Constitutionality of transferring ordinary criminal cases to organized crime courtsConstitucionalidad del traslado de causas penales ordinarias a juzgados de delincuencia organizada

Revisión del Documento 1 *240087380007CO* Res. No. 2024021938 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at thirteen hours fifteen minutes on the thirty-first of July, two thousand twenty-four.

Judicial consultation formulated by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea seat, by means of vote No. 2024-462 of eleven hours thirty minutes on the nineteenth of March, two thousand twenty-four, corrected by resolution No. 2024-713 of fifteen hours five minutes on the twenty-ninth of April, two thousand twenty-four, issued in case file number [Valor 001].

Whereas:

1.- By document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on April 4, 2024, and based on Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the consulting tribunal requests this Chamber to rule on the constitutionality of the following provisions: a) Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (the latter added and amended by the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica - Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017 - Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023); b) the agreements of the Full Court (Corte Plena) (among them the one contained in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the "Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime" insofar as - according to the consulting Tribunal - they "support... and allow the transfer of case files from ordinary justice to that of organized crime", so that the Constitutional Chamber can determine if they "violate the principle of a lawful or natural judge enshrined in Articles 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 35, 39, 121.20, and 166 of the Political Constitution insofar as they allow an administrative body or laws of a lower rank than constitutional and conventional norms to modify the jurisdiction (competencia) of the natural judges of an act, assigning knowledge of the case to tribunals that, as of the date of the acts, did not exist". Regarding the background. The consulting tribunal indicates that attorney José Gerardo Montoya Hernández, private defender of the accused, filed an appeal against the sentence handed down in the case; in the first ground, he alleges the existence of a defective procedural activity due to absolute defect and violation of the principle of a lawful or natural judge, because this matter, which is an ordinary proceeding in which a single individual is charged with the retention of worker-employer quotas, was assigned to an emerging section of the Organized Crime Tribunal and the prosecutor who participated was designated for that type of matter, which demonstrates the creation of a special tribunal for the case and consolidated a posteriori, which implies that the appointment and jurisdiction of the judges was not within reach of the parties to be consulted in a timely manner, but rather emerged after the consummation of the acts charged. It considers that there was a notable violation of criminal due process due to the formation of a tribunal not competent for it, as the tribunal turned out to be one appointed to hear another nature of proceedings, such as the organized crime section, when internal and international norms indicate that the competent tribunal must be pre-constituted before the acts, as established in numerals 35 of the Political Constitution and 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and adds that, in accordance with numeral 178, subsection 2, of the Criminal Procedure Code, defects related to the appointment, capacity, and constitution of judges or tribunals are absolute defects. It considers that what was resolved generates irreparable harm, since the accused was judged by a tribunal appointed after the alleged criminal commission described in the accusatory document, and requests the annulment of the sentence and the corresponding referral back to the competent body. In responding to the appeal, the prosecutorial representation indicated that the claim must be rejected, among other reasons because Article 81, subsection 2) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes that the Superior Council has the power not only to appoint the officials who administer justice but also to transfer them provisionally or definitively. In addition, the law creating the specialized jurisdiction, No. 9481, amended by No. 9769 and No. 10369, establishes, in its Article 18, additions to Article 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch to enable those who work in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime to also carry out work within the ordinary jurisdiction when institutional requirements so determine. It refers to circular number 137-2023, which establishes the issuance of practical rules and the form of processing for the specialized organized crime jurisdiction, in relation to the provisions of law number 9481. The prosecutorial representation considers the claim to be unfounded and lacking in harm, which is why its rejection is appropriate. The consulting Tribunal adds that the appellant alludes to the breach of constitutional and conventional norms, and the prosecutorial representation affirms that the action is enabled by legal norms (of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch or the laws related to organized crime, the latter being subsequent to the date of the charged acts), which is why the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the II Judicial Circuit of San José has doubts as to whether the laws on which the sentencing body's jurisdiction is affirmed violate higher-ranking norms. Regarding standing. The consulting tribunal indicates that it has standing to make the consultation, since the decision on the substantive argument raised in this matter will depend on what is resolved. As for the merits. The consulting tribunal points out that Costa Rica ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), as part of its domestic law, by Law No. 4534 on February 23, 1970, and on February 7, 1980, accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In addition, it ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties according to Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996; further, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 2313-95, indicated that the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as interpreter of the Convention, have the same rank as the latter and that human rights instruments are executive and enforceable, prevail over the law, and acquire supra-constitutional rank (vote number 282-90). It cites Articles 8.1 ACHR, numeral XXVI.II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as numeral 14.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which enshrine the guarantee of the Natural Judge, and reiterates that the pronouncements that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established, both on the normative hierarchy and on the subject of the regular or natural judge, are directly applicable. Regarding the former, it cites paragraph 123 of the judgment in the case of Almonacid Arellano vs. Chile (reiterated in the ruling of Dismissed Congressional Workers vs. Peru, paragraph 128, and the judgment of Gelman vs. Uruguay, of March 20, 2013) regarding conventionality control. It notes that, from this perspective, what the Inter-American Court has specifically said about the lawful or natural judge would be applicable, namely: "76. The natural judge derives his existence and jurisdiction from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general character, concerned with the common good, emanating from constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and drafted according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws'. The natural judge derives his existence and jurisdiction from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general character, concerned with the common good, emanating from constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and drafted according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws'. Consequently, in a State governed by the rule of law, only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the jurisdiction of judges." (Judgment in the case of Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela of November 17, 1999). Similarly, that body has declared the international responsibility of a State when it created Ad Hoc Chambers and courts and designated judges to integrate them at the same time the events of the case were occurring (Judgment in the case of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru of 02.06.2001, para. 114). At the level of domestic law, Articles 35 and 39 of the Political Constitution allude to the fact that the criminal prosecution of a person can only be carried out by a "competent authority". The first of these provisions states: "No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially named for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution." Likewise, Article 121.20 of the Political Constitution regulates, as an essential function of Congress: "In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (...) 20) To create the courts of justice and the other bodies for the national service," and numeral 166 of the Political Constitution establishes: "Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number, and the duration of the courts, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their actions, and the manner of demanding responsibility from them." The competent authority is that which the law endows with functions according to subject matter, grade, and function or objectively must decide the case, all rules that must be established in advance of that particular matter (in the same sense, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2000-10822, No. 1739-92, No. 1422-95, No. 6701-93, No. 6992-96, No. 8738-97, and No. 2491-96, among others). The consulting tribunal points out that, although the scope of the principle of the regular judge has traditionally been limited to the prohibition of being judged by a judge specifically designated for the conflict or by a body outside the Judicial Branch (courts of exception or ad hoc), its content was later extended to the necessary legal pre-existence of the jurisdictional body with respect to the commission of the act (prohibition of ex post facto courts), an extension that occurs through international human rights instruments which, insofar as they expand the catalog of human rights, have a rank equal to or higher than the Political Constitution as established by Articles 7 of the Political Constitution, 73 subsection d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and votes No. 3435-92, No. 2313-95, No. 1319-97, No. 4356-98, and No. 6830-98 of the Constitutional Chamber. The need for courts to exist prior to the commission of the acts has been accepted, almost unanimously, by the most authoritative doctrine (cites Maier, Julio; Cafferata Nores, José; Tiedemann, Klaus; and Antillón Montealegre, Walter). Also, regarding the natural judge, the Spanish Constitutional Court has stated: "The constitutional right to an ordinary judge predetermined by law requires, first, that the judicial body has been previously created by the legal norm, that the latter has invested it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act giving rise to the judicial action and proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as a special or exceptional body." Spanish Constitutional Court, judgment 47/1983. In the same sense and from the same body, votes 102/2001, 170/2002. It also cites pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber (votes No. 2002-06223, No. 6701-93, and No. 2004-12629). According to this principle, then, once jurisdiction to hear a case is acquired, it is only lost due to causes pre-established in the law that seek to protect other principles of equal rank (such as impartiality, for example, through recusals or challenges). Now, as has been seen, constitutional and conventional norms and the jurisprudence of the courts that interpret them establish that jurisdiction is only acquired by law and that such jurisdiction must pre-exist the act being judged. Despite this, there are legal norms, whether prior to the 1949 Political Constitution, such as the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch No. 8 issued on November 29, 1937, or subsequent to it, that transfer those powers that higher norms grant to the law to leave them in the hands of administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch (Full Court, Superior Council), which is why this tribunal doubts whether such provisions imply a hollowing out of said guarantees. It cites Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (LOPJ), amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997, partially transcribes numerals 59 and 81 of the LOPJ, and fully transcribes numeral 101 bis, added by Article 18 of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, amended by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023. The tribunal points out that in the present matter, the person was accused of retaining worker-employer quotas during the period from May to December 2017 and January to September 2018. This is an act typical of the ordinary jurisdiction which, by territory, was processed in the Ordinary Trial Tribunal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, and there has never been, in this proceeding, a declaration of organized crime, which would also not be possible since this requires at least two persons and the accusation against the defendant is individual. The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime was created by Laws No. 9481 of September 13, 2017 (which, however, established its effectiveness for one year later) and amended by Laws No. 9591 of July 24, 2018, No. 9769 of October 18, 2019, and No. 10369 of May 30, 2023. As can be seen, all these provisions are subsequent to the charged acts. Despite this, this proceeding was transferred from the court where it was pending (by subject matter and territory) to the created Specialized Organized Crime Tribunal (of another specialized criminal subject matter and in another location), and this is evident from the heading of the contested sentence (where the tribunal is called an "emerging section"), from the date of that resolution (May 2023), and from the agreements of the Full Court (among them the one contained in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the "Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime" that empower the transfer of ordinary matters to that jurisdiction, which are complemented by the list of case files transferred from the competent body to the newly created one. For all the aforementioned, there are well-founded doubts as to whether allowing, through administrative agreements of the Full Court, the application of laws that create tribunals to acts that had already occurred generates a violation of the constitutional and conventional principle of the regular, lawful, or natural judge, in the modality of the need for a court pre-existing the judged acts. Regarding procedural matters. The Tribunal refers the matter to the Constitutional Chamber, summons the parties so that, within three days, they appear before said Chamber to express their arguments, convert - should they deem it appropriate - the consultation into an unconstitutionality action, as established in Article 105 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and indicate a place or means within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José to receive their notifications, and suspends the processing of the proceeding (and with it the statute of limitations for the criminal action) until the Constitutional Chamber resolves this consultation (Articles 34, subsection a, of the Criminal Procedure Code and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

2.- In response to the summons granted to the parties in the main proceeding, by document filed on April 4, 2024, Carlo Díaz Sánchez, Attorney General of the Republic, appears. He refers to the reason for the consultation, insofar as the appellant alleges the existence of a defective procedural activity due to absolute defect and violation of the principle of natural judge. Regarding the basis. I. Principle of natural judge in the Inter-American Human Rights System, of which Costa Rica is a party, obliges States to comply with the provisions and resolutions emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, without placing their domestic law above the judgments issued by that high court. He cites numeral XXVI.II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 14.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and mentions numeral 8.1 of the ACHR. To justify the formation of a tribunal with judges specialized in organized crime to hear common crimes, and that this does not contravene the principle of a lawful or natural judge, as established in the American Convention on Human Rights, the following key elements must be analyzed:

• a)The principle of natural judge, which establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial court previously established by law; that is, that the judge or judges must be previously defined by the legal system without being constituted ad hoc for the specific case, as a fundamental guarantee for due process. In the case sub examine, the prosecution has been thorough in highlighting that the judges designated to hear the ordinary proceeding in question were not named to hear the specific case, but rather their designation corresponds to a requirement of the justice system, which, moreover, is permitted within the regulations established for such effect. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor's Office considers that there is an error of prescriptive interpretation on the part of the appellant regarding the need for courts to exist prior to the punishment of the acts. It is necessary to clarify that both the signed international agreements and the Costa Rican legal system indicate this obligation; and, certainly, the summary [Valor 001] was heard by a pre-constituted court, with the only variation being that it was composed of judges specialized in organized crime, a matter that is also authorized by law. Under this reality, although it is true that the Law Against Organized Crime came into effect in September 2018, and the imputed acts correspond to May to December 2017 and January to September 2018, the truth is that no crimes in the specialized subject matter were judged, but rather they were heard and adjudicated by judges named in that specialty, a situation that does not limit the jurisdiction of those servants to hear ordinary cases. Thus, the principle of natural judge protected from human rights instances, and from domestic ones, is in no way violated.
• b)Functioning of the judicial system in Costa Rica: In the Costa Rican judicial system, the appointment of judges specialized in organized crime responds to the need to more effectively confront certain cases that require specific knowledge. However, the fact that these judges can hear other types of cases under circumstances of institutional necessity is based on the flexibility of the system to ensure access to justice and judicial efficiency.
• c)Applicability of the principle of natural judge: The assignment of judges specialized in organized crime to cases of common crimes, in exceptional situations and under criteria of institutional necessity and urgency, does not necessarily contravene the principle of natural judge. The core point in this type of matter is that the designation of this authority is provided for by the legal system, maintaining the criteria of competence, independence, and impartiality, and that it is not carried out for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the trial.

II.Regarding the principle of natural judge in Costa Rica: The Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes norms pertaining to the conformation and integration of judicial offices and regulations related to the distribution of work, which admit that, under criteria of service efficiency, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads, they be conformed as suits these circumstances. Furthermore, it provides for the possibility that the integration of tribunals may be modified in accordance with what is indicated (cites Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). Regarding the powers of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, provided for in subsections 1 and 2 of Article 81 of the LOPJ, he points out that it is possible to affirm that the Superior Council has the power both to designate the officials who administer justice and to transfer them, provisionally or definitively, which evidences the powers to modify the work location of the same. The foregoing is observed in the decisions by which, in reason of remedial plans, other competencies are assigned to different judges, without thereby affecting the principle of natural judge.

Since the violation of the natural judge is claimed with the hearing of this matter by the Specialized Tribunal, it is important to first define the term to determine if the accused violation exists:

"III.- […] a.) On the principle of natural judge. The guarantee of the natural judge is based on what is stipulated in numeral 35 of the Political Constitution, which textually provides: 'No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially named for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution [...]’ This constitutional precept establishes a protection for the citizen, so that they may only be judged by ordinary judges, designated in a regular manner and previously by the law itself. The Constitutional Chamber has given content to this constitutional principle through the notable resolution 1739-1992:

‘[...] C) THE RIGHT TO A REGULAR JUDGE: This right, which in the Anglo-North American tradition has developed as the so-called "right to a natural judge," but with very specific profiles that do not correspond to those of our Latin law - since it includes, for example, the right to the judge of one's domicile and, above all, to judgment by one's peers which is expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in the systems of Roman-Germanic tradition have rather produced negative experiences - is enshrined in our Constitution especially in Article 35, which provides: "[...] Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially named for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution [...]." This principle, which we have called the "regular judge," is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152, and 153 and, where applicable, 10, 48, and 49 of the Fundamental Charter, from which the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the courts dependent on the Judicial Branch is clear, as well as with that of Article 39, from which it follows that the "competent authority" is necessarily the judicial and ordinary one, the latter because the transcribed Article 35 excludes any possibility of judgment by special courts for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust in the sphere of the Judicial Branch any possibility of creating courts "established in accordance with this Constitution," with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for electoral disputes. In this way, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, gravity or amount, territory, and grade, both jurisdiction and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that disputes are resolved by regular courts, in the manner stated (Chamber III of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 770 – 2019 of eleven hours thirty minutes on June twenty-first, two thousand nineteen).

See then that this competence by law must be defined, as has been indicated in the particular case, in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. It is permitted then, in reason of interest, to modify these, attending to distribution of work, efficiency criteria in service, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads.

The principle of the natural judge is not violated, therefore, and this has been recognized in other cases when it has been resolved: “[...] the legal reservation in the conformation and designation of judges has not been violated in the case, since the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as has been explained, contains express norms that provide for the conformation and integration of the different courts and tribunals, and precepts are also contemplated that regulate the distribution of work, which can even be modified by the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch, namely, the Full Court and Superior Council, attending to criteria of efficiency, specialization, and equity. On the other hand, regarding the functions of the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, the competence and conformation of the same is previously defined by Articles 93 and 93 bis, organized by sections composed of three judges, and noting that this will be 'according to service needs [...]'” (Chamber III of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 2019-01171 of eleven hours ten minutes on September twentieth, two thousand nineteen.)

Finally, it must be indicated that Law No. 9481 on the “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica” underscores:

18.- Additions. [...] By means of this article, several articles are added to Law 7333, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch of May 5, 1993: 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis [...]. (Amended by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019).

Numeral 101 (bis) of that same body of norms states: '[...] Those who work in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime shall also carry out work within the ordinary jurisdiction when institutional requirements so determine [...]'.

Resting on the provisions of the indicated norms, it can be affirmed that the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in addition to designating the officials who administer justice, can transfer them temporarily or definitively. And in the case of judges chosen as specialized in Organized Crime, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (amended by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019), they are authorized to carry out work within the ordinary jurisdiction when institutional requirements so determine. From the powers conferred by law, in addition to the sessions of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, arise the institutional requirements that determined the need for the Specialized Appeals Tribunal for Organized Crime to collaborate in a remedial plan with different Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunals, due to workloads. In session 098-2022 of November 11, 2022, article II, it was agreed, after hearing legal opinion No.

DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, and to receive in audience Magistrate Sandra Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as coordinator of the Organized Crime Subcommission, Master Roxana Arrieta Meléndez, Internal Director of Human Management, and licensed Olga Guerrero Córdoba, interim subdirector, the following: " […] Having received Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and based on what was indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official communication No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Doctor Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, given that according to the opinion rendered, there is no legal impossibility to carry out the contingency plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime under the terms that were proposed […]." Finally, through session 112-2022 dated December 22, 2022, article V, the Superior Council ordered: " […] Having received Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and based on what was indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official communication No. SCJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Doctor Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, given that according to the opinion rendered, there is no legal impossibility to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime under the terms proposed: (…) However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently expired. 2.) The Organized Crime Subcommission must: a) Order that the resource contemplated in the list of positions and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated, as a priority and in the first instance, to all the necessary actions for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Order that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be allocated on a priority basis to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently applicable regulations. c.) Order that, in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial competence or they are in process, it may be used temporarily in legitimate exercise of the ius variandi for the handling of ordinary matters, according to the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the rules of competence of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the understanding of the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of ius variandi regarding the rights of the employees, the non-affectation of public service, and compliance with the body of administrative legality. d.) The Organized Crime Subcommission will be responsible for the monitoring and control of its execution according to the proposed terms and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter. 3.) The Human Management Directorate will clarify to the officials who would participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is contingent upon the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime, and therefore it cannot be applied until it comes into force. This agreement is declared final […]." Regarding the legitimacy that the high authorities of the Judicial Branch have to decide to modify competencies, for reasons of institutional interest, this can be observed in Article XXXIV of the Full Court session number 22-2022, of May sixteen, two thousand twenty-two, where official communication No. 251-PLANI-2022 from the Planning Directorate was heard, and in this respect, it was agreed to expand the competence of the Juvenile Criminal Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, so that for a period of six months, they may hear adult criminal appeal matters from the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Santa Cruz. The basis for these decisions is directly related to the attention of contingency and remedial plans, the purpose of which is to collaborate with the decongestion of other Criminal Sentence Appeal offices, thus responding to an institutional interest. For this reason, it is considered that the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, having the power and the legitimate reasons to temporarily vary the designation of judges, as observed in the Full Court agreements, in strict respect of the cited norms, orders the handling of ordinary cases in order to collaborate with the remedial plan and workload affecting the counterparts of the Specialized Court of Organized Crime, under the cited conditions. It is neither true nor probable that an "ad hoc" was carried out in the case at hand, nor in any other case, since the hearing of processes by the Specialized Criminal Appeals Court in Organized Crime responds solely to an institutional interest and not to hear this specific case, which is clear to the Judicial Branch, as it would be disobeying the international norms to which Costa Rica is committed, as well as the internal legal system that governs our social state of law.

III.- Regarding the use of the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime: Prior to the use of the positions that correspond to this specialized jurisdiction, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch issued a consultation before the Legal Directorate of this entity, which issued Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, through which it carried out a budgetary analysis of importance for this topic. The analysis has its background in that, within the budget granted to the Judicial Branch for 2022, an item was granted that covered the corresponding salaries and other expenses of the institution for the entry into force of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime. At that moment, given the lack of approval of the transitory provision that would allow training functions, logistics, and other necessary actions for the implementation of the operation of the new jurisdiction against organized crime at the beginning of 2023, it could not be consumed as an entry expense. As a consequence of the above, a contingency plan for the use of the aforementioned budget items was submitted for consideration by the competent bodies, to be executed in that year 2022. The analysis provided the following:

• a)Own nature of public budgets: The regulation of public budgets is contained in Article 176 of the Political Constitution, which provides as follows: "[…] Article 176-. Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, and shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides. The ordinary budget of the Republic comprises all probable income and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, throughout the entire fiscal year. In no case shall the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed that of probable income. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the above rules when issuing its budgets. The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from January first to December thirty-first." (emphasis is ours) Complementary to the above, the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets provided as follows: "[…] Article 8.- Content of budgets. Budgets shall consider as a minimum: a) The income budget, which shall comprise those generated by tax collection, the provision and sale of goods and services, transfers, donations, and others, as well as financing sources, internal or external. b) The expenditure budget, which shall comprise all outflows planned to meet objectives and goals. c) The programming of activities and expected goals for the period, according to the level of detail defined in the regulation. d) The requirements for human resources, according to the detail established in the respective regulation. e) The rules that exclusively regulate budget execution, which shall apply during the fiscal year for which said budget is in force […]" According to the above, it is noted that the ordinary budget of the Republic contemplates an authorization of public expenditure planned for the respective period, in order to fulfill the respective institutional goals and objectives. In this order of ideas, the Budget Law authorizes the use of human resources for a specific purpose, as indicated by its content and the respective budget program. Consequently, the Budget Law contemplates the possibility of executing the budget for the expenditure contemplated in the respective list of positions, in order to give content to the human resource requirements contemplated therein. It is the act by which the Government is authorized to dispose of public funds within certain limits and constitutes the requirement for the validity of administrative acts and contracts that originate public expenditure. That is, the budget is a condition of the regularity or legal effectiveness of budgetary operations and, above all, of the execution of public expenditure, which cannot be carried out if the corresponding budgetary coverage does not exist. The need for the activity to adjust to current legality entails the existence of control mechanisms that guarantee the legality of that activity. According to the above, in order to determine the appropriateness of the administrative expenditure, it is necessary to verify its classification and incorporation in the ordinary budget of the respective budget period, in the understanding that this will determine the opportunity, purpose, and content of the expenditure.

In this regard, the following has been indicated: " […] The items authorized by the Budget Law do not form an indivisible mass. On the contrary, they are specialized. In accordance with the principle of budget specialization, the credits opened by the Budget Law are allocated to a specific expenditure. Meaning that the authorization is given for a precise expenditure and for a determined amount. Amount which constitutes a limit for the Executive. Thus, the allocation of a credit is determined by Law […]," (M, ROJAS: The Executive Power in Costa Rica, Editorial Juricentro, 1997, p. 346).

Our Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets reserves to the Legislative Power the following assumptions for modification of the approved budget: "a) The following are reserved to the Legislative Assembly: i) Those that affect the total amount of the budget. ii) Those that involve an increase in current expenditures to the detriment of capital expenditures. iii) Transfers between budget programs. iv) Those that affect the total amount of indebtedness. v) Transfers between non-personal services and personal services." It is necessary to highlight that, complementary to the above, the origin of the resources destined for the budget expenditure must be taken into consideration, that is, whether it has a specific allocation previously defined by a law that created the origin of the resources and conditions its possibility of execution.

Regarding this type of income allocated to the fulfillment of a specific purpose, opinion C-358-2020, of September 7, 2020, from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, indicates:

"[…] As is known, the concept of specific allocation fundamentally refers to income designated by the legislator to finance the activity of a specific agency. That allocation may be general in the sense that it is destined to finance the totality of the agency's activity, but it can also happen that the legislator designates certain resources for the financing of a specific activity or project of that agency. In which case, the ordinary legislator specifies what the beneficiary of the allocation may spend the received resources on. Traditionally, it has been indicated that when the law creates a specific allocation, only the legislator can modify it, reducing the amount or percentage, or expanding it, or even suppressing the allocation if it considers that a specific program or purpose does not justify the State reforming the allocation. Furthermore, it follows from the above that the Administration lacks competence to vary the amount or percentage of the allocation, to suppress it, or to reallocate amounts not executed by a specific entity, unless the legislator authorizes it to do so […]." Consequently, it is deemed that it must be determined whether the expenditure to be carried out is provided for in the respective budget, according to its classification and budget program, it being understood that, if it is under those conditions, an authorization for its use would be contemplated, with the limitations contained within the same budget that provides its basis, and in the case of specific allocations, the law that creates them.

