Constitutionality of the instrumental legal personality of the Civil Aviation Technical CouncilConstitucionalidad de la personalidad jurídica instrumental del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil

**Resultando:** **1.-** By document received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:00 a.m. on March 28, 2004, the petitioner requests that Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, as amended by Law No. 8038 of October 17, 2000, be declared unconstitutional. He alleges that it is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to administer funds from rates, rents, or fees regulated in Law No. 5150, as well as to perform the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and process agreements so that they are made known to the Executive Branch, which is contrary to articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Constitution, as well as to case law, according to rulings No. 6240-93 and 3513-94. He indicates that constitutionally, the Executive Branch is granted the exclusive power and duty to sign administrative contracts, which makes the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister not only responsible for affixing their signatures to a document but also makes them holders of a genuine responsibility to safeguard the public interest through their management. This is not an accessory or purely formal matter for the Executive Branch but a principal one, and it is, in detail, the exercise of authority on behalf of the people, which must correctly and transparently apply the allocated budgetary resources and assess the interests that the State must satisfy. There is, therefore, a genuine political responsibility that is non-delegable. Additionally, the doctrine of the Constitutional Chamber has been clear that the organizational figure of deconcentration cannot be used to place a body in conditions equal to or superior to those corresponding to a decentralized entity. The wording of Article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants a true status of an autonomous entity with a set of own revenues that form its financial autonomy, all of which is inappropriate for a deconcentrated body. He considers that the contractual capacity granted to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is unconstitutional, since it is not proper for a deconcentrated body to execute this type of contract, as that belongs to a body with full legal capacity, and a deconcentrated body could only have an instrumental capacity. He requests that the action be granted.

**2.-** By a resolution issued at eight hours and fifteen minutes on June tenth, two thousand three (appearing on folio 12 of the case file), the action was given course, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil.

**3.-** The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report, appearing on folios 18 to 39. It points out that the petitioner requests the application of the criteria derived from this Court’s resolutions No. 6240-93 of November 26, 1993, and 3513 of July 15, 1994. If the first of these resolutions were applicable, the Action would be admissible. However, the change in case law criteria on the matter must be taken into account. In the first of these resolutions (6240-93), the Constitutional Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of endowing a body of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, specifically the Dirección General de Hidrocarburos, with a scope of autonomy similar to that of an autonomous entity. It was thus resolved that it was unconstitutional to grant an Executive Branch body the powers to sign administrative contracts, ownership of a budget, the power to disburse resources, and to contract loans, among others. Regarding administrative contracting, only the Executive Branch could sign the contracts pertaining to the Executive Branch. The exercise of budgetary and contractual powers is considered integrated within the concept of full legal personality. It can be considered that, as the petitioner asserts, under this thesis, endowing a body with personality, budgetary autonomy, and its own funds would be equivalent to creating an autonomous entity, without complying with the provisions of articles 188 to 190 of the Political Charter. A more open position by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the granting of contractual and budgetary powers to deconcentrated bodies is found in ruling No. 3513-94 of 8:57 a.m. on July 15, 1994. This resolution sanctions the granting of legal personality to a deconcentrated body of the Executive Branch. It notes that although the legislator's intention was to endow the body "...with merely instrumental legal capacity to the Museum, so that it could receive donations directly, which would be constitutionally valid (as would the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), the first article of the bill, which is the consulted text, does not, however, adhere to what is merely instrumental, but rather fully personifies the Museum (it states categorically: 'Se concede personalidad jurídica al Museo Nacional de Costa Rica...'), although, thereafter, it qualifies it as a 'deconcentrated body, attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports'. The full personification of the Museum gives rise to a state public entity, no longer a mere state body. This Chamber, resolving an optional legislative consultation concerning the Hydrocarbons Law bill, legislative file No. 9573, opined that a provision of that bill whose content closely resembles what is now questioned was unconstitutional. This tribunal has no reasons to change its criteria in the present case, so in its opinion, the first article of the bill subject to this consultation is unconstitutional...". The possibility of an instrumental personality was accepted, which is not defined, but would be different from the full personality characteristic of decentralized entities. Contractual powers would form part of this instrumental personality. The Procuraduría General de la República, through its opinions, pointed out the contradictory nature of the resolutions in question (opinions C-186-95 of August 28, 1995, C-171-96 and C-175-96 of October 18 and 21, 1996, respectively, as well as C-042-2001 of February 20, 2001) and the need for greater discussion on the matter, both at the jurisprudential and legislative levels. The Chamber had the opportunity to standardize its criteria on the matter when called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the "interested management" (gestión interesada) contract for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. The Chamber established its position, accepting the constitutionality of instrumental legal personality with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual spheres. In resolution No. 11657-2001 of 2:43 p.m. on November 14, 2001, the Chamber stated: "...The constitutional principles of the single treasury (caja única) (according to which all revenues in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and budgetary universality (the National Budget must contain the forecast of all revenues and the authorization of all expenditures of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), positively enshrined in constitutional articles 185 and 176, respectively, determine guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the management of such resources. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law, there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications' (personificaciones presupuestarias), according to which, in some cases, the legislator opts to give certain deconcentrated bodies the possibility of managing their own resources outside the Central State Budget, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality' (personalidad jurídica instrumental). This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of which was in ruling number 06240-93 at two p.m. on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that: (….). Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the aforementioned criterion, and in ruling number 03513-94 at eight hours fifty-seven minutes on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, that: (…). The correct position is the one held in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid in light of Constitutional Law to confer upon a deconcentrated body instrumental legal personality for the purpose of managing its own budget and thus carry out more efficiently the public function it is called upon to perform. Precisely, this budgetary personification allows it to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it remains subordinated to it in all aspects not inherent to the function deconcentrated to it and those derived from its instrumental legal personality… In this case, it is not unconstitutional for the resources derived from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport to be administered in a trust at the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, since the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is a body of maximum deconcentration of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, endowed with instrumental legal personality, in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 166 of the General Civil Aviation Law…". From the foregoing, it follows that instrumental legal personality constitutes a budgetary personality (a term the Procuraduría coined regarding various deconcentrated bodies, "administered" by administrative boards with their own legal personality (opinion C-115-89 of July 4, 1989)). In the opinion of this Advisory Body, the personality allows the administration of a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personalized body belongs. Budgetary personality means patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of own resources, as provided by the legislator; ownership of its own budget, separate from the budget of the organization to which it belongs; the administration and management of resources independently of the Budget of the parent entity, which implies recognizing a power to contract. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both have ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions regulating financial matters, among them the directives of the Budget Authority, but its budget and, therefore, its budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, the personality allows the body to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, the powers to execute it. The Procuraduría has considered that in personalities with budgetary content, there is a violation of the principles of budgetary unity and universality and the principle of the single treasury. However, from what was resolved by this Tribunal in the aforementioned resolution No. 11657-2001, it could be considered that for the Chamber, such violations do not exist. Furthermore, regarding the principle of the single treasury, it should be noted that the Financial Administration Law subjects said personifications to the principle of the single treasury, as analyzed in opinion No. C-280-2002 of October 18th of last year. As a consequence of the reform introduced by the Public Debt Restructuring Law, Article 66 of the Financial Administration Law requires considering that the revenues of instrumental legal persons (insofar as they legally cannot be considered decentralized entities – there is no decentralization of substantive powers nor a true constitution of an entity–) constitute revenues of the Central Government, from which it logically follows that such resources form part of a single fund under the charge of the National Treasury. Ergo, said persons –despite the instrumental legal personality– are bound by the principle of the single treasury under the charge of the Treasury. Now, the ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil essentially refers to violations of articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. Said resolution does not analyze a possible violation of Article 140, subsection 19, of the Constitution, which makes the discussion on the matter maintain current interest. Moreover, the Chamber analyzed the point based on provisions contained in the Budget Laws, articles 14, subsection 35 of Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical provisions and as such unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is a product of the amendment introduced to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, an "ordinary law". Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze whether the Law can grant the Council the power to contract that is being challenged. The petitioner asserts that the contractual capacity of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil entails the exercise of powers characteristic of a full legal personality, which do not correspond to a deconcentrated body, because that personality belongs to the Executive Branch in accordance with Article 140, subsection 10, of the Political Constitution. Citing resolution No. 6240-93, he considers that it is not legally permissible to grant contractual capacity to the Consejo Técnico. He adds that contracts referring to airport services must belong to a body with full legal personality and a deconcentrated body can only have an instrumental capacity. The Council can execute any type of contract, which is not typical of a deconcentrated body. It is the competence of the Executive Branch to sign administrative contracts. This duty makes it responsible under the terms of Article 148. He adds that the competence of the Executive Branch is a refined form that the Constitution provides for it to exercise its authority on behalf of the people and apply correctly and transparently the public funds that have been budgetarily assigned to it and so that it can assess the interests that the State must satisfy. He adds that the wording of Article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil a status of an "autonomous entity" (ente autónomo), because it gives it financial autonomy, and this can become a budgetary autonomy typical of an autonomous entity. Therefore, he believes that this constitutes a fraud against the content of Article 188 of the Constitution, since the advantages, conditions, and privileges of an autonomous entity are granted to the deconcentrated body, without the controls, safeguards, and limits of a decentralized institution. The Procuraduría does not share the petitioner's thesis because it starts from a conception of the scope of Article 140, subsection 19, cited, which, if applied, would lead to the paralysis of the Central Administration, due to the impossibility of carrying out part of the instrumental activity necessary for the fulfillment of public purposes. On the other hand, it does not consider the true scope of the power to contract granted by Article 2 of the Civil Aviation Law. Prior to the corresponding analysis, it is necessary to remember that in our system, legal personality must be granted by law. The State is a legal person by full right in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the Executive Branch is not a legal person, although as Administration, a capacity under Public Law and Private Law is recognized. Therefore, a legal and acting capacity. The violation of Article 140, subsection 19, of the Political Constitution is alleged. Said fundamental provision states: "ARTICLE 140.- The duties and powers that correspond jointly to the President and the respective Government Minister are: 19) To sign administrative contracts not included in subsection 14) of Article 121 of this Constitution, subject to submitting them for approval by the Legislative Assembly when they stipulate exemption from taxes or rates, or have as their purpose the exploitation of public services, resources, or natural wealth of the State. The legislative approval of these contracts shall not give them the character of laws nor exempt them from their administrative legal regime. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to loans or other similar agreements referred to in subsection 15) of Article 121, which shall be governed by their special rules. (Thus added by Article 2 of Law No. 5702 of June 5, 1975)". The interpretation that the petitioner gives to this provision implies that the Executive Branch, i.e., the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister (Article 140 of the Political Constitution), is responsible for carrying out administrative contracting, in such a way that they must not only sign administrative contracts but also participate in the prior stages. In a legal system where administrative contract is defined fundamentally by an organic criterion, all contracts executed by a public body are administrative contracts. Consequently, the contracts required for the operation of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil are, in principle, administrative contracts subject to the corresponding regime. In the petitioner's opinion, those contracts – because they are administrative – would have to be executed by the Executive Branch, except for those referring to the goods and services of Article 121, subsection 14. Ergo, regardless of the object of the contract, the Executive Branch would have to conclude the contract. This would imply the necessary participation of the President of the Republic in all contracting carried out, since these are administrative. However, that is not the scope that the rest of the legal system has given to Article 140, subsection 19, and this is shown from the dawn of the 1949 Constitution. Article 88 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic (No. 1279 of May 2, 1951), in its original text, attributed the purchasing function to the National Procurement Office (Proveeduría Nacional) (Article 88) and provided that the selection of the successful bidder in a tender by the National Procurement Office perfected the contract (Article 100). When the contract required a document, the contract was signed by the relevant Minister, except if that document was a public deed. Indeed, the extrajudicial representation of the State has corresponded since 1967 to the Procuraduría General de la República, and it is based on that competence that the Attorney General is responsible for signing contractual documents that require a public deed (Article 3, subsection c) of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República). With the General Law of Public Administration, the Government Minister is attributed the power to sign the administrative contracts of his Ministry, once the contractual procedures have been carried out by the National Procurement Office. Ergo, these contracts are not signed by the Executive Branch (President and relevant Minister), but only by the Minister. By virtue of said provision, the Minister is the holder of the competence to sign the contracts corresponding to the entire ministerial organization, which includes the contracts of interest to the deconcentrated bodies. For the head of a deconcentrated body to be able to sign the contracts that interest him, a provision expressly authorizing him would be required. With the entry into force of the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), a deconcentration of contracting procedures occurs, as the creation of institutional procurement offices is encouraged as bodies in charge of administrative contracting procedures. A deconcentration of procedures that has an impact on the "signing of the contract". It should be remembered, in this regard, that by virtue of the anti-formalist criterion (Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 2050-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001), which prevails in our contractual legislation, the administrative contract is perfected with the final award act and the constitution of the performance guarantee. Therefore, most administrative supply contracts are not materialized in a formal document to be signed by the Minister. Contracts that present a greater degree of complexity and those requiring registry inscription (which are formalized in a public deed) are expressed in a document. Article 32 of the Law on Administrative Contracting provides, in what is relevant here: "Only administrative contracts registrable in the National Registry and those that by law have this requirement shall be formalized in a public deed. Other administrative contracts shall be formalized in a simple document, unless this is not essential for the correct understanding of the scope of the rights and obligations contracted by the parties, as determined by regulation." Article 32 of the Regulation on Administrative Contracting provides in subsection 6 that when it is not necessary to formalize the contract, the execution document called "purchase order" (orden de compra) shall constitute the instrument to continue with the payment procedures. These purchase orders are, certainly, not signed by the head of the contracting body. On the other hand, within the objectives of modernizing the country's financial administration, the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law authorizes the delegation of competence in the matter at hand. Article 106 of said normative body provides: "ARTICLE 106.- Delegation to sign contracts. The heads of public sector bodies or entities may delegate the signing of contracts associated with the contracting process, in accordance with the regulations established for this purpose." Said article recognizes the competence of the head to contract but, on the basis that it is an instrumental activity, which cannot be considered essential, it allows the signing of contracts to be delegated. The deconcentration of administrative contracting through the creation of institutional procurement offices and the delegation of signing would not be possible if all contract signing corresponded to the Executive Branch. This is how the legislator understood it since 1951, and this despite the fact that at the time, the volume of state contracts and their amount was far inferior to what we know today. And it is that to claim that constitutionally, ordinary administrative contracts must necessarily be concluded and signed by the Executive Branch would lead to a paralysis of the ordinary administrative activity of the country, with the risk, moreover, of affecting the normal functioning of the state apparatus. It would incur in absolutely inefficient management, to the detriment of governmental function. The ultimate consequence would be the impossibility of satisfying the community's needs, due to the imposition of a requirement that ends up turning contracting into an end in itself, leaving aside its function as an instrument for public management. It should be remembered that: "...In the judgment of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be ignored in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the questioned provisions. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, because administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a dizzying pace. Indeed, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and at the same time determined by the conditions and rules of the market, whose variables can hardly be captured in the rigidity of a norm. For this reason, and taking into account that, as the Procuraduría rightly pointed out, contracting procedures have an instrumental character vis-à-vis the satisfaction of public interests, they could never become an end in themselves, but must retain their nature as simple means for achieving the higher purpose. Under this reasoning, it is worth asking then whether it is feasible to foresee in a normative body all possible grounds for exception that at a given moment might require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying, and declaring the meaning of the State's primary legal system, cannot disregard the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. That perspective, of course, must maintain a fair balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical meaning and spirit of the constitutional norms, these must be situated in their context, as otherwise they could become provisions of a very limited or inoperative nature, of little relevance, and which may even come to impede the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue..." Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 2060-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001. Such would be the consequences if every administrative contract, regardless of its size, object, or amount, had to be signed by the President and the relevant Minister, in the terms proposed in the Action. In substantiating the alleged constitutional violation, the petitioner refers to the competence regarding aeronautical services. This reference provides grounds for considering that, in his opinion, the contracting power that Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law recognizes for the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil manifests in relation to aeronautical services.

The General Civil Aviation Law provides: "Article 2—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation, both attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, according to the powers granted by this Law.

In relation to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation shall enjoy maximum deconcentration and shall have instrumental legal personality to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and process agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch." (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000). The instrumental legal personality has as a consequence the power to administer the funds from tariffs applicable to aeronautical services and to carry out the contracts or acts necessary for the fulfillment of its functions, as well as to process the agreements that the Executive Branch must sign. Ergo, that competence essentially covers administrative contracts, which are nothing other than an instrument of financial management. The Chamber has recognized that it is constitutionally valid for the legislator to grant a personality with limited effects for the management of a budget, which allows for the administration of certain resources. Well then, there can be no administration of resources, management of own resources, if the power to contract is denied. The contract is simply one of the mechanisms for managing public resources; it is a means to commit the State, constituting a valid source of obligations. Therefore, it can be considered that "the power to contract" is implicit in the instrumental personality. That contractual capacity is, it bears repeating, of an instrumental nature and does not affect, in any way, the exercise of the substantive competences that the Council holds by virtue of the General Civil Aviation Law and particularly those granted in relation to the operating certificate (certificado de explotación) for aeronautical services. Based on Article 2, the Technical Council may carry out the contracts referred to in the Law on Administrative Procurement. But said article is not the norm that provides the basis for the Council's powers regarding aeronautical services. Indeed, the Council's competence regarding aeronautical services does not derive from its classification as an instrumental legal person nor from the recognition of a contractual capacity. It is the product of a set of provisions that attribute material competence to it, in particular from the provisions of Article 10 of the General Civil Aviation Law. Said article grants the Council competence to, among other powers, grant, extend, suspend, revoke, modify, or cancel operating certificates or provisional permits for air transport services, agricultural aviation, and, in short, for any lucrative activity that the Executive Branch deems necessary to require the possession of an operating certificate or provisional permit; as well as to grant the operation of aerodromes, airports, air dispatch services, aeronautical communications, radio aids for air navigation, and other aeronautical installations and auxiliary air navigation services. Article 2 challenged here may be repealed or may be annulled, but as long as the provisions of the rest of the General Civil Aviation Law are not affected, the powers regarding aeronautical services will continue to belong to the Technical Council, except in aspects where competence is expressly attributed to the Executive Branch. In that sense, and because it is the necessary act for the operation of a multiplicity of activities related to aeronautics, it is pertinent to recall that the operating certificate is granted by the Civil Aviation Council. The Executive Branch participates with its approval when it concerns international air services. Article 8 of the Civil Aviation Law provides: "With express exceptions, the Council shall exercise the functions conferred upon it by this law, independently of the Executive Branch; however, operating certificates for international services shall be approved in the final instance by the Executive Branch." (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5437 of December 17, 1973). Hence, the objections of the claimant against Article 2 on its merits are not admissible, when he argues that in this matter there is political responsibility, so the Executive must participate to a greater extent in the negotiation process of a contract, its valuation, and execution, and cannot "reduce its participation to acknowledging or giving approval, by means of a signature." It would seem that the claimant's concern is directed toward ensuring that, in the exercise of that administrative contracting power, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is free from the controls that apply to the Executive Branch. It must be warned, however, that the contracts that the Technical Council carries out based on the repeatedly cited Article 2 must be subject to the administrative procurement procedures established in the Law on Administrative Procurement. But, furthermore, there can be no doubt that said collegial body is fully subject to the oversight of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The instrumental personality cannot constitute a valid limit against the provisions of Articles 182, 183, and 184 of the Political Charter (regarding the control of administrative procurement, cf. Resolutions No. 998-98 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, 5947-98 of 2:32 p.m. on August 19, 1998, and 9524-99 of 9:06 a.m. on December 3, 1999). In accordance with the foregoing, it is the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) that: 1-. In its Resolution No. 11657-2001 of 2:43 p.m. on November 14, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber considered constitutionally valid the granting to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation of an instrumental personality with budgetary effects.

2-. To manage the resources assigned to it, the Technical Council, as an instrumental person, requires the power to contract. 3-. As long as the Council enjoys instrumental personality and it is constitutionally valid, the attribution of the power to carry out administrative acts or contracts, granted by Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, does not violate the provisions of Articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Charter.

4 By writ filed on July 7, 2003, Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, requests the Chamber to clarify to the Council the scope of the suspension ordered in the publication made. The foregoing because it is not clear to them: 1) Whether the Technical Council can proceed with any procedure related to administrative procurement, including the approval, execution, rescission, resolution, endorsement of administrative contracts, resolution of administrative claims, contractual execution, and restoration of the economic balance of the Contract; 2) Whether the Council can reject or admit administrative claims filed by third parties before the publication of the resolution of eight hours fifteen minutes on June tenth, two thousand three; and 3) Whether the Technical Council can deem the administrative avenue exhausted, for purposes of third parties filing claims before it in the corresponding judicial instances, administrative collections, and the exhaustion of the administrative avenue to carry out the corresponding judicial collection process.

5.- Mrs. Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, at folio 43 of the granted hearing, states that to determine the legal nature of any institution, an analysis of the regulations governing it is indispensable. In this case, an unavoidable reference is made to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law No. 5150. She indicates that this norm is consistent with the provisions of Article 2, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, No. 3155 of August 5, 1963. From this, it is clearly deduced that the regulation of everything related to Civil Aviation is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, acting through two of its bodies, namely: the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation. These, as bodies of the said Ministry, constitute part of the organizational structure of the Executive Branch. Regarding the legal nature of the Civil Aviation Council, it was concluded that it constitutes a deconcentrated body of the M.O.P.T., with the particularity of holding instrumental legal personality for the management of the funds regulated in the General Civil Aviation Law. The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), in opinion OJ-072-96 of November 22, 1996, indicated that the General Directorate of Civil Aviation is an administrative body located within the structure of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, but deconcentrated from it. Likewise, said Body is subordinated to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation. The particularity of this subordination is that, in the exercise of public competences related to civil aviation matters, there is the participation of two bodies holding powers of direction and approval (Council) and of execution and decision (Directorate), within the same Ministerial organization. To this effect, she cites judgment No. 11657-2001 of the Constitutional Chamber. From that judgment, it is derived that the instrumental legal personality constitutes a budgetary personality. In the opinion of this consultative body, the personality allows for the administration of a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personified body belongs. Budgetary personality signifies a patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of its own resources, as provided by the legislator, ownership of its own budget, separate from the budget of the organism to which it belongs, the administration and management of resources independently of the Budget of the entity to which it belongs, which implies recognizing a power to contract. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both have ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions regulating financial matters and, among them, the guidelines of the Budgetary Authority, but its budget and, therefore, the budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, the personality allows the body to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, the own powers to execute it. Now then, the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation essentially refers to violations of Articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. Said resolution does not analyze a possible violation of Article 140, subsection 19, of the Constitution, which means that the discussion on the topic maintains current interest. Moreover, the Chamber analyzed the point based on norms contained in the Budget Laws, Article 14, subsection 35 of Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical norms and as such unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is the product of the modification introduced to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, an "ordinary law." Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze whether the Law can attribute to the Council the power to contract that is challenged. She refers to what the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) responded in the granted hearing. The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides the reference framework that identifies and defines the responsibilities that the Costa Rican State, as a signatory of said instrument, must address in matters of civil aviation administration and the organic form and methods that must be followed to fulfill its responsibilities. The country is responsible for the fulfillment of a national aeronautical legal system that allows civil aviation to be conducted in a safe and efficient manner where the aeronautical authorities, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation, have the necessary powers for the legitimate management of International Aviation matters. The legal system must allow the aeronautical authority to comply with the provisions of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its annexes, as well as international agreements or conventions to which Costa Rica is a party. The implementation of the regulatory system presupposes two prior conditions: a) that in its fundamental aeronautical legislation, the State provides for the promulgation of a regulatory code of air navigation; and b) that a competent state body, the Civil Aviation Administration, is granted the necessary powers to guarantee observance of the regulations. The aeronautical legislation must authorize the creation of a Civil Aviation Administration, headed by a Director of Civil Aviation (DCA), provide that the necessary attributions be delegated to the DCA to elaborate, publish, and revise regulations and operating norms in accordance with the code or law; provide for the adoption of regulations and operating norms based on the provisions of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation; adopt provisions to ensure compliance with the navigation code and require that all commercial air transport flights carried out under the State's authority comply with all the conditions that the State may deem applicable in the interest of safety and in accordance with all treaties and agreements concluded by the State. The Category of the country depends on the effective compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Law No. 877 and its Annexes, with the General Directorate of Civil Aviation being the entity obligated to ensure strict compliance with the law and treaties, as well as other regulations. In what is relevant, she points out Article 18 of Law No. 5150 and its reforms: "Article 18: The attributions of the General Directorate of Civil Aviation are: I. To ensure strict compliance with this law, its regulations, treaties, international pacts or conventions on civil aviation that the State signs and constitutionally ratifies; as well as the updating and revision of civil aviation regulations promulgated in accordance with international norms and recommendations regularly issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization." She cites Resolution number 2001-03421 of three hours thirty-one minutes on May second, two thousand one, from the Constitutional Chamber. The Costa Rican State is responsible for the introduction and enforcement of an adequate legal system that allows it to conduct civil aviation in a safe and efficient manner, permitting the pertinent authorities to have the necessary powers so that the legitimate management of civil aviation matters is not impeded or obstructed by other interests. Repeatedly, the International Civil Aviation Organization indicates that the authority of the State constitutes the primary element of the institutional component of the structure of national regulation. They refer to the occasions on which Costa Rica has been subject to audits of Safety and Operational Oversight, in which it is indicated that Costa Rica's basic aeronautical legislation is satisfactory and grants the DGAC the necessary attributions to maintain an adequate level of operational safety oversight. She indicates that the Chamber, in judgment 5735-99, recognized the specialization of air services. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is the product of the modification introduced to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000. She requests that the action be declared without merit.

6.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 118, 119, and 120 of the Judicial Bulletin, of the days June 20, 23, and 24, 2003 (folio 17).

7.- The oral and public hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction was held at nine hours eight minutes on March seventeenth, two thousand five.

8.- By resolution of thirteen hours forty minutes on July thirtieth, two thousand three, the Chamber accepted the President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation as a passive coadjuvant and resolved the clarification request presented (folio 70).

9.- By writ filed on June 18, 2004, the claimant requests that a date be set for the hearing (folio 76).

10.- Through a document received at 9:55 a.m., on February 25, 2005, Mr. Roberto Arguedas Pérez, in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (folio 84), states that in light of the unconstitutionality action filed by Mr. José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, on March 28, 2003, against Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law, for contradicting Articles 140 subsection 19 and 188 of the Political Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence in its votes No. 6240-93 and 3513-94, and pursuant to Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is prohibited that in processes where the application of the challenged norm is discussed, a resolution cannot be issued until the Constitutional Chamber has made a ruling on the case. On the other hand, Costa Rica signed the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was ratified through Law No. 844 of the year 1947, which establishes the obligation of each State to provide operational safety in its territory, in accordance with the Principle of Sovereignty and the obligations assumed with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Then, there is the existence of the operational safety oversight program by ICAO (1996), in which it is examined whether each State effectively applies the norms and methods of the Annexes and other documents according to the Convention. He affirms that the General Directorate of Civil Aviation is responsible for ensuring the provision of public services, the safeguarding and execution of governmental actions aimed at achieving airport and operational safety, and compliance with the commitments acquired with ICAO. Moreover, for the purpose of developing and expanding the Juan Santamaría airport, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation promoted International Public Tender No. 1-98. This Council is complying with the contractual obligations and derived commitments; he affirms that this management is being affected by the impossibility of exercising the power of representation and patrimonial disposition attributed by Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law, and additionally, by the impediment to proceed with the procurement. He alleges that this action is based on diffuse interests, for which reason one resorts to the Constitutional Chamber without a direct individual injury, and by proceeding with it, in light of the suspension provided for in Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, an alteration of the ongoing procurement is generated. Before the mentioned suspension, he states that aeronautical activity is a particular situation, so the established precautionary measure should be suspended; this is grounded on judgment No. 12949-03, where it is established that Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction institutes the retroactive effect of a judgment declaring constitutionality, and the Chamber is allowed to graduate and dimension that effect in time, space, or matter, according to the serious consequences it may produce for safety, justice, or social peace. He requests that the application of the precautionary measure established in the resolution of 8 hours and 15 minutes on June 10, 2003, be suspended, given the serious damages caused to the management of the CETAC.

11.- Through a document received at 4:20 p.m. on March 30, 2005, Mr. José Miguel Corrales Bolaños expands the reasons for unconstitutionality (folio 103), and states that it is not possible at the constitutional level to grant full legal personality to a deconcentrated body, which is why granting this to CETAC is unconstitutional. Above all because Articles 121 subsection 14 and 140 subsection 19 of the Political Constitution protect and reserve for the Executive Branch matters such as public airport service. The attempt to grant CETAC full legal personality violates Articles 188 to 190 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the same normative body, thus injuring the principle of legality, given that also, this regulation only recognizes this attribution to the Central Government, municipalities, and autonomous entities. The introduction of a private party into direct or indirect management requires legislative approval, expressed through a framework law, or through the approval of the contract verified by the Executive Branch; this has not happened with the interested management, thus also violating constitutional Article 9, as the Legislative Assembly is prohibited from delegating the exercise of functions that are its own. In judgment No. 11657-01, it is affirmed that interested management is a form of managing public services and works through which the Administration acts through a third party, who acts on account and in the name of the State; in this case, the respective public entity remains in charge of the asset and public services, but the manager is established as the administrator. Corrales Bolaños alleges that, if in the specific case, things had been done as previously stipulated, a works tender would have had to be carried out, and the income and expense accounts would be known (and would be public); furthermore, the entrepreneur would not be the manager vis-à-vis users and third parties, as this constitutes acting as an illegal concessionaire. He states that invoking Article 55 of the Law on Administrative Procurement, and its open types to justify the specific facts, is a form of fraud on the law, which is condemned in Article 20 of the Civil Code and in Article 5 of Law No. 8422 Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. He argues that the State cannot contract modifications to the contract with the manager either, as it intends to do by adding to the agreed payment an approximate sum of $140,000,000 dollars, since now the manager is an integral part of the Administration, according to Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration; and it is stipulated as a general principle of administrative procurement, the prohibition for officials or agents of the administration intervening in the process from participating as interested parties in the procurement—this finds support in Article 22 subsection c of the Law on Administrative Procurement. Furthermore, it would constitute a direct procurement without any tender. Likewise, the manager is subject to the authority of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and whatever the latter resolves cannot be changed, it can only be challenged through judicial means. The Comptroller rejected the claims for modification of the contract and did not allow expenses and costs to be passed on to tariffs; this was not challenged by the parties. It is for this reason, and in addition to the prohibition found in Article 22 subsection c of the Law on Administrative Procurement, that the parties did not challenge in time or form the Comptroller's decision. He maintains that, according to how Articles 121 subsection 14 and 140 subsection 19 of the Political Constitution have been interpreted, the concession regime must be established and regulated by a norm of legal rank, which is why it is a legislative competence, and not an executive one; it is impossible that it can be authorized through a regulation, and its open types of Article 55 of the Law on Administrative Procurement. The petitioner affirms that what lies behind all this is the desire to carry out the extra and illegal payment of almost $140,000,000 dollars. This leads to the detriment of public interests, as Costa Rica would end up paying double for some meager works; and moreover, its airport, economic, and export development would be delayed until 2025. As he has proposed with the extension of the contract, ALTERRA will have to be compensated without a new international airport in Orotina entering into operation. In light of all this, the crisis at the Juan Santamaría Airport will come in 2010, as with the sums sought, the funds for the airport in Orotina will run out, and also, the TAMS in its calculations prepared in 1997 was not very accurate, as growth has been greater, and according to the FAA (Federal Aviation Agency) of the United States, flights from the U.S. abroad will increase by 95%. Faced with all this, he assures that CETAC cannot make decisions of such magnitude, as this is contrary to the Political Constitution, and also due to the unconstitutionality of this claim that contradicts firm and binding provisions of the Comptroller General of the Republic; and for this reason, he requests once again that Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law be declared unconstitutional.

12.- The prescriptions of law have been fulfilled in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, demanding the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right invoked therein, a requirement that is not necessary in the exceptional cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General (Fiscal General de la República), or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. Based on the foregoing, the general rule points to the need for a prior matter, with the possibilities of resorting to the Constitutional Chamber directly being exceptional. In accordance with the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it is applicable when "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury," that is, when by that very nature, the injury is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that injure the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly.

Secondly, the possibility of resorting to the defense of "diffuse interests (intereses difusos)" is contemplated; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by this Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in ruling number 03750-93 of this court, issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three.

"… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be under our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons or personalized groups can be recognized in relation to them, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that pertain to a community as a whole. They are therefore individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and, consequently, suffer an injury, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of their members. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are simultaneously collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united by a specific social necessity, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could bring, protected under paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights that it has qualified as "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the aforementioned assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; environmental damage does not merely affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather injures or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Republic's Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any given group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description arising from its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests "that pertain to the community as a whole," it refers to the legal assets explained in the preceding lines, that is, to those whose ownership rests with the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Therefore, it does not mean that any person can resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of the assets that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any exhaustive enumeration (see, in this same sense, ruling number 2001-07391 of this Chamber, issued at four o'clock and seven minutes in the afternoon on August fourteenth, two thousand one).

