Constitutionality of liquor sale prohibition in indigenous reservesConstitucionalidad de prohibición de venta de licor en reservas indígenas

* 070076490007CO * Res: 2007-012395 **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at fifteen hours and three minutes of the twenty-ninth of August of two thousand seven.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Marvin Rodríguez Varela, of legal age, married, university student, bearer of identity card number 5-106-005, resident of Nicoya; against the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena, number 6172 of November 29, 1977), its Regulations (Reglamento, executive decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978) and executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date.

**Resultando:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:30 hours on June 4, 2007, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality be declared of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena, number 6172 of November 29, 1977), its Regulations (Reglamento, executive decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978) and executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date. He alleges that said regulations injure: a) human dignity, derived from democratic principles, insofar as they do not recognize legal personality to each indigenous person; b) the right to equality, first by discriminating against them regarding the recognition of other fundamental rights (such as private property) and, second, by making an odious distinction between those who are indigenous and those who are not; c) the right to private property, by imposing a type of communal property on them; d) the principles of autonomy of will and freedom of contract, by preventing them from contracting without restrictions; e) freedom of enterprise, by prohibiting the administration of commercial establishments within the reservations to non-indigenous persons; f) freedom of association, by forcing indigenous persons to form part of comprehensive development associations to represent them; and, g) the right to bequeath to their children, by prohibiting a non-indigenous person from acquiring with their own title land or farms within the reservations. He considers Articles 25, 33, 45, 51, and 77 of the Political Constitution to have been infringed, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the legal standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he points out that pending before the Superior Administrative Litigation Court, on appeal, is his application for a municipal license for the purpose of establishing a liquor outlet within the Matambú Indigenous Reservation, which was denied by the Municipality of Hojancha de Guanacaste based on the provisions of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), as well as opinion C-277-2001 of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and ruling number 1608-96 of the Constitutional Chamber.

**3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, on procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior identical or similar petition rejected.

Written by Magistrate **Vargas Benavides**; and, **Considerando:** **I.-** De previo (Preliminary Matter). The petition does not meet all the formal requirements established in the Law of this jurisdiction for the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality. Indeed, the petitioner does not provide the sufficient number of copies of all the documentation referred to in Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Even so, it is considered appropriate to dispense with the preliminary warning that would otherwise be possible under Article 80 ibid., for reasons of procedural economy, in view of what is resolved below.

**II.- Lack of connection between the action and its underlying matter.** Despite the petitioner's extensive arguments regarding the alleged defects of unconstitutionality that in his opinion affect the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), its Regulations (Reglamento) and related executive decrees, it is plain that the vast majority lack relevant linkage with the administrative proceeding that serves as the basis for the action.

Due to the incidental nature of the action of unconstitutionality with respect to the underlying proceeding, the Chamber's jurisprudence has been consistent in holding that there must be a strict concordance between the latter and the former regarding the provisions under challenge, since otherwise the action could not serve as a reasonable means for the protection of the rights and interests indicated, to which Article 75 of the Law of this jurisdiction refers. Indeed, "The scope of an unconstitutionality action depends not only on the will of the interested party; it is circumscribed by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction: the unconstitutionality must be invoked in the principal proceeding 'as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured' (Article 75, first paragraph). (...) Ruling on the admissibility of the action against articles not directly linked to the underlying matter would mean distorting the challenge regime inherent to the unconstitutionality action in our system: the prior case as the rule, the direct action as the exception; the prior case as a 'reasonable means' to protect the claim in the underlying matter, for whose determination we use the criterion of the usefulness of an upholding judgment: One must ask: Could the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality have relevance in the prior proceeding? This is the reason why the interested party cannot use the opportunity to direct the action against any other norms, because only the related provisions that do not distort the incidental nature of the action are susceptible to this proceeding." (No. 3628-95 at 14:00 hours of July 12, 1995).

In this case and as is evident from the documentation accompanying the action, the denial of the liquor license application made by the Municipality of Hojancha was based solely on Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), so that it is not apparent what possible practical interest the hypothetical declaration of unconstitutionality of the entire Law, its Regulation, and the decrees relating to the creation of indigenous reserves could derive for said application. With respect to those other provisions, the action is manifestly improper and must be so decreed.

