Dismissal of judicial review on conflict between Forestry Law and Possessory Information LawInadmisión de consulta sobre conflicto de normas entre Ley Forestal y Ley de Informaciones Posesorias

*090107600007CO* *090107600007CO* Res. No. 2010001667 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and eleven minutes on the twenty-seventh of January, two thousand ten.

Discretionary judicial review consultation filed by the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by means of a resolution delivered at 14:30 on June 26, 2009, issued within case file number 01-100178-0296-CI, which is a Possessory Information Proceeding filed by Pompilio Vargas Varela.

Considering:

1.- By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and ten minutes on July twenty-second, 2009, and based on articles 8, subsection 1), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; 2, subsection b); 3, 13, 102, and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the consulting office requests that this Chamber rule on the constitutionality of article 7, paragraph 2 of the Law of Possessory Informations, articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and article 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. The consulting Tribunal alleges that it hears on appeal judgment number 23-2008 from 9:16 on June 16, 2008, which rejected the titling of a piece of land based on Voto 1021-F-05 from 16:15 on December 7, 2005, handed down by that Tribunal. According to that vote, titling is not appropriate when dealing with a primary forest, considering that this type of property constitutes forest and natural patrimony of the State, and therefore, public domain (demanial) assets. The consulting Tribunal alleges that the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, provides in its article 11 that “…Unless proven otherwise, the following belong to the State as national reserves: a) All lands located within the limits of the Republic that are not registered as private property, property of the Municipalities, or of Autonomous Institutions; b) Those not protected by ten-year possession (posesión decenal);…”. Furthermore, the first Ley Forestal, No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, provided in article 32 that “…The forest patrimony of the State is constituted by all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of areas declared inalienable, of properties registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration….”, and in article 33 that “…The forest lands and forests that constitute the forest patrimony of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable (inembargables) and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor, and the State's possessory action for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry by means of possessory information; their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law.” Thus, the first forest law classified forested areas and lands of forest suitability within the National Reserves as public domain assets, which it described as unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, not subject to private appropriation. Article 80 of the repealed Ley Forestal cited above prohibited the invasion and occupation of lands in National Parks, Forest Reserves, Protective Zones, and National Reserves, as long as their classification and transfer had not been determined. Article 6 of this same law punished with imprisonment from six months to two years or with a fine of fifteen to one hundred days, any person who exploited a forest of the forest patrimony without the corresponding legal authorization, invaded a National Park, Biological Reserve, Protective Zone, or Forest Reserve. Thus, possessory acts carried out in a State patrimony forest are illegitimate, and therefore they could not confer any right of possession. Law No. 4465 also regulated the exploitation and use of all forests in the country, both private and state-owned; thus, the forest patrimony of the State includes the entire national territory (articles 4, 32 to 42), which in turn can be subdivided into three areas: a) The forest regime (articles l, 2, 7, 47 to 54, 66 to 81); b) Forest harvesting on private property lands (articles 43 to 46, 60 to 65, 82 to 91); and c) the national reserves (articles 32 and following). For its part, the forest regime –consisting of the set of legal, economic, and technical provisions responsible for giving content to the conservation, protection, and rational exploitation of forests and forest lands (article 7)– has three sub-areas: a.1 protective zones, a.2) national parks, forest and biological reserves, and a.3) forests and forest lands. All lands considered national reserves are immediately affected for the purposes of forest regulations (article 32). Over these, the State may create –by Law or by Decreto Ejecutivo– forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, and biological reserves, thus forming the forest patrimony (article 35). To be colonized or transferred, legislative authorization is required (article 40), and even when possessed by third parties, they do not acquire any right, the State's right to repossess being imprescriptible (article 33). The forest patrimony of the State comprises all national assets where natural forest resources exist. Forests and lands of forest suitability also exist; whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, they are subject to the purposes of the Law. They are of public utility and therefore susceptible to expropriation, except for those voluntarily submitted to the forest regime, where afforestation, reforestation, and natural forest management projects are efficiently developed (articles 1 and 4). Forests are "all plant associations composed predominantly of trees and other woody vegetation" (article 6). Lands of forest suitability shall be those declared as such by the Dirección General Forestal according to the official methodology for land classification (article 5). The next Ley Forestal, No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, regulated the forest patrimony of the State in a manner very similar to the previous one. In 1990, a new Ley Forestal was enacted, No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, which again enshrines the public domain character (demanialidad) of lands with forests and forest lands of the National Reserves. This law was replaced by the current Ley Forestal number 7575. This regulation once again contemplates the public domain character of forested areas and lands of forest suitability of the national reserves by providing in its article 13: “… The Natural Patrimony of the State shall be constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves …”. Likewise, article 14 indicates “…The forest lands and forests that constitute the natural patrimony of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor, and the State's possessory action for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Registry by means of possessory information, and both the invasion and occupation thereof shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law…”. Moreover, article 58 of the current Ley Forestal also regulates as a crime the invasion of forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied. Such subjection is made by the same regulation by categorizing the areas of the national reserves as part of the Natural Patrimony of the State, as stated previously. Thus, the national reserves are subject by right to this forest property regime, since they belong to the State and, according to the analysis, the forested lands and lands of forest suitability have not ceased to be public domain assets as established through the different forest laws that have been in force over time until the present day. When discussing possession over a public domain asset, such discussion shall only be valid if the right over the asset was acquired before it was declared a public domain asset. Likewise, the right of property in such cases may only be obtained when the holder has demonstrated ten-year possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law declaring the object as Natural Patrimony of the State. The Constitutional Chamber has insisted that judges analyze from when an asset becomes subject to public domain. In Voto No. 4587 of 15:45 on August 5, 1997, the Chamber examined the constitutionality of the cited article 7 and ruled that to title lands located in the protected areas indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate having possessed them for ten years before the respective Decree came into force. The Chamber considered that the declaration of a protected wildlife area prevents the possession subsequent to the encumbrance from counting, and prevents meeting the requirements for adverse possession (usucapión) if the right has not been acquired by that time, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for adverse possession with the conditions established by law have not elapsed. For the Tribunal, this broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental patrimony and determines that when it is sought to title, through the process of possessory informations, a piece of land located within a protected wildlife area, the discussion should not be reduced to the simple calculation of the time elapsed since the individual entered the property in relation to the date on which the protected wildlife area declaration was made. On one hand, to accredit possession ad usucapionem during the period established in article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, the elements contemplated by each specific type of possession must be considered, and on the other, the possible existence of regulations that previously declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific encumbrance to the public domain. Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations allows the titling of forested areas outside of protected wildlife areas, which contravenes the provisions of the Ley Forestal, which declares the Natural Patrimony of the State as public domain, and includes within it the forests and lands of forest suitability of the National Reserves. The Law of Possessory Informations allows the titling of assets that continue to be encumbered as public domain. It is the Ley Forestal that regulates the "forest" resource, not the Law of Possessory Informations; the latter constitutes a general law that regulates the titling of unregistered properties. In this aspect, the principle of speciality of norms comes into play. The right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is part of third-generation rights, a step forward from classic human rights, civil or political (first generation), and economic, social, and cultural ones (second generation). Its recognition has allowed placing the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment as a true human right and has given a basis to formulate a new legal classification: that of Ecological Law. Voto No. 16975-2008 of 14:53 on November 12, 2008, from the Constitutional Chamber, refers to the Natural Patrimony of the State and its encumbrance to public domain; the Constitutional Chamber recognized the public domain character of forests for belonging to the Natural Patrimony of the State. Forest regulations establish, for all cases and throughout the national territory, a special regime applicable to all forest resources; therein arises forest property. The national reserves are subject by right to the regime, since as State property, the legislative will does not require any other requirement; expropriation is appropriate for private assets that are affected to form national parks, forest or biological reserves, forests, or forest lands. Based on the foregoing, “…the Tribunal is faced with the dilemma in this particular case of applying section 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which allows the titling of forested areas, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15, and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain as part of the national reserves that make up the Natural Patrimony of the State.” Eventually, a supervening unconstitutionality could arise given the State's obligation to protect the forest resource and the environment as provided in article 50, contemplated in third-generation human rights, which is why the case is sent to the Constitutional Chamber so that it may determine the constitutionality of the provisions presented.