II.- Standing of the plaintiffs. This matter is admissible in accordance with the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, insofar as there is no individual and direct injury with respect to the regulation being challenged, which according to the plaintiff excessively, abusively, and disproportionately grants instrumental legal personality to the Technical Council for Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil); therefore, the prior existence of a base case is not possible in this instance, as the questioned norm does not produce direct harm to a particular subject. Under these parameters, it is appropriate to admit this action of unconstitutionality.

III.- Subject of the challenge. The plaintiff challenges article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, as amended by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, insofar as they consider that the instrumental legal personality to administer funds and the capacity to contract granted to the Technical Council for Civil Aviation is unconstitutional because it violates articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Constitution. For study purposes, the rule in question is cited, which reads:

"Article 2.—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Technical Council for Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation, both attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, MOPT), in accordance with the powers granted by this Law. In relation to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Technical Council for Civil Aviation shall enjoy maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and shall have instrumental legal personality to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and process agreements so that they may be reviewed by the Executive Branch." (As amended by article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000) IV.- On the merits. The core point of this study being the unconstitutionality of endowing a deconcentrated administrative body with an instrumental legal personality that allows it to contract, it is advisable to first review the functions constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch and the scope of this legal figure.

a- Functions granted by the Political Constitution to the Executive Branch. Article 140 of the Constitution defines a scope of competencies and attributions that are exclusive—and excluding—to the Executive Branch, understood as the President of the Republic and the respective Minister. Thus, the function of political or government direction and the direction of international policy are demarcated as proper and exclusive. Regarding the function of political direction—which is the only one we will focus on developing, in consideration of the interest of this action—it is important to emphasize that the Executive Branch corresponds to a function of political orientation regarding state activity, whose purpose is to guide state policies in the various areas of public interest, in order to maintain the necessary unity of the State; and this is achieved through the various mechanisms of administrative self-protection (planning power, directive power—related to the issuance of directives—, coordination power—sectorization and regionalization—, the power to issue authorizations—approvals, countersignatures, and approvals). Thus, far from being a legal-order competency, it is a constitutional-order one, proper to the Executive Branch, as this Chamber has previously considered, by virtue of which it is the Executive that must set policy in a specific area of action, and not the reverse:

"The Executive Branch—Government—, as a legal and political organization, is responsible for organizing, directing, and channeling society in all its political, legal, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its various bodies or ministries, as is the political directive function of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Executive Branch to guide, coordinate, and supervise the apparatus of the Administration (article 140, subsection 8 of the Political Constitution) and to issue general norms that are not only simple execution of legal norms but also delimiting (art. 140.2, Political Constitution) ..." (ruling number 3089-98, issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on May twelfth, nineteen ninety-eight).

In this sense, it is important to note that, by virtue of the organizational processes of decentralization by subject matter—autonomous institutions—(articles 188 to 190 of the Political Constitution) and territorial—municipalities—(articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution), and of deconcentration (article 83 of the General Law of Public Administration), these functions are not carried out exclusively by the Executive Branch; however, by virtue of the provisions of articles 26 subsection b) and 27.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, the function of direction and coordination of the tasks of Government and the Central Public Administration as a whole is maintained in the Executive Branch, and also of the decentralized Administration, where corresponding, by virtue of the degree of governmental autonomy of the municipalities—given by constitutional norm—. This Chamber also stated, in ruling number 2002-06513, issued at two o'clock and fifty-seven minutes in the afternoon on July third, two thousand two, that the structure of the Costa Rican State was determined by the original Constituent Assembly in the Political Constitution, and that, although its structure is not closed ("numerus clausus"), the ordinary legislator—indisputable holder of the residual competence—must conform, in relation to the creation of public entities and bodies, to the principles of that fundamental order. Thus, the doctrine of Public Law makes a clear differentiation between administrative decentralization and deconcentration, categorizing the former as that formed by public legal entities with full or special legal personality; with a specific attribution or exclusive competence, which they develop in an exclusive or privative manner, and not concurrently, alternatively, or in parallel, for which reason the major Entity (State) cannot invade their sphere of competencies, since these are competencies that have been transferred from the Executive Branch to the new institution; for which purpose they are endowed with assets and budgetary autonomy; so that they are recognized a legal capacity to administer themselves (administrative autonomy), in the terms provided in article 188 of the Political Constitution:

"The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management." For its part, the term deconcentrated body refers to the phenomenon that occurs within the same legal entity—without creating a new entity—with a specific and dependent competency task, in matters not deconcentrated, from the hierarchy of the entity to which it belongs, as provided in articles 83.2, 83.3, 83.4, and 83.5 of the General Law of Public Administration:

"2. Minimum deconcentration shall occur when the superior cannot:

• a)Avoke competencies from the inferior; and b) Review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party.

3. Maximum deconcentration shall occur when the inferior is also exempted from orders, instructions, or circulars from the superior.

4. The norms that create minimum deconcentration shall be of restrictive application against the competence of the deconcentrated body, and those that create maximum deconcentration shall be of extensive application in its favor." Consequently, administrative deconcentration exists when, by legal norm, an exclusive competence is attributed to an inferior body of the entity, with some degree of autonomy, resulting in the loss of the competence by the hierarchical superior, hence, its condition can never be equal to that of the superior, even in the case of the maximum degree of deconcentration. The doctrine is unanimous in considering that the Public Administration is made up of the set of public entities that form the administrative organization, that is, by the major public entity (State or Central Public Administration), and the rest of the minor public entities (Decentralized Public Administration, whether institutional or by services—autonomous institutions—or territorial—municipalities), which have been created by an act of sovereignty, of constitutional (in the case of municipalities) or legal order. In this sense, decentralization will always imply the creation of minor public entities, distinct from the State, endowed with legal personality, their own assets (which implies financial autonomy), and the attribution of an exclusive and excluding competence that is severed from the Executive Branch; for this reason, the major public entity—the State—cannot invade their sphere of competence, although it is subject to administrative oversight (direction, planning, coordination, and control). Thus, the fundamental element to determine the presence of an entity is the endowment of legal personality, which is delegated by the State for the realization of a specific competence, and which has the immediate consequence of turning it into a center of imputation of rights and obligations, that is, it legitimizes it to manage by itself and before itself the delegated competencies, in consideration of the degree of autonomy granted (administrative—minimum and first-degree—, typical of autonomous institutions; governmental—second-degree—, typical of municipalities and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in relation to the administration of social insurances; and organizational—full or third-degree, typical of State universities). This is how the endowment of legal personality to a public entity places it in a different position from that which, lacking personality, constitutes a body. For this reason, the actions carried out by these entities are the responsibility of the entity, not of the State in the strict sense. Finally, it is necessary to recall that decentralization is a model of Administration organization, with the purpose of seeking the best efficiency of public management, for the satisfaction of the entrusted public interest.

b- Instrumental legal personality. That said, the Chamber has held the criterion that endowing instrumental legal personality to a deconcentrated body is not unconstitutional, as a model of administrative organization, in order to achieve greater efficiency in the state apparatus. It has been considered a budgetary personification, which confers upon a deconcentrated body the power to administer its resources independently from the public Entity to which it belongs, although it remains subordinate in all other aspects proper to the deconcentrated function. It is an endowment of mechanisms and legal instruments strictly necessary for the body to fulfill the public tasks and functions delegated by virtue of law, all of which is not only adequate but necessary under the coverage of two fundamental principles of public management: efficiency and adaptability to change. In such a way, this instrumental capacity is subject to the terms and conditions provided in the law of its creation, and insofar as they are strictly indispensable for the fulfillment of the delegated public function; so that, if the law omits the competence, they must be presumed as proper and reserved to the superior. Thus, it may hire personnel, goods, and services that are indispensable for the fulfillment of the public function delegated to it, only under the understanding that the law expressly empowers it to do so. On the other hand, all constitutional norms and principles of control and oversight of the Public Treasury are binding and applicable to this type of body, that is, those governing administrative contracting, and those of Budgetary Law. In all other respects, they are subject to the control systems proper to the activity of public institutions.

V- On the challenged norm. The plaintiff considers that the powers of the Technical Council for Civil Aviation to administer funds as well as to contract, granted in article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, transgress the Political Constitution and are contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court according to rulings 6240-93 and 3513-94. However, they disregard, as already indicated, that the Chamber subsequently, in ruling No. 11.657-2001 issued at two o'clock and forty-three minutes in the afternoon on November fourteenth, two thousand one, ruled on the legal nature of this body and on its budgetary personality, determining its constitutionality. As the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) correctly indicates, in this last ruling the Chamber unified its position, accepting the constitutionality of an instrumental legal personality with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual spheres:

"...The constitutional principles of Single Treasury (according to which all income in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and of budgetary universality (the Republic's Budget must contain the forecast of all income and the authorization of all expenditures of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), positively enshrined in articles 185 and 176 of the Constitution, respectively, determine guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the handling of such resources. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law, there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications,' according to which, in some cases, the legislator chooses to give certain deconcentrated bodies the possibility of managing their own resources outside the central State Budget, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality.' This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of them in ruling number 06240-93 issued at two o'clock in the afternoon on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that:

'...In this sense, it is necessary to point out that, with the creation of the General Directorate, an attempt is made to configure an institution with the legal regime proper to a decentralized entity—with contractual capacity, financial and budgetary autonomy, its own assets, etc.—under the guise of a deconcentrated Body, which by its nature could not have, at most, more than a merely instrumental legal personality. It is not possible to delegate to the General Directorate competencies attributed by the Constitution to the Executive Branch in the strict sense—President of the Republic and Minister of the portfolio—, regardless of whether such instrumental personality is granted. Stated another way, if the legislator chooses to deconcentrate a Body from a Government Ministry, it cannot equip it with its own independent legal personality separate from it, in the terms of a decentralized administration, insofar as the head of the Ministry integrates, together with the President of the Republic, the constitutional Body "Executive Branch" which is its necessary superior; unless the legislator chooses to create a true decentralized or autonomous institution, which, in any case, would require for its creation a law approved by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly (article 189 of the Political Constitution), precisely because its creation implies the displacement of competencies that constitutionally correspond to the Executive Branch as head of the Central Administration; otherwise, an exceptional regime would be formed, which could lead to an atomization of the Executive Branch and its own competencies, which is repugnant to constitutional ideology.' Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the previously cited criterion, and in ruling number 03513-94, issued at eight o'clock and fifty-seven minutes in the morning on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, stated that:

'(...)

In Considerando II, section 2 of this resolution, the background of that provision was summarized. Despite the fact that the legislator's intention seems limited to providing the Museum with a simply instrumental legal capacity, so that it can receive donations directly, which would be constitutionally valid (as would be the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), the first article of the bill, which is the text consulted, does not, however, adhere to that which is merely instrumental but rather fully personifies the Museum (it categorically states: "Legal personality is granted to the National Museum of Costa Rica..."), although it subsequently qualifies it as a "Deconcentrated Body, attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.

(...)' The correct position is the one sustained in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid under Constitutional Law to confer upon a deconcentrated body instrumental legal personality for the purpose of managing its own budget and thus carrying out the public function it is called upon to perform more efficiently. Precisely this budgetary personification allows it to administer its resources independently from the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it continues to be subordinate to it in all aspects not pertaining to the function given to it by deconcentration and those derived from its instrumental legal personality. A position analogous to the foregoing has been sustained by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in various pronouncements, such as the following: C-176-95, C-178-95, C-189-96, and C-075-98, among others. In this case, it is not unconstitutional that the resources coming from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport are to be administered in a trust at the International Bank of Costa Rica, since the Technical Council for Civil Aviation is a body of maximum deconcentration of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, endowed with instrumental legal personality, in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 166 of the General Law of Civil Aviation, number 5150 of May fourteenth, nineteen seventy-three. The foregoing does not preclude clarifying that, in relation to funds coming from public taxes and levies, the manager performs only collection functions. Furthermore, the use of the trust in question does not imply that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has renounced its powers of oversight and strict control of the funds entering and leaving the trust, but rather, on the contrary, its surveillance action—to be consistent with Constitutional Law—must be constant and permanent in the proper management of the fund, so that its resources are distributed in accordance with the terms agreed upon in the contract. Thus, on this point, the action must also be dismissed." From the foregoing, it is clear that this Court had already ruled on the plaintiff's allegations and that on that occasion, whose criterion it still maintains, it determined that it is not unconstitutional for the Technical Council for Civil Aviation to be granted instrumental legal personality through which it can administer funds and consequently contract, within the terms and delimitations this Court indicated. The ownership of assets implies financial autonomy and, consequently, management autonomy to more efficiently carry out the public function it is called upon to perform. To deny its capacity to contract, as the plaintiff intends, would be unreasonable, since obtaining funds would be meaningless without the possibility of administering them, which necessarily implies the capacity to contract. With financial autonomy, the entity may carry out the acts and contracts necessary that involve the management of said assets within the established legal and constitutional delimitations, because by the nature of some contract processes, these will be reserved to the President and respective Minister, given that it is a merely instrumental and not essential form of contracting. State administrative contracting cannot currently be conceived by understanding that all contracting for the purpose of fulfilling public management be formalized by the President and the respective Minister, as the plaintiff intends, because that would imply an administrative paralysis, given the growth of the public sector and the needs of the administered. On this aspect, the Chamber, in ruling No. 2660-01, stating its position regarding the formal rigor of administrative contracting, stated:

"In the judgment of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be set aside in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the questioned norms. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, because administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a dizzying pace. Indeed, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and at the same time determined by the conditions and rules of the market, whose variables can hardly be captured in the rigidity of a norm. For that reason, and taking into account that, as the Office of the Attorney General correctly pointed out, contracting procedures have an instrumental character vis-à-vis the satisfaction of public interests, they could never be turned into an end in themselves, but must preserve their nature as simple means for the achievement of the higher purpose. Under this reasoning, it is worth asking then whether it is feasible to foresee in a normative body all the possible grounds for exception that at a given moment might require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying, and declaring the meaning of the State's primary legal system, cannot disregard the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. This perspective, of course, must maintain a just balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical sense and spirit of constitutional norms, these must be situated in their context, because otherwise they could become provisions of a very limited or inoperative character, of little relevance, and that could even prevent the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue." The law has had to develop mechanisms that have established greater agility in contracting, such is the case of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic, the Law of Administrative Contracting, and its regulation.

The Public Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, which, for example, provides in Article 106:

“The heads of the organs or entities of the public sector may delegate the signing of contracts associated with the procurement process, in accordance with the regulations established for that purpose.” Of course, understanding that said procurement is an instrumental activity. In the case of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, that contractual capacity is of an instrumental nature and is subject to the legal system, and therefore also to the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República. As a consequence of all the foregoing, the subject matter under study submitted to this Court in the terms indicated does not violate the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not unconstitutional.

VI.- Finally, the claimant, by brief filed on March 30, 2005, expands his reasons of unconstitutionality, reiterating the arguments regarding the powers of the CETAC, but also alleging that the interested management contract for airport services (contrato de gestión interesada de los servicios aeroportuarios) is unconstitutional, since it should have been approved by the Legislative Assembly, given that there is no framework law because it involves a Regulation issued by the Executive Branch and that, furthermore, several irregularities are occurring, since the contract is not being executed as this Court authorized it. The object of this action was circumscribed to the powers of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil established in the challenged article; therefore, the review of the interested management contract for airport services is a matter that, as presented, exceeds the scope of this study and which, moreover, was already the subject of analysis by this Court in judgment No. 11657-01. Regarding the actions of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, that judgment provided:

“...VI.- Regarding the actions carried out by the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil using the legal personality granted by the atypical norms. The claimants allege that due to the unconstitutionality of the norms granting legal personality to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, all acts carried out in relation to bidding process number 1-98 for the interested management of airport services, including the signing of the respective contract, are invalid. In this regard, it should be noted that the declaration of unconstitutionality referred to in the preceding paragraph regarding the budgetary norms that granted legal personality to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil does not have, as the claimants allege, the consequence of annulling the contract initially signed by the Council and not by the Executive Branch. This is because, prior to the filing of this action, the Executive Branch (the President of the Republic and the Minister of Public Works and Transport) issued agreement number 152, published in Alcance number 49-A to La Gaceta number 133 of July ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, by which it ratified and validated against any defect that might arise due to jurisdiction the act of award made by the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil in bidding procedure number 01-98, giving it retroactive effect in accordance with the provisions of Article 187 of the General Law of Public Administration. The validation of administrative acts, for its part, constitutes a mechanism to effectively guarantee the satisfaction of the general interest, preventing formal defects (relative nullities, therefore) from determining the annulment of administrative acts provided they are duly ratified or corrected, as the case may be. Since the defect of lack of jurisdiction resulting from the annulment of Articles 14 subsection 35 of Law number 7018, 122 of Law number 7015, and 81 of Law number 7051 was corrected prior to the filing of this action through an agreement of the body competent to perform acts such as those under study, the appropriate course is to dismiss the claim with respect to that point...” Likewise, regarding the constitutionality of the Regulation by which the challenged contract was issued, the Chamber in that same resolution stated:

“VIII.- Regarding the use of the interested management figure for the administration of the airports. Article 121 subsection 14 of the Political Constitution provides privileged protection for the assets that make up the public domain, accentuating said safeguard in the final paragraph of the referred subsection with respect to national railways, docks, and airports. In general, the inalienability of domain assets is established, and in particular, it is expressly determined that:

\"Article 121.- In addition to the other powers conferred by the Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (...) 14) To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own assets. The following may not definitively leave the domain of the State: (...) National railways, docks, and airports –the latter while they are in service– may not be alienated, leased, or encumbered, directly or indirectly, nor leave in any way the domain and control of the State.\" It is clear, then, that the asset in question, the Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría, cannot be alienated, leased, or encumbered, nor leave the control of the State. Regarding this special protection, it is convenient to mention that when evacuating the legislative consultation regarding the Bill of Hydrocarbons, legislative file number 9573, this Chamber specified the scope of the cited Article 121 subsection 14) of the Constitution, in the following terms:

\"The Chamber considers that, in accordance with its judgment #3789-92 of 12:00 hours on November 27, 1992, Article 121.14) of the Political Constitution contains three different, clearly differentiated rules: \" a) The first is a norm that enables the Legislative Assembly to decree «the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own assets». On one hand, this norm is unrestricted insofar as it refers to all the Nation's own assets, and, on the other, it reserves the matter to law, invalidating administrative acts of alienation or application to public uses not based on prior law; b) The second prescribes which assets «may not definitively leave the domain of the State». For those categories, which are stated in subsections a), b) and c), the restriction is total and absolute regarding «leaving the domain of the State», but, immediately, the norm moderates its severity by warning that such categories of assets may be «exploited by the public administration or by private parties» in accordance with the law or through a special concession; c) The third is a norm that refers specifically to certain assets (railways, docks, and national airports in service) not included in the three categories of the preceding norm\". Consequently, the Constitution provides for two regimes to exploit these specially protected resources, without either of them being able to leave the domain of the State: One, that of concessions or contracts granted by the Legislative Assembly directly, in use of an original competence; the other, the possibility of either exploiting them by the Public Administration, or entrusting them to private parties, by means of a legally granted or authorized concession. Both possibilities presuppose the competence of the Legislative Assembly to set, in the specific case, or regulate in a general law, imperative \"conditions and stipulations\" in the execution of the contract –such as its temporary nature, form of compliance, minimum obligations of the executor, etc.–, which place outside the reach of the concessionaires or the agreement itself of the parties the possibility of departing from them. It is not superfluous to recall that the administrative act of concession never acquires the character or rank of law, even if it is processed and adopted as such, (arts. 140.19 and especially 124.2 Constitution).

III.- Thus, one of the forms established there, obviously foreseeing how difficult and complicated it can be to have to resort to the Legislative Assembly for the approval of each individual concession contract, is that of a general regulatory law of the contracting process, commonly known as a \"framework law\". In this case, the Legislative Assembly vests the Public Administration with the power to grant specific concessions, a competence that, of course, does not include that of entirely substituting the function of the former, as will be discussed below. In this hypothesis, the delegate may be any entity of the public sphere –the Executive Branch itself, the normal body for administrative contracting (art.140 subsection 14 Constitution), as well as any other decentralized entity of the Public Administration– but not, as is proposed in the Bill, a merely deconcentrated organ within a portfolio of the Executive…\" (Judgment number 06240-93, at fourteen hours of November twenty-six, nineteen ninety-three).

The jurisprudence of the Chamber on this matter allows understanding that the choice of the interested management figure for the services of the Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is not so because through this type of contract (as was advanced in the preceding considerando) it allows the Administration itself to provide the Airport services, making use of the manager, but without the latter assuming the domain or control of the asset. The State, through one of its organs (the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), is ultimately the one that has full domain and control of the Airport. Finally, the claimants are also not correct in considering that Article 2° of the General Law of Concession of Public Works with Public Service, number 7762 of April fourteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, makes the use of interested management impossible in the case of airports. The referred numeral provides, in what is relevant:

\"ARTICLE 2.- Coverage. 1.- Any work and its exploitation are susceptible to concession when there exist reasons of public interest, which must be recorded in the file through a reasoned act. Telecommunications and electricity are excepted from the application of this law. 2.- Railways, rail lines, docks, and international airports, both new and existing, as well as the services provided there, may only be granted in concession through the procedures provided in this law. (...)\" Indeed, what the transcribed norm does is oblige the State, in case it determines the convenience of granting in concession the assets mentioned therein, to do so strictly adhering to the procedures established in Law number 7762. The foregoing is the only way to interpret this norm in accordance with the logic deduced from the design of the first two subsections of the article. Thus, it is clear that the legislator foresaw three distinct scenarios: a general rule regarding domain assets that can be granted in concession (any, in principle); an exception for those that cannot be so at all (telecommunications and electricity); and those for which, if it is decided to grant them in concession, the procedures of that Law must be followed, without it being permissible to provide for other procedures by way of Regulation. Since interested management does not constitute a form of concession, as the State continues to hold control of the Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría, it was possible to employ the figure in question or another that, under the same conditions, could serve to adequately fulfill the services provided at the Airport. Therefore, the use of the interested management figure for the administration of the Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría is not contrary to the invoked constitutional norms and principles.

IX.- Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of Legislative Reserve. In the same manner, the plaintiffs allege that the issuance of Executive Decree number 26801-MOPT, of March nineteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, Regulation for the Contracts of Interested Management of Airport Services, is contrary to the constitutional principle of Legislative Reserve established in Article 121 subsection 14) of the Political Constitution in favor of this type of assets, according to which the legislator will be the one who may authorize the respective concession. In this regard, what the Chamber said in its judgment number 02318-98, at seventeen hours and fifty-one minutes of March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-eight, must be mentioned:

\"II.- (…) In the opinion of the consultants, although it is possible to grant in concession the railways, docks, and airports, which are assets of the Nation, it is not possible to grant an authorization to the Executive Branch for such purposes in a generic manner in the Framework Law, but rather the Legislative Assembly must authorize the contract in each individual case. (…)\" To resolve the present point, the first thing we must clarify is that both Article 121 subsection 14 of the Constitution and the jurisprudential doctrine transcribed before refer basically to cases of concession of public works and services, and not to the specific figure of interested management. In any case, the Chamber considers that the Executive Branch was legally authorized to issue a Regulation like the one now challenged. This is so because Articles 3° and 55 of the Law of Administrative Contracting, number 7494 of May second, nineteen ninety-five, allow the Administration to formulate, through the issuance of regulations, atypical contractual forms (the so-called innominate contracts) for the satisfaction of the general interest, and in strict adherence to the ordinary procedures set forth in the same Law. It is thus that the Administration, in order to attend to the general interest, may develop other novel contractual forms, such as interested management, provided it fully observes the procedural rules and the constitutional and legal principles of administrative contracting. The validity of Article 55 of Law number 7494 was already discussed by the Chamber in judgment number 00818-98, at eleven hours and thirty minutes of February sixteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, and it was considered that:

\"(…) In summary, the power to issue executive regulations is expressly conferred by the Political Constitution exclusively to the Executive Branch (to the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of Government), so that the different administrative dependencies, be it the decentralized administration and the deconcentrated administration, are unable to regulate laws, whatever their nature. Having made this delimitation of the scope of the competence to issue regulations, the Chamber does not find that the power granted to the bodies subject to administrative contracting to issue “complementary regulations” to the norms referring to this matter is unconstitutional, in violation of Articles 9, 11 and 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, for constituting an excess of the regulatory power as alleged. The Chamber understands that this concept refers only to regulating the internal organization or administration that the heads are responsible for, understood as autonomous service or organization regulations, with the purpose of enabling the procedures of administrative contracting, as indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República; and if, on the contrary, it were a matter of regulating different modalities or types of contracting not conceived in the current legislation, in a manner that they are true executive regulations, insofar as they develop the principles contained in Articles 55 and 109 of the Law, the power would be reserved to the Executive Branch, as has been said. (…)\" Based on the mentioned norms and jurisprudential criteria, it is concluded that the issuance of Decree number 26801-MOPT does not constitute a violation of the Legislative Reserve in this matter, since it constitutes a valid form of exercise of the executive regulatory power, having as its basis the express authorization of Articles 3° and 55 of Law number 7494. Thus, the Executive Branch was enabled to issue a regulatory decree in use of the powers conferred upon it by Article 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, with the purpose of promoting the effective execution of the aforementioned legal norms, providing for innominate administrative contracting mechanisms that adjust to the specific needs characterizing the complex administrative function, in order to fulfill its essential objective: the satisfaction of the general interest. In use of its discretionary powers, it chose the figure of interested management as the most suitable to satisfy those needs, which is valid from the point of view of the Law of the Constitution. In summary, the issuance of the Regulation for the Contracts of Interested Management of Airport Services does not violate the constitutional norms and principles that regulate the parliamentary reserve in this matter.” Likewise, it does not correspond to this Court to verify whether the contract in question is being applied in the manner in which it was or was not authorized by the Chamber, since what is sought is a control of mere legality. It is appropriate to cite what this jurisdiction provided regarding the validity of the same in that same resolution:

“X.- Regarding the alleged invalidity of the contract. The claimants allege that between Decree number 26801-MOPT, the bidding terms (cartel de licitación), and the contract finally signed, there are large differences that lead to sustaining the invalidity of the contract, referring in particular to the person of the co-contractor, regarding whom they consider an undue assignment occurred. Regarding this aspect, it is to be remembered that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 of the Political Constitution, 1° and 73 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the competence of this Chamber is limited –in constitutional review proceedings– to the verification of the conformity of norms and other acts with respect to the parameter of constitutionality, formed by constitutional norms and principles, as well as those from International Human Rights Law. This is not a court competent for the analysis of the adherence of administrative contracts to legal and regulatory norms, and much less in relation to the original bases of the bidding terms, for which the legal system has provided specialized bodies capable of performing such review, at the administrative level, the Contraloría General de la República, and at the jurisdictional level, the administrative contentious courts. The Chamber must not supplant their powers, for which reason, since regarding these points no specific violation of norms or principles forming the parameter of constitutionality is alleged, it is not appropriate to rule on the merits regarding them.” For all the foregoing, the points alleged by the claimant in this sense must be rejected.

VII.- Conclusion. Consequently, there being no reason whatsoever to vary the stated criterion and since the challenged norm does not violate Articles 140 subsection 14, nor 188 of the Political Constitution, the action is to be dismissed, as is hereby ordered. Judge Armijo dissents and declares the action has merit.

Por tanto:

It is declared without merit the action. Judge Armijo dissents and declares the action has merit.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C.

AVC/169/ccg --- Res: 2005-03629 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on April fifth, two thousand five.- --- Action of unconstitutionality brought by José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, of legal age, married once, with identity card number 3-135-095, resident of San José; against Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, as amended by Law No. 8038 of October 17, 2000. Also appearing in the proceedings were Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), as coadjuvant, and Farid Beirute Brenes, representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República).

**Having reviewed:** **1.-** In a brief received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:00 hours on March 28, 2004, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, as amended by Law No. 8038 of October 17, 2000, be declared. He alleges that it is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in Law No. 5150, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and process agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch, which is contrary to Articles 140, section 19, and 188 of the Political Constitution, as well as to jurisprudence, according to judgments Nos. 6240-93 and 3513-94. He indicates that constitutionally, the Executive Branch is granted the exclusive power and duty to sign administrative contracts, which not only makes the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister responsible for affixing their signature to a document, but makes them holders of a genuine responsibility to safeguard the public interest through their management. This is not an accessory or purely formal matter for the Executive Branch, but rather a principal one, and it is, in detail, the exercise of authority in the name of the people, which must apply budgeted resources correctly and transparently and assess the interests that the State must satisfy. There is, therefore, a genuine political responsibility that is non-delegable. Additionally, the doctrine of the Constitutional Chamber has been clear that the organizational figure of deconcentration cannot be used to place an organ in conditions equal to or superior to those corresponding to a decentralized entity (ente descentralizado). The wording of Article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants a true status of an autonomous entity with a set of own revenues that form its financial autonomy, all of which is improper for a deconcentrated organ. He considers that the contractual capacity granted to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is unconstitutional, since it is not proper for a deconcentrated organ to carry out this type of contract, as that belongs to an organ with full legal capacity, and a deconcentrated organ could only have an instrumental capacity. He requests that the action be granted.

**2.-** By resolution at eight hours fifteen minutes on June tenth, two thousand three (visible on folio 12 of the file), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation.

**3.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report, visible on folios 18 to 39. It points out that the petitioner requests the application of the criteria derived from this Court's resolutions No. 6240-93 of November 26, 1993, and 3513 of July 15, 1994. If the first of these resolutions were applicable, the Action would be admissible. However, the change in jurisprudential criteria on the matter must be taken into account. In the first of these resolutions (6240-93), the Constitutional Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of endowing an organ of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, specifically the General Directorate of Hydrocarbons, with a scope of autonomy similar to that of an autonomous entity. It was thus resolved that it was unconstitutional to endow an organ of the Executive Branch with powers to sign administrative contracts, ownership of a budget, the power to disburse resources, and to contract loans, among others. Regarding administrative contracting, only the Executive Branch could sign the corresponding contracts for the Executive Branch. The exercise of budgetary and contractual powers is considered integrated within the concept of full legal personality. It can be considered that, as the petitioner states, under this thesis, endowing an organ with personality, budgetary autonomy, and own funds would be equivalent to creating an autonomous entity, without complying with the provisions of Articles 188 to 190 of the Political Charter. A more open position of the Constitutional Chamber regarding the granting of contractual and budgetary powers in favor of deconcentrated organs is found in judgment No. 3513-94 of 8:57 hrs. on July 15, 1994. In this resolution, the granting of legal personality to a deconcentrated organ of the Executive Branch is sanctioned. It is noted that although the legislator's intention was to endow the organ *"...with a merely instrumental legal capacity to the Museum, so that it can receive donations directly, which would be constitutionally valid (as would be the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), Article 1 of the bill, which is the text consulted, does not conform, however, to the merely instrumental, but rather fully personifies the Museum (it categorically states: 'Legal personality is granted to the National Museum of Costa Rica...'), although, immediately, it qualifies it as a 'deconcentrated organ, attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.' The full personification of the Museum gives rise to a state public entity, and no longer a mere state organ. This Chamber, answering an optional legislative consultation concerning the Hydrocarbons Law bill, legislative file No. 9573, opined that a norm of that bill whose content bears close similarity to what is now questioned was unconstitutional. This court has no reasons to change its criteria in the present case, so in its opinion, Article 1 of the bill subject to this consultation is unconstitutional..."* The possibility of an instrumental personality was accepted, which is not defined, but which would be different from the full personality proper to decentralized entities. Contractual powers would form part of that instrumental personality. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, through its opinions, pointed out the contradictory nature of the resolutions in question (opinions C-186-95 of August 28, 1995, C-171-96 and C-175-96 of October 18 and 21, 1996, respectively, as well as C-042-2001 of February 20, 2001) and the need for greater discussion on the subject, both at the jurisprudential and legislative levels. The Chamber had the opportunity to standardize its criteria on the matter when called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the "interested management" contract for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. The Chamber established its position, accepting the constitutionality of an instrumental legal personality with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual spheres. In resolution No. 11657-2001 of 14:43 hrs. on November 14, 2001, the Chamber stated: *"…The constitutional principles of the single fund (caja única) (according to which all income in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and of budgetary universality (the Budget of the Republic must contain the forecast of all income and the authorization of all expenses of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), positively enshrined in Articles 185 and 176 of the Constitution, respectively, determine guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the management of such resources. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law, there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications,' according to which, in some cases, the legislator chooses to give certain deconcentrated organs the possibility of managing their own resources outside the Central State Budget, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality.' This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of them in judgment number 06240-93 of fourteen hours on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that: (….). Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the aforementioned criterion, and in judgment number 03513-94 of eight hours fifty-seven minutes on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, that: (…). The correct position is the one held in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid in light of Constitutional Law to confer upon a deconcentrated organ instrumental legal personality for the purpose of managing its own budget and thus more efficiently carrying out the public function it is called upon to perform. Precisely this budgetary personification allows it to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it remains subordinate to it in all aspects not inherent to the function given to it by deconcentration and those derived from its instrumental legal personality… In this case, it is not unconstitutional that the resources coming from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport will be administered in a trust at the International Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Internacional de Costa Rica), given that the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is an organ of maximum deconcentration of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, endowed with instrumental legal personality, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 166 of the General Civil Aviation Law…"* From the foregoing, it follows that instrumental legal personality constitutes a budgetary personality (a term the Attorney General's Office coined regarding various deconcentrated organs, "administered" by administrative boards with their own legal personality (opinion C-115-89 of July 4, 1989). In the opinion of this Advisory Body, the personality allows administering a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personified organ belongs. Budgetary personality means patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of own resources, as provided by the legislator; ownership of its own budget, separate from the budget of the organization to which it belongs; the administration and management of resources independently of the Budget of the parent entity, which implies recognizing a power to contract. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both have ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions regulating financial matters, including the directives of the Budgetary Authority (Autoridad Presupuestaria), but its budget and, therefore, budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, personality allows the organ to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, the proper powers to execute it. The Attorney General's Office has considered that in personalities of budgetary content, a violation of the principles of budgetary unity and universality and the principle of the single fund occurs. However, from what was resolved by this Court in resolution No. 11657-2001 transcribed above, it could be considered that for the Chamber, such violations do not exist. Furthermore, regarding the single fund principle, it should be noted that the Financial Administration Law subjects such personifications to the single fund principle, as analyzed in opinion No. C-280-2002 of October 18th of last year. As a consequence of the reform introduced by the Public Debt Restructuring Law, Article 66 of the Financial Administration Law requires considering that the income of instrumental legal persons (insofar as they legally cannot be considered decentralized entities – there is no decentralization of substantive competencies nor a true constitution of an entity-) constitutes income of the Central Government, from which the logical consequence follows that such resources form part of a single fund under the responsibility of the National Treasury. Therefore, said persons – despite the instrumental legal personality – are bound by the principle of the single fund under the responsibility of the Treasury. Now, the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation essentially refers to violations of Articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. Said resolution does not analyze a possible violation of Article 140, section 19, of the Constitution, which means the discussion on the matter remains of current interest. Moreover, the Chamber analyzed the point based on norms contained in the Budget Laws, Articles 14, section 35 of Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical norms and as such unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is a product of the modification introduced to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, an "ordinary law." Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze whether the Law can attribute to the Council the contracting power that is challenged. The petitioner asserts that the contractual capacity of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation entails the exercise of powers proper to a full legal personality, which do not correspond to a deconcentrated organ, because that personality is proper to the Executive Branch in accordance with Article 140, section 10 of the Political Constitution. Citing resolution No. 6240-93, he considers that it is not legally appropriate to grant contractual capacity to the Technical Council. He adds that contracts relating to airport services must belong to an organ with full legal personality, and a deconcentrated organ can only have an instrumental capacity.

