Access to TAA case files and limits on the right to environmental informationAcceso a expedientes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y límites al derecho de información ambiental

*080040720007CO* Res. No. 2010007789 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April, two thousand ten.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, bearer of identity card No. 2-365-227 and DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, bearer of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC and the ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL.

10/1957

WHEREAS:

1.- By brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:02 hrs. on March 2, 2008 (visible at folios 1-9), the plaintiffs requested the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, given that the latter establishes that only the parties and their representatives, as well as any attorney, shall have the right, at any stage of the proceeding, to examine, read, and photocopy the case file. They considered, in the first place, that the norm under study violates numeral 30 of the Political Constitution, since it impedes the possibility that any person may have access to a case file containing information on environmental complaints, which is of national relevance and interest, because, in accordance with the Environmental Organic Law, what the Administrative Environmental Tribunal investigates constitutes crimes of a social nature and, to that extent, all information must be public and cannot be limited. They explained that in the cases under study, restrictions on access to public information cannot be imposed, given that, even though a person or group is being judged, the relevance of the environmental matter surpasses any private right—even if it imposes administrative sanctions. They argued that, in this case, it is via regulation that access to the case files by journalists or different environmental organizations is limited to learn about the complaints, unless they are an interested party or a legal professional, which they deem unconstitutional, since it violates the principle of participatory democracy. They stated that Article 50 of the Political Constitution itself creates the popular action in environmental matters, which provides unrestricted access to administrative and judicial proceedings where violations regarding that subject are discussed. They asserted that by allowing any attorney to have access to the case file and, concurrently, preventing an ordinary citizen from doing so, a limitation and difference based on profession is established, which contravenes what is established in Article 33 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, they considered the provisions of numerals 30, 33, and 50 of the Fundamental Charter to be violated, as well as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration; Principle 19 of the Stockholm Declaration; Article IV.13 of the Earth Charter; and Article 14 of the Environmental Organic Law. Finally, and in order to substantiate the standing they hold to promote this action of unconstitutionality, they indicated that they appear before this Constitutional Court by virtue of the defense of diffuse interests—the right of access to information on environmental matters—contemplated in numeral 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. They requested that the action filed be declared with merit.

2.- By resolution of the Presidency of the Chamber at 14:50 hrs. on April 18, 2008 (visible at folios 15-16), this action of unconstitutionality was given course.

3.- The legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins Nos. 87, 88, and 89 of May 7, 8, and 9, 2008.

4.- Farid Beirute Brenes, in his capacity as Assistant Attorney General, through a libel presented at 15:30 hrs. on May 12, 2008 (visible at folios 21-49), rendered the legal report. In the first place, he considered that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs have standing to file this proceeding, given that it falls within the framework of the legal protection of the environment. On another note, he stated that the fundamental right of access to environmental information held by public authorities has had broad and complete legislative development in other latitudes, unlike our country, where through case law the Constitutional Chamber has sought to fill the gaps left by the legislator. He indicated that, from the perspective of Public International Law, there is the so-called “Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or Aarhus Convention (Denmark)”, of June 25, 1998, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which in its Article 1 proclaims the existence of the right to enjoy a suitable environment and the duty to respect and protect it—not only of each person in their current dimension as a subject of rights and obligations, but also from the potential perspective of future generations—with the real possibility that each contracting State must guarantee of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice itself in matters related to the environment. In that sense, he pointed out that in the explanatory memorandum of Spanish Law No. 27/2006, of July 18, which regulates the rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (and incorporates Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), the three pillars on which the Aarhus Convention rests are summarized in an exemplary manner: “(...) 1) The pillar of access to environmental information plays an essential role in environmental awareness and education of society, constituting an indispensable instrument to be able to intervene with knowledge of the facts in public affairs. It is divided into two parts: the right to seek and obtain information held by public authorities, and the right to receive environmentally relevant information from public authorities, who must collect it and make it public without the need for a prior request. 2) The pillar of public participation in the decision-making process, which extends to three areas of public action: the authorization of certain activities, the approval of plans and programs, and the drafting of provisions of a general nature of legal or regulatory rank. 3) The third and final pillar is constituted by the right of access to justice and aims to guarantee citizens' access to the courts to review decisions that potentially may have violated the rights that the Convention itself recognizes to them in matters of environmental democracy. The aim is thus to ensure and strengthen, through the guarantee provided by judicial protection, the effectiveness of the rights that the Aarhus Convention recognizes for all and, therefore, the very execution of the Convention. Finally, a provision is introduced that would enable the public to bring administrative or judicial proceedings to challenge any action or omission attributable, either to another private individual or to a public authority, that constitutes a violation of national environmental legislation (...)”. He explained that, in the normative context established by the aforementioned convention, the European Union, in order to harmonize Community legislation with the stipulations contained therein, issued the important Directive No. 2003/4/EC of January 28, 2003, on public access to environmental information and Directive No. 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 26, 2003, providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. He referred that the first cited Directive highlights in its preamble that it is "necessary to ensure that any natural or legal person has a right of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities without his having to state an interest" (recital 8); in the same way it is stated that it is necessary "that public authorities make available and disseminate to the general public environmental information to the widest extent possible, in particular by using information and communication technologies," for which purpose the future evolution of these technologies must be taken into account (recital 9). He noted that recital 16 of the cited Directive No. 2003/4/EC includes the following interpretive criterion: "The right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information in specific and clearly defined cases. Grounds for refusal should be interpreted in a restrictive way, whereby the public interest served by disclosure should be weighed against the interest served by the refusal." He added that the cited Spanish Law No. 27/2006 in its Article 3 indicates the rights regarding access to environmental information that individuals can exercise vis-à-vis public authorities, as follows: 1) Right to access environmental information held by or for public authorities, without being obliged to state a specific interest, regardless of their nationality, domicile, or registered office; 2) right to be informed of the rights granted to them by Law No. 27/2006 and to be advised for their correct exercise; 3) right to be assisted in their search for information; 4) right to receive the information requested within a period that may not exceed 2 months; 5) right to receive the environmental information requested in the chosen form or format; 6) right to know the reasons why the information is not provided, in whole or in part, and also those why said information is not provided in the form or format requested; and, finally, 7) right to know the list of fees and prices that, where applicable, are chargeable for receiving the requested information. Correspondingly, he stated that Article 5 of the aforementioned Law establishes as duties of the different Public Administrations the following: a) Inform the public adequately about the rights granted to them by this Law, as well as the ways to exercise them; b) provide information for their correct exercise, as well as advice and guidance to the extent possible; c) prepare lists of public authorities in relation to the environmental information held by them, which shall be made publicly accessible; d) ensure that their staff assist the public when trying to access environmental information; e) promote the use of information and telecommunications technologies to facilitate access to information; and f) guarantee the principle of agility in the processing and resolution of requests for environmental information. In that sense, he argued that the cited norm adds that public authorities shall ensure that, to the extent of their possibilities, the information collected by them or collected on their behalf is up-to-date, accurate, and comparable; likewise, they shall adopt as many measures as necessary to make effective the exercise of the right of access to environmental information (e.g., designating units responsible for environmental information, creating registries or lists of environmental information held by public authorities or information points, with clear indications of where it can be found, among others). However, he pointed out that the right of access to environmental information finds, like any other fundamental right, limits in its exercise that cannot be transgressed in a State of Law. In this way, he indicated that Article 13 of Law No. 27/2006 (reproducing, practically, in its literalness what Article 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC provides to that effect), stipulates that not every case file or, indeed, not all information directly related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, can be provided by public authorities, under the following terms: “(...) “Article 13. Exceptions to the obligation to provide environmental information. 1. Public authorities may deny requests for environmental information when any of the circumstances indicated below concur: a) That the information requested is not held by or for the public authority, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 10.2.b). b) That the request is manifestly unreasonable. c) That the request is formulated in an excessively general manner, taking into account the provisions of Article 10.2.a). d) That the request concerns material in the course of completion or unfinished documents or data. The latter shall be understood as those on which the public authority is actively working. If the refusal is based on this ground, the competent public authority must mention in the refusal the authority that is preparing the material and inform the applicant about the estimated time for finishing its preparation. e) That the request concerns internal communications, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure. 2. Requests for environmental information may be denied if the disclosure of the requested information could adversely affect any of the following: a) The confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for by a norm with the rank of Law. b) International relations, national defense, or public security. c) The course of justice, the right to effective judicial protection, or the ability to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation. When the case or matter is subject to judicial proceedings or pending before the courts, the judicial body before which it is processed must, in any case, be identified. d) The confidentiality of commercial or industrial data, where such confidentiality is provided for by a norm with the rank of Law or by Community regulations, in order to protect legitimate economic interests, including the public interest in maintaining statistical confidentiality and tax secrecy. e) Intellectual and industrial property rights. Exceptions are cases where the holder has consented to its disclosure. f) The confidentiality of personal data, as regulated in Organic Law 15/1999, of December 13, on the Protection of Personal Data, provided that the interested person to whom it concerns has not consented to its processing or disclosure. g) The interests or protection of a third party who has voluntarily supplied the requested information without being obliged to do so by current legislation. Exceptions are cases where the person has consented to its disclosure. h) The protection of the environment to which the requested information refers. In particular, that referring to the location of threatened species or their breeding sites. 3. The exceptions provided for in the previous sections may be applied in relation to the dissemination obligations contemplated in Chapter II of this Title. 4. The grounds for refusal mentioned in this article must be interpreted restrictively. To this end, the public interest served by the disclosure of information shall be weighed in each specific case against the interest served by its refusal. 5. Public authorities may not, under any circumstances, rely on the grounds provided for in section 2, letters a), d), f), g) and h) of this article, to deny a request for information relating to emissions into the environment. 6. The refusal to provide all or part of the requested information shall be notified to the applicant indicating the reasons for the refusal within the time limits contemplated in Article 10.2.c) (...)”. By virtue of the foregoing, he asserted that in comparative law and, specifically, in European Community law, while the essential importance of the right to environmental information is recognized as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment (because its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole), the fact is that the exercise of said fundamental right is also subject to intrinsic limits, so it is not absolute and unlimited. Regarding the Costa Rican sphere, he indicated that the rights to information and public participation in their environmental dimension lack proper regulation. In such a way that it has been upon the Constitutional Court that the task of developing them and outlining their content has largely fallen, except for the scattered and unsystematic reference that the legislator has made to some of the basic postulates of these rights in some laws. Thus, he stated that Article 10 of the Biodiversity Law proclaims as its objectives, in its subsections 2 and 3, promoting "the active participation of all social sectors in the conservation and ecologically sustainable use of biodiversity, to seek social, economic, and cultural sustainability"; and "education and public awareness about the conservation and use of biodiversity". To this end, its Articles 100 and 101 provide for the application of specific incentives of a tax, technical-scientific, and other nature, to community participation in the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially in areas where endangered, endemic, or rare species have been identified. Next, he argued that obligations are included for the Public Administration, similar to those indicated in the previous heading, such as the duty of the National Council of Conservation Areas to include permanent mechanisms of updated and timely information, both for the bodies of the System, and for the rest of the public sector and society (Article 33.4) or of the National Commission for Biodiversity Management to issue general rules that guarantee the country and its inhabitants to be recipients of information and scientific-technical cooperation in matters of biodiversity (Article 88). For its part, he noted that the final paragraph of Article 2 of the Environmental Organic Law, referring to the principles that inspire said legal text, advocates the State's implementation of an information system with environmental indicators, aimed at measuring evolution and correlation with economic and social indicators for the country. While its Article 6 establishes the duty of the State and the municipalities to promote the active and organized participation of the inhabitants of the Republic in decision-making and actions aimed at protecting and improving the environment, for which purpose the Regional Environmental Councils are created (Article 7). Meanwhile, Article 14 of the Law under discussion contemplates the State's duty to promote the participation of mass media in the process of forming an environmental culture towards the sustainable development of the Nation's inhabitants. He added that, likewise, both the Biodiversity Law and the Environmental Organic Law regulate public participation in environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedures. The first norm, in its Article 95, imposes the duty on the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) to hold public hearings for information and analysis on the proposed project and its impact on biodiversity when it deems it necessary. For its part, the Environmental Organic Law, more broadly, regulates access to and consultation of this type of case files, the duties of public authorities to disseminate the list of proposed studies and to make available to any person the public information contained in such case files, as well as the active participation of society in the evaluation procedure, as follows: “ARTICLE 22.- Evaluation Case File. Individuals or legal entities, public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, at any stage of the evaluation process and in the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of the interested parties shall be included in the case file and assessed for the final report. Within the five working days following the receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat shall send an extract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. Likewise, it shall give extensive dissemination, through the mass media, to the list of studies submitted for its consideration.” “ARTICLE 23.- Public Nature of Information. The information contained in the environmental impact assessment case file shall be public in nature and shall be available to be consulted by any person or organization. However, the interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential, if its publication would affect industrial property rights.” “ARTICLE 24.- Consultation of Case Files. The technical criteria and the weighting percentages for analyzing the environmental impact studies by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat must be of public knowledge.” Finally, he stated that, completing the triad into which the right under discussion is broken down, in its aspect of access to justice in environmental matters, Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law enshrines the popular action, so that every person has standing to bring action in administrative or jurisdictional venues, in defense and protection of biodiversity. Consequently, he asserted that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes, in favor of every person, the right of access to environmental information, the assertion of a diffuse interest in their petition being sufficient for this. However, he argued that the exercise of this right has a scope or range of action that, on a case-by-case basis, has been determined by the Constitutional Chamber in the absence of a law that systematizes the exceptional cases in which the public authority may legitimately deny access. Thus, he explained that, among those exceptional cases, Judgment No. 10693-02 of 18:20 hrs. of November 7, 2002, mentions the confidentiality inherent in judicial proceedings, state secrets, and intellectual property rights, which come to be a concretization, in the environmental field, of the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of the right of access to administrative information in general, which have received abundant treatment and which, in turn, are deduced from the harmonious interplay of numerals 24, 27, 28, and 30 of the Political Constitution. So, among the first, referring to the proper or essential content of the right (its internal scope), this Court has explained that the "purpose of the right is 'information on matters of public interest', so that, when the administrative information sought does not concern an aspect of such a nature, the right is extinguished and cannot be accessed. A second limit is state secrets, within which it distinguishes the secrecy imposed on public officials 'who by reason of the exercise of their functions know a certain type of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see Article 337 of the Penal Code in typifying and sanctioning the crime of "disclosure of secrets")'. Regarding the limitations or extrinsic limits of the right of access to administrative information, this Court mentions, in the first place, those derived from Article 28 of the Constitution: the rights of third parties (the principle of the coexistence of public liberties), morality, and public order. Secondly, the Right to privacy that encompasses bank secrecy and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies 'about certain industrial ideas, products, or procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements', without prejudice to those cases in which the information of a private individual held by an administrative organization may have 'a clear public dimension and vocation' (which aligns with the provision contained in Article 67 of the Biodiversity Law, which indicates that the information of the Registry of access rights on genetic and biochemical elements shall be public, 'except for industrial secrets, which must be protected by the Registry, unless biosafety reasons require their publicity'). Likewise, he stated that in the terms of Constitutional Vote No. 3074-02, of 15:24 hrs. of April 2, 2002: “(...) the right to privacy constitutes a limit to the right to information because, to the extent that the information deals with matters that are not of public relevance, respect for privacy is imposed and operates as a limit or barrier against the right to information (...)”. The third limit has to do with the investigation of crimes, “when it concerns criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police bodies, with the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.” (In a similar sense, he stated that one can consult, among others, Judgments Nos. 136-03, 2120-03, 8884-04, 3391-05, 7889-05, 13419-05, 2916-06, 6522-06, and 11206-07). He added that the previous causes for exception, as stated, have had full application in matters submitted to the knowledge of this constitutional jurisdiction related to the environment, of which a significant sample is a large part of the cited votes, qualifying in some cases the scope of those limits due to the delicate and sensitive nature of the matters under discussion, such as public health, biodiversity, and the environment. Thus, he emphasized the content of Votes Nos. 8884-04 and 9753-06. With respect to the challenged norm, he stated that it reproduces, practically literally, the content of the first paragraph of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, whereby it is clear that the challenged norm enjoys sufficient legal coverage by having its foundation in a norm of legal rank. For this reason, he indicated that the plaintiffs are not correct in pointing out that the General Law has become outdated for duly attending to or guaranteeing the interests or rights at stake in environmental matters processed in administrative venues. This, given that it has been the same legislator who has come to refurbish, so to speak, for environmental law itself, the institutes, guarantees, and principles of the Second Book of the General Law on administrative procedure.

Indeed, it stated that, on one hand, Article 106 of the Biodiversity Law expressly establishes that, except as specifically regulated otherwise in said law, “for all administrative proceedings that biodiversity management requires, the ordinary or summary procedure regulated by the General Law of Public Administration shall be followed, as applicable”; while, on the other, Article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which properly refers to the proceedings processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, provides that this collegiate body, in addition to performing its functions subject to the principles of orality, official initiative, celerity, and immediacy of evidence, shall adjust its actions to the procedure and operating rules established in that Law and, supplementarily, to the General Law of Public Administration, Second Book, Chapter “On the Ordinary Procedure”. Furthermore, it considered that it must be observed that the final paragraph of Article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment has wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law and, consequently, to that of the challenged provision, by specifying the following: “The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of the infractions is recorded. They may consult them without any requirement other than proof of their identity or legal capacity.” By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal does not present any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever. Especially when the Constitutional Tribunal has recently reiterated, in Vote No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter related precisely to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops Article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the block of constitutionality. Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in norms of legal rank that, furthermore, belong to the branch of environmental law. To further substantiate, it affirmed that the suppression of the norm in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under comment does not make any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any attorney to examine or review these case files. In that sense, it stated that the rationale for this measure lies in that of the other procedural norms in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case at hand, so that they may decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of any of the involved parties. This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Administrative Environmental Tribunal have to do, as indicated in Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of damages that may arise in relation to the harm produced by these violations of the environmental order. That is to say, it concerns administrative sanctioning matters, which, due to the eventual negative repercussion that the processing of a proceeding of this type can have on the legal sphere of individuals, requires as part of the right of defense that they can be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason that justifies why the challenged article—as the General Law and the Organic Law of the Environment itself also do—differentiates the degree of access that an attorney can have to a case file of this nature compared to an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent in the professional secrecy that the attorney must, at all times, respect. This means that the attorney is compelled not to reveal or divulge the private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the foregoing reasons, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is fully in accordance with the block of constitutionality in environmental matters.