2.- In response to the summons issued to the parties within the main matter, Lydiana Rodríguez Paniagua, Deputy Procuradora, appeared before the Chamber (folio 15).

3.- By means of the brief visible at folios 15-59, the Procuraduría responds to the hearing granted. In relation to articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal 7575/96, and 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización 2825/1961, it points out that the Tribunal does not specify the well-founded doubts regarding constitutionality, a requirement demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, article 104. The Procuraduría General de la República considers that these norms are not unconstitutional. The State has full jurisdiction over its assets and is neither limited nor prevented in its actions when protecting the country's flora and fauna. The forests and forest lands of the national reserves are environmental assets, which the public authorities must protect in their physical and legal integrity. In relation to articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575, the Procuraduría General, in opinion C-321-2003, noted that national reserves are the lands located within the limits of the Republic not registered as private property, or as property of the municipalities or autonomous institutions; those not protected by ten-year possession or not designated by special laws for the formation of agricultural colonies, and all those that, not being private property, are not used for public services (Art. 11 Ley de Tierras y Colonización in relation to article 261 of the Civil Code). In Voto 4587-97, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that lands considered national reserves are immediately affected for the purposes of forest regulations. It states that according to belonging to the State or state entities, ecological importance, and physical qualities, the legislator affects en bloc, in their natural state, their forests and forest lands, endowing them, in a generic manner, with the condition of public domain, through inalienability and imprescriptibility, with a view to their conservation, protection, adequate administration, and promotion. Inalienability and unseizability are essential, distinctive, and defining characteristics of public domain, a regime attributed to the natural patrimony of the State, guaranteed by the imprescriptible character of possessory actions, the ineffectiveness of possessory acts by private individuals, and the prohibition of titling. The Procuraduría General considers that there is a notorious contradiction in the Ley Forestal 7575/96, which after having affected to public domain the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, and other lands, with the consequent characteristics of inalienable and imprescriptible and that “possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor (arts. 13 and 14), authorizes their titling in article 72, subsection b), by modifying section 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, No. 139, of July 14, 1941, and its reforms. That norm is unprotective of the Natural Patrimony of the State which, in the opinion of the Procuraduría, encompasses forest lands (of forest suitability) and forests of the national reserves and violates articles 50 and 121, subsection 14, of the Political Constitution. It threatens its juridical integrity (state public ownership) and eventually its physical integrity, by placing it at the service of private interests; it distorts the core principles of public domain, a regime that it renders void by allowing possession ad usucapionem within it, which is impossible to obtain, and it disregards the constitutional obligation that the State has to protect, preserve, conserve, and promote those forest resources, for the benefit of present and future generations. In the opinion of the Procuraduría General, two interpretations are possible regarding that contradiction: a) To consider it real, obvious, and to annul the norm (article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, which reforms article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations), for violating articles 50, in connection with 121, subsection 14, of the Constitution; this is the criterion that the Procuraduría endorses. The second possibility would be the harmonious interpretation of both numerals, in accordance with article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, conceiving the legal system as a systematic whole, free of formal contradictions. Under that perspective, since the “period of possession suitable for adverse possession must elapse before the encumbrance of the asset to public domain occurs,” which “prevents subsequent possession from being counted,” and possession “for adverse possession must be prior to the encumbrance of the asset” (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, Voto 4587-97. cons IV), it would be concluded that forest lands and forests of the national reserves may only be titled if possession suitable for adverse possession is reliably demonstrated, with the legal requirements, consolidated ten years before the first encumbrance to forest public domain, which dates –without interruption– back to the Ley Forestal 4465/1969. On the same lines would be the provisions for the titling of properties in protected wildlife areas (Ley Forestal, article 72, paragraph 1, which reforms section 7 Law of Possessory Informations). That is, in an interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, possessory informations for properties located within these would only proceed if a “ten-year possession, exercised ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree” that created it is demonstrated, provided it is prior to the first encumbrance of the property to the Natural, formerly Forest, Patrimony of the State (Ley Forestal 4465/1969). To assess the constitutionality of the questioned norm (article 72, subsection b, of the Ley Forestal, which reforms article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations), emphasis is placed on three points repeatedly admitted by the Constitutional Chamber: the survival of the abolished right to govern situations or relationships born under its protection (declaration of state forest public domain) and the unsusceptibility of possession and adverse possession in public domain assets, as the Procuraduría has also pointed out, acting in advisory functions for the Public Administration. Regarding the first aspect, in Voto 4587-97, the Chamber pointed out the need to demonstrate ten-year possession, suitable for adverse possession, with the legal requirements before the first encumbrance to public domain of forests and forest lands. This thesis has been maintained by the Tribunal in its jurisprudence: judgments 15753-2005, 7989-2005, 738-2003.

4.- In the proceeding, the formalities established by law were fulfilled.

Prepared by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- Admissibility requirements in discretionary judicial review consultations. In judgment number 01617-97 of fourteen hours and fifty-four minutes on March seventeenth, nineteen ninety-seven, this Tribunal indicated the requirements that judicial review consultations must meet for their study and stated the following:

"... the admissibility of the consultation (...) is conditioned upon the concurrence of the following four elements:

A. That it is filed by a 'judge', a generic term that –of course– applies to both single-member judges and collegiate tribunals, and about which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations filed by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuing of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must be, at the time of filing the consultation, duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).

B. That there are 'well-founded doubts' about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and well-considered. It also implies that it cannot deal with aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes efficacy of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it must be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the rule, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a rule has previously passed the explicit constitutional review (via action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same rule, particularly because –in this case– there is always the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the rule itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps via amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the very rule on which it is based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there is a case pending before the judge or tribunal. As in the unconstitutionality action, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'main' matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission giving rise to the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance for the case– it is appropriate to specify. Indeed, the expression ‘must apply the rule or judge the act, conduct, or omission’ carries a very defined current meaning, completely different from if the law spoke in terms of ‘may apply the rule or judge the act, conduct, or omission’. The judicial consultation is not appropriate upon the mere eventuality that those circumstances should occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present tense, with the application of the rule or the judging of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality.".

II.- The consultation is inadmissible on grounds of its object. In the case under study, the consultation does not fulfill the second of the formal requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. In effect, the consulting Tribunal seems to have doubts, not in relation to the content of the second paragraph of article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, but rather as to which rule to apply in the matter pending before it, whether article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations or articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal and article 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Indeed, while the brief filing the consultation initially indicates that “…the constitutionality of article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations must be consulted to the Constitutional Chamber...”, it later points out that “…the Tribunal is faced with the dilemma in this particular case of applying section 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which allows the titling of forested areas, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15 and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain...” to conclude in the Por tanto that: “...The judicial constitutionality consultation is ordered before the Constitutional Chamber, regarding the second paragraph of article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, which allows the titling of areas covered by forests, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15, and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain as part of the national reserves that make up the Natural Patrimony of the State.” It is thus clear that the Tribunal does not raise a doubt of constitutionality regarding a "rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged," but rather its consultation concerns which of the cited rules it must apply. It is necessary to recall that the object of the judicial review consultation is to evacuate those doubts that arise in the mind of a Judge when analyzing and resolving a matter within their competence about the constitutionality of one or more rules that they must apply. In this case, the Tribunal's doubt is limited to which of the rules it must apply to resolve the specific case. However, it is not for this Chamber to tell the Judge which rule to apply in the case before them, nor to indicate, when there are rules whose provisions may be contradictory, which one(s) should prevail. By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is inadmissible.