• b)Regarding the handling of the fight against organized crime: In accordance with the regulations of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is noted that there currently exists a series of criminal types that correspond to the handling of prosecution against organized crime. That is, with the currently existing jurisdictional bodies, offenders in said matter are being processed, including the Law Against Organized Crime, number 8754, dating from the year 2009, and the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481, which has existed since the year 2017.

The very existence of cases upon the entry into force of Law 9481, as it provides the following:

"[…] SOLE TRANSITORY PROVISION- Cases initiated in criminal courts with common competence as of the date of entry into force of this law, which are in the intermediate or trial stages, shall continue to be heard by those courts […]." The above must be complemented by the provisions of Article 17 of the same regulatory body, insofar as it provides:

"[…] ARTICLE 17.- Supplementary rules. The criminal process followed before the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall be the ordinary one provided for by Law No. 7594, Code of Criminal Procedure, of April 10, 1996, with the exceptions provided for in this law. The proceedings and resolutions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall be governed, in matters not expressly provided for in this law, by Law No. 7594, Code of Criminal Procedure, of April 10, 1996; Law No. 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009; Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993, and Law No. 7728, Law of Judicial Reorganization, Reforms to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of December 15, 1997." However, it should be noted that the latter does not have specific financing; rather, the resources for its implementation come from the general allocation made in the respective ordinary budget for the Judicial Branch, including the positions decided to be assigned in the corresponding list of positions. In this sense, it must be clear that, although Article 16 of Law 9481 establishes an obligation to grant budgetary content for the operation of the jurisdictional bodies, it is not a specific allocation as such. The indicated norm states the following:

"[…] ARTICLE 16.- Budget content and initial integration of the courts: The Ministry of Finance must grant sufficient economic content for the operation of the courts and tribunals created by this law. At the time of the publication of this law, the Ministry of Finance must transfer, effectively and completely, the necessary resources that allow the Judicial Branch to create the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime; likewise, it must annually transfer the necessary resources that allow the functioning of this Jurisdiction. The Judicial Branch must guarantee the necessary resources for the functioning of the Jurisdiction created in this law. The Planning Department of the Judicial Branch will recommend the number of officials that must perform duties in this Jurisdiction, at the time this law enters into force." Nevertheless, it is deemed appropriate to indicate that the incorporation of resources for the positions of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime is based not on the Full Court agreement, in session 21-2021 of June 1, 2021, article II, but rather on official communication DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, through which the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency communicated the following to the Deputy President of the Ordinary Permanent Commission of Finance Affairs: "Last May 27, the Supreme Branches of the Republic signed a manifesto expressing their will, each within the framework of their legal limits and constitutional competencies, to promote five strategic action points in favor of the fight against the phenomenon of Organized Crime in all its manifestations. As the second strategic point was 'establishing mechanisms to strengthen the competent institutions with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime.' To materialize this point, the working group established the need to 'generate a space for joint work between the Ministry of Finance and the Judicial Branch for the analysis of the requirements for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime and the fight against this scourge.' After a work process, it was determined that the Judicial Branch requires a total of 2,900,000,000 colones in order to incorporate 413 positions for Technical, Professional, and Police personnel dedicated both to the implementation of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime, in logistical development, remodeling processes, bidding procedures, and others, in addition to the actual start-up…" In this sense, the general framework of this official communication is the agreement between the Branches of the Republic in question, indicating the following points of joint work: "Evaluate the existing legal frameworks to propose improvements, so that preventive and punitive actions in the matter are effective and forceful. Establish mechanisms to strengthen the competent instances with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime. Manage cooperation and assistance from international organizations and strategic partners, with the implementation of programs that allow strengthening joint work between the authorities and police forces of the country to counteract the effects of organized crime. Enhance management instruments, such as the National Strategy on Drugs and Associated Crimes; the National Plan on Drugs, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing; the National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; and the National Strategy for Integrity and Prevention of Corruption and similar ones, as a complement to plans and actions in matters of investigation and criminal justice. Other areas of recommendation that are considered necessary to implement." c) About ius variandi in public employment matters: Additionally, it must be indicated that as long as there is no express or tacit modification to the budget law – e.g., the fulfillment of the different programs of the Judicial Branch – it would not be feasible to consider that the administration of the work of the employees is subject to such rigidity that it is not possible to assign their functions according to the public interest, always ensuring that the modification is within the legal system and in accordance with the legitimate exercise of ius variandi. With respect to the powers that the Administration possesses to modify, totally or partially, non-substantial aspects of a public employment relationship, it is necessary to highlight that it, like any public or private employer, possesses the faculty of ius variandi. In this regard, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber number 7419-1997 of ten hours fifteen minutes of November eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, case file number 6760-M-97, is cited.

This faculty is evidenced as a competence of the Superior Council in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, insofar as said regulatory body establishes that this body is responsible for the following:

"[…] ARTICLE 81.- The Superior Council of the Judicial Branch is responsible for: 1.- Executing the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. 2.- Appointing, with the exception of those that correspond to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; transferring them, provisionally or definitively, suspending them and granting them leaves with or without pay, and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the president […]." According to the above, it is noted that the Superior Council has powers to modify the work location of the employees – attending to the respective budget program and legal limits for the exercise of ius variandi – in accordance with the public interest and institutional needs. That is, human resources can be used for other purposes belonging to jurisdictional competencies, in the understanding that the Superior Council has competencies to adapt the functions of the employees according to the public interest, in legitimate adherence to ius variandi.

Furthermore, the legal advisory body deems that what was proposed by the Contingency Plan proposal is legally appropriate and to that effect recommended:

• Order that the resource contemplated in the list of positions and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated, as a priority and in the first instance, to all the necessary actions for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Order that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the jurisdiction against organized crime, it be allocated on a priority basis to the handling of organized crime matters.

• Order that, in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial competence or they are in process, it be used temporarily in legitimate exercise of ius variandi for the handling of ordinary matters, according to the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

Based on the above, the representative of the Public Ministry concludes that this last recommendation is understood to mean that the law against organized crime poses the possibility that, in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources allocated to this jurisdiction may handle ordinary matters, without this being considered a violation of the principle of natural judge, but on the contrary, it implies maximizing the use of state resources.

3.- By resolution of 9:03 a.m. on April 26, 2024, the president of the Chamber warned the consulting judges, Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Ivette Carranza Cambronero, and Kathya Jiménez Fernández, to identify and specify, in a clear and duly individualized manner, which are the specific Full Court agreements that are intended to be challenged in the present consultation.

4.- In resolution 2024-713 of 3:05 p.m. on April 29, 2024, issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in order to comply with what was ordered, it is indicated in the first place that, although the warning was addressed personally to judges R. Chinchilla, I. Carranza, and K. Jiménez (signatories of the vote through which the consultation was made), it is clarified that as of this date, judge K. Jiménez is medically incapacitated, so, having her jurisdiction suspended, she cannot be part of the court. She is replaced, according to the rules prevailing in this regard, by judge C. Ramírez. However, given that judge Ramírez's father, Magistrate J. Ramírez, participated in the body that issued one of the challenged acts, she recused herself and was replaced, by roster, by judge Max Antonio Escalante Quirós in order to be part of the court and solely to respond to what was requested. Secondly, the court indicates, in order to comply with the indicated warning, it is clarified that in considering clause III of vote 2024-462, reference was made to “…the Full Court agreements (among them the one contained in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the 'Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new form of processing of the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime') that authorize the transfer of ordinary matters to that jurisdiction, which are complemented by the list of case files transferred from the competent body to the newly created one." Upon review of said circular (which was published in Judicial Bulletin number 119 of July 3, 2023, and can be consulted at: https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/avi-1-0003-9349), it is verified that it was issued by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (and not by the Full Court as was indicated, a material error that in this act is corrected as provided for in Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Organized Crime Subcommission of the Judicial Branch. In the section titled "About the competence of the JEDO offices," practical rule 5 (on which the court of origin relied to transfer the case to the organized crime court and the latter to hear the matter) indicates: "5- The Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime will have competence at the national level to perform tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine." Likewise, practical rule 9 states: "9- In order to guarantee an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who work in the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime, from the beginning of their functions and until it is considered necessary, will also perform tasks of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine." Similarly, in the section of that circular titled "About the processing of the case file in the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime," rules 2 and 3 provide: "2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime will follow the form of processing of the office of origin, such that, if it has been processed physically, it will continue in this way until its completion. 3- Ordinary cases heard by the JEDO will continue their processing according to the state in which they are assumed until their execution.

They shall be remitted to the court of origin once they are completely ready for archiving." However, the issuance of said rules by the Superior Council is supported by what was previously resolved by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Plena) in an extraordinary session at 08:16 hours on January 30, 2023, record 003-2023 (article XVIII in which it was firmly agreed: “2) To accept the request made by the Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, referred by official communication No. S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: To vary the territorial jurisdiction (competencia territorial) of the two sections assigned to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, which at this moment have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the equivalent office in Guadalupe, so that as of February 2023, they shall hear all matters assigned to the different sentence appeals courts (tribunales de apelación de sentencia) of the country, beginning with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts of the country, while the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada officially begins to function.” 5.- By official communication of May 6, 2024, the Técnica Sala de la Corte requested from the Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia a certification of the agreement of the Corte Plena, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, record 003-2023, article XVIII.- Likewise, that it certify which magistrates (magistrados) of the Sala Constitucional participated in the approval of said agreement.

6.- On May 8, 2024, a literal certification of the agreement adopted in extraordinary session No. 03-2023 held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII, was incorporated into the case file. Likewise, the Secretaría de la Corte certifies that the justices (magistrados) and the female justice (magistrada) of the Sala Constitucional who participated in the approval of the cited agreement are: Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, Jorge Araya García, Anamari Garro Vargas, and the substitute Aracelly Pacheco Salazar.- 7.- On May 23, 2024, justices Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas filed a recusal (inhibitoria), and indicate the reasons why they believe they have grounds to recuse themselves from hearing this matter.

8.- By resolution at 14:44 hours on May 24, 2024, the acting president (presidenta a.i.) of the Sala Constitucional rejected the request filed by justices Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Ana Mari Garro Vargas and declared them qualified to hear this matter.

9.- By resolution at 9:44 hours on May 27, 2024, the president of the Sala admitted the consultation (consulta) formulated by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José and granted an audience (audiencia) to the Procuraduría General de la República and the president of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial.

10.- By brief filed on June 14, 2024, Iván Vinicio Vincenti Rojas, in his capacity as Procurador General de la República, answers the audience (audiencia) granted and states, first of all, with respect to admissibility, that both unconstitutionality actions (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) and judicial consultations (consultas judiciales) are procedural mechanisms that have a series of requirements to be met, the non-observance of which results in their rejection for reasons of admissibility. Petitions before the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) aimed at expelling a norm from the legal system are clothed in a series of formalities that are not vain, but rather, on the contrary, seek to discover from the outset that the claim is indeed serious and that it is surrounded by arguments of sufficient caliber. In the case of judicial consultations of constitutionality (consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad), they must be totally objective and, furthermore, the judges who issue them must be clear that their purpose is to help ensure that the legal system is always adjusted to the constitutional order. In that sense, that objectivity should not be synonymous with a futile academic or intellectual purpose, but rather the judge must be faced, with certainty, with the application of the norm that they are going to use and that –without ambiguity– they doubt its constitutionality (citing the judgment of the Sala Constitucional No. 3905-2007 at 14:44 hours on March 21, 2007). Regarding the admissibility requirements for judicial consultations of constitutionality (as with actions of the same subject matter), it focuses on two of them:

A.- that the consulting judge is confronted with a genuine doubt about the constitutionality of the norm that must be applied, such that –drawing a parallel with the requirements of the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad)–, the judicial consultation proves to be the ideal means of protecting the right considered to be violated, and B.- that the judicial consultation is duly substantiated.

A.- If we follow the logical path that has guided the consulting Court (Tribunal consultante) to suspect the norms of the LOPJ and the agreement of the Superior Council, we may realize that it does not have standing (legitimación) “…to consult the Sala Constitucional when it has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of a norm or act that it must apply, or of an act, conduct, or omission that it must judge in a case submitted to its cognizance.” for two reasons: 1.- in the specific case, the challenged norm or norms must NOT be applied, nor must the act, conduct, or omission be judged by the consulting Court, and 2.- said norms and agreements must demonstrate a violation (conculcación) of the constitutional order, without forcing or artificial interpretations.

On this point, the Sala Constitucional, in a recent resolution (No. 27,476-2023 at 13:16 hours on October 25, 2023, paraphrasing some other previous resolutions, indicated on the subject:

“That, in that previous matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that gives rise to the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance to the case– should be clarified. Indeed, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' carries a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm could be applied or the act, conduct, or omission could be judged.' (highlighting not in the original).

We explain:

1.- from the very account emanating from the resolution that gives rise to the present judicial consultation of constitutionality, it follows that the standing to consult is artificial and forced, since the initiative for the doubt is not of its own making, but rather comes from an allegation by the defense attorney of the accused for the crime of withholding worker-employer contributions (retención de cuotas obrero-patronales), who alleges as one of the grounds for the appeal (apelación) a defective procedural activity (actividad procesal defectuosa), precisely because it is considered that the principle of the lawful or natural judge (juez legal o natural) has been violated, given the mechanics of the appointment of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) that convicted his client, but more specifically, by the simple statement made by the Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, when it classified the Section it belonged to as “emergent” (“emergente”). Apparently –although other hypotheses are valid– the mere mention of that designation was enough for the defense attorney's intellect to perceive the possibility of facing a Court –now at the appellate stage– as a promoter of constitutional violations.

It is indeed necessary to highlight that both the technical defense of the accused in the case of origin, as well as the material defense of the accused, at no procedural stage or during the adversarial proceeding expressed doubts about the jurisdiction (competencia) of the Trial Court (the only incident presented at the end of the adversarial proceeding was by the defendant ARIAS RUIZ, who alleged a statute of limitations defense [excepción de prescripción]).

2.- as a consequence of this defective procedural activity and the position of the prosecutor (fiscal) in charge of the case, the consulting Court glimpses that the appellant party argues a violation of constitutional and conventional norms and, for its part, the prosecuting body (órgano fiscal) alleges that the action is made possible by legal norms, and at that procedural stage, for the acting Court “…the doubt arises as to whether the laws from which the jurisdiction of the sentencing body is asserted violate norms of superior rank…” (the highlighting is ours).

The misgiving about constitutionality is thus as it reads: the consulting Court retrocedes to prior moments and hesitates about the norms that gave jurisdiction to the lower court (órgano judicial a quo) to issue the judgment it hears on appeal (en alzada). And it is on that factual-legal basis that the proposing Court considers itself sufficiently legitimized to elevate its doubts about the norms that –in its opinion– it must necessarily apply to a judicial consultation.

The questions that spontaneously arise are: does a Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal have the duty to doubt the jurisdiction of the lower Court at the moment the latter issued the appealed judgment; in other words, is the jurisdiction (competencia) of the lower court (a quo) part of the norms that the Appeals Court must apply –as provided by the literal wording of Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional– (and in this case, to waver on its constitutionality), or did the judge of the lower Court (Tribunal A quo) have the duty (or did the defense attorney have to claim) to deem itself without jurisdiction, as ordered by Article 169 of the LOPJ:

“Article 169.- When an official deems that they are without jurisdiction to hear the matter submitted to them, except in the case of extension of jurisdiction (prórroga de competencia), they shall so declare sua sponte and order the case file to be referred to the official whom they believe should hear it. If an appeal by any of the parties is filed or if, absent an appeal, the latter official disagrees with that opinion, the superior of both shall decide the jurisdiction (competencia), without further procedure and as soon as they receive the records.” It is also valid to ask: is the doubt of constitutionality of a Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal a new way of losing the jurisdiction of the lower court (a quo), or is this lost only as provided in Article 163 of the LOPJ or, indeed, by the grounds not exhaustively listed in Article 48 of the CPP?:

“Article 163.- Jurisdiction (competencia) is lost in specific causes:

1.- When the cause is concluded and the judgment executed.

2.- When the judge has been commissioned by another to carry out any proceeding, once the commission is fulfilled.

3.- When, being accessory, the cause is sent to the judge hearing the principal one.

4.- When the judge has been declared disqualified by virtue of impediment (impedimento), excusal (excusa) or recusal (recusación).” From what has been said, in no way was the promoting Court ever –or at least in the specific case– going to have as a possible scenario the obligation to apply either Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the LOPJ, nor the agreement of the Superior Council, nor circular 137-20234, much less when its leitmotiv is to doubt “…whether the laws from which the jurisdiction of the sentencing body is asserted violate norms of superior rank…” That is to say, in its role as Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, hearing on appeal (en alzada) the resolution No. 437-2023 at 14:22 hours on May 10, 2023, issued by the Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, “Emergent” Section (Sección “Emergente”), it had the following possibilities:

a.- let us remember that it can be inferred from the original judicial case file, that the first ground of appeal by the defense attorney was to initiate a defective procedural activity, alleging a transgression of the principle of the lawful judge (juez legal).

From a careful reading of Article 175 of the CPP and the jurisprudence of our Courts (including the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), it is taken as true that the mechanism of defective procedural activity was created to prevent the issuance of a judicial resolution in violation of certain precepts, including conventional ones, but it is improper to use that figure to appeal judicial resolutions already issued; on this point, Article 175 of the CPP provides:

“General principle. Acts performed in violation of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in current International or Community Law in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be assessed to support a judicial decision nor used as presuppositions thereof, unless the defect has been cured (saneado), in accordance with the rules governing the correction of judicial actions.” Indeed, the procedural dynamic that emerges from this institute assumes that the interested party or the one affected by the transgressing acts, prior to the judicial decision being issued, raises a defective procedural activity precisely to prevent the consummation of the defects contained in the preceding acts and to prevent them from being integrated into the judicial resolution. Hand in hand with the above, the correction of the act would be requested, trying, as far as possible, not to retrocede to precluded stages.

As observed, said mechanism is impossible to apply after the judicial decision has already been issued, because the defect could neither be corrected nor, less so, return to precluded stages; from this, it follows that once the judicial resolution is issued, no objection is possible other than its challenge through an appeal (apelación) or the corresponding means of recourse.

Rightly, the resolution of the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 2004-0054 at 8:50 hours on February 6, 2004, concluded the following:

“The request must be rejected outright: If the general rule established in Article 175 of the Código Procesal Penal is observed regarding the cases in which it is appropriate to declare the procedural activity as defective, it can be seen that this is possible only in relation to acts that would serve as a foundation or presupposition of a judicial resolution. That is to say, through the guidelines relating to defective procedural activity, it is not possible to question the resolutions themselves, but only the prior actions on which they are based.” Now then, although we can never know how the consulting Court would have ruled on the defective procedural activity managed by the defense attorney, as the first ground of appeal against the conviction judgment, it is true that said petition by the appellant –in correct terms– could not have succeeded, and the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal could have –then– declared the judgment under appeal ineffective, either by accepting some other ground of the appellant or, indeed, by using the prerogative conferred upon it by the final part of the third paragraph of Article 462 of the Código Procesal Penal, which literally states:

“In any case, the court that verifies the breach of a fundamental right of the parties involved may declare it sua sponte.” and thus, without incurring the serious blunder of believing itself empowered to elevate to the Sala Constitucional a doubt of constitutionality that is not such (because the cited articles would not be subject to analysis by it nor should it have applied them even remotely), it could have declared –even sua sponte– a possible preterition (preterición) of a fundamental right of the party, setting things straight on their normal course and ordering the referral back (reenvío), so that now –from its perspective– the accused would be judged by a lawful or natural judge.

As a corollary to what has been said so far, we leave raised the proposition that the judicial consultation of constitutionality before us has not passed the admissibility test, not only because the invoked norms should not be the subject of analysis or application by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, but also because doubting the laws that gave jurisdiction to the lower Court (Tribunal A quo) to issue the judgment being heard on appeal, contained in prior jurisdictional acts, also does not form part of the set of norms that the consulting Court must apply, as mandatorily prescribed by Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

B.- The second admissibility requirement that we wish to analyze rests on the proper substantiation of judicial consultations of constitutionality, as a derivative of the obligation of every judge to reason their criteria deeply, as indicated –for example– by Article 142 of the CPP. It points out the defects in substantiation that the advisory body attributes to the judicial consultation of constitutionality, which likewise result in its inadmissibility:

a.- questioning the entirety of all the articles, without stopping to specify which extract of them is the presumed cause of the constitutional violation. Likewise, the approach lacks the comparison or collation between the questioned norms and the articles of the Carta Fundamental, to derive the constitutional transgression from there. Or, if the comparison had been materialized, it would have been insufficient to consider the task of substantiation fulfilled.

b.- mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Sala Constitucional, the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations of national and foreign doctrine without further development, merely transcribing them, assuming that, due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the litigation before us are responsible for the task of integrating the claim with the grounds, failing to recognize that this task falls upon the consulting Court. Special mention must be made of the paradigmatic cases that gave rise to the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and which were used by the consulting Court, on which we will comment further down (…)

(…) despite the fact that somewhere from pages 12 to 14 of the brief containing the judicial consultation, the promoting Court already cites some subsections or paragraphs of the 4 articles of the LOPJ, it also fails to fulfill the obligation to collate the challenged articles with the constitutional and conventional principles, in order to derive or evidence the denounced transgressions from there, limiting itself to transcribing them, without greater academic rigor. As observed, neither a consulting Court nor the citizen who files an action of unconstitutionality can afford the luxury of affirming that they fully refute an article or several, and even –as some claimants have done– challenge the entirety of a law, and expect that –in the first instance– this advisory and impartial body of the Sala Constitucional, and later the Court of the subject matter, will unravel in which part of the article or articles the foundation or the violation that sustains the judicial consultation or the citizen's claim is contained.

Nor is it admissible –as already stated– for the promoting Court to content itself with citing the articles of the LOPJ (in their entirety, even if later reduced to some subsections or paragraphs), the presumably transgressed articles of the Carta Fundamental, some conventional provisions laid out in international instruments, and finally, several extracts from judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and firmly believe that it fulfilled the task of reasoning its doubts of constitutionality (especially when its final claim is that 4 articles of the LOPJ be eliminated from the legal system, many of them without the slightest relationship to the materialized questioning of constitutionality) and now, it is the responsibility of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala de la materia) to harmonize all those inputs and correctly forge a reasoned and substantiated claim, which was the primary obligation of the claimant or the consulting party to do.

It is true that starting on pages 12, 13, and 14 of the brief containing the judicial consultation before us, a selection is made of certain paragraphs of the challenged articles of the LOPJ, as if to denote that it is in them where the incorrectness of placing the constitution of the courts in the hands of administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) is evidenced, this being a legislative function (thus, for example, article 46 is repeated in full again, subsection 16 is mentioned from article 59, subsection 2) from article 81, and from article 101 bis, the paragraph that allows judicial personnel of the JEDO to process ordinary matters).

Notwithstanding, despite that effort of specification, it is evident that the admissibility criteria are still not being met, concerning the proper substantiation of judicial consultations. This issue will be analyzed on the merits, where it will be shown that the entire claim made about the transfer of functions or constitution of courts forms part of the prerogative that Article 166 of the Carta Magna offers to the Judicial Branch.

The controversy regarding the agreement of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada of the Judicial Branch and which authorizes the publication of the circular called “Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new form of processing of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado” (circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023), which was correctly described even after a warning (prevención) from the Presidency of the Sala Constitucional to the consulting Court, deserves separate mention. Said contribution and mention have no more validity than that given to it by the fact that many of the actions taken by the Superior Council have been based on the scope of circular 137-2023, issued by said Council. To conclude this section, it is enough for us to maintain that the only constitutional article that has been developed and whose transgression has been alleged is article 35; the others, namely: 39, 121.20), and 166 of the Carta Fundamental have been included to give the appearance that many articles of the Political Code have been violated, but their development is limited to their simple mention. For this reason, the admissibility analysis carried out assumes that only article 35 will be the subject of comment further on, while the others must be discarded. The same fate awaits the mention of article 8.1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH), which is indeed only transcribed without further development.

b.- mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Sala Constitucional, the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations of national and foreign doctrine without further development, limiting itself to transcribing them, assuming that, due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the litigation before us are responsible for the task of integrating the claim with the grounds, failing to recognize that this task falls upon the consulting Court. Special mention must be made of the paradigmatic cases that gave rise to the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and which were used by the promoting Court. Continuing with the tenor already set forth, the consulting Court bases its criterion on citations of some judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that have ruled on the issue of the lawful or natural judge and whose constitution must occur prior to the criminal act to be heard, votes from the Sala Constitucional, judgments of the Constitutional Court of Spain, and extracts of national and foreign doctrine. (…)

1.- regarding the mentioned jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Spain, an extract is cited from judgment 47/1983 of May 31, 1983, which speaks of the constitutional right to an ordinary judge predetermined by law, but another extract from that same resolution explains the possibilities that, for the better public service and, above all, for the public service of the Administration of Justice, internal collaboration between servants of the Judicial Branch may occur, to resolve the "dysfunctionalities of the system":

“It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be demanded of the body as of its holders, given the diverse contingencies that can affect their personal situation and the demand, emanating from the public interest –the so-called 'needs of the service'–, that the different members of the judiciary collaborate within the Administration of Justice in places where their work may be most effective, making up for, as far as possible, the dysfunctionalities of the system. But, in any case, the procedures established for the designation of the holders must guarantee their independence and impartiality, which constitutes the direct interest protected by the right to the predetermined ordinary Judge.” (highlighting not in the original).

