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Res. 07789-2010 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 28/04/2010
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber dismissed the unconstitutionality action against Article 21 of the TAA Procedures Regulation, which limits file access to parties, representatives and attorneys, considering it constitutional, provided that access to information of public interest not available in other registries is allowed.La Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del TAA, que limita el acceso al expediente a partes, representantes y abogados, por considerarlo conforme con la Constitución, siempre que se permita el acceso a información de interés público no disponible en otros registros.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica heard a constitutional challenge against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal (TAA), Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE. The plaintiffs argued that the provision —by limiting file access to the parties, their representatives and attorneys— violated the right of access to public information (Articles 30 and 50 of the Constitution) and the principle of equality (Article 33) because it excluded journalists, environmental groups, and citizens in general. The Chamber dismissed the action. It held that the right of access to environmental information is not absolute and that access to a pending sanctioning case file (ad intra) is subject to limits derived from the right to privacy (Article 24), the presumption of innocence (Article 39), and the proper conduct of investigations, also in accordance with the Aarhus Convention. It distinguished between ad extra access (general environmental information, which must be public) and ad intra access (a specific sanctioning file, reserved to the parties). The Chamber clarified that the challenged provision merely reproduces Articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and 108 of the Organic Environmental Law, and that the TAA may allow third-party participation as coadjuvants. However, it noted that if the file contains information of public interest not available in other records, any person may exercise the ad extra right over those specific pieces.La Sala Constitucional de Costa Rica conoció una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (TAA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE. Los accionantes alegaban que la norma —al limitar el acceso al expediente a las partes, sus representantes y abogados— violaba el derecho de acceso a la información pública (arts. 30 y 50 constitucionales) y el principio de igualdad (art. 33) porque excluía a periodistas, ambientalistas y ciudadanos en general. La Sala desestimó la acción. Sostuvo que el derecho de acceso a la información ambiental no es absoluto y que el acceso a un expediente sancionador en trámite (ad intra) está sujeto a límites derivados de la intimidad (art. 24 constitucional), la presunción de inocencia (art. 39 constitucional) y la buena marcha de las investigaciones, conforme también a la Convención de Aarhus. Diferenció el acceso ad extra (información ambiental general, que debe ser pública) del acceso ad intra (expediente sancionador concreto, reservado a las partes). La Sala aclaró que la norma impugnada simplemente reproduce los arts. 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 108 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, y que el TAA puede permitir la participación de terceros como coadyuvantes. Sin embargo, señaló que si en el expediente obra información de interés público no disponible en otros registros, cualquier persona puede ejercer el derecho ad extra sobre esas piezas específicas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
VI.- ON THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 30 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. ... It must be observed that Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE is a reiteration of the provisions of article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to the provisions of article 106 of the Organic Environmental Law, is applicable to this type of proceedings, that is, those of a sanctioning nature handled by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. Similarly, one must not overlook article 108 of the Organic Environmental Law, since its final paragraph is drafted almost identically to article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to the challenged provision, stating: “(…) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint filed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions. They may consult them without any further requirement than proof of their identity or legal standing.” In this way, the principle of legal reservation in the regulation of fundamental rights (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution) is fully respected. From this perspective, this Constitutional Chamber does not find that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, on this particular aspect, presents any defect of unconstitutionality. VII.- Nevertheless, in the opinion of this Chamber, the aforementioned limitations and exceptions set forth in the previous considering operate unless the sanctioning administrative file contains any information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the ad extra right since such data is not available in any other database. Consequently, only in such cases, the Administration, in this case, the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, is compelled to provide that information, while simultaneously reserving the rest of the administrative file. Under this understanding, this Constitutional Chamber, as stated in the previous considering, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul article 21 in question, since it can be perfectly applied by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the ad intra right of access in an environmental sanctioning proceeding is allowed.VI.- SOBRE EL QUEBRANTO A LOS NUMERALES 30 Y 50 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. ... Debe observarse que el artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, es una reiteración de lo dispuesto por el numeral 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual, a su vez, según lo dispuesto por el precepto 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, resulta aplicable a este tipo de procedimientos, es decir, aquellos de tipo sancionatorio tramitados por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. De igual forma, no se debe dejar pasar por desapercibido el numeral 108 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, pues su párrafo final presenta una redacción casi idéntica a la del artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, por consiguiente, a la del numeral cuestionado, al establecer lo siguiente: “(…) Las partes o sus representantes y sus abogados, tendrán acceso a las actuaciones relativas a la denuncia tramitada ante el tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, inclusive a las actas donde consta la investigación de las infracciones. Podrán consultarlas sin más exigencia que la justificación de su identidad o personería.” De manera tal que, se respeta, plenamente, el principio de reserva de ley en materia de regulación del régimen de derechos fundamentales (artículos 19 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 28 de la Constitución Política). Desde esa perspectiva, este Tribunal Constitucional no estima que el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, sobre este extremo en particular, presente vicio de inconstitucionalidad alguno. VII.- No obstante, en criterio de esta Sala, dichas limitaciones y excepciones expuestas en el considerando anterior, operan salvo que en el expediente administrativo sancionador conste alguna información (v.gr. piezas específicas como informes o documentos) de interés público y general que no se encuentre en ninguna base de datos, archivo o registro de la Administración Pública, en cuyo caso cualquier ciudadano podrá ejercer el derecho ad extra por no contar tales datos en ninguna otra base. Por consiguiente, únicamente, en dichos casos, la Administración, sea, para el proceso bajo estudio, el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, se ve compelido a brindar información, reservando, concomitantemente, el resto del expediente administrativo. Bajo dicha inteligencia, este Tribunal Constitucional, tal y como quedó plasmado en el considerando anterior, reitera que no es necesario anular el numeral 21 en cuestión, toda vez que, éste último puede ser, perfectamente, aplicado por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo dentro de los límites en que cabe el ejercicio legítimo del derecho de acceso ad intra en un procedimiento sancionador ambiental.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra -fuera- y (b) ad intra -dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-."
"A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra -outside- and (b) ad intra -within- an administrative proceeding. The former is granted to any person or interested citizen seeking access to certain administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a specific administrative proceeding –uti singuli–."
Considerando V
"Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra -fuera- y (b) ad intra -dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-."
Considerando V
"Los límites que se le impongan a dicho derecho, se justifican en cuanto habrá situaciones en que la transparencia o publicidad puede causar serios perjuicios o trastornos a los intereses generales o particulares que la sociedad estime dignos de protección o prevalecientes."
"The limits imposed on this right are justified to the extent that there will be situations where transparency or publicity may cause serious harm or disruption to general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or preeminent."
Considerando IV
"Los límites que se le impongan a dicho derecho, se justifican en cuanto habrá situaciones en que la transparencia o publicidad puede causar serios perjuicios o trastornos a los intereses generales o particulares que la sociedad estime dignos de protección o prevalecientes."
Considerando IV
"Dichas limitaciones y excepciones […] operan salvo que en el expediente administrativo sancionador conste alguna información (v.gr. piezas específicas como informes o documentos) de interés público y general que no se encuentre en ninguna base de datos, archivo o registro de la Administración Pública, en cuyo caso cualquier ciudadano podrá ejercer el derecho ad extra por no contar tales datos en ninguna otra base."