Therefore:

The consultation is not to be evacuated.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Jorge Araya G.

Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.

ELECTRONIC ADDRESS: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional **Exp: 09-010760-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 2010001667** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and eleven minutes on the twenty-seventh of January, two thousand ten.** Optional judicial consultation formulated by the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by resolution at 14 hours 30 minutes on June 26, 2009, issued within case file number 01-100178-0296-CI, which is a Possessory Information Proceeding filed by Pompilio Vargas Varela.

**Resultando:** **1.-** By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours ten minutes on July twenty-second, 2009, and based on articles 8, subsection 1), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; 2, subsection b); 3, 13, 102 and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the consulting office requests this Chamber to rule on the constitutionality of article 7, paragraph 2 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal and article 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. The consulting Tribunal alleges that it is hearing, on appeal, judgment number 23-2008 at 9:16 hours on June 16, 2008, which denied the titling of a land based on vote 1021-F-05 at 16:15 hours on December 7, 2005, issued by that Tribunal. According to that vote, titling is not applicable when it involves a primary forest, considering that this type of property constitutes the forest and natural heritage of the State, and therefore, public domain assets (bienes demaniales). The consulting Tribunal alleges that the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, provides in its article 11 that “…Unless proven otherwise, the following belong to the State as national reserves: a) All lands within the limits of the Republic that are not registered as private property, property of the Municipalities, or of the Autonomous Institutions; b) Those not covered by ten-year possession (posesión decenal);…”. On the other hand, the first Ley Forestal, No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, provided in article 32 that “…The forest heritage of the State is constituted by all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of areas declared inalienable, of farms registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration….”, and in article 33 that “…The forest lands and forests that constitute the forest heritage of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor and the State’s action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry by means of possessory information (información posesoria); their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law.” Thus, the first forestry law classified forested areas and lands of forest aptitude within the National Reserves as public domain assets, which it described as unseizable, inalienable and imprescriptible, not subject to private appropriation. Article 80 of the cited repealed Ley Forestal prohibited the invasion and occupation of lands in National Parks, Forest Reserves, Protective Zones (Zonas Protectoras) and National Reserves, as long as their classification and transfer had not been determined. Article 6 of this same law sanctioned with imprisonment of six months to two years or a fine of fifteen to one hundred days, any person who exploited a forest of the forest heritage without the corresponding legal authorization, invaded a National Park, Biological Reserve, Protective Zone or Forest Reserve. It is thus that possessory acts carried out in a forest that is State heritage prove to be illegitimate, and therefore could not confer any right of possession. Law No. 4465 also regulated the exploitation and use of all forests in the country, both private and state-owned; thus the forest heritage of the State includes the entire national territory (articles 4, 32 to 42), which in turn can be subdivided into three areas: a) The forest regime (articles l, 2, 7, 47 to 54, 66 to 81); b) Forest exploitations on privately owned lands (articles 43 to 46, 60 to 65, 82 to 91); and c) the national reserves (articles 32 and following). For its part, the forest regime – constituted by the set of legal, economic and technical provisions responsible for giving content to the conservation, protection and rational exploitation of forests and forest lands (article 7) – has three sub-areas: a.1 protective zones, a.2) national parks, forest and biological reserves, and a.3) forests and forest lands. All lands considered as national reserves are immediately subject to the purposes of the forestry regulations (article 32). Over them, the State may create – by Law or by Executive Decree – forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges and biological reserves, thus forming the forest heritage (article 35). To be colonized or alienated, legislative authorization is required (article 40), and even if possessed by third parties, these acquire no right, the State’s right to recover being imprescriptible (article 33). The State’s forest heritage comprises all national assets where natural forest resources exist. There are also forests and lands of forest aptitude; whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, they are subject to the purposes of the Law. They are of public utility and therefore susceptible to expropriation, except those voluntarily submitted to the forest regime, where afforestation, reforestation and natural forest management projects are efficiently developed (articles 1 and 4). Forests are “all plant associations composed predominantly of trees and other woody vegetation” (article 6). Lands of forest aptitude shall be those declared as such by the Dirección General Forestal according to the official methodology for land classification (article 5). The following Ley Forestal, No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, regulated the forest heritage of the State in a sense very similar to the previous one. In 1990, a new Ley Forestal was enacted, No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, which again enshrines the public domain status (demanialidad) of lands with forests and forest lands of the National Reserves. This law was replaced by the current Ley Forestal number 7575. This norm again contemplates the public domain status of forested areas and lands of forest aptitude in the national reserves by providing in its article 13: “… The Natural Heritage of the State shall be constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves …”. Likewise, article 14 indicates “…The forest lands and forests that constitute the natural heritage of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor and the State’s action for recovery for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Registry by means of possessory information and both the invasion and occupation of them shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law…”. On the other hand, article 58 of the current Ley Forestal also regulates as a crime the invasion of forested areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied. Such subjection is made by the norm itself by classifying the areas of the national reserves as part of the Natural Heritage of the State, as indicated previously. It is thus that national reserves are subjected by law to this forest property regime, as they belong to the State, and according to what has been analyzed, the forested lands and lands of forest aptitude have not ceased to be subject to the condition of public domain assets imposed through the different forestry laws that have been in force over time up to the present. When discussing possession over a public domain asset, such discussion will only be valid if the right over the asset was acquired before it was declared a public domain asset. Likewise, the right of property in such cases may only be obtained when the titleholder has demonstrated ten-year possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the date the law declaring the object as Natural Heritage of the State came into force. The Constitutional Chamber has insisted that judges analyze from when an asset is subject to the public domain. In vote No. 4587 at 15:45 hours on August 5, 1997, the Chamber examined the constitutionality of the cited article 7 and ruled that to title lands located in the protected areas indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate having possessed for ten years before the respective Decree came into effect. The Chamber considered that the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession subsequent to the subjection from counting, and prevents the requirements for adverse possession (usucapión) from being met if at that time the right has not been acquired, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for adverse possession with the conditions established by law have not elapsed. For the Tribunal, this broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation’s environmental heritage and determines that when one seeks to title, through the possessory information procedure, a land located within a protected wild area, the discussion should not be reduced to the simple calculation of the time elapsed since entering a property in relation to the date on which the declaration of a protected wild area occurred. On one hand, to accredit possession ad usucapionem during the period established in article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be considered, and on the other, the possible existence of norms that of old declared these lands inalienable, even before their specific subjection to the public domain. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias allows the titling of forested areas outside protected wild areas, which contravenes the provisions of the Ley Forestal, which declares the Natural Heritage of the State as public domain, and includes among the former the forests and forest lands of the National Reserves. The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias allows the titling of assets that continue to be subject to the public domain. The Ley Forestal is what regulates the “forest” resource, not the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias; it constitutes a general law that regulates the titling of unregistered real estate. In this aspect, the principle of specialty of norms comes into play. The right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment forms part of the third-generation rights, a step forward from the classic, civil or political human rights (first generation) and from the economic, social and cultural ones (second generation). Its recognition has made it possible to place the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment as a true human right and has provided the basis to formulate a new legal classification: that of Ecological Law. Vote No. 16975-2008 at 14:53 hours on November 12, 2008, of the Constitutional Chamber, refers to the Natural Heritage of the State and its subjection to the public domain; the Constitutional Chamber recognized the public domain status of forests as they belong to the Natural Heritage of the State. Forestry regulations establish, for all cases and throughout the national territory, a special regime applicable to all forest resources; therein forest property is born. The national reserves are subjected by law to the regime, since as State property the legislative will requires no other requirement; expropriation proceeds with respect to private assets that are subject to form national parks, forest or biological reserves, forests or forest lands. Based on the foregoing, “…the Tribunal finds itself facing the dilemma in this particular case of applying subsection 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias which allows the titling of forested areas, or the Ley Forestal in its subsections 13, 14 and 15, and subsection 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización which declares them public domain as they are part of the national reserves that make up the Natural Heritage of the State.” A supervening unconstitutionality could eventually arise in view of the State’s obligation in the protection of the forest resource and environment as provided in article 50, contemplated in the third-generation human rights, which is why it is sent to the Constitutional Chamber so that it may determine the constitutionality of the exposed norms.