The Council may enter into any type of contract, which is not characteristic of a deconcentrated body. It is the competence of the Executive Branch to sign administrative contracts. That duty makes it responsible under the terms of Article 148. It adds that the competence of the Executive Branch is a complete form that the Constitution provides so that it exercises its authority in the name of the people and applies correctly and transparently the public funds that have been budgetarily assigned to it and so that it evaluates the interests that the State must satisfy. It adds that the wording of Article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants the Technical Council of Civil Aviation a status of &quot;autonomous entity&quot; (ente autónomo), because it gives it financial autonomy and this can become a budgetary autonomy characteristic of the autonomous entity. Therefore, it considers that there is a fraud against the content of Article 188 of the Constitution, since the deconcentrated body is granted the advantages, conditions, and privileges of the autonomous entity, without the controls, precautions, and limits of a decentralized institution. The Attorney General's Office does not share the petitioner's thesis because it starts from a conception of the scope of Article 140, subsection 19 cited that, if applied, would lead to the paralysis of the Central Administration, due to the impossibility of carrying out part of the instrumental activity necessary for the fulfillment of public purposes. On the other hand, it does not take into account the true scope of the contracting power granted by Article 2 of the Law of Civil Aviation. Prior to the corresponding analysis, it is necessary to recall that in our system, legal personality must be granted by law. The State is a legal person by full right in accordance with what is provided in Article 33 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the Executive Branch is not a legal person, although as Administration it is recognized as having capacity under Public Law and Private Law. Therefore, a legal capacity and capacity to act. The violation of Article 140, subsection 19 of the Political Constitution is alleged. Said fundamental norm provides: &quot;ARTICLE 140.- The following are duties and attributions that jointly correspond to the President and the respective Minister of Government: 19) To sign administrative contracts not included in subsection 14) of Article 121 of this Constitution, with the reservation of submitting them to the approval of the Legislative Assembly when they stipulate exemption from taxes or fees, or have as their object the exploitation of public services, resources, or natural wealth of the State. Legislative approval of these contracts shall not give them the character of laws nor exempt them from their administrative legal regime. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to loans or other similar agreements, referred to in subsection 15) of Article 121, which shall be governed by their special rules. (Thus added by Article 2 of Law No. 5702 of June 5, 1975)&quot;. The interpretation that the petitioner gives to this provision implies that the Executive Branch, i.e., the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister (Article 140 of the Political Constitution), is responsible for carrying out administrative contracting, in such a way that it must not only sign the administrative contracts but also participate in the preceding stages. In a legal system in which the administrative contract is defined fundamentally by an organic criterion, we have that all contracts executed by a public agency are administrative contracts. Consequently, the contracts required for the operation of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation are, in principle, administrative contracts subject to the corresponding regime. In the opinion of the petitioner, those contracts – being administrative – would have to be executed by the Executive Branch, except those referring to the goods and services of Article 121, subsection 14. Ergo, regardless of the object of the contract, the Executive Branch would have to enter into the contract. This would imply the necessary participation of the President of the Republic in all contracting that is carried out, since these are administrative. However, that is not the scope that the rest of the legal system has given to Article 140, subsection 19 and this has been evident since the dawn of the 1949 Constitution. Article 88 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic (No. 1279 of May 2, 1951), in its original text, attributed the purchasing function to the National Procurement Office (Proveeduría Nacional) (Article 88) and provided that the selection of the awardee of a tender by the National Procurement Office perfected the contract (Article 100). When the contracting required a document, the contract was signed by the relevant Minister, unless that document was a public deed. In effect, the extrajudicial representation of the State has corresponded since 1967 to the Attorney General's Office of the Republic and it is based on that competence that corresponds to the Attorney General of the Republic the signing of the contractual documents that require a public deed ((Article 3, subsection c) of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic). With the Law General of Public Administration, the Minister of Government is attributed the power to sign the administrative contracts pertaining to their Ministry, once the contractual procedures have been carried out by the National Procurement Office. Ergo, said contracts are not signed by the Executive Branch (President and relevant Minister), but only by the Minister. By reason of said norm, the Minister is the holder of the competence to sign the contracts corresponding to the entire ministerial organization, which is inclusive of the contracts that interest deconcentrated bodies. For the effect that the head of a deconcentrated body may sign the contracts that interest them, a norm that expressly authorizes it would be required. With the entry into force of the Law of Administrative Contracting, a deconcentration of contracting procedures occurs, since the creation of institutional procurement offices as bodies in charge of the administrative contracting procedures is encouraged. A deconcentration of procedures that has an impact regarding the &quot;signing of the contract&quot;. It is worth recalling, to this effect, that by virtue of the anti-formalist criterion (Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 2050-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001), which prevails in our contractual legislation, the administrative contract is perfected with the final act of award and the constitution of the performance guarantee. Therefore, most of the administrative supply contracts are not materialized in a formal document, to be signed by the Minister. Contracting actions that present a greater degree of complexity and those that require registry inscription (which are formalized in a public deed) are expressed in a document. Article 32 of the Law of Administrative Contracting provides, in what is of interest here: &quot;Only administrative contracting actions registrable in the National Registry and those that by law have this requirement shall be formalized in a public deed. The other administrative contracts shall be formalized in a simple document, unless this is not essential for the correct understanding of the scope of the rights and obligations contracted by the parties, as shall be determined by regulation&quot;. Article 32 of the Regulation of Administrative Contracting provides in its subsection 6 that when it is not necessary to formalize the contracting, the execution document called &quot;purchase order&quot; (orden de compra) shall constitute the instrument to continue with the payment procedures. These purchase orders are not, certainly, signed by the head of the agency that contracts. On another note, within the objectives of modernization of the country's financial administration, the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets authorizes the delegation of competence in the matter that occupies us. Article 106 of said regulatory body provides: <i>&quot;ARTICLE 106.- Delegation to sign contracts. <b> </b>The heads of the organs or entities of the public sector may delegate the signing of the contracts associated with the contracting process, in accordance with the regulation established for this purpose&quot;.</i> Said article recognizes the competence of the head to contract but, starting from the premise that it is an instrumental activity, which cannot be considered as essential, it allows delegating the signing of contracts. The deconcentration of administrative contracting through the creation of institutional procurement offices and the delegation of signing would not be possible if every signing of contracts corresponded to the Executive Branch. This is what the legislator understood since 1951 and this despite the fact that at the time the volume of state contracting and its amount was much lower than what we know today. And it is that pretending that constitutionally, ordinary administrative contracts must necessarily be entered into and signed by the Executive Branch would lead to a paralysis of the ordinary administrative activity of the country, with the risk, moreover, of affecting the normal functioning of the state apparatus. One would incur an absolutely inefficient management to the detriment of the governmental function. The ultimate consequence would be the impossibility of satisfying the needs of the community, by imposing a requirement that ends up turning contracting into an end in itself, leaving aside its function as an instrument for public management. It is worth recalling that: <i>&quot;...In the opinion of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be left aside in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the questioned norms. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, since administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a vertiginous pace. In effect, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and at the same time determined by the conditions and rules of the market, whose variables can hardly be grasped in the rigidity of a norm. For that reason, and taking into account that, as the Attorney General's Office well pointed out, contracting procedures have an instrumental character vis-à-vis the satisfaction of public interests, they could never be turned into an end in themselves, but must retain their nature as simple means for the achievement of the higher purpose. Under this reasoning, it is worth asking then if it is feasible to foresee in a normative body all the possible reasons for exception that at a certain moment could require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, which is entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying, and declaring the meaning of the primary legal system of the State, cannot ignore the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. This perspective, of course, must maintain a fair balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical sense and spirit of constitutional norms, they must be situated in their context, otherwise they could end up becoming provisions of a very limited or inoperative nature, of little relevance, and that may even come to impede the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue...&quot;</i>. Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 2060-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001. Such would be the consequences if every administrative contract, regardless of its scale, object, or amount, had to be signed by the President and the relevant Minister, under the terms proposed in the Action. In substantiating the alleged constitutional violation, the petitioner makes reference to the competence regarding the aeronautical services. That reference gives leeway to consider that, in their opinion, the contracting power that Article 2 of the General Law of Civil Aviation recognizes the Technical Council of Civil Aviation manifests itself in relation to aeronautical services. The General Law of Civil Aviation provides: &quot;Article 2º—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation, both assigned to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, according to the powers granted by this Law.<br> In relation to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation shall enjoy maximum deconcentration and shall have instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to administer the funds coming from fees, rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill the functions and process the agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch&quot;. <em>(Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000)</em>The instrumental legal personality has as a consequence the power to administer the funds from the fees applicable to aeronautical services and to carry out the contracts or acts necessary for the fulfillment of the functions, as well as to process the agreements that the Executive Branch must sign. Ergo, that competence essentially covers administrative contracts, which are nothing other than an instrument of financial management. The Chamber has recognized that it is constitutionally valid for the legislator to grant a personality of limited effects for the management of a budget, which allows administering certain resources. Well then, there cannot be administration of resources, management of own resources, if the power to contract is denied. The contract is simply one of the mechanisms to manage public resources; it is a means to commit the State constituting a valid source of obligations. Therefore, it can be considered that &quot;the power to contract&quot; is implicit in the instrumental personality. That contractual capacity is, we repeat, of an instrumental nature and does not affect, in any way, the exercise of the substantive competences that the Council holds by virtue of the General Law of Civil Aviation and particularly those granted in relation to the operating certificate of aeronautical services. Based on Article 2, the Technical Council may carry out the contracts referred to in the Law of Administrative Contracting. But, said article is not the norm that gives foundation to the Council's powers in matters of aeronautical services. In effect, the Council's competence in matters of aeronautical services does not derive from its classification as an instrumental legal person or from the recognition of a contractual capacity. It is the product of a set of provisions that attribute a material competence to it, in particular from the provisions of Article 10 of the General Law of Civil Aviation. Said article gives the Council competence to, among other powers, grant, extend, suspend, revoke, modify, or cancel operating certificates or provisional permits for air transport services, agricultural aviation, and, in short, for any lucrative activity that the Executive Branch deems necessary to require the possession of an operating certificate or provisional permit; as well as to grant the operation of aerodromes, airports, air dispatch services, aeronautical communications, radio aids for air navigation, and other aeronautical installations and auxiliary air navigation services. Article 2 challenged here can be repealed or can be annulled, but as long as what is provided in the rest of the General Law of Civil Aviation is not affected, the powers regarding aeronautical services shall continue corresponding to the Technical Council, except in the aspects in which the competence is expressly attributed to the Executive Branch. In that sense and because it is the necessary act for the operation of a multiplicity of activities related to aeronautics, it is pertinent to recall that the operating certificate is granted by the Council of Civil Aviation. The Executive Branch participates with its approval when it comes to international air services. Article 8 of the Law of Civil Aviation provides: &quot;With express exceptions, the Council shall exercise the functions conferred upon it by this law, independently of the Executive Branch, however, operating certificates for international services shall be approved in the last instance by the Executive Branch&quot;. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 5437 of December 17, 1973). Hence, the petitioner's objections against Article 2 in question are not admissible, when they argue that in the matter there is political responsibility, so the Executive must participate to a greater degree in the negotiation process of a contract, its evaluation, and execution, and its &quot;participation cannot be reduced to acknowledging or giving a seal of approval, by means of a signature&quot;. It seems that the petitioner's concern is directed at the possibility that, in exercising that administrative contracting power, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is free from the controls that apply to the Executive Branch. It should be warned, however, that the contracts that the Technical Council enters into based on Article 2 repeatedly cited must be subject to the administrative contracting procedures established in the Law of Administrative Contracting. But, in addition, there can be no doubt that said collegiate body is fully subject to the oversight of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The instrumental personality cannot constitute a valid limit against what is provided by Articles 182, 183, and 184 of the Political Charter (on the control of administrative contracting cf. Resolutions No. 998-98 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, 5947-98 of 2:32 p.m. on August 19, 1998, and 9524-99 of 9:06 a.m. on December 3, 1999). Pursuant to the foregoing, it is the opinion of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic that: 1-. In its resolution No. 11657-2001 of 2:43 p.m. on November 14, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber considered the granting to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation of an instrumental personality with budgetary effects constitutionally valid. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;line-height:150%'><span style='mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>2-. To manage the resources assigned to it, the Technical Council, as an instrumental person, requires the power to contract. 3-. As long as the Council enjoys the instrumental personality and this is constitutionally valid, the attribution of the power to carry out administrative acts or contracts, granted by Article 2 of the General Law of Civil Aviation to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation does not violate the provisions of Articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Charter. </span><span style='font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Verdana;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='mso-ansi-language:ES'>4</span> </b><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-weight: bold'>By a brief filed on July 7, 2003, Karla González Carvajal in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation requests the Chamber to clarify for the Council the scope of the suspension ordered in the published notice. The foregoing because it is not clear to them: 1) Whether the Technical Council can carry forward any procedure related to administrative contracting, both for the approval, signing, rescission, resolution, endorsement of administrative contracts, resolution of administrative claims, contractual execution, and restoration of the economic balance of the Contract; 2) The Council can carry out the rejection or admission of administrative claims presented by third parties before the publication of the resolution at eight fifteen a.m. on the tenth of June two thousand three; and 3) The Technical Council can deem the administrative route exhausted, for third parties to file claims before it in the corresponding judicial instances, administrative collections, and the exhaustion of the administrative route to carry out the corresponding judicial collection procedure. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:3.6pt;text-indent:1.0cm'><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=ES-CR>5.- </span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>The</span><span lang=ES-CR> lady Karla González Carvajal in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation at folio 43 of the granted hearing, states that to determine the legal nature of any institution, it is indispensable to analyze the regulations that govern it. In this case, unavoidable allusion is made to Article 2 of the General Law of Civil Aviation No. 5150. She indicates that this norm is consistent with the provisions of Article 2, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, No. 3155 of August 5, 1963. From this it is clearly inferred that the regulation of everything related to Civil Aviation is the competence of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, acting through two of its organs, namely: the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation. These, as organs of the cited Ministry, constitute part of the organizational structure of the Executive Branch. Regarding the legal nature of the Council of Civil Aviation, the conclusion was reached that it constitutes a deconcentrated organ of the M.O.P.T., with the particularity of holding instrumental legal personality for the management of the funds regulated in the General Law of Civil Aviation. The Attorney General's Office of the Republic in opinion OJ-072-96, of November 22, 1996, indicated that the General Directorate of Civil Aviation is an administrative organ that is located within the structure of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, but deconcentrated vis-à-vis it. Likewise, said Organ is subordinated to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation. The particularity that this subordination presents is that, in the exercise of public competences related to the matter of civil aviation, the participation of two organs occurs that hold powers of direction and approval (Council) and of execution and decision (Directorate), within the same Ministerial organization. To this effect, she cites judgment No. 11657-2001 of the Constitutional Chamber. From that judgment it is derived that the instrumental legal personality constitutes a budgetary personality. In the opinion of this consultative body, the personality allows administering a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personalized organ belongs. Budgetary personality means a patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of own resources, as provided by the legislator, ownership of a separate budget, separated from the budget of the body to which it belongs, the administration and management of resources independently of the Budget of the entity of belonging, which implies recognizing a power to contract. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both have the ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it </span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New"'>independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions that regulate the financial matter, including the guidelines of the Budgetary Authority, but its budget and, therefore, the budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, the personality allows the organ to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, of the own powers to execute it. Now, the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation refers essentially to the violations of Articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. Said resolution does not analyze a possible violation of Article 140, subsection 19, of the Constitution, which means that the discussion on the subject maintains current interest. Furthermore, the Chamber analyzed the point starting from norms contained in the Budget Laws, Articles 14, subsection 35 of the Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical norms and as such unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is the product of the modification introduced to Article 2 of the General Law of Civil Aviation by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, &quot;ordinary law&quot;. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze whether the Law can attribute to the Council the contracting power that is challenged. She makes reference to what the Attorney General's Office of the Republic responded in the conferred hearing. The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides the frame of reference that identifies and defines the responsibilities that the Costa Rican State, as a signatory to said instrument, must face in matters of civil aviation administration and the organic form and methods that must be followed to fulfill its responsibilities. The country is responsible for compliance with a national aeronautical legal system that allows conducting civil aviation in a safe and efficient manner, where the aeronautical authorities, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation have the necessary powers for the legitimate management of the affairs of International Aviation. The legal system must allow the aeronautical authority to be able to comply with the provisions of the Convention on Civil Aviation International and its annexes, as well as international agreements or conventions to which Costa Rica is a party. </span>The implementation of the regulatory system presupposes two prior conditions: a) that in its fundamental aeronautical legislation, the State provides for the promulgation of an air navigation regulatory code; and b)<span style='mso-tab-count:1'> </span>that the necessary powers be conferred on a competent state organ, the Civil Aviation Administration, to guarantee the observance of the regulations. The aeronautical legislation must authorize the creation of a Civil Aviation Administration at the head of which there will be a Director of Civil Aviation (DCA), provide that the necessary attributions be delegated to the DCA to prepare, publish, and revise the regulations and operating standards in accordance with the code or law; provide for the adoption of regulations and operating standards based on the provisions of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation; adopt provisions to ensure compliance with the navigation code and require that all commercial air transport flights carried out under the authority of the State comply with all the conditions that the State may deem applicable in the interest of safety and in accordance with all the treaties and agreements concluded by the State. The Category of the country depends on the effective compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Law No. 877 and its Annexes, with the General Directorate of Civil Aviation being obliged to ensure the strict compliance with the law and the treaties, as well as other regulations. In what is of interest, Article 18 of Law No. 5150 and its reforms states: <i>&quot;Article 18: The attributions of the General Directorate of Civil Aviation are: I.

Ensure strict compliance with this law, its regulations, and the international treaties, agreements, or conventions on civil aviation that the State subscribes to and constitutionally ratifies; as well as the updating and revision of civil aviation regulations promulgated in accordance with the international standards and recommendations regularly issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization."</i> Cites resolution number 2001-03421 of fifteen hours thirty-one minutes on May second, two thousand one of the Constitutional Chamber. The Costa Rican State is responsible for introducing and enforcing an adequate legal system that allows it to conduct civil aviation in a safe and efficient manner, permitting the pertinent authorities to have the necessary powers so that the legitimate management of civil aviation matters is not impeded or obstructed by other interests. The International Civil Aviation Organization repeatedly indicates that the authority of the State constitutes the primary element of the institutional component of the national regulatory structure. They refer to instances in which Costa Rica has been subject to audits of Operational Safety and Security Surveillance, in which it is indicated that Costa Rica's basic aeronautical legislation is satisfactory and grants the DGAC the necessary powers to maintain an adequate level of operational safety surveillance. Indicates that the Chamber, in judgment 5735-99, recognized the specialization of air services. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is a product of the amendment introduced to article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000. Requests that the action be dismissed.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right invoked there, a requirement that is not necessary in the exceptional cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, where by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; where it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or where it is filed by the General Prosecutor of the Republic, the General Comptroller of the Republic, the General Attorney of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. Based on the foregoing, the general rule points to the necessity of having a prior matter, the possibilities of approaching the Constitutional Chamber directly being exceptional. According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would then allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it applies when "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual nor direct injury", that is, when, by that same nature, the injury is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that injure the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of acting in defense of "diffuse interests" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this court number 03750-93, of fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three.

"… Diffuse interests, though difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be, in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable in their regard, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests concerning a community as a whole. It then involves individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the sets that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective – because they are common to a generality – and individual, by which they can be claimed in such character." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make, protected by paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has listed various rights to which it has given the qualifier of "diffuse", such as the environment, cultural heritage, defense of the country's territorial integrity, and sound management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; an environmental harm does not barely affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather injures or seriously risks the natural heritage of the entire country and even humanity; similarly, the defense of the sound management of public funds authorized in the National Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description inherent to its obligation – as a jurisdictional body – to confine itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without in any way it being possible to understand that only those rights expressly recognized by the Chamber as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing implies an undesirable overturn in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of Rights", which – as in the case of the Costa Rican model – starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole", it refers to the legal assets explained in the preceding lines, that is, to those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, that any person can appeal to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of the assets that affect the entire national community, without in this field either it being valid to attempt any attempt at an exhaustive enumeration (see in this same sense the judgment of this Chamber number 2001-07391, of sixteen hours seven minutes on August fourteenth, two thousand one).

II.- The standing of the plaintiffs. The present matter is admissible in accordance with the second paragraph of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, insofar as there is no individual and direct injury, regarding the regulation that is challenged and which, according to the plaintiff, excessively, abusively, and disproportionately grants an instrumental legal personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, so in this case it is not possible to have the prior existence of a base matter, as the questioned norm does not produce direct harm to a particular subject. Under these parameters, it is appropriate to admit the present unconstitutionality action.

III.- Object of the challenge. The plaintiff challenges article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, reformed by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, insofar as he considers that the instrumental legal personality to administer funds and the capacity to contract granted to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is unconstitutional because it violates articles 140 subsection 19 and 188 of the Political Constitution. For purposes of study, the norm in question is cited, which reads:

"Article 2—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Technical Council of Civil Aviation and the General Directorate of Civil Aviation, both attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, according to the powers granted by this Law. In relation to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Technical Council of Civil Aviation shall enjoy maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and shall have instrumental legal personality to administer the funds coming from tariffs (tarifas), rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to perform the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and process the agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch." (Thus reformed by article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000) IV.- On the merits. The core point of this study being the unconstitutionality of endowing a deconcentrated administrative body with an instrumental legal personality that allows it to contract, it is convenient to first review the functions that constitutionally have been granted to the Executive Branch and the scope of this legal figure.

a- Functions granted by the Political Constitution to the Executive Branch. Article 140 of the Constitution determines for us a sphere of competencies and powers that are exclusive – and excluding – of the Executive Branch, understood as such, the President of the Republic and the respective Minister. Thus, the function of political or governmental direction and the direction of international policy are demarcated as proper and exclusive. Regarding the function of political direction, - which is the only one we will focus on developing, in light of the interest of study in this action -, it is important to highlight that the Executive Branch is responsible for a function of political orientation concerning state activity, aimed at guiding state policies in the various areas of public interest, in order to maintain the necessary unity of the State; and this is achieved through the various mechanisms of administrative self-protection (planning power, directive power – relating to the issuance of directives –, coordination power – sectorization and regionalization –, the power to issue authorizations – approvals, endorsements, and approvals). Thus, far from being a competence of a legal nature, it is one of a constitutional nature, proper to the Executive Branch, as this Chamber has previously considered, by virtue of which, it is the Executive that must set the policy in a given area of action and not the reverse:

"The Executive Branch – Government -, as a legal and political organization, is in charge of organizing, directing, and channeling society in all its political, legal, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its distinct bodies or ministries, as is the political directive function of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Executive Branch to orient, coordinate, and supervise the apparatus of the Administration (article 140, subsection 8 of the Political Constitution) and to dictate general norms that are not mere execution of legal norms but delimiting ones (art. 140.2, Political Constitution) ..."(judgment number 3089-98, of fifteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen ninety-eight).

In this sense, it is important to note that, by virtue of the organizational processes of decentralization by subject matter – autonomous institutions – (articles 188 to 190 of the Political Constitution) and territorial – municipalities – (articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution), and of deconcentration (article 83 of the General Public Administration Law), these functions are not performed exclusively by the Executive Branch; however, by virtue of the provisions of articles 26 subsection b) and 27.1 of the General Public Administration Law, the Executive Branch maintains the function of direction and coordination of Government tasks and the Central Public Administration as a whole, and also of the decentralized Administration, as applicable, by virtue of the degree of governmental autonomy of the municipalities – given by constitutional norm –. This Chamber has also already pointed out, in judgment number 2002-06513, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July third, two thousand two, that the structure of the Costa Rican State was determined by the original Constituent Assembly in the Political Constitution, and that, although its structure is not closed ("numerus clausus"), the ordinary legislator – uncontested holder of residual competence – must conform, in relation to the creation of public entities and bodies, to the principles of that fundamental order.

Thus, the doctrine of Public Law establishes a clear distinction between administrative decentralization (descentralización) and administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativas), categorizing the former as that which is composed of public legal entities with full or special legal personality (personalidad jurídica plena o especial); with a specific attribution or competence, which it exercises exclusively or privately, and not concurrently, alternatively, or in parallel, so that the superior Entity (the State) may not invade its sphere of competencies, given that these are competencies that have been transferred from the Executive Branch to the new institution; for which purpose they are endowed with their own patrimony and budgetary autonomy; such that they are recognized as having a legal capacity to administer themselves (administrative autonomy—autonomía administrativa), in the terms set forth in Article 188 of the Political Constitution:

"The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management." For its part, a deconcentrated organ (órgano desconcentrado) refers to the phenomenon that occurs within the same legal entity—without creating a new entity—with a specific and dependent functional task, in matters not deconcentrated, subject to the hierarchy of the entity to which it belongs, as provided for in Articles 83.2, 83.3, 83.4, and 83.5 of the General Law of Public Administration:

"2. Minimum deconcentration shall occur when the superior may not:

• a)Avocar the competencies of the inferior; and b) Review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party.

3. Deconcentration shall be maximum when the inferior is also exempt from orders, instructions, or circulars of the superior.

4. The rules that create minimum deconcentration shall be restrictively applied against the competence of the deconcentrated organ, and those that create maximum deconcentration shall be extensively applied in its favor." Thus, administrative deconcentration exists when, by legal rule, an exclusive competence is attributed to an inferior organ of the entity, with some degree of autonomy, resulting in the loss of competence by the hierarchical superior; hence, its status can never be equal to that of the superior, even in the case of the maximum degree of deconcentration. The doctrine is unanimous in considering that the Public Administration is composed of the set of public entities that make up the administrative organization, that is, the superior public entity (State or Central Public Administration), and the rest of the minor public entities (Decentralized Public Administration—Administración Pública Descentralizada, whether institutional or by services—autonomous institutions—or territorial—municipalities), which have been created by an act of sovereignty, of constitutional (in the case of municipalities) or legal order. In this sense, decentralization will always imply the creation of minor public entities, distinct from the State, endowed with legal personality (personalidad jurídica), their own patrimony (which implies financial autonomy), and the attribution of a competence (competencia), exclusive and excluding, which is severed from the Executive Branch; for which reason the superior public entity—the State—cannot invade its sphere of competence, although it is subject to administrative oversight (tutela administrativa) (direction, planning, coordination, and control). Thus, the fundamental element to determine the presence of an entity is the endowment of legal personality, which is delegated by the State for the realization of a specific competence, and which has the immediate consequence of making it a center of imputation of rights and obligations, that is, it legitimizes it to manage for itself and before itself the delegated competencies, in attention to the degree of autonomy granted (administrative—administrativa, minimal and of the first degree, characteristic of autonomous institutions; governmental—de gobierno, of the second degree, characteristic of municipalities and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund regarding the administration of social insurance; and organizational—de organización, full or of the third degree, characteristic of the State universities). Thus, the endowment of legal personality to a public entity places it in a different position from one that, lacking personality, constitutes an organ. For this reason, the actions carried out by these entities are the responsibility of the entity, not of the State in the strict sense. Finally, it is necessary to recall that decentralization is a model of organization of the Administration, with the purpose of seeking the best efficiency of public management, for the satisfaction of the entrusted public interest.

b- Instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental). Having said that, the Chamber has held the criterion that it is not unconstitutional to endow a deconcentrated organ with instrumental legal personality, as a model of administrative organization, in order to achieve greater efficiency in the state apparatus. It has been considered as a budgetary personification, which grants a deconcentrated organ the power of personality to administer its resources independently of the public Entity to which it belongs, although it is subordinate in all other aspects that are characteristic of the deconcentrated function. It is an endowment of mechanisms and legal instruments strictly necessary for the organ to fulfill the tasks and public functions delegated by virtue of law, all of which is not only adequate but necessary under the coverage of two fundamental principles of public management: efficiency and adaptability to change. Consequently, that instrumental capacity is subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the law of its creation, and insofar as they are strictly indispensable for the fulfillment of the delegated public function; such that, if the law omits the competence, it must be presumed to belong to and be reserved for the superior. Thus, it may hire personnel, goods, and services that are indispensable for the fulfillment of the public function delegated to it, only on the understanding that the law expressly empowers it to do so. On the other hand, all constitutional rules and principles of control and oversight of the Public Treasury are binding and applicable to this type of organ, that is, those governing administrative contracting, and those of Budgetary Law. In all other respects, they are subject to the control systems characteristic of the activity of public institutions.

V- Of the challenged rule. The plaintiff considers that the powers of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) to administer funds and to contract, granted in Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, violate the Political Constitution and are contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court according to judgments 6240-93 and 3513-94. However, he disregards, as already indicated, that the Chamber later, in judgment No. 11,657-2001 at fourteen hours forty-three minutes on November fourteenth, two thousand one, ruled on the legal nature of this organ and its budgetary personality, determining its constitutionality. As the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic indicates, in this last judgment, the Chamber unified its position, accepting the constitutionality of an instrumental legal personality with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual sphere:

"...The constitutional principles of the Single Fund (according to which all income in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and of budgetary universality (the Budget of the Republic must contain the provision of all income and the authorization of all expenditures of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), positively enshrined in Articles 185 and 176 of the Constitution, respectively, establish guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the handling of such resources. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law, there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications' (personificaciones presupuestarias), according to which, in some cases, the legislator chooses to give certain deconcentrated Organs the possibility of managing their own resources outside the central State Budget, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality' (personalidad jurídica instrumental). This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of which was in judgment number 06240-93 at fourteen hours on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that:

'...In this sense, it is necessary to point out that, with the creation of the General Directorate, the intention is to configure an institution with the legal regime of a decentralized entity—with contractual capacity, financial and budgetary autonomy, its own patrimony, etc.—under the cover of a deconcentrated Organ, which by its nature could not have, at most, more than a merely instrumental legal personality. It is not possible to delegate to the General Directorate competencies attributed by the Constitution to the Executive Branch in the strict sense—the President of the Republic and the Minister of the portfolio—despite being granted such instrumental personality. In other words, if the legislator opts to deconcentrate an Organ of a Government Ministry, it cannot endow it with its own legal personality independent of the latter, in the terms of a decentralized administration, insofar as the head of the Ministry integrates, with the President of the Republic, the constitutional Organ "Executive Branch," which is its necessary superior; unless the legislator opts to create a true decentralized or autonomous institution, which, in any case, would require for its creation a law approved by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly (Article 189 of the Political Constitution), precisely because its creation implies the displacement of competencies that constitutionally correspond to the Executive Branch as the head of the Central Administration; otherwise, an exceptional regime would be formed, which could lead to an atomization of the Executive Branch and its own competencies, which is repugnant to constitutional ideology.' Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the aforementioned criterion, and in judgment number 03513-94, at eight hours fifty-seven minutes on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, stated:

"(...)

