Constitutionality of fixed fine in Alcohol Sales Regulation LawConstitucionalidad de multa fija en Ley de Regulación de Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas

Res: 1999-08015 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and fifty-seven minutes on the fifteenth of October, nineteen ninety-nine.- Discretionary judicial consultation formulated by the Criminal Court of Corredores, through a resolution at ten hours on the tenth of August, nineteen ninety-nine, issued within case file number 99-500058-441-F.C., which is a case for Infraction of the Ley de Licores against Nombre193531 to the detriment of Public Order.

Resultando:

1.- In a brief filed with the Chamber's Secretariat at ten hours and forty-four minutes on the twenty-seventh of August of this year, and based on articles 8, subsection 1), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; 2, subsection b); 3, 13, 102 and 104 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the consulting court requests that this Chamber rule on the constitutionality of articles 3 and 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas number 7633 of the twenty-sixth of September, nineteen ninety-six. The consulting court considers that such articles violate the principles of proportionality and reasonableness (razonabilidad), which are parameters of constitutionality contained in article 39 of the Political Constitution.

2.- By means of an order at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the thirtieth of August of this year (folio 5), the Presidency of the Chamber admitted the consultation, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República.

3.- Through a brief on folios 10 to 29, the Procuraduría responds to the granted hearing. It indicates that the questioned article 3 orders the closure of establishments selling alcoholic beverages on Holy Thursday and Holy Friday, and for its part, article 7, also questioned, establishes as a sanction for non-compliance with the provisions of numeral 3, a fine (pena de multa) equivalent to twelve base salaries (salarios base). It points out that these norms have Public Order as their legal interest (bien jurídico) and that in this regard, they refer to the various pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressed itself on the matter. It states that Law 7633 establishes the fine as a sanction for non-compliance with the provisions of article 3 of that law, but in it, the legislator does not define the parameters to be used to convert the fine imposed on whoever transgresses the norm into the day-fine system, thereby creating an impossibility of adjusting the fine provided by the legislator to the recipient's economic capacity because the base salary system does not allow it, which eventually leads to different consequences among the subjects upon whom it is imposed, depending on their financial situation, making the norm unjust and therefore irrational (irracional), also violating the principle of equality (principio de igualdad) professed by the Political Constitution. On the other hand, the Procuraduría considers that under no circumstances could the sanction defined by the legislator in article 7 of Law 7633 constitute a confiscatory penalty (pena confiscatoria), since said figure consists of the seizure by the State of the entire assets of the subject upon whom it is imposed, which does not happen in the present case. It points out that this article 7 establishes a fixed penalty as a response to the commission of the conduct described by the legislator, thereby preventing its gradation in relation to the facts by the judge (juzgador), which means the norm inherently carries a disproportionality (desproporcionalidad).

3.- The procedure complied with the formalities established by law.

Drafted by Magistrate Armijo Sancho; and,

Considerando:

I.- In this Consultation, the doubt is raised as to whether articles 3 and 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, number 7633 of the twenty-sixth of September, nineteen ninety-six, are unconstitutional because they are considered to violate the principles of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad), which are parameters of constitutionality contained in article 39 of the Fundamental Charter. The consulting court considers that such articles violate the principle of reasonableness because they allow the imposition of a confiscatory fine, since the vendor with many penalties will be able to pay it, whereby it goes from being a pecuniary penalty to a sanction that would ruin the offender, as well as considers it disproportionate because for the sale of liquor a fine is being imposed that exceeds the injury to the legal interest, which is the preservation of religious values in a time of reflection.

II.- The norms subject to consultation state:

"Artículo 3°. Closure of businesses.

Establishments selling alcoholic beverages (expendios de bebidas alcohólicas) must remain closed on Holy Thursdays and Holy Fridays, on the day of elections called by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the day before, and the day after. Likewise, they must close in the locations where the Tribunal authorizes, in accordance with the law, gatherings or rallies.

Notwithstanding the preceding provision, businesses that sell alcoholic beverages, without that being their main activity, may remain open on the dates indicated above, provided they close the section dedicated to selling them. The corresponding authorities shall compel compliance with the provisions of this article through the system they consider most effective." "Artículo 7. Sanction for violating article 3 The owner, administrator, or person responsible for an establishment that sells alcoholic beverages and opens the business or the section dedicated to the sale of these beverages on any of the dates indicated in article 3 of this law, shall be sanctioned with a fine equivalent to twelve base salaries (salarios base)." Based on the provisions of these articles, the consulting court questions the reasonableness of the penalty from a constitutional point of view. It indicates that proportionality and reasonableness are both parameters of constitutionality control, and if what is reasonable is what is fair, what is suited to reason, and what is proportional is a means adequate to the end, Law 7633 in its articles 3 and 7 is unreasonable and disproportionate, and would also imply a confiscatory fine.

III.- The penalty, a necessary consequence of the offense committed by a criminally responsible subject, must be adequate to the antisocial act that serves as its antecedent, that is, there must be proportionality between crime and penalty, an adequacy in which the gravity of the act, the determining motives, the personality of the author, and especially the degree of culpability, have marked significance. There are three classes or levels of individualization of the penalty: legal, judicial, and administrative. At the legislative level, more than individualization, what the legislator does is set parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the grounds for its mitigation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their actions. It is the judge who truly individualizes the penalty, in the condemnatory sentence; it is they who determine what is the just and equitable penalty that corresponds to the subject in the specific cases submitted for their knowledge. The possibilities of carrying out a correct judicial individualization of the penalty are directly related to the breadth of the margin of discretion that the legislator leaves to the jurisdictional bodies responsible for applying criminal law to specific cases. The broader that margin, the greater the possibilities that the judge may correctly adapt the penalty to the particularities of the case and to the personality of the subjects they must judge. The existence of this margin of discretion for the judge does not represent a violation of constitutional principles, but rather a guarantee that the penalty will be imposed in an individualized manner, attending to the specific characteristics and circumstances of the particular case. Now, this application of the penalty must be done in consonance with the parameters established in article 71 of the Penal Code, which states:

"Artículo 71: The Judge, in a reasoned sentence, shall fix the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits indicated for each crime, attending to the gravity of the act and the personality of the participant.

To assess them, they shall take into account:

The subjective and objective aspects of the punishable act; The importance of the injury or the danger; The circumstances of manner, time, and place; The quality of the determining motives; The other personal conditions of the active subject or the victim, to the extent that they have influenced the commission of the crime; and The conduct of the agent subsequent to the crime.