**2.-** In response to the summons given to the parties within the main matter, Lydiana Rodríguez Paniagua, Deputy Attorney General (Procuradora Adjunta), appeared before the Chamber (folio 15).

**3.-** By means of the brief visible at folios 15-59, the Attorney General's Office answers the hearing granted. In relation to articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal 7575/96, and 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización 2825/1961, it points out that the Tribunal does not specify the founded doubts regarding constitutionality, a requirement demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, article 104. The Attorney General's Office of the Republic considers that these norms are not unconstitutional. The State has full jurisdiction over its assets and is neither limited nor impeded in its actions when protecting the flora and fauna of the country. The forests and forest lands of the national reserves are environmental assets, which the public powers must protect in their physical and legal integrity. In relation to articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575, the Attorney General's Office, in opinion C-321-2003, indicated that the national reserves are the lands within the limits of the Republic not registered as private property, property of the municipalities or autonomous institutions; those not covered by ten-year possession (posesión decenal) or not destined by special laws for the formation of agricultural colonies, and all those that, not being private property, are not used for public services (Art. 11 Ley de Tierras y Colonización in relation to article 261 of the Civil Code). In vote 4587-97, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that lands considered as national reserves are immediately subject to the purposes of forestry regulations. It points out that according to their ownership by the State or state entities, ecological importance and physical qualities, the legislator subjects en bloc, in their natural state, their forests and forest lands, imposing on them, generically, the condition of public domain, through inalienability and imprescriptibility, with a view to their conservation, protection, adequate administration and promotion. Inalienability and unseizability are essential, distinctive and defining notes of the public domain, a regime attributed to the natural heritage of the State, guaranteed by the imprescriptible nature of the recovery actions, the ineffectiveness of possessory acts by private individuals and the prohibition of titling. The Attorney General's Office considers that there is a notorious contradiction existing in the Ley Forestal 7575/96, which after having subjected to public domain the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, and other lands, with the consequent characteristics of inalienable and imprescriptible and that “possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor” (arts. 13 and 14), authorizes their titling in article 72, subsection b), by modifying article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, No. 139, of July 14, 1941 and its reforms. That norm is unprotective of the Natural Heritage of the State which, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, encompasses the forest lands (of forest aptitude) and forests of the national reserves and infringes articles 50 and 121, subsection 14 of the Political Constitution. It threatens its legal integrity (state public ownership) and eventually its physical integrity, by placing them at the service of private interests; it distorts the core principles of the public domain, a regime that it renders void by allowing possession ad usucapionem within it, which is impossible to obtain, and ignores the constitutional obligation of the State to protect, preserve, conserve and promote those forest resources, for the benefit of present and future generations. In the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, two interpretations are possible in relation to that contradiction: a) Consider it real, ostensible, and annul the norm (article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, which reforms article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), for violating articles 50, in connection with 121, subsection 14, of the Constitution; this is the criterion that the Attorney General's Office endorses. The second possibility would be the harmonious interpretation of both numerals, in accordance with article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, conceiving the legal system as a systematic whole, free of formal contradictions. Under that perspective, since the “period of possession suitable for adverse possession must elapse before the subjection of the asset to the public domain occurs”, which “prevents counting possession subsequent”, and possession “for adverse possession must be prior to the subjection of the asset” (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, vote 4587-97. cons IV), the conclusion would be that forest lands and forests of the national reserves may only be titled if a possession suitable for adverse possession is reliably demonstrated, with the requirements of law, consolidated ten years before the first subjection to public forest domain, which dates – without interruption – from the Ley Forestal 4465/1969. In the same line would be the provisions for the titling of properties in protected wild areas (Ley Forestal, article 72, paragraph 1, which reforms article 7 Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). That is, in an interpretation in accordance with the Constitution, possessory information (informaciones posesorias) for properties included within these would proceed only if a “ten-year possession, exercised with ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree” that created it, is demonstrated, provided it is prior to the first subjection of the property to the Natural Heritage, formerly Forest, of the State (Ley Forestal 4465/1969). To assess the constitutionality of the questioned norm (article 72, subsection b, of the Ley Forestal, which reforms article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), emphasis is placed on three points repeatedly admitted by the Constitutional Chamber: the survival of the abolished right to govern situations or relationships born under its protection (declaration of public forest domain of the State) and the unsusceptibility of possession and adverse possession in public domain assets, as the Attorney General's Office has also indicated, acting in advisory functions to the Public Administration. Regarding the first aspect, in vote 4587-97 the Chamber indicated the need to demonstrate ten-year possession, suitable for adverse possession, with the requirements of law before the first subjection to public domain of forests and forest lands. This thesis has been maintained by the Tribunal in its jurisprudence: judgments 15753-2005, 7989-2005, 738-2003.

**4.-** The formalities established by law were followed in the procedure.

Drafted by Judge **Calzada Miranda**; and, **Considerando:** **I.- Admissibility requirements in optional judicial consultations.** In judgment number 01617-97 at fourteen hours and fifty-four minutes on March seventeen, nineteen ninety-seven, this Tribunal indicated the requirements that judicial consultations must meet for their study and stated the following:

"... the admissibility of the consultation (...) is conditioned on the concurrence of the following four elements:

A. That it is formulated by a 'judge', a generic term that – of course – applies both to single-member judges and to collegiate courts, and on which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative courts, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is to be facing the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitration award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could produce the effect of initiating a process that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).

B.

That there exist 'reasonable doubts' about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the challenge must be reasonable and considered. It also implies that it cannot address aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a judicial review consultation (consulta judicial) under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, for its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those rulings in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutionality review (by way of an acción or consulta), a new challenge on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because – in this case – there is always the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps via an amparo or hábeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, under this hypothesis, the judicial review consultation (consulta judicial) is pertinent.