5.- José Lino Chavez López, in his capacity as President of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (visible on folios 50-61), rendered the legal report. He indicated that the provision under study has its legal basis in Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this way, he stated that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, the procedures followed in the Administrative Environmental Tribunal must conform to the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration. He indicated that, in light of what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 14536-05, although the Administrative Environmental Tribunal has the obligation to comply with the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution, the fact is that not every document found in a public department is a document of a public nature. He added that the cited Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent for the following: a) To hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, the complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) to hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the request of a party, complaints regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) to establish, through administrative channels, the damages that may arise in relation to the harm produced by violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. In this way, he argued that it is a sanctioning body that hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the ordinary administrative procedure outlined in the General Law of Public Administration, whether or not there was a violation of any norm of environmental legislation, or whether some environmental harm was produced. He explained that its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA), where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual social impact of a project, activity, or work. For this reason, he asserted that although Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment establishes the publicity of information, this applies exclusively to the case files processed before SETENA. In said Secretariat, a process is carried out to determine the possibility of developing a specific project or not, whereas the Environmental Tribunal hears the possibility of applying an administrative sanction. However, he stated that in a specific case, any person, whether natural or legal, who appears before an administrative case file indicating the factual and legal reasons for which they request to be a party to it, shall be considered an intervenor. This, so that they may state what is appropriate, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and, if applicable, participate in the oral and private hearing and file the legal remedies. To further substantiate, he indicated that in Opinion No. C-187-2003 of June 23, 2003, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in concordance with the provisions of the Internal Control Law, stated the following: “(…) Article 6 of the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 of August 27, 2002, provides: ‘Confidentiality of complainants and studies that originate the opening of administrative procedures. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the administration, and the internal audit offices shall maintain confidentiality regarding the identity of citizens who file complaints before their offices. The information, documentation, and other evidence from the investigations carried out by internal audit offices, the administration, and the Office of the Comptroller General, the results of which may originate the opening of an administrative procedure, shall be confidential during the formulation of the respective report. Once the corresponding report has been notified and until the final resolution of the administrative procedure, the information contained in the case file shall be classified as confidential information, except for the involved parties, who shall have free access to all documents and evidence contained in the administrative case file. In all cases, the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the powers contained in subsection 23) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, may access the reports, documentation, and evidence held by the internal audit offices, the administration, or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.’ The guarantee of confidentiality developed by Article 6 has two essential purposes: on one hand, to ensure the conduct of the investigation, so that it is not obstructed by the disclosure of the data being gathered or by persons interested in certain evidence not being considered, and on the other, to preserve the rights of the investigated parties and complainants. Rights that could be seriously harmed by the disclosure of the very fact of the investigation and the data provided during its conduct. Data that could be subject to incorrect or biased interpretations by third parties. Now, confidentiality is guaranteed until the respective report is completed. The fact that notification of the corresponding report is mentioned gives the idea that outside the control office conducting the report, the information, documentation, ‘evidence,’ must not be known by other persons. The conclusion of the report does not determine the publicity of those elements. Indeed, even when the report gives rise to an administrative procedure, the information remains confidential except for the parties. Access by the parties forms part of the guarantees of due process. To the general provision of Article 6 is joined the provision in numeral 32 of the Law: the duty of internal audit officials to maintain confidentiality regarding the information they access, as well as the prohibition against revealing to third parties unrelated to the matters dealt with in the reports, information about the audits or special audit studies being carried out, ‘nor information about that which determines a possible civil, administrative, or eventually criminal liability of the officials of the entities and bodies subject to this Law.’ A precept that reaffirms the need to preserve the rights of the investigated parties (…)”. By virtue of the foregoing, he stated that although the constitutional right of free access to administrative departments exists for the purpose of obtaining information on matters of public interest, as provided by constitutional numeral 30, it is also true that the parties involved in the process, the parties' attorneys, law students duly authorized by their respective universities, or the person legitimated to act in it may have access to the case files. Likewise, he stated that the right to information is limited by the provisions of precept 24 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy and liberty, as well as the secrecy of communications. The latter guarantee protects the confidentiality of private documents and information, prevents private individuals from accessing these, and, in turn, prohibits institutions from supplying them to third parties. Fundamental values that are also protected in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in numeral 13, subsection 2, paragraph a) of that same instrument. Under such arguments, he considered that Article 21 of Decree No. 34136-MINAE, which derives from numeral 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, does not violate any fundamental principle or right. He requested that the action filed be declared without merit.

6.- In the processing of the case, the legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. Pursuant to Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it involves the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole. On this matter, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests under the following terms:

“(…) According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as a base matter. (...) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (...) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in contrast, determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from the corporate ones that pertain to a community as a whole. It concerns, therefore, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm that is more or less the same for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are the equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances, and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, which is why they can be claimed in that character. (...) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (…)”.

In the present matter, the claimants allege their standing by way of abstract constitutionality control and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they appear in protection of the environment. Consequently, such circumstances configure, in favor of the petitioners, a direct standing for the filing of the present process by invoking the defense of interests that pertain to the national community as a whole, as is the right of access to information related to the environment. Therefore, the hearing and resolution of the present unconstitutionality action by way of abstract control is admissible.

II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The claimants challenge Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, specifically, the following defects of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of numerals 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access a case file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints, and b) breach of Article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to access the said case file.

III.- CHALLENGED NORM. In the present unconstitutionality action, Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is challenged, a precept that establishes the following:

“Article 21.—Access to the administrative case file. The parties and their representatives and any attorney shall have the right at any stage of the proceeding to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the case file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in Article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration.” IV.- LIMITS TO THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION. Although the essential importance of the right of access to information and, in this case, to information of an environmental nature, as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—is recognized in our legal system, the fact is that the exercise of said right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to predicate an absolute right regarding the right of access to environmental information, since, like the rest of rights, it has a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on said right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity can cause serious damage or disruption to the general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, said right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the administered persons. From that perspective, it is feasible to point out, in accordance, in turn, with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or Aarhus Convention, adopted at the “Environment for Europe” Ministerial Conference, held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for environmental information may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request relates to documents that are being prepared, and b) when the disclosure of such information would have adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper course of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, and b.2.) the confidential nature of personal data and files relating to a natural person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when the confidential nature of this type of information is provided for by domestic law.

V.- DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION AD EXTRA AND AD INTRA. A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or administered person interested in accessing certain administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that numeral 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, solely by the interested party or their representative in a specific and concrete administrative procedure. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled “On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,” Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right can be exercised at any stage of the administrative procedure and is related to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the case file that materializes the procedure in which one is a party. On this matter, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m. on March 14, 2003, drafted by the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:

“(…) III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is granted to any person or administered person interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, solely, to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure—uti singuli-. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled ‘On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,’ Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. Numeral 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted over time for more than fifty years since the validity of the constitutional text. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral, thus, by way of example, Law of the National Archive System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies—passive subjects—that make up the National Archive System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (…)”.

Subsequently, in Vote No. 4637-04 of 12:15 p.m. on April 30, 2004, this Chamber provided in the relevant part:

“(…) V.- (…) A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The first is granted to any person or administered person interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, solely, to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure—uti singuli-. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled ‘On Access to the Case File and its Pieces,’ Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274, there is not the slightest doubt that it is grounded in ordinal 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (Article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (ordinals 29 and following). This corollary is imposed when noting the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the sole protection mechanism, established at the infraconstitutional level, of the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, numeral 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge of and access to a piece of a case file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, in the case of the head of hierarchy, reconsideration, without providing an expedited and swift avenue when the remedies are declared without merit, making it clearly insufficient by obliging the petitioner to resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), to seek the nullity of the resolution that denied them access to the administrative case file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved and that is, by all accounts, tardy (…)”.

VI.- CONCERNING THE BREACH OF NUMERALS 30 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The claimants argue that Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE harms the provisions of numerals 30 and 50 of the Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative case file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as complaints of an environmental nature. Indeed, as the interested parties argue, according to what is established by numeral 50 of the Magna Carta, the Costa Rican legal system recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Likewise, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate said information and make it available to those who require it is instituted. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived of as absolute, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited manner and subject to a series of exceptions, meaning that not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities. It is for this reason that, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being prepared are requested, or when it is estimated that the disclosure of such data could have adverse effects on the proper course of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of personal data and files relating to a natural person who has not consented to its publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to provide respect and protection to the privacy and confidentiality, as well as to the presumption of innocence, of all interested parties in a specific administrative procedure. In this way, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in Article 24 of the Constitution, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of an exclusive zone or sphere free from external interference (protective forum) and regarding which they can prohibit any third party from intervening. Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access to it; that is, it concerns a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and personal image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative Sanctioning Law, is constituted by the presumption of innocence recognized in numeral 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicated in a criminal proceeding, or who is subject to a disciplinary or sanctioning administrative procedure, is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and defense.

For this process, it must be taken into consideration that the Environmental Administrative Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent, among other things, for the following: a) To hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, denuncias filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) to hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the request of a party, denuncias referring to active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) to establish, by administrative means, the indemnities that may arise in relation to damages produced by violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. In this way, it is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power, which hears a denuncia and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any norm of the legislation occurred or whether any environmental damage was produced. Consequently, its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of some work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in this acción de inconstitucionalidad, as it belongs to the Procedures Regulation of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, on the occasion of denuncias filed for environmental infraction; for which reason the procedures heard there are, evidently, different from the procedures of environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), in which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment, unrestricted access to the case file is guaranteed, given that the information contained is of a public nature and concerns the community. Hence, in the criterion of this Chamber, the limits indicated above are fully applicable in the processing of administrative procedures followed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. This, considering that, as long as said instance has not definitively decided a particular matter, the status of the case file is in an investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential. In that sense, it should be noted that one thing is environmental information of public or general interest that must be fully available to any person and, moreover, that the Public Administrations must provide immediately, and another is information related to a denuncia attributed to a natural or legal person for violating environmental legislation and that is contained in an administrative case file, in which case the standing for that right of access ad intra to the procedure must be governed by common and general rules, that is, it must be, solely, the interested parties in that procedure and not, as the claimants intend, any person or group. In any event, it must be taken into consideration, as asserted by the President of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, that any person, whether natural or legal, who appears before an administrative procedure processed before said instance, indicating the reasons of fact and of law for which they request to be a party to the same, will be held as a coadjuvant, so that they may manifest what corresponds, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, participate, even, in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a certain person may have in procedures aimed at developing environmental plans, programs, and policies, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, regarding that which they may have in sanctioning procedures, which, as stated, is resolved with the figure of coadjuvancy or adhesive intervention. Likewise, it must be observed that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE is a reiteration of what is provided by numeral 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to what is provided by precept 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. Similarly, numeral 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment must not be overlooked, as its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to that of the challenged numeral, by establishing the following: “(…) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys will have access to the actions relating to the denuncia processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of infractions is recorded. They may consult them with no more requirement than the justification of their identity or representational capacity.” In such a way that the principle of legal reservation in matters regulating the regime of fundamental rights (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution) is fully respected. From that perspective, this Constitutional Tribunal does not find that Article 21 of the Procedures Regulation of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, on this particular point, presents any defect of unconstitutionality.

VII.- Nonetheless, in the criterion of this Chamber, said limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding considerando operate unless any information of public and general interest (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration appears in the administrative sanctioning case file, in which case any citizen may exercise the right ad extra because such data is not available in any other database. Consequently, only in such cases, the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, is compelled to provide information, simultaneously reserving the rest of the administrative case file. Under this understanding, this Constitutional Tribunal, just as was stated in the preceding considerando, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul numeral 21 in question, considering that the latter can be perfectly applied by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra in an environmental sanctioning procedure is possible. In such a way that the requirement of being an interested party or their representative in order to be able to consult a case file held by the mentioned Tribunal will become important only at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.

VIII.- REGARDING THE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. On another point, the complainants allege a violation of constitutional numeral 33, considering that, in their view, the challenged Article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which only permits any attorney, and not all citizens, to have access to the case files of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal. However, this Tribunal, in accordance with what was set forth in considerando VII of this ruling, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning character that the administrative procedures processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal possess and, above all, considering the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys may have the right to be provided with such data. It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access pending administrative case files as provided for in Articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Organic Law of the Environment, and the challenged regulatory norm, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative case file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal counsel that, at the same time, has deep constitutional roots when the administered party decides to have it.

IX.- COROLLARY. By the merit of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the acción de inconstitucionalidad filed.

THEREFORE:

The acción de inconstitucionalidad is dismissed.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.

President Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

Clb/es/801 FILE No. 08-004072-0007-CO Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.

Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional **Exp: 08-004072-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010007789** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April of two thousand ten.** Action of unconstitutionality filed by **ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ**, holder of identity card No. 2-365-227 and **DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS**, holder of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are **THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC** and **THE ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL.** **WHEREAS:** **1.-** By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:02 hrs. on March 2, 2008 (visible at folios 1-9), the plaintiffs requested the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, given that the latter establishes that only the parties and their representatives, as well as any attorney, shall have the right, at any stage of the proceeding, to examine, read, and photocopy the case file. They considered, in the first place, that the norm under review violates Article 30 of the Political Constitution, since it prevents the possibility of any person being able to access a case file containing information on environmental complaints, which is of national relevance and interest, because, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Environment, what the Environmental Administrative Tribunal investigates constitutes social crimes and, to that extent, all information must be public and cannot be limited. They explained that in the cases under study, restrictions on access to public information cannot be imposed, given that, although a person or group is being judged, the relevance of environmental matters surpasses any private right—even if it imposes administrative sanctions. They argued that, in this case, it is by regulation that access to case files to learn about complaints is limited for journalists or different environmental organizations, unless they are an interested party or a legal professional, which they deem unconstitutional because it violates the principle of participatory democracy. They stated that Article 50 of the Political Constitution itself creates the popular action in environmental matters, which provides unrestricted access to administrative and judicial proceedings where violations concerning this subject are discussed. They asserted that allowing any attorney to access the case file and, simultaneously, preventing an ordinary citizen from doing so establishes a limitation and distinction based on profession, which contravenes the provisions of Article 33 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, they considered the provisions of Articles 30, 33, and 50 of the Fundamental Charter to be violated, as well as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration; Principle 19 of the Stockholm Declaration; Article IV.13 of the Earth Charter; and Article 14 of the Organic Law of the Environment. Finally, and for the purpose of substantiating the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they indicated that they come before this Constitutional Court by virtue of the defense of diffuse interests—the right of access to information on environmental matters—provided for in Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. They requested that the action filed be declared with merit.

**2.-** By resolution of the Presidency of the Chamber at 14:50 hrs. on April 18, 2008 (visible at folios 15-16), this action of unconstitutionality was admitted for processing.

**3.-** The legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins Nos. 87, 88, and 89 of May 7, 8, and 9, 2008.

**4.-** Farid Beirute Brenes, in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General, by writ filed at 15:30 hrs. on May 12, 2008 (visible at folios 21-49), rendered the legal report. In the first place, he considered that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs have standing to bring this proceeding, since it falls within the legal protection of the environment. On the other hand, he stated that the fundamental right of access to environmental information held by public authorities has had broad and complete legislative development in other latitudes, unlike our country, where the Constitutional Chamber has sought, through case law, to fill the gaps left by the legislator.