"Such limitations and exceptions […] apply unless the sanctioning administrative file contains any information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the ad extra right since such data is not available in any other database."
Considerando VII
"Dichas limitaciones y excepciones […] operan salvo que en el expediente administrativo sancionador conste alguna información (v.gr. piezas específicas como informes o documentos) de interés público y general que no se encuentre en ninguna base de datos, archivo o registro de la Administración Pública, en cuyo caso cualquier ciudadano podrá ejercer el derecho ad extra por no contar tales datos en ninguna otra base."
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
*080040720007CO* CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April, two thousand ten.
Action of unconstitutionality filed by ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, bearer of identity card No. 2-365-227 and DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, bearer of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC and the ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL.
10/1957
WHEREAS:
Indeed, it stated that, on one hand, Article 106 of the Biodiversity Law expressly establishes that, except as specifically regulated otherwise in said law, “for all administrative proceedings that biodiversity management requires, the ordinary or summary procedure regulated by the General Law of Public Administration shall be followed, as applicable”; while, on the other, Article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which properly refers to the proceedings processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, provides that this collegiate body, in addition to performing its functions subject to the principles of orality, official initiative, celerity, and immediacy of evidence, shall adjust its actions to the procedure and operating rules established in that Law and, supplementarily, to the General Law of Public Administration, Second Book, Chapter “On the Ordinary Procedure”.
Furthermore, it considered that it must be observed that the final paragraph of Article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment has wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law and, consequently, to that of the challenged provision, by specifying the following: “The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of the infractions is recorded. They may consult them without any requirement other than proof of their identity or legal capacity.” By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal does not present any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever. Especially when the Constitutional Tribunal has recently reiterated, in Vote No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter related precisely to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops Article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the block of constitutionality.
Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in norms of legal rank that, furthermore, belong to the branch of environmental law. To further substantiate, it affirmed that the suppression of the norm in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under comment does not make any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any attorney to examine or review these case files. In that sense, it stated that the rationale for this measure lies in that of the other procedural norms in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case at hand, so that they may decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of any of the involved parties.
This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Administrative Environmental Tribunal have to do, as indicated in Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of damages that may arise in relation to the harm produced by these violations of the environmental order. That is to say, it concerns administrative sanctioning matters, which, due to the eventual negative repercussion that the processing of a proceeding of this type can have on the legal sphere of individuals, requires as part of the right of defense that they can be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason that justifies why the challenged article—as the General Law and the Organic Law of the Environment itself also do—differentiates the degree of access that an attorney can have to a case file of this nature compared to an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent in the professional secrecy that the attorney must, at all times, respect.
This means that the attorney is compelled not to reveal or divulge the private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the foregoing reasons, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is fully in accordance with the block of constitutionality in environmental matters.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
WHEREAS:
Pursuant to Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it involves the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole. On this matter, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests under the following terms:
“(…) According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as a base matter. (...) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (...) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in contrast, determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from the corporate ones that pertain to a community as a whole.
It concerns, therefore, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm that is more or less the same for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are the equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances, and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, which is why they can be claimed in that character. (...) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (…)”.
In the present matter, the claimants allege their standing by way of abstract constitutionality control and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they appear in protection of the environment. Consequently, such circumstances configure, in favor of the petitioners, a direct standing for the filing of the present process by invoking the defense of interests that pertain to the national community as a whole, as is the right of access to information related to the environment. Therefore, the hearing and resolution of the present unconstitutionality action by way of abstract control is admissible.
The claimants challenge Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, specifically, the following defects of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of numerals 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access a case file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints, and b) breach of Article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to access the said case file.
In the present unconstitutionality action, Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is challenged, a precept that establishes the following:
“Article 21.—Access to the administrative case file. The parties and their representatives and any attorney shall have the right at any stage of the proceeding to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the case file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in Article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration.”
Although the essential importance of the right of access to information and, in this case, to information of an environmental nature, as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—is recognized in our legal system, the fact is that the exercise of said right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to predicate an absolute right regarding the right of access to environmental information, since, like the rest of rights, it has a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on said right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity can cause serious damage or disruption to the general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, said right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the administered persons.
From that perspective, it is feasible to point out, in accordance, in turn, with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or Aarhus Convention, adopted at the “Environment for Europe” Ministerial Conference, held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for environmental information may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request relates to documents that are being prepared, and b) when the disclosure of such information would have adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper course of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, and b.2.) the confidential nature of personal data and files relating to a natural person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when the confidential nature of this type of information is provided for by domestic law.
A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or administered person interested in accessing certain administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that numeral 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, solely by the interested party or their representative in a specific and concrete administrative procedure. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled “On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,” Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right can be exercised at any stage of the administrative procedure and is related to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the case file that materializes the procedure in which one is a party. On this matter, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m. on March 14, 2003, drafted by the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:
“(…) III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is granted to any person or administered person interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, solely, to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure—uti singuli-. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled ‘On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,’ Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. Numeral 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted over time for more than fifty years since the validity of the constitutional text.
The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral, thus, by way of example, Law of the National Archive System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies—passive subjects—that make up the National Archive System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (…)”.
Subsequently, in Vote No. 4637-04 of 12:15 p.m. on April 30, 2004, this Chamber provided in the relevant part:
“(…) V.- (…) A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is granted to any person or administered person interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, solely, to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure—uti singuli-. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled ‘On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,’ Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274, there is not the slightest doubt that it is grounded in ordinal 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (Article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (ordinals 29 and following).
This corollary is imposed when noting the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the sole protection mechanism, established at the infraconstitutional level, of the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, numeral 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge of and access to a piece of a case file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, in the case of the head of hierarchy, reconsideration, without providing an expedited and swift avenue when the remedies are declared without merit, making it clearly insufficient by obliging the petitioner to resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), to seek the nullity of the resolution that denied them access to the administrative case file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved and that is, by all accounts, tardy (…)”.
The claimants argue that Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE harms the provisions of numerals 30 and 50 of the Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative case file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as complaints of an environmental nature. Indeed, as the interested parties argue, according to what is established by numeral 50 of the Magna Carta, the Costa Rican legal system recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Likewise, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate said information and make it available to those who require it is instituted. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived of as absolute, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited manner and subject to a series of exceptions, meaning that not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities.
It is for this reason that, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being prepared are requested, or when it is estimated that the disclosure of such data could have adverse effects on the proper course of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of personal data and files relating to a natural person who has not consented to its publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to provide respect and protection to the privacy and confidentiality, as well as to the presumption of innocence, of all interested parties in a specific administrative procedure. In this way, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in Article 24 of the Constitution, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of an exclusive zone or sphere free from external interference (protective forum) and regarding which they can prohibit any third party from intervening.
Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access to it; that is, it concerns a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and personal image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative Sanctioning Law, is constituted by the presumption of innocence recognized in numeral 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicated in a criminal proceeding, or who is subject to a disciplinary or sanctioning administrative procedure, is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and defense.