C. That there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. As with the acción de inconstitucionalidad, the judicial review consultation (consulta judicial) never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the called 'prior' or 'main' matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that – due to its relevance to the case – is appropriate to clarify. Indeed, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission be judged' carries a very defined present sense, entirely distinct from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm could be applied or the act, conduct, or omission could be judged'. The judicial review consultation (consulta judicial) does not proceed upon the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since – as explained above – this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consulta to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present tense, with the application of the norm or the judging of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality." II.- The consulta is inadmissible due to its object. In the case under study, the consulta does not fulfill the second of the formal requisites demanded by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Indeed, the consulting Court seems to have doubts, not regarding the content of the second paragraph of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, but rather as to which norm to apply in the matter submitted to its knowledge, namely Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias or Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal and Article 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Indeed, while at the beginning of the brief filing the consulta it indicates that "…the constitutionality of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias must be consulted to the Sala Constitucional...", it later points out that "…the Court finds itself at a crossroads in this particular case of applying ordinal 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias which allows the titling of forested areas or the Ley Forestal in its ordinals 13, 14, and 15 and ordinal 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización which declares them public domain (demanio público)..." to conclude in the Por Tanto that: "...The judicial review consultation of constitutionality is ordered before the Sala Constitucional, regarding the second paragraph of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias which allows the titling of areas covered by forests or the Ley Forestal in its ordinals 13, 14, and 15, and ordinal 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización which declares them public domain (demanio público) as they are part of the national reserves that make up the Patrimonio Natural del Estado." It is thus clear that the Court does not raise a doubt of constitutionality regarding a "norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged," but rather its consulta addresses which of the cited norms it must apply. It is necessary to remember that the purpose of the judicial review consultation of constitutionality (consulta judicial de constitucionalidad) is to resolve those doubts that arise in the mind of a Judge when analyzing and resolving a matter within their competence regarding the constitutionality of one or several norms they must apply. In this case, the Court's doubt is limited to which norm it must apply to resolve the specific case. However, it is not the role of this Chamber to indicate to the Judge which norm to apply in the case submitted to their knowledge, nor to point out, when there are norms whose provisions may be contradictory, which one or ones of them prevail. By virtue of the foregoing, the consulta is inadmissible.

Por tanto:

No ha lugar to process the consulta.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Jorge Araya G.

Voto Nº 16975-2008 of 14:53 on November 12, 2008, of the Sala Constitucional, refers to the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) and its encumbrance as public domain (demanio público); the Sala Constitucional recognized the public domain character of forests because they belong to the Natural Heritage of the State. Forestry regulations establish, for all cases and throughout the national territory, a special regime applicable to all forest resources; therein originates forest property. National reserves are subject by law to the regime, since as State property, the legislative will does not require any other requirement; expropriation applies to private property encumbered to form national parks, forest or biological reserves, forests, or forest lands. Based on the foregoing, “…the Court is faced with the dilemma in this particular case of applying section 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which allows the titling of forested areas, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15, and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain as part of the national reserves that make up the Natural Heritage of the State.” Eventually, a supervening unconstitutionality could arise given the State’s obligation to protect forest resources and the environment as provided in Article 50, contemplated in third-generation human rights; therefore, the matter is sent to the Sala Constitucional for it to determine the constitutionality of the cited norms.

2.- In response to the summons issued to the parties in the main matter, Lydiana Rodríguez Paniagua, Deputy Procuradora, appeared before the Sala (folio 15).

3.- Through the brief visible at folios 15-59, the Procuraduría responded to the hearing granted. Regarding articles 13, 14, and 15 of Ley Forestal 7575/96, and 11 of Ley de Tierras y Colonización 2825/1961, it points out that the Court does not specify the well-founded doubts about constitutionality, a requirement demanded by the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, article 104. The Procuraduría General de la República considers that these norms are not unconstitutional. The State has full jurisdiction over its property and is neither limited nor prevented from acting when protecting the country's flora and fauna. The forests and forest lands of the national reserves are environmental assets, which public authorities must protect in their physical and legal integrity. Regarding articles 13, 14, and 15 of Ley Forestal N° 7575, the Procuraduría General, in opinion C-321-2003, stated that national reserves are the lands included within the limits of the Republic not registered as private property, property of municipalities or autonomous institutions; those not covered by ten-year possession (posesión decenal) or not designated by special laws for the formation of agricultural colonies, and all those that, not being private property, are not used for public services (Art. 11 Ley de Tierras y Colonización in relation to article 261 of the Civil Code). In Voto 4587-97, the Sala Constitucional indicated that lands considered national reserves are immediately encumbered for the purposes of forestry regulations. It notes that according to ownership by the State or state entities, ecological importance, and physical qualities, the legislator encumbers, as a whole, in their natural state, their forests and forest lands, impressing upon them, generically, the condition of public domain (dominio público), through inalienability and imprescriptibility, with a view to their conservation, protection, adequate management, and promotion. Inalienability and unseizability are essential, distinctive, and defining notes of the public domain, a regime attributed to the natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), guaranteed by the imprescriptible nature of recovery actions, the ineffectiveness of possessory acts by private individuals, and the prohibition of titling. The Procuraduría General considers that the contradiction existing in Ley Forestal 7575/96 is notorious, which, after having encumbered forests and forest lands of the national reserves, and other lands, as public domain, with the consequent characteristics of inalienable and imprescriptible, and that “possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor (arts. 13 and 14), authorizes their titling in article 72, subsection b), by modifying section 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, N° 139, of July 14, 1941, and its amendments. That norm is unprotective of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural de Estado) which, in the opinion of the Procuraduría, encompasses forest lands (of forest aptitude) and forests of the national reserves, and violates articles 50 and 121, subsection 14, of the Constitución Política. It undermines its legal integrity (state public ownership) and eventually its physical integrity, by placing it at the service of private interests; it distorts the core principles of the public domain, a regime it renders subsistent by allowing possession ad usucapionem within it, impossible to obtain, and disregards the constitutional obligation of the State to protect, preserve, conserve, and promote these forest resources, for the benefit of present and future generations. In the opinion of the Procuraduría General, two interpretations are possible regarding this contradiction: a) To consider it real, ostensible, and annul the norm (article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, which amends section 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), for violating articles 50, in connection with 121, subsection 14, of the Constitution; this is the criterion the Procuraduría endorses. The second possibility would be a harmonious interpretation of both provisions, in accordance with article 72, subsection b, paragraph 2, of the Ley Forestal, conceiving the legal system as a systematic whole, free of formal contradictions. Under this perspective, since the “period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the encumbrance of the property as public domain occurs,” which “prevents subsequent possession from being counted,” and the possession “for usucapion must be prior to the encumbrance of the property” (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, Voto 4587-97, cons IV), it would be concluded that forest lands and forests of the national reserves may only be titled if possession suitable for usucapion, with legal requirements, consolidated ten years before the first encumbrance as forest public domain (dominio público forestal), which dates –without interruption– from Ley Forestal 4465/1969, is conclusively demonstrated. In the same line would be the provisions for the titling of properties in protected wilderness areas (áreas protegidas silvestres) (Ley Forestal, article 72, paragraph 1, which amends section 7 Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). That is to say, in a constitutionally consistent interpretation, possessory information proceedings (informaciones posesorias) for properties included within these would only be admissible if a “ten-year possession, exercised ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree” that created it is demonstrated, provided it is prior to the first encumbrance of the property to the Natural Heritage, formerly Forest, of the State (Ley Forestal 4465/1969). To assess the constitutionality of the questioned norm (article 72, subsection b, of the Ley Forestal, which amends section 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), emphasis is placed on three points repeatedly admitted by the Sala Constitucional: the survival of the abolished right to govern situations or relationships created under its protection (declaration of State forest public domain) and the unsusceptibility of possession and usucapion in public domain assets (bienes demaniales), as the Procuraduría has also pointed out, acting in advisory functions for the Public Administration. Regarding the first aspect, in Voto 4587-97, the Sala indicated the need to demonstrate a ten-year possession, suitable for usucapion, with legal requirements before the first encumbrance as public domain of forests and forest lands. This thesis has been maintained by the Court in its jurisprudence: judgments 15753-2005, 7989-2005, 738-2003.

