Forest Tax on Imported Wood Cannot Be Challenged via Unconstitutionality Action if Only Alleges Regulatory ExcessImpuesto forestal sobre madera importada no puede impugnarse por inconstitucionalidad si solo alega exceso reglamentario

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and forty-four minutes on May seventh, two thousand eight.

An unconstitutionality action brought by Marco Vinicio Araya Muñoz, of legal age, married, business administrator, resident of San José, in his capacity as Secretary with powers of generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit of sum of the company Multiservicios La Sabana S.A., legal entity identification number three-hundred one-two hundred sixty-three thousand four hundred ninety-four-eighteen, against Regulation Number 28220-MINAE-H, which is the Regulation to Article 42 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575.

Whereas:

1. 1By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours fifty-two minutes on February fourteenth, two thousand eight, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Regulation Number 28220-MINAE-H, which regulates Article 42 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575, be declared. He points out that the challenged provision is unconstitutional because it injures the principle of legal reserve in tax matters. He states that his represented company is dedicated to the assembly of wood pallets, that is, platforms or bases used to place different types of merchandise. The company began activities in November two thousand seven and from then on imports processed wood to produce these pallets. From the date of commencement of the activity, the Ministry of Finance charges his represented company, in addition to other taxes, the one established in Article 42 of the Ley Forestal. That norm establishes a tax on wood in logs, as literally indicated in the first paragraph of the article, and not on other types of wood.Likewise, the norm indicates that those natural or legal persons who are owners of primary wood industrialization centers must pay that tax, so there is no congruence whatsoever between the application of that norm to the activity carried out by his represented company, given that it does not have an industrialization center, does not work with wood in logs, nor does it import it. Article 42 is clear in establishing which product will bear the tax burden, what its meaning is, what the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax is, and who must pay it. The petitioner claims not to understand how Regulation 28220-MINAE-M is being applied to his represented company, imposing that burden on it, if it carries out none of the activities indicated by Article 42 of the Ley Forestal: it does not use wood in logs, does not import wood in logs, nor is it the owner of any industrialization center. From a study of the minutes of the Permanent Commission on Agricultural and Natural Resource Affairs, legislative file 11.003, where the discussion and creation of Article 42 of the Ley Forestal is recorded, it is clear that the intent of the legislator was always to tax wood in logs with said tax, whether national or imported, not other types of wood.This arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional charge is made by the Ministry of Finance based on what was ordered by the Executive Branch three years after the promulgation of the Law, with the issuance of the Regulation to Article 42 of the Ley Forestal, which broadens, illegally and unconstitutionally, what is indicated in that provision. Article 1 of said Regulation establishes that the tax in question will be charged not only to wood in logs, but to any type of wood that is imported. Thus, that provision goes beyond what was established by Article 42 of the Ley Forestal, causing the violation of the principles of legality and legal reserve in tax matters. Said provision makes distinctions where the legislator did not, making it illegal and unconstitutional. For its part, Article 2, subsection b) of the Regulation indicates that the Forest Tax has as its taxable event (hecho generador) “...the entry of wood in the case of imported wood...”; Article 3 establishes that for the purposes of Article 42 of the Ley Forestal, taxpayers of the tax are natural or legal persons, owners of primary wood industrialization centers or that provide sawing services to third parties, as well as natural or legal persons, de facto or de jure, that import wood.The wording of these articles departs from what is established in Article 42 of the Ley Forestal, which does not establish a tax for other types of wood that is not in logs (national or imported) and, the Regulation being a norm of lower rank than the Law, it could not establish new provisions. Hence, said Regulation contravenes the provisions of Articles 9, 11, 39, 40, and 121 subsections 1 and 13 of the Political Constitution.
2. 2In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he states that it derives from the first paragraph of Article 75, since an amparo appeal was filed before this jurisdiction, processed in file number 08-003252, where the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm was alleged.
3. 3Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, summarily or on the merits, at any time, even from the moment of its filing, any petition brought before it that proves to be manifestly without merit, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, identical or similar, rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

.I.- Procedural requirements and assumptions for the formulation of unconstitutionality actions.- The unconstitutionality action is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, prevent the Chamber from hearing the challenge made. Thus, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility assumptions for unconstitutionality actions, and regulates three distinct situations. In the first paragraph, the existence of a matter pending resolution is required, whether in the judicial venue - which includes habeas corpus or amparo appeals - or in the administrative venue, only when the exhaustion of this avenue is in progress, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the main matter. In turn, in the second and third paragraphs, the direct action is regulated, that is, the situations in which the underlying matter is not required, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and b) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman of the Inhabitants.