For this process, it must be taken into consideration that the Environmental Administrative Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent, among other things, for the following: a) To hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, denuncias filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) to hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the request of a party, denuncias referring to active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) to establish, by administrative means, the indemnities that may arise in relation to damages produced by violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources.
In this way, it is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power, which hears a denuncia and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any norm of the legislation occurred or whether any environmental damage was produced. Consequently, its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of some work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in this acción de inconstitucionalidad, as it belongs to the Procedures Regulation of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, on the occasion of denuncias filed for environmental infraction; for which reason the procedures heard there are, evidently, different from the procedures of environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), in which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment, unrestricted access to the case file is guaranteed, given that the information contained is of a public nature and concerns the community.
Hence, in the criterion of this Chamber, the limits indicated above are fully applicable in the processing of administrative procedures followed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. This, considering that, as long as said instance has not definitively decided a particular matter, the status of the case file is in an investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential. In that sense, it should be noted that one thing is environmental information of public or general interest that must be fully available to any person and, moreover, that the Public Administrations must provide immediately, and another is information related to a denuncia attributed to a natural or legal person for violating environmental legislation and that is contained in an administrative case file, in which case the standing for that right of access ad intra to the procedure must be governed by common and general rules, that is, it must be, solely, the interested parties in that procedure and not, as the claimants intend, any person or group.
In any event, it must be taken into consideration, as asserted by the President of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, that any person, whether natural or legal, who appears before an administrative procedure processed before said instance, indicating the reasons of fact and of law for which they request to be a party to the same, will be held as a coadjuvant, so that they may manifest what corresponds, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, participate, even, in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a certain person may have in procedures aimed at developing environmental plans, programs, and policies, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, regarding that which they may have in sanctioning procedures, which, as stated, is resolved with the figure of coadjuvancy or adhesive intervention.
Likewise, it must be observed that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE is a reiteration of what is provided by numeral 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to what is provided by precept 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. Similarly, numeral 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment must not be overlooked, as its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to that of the challenged numeral, by establishing the following: “(…) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys will have access to the actions relating to the denuncia processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of infractions is recorded.
They may consult them with no more requirement than the justification of their identity or representational capacity.” In such a way that the principle of legal reservation in matters regulating the regime of fundamental rights (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution) is fully respected. From that perspective, this Constitutional Tribunal does not find that Article 21 of the Procedures Regulation of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, on this particular point, presents any defect of unconstitutionality.
VII.Nonetheless, in the criterion of this Chamber, said limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding considerando operate unless any information of public and general interest (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration appears in the administrative sanctioning case file, in which case any citizen may exercise the right ad extra because such data is not available in any other database. Consequently, only in such cases, the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, is compelled to provide information, simultaneously reserving the rest of the administrative case file. Under this understanding, this Constitutional Tribunal, just as was stated in the preceding considerando, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul numeral 21 in question, considering that the latter can be perfectly applied by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra in an environmental sanctioning procedure is possible.
In such a way that the requirement of being an interested party or their representative in order to be able to consult a case file held by the mentioned Tribunal will become important only at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.
On another point, the complainants allege a violation of constitutional numeral 33, considering that, in their view, the challenged Article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which only permits any attorney, and not all citizens, to have access to the case files of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. However, this Tribunal, in accordance with what was set forth in considerando VII of this ruling, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning character that the administrative procedures processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal possess and, above all, considering the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys may have the right to be provided with such data.
It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access pending administrative case files as provided for in Articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Organic Law of the Environment, and the challenged regulatory norm, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative case file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal counsel that, at the same time, has deep constitutional roots when the administered party decides to have it.
By the merit of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the acción de inconstitucionalidad filed.
THEREFORE:
The acción de inconstitucionalidad is dismissed.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
President Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.
Clb/es/801 FILE No. 08-004072-0007-CO Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.
Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April of two thousand ten.
Action of unconstitutionality filed by ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, holder of identity card No. 2-365-227 and DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, holder of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC and THE ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL.
WHEREAS:
He indicated that, from the perspective of Public International Law, there exists the so-called "<em><span style="color: #010101;">Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters</span><span style="color: #010101;"> <em>or Aarhus Convention (Denmark)</em>," of June 25, 1998, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which in its Article 1 proclaims the existence of the right to enjoy an adequate environment and the duty to respect and protect it—not only for each person in their current dimension as a subject of rights and obligations, but also from the potential perspective of future generations—with the real possibility that each contracting State must guarantee of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice itself in matters related to the environment. </span>In that regard, he noted that the explanatory memorandum of Spanish Law No. <span style="color: #010101;">27/2006, of July 18, which regulates the rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (and incorporates Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), exemplarily summarizes the three pillars upon which the Aarhus Convention rests: <em>"(...)
Additionally, it considered that it should be noted that the final paragraph of Article 108 of the Environmental Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) presents wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law (Ley General) and, consequently, to that of the questioned provision, by specifying the following: "*The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions. They may consult them without any requirement other than proof of their identity or legal standing.*" By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal does not present any vice of unconstitutionality. This is especially so, given that the Constitutional Chamber has recently reiterated, in Ruling No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter precisely related to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops Article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the block of constitutionality.
Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in rules of legal rank that, additionally, belong to the branch of environmental law. Furthermore, it affirmed that the suppression of the rule in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under comment does not carry out any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any attorney to examine or review these case files. In that sense, it stated that the reason for this measure lies in that of the other procedural rules in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case at hand, so that they can decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of one of the involved parties.
This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Environmental Administrative Tribunal have to do, as indicated in Article 111 of the Environmental Organic Law, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and passive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the rules of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of compensation that may arise in relation to the damages produced by such violations of environmental regulations. In other words, it concerns administrative sanctioning matters, which, due to the potential negative impact that the processing of this type of procedure can have on the legal sphere of private individuals, requires, as part of the right of defense, that they be able to be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason justifying that the questioned article—as the General Law and the Environmental Organic Law itself also do—differentiates the degree of access that an attorney can have to a case file of this nature compared to an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent to the professional secrecy that the attorney must, at all times, respect.
This means that the attorney is compelled not to reveal or divulge private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the foregoing reasons, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal is fully in conformity with the block of constitutionality in environmental matters.
By virtue of the foregoing, he stated that although the constitutional right of free access to administrative departments exists for the purpose of obtaining information on matters of public interest, as provided by constitutional provision 30, it is also true that access to case files shall be available to the parties involved in the process, the parties' attorneys, law students duly authorized by the respective universities, or the person legitimated to act therein. Likewise, he stated that the right to information is limited by what is set forth in precept 24 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy and freedom, as well as the secrecy of communications. This last guarantee protects the confidentiality of private documents and information, prevents private individuals from accessing them, and, in turn, prohibits institutions from supplying them to third parties. Fundamental values that are also protected in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in provision 13, subsection 2°, paragraph a) of that same instrument. Under such arguments, he considered that Article 21 of Decree No. 34136-MINAE, which derives from provision 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, does not violate any fundamental principle or right. He requested that the filed action be declared without merit.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
WHEREAS:
Pursuant to Article 75, paragraph 2°, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:
*"(...) According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the questioned rule must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would then allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. (...) Secondly, the possibility of coming forward in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (...) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that pertain to a community as a whole.