4.- The formalities established by law were observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- Admissibility requirements for optional judicial consultations. In judgment number 01617-97 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on March seventeen, nineteen ninety-seven, this Court indicated the requirements that judicial consultations must meet for their study and stated the following:

"...the admissibility of the consultation (...) is conditional upon the concurrence of the following four elements:

A. That it be formulated by a 'judge' (juez), a generic term that –of course– applies both to single-judge adjudicators and collegiate courts, and on which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, vested with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the moment of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a proceeding that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).

B. That there exist 'well-founded doubts' (dudas fundadas) about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and weighted. Furthermore, it implies that it cannot address aspects on whose constitutionality the Sala has already pronounced. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would mean disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Sala has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed an explicit constitutional review (by way of action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be viable regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because –in this case– there always exists the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps via amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there exist a case before the judge or court for adjudication. As in the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic eagerness; rather, it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior or main matter'. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied, or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance for the case– it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'must be applied the norm or judged the act, conduct or omission' carries a very defined current meaning, totally distinct from if the law spoke in terms of 'may apply the norm or judge the act, conduct or omission'. The judicial consultation is not applicable before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality.".

II.- The consultation is inadmissible by reason of its object. In the case under study, the consultation does not meet the second of the formal requirements demanded by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Indeed, the consulting Court seems to have doubts, not regarding the content of the second paragraph of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, but rather as to which norm to apply in the matter before it, that is, article 7 of the Ley de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias or articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal and article 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Indeed, although at the beginning of the brief filing the consultation it indicates that “…the constitutionality of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias must be consulted with the Sala Constitucional...”, it later indicates that “…the Court is faced with the dilemma in this particular case of applying section 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which allows the titling of forested areas, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15 and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain...” to conclude in the THEREFORE (POR TANTO) that: “...The judicial consultation of constitutionality is ordered before the Sala Constitucional, regarding the second paragraph of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which allows the titling of areas covered by forests, or the Ley Forestal in its sections 13, 14, and 15, and section 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which declares them public domain as they are part of the national reserves that make up the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado).” It is thus clear that the Court does not raise a doubt of constitutionality in relation to a "norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged," but rather its consultation concerns which of the cited norms it must apply. It is necessary to recall that the object of the judicial consultation of constitutionality is to resolve those doubts that arise in the mind of a Judge when analyzing and resolving a matter within his/her competence regarding the constitutionality of one or several norms he/she must apply. In this case, the Court's doubt is limited to which norm it must apply to resolve the specific case. However, it is not the role of this Sala to indicate to the Judge which norm to apply in the case submitted for its adjudication, nor to point out, when there are norms whose provisions may be contradictory, which one or ones of them prevail. By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is inadmissible.

Therefore (Por tanto):

The consultation is not to be answered. Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V. Jorge Araya G. EXPEDIENTE N° 09-010760-0007-CO Teléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional

*090107600007CO* *090107600007CO* Res. Nº 2010001667 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y once minutos del veintisiete de enero del dos mil diez.