The psychological, psychiatric, and social characteristics, as well as those referring to education and background, shall be requested from the Instituto de Criminología, which may include in its report any other aspect that may be of interest for the Judge's better information." It is therefore from this article that the judge has certain parameters to which they must confine themselves to fix the amount and type of penalty to be imposed depending on each specific case. However, for there to be a sound application of the provisions of this numeral, it is essential that the norms containing the sanctions be clear and allow the judge to move within a group of different sanctions to apply to the extent that the conducts to be judged are different; that there exists a system of gradation of sanctions with well-delimited minimum and maximum penalty limits, that allow the judge to operate within them and that attend to criteria of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality.

IV.- The principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) arises from what is called "substantive due process," which means that public acts must contain a substratum of intrinsic justice, so that when it comes to restriction of certain rights, this rule imposes the duty that such limitation be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction with the general principle of equality. Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it fulfills a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable (idóneo), and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis making it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community – or of a specific group – through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is to say, if such action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability (idoneidad), for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted serves the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the latter elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second stems from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. Also, on the subject, in ruling number 5236-99 at fourteen hours on the seventh of July of this year, it was ordered:

"To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called 'technical reasonableness' within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it will be necessary to examine if there is proportionality between the chosen means and the sought end. Having overcome the criterion of 'technical reasonableness,' one must analyze 'juridical reasonableness.' For this, this doctrine proposes examining: a) ponderative reasonableness, which is a type of juridical assessment resorted to when, in the presence of a specific antecedent (e.g., income), a specific provision is required (e.g., tax), and in this case, it must be established whether it is equivalent or proportional; b) equality reasonableness, which is the type of juridical assessment based on the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end: at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved offends the ends provided for in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear through that means. In this way, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable (in a similar sense, see rulings numbers 1738-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on the first of July, nineteen ninety-two, and 08858-98 at sixteen hours thirty-three minutes on the fifteenth of December, nineteen ninety-eight). German doctrine made an important contribution to the subject of 'reasonableness' by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas that it develops by affirming that '...Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the juridical sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'demandable' of the individual…' (ruling of this Chamber number 3933-98 at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on the twelfth of June, nineteen ninety-eight)." V.- Now, based on all of the foregoing, in the specific case of article 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, it is observed that the established sanction is a fixed fine equivalent to twelve base salaries. This questioned norm, in the Chamber's judgment, does not provide the judge with the possibility of having clear and precise parameters for the application of the sanction since, on the contrary, the judge encounters a norm with a fixed sanction, and must therefore impose a sanction consisting of a fine equivalent to twelve base salaries, without the norm contemplating the possibility that the Judge might choose between different levels of fine, meaning there is no margin of choice attending to the circumstances of the specific act intended to be sanctioned. In this matter, it must be borne in mind that the sanction is related to the action taken by the subject, and to that extent, the sanction to be imposed will be a consequence of the committed act, which presupposes the necessary requirement of a reasonable and proportional assessment between the committed act, the harm to the legal interest caused by the action attributed to the active subject of the illicit act, and the sanction intended to punish the illicit activity. However, in the specific case, the sanction as a penalty or punishment is reasonable because it is adequate to regulate and protect the legal interest intended to be safeguarded, and to that extent it is proportional because there is a relationship between the chosen means and the sought end; however, the fixed amount into which the sanction to be imposed translates turns out to be irrational (irracional) and disproportionate (desproporcional) in relation to the specific application in each particular case. Indeed, the Chamber considers that in the specific case of the questioned article 7, the legislator failed to comply with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, and this is so because, in sanctioning matters, the legislator must set parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the reasons for its mitigation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their actions, since it is the judge who truly individualizes the penalty in the condemnatory sentence and determines the just and equitable penalty that corresponds to the subject in the concrete cases submitted for their knowledge, which they do based on the elements provided by the norm. However, in the specific case, the judge does not have any possibility of making a correct individualization of the penalty and cannot use their evaluative power because the legislator left them no possibility, since the norm imposes a single amount that must be imposed as a sanction for the event that an establishment selling alcoholic beverages is found open on a Holy Thursday or Holy Friday. The norm does not have a margin for the judge to evaluate each specific case and thus individualize the sanction, and therefore, we are not in the presence of a norm that guarantees rights, but on the contrary, a norm that harms the principles of legality, equality, proportionality, and reasonableness, as well as, depending on the specific case, it could be a confiscatory norm. From this perspective, the legislator can and must develop the concrete content of the sanctions to be imposed, but they are prohibited from doing so in a way that the sanction becomes inoperative in relation to what is intended to be prevented. Indeed, in the specific case, the construction of the norm containing the sanction allows its concrete application to be disproportionate in relation to the particular case of the active subject. From what has been said, it follows that the sanction contemplated in the questioned article 7 directly affects the financial or economic capacity of the obligor, and this is precisely what makes this sanction disproportionate and unreasonable, as well as confiscatory due to the effects it produces on the offender's assets. In this way, by establishing a fixed amount, it may be disproportionate for some subjects, and to that extent, it may be confiscatory because there is an excess in the amount provided by the legislator, since it establishes a fixed fine without any gradation or mitigation in attention to the different particular circumstances that may arise in each specific case, and therefore it may also harm the principle of equality. Thus, if the reasonableness of a legal norm means verifying the proportion between the desired end and the measure adopted to achieve it, in the specific case, it is not considered that the questioned norm has an amount of sanction that is reasonable or proportional to the end sought to be protected in relation to the committed action; and it is not that the problem lies in the sanction as such established by the article, but rather the problem lies in the amount of the penalty to be imposed. The legislator's intention was probably to create an adequate system aimed at inducing a change in the behavioral habits of individuals regarding religious and electoral values such as those intended to be protected by the prohibition set forth in article 3 of the law regulating operating hours in establishments selling alcoholic beverages, and to protect such purpose, the convenience of imposing a sanction on those who acted against such principles was considered; however, that end is not proportionally or reasonably safeguarded by the fixed amount of the imposed sanction, which definitively causes an imbalance in other aspects when its practical application is imposed because, looking at the case in a concrete example, it is not the same to sanction a company that produces millions of liters of liquor per year, whose profits are considerable, with twelve base salaries, as it is to sanction a small merchant who barely earns enough money to keep their business going with twelve base salaries. From this perspective, article 3 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas is not unconstitutional, unlike the consulted article 7.

VI.- Thus, by virtue of what has been stated, the Chamber considers that the sanction established in article 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas is unconstitutional, it needing to be clear that this Chamber does not consider the sanction as such unconstitutional because there is indeed a legal interest to be protected and for which the sanction is justified, but rather the unconstitutionality is declared because the legislator established a fixed amount of sanction which, precisely because it does not allow gradation of the penalty, could be irrational (irracional) and disproportionate (desproporcionado) depending on each specific case, and therefore, harmful to the principle of equality. Thus, the legislator, in use of their powers and within a reasonable time, must correct this situation so that this article 7 establishes a range-based sanction, with minimums and maximums within which the judge can assess the application of the sanction for each specific case.

Por tanto:

The consultation is resolved in the sense that the fixed sanction established in article 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas is unconstitutional. This ruling is declaratory, and its effects are retroactive to the date the norm took effect. Publish this ruling in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta and publish it in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial. Notify the Legislative Branch.

Nombre44221. . .

Eduardo Sancho G. Nombre54662 . .

Adrián Vargas B. José Luis Molina Q.

Susana Castro A. Gilbert Armijo S.

The consultant considers that such articles violate the principle of reasonableness because they permit the imposition of a confiscatory fine, since the vendor will barely be able to pay it, thus transforming it from a pecuniary penalty into a sanction that would bring ruin to the offender. The consultant also considers it disproportionate because, for the sale of liquor, a fine is imposed that exceeds the injury to the legal interest, which is the preservation of religious values during a time of reflection.

II.- The norms under review establish:

"Article 3. Business closures.

Liquor stores (expendios de bebidas alcohólicas) must remain closed on Holy Thursday and Good Friday, on the day of elections called by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and on the day before and the day after. Likewise, they must close in the towns where the Tribunal authorizes gatherings or meetings, in accordance with the law.

Notwithstanding the preceding provision, businesses that sell alcoholic beverages, without this being their main activity, may remain open on the aforementioned dates, provided they close the section dedicated to selling them. The corresponding authorities shall compel compliance with the provisions of this article through the system they consider most effective." "Article 7. Sanction for violating Article 3 The owner, manager, or responsible party of an establishment that sells alcoholic beverages and opens the business or the section dedicated to the sale of these beverages on any of the dates indicated in Article 3 of this law shall be sanctioned with a fine equivalent to twelve base salaries." Based on the provisions of these articles, the consultant questions the reasonableness of the penalty from a constitutional standpoint. The consultant indicates that proportionality and reasonableness are both parameters of constitutional review, and if what is reasonable is what is just and accommodated to reason, and what is proportional is a means adequate to the end, then Law 7633, in its Articles 3 and 7, is unreasonable and disproportionate, and would also imply a confiscatory fine.

III.- The penalty, the necessary consequence of the offense committed by a criminally responsible subject, must be adequate to the antisocial act that serves as its antecedent; that is, there must be proportionality between the crime and the penalty, an adequacy in which the gravity of the act, the determining motives, the personality of the author, and especially the degree of culpability, hold significant transcendence. Three classes or levels of individualization of the penalty exist: legal, judicial, and administrative. At the legislative level, rather than individualization, the legislator sets parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the grounds for its mitigation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their actions. It is the judge who truly individualizes the penalty; in the condemnatory sentence, it is the judge who determines what just and equitable penalty corresponds to the subject in the specific cases submitted to their knowledge. The possibilities of achieving a sound judicial individualization of the penalty are directly related to the breadth of the margin of discretion that the legislator leaves to the jurisdictional bodies responsible for applying criminal law to specific cases. The broader this margin, the greater the possibilities for the judge to correctly adapt the penalty to the particularities of the case and the personality of the subjects they must judge. The existence of this margin of discretion for the judge does not represent a violation of constitutional principles, but rather a guarantee that the penalty will be imposed in an individualized manner, attending to the specific characteristics and circumstances of the particular case. However, this application of the penalty must be done in accordance with the parameters established in Article 71 of the Penal Code, which provides:

"Article 71: The Judge, in a reasoned decision, shall set the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits indicated for each crime, attending to the gravity of the act and the personality of the participant.

To assess these, the judge shall take into account:

• a)The subjective and objective aspects of the punishable act; b) The importance of the injury or danger; c) The circumstances of manner, time, and place; d) The quality of the determining motives; e) The other personal conditions of the active subject or the victim insofar as they may have influenced the commission of the crime; and f) The conduct of the agent subsequent to the crime.

The psychological, psychiatric, and social characteristics, as well as those concerning education and background, shall be requested from the Institute of Criminology, which may include in its report any other aspect that may be of interest for better informing the Judge." It is therefore based on this article that the judge has specific parameters to which they must confine themselves to set the amount and type of penalty to be imposed, depending on each specific case. However, for one to speak of a sound application of the provisions of this provision, it is indispensable that the rules containing the sanctions be clear and allow the judge to move within a group of different sanctions to apply, to the extent that the conducts to be judged are different; that a system of gradation of sanctions exists, with well-defined minimum and maximum limits of penalty, allowing the judge to operate within them and adhering to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality.

IV.- The principle of reasonableness arises from the so-called "substantive due process," which means that public acts must contain a substratum of intrinsic justice, such that when it concerns the restriction of certain rights, this rule imposes the duty that said limitation must be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction with the general principle of equality. Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality remits us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of markedly greater magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the latter elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. Also, on the subject, in judgment number 5236-99 at fourteen hundred hours on the seventh of July of this year, it was ordered:

"To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, US doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called "*technical reasonableness*" within which the specific rule (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen rule is adequate to regulate a certain matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the sought end. Once the criterion of "technical reasonableness" is overcome, "*legal reasonableness*" must be analyzed. For this, this doctrine proposes examining: *a) pondering reasonableness*, which is a type of legal assessment used when, given the existence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain benefit (e.g., tax) is demanded, and it must be determined in this case whether it is equivalent or proportionate; *b) reasonableness of equality*, is the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; *c) reasonableness in the end* : at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the purposes foreseen in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to state that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear through that means. In this way, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable (in a similar sense, judgments numbers 1738-92, at eleven forty-five on the first of July of nineteen ninety-two, and 08858-98 at sixteen thirty-three on the fifteenth of December of nineteen ninety-eight, may be consulted). The German doctrine made an important contribution to the subject of "reasonableness" by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas it develops by affirming that "...*Legitimacy* refers to the fact that the objective intended with the challenged act or provision must not, at least, be legally prohibited; *suitability* indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; *necessity* means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and *proportionality in the strict sense* provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'demandable' of the individual..." (judgment of this Chamber number 3933-98 at nine fifty-nine on the twelfth of June of nineteen ninety-eight)." V.- Now, based on all of the foregoing, in the specific case of Article 7 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours in Liquor Stores, it is observed that the sanction established is a fixed fine equivalent to twelve base salaries. This questioned norm, in the criterion of the Chamber, does not provide the judge with the possibility of having clear and precise parameters for the application of the sanction, given that, on the contrary, the judge is faced with a norm that has a fixed sanction, meaning they must impose a sanction consisting of a fine equivalent to twelve base salaries, without the norm contemplating the possibility for the Judge to choose between different levels of fine, meaning there is no margin of choice attending to the circumstances of the specific act intended to be sanctioned. In this matter, it must be kept in mind that the sanction is related to the conduct of the subject, and to that extent, the sanction to be imposed will be a consequence of the act committed, which presupposes the necessary requirement of a reasonable and proportional assessment between the act committed, the impact on the legal interest that occurred with the action attributed to the active subject of the illicit act, and the sanction with which the illicit activity is intended to be punished. However, in the specific case, the sanction as a penalty or punishment is reasonable as it is adequate to regulate and protect the legal interest intended to be safeguarded, and to that extent, it is proportional because there is a relationship between the chosen means and the sought end; however, the fixed amount in which the sanction to be imposed is translated turns out to be irrational and disproportionate in relation to its specific application in each particular case. Indeed, the Chamber considers that in the specific case of Article 7 under review, the legislator omitted to comply with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, and this is so because, in sanctioning matters, the legislator must set parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the grounds for its mitigation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their actions, since it is the judge who truly individualizes the penalty in the condemnatory sentence and who determines what just and equitable penalty corresponds to the subject in the specific cases submitted to their knowledge, which they do based on the elements provided by the norm. However, in the specific case, the judge has no possibility whatsoever of achieving a sound individualization of the penalty and cannot use their evaluative power because the legislator left them no possibility, since the norm imposes a single amount to be applied as a sanction for the scenario in which a liquor store is found open on a Holy Thursday or Good Friday. The norm thus lacks a margin for the judge to assess each specific case and thereby individualize the sanction, and therefore, we are not in the presence of a norm that guarantees rights, but on the contrary, a norm that is injurious to the principles of legality, equality, proportionality, and reasonableness, and also, depending on the specific case, it could be a confiscatory norm. From this perspective, the legislator can and must develop the concrete content of the sanctions to be imposed, but they are forbidden from doing so in a way that the sanction becomes inoperative in relation to what is intended to be prevented. Indeed, in the specific case, the construction of the norm containing the sanction allows its specific application to be disproportionate in relation to the particular case of the active subject. From the foregoing, it follows then that the sanction contemplated in Article 7 under review directly affects the financial or economic capacity of the obligor, and this is precisely what makes this sanction disproportionate and unreasonable, as well as confiscatory due to the effects it produces on the assets of the offender. In this way, by establishing a fixed amount, it may be disproportionate for some of the subjects, and to that extent, it may be confiscatory because there is an excess in the amount provided by the legislator, since it establishes a fixed fine without any gradation or attenuations attending to the different particular circumstances that may arise in each specific case, and for this reason, it may also be injurious to the principle of equality. Thus, if the reasonableness of a legal norm means verifying the proportion between the desired end and the measure adopted to achieve it, in the specific case, it is not considered that the questioned norm has a sanction amount that is reasonable or proportional to the end sought to be protected in relation to the conduct committed; and it is not that the problem lies in the sanction as such established by the article, but rather the problem lies in the amount of the penalty to be imposed. Probably the Legislator's intention was to create an adequate system aimed at inducing a change in the conduct habits of individuals regarding religious and electoral values such as those intended to be protected by the prohibition set forth in Article 3 of the law regulating operating hours in liquor stores, and to protect this purpose, the convenience of imposing a sanction on those who acted against such principles was considered; however, that end is not proportionally nor reasonably safeguarded with the fixed amount of the imposed sanction, which definitively causes an imbalance of other aspects when its practical application is imposed, because viewing the case in a concrete example, it is not the same to sanction a company that produces millions of liters of liquor a year and whose profits are considerable with twelve base salaries, as it is to sanction a small merchant who barely earns enough money to sustain their business with twelve base salaries. From this perspective, Article 3 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours in Liquor Stores does not turn out to be unconstitutional, unlike Article 7 under review.

VI.- Thus, based on what has been stated, the Chamber considers that the sanction established in Article 7 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours in Liquor Stores is unconstitutional, it being necessary to clarify that this Chamber does not consider that the sanction as such is unconstitutional, given that a legal interest indeed exists that must be protected and for which the sanction is justified, but rather the unconstitutionality is declared because the legislator established a fixed amount of sanction which, precisely because it does not allow the gradation of the penalty, could be irrational and disproportionate depending on each specific case, and therefore, injurious to the principle of equality. Consequently, the legislator must, in the exercise of their powers and within a reasonable timeframe, correct this situation so that this Article 7 establishes a sanction with a range, with minimums and maximums within which the judge can assess the application of the sanction for each specific case.

Por tanto:

The consultation is resolved in the sense that the fixed sanction established in Article 7 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours in Liquor Stores is unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date the norm came into effect. Let this ruling be noted in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Let this be communicated to the Legislative Branch.

Nombre44221. . .

Eduardo Sancho G. Nombre54662 . .

Adrián Vargas B. José Luis Molina Q.

Susana Castro A. Gilbert Armijo S.

**Exp:** 99-006120-0007-CO **Res:** 1999-08015 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at eleven hours fifty-seven minutes on the fifteenth of October of nineteen ninety-nine.- Optional judicial consultation formulated by the Criminal Court of Corredores, by means of a resolution at ten hours on the tenth of August of nineteen ninety-nine, issued within case file number 99-500058-441-F.C., which is a case for Infraction of the Ley de Licores against [Name] in detriment of the Public Order.

**Considering:** I.- In this Consultation, the question is raised as to whether Articles 3 and 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, number 7633 of the twenty-sixth of September of nineteen ninety-six, are unconstitutional because they are considered to violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which are parameters of constitutionality contained in Article 39 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental). The consulting party considers that said articles violate the principle of reasonableness because they allow the imposition of a confiscatory fine, since the vendor with many penalties will be able to pay it, whereby it goes from being a pecuniary penalty to a sanction that would lead the offender to ruin, and it also considers it is disproportionate because for the sale of liquor a fine is being imposed that exceeds the injury to the legal right, such as the preservation of religious values in a time of reflection.

II.- The norms under consultation state:

*"Article 3°. Business closings.* *Establishments selling alcoholic beverages (expendios de bebidas alcohólicas) must remain closed on Holy Thursday and Good Friday (Jueves y Viernes Santos), on the day of elections called by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the day before and the day after. Likewise, they must close in the towns where the Tribunal authorizes, in accordance with the law, meetings or rallies.* *Notwithstanding the previous provision, businesses that sell alcoholic beverages, without that being their main activity, may remain open on the dates indicated above, as long as they close the section dedicated to selling them. The corresponding authorities shall enforce compliance with the provisions of this article through the system they consider most effective."* *"Article 7. Sanction for infringing Article 3* *The owner, administrator, or person responsible for an establishment that sells alcoholic beverages and opens on any of the dates indicated in Article 3 of this law, the business or the section dedicated to the sale of these beverages, shall be sanctioned with a fine (multa) equivalent to twelve base salaries."* Based on what is established in these articles, the consulting party questions the reasonableness of the penalty from a constitutional point of view. It indicates that proportionality and reasonableness are both parameters of constitutionality control, and if what is reasonable is what is just, what is accommodated to reason, and what is proportional is a means adequate to the end, Law 7633 in its Articles 3 and 7 is unreasonable and disproportionate, and would also imply a confiscatory fine.

III.- The penalty, a necessary consequence of the offense committed by a criminally responsible subject, must be adequate to the antisocial act that serves as its antecedent, that is, there must be proportionality between crime and penalty, an adequacy in which the gravity of the act, the determining motives, the personality of the author, and especially the degree of culpability, have marked importance. There are three classes or levels of individualization of the penalty: legal, judicial, and administrative. At the legislative level, more than individualization, what the legislator does is set parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the reasons for its attenuation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their action. It is the judge who truly individualizes the penalty; in the condemnatory sentence, it is they who determine what is the just and equitable penalty that corresponds to the subject in the specific cases submitted to their knowledge. The possibilities of carrying out a correct judicial individualization of the penalty are directly related to the breadth of the margin of discretion that the legislator leaves to the jurisdictional bodies in charge of applying criminal law to specific cases. The broader this margin, the greater the possibilities that the judge can correctly adapt the penalty to the particularities of the case and to the personality of the subjects they must judge. The existence of this margin of discretion for the judge does not represent, then, a violation of constitutional principles, but rather a guarantee that the penalty will be imposed in an individualized manner, attending to the specific characteristics and circumstances of the particular case. Now, this application of the penalty must be done in accordance with the parameters established in Article 71 of the Penal Code, which states:

*"Article 71: The Judge, in a reasoned sentence, shall set the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits indicated for each crime, attending to the gravity of the act and the personality of the participant.* *To appreciate these, they shall take into account:* a. *The subjective and objective aspects of the punishable act;* b. *The importance of the injury or danger;* c. *The circumstances of manner, time, and place;* d. *The quality of the determining motives;* e. *The other personal conditions of the active subject or the victim to the extent that they have influenced the commission of the crime; and* f. *The conduct of the agent subsequent to the crime.* *The psychological, psychiatric, and social characteristics, as well as those referring to education and background, shall be requested from the Criminology Institute (Instituto de Criminología), which may include in its report any other aspect that may be of interest for better information of the Judge."* It is, therefore, based on this article that the judge has certain parameters to which they must confine themselves to set the amount and type of penalty to impose, depending on each specific case. However, for there to be a sound application of the provisions of this numeral, it is essential that the norms containing the sanctions be clear and allow the judge to move within a group of different sanctions to be applied, insofar as the conducts to be judged are different; that there be a system of graduation of the sanctions with clearly defined minimum and maximum limits of the penalty, allowing the judge to operate within them and attending to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality.

IV.- The principle of reasonableness arises from the so-called "substantive due process," which means that public acts must contain a substrate of intrinsic justice, such that when it comes to the restriction of certain rights, this rule imposes the duty that said limitation be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction with the general principle of equality. Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that there may exist other mechanisms that might better solve the existing need, some of which could fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality sends us back to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of markedly greater magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community. Of the last elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second stems from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. Also, on the subject, in ruling number 5236-99 at fourteen hours on the seventh of July of this year, it was provided:

*"To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, US doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called "technical reasonableness" within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Having established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it will be necessary to examine whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the pursued end. Having overcome the criterion of "technical reasonableness," "juridical reasonableness" must be analyzed. For this, this doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness, which is a type of juridical assessment resorted to when, before the existence of a specific antecedent (e.g., income), a specific provision is demanded (e.g., tax), and in this case, it must be established whether it is equivalent or proportional; b) reasonableness of equality, is the type of juridical assessment that stems from the fact that given equal antecedents, there must be equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness of the end: at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the purposes foreseen in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is necessary, additionally, to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear because of that means. In this way, if the same end can be achieved by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable (in a similar sense, rulings numbers 1738-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on the first of July of nineteen ninety-two, and 08858-98 at sixteen hours thirty-three minutes on the fifteenth of December of nineteen ninety-eight may be consulted). German doctrine made an important contribution to the topic of "reasonableness" by managing to identify, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas it develops by affirming that "... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective intended with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose that which least affects the juridical sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be "demandable" from the individual…" (ruling of this Chamber number 3933-98 at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on the twelfth of June of nineteen ninety-eight)."* V.- Now then, based on everything said above, in the specific case of Article 7 of the Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, it is observed that the sanction established is a fixed fine equivalent to twelve base salaries. This questioned norm, in the Chamber's opinion, does not establish for the judge the possibility of having clear and precise parameters for applying the sanction, given that, on the contrary, the judge encounters a norm with a fixed sanction, for which reason they must impose a sanction consisting of a fine equivalent to twelve base salaries, without the norm contemplating the possibility that the Judge may choose between different levels of fine, whereby there is no margin of choice attending to the circumstances of the specific act intended to be sanctioned. In this matter, it must be kept in mind that the sanction relates to the action the subject took, and to that extent, the sanction to be imposed will be a consequence of the act committed, which presupposes the necessary requirement of a reasonable and proportional assessment between the act committed, the affectation of the legal right that occurred with the action attributed to the active subject of the illicit act, and the sanction with which the illicit activity is intended to be punished. However, in the specific case, the sanction as a penalty or punishment is reasonable insofar as it is adequate to regulate and protect the legal right sought to be safeguarded, and to that extent, it is proportional insofar as there is a relationship between the chosen means and the pursued end; however, the fixed amount into which the sanction to be imposed translates turns out to be irrational and disproportionate in relation to the specific application in each particular case. Indeed, the Chamber considers that in the specific case of the questioned Article 7, the legislator omitted to comply with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, and this is so because, in sanctioning matters, the legislator must set parameters regarding the amount of the penalty to be imposed and the reasons for its attenuation or aggravation, to which the judge must adapt their action, since it is they who truly individualize the penalty in the condemnatory sentence and determine what is the just and equitable penalty that corresponds to the subject in the specific cases submitted to their knowledge, which they do based on the elements provided by the norm. However, in the specific case, the judge does not have any possibility of carrying out a correct individualization of the penalty and cannot use their evaluative power because the legislator left them no possibility, given that the norm imposes a single amount that must be imposed as a sanction for the case in which an alcoholic beverage establishment is found open on a Holy Thursday or Good Friday. The norm thus lacks a margin for the judge to assess each specific case and thereby individualize the sanction, and therefore, we are not in the presence of a norm that guarantees rights, but rather, on the contrary, a norm harmful to the principles of legality, equality, proportionality, and reasonableness, as well as, depending on the specific case, it could be a confiscatory norm. From this perspective, the legislator can and must develop the concrete content of the sanctions to be imposed, but it is forbidden for them to do so in a manner that makes the sanction inoperative in relation to what is intended to be prevented. Indeed, in the specific case, the construction of the norm containing the sanction allows the specific application to be disproportionate in relation to the particular case of the active subject. Based on the foregoing, it follows then that the sanction contemplated in the questioned Article 7 directly affects the financial or economic capacity of the obligor, and that is precisely what makes this sanction disproportionate and unreasonable, as well as confiscatory due to the effects it produces on the offender's assets. Thus, by establishing a fixed amount, it can be disproportionate for some of the subjects, and to that extent, it can be confiscatory because there is an excess in the amount foreseen by the legislator, since it establishes a fixed fine without any graduation or attenuations in attention to the different particular circumstances that may arise in each specific case, and for this reason, it can also be harmful to the principle of equality. This being the case, if the reasonableness of a juridical norm means verifying the proportion between the desired end and the measure adopted to achieve it, in the specific case it is not considered that the questioned norm has a sanction amount that is reasonable or proportional to the end sought to be protected in relation to the action committed; and it is not that the problem lies in the sanction as such established by the article, but rather the problem lies in the amount of the penalty to be imposed. The Legislator's intention was probably to create an adequate system aimed at inducing a change in the behavioral habits of individuals regarding religious and electoral values such as those sought to be protected with the prohibition set forth in Article 3 of the law regulating operating hours in establishments selling alcoholic beverages, and to protect such purpose, the convenience of imposing a sanction on those who acted against such principles was considered; however, this end is not proportionally nor reasonably safeguarded by the fixed amount of the imposed sanction, which definitively causes an imbalance of other aspects when its practical application is imposed, for, viewing the case in a concrete example, it is not the same to sanction with twelve base salaries a company that produces millions of liters of liquor per year whose gains are considerable, as it is to sanction with twelve base salaries a small merchant who barely produces enough money to sustain their business.

From this perspective, Article 3 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours for Alcoholic Beverage Establishments is not unconstitutional, unlike Article 7 that was consulted.

VI.- Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber finds that the penalty established in Article 7 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours for Alcoholic Beverage Establishments is unconstitutional, it being clear that this Chamber does not find the penalty as such unconstitutional, since there is indeed a legal interest to be protected and which justifies the penalty, but rather the unconstitutionality is declared because the legislator established a fixed penalty amount which, precisely because it does not allow for the gradation of the penalty, could be irrational and disproportionate depending on each specific case, and therefore, violative of the principle of equality. Thus, the legislator, exercising its powers and within a reasonable period, must correct this situation so that this Article 7 establishes a penalty with ranges (sanción de bandas), with minimums and maximums within which the judge may assess the application of the penalty for each specific case.

Por tanto:

The consultation is resolved in the sense that the fixed penalty established in Article 7 of the Law Regulating Operating Hours for Alcoholic Beverage Establishments is unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the effective date of the provision. Let this ruling be recorded in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta and published in full in the Boletín Judicial. Notify the Legislative Branch.

Nombre44221. . .

Eduardo Sancho G. Nombre54662 . .

Adrián Vargas B. José Luis Molina Q.

Susana Castro A. Gilbert Armijo S.

Res: 1999-08015 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas con cincuenta y siete minutos del quince de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve.- Consulta judicial facultativa formulada por el Juzgado Penal de Corredores, mediante resolución de las diez horas del diez de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, dictada dentro del expediente número 99-500058-441-F.C. que es causa por Infracción a la Ley de Licores contra Nombre193531 en perjuicio del Orden Público.

Resultando:

1.- En memorial presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las diez horas y cuarenta y cuatro minutos del veintisiete de agosto de este año, y con fundamento en los artículos 8, inciso 1), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; 2, inciso b); 3, 13, 102 y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el despacho consultante solicita a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad de los artículos 3 y 7 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas número 7633 de veintiséis de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis. Considera el consultante que tales artículos son violatorios de los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad que son parámetros de constitucionalidad contenidos en el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política.

2.- Mediante auto de las dieciséis horas quince minutos del treinta de agosto de este año (folio 5), la Presidencia de la Sala dio curso a la consulta, confiriendo audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República.

3.- Con memorial de folios 10 a 29, la Procuraduría contesta a la audiencia conferida. Indica que el artículo 3 cuestionado ordena el cierre de los expendios de bebidas alcohólicas los jueves y viernes santos y por su parte, el artículo 7 también cuestionado, establece como sanción al incumplimiento de lo establecido en el numeral 3, una pena de multa equivalente a doce salarios base. Señala que estas normas tienen como bien jurídico el Orden Público y que en cuanto a esto se remiten a los diferentes pronunciamientos en los cuales la Sala se ha manifestado al respecto. Manifiesta que la ley 7633 establece la pena de multa como sanción ante el incumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 de esa ley, pero en ella el legislador no define los parámetros a utilizar para efectos de convertir la multa impuesta a quien transgrede la norma al sistema de días multa, con lo cual, se produce así una imposibilidad de adecuar la multa prevista por el legislador a la capacidad económica del destinatario debido a que el sistema de salarios base no lo permite, lo que eventualmente conlleva a consecuencias diferentes entre los sujetos a quienes se le impone, dependiendo de su situación patrimonial por lo que la norma se convierte en injusta y por ende, irracional, violentándose también el principio de igualdad que profesa la Constitución Política. Por otra parte considera la Procuraduría que en ningún supuesto, la sanción definida por el legislador en el artículo 7 de la ley 7633, podría constituirse en una pena confiscatoria, ya que dicha figura consiste en el apoderamiento por parte del Estado de todo el patrimonio del sujeto a quien se impone, lo cual no sucede en el presente caso. Señala que este artículo 7 establece una pena fija como respuesta a la comisión de la conducta descrita por el legislador, con lo cual se impide una graduabilidad de la misma en relación con los hechos por parte del juzgador, lo que hace que la norma traiga inmersa una desproporcionalidad.

3.- En el procedimiento se cumplió con las formalidades establecidas por ley.

Redacta el magistrado Armijo Sancho; y,

Considerando:

I.- En esta Consulta se plantea la duda de si los artículos 3 y 7 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, número 7633 de veintiséis de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis, son inconstitucionales por cuanto se considera que violan los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que son parámetros de constitucionalidad contenidos en el artículo 39 de la Carta Fundamental. Considera el consultante que tales artículos atentan contra el principio de razonabilidad porque permiten la imposición de una multa confiscatoria ya que el expendedor con muchas penas podrá pagarla por lo cual pasa de ser una pena pecuniaria a una sanción que llevaría a la ruina al infractor, así como también considera que es desproporcional pues por la venta de licor se está imponiendo una multa que sobrepasa la lesión al bien jurídico como lo es la preservación de los valores religiosos en época de reflexión.

II.- Las normas objeto de consulta, disponen:

"Artículo 3°. Cierre de negocios.

Los expendios de bebidas alcohólicas deberán permanecer cerrados los Jueves y Viernes Santos, el día de las elecciones convocadas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, el día anterior y el siguiente. Asimismo, tendrán que cerrar en las poblaciones donde el Tribunal autorice, de conformidad con la ley, reuniones o mitines.

No obstante la disposición anterior, los negocios que expendan bebidas alcohólicas, sin que esa sea su actividad principal, podrán permanecer abiertos en las fechas antes indicadas, siempre y cuando cierren la sección dedicada a venderlas. Las autoridades correspondientes obligarán a cumplir con lo dispuesto en este artículo mediante el sistema que consideren más eficaz." "Artículo 7. Sanción por infringir el artículo 3 El propietario, administrador o responsable de un establecimiento que expenda bebidas alcohólicas y abra en cualquiera de las fechas indicadas en el artículo 3 de esta ley, el negocio o la sección dedicada a la venta de estas bebidas, será sancionado con multa equivalente a doce salarios base." A partir de lo establecido en estos artículos, el consultante cuestiona la razonabilidad de la pena desde el punto de vista constitucional. Indica que la proporcionalidad y la razonabilidad, son ambos parámetros del control de constitucionalidad y si lo razonable es lo justo, lo acomodado a la razón y lo proporcional es un medio adecuado al fin, la ley 7633 en sus artículos 3 y 7 resulta irrazonable y desproporcional así como también implicaría una multa confiscatoria.

III.- La pena, consecuencia necesaria de la falta cometida por un sujeto penalmente responsable, debe ser adecuada al hecho antisocial que le sirve de antecedente, es decir, debe haber proporcionalidad entre delito y pena, adecuación en la que la gravedad del hecho, los motivos determinantes, la personalidad del autor y en especial el grado de culpabilidad, tienen marcada trascendencia. Existen tres clases o niveles de individualización de la pena: legal, judicial y administrativa. En el plano legislativo, más que individualización, lo que hace el legislador es fijar parámetros en cuanto al monto de la pena a imponer y los motivos de atenuación o agravación de la misma, a los cuales debe adecuar el juez su actuación. Es el juez quién verdaderamente individualiza la pena, en la sentencia condenatoria, es él que determina cuál es la pena justa y equitativa que le corresponde al sujeto en los casos concretos sometidos a su conocimiento. Las posibilidades de realizar una acertada individualización judicial de la pena, están en relación directa con la amplitud del margen de discrecionalidad, que el legislador le deje a los órganos jurisdiccionales encargados de aplicar la ley penal a los casos concretos. Entre más amplio sea ese margen, mayores serán también las posiblilidades de que el juez pueda adecuar correctamente la pena a las particularidades del caso y a la personalidad de los sujetos que debe juzgar. El que exista ese margen de discrecionalidad para el juzgador, no representa entonces una violación a los principios constitucionales, sino más bien una garantía de que la pena se impondrá en forma individualizada, atendiendo a las características y circunstancias concretas del caso en particular. Ahora bien, esta aplicación de la pena, debe hacerse en consonancia con los parámetros establecidos en el artículo 71 del Código Penal, el que establece:

"Artículo 71: El Juez, en sentencia motivada, fijará la duración de la pena que debe imponerse de acuerdo con los límites señalados para cada delito, atendiendo a la gravedad del hecho y a la personalidad del partícipe.

Para apreciarlos tomará en cuenta:

Los aspectos subjetivos y objetivos del hecho punible; La importancia de la lesión o del peligro; Las circunstancias de modo, tiempo y lugar; La calidad de los motivos determinantes; Las demás condiciones personales del sujeto activo o de la víctima en la medida en que hayan influído en la comisión del delito; y La conducta del agente posterior al delito.

Las características psicológicas, psiquiátricas y sociales, lo mismo que las referentes a educación y antecedentes, serán solicitadas al Instituto de Criminología el cual podrá incluír en su informe cualquier otro aspecto que pueda ser de interés para mejor información del Juez." Es entonces a partir de este artículo que el juez cuenta con determinados parámetros a los que debe circunscribirse para fijar el monto y tipo de la pena a imponer dependiendo de cada caso en concreto. Sin embargo, para que se pueda hablar de una sana aplicación de lo dispuesto por este numeral, es indispensable que las normas que contienen las sanciones sean claras y le permitan al juzgador moverse dentro de un grupo de sanciones diferentes a aplicar en la medida en que son diferentes las conductas a juzgar; que exista un sistema de graduación de las sanciones con límites mínimos y máximos de pena bien delimitados, que le permitan al juzgador operar dentro de los mismos y que atiendan a criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

IV.- El principio de razonabilidad surge del llamado "debido proceso substantivo", que significa que los actos públicos deben contener un substrato de justicia intrínseca, de modo que cuando de restricción a determinados derechos se trata, esta regla impone el deber de que dicha limitación se encuentre justificada por una razón de peso suficiente para legitimar su contradicción con el principio general de igualdad. Así, un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad –o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción que será adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los últimos elementos, podría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que el segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados. También, sobre el tema, en la sentencia número 5236-99 de las catorce horas del siete de julio de este año, se dispuso:

"Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Establecido que la norma elegida es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica" hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin : en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos en la constitución. Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable (en similar sentido pueden consultarse las sentencias números 1738-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos y 08858-98 de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). La doctrina alemana hizo un aporte importante al tema de la "razonabilidad " al lograr identificar, de una manera muy clara, sus componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ideas que desarrolla afirmando que "...La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea, no le sea "exigible" al individuo…" (sentencia de esta Sala número 3933-98 de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho)." V.- Ahora bien, a partir de todo lo dicho anteriormente, en el caso concreto del artículo 7 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, se observa que la sanción que se establece es una multa fija equivalente a doce salarios base. Esta norma cuestionada, en criterio de la Sala, no establece para el juez, la posibilidad de contar con parámetros claros y precisos para la aplicación de la sanción toda vez que, por el contrario, el juez se topa con una norma que tiene una sanción fija, por lo cual deberá imponer una sanción que consiste en una multa equivalente a doce salarios base, sin que se contemple en la norma la posibilidad de que el Juez pueda escoger entre diferentes niveles de multa con lo cual no existe un margen de escogencia atendiendo a las circunstancias del hecho concreto que se pretende sancionar. En esta materia debe tenerse en cuenta que la sanción se relaciona con la actuación que tuvo el sujeto y en esa medida la sanción que se vaya a imponer, resultará consecuencia del hecho cometido lo cual presupone la necesaria exigencia de una valoración razonable y proporcional entre el hecho cometido, la afectación del bien jurídico que se dió con la acción atribuida al sujeto activo del ilícito y la sanción con la cual se pretende castigar la actividad ilícita. Sin embargo, en el caso concreto, la sanción como pena o castigo es razonable por cuanto es adecuada para regular y proteger el bien jurídico que se pretende tutelar, y en esa medida es proporcional por cuanto hay relación entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado; sin embargo, el monto fijo en que se traduce la sanción a imponer, resulta ser irracional y desproporcional en relación con la aplicación concreta en cada caso en particular. Efectivamente, estima la Sala que en el caso concreto del artículo 7 cuestionado, el legislador omitió cumplir con la exigencia de crear leyes garantistas de los derechos fundamentales y ello es así por cuanto, en materia sancionatoria, el legislador debe fijar parámetros en cuanto al monto de la pena a imponer y los motivos de atenuación o agravación de la misma, a los cuales debe adecuar el juez su actuación, toda vez que es éste quien verdaderamente individualiza la pena en la sentencia condenatoria y es quien determina cual es la pena justa y equitativa que le corresponde al sujeto en los casos concretos sometidos a su conocimiento, lo que hace a partir de los elementos que le brinda la norma. Sin embargo, en el caso concreto, el juez no cuenta con posibilidad alguna de realizar una acertada individualización de la pena y no puede utilizar su potestad valorativa por cuanto el legislador no le dejó posibilidad toda vez que la norma le impone un único monto que se debe imponer como sanción para el supuesto en que un establecimiento de bebidas alcohólicas sea encontrado abierto un jueves o viernes santo. No tiene entonces la norma un margen para que el juzgador valore cada caso en concreto y así pueda individualizar la sanción y por ende, no se está en presencia de una norma garantista, sino por el contrario, de una norma lesiva de los principios de legalidad, igualdad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, así como también, dependiendo del caso concreto, podría tratarse de una norma confiscatoria. Desde esta perspectiva, el legislador puede y debe desarrollar el contenido concreto de las sanciones a imponer, pero le está vedado hacerlo de manera que la sanción resulte inoperante en relación con lo que se pretende evitar. Efectivamente, en el caso concreto, la construcción de la norma que contiene la sanción, permite que la aplicación en concreto pueda ser desproporcional en relación con el caso particular del sujeto activo. A partir de lo dicho se tiene entonces que la sanción contemplada en el artículo 7 cuestionado, incide directamente en la capacidad financiera o económica del obligado y ello es precisamente lo que convierte a esta sanción en desproporcionada e irrazonable, así como confiscatoria por los efectos que produce en el patrimonio del infractor. De este modo, al establecerse un monto fijo, puede ser desproporcionado para algunos de los sujetos y en esa medida, puede ser confiscatorio por cuanto hay un exceso en la cuantía prevista por el legislador ya que establece una multa fija sin graduación alguna ni atenuaciones en atención a las diferentes circunstancias particulares que se pueden dar en cada caso concreto y por ello también puede ser lesiva del principio de igualdad. Así las cosas, si la razonabilidad de una norma jurídica significa la verificación de la proporción entre el fin querido y la medida adoptada para lograrlo, en el caso concreto no se estima que la norma cuestionada tenga un monto de sanción que sea razonable ni proporcional al fin que se desea proteger en relación con la actuación cometida; y no es que el problema se encuentre en la sanción como tal que establece el artículo sino que el problema está en el monto de la pena a imponer. Probablemente la intención del Legislador era crear un sistema adecuado tendiente a inducir un cambio en los hábitos de conducta de los individuos frente a valores religiosos y electorales como los que se pretenden proteger con la prohibición sentada en el artículo 3 de la ley de regulación de horarios de funcionamiento en expendios de bebidas alcohólicas y para proteger tal finalidad, se pensara en la conveniencia de imponer una sanción a quienes actuaran en contra de tales principios; sin embargo, ese fin no está proporcional ni razonablemente tutelado con el monto fijo de la sanción impuesta que definitivamente causa un desequilibrio de otros aspectos cuando se impone su aplicación práctica pues viendo el caso en un ejemplo en concreto, no es lo mismo sancionar con doce salarios base a una empresa que produce millones de litros de licor al año cuyas ganancias son considerables, que sancionar con doce salarios base a un pequeño comerciante que apenas produce el dinero suficiente para sobrellevar su negocio. Desde esta perspectiva, el artículo 3 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, no resulta ser inconstitucional, a diferencia del artículo 7 consultado.

VI.- Así las cosas, en mérito de lo dicho, la Sala estima que la sanción establecida en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, es inconstitucional, debiendo quedar claro que esta Sala no estima que sea inconstitucional la sanción como tal por cuanto efectivamente existe un bien jurídico que ha de protegerse y por el cual se justifica la sanción, sino que la inconstitucionalidad se declara por cuanto el legislador estableció un monto fijo de sanción que, precisamente por no permitir la graduación de la pena, podría ser irracional y desproporcionado dependiendo de cada caso en concreto, y por ende, lesivo del principio de igualdad. Así las cosas, deberá el legislador en uso de sus facultades y dentro de un plazo razonable, corregir esta situación a efecto de que en este artículo 7 se establezca una sanción de bandas, con mínimos y máximos dentro de los cuales el juzgador pueda valorar la aplicación de la sanción para cada caso en concreto.

Por tanto:

Se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que la sanción fija establecida en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Regulación de Horarios de Funcionamiento en Expendios de Bebidas Alcohólicas, es inconstitucional. Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la norma. Reséñese este fallo en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Comuníquese al Poder Legislativo.

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Eduardo Sancho G. Nombre54662 . .

Adrián Vargas B. José Luis Molina Q.

Susana Castro A. Gilbert Armijo S.