In considering section II, section 2 of this resolution, the background of that provision was summarized. Notwithstanding that the legislator's intention seems to be limited to endowing the Museum with a simply instrumental legal capacity, so that it can receive donations directly, something that would be constitutionally valid (as would be the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), the first article of the bill, which is the text consulted, does not, however, confine itself to the merely instrumental, but rather fully personifies the Museum (it categorically says: 'Legal personality is granted to the National Museum of Costa Rica...'), although it immediately qualifies it as a 'Deconcentrated Organ, attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.' (...)" The correct position is the one sustained in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid in light of Constitutional Law to confer on a deconcentrated organ instrumental legal personality for the purpose of managing its own budget and thus carrying out, in a more efficient manner, the public function it is called to perform. Precisely, this budgetary personification allows it to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it continues to be subordinate to it in all aspects not pertaining to the function given to it by deconcentration and those derived from its instrumental legal personality. A position analogous to the previous one has been sustained by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in various pronouncements, such as the following: C-176-95, C-178-95, C-189-96, and C-075-98, among others. In this case, it is not unconstitutional for the resources coming from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport to be managed in a trust at the International Bank of Costa Rica, since the Technical Council of Civil Aviation is an organ of maximum deconcentration of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, endowed with instrumental legal personality, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 166 of the General Civil Aviation Law, number 5150 of May fourteenth, nineteen seventy-three. The foregoing does not prevent clarifying that, in relation to funds from public taxes and fees, the manager performs nothing other than collection functions. Furthermore, the use of the trust in question does not imply that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has renounced its powers of oversight and strict control of the funds entering and leaving the trust, but rather, on the contrary, its supervisory action—to be consistent with Constitutional Law—must be constant and permanent in the sound management of the fund, so that its resources are distributed in accordance with the terms agreed upon in the contract. This being the case, on this point, the action must also be dismissed." From the foregoing, it is clear that this Court had already ruled on the plaintiff's allegations and that on that occasion, a criterion it still sustains, it determined that it is not unconstitutional for the Technical Council of Civil Aviation to be granted instrumental legal personhood (personería jurídica instrumental) through which it can administer funds and consequently contract, within the terms and limitations indicated by this Court. The ownership of a patrimony implies patrimonial autonomy and, consequently, managerial autonomy to carry out, in a more efficient manner, the public function it is called to perform. To disregard its capacity to contract, as the plaintiff intends, would be unreasonable, since obtaining funds would be completely pointless without the possibility of administering them, which necessarily implies the capacity to contract. With patrimonial autonomy, the entity may carry out the necessary acts and contracts that involve the management of said patrimony with the already established legal and constitutional limitations, since, due to the nature of some contracts, these will be reserved for the President and the respective Minister, given that it is a purely instrumental and non-essential contracting. Administrative contracting of the State cannot currently be conceived under the understanding that all contracting for the purpose of fulfilling public management is formalized by the President and the respective Minister, as the plaintiff intends, since this would imply administrative paralysis, considering the growth of the public sector and the needs of the administered. On this aspect, the Chamber, in judgment No. 2660-01, speaking on the formal rigor of administrative contracting, stated:

"In the judgment of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be ignored in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the questioned rules. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, since administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a dizzying pace. Indeed, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and simultaneously determined by the conditions and rules of the market, whose variables can hardly be apprehended in the rigidity of a rule. For that reason, and taking into account that, as the Attorney General's Office indicated, contracting procedures have an instrumental character vis-à-vis the satisfaction of public interests, they could never become an end in themselves, but must preserve their nature as simple means to achieve the higher purpose. Under this reasoning, one may then ask whether it is feasible to foresee in a normative body all the possible grounds for exception that at a given moment might require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying, and declaring the meaning of the primary ordering of the State, cannot disregard the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. That perspective, of course, must maintain a fair balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical sense and spirit of the constitutional norms, these must be situated in their context, because otherwise they could end up becoming provisions of a very limited or inoperative character, of little relevance, and which may even end up impeding the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue." The law has had to deploy mechanisms that have established greater agility in contracting; such is the case of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, the Administrative Contracting Law, and its regulations. The Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, for example, provides in Article 106:

"The heads of the organs or entities of the public sector may delegate the signing of contracts associated with the contracting process, in accordance with the regulations established for that purpose." Of course, understanding that said contracting is an instrumental activity. In the case of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, that contractual capacity is of an instrumental nature and is subject to the legal order, and therefore also to the oversight of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Consequently, following all of the foregoing, the matter submitted for study to this Tribunal in the terms indicated does not violate the Political Constitution, and therefore, is not unconstitutional.

VI.- Finally, the plaintiff, by brief filed on March 30, 2005, expands his grounds for unconstitutionality, reiterating the allegations about the powers of CETAC, but also alleging that the contract for the interested management of airport services is unconstitutional, since it should have been approved by the Legislative Assembly, given that there is no framework law as it concerns a Regulation issued by the Executive Branch, and that, furthermore, several irregularities are occurring, since the contract is not being executed as this Court authorized. The subject matter of this action was circumscribed to the powers of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation established in the challenged article; therefore, the review of the contract for the interested management of airport services is a topic that, in the manner presented, exceeds the scope of this study and was, moreover, already the subject of analysis by this Court in judgment No. 11657-01. Regarding the actions of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, that judgment provided:

"...VI.- On the actions carried out by the Technical Council of Civil Aviation using the legal personality granted by atypical rules. The plaintiffs allege that due to the unconstitutionality of the rules granting legal personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation, all acts carried out in relation to tender number 1-98 for the interested management of airport services, including the signing of the respective contract, are invalid. In this regard, it should be noted that the declaration of unconstitutionality referred to in the preceding paragraph concerning the budgetary rules that granted legal personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation does not, as the plaintiffs claim, have the consequence of annulling the contract signed in the first instance by the Council and not by the Executive Branch. The foregoing is because, prior to the filing of this action, the Executive Branch (the President of the Republic and the Minister of Public Works and Transport) issued agreement number 152, published in Supplement number 49-A to La Gaceta number 133 of July ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, by which it ratified and validated against any defect that might arise by reason of competence the award act made by the Technical Council of Civil Aviation in tender procedure number 01-98, giving it retroactive effect in accordance with the provisions of Article 187 of the General Law of Public Administration. The validation of administrative acts, in turn, constitutes a mechanism to effectively guarantee the satisfaction of the general interest, preventing formal defects (relative nullities, therefore) from leading to the annulment of administrative acts, provided they are duly ratified or corrected, as appropriate. Since the defect of incompetence resulting from the annulment of Articles 14, subsection 35 of Law number 7018, 122 of Law number 7015, and 81 of Law number 7051 was corrected prior to the filing of this action by means of an agreement of the competent organ to carry out acts such as those under study, the appropriate course is to dismiss the claim in that respect..." Likewise, regarding the constitutionality of the Regulation through which the challenged contract was issued, the Chamber in that same resolution stated:

"VIII.- On the use of the figure of interested management for the administration of airports. Article 121, subsection 14 of the Political Constitution provides privileged protection for the goods that constitute the public domain, accentuating said safeguard in the final paragraph of the referred subsection regarding railways, ports, and national airports. In general, the inalienability of domanial goods is established, and in particular, it is expressly determined that:

"Article 121.- In addition to the other powers conferred by the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has the exclusive authority:

(…)

• 14)To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own goods.

They may not leave definitively from the domain of the State:

(…)

Railways, ports, and national airports—the latter while they are in service—may not be alienated, leased, or encumbered, directly or indirectly, nor leave in any way the domain and control of the State." It is clear, then, that the good in question, the Juan Santamaría International Airport, cannot be alienated, leased, or encumbered, nor leave the control of the State. Regarding this special protection, it is pertinent to mention that when reviewing the legislative consultation on the Hydrocarbons Bill, legislative file number 9573, this Chamber specified the scope of the cited Article 121, subsection 14) of the Constitution, in the following terms:

"The Chamber considers that, in accordance with its judgment #3789-92 of 12:00 hours on November 27, 1992, Article 121.14) of the Political Constitution contains three distinct, clearly differentiated rules: ' a) The first is a norm that empowers the Legislative Assembly to decree 'the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own goods.' On the one hand, this norm is unrestricted insofar as it refers to all of the Nation's own goods, and, on the other, it reserves the matter to law, invalidating administrative acts of alienation or application to public uses not based on prior law; b) The second prescribes which goods 'may not leave definitively from the domain of the State.'" For those categories, which are set forth in subsections a), b) and c), the restriction is total and absolute with respect to "leaving the domain of the State," but, immediately, the rule moderates its severity by warning that such categories of property may be "exploited by the public administration or by private parties" in accordance with the law or through a special concession; c) The third is a rule that refers specifically to certain property (railroads, docks, and national airports in service) not included in the three categories of the preceding rule." Consequently, the Constitution provides two regimes for exploiting those specially protected resources, without any of them being able to leave the domain of the State: One, that of concessions or contracts granted by the Legislative Assembly directly, in the exercise of an original competence; the other, their possibility either of being exploited by the Public Administration, or of being entrusted to private parties, through a legally granted or authorized concession. Both possibilities presuppose the competence of the Legislative Assembly to establish in the specific case, or to regulate in a general law, imperative "conditions and stipulations" in the execution of the contract —such as its temporary nature, form of performance, minimum obligations of the executor, etc.—, which place the possibility of departing from them beyond the reach of the concessionaires or of the agreement itself of the parties. It is not idle to recall that the administrative act of concession never acquires the character or rank of law, even if it is processed and adopted as such, (arts. 140.19 and especially 124.2 Constitution).

III.- Thus, one of the forms established therein, obviously foreseeing how difficult and complicated it can be to have to go to the Legislative Assembly for the approval of each individual concession contract, is that of a general law regulating the contracting process, commonly known as a "framework law" (ley marco). In this case, the Legislative Assembly invests the Public Administration with the power to grant specific concessions, a competence that, of course, does not include that of entirely substituting the function of the former, as will be stated below. Under this hypothesis, the delegate can be any entity in the public sphere —both the Executive Branch itself, the ordinary organ of administrative contracting (art.140 subsection 14 Constitution), as well as any other decentralized entity of the Public Administration— but not, as is proposed in the Draft Bill, a simple deconcentrated organ within an Executive portfolio…" (Judgment number 06240-93, of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of November, nineteen ninety-three).

The jurisprudence of the Chamber in this matter allows us to understand that the election of the figure of interested management (gestión interesada) for the services of the Juan Santamaría International Airport is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is not so because through this type of contracting (as was set forth in the preceding recital) it allows the Administration itself to be the one providing the Airport services, making use of the manager (gestor), but without the latter assuming the domain or control of the property. The State, through one of its organs (the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), is ultimately the one that has full domain and control of the Airport. Finally, the plaintiffs are also not correct in considering that Article 2 of the Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público, number 7762 of April fourteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, makes the use of interested management impossible in the case of airports. The aforementioned provision states, in what is relevant:

"ARTICLE 2.- Coverage.

1.- Any public work and its exploitation are susceptible to concession when there are reasons of public interest, which must be recorded in the case file by means of a reasoned act. Telecommunications and electricity are excepted from the application of this law.

2.- Railways, rail lines, docks, and international airports, both new and existing, as well as the services provided therein, may only be granted in concession through the procedures provided in this law.

(…)" Indeed, what the transcribed rule does is obligate the State, in the event it determines the advisability of granting in concession the property mentioned therein, to do so strictly adhering to the procedures established in Law number 7762. The foregoing is the only way to interpret this rule in accordance with the logic deduced from the design of the first two subsections of the article. Thus, it is clear that the legislator provided for three distinct scenarios: a general rule regarding domanial property that can be granted in concession (any, in principle); an exception for those that absolutely cannot be (telecommunications and electricity); and those for which, if it is decided to grant them in concession, the procedures of that Law must be followed, without it being permissible to provide for other procedures by way of a Regulation (Reglamento). Since interested management does not constitute a form of concession, because the State continues holding control of the Juan Santamaría International Airport, it was possible to employ the figure in question or another that, under the same conditions, could serve to adequately fulfill the services provided at the Airport. For the foregoing reasons, the use of the figure of interested management for the administration of the Juan Santamaría International Airport is not contrary to the invoked constitutional rules and principles.

IX.- Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of legislative reservation (reserva de Ley). In the same manner, the plaintiffs allege that the issuance of Decreto Ejecutivo number 26801-MOPT, of March nineteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios, is contrary to the constitutional principle of legislative reservation established in Article 121 subsection 14) of the Political Constitution in favor of this type of property, according to which it is the legislator who may authorize the respective concession. In this regard, what the Chamber stated in its judgment number 02318-98, of seventeen hours fifty-one minutes on March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-eight, must be mentioned:

"II.- (…) In the opinion of the consultants, although it is possible to grant in concession the railways, docks, and airports, which are property of the Nation, it is not possible to grant an authorization to the Executive Branch for such purposes in a generic form in the Framework Law, but rather the Legislative Assembly must authorize the contract in each individual case. (…)" To resolve the present point, the first thing we must clarify is that both constitutional Article 121 subsection 14 and the jurisprudential doctrine transcribed above refer basically to cases of concession of public works and services, and not to the specific figure of interested management. In any case, the Chamber considers that the Executive Branch was legally authorized to issue a Regulation such as the one now challenged. This is so because Articles 3 and 55 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, number 7494 of May second, nineteen ninety-five, allow the Administration to formulate, through the issuance of regulations, atypical contractual forms (so-called innominate contracts) for the satisfaction of the general interest, and in strict adherence to the ordinary procedures established in the same Law. It is thus that the Administration, in the interest of serving the general interest, can develop other novel contractual forms, such as interested management, provided it fully addresses the procedural rules and the constitutional and legal principles of administrative contracting. The validity of Article 55 of Law number 7494 was already discussed by the Chamber in judgment number 00818-98, of eleven hours thirty minutes on February sixteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, and it was considered that:

"(…)

In summary, the power to issue executive regulations is expressly conferred by the Political Constitution exclusively to the Executive Branch (to the President of the Republic and the respective Government Minister), so that the various administrative dependencies, be it the decentralized administration and the deconcentrated one, are unable to regulate laws, whatever their nature. Having made this delimitation of the scope of the competence to issue regulations, the Chamber does not find it unconstitutional for the organs subject to administrative contracting to be granted the power to issue “supplementary regulations” to the rules referring to this matter, in violation of Articles 9, 11, and 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, for constituting an excess of regulatory power as is alleged. The Chamber understands that this concept refers solely to regulating the internal organization or administration that the heads are responsible for, understood as autonomous service or organization regulations, for the purpose of enabling administrative contracting procedures, as indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República; and if, on the contrary, it were a matter of regulating different modalities or types of contracting not conceived in the current legislation, in a manner, that it involves true executive regulations, as a development of the principles contained in Articles 55 and 109 of the Law, the power would be reserved to the Executive Branch, as has been stated.

(…)" Based on the aforementioned rules and jurisprudential criteria, it is concluded that the issuance of Decreto number 26801-MOPT does not constitute a violation of the legislative reservation in this matter, since it constitutes a valid form of exercising executive regulatory power, based on the express authorization of Articles 3 and 55 of Law number 7494. Thus, the Executive Branch was enabled to issue a regulatory decree in use of the powers conferred by Article 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, for the purpose of facilitating the effective execution of the aforementioned legal rules, providing for innominate administrative contracting mechanisms that could adapt to the specific needs characterizing the complex administrative function, in the interest of fulfilling its essential objective: the satisfaction of the general interest. In the use of its discretionary powers, it chose the figure of interested management as the most suitable to satisfy those needs, which is valid from the standpoint of the Law of the Constitution. In summary, the issuance of the Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios does not violate the constitutional rules and principles regulating the parliamentary reservation in this matter.” Similarly, it is not for this Tribunal to verify whether the contract in question is being applied in the manner in which it was or was not authorized by the Chamber, since what is sought is a mere legality review. It is appropriate to cite what this jurisdiction, in that same resolution, provided regarding its validity:

“X.- Regarding the alleged invalidity of the contract. The plaintiffs accuse that between Decreto number 26801-MOPT, the bidding terms (cartel de licitación), and the contract finally signed, there are large differences that lead to sustaining the invalidity of the contract, referring in particular to the person of the co-contractor, of whom they consider an undue assignment occurred. Regarding this aspect, it should be recalled that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 of the Political Constitution, 1 and 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the competence of this Chamber is limited —in constitutionality review proceedings— to verifying the conformity of rules and other acts with respect to the constitutionality parameter, formed by constitutional rules and principles, as well as those from International Human Rights Law. This is not a tribunal competent to analyze the adherence of administrative contracts to legal and regulatory rules, much less in relation to the original bases of the bidding terms, for which the legal system has provided specialized organs capable of carrying out such review, in the administrative arena, the Contraloría General de la República, and in the jurisdictional arena, the administrative litigation courts. The Chamber must not supplant their powers, for which reason, since regarding these points no specific violation of rules or principles forming the constitutionality parameter is alleged, it is not appropriate to make a substantive pronouncement regarding them.” For all the foregoing, the points alleged by the plaintiff in this regard must be rejected.

VII.- Conclusion. Consequently, as there is no reason to vary the expressed criterion and given that the challenged rule does not injure Articles 140 subsection 14, nor 188 of the Political Constitution, it is appropriate to dismiss the action, as is hereby ordered. Magistrate Armijo dissents (salva el voto) and grants (declara con lugar) the action.

Por tanto:

The action is declared without merit (sin lugar). Magistrate Armijo dissents and grants the action.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

AVC/169/ccg RESOLUTION: 2005-03629 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours fifty-eight minutes on the fifth of April, two thousand five.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, of legal age, married once, with identity card number 3-135-095, resident of San José; against Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, amended by Law No. 8038 of October 17, 2000. Also intervening in the proceeding were Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), as co-adjuvant, and Farid Beirute Brenes, representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República).

RULING:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:00 hours on March 28, 2004, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, amended by Law No. 8038 of October 17, 2000, be declared. He alleges that it is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in Law No. 5150, as well as to perform the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill the functions and process the agreements so that they are made known to the Executive Branch, which is contrary to Articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the case law, according to rulings No. 6240-93 and No. 3513-94. He indicates that constitutionally, the Executive Branch is granted the exclusive attribution and duty to sign administrative contracts, which not only makes the President of the Republic and the Minister of the relevant branch responsible for affixing their signature to the foot of a document, but also makes them holders of a true responsibility to safeguard the public interest through their management. This is not an accessory or purely formal matter for the Executive Branch, but rather a principal one, and it is, in detail, the exercise of authority in the name of the people who must correctly and transparently apply the assigned budgetary resources and so that they may assess the interests that the State must satisfy. There is, therefore, a true political responsibility that is non-delegable. Additionally, the doctrine of the Constitutional Chamber has been clear that the organizational figure of deconcentration (desconcentración) cannot be used to place an organ in conditions equal or superior to those corresponding to a decentralized entity. The wording of Article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants a true status of an autonomous entity with a set of own revenues that make up its financial autonomy, all of which is improper for a deconcentrated organ. He considers that the contractual capacity granted to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) is unconstitutional, since it is not proper for a deconcentrated organ to perform this type of contract, as this belongs to an organ with full legal capacity, and a deconcentrated organ could only have an instrumental capacity. He requests that the action be granted.

2.- By resolution at eight hours fifteen minutes on June tenth, two thousand three (visible at folio 12 of the case file), the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and to the General Directorate of Civil Aviation (Dirección General de Aviación Civil).

3.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) submitted its report visible at folios 18 to 39. It points out that the petitioner requests the application of the criteria derived from the resolutions of this Court, No. 6240-93 of November 26, 1993, and No. 3513 of July 15, 1994. If the first of those resolutions were applicable, the Action would be admissible. However, the change in case law criteria on the matter must be taken into account. In the first of those resolutions (6240-93), the Constitutional Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of endowing an organ of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), specifically the General Directorate of Hydrocarbons (Dirección General de Hidrocarburos), with a scope of autonomy similar to that of an autonomous entity. It was thus resolved that endowing the organ of the Executive Branch with the powers to sign administrative contracts, the ownership of a budget, the power to disburse resources and to contract loans, among others, was unconstitutional. Regarding administrative contracting, only the Executive Branch could sign the contracts corresponding to the Executive Branch. The exercise of budgetary and contractual powers is considered integrated within the concept of full legal personality (personalidad plena). It may be considered that, as the petitioner asserts, under this thesis, endowing an organ with personality, budgetary autonomy, and own funds would be equivalent to creating an autonomous entity, without complying with the provisions of Articles 188 to 190 of the Political Charter. A more open position of the Constitutional Chamber regarding the granting of powers in contractual and budgetary matters in favor of deconcentrated organs is found in ruling No. 3513-94 at 8:57 hrs. on July 15, 1994. In this resolution, the granting of legal personality to a deconcentrated organ of the Executive Branch is sanctioned. It is noted that although the legislator's intention was to endow the organ "...with a merely instrumental legal capacity to the Museum, so that it could receive donations directly, something that would be constitutionally valid (as would be the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), the first article of the bill, which is the consulted text, does not adhere, however, to the merely instrumental, but rather fully personifies the Museum (it categorically states: 'Legal personality is granted to the National Museum of Costa Rica...'), although, immediately, it qualifies it as a 'deconcentrated organ, attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports'. The full personification of the Museum gives rise to a state public entity, no longer to a simple state organ. This Chamber, resolving a facultative legislative consultation concerning the Hydrocarbons Law bill, legislative file No. 9573, opined that a norm of that bill whose content bears close similarity to what is now being questioned was unconstitutional. This court has no reason to change its criterion in the present case, so that, in its opinion, the first article of the bill object of this consultation is unconstitutional...". The possibility of an instrumental personality (personalidad instrumental), which is not defined, but would be different from the full personality (personalidad plena) characteristic of decentralized entities, was accepted. The powers in contractual matters would form part of that instrumental personality. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), through its opinions, noted the contradictory nature of the resolutions in question (opinions C-186-95 of August 28, 1995, C-171-96 and C-175-96 of October 18 and 21, 1996, respectively, as well as C-042-2001 of February 20, 2001) and the need for further discussion on the subject, both at the jurisprudential and legislative levels. The Chamber had the opportunity to standardize its criteria on the matter when called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the "interested management" contract for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. The Chamber fixed its position, accepting the constitutionality of an instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual sphere. In Resolution No. 11657-2001 at 14:43 hrs. on November 14, 2001, the Chamber stated: "…The constitutional principles of the single treasury (caja única) (according to which all income in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and of budgetary universality (the Budget of the Republic must contain the provision of all income and the authorization of all expenditures of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), enshrined positively in constitutional Articles 185 and 176, respectively, determine guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the handling of such resources. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law, there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications' (personificaciones presupuestarias), according to which, in some cases, the legislator chooses to give certain deconcentrated organs the possibility of managing their own resources outside the Central State Budget, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality' (personalidad jurídica instrumental). This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of them in judgment number 06240-93 at fourteen hours on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that: (….). Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the criterion cited above, and in judgment number 03513-94 at eight hours fifty-seven minutes on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, that: (…). The correct position is the one held in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid in light of the Law of the Constitution to confer on a deconcentrated organ instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) for the purpose of managing its own budget and thus carrying out more efficiently the public function it is called to perform. Precisely that budgetary personification (personificación presupuestaria) allows it to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it remains subordinate to it in all aspects not specific to the function given to it by deconcentration and those derived from its instrumental legal personality… In this case, it is not unconstitutional that the resources coming from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport are to be administered in a trust at the International Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Internacional de Costa Rica), since the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) is an organ of maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), endowed with instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental), in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 166 of the General Law of Civil Aviation…". From the transcribed text, it follows that instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) constitutes a budgetary personality (personalidad presupuestaria) (a term that the Attorney General's Office coined regarding various deconcentrated organs, "administered" by administrative boards with their own legal personality (opinion C-115-89 of July 4, 1989)). In the opinion of this Advisory Body, the personality allows for administering a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personified organ belongs. Budgetary personality (personalidad presupuestaria) signifies a patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of own resources, as provided by the legislator; ownership of a separate budget, separated from the budget of the organism to which it belongs; the administration and management of resources independent of the Budget of the entity of belonging, which implies recognizing a power to contract. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both hold ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions regulating financial matters and, among them, the guidelines of the Budgetary Authority, but its budget and, therefore, the budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, personality allows the organ to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, of the powers proper to execute it. The Attorney General's Office has considered that in personalities of a budgetary nature, a violation of the principles of budgetary unity and universality and the principle of the single treasury (caja única) occurs. However, from what was resolved by this Court in Resolution No. 11657-2001 transcribed above, it could be considered that for the Chamber, such violations do not exist. Furthermore, with regard to the single treasury (caja única) principle, it should be noted that the Financial Administration Law subjects such personifications to the single treasury (caja única) principle, as analyzed in opinion No. C-280-2002 of October 18 of last year. As a consequence of the reform introduced by the Public Debt Restructuring Law, Article 66 of the Financial Administration Law obliges one to consider that the income of instrumental legal persons (jurídicas instrumentales) (insofar as they legally cannot be considered decentralized entities – there is no decentralization of substantive competences nor true constitution of an entity-) constitute income of the Central Government, from which it follows as a logical consequence that such resources form part of a single fund under the responsibility of the National Treasury. Ergo, such persons – despite the instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) – are bound by the principle of treasury unity (unidad de caja) under the responsibility of the Treasury. Now then, the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) essentially refers to the violations of Articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. That resolution does not analyze a possible violation of Article 140, subsection 19, of the Constitution, which means the discussion on the matter retains current interest.

Furthermore, the Chamber analyzed the point based on norms contained in the Budget Laws, articles 14, subsection 35 of Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical norms and, as such, unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is the product of the amendment introduced to article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, an "ordinary law." Therefore, it is appropriate to proceed to analyze whether the Law can attribute to the Council the contracting power that is being challenged. The plaintiff affirms that the contractual capacity of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil entails the exercise of powers characteristic of a full legal personality, which do not correspond to a deconcentrated organ, because that personality belongs to the Executive Branch in accordance with article 140, subsection 10 of the Political Constitution. Citing resolution No. 6240-93, it considers that legally granting contractual capacity to the Consejo Técnico is not appropriate. It adds that contracts referring to airport services must belong to an organ with full legal personality, and a deconcentrated organ can only have an instrumental capacity. The Council can execute any type of contract, which is not characteristic of a deconcentrated organ. It is the competence of the Executive Branch to sign administrative contracts. This duty makes it responsible under the terms of article 148. It adds that the competence of the Executive Branch is a perfected form that the Constitution provides so that it exercises its authority on behalf of the people and correctly and transparently applies the public funds that have been budgetarily assigned to it and so that it values the interests that the State must satisfy. It adds that the wording of article 2 of Law No. 8038 grants the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil a status of "autonomous entity (ente autónomo)," because it gives it financial autonomy, and this can become a budgetary autonomy characteristic of the autonomous entity. Therefore, it estimates that there is a fraud against the content of article 188 of the Constitution, since the advantages, conditions, and privileges of the autonomous entity are granted to the deconcentrated organ, without the controls, requisites, and limits of a decentralized institution. The Procuraduría does not share the plaintiff's thesis because it starts from a conception of the scope of article 140, subsection 19 cited that, if applied, would lead to the paralysis of the Central Administration, due to the impossibility of carrying out part of the instrumental activity necessary for the fulfillment of public purposes. On the other hand, it does not take into account the true scope of the contracting power granted by article 2 of the Civil Aviation Law. Prior to the corresponding analysis, it is necessary to recall that in our system, legal personality must be granted by law. The State is a legal person by full right in accordance with what is provided in article 33 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the Executive Branch is not a legal person, although as the Administration it is recognized as having a capacity under Public Law and Private Law. Therefore, a legal capacity and capacity to act. The violation of article 140, subsection 19 of the Political Constitution is alleged. This fundamental norm provides: "ARTICLE 140.- The following are duties and attributions that correspond jointly to the President and the respective Minister of Government: 19) To sign the administrative contracts not included in subsection 14) of article 121 of this Constitution, subject to submitting them for approval by the Legislative Assembly when they stipulate exemption from taxes or fees, or have as their object the exploitation of public services, resources, or natural wealth of the State. The legislative approval of these contracts will not give them the character of laws nor exempt them from their administrative legal regime. The provisions of this subsection will not apply to loans or other similar agreements, referred to in subsection 15) of article 121, which will be governed by their special norms. (Thus added by article 2 of Law No. 5702 of June 5, 1975)." The interpretation that the plaintiff gives to this provision implies that the Executive Branch, that is, the President of the Republic and the Respective Minister (article 140 of the Political Constitution), is responsible for carrying out administrative contracting, in such a way that it must not only sign the administrative contracts but also participate in the prior stages. In a legal system where the administrative contract is fundamentally defined by an organic criterion, we have that all contracts made by a public body are administrative contracts. Consequently, the contracts required for the operation of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil are, in principle, administrative contracts subject to the corresponding regime. In the plaintiff's opinion, those contracts – because they are administrative – would have to be carried out by the Executive Branch, except for those referring to the goods and services of article 121, subsection 14. Ergo, regardless of the object of the contract, the Executive Branch would have to enter into the contract. This would imply the necessary participation of the President of the Republic in all contracting activities that are carried out, since these are administrative. However, that is not the scope that the rest of the legal system has given to article 140, subsection 19, and this has been shown since the dawn of the 1949 Constitution. Article 88 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic (No. 1279 of May 2, 1951), in its original text, attributed the purchasing function to the National Procurement Office (Proveeduría Nacional) (article 88) and provided that the selection of the awardee of a public tender by the National Procurement Office perfected the contract (article 100). When the contract required a document, the contract was signed by the respective Minister, unless that document was a public deed. In effect, the extrajudicial representation of the State has corresponded since 1967 to the Procuraduría General de la República, and it is based on that competence that the signing of contractual documents requiring a public deed corresponds to the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República) (article 3, subsection c) of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República). With the General Law of Public Administration, the authority to sign the administrative contracts proper to his Ministry is attributed to the Minister of Government, once the contractual procedures have been carried out by the National Procurement Office. Ergo, such contracts are not signed by the Executive Branch (President and Respective Minister), but only by the Minister. By reason of said norm, the Minister is the holder of the competence to sign the contracts corresponding to the entire ministerial organization, which includes the contracts that concern the deconcentrated organs. In order for the head of a deconcentrated organ to be able to sign the contracts that concern it, a norm expressly authorizing it would be required. With the entry into force of the Law of Administrative Contracting, a deconcentration of contracting procedures occurs, as the creation of institutional procurement offices is encouraged as organs in charge of administrative contracting procedures. A deconcentration of procedures that has an impact regarding the "signing of the contract." It is worth recalling, in this regard, that by virtue of the anti-formalist criterion (Sala Constitucional, resolution No. 2050-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001), which prevails in our contractual legislation, the administrative contract is perfected with the final award act and the constitution of the performance guarantee. For this reason, most administrative supply contracts are not materialized in a formal document to be signed by the Minister. Contracts that present a greater degree of complexity and those requiring registry inscription (which are formalized in a public deed) are expressed in a document. Article 32 of the Law of Administrative Contracting provides, in what is relevant here: "Only administrative contracts registrable in the National Registry and those that by law have this requirement shall be formalized in a public deed. Other administrative contracts shall be formalized in a simple document, unless this is not essential for the correct understanding of the scope of the rights and obligations contracted by the parties, as will be determined by regulation." Article 32 of the Regulation of Administrative Contracting provides in its subsection 6 that when it is not necessary to formalize the contract, the execution document called "purchase order (orden de compra)" will constitute the instrument to continue with the payment procedures. These purchase orders are certainly not signed by the head of the contracting body. On the other hand, within the objectives of modernizing the country's financial administration, the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets authorizes the delegation of competence in the matter at hand. Article 106 of said normative body provides: "ARTICLE 106.- Delegation to sign contracts. The heads of the organs or entities of the public sector may delegate the signing of the contracts associated with the contracting process, in accordance with the regulation established for that purpose." Said article recognizes the competence of the head to contract but, based on the fact that it is an instrumental activity, which cannot be considered essential, it allows delegating the signing of contracts. The deconcentration of administrative contracting through the creation of institutional procurement offices and the delegation of signing would not be possible if all signing of contracts corresponded to the Executive Branch. This is how the legislator understood it since 1951, and this despite the fact that at that time the volume of state contracts and their amount was far lower than what we know today. And it is that to claim that constitutionally, ordinary administrative contracts must necessarily be entered into and signed by the Executive Branch would lead to a paralysis of the country's ordinary administrative activity, with the risk, moreover, of affecting the normal functioning of the state apparatus. One would incur in an absolutely inefficient management, to the detriment of the governmental function. The ultimate consequence would be the impossibility of satisfying the needs of the community, due to the imposition of a requirement that ends up converting contracting into an end in itself, leaving aside its function as an instrument for public management. It is worth recalling that: "...In the opinion of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be set aside in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the questioned norms. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, because administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a dizzying pace. Indeed, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and at the same time determined by the conditions and rules of the market, whose variables can hardly be grasped in the rigidity of a norm. For that reason, and taking into account that, as the Procuraduría well pointed out, contracting procedures have an instrumental character with respect to the satisfaction of public interests, they could never be seen as becoming an end in themselves, but rather must maintain their nature as simple means for achieving the higher end. Under this reasoning, it is worth asking then if it is feasible to foresee in a normative body all the possible grounds for exception that at a given moment could require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, which is entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying, and declaring the meaning of the primary legal order of the State, cannot disregard the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. This perspective, of course, must maintain a fair balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical meaning and spirit of the constitutional norms, these must be situated in their context, because otherwise they could become provisions of a very limited or inoperative character, of little relevance, and which could even impede the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue..." Sala Constitucional, resolution No. 2060-01 of 3:24 p.m. on April 4, 2001. Such would be the consequences if every administrative contract, regardless of its scale, object, or amount, had to be signed by the President and the Respective Minister, in the terms proposed in the Action. In substantiating the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff refers to the competence regarding aeronautical services. This reference gives room to consider that, in their opinion, the contracting power that article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law recognizes to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is manifested in relation to aeronautical services. The General Civil Aviation Law provides: "Article 2.—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil, both attached to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, according to the powers granted by this Law.