He indicated that, from the perspective of Public International Law, there exists the so-called "<em><span style="color: #010101;">Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters</span><span style="color: #010101;"> <em>or Aarhus Convention (Denmark)</em>," of June 25, 1998, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which in its Article 1 proclaims the existence of the right to enjoy an adequate environment and the duty to respect and protect it—not only for each person in their current dimension as a subject of rights and obligations, but also from the potential perspective of future generations—with the real possibility that each contracting State must guarantee of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice itself in matters related to the environment. </span>In that regard, he noted that the explanatory memorandum of Spanish Law No. <span style="color: #010101;">27/2006, of July 18, which regulates the rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (and incorporates Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), exemplarily summarizes the three pillars upon which the Aarhus Convention rests: <em>"(...) 1) The pillar of access to environmental information plays an essential role in the environmental awareness and education of society, constituting an indispensable instrument for being able to intervene with knowledge of the facts in public affairs. It is divided into two parts: the right to seek and obtain information held by public authorities, and the right to receive environmentally relevant information from public authorities, which must collect it and make it public without the need for a prior request. 2) The pillar of public participation in the decision-making process, which extends to three areas of public action: the authorization of certain activities, the approval of plans and programs, and the drafting of general provisions of legal or regulatory rank. 3) The third and final pillar is constituted by the right of access to justice and aims to guarantee citizens' access to the courts to review decisions that may have potentially violated the rights in matters of environmental democracy recognized by the Convention itself. The aim is thus to ensure and strengthen, through the guarantee provided by judicial protection, the effectiveness of the rights that the Aarhus Convention recognizes for all and, therefore, the very implementation of the Convention. Finally, a provision is introduced that would enable the public to initiate administrative or judicial proceedings to challenge any action or omission attributable to either another private individual or a public authority that constitutes a violation of national environmental legislation (...)".</em> He explained that, within the normative context set by the aforementioned convention, the European Union, in order to harmonize Community legislation with the stipulations contained therein, issued the important Directive No. 2003/4/EC of January 28, 2003, on public access to environmental information and Directive No. 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 26, 2003, providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. He reported that the first Directive cited highlights in its preamble that it is <em>"necessary to ensure that any natural or legal person has a right of access to environmental information held by or on behalf of public authorities without that person having to state an interest"</em> (recital 8); likewise, it affirms the need <em>"for public authorities to disseminate and make available to the general public, as widely as possible, environmental information, especially by means of information and communication technologies"</em>, for which the future evolution of these technologies must be taken into account (recital 9). He pointed out that recital 16 of the cited Directive No. 2003/4/EC contains the following interpretive criterion: <em>"The right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information in specific and clearly defined cases. Grounds for refusal should be interpreted in a restrictive way, whereby the public interest served by disclosure should be weighed against the interest served by the refusal to disclose</em>." He added that the cited Spanish Law No. 27/2006, in its Article 3, indicates the rights in matters of access to environmental information that individuals may exercise with respect to public authorities, as follows: 1) Right to access environmental information held by public authorities or by other subjects on their behalf, without being obliged to state a particular interest, regardless of their nationality, domicile, or registered office, 2) right to be informed of the rights granted to them by Law No.</span> <span style="color: #010101;">27/2006 and to be advised for their correct exercise, 3) right to be assisted in their search for information, 4) right to receive the information requested within a period not exceeding 2 months, 5) right to receive the requested environmental information in the chosen form or format, 6) right to know the reasons why the information is not provided, totally or partially, and also those reasons why said information is not provided in the requested form or format, and finally, 7) right to know the list of fees and prices that, where applicable, are chargeable for receiving the requested information. Correlatively, he stated that Article 5 of the aforementioned Law establishes the following as duties of the different Public Administrations: a) Inform the public adequately about the rights granted to them by this Law, as well as the means for exercising them; b) provide information for their correct exercise, as well as advice and guidance to the extent possible; c) prepare lists of public authorities in view of the environmental information held by them, which shall be made publicly accessible; d) guarantee that their staff assists the public when trying to access environmental information; e) promote the use of information and telecommunications technologies to facilitate access to information; and f) guarantee the principle of agility in the processing and resolution of requests for environmental information. In that sense, he argued that the cited regulation adds that public authorities shall ensure that, to the extent of their possibilities, the information collected by them or on their behalf is updated, accurate, and comparable; likewise, they shall adopt whatever measures are necessary to make the exercise of the right of access to environmental information effective (e.g., designating units responsible for environmental information, creating registers or lists of environmental information held by public authorities or information points, with clear indications of where it can be found, among others). However, he noted that the right of access to environmental information, like any other fundamental right, encounters limits in its exercise that cannot be transgressed in a State of Law. In this way, he indicated that Article 13 of Law No. 27/2006 (reproducing, practically, in its literal terms what is set forth in Article 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC), establishes that not every file or, indeed, not all information directly related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities, under the following terms: <em>"(...) "Article 13. Exceptions to the obligation to provide environmental information. 1. Public authorities may deny requests for environmental information when any of the following circumstances apply: a) That the information requested from the public authority is not held by it or by another entity on its behalf, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 10.2.b). b) That the request is manifestly unreasonable. c) That the request is formulated in an excessively general manner, taking into account the provisions of Article 10.2.a). d) That the request relates to material in the course of completion or to unfinished documents or data. These latter are understood to be those on which the public authority is actively working. If the denial is based on this reason, the competent public authority must mention in the denial the authority that is preparing the material and inform the applicant of the estimated time for completing its preparation. e) That the request relates to internal communications, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure. 2. Requests for environmental information may be denied if the disclosure of the requested information could adversely affect any of the following: a) The confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for by a rule with the rank of Law. b) International relations, national defense, or public security. c) Matters or issues subject to judicial proceedings or pending before courts, the right to effective judicial protection, or the capacity to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation. When the matter or issue is subject to judicial proceedings or pending before courts, the judicial body before which it is processed must, in any case, be identified. d) The confidentiality of commercial and industrial data, where such confidentiality is provided for by a rule with the rank of Law or by Community regulations, in order to protect legitimate economic interests, including the public interest in maintaining statistical confidentiality and tax secrecy. e) Intellectual and industrial property rights. Cases where the holder has consented to their disclosure are excepted. f) The confidential nature of personal data, as regulated in Organic Law 15/1999, of December 13, on the Protection of Personal Data, provided that the interested person to whom they pertain has not consented to their processing or disclosure. g) The interests or protection of a third party who has voluntarily provided the requested information without being legally obliged to do so. Cases where the person has consented to its disclosure are excepted. h) The protection of the environment to which the requested information refers. In particular, information referring to the location of threatened species or to their breeding sites. 3. The exceptions provided for in the preceding paragraphs may be applied in relation to the dissemination obligations referred to in Chapter II of this Title. 4. The grounds for denial mentioned in this article must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. For this purpose, the public interest served by disclosing certain information shall be weighed in each specific case against the interest served by its denial. 5. Public authorities may under no circumstances rely on the grounds provided for in paragraph 2, letters a), d), f), g), and h) of this article to deny a request for information relating to emissions into the environment. 6. The refusal to provide all or part of the requested information shall be notified to the applicant, indicating the grounds for denial within the time periods set forth in Article 10.2.c) (...)".</em> By virtue of the foregoing, he asserted that in comparative law and, specifically, in European Community law, while the essential importance of the right to environmental information is recognized as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment (because its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole), the truth is that the exercise of this fundamental right is also subject to intrinsic limits, and is therefore not absolute and unlimited. Regarding the Costa Rican sphere, he indicated that the rights to information and public participation in their environmental dimension lack proper regulation. Thus, it is the Constitutional Court that has largely been responsible for developing them and outlining their content, except for the scattered and unsystematic reference that the legislator has made to some of the basic postulates of these rights in certain laws. Thus, he stated that Article 10 of the Biodiversity Law proclaims as its</span> objectives, in its subsections 2 and 3, to promote "<em>the active participation of all social sectors in the conservation and ecologically sustainable use of biodiversity, to ensure social, economic, and cultural sustainability</em>"; and "<em>public education and awareness about the conservation and utilization of biodiversity</em>." For this purpose, its Articles 100 and 101 provide for the application of specific incentives of a tax, technical-scientific, and other nature, for community participation in the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially in areas where endangered, endemic, or rare species have been identified. <span style="color: #010101;">Then, he argued that obligations on the part of the Public Administration are included, similar to those indicated in the previous section, such as the duty of the </span>National Council of Conservation Areas to include permanent mechanisms for updated and timely information, both for the bodies of the System, and for the rest of the public sector and society (Article 33.4) or of the <span style="color: #010101;">National Commission for Biodiversity Management</span> to issue general rules that guarantee that the country and its inhabitants are recipients of information and scientific-technical cooperation on biodiversity matters (Article 88). For its part, he pointed out that the final paragraph of Article 2 of <span style="color: #010101;">the Organic Environmental Law, referring to the principles that inspire said legal text, advocates the implementation by the State of an information system with environmental indicators, aimed at measuring evolution and correlation with economic and social indicators for the country. While its Article 6 establishes the duty of the State and municipalities to promote the active and organized participation of the inhabitants of the Republic in decision-making and actions aimed at protecting and improving the environment, for which purpose the Regional Environmental Councils are created (Article 7). Meanwhile, Article 14 of the Law under comment contemplates the duty of the State to promote the participation of mass media in the process of forming an environmental culture towards the sustainable development of the Nation's inhabitants. He added that, similarly, both the Biodiversity Law and the Organic Environmental Law regulate public participation in environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) procedures. The first regulation, in its Article 95, imposes the duty on the National Environmental Technical Secretariat to </span>hold public hearings for information and analysis on the proposed project and its impact on biodiversity when it deems it necessary. For its part, the <span style="color: #010101;">Organic Environmental Law, more broadly, regulates access and consultation to this class of files, the duties of public authorities to disseminate the list of proposed studies and to make available to any person the public information contained in said files, as well as the active participation of society in the evaluation procedure, as follows: <em>"ARTICLE 22.- Evaluation file Individuals or legal entities, public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, at any stage of the evaluation process and in the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of interested parties shall be included in the file and assessed for the final report. Within the five working days following the receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat shall send an abstract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. Likewise, it shall give extensive dissemination, through the mass media, to the list of studies submitted for its consideration."</em> <em>"ARTICLE 23.- Publicity of information The information contained in the environmental impact assessment file shall be of a public nature and shall be available to be consulted by any person or organization. However, interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential if its publication would affect intellectual property rights."</em> <em>"ARTICLE 24.- Consultation of files The technical criteria and weighting percentages for analyzing environmental impact studies by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat must be public knowledge.</em>".</span></span> <span lang="EN" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; color: #010101; mso-ansi-language: EN;">Finally, he stated that, completing the triad into which the right under comment is broken down, in its aspect of access to justice in environmental matters, Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law enshrines the</span><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN;"> popular action (acción popular), so that every person is entitled to take action in administrative or judicial venues, in defense and protection of biodiversity. <span style="color: #010101;">Consequently, he asserted that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes in favor of every person the right of access to environmental information, it being sufficient to allege a diffuse interest in their petition. However, he argued that the exercise of this right has a scope or range of action that has been determined on a case-by-case basis by the Constitutional Chamber in the absence of a law that systematizes the cases of exception in which the public authority can legitimately deny access. Thus, he explained that, among those cases of exception, Judgment No. 10693-02 of 6:20 p.m. on November 7, 2002, mentions </span>the confidentiality inherent to judicial proceedings, State secrets, and intellectual property rights, which come to be a concretization, in the environmental field, of the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of the right of access to administrative information in general, which have received abundant treatment and which, in turn, are deduced from the harmonious interplay of numerals 24, 27, 28, and 30 of the Political Constitution. <span style="color: #010101;">Thus, among the former, referring to the proper or essential content of the right (its internal scope), this Court has explained that the "<em>purpose of the right is 'information on matters of public interest,' </em>so that, when the administrative information sought does not concern an issue of such a nature, the right is rendered null and cannot be accessed. A second limit is State secrets, within which it distinguishes the secrecy imposed on public officials <em>"who by reason of the exercise of their functions know certain types of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see Article 337 of the Penal Code, which typifies and penalizes the crime of 'divulging secrets')."</em> Regarding the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, this Court mentions, firstly, those derived from Article 28 of the Constitution: the rights of third parties (the principle of the coexistence of public liberties), morality, and public order. Secondly, the Right to privacy which encompasses banking secrecy and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies <em>"regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements"</em>, without prejudice to those cases in which the information of an individual held by an administrative organization may have <em>"a clear public dimension and vocation" </em>(which conforms to the provision contained in Article 67 of the Biodiversity Law, which indicates that the information in the </span>Registry of access rights to genetic and biochemical elements shall be of a public nature, "<em>except for</em> <em>industrial secrets</em>, <em>which must be protected by the Registry, unless biosecurity reasons require them to be publicized</em>")<span style="color: #010101;">. Likewise, he stated that in the terms of Constitutional Ruling No. </span>3074-02, of 3:24 p.m. on April 2, 2002: <em>"(...) the right to privacy constitutes a limit to the right to information because, to the extent that the information concerns matters that are not of public relevance, respect for privacy is imposed and operates as a limit or barrier to the right to information (...)."</em> <span style="color: #010101;">The third limit has to do with the investigation of crimes, <em>"when it involves criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police bodies, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved</em>." (In a similar sense, he stated that one may consult, among others, Judgments Nos. 136-03, 2120-03, 8884-04, 3391-05, 7889-05, 13419-05, 2916-06, 6522-06, and 11206-07). He added that the aforementioned grounds for exception, as stated, have had full application in matters submitted for the cognizance of this constitutional jurisdiction related to the environment, of which a significant portion of the cited rulings is a sample, qualifying in some cases the scope of these limits due to the delicate and sensitive nature of the matters under discussion, such as public health, biodiversity, and the environment. Thus, he emphasized the content of Rulings Nos. 8884-04 and 9753-06. Regarding the contested regulation, he stated that it reproduces, practically literally, the content of the first paragraph of Article 272 of the </span>General Law of Public Administration, w<span style="color: #010101;">hich makes it clear that the contested regulation enjoys sufficient legal coverage by having its basis in a regulation of legal rank. For this reason, he indicated that the plaintiffs are not correct in pointing out that the General Law has become outdated for properly attending to or guaranteeing the interests or rights at stake in environmental matters processed in administrative venues. This, given that it has been the legislator itself that has come to renovate, so to speak, for environmental law itself, the institutes, guarantees, and principles of the Second Book of the General Law on administrative procedure. Indeed, he reported that, on the one hand, Article 106 of the Biodiversity Law expressly establishes that, s</span>ave for what is specifically regulated differently in said law, "<em>for all administrative procedures that biodiversity management requires, the ordinary or summary procedure regulated by the General Law of Public Administration shall be followed, as appropriate</em>"; while, on the other hand, Article 106 of the <span style="color: #010101;">Organic Environmental Law, which properly refers to the procedures processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, provides that this collegiate body, in addition to </span>carrying out its functions subject to the principles of orality, official initiative, speediness, and immediacy of evidence, shall adjust its actions to the procedure and operating rules established in that Law and, supplementarily, to the General Law of Public Administration, Second Book, Chapter <em>"On Ordinary Procedure"</em>.

Additionally, it considered that it should be noted that the final paragraph of Article 108 of the Environmental Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) presents wording almost identical to that of Article 272 of the General Law (Ley General) and, consequently, to that of the questioned provision, by specifying the following: "*The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions. They may consult them without any requirement other than proof of their identity or legal standing.*" By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal does not present any vice of unconstitutionality. This is especially so, given that the Constitutional Chamber has recently reiterated, in Ruling No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter precisely related to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops Article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the block of constitutionality. Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in rules of legal rank that, additionally, belong to the branch of environmental law. Furthermore, it affirmed that the suppression of the rule in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under comment does not carry out any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any attorney to examine or review these case files. In that sense, it stated that the reason for this measure lies in that of the other procedural rules in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case at hand, so that they can decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of one of the involved parties. This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Environmental Administrative Tribunal have to do, as indicated in Article 111 of the Environmental Organic Law, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and passive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the rules of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of compensation that may arise in relation to the damages produced by such violations of environmental regulations. In other words, it concerns administrative sanctioning matters, which, due to the potential negative impact that the processing of this type of procedure can have on the legal sphere of private individuals, requires, as part of the right of defense, that they be able to be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason justifying that the questioned article—as the General Law and the Environmental Organic Law itself also do—differentiates the degree of access that an attorney can have to a case file of this nature compared to an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent to the professional secrecy that the attorney must, at all times, respect. This means that the attorney is compelled not to reveal or divulge private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the foregoing reasons, it considered that Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal is fully in conformity with the block of constitutionality in environmental matters.

**5.-** José Lino Chavez López, in his capacity as President of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal (visible on folios 50-61), rendered the legal report. He indicated that the provision under study has its legal basis in Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this way, he stated that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Environmental Organic Law, the procedures followed in the Environmental Administrative Tribunal must conform to the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration. He indicated that, in light of what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in Ruling No. 14536-05, even though the Environmental Administrative Tribunal has the obligation to comply with what is established in Article 30 of the Constitution, the truth is that not every document located in a public department is a document of a public nature. He added that the cited Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), which, according to Article 111 of the Environmental Organic Law, is competent for the following: a) To hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) to hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the request of a party, complaints referring to active and passive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the rules of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) to establish, through administrative channels, the compensation that may arise in relation to the damages produced by violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. In this way, he argued that it is a sanctioning body, which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the ordinary administrative procedure indicated in the General Law of Public Administration, whether or not a violation of any rule of environmental legislation existed, or whether any environmental damage occurred. He explained that its nature is different from that possessed by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the potential social impact of any work, activity, or project. For this reason, he asserted that although the publicity of information is established in Article 23 of the Environmental Organic Law, this applies exclusively to case files processed before SETENA. In said Secretariat, a process is carried out to determine the possibility of developing a specific work or not, while in the Environmental Tribunal, the possibility of applying an administrative sanction is heard. However, he stated that in a given case, any person, whether physical or legal, who appears before an administrative case file indicating the factual and legal reasons for which they request to be a party to it, will be considered an intervening party. The foregoing, so that they may state what corresponds, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings and, if necessary, participate in the oral and private hearing and file the legal remedies. Furthermore, he indicated that in Opinion No. C-187-2003 of June 23, 2003, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in accordance with what is established in the Internal Control Law, stated the following: *"(...) Article 6 of the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 of August 27, 2002, provides: 'Confidentiality of complainants and studies that give rise to the opening of administrative proceedings. The Comptroller General of the Republic, the administration, and the internal audit offices shall maintain confidentiality regarding the identity of citizens who file complaints before their offices. The information, documentation, and other evidence from investigations carried out by internal audit offices, the administration, and the Comptroller General's Office, the results of which may give rise to the opening of an administrative proceeding, shall be confidential during the preparation of the respective report. Once the corresponding report is notified and until the final resolution of the administrative proceeding, the information contained in the case file shall be classified as confidential information, except for the involved parties, who shall have free access to all documents and evidence in the administrative case file. In all cases, the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the powers contained in subsection 23) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, may access the reports, documentation, and evidence held by the internal audit offices, the administration, or the Comptroller General of the Republic.' The guarantee of confidentiality developed by Article 6 has two essential purposes: on one hand, to ensure the carrying out of the investigation, so that it is not obstructed by the disclosure of the data being gathered or by persons interested in certain evidence not being considered; and on the other, to preserve the rights of those investigated and the complainants. Rights that could be severely harmed by the disclosure of the very fact of the investigation and the data provided during its execution. Data that could be subject to incorrect or biased interpretations by third parties. Now then, confidentiality is guaranteed until the completion of the respective report. The fact that it speaks of notification of the corresponding report suggests that outside the control office carrying out the report, the information, documentation, 'evidence,' must not be known by other persons. The conclusion of the report does not determine the publicity of these elements. Indeed, even when the report gives rise to an administrative proceeding, the information remains confidential except for the parties. Access for the parties that forms part of the guarantees of due process. Added to the general provision of Article 6 is what is set forth in provision 32 of the Law: the duty of internal audit officials to maintain confidentiality regarding the information to which they have access, as well as the prohibition of revealing to third parties who are not related to the matters dealt with in the reports, information about the audits or special audit studies being carried out 'nor information about that which determines a possible civil, administrative, or eventually criminal liability of the officials of the entities and bodies subject to this Law.' A precept that reaffirms the need to preserve the rights of those investigated (...)."* By virtue of the foregoing, he stated that although the constitutional right of free access to administrative departments exists for the purpose of obtaining information on matters of public interest, as provided by constitutional provision 30, it is also true that access to case files shall be available to the parties involved in the process, the parties' attorneys, law students duly authorized by the respective universities, or the person legitimated to act therein. Likewise, he stated that the right to information is limited by what is set forth in precept 24 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy and freedom, as well as the secrecy of communications. This last guarantee protects the confidentiality of private documents and information, prevents private individuals from accessing them, and, in turn, prohibits institutions from supplying them to third parties. Fundamental values that are also protected in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in provision 13, subsection 2°, paragraph a) of that same instrument. Under such arguments, he considered that Article 21 of Decree No. 34136-MINAE, which derives from provision 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, does not violate any fundamental principle or right. He requested that the filed action be declared without merit.

**6.-** In the processing of the case, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** Pursuant to Article 75, paragraph 2°, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:

*"(...) According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the questioned rule must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would then allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. (...) Secondly, the possibility of coming forward in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (...) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that pertain to a community as a whole. It involves, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests share a dual nature, since they are at once collective—being common to a generality—and individual, so they can be claimed in such capacity. (...) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (...)"* In the present matter, the plaintiffs allege their standing by way of abstract constitutionality control and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they come forward in protection of the environment. Consequently, such circumstances configure in favor of the petitioners a direct standing for the filing of this process by invoking the defense of interests that pertain to the national community as a whole, such as the right of access to information related to the environment. Therefore, the hearing and resolution of this unconstitutionality action by way of abstract control is admissible.

**II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The plaintiffs challenge Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, specifically, the following vices of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of provisions 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility that any person may have access to a case file processed before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal containing public information of relevance and national interest, such as environmental complaints; and b) breach of Article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to have access to the referred case file.

**III.- CHALLENGED RULE.** In this unconstitutionality action, Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is challenged, a precept that establishes the following:

*"Article 21.—Access to the administrative case file. The parties and their representatives and any attorney shall have the right at any phase of the procedure to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the case file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in Article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration."* **IV.- LIMITS ON THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION.** Although the essential importance of the right of access to information, and in this case, to environmental information, is recognized in our legal system as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—the truth is that the exercise of this right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to predicate an absolute right regarding the right of access to environmental information, because, like all other rights, it possesses a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on that right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity can cause serious harm or disruptions to general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, this right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization, and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the administered parties. From that perspective, it is feasible to point out, also in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, or the Aarhus Convention, adopted at the Ministerial Conference "Environment for Europe," held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for information about the environment may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request refers to documents that are being prepared; and b) when the disclosure of such information has adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper course of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to carry out a criminal or disciplinary investigation; and b.2.) the confidential nature of data and personal files regarding a physical person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when this confidential nature of this type of information is provided for in domestic law.