It involves, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests share a dual nature, since they are at once collective—being common to a generality—and individual, so they can be claimed in such capacity. (...) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (...)"* In the present matter, the plaintiffs allege their standing by way of abstract constitutionality control and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they come forward in protection of the environment.
Consequently, such circumstances configure in favor of the petitioners a direct standing for the filing of this process by invoking the defense of interests that pertain to the national community as a whole, such as the right of access to information related to the environment. Therefore, the hearing and resolution of this unconstitutionality action by way of abstract control is admissible.
The plaintiffs challenge Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, specifically, the following vices of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of provisions 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility that any person may have access to a case file processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal containing public information of relevance and national interest, such as environmental complaints; and b) breach of Article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to have access to the referred case file.
In this unconstitutionality action, Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is challenged, a precept that establishes the following:
*"Article 21.—Access to the administrative case file. The parties and their representatives and any attorney shall have the right at any phase of the procedure to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the case file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in Article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration."*
Although the essential importance of the right of access to information, and in this case, to environmental information, is recognized in our legal system as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—the truth is that the exercise of this right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to predicate an absolute right regarding the right of access to environmental information, because, like all other rights, it possesses a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on that right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity can cause serious harm or disruptions to general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, this right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization, and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the administered parties.
From that perspective, it is feasible to point out, also in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, or the Aarhus Convention, adopted at the Ministerial Conference "Environment for Europe," held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for information about the environment may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request refers to documents that are being prepared; and b) when the disclosure of such information has adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper course of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to carry out a criminal or disciplinary investigation; and b.2.) the confidential nature of data and personal files regarding a physical person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when this confidential nature of this type of information is provided for in domestic law.
A crystal-clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative proceeding. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that provision 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative proceeding. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, only by the interested party or their representative in a specific and concrete administrative proceeding. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter titled "Of Access to the Case File and its Pieces," Third Title of the Second Book, in Articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right can be exercised at any stage of the administrative proceeding and refers to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the case file that materializes the proceeding in which one is a party. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m. on March 14, 2003, drafted by the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:
*"(...) III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A crystal-clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative proceeding. The first is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative proceeding—uti singuli. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter titled 'Of Access to the Case File and its Pieces,' Third Title of the Second Book, in Articles 272 to 274. Provision 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative proceeding. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted over time for more than fifty years since the validity of the constitutional text."* The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, Law of the National Archives System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it regarding documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies —passive subjects— that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (...)".
Subsequently, in Voto No. 4637-04 of 12:15 hrs. of April 30, 2004, this Chamber held as pertinent:
"(...) V.- (...) A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –within– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing a specific piece of administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled 'Of access to the case file and its pieces,' Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274, there is not the slightest doubt that it is grounded in ordinal 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (ordinals 29 and following). This corollary is unavoidable upon considering the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the sole protection mechanism, established at the infra-constitutional level, for the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, numeral 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge of and access to a piece of a case file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, if it concerns the head of the agency, reconsideration, without providing an expedited and swift avenue when the remedies are dismissed, which is clearly insufficient as it forces the petitioner to resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (article 49 of the Political Constitution), to seek the annulment of the resolution that denied them access to the administrative case file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved party and is, by all lights, tardy (...)".
The plaintiffs argue that article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, injures the provisions of constitutional numerals 30 and 50, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative case file processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints. Indeed, as the interested parties argue, according to the provisions of numeral 50 of the Magna Carta, Costa Rican legal order recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Similarly, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate such information and make it available to whoever requires it is instituted. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived in an absolute manner, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited form and subject to a series of exceptions, so that not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities.
It is for this reason that, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being drafted are required, or when it is estimated that the disclosure of such data may produce unfavorable effects on the proper administration of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of personal data and files regarding an individual who has not consented to their publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to respect and protect the privacy and confidentiality, as well as the presumption of innocence, of all those parties interested in a specific administrative procedure. In this way, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in constitutional article 24, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of a zone or sphere of their own exempt from external interference (a protective forum) and regarding which they can prohibit any third party from intervening.
Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access to it; that is, it is a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative Sanctioning Law, is the presumption of innocence recognized in numeral 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicted in a criminal proceeding, or against whom a disciplinary or sanctioning administrative procedure is being followed, is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment that has the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and the right of defense.
For the present process, it must be taken into consideration that the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is a deconcentrated body of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, which, according to article 111 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, is competent, among other things, to: a) Hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, the complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the instance of a party, complaints regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) establish, in the administrative venue, the indemnities that may arise in relation to damages produced by violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. Thus, this is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power, which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any norm of the legislation occurred or if any environmental damage was produced.
Consequently, its nature is different from that of the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of any work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, as it belongs to the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, on the occasion of complaints filed for environmental infractions; which is why the procedures heard there are, evidently, distinct from the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) procedures, in which, in accordance with article 23 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, unrestricted access to the case file is guaranteed, by virtue of the fact that the information contained is public in nature and concerns the community.
Hence, in the opinion of this Chamber, the limits indicated supra are fully applicable in the processing of the administrative procedures followed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. This, since, as long as said instance has not definitively decided a specific matter, the status of the case files is in the investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential in nature. In that sense, it should be noted that environmental information of public or general interest that must be fully available to any person and, moreover, that Public Administrations must provide immediately, is one thing, and information relating to a complaint imputed to an individual or legal entity for infringing environmental legislation and that is contained in an administrative case file is another, in which case the legal standing of that right of access ad intra of the procedure, must be governed by the common and general rules, that is, only the parties interested in that procedure, and not, as the plaintiffs intend, any person or group.
In any case, it must be taken into consideration, as asserted by the President of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, that any person, whether individual or legal entity, who appears before an administrative procedure processed before said instance, indicating the reasons of fact and law for which they request to be a party to it, will be considered as an intervening party, so that they may state what is pertinent, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, even participate in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a specific person may have in procedures aimed at developing plans, programs, and policies on environmental matters, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, from that which they may have in sanctioning-type procedures, which, as stated, is resolved through the figure of coadjuvancy or adhesive intervention.
Likewise, it must be observed that article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, is a reiteration of the provisions of numeral 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to the provision of precept 106 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Similarly, numeral 108 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente should not be overlooked, since its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to that of article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to that of the challenged numeral, when establishing the following: *"(...) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys, shall have access to the proceedings relating to the complaint processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions.
They may consult them with no requirement other than the proof of their identity or legal standing."* So, the principle of legal reserve in matters of regulation of the regime of fundamental rights is fully respected (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution). From that perspective, this Constitutional Court does not consider that article 21 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, on this particular point, presents any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever.
VII.However, in the opinion of this Chamber, such limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding considerando operate unless the administrative sanctioning case file contains any information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the ad extra right because such data do not exist in any other database. Consequently, only in such cases, the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, is compelled to provide information, reserving, concomitantly, the rest of the administrative case file. Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court, as expressed in the preceding considerando, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul numeral 21 in question, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra is appropriate in an environmental sanctioning procedure.