(…)

Finally, judgment STC 55/1990 of March 28, Legal Ground 3, in a sense very similar to the recently set forth 47/1983, declares the following:

“This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to an ordinary Judge predetermined by law requires, fundamentally, that the judicial body has been created by a legal norm, investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act giving rise to the judicial action or proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as a special or exceptional body (STC 47/1983, of May 31, Legal Ground 2). However, this guarantee does not imply the right to a specific Judge in particular (STC 97/1987, of June 10, Legal Ground 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special rules of competence in the distribution of matters among the different judicial bodies. The constitutional notion of the ordinary Judge predetermined by law is not limited to the legislative establishment of general competences, but rather is normally integrated by those legal provisions that repeal or alter that general competence.” (the highlighting is ours).

As can be seen, despite the common place that the conception of the principle of the lawful or natural judge may imply, it is true that –as we will see when analyzing the present judicial consultation of constitutionality on the merits–, the issue is not as flat as presented, nor is its non-compliance consolidated by modifications in the constitution of the courts that will judge the specific case; rather, there are totally valid exceptions, even constitutionally endorsed, either by the Carta Fundamental itself or by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which, far from transgressing the principle under study, strengthen it. We will deal with that further below.

Given what has been said, this advisory and impartial body of the Sala Constitucional believes that the judicial consultation before us suffers from some defects of admissibility (which have been duly accredited), which is why we request that it be so expressed, declaring the present judicial proceeding inadmissible.

On the other hand, regarding the possible impact on the fate of this consultation of constitutionality, this Office wishes to draw attention to the merely literal approach of the presumed preterition of fundamental rights, without demonstrating the true harm caused to the affected party by being sentenced by a Criminal Court, with the characteristics indicated by the judicial consultation before us. The central argument on which the doubt of the consulting Court turns has only one aspect: if the crime was committed in 2017 and the accused was tried and convicted by a Trial Court that was created and integrated subsequently, in principle, the fundamental right to a lawful judge would have been violated. Although the literal wording of Article 35 of the Constitution does not include this latter aspect (the requirement for the necessary pre-existence of the judging Court), it is a fact that a multitude of doctrine established in international instruments and jurisprudence of Human Rights Courts coincide on the issue. It highlights that in the brief constituting the judicial consultation, not a single line is read where the harm caused to the constitutional-legal order, and above all to the accused, is developed, specifically that he was judged by a Court created after the facts and with the series of circumstances and variables surrounding the judicial case, such as administrative decisions taken by the Corte Plena or the Superior Council, through agreements, some embodied in circulars (137-2023, for example). The defense attorney, when attempting through an invalid procedural mechanism (raising a defective procedural activity against a judicial judgment) to reverse the conviction, alleges as harm violations of the principle of the lawful judge and due criminal process (debido proceso penal), setting forth as a claim that the judgment be declared ineffective and that a referral back be ordered. One might think that the harm was already set forth by the corresponding procedural party and at the appropriate procedural moment, which is why a consulting Court is not required to satisfy this requirement. Indeed, we do not intend to invoke inadmissibility of the judicial consultation because the promoting Court did not set forth any harm but rather what we want to place on record is that, although the Court that adjudicated the judicial case of origin was indeed constituted after the facts, what also appears is that the court's approach seeks a nullity for nullity's sake, since the temporal circumstance of the subsequent constitution of the lower Court does not appear to be a real transgression, in such a way that if it had proceeded to be judged by an ordinary Court, the result would have been different.

This line of reasoning has been embraced by the Constitutional Chamber itself, which advocates for achieving, through constitutional challenges—whether via judicial consultations or actions for inapplicability—a genuine protection of the fundamental right deemed to have been violated, thus avoiding declaring unconstitutionality for its own sake:

"Secondly, considering that the protection exercised in this venue is not abstract, i.e., it is not about declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, but rather to protect the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, it must be determined whether the omission challenged here as unconstitutional caused any injury to the fundamental rights of the petitioner. In essence, what is claimed as violated is the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge, which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, alleging that being judged by a court not legally constituted violates this principle. The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the 'natural judge' principle is that of a legal judge, i.e., as a 'body' created by law in accordance with the competence assigned to Congress by the Constitution for this purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, in principle, of having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established in Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition against creating ad-hoc, ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies to judge specific acts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts." Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Ruling 6701-1993 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993 (emphasis supplied).

It seems that with such a categorical stance by the Chamber on this matter, and since the real injury to the fundamental right allegedly harmed was not demonstrated (rather than a formal non-observance of the prior constitution requirement, but without evidence that its configuration was ex profeso and specifically for judging that case), this Constitutional Chamber must equally reject the present judicial consultation, since there is no evidence that the right or principle of the legal judge has been violated, in the terms prohibited by constitutional Article 35 and all the national and foreign doctrine and jurisprudence that informs it, such as the Tribunals constituted in the cases of ALMONACID ARELLANO vs. CHILE and GELMAN vs. URUGUAY.

It must be reiterated that the configuration of the sentencing Court in the specific case responded to requirements and needs to uphold the principle of continuity of the public service "Administration of Justice," also with normative support, so there is no way to demonstrate that any fundamental right of the accused was injured.

III.- On the merits. States that the two propositions of the consulting Court are:

a.- both the cited articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch in their entirety (although they were later reduced to specific paragraphs or subsections), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council and circular 137-2023, facilitate the violation of the principle of the legal judge, since the Trial Court that convicted the accused in the original case was constituted after the commission of the criminal acts, and b.- likewise, this entire web of articles and agreements also allows decisions regarding the appointment and constitution of courts, whose origin comes from administrative bodies or lower regulations, which similarly tend to injure the principle of the legal or natural judge. In this regard, the advisory body's position is:

a.- formally speaking, it is a fact that the single-judge court that tried and convicted the accused ARIAS RUIZ was designated to hear the original judicial case after the commission of the crime (2017). However, it is also tenable that this judging person is part of the roster of judicial officials of the Judicial Branch, who has been designated in that condition for having met all the required qualifications and who, in turn, is a judge appointed within the recently created Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, JEDO).

b.- the constitution of the adjudicating Court, in the manner it occurred, was not a whim nor was it even deliberate action precisely to injure the guarantees defined by constitutional Article 35 to the detriment of the accused. Such designation derives from enabling legal norms for both the Full Court and the Superior Council, who, based on agreements, decisions, and circulars, have issued a series of guidelines to guarantee the continuity of the public service called "Administration of Justice." It must be emphasized that, although it is true that the agreements taken by the Full Court and the Superior Council have materialized through established administrative mechanisms, it is also true that each of them (agreements, decisions, circulars, etc.) has a normative legal origin, so complying with the consulting Court's claim that the designation and constitution of the Courts of Justice be immutable and fully anticipated (solely to comply with the precept that the Court must be constituted not only by law but also prior to the act to be judged) would imply stagnation in the provision of the "Administration of justice" service and, incidentally, a breach of the powers granted by the Fundamental Charter itself to the Judicial Branch and a severe injury to the principle of prompt and complete justice.

c.- on the subject, we bring up here the aforementioned ruling of the Constitutional Court of Spain (47/1983 of May 31, 1983), when it states the following:

"It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be required of the body as of its holders, given the various contingencies that may affect the latter in their personal situation and the requirement, arising from the public interest—the so-called 'needs of the service'—for the different members of the judiciary to collaborate within the Administration of Justice in places where their work can be most effective, mitigating, as far as possible, the dysfunctions of the system.

As is evident, the fact that it is argued that the configuration and constitution of courts is contrary to the constitutional order, solely because these movements have been carried out through administrative decisions originating from administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch, is to ignore not only that these bodies have a legal basis but also that these actions have been absolutely necessary to preserve the continuity of the service provided by the Judicial Branch. The possibilities of transferring personnel from one jurisdiction to another or any other 'dysfunction of the system' have been done, firstly, because the questioned legal norms allow it, and secondly, because these changes were and will continue to be necessary.

Recall here what was said by the Constitutional Court of Spain in a resolution mentioned above (STC 55/1990 of March 28, Legal Ground 3):

"This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law requires, fundamentally, that the judicial body has been created by a legal norm, investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act motivating the judicial action or proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as a special or exceptional body (STC 47/1983, of May 31, Legal Ground 2). But this guarantee does not entail the right to a specifically determined judge (STC 97/1987, of June 10, Legal Ground 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special rules of competence in the distribution of cases among the different judicial bodies." (emphasis supplied).

d.- we are greatly interested in rescuing the ruling of our own Constitutional Court, mentioned above (6701-1993 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993), not only for its richness but also because the solution provided fits the consultation we are dealing with. Indeed, in addition to setting the precedent that the pronouncements of this Chamber are not limited to declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, it also introduces an element that is in itself interesting and powerful, when it concludes that the mechanism for controlling the constitutionality of norms: "... is for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, [but] it must be determined whether the omission challenged here as unconstitutional caused any injury to the fundamental rights of the petitioner." And it is precisely this scenario that arises in the criminal summary proceeding that formed the basis for the judicial consultation before us, because it is not enough to formally verify that the designation of the judge materialized years after the criminal offense; rather, it is also necessary to confirm that the judicial action actually caused the defendant some injury to his fundamental rights.

And in all honesty, neither did the consulting Court undertake the task of demonstrating it, nor has this Office detected it, concluding in the affirmation that it will not be known—because it did not happen—whether the accused would have had greater guarantees if he had been tried and convicted by an "ordinary" Trial Court and not an "emergent" one.

For all the foregoing, having raised the objections to the admissibility of this present judicial consultation of constitutionality, which we respectfully request be applied, the truth is that the petition and its grounds from the promoting court have not managed to demonstrate that, in the case of the trial of the original judicial summary proceeding, the guarantee established in constitutional Article 35 was violated. It is not enough to demonstrate that the court's constitution occurred after the criminal act judged, if the grievance that this circumstance, permitted by the provisions of the LOPJ, produced for the accused has not been demonstrated. Finally, the provisions, agreements, and circulars adopted by the administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch, constituted on normative-legal bases, prove to be a necessary resort to preserve the principle of continuity of the public service called "Administration of Justice," without it having been possible to prove—likewise—how these administrative provisions prevented the defendant from enjoying the prerogatives of constitutional Article 35.

11.- In a brief filed on June 16, 2024, Orlando Aguirre Gómez, in his capacity as president of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, responds to the hearing granted, and states, regarding the Judicial Consultation, that it is conducted within case file number [Valor 001], through Resolution No. 2024-0462 of eleven hours thirty minutes on March nineteen, two thousand twenty-four, corrected by Resolution No. 2024-713 of fifteen hours five minutes on April twenty-nine, two thousand twenty-four, issued by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. In summary, consultation is made regarding the constitutionality of Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (the latter, added by Article 18 of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017—and reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, adopted in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, which authorized the publication of the circular called "Issuance of directives on practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, insofar as they "support... and allow the transfer of case files from ordinary justice to that of organized crime," since, in the opinion of said Court, they violate the principle of the legal or natural judge enshrined by Articles 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 35, 39, 121.20, and 166 of the Political Constitution, as they allow an administrative body or laws of lower rank than constitutional and conventional norms to modify the competence of the natural judges of a fact, assigning knowledge of the case to courts that did not exist at the date of the facts.

II.- Background. 1).- In session of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch No. 95-2022, held on November 3, 2022, article LXXIII, the agreement was adopted whose operative part literally stated:

"(...)

Prior to resolving as appropriate, it was agreed: To forward the request submitted in official communication No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of November 1, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommittee, to the Legal Directorate, so that within a period of three days it may issue an opinion on the legal possibility of temporarily using the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) in the terms proposed, within the framework of the law that has not yet entered into force and, if possible, what the basis would be for such different use. This agreement is declared final." (Emphasis added).

2).- In response to the above, the Legal Directorate rendered Opinion No. DJ-566-2022, of November 7, 2022, requested by the superior body, which was heard in session No. 98-2022, held on November 11, 2022, article II, where it was agreed to accept the request submitted in official communication No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Subcommittee Against Organized Crime, given that there is no legal impossibility to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in the terms proposed. In relevant part, the operative part of the agreement indicates the following:

"(...)

It was agreed: To acknowledge receipt of Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what was indicated: 1) To accept the request submitted in official communication No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommittee, given that, according to the opinion rendered, there is no legal impossibility to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in the terms proposed:

[...]

However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently past due. 2.) The Organized Crime Subcommittee must: a) Arrange that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the position list and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated primarily to all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Arrange that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be allocated primarily to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently valid regulations. c.) Arrange that in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial competence or they are being processed, they may be employed temporarily in the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi for the handling of ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the competence rules of Article 47 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code, given the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi regarding the rights of the employees, the non-affectation of the public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality. d.) It will be the responsibility of the Organized Crime Subcommittee to monitor and control its execution in accordance with the terms set out and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter. 3.) The Human Resources Directorate will clarify to the officials who will participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is contingent upon the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, and therefore cannot be applied until it enters into force. This agreement is declared final." 3).- The Full Court, in session No. 3-2023, held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII, modified the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, at that time based in San José, and they provide support as a remedial plan for the homologous office of Guadalupe, so that starting in February 2023, they will hear all matters assigned to the different sentencing appeals courts of the country, beginning with San Ramón and providing collaboration to the rest of the country's appeals courts, until the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime officially begins functioning.

4).- Finally, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, acknowledged receipt of official communication No. S-CJEDO-08-2023, of June 2, 2023, signed by Magistrate Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Organized Crime Subcommittee, and authorized the publication of Circular No. 137-2023, called "Issuance of directives on practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," and quotes it textually.

III.- On the constitutionality of the consulted norms and the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch. Legal Power of the Supreme Court of Justice to organize the operation of judicial offices. As a first point to highlight, it is worth noting that, as stated by the consulting body, our Political Constitution, in its Article 121, subsection 20), establishes that it is the exclusive competence of the Legislative Assembly to create the Courts of Justice. Thus, once the courts are established in the different territorial circumscriptions of the country, to achieve proper functioning, the legislator granted powers to the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch—Superior Council and Full Court—to organize the judicial instances and execute the budgetary resources where they are most needed, in order to efficiently and effectively fulfill the service of administration of justice. Thus, numeral 3 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 7333, indicates the following:

"ARTICLE 3.- Justice is administered by:

1.- Courts and tribunals of minor claims, contraventions, and summary matters.

2.- Courts of first instance and criminal courts.

3.- Collegiate courts.

4.- Courts of cassation.

5.- Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice.

6.- Full Court.

The Supreme Court of Justice shall establish the number of procedural and decisional judges, as well as other judicial servants that the courts of any category and subject matter must have; for this, it shall consider the specific needs of the office, for the sake of the best execution of the public service of justice.

When there are two or more judges in a court, the coordinator of the body shall be elected internally by their peers.

If the jurisdictional offices are organized within a judicial circuit, the judges shall appoint a general coordinator among themselves.

The judge hearing a proceeding shall have the power to order whatever is appropriate for the fulfillment of their functions and, in each matter, shall have the power to exercise the disciplinary regime. In other cases, this power corresponds to the body of judges, and decisions shall be taken by majority; if there is a tie, the coordinator shall have a casting vote.

In resolutions and actions, the full name of the official in charge of the proceeding must be recorded.

Collegiate courts shall be composed of the number of judges required for the good public service and shall act individually or in panels of three, unless the law provides for another form of integration.

The coordinator shall distribute the workload, applying the criteria previously established by the judges and always seeking the greatest equity. When they cannot agree, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch or the Supreme Court of Justice, as applicable, shall establish the rules. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)" (Emphasis supplied).

For its part, Article 46 of the cited normative body provides for the possibility of modifying territorial circumscriptions, adding competences, or transferring and converting judicial offices, positions, or posts, which must obviously be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads; aspects that were contemplated at the time the directives on practical rules and the new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime were issued, through the agreements of the Full Court, Superior Council, and the questioned circular No. 137-2023.

In this regard, the norm states the following:

"ARTICLE 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning adding competences, transferring and converting judicial offices and positions or posts, must be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads.

By reason of the volume of work and the obligatorily efficient public service of justice, the Court may appoint more members to the courts, temporarily or permanently; it may also open and close—for these same reasons—new offices and bodies attached to the courts, anywhere in the country.

In mixed courts, the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the justice administration services are specialized. When the needs of the service require it, the Court may divide a mixed court into specialized courts.

When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial body, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other servants, so that they may move to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency." (Thus reformed by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) In this same vein, Article 59 states the following:

"Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:

(...)

15.- To propose to the Legislative Assembly the creation of Judicial Offices in the places and subject matters it deems necessary for the good public service.

16.- To merge two or more judicial offices into one or to divide them, to transfer their headquarters, to establish their respective territorial and subject-matter competence, taking into consideration the best public service.

It may also assign specialized competence to one or several offices, so that they hear specific matters, within the same subject matter, occurring in one or several circumscriptions or throughout the national territory." Note how the regulation grants broad powers to the Court to appoint more members to the courts—temporarily or permanently—open and close new offices and bodies attached to the courts, divide functions by subject matter—with the aim of specializing justice administration services—divide mixed courts into specialized ones, establish territorial and subject-matter competence, assign judges and other servants to move to places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency, provided it is in accordance with the public interest and the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, as expressed by the Legal Directorate of the Judicial Branch in Opinion No. DJ-566-2022.

Additionally, subsections 1, 2, 3, 6, 21, and 22 of Article 81 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch grant the power to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch to organize judicial offices, executing the administrative policy of the institution, in accordance with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. To these effects, the article indicates the following:

"Article 81.- It corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch:

1.- To execute the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

2.- To appoint, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; to transfer them, provisionally or permanently, suspend them and grant them leave with or without pay, and remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President.

3.- To appoint interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is verified that the Offices are not up to date.

6.- To transfer, provisionally or permanently, suspend, grant leave with or without pay, remove, and rehabilitate, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial servants, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court.

(...)

21.- To issue internal norms for the better performance of its functions, with the exception of regulations.

22.- To regulate the distribution of judicial matters among the Offices of equal territorial competence, to achieve workload equalization." From the foregoing, it can be deduced that, once the Legislative Assembly creates the Courts of Justice, in accordance with the constitutional mandate of Article 121.20, it is the responsibility of the Judicial Branch to define the functioning of all the judicial offices of the country, i.e., the object of the transcribed legal norms is to grant this institution the possibility of self-organizing without needing, when creating, modifying, or eliminating courts, judges' offices, prosecutors' offices, and other auxiliary bodies, to resort to the legislator for authorization through a law, since that would imply an imminent delay and an unquestionable impact on the provision of the service and on the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, violating Article 41 of our Political Constitution.

Now, in order to safeguard the proper use of public funds, Article 176 of our Political Constitution requires that they be used in a "sustainable, transparent, and responsible" manner, obligations that all public institutions have when executing the budget allocated each year. That is, with respect to the Judicial Branch, all budgetary resources allocated annually must be invested to meet the respective institutional goals and objectives.

In this regard, the cited numeral states the following:

"Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides.

The ordinary budget of the Republic includes all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, for the entire economic year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed the probable revenues.

The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the above rules when issuing its budgets.

The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December." In the same sense, Article 4 of Law No.

8131, known as the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, which establishes: “every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads,” that is, the head must prepare the budget formulation for each year, which includes all institutional needs and allocates resources according to the plans for that year. The article states the following:

“ARTICLE 4.- Subjection to the National Development Plan Every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this Law. The National Development Plan will constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that corresponds in accordance with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions. (Sinalevi Note: By means of article 21 of the Public Investment Law, No. 10441 of March 13, 2024, this numeral will be reformed. In accordance with the aforementioned law, it will enter into force twelve months from its publication, that is, March 22, 2025, therefore, from that date the text of this article will read as follows:

Article 4- Subjection to the National Development and Public Investment Plan. Every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this law. The National Development and Public Investment Plan will constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that corresponds, in accordance with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions.”)” In general terms, if we carefully review the directives issued by the Superior Council of the Judiciary in the questioned agreement and circular, there is no doubt that they were issued with the purpose of implementing a Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, so that both the judges and auxiliary personnel remain in their functions, carrying out their work efficiently, in order to prevent the resource from being underutilized and above all due to the need to strengthen other areas given the difficult situation caused by the increase in crime in the country.

Of special importance, the legislator, with the approval of the Law “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica,” No. 9481, established that this jurisdiction has competence throughout the entire national territory; in addition, it has competence at the national level to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction “when institutional requirements so determine”; this was also reiterated in the addition of article 101 bis to the Organic Law of the Judiciary. Therefore, it could not be interpreted that if a matter from the ordinary jurisdiction is handled by judges specialized in organized crime, the principle of natural judge would be violated, as the appellant and the consulting body wish to make it seem, since these competencies were defined by law, and it is the exclusive and exclusionary responsibility of the Judiciary to allocate the resource where it is most needed.

The cited article states the following:

“Article 2- Competence. Organized crime or organized criminality matters may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. Procedural acts issued in organized crime cases in the ordinary jurisdiction, before the commencement of operations of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, shall maintain their efficacy and validity. The current regulations on the matter apply to both jurisdictions, including Law 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009, unless expressly provided otherwise.

Matters that meet the parameters established in article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction.

These matters shall be heard by the criminal courts, trial courts, and ordinary criminal sentence appeals courts throughout the country. Matters that, in addition to complying with the provisions of article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. These matters may be submitted to the Criminal Court, Trial Court, and Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. They shall hear criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related crimes. Its seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they shall have competence throughout the entire national territory. Furthermore, these offices shall also have competence at the national level to carry out work within the ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.

When the Public Prosecutor's Office verifies that, in accordance with current regulations, the facts under investigation qualify as organized crime or organized criminality, it may request authorization to apply the rules provided for this type of matter: a) For cases corresponding to the ordinary jurisdiction, the jurisdictional authority in charge of the matter shall verify compliance with the requirements, by means of a reasoned resolution, within forty-eight hours after the request. b) For cases corresponding to the specialized jurisdiction, the request shall be made in writing by the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic. The specialized jurisdictional authority may assume competence in a reasoned resolution, after verification of the requirements, in accordance with the procedure established in article 4 of this law. Exceptionally, the request may be managed by the substitute prosecutor, when the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic is impeded, for some duly justified reason. Except for the initial written request by the Attorney General or the substitute prosecutor for the Specialized jurisdiction to assume knowledge of a matter, the other procedures may be delegated to the specialized prosecutors of said jurisdiction, with the exception of those that, by legal imperative, can only be managed by the person holding the position of Attorney General.

The cassation appeal and the special review procedure shall be the competence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.” As we see, by legal mandate, the Full Court or the Superior Council, as the case may be, in its capacity as employer and supreme body of the Judiciary, has the power to define the institutional policies of internal organization and structuring, with the purpose of providing quality public service, which, as administrator of justice it is entrusted with, through the creation or restructuring of judicial offices, as well as with the placement of judicial personnel in the offices where temporary, or even permanent, support and collaboration is required, for the better service of the users of the justice access service. In that sense, the questioned directives find support in the organic and budgetary regulations cited above and in the “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica,” No. 9481, which were enacted in order to ensure that the Judiciary provides an efficient and effective justice administration service, in compliance with the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, without denial, making efforts to address the current situation our country is facing due to the constant increase in criminality derived from the strengthening of organized crime structures such as drug trafficking and other complex crimes.

For these reasons, articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, as well as the agreement of the Superior Council from session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, and Circular No. 137-2023, do not present any problem of constitutionality; conversely, removing the possibility for the superior bodies of the Judiciary to organize the judicial offices and the Courts of Justice would impede the exercise of the functions constitutionally assigned to this Branch of the Republic, violating the Principle of Judicial Independence established in article 9 of the Political Constitution.