**V.- DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION AD EXTRA AND AD INTRA.** A crystal-clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative proceeding. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that provision 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative proceeding. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, only by the interested party or their representative in a specific and concrete administrative proceeding. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter titled "Of Access to the Case File and its Pieces," Third Title of the Second Book, in Articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right can be exercised at any stage of the administrative proceeding and refers to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the case file that materializes the proceeding in which one is a party. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m. on March 14, 2003, drafted by the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:

*"(...) III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A crystal-clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative proceeding. The first is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the second, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative proceeding—uti singuli. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter titled 'Of Access to the Case File and its Pieces,' Third Title of the Second Book, in Articles 272 to 274. Provision 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative proceeding. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted over time for more than fifty years since the validity of the constitutional text."* The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, Law of the National Archives System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it regarding documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies —passive subjects— that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (...)".

Subsequently, in Voto No. 4637-04 of 12:15 hrs. of April 30, 2004, this Chamber held as pertinent:

"(...) V.- (...) A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –within– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing a specific piece of administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled 'Of access to the case file and its pieces,' Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274, there is not the slightest doubt that it is grounded in ordinal 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (ordinals 29 and following). This corollary is unavoidable upon considering the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the sole protection mechanism, established at the infra-constitutional level, for the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, numeral 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge of and access to a piece of a case file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, if it concerns the head of the agency, reconsideration, without providing an expedited and swift avenue when the remedies are dismissed, which is clearly insufficient as it forces the petitioner to resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (article 49 of the Political Constitution), to seek the annulment of the resolution that denied them access to the administrative case file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved party and is, by all lights, tardy (...)".

**VI.- ON THE VIOLATION OF NUMERALS 30 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** The plaintiffs argue that article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, injures the provisions of constitutional numerals 30 and 50, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative case file processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints. Indeed, as the interested parties argue, according to the provisions of numeral 50 of the Magna Carta, Costa Rican legal order recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Similarly, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate such information and make it available to whoever requires it is instituted. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived in an absolute manner, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited form and subject to a series of exceptions, so that not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities. It is for this reason that, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being drafted are required, or when it is estimated that the disclosure of such data may produce unfavorable effects on the proper administration of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of personal data and files regarding an individual who has not consented to their publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to respect and protect the privacy and confidentiality, as well as the presumption of innocence, of all those parties interested in a specific administrative procedure. In this way, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in constitutional article 24, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of a zone or sphere of their own exempt from external interference (a protective forum) and regarding which they can prohibit any third party from intervening. Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access to it; that is, it is a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative Sanctioning Law, is the presumption of innocence recognized in numeral 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicted in a criminal proceeding, or **against whom a disciplinary or sanctioning administrative procedure is being followed,** is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment that has the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and the right of defense. For the present process, it must be taken into consideration that the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is a deconcentrated body of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, which, according to article 111 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, is competent, among other things, to: a) Hear and resolve, in the administrative venue, the complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, b) hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the instance of a party, complaints regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources, and c) establish, in the administrative venue, the indemnities that may arise in relation to damages produced by violations of the legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. Thus, **this is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power**, which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any norm of the legislation occurred or if any environmental damage was produced. Consequently, its nature is different from that of the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of any work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, as it belongs to the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, on the occasion of complaints filed for environmental infractions; which is why the procedures heard there are, evidently, distinct from the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) procedures, in which, in accordance with article 23 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, unrestricted access to the case file is guaranteed, by virtue of the fact that the information contained is public in nature and concerns the community. Hence, in the opinion of this Chamber, the limits indicated supra are fully applicable in the processing of the administrative procedures followed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. This, since, as long as said instance has not definitively decided a specific matter, the status of the case files is in the investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential in nature. In that sense, it should be noted that environmental information of public or general interest that must be fully available to any person and, moreover, that Public Administrations must provide immediately, is one thing, and information relating to a complaint imputed to an individual or legal entity for infringing environmental legislation and that is contained in an administrative case file is another, in which case the legal standing of that right of access **ad intra of the procedure**, must be governed by the common and general rules, that is, only the parties interested in that procedure, and not, as the plaintiffs intend, any person or group. In any case, it must be taken into consideration, as asserted by the President of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, that **any person, whether individual or legal entity,** who appears before an administrative procedure processed before said instance, indicating the reasons of fact and law for which they request to be a party to it, will be considered as an intervening party, so that they may state what is pertinent, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, even participate in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a specific person may have in procedures aimed at developing plans, programs, and policies on environmental matters, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, from that which they may have in sanctioning-type procedures, which, as stated, is resolved through the figure of coadjuvancy or adhesive intervention. Likewise, it must be observed that article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, is a reiteration of the provisions of numeral 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to the provision of precept 106 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Similarly, numeral 108 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente should not be overlooked, since its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to that of article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to that of the challenged numeral, when establishing the following: *"(...) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys, shall have access to the proceedings relating to the complaint processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions. They may consult them with no requirement other than the proof of their identity or legal standing."* So, the principle of legal reserve in matters of regulation of the regime of fundamental rights is fully respected (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution). From that perspective, this Constitutional Court does not consider that article 21 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, on this particular point, presents any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever.

**VII.-** However, in the opinion of this Chamber, such limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding considerando operate unless the administrative sanctioning case file contains any information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the ad extra right because such data do not exist in any other database. Consequently, **only in such cases**, the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, is compelled to provide information, reserving, concomitantly, the rest of the administrative case file. Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court, as expressed in the preceding considerando, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul numeral 21 in question, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra is appropriate in an environmental sanctioning procedure. So that, the requirement of being an interested party or its representative in order to consult a case file held by the aforementioned Tribunal will only become relevant at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.

**VIII.- REGARDING THE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY.** On the other hand, the petitioners allege a violation of constitutional numeral 33, given that, in their view, the challenged article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney and not all citizens to access the case files of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. However, this Tribunal, in accordance with what was stated in Considerando VII of this judgment, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning nature of the administrative procedures processed before the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo and, above all, considering the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys may have the right to be provided with such data. It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access pending administrative case files provided for in articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, and the challenged regulatory norm, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative case file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal representation that, at the same time, has deep constitutional roots when the administered party decides to have it.

**IX.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the foregoing, it is necessary to dismiss the acción de inconstitucionalidad filed.

**POR TANTO:** The acción de inconstitucionalidad is dismissed.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

Clb/es/801 **EXPEDIENTE N° 08-004072-0007-CO** Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and zero minutes on the twenty-eighth of April of two thousand ten.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by **ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ**, holder of identity card No. 2-365-227 and **DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS**, holder of identity card No. 2-639-350, against Article 21 of the Regulations of Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007. Also intervening in the action are **THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC** and **THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL.** **WHEREAS:** **1.-** By brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:02 hrs. on March 2, 2008 (visible at folios 1-9), the petitioners requested the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 21 of Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, given that the latter establishes that only the parties and their representatives, as well as any attorney, shall have the right, at any phase of the proceeding, to examine, read, and photocopy the case file (expediente). They considered, in the first place, that the norm under study violates Article 30 of the Political Constitution, since it prevents the possibility that any person may have access to a case file containing information on environmental complaints, which is of national relevance and interest, because, in accordance with the Organic Environmental Law, what the Administrative Environmental Tribunal investigates constitutes crimes of a social nature and, to that extent, all information must be public and cannot be limited. They explained that in the cases under study, restrictions on access to public information cannot be imposed, given that, although a person or group is being judged, the relevance of environmental matters surpasses any private right—even if it imposes administrative sanctions. They argued that, in this case, it is via regulation that access to case files for journalists or different environmentalist organizations to learn about complaints is limited, unless they are an interested party or a legal professional, which they consider unconstitutional, since it violates the principle of participatory democracy. They stated that Article 50 of the Political Constitution itself creates the popular action in environmental matters, which provides unrestricted access to administrative and judicial proceedings where violations on this subject are discussed. They asserted that by allowing any attorney to have access to the case file and, in parallel, preventing an ordinary citizen from doing so, a limitation and difference based on profession is established, which contravenes the provisions of Article 33 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, they considered the provisions of Articles 30, 33, and 50 of the Constitution violated, as well as Principle 10 of the Declaration of Rio; Principle 19 of the Declaration of Stockholm; Article IV.13 of the Earth Charter, and Article 14 of the Organic Environmental Law. Finally, and for the purpose of grounding the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they noted that they appear before this Constitutional Court by virtue of the defense of diffuse interests—the right of access to information on environmental matters—contemplated in Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. They requested that the action filed be granted.

**2.-** By resolution of the Presidency of the Chamber at 14:50 hrs. on April 18, 2008 (visible at folios 15-16), the present action of unconstitutionality was admitted.

**3.-** The legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins Nos. 87, 88, and 89 of May 7, 8, and 9, 2008.

**4.-** Farid Beirute Brenes, in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General, by means of a brief filed at 15:30 hrs. on May 12, 2008 (visible at folios 21-49), rendered the legal report. In the first place, he considered that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the petitioners have standing to file this proceeding, given that it falls within the legal protection of the environment.

Furthermore, it stated that the fundamental right of access to environmental information held by public authorities has undergone broad and complete legislative development in other jurisdictions, unlike our country, where the Constitutional Chamber has sought, through its case law, to fill the gaps left by the legislator. It indicated that, from the perspective of Public International Law, there exists the so-called “Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or Aarhus Convention (Denmark),” of June 25, 1998, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which in its Article 1 proclaims the existence of the right to enjoy an adequate environment and the duty to respect and protect it—not only for each person in their current dimension as a subject of rights and obligations, but also from the potential perspective of future generations—with the real possibility that each contracting State must guarantee of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters. In that regard, it noted that the statement of purposes of Spanish Law No. 27/2006, of July 18, which regulates the rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (and incorporates Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), exemplarily summarizes the three pillars upon which the Aarhus Convention rests: “(…) 1) The pillar of access to environmental information plays an essential role in the environmental awareness and education of society, constituting an indispensable instrument for intervening knowledgeably in public affairs. It is divided into two parts: the right to seek and obtain information held by public authorities, and the right to receive environmentally relevant information from public authorities, who must collect it and make it public without the need for a prior request. 2) The pillar of public participation in the decision-making process, which extends to three areas of public action: the authorization of certain activities, the approval of plans and programs, and the preparation of general provisions of legal or regulatory rank. 3) The third and final pillar consists of the right of access to justice and aims to guarantee citizens' access to the courts to review decisions that may have potentially violated the rights recognized to them in matters of environmental democracy by the Convention itself. The aim is thus to ensure and strengthen, through the guarantee provided by judicial protection, the effectiveness of the rights that the Aarhus Convention recognizes for all and, therefore, the execution of the Convention itself. Finally, a provision is introduced that would enable the public to initiate administrative or judicial proceedings to challenge any action or omission attributable either to another private party or to a public authority, which constitutes a violation of national environmental legislation (…)” It explained that, in the regulatory context established by the aforementioned convention, the European Union, in order to harmonize community legislation with the stipulations contained therein, issued the important Directive No. 2003/4/EC of January 28, 2003, on public access to environmental information and Directive No. 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 26, 2003, providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. It referred that the first cited Directive highlights in its preamble that it is “necessary to ensure that any natural or legal person has a right of access to environmental information held by public authorities or by other entities on their behalf, without that person being obliged to declare an interest” (Recital 8); likewise, it affirms the need “that public authorities disseminate and make available to the general public, as widely as possible, environmental information, especially by means of information and communication technologies,” for which the future evolution of these technologies should be taken into account (Recital 9). It pointed out that Recital 16 of the cited Directive No. 2003/4/EC includes the following interpretative criterion: “The right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information in specific and clearly defined cases. Grounds for refusal should be interpreted in a restrictive way, whereby the public interest served by disclosure should be weighed against the interest served by the refusal.” It added that the cited Spanish Law No. 27/2006, in its Article 3, indicates the rights regarding access to environmental information that individuals can exercise with respect to public authorities, as follows: 1) The right to access environmental information held by public authorities or by other subjects on their behalf, without being obliged to declare a specific interest, whatever their nationality, domicile, or registered office, 2) the right to be informed of the rights granted by Law No. 27/2006 and to be advised for their correct exercise, 3) the right to be assisted in their search for information, 4) the right to receive the information they request within a period not exceeding 2 months, 5) the right to receive the requested environmental information in the form or format chosen, 6) the right to know the reasons why the information is not provided, wholly or partially, and also those reasons why said information is not provided in the form or format requested, and finally, 7) the right to know the list of fees and prices that, where applicable, are chargeable for receiving the requested information. Correlatively, it stated that Article 5 of the aforementioned Law establishes the following duties for the various Public Administrations: a) To adequately inform the public about the rights granted to them by this Law, as well as the means to exercise them; b) to facilitate information for their correct exercise, as well as advice and guidance to the extent possible; c) to prepare lists of public authorities based on the environmental information held by them, which shall be made publicly accessible; d) to guarantee that their staff assist the public when seeking to access environmental information; e) to promote the use of information and telecommunications technologies to facilitate access to information; and f) to guarantee the principle of agility in the processing and resolution of environmental information requests. In this sense, it argued that the cited regulation adds that public authorities shall ensure that, to the extent of their possibilities, the information collected by them or collected on their behalf is up-to-date, accurate, and comparable; likewise, they shall adopt as many measures as are necessary to make the exercise of the right of access to environmental information effective (e.g., designating units responsible for environmental information, creating registers or lists of environmental information held by public authorities or information points, with clear indications of where it can be found, among others). However, it noted that the right of access to environmental information, like any other fundamental right, encounters limits in its exercise that cannot be transgressed in a State governed by the rule of law. Thus, it indicated that Article 13 of Law No. 27/2006 (reproducing, practically verbatim, the provisions of Article 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC), establishes that not every file or, indeed, not all information directly related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities, under the following terms: “(…) ‘Article 13. Exceptions to the obligation to provide environmental information. 1. Public authorities may refuse requests for environmental information when any of the following circumstances occur: a) That the information requested from the public authority is not held by it or by another entity on its behalf, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 10.2.b). b) That the request is manifestly unreasonable. c) That the request is formulated in an excessively general manner, taking into account the provisions of Article 10.2.a). d) That the request concerns material in the course of completion or unfinished documents or data. The latter shall be understood as those on which the public authority is actively working. If the refusal is based on this ground, the competent public authority must mention in the refusal the authority that is preparing the material and inform the applicant of the estimated time for completing its preparation. e) That the request concerns internal communications, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure. 2. Requests for environmental information may be refused if the disclosure of the requested information could adversely affect any of the following: a) The confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for by a rule with the rank of Law. b) International relations, national defense, or public security. c) Matters or cases subject to judicial proceedings or pending before the courts, the right to effective judicial protection, or the capacity to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation. When the matter or case is subject to judicial proceedings or pending before the courts, the judicial body before which it is being processed must, in any case, be identified. d) The confidentiality of commercial and industrial data, where such confidentiality is provided for by a rule with the rank of Law or by community regulations, in order to protect legitimate economic interests, including the public interest in maintaining statistical confidentiality and tax secrecy. e) Intellectual and industrial property rights. Cases where the holder has consented to its disclosure are excepted. f) The confidential nature of personal data, as regulated in Organic Law 15/1999, of December 13, on the Protection of Personal Data, provided that the interested person concerned has not consented to its processing or disclosure. g) The interests or protection of a third party who has voluntarily supplied the requested information without being legally obliged to do so. Cases where that person has consented to its disclosure are excepted. h) The protection of the environment to which the requested information relates. In particular, that which refers to the location of threatened species or their breeding sites. 3. The exceptions provided for in the preceding paragraphs may be applied in relation to the dissemination obligations referred to in Chapter II of this Title. 4. The grounds for refusal mentioned in this article must be interpreted restrictively. To this end, the public interest served by the disclosure of information shall be weighed against the interest served by its refusal in each specific case. 5. Public authorities may under no circumstances rely on the grounds provided for in paragraph 2, points a), d), f), g), and h) of this article to refuse a request for information relating to emissions into the environment. 6. The refusal to provide all or part of the requested information shall be notified to the applicant, indicating the reasons for the refusal within the time limits set out in Article 10.2.c) (…).’” By virtue of the foregoing, it asserted that in comparative law and, specifically, in European community law, while the essential importance of the right to environmental information is recognized as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment (because its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole), the truth is that the exercise of said fundamental right is also subject to intrinsic limits, and therefore it is not absolute and unlimited. With regard to the Costa Rican sphere, it indicated that the rights to information and public participation in their environmental dimension lack proper regulation. Thus, it has fallen largely upon the Constitutional Court to develop them and outline their content, except for the scattered and unsystematic reference that the legislator has made to some of the basic postulates of these rights in some laws. Thus, it stated that Article 10 of the Biodiversity Law proclaims as its objectives, in its sections 2 and 3, to promote “the active participation of all social sectors in the conservation and ecologically sustainable use of biodiversity, in order to seek social, economic, and cultural sustainability”; and “public education and awareness regarding the conservation and utilization of biodiversity.” For this purpose, its Articles 100 and 101 provide for the application of specific incentives of a tax, technical-scientific, and other nature, for community participation in the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially in areas where endangered, endemic, or rare species have been identified. It then argued that obligations are included for the Public Administration, similar to those indicated in the previous section, such as the duty of the National Council of Conservation Areas to include permanent mechanisms for updated and timely information, both for the bodies of the System and for the rest of the public sector and society (Article 33.4) or the duty of the National Commission for Biodiversity Management to issue general rules that guarantee the country and its inhabitants are recipients of scientific-technical information and cooperation on biodiversity matters (Article 88). For its part, it noted that the final paragraph of Article 2 of the Organic Environmental Law, referring to the principles that inspire said legal text, advocates the implementation by the State of an information system with environmental indicators, intended to measure evolution and correlation with economic and social indicators for the country. Meanwhile, its Article 6 establishes the duty of the State and the municipalities to promote the active and organized participation of the inhabitants of the Republic in decision-making and actions aimed at protecting and improving the environment, for which purpose the Regional Environmental Councils are created (Article 7). While Article 14 of the commented Law contemplates the State's duty to promote the participation of mass media in the process of forming an environmental culture towards the sustainable development of the Nation's inhabitants. It added that, similarly, both the Biodiversity Law and the Organic Environmental Law regulate public participation in environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedures. The first regulation, in its Article 95, imposes the duty on the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) to hold public hearings for information and analysis on the proposed project and its impact on biodiversity when it deems it necessary. For its part, the Organic Environmental Law, more broadly, regulates access and consultation to this type of file, the duties of public authorities to disseminate the list of proposed studies and to make available to any person the public information contained in said files, as well as the active participation of society in the evaluation procedure, as follows: “ARTICLE 22.- Evaluation file. Natural or legal persons, public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, at any stage of the evaluation process and in the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of interested parties shall be included in the file and assessed for the final report. Within five business days following receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat shall send an extract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. Likewise, it shall give wide dissemination, through mass media, to the list of studies submitted for its consideration.” “ARTICLE 23.- Publicity of information. The information contained in the environmental impact assessment file shall be of a public nature and shall be available for consultation by any person or organization. However, interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential, if its publication would affect industrial property rights.” “ARTICLE 24.- Consultation of files. The technical criteria and the weighting percentages for analyzing environmental impact studies by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat must be public knowledge.” Finally, it stated that, completing the triad into which the right under comment is broken down, in its aspect of access to justice in environmental matters, Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law enshrines the popular action, so that any person has standing to bring action in administrative or judicial venues in defense and protection of biodiversity. Consequently, it asserted that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes in favor of every person the right of access to environmental information, with the mere allegation of a diffuse interest in their petition being sufficient. However, it argued that the exercise of this right has a scope or range of action that, on a case-by-case basis, has been determined by the Constitutional Chamber in the absence of a law that systematizes the exceptional cases in which a public authority may legitimately deny access. Thus, it explained that, among those exceptional cases, Judgment No. 10693-02 of 6:20 p.m. on November 7, 2002, mentions the confidentiality inherent to judicial processes, State secrets, and intellectual property rights, which constitute a concretization, in the environmental field, of the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of the right of access to administrative information in general, which have received abundant treatment and which, in turn, are deduced from the harmonious interplay of numerals 24, 27, 28, and 30 of the Political Constitution. Thus, among the former, referring to the proper or essential content of the right (its internal scope), this Court has explained that “the purpose of the right is ‘information on matters of public interest,’” so that when the administrative information sought does not concern a matter of such a nature, the right is undermined and access cannot be granted. A second limit is State secrets, within which it distinguishes the secrecy imposed on public officials “who by reason of the exercise of their functions become aware of a certain type of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see Article 337 of the Penal Code when it typifies and sanctions the crime of ‘divulging secrets’).” Concerning the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, this Court mentions, firstly, those derived from Article 28 of the Constitution: the rights of third parties (the principle of the coexistence of public freedoms), morality, and public order. Secondly, the Right to privacy, which encompasses bank secrecy and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies “regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements,” without prejudice to those cases where a private individual's information held by an administrative organization may have “a clear public dimension and purpose” (which aligns with the provision contained in Article 67 of the Biodiversity Law, which indicates that the information in the Registry of access rights over genetic and biochemical elements shall be of a public nature, “except for industrial secrets, which must be protected by the Registry, unless biosafety reasons require their disclosure”). Likewise, it stated that in terms of Constitutional Vote No. 3074-02, of 3:24 p.m. on April 2, 2002: “(…) the right to privacy constitutes a limit to the right to information because, to the extent that the information concerns matters that are not of public relevance, respect for privacy is imposed and operates as a limit or barrier to the right to information (…)” The third limit concerns the investigation of crimes, “when dealing with criminal investigations conducted by administrative or judicial police bodies, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, the honor, and the privacy of the individuals involved.” (In a similar vein, it stated that one may consult, among others, Judgments Nos. 136-03, 2120-03, 8884-04, 3391-05, 7889-05, 13419-05, 2916-06, 6522-06, and 11206-07). It added that the aforementioned grounds for exception, as stated, have been fully applied in the matters submitted to this constitutional jurisdiction related to the environment, of which a significant sample is a large part of the cited votes, modulating in some cases the scope of those limits due to the delicate and sensitive nature of the matters under discussion, such as public health, biodiversity, and the environment. Thus, it emphasized the content of Votes Nos. 8884-04 and 9753-06. Regarding the challenged regulation, it stated that it reproduces, practically verbatim, the content of the first paragraph of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, thereby making it clear that the challenged regulation enjoys sufficient legal coverage as it is based on a legal-ranking rule. For this reason, it indicated that the plaintiffs are not correct in asserting that the General Law has become outdated for properly addressing or guaranteeing the interests or rights at stake in environmental matters processed in administrative venues. This is because it has been the legislator itself who has come to renovate, so to speak, for environmental law itself, the institutes, guarantees, and principles of the Second Book of the General Law on administrative procedure.