So that, the requirement of being an interested party or its representative in order to consult a case file held by the aforementioned Tribunal will only become relevant at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.
On the other hand, the petitioners allege a violation of constitutional numeral 33, given that, in their view, the challenged article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney and not all citizens to access the case files of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. However, this Tribunal, in accordance with what was stated in Considerando VII of this judgment, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning nature of the administrative procedures processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo and, above all, considering the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys may have the right to be provided with such data. It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access pending administrative case files provided for in articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, and the challenged regulatory norm, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative case file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal representation that, at the same time, has deep constitutional roots when the administered party decides to have it.
By virtue of the foregoing, it is necessary to dismiss the acción de inconstitucionalidad filed.
POR TANTO:
The acción de inconstitucionalidad is dismissed.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.
Clb/es/801 Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April of two thousand ten.
Action of unconstitutionality filed by ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, holder of identity card No. 2-365-227 and DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, holder of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC and THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL.
WHEREAS:
Furthermore, it stated that the fundamental right of access to environmental information held by public authorities has undergone broad and complete legislative development in other jurisdictions, unlike our country, where the Constitutional Chamber has sought, through its case law, to fill the gaps left by the legislator. It indicated that, from the perspective of Public International Law, there exists the so-called “Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or Aarhus Convention (Denmark),” of June 25, 1998, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which in its Article 1 proclaims the existence of the right to enjoy an adequate environment and the duty to respect and protect it—not only for each person in their current dimension as a subject of rights and obligations, but also from the potential perspective of future generations—with the real possibility that each contracting State must guarantee of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters.
In that regard, it noted that the statement of purposes of Spanish Law No. 27/2006, of July 18, which regulates the rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (and incorporates Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), exemplarily summarizes the three pillars upon which the Aarhus Convention rests: “(…)
Indeed, it indicated that, on the one hand, article 106 of the Biodiversity Law expressly establishes that, except as specifically regulated otherwise in said law, “for all administrative procedures required by biodiversity management, the ordinary or summary procedure regulated by the General Law of Public Administration shall be followed, as applicable”; while, on the other hand, article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which properly refers to the procedures processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, provides that this collegiate body, in addition to performing its functions subject to the principles of orality, official initiative, speed, and immediacy of evidence, shall adjust its actions to the procedure and operating rules established in that Law and, supplementarily, to the General Law of Public Administration, Book Two, Chapter "Of the Ordinary Procedure." Furthermore, it considered that it must be observed that the final paragraph of article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment presents wording almost identical to that of article 272 of the General Law and, consequently, to that of the challenged article, when specifying the following: “The parties or their representatives and their lawyers shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions.
They may consult them with no further requirement than proof of their identity or legal capacity.” By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal does not present any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever. Especially when the Constitutional Chamber has recently reiterated, in Vote No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter related precisely to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the constitutionality block. Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in legal-rank norms that, furthermore, belong to the branch of environmental law.
For greater abundance, it affirmed that the suppression of the norm in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under discussion does not make any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any lawyer to examine or review these files. In that sense, it stated that the rationale for this measure lies in that of the other procedural norms in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case in question, so that they may decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of any of the parties involved. This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Administrative Environmental Tribunal have to do, as indicated in article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the protective legislation for the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of indemnities that may arise in relation to the damages produced by these violations of environmental law.
That is, it involves administrative sanctioning matter, which, due to the potential negative repercussion that the processing of a procedure of this type may have on the legal sphere of individuals, requires as part of the right of defense that they may be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason that justifies that the challenged article—as also does the General Law and the Organic Law of the Environment itself—differentiates the degree of access that a lawyer may have to a file of this nature regarding an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent to the professional secrecy that the lawyer must, at all times, respect. This means that the lawyer is compelled not to reveal or divulge private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the above reasons, it considered that article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is fully consistent with the constitutionality block in environmental matters.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
WHEREAS:
Pursuant to article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole. On this point, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:
"(…) According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the norm in question must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. (…) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (…) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, regarding them, specific persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less the same for all, for which reason it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them.
That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—because they are common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity. (…) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (…)." In the present matter, the claimants allege their standing through abstract constitutionality review and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they appear in protection of the environment. Consequently, such circumstances configure in favor of the petitioners a direct standing for the filing of the present proceeding by invoking the defense of interests that concern the national community as a whole, such as the right of access to that information related to the environment. For the foregoing, the cognizance and resolution of the present action of unconstitutionality through abstract review is admissible.
The claimants question article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, concretely, the following defects of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of articles 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to have access to a file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints, and b) breach of article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, allowing only any lawyer, and not all citizens, to have access to the referred file.
In the present action of unconstitutionality, article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is questioned, a precept that establishes the following:
"Article 21.—Access to the administrative file. The parties and their representatives and any lawyer shall have the right at any stage of the procedure to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration."
Although the essential importance of the right of access to information, and in this case, to environmental information, is recognized in our legal system as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—, the truth is that the exercise of said right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to assert, regarding the right of access to environmental information, an absolute right, since, like the rest of rights, it possesses a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on said right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity may cause serious harm or disruptions to the general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, said right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization, and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the citizens.
From that perspective, it is feasible to note, in accordance, in turn, with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or the Aarhus Convention, adopted at the Ministerial Conference "Environment for Europe", held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for environmental information may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request refers to documents that are in the process of being drafted, and b) when the disclosure of such information would have adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper conduct of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried fairly, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, and b.2.) the confidential nature of personal data and files regarding a natural person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when such confidential nature of this type of information is provided for by domestic law.
A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative procedure. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or citizen interested in accessing certain administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, solely by the interested party or its representative in a specific and concrete administrative procedure. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of Access to the File and its Pieces", Third Title of Book Two in articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right may be exercised at any stage of the administrative procedure and refers to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the file that materializes the procedure in which one is a party. On this point, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m.
of March 14, 2003, authored by the presiding Magistrate, held as follows:
"(…) III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –inside– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or individual interested in accessing specific administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of access to the file and its pieces", Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for more than fifty years since the constitutional text came into force.
The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral, thus, for example, Law of the National Archive System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it regarding documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies –passive subjects– that make up the National Archive System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (…)".
Subsequently, in Voto No. 4637-04 of 12:15 hrs. of April 30, 2004, this Chamber held as pertinent:
"(…) V.- (…) A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –inside– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or individual interested in accessing specific administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of access to the file and its pieces", Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is grounded in Article 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (Article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (articles 29 and following).
This corollary is imposed when considering the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the only protection mechanism, established at the infra-constitutional level, for the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, Article 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge and access to a piece of a file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, in the case of the superior authority, reconsideration, without providing an expeditious and swift route when the remedies are declared without merit, which makes it clearly insufficient by obliging the petitioner to go to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution) to seek the annulment of the resolution that denied access to the administrative file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved party and that is, by all accounts, belated (…)".
The plaintiffs argue that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE violates the provisions of constitutional Articles 30 and 50, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints. Indeed, as argued by the interested parties, according to the provisions of Article 50 of the Magna Carta, the Costa Rican legal system recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Similarly, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate such information and make it available to whoever requires it is established. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived in an absolute manner, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited way and subject to a series of exceptions, so not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities.
It is for this reason, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, that environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being drafted are requested or when it is considered that the disclosure of such data may produce unfavorable effects on the proper administration of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of data and personal files regarding a natural person who has not consented to its publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to respect and protect the privacy and confidentiality, as well as the presumption of innocence, of all those interested parties in a particular administrative procedure. Thus, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in Article 24 of the constitution, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of a zone or sphere of their own exempt from external interference (protection shield) and regarding which they may prohibit any third party from intervening.
Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access; that is, it concerns a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative sanctioning law, is the presumption of innocence recognized in Article 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicted in a criminal process, or against whom an administrative disciplinary or sanctioning procedure is being pursued, is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and the right of defense. For the present process, it must be taken into consideration that the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent, among other things, to: a) Hear and resolve, in administrative proceedings, the complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources; b) hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or upon request of a party, complaints regarding active or omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the rules of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources; and c) establish, in administrative proceedings, the indemnities that may originate in relation to damages caused by violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources.
Thus, it is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power, which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any rule of legislation occurred or whether any environmental damage was caused. Consequently, its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of some work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in the present action of unconstitutionality, as it belongs to the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, upon complaints filed for infringement of the environment; for which reason the procedures heard there are evidently different from the Environmental Impact Assessment evaluation processes, in which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment, unrestricted access to the file is guaranteed, because the information contained is of a public nature and concerns the community.
Hence, in the opinion of this Chamber, the limits indicated supra are fully applicable in the processing of administrative procedures followed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. This, since as long as said instance has not definitively decided a specific matter, the status of the files is in the investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential in nature. In this sense, it should be noted that information of public or general environmental interest, which must be fully available to any person and, moreover, which Public Administrations must provide immediately, is one thing, and information relating to a complaint attributed to a natural or legal person for violating environmental legislation and which is contained in an administrative file is another, in which case the standing for that right of access ad intra to the procedure must be governed by the common and general rules, that is, only the interested parties in that procedure, and not, as the plaintiffs intend, any person or group.
In any case, it must be considered, as stated by the President of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, that any person, whether natural or legal, who appears in any administrative procedure processed before said instance indicating the factual and legal reasons why they request to be a party to it, shall be considered as an adjuvant, in order to state what is pertinent, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, participate even in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a specific person may have in procedures aimed at developing plans, programs, and policies on environmental matters, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, from that which they may have in sanctioning-type procedures, which, as stated, is resolved by the figure of adjuvancy or adhesive intervention.
Likewise, it must be observed that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE is a reiteration of the provisions of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to the provisions of precept 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. Similarly, Article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment should not be overlooked, since its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to the questioned article, by establishing the following: "(…) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of the infractions is recorded.
They may consult them with no further requirement than proof of their identity or legal capacity." In such a way that the principle of legal reserve in the matter of regulating the regime of fundamental rights (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution) is fully respected. From that perspective, this Constitutional Court does not consider that Article 21 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, on this particular point, presents any vice of unconstitutionality.
VII.However, in the opinion of this Chamber, such limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding recital operate except when the sanctioning administrative file contains some information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the right ad extra because such data is not available in any other base. Consequently, only in said cases, the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, is compelled to provide information, concomitantly withholding the rest of the administrative file. Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court, as was set forth in the preceding recital, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul Article 21 in question, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra in an environmental sanctioning procedure fits.
In such a way that, the requirement of being an interested party or their representative to be able to consult a file held by the aforementioned Tribunal will gain importance only at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.
On the other hand, the petitioners allege that Article 33 of the constitution is violated, since, in their opinion, the challenged Article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to access the files of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. However, this Court, in accordance with what was stated in recital VII of this judgment, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument, and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning nature of the administrative procedures processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and, above all, in consideration of the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys can have the right to be provided with such data.
It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access administrative files in process, provided for by articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Organic Law of the Environment, and the challenged regulatory rule, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal representation that, at the same time, has profound constitutional roots when the individual chooses to have it.
By virtue of the foregoing, it is required to declare the action of unconstitutionality filed without merit.
POR TANTO:
The action of unconstitutionality is declared without merit.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.
Clb/es/801 Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional
hmendez hmendez 2 0 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 10 10365 57010 Poder Judicial 475 134 67241 12.00 21 false false false ES-CR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 *080040720007CO* SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y cero minutos del veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 2-365-227 y DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, portadora de la cédula de identidad No. 2-639-350, contra el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007. Intervienen también en la acción, LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA y EL TRIBUNAL AMBIENTAL ADMINISTRATIVO.
10/1957
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
A tenor del artículo 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, no será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 8239-01 de las 16:07 hrs. de 14 de agosto de 2001, se refirió a los intereses difusos bajo los siguientes términos:
"(…) De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. (...) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de intereses difusos (...) Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto.
Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. (...) En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. (…)".
En el presente asunto, los accionantes aducen su legitimación por vía del control de constitucionalidad abstracto e invocan la defensa de intereses difusos, toda vez que, acuden en resguardo del ambiente. Por consiguiente, tales circunstancias configuran a favor de los gestionantes una legitimación directa para la interposición del presente proceso por invocar la defensa de intereses que atañen a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, tal y como lo es el derecho de acceso a aquella información relacionada con el medio ambiente. Por lo anterior, resulta admisible el conocimiento y resolución de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad por vía del control abstracto.
Los accionantes cuestionan el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007, por estimar que presenta, concretamente, los siguientes vicios de inconstitucionalidad: a) Violación a los numerales 30 y 50 de la Constitución Política, dado que, se limita la posibilidad que cualquier persona pueda tener acceso a un expediente tramitado ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo que contenga información pública de relevancia e interés nacional, como lo son las denuncias ambientales y b) quebranto al artículo 33 constitucional, toda vez que, se establece una limitación y diferencia en razón de la profesión, que permite, únicamente, a cualquier abogado y no, a todos los ciudadanos, tener acceso al referido expediente.
En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, se cuestiona el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007, precepto que establece lo siguiente:
“Artículo 21.—Acceso al expediente administrativo. Las partes y sus representantes y cualquier abogado tendrán derecho en cualquier fase del procedimiento a examinar, leer y fotocopiar cualquier pieza del expediente, así como solicitar certificación de la misma, con las salvedades que indica el artículo 273 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.”
Si bien se reconoce en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico la importancia esencial que posee el derecho de acceso a la información y, en este caso, a la información de índole ambiental, como un instrumento para garantizar la adecuada protección del medio ambiente –pues su conservación es una obligación que comparten los poderes públicos y la sociedad en su conjunto-, lo cierto es que, también, el ejercicio de dicho derecho se encuentra sujeto a límites. Resulta imposible predicar, respecto del derecho de acceso a la información ambiental, un derecho absoluto, puesto que, como el resto de derechos, posee un carácter relativo. De modo tal que, los límites que se le impongan a dicho derecho, se justifican en cuanto habrá situaciones en que la transparencia o publicidad puede causar serios perjuicios o trastornos a los intereses generales o particulares que la sociedad estime dignos de protección o prevalecientes.
De ahí que, dicho derecho debe ceder ante las exigencias de una convivencia pacífica y democrática, objetivo prioritario de la sociedad y de su organización política y, desde luego, también, ante el derecho a la intimidad y reserva del resto de los administrados. Desde esa perspectiva, resulta factible señalar, de conformidad, a su vez, con lo dispuesto por la Convención sobre el acceso a la información, la participación del público en la toma de decisiones y el acceso a la justicia en asuntos ambientales o Convención de Aarhus, adoptada en la Conferencia Ministerial “Medio Ambiente para Europa”, celebrada en Dinamarca el 25 de junio de 1998, que una solicitud de información sobre el medio ambiente podrá denegarse en los siguientes supuestos: a) Cuando la solicitud se refiere a documentos que están elaborándose y b) cuando la divulgación de tal información tenga efectos desfavorables sobre los siguientes aspectos: b.1.) La buena marcha de la justicia, posibilidad que toda persona pueda ser juzgada, equitativamente, o la capacidad de una autoridad pública para efectuar una investigación de orden penal o disciplinario y b.2.) el carácter confidencial de los datos y de los expedientes personales respecto de una persona física si esta persona no ha consentido la divulgación de esas informaciones al público, cuando dicho carácter confidencial de este tipo de información esté previsto por el derecho interno.
Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra -fuera- y (b) ad intra -dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se ejerce uti universi, es decir, por cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder determinada información administrativa. En virtud de lo anterior, se dice que el numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, evidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, toda vez que, es, absolutamente, independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo. El segundo, por su parte, se ejerce uti singuli, esto es, únicamente, por la parte interesada o su representante en un determinado y concreto procedimiento administrativo. Este último derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274.
A su vez, este derecho puede ser ejercitado en cualquier etapa del procedimiento administrativo y se encuentra referido a documentos en estado de tramitación dentro del marco general de éste último; es decir, al expediente que materializa el procedimiento en el que se es parte. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 2120-03 de las 13:30 hrs. de 14 de marzo de 2003, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, estimó lo siguiente:
“(…) III.- TIPOLOGIA DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra –dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-. Este derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274. El numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, evidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, puesto que, es absolutamente independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo.
Este derecho no ha sido desarrollado legislativamente de forma sistemática y coherente, lo cual constituye una seria y grave laguna de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico que se ha prolongado en el tiempo por más de cincuenta años desde la vigencia del texto constitucional. La regulación de este derecho ha sido fragmentada y sectorial, así, a título de ejemplo, la Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos No. 7202 del 24 de octubre de 1990, lo norma respecto de los documentos con valor científico y cultural de los entes y órganos públicos –sujetos pasivos- que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Archivos (Poderes Legislativo, Judicial, Ejecutivo y demás entes públicos con personalidad jurídica, así como los depositados en los archivos privados y particulares sometidos a las previsiones de ese cuerpo legal) (…)”.
Posteriormente, en el Voto No. 4637-04 de las 12:15 hrs. de 30 de abril de 2004, esta Sala dispuso en lo conducente:
“(…) V.- (…) Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra –dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-. Si bien este último derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274, no cabe la menor duda que tiene asidero en el ordinal 30 de la Constitución Política y, por ende, goza de los mecanismos de garantía, tutela y defensa previstos en el texto fundamental (artículo 48 de la Constitución Política)y desarrollados por la ley del rito de esta jurisdicción (ordinales 29 y siguientes).
Este corolario se impone al reparar en el carácter claramente insuficiente, lento y engorroso del único mecanismo de protección, establecido a nivel infraconstitucional, del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa ad intra de un procedimiento administrativo. En efecto, el numeral 274 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que contra la resolución que deniegue el conocimiento y acceso a una pieza de un expediente caben los recursos ordinarios previstos por ese cuerpo normativo, esto es, la revocatoria, la apelación y, eventualmente, de tratarse del jerarca, la reposición, sin preverse una vía expedita y célere cuando los recursos sean declarados sin lugar, con lo cual resulta claramente insuficiente al obligar al petente a acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), para pretender la nulidad de la resolución que le ha denegado el acceso al expediente administrativo, solución que supone un elevado costo económico y temporal para el agraviado y que resulta, a todas luces, tardía (…)”.
Los accionantes aducen que el artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, lesiona lo dispuesto en los numerales 30 y 50 constitucionales, dado que, limita la posibilidad que cualquier persona pueda tener acceso a un expediente administrativo tramitado ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo que contenga información pública de relevancia e interés nacional, como lo son las denuncias de carácter ambiental. Efectivamente, tal y como lo aducen los interesados, de acuerdo a lo estatuido por el numeral 50 de la Carta Magna, el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense reconoce, en favor de toda persona, un amplio derecho para recibir y acceder la información pública relacionada con el medio ambiente. De igual forma, paralelamente, se instituye el deber de la Administración Pública de facilitar dicha información y ponerla a disposición de quien la requiera. Sin embargo, el ejercicio de dicho derecho, tal y como se apuntó supra, no puede concebirse de manera absoluta, sino que, por el contrario, de forma limitada y sujeto a una serie de excepciones, por lo que no toda información relacionada con el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, puede ser facilitada por las autoridades públicas.
Es por tal motivo, que en criterio de esta Sala y, en concordancia con lo dispuesto por la Convención de Aarhus, la información de carácter ambiental se podrá denegar cuando, por ejemplo, se requieran documentos que se están elaborando aún o bien, cuando se estime que la divulgación de tales datos puede producir efectos desfavorables sobre la buena marcha de la justicia, la posibilidad que toda persona pueda ser juzgada, equitativamente, o la capacidad de una autoridad pública para efectuar una investigación de orden penal o disciplinario, así como sobre el carácter confidencial de los datos y de los expedientes personales respecto de una persona física que no ha consentido su publicidad. De ahí que, resulte importante y, sobre todo, razonable, el respeto y la protección que se otorgue a la intimidad y confidencialidad, así como a la presunción de inocencia de todas aquellas partes interesadas en un determinado procedimiento administrativo.
De este modo, debe de observarse que el derecho a la intimidad, señalado en el artículo 24 constitucional, se ha definido como el reconocimiento que se le hace a la persona humana de una zona o esfera propia exenta de injerencias externas (fuero de protección) y respecto de la cual puede prohibirle, a cualquier tercero, su intervención. Así, le permite al individuo disponer de la información personal negando o concediendo su acceso; es decir, se trata de una libertad de autodeterminación informativa. Precisamente, por esto, es que esta Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los derechos a la intimidad, el honor y la imagen, constituyen límites al derecho a la información. De igual forma, uno de los pilares básicos del Estado de Derecho y, por consiguiente, del Derecho Administrativo sancionador, lo constituye la presunción de inocencia reconocida en el numeral 39, párrafo 1°, de nuestra Constitución Política, la cual significa que cualquier persona que sea indiciada en un proceso o penal, o bien, se le siga un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario o sancionador, se presuma inocente hasta tanto no se demuestre lo contrario, respectivamente, en virtud de sentencia firme y pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material o de acto final dictado observando el debido proceso y la defensa.