Likewise, it requires certain important formalities, such as the explicit determination of the challenged norms, duly supported, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by a lawyer of the brief initiating the petition, the necessary copies for the magistrates who are members of the Chamber, the Office of the Attorney General, and the parties involved in the main matter, the accreditation of standing conditions (powers and certifications), and literal certification of the claim brief, which, in the event of not being provided by the petitioner, can be ordered by the President of the Chamber for compliance.

II. Non-compliance with formal requirements

In the case under study, this Court observes that the petitioning company does not meet all the essential requirements that contribute to the determination of the admissibility of the action, since the person acting as representative of the petitioning company does not accredit the condition he claims to have, in that he claims to act in his capacity as Secretary with powers of generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit of sum of the company "Multiservicios La Sabana S.A." but does not provide certification of the legal existence and representation (personería) of that legal entity. However, despite the fact that these are formal requirements whose fulfillment could be ordered for its substantiation, this is not deemed pertinent or necessary in this case, for reasons of procedural economy, since the action is inadmissible for the reasons that will be explained in the following considering.

III. Inadmissibility of the action by reason of its object

The petitioner challenges Regulation Number 28220-MINAE-H, which is the Regulation to Article 42 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575. The action is inadmissible by reason of its object of challenge, given that what is claimed is the excess of a regulatory norm in relation to the law that serves as its basis, or the breach of the principle of legality, which may be heard through the contentious-administrative venue.

In this regard, the petitioner must abide by what has been considered in the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court on this matter, in which it has considered that the invocation of unconstitutionality motivated exclusively by the violation of the principle of administrative legality is a matter reserved for the ordinary jurisdiction, precisely under the provisions of Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Constitution. Thus, the simple infringement of the principle of legal reserve by exceeding the content given to it by the Law on which a regulatory provision is based, implies that it must be heard in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. That task of analysis and verification was assigned by the Constituent Power to the contentious-administrative judge, as is clear from the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, which requires a systematic interpretation of the constitutional text and an understanding that questions of legality must be submitted to the cited jurisdiction, in order to maintain a uniform distribution of competencies and respect for all the rules that make up the Political Constitution.

As has been repeatedly and consistently stated by this Court; "It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but within the Constitution itself there exists a distribution of competencies in order to guarantee the citizen a means of protecting the different classes of rights and interests they possess. In that way, the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions (Articles 49 and 70) are regulated in the Political Constitution, and it is within this context that the constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, with the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those mentioned, for the purposes of protecting the citizen" (see, among others, judgments number 94-000843, 96-000404, 96-003379, 96-006471, 96-006692-96, 96-006689, 97-2402, 97-004261, 98-3458, 98-5055, 98-6242, 99-2364, 99-2372, 99-5025, 99-5026, 99-6399, 2003-11921, 2004-4865).

In this sense, delineating the constitutional jurisdiction from the ordinary one becomes delicate, since the infringement of the principle of legality derives precisely from constitutional norms - Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution -; and what is precisely requested is that this principle be upheld by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged provision. The petitioner is warned that, despite the significance of this principle, it cannot, however, be fruitfully invoked unless at least one other constitutional norm or principle has also been breached, when it concerns the constitutional jurisdiction, a situation that does not occur in the specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the action must be rejected, in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction.

Therefore:

The action is summarily rejected.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Acting Presiding Judge a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

GROJAS FILE No. 08-003268-0007-CO Telephones: 295-3696, 295-3697, 295-3698, 295-3700. Fax: 295-3712. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional In the case under study, this Court observes that the plaintiff company does not meet all the essential requirements that contribute to determining the admissibility of the action, since the person appearing as representative of the plaintiff company does not prove the condition he claims to have, as he alleges he acts in his capacity as Secretary with powers of unrestricted general agent without limit of amount of the company "Multiservicios La Sabana S.A.," but does not provide certification of the legal capacity (personería) of that legal entity. However, despite the fact that these are formal requirements the fulfillment of which could be ordered for its processing, this is not deemed either pertinent or necessary in this case, for reasons of procedural economy (economía procesal), since the action is inadmissible for the reasons that will be explained in the following recital (considerando).