III.- Failure to invoke the unconstitutionality of some of the challenged provisions. Without prejudice to what has just been indicated, from the written submission invoking unconstitutionality filed in the underlying proceeding and, specifically, from the extract thereof, at folio 38, it is recorded that in that matter, the now petitioner only indicated his intention to "challenge via unconstitutionality the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) number 6172 of March 29, 1977 and its Regulation". That is, he omitted to refer in that sense to executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date, which he does however include in the action. This lack of concordance reinforces what was indicated in the previous section, regarding the fact that, with respect to those normative provisions, the action cannot serve as a means of defense for the rights and interests in question.

IV.- Constitutionality of Article 6 of Law 6172. Now then, regarding Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) -the only one with respect to which, for the reasons given in the preceding point, the action could have effective relevance- the Chamber has already ruled previously, just as the Municipality of Hojancha de Guanacaste correctly indicated at the time. Indeed, regarding the prohibition on the sale of liquor established in the referenced norm, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) already declared its constitutionality in judgment number 1608-96 at 15:57 hours on April 9, 1996, ratified by judgments number 2843-99 at 15:09 hours on April 21, 1999, 2000-11530 at 14:43 on December 21, 2000, and -more recently- by number 2005-01538 at 14:56 hours on February 15, 2005. For example, on the penultimate of those occasions, it was stated, as relevant:

"III.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED NORM. On two previous occasions this Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality of the challenged norm, for the same reasons alleged on this occasion, and in both has determined its conformity with Constitutional Law. In this manner, in judgment number 01608-96, at fifteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on the ninth of April, nineteen ninety-six, it is considered that the restriction imposed in Article 6 of the Indigenous Law of Costa Rica (Ley Indígena de Costa Rica) for the granting of national and foreign liquor licenses in indigenous reserves is in accordance with the constitutional principles and norms considered infringed by the petitioning association, for two fundamental reasons: the first of them, insofar as it is constitutionally possible to impose limitations on the freedom of commerce, as a fundamental right that it is, provided it is done by law (judgment number 01195-91, among others); and the second, insofar as the limitation imposed is reasonable. In this sense, it must be recalled that constitutionally the legislator has the power to arbitrate compensatory measures that allow for greater realization of the right to equality of opportunity and access to the benefits offered by the social system, whence it is -constitutionally- empowered to establish protective measures in favor of the weaker party, which is what occurs in the case under study, upon considering that:

'(...) This is the legal framework of a comprehensive development strategy to balance the situation of disadvantage traditionally experienced by indigenous reserve areas, and there is no doubt that the secular disadvantage of the social groups that the law intends to benefit justifies such a measure, highly protective in nature, meaning the purpose pursued by the regulation is valid from a constitutional perspective, as is the means employed which -in the Chamber's opinion- conforms to said objective, so there is no violation of the constitutional scope of the freedom of commerce in this case and the action must be dismissed on the merits regarding the aforementioned Article 6 of Law number 6172, for not being contrary to Article 46 of the Constitution.' From the foregoing, it is evident that the norm in question, far from creating a discriminatory situation to the detriment of the indigenous people residing in a reserve, constitutes a protective measure for them, established within the international normative framework for the protection of indigenous peoples, insofar as it is evident that the legislator's objective was to isolate these peoples from the harmful influence of external factors or factors that contaminate their culture, customs, and institutions. It is clear that there is no prohibition for indigenous people to establish businesses where they can sell liquor (both national and foreign), but with the sole condition that such businesses be established outside the respective reserves, with the corresponding liquor license; this makes it evident that the norm does not establish a prohibition against indigenous people solely by their condition as such; reasons for which this Chamber considers that there is neither an infringement of the principles of equality before the law and freedom of commerce, contained in Articles 33 and 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). " (...)

"V.- CONCLUSION. In this Chamber's opinion, Article 6 of the Indigenous Law of Costa Rica (Ley Indígena de Costa Rica), number 6172, of the twenty-ninth of November, nineteen seventy-seven, does not harm any fundamental right; on the contrary, it considers that it is a protective measure in favor of a vulnerable group..." As the present action does not provide additional elements of judgment that oblige a change in the expressed criterion, the proper course is to deny it on the merits, as to the recently examined point, and outright as to the rest, for the reasons outlined supra.

V.- Magistrate Calzada dissents and declares the action with merit.

Therefore:

The action is dismissed on the merits as to Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). It is dismissed outright as to the rest. Magistrate Calzada dissents and declares the action with merit.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Acting Presiding Judge (Presidenta a.i.)

Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jorge Araya G.

JFB/oc.- Magistrate Calzada dissents and declares the action with merit, based on the following considerations:

Just as I did in judgment No. 2005-1538, I must state that indeed in judgment No. 0836-M-97 of this Court, the Chamber had already ruled regarding the challenged norms, dismissing the action on the merits, in which I subscribed a separate note, since even though I concurred with the Court at that time regarding the existence of a lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) in favor of the indigenous people over the lands traditionally occupied by them, I expressed that said regime could only have a temporary effect, considering that it is an imposed limitation, and moreover that it should not be permanent. Otherwise, it would mean that indigenous people would not have access to private property, which in my opinion is discriminatory in relation to non-indigenous people. Therefore, given that said analysis was in 1997, that is, nearly 11 years ago, I consider that any period that could be considered reasonable to limit indigenous people from being considered owners of their own lands, bearing all the limitations that communal property implies, has already elapsed. It is under this reasoning that the present unconstitutionality action must be declared with merit for violation of Articles 33 and 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política).

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON INDIGENOUS PROPERTIES. Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) (number 6172 of November 29, 1977), its Regulations (Reglamento) (executive decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978) and executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date.

Res: 2007-012395 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and three minutes on August twenty-ninth, two thousand seven.- Unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) brought by Marvin Rodríguez Varela, of legal age, married, university student, bearer of identity card number 5-106-005, resident of Nicoya; against the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) (number 6172 of November 29, 1977), its Regulations (Reglamento) (executive decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978) and executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date.

Resultando (Factual Background):

1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:30 hours on June 4, 2007, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) (number 6172 of November 29, 1977), its Regulations (Reglamento) (executive decree number 8487-G of April 26, 1978) and executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date be declared. He alleges that said regulations harm: a) human dignity, derived from democratic principles, in that they do not recognize legal personality to each indigenous person; b) the right to equality, first by discriminating against them in the recognition of other fundamental rights (such as that of private property) and, second, by making an odious distinction between those who are indigenous and those who are not; c) the right to private property, by imposing a type of community property on them; d) the principles of autonomy of will and contractual freedom, by preventing them from contracting without restrictions; e) freedom of enterprise, by prohibiting non-indigenous persons from managing commercial establishments within the reserves; f) freedom of association, by forcing indigenous persons to form part of integral development associations to represent them; and, g) the right to inherit to their children, by prohibiting a non-indigenous person from acquiring with their own title lands or farms located within the reserves. He considers Articles 25, 33, 45, 51, and 77 of the Political Constitution to be infringed, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing (legitimación) he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he points out that before the Contentious-Administrative Superior Court, a request of his for a municipal license (patente municipal) to establish a liquor outlet within the Matambú Indigenous Reserve is pending on appeal, which was denied by the Municipality of Hojancha de Guanacaste based on the provisions of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), as well as legal opinion C-277-2001 of the General Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and judgment number 1608-96 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).

3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject on preliminary grounds (de plano) or on the merits (por el fondo), at any time, including from its submission, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previously rejected identical or similar petition.

Drafted by Judge Vargas Benavides; and, Considerando (Legal Reasoning):

I.- Preliminary matter. The petition does not meet all the formal requirements established in the Law of this jurisdiction for the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions. Specifically, the petitioner does not provide the sufficient number of copies of all the documentation referred to in Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Even so, it is deemed appropriate to dispense with the preliminary order (prevención) that would otherwise be applicable under Article 80 ibidem, for reasons of procedural economy, in view of what is resolved below.

II.- Lack of connection between the action and its base matter (asunto base). Despite the extensive arguments of the plaintiff regarding the alleged defects of unconstitutionality which, in his opinion, affect the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), its Regulations (Reglamento) and the related executive decrees, it is obvious that the vast majority of them lack a relevant link to the administrative procedure that serves as the basis for the action. Due to the incidental nature of the unconstitutionality action with respect to the proceeding that serves as its base, the Chamber’s jurisprudence has been reiterated to the effect that there must be a strict concordance between the latter and the former regarding the provisions that are the subject of challenge, since otherwise the action could not serve as the reasonable means for the protection of the rights and interests indicated, as referred to in Article 75 of the Law of this jurisdiction. In effect, “The scope of an unconstitutionality action does not depend solely on the will of the interested party; it is circumscribed by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional): the unconstitutionality must be invoked in the main proceeding ‘as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered harmed’ (Article 75, first paragraph). (...) Declaring the admissibility of the action against articles not directly linked to the base matter (asunto base) would mean distorting the challenge regime inherent to the unconstitutionality action in our system: the prior case as a rule, the direct action as an exception; the prior case as a ‘reasonable means’ to protect the claim in the base matter (asunto base), for whose determination we use the criterion of the utility of the estimatory judgment: One must ask: Could the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality have significance in the prior proceeding? Here is the reason why the interested party cannot take the opportunity to direct the action against any other norms, because only those related provisions that do not distort the incidental nature of the action are subject to this proceeding.” (Judgment No. 3628-95 of 14:00 hours on July 12, 1995).

In this case, and as is evident from the documentation accompanying the action, the denial of the liquor license application issued by the Municipality of Hojancha was based solely on Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), so it is not apparent what possible practical interest the hypothetical declaration of unconstitutionality of the entire Law, its Regulations (Reglamento), and the decrees relating to the creation of indigenous reserves could have for that petition. Regarding those other provisions, the action is manifestly inadmissible and must be so decreed.

III.- Failure to invoke the unconstitutionality of some of the challenged provisions. Without prejudice to what has just been indicated, from the brief invoking unconstitutionality filed in the base proceeding, and specifically, from its extract, at folio 38, it is recorded that in that matter, the now petitioner only indicated his intention to "question via unconstitutionality the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) number 6172 of March 29, 1977, and its Regulations (Reglamento)". That is, he omitted to refer in that sense to executive decrees number 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G of August 20, 1977, and 7268-G of that same date, which he nevertheless does include in the action. This lack of concordance reinforces what was indicated in the previous section, regarding the fact that, with respect to those normative provisions, the action cannot serve as a means of defense for the rights and interests in question.

IV.- Constitutionality of Article 6 of Law 6172. Now, regarding Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) -the only one for which, due to the reasons given in the point two sections prior, the action could indeed have effective relevance- the Chamber has already pronounced before, just as the Municipality of Hojancha de Guanacaste correctly indicated at the time. Specifically, regarding the prohibition on the sale of liquor established in the referenced norm, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) already declared its constitutionality in judgment number 1608-96 of 15:57 hours on April 9, 1996, ratified by judgments number 2843-99 of 15:09 hours on April 21, 1999, 2000-11530 of 14:43 on December 21, 2000, and -most recently- by number 2005-01538 of 14:56 hours on February 15, 2005. For example, on the second-to-last of those occasions it was stated, as relevant:

“III.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED NORM. On two prior occasions, this Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality of the challenged norm, for the same reasons alleged on this occasion, and on both it has determined its conformity with Constitutional Law. Thus, in judgment number 01608-96, of fifteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on April ninth, nineteen ninety-six, it is considered that the restriction imposed in Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) of Costa Rica for the granting of domestic and foreign liquor licenses in indigenous reserves is in accordance with the constitutional principles and norms considered infringed by the petitioner association, for two fundamental reasons: the first, insofar as the imposition of limitations on the freedom of commerce, as a fundamental right it is, is constitutionally possible, provided it is done by law (judgment number 01195-91, among others); and the second, insofar as the imposed limitation is reasonable. In this sense, it must be remembered that constitutionally the legislator has the power to arbitrate compensatory measures that allow for a greater realization of the right to equal opportunities and access to the benefits offered by the social system, whence it is –constitutionally- empowered to establish protective measures in favor of the weakest, which is what occurs in the case under study, upon considering that:

‘(…) It concerns the legal framework for a comprehensive development strategy to balance the disadvantageous situation that indigenous reserve zones traditionally suffer, and there is no doubt that the secular disadvantage of the social groups whom the law seeks to benefit justifies a measure such as this, highly protective, so that the aim pursued with the regulation is valid from the constitutional perspective, as is the means employed which -in the Chamber’s view- is adjusted to said objective, so there is no violation of the constitutional scope of freedom of commerce in this case, and the action must be rejected on the merits (por el fondo) with respect to the aforementioned Article 6 of Law number 6172, as it is not contrary to Article 46 Constitutional.’ From the foregoing, it is evident that the norm in question, far from creating a discriminatory situation to the detriment of indigenous persons residing in a reserve, constitutes a protective measure for them, established within the international normative framework for the protection of indigenous peoples, in that it is clear that the legislator's objective was to shield these peoples from the harmful influence of foreign factors or contaminants of their culture, customs, and institutions. It is clear that there is no prohibition against indigenous persons establishing businesses where they can sell liquor (both domestic and foreign), but with the sole condition that such businesses be established outside the respective reserves, with the corresponding liquor license; from which it becomes evident that the norm does not establish a prohibition against indigenous persons based solely on their status as such; reasons for which this Chamber considers that there is neither an infringement of the principles of equality before the law nor freedom of commerce, contained in Articles 33 and 46 of the Political Constitution.

(…)

V.- CONCLUSION. In the opinion of this Chamber, Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) of Costa Rica, number 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven, does not harm any fundamental right; on the contrary, it considers that it is a protective measure in favor of a vulnerable group…” Since the present action does not provide additional elements of judgment that compel a change in the expressed criteria, the appropriate course is to deny it on the merits (por el fondo) with respect to the just-examined point, and on preliminary grounds (de plano) for the rest, for the reasons indicated supra.

V.- Judge Calzada dissents (salva el voto) and declares the action admissible (con lugar).

Por tanto (Therefore):

The action is rejected on the merits (por el fondo) regarding Article 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). It is rejected on preliminary grounds (de plano) for the rest. Judge Calzada dissents (salva el voto) and declares the action admissible (con lugar).

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Acting Presiding Judge (Presidenta a.i.)

Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jorge Araya G.

JFB/oc.- **Magistrate Calzada dissents and grants the action, based on the following considerations:** As I did in judgment No. 2005-1538, I must state that indeed in judgment No. 0836-M-97 of this Court, the Chamber had already ruled on the challenged norms, rejecting the action on its merits, in which I signed a separate note, because even though I agreed with the Court at that time regarding the existence of communal property in favor of indigenous peoples over the lands traditionally occupied by them, I expressed that such a regime could only have a temporary effect, considering that it is an imposed limitation, and furthermore that it should not be permanent. Otherwise, it would mean that indigenous peoples would not have access to private property, which in my opinion is discriminatory in relation to non-indigenous peoples. Well, since that analysis was in 1997, that is, almost 11 years ago, I consider that any period that could be considered reasonable for limiting indigenous peoples from being considered owners of their own lands, bearing all the limitations that communal property entails, has already elapsed. Based on this reasoning, this action of unconstitutionality must be granted due to a violation of Articles 33 and 45 of the Political Constitution.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

* 070076490007CO * * 070076490007CO * Res: 2007-012395 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas con tres minutos del veintinueve de agosto del dos mil siete.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Marvin Rodríguez Varela, mayor, casado, estudiante universitario, portador de la cédula de identidad número 5-106-005, vecino de Nicoya; contra la Ley Indígena (número 6172 de 29 de noviembre de 1977), su Reglamento (decreto ejecutivo número 8487-G del 26 de abril de 1978) y los decretos ejecutivos número 5904-G de 10 de abril de 1976, 6036-G de 12 de junio de 1976, 6037-G de 15 de junio de 1976, 7267-G de 20 de agosto de 1977 y 7268-G de esa misma fecha.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:30 horas del 4 de junio del 2007, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley Indígena (número 6172 de 29 de noviembre de 1977), su Reglamento (decreto ejecutivo número 8487-G del 26 de abril de 1978) y los decretos ejecutivos número 5904-G de 10 de abril de 1976, 6036-G de 12 de junio de 1976, 6037-G de 15 de junio de 1976, 7267-G de 20 de agosto de 1977 y 7268-G de esa misma fecha. Alega que dicha normativa lesiona: a) la dignidad humana, derivada de los principios democráticos, en cuanto no le reconocen personalidad jurídica a cada indígena; b) el derecho de igualdad, primero por discriminarlos en cuanto al reconocimiento de otros derechos fundamentales (como el de propiedad privada) y, segundo, por hacer una distinción odiosa entre quienes son indígenas y quienes no; c) el derecho a la propiedad privada, por imponerles un tipo de propiedad comunitaria; d) los principios de autonomía de la voluntad y libertad contractual, por impedirles contratar sin restricciones; e) la libertad de empresa, al prohibir administrar los establecimientos comerciales dentro de las reservas a no indígenas; f) la libertad de asociación, por obligar a los indígenas a formar parte de asociaciones de desarrollo integral para que los representen; y, g) el derecho de heredar a sus hijos, por prohibir que un no indígena adquiera con título propio terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de las reservas. Considera infringidos los artículos 25, 33, 45, 51 y 77 de la Constitución Política, así como la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, la Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación Racial y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala que ante el Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo pende, en apelación, una solicitud suya de patente municipal para efectos de establecer un expendio de licores dentro de la Reserva Indígena de Matambú, la cual fue denegada por la Municipalidad de Hojancha de Guanacaste con base en lo dispuesto en la Ley Indígena, así como el dictamen C-277-2001 de la Procuraduría General de la República y la sentencia número 1608-96 de la Sala Constitucional.

3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Vargas Benavides; y,

Considerando:

I.- De previo. La gestión no cumple con todos los requisitos formales establecidos en la Ley de esta jurisdicción para la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad. En efecto, el actor no aporta el número suficiente de copias de toda la documentación a que se refiere el artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Aun así, se estima oportuno prescindir de la prevención que de otro modo cabría efectuar conforme al artículo 80 ibidem, por motivos de economía procesal, en atención a lo que seguidamente se resuelve.

II.- Falta de conexidad entre la acción y su asunto base. A pesar de los extensos argumentos del demandante en cuanto a los alegados vicios de inconstitucionalidad que en su criterio afectan a la Ley Indígena, su Reglamento y los decretos ejecutivos conexos, es palmario que en su gran mayoría carecen de vinculación relevante con el procedimiento administrativo que sirve de fundamento a la acción. Debido al carácter incidental de la acción de inconstitucionalidad respecto del proceso que le sirve de base, la jurisprudencia de la Sala ha sido reiterada en el sentido de que entre éste y aquélla debe existir una concordancia estricta respecto de las disposiciones que son objeto de cuestionamiento, puesto que de lo contrario no podría servir la acción como el medio razonable para la tutela de los derechos e intereses señalados a que se refiere el artículo 75 de la Ley de esta jurisdicción. En efecto, “El ámbito de una acción de inconstitucionalidad no solo depende de la voluntad del interesado; queda circunscrito por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional: la inconstitucionalidad debe invocarse en el principal ‘como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado’ (artículo 75, párrafo primero). (...) Pronunciar la admisibilidad de la acción contra artículos no ligados directamente al asunto base significaría desnaturalizar el régimen de impugnación propio de la acción de inconstitucionalidad en nuestro sistema: el caso previo como regla, la acción directa como excepción; el caso previo como ‘medio razonable’ de amparar la pretensión en el asunto base, para cuya determinación nos sirve el criterio de la utilidad de la sentencia estimatoria: Hay que preguntarse: ¿Podría la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad tener trascendencia en el proceso previo? He aquí la razón de que no pueda el interesado aprovechar la oportunidad para enderezar la acción contra cualesquiera otras normas, porque solo son susceptibles de ese trámite las disposiciones conexas que no desnaturalicen el carácter incidental de la acción.” (N ° 3628-95 de las 14:00 horas del 12 de julio de 1995).

En este caso y tal y como se desprende de la documental que acompaña a la acción, la denegatoria de la solicitud de patente de licores que efectuó la Municipalidad de Hojancha se fundamentó únicamente en el artículo 6 de la Ley Indígena, de modo que no se aprecia qué posible interés práctico podría derivar para dicha gestión la hipotética declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de la Ley completa, su Reglamento y los decretos relativos a la creación de reservas indígenas. Respecto de esas demás disposiciones, la acción resulta manifiestamente improcedente y así se debe decretar.

III.- Falta de invocación de la inconstitucionalidad de algunas de las disposiciones impugnadas. Sin perjuicio de lo recién indicado, del libelo de invocación de la inconstitucionalidad presentado en el proceso base y, específicamente, del extracto de éste, a folio 38, consta que en ese asunto, el ahora actor únicamente señaló su intención de “cuestionar vía inconstitucionalidad la Ley Indígena número 6172 de 29 de marzo de 1977 y su Reglamento”. Es decir, omitió referirse en dicho sentido a los decretos ejecutivos número 5904-G de 10 de abril de 1976, 6036-G de 12 de junio de 1976, 6037-G de 15 de junio de 1976, 7267-G de 20 de agosto de 1977 y 7268-G de esa misma fecha, que sin embargo sí incluye en la acción. Esta falta de concordancia refuerza lo señalado en el acápite anterior, acerca del hecho de que, respecto de esas disposiciones normativas, la acción no puede fungir como medio de defensa de los derechos e intereses en cuestión.

IV.- Constitucionalidad del artículo 6 de la ley 6172. Ahora bien, en cuanto al artículo 6 de la Ley Indígena -único respecto del cual, por las razones dadas en el punto trasanterior, la acción sí podría tener una relevancia efectiva- ya la Sala se ha pronunciado antes, tal y como se lo indicó en su momento, correctamente, la Municipalidad de Hojancha de Guanacaste. En efecto, en cuanto a la prohibición de venta de licor establecida en la referida norma, la Sala Constitucional ya declaró su constitucionalidad en la sentencia número 1608-96 de las 15:57 horas del 9 de abril de 1996, ratificada por sentencias número 2843-99 de las 15:09 horas del 21 de abril de 1999, 2000-11530 de las 14:43 del 21 de diciembre del 2000 y -más recientemente- por la número 2005-01538 de las 14:56 horas del 15 de febrero del 2005. Por ejemplo, en la penúltima de esas ocasiones se dijo, en cuanto interesa:

“III.- DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA NORMA IMPUGNADA. En dos ocasiones anteriores este Tribunal Constitucional ha analizado la constitucionalidad de la norma impugnada, por los mismos motivos alegados en esta ocasión, y en ambas ha determinado la conformidad de ella con el Derecho de la Constitución. De esta suerte, en sentencia número 01608-96, de las quince horas cincuenta y siete minutos del nueve de abril de mil novecientos noventa y seis, se considera que la restricción impuesta en el artículo 6 de la Ley Indígena de Costa Rica para el otorgamiento de patentes de licores nacionales y extranjeros en las reservas indígenas es acorde con los principios y normas constitucionales considerados infringidos por la asociación accionante, por dos razones fundamentales: la primera de ellas, en tanto constitucionalmente resulta posible la imposición de limitaciones a la libertad de comercio, como derecho fundamental que es, siempre y cuando se haga mediante ley (sentencia número 01195-91, entre otras); y la segunda, en tanto la limitación impuesta resulta razonable. En este sentido, debe recordarse que constitucionalmente el legislador tiene la facultad para arbitrar medidas compensatorias que permitan una mayor concreción del derecho de igualdad de oportunidades y acceso a los beneficios que ofrece el sistema social, de donde se encuentra –constitucionalmente- facultado para establecer medidas de protección a favor del más débil, que es lo que sucede en el caso en estudio, al estimar que:

‘(…) Se trata del andamiaje jurídico de una estrategia integral de desarrollo para equilibrar la situación de desventaja que tradicionalmente acusan las zonas de reserva indígena, y no cabe duda que la secular desventaja de los grupos sociales a quienes pretende beneficiar la ley, justifican una medida como esa, altamente protectora, por lo que el fin perseguido con la regulación es válido desde la óptica constitucional, así como lo es el medio empleado que -a criterio de la Sala- se ajusta a dicho objetivo, por lo que no existe violación del alcance constitucional de la libertad de comercio en este caso y la acción debe rechazarse por el fondo en cuanto al supracitado artículo 6 de la Ley número 6172, por no ser contrario al artículo 46 Constitucional.’ De lo anterior, se evidencia que la norma en cuestión lejos de crear una situación discriminatoria en perjuicio de los indígenas que residen en una reserva, constituye una medida de protección para el mismo, establecida dentro del marco normativo internacional de protección a los pueblos indígenas, en tanto se evidencia que el objetivo del legislador fue el de abstraer a estos pueblos de la influencia nociva de factores foráneos o contaminantes de su cultura, costumbres e instituciones. Queda claro que no existe prohibición para que los indígenas establezcan negocios en los que puedan vender licor (tanto nacional como extranjero), pero con la única condición de que tales negocios se establezcan fuera de las respectivas reservas, con la correspondiente patente de licor; con lo cual queda en evidencia que la norma no establece una prohibición a los indígenas por su sola condición de tales; motivos por los que esta Sala considera que ni hay infracción a los principios de igualdad ante la ley y libertad de comercio, contenidos en los artículos 33 y 46 de la Constitución Política.

(…)

V.- CONCLUSIÓN. En criterio de esta Sala, el artículo 6 de la Ley Indígena de Costa Rica, número 6172, de veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete, no lesiona ningún derecho fundamental, por el contrario, estima que se trata de una medida de protección a favor de un grupo vulnerable…” Al no aportar la presente acción elementos de juicio adicionales que obliguen a variar el criterio expresado, lo que procede es denegarla por el fondo, en cuanto al recién examinado extremo y de plano en lo demás, por los motivos reseñados supra.

V.- La Magistrada Calzada salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en cuanto al artículo 6 de la Ley Indígena. Se rechaza de plano en lo demás. La Magistrada Calzada salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta a.i.

Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Federico Sosto L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jorge Araya G.

JFB/oc.- La Magistrada Calzada salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción, con fundamento en las siguientes consideraciones:

Al igual que lo hice en la sentencia No. 2005-1538, debo manifestar que efectivamente en la sentencia No. 0836-M-97 de este Tribunal, la Sala ya se había pronunciado respecto a las normas impugnadas rechazando por el fondo la acción, en la cual suscribí una nota separada, por cuanto aún y cuando coincidí con el Tribunal en aquel momento, en cuanto a la existencia de una propiedad comunal a favor de los indígenas sobre las tierras tradicionalmente ocupadas por ellos, externé que dicho régimen sólo podía tener efecto temporal, considerando que se trata de una limitación impuesta, además de que ésta no debe ser permanente. De lo contrario, significaría que los indígenas no tendrían acceso a la propiedad privada, lo que en mi criterio resulta discriminatorio con relación a los no indígenas. Pues bien, siendo que dicho análisis fue en el año 1997, o sea hace casi 11 años, considero que ya ha transcurrido cualquier plazo que se pudiera considerar razonable para limitarles a los indígenas ser considerados propietarios de sus propias tierras, soportando todas las limitaciones que la propiedad comunal implica. Bajo este razonamiento es que la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad se debe declarar con lugar por violación a los artículos 33 y 45 de la Constitución Política.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.