Para el presente proceso, se debe de tomar en consideración que el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo es un órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, el cual, de acuerdo con el artículo 111 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, es competente, entre otras cosas, para lo siguiente: a) Conocer y resolver, en sede administrativa, las denuncias establecidas contra todas las personas, públicas o privadas, por violaciones a la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales, b) conocer, tramitar y resolver, de oficio o a instancia de parte, las denuncias referentes a comportamientos activos y omisos que violen o amenacen violar las normas de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales y c) establecer, en vía administrativa, las indemnizaciones que puedan originarse en relación con los daños producidos por violaciones de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales.
De este modo, se trata de un órgano que ejerce una clara potestad sancionadora, que conoce de una denuncia y determina, mediante la aplicación del respectivo procedimiento, si existió o no violación de alguna norma de la legislación o si se produjo algún daño de tipo ambiental. Por consiguiente, su naturaleza es diversa a la que posee la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, en donde la participación ciudadana es fundamental para determinar el eventual impacto ambiental de alguna obra, actividad o proyecto. Bajo tales consideraciones, debe observarse que el artículo impugnado en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, al pertenecer al Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, hace referencia al ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora que dicho Tribunal ejerce contra sujetos de derecho público y privado, con ocasión de las denuncias interpuestas por infracción al medio ambiente; razón por la cual los procedimientos allí conocidos, resultan, evidentemente, distintos a los procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, en los cuales, de conformidad con el artículo 23 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, se garantiza el acceso irrestricto al expediente, en virtud que la información contenida reviste carácter público y le atañe a la colectividad.
De ahí que, en criterio de esta Sala, los límites supra señalados, resulten plenamente aplicables en la tramitación de los procedimientos administrativos seguidos ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Esto, toda vez que, mientras dicha instancia no haya decidido en forma definitiva un determinado asunto, el estado de los expediente se encuentra en etapa de investigación y, por lo tanto, la información ahí contenida se considera de índole confidencial. En ese sentido, nótese que una cosa es la información ambiental de interés público o general que debe de estar a la plena disposición de cualquier persona y, más aún, que las Administraciones Públicas deben brindar de manera inmediata, y otra es la información relativa a una denuncia que se le imputa a una persona física o jurídica por infringir la legislación ambiental y que se encuentra contenida en un expediente administrativo, en cuyo caso la legitimación de ese derecho de acceso ad intra del procedimiento, se debe de regir por las reglas comunes y generales, es decir, deben de ser, únicamente, las partes interesadas en ese procedimiento y no, como lo pretenden los accionantes, cualquier persona o grupo.
En todo caso, debe de tomarse en consideración, según lo aseveró el Presidente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, que cualquier persona, sea física o jurídica, que se apersone a algún procedimiento administrativo tramitado ante dicha instancia indicando las razones de hecho y de derecho por las cuales solicita ser parte del mismo, será tenido como coadyuvante, a efecto que manifieste lo que corresponda, aporte prueba, participe en las diferentes diligencias administrativas y si es del caso, participe, incluso, en la audiencia oral y privada. De ahí que, resulte importante diferenciar la participación que una determinada persona pueda tener en los procedimientos tendentes a elaborar planes, programas y políticas en materia medio ambiental, así como instrumentos normativos de carácter ambiental como reglamentos y decretos, respecto de la que puede tener en procedimientos de tipo sancionador, lo cual, como se dijo, queda solventado con la figura de la coadyuvancia o intervención adhesiva.
Asimismo, debe de observarse que el artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, es una reiteración de lo dispuesto por el numeral 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual, a su vez, según lo dispuesto por el precepto 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, resulta aplicable a este tipo de procedimientos, es decir, aquellos de tipo sancionatorio tramitados por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. De igual forma, no se debe dejar pasar por desapercibido el numeral 108 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, pues su párrafo final presenta una redacción casi idéntica a la del artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, por consiguiente, a la del numeral cuestionado, al establecer lo siguiente: “(…) Las partes o sus representantes y sus abogados, tendrán acceso a las actuaciones relativas a la denuncia tramitada ante el tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, inclusive a las actas donde consta la investigación de las infracciones.
Podrán consultarlas sin más exigencia que la justificación de su identidad o personería.” De manera tal que, se respeta, plenamente, el principio de reserva de ley en materia de regulación del régimen de derechos fundamentales (artículos 19 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 28 de la Constitución Política). Desde esa perspectiva, este Tribunal Constitucional no estima que el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, sobre este extremo en particular, presente vicio de inconstitucionalidad alguno.
VII.No obstante, en criterio de esta Sala, dichas limitaciones y excepciones expuestas en el considerando anterior, operan salvo que en el expediente administrativo sancionador conste alguna información (v.gr. piezas específicas como informes o documentos) de interés público y general que no se encuentre en ninguna base de datos, archivo o registro de la Administración Pública, en cuyo caso cualquier ciudadano podrá ejercer el derecho ad extra por no contar tales datos en ninguna otra base. Por consiguiente, únicamente, en dichos casos, la Administración, sea, para el proceso bajo estudio, el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, se ve compelido a brindar información, reservando, concomitantemente, el resto del expediente administrativo. Bajo dicha inteligencia, este Tribunal Constitucional, tal y como quedó plasmado en el considerando anterior, reitera que no es necesario anular el numeral 21 en cuestión, toda vez que, éste último puede ser, perfectamente, aplicado por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo dentro de los límites en que cabe el ejercicio legítimo del derecho de acceso ad intra en un procedimiento sancionador ambiental.
De modo tal que, el requisito de ser parte interesada o su representante para poder consultar un expediente en poder del Tribunal mencionado, cobrará importancia, únicamente, en el momento que se desee acceder a información que pueda, por ejemplo, ser considerada confidencial, que vulnere la intimidad, el honor o bien, la presunción de inocencia.
De otra parte, los gestionantes alegan vulnerado el numeral 33 constitucional, toda vez que, en su criterio, el artículo 21 impugnado establece una limitación y diferencia en razón de la profesión, que permite, únicamente, a cualquier abogado y no, a todos los ciudadanos, tener acceso a los expedientes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Sin embargo, este Tribunal, de conformidad con lo expuesto en el considerando VII de la presente sentencia, no aprecia que lleven razón los interesados en su alegato y, en ese sentido, reitera que, en virtud del carácter sancionatorio que poseen los procedimientos administrativos tramitados ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y, sobre todo, en atención, al contenido de los límites establecidos al derecho de acceso ad intra en los procedimientos sancionatorios ambientales, únicamente, las partes interesadas, representantes y abogados, pueden tener derecho a que se les brinden tales datos.
Debe tomarse en consideración que la posibilidad otorgada a los abogados para acceder expedientes administrativos en trámite que prevén los artículos 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 108, párrafo in fine, de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y la norma reglamentaria impugnada, tiene una justificación objetiva y razonable que radica en la necesidad de un profesional en Derecho de revisar un expediente administrativo antes de asumir la defensa técnica de alguna de las partes interesadas, patrocinio letrado que, al propio tiempo, tiene una profunda raigambre constitucional cuando el administrado decide tenerlo.
En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada.
POR TANTO:
Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.
Clb/es/801
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