In relation to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil shall enjoy maximum deconcentration and shall have instrumental legal personality to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill the functions and process the agreements so that they may be known by the Executive Branch." *(Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000)* The instrumental legal personality has as a consequence the power to administer the funds from the tariffs applicable to aeronautical services and to carry out the contracts or acts necessary for the fulfillment of the functions, as well as to process the agreements that the Executive Branch must sign. Ergo, this competence essentially covers administrative contracts, which are nothing more than an instrument of financial management. The Chamber has recognized that it is constitutionally valid for the legislator to grant a personality with limited effects for the management of a budget, which allows administering certain resources. Well, there cannot be administration of resources, management of own resources, if the contracting power is denied. The contract is simply one of the mechanisms for managing public resources; it is a means to commit the State, constituting a valid source of obligations. Therefore, it can be considered that "the contracting power" is implicit in the instrumental personality. This contractual capacity is, I repeat, of an instrumental nature and does not affect, in any way, the exercise of the substantial competences that the Council holds by virtue of the General Civil Aviation Law, particularly those granted in relation to the operating certificate (certificado de explotación) for aeronautical services. Based on article 2, the Consejo Técnico may execute the contracts referred to in the Law of Administrative Contracting. But, said article is not the norm that provides the foundation for the Council's powers regarding aeronautical services. Indeed, the Council's competence regarding aeronautical services does not derive from its classification as an instrumental legal person nor from the recognition of a contractual capacity. It is the product of a set of provisions that attribute material competence to it, in particular, of what is provided in article 10 of the General Civil Aviation Law. Said article gives the Council the competence to, among other powers, grant, extend, suspend, revoke, modify, or cancel operating certificates or provisional permits for air transport services, agricultural aviation, and, in short, for any for-profit activity that the Executive Branch deems necessary must possess an operating certificate or provisional permit; as well as to grant the operation of aerodromes, airports, air dispatch services, aeronautical communications, radio aids for air navigation, and other aeronautical installations and auxiliary air navigation services. Article 2 challenged here may be repealed or may be annulled, but as long as what is provided in the rest of the General Civil Aviation Law is not affected, the powers regarding aeronautical services will continue to correspond to the Consejo Técnico, except in the aspects where competence is expressly attributed to the Executive Branch. In that sense, and because it is the necessary act for the operation of a multiplicity of activities related to aeronautics, it is appropriate to recall that the operating certificate is granted by the Consejo de Aviación Civil. The Executive Branch participates with its approval when dealing with international air services. Article 8 of the Civil Aviation Law provides: "With express exceptions, the Council shall exercise the functions conferred upon it by this law, independently of the Executive Branch; however, operating certificates for international services shall be approved in the final instance by the Executive Branch." (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 5437 of December 17, 1973). Hence, the plaintiff's objections against article 2 in question are not admissible, when they argue that in this matter there is political responsibility, and therefore the Executive must participate to a greater or lesser extent in the negotiation process of a contract, its valuation and execution, and its participation cannot be "reduced to knowing or giving approval, by means of a signature." It would seem that the plaintiff's concern is directed at the possibility that, in the exercise of this administrative contracting power, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is free from the controls that apply to the Executive Branch. It must be warned, however, that the contracts that the Consejo Técnico executes based on repeatedly cited article 2 must be subject to the administrative contracting procedures established in the Law of Administrative Contracting. But, in addition, there cannot be any doubt that said collegiate organ is fully subject to the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República. The instrumental personality cannot constitute a valid limit against what is provided by articles 182, 183, and 184 of the Political Charter (regarding the control of administrative contracting, cf. Resolutions Nos. 998-98 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, 5947-98 of 2:32 p.m. on August 19, 1998, and 9524-99 of 9:06 a.m. on December 3, 1999). In accordance with the foregoing, it is the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República that: 1-. In its resolution No. 11657-2001 of 2:43 p.m. on November 14, 2001, the Sala Constitucional considered constitutionally valid the granting to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil of an instrumental personality with budgetary effects.

2-. To manage the resources assigned to it, the Consejo Técnico, as an instrumental person, requires the contracting power. 3-. As long as the Council enjoys the instrumental personality and this is constitutionally valid, the attribution of the power to carry out administrative acts or contracts, granted by article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, does not violate the provisions of articles 140, subsection 19, and 188 of the Political Charter.

4 By a brief filed on July 7, 2003, Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, requests the Chamber to clarify to the Council the scope of the suspension ordered in the publication made. The foregoing because it is not clear to them: 1) Whether the Consejo Técnico can carry forward any procedure related to administrative contracting, both for the approval, signing, rescission (rescisión), resolution (resolución), approval (refrendo) of administrative contracts, resolution of administrative claims, contractual execution, and restoration of the economic equilibrium of the Contract; 2) The Council can carry out the rejection or admission of administrative claims filed by third parties before the publication of the resolution of eight fifteen a.m. on June tenth, two thousand three; and 3) The Consejo Técnico can deem the administrative channel exhausted, so that third parties may present claims before it in the corresponding judicial instances, administrative collections, and the exhaustion of the administrative channel to carry out the corresponding judicial collection process.

5.- Mrs. Karla González Carvajal, in her capacity as President of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, at folio 43 of the granted hearing, states that to determine the legal nature of any institution, the analysis of the regulations that govern it is indispensable. In this case, an unavoidable reference to article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law No. 5150. She indicates that this norm is consistent with what is provided in article 2, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, No. 3155 of August 5, 1963. From this, it is clearly deduced that the regulation of everything related to Civil Aviation is the responsibility of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, acting through two of its organs, namely: the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil. These, as organs of said Ministry, constitute part of the organizational structure of the Executive Branch. Regarding the legal nature of the Consejo de Aviación Civil, it was concluded that it constitutes a deconcentrated organ of the M.O.P.T., with the particularity of holding instrumental legal personality for the management of the funds regulated in the General Civil Aviation Law. The Procuraduría General de la República, in opinion OJ-072-96, of November 22, 1996, indicated that the Dirección General de Aviación Civil is an administrative organ located within the structure of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, but deconcentrated with respect to it. Likewise, said Organ is subordinated to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil. The particularity that this subordination presents is that, in the exercise of public competences related to the civil aviation matter, there is the participation of two organs that hold powers of direction and approval (Council) and of execution and decision (Directorate), within the same Ministerial organization. In this regard, she cites judgment No. 11657-2001 of the Sala Constitucional. From that judgment, it is derived that the instrumental legal personality constitutes a budgetary personality. In the opinion of this consultative organ, the personality allows administering a budget and, therefore, resources, independently of the Budget of the Entity to which the personalized organ belongs. Budgetary personality means a patrimonial autonomy determined by the ownership of own resources, as provided by the legislator, ownership of its own budget, separated from the budget of the body to which it belongs, the administration and management of resources independently of the Budget of the entity of belonging, which implies recognizing a contracting power. For budgetary purposes, the situation of the instrumental person is assimilated to that of a decentralized entity, in the sense that both have the ownership of a budget and the possibility of executing it independently. Certainly, the instrumental person is subject to various provisions that regulate the financial matter, among them the directives of the Budgetary Authority, but its budget and, therefore, the budgetary execution are not identified with the Budget of the entity to which it belongs. For the Chamber, the personality allows the organ to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, which implies the recognition of its own budget and, therefore, of the proper powers to execute it. Now, the judgment delivered by the Sala Constitucional regarding the attribution of instrumental personality to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil essentially refers to the violations of articles 176 and 185 of the Political Charter. Said resolution does not analyze a possible violation of article 140, subsection 19, of the Constitution, which means that the discussion on the topic maintains current interest. Furthermore, the Chamber analyzed the point based on norms contained in the Budget Laws, articles 14, subsection 35 of Law No. 7018 of September 13, 1985, 122 of Law No. 7015 of September 13, 1985, and 81 of Law No. 7051 of October 30, 1986, atypical norms and, as such, unconstitutional. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is the product of the amendment introduced to article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, an "ordinary law." Therefore, it is appropriate to proceed to analyze whether the Law can attribute to the Council the contracting power that is being challenged. She makes reference to what the Procuraduría General de la República answered in the granted hearing. The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides the reference framework that identifies and defines the responsibilities that the Costa Rican State, as a signatory to said instrument, must address in matters of civil aviation administration and the organic form and methods to be followed to meet its responsibilities. The country is responsible for compliance with a national aeronautical legal system that allows conducting civil aviation in a safe and efficient manner where the aeronautical authorities, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil have the necessary powers for the legitimate management of International Aviation affairs; the legal system must allow the aeronautical authority to comply with the provisions of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its Annexes, as well as international agreements or conventions to which Costa Rica is a party. The implementation of the regulatory system presupposes two prior conditions: a) that in its fundamental aeronautical legislation, the State provides for the promulgation of a regulatory code for air navigation; and b) that the necessary powers are conferred upon a competent state organ, the Civil Aviation Administration, to guarantee the observance of the regulations.

Aeronautical legislation must authorize the creation of a Civil Aviation Administration headed by a Director of Civil Aviation (DCA), provide that the necessary powers be delegated to the DCA to develop, publish, and revise operating regulations and standards in accordance with the code or law; provide for the adoption of operating regulations and standards based on the provisions of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation; adopt provisions to ensure compliance with the navigation code and require that all commercial air transport flights conducted under the authority of the State comply with all conditions the State may deem applicable in the interest of safety and in accordance with all treaties and agreements entered into by the State. The country's Category depends on the effective compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Law No. 877 and its Annexes, with the Dirección General de Aviación Civil being obligated to ensure strict compliance with the law and treaties, as well as other regulations. Of relevance, Article 18 of Law No. 5150 and its amendments states: <i>"Article 18: The powers of the Dirección General de Aviación Civil are: I. To ensure strict compliance with this law, its regulations, treaties, agreements, or international conventions on civil aviation that the State signs and constitutionally ratifies; as well as the updating and revision of civil aviation regulations promulgated in accordance with international standards and recommended practices regularly issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization."</i> It cites resolution number 2001-03421 of fifteen hours thirty-one minutes on May second, two thousand one, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). The Costa Rican State is responsible for introducing and enforcing an adequate legal system that allows it to conduct civil aviation in a safe and efficient manner, enabling the relevant authorities to have the necessary powers so that the legitimate management of civil aviation matters is not hindered or obstructed by other interests. The International Civil Aviation Organization repeatedly indicates that the authority of the State constitutes the primary element of the institutional component of the national regulatory structure. Reference is made to instances where Costa Rica has been subject to Safety Oversight and Operational Safety audits, in which it is indicated that Costa Rica's basic aeronautical legislation is satisfactory and grants the DGAC the powers necessary to maintain an adequate level of operational safety oversight. It indicates that the Chamber, in judgment 5735-99, recognized the specialization of air services. Currently, the instrumental legal personality is a product of the amendment introduced to Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law (Ley General de Aviación Civil) by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000. It requests that the action be dismissed.

**6.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 118, 119, and 120 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on June 20, 23, and 24, 2003 (folio 17).

**7.-** The oral and public hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction was held at nine hours eight minutes on March seventeenth, two thousand five.

**8.-** By resolution of thirteen hours forty minutes on July thirtieth, two thousand three, the Chamber accepted the President of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil as a passive coadjuvant and resolved the motion for clarification presented (folio 70).

**9.-** By brief presented on June 18, 2004, the petitioner requests that a date be set for the hearing (folio 76).

**10.-** By brief received at 9:55 hours on February 25, 2005, Mr. Roberto Arguedas Pérez, in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors of the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil (folio 84), states that regarding the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. José Miguel Corrales Bolaños on March 28, 2003, against Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law, for contravening Articles 140 subsection 19 and 188 of the Political Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence in its votes No. 6240-93 and 3513-94, and pursuant to Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is prohibited in proceedings where the application of the challenged norm is discussed, from issuing a resolution until the Constitutional Chamber has made a ruling on the case. On the other hand, Costa Rica signed the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was ratified through Law No. 844 of 1947, which establishes the obligation of each State to provide operational safety in its territory, in accordance with the Principle of Sovereignty and the obligations assumed with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Subsequently, the ICAO established the safety oversight audit program (1996), which examines whether each State effectively applies the standards and recommended practices of the Annexes and other documents pursuant to the Convention. He affirms that the Dirección General de Aviación Civil is responsible for ensuring the provision of public services, safeguarding and carrying out governmental actions aimed at achieving airport and operational safety, and compliance with the commitments assumed with ICAO. Furthermore, with the purpose of developing and expanding the Juan Santamaría airport, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil promoted the International Public Tender (Licitación Pública Internacional) No. 1-98. This Council is fulfilling the contractual obligations and the derived commitments; he affirms that this management is being affected by the impossibility of exercising the power of representation and patrimonial disposition attributed by Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law, and also, by the impediment to proceed with the contracting. He alleges that this action is based on diffuse interests, for which reason the Constitutional Chamber is petitioned without a direct individual injury, and by granting it course, given the suspension provided for in Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, an alteration of the ongoing contracting is generated. Given the aforementioned suspension, he states that aeronautical activity is a particular situation, and therefore the established precautionary measure should be suspended; this based on judgment No. 12949-03, where it is established that Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction institutes the retroactive effect of the judgment declaring constitutionality, and allows the Chamber to graduate and dimension in time, space, or matter that effect, according to the serious consequences on safety, justice, or social peace that it may produce. He requests that the application of the precautionary measure established in the resolution of 8 hours and 15 minutes on June 10, 2003, be suspended, given the serious damages caused to the management of the CETAC.

**11.-** By brief received at 16:20 on March 30, 2005, Mr. José Miguel Corrales Bolaños expands the reasons for unconstitutionality (folio 103), and states that it is not possible at the constitutional level to grant full legal personality (personalidad jurídica plena) to a deconcentrated administrative body (órgano desconcentrado), which is why granting it to the CETAC is unconstitutional. Especially because Articles 121 subsection 14 and 140 subsection 19 of the Political Constitution protect and reserve to the Executive Branch matters such as the airport public service. The attempt to grant the CETAC full legal personality violates Articles 188 to 190 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the same regulatory body, thus injuring the principle of legality, given that this regulation also only recognizes this power for the Central Government, the municipalities, and the autonomous entities (entidades autónomas). Authorizing a private entity to engage in direct or indirect management (gestión interesada) requires legislative approval, expressed through a framework law, or through the approval of the contract verified by the Executive Branch; this has not happened with the gestión interesada, therefore Article 9 of the Constitution is also violated, as the Legislative Assembly is prohibited from delegating the exercise of its own functions. In judgment No. 11657-01, it is affirmed that gestión interesada is a form of management of public services and works through which the Administration acts through a third party, who acts on behalf and in the name of the State; in this case, the respective public entity remains in charge of the goods and public services, but the manager is instituted as the administrator. Corrales Bolaños alleges that if things had been applied as stipulated previously in the specific case, a tender for works would have had to be held, and the income and expense accounts would be known (whether they would be public); furthermore, the empresario would not be the manager vis-à-vis users and third parties, because this would constitute acting as an illegal concessionaire. He states that invoking Article 55 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), and its open types to justify the specific facts, is a modality of the fraud of law (fraude de ley), which is condemned in Article 20 of the Civil Code and in Article 5 of Law No. 8422 Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). He argues that the State also cannot contract with the manager for contractual modifications, as it seeks to do by adding to the agreed payment a sum approximating 140,000,000 dollars, since the manager is now an integral part of the Administration, according to Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); and it is stipulated as a general principle of administrative contracting that officials or agents of the Administration involved in the process are prohibited from participating as interested parties in the contracting, this is based on Article 22 subsection c of the Administrative Contracting Law; furthermore, it would constitute a direct contract without any tender. Likewise, the manager is subject to the authority of the Contraloría General de la República, and what it resolves cannot be changed, it can only be challenged through judicial means. The Contraloría rejected the claims for contract modification and did not allow expenses and costs to be passed on through tariffs; this was not challenged by the parties. It is for this reason, and in addition to the prohibition found in Article 22 subsection c of the Administrative Contracting Law, that the parties did not challenge in time or form what was resolved by the Contraloría. He maintains that, according to how Articles 121 subsection 14 and 140 subsection 19 of the Political Constitution have been interpreted, the concession regime (régimen concesional) must be established and regulated by a norm of legal rank, which is why it is a legislative competence, and not an executive one; it is impossible for it to be authorized through a regulation, and its open types under Article 55 of the Administrative Contracting Law. The petitioner affirms that what lies behind all this is the desire to carry out the extra and illegal payment of almost 140,000,000 dollars. This leads to damage to public interests, because Costa Rica would end up paying double for some meager works; and furthermore, its airport, economic, and export development would be delayed until 2025. As has been proposed with the contract extension, ALTERRA will have to be compensated if a new international airport in Orotina does not come into operation. Faced with all this, the crisis at the Juan Santamaría Airport will come in 2010, because with the sums sought, the funds for the airport in Orotina will be exhausted, and also, the TAMS in its calculations prepared in 1997 was not very accurate, as growth has been greater, and according to the United States Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), flights from the US abroad will increase by 95%. Faced with all this, he assures that the CETAC cannot make decisions of such magnitude, because this is contrary to the Political Constitution, and also due to the unconstitutionality of this claim that contradicts firm and binding provisions of the Contraloría General de la República; and for this reason, he again requests that Article 2 of the General Civil Aviation Law be declared unconstitutional.

**12.-** The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Justice **Calzada Miranda** writes; and, **Considering:** **I.- On admissibility.** Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right invoked therein, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases of exception provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these last cases, within their respective spheres of competence. From the foregoing, it follows that the general rule points to the need for a prior matter, the possibilities of directly resorting to the Constitutional Chamber being exceptional. According to the first of the assumptions provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it proceeds when "<i>by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury</i>", that is, when, by that same nature, the injury is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that injure the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "<i>diffuse interests</i>" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in this court's judgment number 03750-93, of fifteen hours thirty minutes on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three.

"… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that it deals with equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is to say, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, as they are at once collective - because they are common to a generality - and individual, so they can be claimed in that capacity" In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united around a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (<i>diffuse)</i> among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make, relying on paragraph 2 of Article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier of "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred-to goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not only affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of humanity; similarly, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the National Budget (Presupuesto de la República) is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is no more than a simple description inherent in its obligation –as a jurisdictional body– to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scopes of the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho), and its correlative "State of rights" (Estado de derechos), which –as in the case of the Costa Rican model– is based on the premise that what must be explicit are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the very human condition and do not therefore require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests "<i>that concern the community as a whole</i>," it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests with the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, a question of any person being able to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (popular action), but rather that any individual can act in defense of goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any attempt at a exhaustive enumeration (see in this same sense judgment of this Chamber number 2001-07391, of sixteen hours seven minutes on August fourteenth, two thousand one).

**II.- The standing of the petitioners.** The present matter is admissible in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since there is no individual and direct injury, in the face of the regulations that are challenged and that, according to the petitioner, excessively, abusively, and disproportionately grants an instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, so it is not possible in this case to have the prior existence of a base matter, as the challenged norm does not produce direct harm to a particular subject. Under these parameters, it is appropriate to admit this action of unconstitutionality.

**III.- Object of the challenge.** The petitioner challenges Article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, amended by Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000, insofar as he considers that the instrumental legal personality to administer funds and the capacity to contract granted to the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is unconstitutional because it violates Articles 140 subsection 19 and 188 of the Political Constitution. For study purposes, the norm in question is cited, which reads:

“Article 2.—The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil, both attached to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, according to the powers granted by this Law. In relation to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil shall enjoy maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and shall have instrumental legal personality to administer the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated in this Law, as well as to perform the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill its functions and to process agreements so that they may be brought before the Executive Branch." *(Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 8038 of October 12, 2000)* **IV.- On the merits.** The core point of this study being the unconstitutionality of endowing a deconcentrated administrative body with an instrumental legal personality that allows it to contract, it is advisable to review in advance the functions that have been constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch and the scope of this legal figure.

**a- Functions granted to the Executive Branch by the Political Constitution.** Article 140 of the Constitution determines for us a sphere of competencies and powers that are exclusive –and excluding– of the Executive Branch, understood as the President of the Republic and the respective Minister. Thus, the function of political or governmental direction and the direction of international policy are demarcated as proper and exclusive. Regarding the function of political direction, -which is the only one we will focus on developing, in attention to the interest of study of this action-, it is important to highlight that the Executive Branch corresponds to a function of political guidance concerning state activity, whose purpose is to guide state policies in the various areas of public interest, in order to maintain the necessary unity of the State; and this is achieved through the various mechanisms of administrative self-review (autotutela administrativa) (planning power, steering power –related to the issuance of directives–, coordination power –sectorization and regionalization–, the power to issue authorizations –approvals, countersignatures, and endorsements–). Thus, far from being a competence of a legal nature, it is one of a constitutional nature, proper to the Executive Branch, as this Chamber has previously considered, by virtue of which it is the Executive that must set policy in a given area of action and not the other way around:

"The Executive Branch –Government–, as a legal and political organization, is the one in charge of organizing, directing, and guiding society in all its political, legal, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its various organs or ministries, as is also the political directive of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Executive Branch to guide, coordinate, and supervise the apparatus of the Administration (Article 140, subsection 8 of the Political Constitution) and to issue general norms that are not merely simple execution of legal norms but rather delimiting (art.

140.2, Political Constitution) ..." (judgment number 3089-98, of fifteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen ninety-eight).</span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR>In this regard, it is important to note that, by virtue of the organizational processes of decentralization by subject matter –autonomous institutions– (articles 188 to 190 of the Political Constitution) and territorial –municipalities– (articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution), and of deconcentration (article 83 of the General Law of Public Administration), these functions are not performed exclusively by the Executive Branch; however, by virtue of the provisions of article 26 subsection b) and 27.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Executive Branch retains the function of directing and coordinating the tasks of the Government and the Central Public Administration as a whole, and also of the decentralized Administration, as applicable, by virtue of the degree of governmental autonomy of the municipalities –granted by constitutional norm–. <span style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>This Chamber also already indicated, in judgment </span>number 2002-06513, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July third, two thousand two, that the structure of the Costa Rican State was determined by the original Constituent Assembly in the Political Constitution, and that, although its structure is not closed ("<i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>numerus clausus</i>"), the ordinary legislator –undisputed holder of residual competence– must conform, regarding the creation of public entities and organs, to the principles of that fundamental order. It is thus that the doctrine of Public Law makes a clear differentiation between <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'><span style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>administrative decentralization</span></i><span style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'> and <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>administrative deconcentration</i></span>, categorizing the first as that <span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&#160;</span>composed of public legal persons <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>with full or special legal personality</i><span style='mso-bidi-font-style:italic'>; with a specific attribution or competence, which it develops exclusively or privately, and not concurrently, alternatively, or in parallel, meaning the higher Entity (State) cannot invade its sphere of competence, given that these are </span>competences that have been transferred from the Executive Branch to the new institution;<span style='mso-bidi-font-style:italic'> </span>for which they are endowed with assets (patrimonio) and budgetary autonomy; such that they are recognized as having the legal capacity to administer themselves (administrative autonomy), under the terms provided in article 188 of the Political Constitution:</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>"The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management."</span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR>For its part, a deconcentrated organ refers to the phenomenon that occurs within the same legal person <i style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'>–without creating a new entity–</i> with a concrete and dependent competence task, in matters not deconcentrated, on the hierarchy of the entity to which it belongs, as provided in articles 83.2, 83.3, 83.4, and 83.5 of the General Law of Public Administration:</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>"2. Minimum deconcentration shall occur when the superior cannot:</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>a) Avocar competences of the inferior; and</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>b) Review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party.</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>3. The deconcentration shall be maximum when the inferior is also exempt from orders, instructions, or circulars of the superior.</span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR>4. The norms creating minimum deconcentration shall be of restrictive application against the competence of the deconcentrated organ, and those creating maximum deconcentration shall be of extensive application in its favor."</span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR>Thus, administrative deconcentration exists when, by legal norm, an exclusive competence is attributed to an inferior organ of the entity, with some degree of autonomy, resulting in the loss of competence by the hierarchical superior, whereby its condition can never be equal to that of the superior, even in the case of the maximum degree of deconcentration. The doctrine is unanimous in considering that the Public Administration is formed by the set of public entities that make up the administrative organization, that is, by the greater public entity (State or Central Public Administration), and the rest of the lesser public entities (Decentralized Public Administration, whether institutional or by services –autonomous institutions– or territorial –municipalities), which have been created by an act of empire, of constitutional (in the case of municipalities) or legal order. In this sense, decentralization will always imply the creation of lesser public entities, distinct from the State, endowed with <i>legal personality</i>, <i>own assets (patrimonio)</i> (which implies financial autonomy), and the <i>attribution of a competence</i>, exclusive and excluding, that is severed from the Executive Branch; for which reason the greater public entity –State– cannot invade its sphere of competence, although it is subject to administrative oversight (tutela administrativa) (direction, planning, coordination, and control). Thus, the fundamental element for determining the presence of an entity is the endowment of legal personality, which is delegated by the State for the performance of a specific competence, and which has the immediate consequence of converting it into a center for the imputation of rights and obligations, that is, it legitimizes it to manage by itself and for itself the delegated competences, in attention to the degree of autonomy granted (<i>administrative</i> –minimum and first degree–, typical of autonomous institutions; <i>governmental</i> –second degree–, typical of municipalities and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) regarding the administration of social security; and <i>organizational</i> –full or third degree, typical of the State universities). This is how the endowment of legal personality to a public entity places it in a different position from one that, by lacking personality, constitutes an organ. For this reason, the actions carried out by these entities are the responsibility of the entity, not of the State in the strict sense. Finally, it is necessary to remember that decentralization is a model of Administration organization, with the objective of seeking the best efficiency of public management, for the satisfaction of the entrusted public interest. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><b><span lang=ES-CR>b- Instrumental legal personality.</span></b><span lang=ES-CR> Having said that, the Chamber has held the criteria that endowing a deconcentrated organ with instrumental legal personality is not unconstitutional, as a model of administrative organization, for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency in the state apparatus. It has been considered as a budgetary personification (personificación presupuestaria), which confers on a deconcentrated organ the power of personality to administer its resources independently of the public Entity to which it belongs, although it is subordinated in all other aspects that are characteristic of the deconcentrated function. It is an endowment of legal mechanisms and instruments strictly necessary so that the organ can fulfill the public tasks and functions delegated by virtue of law, all of which is not only adequate but necessary under the coverage of two fundamental principles of public management: efficiency and adaptability to change. Such that this instrumental capacity is subject to the terms and conditions provided in the law of its creation, and insofar as they are strictly indispensable for the fulfillment of the delegated public function; so that, if the law omits the competence, they must be presumed as belonging to and reserved for the superior. Thus, it may hire personnel, goods, and services that are indispensable for the fulfillment of the public function delegated to it, only on the understanding that the law expressly empowers it to do so. On the other hand, all constitutional norms and principles of control and oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) are binding and applicable to this type of organ, that is, those governing administrative contracting, and those of Budgetary Law. In all other respects, they are subject to the control systems typical of the activity of public institutions. <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><o:p></o:p></b></span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=ES-CR>V- Regarding the challenged norm.</span></b><span lang=ES-CR> The claimant considers that the powers of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) to administer funds and to contract, granted in article 2 of Law No. 5150 of May 14, 1973, violate the Political Constitution and are contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court according to judgments 6240-93 and 3513-94. However, he disregards, as already indicated, that the Chamber subsequently, in judgment No. 11.657-2001 of fourteen hours forty-three minutes on November fourteenth, two thousand one, ruled on the legal nature of this organ and on its budgetary personality, determining its constitutionality. As the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) well indicates, in this last judgment t</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>he Chamber unified its position, accepting the constitutionality of an instrumental legal personality with manifestation in the budgetary and contractual sphere:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR>"...The constitutional principles of the Single Fund (Caja única) (according to which all revenues in favor of the central State must enter and leave through the National Treasury) and of budgetary universality (the Budget of the Republic must contain the forecast of all revenues and the authorization of all expenses of the central State during the corresponding fiscal year), positively enshrined in articles 185 and 176 of the Constitution, respectively, determine guarantees for the sound management of public funds, enabling greater control over the handling of such resources. <b>Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Costa Rican Public Law there are several examples of the figure called 'budgetary personifications' (personificaciones presupuestarias), according to which in some cases the legislator chooses to give certain deconcentrated organs the possibility of managing their own resources outside the Budget of the central State, by endowing them with 'instrumental legal personality</b>'. This practice has been analyzed by this Chamber on at least two occasions, the first of them in judgment number 06240-93 of fourteen hours on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, in which it was considered that:</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:2'>&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; </span>"...In this sense, it is necessary to point out that, with the creation of the General Directorate, the intention is to configure an institution with<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&#160; </span>the legal regime typical of a decentralized entity –with contractual capacity, financial and budgetary autonomy, own assets (patrimonio), etc.–; under the guise of a deconcentrated organ, which by its nature could not have, at most, more than a purely instrumental legal personality. It is not possible to delegate to the General Directorate competences attributed by the Constitution to the Executive Branch in the strict sense –President of the Republic and Minister of the portfolio–, despite being granted such instrumental personality. In other words, if the legislator opts to deconcentrate an organ of a Government Ministry, it cannot endow it with its own legal personality independent of the latter, in the terms of a decentralized administration, insofar as the head of the Ministry integrates, with the President of the Republic, the constitutional organ 'Executive Branch' which is its necessary superior; unless the legislator opts to create a true decentralized or autonomous institution, which, in any case, would require for its creation a law approved by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly (article 189 of the Political Constitution), precisely because its creation implies the displacement of competences that constitutionally correspond to the Executive Branch as superior of the Central Administration; otherwise, an exceptional regime would be formed, which can lead to an atomization of the Executive Branch and its own competences that is repugnant to the constitutional ideology."</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:1'> </span>Subsequently, this Chamber reviewed the previously cited criterion, and in judgment number 03513-94, of eight hours fifty-seven minutes on July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-four, that:</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:2'>&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; </span>"(...)</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:2'>&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; </span>In considerando II section 2 of this resolution, the background to that provision was summarized. Notwithstanding that the legislator's intention appears to be limited to endowing the Museum with a merely instrumental legal capacity, so that it can receive donations directly, which <b>would be constitutionally valid</b> (as would be the creation of a decentralized entity of any nature), article one of the bill, which is the text consulted, does not, however, confine itself to the merely instrumental, but rather fully personifies the Museum (it says categorically: 'Legal personality is granted to the Museo Nacional de Costa Rica...'), although, immediately after, it qualifies it as a 'Deconcentrated organ, attached to the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes. </span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:2'>&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; </span>(...)"</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR><span style='mso-tab-count:1'> </span><b>The correct position is the one held in the second of the cited rulings, on the understanding that it is valid in the light of Constitutional Law to confer on a deconcentrated organ, instrumental legal personality for the purposes of managing its own budget and thus carrying out more efficiently the public function it is called upon to perform.</b> Precisely, this budgetary personification (personificación presupuestaria) allows it to administer its resources independently of the Budget of the public entity to which it belongs, although it continues to be subordinated to the latter in all aspects not pertaining to the function given to it by deconcentration and those derived from its instrumental legal personality. An analogous position to the foregoing has been held by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) in various pronouncements, such as the following: C-176-95, C-178-95, C-189-96, and C-075-98, among others. In this case, it is not unconstitutional that the resources coming from the operation of the Juan Santamaría International Airport are to be administered in a trust (fideicomiso) in the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, since <b>the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) is an organ of maximum deconcentration of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, endowed with instrumental legal personality, in accordance with the provisions of articles 2 and 166 of the General Law of Civil Aviation (Ley General de Aviación Civil), number 5150 of May fourteenth, nineteen seventy-three.</b> The foregoing does not prevent clarifying that, in relation to funds coming from public taxes and levies, the manager performs only collector functions. Furthermore, the use of the trust (fideicomiso) in question does not imply that the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) has renounced its powers of oversight and strict control of the funds entering and leaving the trust, but rather, on the contrary, its supervisory action –to be in accordance with Constitutional Law– must be constant and permanent regarding the sound management of the fund, so that its resources are distributed in accordance with the terms agreed upon in the contract. Thus, regarding this point, the action must also be dismissed."</span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span style='mso-ansi-language:ES'>From the foregoing, it is clear that this Court had already ruled regarding the claimant's allegations and that on that occasion, a criterion it still holds, it determined that it is not unconstitutional for the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) to be granted an instrumental legal personhood through which it can administer funds and consequently contract, under the terms and limitations that this Court indicated. </span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>The ownership of assets (patrimonio) implies patrimonial autonomy and, consequently, management autonomy to </span><span lang=ES-CR>carry out more efficiently the public function it is called upon to perform.</span><span style='mso-ansi-language:ES'> To disregard its capacity to contract as the claimant intends would be unreasonable, since obtaining funds without the possibility of administering them would be meaningless, which necessarily implies the capacity to contract</span><span style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";mso-ansi-language:ES'>.</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'> With patrimonial autonomy, the entity may perform the necessary acts and contracts that involve the management of said assets (patrimonio) with the already established legal and constitutional limitations, because due to the nature of some contracts, these will be reserved for the President and the respective Minister, as it is a purely instrumental and non-essential contract. The administrative contracting of the State cannot currently be conceived by understanding that every contract for fulfilling public management must be formalized by the President and the respective Minister as the claimant intends, as this would imply administrative paralysis, taking into account the growth of the public sector and the needs of the administered persons. On this aspect, the Chamber, in judgment No. 2660-01, manifesting itself regarding the formal rigor of administrative contracting, stated:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>"</span><span lang=ES-CR>In the opinion of this Chamber, there are a series of elements that cannot be set aside in the analysis of the constitutional validity of the challenged norms. In the first place, one cannot start from a simplistic or formal analysis, because administrative contracting is an extremely complex matter that unfolds in an environment of constant changes, often at a vertiginous pace. Indeed, the process of acquiring goods and services is immersed in and at the same time determined by market conditions and rules, whose variables can hardly be apprehended within the rigidity of a norm. For this reason, and taking into account that, as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) well pointed out, contracting procedures have an instrumental character vis-à-vis the satisfaction of public interests, they could never be seen as an end in themselves, but must preserve their nature as simple means for achieving the higher purpose. Under this reasoning, it is then worth asking if it is feasible to foresee in a regulatory body all the possible reasons for exception that at a given moment might require a procedure such as direct contracting. The function of a constitutional court, entrusted with the task of discovering, clarifying<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&#160; </span>and declaring the meaning of the State's primary legal order, cannot disregard the environment, and, in this case, the realities and problems that the State may face in its contractual activity. This perspective, of course, must maintain a fair balance with the preservation and defense of Constitutional supremacy. Hence, in this difficult task of extracting the logical sense and spirit of constitutional norms, these must be situated in their context, because otherwise they could become provisions of a very limited or inoperative character, of little relevance and which could even come to impede the satisfaction of the public interest that the State must pursue."</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>The law has had to deploy mechanisms that have established greater agility in contracting, such is the case of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República), the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its regulations. The Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de Administración Financiera y presupuestos públicos), for example, provides in article 106:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><i><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>"The heads of the organs or entities of the public sector may delegate the signing of contracts associated with the contracting process, in accordance with the regulations established for this purpose."<o:p></o:p></span></i></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR>Of course, understanding that said contracting is an instrumental activity. In the case of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), that contractual capacity is of an instrumental nature and is subject to the legal order, therefore also to the oversight of the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República). As a consequence of all the foregoing, the subject matter of study submitted to this Court under the terms indicated does not injure the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not unconstitutional. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=ES-CR>VI.- </span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>Finally, the claimant, by brief filed on March 30, 2005, expands his reasons for unconstitutionality, reiterating the allegations about the powers of the CETAC, but also alleging that</span><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=ES-CR> </span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>the contract for the interested management (gestión interesada) of airport services is unconstitutional, because it should have been approved by the Legislative Assembly, since there is no framework law as it involves a Regulation (Reglamento) issued by the Executive Branch, and that, moreover, several irregularities are occurring, because the contract is not being executed as authorized by this Court. The object of this action was limited to the powers of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) established in the challenged article, so the review of the contract for the interested management (gestión interesada) of airport services is an issue that, as raised, exceeds the object of knowledge of this study and that, moreover, was already the subject of analysis by this Court in judgment No. 11657-01. Regarding the actions of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) in that judgment it was ordered:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=CitaTextual0><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>"...</span><span lang=ES-CR>VI.- On the actions carried out by the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) making use of the legal personality given by the atypical norms. The claimants allege that due to the unconstitutionality of the norms that give legal personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), all the acts carried out in relation to bid number 1-98 for the interested management (gestión interesada) of airport services, including the signing of the respective contract, are invalid. In this regard, it should be noted that the declaration of unconstitutionality referred to in the previous paragraph regarding the budgetary norms that gave legal personality to the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) does not have, as the claimants allege, the consequence of annulling the contract signed in the first instance by the Council and not by the Executive Branch. This is because, before the filing of this action, the Executive Branch (the President of the Republic and the Minister of Obras Públicas y Transportes) issued agreement number 152, published in Alcance number 49-A to La Gaceta number 133 of July ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, whereby it ratified and validated against any defect that might arise due to competence, the award act made by the Technical Council of Civil Aviation (Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) in bidding procedure number 01-98, giving it retroactive effect in accordance with the provisions of article 187 of the General Law of Public Administration. The validation (convalidación) of administrative acts, for its part, constitutes a mechanism to effectively guarantee the satisfaction of the general interest, preventing formal defects (relative nullities, therefore) from determining the annulment of administrative acts provided they are duly ratified or corrected, as the case may be. Since the defect due to lack of competence resulting from the annulment of articles 14 subsection 35 of Law number 7018, 122 of Law number 7015, and 81 of Law number 7051 was corrected prior to the filing of this action by means of an agreement of the organ competent to carry out acts such as those under study, it is appropriate to dismiss the claim with respect to that point..."</span></p> <p class=MsoNormalIndent><span lang=ES-CR>Likewise, regarding the constitutionality of the Regulation (Reglamento) through which the challenged contract was issued, the Chamber in that same resolution stated:</span></p> <p class=Citatextual><span lang=ES-CR>"<b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>VIII.- On the use of the figure of interested management (gestión interesada) for the administration of airports.</b> Article 121 subsection 14 of the Political Constitution provides privileged protection for the assets that constitute the public domain, accentuating said safeguard in the final paragraph of the referred subsection regarding railways, docks, and national airports.</span></p> In general, the inalienability of public domain assets is established, and in particular, it is expressly determined that:

"Article 121.- In addition to the other powers conferred by the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has the exclusive authority:

(…)

• 14)To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of assets belonging to the Nation.

The following may not permanently leave the domain of the State:

(…)

National railways, docks, and airports—the latter while they are in service—may not be alienated, leased, or encumbered, directly or indirectly, nor may they leave the domain and control of the State in any way." It is clear, then, that the asset in question, the Juan Santamaría International Airport, cannot be alienated, leased, or encumbered, nor may it leave the control of the State. Regarding this special protection, it is pertinent to mention that when evacuating the legislative consultation regarding the Hydrocarbons Bill, legislative file number 9573, this Chamber specified the scope of the aforementioned Article 121, subsection 14) of the Constitution, in the following terms:

"The Chamber considers that, in accordance with its judgment #3789-92 of 12:00 hours on November 27, 1992, Article 121.14) of the Political Constitution contains three clearly differentiated rules: " a) The first is a norm that empowers the Legislative Assembly to decree 'the alienation or the application to public uses of assets belonging to the Nation.' On one hand, this norm is unrestricted insofar as it refers to all assets belonging to the Nation, and, on the other, it reserves the matter to law, invalidating administrative acts of alienation or application to public uses not based on prior law; b) The second prescribes which assets 'may not permanently leave the domain of the State.' For those categories, which are listed in subsections a), b), and c), the restriction is total and absolute regarding 'leaving the domain of the State,' but immediately, the norm moderates its severity by warning that such categories of assets may be 'exploited by the public administration or by private parties' in accordance with the law or through a special concession; c) The third is a norm that refers specifically to certain assets (national railways, docks, and airports in service) not included in the three categories of the preceding norm." Consequently, the Constitution provides two regimes for exploiting those specially protected resources, without any of them being able to leave the domain of the State: One, that of concessions or contracts granted by the Legislative Assembly directly, in use of an original competence; the other, the possibility of exploiting them, either by the Public Administration, or of entrusting them to private parties, through a legally granted or authorized concession. Both possibilities presuppose the competence of the Legislative Assembly to set, in the specific case, or to regulate in a general law, imperative "conditions and stipulations" in the execution of the contract—such as its temporary nature, form of performance, minimum obligations of the executor, etc.—which place the possibility of departing from them outside the reach of the concessionaires or the agreement of the parties themselves. It is not idle to recall that the administrative act of concession never acquires the character or rank of law, even if it is processed and adopted as such (arts. 140.19 and especially 124.2 Constitution).

III.- Thus, one of the forms established there, obviously foreseeing how difficult and complicated it can be to have to go to the Legislative Assembly for the approval of each individual concession contract, is that of a general law regulating the contracting process, commonly known as a "framework law (ley marco)." In this case, the Legislative Assembly vests in the Public Administration the power to grant specific concessions, a competence that, of course, does not include that of entirely substituting the function of the former, as will be discussed below. In this hypothesis, the delegate can be any entity of the public sphere—both the Executive Branch itself, the normal organ for administrative contracting (art. 140, subsection 14, Constitution), as well as any other decentralized entity of the Public Administration—but not, as proposed in the Bill, a simple deconcentrated organ within an Executive ministry…" (Judgment number 06240-93, of the fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of November of nineteen ninety-three).

The Chamber's jurisprudence in this matter allows us to understand that the choice of the figure of interested management (gestión interesada) for the services of the Juan Santamaría International Airport is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution. It is not so, because through this type of contract (as was advanced in the preceding recital), it allows the Administration itself to provide the Airport services, using the manager, but without the latter assuming the domain or control of the asset. The State, through one of its organs (the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil), is ultimately the one with full domain and control of the Airport. Finally, the plaintiffs are also incorrect in considering that Article 2 of the Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público, number 7762 of April 14, 1998, precludes the use of interested management in the case of airports. The referred article provides, in relevant part:

"ARTICLE 2.- Coverage.

1.- Any work and its exploitation are subject to concession when there are reasons of public interest, which must be recorded in the file through a reasoned act. Telecommunications and electricity are excepted from the application of this law.

2.- Railways, rail lines, docks, and international airports, both new and existing, as well as the services provided therein, may only be granted in concession through the procedures set forth in this law.

(…)" Indeed, what the transcribed norm does is obligate the State, in case it determines the convenience of granting the assets mentioned therein in concession, to do so strictly adhering to the procedures established in Law number 7762. The above is the only way to interpret this norm in accordance with the logic deduced from the design of the first two subsections of the article. Thus, it is clear that the legislator foresaw three distinct scenarios: a general rule regarding public domain assets that may be given in concession (any in principle); an exception for those that cannot be at all (telecommunications and electricity); and those regarding which, if it is decided to grant them in concession, the procedures of that Law must be followed, without it being permissible to provide for other procedures by way of Regulation. Since interested management does not constitute a form of concession, because the State continues holding control of the Juan Santamaría International Airport, it was possible to employ the figure in question or another that, under the same conditions, could serve to adequately fulfill the services provided at the Airport. Therefore, the use of the figure of interested management for the administration of the Juan Santamaría International Airport is not contrary to the invoked constitutional norms and principles.

IX.- Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of legal reserve. In the same manner, the plaintiffs allege that the issuance of Decreto Ejecutivo number 26801-MOPT, of March 19, 1998, Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios, is contrary to the constitutional principle of legal reserve established in Article 121, subsection 14) of the Political Constitution in favor of this type of assets, according to which the legislator is the one who may authorize the respective concession. In this regard, what the Chamber stated in its judgment number 02318-98, of seventeen hours fifty-one minutes on March 31, 1998, must be mentioned:

"II.- (…) In the opinion of the consultants, although it is possible to grant railways, docks, and airports, which are assets of the Nation, in concession, it is not possible to grant an authorization to the Executive Branch for such purposes generically in a Ley Marco, but rather the Legislative Assembly must authorize the contract in each individual case. (…)" To resolve this point, the first thing we must clarify is that both constitutional Article 121, subsection 14, and the jurisprudential doctrine transcribed above refer basically to cases of concession of public works and services, and not to the specific figure of interested management. In any case, the Chamber considers that the Executive Branch was legally authorized to issue a Regulation like the one now challenged. This is so because Articles 3 and 55 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, allow the Administration to formulate, through the issuance of regulations, atypical contractual forms (the so-called innominate contracts) for the satisfaction of the general interest, and in strict compliance with the ordinary procedures set forth in the same Law. It is thus that the Administration, in the interest of serving the general interest, can develop other novel contractual forms, such as interested management, provided it fully complies with the procedural rules and the constitutional and legal principles of administrative contracting. The validity of Article 55 of Law number 7494 was already discussed by the Chamber in judgment number 00818-98, of eleven hours thirty minutes on February 16, 1998, and it was considered that:

"(…)

In summary, the power to issue executive regulations is expressly conferred by the Political Constitution exclusively to the Executive Branch (to the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of Government), so that the different administrative dependencies, be it the decentralized and deconcentrated administration, are impeded from regulating laws, whatever their nature may be. Having delimited the scope of the competence to issue regulations, the Chamber does not find unconstitutional the power granted to the organs subject to administrative contracting to issue 'complementary regulations' to the norms referring to this matter, in violation of Articles 9, 11, and 140, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, for constituting an excess of regulatory power as alleged. The Chamber understands that this concept deals only with regulating the internal organization or administration under the charge of the heads, understood as autonomous service or organization regulations, for the purpose of enabling the procedures of administrative contracting, as indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República; and if, on the contrary, it dealt with regulating different modalities or types of contracts not conceived in current legislation, in a manner that they are true executive regulations, as development of the principles contained in Articles 55 and 109 of the Law, the authority would be reserved to the Executive Branch, as stated.

(…)" Based on the mentioned norms and jurisprudential criteria, it is concluded that the issuance of Decree number 26801-MOPT does not constitute a violation of the legal reserve in this matter, since it constitutes a valid form of exercise of the executive regulatory power, having as its basis the express authorization of Articles 3 and 55 of Law number 7494. Thus, the Executive Branch was authorized to issue a regulatory decree in use of the powers conferred by Article 140, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution, for the purpose of facilitating the effective execution of the already mentioned legal norms, providing for innominate mechanisms of administrative contracting that would adjust to the specific needs characterizing the complex administrative function, in the interest of fulfilling its essential objective: the satisfaction of the general interest. In use of its discretionary powers, it chose the figure of interested management as the most suitable to satisfy those needs, which is valid from the standpoint of the Law of the Constitution. In summary, the issuance of the Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios does not violate the constitutional norms and principles regulating parliamentary reserve in this matter." Likewise, it is not for this Court to verify whether the contract in question is being applied in the manner in which it was or was not authorized by the Chamber, since what is sought is a mere legality control. It is worth citing what this jurisdiction, in that same ruling, provided regarding its validity:

"X.- Regarding the alleged invalidity of the contract. The plaintiffs accuse that between Decree number 26801-MOPT, the bidding terms (cartel de licitación), and the contract finally signed, there are large differences that lead to sustain the invalidity of the contract, referring in particular to the person of the co-contractor, of whom they consider an improper assignment occurred. Regarding this aspect, it must be recalled that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 of the Political Constitution, 1, and 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the competence of this Chamber is limited—in constitutionality control proceedings—to verifying the conformity of norms and other acts with respect to the constitutionality parameter, formed by constitutional norms and principles, as well as those from International Human Rights Law. This is not a court competent for the analysis of the compliance of administrative contracts with respect to legal and regulatory norms, much less in relation to the original bases of the bidding terms, for which the legal system has provided specialized organs capable of carrying out such control, in administrative venue, the Contraloría General de la República, and in jurisdictional venue, the contentious-administrative courts. The Chamber must not supplant their powers, which is why, as no specific violation of norms or principles forming the constitutionality parameter is alleged regarding these aspects, a ruling on the merits is not appropriate with respect to them." For all the above, the claims alleged by the plaintiff in this regard must be rejected.

VII.- Conclusion. Consequently, there being no reason whatsoever to vary the stated criterion and since the challenged norm does not injure Articles 140, subsection 14, nor 188 of the Political Constitution, the action must be dismissed, as is hereby ordered. Magistrate Armijo issues a dissenting vote and upholds the action.

Therefore:

The action is dismissed. Magistrate Armijo issues a dissenting vote and upholds the action.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

AVC/169/ccg

Res: 2005-03629 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del cinco de abril del dos mil cinco.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, mayor, casado una vez, con cédula de identidad número 3-135-095, vecino de San José; contra el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 5150 del 14 de mayo de 1973, modificado por la Ley No. 8038 de 17 de octubre del año 2000. Intervinieron también en el proceso Karla González Carvajal en su condición de Presidenta del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, como coadyuvante, y Farid Beirute Brenes, en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:00 horas del 28 de marzo del 2004, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 5150 del 14 de mayo de 1973, modificado por la Ley No. 8038 de 17 de octubre del año 2000. Alega que la misma es inconstitucional en tanto otorga al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, desconcentración máxima y personalidad jurídica instrumental para administrar los fondos provenientes de tarifas, rentas o derechos regulados en la Ley No. 5150, así como para realizar los actos o contratos necesarios para cumplir las funciones y tramitar los convenios a fin de que sean conocidos por el Poder Ejecutivo, lo cual resulta contrario a los artículos 140 inciso 19 y 188 de la Constitución Política, así como de la jurisprudencia, según sentencias Nos. 6240-93 y 3513-94. Indica que constitucionalmente se le otorga al Poder Ejecutivo la atribución y el deber exclusivo de suscribir contratos administrativos, lo que no solamente hace responsables al Presidente de la República y al Ministro del ramo de estampar su firma al pie de un documento, sino que los hace titulares de una verdadera responsabilidad de tutelar el interés público por medio de su gestión. Este no es un tema accesorio o puramente formal del Poder Ejecutivo, sino que es principal, y es en detalle el ejercicio de una autoridad en nombre del pueblo que debe aplicar correcta y transparentemente los recursos presupuestarios asignados y para que valoren los intereses que el Estado debe satisfacer. Hay pues una verdadera responsabilidad política que es indelegable. Adicionalmente, la doctrina de la Sala Constitucional ha sido clara que no puede utilizarse la figura organizativa de la desconcentración para colocar a un órgano en condiciones iguales o superiores a los que corresponden a un ente descentralizado. La redacción del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 8038 otorga un verdadero estatus de ente autónomo con un conjunto de entradas propias que conforman su autonomía financiera, todo lo cual es impropio de un órgano desconcentrado. Considera que la capacidad contractual que se le brinda al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil resulta inconstitucional, toda vez que no es propio de un órgano desconcentrado realizar este tipo de contratos, ya que eso pertenece a un órgano con capacidad jurídica plena, y un órgano desconcentrado podría contar únicamente con una capacidad instrumental. Solicita que se declare con lugar la acción.

2.- Por resolución de las ocho horas quince minutos del diez de junio del dos mil tres (visible a folio 12 del expediente), se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y a la Dirección General de Aviación Civil.

3.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe visible a folios 18 a 39. Señala que el accionante solicita aplicar los criterios derivados de las resoluciones de ese Tribunal No. 6240-93 de 26 de noviembre de 1993 y 3513 de 15 de julio de 1994. De resultar aplicables la primera de dichas resoluciones tendríamos que la Acción sería procedente. Empero, debe tomarse en cuenta el cambio de criterio jurisprudencial sobre el tema. En la primera de dichas resoluciones (6240-93), la Sala Constitucional se pronunció sobre la constitucionalidad de dotar a un órgano del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en concreto la Dirección General de Hidrocarburos, de un ámbito de autonomía similar a la de un ente autónomo. Se resolvió, así, que resultaba inconstitucional el dotar al órgano del Poder Ejecutivo de facultades para suscribir contratos administrativos, la titularidad de un presupuesto, la facultad de girar recursos y de contratar empréstitos, entre otras. En lo que concierne la contratación administrativa, sólo el Poder Ejecutivo podría suscribir los contratos correspondientes al Poder Ejecutivo. Se considera integrado dentro del concepto de personalidad plena el ejercicio de facultades presupuestarias y contractuales. Puede considerarse que, tal como afirma el accionante, bajo esta tesis el dotar a un órgano de personalidad, autonomía presupuestaria y fondos propios equivaldría a crear un ente autónomo, sin sujetarse a lo dispuesto en los artículos 188 a 190 de la Carta Política. Una posición más abierta de la Sala Constitucional en orden al otorgamiento de facultades en materia contractual y presupuestaria a favor de órganos desconcentrados se encuentra en la sentencia N° 3513-94 de las 8:57 hrs. de 15 de julio de 1994. En esta resolución se sanciona el otorgamiento de personalidad jurídica a un órgano desconcentrado del Poder Ejecutivo. Se señala que si bien la intención del legislador fue la de dotar al órgano "...de una capacidad jurídica simplemente instrumental al Museo, a fin de que éste pueda recibir las donaciones directamente, cosa que sería constitucionalmente válida (como lo sería la creación de una entidad descentralizada de cualquier naturaleza), el artículo primero del proyecto, que es el texto consultado, no se ciñe, en cambio, a lo meramente instrumental, sino que personifica plenamente al Museo (dice categóricamente: "Se concede personalidad jurídica al Museo Nacional de Costa Rica..."), aunque, de seguido, lo califica de "órgano desconcentrado, adscrito al Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes". La plena personificación del Museo da origen a una entidad pública estatal, ya no a un simple órgano estatal. Esta Sala, absolviendo una consulta legislativa facultativa tocante al proyecto de Ley de Hidrocarburos, expediente legislativo No. 9573, opinó que una norma de ese proyecto cuyo contenido guarda estrecha semejanza con lo que ahora se cuestiona, era inconstitucional. Este tribunal no tiene razones para cambiar de criterio en el presente caso, de modo que en su opinión es inconstitucional el artículo primero del proyecto objeto de esta consulta...". Se aceptó la posibilidad de una personalidad instrumental, que no se define, pero que sería diferente de la personalidad plena propia de los entes descentralizados. Formaría parte de esa personalidad instrumental las facultades en materia contractual. La Procuraduría General de la República, a través de sus dictámenes, señaló el carácter contradictorio de las resoluciones en cuestión (dictámenes C- 186-95 de 28 de agosto de 1995, C-171-96 y C-175-96 de 18 y 21 de octubre de 1996, respectivamente, así como C-042- 2001 de 20 de febrero de 2001) y la necesidad de una mayor discusión sobre el tema, tanto a nivel jurisprudencial como legislativo. La Sala tuvo oportunidad de uniformar sus criterios sobre el tema al ser llamada a pronunciarse sobre la constitucionalidad del contrato de "gestión interesada" para el Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría. La Sala fijó su posición, aceptando la constitucionalidad de una personalidad jurídica instrumental con manifestación en el ámbito presupuestario y contractual. En la resolución No. 11657-2001 de 14:43 hrs. del 14 de noviembre de 2001 manifestó la Sala: "…Los principios constitucionales de caja única (según el cual todos los ingresos a favor del Estado central deben entrar y salir por la Tesorería Nacional) y de universalidad presupuestaria (el Presupuesto de la República deberá contener la previsión de todos los ingresos y la autorización de todos los gastos del Estado central durante el ejercicio económico correspondiente), consagrados positivamente en los artículos 185 y 176 constitucionales, respectivamente, determinan garantías para el sano manejo de los fondos públicos, posibilitando un mayor control acerca del manejo de tales recursos. No obstante lo anterior, en el Derecho Público costarricense existen varios ejemplos de la figura denominada "personificaciones presupuestaria", según las cuales en algunos casos el legislador opta por dar a ciertos órganos desconcentrados la posibilidad de manejar sus propios recursos fuera del Presupuesto del Estado Central, al dotarlos de "personalidad jurídica instrumental". Esta práctica ha sido analizada por esta Sala al menos en dos ocasiones, la primera de ellas en la sentencia número 06240-93 de las catorce horas del dieciséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, en la cual se consideró que: (….). Posteriormente, esta Sala revisó el criterio antes citado, y en la sentencia número 03513-94 de las ocho horas cincuenta y siete minutos del quince de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, que: (…). La posición correcta es la sostenida en el segundo de los fallos citados, en el entendido de que resulta válido a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución conferir a un órgano desconcentrado, personalidad jurídica instrumental para efectos de manejar su propio presupuesto y así llevar a cabo en forma más eficiente la función pública que está llamado a desempeñar. Precisamente esa personificación presupuestaria le permite administrar sus recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente público al que pertenece, si bien continúa subordinado a éste en todos los aspectos no propios de la función que le fue dada por desconcentrados y de los derivados de su personalidad jurídica instrumental… En este caso, no resulta inconstitucional el hecho de que los recursos provenientes del funcionamiento del Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría vayan a ser administrados en un fideicomiso en el Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, toda vez que el Consejo técnico de Aviación Civil es un órgano de desconcentración máxima del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, dotado de personalidad jurídica instrumental, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 2 y 166 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil…". De lo transcrito se deriva que la personalidad jurídica instrumental constituye una personalidad presupuestaria (término que la Procuraduría acuñó respecto de diversos órganos desconcentrados, "administrados" por juntas administrativas con personalidad jurídica propia (dictamen C-115-89 de 4 de julio de 1989). En criterio de este Órgano Consultivo, la personalidad permite administrar un presupuesto y, por ende, recursos, con independencia del Presupuesto del Ente al que pertenece el órgano que se personaliza. La personalidad presupuestaria significa una autonomía patrimonial determinada por la titularidad de recursos propios, según lo disponga el legislador; titularidad de un presupuesto propio, separado del presupuesto del organismo al cual se pertenece, la administración y manejo de recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente de pertenencia, lo que implica reconocer una facultad de contratar. Para efectos presupuestarios, la situación de la persona instrumental se asimila a la de un ente descentralizado, en el sentido de que ambos tienen la titularidad de un presupuesto y la posibilidad de ejecutarlo en forma independiente. Ciertamente, la persona instrumental está sujeta a diversas disposiciones que regulan la materia financiera y entre ellas las directrices de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, pero su presupuesto y, por ende, la ejecución presupuestaria no se identifican con el Presupuesto del ente al que se pertenece. Para la Sala, la personalidad permite al órgano administrar sus recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente público al que pertenece, lo que implica el reconocimiento de un presupuesto propio y, por ende de las potestades propias para ejecutarlo. La Procuraduría ha considerado que en las personalidades de contenido presupuestario se produce una lesión a los principios de unidad y universalidad presupuestaria y al principio de caja única. Empero, de lo resuelto por ese Tribunal en la resolución N° 11657-2001 supra transcrita cabría considerar que para la Sala dichas violaciones no existen. Además, en orden al principio de caja única cabe señalar que la Ley de la Administración Financiera sujeta dichas personificaciones al principio de caja única, tal como lo analizaron en el dictamen N° C-280-2002 de 18 de octubre del año pasado. Como consecuencia de la reforma introducida por la Ley de Reestructuración de la Deuda Pública, el artículo 66 de la Ley de Administración Financiera obliga a considerar que los ingresos de las personas jurídicas instrumentales (en tanto jurídicamente no pueden ser consideradas entes descentralizados –no hay una descentralización de competencias sustantivas ni verdadera constitución de un ente-) constituyen ingresos del Gobierno Central, de lo cual se sigue como lógica consecuencia que tales recursos forman parte de un fondo único a cargo de la Tesorería Nacional. Ergo, dichas personas –a pesar de la personalidad jurídica instrumental- resultan vinculadas por el principio de unidad de caja a cargo de la Tesorería. Ahora bien, la sentencia dictada por la Sala Constitucional en orden a la atribución de personalidad instrumental al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil se refiere esencialmente a las violaciones de los artículos 176 y 185 de la Carta Política. Dicha resolución no analiza una posible violación al artículo 140, inciso 19, de la Constitución, lo que hace que la discusión sobre el tema mantenga interés actual. Por demás, la Sala analizó el punto partiendo de normas contenidas en las Leyes de Presupuesto, artículos 14, inciso 35 de la Ley N° 7018 de 13 de septiembre de 1985, 122 de la Ley N° 7015 de 13 de septiembre de 1985 y 81 de la Ley N° 7051 de 30 de octubre de 1986, normas atípicas y como tales inconstitucionalidad. Actualmente, la personalidad jurídica instrumental es producto de la modificación introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil por la Ley N° 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000, "ley ordinaria". Por lo que resulta procedente entrar a analizar si la Ley puede atribuir al Consejo la facultad de contratar que se impugna. Afirma el accionante que la capacidad contractual del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil conlleva el ejercicio de potestades propias de una personalidad jurídica plena, que no corresponden a un órgano desconcentrado, porque esa personalidad es propia del Poder Ejecutivo de acuerdo con el artículo 140, inciso 10 de la Constitución Política. Con cita de la resolución No. 6240-93 considera que no procede jurídicamente otorgar la capacidad contractual al Consejo Técnico. Agrega que los contratos referidos a servicios aeroportuarios deben pertenecer a un órgano con personalidad jurídica plena y un órgano desconcentrado sólo puede contar con una capacidad instrumental. El Consejo puede realizar cualquier tipo de contrato, lo que no es propio de un órgano desconcentrado. Es competencia del Poder Ejecutivo suscribir los contratos administrativos. Ese deber lo hace responsable en los términos del artículo 148. Agrega que la competencia del Poder Ejecutivo es una forma acabada que la Constitución dispone para que ejerza su autoridad en nombre del pueblo y aplique correcta y transparentemente los fondos públicos que presupuestariamente se le han asignado y para que valore los intereses que el Estado debe satisfacer. Añade que la redacción del artículo 2 de la Ley N° 8038 otorga al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil un status de "ente autónomo", porque le da autonomía financiera y ésta puede convertirse en una autonomía presupuestaria propia del ente autónomo. Por lo que estima que se está ante un fraude al contenido del artículo 188 de la Constitución, ya que se conceden al órgano desconcentrado las ventajas, condiciones y privilegios del ente autónomo, sin los controles, recaudos y límites de una institución descentralizada. La Procuraduría no comparte la tesis del accionante porque parte de una concepción de los alcances del artículo 140, inciso 19 de cita que, de aplicarse, llevaría a la parálisis de la Administración Central, por imposibilidad de realizar parte de la actividad instrumental necesaria para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos. Por otra parte, no toma en cuenta el verdadero alcance de la facultad de contratar otorgada por el artículo 2 de la Ley de Aviación Civil. De previo al análisis correspondiente, es necesario recordar que en nuestro sistema la personalidad jurídica debe ser otorgada por ley. El Estado es persona jurídica de pleno derecho de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 33 del Código Civil. Por consiguiente, el Poder Ejecutivo no es persona jurídica, aunque como Administración se le reconozca una capacidad de Derecho Público y de Derecho Privado. Por ende, una capacidad jurídica y de actuar. Se acusa la violación del artículo 140 inciso 19 de la Constitución Política. Dispone dicha norma fundamental: "ARTÍCULO 140.- Son deberes y atribuciones que corresponden conjuntamente al Presidente y al respectivo Ministro de Gobierno: 19) Suscribir los contratos administrativos no comprendidos en el inciso 14) del artículo 121 de esta Constitución, a reserva de someterlos a la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa cuando estipulen exención de impuestos o tasas, o tengan por objeto la explotación de servicios públicos, recursos o riquezas naturales del Estado. La aprobación legislativa a estos contratos no les dará carácter de leyes ni los eximirá de su régimen jurídico administrativo. No se aplicará lo dispuesto en este inciso a los empréstitos u otros convenios similares, a que se refiere el inciso 15) del artículo 121, los cuales se regirán por sus normas especiales. (Así adicionado por el artículo 2 de ley No.5702 de 5 de junio de 1975)". La interpretación que el accionante da a esta disposición entraña que el Poder Ejecutivo, sea Presidente de la República y Ministro de Ramo (artículo 140 de la Constitución Política), es el responsable de realizar la contratación administrativa, de modo tal que no sólo debe suscribir los contratos administrativos sino participar en las etapas anteriores. En un ordenamiento en el que el contrato administrativo se define fundamentalmente por un criterio orgánico, tenemos que son contratos administrativos todos los que realiza un organismo público. Por consiguiente, los contratos que se requieran para el funcionamiento del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil son, por principio, contratos administrativos sujetos al régimen correspondiente. En criterio del accionante, esos contratos –por ser administrativos- tendrían que ser realizados por el Poder Ejecutivo, salvo los referidos a los bienes y servicios del artículo 121, inciso 14. Ergo, independientemente del objeto del contrato, el Poder Ejecutivo tendría que celebrar el contrato. Ello implicaría la necesaria participación del Presidente de la República en todas las contrataciones que se realicen, puesto que éstas son administrativas. Empero, ese no es el alcance que el resto del ordenamiento le ha dado al artículo 140, inciso 19 y eso se muestra desde los albores de la Constitución del 49. El artículo 88 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República (N. 1279 de 2 de mayo de 1951), en su texto original, atribuyó la función de comprar a la Proveeduría Nacional (artículo 88) y dispuso que la selección del adjudicatario de una licitación por parte de la Proveeduría Nacional perfeccionaba el contrato (artículo 100). Cuando la contratación requería un documento, el contrato era firmado por el Ministro del ramo, salvo si ese documento era una escritura. En efecto, la representación extrajudicial del Estado corresponde desde 1967 a la Procuraduría General de la República y es con base en esa competencia que corresponde al Procurador General de la República la suscripción de los documentos contractuales que requieren escritura pública ((artículo 3, inciso c) de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República). Con la Ley General de la Administración Pública se atribuye al Ministro de Gobierno la facultad de firmar los contratos administrativos propios de su Ministerio, una vez realizados los procedimientos contractuales por parte de la Proveeduría Nacional. Ergo, dichos contratos no son suscritos por el Poder Ejecutivo (Presidente y Ministro del Ramo), sino sólo por el Ministro. En razón de dicha norma, el Ministro es titular de la competencia para suscribir los contratos correspondientes a toda la organización ministerial, lo que es comprensivo de los contratos que interesan a los órganos desconcentrados. Para efecto de que el titular de un órgano desconcentrado pueda suscribir los contratos que le interesan, se requeriría una norma que lo autorizara expresamente. Con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa se produce una desconcentración de los procedimientos de contratación, ya que se estimula la creación de proveedurías institucionales como órganos encargados de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. Una desconcentración de procedimientos que tiene incidencia en orden a la "suscripción del contrato". Cabe recordar, al efecto, que en virtud del criterio antiformalista (Sala Constitucional, resolución N° 2050-01 de 15:24 hrs. de 4 de abril de 2001), que impera en nuestra legislación contractual, el contrato administrativo se perfecciona con el acto firme de adjudicación y la constitución de la garantía de cumplimiento. Por ello, la mayor parte de los contratos administrativos de suministros no se materializan en un documento formal, a ser firmado por el Ministro. Se expresan en documento las contrataciones que presentan un mayor grado de complejidad y las que requieren inscripción registral (que se formalizan en escritura pública). Dispone el artículo 32 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa en lo que aquí interesa: "Sólo se formalizarán, en escritura pública, las contrataciones administrativas inscribibles en el Registro Nacional y las que por ley tengan este requisito. Los demás contratos administrativos se formalizarán en simple documento, a no ser que ello no sea imprescindible para el correcto entendimiento de los alcances de los derechos y las obligaciones contraídos por las partes, según se determinará reglamentariamente". El artículo 32 del Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa dispone en su inciso 6 que cuando no resultare necesario formalizar la contratación, el documento de ejecución denominado "orden de compra" constituirá el instrumento para continuar con los trámites de pago. Estas órdenes de compra no son, ciertamente, firmadas por el jerarca del organismo que contrata. Por otra parte, dentro de los objetivos de modernización de la administración financiera del país, la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos autoriza la delegación de competencia en la materia que nos ocupa. Dispone el artículo 106 de dicho cuerpo normativo: "ARTÍCULO 106.- Delegación para suscribir contratos. Los jerarcas de los órganos o entes del sector público podrán delegar la suscripción de los contratos asociados al proceso de contratación, de conformidad con la reglamentación que se establezca para el efecto". Dicho artículo reconoce la competencia del jerarca para contratar pero, partiendo de que se trata de una actividad instrumental, que no puede considerarse como esencial, permite delegar la suscripción de los contratos. La desconcentración de la contratación administrativa a través de la creación de las proveedurías institucionales y la delegación de la suscripción no serían posible si toda suscripción de contratos correspondiere al Poder Ejecutivo. Así lo comprendió el legislador desde 1951 y ello a pesar de que para la época el volumen de contrataciones estatales y su monto era muy inferior al que conocemos hoy día. Y es que pretender que constitucionalmente los contratos administrativos ordinarios deben ser necesariamente celebrados y firmados por el Poder Ejecutivo llevaría a una parálisis de la actividad administrativa ordinaria del país, con riesgo, por demás, de afectar el normal funcionamiento del aparato estatal. Se incurriría en una gestión absolutamente ineficiente con desmedro de la función gubernativa. La consecuencia última sería la imposibilidad de satisfacer las necesidades de la comunidad, por la imposición de un requisito que termina convirtiendo la contratación en un fin en sí misma, dejando de lado su función de instrumento para la gestión pública. Cabe recordar que: "...A juicio de esta Sala, existen una serie de elementos que no pueden dejarse de lado en el análisis de la validez constitucional de las normas cuestionadas. En primer término, no puede partirse de un análisis simplista o formal, pues la contratación administrativa es una materia sumamente compleja que se desenvuelve en un entorno de cambios constantes, muchas veces con un ritmo vertiginoso. En efecto, el proceso de adquisición de bienes y servicios está inmerso y a la vez determinado por las condiciones y reglas del mercado, cuyas variables difícilmente pueden aprehenderse en la rigidez de una norma. Por esa razón, y tomando en cuenta que, como bien señaló la Procuraduría, los procedimientos de contratación tienen un carácter instrumental de frente a la satisfacción de los intereses públicos, nunca podrían verse convertidos en un fin en sí mismo, sino que deben conservar su naturaleza de simples medios para la consecución del fin superior. Bajo este razonamiento, cabe preguntarse entonces si es factible prever en un cuerpo normativo todos los posible motivos de excepción que en determinado momento pudieran requerir de un procedimiento como la contratación directa. La función de un tribunal constitucional, al que se le encomienda la labor de descubrir, aclarar y declarar el significado del ordenamiento primario del Estado, no puede desentenderse del entorno, y, en este caso, de las realidades y problemas que puede enfrentar el Estado en su actividad contractual. Esa perspectiva, claro está, debe guardar en justo equilibrio con la preservación y defensa de la supremacía Constitucional. De ahí que en esta difícil tarea de extraer el sentido lógico y espíritu de las normas constitucionales, éstas deben ser situadas en su contexto, pues de otra forma podrían llegar a convertirse en disposiciones de un carácter muy limitado o inoperante, de poca actualidad y que puede incluso llegar a impedir la satisfacción del interés público que debe perseguir el Estado..". Sala Constitucional, resolución N° 2060-01 de 15:24 hrs. del 4 de abril de 2001. Tales serían las consecuencias si todo contrato administrativo, independientemente de su envergadura, objeto o monto, tuviese que ser suscrito por el Presidente y el Ministro del Ramo, en los términos en que se propone en la Acción. Al fundamentar la supuesta violación constitucional, el accionante hace referencia a la competencia en orden a los servicios aeronáuticos. Esa referencia da margen para considerar que, en su opinión, la facultad de contratación que el artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil reconoce al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil se manifiesta en relación con los servicios aeronáuticos. Dispone la Ley General de Aviación Civil: "Artículo 2º—La regulación de la aviación civil será ejercida por el Poder Ejecutivo por medio del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, ambos adscritos al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, según las potestades otorgadas por esta Ley. En relación con el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil gozará de desconcentración máxima y tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental para administrar los fondos provenientes de tarifas, rentas o derechos regulados en esta Ley, así como para realizar los actos o contratos necesarios para cumplir las funciones y tramitar los convenios a fin de que sean conocidos por el Poder Ejecutivo".(Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000)La personalidad jurídica instrumental tiene como consecuencia la potestad de administrar los fondos de las tarifas aplicables a los servicios aeronáuticos y realizar los contratos o actos necesarios para el cumplimiento de las funciones, así como tramitar los convenios que debe suscribir el Poder Ejecutivo. Ergo, esa competencia ampara esencialmente los contratos administrativos, los cuales no son sino un instrumento de la gestión financiera. La Sala ha reconocido que es constitucionalmente válido que el legislador otorgue una personalidad de efectos limitados al manejo de un presupuesto, lo que permite administrar ciertos recursos. Pues bien, no puede haber administración de recursos, gestión de recursos propios, si se niega la facultad de contratar. El contrato es simplemente uno de los mecanismos para gestionar los recursos públicos; es un medio para comprometer al Estado constituyendo una fuente válida de obligaciones. Por ello, puede considerarse que "la facultad de contratar" va implícita en la personalidad instrumental. Esa capacidad contractual es, repite, de orden instrumental y no afecta, en modo alguno, el ejercicio de las competencias sustanciales que el Consejo ostenta en virtud de la Ley General de Aviación Civil y particularmente las otorgadas en relación con el certificado de explotación de los servicios aeronáuticos. Con base en el artículo 2, el Consejo Técnico podrá realizar los contratos a que se refiere la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. Pero, dicho artículo no es la norma que da fundamento a las potestades del Consejo en materia de servicios aeronáuticos. En efecto, la competencia del Consejo en materia de servicios aeronáuticos no deriva de la calificación como persona jurídica instrumental ni del reconocimiento de una capacidad contractual. Es producto de un conjunto de disposiciones que le atribuyen una competencia material, en particular de lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil. Dicho artículo le da competencia al Consejo para, entre otras potestades, otorgar, prorrogar, suspender, revocar, modificar o cancelar certificados de explotación o permisos provisionales para servicios de transporte aéreo, aviación agrícola y, en fin, para cualquier actividad lucrativa que el Poder Ejecutivo juzgue necesario que debe contar con la posesión de un certificado de explotación o permiso provisional; así como para conceder el funcionamiento de aeródromos, aeropuertos, servicios de despacho aéreo, comunicaciones aeronáuticas, radio ayudas para la navegación aérea y demás instalaciones aeronáuticas y servicios auxiliares de la aeronavegación. El artículo 2 aquí impugnado puede ser derogado o puede ser anulado, pero mientras no se afecte lo dispuesto en el resto de la Ley General de Aviación Civil las potestades en orden a los servicios aeronáuticos seguirán correspondiendo al Consejo Técnico, salvo en los aspectos en que expresamente se atribuye la competencia al Poder Ejecutivo. En ese sentido y debido a que es el acto necesario para la explotación de una multiplicidad de actividades relacionadas con lo aeronáutico, procede recordar que el certificado de explotación es otorgado por el Consejo de Aviación Civil. El Poder Ejecutivo participa con su aprobación cuando se trate de servicios aéreos internacionales. Dispone el artículo 8 de la Ley de Aviación Civil: "Con las excepciones expresas, el Consejo ejercerá las funciones que le confiere esta ley, independientemente del Poder Ejecutivo, no obstante, los certificados de explotación para servicios internacionales, serán aprobados en última instancia por el Poder Ejecutivo". (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la ley N° 5437 del 17 de diciembre de 1973). De allí que no sean atendibles las objeciones del accionante contra el artículo 2 de mérito, cuando arguye que en la materia existe una responsabilidad política, por lo que el Ejecutivo debe participar en mayor o medida del proceso de negociación de un contrato, su valoración y ejecución, no pudiéndose "reducir su participación a conocer o dar un visto bueno, por medio de una firma". Pareciera que la preocupación del accionante está encaminada a que, en ejercicio de esa facultad de contratación administrativa, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil esté libre de los controles que se aplican al Poder Ejecutivo. Es de advertir, empero, que los contratos que con fundamento en el artículo 2 de repetida cita realice el Consejo Técnico tienen que sujetarse a los procedimientos de contratación administrativa establecidos en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Pero, además, no puede caber ninguna duda de que dicho órgano colegiado está plenamente sujeto a la fiscalización de la Contraloría General de la República. La personalidad instrumental no puede constituir un límite válido frente a lo dispuesto por los artículos 182, 183 y 184 de la Carta Política (sobre el control de la contratación administrativa cfr. Resoluciones Nos. 998-98 de 11:30 hrs. del 16 de febrero de 1998, 5947-98 de 14:32 hrs. del 19 de agosto de 1998 y 9524-99 de 9:06 hrs. del 3 de diciembre de 1999). Conforme lo expuesto, es criterio de la Procuraduría General de la República que: 1-. En su resolución N° 11657-2001 de 14:43 hrs. del 14 de noviembre de 2001 la Sala Constitucional consideró constitucionalmente válido el otorgamiento al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil de una personalidad instrumental de efectos presupuestarios.

2-. Para gestionar los recursos que se le asignan, el Consejo Técnico, como persona instrumental, requiere la facultad de contratar. 3-. En el tanto en que el Consejo goce de la personalidad instrumental y ésta sea constitucionalmente válida, la atribución de la facultad de realizar actos o contratos administrativos, otorgada por el artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil no violenta lo dispuesto en los artículos 140, inciso 19 y 188 de la Carta Política.

4 Por escrito presentado el 7 de julio del 2003, Karla González Carvajal en su condición de Presidenta del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil solicita a la Sala que se aclare al Consejo los alcances de la suspensión ordenada en la publicación realizada. Lo anterior por cuanto no les queda claro: 1) Si el Consejo Técnico puede llevar adelante cualquier procedimiento relacionado con la contratación administrativa, tanto para la aprobación, suscripción, rescisión, resolución, refrendo de contratos administrativos, resolución de reclamos administrativos, ejecución contractual y restablecimiento del equilibrio económico del Contrato; 2) El Consejo puede efectuar el rechazo o la admisión de reclamos administrativos presentados por parte de terceros antes de la publicación de la resolución de las ocho horas quince minutos del diez de junio del dos mil tres y 3) El Consejo Técnico puede dar por agotada la vía administrativa, para efectos de que terceros presenten reclamos ante éste en las instancias judiciales correspondientes, cobros administrativos y el agotamiento de la vía administrativa para efectuar el trámite de cobro judicial correspondiente.

5.- La señora Karla González Carvajal en su condición de Presidenta del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil a folio 43 la audiencia concedida, manifiesta que para determinar la naturaleza jurídica de cualquier institución resulta indispensable el análisis de la normativa que la regula. En este caso se alusión ineludible al artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil No. 5150. Indica que esta norma es congruente con lo dispuesto en el artículo 2, inciso b) de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, No. 3155 de 5 de agosto de 1963. De ahí se desprende claramente que la regulación de todo lo relacionado con Aviación Civil compete al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, actuando por intermedio de dos de sus órganos, a saber: el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y la Dirección General de Aviación Civil. Estos, en tanto órganos del citado Ministerio, constituyen parte de la estructura organizacional del Poder Ejecutivo. En cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica del Consejo de Aviación Civil, se llegó a la conclusión de que el mismo constituye un órgano desconcentrado del M.O.P.T., con la particularidad de ostentar personalidad jurídica instrumental para el manejo de los fondos que se regulan en la Ley General de Aviación Civil. La Procuraduría General de la República en la opinión OJ-072-96, de 22 de noviembre de 1996, indicó que la Dirección General de Aviación Civil es un órgano administrativo que se encuentra ubicado dentro de la estructura del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, pero desconcentrado frente a éste. Asimismo, dicho Órgano se encuentra subordinado al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil. La particularidad que presenta esa subordinación es que, en el ejercicio de las competencias públicas relacionadas con la materia de aviación civil, se da la participación de dos órganos que ostentan potestades de dirección y aprobación (Consejo) y de ejecución y decisión (Dirección), dentro de una misma organización Ministerial. Al efecto cita la sentencia No. 11657-2001 de la Sala Constitucional. De esa sentencia se deriva que la personalidad jurídica instrumental constituye una personalidad presupuestaria. En criterio de este órgano consultivo, la personalidad permite administrar un presupuesto y, por ende, recursos, con independencia del Presupuesto del Ente al que pertenece el órgano que se personaliza. La personalidad presupuestaria significa una autonomía patrimonial determinada por la titularidad de recursos propios, según lo disponga el legislador, titularidad de un presupuesto propio, separado del presupuesto del organismo al cual se pertenece, la administración y manejo de recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente de pertenencia, lo que implica reconocer una facultad de contratar. Para efectos presupuestarios, la situación de la persona instrumental se asimila a la de un ente descentralizado, en el sentido de que ambos tienen la titularidad de un presupuesto y la posibilidad de ejecutarlo en forma independiente. Ciertamente, la persona instrumental está sujeta a diversas disposiciones que regulan la materia financiera y entre ellas las directrices de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, pero su presupuesto y, por ende, la ejecución presupuestaria no se identifican con el Presupuesto del ente al que se pertenece. Para la Sala, la personalidad permite al órgano administrar sus recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente público al que pertenece, lo que implica el reconocimiento de un presupuesto propio y, por ende de las potestades propias para ejecutarlo. Ahora bien, la sentencia dictada por la Sala Constitucional en orden a la atribución de personalidad instrumental al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil se refiere esencialmente a las violaciones de los artículos 176 y 185 de la Carta Política. Dicha resolución no analiza una posible violación al artículo 140, inciso 19, de la Constitución, lo que hace que la discusión sobre el tema mantenga interés actual. Por demás, la Sala analizó el punto partiendo de normas contenidas en las Leyes de Presupuesto, artículos 14, inciso 35 de la Ley N° 7018 de 13 de septiembre de 1985, 122 de la Ley N° 7015 de13 de septiembre de 1985 y 81 de la Ley N° 7051 de 30 de octubre de 1986, normas atípicas y como tales inconstitucionalidad. Actualmente, la personalidad jurídica instrumental es producto de la modificación introducida al articulo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil por la Ley N° 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000, "ley ordinaria". Por lo que resulta procedente entrar a analizar si la Ley puede atribuir al Consejo la facultad de contratar que se impugna. Hace alusión a lo que contestó la Procuraduría General de la Republica en la audiencia conferida. El Convenio sobre Aviación Civil Internacional proporciona el marco de referencia que identifica y define las responsabilidades a que el Estado costarricense como signatario de dicho instrumento debe hacer frente en materia de administración de aviación civil y de la forma orgánica y métodos que se deben seguir para cumplir con sus responsabilidades. El país es responsable del cumplimiento de un sistema jurídico aeronáutico nacional que permita conducir la aviación civil de una manera segura y eficiente donde las autoridades aeronáuticas, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y la Dirección General de Aviación Civil tengan los poderes necesarios para el legítimo manejo de los asuntos de Aviación Internacional que debe el sistema jurídico permitir que la autoridad aeronáutica pueda cumplir con las previsiones del Convenio sobre Aviación Civil Internacional y sus anexos, así como acuerdos o convenios internacionales en los que Costa Rica sea parte. La implementación del sistema de reglamentación supone dos condiciones previas: a) que en su legislación aeronáutica fundamental, el Estado prevea la promulgación de un código reglamentario de navegación aérea; y b) que se confieran a un órgano estatal competente, Administración de Aviación Civil, facultades necesarias para garantizar la observancia de los reglamentos. La legislación aeronáutica debe autorizar la creación de una Administración de Aviación Civil al frente de la cual habrá un Director de Aviación Civil (DCA), prever que se deleguen en el DCA las atribuciones necesarias para elaborar, publicar y revisar los reglamentos y normas de operación de conformidad con el código o la ley; prever la adopción de reglamentos y normas de operación basados en las disposiciones de los Anexos al Convenio sobre Aviación Civil Internacional; adoptar disposiciones para que se de cumplimiento al código de navegación y exigir que todos los vuelos de transporte aéreo comercial que se efectúen bajo la autoridad del Estado, cumplan con todas las condiciones que el Estado pueda juzgar aplicables en interés de la seguridad y conforme a todos los tratados y acuerdos concertados por el Estado. La Categoría del país depende del efectivo cumplimiento del Convenio sobre Aviación Civil Internacional, Ley N. 877 y sus Anexos, siendo la Dirección General de Aviación Civil la obligada a velar por el cumplimiento estricto de la ley y los tratados, así como demás normativa. En lo que interesa señala el artículo 18 de la Ley N. 5150 y sus reformas: "Artículo 18: Son atribuciones de la Dirección General de Aviación civil: I. Velar por el cumplimiento estricto de esta ley, sus reglamentos, los tratados, los convenios o las convenciones internacionales sobre aviación civil que el Estado suscriba y ratifique constitucionalmente; así como la actualización y revisión los reglamentos de aviación civil promulgadas conforme a las normas y recomendaciones internacionales dictadas regularmente por la Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional.” Cita la resolución número 2001-03421 de las quince horas con treinta y un minutos del dos de mayo del dos mil uno de la Sala Constitucional. El Estado Costarricense es responsable de la introducción y cumplimiento de un sistema adecuado de ley que le permita conducir la aviación civil de una manera segura y eficiente permitiendo que las autoridades pertinentes tengan los poderes necesarios para que el legítimo manejo de los asuntos de aviación civil no sea impedido u obstruido por otros intereses. Reiteradamente la Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional indica que la autoridad del Estado constituye el elemento primordial del componente institucional de la estructura de la reglamentación nacional. Hacen referencia a las ocasiones en que Costa Rica ha sido objeto de auditorías de la Vigilancia y Seguridad Operacional, en la cual se indica que la legislación aeronáutica básica de Costa Rica es satisfactoria y otorga a la DGAC las atribuciones necesarias para mantener un nivel adecuado de vigilancia de la seguridad operacional. Indica que la Sala en la sentencia 5735-99, se reconoció la especialización de los servicios aéreos. Actualmente la personalidad jurídica instrumental es producto de la modificación introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil por la Ley No. 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000. Solicita que se declare sin lugar la acción.

6.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 118, 119 y 120 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 20, 23 y 24 de junio del 2003 (folio 17).

7.- La audiencia oral y pública prevista en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se celebró a las nueve horas ocho minutos del diecisiete de marzo del dos mil cinco.

8.- Por resolución de las trece horas cuarenta minutos del treinta de julio del dos mil tres, la Sala tuvo como coadyuvante pasiva a la Presidenta del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y resolvió la gestión de aclaración presentada (folio 70).

9.- Por escrito presentado el 18 de junio del 2004, el accionante solicita que se fije fecha para la audiencia (folio 76).

10.- Mediante escrito recibido a las 9:55 horas, del día 25 de febrero de 2005, el señor Roberto Arguedas Pérez, en su condición de Presidente de la Junta Directiva del Consejo técnico de Aviación Civil (folio 84), manifiesta que frente a la acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada por el señor José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, el día 28 de marzo de 2003, contra el artículo 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, por contrariar los artículos 140 inciso 19 y 188 de la Constitución Política y a la jurisprudencia constitucional en sus votos No. 6240-93 y 3513-94, y conforme a la artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se prohíbe que en los procesos donde se discute la aplicación de la norma impugnada, no se podrá dictar resolución hasta que la Sala Constitucional haya hecho un pronunciamiento del caso. Por otro lado, Costa Rica suscribió el Convenio Sobre Aviación Civil Internacional, el cual fue ratificado mediante la Ley No. 844 del año 1947, en el cual se establece la obligación de cada Estado de brindar seguridad operacional en su territorio, de acuerdo al Principio de Soberanía y las obligaciones asumidas con la Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional (OACI). Luego se da la existencia del programa de vigilancia de la seguridad operacional por parte de la OACI (1996), en este se examina su cada Estado aplica de forma eficaz las normas y métodos de los Anexos y otros documentos conforme al Convenio. Afirma que la Dirección General de Aviación Civil es responsable de procurar la prestación de servicios públicos, el resguardo y realización de las acciones gubernamentales tendientes al logro de la seguridad aeropuertaria y operacional, y el cumplimiento de los compromisos adquiridos con la OACI. Por otra parte, con la finalidad de desarrollar y ampliar el aeropuerto Juan Santamaría, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil promovió la Licitación Pública Internacional No. 1-98. Este Consejo está cumpliendo con las obligaciones contractuales y los compromisos derivados; afirma que esta gestión está siendo afectada por la imposibilidad de ejercitar la potestad de representación y disposición patrimonial que atribuye el artículo 2 de la Ley General de la Aviación Civil, y además, del impedimento de seguir adelante con la contratación. Alega que, esta acción está basada en intereses difusos, por lo cual se acude a la Sala Constitucional sin una lesión individual directa, y al dársele curso, frente a la suspensión prevista en el artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se genera una alteración de la contratación en curso. Ante la mencionada suspensión, manifiesta que, la actividad aeronáutica es una situación particular, por lo que se debería suspender la medida cautelar establecida; esto fundamentado por la sentencia No. 12949-03, donde se establece que en el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se instituye el efecto retroactivo a la sentencia que declara la constitucionalidad, y se permite a la Sala graduar y dimensionar en el tiempo, espacio o materia ese efecto, de acuerdo a las consecuencias graves en la seguridad, la justicia o la paz sociales, que éste pueda producir. Solicita que se suspenda la aplicación de la medida cautelar establecida en la resolución de las 8 horas y 15 minutos del 10 de junio de 2003, dado a los graves perjuicios ocasionados a la gestión del CETAC.

11.- Mediante escrito recibido a las 16:20 del 30 de marzo de 2005, el señor José Miguel Corrales Bolaños amplía las razones de inconstitucionalidad (folio 103), y manifiesta que no es posible a nivel constitucional, dotar de personalidad jurídica plena a un órgano desconcentrado, es por ello que dotar al CETAC de ésta, es inconstitucional. Sobretodo por que los artículos 121 inciso 14 y 140 inciso 19 de la Constitución Política, protegen y reservan al Poder Ejecutivo materias como el servicio público aeropuertario. La pretensión de dotar a la CETAC de personalidad jurídica plena violenta los artículos 188 a 190 de la Constitución Política y el artículo 11 del mismo cuerpo normativo, lesionando así, el principio de legalidad, dado que también, esta normativa solamente reconoce esta atribución al Poder Central, los municipios y las entidades autónomas. La introducción de un particular en la gestión directa o indirecta requiere de aprobación legislativa, expresada mediante una ley marco, o por medio de la aprobación del contrato verificado por el Poder Ejecutivo, esto no ha sucedido con la gestión interesada, por lo que se violenta también el artículo 9 constitucional, pues se prohíbe a la Asamblea Legislativa delegar el ejercicio de funciones que le son propias. En la sentencia No. 11657-01, se afirma que la gestión interesada es una forma de gestión de los servicios y las obras públicas por medio de la cual la Administración actúa a través de un tercero, el cual actúa por cuenta y en nombre del Estado; en este caso, el ente público respectivo continúa a cargo del bien y de los servicios públicos, pero el gestor se instituye como administrador. Alega Corrales Bolaños que, si se hubiese, en el caso concreto, aplicado las cosas como se estipularon anteriormente, se hubiese tenido que hacer una licitación de obras, y se sabrían (si serían públicas) las cuentas de ingresos y de gastos; además, no sería el empresario frente a usuarios y terceros el gestor, pues esto es constituirse como concesionario ilegal. Manifiesta que, invocar el artículo 55 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, y sus tipos abiertos para justificar los hechos concretos, es una modalidad del fraude de ley, el cual es condenado en el artículo 20 del Código Civil y en el artículo 5 de la Ley No. 8422 Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. Arguye que, el Estado tampoco puede contratar con el gestor modificaciones en el contrato, como se quiere hacer adicionando al pago convenido una suma aproximada a los 140.000.000 dólares, ya que ahora éste es parte integral de la Administración, según el artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; y se estipula como principio general de la contratación administrativa, la prohibición de que los funcionarios o agentes de la administración, intervinientes en el proceso participen como interesados en la contratación, este encuentra asidero en el artículo 22 inciso c de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa.; además constituiría una contratación directa sin licitación alguna. Asimismo, el gestor está sujeto a la autoridad de la Contraloría General de la República, y lo que ésta resuelva no lo puede cambiar, sólo puede impugnarlo por vía jurisdiccional. La Contraloría rechazó las pretensiones de modificación del contrato y no permitió que los gastos y costos pasasen las tarifas, esto no fue impugnado por las partes. Es por ello y además de la prohibición encontrada en el artículo 22 inciso c de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, que las partes no impugnaron en tiempo ni en forma lo resuelto por la Contraloría. Sostiene que, según como se han interpretado los artículos 121 inciso 14 y 140 inciso 19 de la Constitución Política, el régimen concesional ha de estar establecido y regulado por una norma de rango legal, es por ello que es una competencia legislativa, y no así, ejecutiva; es imposible que pueda autorizarse mediante un reglamento, y sus tipos abiertos del artículo 55 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. Afirma el promovente que, lo que se encuentra detrás de todo esto es el deseo de llevar a cabo el pago extra e ilegal de casi 140.000.000 dólares. Esto conlleva al perjuicio de los intereses públicos, pues Costa Rica terminaría pagando el doble por unas exiguas obras; y además, se estaría atrasando su desarrollo aeropuertario, económico y de exportación hasta el 2025. Según ha propuesto con la extensión del contrato, se tendrá que indemnizar a ALTERRA sin entra en operación un nuevo aeropuerto internacional en Orotina. Ante todo esto, la crisis en el Aeropuerto Juan Santamaría vendrá en el 2010, pues con las sumas pretendidas se terminan los fondos del aeropuerto en Orotina, y también, el TAMS en sus cálculos elaborados en 1997, no fue muy exacto, pues el crecimiento ha sido mayor, y según la FAA (Federal Aviaton Agency) de los Estados unidos los vuelos desde EE.UU. hacia el extranjero aumentarán en un 95%. Frente a todo esto, asegura que, la CETAC no puede tomar decisiones de tal magnitud, pues esto es contrario a la Constitución Política, y también por la inconstitucionalidad de esta pretensión que contraría disposiciones firmes y obligantes de la Contraloría General de la República; y por ello solicita, nuevamente, que se declare inconstitucional el artículo 2 de la Ley General de la Aviación Civil.

12.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho allí invocado, requisito que no es necesario en los casos de excepción previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, que por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; que se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o que sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. A partir de lo antes dicho, se tiene que la regla general apunta a la necesidad de contar con un asunto previo, siendo excepcionales las posibilidades de acudir a la Sala Constitucional en forma directa. De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. Dispone el texto en cuestión que procede cuando "por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual ni directa", es decir, cuando por esa misma naturaleza, la lesión sea colectiva (antónimo de individual) e indirecta. Sería el caso de actos que lesionen los intereses de determinados grupos o corporaciones en cuanto tales, y no propiamente de sus miembros en forma directa. En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 03750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres.

"… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter" En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos los que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implica dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, a aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República. No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de los bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa (ver en este mismo sentido la sentencia de esta Sala número 2001-07391, de las dieciséis horas siete minutos del catorce de agosto de dos mil uno).

II.- La legitimación de los accionantes. El presente asunto resulta admisible de conformidad con el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto no existe una lesión individual y directa, frente a la normativa que se impugna y que según el accionante otorga en forma excesiva, abusiva y desmedida una personalidad jurídica instrumental al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, por lo que no es posible en este caso, la existencia previa de un asunto base, al no producir la norma cuestionada un perjuicio directo a un sujeto en particular. Bajo estos parámetros procede admitir la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.

III.- Objeto de la impugnación. El accionante impugna el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 5150 del 14 de mayo de 1973, reformado mediante Ley No. 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000, por cuanto estima que la personalidad jurídica instrumental para administrar fondos y la capacidad de contratar otorgada al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil es inconstitucional porque violenta los artículos 140 inciso 19 y 188 de la Constitución Política. A efectos de estudio se cita la norma en cuestión que dice:

“Artículo 2º—La regulación de la aviación civil será ejercida por el Poder Ejecutivo por medio del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, ambos adscritos al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, según las potestades otorgadas por esta Ley. En relación con el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil gozará de desconcentración máxima y tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental para administrar los fondos provenientes de tarifas, rentas o derechos regulados en esta Ley, así como para realizar los actos o contratos necesarios para cumplir las funciones y tramitar los convenios a fin de que sean conocidos por el Poder Ejecutivo." (Así reformado por el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000) IV.- Sobre el fondo. Siendo el punto medular de este estudio la inconstitucionalidad del dotamiento a un órgano administrativo desconcentrado de una personalidad jurídica instrumental que le permita contratar, es conveniente revisar de previo las funciones que constitucionalmente le han sido otorgadas al Poder Ejecutivo y los alcances de esta figura jurídica.

a- Funciones otorgadas por la Constitución Política al Poder Ejecutivo. El artículo 140 de la Constitución nos determina un ámbito de competencias y atribuciones que son exclusivas –y excluyentes– del Poder Ejecutivo, entendiendo por tal, al Presidente de la República y al Ministro respectivo. Así, se demarcan como propias y exclusivas, la función de dirección política o gubernativa y la dirección de la política internacional. En cuanto a la función de dirección política, -que es la única que nos avocaremos a desarrollar, en atención al interés de estudio de esta acción-, es importante resaltar que le corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo una función de orientación política en lo relativo a la actividad estatal, cuya finalidad es la de orientar las políticas estatales en los diversos ámbitos de interés público, a fin de mantener la necesaria unidad del Estado; y ello se logra a través de los diversos mecanismos de autotutela administrativa (potestad de planificación, potestad de dirección –lo relacionado con la emisión de directrices–, la potestad de coordinación –sectorización y regionalización–, la potestad de emitir autorizaciones –aprobaciones, refrendos y vistos buenos–). Así, lejos de ser una competencia de orden legal, se trata de una de orden constitucional, propia del Poder Ejecutivo, según lo ha considerado con anterioridad esta Sala, en virtud de lo cual, es el Ejecutivo el que debe fijar la política en un área de acción determinada y no a la inversa:

"El Poder Ejecutivo –Gobierno-, como organización jurídica y política, es el que se encarga de organizar, dirigir y encauzar a la sociedad en todos sus aspectos político, jurídico, económico y social. La función ejecutiva es una tarea esencial del Gobierno en sus distintos órganos o ministerios, como lo es también la directiva política de fijar los objetivos y metas de la acción coordinada en los demás entes públicos, proponiendo los medios y métodos para conseguir esos objetivos. Es también función esencial del Poder Ejecutivo orientar, coordinar y supervisar el aparato de la Administración (artículo 140, inciso 8 de la Constitución Política) y dictar normas generales que no son solo simple ejecución de normas legales sino delimitantes (art. 140.2 , Constitución Política) ..."(sentencia número 3089-98, de las quince horas del doce de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).

En este sentido, es importante anotar, que en virtud de los procesos organizativos de la descentralización por la materia –instituciones autónomas– (artículo 188 a 190 de la Constitución Política) y territorial –municipalidades– (artículo 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política), y de la desconcentración (artículo 83 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), estas funciones no son realizadas en forma exclusiva por el Poder Ejecutivo; sin embargo, en virtud de lo dispuesto en los artículo 26 inciso b) y 27.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se mantiene en el Poder Ejecutivo, la función de dirección y coordinación de las tareas de Gobierno y de la Administración Pública Central en su conjunto, y también de la Administración descentralizada, en lo que corresponde, en virtud del grado de autonomía de gobierno de las municipalidades –dada por norma constitucional–. Esta Sala ya señaló también, en la sentencia número 2002-06513, de las catorce horas cincuenta y siete minutos del tres de julio del dos mil dos, que la estructura del Estado costarricense quedó determinada por el Constituyente originario en la Constitución Política, y que, aunque su estructura no es cerrada (“números clausus”), el legislador ordinario –poseedor indiscutible de la competencia residual- debe ajustarse, en relación con la creación de entes y órganos y públicos, a los principios de ese orden fundamental. Es así como la doctrina del Derecho Público hace una clara diferenciación entre descentralización y desconcentración administrativas, categorizando a la primera como aquella conformada por personas jurídicas públicas con personalidad jurídica plena o especial; con una atribución o competencia específica, que desarrolla en forma exclusiva o privativa, y no concurrente, alternativa o paralela, por lo que el Ente mayor (Estado) no puede invadir su esfera de competencias, toda vez que se trata de competencias que han sido trasladadas del Poder Ejecutivo a la nueva institución; para lo cual se les dota de patrimonio y autonomía presupuestaria; de modo que se les reconoce una aptitud legal para administrarse a sí mismas (autonomía administrativa), en los términos previstos en el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política:

"Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión." Por su parte, por órgano desconcentrado se hace mención al fenómeno que se produce dentro de una misma persona jurídica –sin crear un nuevo ente- con una tarea competencial concreta y dependiente, en lo no desconcentrado, de la jerarquía del ente al que pertenece, según se dispone en los artículos 83.2, 83.3, 83.4 y 83.5 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública:

"2. La desconcentración mínima se dará cuando el superior no pueda:

• a)Avocar competencias del inferior; y b) Revisar o sustituir la conducta del inferior, de oficio o a instancia de parte.

3. La desconcentración será máxima cuando el inferior esté sustraído además, a órdenes, instrucciones o circulares del superior.

4. Las normas que crean la desconcentración mínima serán de aplicación restrictiva en contra de la competencia del órgano desconcentrado y las que crean la desconcentración máxima sean de aplicación extensiva en su favor." De manera que existe desconcentración administrativa cuando por norma legal se atribuye a un órgano inferior del ente una competencia exclusiva, con algún grado de autonomía, con lo que se produce la pérdida de la competencia por parte del superior jerárquico, de donde, su condición nunca puede ser igual a la del superior, aún cuando se trate del grado máximo de la desconcentración. La doctrina es unánime al estimar que la Administración Pública está conformada por el conjunto de entes públicos que conforman la organización administrativa, esto es, por el ente público mayor (Estado o Administración Pública Central), y el resto de los entes públicos menores (Administración Pública Descentralizada, sea institucional o por servicios –instituciones autónomas- o territorial -municipalidades), que han sido creados por un acto de imperio, de orden constitucional (caso de las municipalidades) o legal. En este sentido, la descentralización siempre implicará la creación de entes públicos menores, distinto del Estado, dotados de personalidad jurídica, patrimonio propio (lo cual implica autonomía financiera) y la atribución de una competencia, exclusiva y excluyente que se cercena del Poder Ejecutivo; motivo por el cual el ente público mayor –Estado- no puede invadir su esfera de competencia, aunque si está sujeto a la tutela administrativa (dirección, planificación, coordinación, y control). Así, el elemento fundamental para determinar la presencia de un ente es la dotación de la personalidad jurídica, que es delegada por el Estado para la realización de una competencia específica, y que tiene la consecuencia inmediata de convertirlo en un centro de imputación de derechos y obligaciones, esto es, lo legitima para gestionar por sí y ante sí las competencias delegadas, en atención al grado de autonomía otorgado (administrativa –mínima y de primer grado-, propia de las instituciones autónomas; de gobierno –de segundo grado-, propia de las municipalidades y de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social en lo relativo a la administración de los seguros sociales; y de organización -plena o de tercer grado, propia de las universidades del Estado). Es así como la dotación de personalidad jurídica a un ente público lo coloca en una posición diferente de quien, por carecer de personalidad, constituye un órgano. Por tal motivo las actuaciones que realicen estos entes es responsabilidad es del ente, no del Estado en sentido estricto. Por último, es necesario recordar que la descentralización es un modelo de organización de la Administración, con el objeto de buscar la mejor eficiencia de la gestión pública, para la satisfacción del interés público encomendado.

b- La personalidad jurídica instrumental. Ahora bien, la Sala ha sostenido el criterio de que no resulta inconstitucional la dotación de personalidad jurídica instrumental a un órgano desconcentrado, como un modelo de organización administrativa, a efecto de lograr una mayor eficiencia en el aparato estatal. Ha sido considerada como una personificación presupuestaria, que le confiere la potestad a un órgano desconcentrado personalidad para administrar sus recursos con independencia del Ente público al que pertenece, aunque esté subordinado en todos los demás aspectos que son propios de la función desconcentrada. Se trata de una dotación de mecanismos e instrumentos jurídicos estrictamente necesarios para que el órgano pueda cumplir los cometidos y funciones públicas delegadas en virtud de ley, todo lo cual, resulta no sólo adecuado sino necesario bajo la cobertura de dos principios fundamentales de la gestión pública, la eficiencia y adaptabilidad al cambio. De tal suerte, que esa capacidad instrumental está sujeta a los términos y condiciones previstos en la ley de su creación, y en cuanto resulten estrictamente indispensables para el cumplimiento de la función pública delegada; de manera que, si la ley omite la competencia, deben presumirse como propias y reservadas del superior. Así, podrá contratar personal, bienes y servicios que le fueren indispensables para el cumplimiento de la función pública que le fue delegada, únicamente en el entendido de que la ley le faculte expresamente para ello. Por otro lado, son vinculantes y aplicables a este tipo de órganos todas las normas y principios constitucionales de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, sea, los que rigen la contratación administrativa, y los del Derecho Presupuestario. En todo lo demás, están sometidos a los sistemas de control propio de la actividad de las instituciones públicas.

V- De la norma impugnada. El accionante estima que las potestades del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil de administrar fondos así como de contratar otorgadas en el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 5150 del 14 de mayo de 1973, transgreden la Constitución Política y son contrarias a la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal según sentencias 6240-93 y 3513-94. No obstante, desatiende como ya se indicó, que la Sala posteriormente en la sentencia No. 11.657-2001 de las catorce horas cuarenta y tres minutos del catorce de noviembre del dos mil uno, se pronunció respecto a la naturaleza jurídica de este órgano y sobre su personalidad presupuestaria, determinando la constitucionalidad del mismo. Como bien indica la Procuraduría General de la República, en esta última sentencia la Sala unificó su posición, aceptando la constitucionalidad de una personalidad jurídica instrumental con manifestación en el ámbito presupuestario y contractual:

“...Los principios constitucionales de Caja única (según el cual todos los ingresos a favor del Estado central deben entrar y salir por la Tesorería Nacional) y de universalidad presupuestaria (el Presupuesto de la República deberá contener la previsión de todos los ingresos y la autorización de todos los gastos del Estado central durante el ejercicio económico correspondiente), consagrados positivamente en los artículos 185 y 176 constitucionales, respectivamente, determinan garantías para el sano manejo de los fondos públicos, posibilitando un mayor control acerca del manejo de tales recursos. No obstante lo anterior, en el Derecho Público costarricense existen varios ejemplos de la figura denominada "personificaciones presupuestarias", según las cuales en algunos casos el legislador opta por dar a ciertos Órganos desconcentrados la posibilidad de manejar sus propios recursos fuera del Presupuesto del Estado central, al dotarlos de "personalidad jurídica instrumental". Esta práctica ha sido analizada por esta Sala al menos en dos ocasiones, la primera de ellas en la sentencia número 06240-93 de las catorce horas del dieciséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, en la cual se consideró que:

"...En este sentido, es necesario señalar que, con la creación de la Dirección General, se pretende configurar una institución con el régimen jurídico propio de un ente descentralizado -con capacidad contractual, autonomía financiera y presupuestaria, patrimonio propio, etc.-; bajo la cobertura de un Órgano desconcentrado, que por su naturaleza no podría contar, a lo sumo, más que con una personalidad jurídica meramente instrumental. No es posible delegar en la Dirección General competencias atribuidas por la Constitución al Poder Ejecutivo en sentido estricto -Presidente de la República y Ministro de la cartera-, no empece que se le otorgue tal personalidad instrumental. Dicho de otra manera, si el legislador opta por desconcentrar un Órgano de una Cartera de Gobierno, no puede dotarlo de personalidad jurídica propia e independiente de ésta, en los términos de administración descentralizada, en tanto el titular de la Cartera integra con el Presidente de la República, el Órgano constitucional "Poder Ejecutivo" que es su jerarca necesario; salvo que el legislador opte por crear una verdadera institución descentralizada u autónoma, la cual, en todo caso, requeriría para su creación una ley aprobada por votación no menor de dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa (artículo 189 de la Constitución Política), en razón, precisamente, de que su creación implica el desplazamiento de competencias que constitucionalmente corresponden al Poder Ejecutivo como jerarca de la Administración Central; de lo contrario, se conformaría un régimen de excepción, que puede conducir a una atomización del Poder Ejecutivo y de sus propias competencias que repugna a la ideología constitucional." Posteriormente, esta Sala revisó el criterio antes citado, y en la sentencia número 03513-94, de las ocho horas cincuenta y siete minutos del quince de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, que:

"(...)

En el considerando II sección 2 de esta resolución se resumieron los antecedentes de esa disposición. No obstante que la intención del legislador parece limitarse a dotar de una capacidad jurídica simplemente instrumental al Museo, a fin de que éste pueda recibir las donaciones directamente, cosa que sería constitucionalmente válido (como lo sería la creación de una entidad descentralizada de cualquier naturaleza), el artículo primero del proyecto, que es el texto consultado, no se ciñe, en cambio, a lo meramente instrumental, sino que personifica plenamente al Museo (dice categóricamente: "Se concede personalidad jurídica al Museo Nacional de Costa Rica..."), aunque, de seguido, lo califica de "Órgano desconcentrado, adscrito al Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes.

(...)" La posición correcta es la sostenida en el segundo de los fallos citados, en el entendido de que resulta válido a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución conferir a un órgano desconcentrado, personalidad jurídica instrumental para efectos de manejar su propio presupuesto y así llevar a cabo en forma más eficiente la función pública que está llamado a desempeñar. Precisamente esa personificación presupuestaria le permite administrar sus recursos con independencia del Presupuesto del ente público al que pertenece, si bien continúa subordinado a éste en todos los aspectos no propios de la función que le fue dada por desconcentración y de los derivados de su personalidad jurídica instrumental. Posición análoga a la anterior ha sostenido la Procuraduría General de la República en diversos pronunciamientos, tales como los siguientes: C-176-95, C-178-95, C-189-96, Y C-075-98, entre otros. En este caso, no resulta inconstitucional el hecho de que los recursos provenientes del funcionamiento del Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría vayan a ser administrados en un fideicomiso en el Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, toda vez que el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil es un órgano de desconcentración máxima del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, dotado de personalidad jurídica instrumental, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 2° y 166 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, número 5150 de catorce de mayo de mil novecientos setenta y tres. Lo anterior no impide aclarar que, en relación con los fondos provenientes de impuestos y tasas públicos, el gestor no realiza sino funciones de recaudador. Además, el uso del fideicomiso en cuestión no implica que la Contraloría General de la República ha renunciado a sus potestades de fiscalización y control estricto de los fondos que ingresen y salgan del fideicomiso, sino que por el contrario su actuación de vigilancia -para ser acorde con el Derecho de la Constitución- deberá ser constante y permanente en el buen manejo del fondo, a fin de que los recursos del mismo sean distribuidos de conformidad con los términos pactados en el contrato. Así las cosas, en cuanto a este punto la acción también deberá ser desestimada.” De lo anteriormente alegatos del accionante y que en aquella oportunidad, cuyo criterio aún sostiene, determinó que no es inconstitucional que al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil se le otorgue una personería jurídica instrumental a través de la cual pueda administrar fondos y consecuentemente contratar, en los términos y delimitaciones que este Tribunal indicó. La titularidad de un patrimonio implica autonomía patrimonial y, consecuentemente, de gestión para llevar a cabo en forma más eficiente la función pública que está llamado a desempeñar. Desconocer su capacidad para contratar como pretende el accionante, sería irrazonable, pues carecería de todo sentido la obtención de fondos sin la posibilidad de administrarlos, lo cual implica necesariamente la capacidad de contratar. Con la autonomía patrimonial, el ente podrá realizar los actos y contratos necesarios que impliquen la gestión de dicho patrimonio con las delimitaciones legales y constitucionales ya establecidas, pues por la naturaleza de algunas contrataciones, éstas estarán reservadas al Presidente y Ministro respectivo, ya que se trata de una contratación meramente instrumental y no esencial. La contratación administrativa del Estado no puede concebirse actualmente, entendiendo que toda contratación con el fin de cumplir la gestión pública sea formalizada por el Presidente y el Ministro respectivo como pretende el accionante, pues ello implicaría una paralización administrativa, atendiendo al crecimiento del sector público y a las necesidades de los administrados. Sobre este aspecto, la Sala en sentencia No. 2660-01 manifestándose respecto a la rigurosidad formal de la contratación administrativa señaló:

“A juicio de esta Sala, existen una serie de elementos que no pueden dejarse de lado en el análisis de la validez constitucional de las normas cuestionadas. En primer término, no puede partirse de un análisis simplista o formal, pues la contratación administrativa es una materia sumamente compleja que se desenvuelve en un entorno de cambios constantes, muchas veces con un ritmo vertiginoso. En efecto, el proceso de adquisición de bienes y servicios está inmerso y a la vez determinado por las condiciones y reglas del mercado, cuyas variables difícilmente pueden aprehenderse en la rigidez de una norma. Por esa razón, y tomando en cuenta que, como bien señaló la Procuraduría, los procedimientos de contratación tienen un carácter instrumental de frente a la satisfacción de los intereses públicos, nunca podrían verse convertidos en un fin en sí mismo, sino que deben conservar su naturaleza de simples medios para la consecución del fin superior. Bajo este razonamiento, cabe preguntarse entonces si es factible prever en un cuerpo normativo todos los posible motivos de excepción que en determinado momento pudieran requerir de un procedimiento como la contratación directa. La función de un tribunal constitucional, al que se le encomienda la labor de descubrir, aclarar y declarar el significado del ordenamiento primario del Estado, no puede desentenderse del entorno, y, en este caso, de las realidades y problemas que puede enfrentar el Estado en su actividad contractual. Esa perspectiva, claro está, debe guardar en justo equilibrio con la preservación y defensa de la supremacía Constitucional. De ahí que en esta difícil tarea de extraer el sentido lógico y espíritu de las normas constitucionales, éstas deben ser situadas en su contexto, pues de otra forma podrían llegar a convertirse en disposiciones de un carácter muy limitado o inoperante, de poca actualidad y que puede incluso llegar a impedir la satisfacción del interés público que debe perseguir el Estado.” La ley ha tenido que ir desplegando mecanismos que han establecido mayor agilidad en la contratación, tal es el caso de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento. La Ley de Administración Financiera y presupuestos públicos, que por ejemplo, dispone en el artículo 106:

“Los jerarcas de los órganos o entes del sector público podrán delegar la suscripción de los contratos asociados al proceso de contratación, de conformidad con la reglamentación que se establezca para el efecto.” Por supuesto, entendiendo que dicha contratación se trata de una actividad instrumental. En el caso del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, esa capacidad contractual es de orden instrumental y está sujeta al ordenamiento jurídico, por ende también a la fiscalización de la Contraloría General de la República. En consecuencia de todo lo anterior, el objeto de estudio sometido a este Tribunal en los términos señalados, no lesiona la Constitución Política y por ende, no resulta inconstitucional.

VI.- Finalmente, el accionante por escrito presentado el 30 de marzo del 2005 amplía sus razones de inconstitucionalidad reiterando los alegatos sobre las potestades del CETAC, pero alegando además que el contrato de gestión interesada de los servicios aeroportuarios es inconstitucional, pues debía ser aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa, toda vez que no hay ley marco por tratarse de un Reglamento emitido por el Poder Ejecutivo y que además se están produciendo varias irregularidades, pues el contrato no se está ejecutando como lo autorizó este Tribunal. El objeto de esta acción se circunscribió a las potestades del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil establecidas en el artículo impugnado, por lo que la revisión del contrato de gestión interesada de los servicios aeroportuarios, es un tema que de la forma planteada excede el objeto de conocimiento de este estudio y que además ya fue objeto de análisis de este Tribunal en la sentencia No. 11657-01. Respecto a las actuaciones del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil en aquella sentencia se dispuso:

“...VI.- Sobre las actuaciones desplegadas por el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil haciendo uso de la personalidad jurídica dada por las normas atípicas. Alegan los accionantes que debido a la inconstitucionalidad de las normas que dan personalidad jurídica al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, todos los actos desplegados en relación con la licitación número 1-98 para la gestión interesada de los servicios aeroportuarios, incluida la firma del respectivo contrato, resultan inválidos. Al respecto, es de señalar que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad a que se hizo referencia en el párrafo anterior respecto de las normas presupuestarias que daban personalidad jurídica al Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil no tiene, tal cual alegan los accionantes, como consecuencia la anulación del contrato firmado en un primer término por el Consejo y no por el Poder Ejecutivo. Lo anterior en razón de que antes de la presentación de esta acción, el Poder Ejecutivo (el Presidente de la República y el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes) emitió el acuerdo número 152, publicado en el Alcance número 49-A a La Gaceta número 133 del nueve de julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, mediante el cual ratificó y convalidó de cualquier defecto que pudiera sobrevenir en razón de la competencia el acto de adjudicación hecho por el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil en el procedimiento licitatorio número 01-98, dándole efecto retroactivo de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 187 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. La convalidación de los actos administrativos, por su parte, constituye un mecanismo para garantizar efectivamente la satisfacción del interés general, evitando que vicios de forma (nulidades relativas, por lo tanto) puedan determinar la anulación de actos administrativos siempre que sean debidamente ratificados o subsanados, según el caso. Como el vicio por incompetencia producto de la anulación de los artículos 14 inciso 35 de la Ley número 7018, 122 de la Ley número 7015, y 81 de la Ley número 7051 fue subsanado con anterioridad a la presentación de esta acción mediante un acuerdo del órgano competente para efectuar actos como los que están en estudio, lo que procede es desestimar la demanda en cuanto a ese extremo...” Asimismo, en cuanto la constitucionalidad del Reglamento mediante el cual se emitió el contrato impugnado, la Sala en esa misma resolución señaló:

“VIII.- Sobre el uso de la figura de la gestión interesada para la administración de los aeropuertos. El artículo 121 inciso 14 de la Constitución Política prevé una protección privilegiada para los bienes que conforman el dominio público, acentuando dicha salvaguarda en el párrafo final del referido inciso en cuanto a los ferrocarriles, muelles y aeropuertos nacionales. En general se establece la inalienabilidad de los bienes dominiales, y en particular se determina expresamente que:

"Artículo 121.- Además de las otras atribuciones que le confiere la Constitución, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa:

(…)

• 14)Decretar la enajenación o la aplicación a usos públicos de los bienes propios de la Nación.

No podrán salir definitivamente del dominio del Estado:

(…)

Los ferrocarriles, muelles y aeropuertos nacionales –estos últimos mientras se encuentren en servicio- no podrán ser enajenados, arrendados ni gravados, directa o indirectamente, ni salir en forma alguna del dominio y control del Estado." Queda claro, entonces, que el bien en cuestión, el Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría, no puede ser enajenado, arrendado o gravado, ni salir del control del Estado. Respecto de esta especial protección, es conveniente mencionar que al evacuar la consulta legislativa en torno al Proyecto de Ley de Hidrocarburos, expediente legislativo número 9573, esta Sala precisó los alcances del citado artículo 121 inciso 14) constitucional, en los términos siguientes:

"La Sala estima que, de conformidad con su sentencia #3789-92 de las 12:00 horas del 27 de noviembre de 1992, el artículo 121.14) de la Constitución Política contiene tres reglas distintas claramente diferenciadas: " a) La primera, es una norma que habilita a la Asamblea Legislativa para decretar «la enajenación o la aplicación a usos públicos de los bienes propios de la Nación». Por una parte, esta norma es irrestricta en cuanto se refiere a todos los bienes propios de la Nación, y, por otra, reserva a la ley la materia, invalidando actos administrativos de enajenación o aplicación a usos públicos no fundados en ley previa; b) La segunda, prescribe qué bienes no «podrán salir definitivamente del dominio del Estado». Para esas categorías, que están enunciadas en los incisos a), b) y c), la restricción es total y absoluta en cuanto a «salir del dominio del Estado», pero, de inmediato, la norma modera su severidad advirtiendo que tales categorías de bienes pueden ser «explotados por la administración pública o por particulares» de acuerdo con la ley o mediante concesión especial; c) La tercera, es una norma que se refiere específicamente a ciertos bienes (ferrocarriles, muelles y aeropuertos nacionales en servicio) no incluidos en las tres categorías de la norma precedente". En consecuencia, la Constitución prevé dos regímenes para explotar esos recursos especialmente protegidos, sin que ninguno de ellos puedan salir del dominio del Estado: Uno, el de las concesiones o contratos otorgados por la Asamblea Legislativa directamente, en uso de una competencia originaria; el otro, su posibilidad sea de explotarlos, por la Administración Pública, sea de encomendarlos a particulares, mediante concesión legalmente otorgada o autorizada. Ambas posibilidades presuponen la competencia de la Asamblea Legislativa para fijar en el caso concreto, o bien regular en una ley general, "condiciones y estipulaciones" imperativas en la ejecución del contrato -como su naturaleza temporal, forma de cumplimiento, obligaciones mínimas del ejecutor, etc.-, las cuales sitúan fuera del alcance de los concesionarios o del acuerdo mismo de las partes, la posibilidad de apartarse de ellas. No es ocioso recordar que el acto administrativo de concesión no adquiere nunca carácter ni rango de ley, aunque sea tramitado y adoptado como tal, (arts. 140.19 y especialmente 124.2 Constitución).

III.- Así pues, una de las formas allí establecidas, obviamente previendo lo difícil y complicado que puede resultar el tener que acudir a la Asamblea Legislativa para la aprobación de cada contrato de concesión individual, es la de una ley general regulatoria del proceso de contratación, comúnmente conocida como "ley marco". En este caso, la Asamblea Legislativa inviste en la Administración Pública la potestad de otorgar concesiones específicas, competencia que, claro está, no comprende la de sustituir del todo la función de la primera, como se dirá adelante. En esta hipótesis, el delegado puede ser cualquier ente del ámbito público -tanto el propio Poder Ejecutivo, órgano normal de la contratación administrativa (art.140 inc.14 Constitución), como cualquier otra entidad descentralizada de la Administración Pública- pero no, como se propone en el Proyecto, un simple órgano desconcentrado dentro de una cartera del Ejecutivo…" (Sentencia número 06240-93, de las catorce horas del veintiséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres).

La jurisprudencia de la Sala en esta materia permite entender que la elección de la figura de la gestión interesada para los servicios del Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría no es contraria al Derecho de la Constitución. No lo es por cuanto mediante este tipo de contratación (como fuera adelantado en el considerando anterior) permite que la misma Administración sea la que preste los servicios del Aeropuerto, haciendo uso del gestor, pero sin que éste asuma el dominio o control del bien. El Estado, a través de uno de sus órganos (el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil) es en definitiva el que tiene pleno dominio y control del Aeropuerto. Finalmente, tampoco llevan razón los accionantes al considerar que el artículo 2° de la Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público, número 7762 de catorce de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, imposibilita el empleo de la gestión interesada en el caso de los aeropuertos. El referido numeral dispone en lo que interesa:

"ARTÍCULO 2.- Cobertura.

1.- Toda obra y su explotación son susceptibles de concesión cuando existan razones de interés público, que deberán constar en el expediente mediante acto razonado. Se exceptúan de la aplicación de esta ley las telecomunicaciones y la electricidad.

2.- Los ferrocarriles, las ferrovías, los muelles y los aeropuertos internacionales, tanto nuevos como existentes, así como los servicios que ahí se presten, únicamente podrán ser otorgados en concesión mediante los procedimientos dispuestos en esta ley.

(…)" En efecto, lo que la norma transcrita hace es obligar al Estado para que en caso de determinar la conveniencia de dar en concesión los bienes allí mencionados, lo haga ciñéndose estrictamente a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley número 7762. La anterior es la única forma de interpretar esta norma de conformidad con la lógica que se deduce del diseño de los dos primeros incisos del artículo. Así, resulta claro que el legislador previó tres supuestos distintos: una regla general respecto de los bienes dominiales que pueden ser dados en concesión (cualesquiera en principio); una excepción para los que del todo no pueden serlo (telecomunicaciones y electricidad) y aquellos respecto de los cuales, si se decide darlos en concesión, deberá estarse a los procedimientos de esa Ley, sin que sea permisible disponer por vía de Reglamento otros procedimientos. Como la gestión interesada no constituye una forma de concesión, pues el Estado continúa ostentando el control del Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría, resultaba posible emplear la figura en cuestión u otra que, bajo las mismas condiciones, pudiera servir para cumplir adecuadamente con los servicios prestados en el Aeropuerto. Por lo anterior, el empleo de la figura de la gestión interesada para la administración del Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría no es contraria a las normas y principios constitucionales invocados.

IX.- Sobre la alegada violación del principio de reserva de Ley. De la misma forma, alegan los demandantes que la emisión del Decreto Ejecutivo número 26801-MOPT, de diecinueve de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios, resulta contrario al principio constitucional de reserva de Ley establecido en el artículo 121 inciso 14) de la Constitución Política a favor de este tipo bienes, según el cual será el legislador quien podrá autorizar la respectiva concesión. Al respecto, debe ser mencionado lo que dijo la Sala en su sentencia número 02318-98, de las diecisiete horas cincuenta y un minutos del treinta y uno de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho:

"II.- (…) En el criterio de los consultantes, si bien es posible dar en concesión los ferrocarriles, muelles y aeropuertos, que son bienes de la Nación, no es posible, otorgar una autorización al Poder Ejecutivo para tales efectos en forma genérica en la Ley Marco, sino que la Asamblea Legislativa debe autorizar el contrato en cada caso individual. (…)" Para resolver el presente punto, lo primero que debemos aclarar es que tanto el artículo 121 inciso 14 constitucional como la doctrina jurisprudencial antes transcrita se refiere básicamente a los casos de concesión de obras y servicios públicos, y no a la específica figura de la gestión interesada. De todos modos, estima la Sala que el Poder Ejecutivo se encontraba legalmente autorizado para emitir un Reglamento como el ahora impugnado. Ello es así por cuanto los artículos 3° y 55 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, número 7494 de dos de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, permiten a la Administración formular, mediante la emisión de reglamentos, formas contractuales atípicas (los llamados contratos innominados) para la satisfacción del interés general, y en estricto apego a los procedimientos ordinarios fijados en la misma Ley. Es así como la Administración, en aras de atender el interés general, puede desarrollar otras formas contractuales novedosas, tales como la gestión interesada, siempre que atienda plenamente las reglas procedimentales y los principios constitucionales y legales de la contratación administrativa. La validez del artículo 55 de la Ley número 7494 ya fue discutida por la Sala en la sentencia número 00818-98, de las once horas treinta minutos del dieciséis de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, y se consideró que:

"(…)

En síntesis, la potestad de dictar reglamentos ejecutivos la confiere expresamente la Constitución Política en forma exclusiva al Poder Ejecutivo (al Presidente de la República y al Ministro de Gobierno respectivo), de manera que las distintas dependencias administrativas, sea la administración descentralizada y la desconcentrada están imposibilitados para reglamentar las leyes, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza. Hecha esta delimitación de los alcances de la competencia para dictar reglamentos, la Sala no encuentra que sea inconstitucional la facultad que se otorga a los órganos sujetos a la contratación administrativa para emitir “reglamentos complementarios” a la normativa referente a esta materia, en violación de los artículos 9, 11 y 140 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política, por constituir un exceso de la potestad reglamentaria como se alega. La Sala entiende que en este concepto se trata únicamente de regular la organización o administración interna que los jerarcas tienen a su cargo, entendidos como reglamentos autónomos de servicio o de organización, con el fin de habilitar los trámites de la contratación administrativa, como señala la Procuraduría General de la República; y si por el contrario, se tratara de regular diferentes modalidades o tipos de contratación no concebidos en la legislación vigente, de manera, que se trata de verdaderos reglamentos ejecutivos, en tanto desarrollo de los principios contenidos en los artículos 55 y 109 de la Ley, la facultad estaría reservada al Poder Ejecutivo, según se ha dicho.

(…)" A partir de las normas y criterios jurisprudenciales mencionados, se concluye que la emisión del Decreto número 26801-MOPT no configura una violación a la reserva de Ley en esta materia, ya que constituye una forma válida de ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria ejecutiva, teniendo como base la autorización expresa de los artículos 3° y 55 de la Ley número 7494. Así, el Poder Ejecutivo estaba habilitado para dictar un decreto reglamentario en uso de las atribuciones que el artículo 140 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política le confiere, con la finalidad de propiciar la efectiva ejecución de las normas legales ya mencionadas, previendo mecanismos innominados de contratación administrativa que se ajustaran a las concretas necesidades que caracterizan a la compleja función administrativa, en aras de cumplir su objetivo esencial: la satisfacción del interés general. En uso de sus potestades discrecionales, eligió la figura de la gestión interesada como la más idónea para satisfacer esas necesidades, lo cual es válido desde el punto de vista del Derecho de la Constitución. En síntesis, la emisión del Reglamento para los Contratos de Gestión Interesada de los Servicios Aeroportuarios no resulta violatoria de las normas y principios constitucionales que regulan la reserva parlamentaria en esta materia.” De igual forma, no le corresponde a este Tribunal verificar si el contrato en cuestión está siendo aplicado en la forma en que fue o no autorizado por la Sala, pues lo pretendido es un control de mera legalidad. Conviene citar lo que sobre la validez del mismo, esta jurisdicción en aquella misma resolución dispuso:

“X.- Respecto de la alegada invalidez del contrato. Acusan los accionantes que entre el Decreto número 26801-MOPT, el cartel de licitación y el contrato finalmente firmado existen grandes diferencias que llevan a sostener la invalidez del contrato, referentes en particular a la persona del cocontratante, de quien consideran ocurrió una cesión indebida. En cuanto a este aspecto, es de recordar que de conformidad con lo establecido en los artículos 10 de la Constitución Política, 1° y 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la competencia de esta Sala se limita –en los procesos de control de constitucionalidad- a la verificación de la conformidad de las normas y otros actos respecto del parámetro de constitucionalidad, conformado por las normas y principios constitucionales, así como por los provenientes del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. No es éste un tribunal competente para el análisis del apego de los contratos administrativos con respecto a las normas de rango legal y reglamentario, y mucho menos en relación con las bases originales del cartel licitatorio, para lo cual el ordenamiento ha provisto los órganos especializados capaces de realizar dicho control, en sede administrativa, la Contraloría General de la República y en sede jurisdiccional, los tribunales contencioso administrativos. No debe la Sala suplantar las atribuciones de ellos, razón por la cual, como en cuanto a estos extremos no se acusa ninguna concreta violación a normas o principios conformadores del parámetro de constitucionalidad, no procede hacer pronunciamiento por el fondo respecto de los mismos.” Por todo lo expuesto, se deben rechazar los extremos alegados por el accionante en este sentido.

VII.- Conclusión. Por consiguiente, no existiendo motivo alguno para variar el criterio expuesto y siendo que la norma impugnada no lesiona los artículos 140 inciso 14, ni el 188 de la Constitución Política, es que procede desestimar la acción, como en efecto se ordena. El magistrado Armijo salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción

Por tanto:

Se declara sin lugar la acción. El magistrado Armijo salva el voto y declara con lugar la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

AVC/169/ccg