Indeed, it indicated that, on the one hand, article 106 of the Biodiversity Law expressly establishes that, except as specifically regulated otherwise in said law, “for all administrative procedures required by biodiversity management, the ordinary or summary procedure regulated by the General Law of Public Administration shall be followed, as applicable”; while, on the other hand, article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which properly refers to the procedures processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, provides that this collegiate body, in addition to performing its functions subject to the principles of orality, official initiative, speed, and immediacy of evidence, shall adjust its actions to the procedure and operating rules established in that Law and, supplementarily, to the General Law of Public Administration, Book Two, Chapter "Of the Ordinary Procedure." Furthermore, it considered that it must be observed that the final paragraph of article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment presents wording almost identical to that of article 272 of the General Law and, consequently, to that of the challenged article, when specifying the following: “The parties or their representatives and their lawyers shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records containing the investigation of the infractions. They may consult them with no further requirement than proof of their identity or legal capacity.” By virtue of the foregoing, it considered that article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal does not present any defect of unconstitutionality whatsoever. Especially when the Constitutional Chamber has recently reiterated, in Vote No. 1249-07 of 4:13 p.m. on January 31, 2007, in a matter related precisely to public health, the criterion of Judgment No. 02927-03 of 3:31 p.m. on April 10, 2003, by which it is considered that article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration develops article 30 of the Political Constitution, as part of the constitutionality block. Therefore, it explained that it is not appropriate to annul the challenged article, because it finds sufficient legal support in legal-rank norms that, furthermore, belong to the branch of environmental law. For greater abundance, it affirmed that the suppression of the norm in question is not necessary, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access to environmental information fits. Finally, it asserted that the article under discussion does not make any discrimination regarding the possibility given to any lawyer to examine or review these files. In that sense, it stated that the rationale for this measure lies in that of the other procedural norms in force in the Costa Rican legal system, that is, to allow legal professionals to analyze the case in question, so that they may decide whether or not to assume the legal representation of any of the parties involved. This is because the cases submitted for consideration to the Administrative Environmental Tribunal have to do, as indicated in article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, with complaints filed against all persons, public or private, regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the protective legislation for the environment and natural resources, as well as with the determination of indemnities that may arise in relation to the damages produced by these violations of environmental law. That is, it involves administrative sanctioning matter, which, due to the potential negative repercussion that the processing of a procedure of this type may have on the legal sphere of individuals, requires as part of the right of defense that they may be advised by a legal professional. It argued that another compelling reason that justifies that the challenged article—as also does the General Law and the Organic Law of the Environment itself—differentiates the degree of access that a lawyer may have to a file of this nature regarding an ordinary citizen, is that the latter, unlike the former, is not subject to the duty of confidentiality inherent to the professional secrecy that the lawyer must, at all times, respect. This means that the lawyer is compelled not to reveal or divulge private information to which they may have had access; whereas the ordinary citizen is not. For the above reasons, it considered that article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is fully consistent with the constitutionality block in environmental matters.

5.- José Lino Chávez López, in his capacity as President of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (visible on folios 50-61), rendered the mandatory report. He indicated that the article under study has its legal basis in article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this way, he stated that, in accordance with the provisions of article 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, the procedures followed in the Administrative Environmental Tribunal must conform to the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration. He indicated that, in light of what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 14536-05, although the Administrative Environmental Tribunal has the obligation to comply with what is established in article 30 of the Constitution, the fact is that not every document located in a public department is a public document. He added that the cited Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent for the following: a) To hear and resolve, in administrative proceedings, complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of the protective legislation for the environment and natural resources, b) to hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or at the request of a party, complaints regarding active and omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the norms of the protective legislation for the environment and natural resources, and c) to establish, through administrative channels, the indemnities that may arise in relation to damages produced by violations of the protective legislation for the environment and natural resources. In this way, he argued that it is a sanctioning body, which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the ordinary administrative procedure indicated in the General Law of Public Administration, whether or not a violation of any norm of environmental legislation occurred or whether any environmental damage was produced. He explained that its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA), where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the potential social impact of any work, activity, or project. For this reason, he asserted that although Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment establishes the public nature of information, this applies exclusively to the files processed before SETENA. In said Secretariat, a process is carried out to determine the possibility of developing or not a specific work, while in the Environmental Tribunal, the possibility of applying an administrative sanction is heard. However, he stated that in a given case, any person, whether natural or legal, who appears before an administrative file indicating the factual and legal reasons for which they request to be a party to the same, will be considered as an coadjuvant. The foregoing, so that they may state what is appropriate, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings and, if applicable, participate in the oral and private hearing and file the legal appeals. For greater abundance, he indicated that in Opinion No. C-187-2003 of June 23, 2003, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Control Law, indicated the following: “(…) Article 6 of the General Law on Internal Control, No. 8292 of August 27, 2002, provides: 'Confidentiality of complainants and studies that originate the opening of administrative procedures. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the administration, and the internal audit offices shall maintain confidentiality regarding the identity of citizens who file complaints before their offices. The information, documentation, and other evidence from investigations carried out by internal audit offices, the administration, and the Office of the Comptroller General, the results of which may originate the opening of an administrative procedure, shall be confidential during the formulation of the respective report. Once the corresponding report is notified and until the final resolution of the administrative procedure, the information contained in the file shall be classified as confidential information, except for the parties involved, who shall have free access to all documents and evidence existing in the administrative file. For all cases, the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the powers contained in subsection 23) of article 121 of the Political Constitution, may access the reports, documentation, and evidence held by the internal audit offices, the administration, or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.' The guarantee of confidentiality developed by Article 6 has two essential purposes: on the one hand, to ensure the conduct of the investigation, so that it is not obstructed by the disclosure of the data gathered or by persons interested in certain evidence not being considered, and on the other, to preserve the rights of those investigated and the complainants. Rights that could be seriously harmed by the disclosure of the very fact of the investigation and of the data provided during its conduct. Data that could be subject to incorrect or biased interpretations by third parties. Now, confidentiality is guaranteed until the respective report is prepared. The fact that reference is made to the notification of the corresponding report gives the idea that outside the control office conducting the report, the information, documentation, 'evidence' should not be known by other persons. The conclusion of the report does not determine the public nature of those elements. Indeed, even when the report gives rise to an administrative procedure, the information remains confidential except for the parties. Access by the parties is part of the guarantees of due process. To the general provision of Article 6 is added what is provided in article 32 of the Law: the duty of the officials of the internal audit office to maintain confidentiality regarding the information to which they have access, as well as the prohibition of revealing to third parties unrelated to the matters dealt with in the reports, information about the audits or special audit studies being carried out, 'nor information about that which determines possible civil, administrative, or eventually criminal liability of the officials of the entities and bodies subject to this Law.' A precept that reaffirms the need to preserve the rights of those investigated (…)." By virtue of the foregoing, he stated that although the constitutional right of free access to administrative departments exists for the purpose of obtaining information on matters of public interest, as provided in article 30 of the Constitution, it is also true that access to the files may be had by the parties involved in the process, the lawyers of the parties, law students duly authorized by the respective universities, or the person with standing to act in the proceeding. Likewise, he stated that the right to information is limited by the provisions of article 24 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy and freedom, as well as the secrecy of communications. This last guarantee protects the confidentiality of private documents and information, prevents individuals from accessing them, and, in turn, prohibits institutions from providing them to third parties. Fundamental values that are also protected in Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in article 13, subsection 2), paragraph a) of that same instrument. Under such arguments, he considered that article 21 of Decree No. 34136-MINAE, which derives from article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, does not violate any fundamental principle or right. He requested that the action filed be dismissed.

6.- In the processing of the case, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. Pursuant to article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, a prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole. On this point, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 8239-01 of 4:07 p.m. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:

"(…) According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the norm in question must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. (…) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (…) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, regarding them, specific persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less the same for all, for which reason it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—because they are common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity. (…) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (…)." In the present matter, the claimants allege their standing through abstract constitutionality review and invoke the defense of diffuse interests, since they appear in protection of the environment. Consequently, such circumstances configure in favor of the petitioners a direct standing for the filing of the present proceeding by invoking the defense of interests that concern the national community as a whole, such as the right of access to that information related to the environment. For the foregoing, the cognizance and resolution of the present action of unconstitutionality through abstract review is admissible.

II.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. The claimants question article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, considering that it presents, concretely, the following defects of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of articles 30 and 50 of the Political Constitution, given that it limits the possibility for any person to have access to a file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints, and b) breach of article 33 of the Constitution, since it establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, allowing only any lawyer, and not all citizens, to have access to the referred file.

III.- CHALLENGED NORM. In the present action of unconstitutionality, article 21 of the Regulations on Procedures of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, Executive Decree No. 34136-MINAE of June 20, 2007, is questioned, a precept that establishes the following:

"Article 21.—Access to the administrative file. The parties and their representatives and any lawyer shall have the right at any stage of the procedure to examine, read, and photocopy any piece of the file, as well as to request certification thereof, with the exceptions indicated in article 273 of the General Law of Public Administration." IV.- LIMITS ON THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION. Although the essential importance of the right of access to information, and in this case, to environmental information, is recognized in our legal system as an instrument to guarantee adequate protection of the environment—since its conservation is an obligation shared by public authorities and society as a whole—, the truth is that the exercise of said right is also subject to limits. It is impossible to assert, regarding the right of access to environmental information, an absolute right, since, like the rest of rights, it possesses a relative character. In such a way that the limits imposed on said right are justified insofar as there will be situations in which transparency or publicity may cause serious harm or disruptions to the general or particular interests that society deems worthy of protection or prevailing. Hence, said right must yield to the demands of peaceful and democratic coexistence, a priority objective of society and its political organization, and, of course, also to the right to privacy and confidentiality of the rest of the citizens. From that perspective, it is feasible to note, in accordance, in turn, with the provisions of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters or the Aarhus Convention, adopted at the Ministerial Conference "Environment for Europe", held in Denmark on June 25, 1998, that a request for environmental information may be denied in the following cases: a) When the request refers to documents that are in the process of being drafted, and b) when the disclosure of such information would have adverse effects on the following aspects: b.1.) The proper conduct of justice, the possibility for any person to be tried fairly, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, and b.2.) the confidential nature of personal data and files regarding a natural person if that person has not consented to the disclosure of that information to the public, when such confidential nature of this type of information is provided for by domestic law.

V.- DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION AD EXTRA AND AD INTRA. A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative procedure. The first is exercised uti universi, that is, by any person or citizen interested in accessing certain administrative information. By virtue of the foregoing, it is said that article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. The second, for its part, is exercised uti singuli, that is, solely by the interested party or its representative in a specific and concrete administrative procedure. This latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of Access to the File and its Pieces", Third Title of Book Two in articles 272 to 274. In turn, this right may be exercised at any stage of the administrative procedure and refers to documents in the process of being processed within the general framework of the latter; that is, to the file that materializes the procedure in which one is a party. On this point, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Vote No. 2120-03 of 1:30 p.m.

of March 14, 2003, authored by the presiding Magistrate, held as follows:

"(…) **III.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –inside– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or individual interested in accessing specific administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of access to the file and its pieces", Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for more than fifty years since the constitutional text came into force. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral, thus, for example, Law of the National Archive System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it regarding documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies –passive subjects– that make up the National Archive System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body) (…)".

Subsequently, in Voto No. 4637-04 of 12:15 hrs. of April 30, 2004, this Chamber held as pertinent:

"(…) V.- (…) A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –inside– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or individual interested in accessing specific administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure –uti singuli–. Although this latter right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled "Of access to the file and its pieces", Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is grounded in Article 30 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, enjoys the mechanisms of guarantee, protection, and defense provided for in the fundamental text (Article 48 of the Political Constitution) and developed by the procedural law of this jurisdiction (articles 29 and following). This corollary is imposed when considering the clearly insufficient, slow, and cumbersome nature of the only protection mechanism, established at the infra-constitutional level, for the right of access to administrative information ad intra of an administrative procedure. Indeed, Article 274 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that against the resolution denying knowledge and access to a piece of a file, the ordinary remedies provided for by that normative body are available, that is, revocation, appeal, and, eventually, in the case of the superior authority, reconsideration, without providing an expeditious and swift route when the remedies are declared without merit, which makes it clearly insufficient by obliging the petitioner to go to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution) to seek the annulment of the resolution that denied access to the administrative file, a solution that entails a high economic and temporal cost for the aggrieved party and that is, by all accounts, belated (…)".

