Export tax on wild flora does not violate legal reserveImpuesto a la exportación de flora silvestre no viola reserva de ley

Res:

2002-00155 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.

San José, at sixteen hours and two minutes of the sixteenth of January of two thousand two.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Nombre4190, of legal age, single, bearer of identity card number CED202, resident of San José in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the corporation VIA TICA S.A.; against Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law. Also participating in the proceeding were CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS in his capacity as DIRECTOR OF WILDLIFE, and FARID BEIRUTE BRENES, representing the Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- By writing received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 16 hours and 17 minutes of May 3, 2000 (folio 1), the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law be declared, considering it a violation of the principle of legality or reservation in tax matters. He alleges that his represented party is engaged, among other things, in the exportation of "ipecac root (raíz de ipecacuana)", coming from the plant species also called ipecacuanha (scientific name: Psycotrix ipecacuana). That the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) established in its Article 27 a tax on the exportation of wild animals, but not of plants. They point out that the aforementioned tax (erroneously called "fee (tasa)") had never been applied to the exports of ipecac root made by their represented party, a situation that changed abruptly in the export made by their represented party on the past February 5, in which the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre demanded, as a sine qua non requirement to issue the corresponding export permit, the payment of the aforementioned tax. That is, their represented party was coerced into paying a tax that the law established for animals, by virtue of a regulatory norm that illegitimately extended that tax to plant species. By reason of the foregoing, they filed the amparo appeal 00-002835-007-CO, which is the basis of this action. They consider that the challenged norm has violated the principle of legality or law reservation in tax matters, enshrined by Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, since there can be no tax without a prior law establishing it, and the Constitutional Chamber has reaffirmed this. The taxable object, that is, the matter upon which the tax falls, forms part of the irreducible core of the principle of legality or law reservation. Other matters, within certain limits, may be delegated to the author of the regulation, but not the taxable object. In other words, if the law establishes a tax on animals, it is not lawful for the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), in the exercise of its regulatory power, to vary that taxable object and declare that the tax is also triggered on exports of flora. They indicate that even the certain relativity that our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized for the principle of law reservation in tax matters does not extend to the "structural bases of the tax (impuesto)", to the constitutive or fundamental elements, such as the matter that the legislator chose as a manifestation of an economic capacity to tax. That choice corresponds to the Legislative Assembly in a heightened manner, since Article 124 of the Magna Carta prevents such matter from being heard by a legislative committee, but rather it must be heard by the plenary of the Assembly. It must be concluded then, that what cannot be delegated even to a Legislative Committee within the Congress, much less can be delegated to the Executive Branch. If the Executive legislates on the matter of the tax's object, it invades—invalidly and unconstitutionally—the powers of the legislative body. They emphasize that although the Wildlife Conservation Law uses the word "fee (tasa)", it is evident that what it established was a tax (impuesto) and not a fee, and their distinction lies in the different content of their triggering events (hechos generadores).

2.- The verbatim certification of the libel invoking unconstitutionality is on folio 13.

3.- By resolution of 16 hours 25 minutes of the sixteenth of May of two thousand (visible on folio 28 of the expediente), the action was given course, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República and to the Director General of Customs.

4.- The Procuraduría General de la República rendered its report, visible on folios 30 to 42. It points out that the plaintiff's standing comes from the amparo appeal filed, and from what Article 30(a) of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law provides for that purpose, since in that proceeding it challenged a normative provision together with the individual act of application. Consequently, this Advisory Body has no objection to raise regarding active standing, and therefore proceeds to the analysis on the merits of the action filed. This action seeks the analysis of Article 36 of the Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, insofar as it establishes a tax (impuesto) of 5% on the FOB value of the shipment of wild flora, as a requirement for granting the corresponding export permit. The action is filed insofar as wild flora is not contemplated as an object of the tax created by Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the law that serves as the basis for what is regulated in Article 36 of the cited decree. In this sense, the plaintiff alleges that said article breaches the principle of law reservation in tax matters, guaranteed by constitutional Article 121, subsection 13). Regarding the State's taxing power, the Procuraduría General de la República, as the superior technical-legal advisory body of the Public Administration, has produced abundant administrative jurisprudence, which has been reiterated in the reports rendered to this Chamber as its objective advisor. From this perspective, it is appropriate to point out that the Chamber has adopted the criteria of the Procuraduría, on the matter before us, strengthening—with the binding nature of its erga omnes rulings—a uniform position. Within this coinciding line, the Chamber has classified the law reservation as one of the constitutional principles that, in tax matters, our Constitution establishes (see ruling number 2197-92 of August eleventh, 1992, as well as the provisions in ruling number 2359-94, of fifteen hours three minutes of the seventeenth of May of nineteen ninety-four). The doctrine of the Chamber, coinciding with that expressed by the Procuraduría, has been clear in pointing out that the principle of legality or law reservation in tax matters constitutes a principle of constitutional rank that stands as a limit to the exercise of taxing power. On repeated occasions, this High Court has pointed out the scope of the principle of tax legality (see ruling number 1830-99 of the tenth of March of nineteen ninety-nine). When the Constitutional Chamber addressed the issue of legislative delegation in relation to the principle of legal reservation, it specified its content following, in essence, the doctrine of the Plenary Court when it acted as controller of constitutionality (ruling number 730-95). Likewise, in ruling number 2947-94, it reiterated the jurisprudence of the Plenary Court in relation to the principle of tax legality, a ruling in which it cited what was resolved by that court. And, in ruling number 687-96 of the seventh of February of nineteen ninety-five, also in relation to the issue of legislative delegation in tax matters, it pointed out: "(...) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not so regarding the constitutive elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called law reservation does apply." In such a way that the taxing power, understood as the power to sanction legal norms containing, for determined individuals or categories of persons, the obligation to pay a tax, is a power of the State that, by virtue of the principle of legality or law reservation; and in accordance with the distribution of functions corresponding to each Branch of the State (Article 9 of the Magna Carta), is the responsibility of the Legislative Assembly. Hence, the structure of the tax obligation (its constitutive elements) must be determined by formal law. This means that the active and passive subject, the object, and the cause (triggering event (hecho generador)) can only be established by law. The Wildlife Conservation Law, number 7317 of October 21, 1992, and its amendments, establishes in Article 27 a tax (impuesto) on the "CIF" value of exported animals. Article 36 of the Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435 of October 1, 1997, attempts or tends to develop what is established in Article 27 of the Law and specifies the percentages for the different animal species; however, it adds a tax of 5% on the export of wild fauna, which is not contemplated in the Law. Said Article 36 states: "Article 36.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay, before departure from the shipping point, 3% of the "CIF" value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the "CIF" value for other fauna species, and 5% of the "FOB" value of the shipment for wild flora. Excluded from the application of this article are the exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS." (The bold is not in the original). The law reservation as a limit to the taxing power of the State prevents the Executive Branch, in the exercise of its normative power, from establishing taxes because, in accordance with the constitutional jurisprudence cited supra, the relative nature of said reservation does not include the possibility of setting the bases of the tax obligation, fundamentally, the active and passive subject, and the triggering event of the tax. In this sense, what the challenged Article 36 does is to establish a tax (impuesto) (even though it is called fee (tasa)) not contemplated by law, since it defines the passive subject (the exporters of wild flora) and the triggering event (the activity of exporting wild flora, specifically the request for the wild flora export permit). What is regulated in Article 36 of the cited Decree clearly exceeds the relative nature that delegation in tax matters may have. Therefore, this Advisory Body considers that the phrase "and 5% of the "FOB" value of the shipment for wild flora" of Article 36 of the Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435 of October 1, 1997, is unconstitutional insofar as it establishes a 5% tax on the "FOB" value for the export of wild flora. Consequently, and in fulfillment of its role as Advisory Body of the Constitutional Chamber, this Procuraduría General recommends that the Honorable Constitutional Chamber uphold this action, for which it suggests considering the following: That the jurisprudence—both administrative and that emanating from the Chamber—has been consistent in establishing that the principle of tax legality or law reservation in that matter implies that taxes can only be established by formal law. -That the recognition of the relative nature of the law reservation in tax matters does not mean that the Executive Branch can establish the structural bases of tax obligations, whose regulation is the exclusive power of the Legislative Assembly. -That Article 36 of Decreto Ejecutivo 26435 defines per se the passive subject and the triggering event of a tax by taxing the export of wild flora, since the legal norm that serves as its basis and that it purports to develop, Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, when establishing a tax on the export of animals, does not include wild flora.

5.- Mr. LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WILDLIFE, responds to the hearing granted on folio 43, stating that the challenged norm is related to the content of Article 27 of Law 7317; however, by its scope and through a normative comparison exercise, it is perceived with relative ease that there is a fusion of regulatory aspects described in at least also Article 56 of that same legal body, and that due to a double interpretive error, they were described and incorporated within the text of Article 36. Indeed, the challenged Article 36, complying with what Article 27 of the Law itself orders, insofar as the setting of fees (tasas) for export must be done by executive decree (decreto ejecutivo), proceeds to describe the percentage amounts corresponding to the exports of (animal) species reproduced in breeding farms (zoocriaderos) registered with the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre. The requirement described by the legislator cannot be deferred, modulated, or nullified by the Executive who regulated that law, such that the payment of the fee corresponding to the assumption described by the legislator is mandatory, both for the person who, on behalf of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre, performs the collection act, and for the administered party, who is placed under the obligation to comply with the payment. However, the assumptions described in numeral 36 of the regulation partially correspond to the prefigurations of Article 27 of the Law, such as 3% of the CIF value of the shipment for export actions including fish and butterflies, and 5% for other fauna species. In both assumptions, the scope of the Law is being regulated by executive decree, and the assumption described by the legislator is thus fulfilled. These norms also establish a setting within the percentage parameters that Law 7317 admits as valid. Related to this aspect, the first error that this Directorate points out and which is, by its substance, the reason for the plaintiff's disagreement, consists of the fact that the norm in question includes a phrase that literally says: "...and 5% of the "FOB" value of the shipment for wild flora." This phrase, this provision, does not come from any of the enabling assumptions by the Legislator for the exercise of the tax function in this Directorate, since its insertion into the challenged norm seems to have as its immediate antecedent Article 56 of the same Law 7317, not Article 27, as erroneously stated in the text published in the regulatory act. And it is that Article 56 of the Law, which regulates the export acts of wild flora, is the norm that establishes, as a requirement of the permit, the payment of 5% of the FOB value of the flora shipment, further reason to determine the inclusion of that phrase within the challenged Article 36 as mistaken, since through the latter, Article 27 of the law is regulated, according to that regulatory text, but not Article 56 of the same legal body, which, in any case, would be legally inappropriate for being contrary to the legal regularity that norms and acts governed by public law must maintain, in accordance with the block of legality enshrined in numeral 11 of the Political Constitution. It must also be considered that Article 56 of the Law would be inapplicable to the case, insofar as it regulates the export acts of wild flora for commercial purposes, since the species Psycotrix ipecacuanha turns out to be part of the taxonomic group of the Rubiaceae family, a species that, according to Article 3 of the same Regulation, constitutes national wild flora; however, both Article 56 of the Law and the concept inherent in the expression "in wild form (en forma silvestre)" described in paragraph one of Article 3 of the Regulation under comment, are excluded from the definition of Wildlife inserted into the Legal System by Law 7317 itself (Article 2). Whereby the tax assumption would also be inapplicable to the plaintiff company. Thus, the facts being so, in the judgment of this state representation, the plaintiff is not correct in assuming that the entirety of the challenged norm is unconstitutional in its integrity. On the other hand, the plaintiff alleges that the legislator's use of the designation "fee (tasa)" is erroneous, since the assumptions with which the doctrine assimilates this subspecies of tax are not fulfilled (in the challenged norm). In this aspect, the criticism and the surrounding arguments, such as the degree of relativity or absoluteness of the law reservation that our normative system recognizes, become sterile in this case, in principle, because the decision adopted by the legislator to formulate the description contained in the Tax Code forms part of the parameters of constitutionality that this Dirección General considers valid within the classificatory modality of taxes that the country has followed, in accordance with the legal institutes and principles collected in Articles 4 and 5 of the cited Code, Law 4755 of April 29, 1971, and its amendments. In such a way that, if there were any controversial criterion between the classificatory systematization made by the legislator of the Tax Code and the scope of the most commonly accepted doctrine, this should be the object of an action different from the present one, in which the plaintiff would direct his diatribe against the descriptive module that the legislator of the Tax Code has incorporated into our legal system, but it is not acceptable, and he asks the Chamber to so declare in its ruling, that the challenged norm does maintain legal regularity (and is therefore within the limits of legality) with the norm that sustains its legislative basis, insofar as it (the challenged norm) is limited to reproducing the scope described by the legislator in Article 27 of Law 7317, by applying the designation "fee (tasa)" for the tax burden arising within the proceeding under comment. Exception made of the inconclusively introduced phrase: "...and 5% of the "FOB" value of the shipment for wild flora", just as this Directorate has solvently acknowledged. The plaintiff is partially correct only regarding what is indicated in parentheses (Art. 27 of Law 7317), the first paragraph of Article 36 of the regulation was remiss in that it did not relate to Article 56 of the cited Law, therefore it includes both fauna and wild flora. He requests that the present action be declared without merit.

6.- Mr. CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, responds to the hearing granted on folio 49, stating that the challenged tax is not collectible in the customs venue: the Customs Service does not contemplate, as part of the customs duties or the customs tax obligation, the fee that MINAE is currently demanding. It is the exporter who has had to prove payment of said fee before MINAE so that the latter would issue the document called "Export Permit". That document is presented before PROCOMER along with the rest, which upon applying its seal indicates that the export procedure is authorized for having complied with the necessary requirements. In the case under study, the plaintiff did not take into consideration Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which clearly states that the permit shall also be issued for wild flora, not circumscribing its scope of application solely to fauna.

7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 110, 111, and 112 of the Boletín Judicial, on the 8th, 9th, and 12th of June 2000 (folio 56).

8.- The oral hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, given that the second paragraph of Article 9 of the same law empowers the Chamber to resolve on the merits any petition, even from its presentation, when it is considered sufficiently grounded in indirect principles or norms or in its own precedents or jurisprudence.

9.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.

Drafted by Justice Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility.

The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes that, to file an action of unconstitutionality, it is necessary that there exists a matter pending resolution in the courts or a proceeding for exhausting the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the prior matter that legitimizes the plaintiff party corresponds to the amparo appeal filed before this same Chamber, with a view to expediente 00-002835-007-CO, in which the harm caused by the application of the questioned norm is alleged.

II.- Object of the challenge.

Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, is challenged, considering it violatory of the principle of tax legal reservation. For study purposes, the challenged norm is transcribed:

"Article 36.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay, before departure from the shipping point, 3% of the "CIF" value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the "CIF" value for other fauna species, and 5% of the "FOB" value of the shipment for wild flora. Excluded from the application of this article are the exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS".

III.- On the merits.

The plaintiff challenges the cited article, alleging that the legal basis of Article 27 of Law No. 7317 does not in any way authorize the tax of 5% of the FOB value of the shipment of wild flora stipulated therein, which, in his judgment, violates the principle of legal reservation in tax matters. Certainly, this Court has been consistent in its jurisprudence in recognizing the constitutional nature of the principle of legality in tax matters, and has defined it as that which guarantees that the creation, modification, or suppression of taxes, charges, or exactions, the definition of the triggering event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship, as well as the granting of exemptions or benefits, can only be provided for in a law. Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution establishes an express legal reservation in tax matters, which is reinforced by the provision contained in numeral 124 of the General Public Administration Law that "by means of decree, fines, charges, or exactions cannot be created..." This same "Law Reservation" is developed by Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, which in general terms stipulates that "only the Law can create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the triggering event of the tax relationship; grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; establish privileges, etcetera...". The challenged norm refers in its text solely to Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which states:

"ARTICLE 27.- The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Environment and Energy is empowered to grant export permits for species reproduced in breeding farms (zoocriaderos), registered according to this Law.

The permittee must pay the fees (tasas) that, by executive decree, are set for the authorized animals, before their departure from the port of shipment, which may not be less than two percent (2%) nor greater than five percent (5%) of the "CIF" value.

The export permits granted shall not be transferred to third parties without the prior authorization of that Directorate." (Thus modified the name of the Ministry by Article 116 of the Organic Law of the Environment No. 7554 of October 4, 1995).

However, from the analysis of the case record and the Wildlife Conservation Law, it is evident that the legal basis of the tax here challenged by the plaintiff derives from Article 56 of said normative body, which cites in the pertinent part:

"ARTICLE 56.- The permit for the export of wild flora for commercial purposes shall be issued by the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines, upon prior payment of five percent (5%) of the "FOB" value of the shipment, which shall be made into the Wildlife Fund account..." Thus, the facts being so, there does exist a legal basis supporting it. The challenged Article 36 indicates what is authorized by the legal norms that grant regulatory power, without including any other concept. It contains the constitutive elements of the tax obligation, transcribes the active subject, passive subject, taxable matter, and amount of the tax, which are a full reproduction of what is contained in Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. In this way, the alleged violation is not evidenced. On the other hand, the Chamber considers that even though the questioned norm was remiss in its basis by indicating as its sole normative source Article 27 of Law No. 7317 and not Article 56 of the same law, in what pertains to this Court, this does not constitute any constitutional violation, because this imposition was created by law and its constitutive elements are fully identified in the norm in question, conforming to the principle of legal reservation in tax matters.

IV.- Conclusion.

Consequently, in accordance with all of the foregoing considerations, the challenged norm is not unconstitutional, and therefore, the action must be dismissed.

Por tanto:

The action is declared without merit.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

President Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

They point out that the mentioned tax (erroneously called a "fee" (tasa)) had never been applied to the ipecac root exports made by their represented party, a situation that changed abruptly with the export made by their represented party on the past February 5th, in which the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre demanded, as a sine qua non requirement for issuing the corresponding export permit, the payment of the aforementioned tax. That is to say, their represented party was compelled to pay a tax that the law established for animals, by virtue of a regulatory provision that illegitimately extended that tax to plant species. On the foregoing grounds, they filed the amparo action 00-002835-007-CO that is the basis for this proceeding. They consider that the challenged provision has violated the principle of legality or legal reserve in tax matters, enshrined in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, since there can be no tax without a prior law establishing it, and the Constitutional Chamber has so reaffirmed. The taxable object, that is, the matter upon which the tax falls, forms part of the irreducible core of the principle of legality or legal reserve. Other matters, within certain limits, may be delegated to the author of the regulation, but not the taxable object. In other words, if the law establishes a tax on animals, it is not lawful for the Executive Branch, in the exercise of its regulatory power, to vary that taxable object and declare that the tax is also levied on exports of flora. They indicate that even the certain relativity that our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized for the principle of legal reserve in tax matters does not extend to the "structural bases of the tax" (bases estructurales del impuesto), to the constitutive or fundamental elements, such as the matter that the legislator chose as a manifestation of economic capacity to burden. That choice belongs to the Legislative Assembly in a qualified manner, since Article 124 of the Magna Carta prevents such matter from being heard by a legislative committee, but rather it must be heard by the full Assembly. It must therefore be concluded that what cannot be delegated even to a Legislative Committee within Congress, even less can be delegated to the Executive Branch. If the Executive legislates on the matter of the object of the tax, it invades—invalidly and unconstitutionally—the powers of the legislative organ. They emphasize that although the Wildlife Conservation Law uses the word "fee" (tasa), it is evident that what it established was a tax (impuesto) and not a fee (tasa), and their distinction lies in the different content of their taxable events (hechos generadores).

2.- The literal certification of the pleading in which the unconstitutionality is invoked appears at folio 13.

3.- By resolution issued at 4:25 p.m. on May sixteenth, two thousand (visible at folio 28 of the case file), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Director General de Aduanas.

4.- The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report, visible at folios 30 to 42. It points out that the plaintiff's standing originates from the amparo action filed and from the provisions of Article 30(a) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since in that process it challenged a normative provision along with the act of individual application. Consequently, this Advisory Body has no objection to make regarding active standing, and therefore proceeds to the analysis on the merits of the action filed. This action has as its object the analysis of Article 36 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, insofar as it establishes a tax (impuesto) of 5% on the FOB value of the wildlife flora shipment, as a requirement for granting the corresponding export permit. The action is filed insofar as wildlife flora is not contemplated as an object of the tax (impuesto) created by Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the law that serves as the basis for what is regulated in Article 36 of the cited decree. In this regard, the plaintiff alleges that said article violates the principle of legal reserve in tax matters, guaranteed by Article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitution. Regarding the State's taxing power, the Procuraduría General de la República, as the superior technical-legal advisory body of the Public Administration, has produced abundant administrative jurisprudence, which has been reiterated in the reports rendered to this Chamber as its objective advisor. From this perspective, it is appropriate to point out that the Chamber has endorsed the criteria of the Procuraduría on the matter at hand, strengthening—with the binding nature of its erga omnes rulings—a uniform position. Within this coinciding line, the Chamber has categorized the legal reserve as one of the constitutional principles that our Constitution establishes in tax matters (see ruling number 2197-92 of August eleventh, 1992, as well as the provisions of ruling number 2359-94, at 3:03 p.m. on May seventeenth, nineteen ninety-four). The Chamber's doctrine, coinciding with that expressed by the Procuraduría, has been clear in pointing out that the principle of legality or legal reserve in tax matters constitutes a principle of constitutional rank that stands as a limit on the exercise of taxing power. On repeated occasions, this High Court has indicated the scope of the principle of tax legality (see ruling number 1830-99 of March tenth, nineteen ninety-nine). When the Constitutional Chamber addressed the issue of legislative delegation in relation to the principle of legal reserve, it specified its content, essentially following the doctrine of the Full Court when it acted as controller of constitutionality (ruling number 730-95). Similarly, in ruling number 2947-94, it reiterated the jurisprudence of the Full Court in relation to the principle of tax legality, a ruling in which it cited what was resolved by that court. And, in ruling number 687-96 of February seventh, nineteen ninety-five, also in relation to the issue of legislative delegation in tax matters, it stated: "(…) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not so in what refers to the constitutive elements of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria) (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause (causa), tax rate (tarifa del impuesto)), in which the so-called legal reserve does apply." In such a way that the taxing power, understood as the power to enact legal norms that contain, against certain individuals or categories of persons, the obligation to pay a tax (tributo), is a power of the State which, by virtue of the principle of legality or legal reserve, and in accordance with the distribution of functions corresponding to each Branch of the State (Article 9 of the Magna Carta), is the responsibility of the Legislative Assembly. Hence, the structure of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria) (its constitutive elements) must be determined by formal law. This means that the active and passive subjects, the object, and the cause (taxable event (hecho generador)) can only be established by law. The Wildlife Conservation Law, number 7317 of October 21, 1992, and its amendments, establishes in Article 27 a tax (impuesto) on the "CIF" value of exported animals. Article 36 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435 of October 1, 1997, purports or tends to develop what is established in Article 27 of the Law and specifies the percentages for the different animal species; however, it adds a tax (impuesto) of 5% on the export of wildlife fauna, which is not contemplated in the Law. The cited Article 36 states: "Article 36.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay, before departure from the boarding point, 3% of the 'CIF' value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the 'CIF' value for other fauna species, and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wildlife flora. Exempted from the application of this article are the exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS." (The bold is not in the original). The legal reserve as a limit to the State's taxing power prevents the Executive Branch, in the exercise of its normative power, from establishing taxes (impuestos) because, in accordance with the constitutional jurisprudence cited supra, the relative nature of said reserve does not include the possibility of setting the bases of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), fundamentally, the active and passive subject, and the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax (tributo). In this sense, what the challenged Article 36 does is establish a tax (impuesto) (even though it is called a fee (tasa)) not contemplated by law, since it defines the passive subject (the exporters of wildlife flora), and the taxable event (hecho generador) (the activity of exporting wildlife flora, specifically the request for the wildlife flora export permit). What is regulated in Article 36 of the cited Decree clearly exceeds the relative nature that delegation in tax matters may have. Therefore, this Advisory Body considers that the phrase "and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wildlife flora" of Article 36 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 26435 of October 1, 1997, is unconstitutional insofar as it establishes a tax (impuesto) of 5% on the "FOB" value for the export of wildlife flora. Consequently, and in fulfillment of its role as Advisory Body to the Constitutional Chamber, this Procuraduría General recommends to the Honorable Constitutional Chamber that it grant this action, for which it suggests considering the following: That the jurisprudence—both administrative and that emanating from the Chamber—has consistently established that the principle of tax legality or legal reserve in that matter implies that taxes (impuestos) can only be established by formal law. -That the recognition of the relative nature of the legal reserve in tax matters does not mean that the Executive Branch can establish the structural bases of tax obligations (obligaciones tributarias), whose regulation is the exclusive power of the Legislative Assembly. -That Article 36 of Decreto Ejecutivo 26435 defines per se the passive subject and the taxable event (hecho generador) of a tax (impuesto) by levying it on the export of wildlife flora, because the legal norm that serves as its basis and that it purports to develop, Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, when establishing a tax (impuesto) on the export of animals, does not include wildlife flora.

5.- Mr. LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL DE VIDA SILVESTRE, responds to the hearing granted at folio 43, stating that the challenged norm is related to the content of Article 27 of Law 7317; however, due to its scope and from an exercise of normative comparison, it is perceived with relative ease that there is a fusion of regulatory aspects described in at least also Article 56 of that same legal body, and that due to a double interpretative error, they were described and incorporated within the text of Article 36. In effect, the challenged Article 36, complying with what Article 27 of the Law itself orders, in that the setting of rates (tasas) for export must be done by decreto ejecutivo, proceeds to describe the percentage amounts corresponding to the exports of species (animals) reproduced in breeding farms registered before the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre. The requirement described by the legislator cannot be deferred, modulated, or nullified by the Executive that has regulated that law, such that the payment of the fee (tasa) corresponding to the scenario described by the legislator is mandatory, both for the person who, on behalf of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre, performs the act of collection, and for the administered party, who is situated within the obligation to comply with the payment. However, the scenarios described in section 36 of the regulation partially correspond to the prefigurations of Article 27 of the Law, such as 3% of the CIF value of the shipment for export actions that include fish and butterflies, and 5% for other fauna species. In both scenarios, the scope of the Law is being regulated by decreto ejecutivo and thus fulfills the scenario described by the legislator. These rules also establish a setting within the percentage parameters that Law 7317 admits as valid. Related to this aspect, the first error that this Directorate points out and which is, at its core, the reason for the petitioner's disagreement, consists of the fact that the norm in question includes a phrase that literally says: "…and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wildlife flora". This phrase, this provision, does not come from any of the enabling scenarios by the Legislator for the exercise of the tax function in this Directorate, since its insertion within the challenged norm seems to have as its immediate antecedent Article 56 of the same Law 7317, not Article 27 as the text published in the regulatory act erroneously records. And it is that Article 56 of the Law, which regulates the acts of exportation of wildlife flora, is the norm that establishes, as a requirement of the permit, the payment of 5% of the FOB value of the flora shipment, all the more reason to determine as misguided the inclusion of that phrase within the challenged Article 36, since by means of the latter, Article 27 of the law is regulated, according to that regulatory text, but not Article 56 of the same legal body, which, in any case, would be legally inappropriate for being contrary to the legal regularity that norms and acts governed by public law must observe, in accordance with the bloc of legality (bloque de legalidad) enshrined in section 11 of the Political Constitution. It must also be considered that Article 56 of the Law would be inapplicable to the case, insofar as it regulates acts of exportation of wildlife flora for commercial purposes, since the species Psychotria ipecacuanha happens to be part of the taxonomic group of the Rubiaceae family, a species that according to Article 3 of the same Regulation constitutes national wildlife flora; however, both Article 56 of the Law and the concept inherent in the expression "in the wild" (en forma silvestre) described in paragraph one of Article 3 of the Regulation in question, are excluded from the definition of Wildlife that Law 7317 itself inserts into the legal system (Article 2). Hence, the tax scenario would also be inapplicable to the petitioner company. Thus, in the judgment of this state representation, the plaintiff is not correct in assuming that the entirety of the challenged norm is unconstitutional in its entirety. On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the use of the designation "fee" (tasa) by the legislator is erratic, since the scenarios with which doctrine assimilates this subspecies of tax (tributo) are not fulfilled (in the challenged norm). In this aspect, the criticism and the surrounding arguments, such as the degree of relativity or absoluteness of the legal reserve that our normative system recognizes, become sterile in this case, in principle, because the decision adopted by the legislator to formulate the description contained in the Código Tributario forms part of the parameters of constitutionality that this Dirección General considers valid within the classificatory modality of taxes (tributos) that the country has followed, in accordance with the legal institutes and principles gathered in Articles 4 and 5 of the cited Code, Law 4755 of April 29, 1971, and its reforms. In such a way that, if there were any controversial criterion between the classificatory systematization made by the legislator of the Código Tributario and the scope of the most commonly accepted doctrine, this should be the object of an action different from the present one, in which the petitioner would establish its disagreement against the descriptive module that the legislator of the Código Tributario has incorporated into our legal system, but it is not acceptable, and it requests the Chamber to so declare in its ruling, that the challenged norm does maintain legal regularity (and is therefore within the limits of legality) with the norm that sustains its legislative basis, insofar as it (the challenged one) limits itself to reproducing the scope described by the legislator in Article 27 of Law 7317, by applying the designation "fee" (tasa) for the tax burden (carga tributaria) arising within the proceeding in question. Exception made of the inconsequentially introduced phrase: "…and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wildlife flora", as this Directorate has solvently acknowledged. The petitioner is partially correct only in that what is indicated in parentheses (Art. 27 of Law 7317), first paragraph of Article 36 of the regulation, was silent regarding its failure to relate to Article 56 of the cited Law, therefore it includes both fauna and wildlife flora. It requests that the present action be dismissed.

6.- Mr. CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADUANAS, responds to the hearing granted at folio 49, stating that the challenged tax (impuesto) is not collectible at the customs level: the Customs Service does not contemplate, as part of customs taxes (impuestos aduaneros) or the customs tax obligation (obligación tributaria aduanera), the fee (tasa) that MINAE is currently demanding. It is the exporter who has had to prove payment of said fee (tasa) before MINAE so that it may issue the document called "Export Permit" (Permiso de Exportación). That document is presented before PROCOMER together with the rest, which upon applying its seal indicates that the export procedure is authorized for having met the necessary requirements. In the case under study, the plaintiff did not take into consideration Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which clearly indicates that the permit will also be extended to wildlife flora, not limiting its scope of application solely to fauna.

7.- The legal notices referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 110, 111, and 112 of the Boletín Judicial, of June 8, 9, and 12, 2000 (folio 56).

8.- The oral hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, given that the second paragraph of Article 9 ibidem empowers the Chamber to resolve any motion on the merits, even from its presentation, when it is considered sufficiently grounded in principles or indirect norms or in its own precedents or jurisprudence.

9.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.

Drafted by Judge Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility.

The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that to file an unconstitutionality action, it is necessary that there be a matter pending resolution in the courts or a proceeding to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is considered harmed. In the present case, the prior matter that confers standing on the plaintiff corresponds to the amparo action filed before this same Chamber, in view of case file 00-002835-007-CO, in which the harm caused by the application of the questioned norm is alleged.

II.- Object of the challenge.

Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, is challenged, considering it violative of the principle of tax legal reserve. For study purposes, the challenged norm is transcribed:

"Article 36.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay, before departure from the boarding point, 3% of the 'CIF' value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the 'CIF' value for other fauna species and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wildlife flora. Exempted from the application of this article are the exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS." III.- On the merits.

The plaintiff challenges the cited article, alleging that the legal basis of Article 27 of Law No. 7317 in no way authorizes the tax (impuesto) of 5% of the FOB value of the wildlife flora shipment stipulated therein, which in their opinion violates the principle of legal reserve in tax matters. Certainly, this Tribunal has been consistent in its jurisprudence in recognizing the constitutional nature of the principle of legality in tax matters, and has defined it as that which guarantees that the creation, modification, or suppression of taxes (tributos), charges (cargas), or levies (exacciones), the definition of the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship, as well as the granting of exemptions or benefits, can only be provided for in a law. Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution establishes an express legal reserve (reserva legal) in tax matters, which is reinforced by the provision contained in section 124 of the General Law of Public Administration that by way of decree, fines, charges (cargas), or levies (exacciones) cannot be created... That same "Legal Reserve" (Reserva de Ley) is developed by Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which in general terms stipulates that only the Law can create, modify, or suppress taxes (tributos); define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship; grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; establish privileges, etcetera...". The challenged norm refers in its text solely to Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which states:

"ARTICLE 27.- The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Environment and Energy is empowered to grant export permits for species reproduced in breeding farms (zoocriaderos), registered according to this Law. The permit holder must pay the fees (tasas) that, by decreto ejecutivo, are set for the authorized animals, before their departure from the port of boarding, which may not be less than two percent (2%) nor greater than five percent (5%) of the 'CIF' value. The export permits granted shall not be transferred to third parties without the prior authorization of that Directorate." (Thus amended the name of the Ministry by Article 116 of the Organic Law of the Environment No. 7554 of October 4, 1995).

However, from the analysis of the case record and the Wildlife Conservation Law, it is clear that the legal basis for the tax (impuesto) challenged herein by the plaintiff derives from Article 56 of said normative body, which states in the pertinent part:

"ARTICLE 56.- The export permit for wildlife flora for commercial purposes shall be issued by the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, upon prior payment of five percent (5%) of the 'FOB' value of the shipment, which shall be made to the account of the Wildlife Fund…" Thus, there is indeed a legal basis that supports it. The challenged Article 36 indicates what is authorized by the legal norms that grant regulatory power, without including any other concept. It contains the constitutive elements of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), transcribes the active subject, passive subject, taxable matter, and amount of the tax (tributo), which are a full reproduction of what is contained in Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. In this way, the alleged violation is not evident. On the other hand, the Chamber considers that even though the questioned norm was silent in its basis by indicating as its normative source only Article 27 of Law No. 7317 and not Article 56 of the same law, as far as this Tribunal is concerned, this does not constitute any constitutional violation, because this imposition was created by law and its constitutive elements are fully identified in the norm in question, conforming to the principle of legal reserve in tax matters.

IV.- Conclusion.

Consequently, in accordance with all the foregoing considerations, the challenged norm is not unconstitutional, and therefore, the action must be dismissed.

Por tanto:

The action is dismissed.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B.

155-02. WILD FLORA SHIPMENT TAX. Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law File 00-003521-0007-CO Res:

2002-00155 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hundred hours and two minutes on the sixteenth of January of two thousand two.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Nombre4190, of legal age, single, bearer of identity card number CED202, resident of San José, in his capacity as special judicial representative of the corporation VIA TICA S.A.; against Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law. Also participating in the proceeding were CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS in his capacity as DIRECTOR OF WILDLIFE, and FARID BEIRUTE BRENES, representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

**Resultando:** 1.- By document received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 16 hours and 17 minutes on May 3, 2000 (folio 1), the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law be declared, considering it a violation of the principle of legality or reservation of law in tax matters. He alleges that his represented party is engaged, among other things, in the export of "ipecac root," from the plant species also called ipecacuanha (scientific name: Psycotrix ipecacuana). That the Wildlife Conservation Law established in its Article 27 a tax on the export of wild animals, but not of plants. They point out that the mentioned tax (erroneously called "rate") had never been applied to the exports of ipecac root carried out by his represented party, a situation that changed abruptly in the export made by his represented party on the past 5th of February, in which the General Directorate of Wildlife demanded, as a sine qua non requirement to issue the corresponding export permit, the payment of the aforementioned tax. That is, his represented party was compelled to pay a tax that the law established for animals, by virtue of a regulatory provision that illegitimately extended that tax to plant species. Based on the foregoing, they filed the amparo action 00-002835-007-CO, which serves as the basis for this action. They deem that the challenged provision has violated the principle of legality or reservation of law in tax matters, enshrined by Article 121, paragraph 13 of the Political Constitution, since there can be no tax without a prior law establishing it, as reaffirmed by the Constitutional Chamber. The taxable object, that is, the matter upon which the tax falls, forms part of the irreducible core of the principle of legality or reservation of law. Other matters, within certain limits, may be delegated to the author of the regulation, but not the taxable object. In other words, if the law establishes a tax on animals, it is not lawful for the Executive Branch, in the exercise of its regulatory power, to vary that taxable object and declare that the tax is also triggered on exports of flora. They indicate that even the certain relativity that our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized for the principle of reservation of law in tax matters does not extend to the "structural bases of the tax," to the constitutive or fundamental elements, such as the matter that the legislator chose as a manifestation of economic capacity to tax. That choice corresponds to the Legislative Assembly in an aggravated manner, since Article 124 of the Magna Carta prevents such matter from being heard by a legislative committee, but rather it must be heard by the full Assembly. It must be concluded then, that what cannot be delegated even to a Legislative Committee within Congress, much less can be delegated to the Executive Branch. If the Executive legislates on the matter of the tax object, it invades – invalidly and unconstitutionally – the powers of the legislative body. They highlight that, although the Wildlife Conservation Law uses the term "rate," it is evident that what it established was a tax and not a rate, and its distinction lies in the different content of their generating events.

2.- The literal certification of the petition in which unconstitutionality is invoked appears on folio 13.

3.- By resolution at 16 hours 25 minutes on the sixteenth of May of two thousand (visible on folio 28 of the file), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Director General of Customs.

4.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic rendered its report, visible on folios 30 to 42. It states that the plaintiff's standing arises from the amparo action filed, and from what Article 30, a) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides to that effect, since in that proceeding it challenged a regulatory provision along with the individual act of application. Consequently, this Advisory Body has no objection to make regarding active standing, and thus proceeds to the analysis on the merits of the action filed. This action seeks the analysis of Article 36 of Executive Decree number 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, insofar as it establishes a tax of 5% on the FOB value of the shipment of wild flora, as a requirement for the granting of the corresponding export permit. The action is filed insofar as wild flora is not contemplated as an object of the tax created by Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, a law that serves as the foundation for what is regulated in Article 36 of the aforementioned decree. In this sense, the plaintiff alleges that said article violates the principle of reservation of law in tax matters, which is guaranteed by Article 121, paragraph 13) of the Constitution. Regarding the tax authority of the State, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as the superior technical-legal advisory body of the Public Administration, has produced abundant administrative jurisprudence, which has been reiterated in the reports rendered to this Chamber as its objective advisor. From this perspective, it is appropriate to note that the Chamber has endorsed the criteria of the Attorney General's Office on the matter at hand, strengthening – with the binding nature of its erga omnes judgments – a uniform position. Within this coinciding line, the Chamber has categorized the reservation of law as one of the constitutional principles that, in tax matters, our Constitution establishes (see judgment number 2197-92 of August eleventh, 1992, as well as the provisions in judgment number 2359-94, at fifteen hours three minutes on the seventeenth of May of nineteen ninety-four). The Chamber's doctrine, coinciding with that expressed by the Attorney General's Office, has been clear in stating that the principle of legality or reservation of law in tax matters constitutes a principle of constitutional rank that stands as a limit to the exercise of tax authority. On repeated occasions, this High Court has indicated the scope of the principle of tax legality (see judgment number 1830-99 of the tenth of March of nineteen ninety-nine). When the Constitutional Chamber addressed the issue of legislative delegation in relation to the principle of legal reservation, it specified its content following, in essence, the doctrine of the Full Court when it acted as a controller of constitutionality (judgment number 730-95). Similarly, in judgment number 2947-94, it reiterated the jurisprudence of the Full Court in relation to the principle of tax legality, a judgment in which it cited what was resolved by that court. And, in judgment number 687-96 of the seventh of February of nineteen ninety-five, also in relation to the issue of legislative delegation in tax matters, it stated: "(…) the Chamber has pronounced itself in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not so regarding the constitutive elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called reservation of law does apply." Thus, the tax authority, understood as the power to enact legal provisions that impose the obligation to pay a tax on certain individuals or categories of persons, is a power of the State that, by virtue of the principle of legality or reservation of law, and in accordance with the distribution of functions corresponding to each Branch of the State (Article 9 of the Magna Carta), is the domain of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, the structure of the tax obligation (its constitutive elements) must be determined by formal law. This means that the active and passive subjects, the object, and the cause (generating event) can only be established by law. The Wildlife Conservation Law, number 7317 of October 21, 1992, and its reforms, establishes in Article 27 a tax on the "CIF" value of exported animals. Article 36 of Executive Decree number 26435 of October 1, 1997, attempts or tends to develop what is established in Article 27 of the Law and specifies the percentages for the different species of animals; however, it adds a tax of 5% on the export of wild fauna, which is not contemplated in the Law. The cited Article 36 states: "Article 36.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay before departure from the shipping point 3% of the 'CIF' value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the 'CIF' value for other fauna species, and **5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wild flora**. Excluded from the application of this article are exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS." (The bold text is not from the original). The reservation of law, as a limit to the State's tax power, prevents the Executive Branch, in the exercise of its regulatory authority, from establishing taxes because, in accordance with the constitutional jurisprudence cited *supra*, the relative nature of said reservation does not include the possibility of setting the bases of the tax obligation, fundamentally, active and passive subjects, and the generating event of the tax. In this sense, what the challenged Article 36 does is establish a tax (although it is denominated a rate) not contemplated by law, since it defines the passive subject (the exporters of wild flora), and the generating event (the activity of exporting wild flora, specifically the application for the export permit for wild flora). What is regulated in Article 36 of the cited Decree clearly exceeds the relative nature that delegation in tax matters can have. Therefore, this Advisory Body considers that the phrase "*and **5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wild flora***" of Article 36 of Executive Decree number 26435 of October 1, 1997, is unconstitutional insofar as it establishes a tax of 5% on the "FOB" value for the export of wild flora. Consequently, and in fulfillment of its role as Advisory Body to the Constitutional Chamber, this Office of the Attorney General recommends that the Honorable Constitutional Chamber grant this action, for which it suggests considering the following: That the jurisprudence – both administrative and that emanating from the Chamber – has been consistent in establishing that the principle of tax legality or reservation of law in that matter implies that taxes can only be established by formal law. -That the recognition of the relative nature of the reservation of law in tax matters does not mean that the Executive Branch can establish the structural bases of tax obligations, the regulation of which is the exclusive power of the Legislative Assembly. -That Article 36 of Executive Decree 26435 defines *per se* the passive subject and the generating event of a tax by levying a charge on the export of wild flora, since the legal norm that serves as its foundation and which it intends to develop, Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, when it establishes a tax on the export of animals, does not include wild flora.

5.- Mr. LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WILDLIFE, responds on folio 43 to the granted hearing, stating that the challenged provision is related to the content of Article 27 of Law 7317; however, from its scope and a normative comparison exercise, it is perceived with relative ease that there is a fusion of regulatory aspects described at least also in Article 56 of that same legal body, and which, due to a double interpretive error, were described and incorporated within the text of Article 36. In effect, the challenged Article 36, complying with what Article 27 of the Law itself orders, regarding that the setting of rates for export must be done by executive decree, goes on to describe the percentage amounts corresponding to the exports of species (animals) reproduced in breeding farms registered with the General Directorate of Wildlife. The requirement described by the legislator cannot be deferred, modulated, or nullified by the Executive that has regulated that law, such that the payment of the rate corresponding to the assumption described by the legislator is mandatory, both for the person who, on behalf of the General Directorate of Wildlife, carries out the collection act, and for the administered party, who is placed under the obligation to comply with the payment. However, the assumptions described in numeral 36 of the regulation correspond partially to the prefigurations of Article 27 of the Law, such as 3% of the CIF value of the shipment for export actions that include fish and butterflies, and 5% for other fauna species. In both assumptions, the scope of the Law is being regulated by executive decree, and thus the assumption described by the legislator is fulfilled. These provisions also establish a setting within the percentage parameters that Law 7317 admits as valid. Related to this aspect, the first error that this Directorate points out, and which is fundamentally the reason for the plaintiff's disagreement, is that the regulation in question includes a phrase that literally says: "…and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wild flora." This phrase, this provision, does not originate from any of the enabling assumptions on the part of the Legislator for the exercise of the tax function in this Directorate, since its insertion within the challenged provision seems to have as its immediate antecedent Article 56 of the same Law 7317, not Article 27 as erroneously stated in the text published in the regulatory act. And it is that Article 56 of the Law, which regulates export acts of wild flora, is the provision that establishes as a requirement of the permit, the payment of 5% of the FOB value of the flora shipment, all the more reason to determine as mistaken the inclusion of that phrase within the challenged Article 36, since by means of the latter, Article 27 of the law is regulated, according to said regulatory text, but not Article 56 of the same legal body, which, in any case, would be juridically inappropriate for being contrary to the juridical regularity that norms and acts governed by public law must maintain, in accordance with the block of legality enshrined in numeral 11 of the Political Constitution. It should also be considered that Article 56 of the Law would be inapplicable in this case, insofar as it regulates the acts of export of wild flora for commercial purposes, since the species Psycotrix ipecacauana happens to be part of the taxonomic group of the Rubiaceae family, a species that, according to Article 3 of the same Regulation, constitutes national wild flora; however, both Article 56 of the Law, and the concept implicit in the expression "in wild form" described in the first paragraph of Article 3 of the Regulation under discussion, are excluded from the definition of Wildlife that Law 7317 itself (Article 2) inserts into the Legal System. From which the tax assumption would also be inapplicable to the plaintiff company. Therefore, in the judgment of this state representation, the plaintiff is not correct in assuming that the entirety of the challenged provision is unconstitutional in its entirety. On the other hand, the plaintiff alleges that the use of the designation "rate" by the legislator is erroneous, since the assumptions with which doctrine assimilates this subspecies of tax are not met (in the challenged provision). In this aspect, the criticism and the surrounding arguments, such as the degree of relativity or absoluteness of the reservation of law recognized by our regulatory system, become moot in this case, in principle, because the decision adopted by the legislator to formulate the description contained in the Tax Code forms part of the parameters of constitutionality that this General Directorate considers valid within the classification modality of taxes that the country has followed, in accordance with the legal institutes and principles collected in Articles 4 and 5 of the cited Code, Law 4755 of April 29, 1971, and its reforms. In such a way that, if there were any controversial criterion between the classification systematization made by the legislator of the Tax Code, and the scope of the most commonly accepted doctrine, this should be the object of an action different from the present one, in which the plaintiff would engage his diatribe against the descriptive module that the legislator of the Tax Code has incorporated into our legal system; but it is not acceptable, and it asks the Chamber to so declare in its judgment, that the challenged provision does maintain juridical regularity (and is therefore within the limits of legality) with the norm that supports its legislative foundation, insofar as the latter (the challenged provision) is limited to reproducing the scope described by the legislator in Article 27 of Law 7317, by applying the designation "rate" for the tax burden arising within the proceeding under discussion. Exception made for the phrase of inconsequential introduction: "…and 5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wild flora," as this Directorate has reliably recognized. The plaintiff is partially correct only insofar as the indication in parentheses (Art. 27 of Law 7317), first paragraph of Article 36 of the regulation, was omitted in that it did not relate to Article 56 of the cited Law; therefore, it includes both fauna and wild flora. It requests that the present action be declared without merit.

6.- Mr. CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, responds on folio 49 to the granted hearing, stating that the challenged tax is not collectible at the customs level: the Customs Service does not contemplate, as part of the customs duties or the customs tax obligation, the rate that MINAE is currently demanding. It is the exporter who has had to prove the payment of said rate before MINAE so that the latter issues the document called "Export Permit." This document is presented before PROCOMER along with the rest, and when the latter applies its seal, it indicates that the export process is authorized because the necessary requirements have been met. In the case under study, the plaintiff did not take into consideration Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which clearly states that the permit will also be extended to wild flora, not confining its scope of application solely to fauna.

7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in issues 110, 111, and 112 of the Judicial Bulletin, of the 8th, 9th, and 12th of June 2000 (folio 56).

8.- The oral hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, given that the second paragraph of Article 9 ibidem empowers the Chamber to resolve any matter on its merits, even from its presentation, when it is considered sufficiently founded on indirect principles or norms or on its own precedents or jurisprudence.

9.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and, **Considerando:** I.- On admissibility. The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that to file an action of unconstitutionality, it is necessary that there exists a matter pending resolution in the courts or a proceeding to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the prior matter that grants standing to the plaintiff corresponds to the amparo action filed before this same Chamber, in view of file 00-002835-007-CO in which the harm caused by the application of the challenged provision is alleged.

II.- Object of the challenge. Article 36 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Executive Decree No. 26435-MINAE of October 1, 1997, is challenged, being considered a violation of the principle of legal reservation in tax matters. For study purposes, the challenged provision is transcribed below:

"**Article 36**.- For the granting of the export permit (Article 27, Law No. 7317), the applicant must pay before departure from the shipping point 3% of the 'CIF' value for fish and butterflies, 5% of the 'CIF' value for other fauna species, and **5% of the 'FOB' value of the shipment for wild flora**. Excluded from the application of this article are exports regulated in Article 81 of the LCVS." III.- On the merits. The plaintiff challenges the cited article, arguing that the legal foundation of Article 27 of Law No. 7317 in no way authorizes the tax of 5% of the FOB value of the shipment of wild flora stipulated therein, which in his view violates the principle of legal reservation in tax matters.

Certainly this Court has been consistent in its jurisprudence in recognizing the constitutional character of the principle of legality in tax matters, and has defined it as that which guarantees that the creation, modification, or suppression of taxes (tributos), charges (cargas), or levies (exacciones), the definition of the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship, as well as the granting of exemptions or benefits, may only be provided for in a law. Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution establishes an express legal reservation in tax matters, which is reinforced by the provision contained in numeral 124 of the General Law of Public Administration that by means of a decree, fines, charges, or levies cannot be created...\" That same \"Legal Reservation\", is developed by Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, which in general terms stipulates that only the Law can create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; establish privileges, etcetera...\". The challenged norm refers in its text solely to Article 27 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which states:

"ARTICLE 27.- The General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Environment and Energy is empowered to grant export permits for species reproduced in wildlife breeding centers (zoocriaderos), registered under this Law.

The permit holder must pay the fees (tasas) that, by executive decree, are set for the authorized animals, before their departure from the port of embarkation, which may not be less than two percent (2%) nor greater than five percent (5%) of the CIF value.

The export permits granted shall not be transferred to third parties without prior authorization from that Directorate." (Thus modified the name of the Ministry by Article 116 of the Organic Law of the Environment No. 7554 of October 4, 1995).

However, from the analysis of the case file and the Wildlife Conservation Law, it follows that the legal basis for the tax (impuesto) challenged here by the plaintiff derives from Article 56 of said body of law, which, in pertinent part, states:

"ARTICLE 56.- The export permit for wild flora for commercial purposes shall be issued by the General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, upon prior payment of five percent (5%) of the 'FOB' value of the shipment, which shall be made to the account of the Wildlife Fund…" Thus, there is a legal basis that supports it. The challenged Article 36 indicates what is authorized by the legal norms that grant regulatory authority, without including any other concept. It contains the constitutive elements of the tax obligation, transcribing the active subject, the passive subject, the taxable base (materia imponible), and the amount of the tax, which are a full reproduction of what is contained in Article 56 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. In this way, the alleged violation is not evidenced. On the other hand, this Chamber considers that, even though the questioned norm was remiss in its basis by indicating as a normative source only Article 27 of Law No. 7317 and not Article 56 of the same law, as far as this Court is concerned, this does not constitute any constitutional violation, because this imposition was created by law and its constitutive elements are fully identified in the norm in question, conforming to the principle of legal reservation in tax matters.

IV.- Conclusion.

Consequently, in accordance with all the above considered, the challenged norm is not unconstitutional, and therefore, the action must be dismissed.

Therefore:

The action is declared without merit.

Luis Fernando Solano C. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

Res:

2002-00155 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.

San José, a las dieciséis horas con dos minutos del dieciséis de enero del dos mil dos.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre4190, mayor, soltero, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED202, vecino de San José en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de la sociedad VIA TICA S.A.; contra el artículo 36 del Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Intervinieron también en el proceso CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA, en su condición de DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADUANAS, LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS en su condición de DIRECTOR DE VIDA SILVESTRE y FARID BEIRUTE BRENES, en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 16 horas y 17 minutos del 3 de mayo del 2000 (folio 1), el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 36 del Reglamento de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre por estimarlo violatorio del principio de legalidad o reserva en materia tributaria. Alega que su representada se dedica entre otras cosas, a la exportación de "raíz de ipecacuana", proveniente de la especie vegetal denominada también ipecacuana ( nombre científico: Psycotrix ipecacuana). Que la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre estableció en su artículo 27 un impuesto a la exportación de animales silvestres, no así de las plantas. Señalan que el impuesto mencionado (erróneamente llamado "tasa") no se había aplicado nunca a las exportaciones de raíz de ipecacuana realizadas por su representada, situación que cambió abruptamente en la exportación realizada por su representada el pasado 5 de febrero, en la que la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre le exigió como requisito sine qua non para extenderle el correspondiente permiso de exportación, el pago del mencionado impuesto. Es decir, su representada se vio compelida a pagar un impuesto que la ley estableció para animales, en virtud de una norma reglamentaria que extendió ilegítimamente ese impuesto a especies vegetales. En razón de lo anterior, plantearon el recurso de amparo 00-002835-007-CO base de esta acción. Estiman que la norma impugnada ha violado el principio de legalidad o reserva de ley en materia tributaria, consagrado por el artículo 121, inciso 13 de la Constitución Política, pues no puede haber tributo sin ley previa que lo establezca y así lo ha reafirmado la Sala Constitucional. El objeto imponible, es decir, la materia sobre la cual recae el impuesto, forma parte del núcleo irreductible del principio de legalidad o reserva de ley. Otras materias, dentro de ciertos límites, podrán ser delegadas al autor del reglamento, pero no el objeto imponible. En otras palabras, si la ley establece un impuesto sobre animales, no le es lícito al Poder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de su potestad reglamentaria, variar ese objeto imponible y declarar que el impuesto se causa también sobre exportaciones de flora. Indican que incluso la cierta relatividad que nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido al principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, no se extiende a las "bases estructurales del impuesto", a los elementos constitutivos o fundamentales, tales como la materia que el legislador escogió como manifestación de una capacidad económica agravar. Esa elección corresponde a la Asamblea Legislativa de una manera agravada, puesto que el artículo 124 de la Carta Magna impide que tal materia sea conocida por una comisión legislativa, sino que ha de serlo por el pleno de la Asamblea. Debe concluirse entonces, que lo que no puede delegarse ni siquiera en una Comisión Legislativa en el seno del Congreso, mucho menos puede delegarse en el Poder Ejecutivo. Si el Ejecutivo legisla en materia del objeto del impuesto, invade –inválida e inconstitucionalmente- las potestades del órgano legislador. Resaltan, que aunque la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre utiliza el vocablo "tasa", es evidente que lo que estableció fue un impuesto y no una tasa y su distinción radica en el distinto contenido de sus hechos generadores.

2.- La certificación literal del libelo en que se invoca la inconstitucionalidad consta a folio 13.

3.- Por resolución de las 16 horas 25 minutos del dieciséis de mayo del dos mil (visible a folio 28 del expediente), se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Director General de Aduanas.

4 .- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe visible a folios 30 a 42. Señala que la legitimación de la actora proviene del recurso de amparo interpuesto, y de lo que al efecto dispone el artículo 30, a) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues en aquel proceso impugnó una disposición normativa junto con el acto de aplicación individual. Consecuentemente, este Organo Asesor no tiene reparo que hacer en relación con la legitimación activa, por lo que procede al análisis sobre el fondo de la acción interpuesta. Esta acción tiene por objeto el análisis del artículo 36 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 26435-MINAE de 1 de octubre de 1997, en tanto establece un impuesto de un 5% sobre el valor FOB del embarque de flora silvestre, como requisito para el otorgamiento del permiso de exportación correspondiente. La acción se interpone en tanto la flora silvestre no está contemplada como objeto del impuesto creado por el artículo 27 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, ley que sirve de fundamento a lo regulado en el artículo 36 del citado decreto. En tal sentido, alega la actora que dicho artículo quebranta el principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, que garantiza el artículo 121, inciso 13) constitucional. Acerca de la potestad tributaria del Estado, la Procuraduría General de la República, como órgano asesor superior técnico-jurídico de la Administración Pública, ha producido abundante jurisprudencia administrativa, que ha sido reiterada en los informes rendidos a esa Sala como su asesor objetivo. Desde esta óptica, procede señalar que la Sala ha prohijado los criterios de la Procuraduría, sobre la materia que nos ocupa, fortaleciendo -con el carácter vinculante de sus sentencias erga homnes- una posición uniforme. Dentro de esta línea coincidente la Sala ha catalogado a la reserva de ley como unos de los principios constitucionales que, en materia tributaria, establece nuestra Constitución (ver sentencia número 2197-92 de once de agosto de 1992, así como lo dispuesto en sentencia número 2359-94, de las quince horas tres minutos del diecisiete de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro). La doctrina de la Sala, coincidente con la externada por la Procuraduría, ha sido clara en señalar que el principio de legalidad o de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, constituye un principio de rango constitucional que se alza como límite al ejercicio de la potestad tributaria. En reiteradas ocasiones, este Alto Tribunal ha señalado los alcances del principio de legalidad tributaria (ver sentencia número 1830-99 del diez de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve). Cuando la Sala Constitucional abordó el tema de la delegación legislativa en relación con el principio de reserva legal, precisó su contenido siguiendo, en lo esencial, la doctrina de la Corte Plena cuando actuaba como contralora de constitucionalidad (sentencia número 730-95). De igual modo, en sentencia número 2947-94, reiteró la jurisprudencia de Corte Plena en relación con el principio de legalidad tributario, sentencia en la que citó lo resuelto por aquella. Y, en sentencia número 687-96 de siete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, también en relación con el tema de la delegación legislativa en materia tributaria, señaló: "(…) la Sala se ha pronunciado en favor de la delegación relativa en materia tributaria, pero no así en lo que se refiere a los elementos constitutivos de la obligación tributaria (sujetos activo y pasivo, objeto de la obligación, causa, tarifa del impuesto), en los que sí se da la llamada reserva de ley." De modo tal que la potestad tributaria, entendida como la potestad de sancionar normas jurídicas que contengan a cargo de determinados individuos o categorías de personas, la obligación de pagar un tributo, es una potestad del Estado que, en virtud del principio de legalidad o reserva de ley; y de acuerdo con la distribución de funciones que corresponden a cada Poder del Estado (artículo 9 de la Carta Magna), compete a la Asamblea Legislativa. De allí que la estructura de la obligación tributaria (sus elementos constitutivos) debe estar determinada por ley formal. Esto quiere decir que el sujeto activo y pasivo, el objeto y la causa (hecho generador) solamente pueden establecerse por ley. La Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, número 7317 de 21 de octubre de 1992, y sus reformas, establece en el artículo 27 un impuesto sobre el valor "CIF" de los animales exportados. El artículo 36 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 26435 de 1 de octubre de 1997, pretende o tiende a desarrollar lo establecido en el artículo 27 de la Ley y concreta los porcentajes para las distintas especies de animales; sin embargo, agrega un impuesto de un 5% sobre la exportación de fauna silvestre, lo que no está contemplado en la Ley. Dice el artículo 36 citado: "Artículo 36.- Para el otorgamiento del permiso de exportación (Artículo 27, Ley N° 7317), el solicitante deberá cancelar antes de la salida del puesto de embarque un 3% del valor "CIF" para peces y mariposas, un 5% del valor "CIF" para otras especies de fauna y un 5% del valor "FOB" del embarque para flora silvestre. Se exceptúan de la aplicación de este artículo las exportaciones reguladas en el artículo 81 de la LCVS." (La negrita no es del original). La reserva de ley como límite al poder tributario del Estado, impide que el Poder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de su potestad normativa, establezca impuestos porque, de conformidad con la jurisprudencia constitucional citada supra, el carácter relativo de dicha reserva no incluye la posibilidad de fijar las bases de la obligación tributaria, fundamentalmente, sujeto activo y pasivo, y hecho generador del tributo. En este sentido, lo que hace el artículo 36 impugnado es establecer un impuesto (aunque se le denomine tasa) no contemplado por la ley, ya que define el sujeto pasivo, (los exportadores de flora silvestre), y el hecho generador, (la actividad de exportación de flora silvestre, concretamente la solicitud del permiso de exportación de flora silvestre). Lo regulado en el artículo 36 del Decreto citado, rebasa claramente el carácter relativo que puede tener la delegación en materia tributaria. Por ello, considera este Organo Asesor que la frase "y un 5% del valor "FOB" del embarque para flora silvestre" del artículo 36 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 26435 de 1 de octubre de 1997, es inconstitucional en tanto establece un impuesto de 5% sobre el valor "FOB" para la exportación de flora silvestre. En consecuencia, y en cumplimiento de su papel de Organo Asesor de la Sala Constitucional, esta Procuraduría General recomienda a la Honorable Sala Constitucional estimar esta acción, para lo cual sugiere considerar lo siguiente: Que la jurisprudencia –tanto la administrativa como la emanada de la Sala- ha sido conteste en establecer que el principio de legalidad tributaria o de reserva de ley en esa materia, implica que sólo por ley formal se pueden establecer impuestos. -Que el reconocimiento del carácter relativo de la reserva de ley en materia tributaria, no significa que el Poder Ejecutivo pueda establecer las bases estructurales de las obligaciones tributarias, cuya regulación es potestad exclusiva de la Asamblea Legislativa. -Que el artículo 36 del Decreto Ejecutivo 26435, define per se el sujeto pasivo y el hecho generador de un impuesto al gravar la exportación de flora silvestre, pues la norma legal que le sirve de fundamento y que pretende desarrollar el artículo 27 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, cuando establece un impuesto sobre la exportación de animales, no incluye a la flora silvestre.

5.- El señor LUIS ROJAS BOLAÑOS en su condición de DIRECTOR GENERAL DE VIDA SILVESTRE contesta a folio 43 la audiencia concedida, manifestando que la norma impugnada está relacionada con el contenido del artículo 27 de la Ley 7317, sin embargo, por sus alcances y de un ejercicio de cotejo normativo, se percibe con relativa sencillez, que existe una fusión de aspectos regulatorios descritos en al menos también en el artículo 56 de aquel mismo cuerpo legal, y que por un doble error interpretativo, fueron descritas e incorporadas dentro del texto del artículo 36. En efecto, el artículo 36 impugnado cumpliendo con lo que ordena el mismo artículo 27 de la Ley, en cuanto a que la fijación de tasas para exportación debe hacerse mediante decreto ejecutivo, entra a describir los montos porcentualmente correspondientes a las exportaciones de especies (animales) reproducidas en los criaderos inscritos ante la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre. El requisito descrito por el legislador, no puede ser diferido, modulado o enervado por el Ejecutivo que ha reglamentado aquella ley, de tal suerte, que el pago de la tasa correspondiente al supuesto descrito por el legislador, es de acatamiento obligatorio, tanto para la persona que en nombre de la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre realiza el acto de cobro, como para el administrado, quien se sitúa dentro de la obligación de cumplir con el pago. No obstante, los supuestos descritos en el numeral 36 del reglamento, corresponden parcialmente a las prefiguraciones del artículo 27 de la Ley, tales como lo son un 3% del valor CIF del embarque para las acciones de exportación que incluyan peces y mariposas y de un 5% para otras especies de fauna. En ambos supuestos se está regulando mediante decreto ejecutivo los alcances de la Ley y se cumple así con el supuesto descrito por el legislador. En estas normas también se establece una fijación dentro de los parámetros porcentuales que admite como válidos la Ley 7317. Relacionado a este aspecto, el primer yerro que esta Dirección apunta y que es por su fondo el motivo de la disconformidad del recurrente, consiste en que la norma de marras incluye un frase que literalmente dice: "…y un 5% del valor "FOB" del embarque para la flora silvestre". Esta frase, esta disposición, no proviene de ninguno de los supuestos habilitatorios por parte del Legislador para el ejercicio de la función tributaria en esta Dirección, ya que su inserción dentro de la norma impugnada, parece tener como inmediato antecedente, el artículo 56 de la misma Ley 7317, no el artículo 27 como erróneamente lo consigna el texto publicado en el acto reglamentario. Y es que el artículo 56 de la Ley, que regula los actos de exportación de la flora silvestre, es la norma que establece como requisito del permiso, el pago de un 5% del valor FOB del embarque de flora, razón de más para determinar como desacertada la inclusión de aquella frase dentro del artículo 36 impugnado, ya que mediante este último, se reglamenta el artículo 27 de la ley, según dice aquel texto reglamentario, pero no el 56 del mismo cuerpo legal, lo que, en todo caso, sería jurídicamente inapropiado por ser contrario a la regularidad jurídica que deben guardar las normas y actos regidos por el derecho público, de conformidad con el bloque de legalidad que consagra el numeral 11 de la Constitución Política. También debe considerarse, que el artículo 56 de la Ley resultaría inaplicable al caso, en tanto éste regula los actos de exportación de la flora silvestre con fines comerciales, ya que la especie Psycotrix ipecacauana resulta ser parte del grupo taxonómico de la familia Rubiaceae, especie que según el artículo 3 del mismo Reglamento, constituye flora silvestre nacional, sin embargo, tanto el artículo 56 de la Ley, como el concepto ínsito en la expresión "en forma silvestre" descrito en el párrafo uno del artículo 3 del Reglamento en comentario, están excluidos de la definición de la Vida Silvestre que inserta en el Ordenamiento, la misma Ley 7317 (artículo 2). De donde también resultaría inaplicable el supuesto tributario para la empresa recurrente. Así las cosas, a juicio de esta representación estatal, no lleva razón el accionante al suponer que la totalidad de la norma impugnada es inconstitucional en su integridad. Por otro lado, alega el recurrente que el uso de la designación "tasa" por parte del legislador es errática, ya que no se cumplen (en la norma impugnada), los supuestos con los que la doctrina asimila esta subespecie de tributo. En este aspecto, la crítica y los argumentos circundantes, tales como el grado de relatividad o absolutez de la reserva de ley que reconoce nuestro sistema normativo, devienen estériles en este caso, en principio, porque la decisión adoptada por el legislador para formular la descripción contenida en el Código Tributario, forma parte de los parámetros de constitucionalidad que esta Dirección General considera válidos dentro de la modalidad clasificatoria de los tributos que ha seguido el país, de conformidad con los institutos jurídicos y principios recogidos en los artículos 4 y 5 del citado Código, Ley 4755 del 29 de abril de 1971 y sus reformas. De tal forma que, si hubiese algún criterio controversial entre la sistematización clasificatoria hecha por el legislador del Código Tributario, y los alcances de la doctrina más comúnmente aceptada, éste debería ser objeto de una acción distinta de la presente, en la que el recurrente entablará su diatriba contra el módulo descriptivo que ha incorporado el legislador del Código Tributario a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, pero no es aceptable y pide a la Sala que en sentencia así lo declare, que la norma impugnada sí guarda regularidad jurídica (y está por ende dentro de los límites de la legalidad) con la norma que sustenta su fundamento legislativo, en tanto esta (la impugnada), se limita a reproducir los alcances descritos por el legislador en el artículo 27 de la Ley 7317, al aplicar la designación "tasa" para la carga tributaria surgida dentro del trámite en comentario. Excepción hecha de la frase de inconducente introducción: "…y un 5% del valor "FOB" del embarque para la flora silvestre", tal y como esta Dirección lo ha reconocido solventemente. El recurrente lleva parcialmente la razón únicamente en cuanto a lo que se indica entre paréntesis (Art. 27 de la Ley 7317), primer párrafo del artículo 36 del reglamento fue omiso en cuanto a que no hizo relación con el artículo 56 de la citada Ley, por lo tanto se incluye tanto a la fauna, como a la flora silvestre. Solicita se declare sin lugar la presente acción.

6.- El señor CARLOS EDUARDO MUÑOZ VEGA en su condición de DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADUANAS contesta a folio 49 la audiencia concedida, manifestando que el impuesto impugnado no es cobrable en sede aduanera: el Servicio de Aduanas no contempla como parte de los impuestos aduaneros o de la obligación tributaria aduanera, la tasa que actualmente está exigiendo el MINAE. Es el exportador quien ha tenido que comprobar el pago de dicha tasa ante el MINAE para que éste le extienda el documento denominado "Permiso de Exportación". Ese documento lo presenta ante PROCOMER junto con el resto, la cual al aplicar su sello indica que está autorizado el trámite de exportación por haberse cumplido con los requisitos necesarios. En el caso de estudio, el accionante no tomó en consideración el artículo 56 de la Ley de la Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, que claramente señala que el permiso también se extenderá a la flora silvestre, no circunscribiendo su ámbito de aplicación únicamente a la fauna.

7.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 110, 111 y 112 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 8, 9 y 12 de junio del 2000 (folio 56).

8.- Se prescinde de la vista oral prevista en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 ibídem, faculta a la Sala para resolver por el fondo cualquier gestión, aún desde su presentación, cuando se considere suficientemente fundada en principios o normas indirectas o en sus propios precedentes o jurisprudencia.

9.- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad.

El artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que para interponerse una acción de inconstitucionalidad es necesario que exista asunto pendiente de resolver en los tribunales o un procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En el presente caso, el asunto previo que legitima a la parte accionante, corresponde al recurso de amparo presentado ante esta misma Sala, con vista al expediente 00-002835-007-CO en el cual se acusa el perjuicio que le causa la aplicación de la norma cuestionada.

II.- Objeto de la impugnación.

Se impugna el artículo 36 del Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26435-MINAE del 1 de octubre de 1997, por considerarlo violatorio del principio de reserva legal tributaria. Para efectos de estudio se procede a transcribir la norma impugnada:

"Artículo 36.- Para el otorgamiento del permiso de exportación (Artículo 27, Ley N° 7317), el solicitante deberá cancelar antes de la salida del puesto de embarque un 3% del valor "CIF" para peces y mariposas, un 5% del valor "CIF" para otras especies de fauna y un 5% del valor "FOB" del embarque para flora silvestre. Se exceptúan de la aplicación de este artículo las exportaciones reguladas en el artículo 81 de la LCVS".

III.- Sobre el fondo.

El accionante impugna el artículo de cita, por cuanto alega que el fundamento legal del artículo 27 de la Ley No. 7317 no autoriza en forma alguna el impuesto de un 5% del valor FOB del embarque de flora silvestre que ahí se estipula, lo que a su criterio violenta el principio de reserva legal en materia tributaria. Ciertamente este Tribunal ha sido consecuente en su jurisprudencia al reconocer el carácter constitucional del principio de legalidad en materia tributaria, y lo ha definido como aquel que garantiza que la creación, modificación o supresión de tributos, cargas o exacciones, la definición del hecho generador de la relación tributaria, así como el otorgamiento de exenciones o beneficios, solo puede disponerse en una ley. El artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política establece una reserva legal expresa en materia tributaria, lo cual se refuerza con la disposición contenida en el numeral 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública de que por vía de decreto no se pueden crear multas, cargas ni exacciones..." Esa misma "Reserva de Ley", es desarrollada por el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, el cual en términos generales estipula que sólo la Ley puede crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir el hecho generador de la relación tributaria; otorgar exenciones, reducciones o beneficios, establecer privilegios, etcétera...". La norma impugnada hace referencia en su texto únicamente al artículo 27 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre que dice:

"ARTICULO 27.- Facúltase a la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía para otorgar permisos de exportación para especies reproducidas en zoocriaderos, inscritos según la presente Ley.

El permisionario deberá cancelar las tasas que, por decreto ejecutivo, se fijen para los animales autorizados, antes de su salida del puerto de embarque, las que no podrán ser inferiores a un dos por ciento (2%) ni mayores a un cinco por ciento (5%) del valor "CIF".

Los permisos de exportación otorgados no serán transferidos a terceras personas, sin la previa autorización de esa Dirección." (Así modificado el nombre del Ministerio por el artículo 116 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente No.7554 del 4 de octubre de 1995).

Sin embargo, del análisis de los autos y de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, se desprende que el fundamento legal del impuesto aquí impugnado por el accionante, deriva del artículo 56 de dicho cuerpo normativo, que cita en lo que interesa:

"ARTICULO 56.- El permiso de exportación de la flora silvestre con fines comerciales lo extenderá la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, previa cancelación del cinco por ciento (5%) del valor "FOB" del embarque, la que se efectuará en la cuenta del Fondo de Vida Silvestre…" Así las cosas, sí existe fundamento legal que lo respalda. El artículo 36 impugnado señala lo autorizado por las normas jurídicas que conceden la facultad reglamentaria, sin incluir ningún otro concepto. Contiene los elementos constitutivos de la obligación tributaria, transcribe el sujeto activo, sujeto pasivo, materia imponible y monto del tributo, que son plena reproducción de lo contenido en el artículo 56 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. De este modo, no se evidencia la violación acusada. Por otro lado, estima la Sala, que aún y cuando la norma cuestionada resultó omisa en su fundamento al indicar como fuente normativa únicamente el artículo 27 de la Ley No. 7317 y no el artículo 56 de la misma ley, en lo que compete a este Tribunal, ello no constituye violación constitucional alguna, por cuanto esta imposición fue creada por ley y sus elementos constitutivos se encuentran plenamente identificados en la norma de marras, ajustándose al principio de reserva legal en materia tributaria.

IV.- Conclusión.

Por consiguiente, de conformidad con todo lo anteriormente considerado, la norma impugnada no resulta inconstitucional, y por ende, la acción debe ser desestimada.

Por tanto:

Se declara sin lugar la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.