Constitutional jurisprudence has been developing this principle from the perspective of “organizational independence,” in the sense that each of the branches of the Republic can issue rules and adopt decisions regarding its operation, its organization, and the development of substantive functions (citing vote number 14286-2005 of fourteen hours and forty-five minutes of October nineteenth, two thousand five) and points out that the separation of powers and the self-organization power that the Judiciary has is complemented by the regulatory power, which finds support in subsection d), of the first paragraph, of article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration, when it provides that “The hierarchy of the sources of the administrative legal system shall be subject to the following order: (…) d) The decrees of the Executive Branch that regulate laws, those of the other Supreme Branches in the matter of their competence.” Thus, the superior bodies have the possibility of issuing regulations and service directives to organize judicial offices, as usually happens when a court or tribunal needs to reorganize and assume new functions within the competencies established by the legislator. This regulatory power was also addressed by the Constitutional Court in the cited vote (No. 14286-2005), where the following was stated:

“I.- B) Regulatory Power of the other Branches and of other public entities: Having said all the above, it would seem to be concluded that the regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch; however, this assertion must be understood in the sense that, indeed, the executive regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, but not the autonomous regulatory power. That is, the possibility is admitted that the other Supreme Branches, distinct from the Executive Branch, may issue autonomous regulations, whether of organization or of service. The foregoing is based on subsection d) of the first paragraph of article 6 of the LGAP…

(…)

Now then, specifically regarding the autonomous regulatory power of the Judiciary, it derives from the very principle of separation of functions, since, as stated, nothing prevents the same function - non-primary - from being exercised by two Branches or by all, which is why one cannot speak of a rigid distribution of competencies based on function and matter. Thus, the Judiciary also has normative power, which also translates into its autonomous regulatory power for aspects related to its internal organization or the services it provides. The self-organization power further recognized by constitutional Article 167 itself, insofar as it establishes the mandatory consultation of bills related to the organization or functioning of the Judiciary; likewise, article 48 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary states:

“Article 48.- The Supreme Court of Justice is the Superior Court of the Judiciary and as the superior body thereof shall exercise the functions of government and regulation.” Thus, it is not surprising that this Chamber has had the opportunity to analyze the powers of the Supreme Court of Justice with respect to regulating the functions of the different judicial offices (see resolution 02-07626 of 14 hours 35 minutes of August 1, 2002 and resolution 00-05888 of 10 hours 03 minutes of July 13, 2000). In conclusion, as observed, not only does the Executive Branch enjoy regulatory power (executive and autonomous), but this power has also been recognized to other Branches and public entities, but regarding these, only if they are autonomous regulations (whether of organization or of service), since the executive regulatory power remains exclusive to the Executive Branch.” (Emphasis is ours).

By virtue of the foregoing, the questioned rules are not unconstitutional, given that they grant powers to the superior bodies to self-organize the judicial offices in order to provide a quality, efficient, and effective justice administration service, subject to changes due to incidents that may be occurring due to certain social situations, and where the budgetarily assigned resources are required to be used in a “sustainable, transparent, and responsible” manner, which was ordered by the Subcommission Against Organized Crime, the Full Court, and the Superior Council, when the Contingency Plan was implemented, in that jurisdiction, under the possibilities that the law establishes regarding judicial offices that handle criminal matters.

There is no impact on the Principle of Natural Judge. As indicated, the Organic Law of the Judiciary number 7333 establishes a series of norms that allow the Full Court and the Superior Council to organize judicial offices. Among these norms, it is worth highlighting articles 46, 59, and 81, which allow the superior bodies the modification of territorial circumscriptions, the addition of competencies, or the transfer and conversion of judicial offices, positions, or posts, which evidently will have to be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads.

In the case sub examine, it should be noted that it is Law No. 9481 that creates the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, which defines the competence of the judicial offices that handle this matter, whose competence they have at the national level and to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction. This has the consequence that the Judiciary, within its self-organization power, can use human and budgetary resources where it deems pertinent, always attending to good service and the public interest. Thus, the principle of natural judge establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial court, pre-established by law, as happened with the creation of the referred specialized jurisdiction, so we are not before an ad hoc constituted jurisdictional body, but rather before courts of justice that were created by law and whose competence has also been defined by the legislator, just as the principle of natural judge requires.

If we review the directives contained in Circular No. 137-2023 again, these are consistent with the mentioned regulations, since they in no way implement any modification to what is legally provided, but rather seek that judges specialized in organized crime can handle ordinary matters, when the circumstances of institutional need so require, to guarantee access to justice and efficiency in the administration of justice. This practice is also common in other matters, where judicial offices have had to be reorganized due to the approval of new Laws, which modify or establish new competencies and functions of some Courts of Justice, among others, the Labor Procedural Reform, the Civil Procedural Reform, and others that are approved but are in a vacatio legis period, such as the Family Procedural Code, effective as of October 2024, or those that are about to be approved.

In the specific case, the judges who heard the ordinary process, as explained, are criminal judges who by legal mandate have competence throughout the entire national territory to handle organized crime or ordinary matters. They were not designated for the specific case, but rather form part of the composition of a determined jurisdictional body whose competence has been legally defined, having to hear “ordinary and specialized processes” due to the requirement of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime - whose processing corresponds to the ordinary process - was not tried through the specialized process, but rather, it was simply processed by specialized judges applying the procedural law of the ordinary process, a situation that in no way affects the legally defined competence.

It is important to bring up what was indicated by the Legal Directorate in opinion number DJ-566-2022, when it analyzed the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, under the terms that were proposed by the Sub Commission of the Criminal Jurisdiction. In this regard, the Advisory Unit, in what is of interest, stated the following:

“It is evident that there is a manifest instrumentality in the resources of the current year for the start of the operation of the respective jurisdiction, as manifested by the reform of the same transitory I when indicating: ‘It will enter into force eighteen months after the necessary budget for its implementation has been granted, in accordance with the technical studies of the Judiciary’ Note how this transitory provision foresees that a budget be assigned for the respective jurisdiction 18 months before, that is, in a previous budgetary period, to the entry into force of the jurisdiction, thereby making clear the possibility of executing the respective resources. It should be remembered that article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration provides the following:

“Article 16.- 1. In no case may acts be issued contrary to univocal rules of science or technology, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience.” Logic indicates that if resources were assigned in the year 2022 in the context indicated ut supra, it is for the purpose of preparing the start of the respective jurisdiction, derived from the ordinary budget that authorizes the expense, and so that the commencement of the law's effects are in accordance with the principles of public service, namely:

“Article 4.- The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need it satisfies, and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries.” The contrary would imply waiting for the Law's entry into force to make the necessary investments for its start, which is not the purpose of the budgetary allocation for the year 2022 nor of the reformed transitory I of Law 9481, which rather contemplates preparatory acts for its execution.

Furthermore, it should be noted that it would not even be logical not to execute duly foreseen budgetary resources, nor, by partially implementing the respective plan in the preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, to leave human resources idle afterwards by presuming that they cannot exercise jurisdictional or para-jurisdictional functions because Law 9481 is not in force, when the same, in the future, contemplates that judicial servants may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases, and the Budget Law does not condition execution on its entry into force.

For the purposes of this opinion, this Directorate analyzed the document presented by Judge Zúñiga Morales, and from the expert technical opinion of the undersigned, it is evidenced that the use that would be given to the positions would be the following…

(…)

As evidenced, the plan contemplates a series of actions by the appointed individuals who would be participating in actions necessary for the preparation of the entry into force of the Law in question, which we consider in accordance with the provisions of official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, and the agreement between Branches of the Republic that provides its basis.

This Legal Directorate considers that the legal basis for the execution of the plan is the ordinary budget 2022, which grants resources so that, ex ante, what is necessary for the implementation of Law 9481 is prepared, when the legal prerequisites for its enforcement are met.

The contrary would imply assuming that it is not until the entry into force of the law that the respective assigned resources could be used, which would further postpone its effects, contrary to its provisions, the purpose of the legislator, and the public interest itself.

It is evident that official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, contemplates financing for preparatory acts for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction, in accordance with the mentioned transitory I itself, and with the understanding that said administrative act uses the term “others,” in addition to “logistical development, remodeling processes, bidding processes…” for the destination of the resources.

This Directorate considers that it is also possible that once all the necessary technical preparatory actions for the start of the respective jurisdiction have been implemented, the human resource may be used for other purposes specific to jurisdictional competencies, with the understanding that the Superior Council has competencies to adapt the functions of the servants in accordance with the public interest, in the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, and given that it would not be possible to apply Law 9481 until it is in force.

This advisory unit considers that limiting the possibility for designated individuals to exercise ordinary functions within the framework of competencies assigned by law or by administrative act would imply giving effects to a law that is not yet in force and limiting the effects of the ordinary budget 2022, which does not contemplate limitations or conditions in that sense.

Consequently, once the provisions of official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, have been applied, it must be understood that the effects of the respective staffing table in the ordinary budget 2022 must be applied.

Pursuant to the foregoing, it is considered that what is proposed by the Contingency Plan proposal is legally appropriate, and to that effect we recommend the following:

• Provide that, as a priority, the resources contemplated in the staffing table and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated primarily to all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Provide that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the jurisdiction against organized crime, it be allocated primarily to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently effective regulations.

• Provide that, in the event that in the respective territorial competence there are no organized crime cases or the same are in process, they may be employed temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, for the handling of ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

This last recommendation addresses the fact that even the not-yet-effective law raises the possibility that, in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources destined for this jurisdiction may handle ordinary matters, and in the understanding that, as has been indicated, the ordinary budget 2022 does not contemplate any condition in its content regarding the use of the positions.

It is reiterated that in the case under analysis, we are not in the presence of a technically specific destination, but rather an additional allocation of budgetary resources in the year 2022, though without there being an originating law that ordered the specific destination of previously established resources, and where a spirit of liberality by the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement of Presidents of Supreme Branches.

This advisory unit considers that in this case, the interpretation criteria of article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration and of the Civil Code must be applied, which provide:

“Article 10.- 1. The administrative norm must be interpreted in the way that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within due respect for the rights and interests of the individual.

2. It must be interpreted and integrated taking into account other related norms and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers.” “ARTICLE 10.- Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.” It is reiterated in this sense that it would not be logical to interpret an Ordinary Budget Law in the sense that previously foreseen budgetary resources could not be executed, or that if the respective plan were partially implemented in the preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, human resources could be left idle afterwards by presuming that they cannot exercise jurisdictional or para-jurisdictional functions because Law 9481 is not in force, when the same, in the future, contemplates that judicial servants may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases, and the Budget Law does not condition execution in the year 2022 on its entry into force.

V.- Conclusions:

In accordance with the foregoing considerations, this advisory unit considers that the following can be concluded:

I.- The budget execution for 2022, and therefore the entire staffing table related to the positions referred to in the Contingency Plan under analysis, cannot be understood as conditioned on the very entry into force of Law 9481, since it is governed by the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic for that year, which does not contemplate any condition or limitation based on the entry into force of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime. Thus, the execution of said resources for the year 2022 will be based on the Ordinary Budget Law and not on a law that is not yet in force and that cannot limit the budgetary execution in the year 2022.

II.- The resources contributed to the ordinary budget project 2022 by official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, cannot be understood as a specific destination, given that there is no originating law that ordered the specific destination of the previously established resources, but rather a spirit of liberality by the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement of Presidents of Supreme Branches.

III.- In any case, it must be understood that based on the agreement of Presidents of Supreme Branches mentioned in official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, by the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency, and in this last administrative act, the resources assigned through modification to the ordinary budget project 2022 were not foreseen exclusively for the execution of the respective law, but also for any preparatory act for its enforcement in accordance with science, technique, logic, and experience, and so that the effects of the law are in accordance with the principles of public service, ensuring continuity in the service.

IV.- Additionally, it must be understood that as long as it is within the same budget program, nothing prevents the exercise of the legitimate ius variandi by the Superior Council, as part of the competencies assigned by the Organic Law of the Judiciary, since the ordinary budget 2022 does not contemplate any condition regarding its use and destination, and there is no law that creates the specific destination.” IV.- For greater certainty of the Superior Council, we recommend that the respective agreement indicate the following:

• Order that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the staffing list and linked to the proposed Contingency Plan be allocated in the first instance to all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of operations of the organized crime jurisdiction.

• Order that once the respective human resource participates in the actions scheduled in the proposed Contingency Plan as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be allocated as a priority to handling organized crime matters under the currently applicable regulations.

• Order that in the event that there are no organized crime cases within the respective territorial competence or they are in process, they may be temporarily employed, in the legitimate exercise of *ius variandi*, for handling ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing in strict compliance with the rules of competence of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Código Procesal Penal, in understanding of the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of *ius variandi* regarding the rights of the serving persons, the non-affectation of public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality.

V.- In accordance with the foregoing, it is concluded that there is a legal possibility of temporarily using the positions contemplated in the 2022 staffing list granted by the modification of positions carried out based on official communication DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, within the very content of the 2022 ordinary budget and since there is no condition or limitation therein regarding their use.

VI.- The motivation for the administrative decision adopted by the Superior Council will be based on the considerations and proposals of the respective Contingency Plan, it being so that the corresponding Jurisdictional Commission will be responsible for the monitoring and control of its execution in accordance with the terms set forth and the applicable administrative, labor, and criminal regulations.” From the foregoing, it is deduced that the budgetary resources were assigned so that the specialized jurisdiction could handle both specialized and ordinary proceedings, just as was ordered by the legislator, safeguarding the principles of public service and ensuring continuity of service, especially in a matter that has generated great social impact in recent years, such as Organized Crime offenses, and where it is not beyond the knowledge of the entire population that both the Legislative Branch, the Judicial Branch, and the Executive Branch are arduously working on proposing legal reforms to adapt the justice system so that this type of crime can be faced with the best legal tools.

Finally, the Constitutional Chamber, in reiterated opinions, has referred to the powers of the ordinary legislator to define the competencies of judges, which “constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body such as the ‘free configuration of the legislator,’ also called ‘free legislative design.’” Thus, in opinion number 2017-4005, of ten hours and forty minutes of March fifteenth, two thousand seventeen, the following was indicated:

“Now then, the fact that the ordinary legislator has chosen to provide the questioned procedure for the substitution of judges constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body such as the ‘free configuration of the legislator,’ also called ‘free legislative design’ or ‘legislative discretion.’ For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. of June 11, 2003, it was noted that: ‘The Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (article 121, paragraph 1°, of the Constitución Política), enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it is limited by the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, values, and principles - among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out - of that nature and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases.’ For this Court, the legislative discretion applied to the *sub iudice* reaches and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to consider” (opinion 13-011706 of 11:44 hrs. of August 30, 2013).

It is necessary to indicate that *stricto sensu*, the principle of the natural judge results in the impossibility of being subjected to a proceeding before the authority of someone who is not a judge or who lacks competence to resolve a determined case, and that the competence of judges and courts must be previously established by law, which is fully presented in the proceeding where the consultation is raised, without it being possible to derive other effects that prevent the hearing of cases by competent judges formally designated as such by a firm and effective act.

In accordance with the foregoing, what is questioned has no reason to be, since the respective cases will be heard by competent, independent, and impartial judges, which is evidenced by Article 10 of the Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, as it establishes:

“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” On this topic, Luigi Ferrajoli has indicated:

“(…) while the legal pre-constitution of the judge and the inalterability of competencies are guarantees of impartiality, being aimed at preventing instrumental interventions of an individual or general nature on the formation of the judge, the prohibition of special and extraordinary judges is, above all, a guarantee of equality, which satisfies everyone's right to have the same judges and the same processes.” It is not observed that the norms and provisions subject to consultation are contrary to these considerations, and on the contrary, they are consistent, including with the precedents of the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos on the subject, inasmuch as this jurisdictional body has indicated:

“It constitutes a basic principle relating to the independence of the judiciary that every person has the right to be tried by ordinary courts in accordance with legally established procedures. The State must not create ‘courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to replace the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to the ordinary courts.’” Caso Lori Berenson Mejía Vs. Perú. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004.

“The State must not create courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to replace the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to the ordinary courts. This seeks to avoid people being judged by special courts, created for the case, or ad hoc.” Caso Apitz Barbera y otros Vs. Venezuela. August 5, 2008.

It cites opinion No. 1739-1992 of 11:45 hours of June 1, 1992, regarding the right to a regular judge:

“If, then, jurisdiction consists, in general, in the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution that the law makes of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, seriousness or amount, territory, and degree, both jurisdiction -general or by subject matter- and competence are part of due process, since they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by regular courts, in the manner stated.” In a complementary manner, opinion No. 2020-001312 of 9:20 hours of January 22, 2020, of that same Chamber ordered:

“In relation to the principle of the Natural Judge, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process, presupposes the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. What is protected through this principle is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge certain facts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts.” It concludes that, in the cases in question, we are not in situations of judges appointed *ex profeso* or ad hoc for specific persons, and what is contemplated in the questioned regulations responds to aspects inherent to the administrative order, in accordance with the objective assumptions considered therein and the need to attend to the administration of justice service in the current historical juncture, and in the understanding that the hearing of ordinary jurisdiction cases by the Jurisdicción de la Delincuencia Organizada is provided for by law, in such a way that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific assumption, but rather that the hearing of the proceeding remains in the hands of a Criminal Judge, providing the adequate guarantees indicated *ut supra*. Note also that it is not observed, nor do the consultants indicate, that with the objected provisions the procedural guarantees that the parties possess have been affected, the relevant procedural regulations have been modified to their detriment, or due process has been violated *per se* regarding their legitimate exercise of the right of defense and hearing, since the respective processing and resolution of the proceedings will be common to any other proceeding regulated by the procedural rules applicable to criminal matters.

12.- By resolution at 1:54 p.m. on June 19, 2024, the president of the Chamber deemed the hearings granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the president of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial as answered, and referred the judicial consultation to the office of the reporting magistrate.

13.- By resolution of the instructing magistrate at 3:35 p.m. on July 17, 2024, the material error that, due to a defect in the electronic system, was contained in the resolution issued at 1:37 p.m. on July 17, 2024, was corrected, in the sense that it orders, as evidence for better resolution, the executive director of the Poder Judicial to indicate the date from which the necessary resources for the implementation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada were received in that Branch.

14.- By document incorporated into the electronic file on July 24, 2024, Ana Eugenia Romero Jenkins, Executive Director of the Poder Judicial, reports that, as stated in the report of the Dirección de Planificación No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024, the date on which the resources were assigned to the Poder Judicial to implement said Jurisdicción Especializada (Ley No. 9481) was as of the ordinary budget for the year 2022, in which, through Motion 15 approved in the Consecutive of the Comisión de Hacendarios 36, of October 14, 2021, which forms part of the Ley de Presupuesto 2022, (Ley No. 10103 of November 30, 2021, published in the Supplement 249 to La Gaceta 235, of December 7, 2021), the Asamblea Legislativa authorized the Poder Judicial to include an amount of ¢2.900 billion, which enabled the initiation of the implementation process of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. (See attached certification). From the indicated communication, the following is extracted textually: “The authorized amount allowed covering the costs corresponding to 413 positions for the implementation of the JEDO proportionally according to their start date, of which 402 are ordinary and 11 are extraordinary. Of this total, 394 positions were projected for two months (November and December 2022), while 4 positions were projected for 4 months, and finally, 15 positions were budgeted for 12 months. In addition, within the authorized budgetary amount, the expense corresponding to computer equipment was included.” The underline and bold do not correspond to the original document. Likewise, through communication No. 407-PLA-2023 dated May 12, 2023 (attached), the Dirección de Planificación of the Poder Judicial certifies that through the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para el Ejercicio Económico del 2023, Ley No. 10331 published in the Digital Supplement No. 267 to La Gaceta No. 235 of December 9, 2022, and its reforms; budgetary content was granted to the Poder Judicial for the preparation and implementation of the law for the Creation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada in Costa Rica, Ley N° 9481. In this regard, through communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 indicated above, the Dirección de Planificación noted that resources in the sum of ¢15.583 billion colones were assigned for this 2023 period, which allowed covering the investment for positions and operational expenses. The detail of the budgetary financing for Ley 9481 for the implementation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada can be seen in communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024, attached.

15.- The provisions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Hess Herrera; and,

Considering:

I.- PRELIMINARILY. - For having participated in the adoption of the agreement of the Corte Suprema de Justicia of January 30, 2023, session No. 003-2023, article VIII, Magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas recused themselves from the hearing of this matter, a request that was rejected by resolution at 2:44 p.m. on May 24, 2024, of the acting president of the Chamber. Although Magistrate Araya García and substitute Magistrate Aracelly Pacheco Salazar also composed the Court at the time of the adoption of the mentioned agreement, they did not formulate a recusal at that opportunity, as they were not sitting on the Tribunal, the first due to incapacity and the second because she was not then appointed. However, in application of the principles *pro sentencia* and procedural economy, express record is left that they are enabled to hear this matter, as these are the same reasons expressed by the indicated proprietary magistrates, timely denied as grounds for being separated from the hearing of the consultation.

II.- ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites for admission of judicial consultations; a provision from which some conditioning and fundamental elements emerge for its origin: that it be formulated by a judge; that there exist “reasoned doubts” about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; that there is a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or tribunal; and that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged that raises the doubt of constitutionality. Such prerequisites were analyzed in detail in judgment of this Chamber No. 01617-97 of 2:54 p.m. on March 17, 1997, in the following manner:

“a. that it be formulated by a 'judge,' a generic term that - of course - applies both to single-member judges and to collegiate tribunals, and on which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that they must be authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, vested with the authority of *res judicata*); and, b) that the judge must be, at the moment of formulating the consultation, duly enabled to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a proceeding that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).

b. that there exist 'reasoned doubts' about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged, this means that the questioning must be reasonable and well-considered; it also implies that it cannot deal with aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the *erga omnes* effectiveness of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also given that a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it must be stressed, for its relevance to the *sub examine*, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the adequacy of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to constitutional parameters; consequently, if a norm has previously passed the explicit examination of constitutionality (by way of action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because - in this case - there is always the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which those are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

c. that there exist a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or tribunal. As with the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation is never given in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'principal' matter. finally, d. that, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged that raises the doubt of constitutionality, an aspect that - for its relevance to the case - it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'must apply the norm or judge the act, conduct, or omission' carries a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms that 'may apply the norm or judge the act, conduct, or omission.' The judicial consultation does not proceed before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since - as explained above - this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for him.” Likewise, Article 104 of the same law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that notice be served on the parties within three days, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended, until the Chamber has evacuated the consultation.

III.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS CONSULTATION. The consultation is raised by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea venue, through opinion No. 2024-462 of 11:30 a.m. on March 19, 2024, corrected by resolution No. 2024-713 of 3:05 p.m. on April 29, 2024, issued in file number [Valor 001]. In that case, the Tribunal hears on appeal resolution No. 437-2023 of 2:22 p.m. on May 10, 2023, issued by the Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, “Emergente” Section, an appeal that was admitted and is pending resolution. In the appeal, the private defender of the accused alleges, as the first ground for challenge, the existence of defective procedural activity due to absolute defect and violation of the principle of the legal or natural judge, because an ordinary proceeding, in which a single person is charged with the retention of worker-employer contributions, was assigned to an emergent section of the Tribunal de Delincuencia Organizada and the prosecutor assisting was designated for that type of matter, which evidences the creation of a special court for the case and consolidated *a posteriori*, which implies that the appointment and the competence of the judges were not within reach of the parties to be consulted in a timely manner, but rather emerged after the consummation of the acts charged. He considers that there was a notable violation of criminal due process due to the formation of a non-competent tribunal, as it turns out to be a tribunal appointed to hear another nature of proceedings, as is the organized crime section, when internal and international norms indicate that the competent tribunal must be pre-constituted before the facts. The norms whose constitutionality is challenged are Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, in addition to general provisions issued by the Superior Council, which, although they do not have to be applied directly by the consulting tribunal, are related to the grounds and grievances raised by the appellant which it must resolve, since they establish rules of competence for the specialized organized crime jurisdiction, related to the grounds for appeal raised. For all the foregoing, the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del II Circuito Judicial de San José has sufficient standing to formulate the consultation.

IV.- UNEVACUABILITY OF THE CONSULTATION REGARDING THE AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF JANUARY 30, 2023, ACTA 003-2023, ARTICLE XVIII. The indicated agreement, adopted by the Full Court, stipulates the following:

“(…) 2) Grant what was requested by the Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, submitted by official communication No. S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: Vary the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, which at this moment have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that as of February 2023, they shall hear all matters assigned to the different criminal appeal tribunals in the country, starting with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeal tribunals in the country, while the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada officially begins functioning. 3.) The Secretaría General de la Corte will take note for the publication of the corresponding circular. The agreement is declared firm.” In the first place, it must be indicated that according to the provisions of numeral 108 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the provisions on the legislative consultation of constitutionality and those provided for the action of unconstitutionality are supplementarily applicable to the judicial consultation of constitutionality. In the present matter, the Chamber considers that the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del II Circuito Judicial de San José does not have standing to consult the constitutionality of the agreement of the Full Court, since what is provided therein does not form part of the objections contained in the appeal that it must resolve and that motivate the formulation of the consultation. The decision adopted by the Court consists of varying the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, so that, as of February 2023, it hears all matters assigned to the different criminal appeal tribunals in the country, starting with San Ramón, and provides collaboration to the rest of the appeal tribunals, while the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada officially begins functioning. It should be remembered that what is pending resolution is an appeal against the conviction judgment issued by the Tribunal Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, in an ordinary criminal matter, so the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality of the consulted agreement would not have any impact on the matter that the consulting tribunal must resolve, which questions the norms and provisions that support the competence of the sentencing tribunal - Tribunal Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada de San José -. For the indicated reasons, regarding the referred agreement of the Full Court, the consultation is declared unevacuable.

V.- UNEVACUABILITY OF THE CONSULTATION ON THE AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CONSEJO SUPERIOR DEL PODER JUDICIAL, IN SESSION NUMBER 48-2023, HELD ON JUNE 8, 2023, ARTICLE LXXI. The questioned agreement authorized the publication of the circular called “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado,” Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, published in the Boletín Judicial number 119 of July 3, 2023.

“CIRCULAR No. 137-2023 Subject: “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”. - TO ALL JUDICIAL OFFICES AND BUREAUS OF THE COUNTRY.

BE IT KNOWN THAT:

This Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session number 48-2023 held on June 08, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, makes known the practical rules and new form of processing of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado:

“Practical rules On the competence of JEDO offices:

With the entry into force of Ley N° 9481 de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, as well as ley N° 10369 Reforma de la ley 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, of May 5, 1993 and reforma de la ley 9481, Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, of May 30, 2023:

1- Organized crime or organized criminality matters may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or, in the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada.

2- Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Ley 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be heard by the ordinary criminal courts, criminal tribunals, and criminal appeal tribunals throughout the country.

3- The Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada may hear matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Ley 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Ley 9481.

4- Matters submitted to the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada may be submitted before the Juzgado Penal, Tribunal Penal, and Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, all of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, as appropriate. They shall hear criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as connected offenses. Its seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Corte Suprema de Justicia, and it shall have competence throughout the national territory.

5- The Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada shall have competence at the national level to carry out tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.

6- The Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada may hear all organized crime cases that, at the moment of commencement of functions, the person occupying the position of fiscal general de la República or the person occupying the position of fiscal subrogante (due to the impossibility of the first), requests the competent jurisdictional authority of the JEDO, according to the procedural stage in which the matter is found, to assume jurisdiction over these, prior verification of the legal requirements.

7- In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Ley 10369 which reforms Transitorio II of Ley 9481, the procedural deadlines established in Article 10 of Ley 9481 shall be applicable to organized crime matters that are in process, without the need for an additional jurisdictional resolution.

Jurisdictional authorities who have persons subject to any precautionary measure under their order shall, on their own motion or at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, readjust the time limits as appropriate, by means of a reasoned resolution.

8- The jurisdiction to hear the cassation appeal and the special review procedure corresponds to the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

9- For the purposes of guaranteeing an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who serve in the jurisdiction specialized in organized crime, from the beginning of their duties and until it is deemed necessary, shall also perform tasks of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.

10- When circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform tasks in processes of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.

Regarding the processing of the case file in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime:

1- All processes that are susceptible to being heard in the new jurisdiction, in which it is deemed appropriate for the Public Prosecutor's Office to make a request to the criminal court specialized in organized crime so that it assumes jurisdiction over them, must be processed in 100% electronic form, through the use of the virtual desktop, the electronic court file, and online processing for users.

2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the jurisdiction specialized in organized crime shall follow the processing method of the court of origin, meaning that, if it has been processed in physical form, it shall continue thus until its conclusion.

3- Ordinary cases heard by the JEDO shall continue their processing according to the state in which they are assumed until their execution. They shall be referred to the court of origin once they are completely ready for archiving.

Mandatory use of the identification card for officials and employees of JEDO.

The use of the identification card is mandatory for officials and employees working in the jurisdiction specialized in organized crime, which must be worn in a visible place and used to access the different spaces that require electronic control.

The use of the identification card is personal, as is the responsibility to immediately inform the Security Department of the Judicial Branch in case of deterioration, theft, or loss.

Access to the different offices and courts, as well as to the courtrooms and, in general, to the facilities housing the JEDO that require electronic control, must be done using the identification card. In case of forgetfulness, theft, or loss (once such circumstance has been duly reported), a daily pass must be requested from the Security Department in order to facilitate access by electronic means to the different spaces that so require, which shall also be for personal use and shall be under the responsibility of the official or employee to whom it is granted.

Provisions on documents to be backed up in a physical file and other operational aspects:

1- For the purposes of preparing the physical file to be used by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction (JEDO) as a backup, considering that the processing will be in 100% electronic form, which includes the digital court file, the use of the virtual desktop, and online processing, among other characteristics of the electronic court file, the documents that must be backed up in physical form are the following:

PREPARATORY STAGE:

- The statement of the accused (declaración indagatoria).

- The resolution that first imposes pretrial detention or less burdensome precautionary measures.

- The subsequent resolutions that extend, vary, or order the cessation of a precautionary measure.

- The interlocutory appeal resolutions that rule on the precautionary measure.

- The resolution ordering the interception of private communications, its extensions, and the one ordering its lifting.

- "Tener a la Orden" (Order to Hold), "Orden de Libertad" (Release Order), "Remisiones de detenidos" (Remands of detainees) (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and involve printed forms).

- The search, registration, and seizure order.

- The order decreeing the lifting of bank secrecy and its subsequent extensions.

- The dismissal (desestimación).

- The definitive closing of proceedings (sobreseimiento definitivo).

- The request for international cooperation to obtain evidence and the communications from the requested international authority.

- The international capture order.

- The extradition request from the Public Prosecutor's Office, the resolution requesting active extradition, and the various resolutions of the requested country (these documents may also relate to other stages of the process).

- The documentation referring to the notification of the detention of a foreigner to the consulate of their country of nationality.

- Resolution deciding on the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office for the criminal court specialized in organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case.

- Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: scheduling of hearings, declaration of contumacy (rebeldías), lifting of contumacy, preliminary rulings (prejudicialidad), etc.)

INTERMEDIATE STAGE:

- The indictment (acusación) and request to open the trial.

- The private criminal complaint (querella) and civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria).

- The record of the preliminary hearing.

- The provisional or definitive closing of proceedings (sobreseimiento).

- The order to open the trial (auto de apertura a juicio).

- Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: scheduling of hearings, declaration of contumacy, lifting of contumacy, preliminary rulings, etc.)

TRIAL STAGE:

- The record documenting the application of the special abbreviated procedure (in case it is applicable).

- The records of the debate.

- The definitive closing of proceedings.

- The judgment (sentencia).

- The resolutions in which processing is given to appeals, such as hearings or summons (emplazamientos).

- "Tener a la Orden," "Orden de Libertad," "Remisiones de detenidos" (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and involve printed forms).

- Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: scheduling of hearings, declaration of contumacy, lifting of contumacy, preliminary rulings, etc.)

- Resolution of interlocutory appeals (such as on precautionary measures, on the resolution deciding the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office for the criminal court specialized in organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case, execution, etc.).

APPEAL OF SENTENCE:

- Extensions of pretrial detention or house arrest with electronic monitoring, or their rejection.

- The decision (voto) that resolves the admissibility of the appeal or admits evidence to be presented in an oral hearing.

- The decision that resolves the sentence appeal.

CASSATION:

- The decision that resolves the admissibility of the appeal or admits evidence to be presented in an oral hearing.

- The decision that resolves the appeal.

REVIEW:

- The decision that resolves on the admissibility of the review procedure.

- The decision that resolves on the merits of the review procedure.

SENTENCE EXECUTION STAGE:

- The sentence computation order (auto de liquidación de pena).

- The resolutions on execution incidents (interlocutory appeal).

2- Regarding those resolutions issued orally, the judging persons are reminded that the record documenting them must contain, in addition to the requirements established by Article 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, also the recommendations established by the subcommittee on orality, with special emphasis on containing necessary data such as the parties and other participants, the statement of proven facts and those not proven -if any-, the indication of the admitted evidence (according to the type of hearing and resolution in question), and the complete transcription of the operative part.

3- For the purposes of guaranteeing the traceability of the backup file, it shall begin to be prepared during the preparatory stage by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and in the successive stages, or when a jurisdictional body needs to intervene, it shall complete the file with the corresponding resolutions according to the established parameters.

4- It is the duty of each court or office to make the respective change of location in the Management System or Virtual Desktop once the case file (material backup) enters and leaves.

5- Once the process is concluded, the custody of said file shall correspond to the JEDO Criminal Court, as is currently done by the offices that use physical case files.

6- It must be borne in mind that this is a security backup; however, the only valid form of processing for the court and the procedural parties shall be electronic.

7- It must be taken into account that this is a backup for the exclusive use of judicial offices and courts, which may not be provided to the parties as a case file, because the official processing method shall be electronic." In accordance with Circular No. 67-09 issued by the Court Secretariat on June 22, 2009, it is hereby communicated that by virtue of the principle of gratuity that governs this matter, the publication is exempt from all payment of fees.

Publish once in the Judicial Bulletin." San José, June 14, 2023.

Lic. Carlos T. Mora Rodríguez Interim Deputy General Secretary Supreme Court of Justice" If it is taken into consideration that resolution No. 437-2023 of 2:22 p.m. on May 10, 2023, of the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Emerging Section, is prior to the adoption of this circular, the necessary temporal link between the two acts does not exist to allow examining the constitutionality of the circular in question in this consultation. In other words, if the doubt of constitutionality of the consulting court has as its reference point the issuance of the indicated judgment, of May 10, 2023, at that time the Superior Council had not yet issued the circular, so it is chronologically impossible that it could have influenced the jurisdictional act on which the consultation is based. Consequently, the consultation is unevacuable as regards the act issued by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023.

VI.- Object of the consultation. The court raises doubts about the constitutionality of Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, (the latter, added by Article 18 of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, amended by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

The provisions consulted are transcribed in full, below, for better understanding:

ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, LAW NO. 7333, of May 5, 1993:

A.- "Article 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial district, or those concerning the overload of competences, the transfer, and conversion of judicial offices and positions, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads.

By reason of the volume of work and the mandatory efficiency of the public justice service, the Court may appoint more members to the courts, on a temporary or permanent basis; it may also open and close - for those same reasons - new offices and bodies attached to the courts, anywhere in the country.

In mixed courts, the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the justice administration services are specialized. When service needs impose it, the Court may divide a mixed court into specialized courts.

When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial body, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other servants, to move to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency." (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

B.- "Article 59.- The Supreme Court of Justice is responsible for:

1.- Informing the other Branches of the State on matters in which the Constitution or the laws determine that it be consulted, and issuing its opinion, when required, on proposed reforms to codified legislation or those that affect the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch.

2.- Proposing the legislative and regulatory reforms it deems convenient to improve the administration of justice.

3.- Approving the draft budget of the Judicial Branch, which, once enacted by the Legislative Assembly, it may execute through the Council.

4.- Appointing the full and alternate members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

5.- Resolving jurisdictional conflicts (competencias) that arise between the Chambers of the Court, except as provided by law regarding the Constitutional Chamber.

6.- Designating, by public vote, the President and Vice President of the Court, for periods of four years and two years, respectively, who may be reelected for equal periods and, if they must be replaced for any cause, the person appointed shall serve a new full period. In cases of temporary absences, the procedure indicated in subsection 1) of Article 32 shall be followed. (The previous subsection thus amended by the sole article of the Law to Guarantee Transparency in Judicial Branch Votes, No. 10325 of November 9, 2022) 7.- Enacting, on its own initiative or at the proposal of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, the internal regulations of order and service it deems pertinent.

8.- Hearing the appeal of sentence, cassation, and the review procedure for judgments issued by the Second and Third Chambers, when they act as trial courts or as courts of sole instance. (The previous subsection thus amended by Article 5 of Law No. 9021 of January 3, 2012) 9.- Appointing on a permanent basis the members of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, the general inspectors of the Judicial Inspection Court, the cassation judges and those of the collegiate courts, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Director and Deputy Director of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial); likewise, the head and deputy head of the Public Defense.

When it concerns officials appointed for a determined period, the Court must make the new appointment in the first ordinary session of December in which the period ends, and the appointees shall take office on the first business day of the following January.

The Court is also responsible for appointing the substitutes for the officials mentioned in this subsection.

10.- Hearing the annual report of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch.

11.- Assuming jurisdiction over (avocar) the hearing and decision of matters within the competence of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, when so ordered in a session convened at the request of five of its members or its President, by a simple majority of the Court. From the moment the request for assumption of jurisdiction is presented, the decision on the matter by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch is suspended, as long as the Court does not rule, without prejudice to the precautionary measures the Court may order.

The Court shall have one month to resolve the matter it ordered to assume before it. In such a case, the exhaustion of the administrative channel shall occur with the communication of the final agreement of the Court. When ordering the assumption of jurisdiction, it may order the suspension of the effects of the Council's agreement.

12.- Exercising the disciplinary regime over its own members and those of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in the manner provided in this Law.

13.- Establishing the amounts to determine competence, by reason of the amount in dispute (cuantía), in all matters of a patrimonial nature.

14.- Establishing the amounts to determine the admissibility of the cassation appeal, by a minimum vote of two-thirds of the totality of the Magistrates. This amount may be decreased or increased once the period established herein has elapsed, for which purpose a report on the inflationary index shall be previously requested from the Central Bank of Costa Rica.

If a month elapses without the report having been received, the Court shall dispense with it and make the corresponding determination. The determination made, both in this case and in that of the previous subsection, shall take effect one month after its first publication in the Judicial Bulletin, for a minimum period of two years.

15.- Proposing, to the Legislative Assembly, the creation of Judicial Offices in the places and subject matters it deems necessary for good public service.

16.- Merging two or more judicial offices into one or dividing them, transferring their headquarters, establishing their respective territorial and subject-matter competence, taking into consideration the best public service.

It may also assign specialized competence to one or more offices, to hear specific matters, within the same subject matter, occurring in one or several territorial districts or in the entire national territory.

17.- Hearing the liability lawsuits filed against the Magistrates of the Court's Chambers.

18.- Deciding which work commissions shall be permanent and appointing the Magistrates who will integrate them.

19.- Incorporating into the budget of the Judicial Branch, through internal modification, all money it may receive from the settlement or non-execution of contracts, interest, damages, and from the collection of document photocopying, microfilming, and similar services.

This money shall be deposited in the bank accounts of the Judicial Branch.

20.- Setting the days and hours of service of the judicial offices and publishing the respective notice in the Judicial Bulletin.

21.- Issuing directives on the scope of norms, when deemed necessary to make effective the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice.

22.- Others indicated by the Political Constitution and the laws." C.- "Article 81.- The Superior Council of the Judicial Branch is responsible for:

1.- Executing the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

2.- Appointing, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; transferring them, provisionally or permanently, suspending them, granting them leave with or without pay, and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President.

3.- Appointing interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is proven that the Offices are not up to date.

4.- Exercising disciplinary authority over judicial servants, in accordance with the law and without prejudice to the powers granted to the Full Court, the President of the Court, and the Judicial Inspection Court.

5.- Appointing interim officials to cover vacancies, including those of officials whose permanent appointment corresponds to the Court.

6.- Transferring, provisionally or permanently, suspending, granting leave with or without pay, removing, and reinstating, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial servants, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court.

7.- Approving or disapproving the appointment of subordinate personnel made by each administrative head in their respective Office, department, or judicial office. In doing so, it shall verify that the appointment has complied with the procedure established for this purpose in the Judicial Service Statute.

8.- (Repealed by Article 23 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

9.- Resolving claims of an economic nature made to the Judicial Branch, on any grounds, and ordering judicial servants to make the reimbursements of monies that are appropriate according to the law.

10.- Resolving on public tenders (licitaciones) and requesting the Full Court to agree on the expropriations of real estate or the encumbrance of rights in rem that are of interest to the Judicial Branch. Once the expropriation of a real estate property or the encumbrance of rights in rem has been agreed, the Full Court shall publish the agreement in La Gaceta and shall transmit the respective administrative file to the Superior Council so that it appoints one or several experts, as required, to provide an appraisal of the real estate or affected rights in rem. The appraisal shall not take into account any potential surplus value originating from the construction of the project motivating the expropriation or encumbrance of rights. Once the appraisal is rendered, it shall be made known to the interested parties, through personal notification or at their place of residence, so that they may state, within the following fifteen business days, whether they agree to transfer the real estate or right in rem in question, for the price indicated in the appraisal accepted by the Council; in which case they shall formalize the transfer before the State Notary, within the following three months.

If for any reason they do not agree to the transfer, the Council shall refer the administrative file, within the following ten business days, to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court that corresponds by rotation, so that it initiates the judicial appraisal proceedings for expropriation, in accordance with the procedure established in the Law of Expropriations and Encumbrance of Rights in Rem of the Judicial Branch.

11.- Investing, in the maintenance and construction of premises and in other items that warrant it, the surpluses that may arise in accordance with what the Full Court orders.

12.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 13.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 14.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 15.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 16.- Directing, planning, organizing, and coordinating the administrative activities of the Judicial Branch and proposing the corresponding regulations to the Court.

17.- Hearing and approving the preliminary draft Budget of the Judicial Branch.

18.- Granting leave with pay to judicial servants, to undertake studies or projects that are of interest to the Judicial Branch.

19.- Hearing on appeal, in the cases established by law or regulation, the resolutions of the Executive Director or Deputy Executive Director.

20.- Hearing and approving the vacation plan of the Judicial Branch; with the exception of the vacation plan of the Chambers of the Court.

21.- Issuing internal norms for the better performance of its functions, with the exception of regulations.

22.- Regulating the distribution of judicial matters among the Offices of equal territorial competence, to achieve workload equalization.

23.- The other activities that are proper to its mission, in everything not expressly provided for in this Law.

24.- Any other that the law attributes to it.

When there is doubt about whether a matter is within the competence of the Council or not, the Council shall decide, unless the conflict is with the Supreme Court of Justice, in which case what the latter decides shall govern; in both cases without any appeal.

In any case, all the powers of the Council regarding judicial servants shall correspond to the Full Court, when it concerns full or alternate Magistrates." D.- "Article 101 bis- To be a female judge or male judge of the Specialized Court on Organized Crime and a female or male processing judge (juez tramitador) of the Specialized Criminal Court on Organized Crime and of the Specialized Sentence Appeals Court on Organized Crime, whether titular or substitute, requires:

1-) To be Costa Rican in exercise of their citizen rights.

2-) To be at least thirty years of age.

3-) To hold the title of lawyer (abogado or abogada), legally recognized in the country.

4-) To have practiced as a legal professional in the auxiliary justice or jurisdictional spheres, in criminal matters, for a minimum of five years and to be eligible on the corresponding roster.

5-) To have a permanent professional appointment status in the Judicial Branch.

6-) To possess specialized training in organized crime imparted by the Judicial School or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Management Directorate.

These judges shall earn a salary incentive compared to other judges of the same category.

To be a female judge or male judge of the Specialized Criminal Court on Organized Crime and of the Specialized Sentence Appeals Court on Organized Crime, whether titular or substitute, requires:

1-) To be Costa Rican in exercise of their citizen rights.

2-) To be at least thirty-five years of age.

3-) To hold the title of lawyer legally recognized in the country.

4-) To have practiced as a legal professional in the auxiliary justice or jurisdictional spheres, in criminal matters, for a minimum of six years and to be eligible on the corresponding roster.

5-) To have a permanent professional appointment status in the Judicial Branch.

6-) To possess specialized training in organized crime imparted by the Judicial School or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Management Directorate.

These judges shall earn a salary incentive compared to other judges of the Criminal Court or the Sentence Appeals Court, as applicable.

In the specialized jurisdiction, it is the responsibility of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch to appoint the judges of the Criminal Court and the processing judges, and the Supreme Court of Justice to appoint the judges of the Criminal Court and the Sentence Appeals Court. The head of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the director of the Judicial Investigation Agency, and the director of the Public Defense shall, respectively, make the appointments of all the professional, technical, and support personnel attached to their sphere of competence, in said jurisdiction.

In the same manner, the Superior Council and the other directorates of the institution shall do so, in accordance with their appointment competences, with the remaining personnel designated as specialized in this jurisdiction. All appointments in this specialized jurisdiction shall be made for a period of up to eight years, without the possibility of reelection for the immediately following period. Once the appointment period expires, the personnel shall return to their permanent position. Their appointment may be extended for the term necessary to conclude procedural acts or other assignments in progress, under their charge, duly justified, or until the person who must assume the new period is appointed.

To serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, it shall be necessary to have a permanent appointment in the Judicial Branch and to pass a rigorous recruitment and selection process, in accordance with the principle of proven suitability, carried out by the Human Resources Management Directorate. Once the appointment in the specialized jurisdiction concludes, the official shall return to their permanent position.

All persons serving in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime must be evaluated, at least every two years, by the Human Resources Management Directorate, which shall be provided with the necessary personnel and budget, in order to verify that they maintain suitability to perform the position, as established by the Judicial Service Statute and when exceptionally requested by any higher instance, or one responsible for supervising and ensuring compliance with probity duties; including heads of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Public Defense, Judicial Investigation Agency, Superior Council, Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice, or the Compliance Office. The unfavorable results of any suitability assessment to serve in the specialized jurisdiction shall be forwarded for the knowledge of the authority that made the appointment, which, among other options, may revoke the appointment in this jurisdiction and return the official to their permanent position. Upon the opening of a disciplinary and/or criminal procedure, the respective head of the denounced or investigated person may adopt as an administrative measure, duly justified, the return of the official to their permanent position, to continue with the development of the respective process.

While they are serving exclusively in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, those who work in said jurisdiction shall earn a salary incentive.

In the event that the sanction resulting from a disciplinary procedure is suspension, it must be served in the permanent position (plaza en propiedad), without receiving the aforementioned incentive.

Those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction shall have special protection, only when risk factors arise from the exercise of their functions that make it necessary, according to the respective technical studies.

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) shall also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Likewise, when circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform work in cases within the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction." (Thus added by Article 18 of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, No. 9481 of September 13, 2017) (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

VII.- ON THE GUARANTEE OF THE NATURAL JUDGE. The principle of the natural judge (juez natural) is enshrined in Article 35 of the Political Constitution, which provides:

"Article 35 - No one may be tried by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution. Article 35 guarantees the right that no case may be tried except by a 'competent authority.'" In the American Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee under discussion is contained in Article 8.1, which establishes:

"Article 8. Judicial Guarantees 1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against him, or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature (...)" In this regard, the landmark judgment of this Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1739-1992 of 11:45 a.m. on June 1, 1992, on due process (debido proceso), stated:

"THE RIGHT TO A REGULAR JUDGE:

This right, which in the Anglo-American tradition has developed as the so-called 'right to a natural judge,' but with very specific profiles that do not correspond to those of our Latin law—since it includes, for example, the right to the judge of one's domicile and, above all, to trial by one's peers, expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in the Roman-Germanic tradition systems have rather produced negative experiences—, is specifically incorporated in our Constitution in Article 35, according to which:

'Article 35 - No one may be tried by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution.' This principle, which we have called the 'regular judge' (juez regular), is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152, and 153 and, as applicable, 10, 48, and 49, from which it clearly results, as stated supra, the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the tribunals dependent on the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), as well as with that of Article 39, in which it must be understood that the 'competent authority' is necessarily the judicial and ordinary one, the latter because Article 35 transcribed excludes any possibility of trial by special tribunals for the case or for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust, within the scope of the Judicial Branch, any possibility of creating tribunals 'established in accordance with this Constitution,' with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Supremo de Elecciones) for electoral disputes.

If, then, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence of the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the tribunals based on criteria of subject matter, gravity or amount, territory, and degree, both jurisdiction—general or by subject matter—and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by the regular tribunals, in the manner described." Likewise, this Constitutional Court, in judgment No. 6701-93 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993, referred to this guarantee in the following terms:

"The guarantee of the natural judge (juez natural) means the existence of judicial bodies pre-established in a permanent manner by law. One of the contents of the principle 'natural judge' is as a legal judge, that is, as a 'body' created by law in accordance with the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for this purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, as a principle, in having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges, is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge certain facts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence that are characteristic of judicial tribunals. Ultimately, what is intended is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, preventing it from being created or chosen, by any authority, once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not happen in the case under examination." (reiterated in judgments number 000009-94 of 14 hours 54 minutes on January 4, 1994, and 2000-08763 of 15 hours 06 minutes on October 4, 2000).

More recently, in judgment No. 2020001312 of 9:20 a.m. on January 22, 2020, the Court held:

"In relation to the principle of the Natural Judge (Juez Natural), the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process, supposes the existence of judicial bodies pre-established in a permanent manner by law. What is protected through this principle is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge certain facts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence that are characteristic of judicial tribunals." Thus, the principle of the natural judge (juez natural) or ordinary judge, guarantees that a person can only be tried by those tribunals that have been previously constituted by law, prohibiting the creation of ad-hoc or special bodies to judge specific facts or persons in a concrete manner.

This principle has also been widely protected by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, specifically, in the judgment of November 17, 2009, Case of Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela, in what is relevant, it was held:

"75. Article 8.1 of the Convention guarantees the right to be tried by 'a competent tribunal […] previously established by law,' a provision that relates to the concept of a natural judge, one of the guarantees of due process, which has even been recognized, by a certain sector of the doctrine, as a prerequisite thereof. This implies that persons have the right to be tried, in general, by ordinary tribunals, in accordance with legally established procedures.

76. The natural judge derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, adhering to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the Constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.' Consequently, in a State of Law, only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." In this way, the creation of Courts of Justice and the granting of the competence of each one of them is a matter reserved to the law, so only the Legislative Branch can regulate it.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has specified that this right constitutes "a basic principle of due process" (I/A Court H.R. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., vs. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999, and Case of Radilla Pacheco vs. Mexico. Judgment of November 23, 2009) related to the concept of the natural judge, which implies that "persons have the right to be tried, in general, by ordinary tribunals, in accordance with legally established procedures" prior to the facts subject to trial. Said natural judge "derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, adhering to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the Constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.'" Consequently, in a State of Law, "only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." Thus, for example, the Court has declared the international responsibility of a State when it created ad hoc Chambers and Courts and designated judges to integrate them, at the time the events of the case were occurring (I/A Court H.R. Case of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74. para. 114).