Consulta judicial facultativa formulada por el Tribunal Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, mediante resolución de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 26 de junio del 2009, dictada dentro del expediente número 01-100178-0296-CI, que es Proceso de Información Posesoria planteada por Pompilio Vargas Varela.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las diez horas diez minutos del veintidós de julio del 2009, y con fundamento en los artículos 8, inciso 1), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; 2, inciso b); 3, 13, 102 y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el despacho consultante solicita a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 párrafo 2º de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal y artículo 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Alega el Tribunal consultante que conoce en apelación la sentencia número 23-2008 de las 9:16 horas del 16 de junio de 2008 que rechazó la titulación de un terreno con fundamento en el voto 1021-F-05 de las 16:15 horas del 7 de diciembre de 2005 dictado por ese Tribunal. Según ese voto, no cabe la titulación cuando se trata de un bosque primario, al considerar que ese tipo de inmuebles constituyen patrimonio forestal y natural del Estado, y por tanto, bienes demaniales. Alega el Tribunal consultante que la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, N° 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961, dispone en su artículo 11 que “…Mientras no se pruebe lo contrario, pertenecen al Estado en carácter de reservas nacionales: a) Todos los terrenos comprendidos dentro de los límites de la República que no estén inscritos como propiedad particular, de las Municipalidades o de las Instituciones Autónomas; b) Los que no estén amparados por la posesión decenal;…”. Por otra parte, la primera Ley Forestal, N° 4465 de 25 de noviembre de 1969, disponía en el artículo 32 que “…El patrimonio forestal del Estado está constituido por todos los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a las municipalidades, a las instituciones autónomas y a los demás organismos de la Administración Pública….”, y en el artículo 33 que “…Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio forestal del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no son susceptibles de inscripción en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria; su invasión y ocupación serán sancionadas conforme con lo dispuesto en esta ley.” Así, la primera ley forestal catalogaba como bienes demaniales las áreas boscosas y terrenos de aptitud forestal dentro de las Reservas Nacionales, las cuales calificaba de inembargables, inalienables e imprescriptibles, no sujetas a apropiación particular. El artículo 80 de la citada Ley Forestal derogada prohibía la invasión y ocupación de terrenos en los Parques Nacionales, Reservas Forestales, Zonas Protectoras y Reservas Nacionales, en tanto no se hubiese determinado su clasificación y transferencia. El artículo 6 de esta misma ley sancionaba con prisión de seis meses a dos años o con multa de quince a cien días, aquella persona que explotara un bosque de patrimonio forestal sin autorización legal correspondiente, invadiera un Parque Nacional, Reserva Biológica, Zona Protectora o Reserva Forestal. Es así como los actos posesorios realizados en un bosque patrimonio Estatal resultan ser ilegítimos, por lo que no podían conferir ningún derecho de posesión. La Ley N° 4465, regulaba además el aprovechamiento y utilización de todos los bosques del país tanto privados como estatales; así el patrimonio forestal del Estado incluye todo el territorio nacional (artículos 4, 32 al 42), el cual a su vez se puede subdividir en tres áreas: a) El régimen forestal (artículos l, 2, 7, 47 a 54, 66 al 81); b) Los aprovechamientos forestales en terrenos de propiedad privada (artículos 43 al 46, 60 al 65, 82 al 91); y c) las reservas nacionales (artículos 32 y siguientes). Por su parte el régimen forestal -constituido por el conjunto de disposiciones de carácter jurídico, económico y técnico, encargado de darle un contenido a la conservación, protección y racional aprovechamiento de los bosques y terrenos forestales (artículo 7)- tiene tres subáreas: a.1 zonas protectoras, a.2) parques nacionales, reservas forestales y biológicas y a.3) bosques y terrenos forestales. Todas las tierras consideradas como reservas nacionales quedan afectas en forma inmediata a los fines de la normativa forestal (artículo 32). Sobre ellas puede el Estado crear -por Ley o por Decreto Ejecutivo- reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre y reservas biológicas, conformando así el patrimonio forestal (artículo 35). Para poder ser colonizadas o enajenadas se requiere autorización legislativa (artículo 40), y aún cuando fueren poseídas por terceros éstos no adquieren ningún derecho, siendo imprescriptible el derecho del Estado para reivindicar (artículo 33). El patrimonio forestal del Estado comprende todos los bienes nacionales donde existan recursos naturales forestales. Existen también los bosques y los terrenos de aptitud forestal; sean estatales o estén reducidos a dominio particular, están sometidos a los fines de la Ley. Son de utilidad pública y por tanto susceptibles de los cuales se desarrollen eficientemente proyectos de forestación, reforestación y manejo de bosques naturales (artículos 1 y 4). Son bosques "todas las asociaciones vegetales compuestas, predominantemente de árboles y de otra vegetación leñosa" (artículo 6). Los terrenos de aptitud forestal serán los declarados así por la Dirección General Forestal de acuerdo a la metodología oficial para la clasificación de tierras (artículo 5). La Ley Forestal siguiente, N° 7032 de 7 de abril de 1986, normaba el patrimonio forestal del Estado en un sentido muy similar a la anterior. En el 1990 se promulga una nueva Ley Forestal, N° 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, la cual de nuevo consagra la demanialidad de los terrenos con bosques y terrenos forestales de las Reservas Nacionales. Esta ley fue sustituida por la actual Ley Forestal número 7575. Esta norma contempla nuevamente la demanialidad de las áreas boscosas y terrenos de aptitud forestal de las reservas nacionales al disponer en su artículo 13: “… El Patrimonio natural del Estado estará constituido por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales …”. Asimismo el artículo 14 indica “…Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio natural del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reinvindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no pueden inscribirse en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria y tanto la invasión como la ocupación de ellos será sancionada conforme a lo dispuesto en esta ley…”. Por otra parte el artículo 58 de la actual Ley Forestal también regula como delito la invasión de áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal cualquiera que sea el área ocupada. Tal sometimiento lo hace la misma norma al catalogar las áreas de las reservas nacionales como parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, según se indicó anteriormente. Es así como las reservas nacionales están sometidas de derecho a este régimen de propiedad forestal, pues pertenecen al Estado y conforme a lo analizado los terrenos boscosos y terrenos de aptitud forestal no han salido de la afectación de bienes de dominio público dado a través de las diferentes leyes forestales que han estado vigentes a través del tiempo hasta la actualidad. Al discutir la posesión sobre un bien demanial, dicha discusión solo será válida si el derecho sobre el bien se adquirió antes de que aquel se haya declarado bien de dominio público. Asimismo, el derecho de propiedad en tales casos sólo podrá obtenerse cuando el titular haya demostrado una posesión decenal, ejercida por lo menos con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley que declara el objeto como Patrimonio Natural del Estado. La Sala Constitucional ha insistido en los juzgadores analicen a partir de cuándo se afecta un bien al demanio público. En el voto N° 4587 de las 15:45 horas del 5 de agosto de 1997 la Sala examinó la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 citado y dispuso que para titular los terrenos ubicados en las zonas protegidas que ahí se señalan, el interesado debía demostrar haber poseído durante diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto respectivo. La Sala estimó que la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley. Para el Tribunal, esa perspectiva de mayor amplitud favorece la protección del patrimonio ambiental de la Nación y determina que cuando se pretenda titular mediante el procedimiento de informaciones posesorias un terreno ubicado dentro de un área silvestre protegida, la discusión no se reduzca al simple cálculo del tiempo que tiene de haber ingresado a un inmueble en relación con la fecha en que se haya producido la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida. Por un lado deberá contemplarse para acreditar la posesión ad usucapionem durante el plazo establecido en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias los elementos que cada tipo específico de posesión contempla, y por otro, la posible existencia de normas que de antaño declaraban inalienables esos terrenos, aún antes de su afectación específica al dominio público. El artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias permite la titulación de áreas boscosas fuera de áreas silvestres protegidas, lo cual contraviene lo dispuesto en la Ley Forestal, la que declara el Patrimonio Natural del Estado como demanio público, e incluye entre aquél los bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal de las Reservas Nacionales. La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias permite la titulación de bienes que continúan estando afectos al demanio público. La Ley Forestal es la que regula el recurso "bosque", no la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias; constituye una ley de carácter general que regula la titulación de inmuebles sin inscribir. En este aspecto entra en juego el principio de especialidad de normas. El derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado forma parte de los derechos de la tercera generación, un paso adelante de los derechos humanos clásicos, civiles o políticos (primera generación) y de los económicos, sociales y culturales (segunda generación). Su reconocimiento ha permitido colocar al derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado como un verdadero derecho humano y ha dado base para formular una nueva clasificación jurídica: la del Derecho Ecológico. El voto Nº 16975-2008 de las 14:53 horas del 12 de noviembre de 2008 de la Sala Constitucional, hace referencia al Patrimonio Natural del Estado y su afectación al demanio público; la Sala Constitucional reconoció la demanialidad de los bosques por pertenecer al Patrimonio Natural del Estado. La normativa forestal establece, para todos los casos y en todo el territorio nacional, un régimen especial aplicable a todos los recursos forestales; ahí nace la propiedad forestal. Las reservas nacionales están sometidas de derecho al régimen, pues como propiedad del Estado la voluntad legislativa no exige ningún otro requisito; la expropiación procede en cuanto a bienes privados que se afecten para conformar parques nacionales, reservas forestales o biológicas, bosques o terrenos forestales. Partiendo de lo expuesto, “…el Tribunal se encuentra ante la disyuntiva en este caso particular de aplicar el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias que permite la titulación de áreas boscosas o la Ley Forestal en sus ordinales 13, 14 y 15, y el ordinal 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización que los declara demanio público al ser parte de las reservas nacionales que integran el Patrimonio Natural del Estado.” Eventualmente podría darse una inconstitucionalidad sobrevenida ante la obligación del Estado en la tutela del recurso bosque y ambiente conforme lo prevé el artículo 50, contemplado en los derechos humanos de la tercera generación, por lo que se envía a la Sala Constitucional a fin de que se sirva determinar la constitucionalidad de las normas expuestas.

2.- En atención al emplazamiento conferido a las partes dentro del asunto principal, se apersonó ante la Sala Lydiana Rodríguez Paniagua, Procuradora Adjunta (folios 15).