III. Inadmissibility of the action due to its object

The plaintiff challenges Regulation Number 28220-MINAE-H, which is the Regulation to Article 42 of the Ley Forestal N° 7575. The action is inadmissible due to the object of the challenge, since what is claimed is the excess of a regulatory norm in relation to the law that serves as its basis, or the breach of the principle of legality, which is capable of being heard in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (vía contenciosa).

In this regard, the plaintiff must abide by what has been considered in the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court on this matter, in which it has considered that the invocation of unconstitutionality motivated by the exclusive violation of the principle of administrative legality is a matter reserved for the ordinary jurisdiction, precisely in accordance with the provisions of Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Constitution. Thus, the simple infringement of the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva legal) by exceeding the content given by the Law on which a regulatory provision is based, implies, and must be addressed within, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. That task of analysis and verification was assigned by the Constituent Power to the contentious-administrative judge, as can be inferred from the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, which requires a systematic interpretation of the constitutional text and an understanding that matters of legality must be submitted to the cited jurisdiction, in order to maintain a uniform distribution of competences and respect for all the rules that make up the Political Constitution.

As has been pointed out repeatedly by this Court; "It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system is derived from it, but within the Constitution itself, there exists a distribution of competences aimed at guaranteeing the citizen a way to protect the different kinds of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, with the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those mentioned, for the purposes of protecting the citizen" (see, among others, rulings number 94-000843, 96-000404, 96-003379, 96-006471, 96-006692-96, 96-006689, 97-2402, 97-004261, 98-3458, 98-5055, 98-6242, 99-2364, 99-2372, 99-5025, 99-5026, 99-6399, 2003-11921, 2004-4865).

In this sense, delimiting constitutional jurisdiction from ordinary jurisdiction becomes delicate, since the infringement of the principle of legality arises precisely from constitutional-ranking norms—Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution—; and what is precisely requested is that this principle be upheld by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged provision. The plaintiff is advised that, despite the importance of this principle, for it to be productively invoked, at least one other norm or constitutional principle must have been breached when it comes to constitutional jurisdiction, a situation that does not occur in this specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the action must be rejected, in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

GROJAS As has been pointed out repeatedly and consistently by this Court; "It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly carries an alleged violation of the Political Constitution, since the entire legal order derives from it, but within the Constitution itself there exists a distribution of jurisdiction (competencias) for the purpose of guaranteeing the citizen a way to protect the different classes of rights and interests they possess. In this manner, the Political Constitution regulates the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, in the understanding that its competence complements, and does not overlap with, those indicated, for the purposes of the citizen's protection" (see, among others, rulings number 94-000843, 96-000404, 96-003379, 96-006471, 96-006692-96, 96-006689, 97-2402, 97-004261, 98-3458, 98-5055, 98-6242, 99-2364, 99-2372, 99-5025, 99-5026, 99-6399, 2003-11921, 2004-4865).

In this regard, delimiting the constitutional jurisdiction from the ordinary jurisdiction becomes delicate, since the infringement of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) derives precisely from norms of constitutional rank — Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution — and what is precisely requested is that this principle be made to prevail by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged provision. The petitioner is advised that the transcendence of this principle does not prevent it, however, from being fruitfully invoked, provided that at least another constitutional norm or principle has been breached, when it comes to the constitutional jurisdiction, a situation that does not occur in the specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the action must be rejected, in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

GROJAS

* 080032680007CO * * 080032680007CO * SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cuarenta y cuatro minutos del siete de mayo del dos mil ocho.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Marco Vinicio Araya Muñoz, mayor, casado, administrador de empresas, vecino de San José, en su condición de Secretario con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la empresa Multiservicios La Sabana S.A. cédula de persona jurídica número tres-ciento uno-doscientos sesenta y tres mil cuatrocientos noventa y cuatro-dieciocho contra el Reglamento Número 28220-MINAE-H que es el Reglamento al artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal N° 7575.

Resultando:

1. 1Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las trece horas cincuenta y dos minutos del catorce de febrero del dos mil ocho, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Reglamento Número 28220-MINAE-H que reglamenta el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal N° 7575. Señala que la disposición impugnada es inconstitucional pues lesiona el principio de reserva legal en materia tributaria. Manifiesta que su representada se dedica al ensamble de pallets de madera, es decir, tarimas o plataformas que se utilizan para colocar distintos tipos de mercadería. La empresa inicio actividades en noviembre del dos mil siete y a partir de entonces importa madera procesada para producir esas tarimas. A partir de la fecha de inicio de la actividad, el Ministerio de Hacienda le cobra a su representada, además de otros impuestos, el establecido en el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal. Esa norma establece un impuesto a la madera en trozas, como literalmente lo indica el párrafo primero del artículo, y no a otros tipos de madera.Asimismo, la norma indica que deberán pagar ese impuesto, aquellas personas física o jurídica propietarias de centros de industrialización primaria de maderas, por lo que no existe congruencia alguna entre la aplicación de esa norma a la actividad realizada por su representada, dado que esta no tiene un centro de industrialización, no trabaja con madera en trozas, ni la importa. El artículo 42 es claro al establecer cuál es el producto que tendrá la carga impositiva, cuál es su significado, cuál es el hecho generador del impuesto y quienes deben pagarlo. El accionante alega no comprender como el Reglamento 28220-MINAE-M está siendo aplicado a su representada imponiéndole esa carga, si no realiza ninguna de las actividades que indica el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal: no utiliza madera en trozas, no importa madera en trozas ni es propietaria de ningún centro de industrialización. De un estudio sobre las actas de la Comisión Permanente de asuntos agropecuarios y de recursos naturales, expediente legislativo 11.003, donde consta la discusión y creación del artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal, se desprende que el espíritu del legislador siempre fue el gravar con dicho impuesto la madera en trozas, sea nacional o importada, no otro tipo de madera.Ese cobro arbitrario, ilegal e inconstitucional lo hace el Ministerio de Hacienda con fundamento en lo dispuesto por el Poder Ejecutivo tres años después de la promulgación de la Ley, con la emisión del Reglamento al artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal, que amplía, de manera ilegal e inconstitucional, lo indicado en esa disposición. El artículo 1° de dicho Reglamento establece que el impuesto en cuestión será cobrado no solo a la madera en trozas, sino a cualquier tipo de madera que se importe. Es así como esa disposición va más allá de lo establecido por el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal, lo que hace que se violen los principios de legalidad y de reserva legal en materia tributaria. Dicha disposición distingue donde el legislador no lo hizo, por lo que es ilegal e inconstitucional. Por su parte, el artículo 2° inciso b) del Reglamento señala que el Impuesto Forestal tiene como hecho generador “…la internación de madera en el caso de la madera importada…”; el artículo 3° establece que para efectos del artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal son contribuyentes del impuesto las personas físicas o jurídicas, propietarias de centros de industrialización primaria de manera o que brinden servicios de aserrío a terceras personas, así como las personas físicas o jurídicas de hecho o de derecho que importen madera.La redacción de estos artículos se aparta de lo establecido en el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal, que no establece un impuesto para otros tipos de madera que no sea en troza (nacional o importada) y al ser el Reglamento una norma de rango inferior a la Ley, no podría establecer disposiciones nuevas. De ahí que dicho Reglamento contraviene lo dispuesto en los artículos 9, 11, 39, 40 y 121 incisos 1 y 13 de la Constitución Política.
2. 2A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad señala que deriva del artículo 75 párrafo primero, pues se presentó ante esta jurisdicción un recurso de amparo que se tramita en el expediente número 08-003252 donde se alegó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada.
3. 3El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

.I.- Requisitos y presupuestos procesales para la formulación de acciones de inconstitucionalidad.- La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con determinadas formalidades, que si no se reúnen, imposibilitan a la Sala conocer de la impugnación que se hace. Es así como en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, y se regulan tres situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero, se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial -en el que se incluyen los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo-, o en la administrativa, únicamente cuando está en la fase de agotamiento de esta vía, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. A su vez, en los párrafos segundo y tercero, se regula la acción directa, es decir, las situaciones en las que no se requiere del asunto base, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y b) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

Asimismo, requiere de ciertas formalidades importantes, como la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y principios constitucionales que se consideren infringidos, autenticación por abogado del escrito de interposición de la gestión, las copias necesarias para los magistrados integrantes de la Sala, la Procuraduría y las partes que intervienen en el asunto principal, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), y certificación literal del libelo de impugnación, los cuales, en caso de no ser aportadas por el accionante, pueden ser prevenidos para su cumplimiento por el Presidente de la Sala.

II. Del incumplimiento de requisitos formales

En el caso en estudio, observa este Tribunal que la sociedad accionante no cumple con todos los requisitos esenciales que coadyuvan a la determinación de la admisibilidad de la acción, pues quien figura como representante de la empresa accionante no acredita condición que dice tener, en cuanto alega que lo hace en su condición de Secretario con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad "Multiservicios La Sabana S.A.” pero no aporta certificación de la personería de esa persona jurídica. Sin embargo, no obstante que se trata de requisitos que formales cuyo cumplimiento podrían ser prevenidos para su substanciación, ello no se estima ni pertinente ni necesario en este caso, por una cuestión de economía procesal, toda vez que la acción es inadmisible, por los motivos que se explicarán en el siguiente considerando.

III. Inadmisibilidad de la acción en razón de su objeto

El accionante impugna el Reglamento Número 28220-MINAE-H que es el Reglamento al artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal N° 7575. La acción es inadmisible en razón del objeto de impugnación, toda vez que lo que reclama es el exceso de una norma reglamentaria en relación con la ley que le sirve de base, o el quebranto del principio de legalidad, susceptible de ser conocido en la vía contenciosa.

A este respecto, el accionante debe estarse a lo considerado en la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en esta materia, en la que ha considerado que la invocación de inconstitucionalidad motivada en la exclusiva violación del principio de legalidad administrativa es un asunto que se reserva a la jurisdicción ordinaria, precisamente al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 49, 121 y 140 Constitucionales. De esta suerte, la simple infracción del principio de reserva legal por exceder el contenido que le da la Ley en que se apoya una disposición reglamentaria, implica, debe residenciarse en la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Esa labor de análisis y verificación fue asignada por el Constituyente al juez contencioso, según se desprende de lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, lo cual obliga a interpretar de forma sistemática el texto constitucional y entender que las cuestiones de legalidad han de someterse a la citada jurisdicción, con el fin de mantener una uniforme distribución de las competencias y el respeto de todas las reglas que conforman la Constitución Política.

Como se ha señalado en forma reiterada y repetida por este Tribunal; "Es claro que cualquier impugnación como la que se plantea, conlleva implícita una presunta violación a la Constitución Política, dado que de ella se deriva todo el ordenamiento jurídico, pero en la propia Constitución existe un reparto de competencias con el fin de garantizar al ciudadano una manera de proteger las distintas clases de derechos e intereses que posee. De esa forma, se regulan en la Constitución Política, las jurisdicciones contenciosa y de trabajo (artículos 49 y 70) y es dentro de este contexto que debe incrustarse la jurisdicción constitucional, en el entendido que su competencia se complementa y no se superpone a las señaladas, a los fines de protección del ciudadano" (ver entre otras las sentencias número 94- 000843, 96-000404, 96-003379, 96-006471, 96-006692-96, 96-006689, 97-2402, 97- 004261, 98-3458, 98-5055, 98-6242, 99-2364, 99-2372, 99-5025, 99-5026, 99-6399, 2003-11921, 2004-4865).

En este sentido, deslindar la jurisdicción constitucional de la común se torna delicado, ya que la infracción al principio de legalidad se desprende precisamente de normas de rango constitucional -artículos 11, 49, 121 y 140 de la Constitución Política-; y lo que precisamente se solicita es que se haga prevalecer ese principio al declarar la existencia de violación de preceptos legales por parte de la disposición impugnada. Se advierte al accionante que no obsta la trascendencia de este principio, sin embargo, para que pueda invocársele fructíferamente debe haberse quebrantado por lo menos, otra norma o principio constitucional, cuando de la jurisdicción constitucional se trata, situación que no se da en el caso concreto. En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción debe rechazarse, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero del artículo 9 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

GROJAS 295-3698, 295-3700. Fax: 295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional