Outright rejection of unconstitutionality action against tax rules on assignment of fiscal creditsRechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra normas tributarias sobre cesión de créditos fiscales

Res: 2001-02239 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-one minutes on March twenty-first, two thousand one.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Rolando Salas Arce, holder of identity card number CED420, in his capacity as Nombre211 with powers of general attorney-in-fact for the Cámara Nacional de Comercializadores de Tecnología Informática. Farid Beirute Brenes appears in the proceeding on behalf of the Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- In a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours and twelve minutes on October twentieth, two thousand (folio 1), Rolando Salas Arce files this action and states: 1) Regarding the object of the action. Article 43 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios is challenged, specifically the first part of the first paragraph, as well as its second paragraph. Likewise, the first paragraph of Article 45 of the same code. Transitorio III of Ley N° 7900 of August 3, 1999, is also questioned in the action. 2) Regarding the admissibility of the action. In relation to standing (legitimación) to appear before this jurisdictional venue, the plaintiff invokes the rule established in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, whose jurisprudential development has admitted the admissibility of the action without the need for a pending matter to serve as the basis for the action, when it concerns the defense of corporate interests, which by their nature belong to the association that represents and defends them, and at the same time to each of its members. 3) Regarding the grounds for the action. The plaintiff indicates that the members of the chamber he represents, as merchants, are taxpayers (contribuyentes), responsible parties, and withholding agents for sales and income taxes. That the challenged norms prohibit offsetting by third-party assignees, so the liquid and enforceable credits of taxpayers and responsible parties cannot be assigned. That this class of credits, by its legal nature, is of immediate enforcement of compliance by the creditor, not subject to any term or condition. That the norms denature this character of a liquid and enforceable obligation, as they eliminate the free circulation of the credit, affecting the rights of property and free trade thereof, enshrined in Articles 45 and 46 of the Constitución Política. That the taxpayer, despite having these credits integrated into his/her estate, and therefore belonging to him/her as rights, cannot dispose of his/her property as he/she sees fit, but rather as the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) defines it. That it is not a purely simple bearable limitation, but rather constitutes an irrational or disproportionate restriction on the free circulation of wealth and estate, in this case the credits held by the taxpayer. That moreover, this prohibition undermines proper tax management and collection, as it prevents responsible taxpayers or withholding agents from paying their tax obligations through this means, which may be considered swift and reliable, making tax management more burdensome. He adds that the elimination of Article 48 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, by virtue of the provisions of the challenged Transitorio III, suffers from the defect of lack of reasonableness and proportionality, limiting trade with credits, for the purpose of assigning them to third parties.

2.- Procedural actions. 1) By resolution of seven hours fifty-five minutes on November first, two thousand, the plaintiff was warned to justify his standing regarding the corporate interest deemed injured, to specify which part of the norms is questioned in the action and in what sense it is raised, as well as to indicate which constitutional norms or principles are deemed violated, with an express indication of the reasons (folio 7). 2) By a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes on November sixth, two thousand, the plaintiff responded to the referred warning (folio 12). 3) By resolution of fifteen hours forty-five minutes on December eleventh, two thousand, the action was admitted and the legal hearing was granted to the Procuraduría General de la República (folio 19). 4) The Procuraduría General answered the respective hearing in a writing filed with the Chamber on January sixteenth, two thousand one (folio 26). 5) The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 6, 7, and 8 of the Boletín Judicial, on the ninth, tenth, and eleventh days of January, two thousand one, respectively (folio 25). 6) The oral and public hearing provided for in Article 10 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the same law, since there are sufficient elements of judgment to resolve.

3.- Report of the Procuraduría General de la República. In its corresponding report, that advisory body indicates: 1) Regarding standing. It indicates that the jurisprudence of this Chamber initially held that corporate entities were empowered to directly file actions of unconstitutionality when the challenged norm affected the sphere of action of the entity and its members, such that an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality would favorably modify the obligations, powers, or faculties of the members of the association, it being necessary to demonstrate the connection that the claim bears with regard to the specific situation of the collective, specifically with its object and estate. That this thesis has been changed, in the sense that when the norm is capable of being applied individually to the members, the corporation lacks standing to raise the action directly, but must do so based on a prior matter. The Procuraduría considers that the second jurisprudential position is the correct one, so the plaintiff Chamber lacks standing to directly file the action. That the challenged norms are capable of being applied individually to the members of that association, which would allow those persons to make the claims that serve as the basis for the action. 2) On the merits. As a preliminary observation, the Procuraduría affirms that from the approach of the action it infers that the claim is directed at maintaining what was provided—before the entry into force of Ley N° 7900—by Article 48 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, so it understands that the action is directed against Article 5, subsection a) of Ley N° 7900, a norm that expressly repealed Article 48 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which contemplated the possibility of assigning tax credits to third parties. Regarding the alleged violation of the right to property, it considers that the inability to assign tax credits does not in any way diminish the estate of the taxpayers, since whoever makes an excess payment to the Administration has the right to claim its return together with the payment of the interest that those sums would have accrued, therefore no unjust enrichment occurs in favor of the treasury. That the truth is that the legal system has reasonably provided for the manner in which the return of money received in excess is to be effected. That the decision to allow or not the assignment of tax credits falls within the sphere of legislative discretion, without any constitutional principle being injured. That, indeed, during the legislative process of Ley N° 7900, the convenience of maintaining the assignment of tax credits in force was analyzed, and that possibility was discarded, through the legitimate exercise of legislative powers. Regarding the alleged violation of the freedom of commerce, it points out that, like any other right, that freedom is subject to restrictions and limitations, which are valid provided they are established in norms of legal rank, are reasonable, proportional, and do not empty the fundamental right in question of its content, conditions that are met in the case discussed in the action. Nor does it appreciate any unconstitutionality in the provision that obliges taxpayers to offset their tax credits with the debts they may have with the Tax Administration. The foregoing, because the simultaneous concurrence of a reciprocal credit and debit between two persons—unless otherwise agreed—causes offsetting to operate by operation of law, a rule also applicable in civil matters. That this rule is even more justified in the case of obligations with the Tax Administration, as there is a reason of public interest that justifies it, namely the State's need to collect taxes in the most efficient manner possible. It adds that, in any case, the plaintiff does not challenge Article 46 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the norm in which that possibility is regulated. The Procuraduría concludes that if the merits of the matter were to be heard, the action must be declared without merit, given the absence of a breach of the Constitución Política.

4.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Arguedas Ramírez; and,

Considerando:

I.- Regarding the object of the action. This action is brought for the purpose of having the unconstitutionality declared of Articles 43 and 45 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, as well as Transitorio III of Ley N° 7900, specifically in the texts transcribed below:

Article 43. Excess payments and statute of limitations for the action for restitution. Taxpayers and responsible third parties have an action to claim the restitution of what was unduly paid for taxes, advance payments, penalties, and interest, even if at the time of payment they did not formulate any reservation.

(...)

Likewise, taxpayers and responsible parties may request the return of credit balances that exceed the offsetting provided for in Article 46 of this Code. Refunds shall earn interest equal to that established in Article 58 of this Code; this interest shall run from the first calendar day following the date of payment made by the taxpayer." "Artículo 45.- Cases in which it proceeds. Liquid and enforceable credits of the taxpayer for taxes and their accessories shall be offset ex officio or at the request of a party, with tax debts determined by the taxpayer and unpaid, or with those determined ex officio, (...)" TRANSITORIO III. (...) Until September 30, 2000, Article 48 repealed in this law shall remain in force. Requests for assignment to third parties made before the repeal of Article 48 must be processed in accordance with said article." II.- Regarding admissibility. The plaintiff Chamber seeks to base its standing on the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which regulates the exceptions to the requirement of having a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the interest deemed injured, as a requirement for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. It alleges that by virtue of the importation and commercialization of information technology by its members, they act as taxpayers and also as withholding agents for sales and income taxes, generating a series of tax credits, which however they cannot assign by virtue of the questioned norms. It points out that among the purposes of that corporation are to exercise permanent vigilance over state legal and political actions related to the interests of importers, representatives, sellers, and consumers of computer equipment, as well as to exercise the pertinent legal actions for the defense of its members and the community as a whole, in everything concerning the field of computing and its market. They consider that tax credits, being liquid and enforceable, are part of their members' estate, so that the impossibility of assigning or trading that part of their estate with third parties causes them immediate harm, being directly affected by that limitation. Considering the plaintiff's approach, first, it must be recalled that the action of unconstitutionality is a judicial route that, as expressly regulated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, must meet a series of formal requirements for its admissibility, unlike habeas corpus and the recurso de amparo, in which the principle of informality prevails, in order to foster the broadest access to an expeditious jurisdictional remedy for the defense of fundamental rights. This rigorousness that characterizes the action of unconstitutionality is based not only on the greater complexity that usually accompanies the legal arguments that support it but is also related to the transcendence that an estimatory judgment acquires when, with erga omnes effects, it eliminates one or more provisions from the legal system with declaratory and retroactive effects to their date of effectiveness. In that sense, precisely one of the aspects of formality that takes on special importance is the issue of active standing to bring the action. In this regard, Article 75 of the law regulating this jurisdiction requires accrediting the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the norm whose constitutional quality is questioned is necessarily applicable. The latter ensures that the action becomes a reasonable means of protection for the promoter, through the annulment of the norm that, in the base matter, is being applied to the detriment of his/her rights. As this Court has repeatedly stated, the action is incidental in nature in favor of any of the parties in the principal matter, so it cannot be directed against any norm, but only against those that have a direct influence on the case pending resolution, for the determination of which the criterion of the utility of the estimatory judgment is used (see resolutions number 6696-93 and 3628-95). Hence, this Chamber deems it appropriate to emphasize that such an admissibility requirement is the rule, and that it can only be bypassed in the qualified circumstances of exception established by the law itself. Certainly, jurisprudence has had the opportunity to refer to the case of the defense of corporate interests, in the case of a specific collective, as one of those exception hypotheses. However, special care must be taken not to confuse that hypothesis with a popular action that allows challenging any type of norm, thereby denaturing the standing rules referred to. Thus, resolution N° 2621-95 of May 23, 1995, stated: "the Chamber has interpreted that the assumption established in Article 75.2, regarding the defense of interests that concern the collective as a whole, refers to interests of a corporate nature of a specific collective, and it has systematically rejected the standing to directly bring an action in this constitutional review avenue for those who only hold an interest in constitutional legality, because this would imply admitting the existence of a kind of popular action that our legal system, in general, rejects." Under this exception, the Chamber has admitted some actions of unconstitutionality brought by entities that group together a series of members identified by a specific activity in common. Now, in the case of the present action, it must be taken into account that these are norms of a general nature in tax matters, referring to the cancellation and assignment of credits that the taxpayer may have against the Administration, by virtue of excess payments made. From a simple reading of the norms, as well as from the arguments outlined in the action, it is concluded without difficulty that there is no exclusive or special affectation of the plaintiff Chamber or its members, since these are general norms. So much so that they are contained in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which collects the general principles and regulations in this matter. This means that these are provisions that, although it is true they may affect the members of the plaintiff Chamber—in their capacity as taxpayers or withholding agents for taxes, since they participate in activities of a commercial nature—are equally applicable to any other taxpayer, whether a natural or legal person and whatever the activity to which they are dedicated. And that first conclusion leads to another even more important one: these normative provisions are destined to materialize in innumerable cases of specific application, relative to the legal sphere of specific persons. Consequently, even in the eventual case that the questioned norms could entail some defect of unconstitutionality, that irregularity would be reflected and individualized in any taxpayer who finds themselves in the normative assumption in question. Thus, it would be that person who, based on a claim at the judicial or administrative level, would be able to have the matter pending resolution that serves as support in terms of standing for purposes of raising the corresponding action. The foregoing considerations lead this Chamber to order a flat rejection (rechazo de plano) of the action, insofar as the person bringing it lacks the necessary standing that would allow the Court to hear the substantive issues raised.

III.- In addition to the considerations set forth in the preceding section, in any case, it is worth noting that there is an additional reason that determines the inadmissibility of the action directed against Articles 43 and 45 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, and Transitorio III of Ley N° 7900. Note that the plaintiff's claim is directed at questioning the legal impossibility of assigning tax credits in favor of third parties—who have debts with the Tax Administration—at the free choice of the creditor taxpayer. However, it was the repeal of Article 48 of the cited code—which occurred, as the Procuraduría rightly notes in its report, by express provision of subsection a) of Article 5 of Ley N° 7900—that barred that possibility, and not the norms that the plaintiff challenges. As noted in section 1) of the second resultando of this resolution, the Chamber warned the plaintiff to correctly specify which text of the norms was being challenged, and in relation to which constitutional principles or norms it was doing so. However, even upon responding to the warning, the weaknesses that the Chamber observes in the action were not remedied. In that sense, there is an evident incongruence between the claim and the object of the action, a serious error in approach that would determine—even disregarding the aspect of standing—the flat rejection of the action brought.

Por tanto:

The action is flatly rejected (se rechaza de plano).

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Nombre211, a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Adrián Vargas B.

José Luis Molina Q. Gilbert Armijo S.

• 2)On the merits. As a preliminary observation, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) states that from the framing of the action, it infers that the claim is aimed at maintaining what was provided—before the entry into force of Law No. 7900—by Article 48 of the Tax Code (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), such that it understands the action is directed against Article 5, subsection a) of Law No. 7900, a provision that expressly repealed Article 48 of the Tax Code, which contemplated the possibility of assigning tax credits (créditos fiscales) to third parties. Regarding the alleged violation of the right to property, it considers that the impossibility of assigning tax credits does not in any way impair the assets of taxpayers, since anyone who makes an excess payment to the Administration has the right to claim its refund along with the payment of interest that those sums would have accrued, meaning there is no unjust enrichment in favor of the treasury. The fact is that the legal system reasonably provides for the manner in which the refund of money received in excess is to be made effective. The decision to allow or not allow the assignment of tax credits falls within the scope of legislative discretion, without violating any constitutional principle. Indeed, during the legislative process of Law No. 7900, the advisability of keeping the assignment of tax credits in force was analyzed, and that possibility was discarded through the legitimate exercise of legislative powers. Regarding the alleged violation of freedom of commerce, it notes that, like any other right, that freedom is subject to restrictions and limitations, which are valid provided they are established in legal provisions, are reasonable, proportionate, and do not empty the fundamental right in question of its content, conditions that are met in the case discussed in the action. It also does not perceive any unconstitutionality in the provision that obligates taxpayers to offset (compensar) their tax credits against debts they may have with the Tax Administration. The foregoing, because the simultaneous concurrence of a reciprocal credit and debit between two persons—unless there is a prior agreement to the contrary—causes offsetting (compensación) to operate by operation of law, a rule also applicable in civil matters. This rule is even more justified in the case of obligations with the Tax Administration, as there is a public interest reason that justifies it, namely the State's need to collect taxes as efficiently as possible. It adds that, in any case, the plaintiff does not challenge Article 46 of the Tax Code, the provision in which that possibility is regulated. The Attorney General's Office concludes that if the merits of the matter are to be heard, the action must be dismissed, given the absence of any breach of the Political Constitution.

4.- The procedures have complied with the prescriptions of law.

Drafted by Magistrate Arguedas Ramírez; and,

Considering:

I.- On the object of the action. This action is brought with the purpose of having the unconstitutionality of Articles 43 and 45 of the Tax Code, as well as Transitory Provision III of Law No. 7900, declared, specifically in the texts transcribed below:

Article 43. Excess payments and statute of limitations for the action for recovery. Taxpayers and responsible third parties have the right of action to claim the restitution of amounts unduly paid for taxes, advance payments, penalties, and interest, even if no reservation was made at the time of payment.

(...)

Likewise, taxpayers and responsible parties may request the refund of credit balances that exceed the offsetting (compensación) provided for in Article 46 of this Code. Refunds shall accrue interest equal to that established in Article 58 of this Code; this interest shall run from the first calendar day following the date of the payment made by the taxpayer." "Article 45.- Cases in which it is appropriate. Liquid and enforceable credits of the taxpayer for taxes and their accessories shall be offset (compensar) ex officio or at the party's request, against tax debts determined by the taxpayer and not paid, or against those determined ex officio, (...)" TRANSITORY PROVISION III. (...) Until September 30, 2000, Article 48 repealed in this law shall remain in force. Requests for assignment to third parties made before the repeal of Article 48 must be processed in accordance with said article." II.- On admissibility. The plaintiff Chamber seeks to base its legal standing (legitimación) on the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which regulates the exceptions to the requirement of having a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the unconstitutionality of the provision has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the interest deemed harmed, as a requirement for the admissibility of the unconstitutionality action. It claims that by virtue of its members' import and marketing of information technology, they act as taxpayers and also as withholding agents for sales and income taxes, generating a series of tax credits, which, however, they cannot assign by virtue of the questioned provisions. It points out that among the purposes of that corporation are to exercise permanent oversight of state legal and political actions related to the interests of importers, representatives, sellers, and consumers of computer equipment, as well as to exercise pertinent legal actions for the defense of its members and the community as a whole, in everything concerning the field of computing and its market. They consider that tax credits, being liquid and enforceable, are part of their members' assets, such that the impossibility of assigning or negotiating that part of their assets with third parties causes them immediate harm, being directly affected by that limitation. In view of the plaintiff's argument, it must first be recalled that the unconstitutionality action is a judicial remedy that, as expressly regulated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, must meet a series of formal requirements for its viability, unlike habeas corpus and the amparo remedy (recurso de amparo), in which the principle of informality prevails, in order to foster the broadest access to an expeditious jurisdictional remedy for the defense of fundamental rights. This rigor that characterizes the unconstitutionality action is based not only on the greater complexity that usually accompanies the legal arguments that support it, but also relates to the significance that an upholding judgment acquires when, with erga omnes effects, it removes one or more provisions from the legal system with declaratory and retroactive effects to their effective date. In this vein, precisely one of the aspects of formality that takes on special importance is the issue of active legal standing to bring the action. In this regard, Article 75 of the law governing this jurisdiction requires demonstrating the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, either in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the provision whose constitutional quality is questioned must necessarily be applied. The latter ensures that the action becomes a reasonable means of protection for the plaintiff, through the annulment of the provision that, in the underlying matter, is being applied to the detriment of their rights. As this Court has repeatedly stated, the action has an incidental character in favor of any of the parties in the main matter, so it cannot be directed against just any provision, but only against those that have a direct influence on the case pending resolution, for whose determination the criterion of the usefulness of the upholding judgment is used (see resolutions numbers 6696-93 and 3628-95). Hence, this Chamber deems it appropriate to emphasize that such an admissibility requirement is the rule, and that it can only be dispensed with under the qualified exceptional circumstances established by the law itself. Certainly, jurisprudence has had the opportunity to refer to the case of the defense of corporate interests, in the case of a specific community, as one of those exceptional hypotheses. However, special care must be taken not to confuse that hypothesis with a popular action allowing any type of provision to be challenged, thereby distorting the rules of standing referred to. Thus, Resolution No. 2621-95 of May 23, 1995, stated: "the Chamber has interpreted that the scenario established in Article 75.2, regarding the defense of interests that concern the community as a whole, refers to interests of a corporate nature of a specific community, and it has systematically rejected the standing to bring a direct action in this channel of constitutional review of those who only hold an interest in constitutional legality, because this would imply admitting the existence of a kind of popular action that our legal system, in general, rejects." Based on this exception, the Chamber has admitted some unconstitutionality actions brought by entities that group a series of members identified by a specific common activity. Now, in the case of the present action, it must be taken into account that these are provisions of a general nature in tax matters, referring to the cancellation and assignment of credits that the taxpayer may have against the Administration, by virtue of excess payments made. From a simple reading of the provisions, as well as from the arguments outlined in the action, it is easily concluded that there is no exclusive or special impact on the plaintiff Chamber or its members, since these are general provisions. This is so much so that they are contained in the Tax Code, which collects the general principles and regulations in this matter. This means that these are provisions that, while it is true they may affect the members of the plaintiff Chamber—in their capacity as taxpayers or tax withholding agents, since they participate in activities of a commercial nature—they are equally applicable to any other taxpayer, whether an individual or legal entity and whatever the activity they engage in. And that first conclusion leads to another even more important one: these regulatory provisions are destined to materialize in innumerable cases of specific application, relating to the legal sphere of specific persons. Consequently, even in the event that some defect of unconstitutionality could be inherent in the questioned provisions, that irregularity would be reflected and individualized in any taxpayer who finds themselves in the regulatory scenario in question. Thus, it would be that person who, based on a claim at the judicial or administrative level, could have the pending matter for resolution that serves as a basis for standing purposes to bring the corresponding action. The foregoing considerations lead this Chamber to order the outright dismissal (rechazo de plano) of the action, since whoever brings it lacks the necessary legal standing to allow the Court to hear the substantive issues raised.

III.- In addition to the considerations set out in the previous section, it is in any case appropriate to note that there is an additional reason determining the inadmissibility of the action directed against Articles 43 and 45 of the Tax Code, and Transitory Provision III of Law No. 7900. Note that the plaintiff's claim is directed at questioning the legal impossibility of assigning tax credits to third parties—who have debts with the Tax Administration—at the free choice of the creditor taxpayer. However, it was the repeal of Article 48 of the said code—which occurred, as the Attorney General's Office rightly notes in its report, by express provision of subsection a) of Article 5 of Law No. 7900—that rendered that possibility forbidden, and not the provisions that the plaintiff challenges. As noted in section 1) of the second recital of this resolution, the Chamber warned the plaintiff to correctly specify which text of the provisions it was challenging, and in relation to which constitutional principles or norms it was doing so. However, even when responding to the warning, the weaknesses that the Chamber observes in the action were not remedied. In this sense, there is an evident inconsistency between the claim and the object of the action, a serious error in the pleading that would determine—even disregarding the issue of standing—the outright dismissal of the action brought.

Por tanto:

The action is dismissed outright.

Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre211, a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Adrián Vargas B.

José Luis Molina Q. Gilbert Armijo S.

Taxpayers and third-party responsible persons have a cause of action to claim the restitution of what was paid unduly for taxes (tributos), payments on account, penalties, and interest, even if at the time of payment they made no reservation whatsoever.

(...)

Likewise, taxpayers and responsible persons may request the refund of credit balances that exceed the compensation provided for in Article 46 of this Code. Refunds shall earn interest equal to that established in Article 58 of this Code; this interest shall run from the first calendar day following the date of payment made by the taxpayer." **"Article 45.- Cases in which it applies.** Liquid and due credits of the taxpayer for taxes and their accessories must be offset ex officio or at the request of a party, against tax debts determined by the taxpayer and unpaid, or those determined ex officio, (...)" **TRANSITORIO III**. (...) Article 48 repealed in this law shall remain in force until September 30, 2000. Requests for assignment to third parties made before the repeal of Article 48 must be processed in accordance with said article." **II.- On admissibility.** The plaintiff Chamber seeks to base its standing (legitimación) on the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which regulates the exceptions to the requirement of having a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the interest deemed injured, as a requirement for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. It alleges that by virtue of the importation and commercialization of computer technology by its members, they act as taxpayers and also as withholding agents for sales and income taxes, generating a series of tax credits, which, however, they cannot assign by virtue of the challenged norms. It points out that among the purposes of that corporation is to exercise permanent vigilance over state legal and political actions related to the interests of importers, representatives, sellers, and consumers of computer equipment, as well as to bring the pertinent legal actions for the defense of its members and the community as a whole, in everything concerning the field of computing and its market. They consider that tax credits, being liquid and due, are part of the assets of their members, so that the impossibility of assigning or negotiating that part of their assets with third parties causes them immediate harm, being directly affected by that limitation. Given the plaintiff's approach, it must first be recalled that the action of unconstitutionality is a judicial avenue that, as expressly regulated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, must fulfill a series of formal requirements for its admissibility, unlike habeas corpus and the amparo remedy, in which the principle of informality prevails, in order to foster the broadest possible access to an expeditious jurisdictional remedy for the defense of fundamental rights. That rigor that characterizes the action of unconstitutionality is based not only on the greater complexity that usually accompanies the legal arguments supporting it, but also relates to the significance acquired by an upholding judgment when, with *erga omnes* effects, it removes from the legal system one or several provisions with declaratory and retroactive effects to their effective date. In that line of thought, precisely one of the aspects of formality that takes on special importance is the issue of active standing to bring the action. In this regard, Article 75 of the law regulating this jurisdiction requires proving the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in an administrative or judicial venue, in which the norm whose constitutional quality is questioned is of necessary application. The latter guarantees that the action becomes a reasonable means of protection for the petitioner, through the annulment of the norm that, in the base matter, is being applied to the detriment of their rights. As this Court has repeatedly stated, the action has an incidental character in favor of any of the parties in the main matter, such that it cannot be directed against just any norm, but only regarding those that have a direct influence on the case pending resolution, for the determination of which one starts from the criterion of usefulness of the upholding judgment (see resolutions numbers 6696-93 and 3628-95). Hence, this Chamber deems it appropriate to emphasize that such a requirement of admissibility is the rule, and that it may only be bypassed in the qualified exceptional circumstances established by the law itself. Certainly, the jurisprudence has had the opportunity to refer to the case of the defense of corporate interests, in the case of a specific community, as one of those exceptional hypotheses. However, special care must be taken not to confuse that hypothesis with a popular action that would allow challenging any type of norm, thereby distorting the rules of standing that have been referred to. Thus, resolution No. 2621-95 of May 23, 1995, stated: "the Chamber has interpreted that the situation established in Article 75.2, regarding the defense of interests that concern the community as a whole, refers to interests of a corporate nature of a specific community, and it has systematically rejected the standing to bring action directly through this avenue of constitutionality control for those who only have an interest in constitutional legality, because this would imply admitting the existence of a kind of popular action that our legal system, in general, rejects." Under the protection of this exception, the Chamber has admitted some actions of unconstitutionality brought by entities that group a series of members identified by a specific activity in common. However, in the case of the present action, it must be taken into account that these are norms of a general nature in tax matters, referring to the cancellation and assignment of credits that the taxpayer may have before the Administration, by virtue of payments made in excess. From a simple reading of the norms, as well as the arguments outlined in the action, it is concluded without difficulty that there is no exclusive or special affectation of the plaintiff Chamber or its members, given that these are general norms. This is so much so that they are contained in the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, which encompasses the general principles and regulations in this matter. This means that these are provisions that, although it is true they may affect the members of the plaintiff Chamber –in their capacity as taxpayers or tax withholding agents, given that they participate in activities of a commercial nature– are equally applicable to any other taxpayer, whether an individual or legal entity and whatever the activity to which they are dedicated. And that first conclusion leads to another even more important one: those normative provisions are destined to materialize in innumerable cases of concrete application, related to the legal sphere of specific persons. Consequently, even in the event that some defect of unconstitutionality could be entailed by the challenged norms, that irregularity would be reflected and individualized in any taxpayer who is in the normative situation in question. Thus, it would be that person who, based on a claim at a judicial or administrative level, could have the matter pending resolution that serves as support in terms of standing for purposes of bringing the corresponding action. The foregoing considerations lead this Chamber to order a summary rejection of the action, insofar as the party bringing it lacks the necessary standing to allow the Court to hear the substantive arguments raised.

**III.-** In addition to the considerations set forth in the previous section, in any case, it is appropriate to note that there is an additional reason that determines the inadmissibility of the action directed against Articles 43 and 45 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, and Transitorio III of Law No. 7900. Note that the plaintiff's claim is aimed at questioning the legal impossibility of assigning tax credits in favor of third persons –who have debts with the Tax Administration– at the free choice of the creditor taxpayer. However, it was the repeal of Article 48 of the aforementioned code –which occurred, as the Attorney General's Office rightly notes in its report, by express provision of subsection a) of Article 5 of Law No. 7900– that barred that possibility, and not the norms that the plaintiff challenges. As noted in subsection 1) of the second recital of this resolution, the Chamber warned the plaintiff to correctly specify which text of the norms was being challenged, and in relation to which constitutional principles or norms it was doing so. However, the weaknesses that the Chamber observes in the action were not remedied when addressing the warning either. In that sense, there is an evident inconsistency between the claim and the object of the action, a serious error in approach that would determine –even ignoring the aspect of standing– the summary rejection of the action brought.

The rigor that characterizes the acción de inconstitucionalidad (constitutional complaint) is based not only on the greater complexity that usually accompanies the legal arguments that support it, but also relates to the significance acquired by an upholding judgment when, with *erga omnes* effects, it removes one or several provisions from the legal system with declaratory and retroactive effects to their effective date. In this line of thought, precisely one of the formal aspects that takes on special importance is the matter of standing (legitimación activa) to bring the action. In this regard, Article 75 of the law regulating this jurisdiction requires proving the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in administrative or judicial proceedings, in which the rule whose constitutional quality is questioned must necessarily be applied. This ensures that the action becomes a reasonable means of protection for the petitioner, through the annulment of the rule that, in the base case, is being applied to the detriment of his or her rights. As this Tribunal has repeatedly held, the action has an incidental character in favor of any of the parties in the main matter, so it cannot be directed against just any rule, but only against those that have a direct influence on the pending case to be resolved, for which determination the criterion of the usefulness of the upholding judgment is the starting point (see resolutions numbers 6696-93 and 3628-95). Hence, this Chamber considers it appropriate to emphasize that this admissibility requirement is the rule, and that it can only be bypassed in the qualified exceptional circumstances established by the law itself. Certainly, the case law has had the opportunity to refer to the case of the defense of corporate interests, in the case of a specific community, as one of those exceptional hypotheses. However, special care must be taken not to confuse this hypothesis with a popular action that would allow any type of rule to be challenged, thereby distorting the standing rules that have been referred to. Thus, Resolution No. 2621-95 of May 23, 1995, stated: "the Chamber has interpreted that the assumption established in Article 75.2, regarding the defense of interests that concern the community as a whole, refers to interests of a corporate nature of a specific community, and has systematically rejected the standing to bring an action directly through this constitutional review pathway by those who only hold an interest in constitutional legality, because this would imply admitting the existence of a kind of popular action that our legal system, in general, rejects." Under this exception, the Chamber has admitted some acciones de inconstitucionalidad filed by entities that group together a series of members identified by a specific common activity. However, in the case of the present action, it must be taken into account that these are norms of a general nature in tax matters, referring to the cancellation and assignment of credits that the taxpayer may have against the Administration, by virtue of overpayments. From a simple reading of the norms, as well as the arguments outlined in the action, it is concluded without difficulty that there is no exclusive or special affectation of the petitioning Chamber or its members, given that these are general norms. This is evidenced by the fact that they are contained in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), which gathers the general principles and regulations on this matter. This means that these are provisions which, although it is true they may affect the members of the petitioning Chamber–in their capacity as taxpayers or tax withholding agents, given that they participate in activities of a commercial nature–are equally applicable to any other taxpayer, whether an individual or legal entity and whatever the activity to which they are dedicated. And that first conclusion leads to another even more important one: those normative provisions are destined to be materialized in innumerable cases of concrete application, relating to the legal sphere of specific persons. Consequently, even in the eventual case that some defect of unconstitutionality could be contained in the questioned norms, that irregularity would be reflected and individualized in any taxpayer who finds themselves in the normative assumption in question. Thus, it would be that person who, based on a claim at the judicial or administrative level, could rely on the pending matter to be resolved that serves as support regarding standing for purposes of filing the corresponding action. The foregoing considerations lead this Chamber to order a summary rejection (rechazo de plano) of the action, insofar as the party filing it lacks the necessary standing that would allow the Tribunal to address the substantive points raised.

**III.-** In addition to the considerations set forth in the preceding section, in any case, it is appropriate to note that there is an additional reason that determines the inadmissibility of the action directed against Articles 43 and 45 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, and Transitory Provision III of Law No. 7900. Note that the claim of the petitioning party is aimed at questioning the legal impossibility of assigning tax credits in favor of third parties–who have debts with the Tax Administration–at the free choice of the creditor taxpayer. However, it was the repeal of Article 48 of the cited code–which occurred, as the Procuraduría correctly notes in its report, by express provision of subsection a) of Article 5 of Law No. 7900–that foreclosed that possibility, and not the norms that the petitioner challenges. As noted in section 1) of the second recital of this resolution, the Chamber warned the petitioner to correctly specify which text of the norms was being challenged, and in relation to which constitutional principles or norms it was doing so. However, even when responding to the warning, the weaknesses that the Chamber notices in the action were not corrected. In that sense, there is an evident inconsistency between the claim and the object of the action, a serious error of approach that would determine–even bypassing the standing aspect–the summary rejection of the action filed.

**Por tanto:** Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre211, a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Adrián Vargas B.

José Luis Molina Q. Gilbert Armijo S.

Res: 2001-02239 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas con treinta y un minutos del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Rolando Salas Arce, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED420, en su carácter de Nombre211 con facultades de apoderado generalísimo de la Cámara Nacional de Comercializadores de Tecnología Informática. Interviene en el proceso Farid Beirute Brenes, en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- En memorial presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las ocho horas y doce minutos de veinte de octubre del dos mil (folio 1), Rolando Salas Arce interpone esta acción y manifiesta: 1) Sobre el objeto de la acción. Se impugna el artículo 43 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, propiamente la primera parte del primer párrafo, así como su párrafo segundo. Asimismo, el primer párrafo del artículo 45 del mismo código. También se cuestiona en la acción el Transitorio III de la Ley N° 7900 del 3 de agosto de 1999. 2) Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. En relación con la legitimación para acudir a esta sede jurisdiccional, invoca el accionante la regla establecida en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, cuyo desarrollo jurisprudencial ha admitido la procedencia de la acción sin necesidad de un asunto pendiente que sirva de base a la acción, cuando se trata de la defensa de intereses corporativos, que por su naturaleza pertenecen a la agrupación que los representa y defiende, y al mismo tiempo a cada uno de sus asociados. 3) Sobre los motivos de la acción. Señala el accionante que los agremiados de la cámara que representa, como comerciantes, son contribuyentes, responsables y agentes de retención de los impuestos de ventas y renta. Que las normas impugnadas prohiben la compensación por terceros cesionarios, por lo que los créditos líquidos y exigibles de los contribuyentes y responsables no pueden ser cedidos. Que esta clase de créditos, por su naturaleza jurídica, es de inmediata exigencia de cumplimiento por parte del acreedor, no sujeta a plazo o condición alguna. Que las normas desnaturalizan ese carácter de obligación líquida y exigible, pues eliminan la libre circulación del crédito, afectando los derechos de propiedad y libre comercio de éste, consagrados en los artículos 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política. Que el contribuyente, a pesar de tener esos créditos integrados a su patrimonio, y que por lo tanto le pertenecen en condición de derechos, no puede disponer de su propiedad como a bien lo tenga, sino como la Administración Tributaria lo define. Que no se trata de una limitación soportable pura y simple, sino que constituye una restricción irracional o desproporcionada a la libre circulación de la riqueza y del patrimonio, en este caso los créditos que posee el contribuyente. Que además esa prohibición atenta contra la correcta gestión y recaudación tributaria, pues impide a los contribuyentes responsables o agentes de retención, pagar sus obligaciones tributarias por este medio que puede estimarse célere y confiable, haciendo más gravosa la gestión tributaria. Agrega que la eliminación del artículo 48 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en virtud de lo dispuesto por el Transitorio III impugnado, padece el vicio de falta de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, limitando el comercio con los créditos, con objeto de cederlos a terceras personas.

2.- Actuaciones procesales. 1) Mediante resolución de las siete horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del primero de noviembre del dos mil se previno al accionante justificar su legitimación respecto del interés corporativo que se estima lesionado, concretar cuál parte de las normas se cuestiona en la acción y en qué sentido se plantea, así como indicar cuáles normas o principios constitucionales se estiman violentados, con expresa indicación de los motivos (folio 7). 2) Por memorial presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las quince horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del seis de noviembre del dos mil el accionante atendió la prevención referida (folio 12). 3) Por resolución de las quince horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del once de diciembre del dos mil se dio curso a la acción y se confirió la audiencia de ley a la Procuraduría General de la República (folio 19). 4) La Procuraduría General contestó la respectiva audiencia por escrito presentado en la Sala el dieciséis de enero del dos mil uno (folio 26). 5) Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 6, 7 y 8 del Boletín Judicial, los días nueve, diez y once de enero del dos mil uno respectivamente (folio 25). 6) Se prescinde de la audiencia oral y pública prevista en el artículo 10 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 9 de la misma ley, ya que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para resolver.

3.- Informe de la Procuraduría General de la República. En su correspondiente informe, señala ese órgano asesor: 1) Sobre la legitimación. Indica que la jurisprudencia de esta Sala en un primer momento sostuvo que los entes corporativos estaban facultados para interponer directamente acciones de inconstitucionalidad cuando la norma impugnada afectara la esfera de acción del ente y de sus integrantes, de modo que la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad modificara favorablemente las obligaciones, potestades o facultades de los miembros de la agrupación, siendo necesario demostrar la conexidad que la pretensión guarda respecto de la situación propia de la colectividad, específicamente con su objeto y patrimonio. Que se ha variado esa tesis, en el sentido de que cuando la norma es susceptible de ser aplicada individualmente a los miembros, la corporación carece de legitimación para plantear la acción directamente, sino que debe hacerlo con fundamento en un asunto previo. Estima la Procuraduría que la segunda posición jurisprudencial es la atinada, de manera que la Cámara accionante carece de legitimación para interponer directamente la acción. Que las normas impugnadas son susceptibles de ser aplicadas individualmente a los miembros de esa agrupación, lo que les permitiría a esas personas realizar las reclamaciones que sirvan de base a la acción. 2) Sobre el fondo. Como observación preliminar, afirma la Procuraduría que del planteamiento de la acción infiere que la pretensión se dirige a mantener lo que disponía –antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley N° 7900– el artículo 48 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, de modo que entiende que la acción se dirige en contra del artículo 5 inciso a) de la Ley N° 7900, norma que derogó expresamente el artículo 48 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, el cual contemplaba la posibilidad de ceder los créditos fiscales a terceras personas. En cuanto a la supuesta violación del derecho de propiedad, estima que la imposibilidad de ceder los créditos tributarios no menoscaba en forma alguna el patrimonio de los contribuyentes, pues quien hace un pago en exceso ante la Administración tiene derecho a reclamar su devolución junto con el pago de los intereses que hubieran devengado esas sumas, por lo que no se produce un enriquecimiento sin causa a favor del fisco. Que lo cierto es que el ordenamiento tiene prevista, de modo razonable, la forma en que procede hacer efectiva la devolución del dinero recibido de más. Que la decisión de permitir o no la cesión de créditos tributarios, entra dentro del ámbito de discrecionalidad legislativa, sin que se lesione principio constitucional alguno. Que, en efecto, durante el trámite legislativo de la Ley N° 7900 se analizó la conveniencia de mantener vigente la cesión de créditos tributarios, desechándose esa posibilidad, mediante el ejercicio legítimo de las potestades legislativas. En cuanto a la alegada violación a la libertad de comercio, señala que, como cualquier otro derecho, esa libertad está sujeta a restricciones y limitaciones, las cuales son válidas siempre que se encuentren previstas en normas de rango legal, sean razonables, proporcionadas, y no vacíen de contenido el derecho fundamental de que se trata, condiciones que se cumplen en el caso discutido en la acción. Tampoco aprecia inconstitucionalidad alguna en la disposición que obliga a los contribuyentes a compensar sus créditos fiscales con las deudas que pudieran tener con la Administración Tributaria. Lo anterior, por cuanto la concurrencia simultánea de un crédito y un débito recíproco entre dos personas –salvo convenio previo en contrario– hace que opere de pleno derecho la compensación, regla también aplicable en materia civil. Que dicha regla se justifica aún más tratándose de obligaciones con la Administración Tributaria, pues existe una razón de interés público que lo justifica, cual es la necesidad del Estado de recolectar los tributos de la manera más eficiente posible. Agrega que, en todo caso, el accionante no impugna el artículo 46 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, norma en la que se encuentra regulada esa posibilidad. Concluye la Procuraduría que en caso de que se llegue a conocer el fondo del asunto, la acción debe ser declarada sin lugar, en vista de la ausencia de quebranto a la Constitución Política.

4.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el magistrado Arguedas Ramírez; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre el objeto de la acción. Esta acción se promueve con el objeto de que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 43 y 45 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, así como el Transitorio III de la Ley N° 7900, propiamente en los textos que de seguido se transcriben:

Artículo 43. Pagos en exceso y prescripción de la acción de repetición. Los contribuyentes y los terceros responsables tienen acción para reclamar la restitución de lo pagado indebidamente por concepto de tributos, pagos a cuenta, sanciones e intereses, aunque en el momento del pago no hayan formulado reserva alguna.

(...)

Asimismo, los contribuyentes y responsables podrán solicitar la devolución de los saldos acreedores que excedan de la compensación prevista en el artículo 46 de este Código. Las devoluciones devengarán un interés igual al establecido en el artículo 58 de este Código; este interés correrá a partir del primer día natural posterior a la fecha del pago efectuado por el contribuyente." "Artículo 45.- Casos en que procede. Se deben compensar de oficio o a petición de parte los créditos líquidos y exigibles del contribuyente por concepto de tributos y sus accesorios, con las deudas tributarias determinadas por él y no pagadas, o con las determinadas de oficio, (...)" TRANSITORIO III. (...) Hasta el 30 de setiembre del 2000 conservará su vigencia el artículo 48 de derogado en esta ley. Las solicitudes de cesión a terceros realizadas antes de la derogación del artículo 48 deberán tramitarse de conformidad con dicho artículo." II.- Sobre la admisibilidad. La Cámara accionante pretende fundamentar su legitimación en lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que regula las excepciones al requisito de contar con un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial, en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma como medio razonable para tutelar el interés que se estima lesionado, como una exigencia para la admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Alega que en virtud de la importación y comercialización de tecnología informática por parte de sus agremiados, éstos actúan como contribuyentes y también como agentes de retención de impuestos de ventas y renta, generando una serie de créditos tributarios, que sin embargo no pueden ceder en virtud de las normas cuestionadas. Señala que dentro de los fines de esa corporación están ejercer una permanente vigilancia de las actuaciones jurídicas y políticas estatales relacionadas con los intereses de los importadores, representantes, vendedores y consumidores de equipo de cómputo, así como ejercer las acciones legales pertinentes para la defensa de sus agremiados y la colectividad en su conjunto, en todo lo concerniente al ramo de la computación y su mercado. Consideran que los créditos tributarios, al ser líquidos y exigibles, son parte del patrimonio de sus agremiados, de manera que la imposibilidad de ceder o negociar con terceros esa parte de su patrimonio les genera un perjuicio inmediato, viéndose directamente afectados por esa limitación. Visto el planteamiento de la parte accionante, en primer término debe recordarse que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es una vía judicial que, según lo regula expresamente la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, debe cumplir una serie de requisitos formales para su procedencia, a diferencia del hábeas corpus y el recurso de amparo, en los que prima el principio de informalismo, con el fin de propiciar el más amplio acceso a un remedio jurisdiccional expedito para la defensa de los derechos fundamentales. Esa rigurosidad que caracteriza la acción de inconstitucionalidad se asienta no sólo en la mayor complejidad que usualmente acompaña a los planteamientos jurídicos que la sostienen, sino que además guarda relación con la trascendencia que adquiere una sentencia estimatoria cuando, con efectos erga omnes, elimina del ordenamiento jurídico una o varias disposiciones con efectos declarativos y retroactivos a su fecha de vigencia. En ese orden de ideas, justamente uno de los aspectos de formalidad que cobra especial importancia es el tema de la legitimación activa para promover la acción. Al respecto, el artículo 75 de la ley reguladora de esta jurisdicción exige acreditar la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede administrativa o judicial, en el que resulte de necesaria aplicación la norma cuya calidad constitucional es cuestionada. Esto último garantiza que la acción se convierta en un medio razonable de protección para el promovente, mediante la anulación de la norma que, en el asunto base, se está aplicando en perjuicio de sus derechos. Como ya ha señalado reiteradamente este Tribunal, la acción tiene un carácter incidental a favor de cualquiera de las partes en el asunto principal, de modo que no puede enderezarse contra cualquier norma, sino únicamente respecto de aquellas que presentan una influencia directa sobre el caso pendiente de resolver, para cuya determinación se parte del criterio de utilidad de la sentencia estimatoria (ver resoluciones números 6696-93 y 3628-95). De ahí que esta Sala estime conveniente enfatizar que tal requisito de admisibilidad es la regla, y que únicamente puede obviarse en las circunstancias calificadas de excepción que establece la propia ley. Ciertamente la jurisprudencia ha tenido la oportunidad de referirse al caso de la defensa de intereses corporativos, en el caso de una colectividad determinada, como una de esas hipótesis de excepción. Sin embargo, debe observarse un especial cuidado para no confundir esa hipótesis con una acción popular que permita impugnar cualquier tipo de norma, desnaturalizando con ello las reglas de legitimación a que se ha hecho referencia. Así, la resolución N° 2621-95 del 23 de mayo de 1995 señaló: "la Sala ha interpretado que el supuesto establecido en el artículo 75.2, sobre la defensa de intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, se refiere a intereses de naturaleza corporativa de una colectividad concreta, y sistemáticamente ha rechazado la legitimación para accionar directamente en esta vía de control de constitucionalidad de quienes sólo ostenten un interés por la legalidad constitucional, porque esto supondría admitir la existencia de una especie de acción popular que nuestro ordenamiento, en general, rechaza." Con amparo en esta excepción, la Sala ha dado entrada a algunas acciones de inconstitucionalidad planteadas por entidades que agrupan a una serie de miembros identificados por una concreta actividad en común. Ahora bien, en el caso de la presente acción, debe tenerse en cuenta que se trata de normas de carácter general en materia tributaria, referidas a la cancelación y la cesión de los créditos que el contribuyente pueda tener frente a la Administración, en virtud de pagos hechos en exceso. De la simple lectura de las normas, así como de los planteamientos esbozados en la acción, se concluye sin dificultad que no existe una exclusiva ni especial afectación de la Cámara accionante ni de sus miembros, toda vez que se trata de normas generales. Tan es así que están contenidas en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, que recoge los principios y las regulaciones generales en esta materia. Esto quiere decir que se trata de disposiciones que, si bien es cierto pueden afectar a los miembros de la Cámara accionante –en su carácter de contribuyentes o de agentes de retención de impuestos, toda vez que participan en actividades de naturaleza comercial– igual son aplicables a cualquier otro contribuyente, sea persona física o jurídica y sea cualquiera la actividad a la que se dedique. Y esa primera conclusión lleva a otra aún más importante: esas previsiones normativas están destinadas a concretarse en innumerables casos de aplicación concreta, relativos a la esfera jurídica de determinadas personas. En consecuencia, aún en el eventual caso de que algún vicio de inconstitucionalidad pudieran entrañar las normas cuestionadas, esa irregularidad se vería reflejada e individualizada en cualquier contribuyente que se encuentre en el supuesto normativo de que se trata. Así, sería esa persona la que, a partir de una reclamación a nivel judicial o administrativo, podrá contar con el asunto pendiente de resolución que le sirva de soporte en materia de legitimación para efectos de plantear la correspondiente acción. Las anteriores consideraciones llevan a esta Sala a disponer un rechazo de plano de la acción, en tanto quien la promueve carece de la necesaria legitimación que permita al Tribunal entrar a conocer los extremos de fondo planteados.

III.- Además de las consideraciones expuestas en el aparte anterior, en todo caso, conviene dejar señalado que existe un motivo adicional que determina la inadmisibilidad de la acción enderezada en contra de los artículos 43 y 45 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, y el Transitorio III de la Ley N° 7900. Nótese que el reclamo de la parte accionante se dirige a cuestionar la imposibilidad jurídica de ceder los créditos tributarios a favor de terceras personas -que tengan deudas con la Administración tributaria- a la libre elección del contribuyente acreedor. No obstante, fue la derogatoria del artículo 48 del citado código -que se produjo, como bien hace notar la Procuraduría en su informe, por disposición expresa del inciso a) del artículo 5 de la Ley N° 7900- lo que dejó vedada esa posibilidad, y no las normas que la accionante impugna. Como se señaló en el aparte 1) del segundo resultando de esta resolución, la Sala previno al accionante para que especificara correctamente cuál texto de las normas impugnaba, y en relación a cuáles principios o normas constitucionales lo hacía. Sin embargo, tampoco al atender la prevención se subsanaron las debilidades que la Sala advierte en la acción. En ese sentido, existe una evidente incongruencia entre la pretensión y el objeto de la acción, grave error de planteamiento que determinaría –aún obviando el aspecto de la legitimación– el rechazo de plano de la acción promovida.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Nombre211, a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Adrián Vargas B.

José Luis Molina Q. Gilbert Armijo S.