It is also pertinent to revisit the citations of the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, invoked by the consulting Court and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), where it has been indicated that the constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law "requires, first of all, that the judicial body has been previously created by the legal norm, that it has vested it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the fact motivating the judicial proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as special or exceptional" (STC 47/83 Caso Serena). So that "the legal predetermination of the judge means that the law, with generality and prior to the case, must contain the criteria of competence determination whose application to each litigious case allows determining which is the judge or tribunal called to hear the case. The generality of the legal criteria guarantees the non-existence of 'ad hoc' judges; the anteriority of such criteria with respect to the procedural filing of the litigation guarantees that, once the judge of a case is concretely determined by virtue of the application of the competence criteria contained in the laws, the judge of the case may not be dispossessed of its knowledge by virtue of decisions taken by governmental bodies" (STC 101/84, Caso Naviera Aznar). It must be noted that the direct interest protected by the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law is the impartiality of the judge. And, in turn, the impartiality of the judge is part of the right to a process with all guarantees recognized in numerals 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Hence, the other elements—ordinary character and legal predetermination—are subordinated to that objective, and make sense insofar as they allow its achievement (Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 2022007481 of 1:01 p.m. on March 30, 2022).

VIII.- ON THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATOR TO ESTABLISH THE COMPETENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL BODIES. - Articles 152 and 166 of the Political Constitution state:

"Article 152.- The Judicial Branch is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) and by the other tribunals established by law." "Article 166.- Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number, and the duration of the tribunals, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their acts, and the manner of demanding responsibility from them." From the cited norms, the exclusive power that the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo) possesses to enact the laws creating Courts of Justice is extracted, as well as those necessary to regulate what relates to their powers and competence, a matter covered by legal reserve (reserva legal). Hence, the creation of Courts of Justice is an exclusive competence of the Legislative Branch. Moreover, numeral 153 of the Political Constitution provides:

"Article 153: It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions that this constitution assigns to it, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativo) cases, as well as the others that the law establishes, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; to resolve them definitively and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the help of the public force if necessary." This provision grants full discretion to the legislator to create the tribunals through which the Judiciary exercises its function.

In the matter under analysis, it is necessary to refer to the law for the "Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime" (Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017.

"ARTICLE 1- Purpose. The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime is created, with competence in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed by adults and that meet the criteria provided for in this law. The courts and tribunals that apply this law shall extend their competence to the knowledge of related crimes (delitos conexos) over which the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime asserts its competence.

For the entire criminal legal system, organized crime (delincuencia organizada) shall be understood as any activity that meets the requirements and parameters provided for in Articles 8 and 9 of this law." Article 2 defines its competence, in the following terms:

"ARTICLE 2- Competence. Matters of organized crime or organized criminality may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction or in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. Procedural acts issued in organized crime cases in the ordinary jurisdiction, prior to the commencement of operations of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, shall maintain their efficacy and validity. For both jurisdictions, the current regulations on the matter are applicable, including Law 8754, Law Against Organized Crime (Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada), of July 22, 2009, unless expressly provided otherwise.

Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be heard by the ordinary criminal courts, criminal tribunals, and criminal sentence appellate tribunals of the entire country. Matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the knowledge of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. These matters may be submitted to the knowledge of the Criminal Court, Criminal Tribunal, and Criminal Sentence Appellate Tribunal, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. They shall hear criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related crimes. Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they shall have competence throughout the national territory. Furthermore, these offices shall also have national-level competence to perform work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (...) (Thus reformed by Article 2 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

Likewise, Article 18 of Law No. 9481, "Additions," contemplates one of the provisions consulted by the tribunal, numeral 101 Bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), which is transcribed, in the relevant part:

"The following articles are added to Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993: articles 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis. The texts are as follows:

(...) Article 101 bis- (...) Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime shall also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019)." Now, as already indicated, the principle of the natural judge (juez natural) establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, pre-established by law, as occurred with the creation of the referred specialized jurisdiction, so that we are not before a jurisdictional body constituted ad hoc, but before courts of justice that were created by law and whose competence has also been defined by the legislator, as required by the principle of the natural judge. The criminal judges of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, by legal mandate, have competence throughout the national territory to handle matters of organized or ordinary crime. They were not designated for the specific case, but rather form part of the integration of a specific jurisdictional body whose competence has been legally defined, and must hear "ordinary and specialized processes" due to the requirement of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime—whose procedure corresponds to the ordinary process—was not tried through the specialized process, but rather, it was simply processed by specialized judges applying the procedural law of the ordinary process, a situation that in no way affects the legally defined competence. It is reiterated that the questioned provisions do not contemplate judges appointed ex professo or ad hoc for specific persons; the challenged regulations respond to aspects inherent to the administrative order of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the objective assumptions considered therein and the need to attend to the judicial administration service in the current historical juncture, and on the understanding that the hearing of cases from the ordinary jurisdiction by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction is provided for by law, in such a way that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific assumption, but rather that the hearing of the process continues in the hands of a Criminal Judge, in a process in which due process is guaranteed to the accused.

IX.- NON-EXISTENCE OF A VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 121.20 AND 166 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The Criminal Sentence Appellate Tribunal also consults whether Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the latter added and reformed by the Law "Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica" Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023, violate the precepts of Article 121, subsection 20) and Article 166 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the competence to hear matters from the ordinary jurisdiction was established by Law No. 9481 creating the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction, as mandated by the Political Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights, and both the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court. Far from violating the cited constitutional provisions, the truth is that the norms whose constitutionality is doubted fully comply with ordinals 121, subsection 20) and 166 of the Constitution, by regulating jurisdictional bodies and their competences through provisions of legal rank, so Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the Law of the Constitution, and in that sense, the consultation is answered.

X.- CONCLUSION. - Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the principle of the Natural Judge (Juez Natural), protected in numerals 35 and 39 of the Political Constitution and 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, Minutes 003-2023 - Article XVIII, and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the consultation is declared unanswerable (inevacuable).

XI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judicial Branch" (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI, and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore (Por tanto):

The consultation formulated by the Criminal Sentence Appellate Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea seat, is answered in the sense that Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (the latter added and reformed by the Law "Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica" Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023) do not infringe the principle of the Natural Judge nor Articles 121, subsection 20, and 166 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, Minutes 003-2023 - Article XVIII, and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the consultation is declared unanswerable. Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents (salva el voto) and declares the consultation unanswerable. Let this pronouncement be summarized in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta) and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify the consulting Court and the parties.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

Aracelly Pacheco S.

Alexandra Alvarado P.

Res. 2024021938 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL. With the customary respect, I dissent (salvo el voto) based on these reasons.

By resolution of 9:03 a.m. on April 26, 2024, the Presidency of this Court warned the consulting judges as follows: "…they must identify and specify, clearly and duly individualized, which are the concrete agreements of the Full Court intended to be questioned in this consultation." The warning is entirely pertinent, considering the formality of the judicial consultation process, which includes the need to adequately identify the norm or provision whose constitutionality is questioned.

In responding to this warning, the consulting tribunal identified the agreement of the Superior Council, adopted in article LXXI of session no. 48-2023 of June 8, 2023, and the agreement of the Full Court, adopted by article XVIII of the extraordinary session of 8:16 a.m. on January 30, 2023, minutes 003-2023. I note, in relation to the latter, that according to official letter no. 81-2024 from the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, the undersigned did not participate in its approval, so there is no reason for me to recuse myself from the hearing of the sub lite.

Now, I agree with the majority opinion when it declares the consultation unanswerable regarding the Full Court agreement. Indeed, it applied to the Criminal Sentence Appellate Tribunal of the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction, which is not the instance that issued the sentence appealed in the underlying matter. Ergo, there is no connection between the latter and the challenged agreement.

I also share with the majority that the consultation is unanswerable regarding the Superior Council agreement indicated by the consulting Tribunal, since it is subsequent to the issuance of the appealed sentence. An additional element confirms the thesis put forward. In response to a request from the consulting tribunal, the processing judge of the Criminal Tribunal of San José stated:

"According to consultation made with the coordination of this office as well as with the Specialized Criminal Tribunal in Organized Crime, it is reported that the case [Value 001] was remitted to said Tribunal on the past February 07, 2023, as part of the agreements made by the Superior Council, on dates November 03 and 11, 2022." (The underlining is added).

Thus, it is patent that the agreements identified by the consulting tribunal do not have the necessary connection with the underlying matter.

Concerning Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, whose constitutionality is indeed analyzed by the majority of this Court, the undersigned objects to the admissibility of the consultation on two grounds.

In the first place, the consultation resolution does not carry out an analysis of each one of them, seeking to contrast them with the constitutionality block (bloque de constitucionalidad), for the purpose of demonstrating the legal antinomy. This requirement is indispensable for the admissibility of any consultation.

Secondly, regarding the cited ordinals 46, 59, and 81, I determine that they are competence norms that, for the purposes of the consultation, should find their development in agreements of the Superior Council or the Full Court, as the case may be, so that the requirement is met that the questioned provision is a "...norm or act that it must apply, or an act, conduct, or omission that it must judge in a case submitted to its knowledge" (canon 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)). Such precepts state:

"Article 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning the overload of competences, the transfer, and conversion of judicial offices and positions or posts, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and courts, and the necessary equity of workloads…" (Highlighted by the consultants).

"Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:

(...)

16.- To merge two or more judicial offices into one or divide them, transfer their seat, set their respective territorial and by subject matter competence, taking into consideration the best public service.

It may also assign specialized competence to one or several offices, so that they hear specific matters, within the same subject area, occurring in one or several circumscriptions or throughout the national territory." (Highlighted by the consultants).

"Article 81.- It corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch:

(...)

2.- To appoint, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; to transfer them, provisionally or definitively, suspend them, and grant them leave with or without pay, and remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President." (Highlighted by the consultants).

In other words, so that the judicial consultation is not an abstract exercise (which would entail its inadmissibility), the consulting judges had to establish the link between those ordinals of the Organic Law and the case submitted to their knowledge. Such connection was found, in the judgment of the consultants, in the challenged agreements. However, given that the admissibility of those was dismissed ut supra, the cited link remained without support.

Even, it is inferred from the consultation that the consulting office understands the nature of jurisdictional norms and the need for an agreement that develops or relates them to the specific case, given that it establishes as a claim that “…the Constitutional Chamber determine whether articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (…) and the agreements of the Full Court (Corte Plena) (…) that support those and allow the transfer of case files…” (underlining added).

Now, if the consulting authority intended to challenge the cited articles autonomously (without an agreement that develops them), then the inadmissibility for lack of adequate reasoning resurfaces, as already stated, since a justification of the connection to the specific case would be missed.

Finally, regarding canon 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), it states in relevant part:

“Article 101 bis-To be a judge of the Specialized Court for Organized Crime (Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and a processing judge of the Specialized Criminal Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Sentencing Appeals Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada), regular or substitute, it is required:

(…)

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) shall also perform tasks within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Likewise, when circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform tasks in processes of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.” (Highlighted by the consultants).

This precept, unlike the previous ones, does not expressly assign powers to the Superior Council (Consejo Superior) or the Full Court (Corte Plena). However, in the *sub examine* matter, admissibility objections persist. On the one hand, its link to the specific case is not clearly substantiated, as previously explained. On the other hand, I emphasize that this provision concerns those who “…serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada)…” (underlining added), which is not considered applicable to the base matter, given that such jurisdiction had not come into operation at the time the conviction was handed down, so the judging person could not have been “serving” in that jurisdiction.

In view of these shortcomings in the reasoning of the consultation, I consider it unevictable.

Paul Rueda L.

1 It is necessary to clarify that both the international conventions signed and the Costa Rican legal system indicate this obligation; and, certainly, the summary [Value 001] was heard by a pre-constituted court, with the sole variant that it was composed of judges specialized in organized crime, a matter that is also authorized by law. Under this reality, although it is true that the Law Against Organized Crime (Ley Contra la Delincuencia Organizada) entered into force in September 2018, and the acts charged correspond to May through December 2017 and January through September 2018, the truth is that crimes in the specialized subject matter were not judged; rather, they were heard and adjudicated by judges appointed in that specialty, a situation that does not limit the competence of those servants to hear ordinary cases. Thus, in no way is the principle of the natural judge, protected both by human rights bodies and by our own, violated.

• b)Functioning of the judicial system in Costa Rica: In the Costa Rican judicial system, the appointment of judges specialized in organized crime responds to the need to confront more effectively certain cases that require specific knowledge. However, the fact that these judges may hear other types of cases, under circumstances of institutional necessity, is based on the flexibility of the system to ensure access to justice and judicial efficiency.
• c)Applicability of the principle of the natural judge: The assignment of judges specialized in organized crime to ordinary crime cases, in exceptional situations and under criteria of institutional necessity and urgency, does not necessarily contravene the principle of the natural judge. The core point in this type of matter is that the designation of this authority be provided for by the legal system, maintaining the criteria of competence, independence, and impartiality, and that it not be carried out for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the trial.

II.Regarding the principle of the natural judge in Costa Rica: The Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) establishes rules concerning the conformation and integration of judicial offices and regulations related to the distribution of work, which allow that, under criteria of service efficiency, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads, they be conformed as befits these circumstances. Furthermore, it provides for the possibility that the integration of courts may be modified in accordance with what is indicated (citing Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). Regarding the powers of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), provided for in subsections 1 and 2 of Article 81 of the LOPJ, it is noted that it is possible to affirm that the Superior Council has the power both to designate the officials who administer justice and to transfer them, provisionally or definitively, which demonstrates the powers of modification of their work location. The foregoing is observed in the decisions by which, by reason of remedial plans, other competences are assigned to different judges, without affecting the principle of the natural judge.

Since a violation of the natural judge principle is claimed by reason of this matter being heard by the Specialized Court (Tribunal Especializado), it is important to first define the term in order to determine if the alleged violation exists:

“III.- […] a.) On the principle of the natural judge. The guarantee of the natural judge is based on what is stipulated in numeral 35 of the Political Constitution, which textually provides: “No one may be judged by a commission, court, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the courts established in accordance with this Constitution […]” This constitutional precept establishes a protection for the citizen, such that they may only be judged by ordinary judges, designated regularly and previously by the law itself. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has given content to that constitutional principle through the notable resolution 1739-1992:

“[…] C) THE RIGHT TO A REGULAR JUDGE: This right, which in the Anglo-North American tradition has been developed as the so-called 'right to a natural judge,' but with very specific profiles that do not correspond to those of our Latin law—since it comprises, for example, the right to the judge of one's domicile and, above all, to being judged by one's peers, which is expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in Roman-Germanic tradition systems have rather produced negative experiences—is collected in our Constitution especially in Article 35, which provides: '[...] Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, court, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the courts established in accordance with this Constitution [...]' .

This principle, which we have called the 'regular judge,' is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152, and 153 and, where applicable, 10, 48, and 49 of the Fundamental Charter, from which the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the courts dependent on the Judicial Branch is clear, as well as with that of Article 39, from which it follows that the 'competent authority' is necessarily the ordinary judicial one, the latter because the transcribed Article 35 excludes all possibility of judgment by special courts for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust in the scope of the Judicial Branch all possibility of creating courts 'established in accordance with this Constitution,' with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for electoral contentious matters. In this way, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, gravity or amount, territory, and instance. Both jurisdiction and competence are part of due process, since they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by regular courts, in the manner stated (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice [Sala III de la Corte Suprema de Justicia], resolution No. 770 – 2019 of eleven hours thirty minutes of the twenty-first of June two thousand nineteen).

See then that this competence by law must be defined, as has been indicated in the particular case, in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. It is therefore permitted, by reason of interest, to modify these, attending to distribution of work, criteria of efficiency in service, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads.

The principle of the natural judge is therefore not violated, and it has been so known in other cases when it has been resolved: “[…] the legal reservation in the conformation and designation of judges has not been infringed in this case, since the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as has been explained, contains express rules that provide for the conformation and integration of the different courts and tribunals, and precepts are also contemplated that regulate the distribution of work, which may even be modified by the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch, namely, the Full Court (Corte Plena) and the Superior Council, attending to criteria of efficiency, specialization, and equity. On the other hand, concerning the functions proper to the Sentence Appeals Court, its competence and conformation are previously defined by Articles 93 and 93 bis, organized by sections made up of three judges, and making the exception that this will be ‘in accordance with the needs of the service [...]’ (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 2019-01171 of eleven hours ten minutes of the twentieth of September two thousand nineteen.)

Finally, it must be noted that Law No. 9481 on the “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica” (Ley N°9481 de “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica”), highlights:

18.- Additions. […] Through this article, several articles are added to Law 7333, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch of May 5, 1993: 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis […]. (Amended by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019).

Numeral 101 (bis) of that same body of rules indicates: “[…] Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada) shall also perform tasks within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine […].” Resting on what is provided for by the indicated rules, it can be affirmed that the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, besides designating the officials who administer justice, can transfer them temporarily or definitively. And in the case of judges elected as specialized in Organized Crime, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (amended by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019), they are legitimized to perform tasks within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. From the powers conferred by law, in addition to the sessions of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, the institutional requirements that determined the need for the Specialized Appeals Court in Organized Crime to collaborate in a remedial plan with different Criminal Sentence Appeals Courts, by reason of workloads, are derived. In Session 098-2022 of November 11, 2022, Article II, it was agreed, after learning of legal opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, and receiving in audience Mrs. Magistrate Sandra Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as coordinator of the Organized Crime Subcommission, Master Roxana Arrieta Meléndez, Internal Director of Human Management, and licensed Olga Guerrero Córdoba, interim subdirector, the following: “[…] Acknowledged receipt of opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, subscribed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what is indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, given that according to the opinion given, there is no legal impossibility of carrying out the contingency plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms proposed […].” Finally, by means of Session 112-2022 dated December 22, 2022, Article V, the Superior Council provided: “[…] Acknowledged receipt of Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, subscribed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what is indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official letter No. SCJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, given that according to the opinion given, there is no legal impossibility of carrying out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms proposed: (…) However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently expired. 2.) The Organized Crime Subcommission must: a) Provide that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the list of positions and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated in the first instance for all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Provide that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be allocated as a priority to attending to organized crime matters under the regulations currently in force. c.) Provide that in the event that in the respective territorial competence there are no organized crime cases or they are being processed, it may be used temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, to attend to ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the rules of competence of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Criminal Procedural Code (Código Procesal Penal), in understanding of the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of ius variandi regarding the rights of the serving persons, non-affectation of the public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality. d.) It will be the responsibility of the Organized Crime Subcommission to monitor and control its execution in accordance with the terms proposed and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter. 3.) The Human Management Directorate shall clarify to the officials who would participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is subject to the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime, and therefore cannot be applied until it comes into force. This agreement is declared final […].” Regarding the legitimacy that the high authorities of the Judicial Branch have to decide to modify competences, by reason of an institutional interest, it can be observed in Article XXXIV of the Full Court Session number 22-2022, of the sixteenth of May two thousand twenty-two, where official letter No. 251-PLANI-2022 from the Planning Directorate was heard, and in this regard it was agreed to expand the competence of the Juvenile Criminal Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, so that for a period of six months, they may hear adult criminal appeals matters from the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Santa Cruz. The basis for these decisions has to do directly with attending to contingency and remedial plans, whose purpose is to collaborate with the decongestion of other Criminal Sentence Appeals offices, thus responding to an institutional interest. It is for the foregoing that it is considered that the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, having the power and the legitimate reasons to temporarily vary the designation of judges, as observed from the agreements of the Full Court, in strict respect for the cited rules, orders the attention of ordinary cases in order to collaborate with the remedial plan and workload afflicting the counterparts of the Specialized Court of Organized Crime, under the cited conditions. It is not true, nor probable, that an “ad hoc” action was taken in the case at hand, nor in any other case, since the hearing of proceedings by the Specialized Criminal Appeals Court in Organized Crime responds solely to an institutional interest and not to hear this specific case, something the Judicial Branch is clear on, as it would be disobeying the international norms to which Costa Rica is committed, as well as the internal legal system governing our social state of law.

III.- Regarding the use of the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime: Prior to the use of the positions corresponding to that specialized jurisdiction, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch issued a consultation before the Legal Directorate of this entity, which provided opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, through which it conducted a budgetary analysis of importance for this topic. The analysis has its antecedent in that, within the budget granted to the Judicial Branch for 2022, an allocation was granted that covered the corresponding salaries and other expenses of the institution for the entry into force of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime. At that time, in the absence of the approval of the transitional provision that would allow the commencement of training, logistics, and other functions necessary for the implementation of the operation of the new jurisdiction against organized crime at the beginning of 2023, it could not be consumed as an entry expense. As a consequence of the foregoing, a contingency plan for the use of the aforementioned budget allocations, to be executed in that year 2022, was submitted for consideration of the competent bodies. The analysis provided the following:

• a)Proper nature of public budgets: The regulation proper to public budgets is contained in Article 176 of the Political Constitution, insofar as it provides the following: “[…] Article 176-. Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, which shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides. The ordinary budget of the Republic comprises all probable income and all authorized expenses of the Public Administration, during the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenses exceed that of probable income. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the foregoing rules for issuing its budgets. The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December.” (emphasis is ours) Complementary to the foregoing, the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera y de Presupuestos Públicos) provided the following: “[…] Article 8.- Content of budgets. Budgets shall consider at least: a) The income budget, which shall comprise that generated by tax collection, the provision and sale of goods and services, transfers, donations, and others, as well as financing sources, internal or external. b) The expense budget, which shall comprise all outflows foreseen to fulfill the objectives and goals. c) The programming of activities and expected goals for the period, according to the level of detail defined in the regulation. d) The human resource requirements, according to the detail established in the respective regulation. e) The rules that exclusively regulate budgetary execution, which shall apply during the fiscal year for which said budget is in force […]” In accordance with the foregoing, it is noted that the ordinary budget of the Republic contemplates an authorization of public spending foreseen for the respective period, in order to fulfill the respective institutional goals and objectives. In this order of ideas, the Budget Law authorizes the use of human resources for a specific objective, in accordance with what is indicated in its content and the respective budget program. Consequently, the Budget Law contemplates the possibility of executing the budget for the spending contemplated in the respective list of positions, in order to give content to the human resource requirements contemplated therein. It is the act by which the Government is authorized to dispose of public funds within certain limits and constitutes the validity requirement for administrative acts and contracts that originate public spending. That is to say, the budget is a condition of the regularity or legal efficacy of budget operations and, above all, of the execution of public spending, which cannot be carried out if the corresponding budget coverage does not exist. The need for the activity to conform to current legality entails the existence of control mechanisms that guarantee the legality of that activity. In accordance with the foregoing, in order to determine the propriety of the administrative expenditure, it is necessary to verify its classification and incorporation in the ordinary budget of the respective budgetary period, on the understanding that this will determine the opportunity, objective, and content of the expenditure.

In this regard, the following has been indicated: “[…] The allocations authorized by the Budget Law do not form an indivisible mass. On the contrary, they are specialized. In accordance with the principle of budget specialization, the credits opened by the Budget Law are earmarked for a determined expenditure. This means that the authorization is given for a precise expense and for a determined amount. An amount that constitutes a limit for the Executive. Thus, the destination of a credit is determined by law […]”, (M, ROJAS: El Poder Ejecutivo en Costa Rica, Editorial Juricentro, 1997, p. 346).

Our Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets reserves to the Legislative Power the following assumptions for modification of the approved budget: “a) Reserved to the Legislative Assembly are: i) Those that affect the total amount of the budget. ii) Those that entail an increase in current expenses to the detriment of capital expenses. iii) Transfers between budget programs. iv) Those that affect the total amount of indebtedness. v) Transfers between non-personal services and personal services.” It is necessary to highlight that complementary to the foregoing, the origin of the resources destined for the budget expenditure must be taken into consideration, whether it has a specific purpose previously defined by a law that created the origin of the resources and that conditions its possibility of execution.

About this type of income earmarked for the fulfillment of a determined purpose, opinion C-358-2020, of September 7, 2020, of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), indicates:

“[…] As is known, the concept of specific purpose fundamentally alludes to income destined by the legislator to finance the activity of a determined body. That purpose can be general in the sense that it is destined to finance the totality of the body's activity, but it may also happen that the legislator destines determined resources to the financing of a specific activity or project of that body. In which case the ordinary legislator specifies how the beneficiary of the purpose may spend the resources it receives. It has traditionally been indicated that when the law creates a specific purpose, only the legislator can modify it, reducing the amount or percentage or expanding it, or else, suppressing the purpose if it considers that a certain program or purpose does not justify the State reforming the purpose. Furthermore, it is derived from the foregoing that the Administration lacks competence to vary the amount or percentage of the purpose, to suppress it, or else, to reallocate the amounts not executed by a determined entity, unless the legislator authorizes it to do so […].” Consequently, it is estimated that it must be determined if the expenditure to be made is provided for in the respective budget, in accordance with its classification and budget program, it being understood that, if under those conditions, an authorization for its use would be contemplated, with the limitations contained within the same budget that gives it basis, and in the case of specific purposes, the law that creates them.