**VI.- ON THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 30 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** The plaintiffs argue that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE violates the provisions of constitutional Articles 30 and 50, given that it limits the possibility for any person to access an administrative file processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal that contains public information of national relevance and interest, such as environmental complaints. Indeed, as argued by the interested parties, according to the provisions of Article 50 of the Magna Carta, the Costa Rican legal system recognizes, in favor of every person, a broad right to receive and access public information related to the environment. Similarly, in parallel, the duty of the Public Administration to facilitate such information and make it available to whoever requires it is established. However, the exercise of said right, as noted supra, cannot be conceived in an absolute manner, but rather, on the contrary, in a limited way and subject to a series of exceptions, so not all information related to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be provided by public authorities. It is for this reason, in the opinion of this Chamber and, in accordance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, that environmental information may be denied when, for example, documents that are still being drafted are requested or when it is considered that the disclosure of such data may produce unfavorable effects on the proper administration of justice, the possibility that every person may be judged equitably, or the capacity of a public authority to conduct a criminal or disciplinary investigation, as well as on the confidential nature of data and personal files regarding a natural person who has not consented to its publicity. Hence, it is important and, above all, reasonable, to respect and protect the privacy and confidentiality, as well as the presumption of innocence, of all those interested parties in a particular administrative procedure. Thus, it must be observed that the right to privacy, indicated in Article 24 of the constitution, has been defined as the recognition granted to the human person of a zone or sphere of their own exempt from external interference (protection shield) and regarding which they may prohibit any third party from intervening. Thus, it allows the individual to dispose of personal information by denying or granting access; that is, it concerns a freedom of informational self-determination. Precisely for this reason, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the rights to privacy, honor, and image constitute limits to the right to information. Likewise, one of the basic pillars of the Rule of Law and, consequently, of Administrative sanctioning law, is the presumption of innocence recognized in Article 39, paragraph 1, of our Political Constitution, which means that any person who is indicted in a criminal process, or **against whom an administrative disciplinary or sanctioning procedure is being pursued,** is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, respectively, by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata or a final act issued observing due process and the right of defense. For the present process, it must be taken into consideration that the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which, in accordance with Article 111 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is competent, among other things, to: a) Hear and resolve, in administrative proceedings, the complaints filed against all persons, public or private, for violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources; b) hear, process, and resolve, ex officio or upon request of a party, complaints regarding active or omissive behaviors that violate or threaten to violate the rules of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources; and c) establish, in administrative proceedings, the indemnities that may originate in relation to damages caused by violations of legislation protecting the environment and natural resources. Thus, **it is a body that exercises a clear sanctioning power,** which hears a complaint and determines, through the application of the respective procedure, whether or not a violation of any rule of legislation occurred or whether any environmental damage was caused. Consequently, its nature is different from that of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, where citizen participation is fundamental to determine the eventual environmental impact of some work, activity, or project. Under such considerations, it must be observed that the article challenged in the present action of unconstitutionality, as it belongs to the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the exercise of the sanctioning power that said Tribunal exercises against subjects of public and private law, upon complaints filed for infringement of the environment; for which reason the procedures heard there are evidently different from the Environmental Impact Assessment evaluation processes, in which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Environment, unrestricted access to the file is guaranteed, because the information contained is of a public nature and concerns the community. Hence, in the opinion of this Chamber, the limits indicated supra are fully applicable in the processing of administrative procedures followed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. This, since as long as said instance has not definitively decided a specific matter, the status of the files is in the investigation stage and, therefore, the information contained therein is considered confidential in nature. In this sense, it should be noted that information of public or general environmental interest, which must be fully available to any person and, moreover, which Public Administrations must provide immediately, is one thing, and information relating to a complaint attributed to a natural or legal person for violating environmental legislation and which is contained in an administrative file is another, in which case the standing for that right of access **ad intra to the procedure** must be governed by the common and general rules, that is, only the interested parties in that procedure, and not, as the plaintiffs intend, any person or group. In any case, it must be considered, as stated by the President of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, that **any person, whether natural or legal,** who appears in any administrative procedure processed before said instance indicating the factual and legal reasons why they request to be a party to it, shall be considered as an adjuvant, in order to state what is pertinent, provide evidence, participate in the different administrative proceedings, and if applicable, participate even in the oral and private hearing. Hence, it is important to differentiate the participation that a specific person may have in procedures aimed at developing plans, programs, and policies on environmental matters, as well as normative instruments of an environmental nature such as regulations and decrees, from that which they may have in sanctioning-type procedures, which, as stated, is resolved by the figure of adjuvancy or adhesive intervention. Likewise, it must be observed that Article 21 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE is a reiteration of the provisions of Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, which, in turn, according to the provisions of precept 106 of the Organic Law of the Environment, is applicable to this type of procedure, that is, those of a sanctioning nature processed by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. Similarly, Article 108 of the Organic Law of the Environment should not be overlooked, since its final paragraph presents wording almost identical to Article 272 of the General Law of Public Administration and, consequently, to the questioned article, by establishing the following: "(…) The parties or their representatives and their attorneys shall have access to the proceedings related to the complaint processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, including the records where the investigation of the infractions is recorded. They may consult them with no further requirement than proof of their identity or legal capacity." In such a way that the principle of legal reserve in the matter of regulating the regime of fundamental rights (articles 19 of the General Law of Public Administration and 28 of the Political Constitution) is fully respected. From that perspective, this Constitutional Court does not consider that Article 21 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, on this particular point, presents any vice of unconstitutionality.

**VII.-** However, in the opinion of this Chamber, such limitations and exceptions set forth in the preceding recital operate except when the sanctioning administrative file contains some information (e.g., specific pieces such as reports or documents) of public and general interest that is not found in any database, archive, or registry of the Public Administration, in which case any citizen may exercise the right ad extra because such data is not available in any other base. Consequently, **only in said cases,** the Administration, that is, for the process under study, the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, is compelled to provide information, concomitantly withholding the rest of the administrative file. Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court, as was set forth in the preceding recital, reiterates that it is not necessary to annul Article 21 in question, since the latter can be perfectly applied by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal within the limits in which the legitimate exercise of the right of access ad intra in an environmental sanctioning procedure fits. In such a way that, the requirement of being an interested party or their representative to be able to consult a file held by the aforementioned Tribunal will gain importance only at the moment one wishes to access information that may, for example, be considered confidential, that violates privacy, honor, or the presumption of innocence.

**VIII.- REGARDING THE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY.** On the other hand, the petitioners allege that Article 33 of the constitution is violated, since, in their opinion, the challenged Article 21 establishes a limitation and difference based on profession, which allows only any attorney, and not all citizens, to access the files of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. However, this Court, in accordance with what was stated in recital VII of this judgment, does not find that the interested parties are correct in their argument, and, in that sense, reiterates that, by virtue of the sanctioning nature of the administrative procedures processed before the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and, above all, in consideration of the content of the limits established on the right of access ad intra in environmental sanctioning procedures, only the interested parties, representatives, and attorneys can have the right to be provided with such data. It must be taken into consideration that the possibility granted to attorneys to access administrative files in process, provided for by articles 272 of the General Law of Public Administration, 108, final paragraph, of the Organic Law of the Environment, and the challenged regulatory rule, has an objective and reasonable justification that lies in the need for a legal professional to review an administrative file before assuming the technical defense of any of the interested parties, legal representation that, at the same time, has profound constitutional roots when the individual chooses to have it.

**IX.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the foregoing, it is required to declare the action of unconstitutionality filed without merit.

**POR TANTO:** The action of unconstitutionality is declared without merit.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ricardo Guerrero P.

Clb/es/801 **EXPEDIENTE N°** **08-004072-0007-CO** Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional

hmendez hmendez 2 0 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 10 10365 57010 Poder Judicial 475 134 67241 12.00 21 false false false ES-CR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 *080040720007CO* Res. Nº 2010007789 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y cero minutos del veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por ALVARO SAGOT RODRÍGUEZ, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 2-365-227 y DANIELA CORDERO CAMPOS, portadora de la cédula de identidad No. 2-639-350, contra el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007. Intervienen también en la acción, LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA y EL TRIBUNAL AMBIENTAL ADMINISTRATIVO.

10/1957

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por memorial presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 12:02 hrs. de 2 de marzo de 2008 (visible a folios 1-9), los accionantes solicitaron la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007, por cuanto, éste último establece que, únicamente, las partes y sus representantes, así como cualquier abogado, tendrán derecho, en cualquier fase del procedimiento, a examinar, leer y fotocopiar el expediente. Consideraron, en primer término, que la norma bajo estudio vulnera el numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, toda vez que, impide la posibilidad que cualquier persona pueda tener acceso a un expediente que contiene información sobre denuncias ambientales, el cual es de relevancia e interés nacional, pues, de conformidad con la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, lo que investiga el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo constituye delitos de carácter social y, en ese tanto, toda la información debe ser pública y no se puede limitar. Explicaron, que en los casos bajo estudio no pueden imponerse restricciones de acceso a la información pública, dado que, si bien se juzga a una persona o grupo, la relevancia de lo ambiental supera cualquier derecho particular -aunque imponga sanciones administrativas-. Adujeron, que, en este caso, es vía reglamento que se limita a los periodistas o a diferentes organizaciones ambientalistas el acceso a los expedientes para conocer las denuncias, salvo que sean parte interesada o un profesional en Derecho, lo cual estiman inconstitucional, por cuanto, violenta el principio de democracia participativa. Manifestaron, que el propio artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, crea la acción popular en materia ambiental que expone un acceso irrestricto a procesos administrativos y judiciales donde se discutan violaciones que versen sobre ese particular. Aseveraron, que al permitir que cualquier abogado pueda tener acceso al expediente y, paralelamente, impedir que un ciudadano común lo haga, se establece una limitación y diferencia en razón de la profesión, lo cual contraviene lo establecido en el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política. En consecuencia, estimaron quebrantado lo dispuesto en los numerales 30, 33 y 50 de la Carta Fundamental, así como el principio 10 de la Declaración de Río; el principio 19 de la Declaración de Estocolmo; el artículo IV. 13, de la Carta de la Tierra y el artículo 14 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Finalmente y, a efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, señalaron que acuden a este Tribunal Constitucional en virtud de la defensa de intereses difusos -derecho de acceso a la información sobre asuntos ambientales-, contemplada en el numeral 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Solicitaron que se declare con lugar la acción planteada.

2.- Por resolución de la Presidencia de la Sala de las 14:50 hrs. de 18 de abril de 2008 (visible a folios 15-16), se le dio curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.

3.- Los avisos de Ley fueron publicados en los Boletines Judiciales Nos. 87, 88 y 89 de los días 7, 8 y 9 de mayo de 2008.

4.- Farid Beirute Brenes, en su condición de Procurador General Adjunto, mediante libelo presentado a las 15:30 hrs. de 12 de mayo de 2008 (visible a folios 21-49), rindió el informe de ley. En primer término, estimó que, de conformidad con lo estipulado en el artículo 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, los accionantes se encuentran legitimados para interponer el presente proceso, toda vez que, el mismo se enmarca en la protección jurídica del ambiente. De otra parte, manifestó que el derecho fundamental de acceso a la información medioambiental que se encuentra en poder de las autoridades públicas, ha tenido un amplio y completo desarrollo legislativo en otras latitudes, a diferencia de nuestro país, en el que por la vía jurisprudencial la Sala Constitucional ha procurado llenar los vacíos que ha dejado el legislador. Indicó, que, desde la perspectiva del Derecho Internacional Público, se cuenta con la denominada “Convención sobre el acceso a la información, la participación del público en la toma de decisiones y el acceso a la justicia en asuntos ambientales o Convención de Aarhus (Dinamarca)”, de 25 de junio de 1998, de la Comisión Económica para Europa de Naciones Unidas, la cual en su artículo 1° proclama la existencia del derecho a disfrutar de un medio ambiente adecuado y el deber de respetarlo y protegerlo -no sólo de cada persona en su dimensión actual como sujeto de derechos y obligaciones, sino, también, desde la perspectiva potencial de las generaciones futuras-, con la posibilidad real que ha de garantizar cada Estado contratante de acceso a la información ambiental, participación del público en la toma de decisiones y el propio acceso a la justicia en los asuntos relacionados con el ambiente. En ese sentido, señaló que en la exposición de motivos de la Ley Española No. 27/2006, del 18 de julio, por la que se regulan los derechos de acceso a la información, de participación pública y de acceso a la justicia en materia de medio ambiente (e incorpora las Directivas 2003/4/CE y 2003/35/CE), se resumen de manera ejemplar los tres pilares sobre los que se asienta el Convenio de Aarhus: “(…) 1) El pilar de acceso a la información medioambiental desempeña un papel esencial en la concienciación y educación ambiental de la sociedad, constituyendo un instrumento indispensable para poder intervenir con conocimiento de causa en los asuntos públicos. Se divide en dos partes: el derecho a buscar y obtener información que esté en poder de las autoridades públicas, y el derecho a recibir información ambientalmente relevante por parte de las autoridades públicas, que deben recogerla y hacerla pública sin necesidad de que medie una petición previa. 2) El pilar de participación del público en el proceso de toma de decisiones, que se extiende a tres ámbitos de actuación pública: la autorización de determinadas actividades, la aprobación de planes y programas y la elaboración de disposiciones de carácter general de rango legal o reglamentario. 3) El tercer y último pilar está constituido por el derecho de acceso a la justicia y tiene por objeto garantizar el acceso de los ciudadanos a los tribunales para revisar las decisiones que potencialmente hayan podido violar los derechos que en materia de democracia ambiental les reconoce el propio Convenio. Se pretende así asegurar y fortalecer, a través de la garantía que dispensa la tutela judicial, la efectividad de los derechos que el Convenio de Aarhus reconoce a todos y, por ende, la propia ejecución del Convenio. Finalmente, se introduce una previsión que habilitaría al público a entablar procedimientos administrativos o judiciales para impugnar cualquier acción u omisión imputable, bien a otro particular, bien a una autoridad pública, que constituya una vulneración de la legislación ambiental nacional (…)”. Explicó, que en el contexto normativo que fijó el convenio anterior, la Unión Europea, a fin de armonizar la legislación comunitaria con las estipulaciones contenidas en aquél, emitió la importante Directiva No. 2003/4/CE de 28 de enero de 2003, relativa al acceso del público a la información medioambiental y la Directiva No. 2003/35/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo de 26 de mayo de 2003, mediante la que se establecen medidas para la participación del público en determinados planes y programas relacionados con el medio ambiente y por la que se modifican, en lo que se refiere a la participación pública y el acceso a la justicia, las Directivas Nos. 85/337/CEE y 96/61/CE. Refirió, que la primera Directiva citada, destaca en su preámbulo que es “necesario garantizar que toda persona física o jurídica tenga derecho de acceso a la información medioambiental que obre en poder de las autoridades públicas de otras entidades en su nombre sin que dicha persona se vea obligada a declarar un interés determinado” (considerando 8°); del mismo modo que se afirma la necesidad “que las autoridades públicas difundan y pongan a disposición del público en general, de la forma más amplia posible la información medioambiental, especialmente por medio de las tecnologías de la información y de las comunicaciones”, para lo cual deberá tenerse en cuenta la evolución futura que vayan a tener estas tecnologías (considerado 9°). Apuntó, que el considerando 16 de la citada Directiva No. 2003/4/CE, recoge el siguiente criterio interpretativo: “El derecho a la información significa que la divulgación de la información debe ser la norma general y que debe permitirse que las autoridades públicas denieguen una solicitud de información medioambiental en casos concretos claramente definidos. Los motivos de denegación deben interpretarse de manera restrictiva, de tal modo que el interés público atendido por la divulgación de la información debe ponderarse con el interés atendido por la denegación de la divulgación”. Añadió, que la citada Ley Española No. 27/2006 en su artículo 3° señala los derechos en materia de acceso a la información ambiental que pueden ejercer los administrados con respecto a las autoridades públicas, de la siguiente manera: 1) Derecho a acceder a la información ambiental que obre en poder de las autoridades públicas o en el de otros sujetos en su nombre, sin que para ello estén obligados a declarar un interés determinado, cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad, domicilio o sede, 2) derecho a ser informados de los derechos que le otorga la Ley No. 27/2006 y a ser asesorados para su correcto ejercicio, 3) derecho a ser asistidos en su búsqueda de información, 4) derecho a recibir la información que soliciten en un plazo que no podrá exceder de los 2 meses, 5) derecho a recibir la información ambiental solicitada en la forma o formato elegidos, 6) derecho a conocer los motivos por los cuales no se les facilita la información, total o parcialmente, y también aquellos por los cuales no se les facilita dicha información en la forma o formato solicitados y, finalmente, 7) derecho a conocer el listado de las tasas y precios que, en su caso, sean exigibles para la recepción de la información solicitada. Correlativamente, manifestó que el artículo 5° de la Ley supra referida, establece como deber de las distintas Administraciones Públicas lo siguiente: a) Informar al público de manera adecuada sobre los derechos que les otorga esa Ley, así como de las vías para ejercitarlos; b) facilitar información para su correcto ejercicio, así como consejo y asesoramiento en la medida en que resulte posible; c) elaborar listas de autoridades públicas en atención a la información ambiental que obre en su poder, las cuales se harán públicamente accesibles; d) garantizar que su personal asista al público cuando trate de acceder a la información ambiental; e) fomentar el uso de tecnologías de la información y de las telecomunicaciones para facilitar el acceso a la información y f) garantizar el principio de agilidad en la tramitación y resolución de las solicitudes de información ambiental. En ese sentido, adujo que la norma de cita agrega que las autoridades públicas velarán porque, en la medida de sus posibilidades, la información recogida por ellas o la recogida en su nombre esté actualizada, sea precisa y susceptible de comparación, asimismo adoptarán cuantas medidas sean necesarias para hacer efectivo el ejercicio del derecho de acceso a la información ambiental (v. gr. designando unidades responsables de información ambiental, creando registros o listas de la información ambiental que obre en poder de las autoridades públicas o puntos de información, con indicaciones claras sobre dónde se puede encontrar, entre otras). Sin embargo, señaló que el derecho de acceso a la información ambiental encuentra, como todo otro derecho fundamental, límites en su ejercicio que en un Estado de Derecho no se pueden transgredir. De ese modo, indicó que el artículo 13 de la Ley No. 27/2006 (reproduciendo, prácticamente, en su literalidad lo que al efecto dispone el artículo 4° de la Directiva 2003/4/CE), estatuye que no todo expediente o bien, no toda información relacionada de forma directa con el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, puede ser facilitada por las autoridades públicas, bajo los siguientes términos: “(…) “Artículo 13. Excepciones a la obligación de facilitar la información ambiental. 1. Las autoridades públicas podrán denegar las solicitudes de información ambiental cuando concurra cualquiera de las circunstancias que se indican a continuación: a) Que la información solicitada a la autoridad pública no obre en poder de ésta o en el de otra entidad en su nombre, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 10.2.b). b) Que la solicitud sea manifiestamente irrazonable. c) Que la solicitud esté formulada de manera excesivamente general, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el artículo 10.2.a). d) Que la solicitud se refiera a material en curso de elaboración o a documentos o datos inconclusos. Por estos últimos se entenderán aquellos sobre los que la autoridad pública esté trabajando activamente. Si la denegación se basa en este motivo, la autoridad pública competente deberá mencionar en la denegación la autoridad que está preparando el material e informar al solicitante acerca del tiempo previsto para terminar su elaboración. e) Que la solicitud se refiera a comunicaciones internas, teniendo en cuenta el interés público atendido por la revelación. 2. Las solicitudes de información ambiental podrán denegarse si la revelación de la información solicitada puede afectar negativamente a cualquiera de los extremos que se enumeran a continuación: a) A la confidencialidad de los procedimientos de las autoridades públicas, cuando tal confidencialidad esté prevista en una norma con rango de Ley. b) A las relaciones internacionales, a la defensa nacional o a la seguridad pública. c) A causas o asuntos sujetos a procedimiento judicial o en trámite ante los tribunales, al derecho de tutela judicial efectiva o a la capacidad para realizar una investigación de índole penal o disciplinaria. Cuando la causa o asunto estén sujetos a procedimiento judicial o en trámite ante los tribunales, deberá, en todo caso, identificarse el órgano judicial ante el que se tramita. d) A la confidencialidad de datos de carácter comercial e industrial, cuando dicha confidencialidad esté prevista en una norma con rango de Ley o en la normativa comunitaria, a fin de proteger intereses económicos legítimos, incluido el interés público de mantener la confidencialidad estadística y el secreto fiscal. e) A los derechos de propiedad intelectual e industrial. Se exceptúan los supuestos en los que el titular haya consentido en su divulgación. f) Al carácter confidencial de los datos personales, tal y como se regulan en la Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, siempre y cuando la persona interesada a quien conciernan no haya consentido en su tratamiento o revelación. g) A los intereses o a la protección de un tercero que haya facilitado voluntariamente la información solicitada sin estar obligado a ello por la legislación vigente. Se exceptúan los supuestos en los que la persona hubiese consentido su divulgación. h) A la protección del medio ambiente al que se refiere la información solicitada. En particular, la que se refiera a la localización de las especies amenazadas o a la de sus lugares de reproducción. 3. Las excepciones previstas en los apartados anteriores se podrán aplicar en relación con las obligaciones de difusión contempladas en el capítulo II de este Título. 4. Los motivos de denegación mencionados en este artículo deberán interpretarse de manera restrictiva. Para ello, se ponderará en cada caso concreto el interés público atendido con la divulgación de una información con el interés atendido con su denegación. 5. Las autoridades públicas no podrán en ningún caso ampararse en los motivos previstos en el apartado 2, letras a), d), f), g) y h) de este artículo, para denegar una solicitud de información relativa a emisiones en el medio ambiente. 6. La negativa a facilitar la totalidad o parte de la información solicitada se notificará al solicitante indicando los motivos de la denegación en los plazos contemplados en el artículo 10.2.c) (…)”. En virtud de lo anterior, aseveró que en el derecho comparado y, en concreto, en el derecho comunitario europeo, si bien se reconoce la importancia esencial del derecho a la información ambiental como un instrumento para garantizar la adecuada protección del medio ambiente (debido a que su conservación es una obligación que comparten los poderes públicos y la sociedad en su conjunto), lo cierto es que, también, el ejercicio de dicho derecho fundamental está sujeto a límites intrínsecos, por lo que no es absoluto e ilimitado. En lo tocante al ámbito costarricense, indicó que los derechos a la información y a la participación pública en su dimensión ambiental carecen de una debida regulación. De manera tal que, ha sido sobre el Tribunal Constitucional que ha recaído, en mayor parte, la labor de desarrollarlos y de perfilar su contenido, salvo por la referencia dispersa y asistemática que el legislador ha hecho de alguno de los postulados básicos de estos derechos en algunas leyes. Así, manifestó que el artículo 10 de la Ley de Biodiversidad proclama como sus objetivos, en sus apartados 2° y 3°, el promover “la participación activa de todos los sectores sociales en la conservación y el uso ecológicamente sostenible de la biodiversidad, para procurar la sostenibilidad social, económica y cultural”; y “la educación y la conciencia pública sobre la conservación y la utilización de la biodiversidad”. Para tal efecto, sus artículos 100 y 101 prevén la aplicación de incentivos específicos de carácter tributario, técnico-científico y de otra índole, a la participación comunitaria en la conservación y el uso sostenible de la diversidad biológica, especialmente, en áreas donde se hayan identificado especies en peligro de extinción, endémicas o raras. Luego, argumentó que se incluyen obligaciones a cargo de la Administración pública, similares a las indicadas en el epígrafe anterior, como el deber del Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación de incluir mecanismos permanentes de información actualizada y oportuna, tanto para los órganos del Sistema, como para el resto del sector público y la sociedad (artículo 33.4) o de la Comisión Nacional para la Gestión de la Biodiversidad de dictar las normas generales que garanticen, al país y sus habitantes, ser destinatarios de información y cooperación científico-técnica en materia de biodiversidad (artículo 88). Por su parte, apuntó que el párrafo final del artículo 2° de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, referido a los principios que inspiran dicho texto legal, propugna la puesta en práctica por parte del Estado de un sistema de información con indicadores ambientales, destinados a medir la evolución y la correlación con los indicadores económicos y sociales para el país. En tanto que su artículo 6° establece el deber de éste y de las municipalidades de fomentar la participación activa y organizada de los habitantes de la República en la toma de decisiones y acciones tendentes a proteger y mejorar el ambiente, para lo cual se crean los Consejos Regionales Ambientales (artículo 7°). Mientras que el artículo 14 de la Ley de comentario, contempla el deber del Estado de fomentar la participación de los medios de comunicación colectiva en el proceso de formación de una cultura ambiental hacia el desarrollo sostenible de los habitantes de la Nación. Añadió, que, de igual manera, tanto la Ley de Biodiversidad, como la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, regulan la participación pública en los procedimientos de evaluación de impacto ambiental. La primera norma en su artículo 95 impone el deber a la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental de realizar audiencias públicas de información y análisis sobre el proyecto propuesto y su impacto en la biodiversidad cuando lo considere necesario. Por su parte, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, de forma más amplia, regula el acceso y consulta a esta clase de expedientes, los deberes de las autoridades públicas de difundir el listado de estudios propuestos y de poner a disposición de cualquier persona la información de carácter público que contengan dichos expedientes, así como la participación activa de la sociedad en el procedimiento de evaluación, de la siguiente manera: “ARTICULO 22.- Expediente de la evaluación Las personas, físicas o jurídicas, públicas o privadas, tendrán el derecho a ser escuchadas por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, en cualquier etapa del proceso de evaluación y en la fase operativa de la obra o el proyecto. Las observaciones de los interesados serán incluidas en el expediente y valoradas para el informe final. Dentro de los cinco días hábiles siguientes al recibo de una evaluación de impacto ambiental, la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental remitirá un extracto de ella a las municipalidades en cuya jurisdicción se realizará la obra, la actividad o el proyecto. Asimismo, le dará profusa divulgación, por los medios de comunicación colectiva, a la lista de estudios sometidos a su consideración.” “ARTICULO 23.- Publicidad de la información. La información contenida en el expediente de la evaluación de impacto ambiental será de carácter público y estará disponible para ser consultada por cualquier persona u organización. No obstante, los interesados podrán solicitar que se mantenga en reserva información integrada al estudio, si de publicarse afectare derechos de propiedad industrial.” “ARTICULO 24.- Consulta de expedientes. Los criterios técnicos y los porcentajes de ponderación para analizar los estudios de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, deben ser de conocimiento público.”. Finalmente, manifestó que, completando la tríada en que se descompone el derecho de comentario, en su vertiente de acceso a la justicia en materia ambiental, el artículo 105 de la Ley de Biodiversidad consagra la acción popular, de forma que toda persona está legitimada para accionar en sede administrativa o jurisdiccional, en defensa y protección de la biodiversidad. En consecuencia, aseveró que el ordenamiento costarricense reconoce a favor de toda persona, el derecho de acceso a la información ambiental, bastando para esto la alegación de un interés difuso en su petición. No obstante, adujo que el ejercicio de ese derecho tiene un alcance o un rango de acción que, casuísticamente, ha venido siendo determinado por Sala Constitucional a falta de una ley que sistematice los casos de excepción en que la autoridad pública, legítimamente, puede denegar su acceso. Así, explicó que, entre esos supuestos de excepción, la Sentencia No. 10693-02 de las 18:20 hrs. de 7 de noviembre de 2002 menciona la confidencialidad propia de los procesos judiciales, los secretos de Estado y los derechos de propiedad intelectual, los cuales vienen a ser una concretización, en el ámbito ambiental, de los límites intrínsecos y extrínsecos del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa en general, que han recibido un abundante tratamiento y que, a su vez, se deducen del juego armónico de los numerales 24, 27, 28 y 30 de la Constitución Política. De manera que, entre los primeros, referidos al contenido propio o esencial del derecho (su ámbito interno), ese Tribunal ha explicado que el “fin del derecho es la "información sobre asuntos de interés público", de modo que, cuando la información administrativa que se busca no versa sobre un extremo de tal naturaleza, el derecho se ve enervado y no se puede acceder. Un segundo límite son los secretos de Estado, dentro los cuales distingue el secreto impuesto a los funcionarios públicos “quienes por motivo del ejercicio de sus funciones conocen cierto tipo de información, respecto de la cual deben guardar un deber de sigilo y reserva (vid. artículo 337 del Código Penal al tipificar y sancionar el delito de "divulgación de secretos)”. En lo concerniente a las limitaciones o límites extrínsecos del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, ese Tribunal menciona, en primer lugar, los derivados del artículo 28 constitucional: el derecho de terceros (el principio de la coexistencia de las libertades públicas), la moral y el orden público. En segundo término, el Derecho a la intimidad que abarca al secreto bancario y al secreto industrial, comercial o económico de las empresas “acerca de determinadas ideas, productos o procedimientos industriales y de sus estados financieros, crediticios y tributarios”, sin perjuicio de aquellos supuestos en que la información de un particular que posea una organización administrativa, puede tener “una clara dimensión y vocación pública” (lo cual se ajusta con la previsión que contiene el artículo 67 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, que indica que la información del Registro de derechos de acceso sobre elementos genéticos y bioquímicos será de carácter público, “excepto los secretos industriales, que deberán ser protegidos por el Registro, salvo que razones de bioseguridad obliguen a darles publicidad”). Asimismo, manifestó que en los términos del Voto constitucional No. 3074-02, de las 15:24 hrs. de 2 de abril de 2002: “(…) el derecho a la intimidad se constituye en un límite para el derecho a la información por cuanto, en la medida en que la información verse sobre asuntos que no sean de relevancia pública, se impone el respeto a la intimidad y opera como límite o barrera frente al derecho a la información (…)”. El tercer límite tiene que ver con la averiguación de los delitos, “cuando se trata de investigaciones criminales efectuadas por cuerpos policiales administrativos o judiciales, con el propósito de garantizar el acierto y éxito de la investigación y, ante todo, para respetar la presunción de inocencia, el honor y la intimidad de las personas involucradas”. (En sentido similar, manifestó que se pueden consultar, entre otras, las Sentencias Nos. 136-03, 2120-03, 8884-04, 3391-05, 7889-05, 13419-05, 2916-06, 6522-06 y 11206-07). Agregó, que las causales de excepción anteriores, según se dijo, han tenido plena aplicación en los asuntos sometidos a conocimiento de esa jurisdicción constitucional relacionados con el ambiente, de los cuales es una muestra significativa gran parte de los votos citados, matizando en algunos casos los alcances de esos límites por lo delicado y sensible de las materias en discusión, como lo es la salud pública, la biodiversidad y el medio ambiente. Así, recalcó el contenido de los Votos Nos. 8884-04 y 9753-06. En lo que respecta a la norma impugnada, manifestó que ésta reproduce, prácticamente, de forma literal, el contenido del párrafo primero del artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, con lo cual queda claro que la norma impugnada goza de la suficiente cobertura jurídica al tener su fundamento en una norma de rango legal. Por tal motivo, indicó que no llevan razón los accionantes al señalar que la Ley General ha quedado desfasada para atender o garantizar, debidamente, los intereses o derechos que se encuentran en juego en los asuntos de naturaleza ambiental tramitados en sede administrativa. Esto, dado que, ha sido el mismo legislador quien ha venido a remozar, si se quiere, para el propio derecho ambiental, los institutos, garantías y principios del Libro Segundo de la Ley General sobre el procedimiento administrativo. En efecto, refirió que, de un lado, el artículo 106 de la Ley de Biodiversidad establece, de forma expresa, que, salvo lo regulado, específicamente, de modo distinto en dicha ley, “para todas las tramitaciones administrativas que la gestión de la biodiversidad requiera, se seguirá, el procedimiento ordinario o sumario regulado por la Ley General de la Administración Pública, según corresponda”; mientras que, de otro, el artículo 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, que se refiere propiamente a los procedimientos que se tramitan ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, dispone que ese órgano colegiado, además de realizar sus funciones sujeto a los principios de oralidad, oficialidad, celeridad e inmediación de la prueba, ajustará su actuación al procedimiento y las normas de funcionamiento establecidos en esa Ley y, supletoriamente, a la Ley General de la Administración Pública, Libro Segundo, Capítulo “Del Procedimiento Ordinario". Además, estimó que se debe de observar que el párrafo final del artículo 108 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, presenta una redacción casi idéntica a la del artículo 272 de la Ley General y, en consecuencia, a la del numeral cuestionado, al precisar lo siguiente: “Las partes o sus representantes y sus abogados, tendrán acceso a las actuaciones relativas a la denuncia tramitada ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, inclusive a las actas donde consta la investigación de las infracciones. Podrán consultarlas sin más exigencia que la justificación de su identidad o personería.”. En virtud de lo anterior, consideró que el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo no presenta vicio de inconstitucionalidad alguno. Máxime, cuando el Tribunal Constitucional ha reiterado, recientemente, en el Voto No. 1249-07 de las 16:13 horas de 31 de enero de 2007, en un asunto relacionado, precisamente, con la salud pública, el criterio de la Sentencia No. 02927-03 de las 15:31 horas de 10 de abril de 2003, por el que se considera que el artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública desarrolla el artículo 30 de la Constitución Política, como parte del bloque de constitucionalidad. Por ende, explicó que no resulta procedente que se anule el artículo impugnado, debido a que encuentra el suficiente respaldo jurídico en normas de rango legal que, además, pertenecen a la rama del derecho ambiental. A mayor abundamiento, afirmó que la supresión de la norma en cuestión no es necesaria, toda vez que, ésta última puede ser, perfectamente, aplicada por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo dentro de los límites en que cabe el ejercicio legítimo del derecho al acceso a la información ambiental. Finalmente, aseveró que el artículo de comentario no realiza discriminación alguna en cuanto a la posibilidad que se le da a cualquier abogado para examinar o revisar estos expedientes. En ese sentido, manifestó que la razón de ser de esta medida radica en la de las demás normas de índole procesal vigentes en el ordenamiento costarricense, sea, la de permitir que los profesionales en derecho analicen el caso en causa, a efecto que decidan si asumen o no el patrocinio letrado de alguna de las partes involucradas. Esto, por cuanto, los casos que se someten a consideración del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo tienen que ver, según se indica en el artículo 111 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, con denuncias establecidas contra todas las personas, públicas o privadas, referentes a comportamientos activos y omisos, que violen o amenacen violar las normas de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales, así como con la determinación de indemnizaciones que puedan originarse en relación con los daños producidos por esas violaciones al ordenamiento ambiental. Es decir, se trata de materia sancionadora administrativa, que por la eventual repercusión negativa que la sustanciación de un procedimiento de este tipo puede tener en la esfera jurídica de los particulares, exige como parte del derecho de defensa, que estos puedan ser asesorados por un profesional en derecho. Adujo, que otra razón de peso que justifica que el artículo cuestionado -como también lo hace la Ley General y la misma Ley Orgánica del Ambiente-, diferencie el grado de acceso que un abogado puede tener a un expediente de esta naturaleza respecto a un ciudadano común, es que este último, a diferencia del primero, no se encuentra sujeto al deber de confidencialidad propio del secreto profesional que el abogado debe, en todo momento, respetar. Lo que significa que el abogado se encuentra compelido para revelar o divulgar la información de carácter privado a la que haya podido tener acceso; mientras que el ciudadano común no. Por las razones anteriores, consideró que el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo resulta plenamente conforme con el bloque de constitucionalidad en materia ambiental.

5.- José Lino Chavez López, en su condición de Presidente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (visible a folios 50-61), rindió el informe de ley. Indicó, que el numeral bajo estudio tiene su asidero legal en el artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De este modo, manifestó que, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, los procedimientos que se siguen en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo deben de ajustarse a la Ley General de la Administración Pública supra referida. Indicó, que, a la luz de lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en el Voto No. 14536-05, si bien el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo tiene la obligación de cumplir con lo establecido en el artículo 30 constitucional, lo cierto es que no todo documento que se encuentre en un departamento público, es un documento de carácter público. Agregó, que el Tribunal citado es un órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, el cual, de acuerdo con el artículo 111 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, es competente para lo siguiente: a) Conocer y resolver, en sede administrativa, las denuncias establecidas contra todas las personas, públicas o privadas, por violaciones a la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales, b) conocer, tramitar y resolver, de oficio o a instancia de parte, las denuncias referentes a comportamientos activos y omisos que violen o amenacen violar las normas de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales y c) establecer, en vía administrativa, las indemnizaciones que puedan originarse en relación con los daños producidos por violaciones de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales. De este modo, argumentó que se trata de un órgano sancionatorio, que conoce de una denuncia y determina, mediante la aplicación del procedimiento ordinario administrativo señalado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, si existió o no violación de alguna norma de la legislación ambiental o bien, se produjo algún daño ambiental. Explicó, que su naturaleza es diversa a la que posee la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, en donde la participación ciudadana es fundamental para determinar el eventual impacto social de alguna obra, actividad o proyecto. Por tal motivo, aseveró que si bien en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente se establece en el artículo 23 la publicidad de la información, ésta se aplica, exclusivamente, para los expedientes tramitados ante la SETENA. En dicha Secretaría se lleva a cabo un proceso para determinar la posibilidad que se desarrolle o no una determinada obra, mientras que en el Tribunal Ambiental se conoce la posibilidad de aplicar una sanción administrativa. Sin embargo, manifestó que en un determinado caso, cualquier persona que sea, física o jurídica, que se apersone a algún expediente administrativo indicando las razones de hecho y de derecho por las cuales solicita ser parte del mismo, será tenido como coadyuvante. Lo anterior, a efecto que manifieste lo que corresponda, aporte prueba, participe de las diferentes diligencias administrativas y, si es del caso, participe en la audiencia oral y privada y presente los recursos de ley. A mayor abundamiento, indicó que en el Dictamen No. C-187-2003 de 23 de junio de 2003, la Procuraduría General de la República, en concordancia con lo establecido en la Ley de Control Interno, señaló lo siguiente: “(…) Dispone el artículo 6 de la Ley General de Control Interno, N° 8292 de 27 de agosto de 2002: "Confidencialidad de los denunciantes y estudios que originan la apertura de procedimientos administrativos. La Contraloría General de la República, la administración y las auditorías internas, guardarán confidencialidad respecto de la identidad de los ciudadanos que presenten denuncias ante sus oficinas. La información, documentación y otras evidencias de las investigaciones que efectúan las auditorías internas, la administración y la Contraloría General, cuyos resultados puedan originar la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, serán confidenciales durante la formulación del informe respectivo. Una vez notificado el informe correspondiente y hasta la resolución final del procedimiento administrativo, la información contenida en el expediente será calificada como información confidencial, excepto para las partes involucradas, las cuales tendrán libre acceso a todos los documentos y las pruebas que obren en el expediente administrativo. Para todos los casos, la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio de las facultades contenidas en el inciso 23) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, podrá acceder a los informes, la documentación y las pruebas que obren en poder de las auditorías internas, la administración o la Contraloría General de la República". La garantía de confidencialidad que desarrolla el artículo 6 tiene dos finalidades esenciales: por una parte, asegurar la realización de la investigación, de manera que no sea obstruida por la divulgación de los datos que se reúnen o por personas interesadas en que determinadas evidencias no sean consideradas y por otra, preservar los derechos de los investigados y denunciantes. Derechos que podrían verse gravemente lesionados por la divulgación del hecho mismo de la investigación y de los datos que en la realización de ésta hayan sido aportados. Datos que podrían ser objeto de interpretaciones incorrectas o tendenciosas por terceros. Ahora bien, la confidencialidad se garantiza hasta la realización del informe respectivo. El hecho de que se hable de notificación del informe correspondiente da idea de que fuera de la oficina de control que realiza el informe, la información, documentación, "evidencias", no deben ser conocidas por otras personas. La conclusión del informe no determina la publicidad de esos elementos. En efecto, aún cuando el informe dé origen a un procedimiento administrativo, la información se mantiene como confidencial excepto para las partes. Acceso a las partes que forma parte de las garantías del debido proceso. A la disposición general del artículo 6 se une lo dispuesto en el numeral 32 de la Ley: el deber de los funcionarios de la auditoría interna de mantener la confidencialidad sobre la información a que tengan acceso, así como la prohibición de revelar a terceros que no tengan relación con los asuntos tratados en los informes, información sobre las auditorías o los estudios especiales de auditoría que se estén realizando "ni información sobre aquello que determine una posible responsabilidad civil, administrativa o eventualmente penal de los funcionarios de los entes y órganos sujetos a esta Ley". Precepto que viene a reafirmar la necesidad de preservar los derechos de los investigados (…)”. En virtud de lo anterior, refirió que si bien existe el derecho constitucional de libre acceso a los departamentos administrativos con el propósito de obtener información sobre asuntos de interés público, según lo dispone el numeral 30 constitucional, también es cierto que a los expedientes podrán tener acceso las partes involucradas en el proceso, los abogados de las partes, estudiantes de derecho, debidamente, autorizados por las respectivas universidades o la persona legitimada para actuar en éste. Asimismo, manifestó que el derecho a la información se encuentra limitado por lo dispuesto en el precepto 24 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza el derecho a la intimidad y a la libertad, así como al secreto de las comunicaciones. Garantía última que protege la confidencialidad de los documentos e informaciones privadas, impide a los particulares el acceso a estos y, a su vez, prohíbe a las instituciones el suministro a terceros. Valores fundamentales que se encuentran, también, tutelados en el artículo 11 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, así como en el numeral 13, inciso 2°), aparte a) de ese mismo instrumento. Bajo tales argumentos, consideró que el artículo 21 del Decreto No. 34136-MINAE, el cual se desprende del numeral 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, no violenta ningún principio o derecho fundamental. Solicitó que se declare sin lugar la acción planteada.

6.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- LEGITIMACIÓN Y PROCEDENCIA DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. A tenor del artículo 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, no será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 8239-01 de las 16:07 hrs. de 14 de agosto de 2001, se refirió a los intereses difusos bajo los siguientes términos:

"(…) De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. (...) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de intereses difusos (...) Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. (...) En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. (…)".

En el presente asunto, los accionantes aducen su legitimación por vía del control de constitucionalidad abstracto e invocan la defensa de intereses difusos, toda vez que, acuden en resguardo del ambiente. Por consiguiente, tales circunstancias configuran a favor de los gestionantes una legitimación directa para la interposición del presente proceso por invocar la defensa de intereses que atañen a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, tal y como lo es el derecho de acceso a aquella información relacionada con el medio ambiente. Por lo anterior, resulta admisible el conocimiento y resolución de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad por vía del control abstracto.

II.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. Los accionantes cuestionan el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007, por estimar que presenta, concretamente, los siguientes vicios de inconstitucionalidad: a) Violación a los numerales 30 y 50 de la Constitución Política, dado que, se limita la posibilidad que cualquier persona pueda tener acceso a un expediente tramitado ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo que contenga información pública de relevancia e interés nacional, como lo son las denuncias ambientales y b) quebranto al artículo 33 constitucional, toda vez que, se establece una limitación y diferencia en razón de la profesión, que permite, únicamente, a cualquier abogado y no, a todos los ciudadanos, tener acceso al referido expediente.

III.- NORMA IMPUGNADA. En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, se cuestiona el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE de 20 de junio de 2007, precepto que establece lo siguiente:

“Artículo 21.—Acceso al expediente administrativo. Las partes y sus representantes y cualquier abogado tendrán derecho en cualquier fase del procedimiento a examinar, leer y fotocopiar cualquier pieza del expediente, así como solicitar certificación de la misma, con las salvedades que indica el artículo 273 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.” IV.- LÍMITES AL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN AMBIENTAL. Si bien se reconoce en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico la importancia esencial que posee el derecho de acceso a la información y, en este caso, a la información de índole ambiental, como un instrumento para garantizar la adecuada protección del medio ambiente –pues su conservación es una obligación que comparten los poderes públicos y la sociedad en su conjunto-, lo cierto es que, también, el ejercicio de dicho derecho se encuentra sujeto a límites. Resulta imposible predicar, respecto del derecho de acceso a la información ambiental, un derecho absoluto, puesto que, como el resto de derechos, posee un carácter relativo. De modo tal que, los límites que se le impongan a dicho derecho, se justifican en cuanto habrá situaciones en que la transparencia o publicidad puede causar serios perjuicios o trastornos a los intereses generales o particulares que la sociedad estime dignos de protección o prevalecientes. De ahí que, dicho derecho debe ceder ante las exigencias de una convivencia pacífica y democrática, objetivo prioritario de la sociedad y de su organización política y, desde luego, también, ante el derecho a la intimidad y reserva del resto de los administrados. Desde esa perspectiva, resulta factible señalar, de conformidad, a su vez, con lo dispuesto por la Convención sobre el acceso a la información, la participación del público en la toma de decisiones y el acceso a la justicia en asuntos ambientales o Convención de Aarhus, adoptada en la Conferencia Ministerial “Medio Ambiente para Europa”, celebrada en Dinamarca el 25 de junio de 1998, que una solicitud de información sobre el medio ambiente podrá denegarse en los siguientes supuestos: a) Cuando la solicitud se refiere a documentos que están elaborándose y b) cuando la divulgación de tal información tenga efectos desfavorables sobre los siguientes aspectos: b.1.) La buena marcha de la justicia, posibilidad que toda persona pueda ser juzgada, equitativamente, o la capacidad de una autoridad pública para efectuar una investigación de orden penal o disciplinario y b.2.) el carácter confidencial de los datos y de los expedientes personales respecto de una persona física si esta persona no ha consentido la divulgación de esas informaciones al público, cuando dicho carácter confidencial de este tipo de información esté previsto por el derecho interno.

V.- DIFERENCIA ENTRE EL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN AD EXTRA Y AD INTRA. Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra -fuera- y (b) ad intra -dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se ejerce uti universi, es decir, por cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder determinada información administrativa. En virtud de lo anterior, se dice que el numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, evidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, toda vez que, es, absolutamente, independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo. El segundo, por su parte, se ejerce uti singuli, esto es, únicamente, por la parte interesada o su representante en un determinado y concreto procedimiento administrativo. Este último derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274. A su vez, este derecho puede ser ejercitado en cualquier etapa del procedimiento administrativo y se encuentra referido a documentos en estado de tramitación dentro del marco general de éste último; es decir, al expediente que materializa el procedimiento en el que se es parte. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 2120-03 de las 13:30 hrs. de 14 de marzo de 2003, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, estimó lo siguiente:

“(…) III.- TIPOLOGIA DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra –dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-. Este derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274. El numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, evidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, puesto que, es absolutamente independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo. Este derecho no ha sido desarrollado legislativamente de forma sistemática y coherente, lo cual constituye una seria y grave laguna de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico que se ha prolongado en el tiempo por más de cincuenta años desde la vigencia del texto constitucional. La regulación de este derecho ha sido fragmentada y sectorial, así, a título de ejemplo, la Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos No. 7202 del 24 de octubre de 1990, lo norma respecto de los documentos con valor científico y cultural de los entes y órganos públicos –sujetos pasivos- que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Archivos (Poderes Legislativo, Judicial, Ejecutivo y demás entes públicos con personalidad jurídica, así como los depositados en los archivos privados y particulares sometidos a las previsiones de ese cuerpo legal) (…)”.

Posteriormente, en el Voto No. 4637-04 de las 12:15 hrs. de 30 de abril de 2004, esta Sala dispuso en lo conducente:

“(…) V.- (…) Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra –dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-. Si bien este último derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274, no cabe la menor duda que tiene asidero en el ordinal 30 de la Constitución Política y, por ende, goza de los mecanismos de garantía, tutela y defensa previstos en el texto fundamental (artículo 48 de la Constitución Política)y desarrollados por la ley del rito de esta jurisdicción (ordinales 29 y siguientes). Este corolario se impone al reparar en el carácter claramente insuficiente, lento y engorroso del único mecanismo de protección, establecido a nivel infraconstitucional, del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa ad intra de un procedimiento administrativo. En efecto, el numeral 274 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que contra la resolución que deniegue el conocimiento y acceso a una pieza de un expediente caben los recursos ordinarios previstos por ese cuerpo normativo, esto es, la revocatoria, la apelación y, eventualmente, de tratarse del jerarca, la reposición, sin preverse una vía expedita y célere cuando los recursos sean declarados sin lugar, con lo cual resulta claramente insuficiente al obligar al petente a acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), para pretender la nulidad de la resolución que le ha denegado el acceso al expediente administrativo, solución que supone un elevado costo económico y temporal para el agraviado y que resulta, a todas luces, tardía (…)”.

VI.- SOBRE EL QUEBRANTO A LOS NUMERALES 30 Y 50 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. Los accionantes aducen que el artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, lesiona lo dispuesto en los numerales 30 y 50 constitucionales, dado que, limita la posibilidad que cualquier persona pueda tener acceso a un expediente administrativo tramitado ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo que contenga información pública de relevancia e interés nacional, como lo son las denuncias de carácter ambiental. Efectivamente, tal y como lo aducen los interesados, de acuerdo a lo estatuido por el numeral 50 de la Carta Magna, el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense reconoce, en favor de toda persona, un amplio derecho para recibir y acceder la información pública relacionada con el medio ambiente. De igual forma, paralelamente, se instituye el deber de la Administración Pública de facilitar dicha información y ponerla a disposición de quien la requiera. Sin embargo, el ejercicio de dicho derecho, tal y como se apuntó supra, no puede concebirse de manera absoluta, sino que, por el contrario, de forma limitada y sujeto a una serie de excepciones, por lo que no toda información relacionada con el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, puede ser facilitada por las autoridades públicas. Es por tal motivo, que en criterio de esta Sala y, en concordancia con lo dispuesto por la Convención de Aarhus, la información de carácter ambiental se podrá denegar cuando, por ejemplo, se requieran documentos que se están elaborando aún o bien, cuando se estime que la divulgación de tales datos puede producir efectos desfavorables sobre la buena marcha de la justicia, la posibilidad que toda persona pueda ser juzgada, equitativamente, o la capacidad de una autoridad pública para efectuar una investigación de orden penal o disciplinario, así como sobre el carácter confidencial de los datos y de los expedientes personales respecto de una persona física que no ha consentido su publicidad. De ahí que, resulte importante y, sobre todo, razonable, el respeto y la protección que se otorgue a la intimidad y confidencialidad, así como a la presunción de inocencia de todas aquellas partes interesadas en un determinado procedimiento administrativo. De este modo, debe de observarse que el derecho a la intimidad, señalado en el artículo 24 constitucional, se ha definido como el reconocimiento que se le hace a la persona humana de una zona o esfera propia exenta de injerencias externas (fuero de protección) y respecto de la cual puede prohibirle, a cualquier tercero, su intervención. Así, le permite al individuo disponer de la información personal negando o concediendo su acceso; es decir, se trata de una libertad de autodeterminación informativa. Precisamente, por esto, es que esta Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los derechos a la intimidad, el honor y la imagen, constituyen límites al derecho a la información. De igual forma, uno de los pilares básicos del Estado de Derecho y, por consiguiente, del Derecho Administrativo sancionador, lo constituye la presunción de inocencia reconocida en el numeral 39, párrafo 1°, de nuestra Constitución Política, la cual significa que cualquier persona que sea indiciada en un proceso o penal, o bien, se le siga un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario o sancionador, se presuma inocente hasta tanto no se demuestre lo contrario, respectivamente, en virtud de sentencia firme y pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material o de acto final dictado observando el debido proceso y la defensa. Para el presente proceso, se debe de tomar en consideración que el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo es un órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, el cual, de acuerdo con el artículo 111 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, es competente, entre otras cosas, para lo siguiente: a) Conocer y resolver, en sede administrativa, las denuncias establecidas contra todas las personas, públicas o privadas, por violaciones a la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales, b) conocer, tramitar y resolver, de oficio o a instancia de parte, las denuncias referentes a comportamientos activos y omisos que violen o amenacen violar las normas de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales y c) establecer, en vía administrativa, las indemnizaciones que puedan originarse en relación con los daños producidos por violaciones de la legislación tutelar del ambiente y los recursos naturales. De este modo, se trata de un órgano que ejerce una clara potestad sancionadora, que conoce de una denuncia y determina, mediante la aplicación del respectivo procedimiento, si existió o no violación de alguna norma de la legislación o si se produjo algún daño de tipo ambiental. Por consiguiente, su naturaleza es diversa a la que posee la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, en donde la participación ciudadana es fundamental para determinar el eventual impacto ambiental de alguna obra, actividad o proyecto. Bajo tales consideraciones, debe observarse que el artículo impugnado en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, al pertenecer al Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, hace referencia al ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora que dicho Tribunal ejerce contra sujetos de derecho público y privado, con ocasión de las denuncias interpuestas por infracción al medio ambiente; razón por la cual los procedimientos allí conocidos, resultan, evidentemente, distintos a los procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, en los cuales, de conformidad con el artículo 23 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, se garantiza el acceso irrestricto al expediente, en virtud que la información contenida reviste carácter público y le atañe a la colectividad. De ahí que, en criterio de esta Sala, los límites supra señalados, resulten plenamente aplicables en la tramitación de los procedimientos administrativos seguidos ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Esto, toda vez que, mientras dicha instancia no haya decidido en forma definitiva un determinado asunto, el estado de los expediente se encuentra en etapa de investigación y, por lo tanto, la información ahí contenida se considera de índole confidencial. En ese sentido, nótese que una cosa es la información ambiental de interés público o general que debe de estar a la plena disposición de cualquier persona y, más aún, que las Administraciones Públicas deben brindar de manera inmediata, y otra es la información relativa a una denuncia que se le imputa a una persona física o jurídica por infringir la legislación ambiental y que se encuentra contenida en un expediente administrativo, en cuyo caso la legitimación de ese derecho de acceso ad intra del procedimiento, se debe de regir por las reglas comunes y generales, es decir, deben de ser, únicamente, las partes interesadas en ese procedimiento y no, como lo pretenden los accionantes, cualquier persona o grupo. En todo caso, debe de tomarse en consideración, según lo aseveró el Presidente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, que cualquier persona, sea física o jurídica, que se apersone a algún procedimiento administrativo tramitado ante dicha instancia indicando las razones de hecho y de derecho por las cuales solicita ser parte del mismo, será tenido como coadyuvante, a efecto que manifieste lo que corresponda, aporte prueba, participe en las diferentes diligencias administrativas y si es del caso, participe, incluso, en la audiencia oral y privada. De ahí que, resulte importante diferenciar la participación que una determinada persona pueda tener en los procedimientos tendentes a elaborar planes, programas y políticas en materia medio ambiental, así como instrumentos normativos de carácter ambiental como reglamentos y decretos, respecto de la que puede tener en procedimientos de tipo sancionador, lo cual, como se dijo, queda solventado con la figura de la coadyuvancia o intervención adhesiva. Asimismo, debe de observarse que el artículo 21 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34136-MINAE, es una reiteración de lo dispuesto por el numeral 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual, a su vez, según lo dispuesto por el precepto 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, resulta aplicable a este tipo de procedimientos, es decir, aquellos de tipo sancionatorio tramitados por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. De igual forma, no se debe dejar pasar por desapercibido el numeral 108 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, pues su párrafo final presenta una redacción casi idéntica a la del artículo 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, por consiguiente, a la del numeral cuestionado, al establecer lo siguiente: “(…) Las partes o sus representantes y sus abogados, tendrán acceso a las actuaciones relativas a la denuncia tramitada ante el tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, inclusive a las actas donde consta la investigación de las infracciones. Podrán consultarlas sin más exigencia que la justificación de su identidad o personería.” De manera tal que, se respeta, plenamente, el principio de reserva de ley en materia de regulación del régimen de derechos fundamentales (artículos 19 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 28 de la Constitución Política). Desde esa perspectiva, este Tribunal Constitucional no estima que el artículo 21 del Reglamento de Procedimientos del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, sobre este extremo en particular, presente vicio de inconstitucionalidad alguno.

VII.- No obstante, en criterio de esta Sala, dichas limitaciones y excepciones expuestas en el considerando anterior, operan salvo que en el expediente administrativo sancionador conste alguna información (v.gr. piezas específicas como informes o documentos) de interés público y general que no se encuentre en ninguna base de datos, archivo o registro de la Administración Pública, en cuyo caso cualquier ciudadano podrá ejercer el derecho ad extra por no contar tales datos en ninguna otra base. Por consiguiente, únicamente, en dichos casos, la Administración, sea, para el proceso bajo estudio, el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, se ve compelido a brindar información, reservando, concomitantemente, el resto del expediente administrativo. Bajo dicha inteligencia, este Tribunal Constitucional, tal y como quedó plasmado en el considerando anterior, reitera que no es necesario anular el numeral 21 en cuestión, toda vez que, éste último puede ser, perfectamente, aplicado por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo dentro de los límites en que cabe el ejercicio legítimo del derecho de acceso ad intra en un procedimiento sancionador ambiental. De modo tal que, el requisito de ser parte interesada o su representante para poder consultar un expediente en poder del Tribunal mencionado, cobrará importancia, únicamente, en el momento que se desee acceder a información que pueda, por ejemplo, ser considerada confidencial, que vulnere la intimidad, el honor o bien, la presunción de inocencia.

VIII.- ACERCA DE LA VIOLACIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE IGUALDAD. De otra parte, los gestionantes alegan vulnerado el numeral 33 constitucional, toda vez que, en su criterio, el artículo 21 impugnado establece una limitación y diferencia en razón de la profesión, que permite, únicamente, a cualquier abogado y no, a todos los ciudadanos, tener acceso a los expedientes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Sin embargo, este Tribunal, de conformidad con lo expuesto en el considerando VII de la presente sentencia, no aprecia que lleven razón los interesados en su alegato y, en ese sentido, reitera que, en virtud del carácter sancionatorio que poseen los procedimientos administrativos tramitados ante el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y, sobre todo, en atención, al contenido de los límites establecidos al derecho de acceso ad intra en los procedimientos sancionatorios ambientales, únicamente, las partes interesadas, representantes y abogados, pueden tener derecho a que se les brinden tales datos. Debe tomarse en consideración que la posibilidad otorgada a los abogados para acceder expedientes administrativos en trámite que prevén los artículos 272 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 108, párrafo in fine, de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y la norma reglamentaria impugnada, tiene una justificación objetiva y razonable que radica en la necesidad de un profesional en Derecho de revisar un expediente administrativo antes de asumir la defensa técnica de alguna de las partes interesadas, patrocinio letrado que, al propio tiempo, tiene una profunda raigambre constitucional cuando el administrado decide tenerlo.

IX.- COROLARIO. En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada.

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

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