3.- Por medio del memorial visible a folios 15-59, la Procuraduría contesta a la audiencia otorgada. En relación con los artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal 7575/96, y 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización 2825/1961, señala que el Tribunal no concreta las dudas fundadas sobre la constitucionalidad, requisito que exige la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, artículo 104. La Procuraduría General de la República considera que esas normas no son inconstitucionales. El Estado tiene plena jurisdicción sobre sus bienes y no está limitado ni imposibilitado en su actuación al momento de proteger la flora y fauna del país. Los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, son bienes medioambientales, que los poderes públicos deben proteger en su integridad física y jurídica. En relación con los artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal N° 7575, la Procuraduría General, en el dictamen C-321-2003 señaló que las reservas nacionales son los terrenos comprendidos dentro de los límites de la República no inscritos como propiedad privada, de las municipalidades o instituciones autónomas; los no amparados por posesión decenal o no destinados por leyes especiales a la formación de colonias agrícolas y todos lo que no siendo propiedad particular, no se ocupan en servicios públicos (Art. 11 Ley de Tierras y Colonización en relación con el artículo 261 del Código Civil). En el voto 4587-97 la Sala Constitucional indicó que las tierras consideradas como reservas nacionales quedan afectadas en forma inmediata a los fines de la normativa forestal. Señala que según la pertenencia al Estado o entes estatales, importancia ecológica y cualidades físicas, el legislador afecta en bloque, en estado natural, sus bosques y terrenos forestales, imprimiéndoles, en forma genérica la condición de dominio público, a través de la inalienabilidad e imprescriptibilidad, con miras a su conservación, protección, administración adecuada y fomento. La inalienabilidad e inembargabilidad son notas esenciales, distintivas y definitorias del dominio público, régimen que se atribuye al patrimonio natural del Estado, garantizadas por el carácter imprescriptible de las acciones reivindicatorias, la ineficacia de los actos posesorios de particulares y la prohibición de titulaciones. La Procuraduría General estima que es notoria la contradicción existente en la Ley Forestal 7575/96, que tras haber afectado a dominio público los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, y otros terrenos, con las consiguientes características de inalienable e imprescriptible y de que “la posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor (arts. 13 y 14), autoriza su titulación en el artículo 72, inciso b), al modificar el 7° de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, N° 139, del 14 de julio de 1941 y sus reformas. Esa norma es desprotectora del Patrimonio Natural de Estado que, a juicio de la Procuraduría, engloba los terrenos forestales (de aptitud forestal) y bosques de las reservas nacionales e infringe los artículos 50 y 121 inciso 14 de la Constitución Política. Atenta contra su integridad jurídica (titularidad pública estatal) y eventualmente física, al ponernos al servicios de intereses privados; desvirtúa los principios medulares del dominio público, régimen que deja insubsistente al permitir la posesión ad usucapionem dentro de éste, imposible de obtener, y desconoce la obligación constitucional que tiene el Estado de proteger, preservar, conservar y fomentar esos recursos forestales, en beneficio de las generaciones presentes y futuras. A juicio de la Procuraduría General, son posibles dos interpretaciones en relación con esa contradicción: a) Estimarla real, ostensible, y anular la norma (artículo 72, inciso b, párrafo 2°, de la Ley Forestal, que reforma el artículo 7° de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), por violentar los artículos 50, en conexión con el 121, inciso 14, constitucionales; este es el criterio que la Procuraduría avala. La segunda posibilidad sería la interpretación armónica de ambos numerales, de conformidad con el artículo 72, inciso b, párrafo 2°, de la Ley Forestal, concibiendo el ordenamiento jurídico como un todo sistemático, exento de contradicciones formales. Bajo esa perspectiva, como el “plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público”, la cual “evita que se cuente la posesión posterior”, y la posesión “para la usucapión debe ser anterior a la afectación del bien” (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, voto 4587-97. cons IV), se concluiría que sólo podrán titularse los terrenos forestales y bosques de las reservas nacionales si se demuestra fehacientemente una posesión apta para usucapir, con los requisitos de ley, consolidada diez años antes de la primera afectación a dominio público forestal, que data –sin solución de continuidad- desde la Ley Forestal 4465/1969. En la misma línea se hallaría lo dispuesto para las titulaciones de inmuebles en las áreas protegidas silvestres (Ley Forestal, artículo 72, párrafo 1°, que reforma el 7° Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Es decir, en una interpretación conforme a la Constitución, las informaciones posesorias de inmuebles comprendidos dentro de éstas procederían únicamente si se demuestra una “posesión decenal, ejercida con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto” que la creó, siempre y cuando sea anterior a la primera afectación del inmueble al Patrimonio Natural, antes Forestal, del Estado (Ley Forestal 4465/1969). Para valorar la constitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada (artículo 72, inciso b, de la Ley Forestal, que reforma el artículo 7° de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), se hace hincapié en tres puntos admitidos con reiteración por la Sala Constitucional: la supervivencia del derecho abolido para regir las situaciones o relaciones nacidas a su amparo (declaratoria de dominio público forestal del Estado) y la insusceptibilidad de la posesión y usucapión en bienes demaniales, como también lo ha señalado la Procuraduría, actuando en funciones consultivas de la Administración Pública. En cuanto al primer aspecto, en el voto 4587-97 la Sala señaló la necesidad de demostrar una posesión decenal, apta para usucapir, con los requisitos de ley antes de la primera afectación a dominio público de los bosques y terrenos forestales. Esa tesis ha sido mantenida por el Tribunal en su jurisprudencia: sentencia 15753-2005, 7989-2005, 738-2003.

4.- En el procedimiento se cumplieron las formalidades establecidas por ley.

Redacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

I.- Presupuestos de admisibilidad en las consultas judiciales facultativas. En la sentencia número 01617-97 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, este Tribunal indicó los requisitos que deben cumplir las consultas judiciales para su estudio y señaló lo siguiente:

"... la admisibilidad de la consulta (...) está condicionada a la concurrencia de los cuatro elementos siguientes:

A. Que la formule un 'juez', término genérico que –desde luego– se aplica tanto a los juzgadores unipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario precisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder jurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales administrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los asuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es que se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una sentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b) que el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente habilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución que sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio a un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).

B. Que existan 'dudas fundadas' sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar. Esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y ponderado. Además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya constitucionalidad la Sala ya se haya pronunciado. Ello es así no sólo porque aceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las resoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas circunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. Pero subráyese, por su relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva de aquellos pronunciamientos en que la Sala haya validado expresamente la adecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros constitucionales. En consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen explícito de constitucionalidad (en vía de acción o consulta), no sería viable un nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de un acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque –en este caso– siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya no en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. A la inversa, el hecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente (quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquellos se fundamenten. Y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.

C. Que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. Al igual que en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución del llamado 'asunto previo' o 'principal'. Finalmente, D. Que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que –por su relevancia para el caso– resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión 'deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión', conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que 'pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión'. La consulta judicial no procede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que –como se explicó arriba– esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los recursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o doctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o al juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad.".

II.- La consulta es improcedente en razón de su objeto. En el caso en estudio, la consulta no cumple el segundo de los requisitos formales que exige la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En efecto, el Tribunal consultante parece tener dudas, no en relación con el contenido del párrafo segundo del artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, sino en cuanto a cuál norma aplicar en el asunto sometido a su conocimiento, sea el artículo 7 de la Ley de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias o los artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal y el artículo 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización. En efecto, si bien al inicio del memorial de interposición de la consulta indica que “…ha de consultarse a la Sala Constitucional la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias...”, posteriormente señala que “…el Tribunal se encuentra en la disyuntiva en este caso particular de aplicar el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias que permite la titulación de áreas boscosas o la Ley Forestal en sus ordinales 13, 14, y 15 y el ordinal 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización que los declara demanio público...” para concluir en el POR TANTO que: “...Se dispone la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad para ante la Sala Constitucional, sobre el párrafo segundo del artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias que permite la titulación de áreas cubiertas de bosques o la Ley Forestal en sus ordinales 13, 14 y 15, y el ordinal 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización que los declara demanio público al ser parte de las reservas nacionales que integran el Patrimonio Natural del Estado.” Es claro así que el Tribunal no plantea una duda de constitucionalidad en relación con una "norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar", sino que su consulta versa sobre cuál de las normas citadas debe aplicar. Es preciso recordar que el objeto de la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad es evacuar aquellas dudas que surgen en el ánimo de un Juez al analizar y resolver un asunto de su competencia sobre la constitucionalidad de una o varias normas que debe aplicar. En este caso la duda del Tribunal se circunscribe a cuál de las normas debe aplicar para resolver el caso concreto. Sin embargo, no le corresponde a esta Sala indicar al Juez cuál norma debe aplicar en el caso sometido a su conocimiento, ni tampoco señalar cuando hay normas cuyas disposiciones pueden ser contradictorias, cuál o cuáles de ellas prevalecen. En virtud de lo expuesto, la consulta es inadmisible.

Por tanto:

No ha lugar a evacuar la consulta.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Jorge Araya G.

2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional