Dismissal of unconstitutionality challenge to 15% private generation capRechazo de inconstitucionalidad contra límite del 15% de generación privada

* 070054430007CO * Res: No. 2007-007135 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and forty-five minutes on the twenty-third of May of two thousand seven.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by Federico Alvarado Orozco, of legal age, married, attorney, bearer of identity card number 1-713-152, resident of San José; against Article 7 of Law 7200, called Law that Authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electrical Generation.

**Resulting:** **1.-** By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours and forty-six minutes on the twenty-fourth of April of two thousand seven, the plaintiff requests that the following phrase be declared unconstitutional: *“siempre y cuando la potencia, por concepto de generación paralela, no llegue a constituir más del quince por ciento (15%) de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional”* contained in Article 7 of Law 7200. He alleges that: **a)** The cap challenged in Article 7 of Law 7200 is unreasonable and disproportionate, because under the principle of the block of legality by which public servants act (Article 11 of the Political Constitution), the challenged law shelters and indirectly imposes on the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad the duty to use polluting or thermal electric generators, in contrast to the possibility that private initiative, which is controlled by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad under the same law's framework, might invest, develop, and trade in healthy, clean, renewable, and non-polluting electricity; **b)** That legal norm is prohibiting new wind, hydroelectric plants and those of any other nature (with respect to the environment) from being established, or allowing existing ones to grow; **c)** It is tacitly prohibited that, should there be an electrical surplus, it could be sold to other Central American countries, with benefit to the national coffers and economy, and with the additional achievement that those countries might also reduce the use of thermal plants for electricity generation; **d)** By consuming petroleum and its derivatives, besides the damage to the environment, it implies a patrimonial disbursement, where it is evident that the cost of a barrel of petroleum is very high for Costa Ricans and therefore a significant additional cost to the citizens' pockets; **e)** It is absurd that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad cannot authorize electrical generation to private companies already established or that seek to do so, when the cap on the private generation quota has been met, condemning it to burn solid fuels or petroleum derivatives in large quantities to contribute to global warming, instead of preferring the force of the winds or the power of water managed by private initiative. He considers that such action is contrary to Article 50 of the Political Constitution.

**2.-** In order to ground his standing to bring this action, he does so based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which empowers one to bring a direct action, that is, without the need to be based on a prior matter, *"when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that pertains to the community as a whole."* **3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its filing, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Solano Carrera; and, **Considering:** **I.- PRELIMINARY ISSUES.** Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires that if the formalities referred to in Articles 78 and 79 of the Law governing this jurisdiction are not fulfilled, the President of the Constitutional Chamber shall specify by resolution which they are and order them to be fulfilled within three days. Upon analyzing the complaint, the omission of a series of requirements is evident, such as the Stamp of the Colegio de Abogados corresponding to the signature authentication found on page 13 of the case file. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for reasons of procedural economy, the aforementioned omission will not be addressed by warning, since, even if it were completed, the complaint must be rejected on the merits as explained below.

**II.- OBJECT OF THE CHALLENGE.-** This action of unconstitutionality seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase *“siempre y cuando la potencia, por concepto de generación paralela, no llegue a constituir más del quince por ciento (15%) de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional”* contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, as it is contrary to the provisions of Article 50 of the Political Constitution; this is because the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad limits companies providing the autonomous parallel electricity service to a cap of fifteen percent in power, a limit that displaces the use of clean energy and tacitly imposes the use of energy produced by thermal plants, with the adverse consequences for global warming and damage to the environment.

**III.- ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND PREREQUISITES FOR FILING ACTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** The action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, prevent the Chamber from hearing the challenge presented. Previously, this Chamber has considered the following in this regard:

"[...] it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved – either before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust administrative remedies – in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending process, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this avenue – as per the prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction" (Judgment number 4190-95, at eleven hours and thirty-three minutes on the twenty-eighth of July of nineteen ninety-five).

Thus, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality, and three different situations are governed. In the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue – which includes appeals for habeas corpus or amparo –, or in an administrative venue, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right that is considered injured in the main matter. Accordingly, the requirement of the existence of this pending matter to be resolved has been interpreted by this Chamber such that the mere existence of that matter is not sufficient, but rather its invocation in the main matter is also required, in a manner that constitutes a “reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured”, as the norm under commentary provides; that is, the mere invocation of unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is not sufficient, but rather it must be applicable – directly or indirectly – in the matter that underpins the action. This has been repeatedly stated by this Chamber, among others, see Judgments 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96. In turn, in the second and third paragraphs, the direct action is governed, that is, the situations in which the base matter is not required, in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that pertain to the community as a whole; and b) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Likewise, it requires certain important formalities, such as the explicit determination of the challenged norms, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by an attorney of the brief filing the petition, the necessary copies for the Chamber's member magistrates, the Procuraduría, and the parties involved in the main matter, the accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers of attorney and certifications), and a literal certification of the challenging brief, which, if not provided by the plaintiffs, must be warned for fulfillment by the President of the Chamber.

**IV.- ON INTERESTS THAT PERTAIN TO THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AND DIFFUSE INTERESTS.** As indicated above, the cases contained in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of Article 75, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. In relation to the concept of “collective interests”, one of the possible sources of standing from the second paragraph of the indicated Article 75, encompassed in the expression “interests that pertain to the community as a whole”, the Chamber has indicated that such concept refers to the standing held by a corporate group when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associative base, and in relation to norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group. In this regard, the Court has indicated that such expression does not refer to the national community, as that would mean accepting and recognizing a popular action that is not regulated in the legislation.

As for the diffuse interest, this has been understood as that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a determined group or category. Thus, the violation of that right may affect everyone in general and/or each one in particular. Judgment number 03705-93, of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests, as does Judgment 360-99 of 15:51 hours on January 20, 1999, in which it was stated:

"It has been indicated that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considering, but which cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized for all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter – as has been repeatedly stated – is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is thus an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less ascertainable, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them in relation to them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as stated in different resolutions such as 03705-93 of fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen hours and forty-five on the ninth of November of that same year for the defense of historic heritage, and number 00980-91 of thirteen hours and thirty on the twenty-fourth of May of nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, for in that case, standing would derive from such a claim. Examples of interests of that nature are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historic heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.

**V.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The plaintiff argues that the action of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad in not authorizing electrical generation to private companies already established or that seek to do so when the cap on the private generation quota (fifteen percent of the power of all the electrical plants that make up the national electrical system) has been met puts the environment at risk, a right that belongs to the entire community. In this regard, and from the analysis of the norm contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, called Law that Authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electrical Generation, which the appellant challenges, this Court infers that what it establishes is a maximum percentage of the power of all the electrical plants for the operation of a plant, which in no way significantly affects the diffuse interests commented on in the judgment transcribed supra, but rather affects the distribution of the object of operation for the providers of electrical generation services determined by that law, which are private companies and rural electrification cooperatives. Thus, since there is no diffuse interest supporting the plaintiff's standing and given the absence of a base matter in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm had been invoked, the appropriate course is to reject the action outright as is hereby ordered. Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta dissent (salvan el voto) and order the action to be processed.

**Therefore:** The action is rejected outright.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

40/lgarrop DISSENT OF MAGISTRATE CALZADA AND MAGISTRATES VARGAS AND JINESTA Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta, with the drafting by the latter, dissent (salvan el voto) and order the action of unconstitutionality to be processed, for the following reasons:

The plaintiff challenges, alleging diffuse interests, Article 7 of the Law that Authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electrical Generation, insofar as it establishes, for parallel generation, a limit of 15% of the power of all the electrical plants that make up the national electrical system. We believe that the appellant, in his capacity as a user or consumer of the national electrical system, has a diffuse interest in challenging the referred limit as eventually unreasonable or disproportionate, given that a higher limit or its elimination results in a better service for all subscribers. One of the areas where diffuse interests classically prevail – interests belonging to everyone and to no one – is that of consumer protection – which applies not only to private goods and services, but also to public ones – as is evident from the constitutional text itself, when it provides in Article 46, final paragraph, that "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, security, and economic interests (…)". It is sufficiently clear that the plaintiff does not challenge the referred cap out of a simple scruple to ensure the substantial regularity of the legal system with the Law of the Constitution; he goes much further, since his goal or purpose is that the consumer or user of the national electrical service does not suffer breaks in continuity or interruptions in its provision and enjoys good performance or output, that is, he seeks to protect his economic interests, just as mandated by Article 46, final paragraph, of the Constitution. For the foregoing, we dissent (salvamos el voto) and order the filed action of unconstitutionality to be processed.

Ana V. Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Drafted by Magistrate **Solano Carrera**; and, **Considering:** **I.- PRELIMINARY ISSUES.** Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires that if the formalities referred to in articles 78 and 79 of the Law governing this jurisdiction are not fulfilled, the President of the Constitutional Chamber shall specify by resolution what they are and order compliance within three days. Upon analyzing the complaint, the omission of a series of requirements is evident, such as the Colegio de Abogados stamp corresponding to the authentication of the signature found on folio 13 of the expediente. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for reasons of ***procedural economy (economía procesal)***, the above-noted deficiency will not be ordered to be cured, since, even if it were fulfilled, the complaint must be rejected on the merits as explained below.

**II.- OBJECT OF THE CHALLENGE.-** This acción de inconstitucionalidad seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase *“siempre y cuando la potencia, por concepto de generación paralela, no llegue a constituir más del quince por ciento (15%) de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional”* contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, since it is contrary to the provisions of Article 50 of the Political Constitution; this is because the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad limits the companies providing autonomous parallel electricity service to a cap of fifteen percent of the power, a limit that displaces the use of clean energy and tacitly imposes the use of energy produced by thermal plants, with the adverse consequences for global warming and environmental damage.

**III.- REQUIREMENTS AND PREREQUISITES FOR FILING ACTIONS OF INCONSTITUTIONALITY.** The acción de inconstitucionalidad is a procedure with specific formalities, which, if not met, prevent the Chamber from hearing the challenge filed. This Chamber has previously considered in this regard:

“[...] it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route- is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending process, since it pronounces on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction-” (judgment number 4190-95, at eleven thirty-three hours on July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five).

Thus, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility prerequisites for acciones de inconstitucionalidad, and three distinct situations are regulated. In the first paragraph, the ***existence of a pending matter to be resolved (existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver)*** is required, whether in a judicial venue – which includes habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in an administrative venue, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered harmed in the main matter. Thus, the requirement of the existence of this pending matter has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter is not sufficient, but that its invocation in the main matter is also required, in such a way that it constitutes *“a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed”*, as provided by the norm under discussion; that is, the mere invocation of unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is not sufficient, but it must be applicable -directly or indirectly- in the matter that supports the action; as repeatedly stated by this Chamber, among others, see judgments 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96. In turn, the second and third paragraphs regulate direct action, that is, situations where the underlying matter is not required, in the following cases: *a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the collectivity as a whole; and b) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes*. Likewise, it requires certain important formalities, such as the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by a lawyer of the writ filing the action, the necessary copies for the magistrates that make up the Chamber, the Procuraduría, and the parties involved in the main matter, accreditation of standing conditions (powers of attorney and certifications), and a literal certification of the challenging writ, which, if not provided by the claimants, must be ordered to be cured for compliance by the President of the Chamber.

**IV.- INTERESTS THAT PERTAIN TO THE COLLECTIVITY AS A WHOLE AND DIFFUSE INTERESTS.** As indicated above, the cases contained in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of Article 75, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. Regarding the concept of “collective interests,” one of the possible sources of standing in the second paragraph of said Article 75, included in the expression “interests that pertain to the collectivity as a whole,” the Chamber has indicated that this concept refers to the standing held by a corporate group, when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the individuals who make up its associative base, and in relation to norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the group's reason for being and the cohesive factor. In this regard, the Court has indicated that such expression does not refer to the national collectivity, as that would mean accepting and recognizing a popular action that is not regulated in the legislation.

Regarding the diffuse interest, this has been understood as that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general and/or each one individually. Judgment number 03705-93, at 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests, as does judgment 360-99 at 15:51 hours on January 20, 1999, in which it was indicated:

"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than the collective one just defined in the preceding considering, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them before them, that are the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), it also cannot be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, because in such a case, standing would derive from such a claim. Examples of interests of this nature are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.

**V.- THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The claimant alleges that the action of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad in not authorizing electric generation to private companies already established or seeking to do so when the limit of the private generation quota (fifteen percent of the power of the set of power plants that make up the national electric system) has been reached puts the environment at risk, a right that belongs to the entire collectivity. In this regard, and from the analysis of the norm contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, called the Law Authorizing Autonomous or Parallel Electric Generation, which the claimant challenges, this Court infers that what it establishes is a maximum percentage of the power of the set of power plants for the operation of a plant, which in no way affects the diffuse interests significantly discussed in the judgment transcribed supra, but rather affects the distribution of the object of operation of the providers of electric generation services determined by that law, which are private companies and rural electrification cooperatives. Thus, since there is no diffuse interest to support the claimant's standing and given the absence of an underlying matter in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm had been invoked, the proper course is to reject the action outright, as is hereby ordered. **Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta dissent and order that the action be processed.** **Therefore:** The action is rejected outright.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

**40/lgarrop** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE CALZADA AND** **MAGISTRATES VARGAS AND JINESTA** Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta, drafted by the latter, dissent and order that the acción de inconstitucionalidad be processed, for the following reasons:

The claimant challenges, alleging diffuse interests, Article 7° of the Law Authorizing Autonomous or Parallel Electric Generation, insofar as it establishes, for parallel generation, a limit of 15% of the power of the set of power plants that make up the national electric system. We believe that the claimant, in his capacity as a user or consumer of the national electric system, has a diffuse interest to challenge the referred limit as, eventually, unreasonable or disproportionate, given that a greater limit or its elimination would result in better service for all subscribers. One of the areas where diffuse interests classically prevail – belonging to everyone and to no one – is that of consumer protection – who is a consumer not only of private goods and services, but also of public ones – as is evident from the constitutional text itself when it provides in Article 46, final paragraph, that *“Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos (…)”*. It is sufficiently clear that the claimant does not challenge the referred cap out of a mere scruple to ensure the substantial regularity of the legal system with the Law of the Constitution; he goes much further, since his end or purpose is that the consumer or user of the national electric service not suffer service interruptions or disruptions and have good performance or efficiency; that is, he seeks to protect their economic interests, just as mandated by Article 46, final paragraph, of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, we dissent and order that the filed acción de inconstitucionalidad be processed.

**Ana V.

**Exp: No. 07-005443-0007-CO** **Res: No. 2007-007135** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and forty-five minutes on the twenty-third of May of two thousand seven.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by Federico Alvarado Orozco, of legal age, married, attorney, bearer of identity card number 1-713-152, resident of San José; against Article 7 of Law 7200, entitled Law that Authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electric Generation.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By document received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours and forty-six minutes on the twenty-fourth of April of two thousand seven, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of the phrase *"always provided that the power, by concept of parallel generation, does not come to constitute more than fifteen percent (15%) of the power of the set of electric plants that make up the national electric system"* contained in Article 7 of Law 7200 be declared. He alleges that: **a)** The ceiling challenged in Article 7 of Law 7200 is unreasonable and disproportionate, because by the principle of the block of legality under which public servants act (Article 11 of the Political Constitution), the challenged law indirectly shelters and imposes the duty on the Costa Rican Electricity Institute to use polluting or thermal electric generators, as opposed to the possibility that private initiative, which is controlled by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute under the same law's scheme, invest, develop, and trade in healthy, clean, renewable, and non-polluting electricity; **b)** This legal norm is prohibiting new wind, hydroelectric, and plants of any other nature (with respect to the environment) from being established or else allowing those currently established to grow; **c)** It is tacitly prohibited that, if an electricity surplus were to occur, it could be sold to other Central American countries, for the benefit of the national coffers and economy, and with the additional achievement that those countries could also reduce the use of thermal plants for electricity generation; **d)** Consuming petroleum and its derivatives, besides the damage to the environment, implies a pecuniary expenditure, where it is evident that the cost of a barrel of petroleum is very high for Costa Ricans and, therefore, a significant additional cost to citizens' pockets; **e)** It is absurd that the Costa Rican Electricity Institute cannot authorize electric generation to private companies already established or that intend to do so, when the ceiling of the private generation quota has been met, condemning it to burn solid fuels or petroleum derivatives in large quantities to add to global warming, instead of preferring the force of the winds or the power of water managed by private initiative. He considers that said action is contrary to Article 50 of the Political Constitution.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action, he does so based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which empowers one to bring a direct action, that is, without needing to rely on a prior matter, *"when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that concerns the community as a whole."* **3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject summarily or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previously rejected, identical, or similar petition.

Written by Magistrate **Solano Carrera**; and, **Considering:** **I.- PRELIMINARY ISSUES.** Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires that if the formalities referred to in Articles 78 and 79 of the Law governing this jurisdiction are not fulfilled, the President of the Constitutional Chamber shall indicate by resolution which they are and order their fulfillment within three days. An analysis of the complaint reveals the omission of a series of requirements, such as the Bar Association Stamp corresponding to the authentication of the signature found on folio 13 of the case file. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for reasons of **procedural economy**, the order to remedy the above-noted deficiency will not be issued, given that, even if it were remedied, the complaint must be rejected on the merits as explained below.

**II.- OBJECT OF THE CHALLENGE.-** This action of unconstitutionality requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase *"always provided that the power, by concept of parallel generation, does not come to constitute more than fifteen percent (15%) of the power of the set of electric plants that make up the national electric system"* contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, inasmuch as it is contrary to the provisions of Article 50 of the Political Constitution; this because the Costa Rican Electricity Institute limits the companies providing autonomous parallel electricity service to a ceiling of fifteen percent in power, a limit that displaces the use of healthy energy and tacitly imposes the use of energy produced by thermal plants, with the adverse consequences for global warming and damage to the environment.

**III.- THE REQUIREMENTS AND PREREQUISITES FOR BRINGING ACTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** The action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for the Chamber to hear the challenge made. Previously, this Chamber has considered in this regard:

*"[...] it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, by which is meant that it requires the existence of a matter pending resolution -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative remedy- in order to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, such that the decision of the Constitutional Court will have a positive or negative impact on said pending process, as it manifests on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation allows direct access to this route - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction-" (Judgment number 4190-95, of eleven hours and thirty-three minutes on the twenty-eighth of July of nineteen ninety-five).* Thus, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility prerequisites for actions of unconstitutionality, regulating three distinct situations. The first paragraph requires the **existence of a matter pending resolution**, whether in a judicial setting – including habeas corpus or amparo remedies – or in an administrative one, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. Thus, the requirement of the existence of this matter pending resolution has been interpreted by this Chamber such that the mere existence of that matter is not enough, but rather its invocation in the main matter is also required, so that it constitutes *"a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured"*, as provided by the norm under commentary, that is, the mere invocation of unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is not enough, rather it must be applicable -directly or indirectly- in the matter that supports the action; as repeatedly stated by this Chamber, among others, see Judgments 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96. In turn, the second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action, that is, situations in which the base matter is not required, under the following assumptions: *a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that concerns the community as a whole; and b) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman*. Likewise, it requires certain important formalities, such as the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by an attorney of the document filing the petition, the necessary copies for the magistrates members of the Chamber, the Attorney General's Office, and the parties intervening in the main matter, accreditation of standing conditions (powers of attorney and certifications), and a literal certification of the libel of challenge, which, if not provided by the petitioners, must be ordered by the President of the Chamber for compliance.

**IV.- REGARDING INTERESTS THAT CONCERN THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AND DIFFUSE INTERESTS.** As indicated in previous paragraphs, the assumptions contained in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of Article 75, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. Regarding the concept of "collective interests", one of the possible sources of standing in the second paragraph of Article 75, reflected in the phrase "interests that concern the community as a whole", the Chamber has indicated that said concept refers to the standing held by a corporate group, when acting as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associational base, and in relation to norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the binding factor of the group. In this sense, the Court has indicated that such expression does not refer to the national community, as that would imply accepting and recognizing a popular action that is not regulated in the legislation.

Regarding diffuse interest, this has been understood as that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general and/or each person in particular. Judgment number 03705-93, of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests, as does judgment 360-99 of 15:51 hours on January 20, 1999, in which it was stated:

*"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considering paragraph, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is thus an interest distributed in each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less ascertainable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them regarding them, that is the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as number 03705-93 of fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July for the right to a healthy environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen hours forty-five on the ninth of November of that same year for the defense of historical patrimony, and number 00980-91 of thirteen thirty on the twenty-fourth of May of nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters."* In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), nor can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, as in that case, standing would derive from such a claim. Examples of interests of that nature are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical patrimony, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.

**V.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The petitioner argues that the action of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute in not authorizing electric generation to private companies already established or that intend to do so when the ceiling of the private generation quota (fifteen percent of the power of the set of electric plants that make up the national electric system) has been met puts the environment at risk, a right that belongs to the entire community. In this regard, and from the analysis of the norm contained in Article 7 of Law 7200, entitled Law that Authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electric Generation, which the petitioner challenges, this Court infers that it establishes a maximum percentage of the power of the set of electric plants for the operation of a plant, which in no way affects the diffuse interests significantly discussed in the judgment transcribed above, but rather affects the distribution of the object of operation of the providers of electric generation services determined by that law, which are private companies and rural electrification cooperatives. This being the case, as there is no diffuse interest supporting the petitioner's standing, and given the absence of a base matter in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm had been invoked, the proper course is to reject the action summarily, as is hereby ordered. **Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta dissent and order that the action be given course.** **Therefore:** The action is rejected summarily.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

**40/lgarrop** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE CALZADA AND MAGISTRATES VARGAS AND JINESTA** Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Vargas and Jinesta, with the latter writing, dissent and order that the action of unconstitutionality be processed, for the following reasons:

The petitioner challenges, alleging diffuse interests (intereses difusos), Article 7 of the Law that authorizes Autonomous or Parallel Electrical Generation, insofar as it sets a limit for parallel generation of 15% of the power of the set of electrical plants that make up the national electrical system. We believe that the appellant, in his condition as a user or consumer of the national electrical system, has a diffuse interest in challenging the referred limit as potentially unreasonable or disproportionate, given that a higher limit or its elimination results in a better service for all subscribers. One of the areas where diffuse interests classically prevail – of everyone and of no one – is that of consumer protection – which applies not only to private goods and services, but also to public ones – as can be deduced from the constitutional text itself when it establishes in Article 46, final paragraph, that *“Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety and economic interests (…)”*. It is sufficiently clear that the petitioner does not challenge the referred cap out of a simple scruple to ensure the substantial regularity of the legal system with the Law of the Constitution; he goes much further, since his goal or purpose is for the consumer or user of the national electrical service not to suffer discontinuities or interruptions in its provision and for it to have good performance or output, that is, he seeks to protect his economic interests, just as mandated by Article 46, final paragraph, of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, we dissent and order that the action of unconstitutionality filed be processed.

**Ana V. Calzada M.** **Adrián Vargas B.** **Ernesto Jinesta L.** **EJL/vcg**

* 070054430007CO * * 070054430007CO * Res: Nº 2007-007135 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintitrés de mayo del dos mil siete.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Federico Alvarado Orozco, mayor, casado, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-713-152, vecino de San José; contra el artículo 7 de la Ley 7200 denominada Ley que autoriza la generación eléctrica autónoma o paralela.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las ocho horas cuarenta y seis minutos del veinticuatro de abril del dos mil siete, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la frase “siempre y cuando la potencia, por concepto de generación paralela, no llegue a constituir más del quince por ciento (15%) de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional” contenida en el artículo 7 de la Ley 7200. Alega que: a) El tope impugnado en el artículo 7 de la Ley 7200 es irrazonable y desproporcionado, pues por el principio del bloque de legalidad con que actúan los servidores públicos (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política), la ley impugnada abriga e impone indirectamente el deber al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad de utilizar generadores eléctricos contaminantes o térmicos, frente a la posibilidad de que la iniciativa privada, que está controlada por el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad bajo el esquema de la misma ley, invierta, desarrolle y comercie con electricidad sana, limpia, renovable y no contaminante; b) Esa norma legal está prohibiendo que nuevas plantas eólicas, hidroeléctricas y de cualquier otra naturaleza (con respecto al ambiente) se establezcan o bien permitiendo que las actualmente instauradas crezcan; c) Se prohíbe tácitamente, que si se llegare a dar un sobrante eléctrico, pueda ser vendido a los otros países centroamericanos, con beneficio para las arcas y economía nacional, y con el logro adicional de que esos países puedan también reducir la utilización de plantas térmicas para la generación de electricidad; d) Al consumir el petróleo y sus derivados, a parte del daño al ambiente, implica una erogación patrimonial, donde es evidente que el costo del barril de petróleo es muy elevado para los costarricenses y por ende un costo adicional importante para el bolsillo de los ciudadanos; e) Es absurdo que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad no pueda autorizar la generación eléctrica a empresas privadas ya establecidas o que pretendan hacerlo, cuando el tope de la cuota de la generación privada se ha cumplido, condenándola a quemar combustibles sólidos o derivados del petróleo en grandes cantidades para sumarse al calentamiento global, en vez de preferir la fuerza de los vientos o el poder del agua administrado por la iniciativa privada. Considera que dicha actuación es contraria al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para formular esta acción, lo hace con fundamento en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que faculta a accionar en forma directa, esto es, sin la necesidad de sustentarse en un asunto previo, "cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañe a la colectividad en su conjunto." 3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Solano Carrera; y,

Considerando:

I.- CUESTIONES PRELIMINARES. El artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, exige que si no se llenaren las formalidades a que se refieren los artículos 78 y 79 de la Ley que rige esta jurisdicción, el Presidente de la Sala Constitucional señalará por resolución cuáles son y ordenará cumplirlos dentro de tercero día. Analizada la demanda, se evidencia la omisión de una serie de requisitos, como lo es el Timbre del Colegio de Abogados correspondiente a la autenticación de firma que corre a folio 13 del no se procederá a prevenir lo apuntado arriba, toda vez que, aún cuando fuera cumplimentado, la demanda debe ser rechazada por el fondo conforme se explica a continuación.

II.- OBJETO DE LA IMPUGNACIÓN.- Se solicita en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de la frase “siempre y cuando la potencia, por concepto de generación paralela, no llegue a constituir más del quince por ciento (15%) de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional” contenida en el artículo 7 de la Ley 7200, toda vez que resulta contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política; ello por cuanto el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad limita a las empresas prestatarias del servicio de electricidad autónoma paralela a un tope de un quince por ciento en la potencia, límite que desplaza la utilización de energía sana e impone tácitamente, la utilización de energía producto de plantas térmicas, con las consecuencias adversas para el calentamiento global y el daño al ambiente.

III.- DE LOS REQUISITOS Y PRESUPUESTOS PARA FORMULAR ACCIONES DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con determinadas formalidades, que si no se reúnen, imposibilitan a la Sala conocer de la impugnación que se hace. Ya con anterioridad esta Sala ha considerado al respecto:

"[...] se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-" (sentencia número 4190-95, de las once horas treinta y tres minutos del veintiocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco).

Es así como en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, y se regulan tres situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero, se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –en el que se incluyen los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo–, o en la administrativa, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. Así, el requisito de la existencia de este asunto pendiente de resolver, ha sido interpretado por esta Sala de manera tal que, no basta la mera existencia de ese asunto, sino que además se requiere de su invocación en el asunto principal, de manera que constituya “medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés considerado lesionado”, tal y como lo dispone la norma en comentario, es decir, no basta la mera invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, sino que la misma debe ser de aplicación -directa o indirecta- en el asunto que le da sustento a la acción; tal y como lo ha manifestado en forma reiterada esta Sala, entre otras, ver las sentencias 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96. A su vez, en los párrafos segundo y tercero, se regula la acción directa, es decir, las situaciones en las que no se requiere del asunto base, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y b) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. Asimismo, requiere de ciertas formalidades importantes, como la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y principios constitucionales que se consideren infringidos, autenticación por abogado del escrito de interposición de la gestión, las copias necesarias para los magistrados integrantes de la Sala, la Procuraduría y las partes que intervienen en el asunto principal, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), y certificación literal del libelo de impugnación, los cuales, en caso de no ser aportadas por los accionantes, deben ser prevenidos para su cumplimiento por el Presidente de la Sala.

IV.- SOBRE LOS INTERESES QUE ATAÑEN A LA COLECTIVIDAD EN SU CONJUNTO Y LOS INTERESES DIFUSOS. Como se indicó líneas atrás, los supuestos contenidos en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. En relación con el concepto “intereses colectivos”, una de las posibles fuentes de legitimación del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 señalado recogida en la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, la Sala ha señalado que tal concepto se refiere a la legitimación que ostenta un grupo corporativo, cuando actúa como tal por intermedio de sus representantes, en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa, y en relación con normas o disposiciones que inciden en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación. En este sentido, el Tribunal ha señalado que tal expresión no se refiere a la colectividad nacional, pues ello supondría aceptar y reconocer una acción popular que no está regulada en la legislación.

En cuanto al interés difuso, éste ha sido entendido como aquel interés personal relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general y/o a cada uno en particular. La sentencia número 03705-93, de las 15:00 horas del 30 de julio de 1993, ilustra lo que se ha entendido como intereses difusos, lo mismo que la sentencia 360-99 de las 15:51 horas del 20 de enero de 1999, en la cual se indicó:

"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de tal reclamo. Ejemplos de intereses de esa naturaleza son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos.

V.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO. El accionante aduce que la actuación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad al no autorizar la generación eléctrica a empresas privadas ya establecidas o que pretenden hacerlo cuando el tope de la cuota de la generación privada (quince por ciento de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional) se ha cumplido pone en riesgo el medio ambiente, derecho que pertenece a toda la colectividad. Al respecto y del análisis de la norma contenida en el artículo 7 de la Ley 7200 denominada Ley que Autoriza la Generación Eléctrica Autónoma o Paralela, que cuestiona el recurrente, infiere este Tribunal que lo que fija es un porcentaje máximo de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas para la explotación de una central, lo que de modo alguno afecta los intereses difusos significativamente comentados en la sentencia transcrita supra, sino que incide en la distribución del objeto de la explotación de las prestatarias de los servicios de generación eléctrica que determina esa ley y que son las empresas privadas y las cooperativas de electrificación rural. Así las cosas al no existir un interés difuso que respalde la legitimación del accionante y ante la ausencia de un asunto base en el que se hubiera invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada, lo procedente es rechazar de plano la acción como en efecto se dispone. La Magistrada Calzada y los Magistrados Vargas y Jinesta salvan el voto y ordenan darle curso a la acción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

40/lgarrop VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA CALZADA Y LOS MAGISTRADOS VARGAS Y JINESTA La Magistrada Calzada y los Magistrados Vargas y Jinesta, con redacción del último, salvan el voto y ordenan darle curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad, por las razones siguientes:

El accionante impugna, aduciendo intereses difusos, el artículo 7° de la Ley que autoriza la Generación Eléctrica Autónoma o Paralela, en cuanto le establece, a la generación paralela, un límite del 15% de la potencia del conjunto de centrales eléctricas que conforman el sistema eléctrico nacional. Estimamos, que al recurrente le asiste, en su condición de usuario o consumidor del sistema eléctrico nacional un interés difuso, para impugnar por, eventualmente, irrazonable o desproporcionado el límite referido, dado que, uno mayor o su eliminación redunda en un mejor servicio para todos los abonados. Uno de los ámbitos donde clásicamente campean los intereses difusos –de todos y de ninguno- es el de la protección del consumidor –el cual lo es no solo de bienes y servicios privados, sino, también, de los públicos-, según se desprende del propio texto constitucional al disponer en el artículo 46, párrafo in fine, que “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos (…)”. Resulta suficientemente claro que el accionante no impugna el tope referido por un simple escrúpulo de velar por la regularidad sustancial del ordenamiento jurídico con el Derecho de la Constitución, va mucho más allá, puesto que, su fin o propósito es que el consumidor o usuario del servicio eléctrico nacional no sufra soluciones de continuidad o interrupciones en su prestación y tenga un buen desempeño o rendimiento, esto es, procura velar por sus intereses intereses económicos, tal y como lo manda el artículo 46, párrafo in fine, de la Constitución. Por lo inconstitucionalidad interpuesta.

Ana V. Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Ernesto Jinesta L.