• b)On the treatment of the fight against organized crime: In accordance with the regulations proper to the Criminal Code (Código Penal) and the Criminal Procedural Code, it is noted that at present there are a series of criminal types that respond to the treatment of prosecution against organized crime. That is to say, with the currently existing jurisdictional bodies, offenders in said matter are being processed, including the Law Against Organized Crime, number 8754 dating from the year 2009, and the Law for the Creation of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime in Costa Rica (Ley de Creación de la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada en Costa Rica), Law No. 9481, which has existed since the year 2017.

The very existence of cases at the entry into force of Law 9481, insofar as it provides the following:

"[…] SINGLE TRANSITORY PROVISION- Cases initiated in criminal courts with common jurisdiction as of the date of entry into force of this law, which are in the intermediate or trial stages, shall continue to be heard by those courts […]".

The foregoing must be complemented with the provisions of Article 17 of the same regulatory body, insofar as it provides:

"[…] ARTICLE 17.- Supplementary rules. The criminal process followed before the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime shall be the ordinary process provided for by Law No. 7594, Code of Criminal Procedure, of April 10, 1996, with the exceptions provided for in this law. The actions and resolutions of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime shall be governed, in matters not expressly provided for in this law, by Law No. 7594, Code of Criminal Procedure, of April 10, 1996; Law No. 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009; Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993, and Law No. 7728, Law of Judicial Reorganization, Reforms to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of December 15, 1997". However, it should be noted that the latter does not have specific financing, but rather that the resources for its implementation come from the general allocation made in the respective ordinary budget for the Judicial Branch, including the positions decided to be assigned in the corresponding staffing table. In this regard, it must be clear that, although Article 16 of Law 9481 provides for an obligation to grant budgetary content for the operation of the jurisdictional bodies, it is not a specific destination as such. The indicated norm states the following:

"[…] ARTICLE 16.- Budgetary content and initial integration of the courts: The Ministry of Finance must grant sufficient economic content for the operation of the courts and tribunals created by this law. At the time of publication of this law, the Ministry of Finance must effectively and completely transfer the necessary resources to enable the Judicial Branch to create the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime; likewise, it must annually transfer the necessary resources for the operation of this Jurisdiction. The Judicial Branch must guarantee the necessary resources for the operation of the Jurisdiction created in this law. The Planning Department of the Judicial Branch shall recommend the number of officials to serve in this Jurisdiction, at the time this law enters into force." However, it is deemed appropriate to indicate that the incorporation of resources for the positions of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime is based not on the agreement of the Full Court, in session 21-2021 of June 1, 2021, article II, but rather on official communication DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, through which the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency communicated to the Deputy President of the Permanent Ordinary Commission on Financial Affairs the following: "On May 27, the Supreme Branches of the Republic signed a manifesto expressing their will, each within the framework of their legal limits and constitutional powers, to promote five strategic action points in favor of combating the phenomenon of Organized Crime in all its manifestations. As the second strategic point was 'establishing mechanisms to strengthen the competent institutions with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime.' To materialize this point, the working group established it was necessary 'to generate a joint workspace between the Ministry of Finance and the Judicial Branch for the analysis of the requirements for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction on organized crime and the fight against this scourge.' After a working process, it was determined that the Judicial Branch requires a total of 2,900,000,000 colones in order to incorporate 413 positions of Technical, Professional, and Police personnel dedicated both to the implementation of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, in logistical development, remodeling processes, public tenders, and others, in addition to the actual start-up…" In this sense, the general framework of this official communication is the agreement between the mentioned Branches of the Republic, which indicates the following joint work points: "Evaluate existing legal frameworks to propose improvements, so that preventive and punitive actions on the matter are effective and forceful. Establish mechanisms to strengthen the competent instances with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime. Manage cooperation and assistance from international organizations and strategic partners, with the implementation of programs that strengthen joint work between the authorities and police forces of the country to counteract the effects of organized crime. Enhance management instruments, such as the National Strategy on Drugs and Associated Crimes; the National Plan on Drugs, Capital Legitimization, and Financing of Terrorism; National Risk Assessment of Capital Legitimization and Financing of Terrorism and the National Strategy for Integrity and Prevention of Corruption and similar ones, as a complement to the plans and actions in matters of criminal investigation and justice. Other areas of recommendation considered necessary to implement." **c)** Regarding ius variandi in public employment matters: Additionally, it must be noted that as long as there is no express or tacit modification to the budget law – e.g., the fulfillment of the different programs of the Judicial Branch – it would not be feasible to consider that the administration of the work of serving persons is subjected to such rigidity that it is not possible to allocate their functions in accordance with the public interest, always ensuring that the modification is within the legal system and in accordance with the legitimate exercise of ius variandi. Regarding the powers that the Administration possesses to totally or partially modify non-substantial aspects of a public employment relationship, it is necessary to highlight that the same, like any public or private employer, possesses the faculty of ius variandi. In this respect, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber number 7419-1997 of ten hours fifteen minutes on November eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, case file number 6760-M-97 is cited.

This faculty is evidenced as a competence of the Superior Council in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as that regulatory body establishes that this body is responsible for the following:

"[…] ARTICLE 81.- The Superior Council of the Judicial Branch is responsible for: 1.- Executing the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. 2.- Appointing, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; transferring them, provisionally or definitively, suspending them and granting them leave with or without pay and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the president […]." Pursuant to the foregoing, it is noted that the Superior Council has powers to modify the work location of serving persons – attending to the respective budget program and legal limits for the exercise of ius variandi – in accordance with the public interest and institutional needs. That is, human resources can be used for other purposes pertaining to jurisdictional competences, it being understood that the Superior Council has competences to adapt the functions of serving persons according to the public interest, in legitimate adherence to ius variandi.

Furthermore, the legal advisory body considers that what was proposed in the Contingency Plan proposal is legally appropriate and to that effect recommended:

• Order that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the staffing table and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated primarily to all necessary actions for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Order that once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the jurisdiction against organized crime, it be allocated primarily to attending organized crime matters.

• Order that, in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial jurisdiction or they are in process, they be used temporarily, in legitimate exercise of ius variandi, for attending ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

Based on the foregoing, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office concludes that this last recommendation implies that the law against organized crime poses the possibility that, in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources allocated to this jurisdiction may attend to ordinary matters, without this being considered a violation of the principle of natural judge, but on the contrary, it implies maximizing the use of state resources.

**3.-** By resolution at 9:03 hours on April 26, 2024, the president of the Chamber directed the consulting judges, Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Ivette Carranza Cambronero, and Kathya Jiménez Fernández, to identify and specify, in a clear and duly individualized manner, which are the concrete agreements of the Full Court that are intended to be challenged in this consultation.

**4.-** In resolution 2024-713 at 15:05 hours on April 29, 2024, issued by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in order to comply with the direction, it is first indicated that, although the direction was addressed personally to judges R. Chinchilla, I. Carranza, and K. Jiménez (signatories of the vote through which the consultation was made), it is clarified that as of this date, judge K. Jiménez is medically incapacitated and therefore, having her jurisdiction suspended, she cannot integrate the tribunal. She is substituted, in accordance with the rules prevailing for this purpose, by judge C. Ramírez. However, given that judge Ramírez's father, magistrate J. Ramírez, integrated the body that issued one of the acts appealed, she recused herself and was substituted, by role, by judge Max Antonio Escalante Quirós in order to integrate the tribunal and solely respond to what was requested. Secondly, the tribunal points out, in order to fulfill the indicated direction, it is clarified that in Considering III of vote 2024-462, reference was made to "…the agreements of the Full Court (among them the one contained in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the 'Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime') that empower transferring ordinary matters to that jurisdiction, which are complemented by the list of case files transferred from the competent body to the newly created one." Upon reviewing said circular (which was published in Judicial Bulletin number 119 of July 3, 2023 and can be consulted at: https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/avi-1-0003-9349), it is verified that it was issued by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (and not by the Full Court as indicated, a material error that is corrected at this time as provided for in Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime of the Judicial Branch. In the section titled "On the competence of JEDO offices," practical rule 5 (on which the court of origin based its decision to transfer the case to the organized crime tribunal and the latter to hear the matter) indicates: "5- The Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime shall have nationwide competence to perform tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine." Likewise, practical rule 9 states: "9- In order to guarantee an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction on organized crime, from the start of their functions and until it is deemed necessary, shall also perform tasks of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine." Similarly, in the section of that circular titled *"On the processing of the case file in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime"* rules 2 and 3 provide: *"2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the specialized jurisdiction on organized crime shall follow the processing method of the office of origin, meaning that if it is being processed physically, it shall continue this way until its conclusion. 3- Ordinary cases that are heard by the JEDO shall continue their processing according to the state in which they are assumed until their execution. They shall be referred to the office of origin once they are completely ready for archiving."* However, the issuance of these rules by the Superior Council is supported by what was previously decided by the Supreme Court of Justice (Full Court) in an extraordinary session at 08:16 hours on January 30, 2023, minutes 003-2023 (article XVIII in which it was firmly agreed: *"2) Accept what was requested by the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, referred through official communication No. S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: Vary the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, which at this moment have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the corresponding office in Guadalupe, so that starting in February 2023, they hear all matters assigned to the different criminal sentencing appeals tribunals of the country, starting with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals tribunals of the country, while the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime officially begins to function."* **5.-** By official communication of May 6, 2024, the Technical Chamber of the Court requested the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice to certify the agreement of the Full Court, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, minutes 003-2023, article XVIII.- Likewise, to certify which magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber participated in the approval of said agreement.

**6.-** On May 8, 2024, a literal certification of the agreement adopted in extraordinary session No. 03-2023 held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII, was incorporated into the case file. Likewise, the Secretariat of the Court certifies that the sirs magistrate and madam magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber who participated in the approval of the cited agreement are: Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, Jorge Araya García, Anamari Garro Vargas, and the substitute Aracelly Pacheco Salazar.- **7.-** On May 23, 2024, magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas filed a recusal, and indicated the reasons why they believe they have grounds to separate themselves from hearing this matter.

**8.-** By resolution at 14:44 hours on May 24, 2024, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber rejected the request filed by magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Ana Mari Garro Vargas and declared them qualified to hear this matter.

**9.-** By resolution at 9:44 hours on May 27, 2024, the president of the Chamber admitted the consultation formulated by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José and granted a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the president of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch.

**10.-** By brief filed on June 14, 2024, Iván Vinicio Vincenti Rojas, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, answered the hearing granted and stated, firstly, regarding **admissibility**, that both actions of unconstitutionality (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) and judicial consultations (consultas judiciales) are procedural mechanisms that have a series of requirements to fulfill, the non-observance of which leads to their rejection for admissibility reasons. The applications before the Constitutional Court tending to expel a norm from the legal system are vested with a series of formalities that are not vain, but rather, on the contrary, seek to discover from the outset that the claim is indeed serious and that it is surrounded by arguments of sufficient caliber. In the case of judicial consultations on constitutionality (consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad), they must be totally objective and, in addition, the judges who issue them must be clear that their endeavor is to help ensure that the legal system is always adjusted to the constitutional order. In that sense, that objectivity should not be synonymous with a futile academic or intellectual purpose, but rather the judge must be faced, with certainty, with the application of the norm they are going to employ and about which – without circumlocution – they doubt its constitutionality (cites Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 3905-2007 at 14:44 hours on March 21, 2007). Regarding the admissibility requirements of judicial consultations on constitutionality (as well as actions of the same matter), he focuses on two of them:

**A.-** that the consulting judge faces a genuine doubt of constitutionality regarding the norm they must apply, in such a way that – drawing a parallel with the requirements of the action of unconstitutionality – the judicial consultation turns out to be the appropriate means to protect the right considered injured and **B.-** that the judicial consultation is duly substantiated.

**A.**- If we thread the logical path that has guided the consulting Tribunal, to suspect the norms of the LOPJ and the agreement of the Superior Council, we may realize that it lacks the standing *"…to consult the Constitutional Chamber when it has founded doubts about the constitutionality of a norm or act it must apply, or an act, conduct, or omission it must judge in a case submitted to its knowledge."* in two ways: 1.- in the specific case, the challenged norm or norms MUST NOT be applied nor must the act, conduct, or omission be judged by the consulting Tribunal, and 2.- said norms and agreements must evidence a violation of the constitutional order, without forcing or artificial interpretations.

On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber in a recently dated resolution (No. 27.476-2023 at 13:16 hours on October 25, 2023, paraphrasing some other previous resolutions, stated on the issue:

"That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that - due to its relevance for the case - it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' entails a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be judged.'" (highlighting is not from the original).

We explain:

1.- From the account emanating from the decision that gives rise to this judicial consultation of constitutionality, it follows that the standing to consult is artificial and forced, since the initiative for the doubt is not of its own making, but rather comes from an argument by the defense attorney of the accused for the crime of withholding employee-employer contributions, who alleges as one of the grounds for appeal a defective procedural act (actividad procesal defectuosa), precisely for considering that the principle of the lawful or natural judge has been violated, given the mechanics of the appointment of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) that convicted his client, but more specifically, because of the simple statement made by the Criminal Court (Tribunal Penal) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, when it categorized the belonging Section as “emergent”. Apparently—although other hypotheses are valid—the mere mention of this appellation was enough for the defense attorney's intellect to conceive the possibility of being before a Court—now indeed at the appellate stage—as a promoter of constitutional violations.

It is necessary to highlight that both the technical defense of the accused in the original case, as well as the material defense of the defendant, at no procedural stage nor during the adversarial proceedings expressed doubts about the jurisdiction of the Trial Court (the only incidence presented at the end of the adversarial proceedings was by the defendant ARIAS RUIZ, who alleged a statute of limitations exception).

2.- As a consequence of this defective procedural act and the stance of the prosecutor in charge of the case, the consulting Court foresees that the appellant party argues a violation of constitutional and conventional norms, and, for its part, the prosecutorial body argues that the action is enabled by legal norms, and at that procedural stage, to the acting Court "…the doubt arises as to whether the laws from which the sentencing body’s jurisdiction is affirmed violate higher-ranking norms…" (emphasis added).

The constitutional misgiving is thus as it reads: the consulting Court goes back to past moments and hesitates about the norms that vested jurisdiction in the judicial body a quo to issue the judgment it hears on appeal. And it is on this factual-legal basis that the proposing Court considers itself sufficiently legitimated to elevate its doubts to judicial consultation regarding the norms that—in its view—it must forcibly apply.

The questions that arise spontaneously would be: does a Criminal Judgment Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal) have the standing to doubt the jurisdiction of the lower Court, at the moment the latter issued the appealed judgment; in other words, is the jurisdiction of the a quo part of the norms that the appellate Court must apply—as provided by the literal wording of Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—(and in this case, to vacillate about their constitutionality), or did it fall upon the judging person of the A quo Court (or for the defense attorney to claim) to assess their lack of jurisdiction, as ordered by Article 169 of the LOPJ:

"Article 169.- When an official estimates that they lack jurisdiction to hear the matter submitted to them, except in the case of extension of jurisdiction, they shall declare so ex officio and order the case file to be sent to the official who, in their judgment, should hear it. If any of the parties appeals or if, absent an appeal, the latter official disagrees with that opinion, it shall be the superior of both who decides the jurisdiction, without further procedure and as soon as the records are received." It is equally valid to ask: is the constitutional doubt of a Criminal Judgment Appeals Court a new way of losing the jurisdiction of the A quo, or is this lost only through the provisions of Article 163 of the LOPJ or, alternatively, through the grounds not exhaustively listed in Article 48 of the CPP?:

"Article 163.- Jurisdiction is lost in specific causes: 1.- When the cause is concluded and the judgment is executed. 2.- When the judge has been commissioned by another to carry out some diligence, once the commission is fulfilled. 3.- When, because it is accessory, the cause is sent to the judge who hears the principal one. 4.- When the judge has been declared disqualified by virtue of impediment, excuse, or recusal." From what has been said, in no way did the promoting Court ever—or at least in the specific case—have as a possible scenario the obligation to apply Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the LOPJ, nor the agreement of the Superior Council (Consejo Superior), nor circular 137-20234, much less when its leitmotiv is to doubt "...whether the laws from which the sentencing body’s jurisdiction is affirmed violate higher-ranking norms..." That is to say, in its role as a Criminal Judgment Appeals Court, hearing on appeal Decision No. 437-2023 of 2:22 PM on May 10, 2023, issued by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, “Emergent” Section, it had the following possibilities:

a.- Let us remember that it follows from the original judicial case file that the first ground for appeal by the defense attorney was to raise a defective procedural act, alleging a transgression of the principle of the lawful judge.

From a careful reading of Article 175 of the CPP and the jurisprudence of our Courts (including the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice), it is taken as true that the mechanism of the defective procedural act was created to prevent the issuance of a judicial decision with non-observance of certain precepts, including conventional ones, but it is improper to use said figure to appeal judicial decisions already issued; in this regard, Article 175 of the CPP provides:

"General Principle. Acts carried out with non-observance of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code, may not be evaluated to support a judicial decision nor used as presuppositions of it, unless the defect has been remedied, in accordance with the norms that regulate the correction of judicial actions." In effect, the procedural dynamic that follows from this institute supposes that the interested party or the one affected by the transgressing acts, prior to the judicial decision being issued, raises a defective procedural act precisely to avoid the consummation of the flaws contained in the preceding acts, and for these to be integrated into the judicial decision. Hand in hand with the above, the remediation of the act would be requested, seeking, as far as possible, not to go back to precluded stages.

As can be observed, said mechanism is impossible to apply after the judicial decision has already been issued, because the flaw could neither be corrected nor, even less, could one return to precluded stages; it follows from this that, once the judicial decision is issued, there is no further objection than the challenge through appeal or the appropriate recourse.

Accurately, Decision No. 2004-0054 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, issued at 8:50 AM on February 6, 2004, concluded the following:

"The request must be rejected outright: If one examines the general rule established in Article 175 of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the cases in which it is appropriate to declare the procedural activity as defective, it can be observed that this is possible only in relation to acts that would serve as the basis or presupposition of a judicial decision. That is, through the guidelines relating to defective procedural activity, it is not possible to question the decisions themselves, but only the prior actions on which they are based." Now then, although we can never know how the consulting Court would have ruled on the defective procedural act raised by the defense attorney as the first ground for appealing the conviction, it is certain that said request by the appellant—in correction of terms—could not have prospered, and the Criminal Judgment Appeals Court could have—then—declared the judgment brought on appeal ineffective, either by accepting some other ground of the appellant or, alternatively, by using the prerogative conferred upon it by the final part of the third paragraph of Article 462 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which literally provides:

"In any case, the court that verifies the breach of a fundamental right of the involved parties may decree it ex officio." and thus, without incurring the serious blunder of believing itself empowered to raise before the Constitutional Chamber a doubt of constitutionality that is not such (because the invoked articles would not be subject to its analysis, nor should it have had to apply them by any stretch of the imagination), it could have declared—even ex officio—a possible pretermittance of a party's fundamental right, directing things back to their normal course and ordering the remittal, so that now indeed—from its perspective—the accused would be tried by a lawful or natural judge.

As a corollary to what has been said so far, we leave posed the event that the judicial consultation of constitutionality that occupies us has not surpassed the admissibility test, not only because the invoked norms should not be subject to analysis or application by the Criminal Judgment Appeals Court, but also because doubting the laws that vested jurisdiction in the A quo Court to issue the judgment heard on appeal, contained in past jurisdictional acts, also do not form part of the list of norms that the consulting Court must apply, as mandatorily prescribed by Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.

B.- The second admissibility requirement we wish to analyze is based on the proper substantiation of judicial consultations of constitutionality, as a derivative of the obligation of every judge to thoroughly reason their criteria, as indicated—for example—by Article 142 of the CPP. The advisory body points out the substantiation defects it attributes to the judicial consultation of constitutionality, which likewise entail its inadmissibility:

a.- questioning the entirety of all the articles, without stopping to specify which extract from them is the alleged cause of the constitutional violation. Likewise, the approach lacks the comparison or collation between the questioned norms and the articles of the Fundamental Charter, to derive from there the constitutional transgression. Or else, if the comparison had materialized, it would have been insufficient to consider the task of substantiation fulfilled.

b.- mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Chamber, the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations from national and foreign doctrine without further development, merely transcribing them, assuming that due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the dispute before us are responsible for integrating the claim with the basis, unaware that this task pertains to the consulting Court. Special mention merits the paradigmatic cases that provoked the judgments of the Inter-American Court and were used by the consulting Court, about which we will comment further below (…)

(…) although around pages 12 to 14 of the document containing the judicial consultation, the promoting Court already cites some subsections or paragraphs of the 4 articles of the LOPJ, it also fails to comply with the obligation to collate the contested articles with the constitutional and conventional principles, to derive or evidence the reported transgressions from there, limiting itself to transcribing them, without greater academic rigor. As can be observed, neither a consulting Court nor a citizen who files an unconstitutionality action can afford the luxury of affirming that they entirely refute one or several articles, and even—as some claimants have done—question the entirety of a law, and expect that—in the first instance—this advisory and impartial Body of the Constitutional Chamber, and subsequently the Court of the subject matter, unravel in which part of the numeral or numerals the basis or the violation that supports the judicial consultation or the citizen's claim is contained.

Nor is it admissible—as has already been said—that the promoting Court is satisfied with citing the numerals of the LOPJ (in their entirety, although later reducing them to some subsections or paragraphs), the articles of the Fundamental Charter allegedly transgressed, some conventional principles set forth in International Instruments, and finally, several extracts from judgments of the Inter-American Court, and firmly believes that it fulfilled the task of reasoning its constitutional doubts (especially since its final claim is that 4 articles of the LOPJ be eliminated from the legal system, many of them without the slightest relation to the constitutional questioning materialized), and now, it falls upon the Chamber of the subject matter to harmonize all those inputs and correctly forge a reasoned and substantiated claim, which it was the primary obligation of the claimant or consultant to do.

It is true that from pages 12, 13, and 14 of the document containing the judicial consultation before us, a selection is made of certain paragraphs of the questioned LOPJ articles, as if to denote that it is in them where the incorrectness of placing the constitution of courts in the hands of administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) is evidenced, this being a legislative function (thus, for example, numeral 46 is repeated again in full, from 59 subsection 16 is mentioned, from Article 81 subsection 2), and from 101 bis the paragraph that allows judging personnel from the JEDO to process ordinary matters).

However, despite that effort of concretion, it is evident that the admissibility criteria are still not being met, concerning the proper substantiation of judicial consultations. This issue will be analyzed on the merits, where it will be evidenced that the entire claim made regarding the transfer of functions or constitution of courts forms part of the prerogative offered to the Judicial Branch by Article 166 of the Magna Carta.

The controversy over the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime of the Judicial Branch, which authorizes the publication of the circular called "Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and a new form of processing of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime" (circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023), deserves separate mention, which was correctly described even after a warning from the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber to the consulting Court. Said contribution and mention has no more validity than that granted to it by the fact that many of the movements made by the Superior Council have been based on the scope of circular 137-2023, issued by said Council. To conclude this section, suffice it to maintain that the only constitutional article that has been developed and whose transgression has been alleged is canon 35; the others, namely: 39, 121.20), and 166 of the Fundamental Charter, have been included to give the appearance that there are many numerals of the Political Code violated, but its development is limited to their simple mention. For that reason, the admissibility analysis carried out means that only Article 35 will be subject to comment later, as the others must be discarded. The mention of numeral 8.1) of the ACHR suffers the same fate, of which indeed only a transcription is made without further development.

b.- mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Chamber, the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations from national and foreign doctrine without further development, limiting themselves to transcribing them, assuming that due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the dispute before us are responsible for integrating the claim with the basis, unaware that this task pertains to the consulting Court. Special mention merits the paradigmatic cases that provoked the judgments of the Inter-American Court and that were used by the promoting Court. Continuing with the trend already exposed, the consulting Court bases its criterion on citations from some judgments of the Inter-American Court that have ruled on the issue of the lawful or natural judge and whose constitution must be materialized before the criminal act it will hear, votes from the Constitutional Chamber, judgments from the Constitutional Court of Spain, and extracts from national and foreign doctrine. (…)

1.- Concerning the mentioned jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Spain, an extract from judgment 47/1983 of May 31, 1983, is cited, which speaks of the constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law, but likewise, another extract from that same decision explains the possibilities that, for the better public service and, above all, for the public service of the Administration of Justice, internal collaboration exists among servants of the Judicial Branch, to remedy the "dysfunctionalities of the system":

"It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be demanded of the body as of its titulars, given the various contingencies that may affect these in their personal situation and the requirement, emanating from the public interest—the so-called 'needs of the service'—, that the different members of the judiciary collaborate within the Administration of Justice in the places where their work may be most effective, compensating, insofar as possible, the dysfunctionalities of the system. But, in any case, the procedures established for the designation of the titulars must guarantee the independence and impartiality of these, which constitutes the direct interest protected by the right to the ordinary Judge predetermined." (emphasis not in original).

(…)

Finally, judgment STC 55/1990 of March 28, FJ 3, in a sense very similar to the recently exposed 47/1983, declares the following:

"This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to the ordinary Judge predetermined by law fundamentally requires that the judicial body have been created by a legal norm investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act motivating the action or judicial process, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as a special or exceptional body (STC 47/1983, of May 31, FJ 2). But this guarantee does not imply the right to a specifically determined Judge (STC 97/1987, of June 10, FJ 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special rules of competence in the distribution of matters among the different judicial bodies." The constitutional notion of an ordinary judge predetermined by law is not concretized in the general legislative establishment of jurisdictional competences, but rather is normally integrated by those legal provisions that repeal or alter that general competence." (emphasis ours).

As can be observed, despite the commonplace conception that the principle of the legal or natural judge may represent, the truth is that—as we shall see when analyzing the merits of this judicial consultation of constitutionality—the issue is not as flat as it is presented, nor is its breach consolidated by modifications to the constitution of the courts that will judge the specific case; rather, there exist entirely valid exceptions, even constitutionally endorsed ones, whether by the Fundamental Charter itself or the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which, far from transgressing the principle under study, strengthen it. We will address that further below.

Based on what has been stated, this advisory and impartial Body of the Constitutional Chamber believes that the judicial consultation before us suffers from certain admissibility defects (which have been duly accredited), for which reason we request that these be so expressed, declaring the present judicial action inadmissible.

On the other hand, regarding a matter of possible incidence on the fate of this consultation of constitutionality, this Office does wish to draw attention to the merely literal approach to the alleged preterition of fundamental rights, without demonstrating the true grievance caused to the affected party by being sentenced by a Criminal Trial Court, with the characteristics pointed out by the judicial consultation before us. The central issue around which the consulting Court's doubt revolves has only one facet: if the crime was committed in 2017 and the accused was tried and convicted by a Trial Court that was created and integrated subsequently, in principle the fundamental right to have a legal judge would have been injured. Although the literal wording of Article 35 of the Constitution does not encompass this latter aspect (the requirement of the necessary prior existence of the adjudicating Court), it is a fact that a vast body of doctrine established in international instruments and jurisprudence of Human Rights Courts is coincident on the matter. It is noteworthy that in the brief forming the judicial consultation, not one line is read in which the grievance caused to the legal-constitutional order, and above all to the accused, is developed—namely, that he was tried by a Court created after the facts and with the series of circumstances and variables surrounding the judicial case, such as administrative decisions taken by the Full Court (Corte Plena) or the Superior Council (Consejo Superior), through agreements, some set forth in circulars (137-2023, for example). The defense attorney, when attempting through an invalid procedural mechanism (raising a defective procedural activity against a judicial ruling) to reverse the conviction, alleges as a grievance violations of the principle of the legal judge and due criminal process, putting forward as a claim that the ruling be declared ineffective and that a retrial be ordered. One might think that the grievance was already set forth by the corresponding procedural party at the opportune procedural moment, for which reason a consulting Court cannot be required to satisfy this requirement. Indeed, we do not intend to invoke an inadmissibility of the judicial consultation because the promoting Court did not set forth any grievance; rather, what we wish to place on record is that, although it is true that the adjudicating Court of the originating judicial case was constituted after the facts, it also appears that the judicial approach seeks a nullity for nullity's sake, since the temporal circumstance of the subsequent constitution of the Court A quo does not appear to represent a real transgression, such that if the accused had been tried by an ordinary Court, the result would have been different. This line of thought has been echoed by the Constitutional Chamber itself, which advocates, through constitutional challenges—whether via judicial consultations or actions for inapplicability—achieving a true protection of the fundamental right considered violated, thus avoiding declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake:

"In the second place, considering that the protection exercised in this avenue is not in the abstract, that is, it is not about declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, but rather it is for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, it must be determined whether the omission here accused as unconstitutional caused any injury to the plaintiff's fundamental rights. In essence, what is claimed as violated is the constitutional guarantee to a natural judge, which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, alleging that by being tried by a court not legally constituted, that principle is violated. The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial organs permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the 'natural judge' principle is as a legal judge, that is, as an 'organ' created by law in accordance with the competence the Constitution assigns for that purpose to Congress. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, in principle, of having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established in Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José de Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or court established prior to the act by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc organisms, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special ones, to judge certain acts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts." Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Resolution 6701-1993 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993 (the emphasis is supplied).

It would seem that with such a categorical stance from the Chamber specializing in this matter, and since the true injury to the fundamental right allegedly harmed has not been demonstrated (beyond a formal non-observance of the requirement of prior constitution, but without evidence that its configuration was ex professo and to try that particular case), this Constitutional Chamber must likewise reject the present judicial consultation, as there is no record that the right or principle of the legal judge has been violated, in the terms prohibited by Article 35 of the Constitution and all the national and foreign doctrine and jurisprudence that informs it, such as, for example, the Courts constituted in the cases of ALMONACID ARELLANO vs. CHILE and GELMAN vs. URUGUAY.

It must be reiterated that the configuration of the sentencing Court in the specific case responded to requirements and needs to sustain the principle of continuity of the public service "Administration of Justice," equally supported by normative grounds, so there is no way to demonstrate that any fundamental right of the accused was injured.

III.- On the merits. It indicates that the two propositions of the consulting Court are:

a.- both the cited articles of the Organic Law of the Judiciary in their entirety (although they were later reduced to citations of specific paragraphs or subsections), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council and Circular 137-2023, facilitate the violation of the principle of the legal judge, since the Trial Court that convicted the accused in the originating case was constituted after the commission of the criminal acts, and b.- likewise, this whole framework of articles and agreements also allows decisions to be made regarding the appointment and constitution of courts, whose origin comes from administrative organs or lower regulations, which similarly tend to injure the principle of the legal or natural judge. In this regard, the position of the advisory body is:

a.- formally speaking, it is a fact that the single-judge body that tried and convicted the accused ARIAS RUIZ was designated to hear the originating judicial case after the commission of the crime (2017). However, it is also possible to sustain that said adjudicating person is part of the roster of Judicial Branch official-judges, who has been designated in that condition for having met all the required credentials and who, in turn, is a judge appointed within the recently created Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, JEDO).

b.- the constitution of the adjudicating Court, in the manner it occurred, was not a whim, nor was it even acted upon deliberately to, precisely, injure the guarantees defined by Article 35 of the Constitution to the detriment of the accused. Such designation derives from enabling legal regulations granted to both the Full Court and the Superior Council, who, based on agreements, decisions, and circulars, have issued a series of guidelines to guarantee the continuity of the public service called "Administration of Justice." The fact must be emphasized that, while it is true that the agreements adopted by the Full Court and the Superior Council have materialized through established administrative mechanisms, it is also true that each one of them (agreements, decisions, circulars, etc.) has a normative origin in law, so complying with the consulting Court's claim that the designation and constitution of the Courts of Justice must be immutable and fully anticipated (solely to comply with the precept that the Court must be constituted not only by law but prior to the fact to be judged) would entail stagnation in the provision of the "Administration of Justice" service and, incidentally, a failure to fulfill the powers granted by that very Fundamental Charter to the Judicial Branch and a severe injury to the principle of swift and fulfilled justice.

c.- on the matter, we bring up here the previously cited ruling of the Constitutional Court of Spain (47/1983 of May 31, 1983), when it holds the following:

"It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be demanded of the organ as of its holders, given the various contingencies that may affect the latter in their personal situation and the requirement, emanating from the public interest —the so-called 'needs of the service'—, that the different members of the judicial power collaborate within the Administration of Justice in the places where their work can be most effective, making up, as far as possible, for the dysfunctionalities of the system.

As is evident, to maintain that the configuration and constitution of the courts is contrary to the constitutional order, solely because these movements have been carried out through administrative decisions coming from administrative organs of the Judicial Branch, is to ignore not only that these instances have a legal basis, but also that these actions have been absolutely necessary to preserve the continuity of the service provided by the Judicial Branch. The possibilities for mobilizing personnel from one jurisdiction to a different one or any other "dysfunctionality of the system" have been carried out, in the first instance, because the questioned legal norms permit it, and secondly, because said changes were and will continue to be necessary.

Let it be recalled here what was stated by the Constitutional Court of Spain in a resolution mentioned above (STC 55/1990 of March 28, Legal Ground 3):

"This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law requires, fundamentally, that the judicial organ has been created by a legal norm investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the fact giving rise to the action or judicial proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as a special or exceptional organ (STC 47/1983, of May 31, Legal Ground 2). But this guarantee does not entail the right to a specific, concrete judge (STC 97/1987, of June 10, Legal Ground 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special competence rules in the distribution of matters among the different judicial organs." (the emphasis is supplied).

d.- we are greatly interested in retrieving the ruling of our country's Constitutional Court, mentioned above (6701-1993 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993), not only for its richness but also because the solution provided fits the consultation before us. Indeed, in addition to setting the precedent that the pronouncements of that Chamber are not reduced to declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, it also introduces an element that is quite interesting and powerful in itself, when it concludes that the mechanism of constitutional control of norms: "... is for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, [but] it must be determined whether the omission here accused as unconstitutional caused any injury to the plaintiff's fundamental rights." And that is precisely the scenario presented in the criminal summary proceeding that gave rise to the judicial consultation attracting our attention, because it is not enough to formally verify that the designation of the adjudicator materialized years after the criminal offense, but rather, it is also necessary to confirm that the judicial action effectively caused the accused some injury to his fundamental rights.

And in all truthfulness, neither did the consulting Court undertake the task of demonstrating it, nor has this Office detected it, concluding in the affirmation that it will not be known—because it did not occur—whether the accused would have had greater guarantees if he had been tried and convicted by an "ordinary" Trial Court rather than an "emergent" one.

For all that has been stated, having made the admissibility objections to the present judicial consultation of constitutionality, which we respectfully request be applied, the truth is that the brief and its foundations from the promoting court have not managed to demonstrate that, in the case of the hearing of the original judicial summary proceeding, the guarantee established in Article 35 of the Constitution was violated. It is not enough to demonstrate that the constitution of the court occurred after the criminal act judged, if the grievance that this circumstance, permitted by the provisions of the LOPJ, produced in the accused has not been demonstrated. Finally, the provisions, agreements, and circulars adopted by the administrative organs of the Judicial Branch, established on normative-legal bases, prove to be a necessary mechanism to preserve the principle of continuity of the public service called "Administration of Justice," without it having been possible to prove—likewise—how these administrative provisions prevented the accused from enjoying the prerogatives of Article 35 of the Constitution.

11.- In a brief filed on June 16, 2024, Orlando Aguirre Gómez, in his capacity as President of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, responds to the hearing granted, and points out, regarding the Judicial Consultation, that it is carried out within case file number [Value 001], by means of Resolution No. 2024-0462 at eleven hours thirty minutes on March nineteenth, two thousand twenty-four, corrected by Resolution No. 2024-713 at fifteen hours five minutes on April twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty-four, issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. In summary, it queries the constitutionality of Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (the latter, added by Article 18 of the Law on the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017 —and reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, adopted in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, Article LXXI, which authorized the publication of the circular entitled “Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new processing methods for the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime,” Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, insofar as they "support… and allow the transfer of case files from ordinary justice to that of organized crime," since, in the opinion of the aforementioned Court, they violate the principle of the legal or natural judge enshrined in Articles 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 35, 39, 121.20, and 166 of the Political Constitution, as they allow an administrative organ or laws with a lower rank than the constitutional and conventional norms to modify the competence of the natural judges of a fact, assigning the hearing of the case to courts that did not exist at the date of the facts.

II.- Background. 1).- In session of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch No. 95-2022 held on November 3, 2022, Article LXXIII, the agreement was adopted whose operative part literally stated:

"(…)

Prior to resolving what corresponds, it was agreed: To transfer the action presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of November 1, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, to the Legal Directorate, so that within three days it issues a legal opinion on the legal possibility of temporarily using the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms proposed, within the framework of the law that has not yet entered into force, and if possible, what would be the legal basis for giving it that different use. The agreement is declared final." (The highlighting is ours).

2).- In response to the above, the Legal Directorate rendered Legal Opinion No. DJ-566-2022, of November 7, 2022, requested by the superior organ, which was made known in session No. 98-2022, held on November 11, 2022, Article II, where it was agreed to accept the action presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating Magistrate of the Subcommission Against Organized Crime, given that there is no legal impossibility of carrying out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms proposed. In what is relevant, the operative part of the agreement indicates the following:

"(…)

It was agreed: To acknowledge receipt of Legal Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, issued by Máster Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by virtue of what is indicated: 1) Accept the action presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Organized Crime Subcommission, given that according to the opinion rendered, there is no legal impossibility of carrying out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms proposed:

[...]

However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently expired. 2.) The Organized Crime Subcommission must: a) Mandate that the resources contemplated in the staffing table and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be primarily allocated, in the first term, for all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Mandate that once the respective human resources participate in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, they be primarily allocated to the attention of organized crime matters under the currently applicable regulations. c.) Mandate that in the event that there are no organized crime cases within the respective territorial competence, or the same are in progress, they may be employed temporarily in the legitimate exercise of ius variandi for the attention of ordinary matters, according to the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

The foregoing shall strictly respect the rules of competence under Article 47 and concordant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, within the understanding of the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi regarding the rights of staff members, the non-impairment of the public service, and compliance with the body of administrative legality. d.) The Subcommittee on Organized Crime shall be responsible for the monitoring and control of its execution in accordance with the terms proposed and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter. 3.) The Human Resources Directorate shall clarify to the officials who would participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is subject to the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, and therefore it may not be applied until it takes effect. This agreement is declared final.

3).- The Full Court, in session No. 3-2023, held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII, modified the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Sentence Appeals Tribunal of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, at that time based in San José and providing support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that as of February 2023, they hear all matters assigned to the different sentence appeals tribunals in the country, starting with San Ramón and providing collaboration to the other appeals tribunals in the country, while the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime officially began to operate.

4).- Finally, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, acknowledged receipt of official communication No. S-CJEDO-08-2023, dated June 2, 2023, signed by Magistrate Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, and authorized the publication of Circular No. 137-2023, titled "Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new form of processing of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," and quotes it verbatim.

III.- On the constitutionality of the norms consulted and the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judiciary. Legal Authority of the Supreme Court of Justice to organize the functioning of judicial offices. As a first point to highlight, it should be noted that, as indicated by the consulting body, our Political Constitution in its Article 121, subsection 20), establishes that the creation of Courts of Justice is the exclusive competence of the Legislative Assembly. Thus, once courts are established in the different territorial constituencies of the country, in order to achieve proper functioning, the legislator granted powers to the superior bodies of the Judiciary—the Superior Council and the Full Court—to organize judicial bodies and execute budget resources where they are most needed, in order to efficiently and effectively fulfill the justice administration service. Thus, in numeral 3 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, number 7333, the following is stated:

"ARTICLE 3.- Justice is administered by: 1.- Small claims, contraventional, and summary matters courts and tribunals. 2.- First instance and criminal courts. 3.- Collegiate tribunals. 4.- Cassation tribunals. 5.- Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice. 6.- Full Court. The Supreme Court of Justice shall establish the number of processing judges and decision-making judges, as well as the other judicial officers that courts of any category and subject matter must have; for this, it shall take into consideration the needs inherent to the office, in the interest of the better provision of the public service of justice. When two or more judges exist in a court, the coordinator of the body shall be elected internally by their peers. If the jurisdictional offices are organized in a judicial circuit, the judges shall appoint a general coordinator from among themselves. The judge hearing a proceeding shall have the authority to order what is appropriate for the fulfillment of their duties and, in each matter, shall have the power to exercise the disciplinary regime. In other cases, that power corresponds to the body of judges and the agreements shall be adopted by majority; if there is a tie, the coordinator shall have a casting vote. In the rulings and actions, the name and surnames of the official in charge of the proceeding must be recorded. Collegiate tribunals shall be composed of the number of judges required for good public service and shall act individually or in panels of three of them, unless the law provides for another form of integration. The coordinator shall distribute the workload, applying the criteria previously established by the judges and always seeking the greatest equity. When they do not agree, the Superior Council of the Judiciary or the Supreme Court of Justice, as the case may be, shall set the rules. (Thus amended by article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)" (Emphasis added).

In turn, Article 46 of the cited normative body provides for the possibility of modifying territorial constituencies, reassignment of competences, or the transfer and conversion of judicial offices, positions, or posts, which must evidently be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads; aspects that were contemplated at the time the guidelines on practical rules and a new form of processing of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime were issued, through the agreements of the Full Court, the Superior Council, and the questioned circular No. 137-2023.

In this regard, the rule states the following:

"ARTICLE 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court regarding the establishment and definition of a territorial constituency, or those concerning the reassignment of competences, the transfer and conversion of judicial offices and of positions or posts, must be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads. By reason of the volume of work and the required efficiency of the public service of justice, the Court may appoint more members to the tribunals, on a temporary or permanent basis; it may also open and close—for those same reasons—new offices and bodies attached to the tribunals, anywhere in the country. In mixed tribunals, the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the administration of justice services are specialized. When the needs of the service so dictate, the Court may divide a mixed tribunal into specialized tribunals. When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial body, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other officers, so that they travel to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency." (Thus amended by article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) In this same sense, Article 59 states the following:

"Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice: (…) 15.- To propose, to the Legislative Assembly, the creation of Judicial Offices in the places and subjects it deems necessary for good public service. 16.- To merge two or more judicial offices into one or to divide them, to transfer their seat, to establish the respective territorial and subject-matter competence, taking into consideration the best public service. It may also assign specialized competence to one or several offices, to hear specific matters, within the same subject area, occurring in one or several constituencies or throughout the entire national territory." Note how the regulations grant broad powers to the Court to appoint more members to the tribunals—on a temporary or permanent basis—to open and close new offices and bodies attached to the tribunals, to divide functions by subject matter—for the purpose of specializing the administration of justice services—to divide mixed tribunals into specialized ones, to establish territorial and subject-matter competence, to assign judges and other officers to travel to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency, provided it is in accordance with the public interest and the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, as expressed by the Legal Directorate of the Judiciary in opinion No. DJ-566-2022.

In addition, subsections 1, 2, 3, 6, 21, and 22 of Article 81 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary grant the power to the Superior Council of the Judiciary to organize judicial offices by executing the administrative policy of the institution, in accordance with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. To those effects, the article indicates the following:

"Article 81.- It corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judiciary: 1.- To execute the administrative policy of the Judiciary, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. 2.- To appoint, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; to transfer them, provisionally or permanently, to suspend them and grant them leave with or without pay, and to remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President. 3.- To appoint interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is proven that the Offices are not up to date. 6.- To transfer, provisionally or permanently, suspend, grant leave with or without pay, remove, and reinstate, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial officers, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court. (…) 21.- To dictate internal rules for the better performance of their duties, with the exception of regulations. 22.- To regulate the distribution of judicial matters among the Offices of equal territorial competence, to achieve the equalization of work." From the foregoing, it is inferred that, once the Legislative Assembly creates the Courts of Justice, in accordance with the constitutional mandate of Article 121.20, it corresponds to the Judiciary to define the functioning of all judicial offices in the country, that is, the purpose of the transcribed legal norms is to grant this institution the possibility of self-organizing without the need for the legislator to authorize, through a law, the creation, modification, or elimination of tribunals, courts, prosecutor's offices, and other auxiliary bodies, since that would entail an imminent delay and an unquestionable impairment of the provision of the service and the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, violating Article 41 of our Political Constitution.

Now, in order to safeguard the proper use of public funds, Article 176 of our Political Constitution requires that they be used in a "sustainable, transparent, and responsible" manner, obligations that all public institutions have at the time of executing the budget assigned each year. That is to say, with respect to the Judiciary, all budgetary resources assigned annually must be invested to meet the respective institutional goals and objectives, In this regard, the cited numeral states the following:

"Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, and shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides. The ordinary budget of the Republic comprises all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, during the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed that of probable revenues. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the foregoing rules when adopting its budgets. The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from January first to December thirty-first." In the same sense, Article 4 of Law No. 8131, called the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, establishes: "every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective senior officials," that is, the senior official must prepare the budget formulation for each year, which includes all institutional needs and allocates resources according to the plans established for that year. The article states the following:

"ARTICLE 4.- Subjection to the National Development Plan Every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective senior officials, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this Law. The National Development Plan shall constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that applies in accordance with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions. (Note from Sinalevi: By means of Article 21 of the Public Investment Law, N° 10441 of March 13, 2024, this numeral will be amended. In accordance with the aforementioned law, it shall enter into force twelve months after its publication, that is, March 22, 2025, so as of that date the text of this article shall read as follows: Article 4- Subjection to the National Development and Public Investment Plan. Every public budget must respond to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective senior officials, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this law. The National Development and Public Investment Plan shall constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that applies, in accordance with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions.")" In general terms, if we carefully review the guidelines issued by the Superior Council of the Judiciary in the questioned agreement and circular, there is no doubt that they were issued with the objective of implementing a Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, so that both the adjudicating persons and the auxiliary staff remain in service, exercising their work efficiently, in order to prevent the resource from being underutilized and, above all, due to the need to strengthen other areas given the difficult situation caused by the increase in criminality in the country.

Of special importance, the legislator, with the approval of Law “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica”, No. 9481, established that this jurisdiction has competence throughout the entire national territory, and furthermore has nationwide competence to perform tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction "when institutional requirements so determine", this was also reiterated in the addition of article 101 bis to the Organic Law of the Judiciary. Therefore, it could not be interpreted that if a matter from the ordinary jurisdiction is handled by adjudicating persons specialized in organized crime, the principle of a natural judge would be violated, as the appellant and the consulting body wish to imply, since these competences were defined by a law, and it corresponds to the Judiciary exclusively and preclusively to allocate the resource where it is most needed.

The cited article states the following:

</p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Ley 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">These matters shall be heard by the criminal trial courts, criminal tribunals, and ordinary criminal sentence appellate tribunals throughout the country. Matters that, in addition to meeting the requirements of Article 1 of Ley 8754, of July 22, 2009, also conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Ley 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica (Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica), of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime. These matters may be heard by the Criminal Trial Court, Criminal Tribunal, and Criminal Sentence Appellate Tribunal, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime. They shall hear the criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related offenses (delitos conexos). Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they shall have jurisdiction throughout the national territory. Furthermore, these offices shall also have national-level jurisdiction to perform tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">When the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) verifies that, according to current regulations, the facts under investigation qualify as organized crime or organized criminality, it may request authorization to apply the rules provided for this type of matter: a) For cases falling under the ordinary jurisdiction, the jurisdictional authority in charge of the matter shall verify compliance with the requirements, by means of a reasoned resolution (resolución fundada), within forty-eight hours following the request. b) For cases falling under the specialized jurisdiction, the request shall be made in writing by the person occupying the position of Attorney General of the Republic (fiscal general de la República). The specialized jurisdictional authority may assume jurisdiction in a reasoned resolution, after verifying the requirements, in accordance with the procedure established in Article 4 of this law. Exceptionally, the request may be made by the acting prosecutor (persona fiscal subrogante), when the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic is prevented from doing so for some duly justified reason. Except for the initial written request from the Attorney General or the acting prosecutor for the specialized jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction over a matter, the other proceedings may be delegated to the specialized prosecutors (fiscales especializados) of that jurisdiction, except for those that by legal imperative may only be handled by the person occupying the position of Attorney General.</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) and the special review procedure (procedimiento especial de revisión) shall fall under the jurisdiction of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia).”</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">As we see, by legal mandate, the Full Court (Corte Plena) or the Superior Council (Consejo Superior), as the case may be, in their capacity as employer and supreme body of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), have the power to define the internal institutional policies for organization and structuring, with the purpose of providing quality public service, which, as administrator of justice, they are entrusted with, through the creation or restructuring of judicial offices, as well as with the placement of judicial personnel in offices where temporary, or even permanent, support and collaboration are required for the better service of the users of the access to justice service. In that sense, the questioned guidelines find support in the aforementioned organic and budgetary regulations and in the “Creation of the Organized Crime Specialized Jurisdiction in Costa Rica” (Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica), No. 9481, which were enacted in order to enable the Judicial Branch to provide a justice administration service efficiently and effectively, in compliance with the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, without denial, making efforts to address the current situation our country is facing due to the constant increase in criminality arising from the strengthening of organized crime structures such as drug trafficking and other complex crimes. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">For these reasons, Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council from session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, and Circular No. 137-2023, do not present any constitutionality problem; conversely, removing the possibility for the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch to organize judicial offices and the Courts of Justice would impede the exercise of the functions constitutionally assigned to this Branch of the Republic, violating the Principle of Judicial Independence established by Article 9 of the Political Constitution. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Constitutional jurisprudence has been developing this principle from the perspective of “organizational independence,” in the sense that each of the branches of the Republic may issue norms and adopt decisions regarding its functioning, its organization, and the development of its substantive functions (citing Vote No. 14286-2005 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on October nineteenth, two thousand five) and points out that the separation of powers and the power of self-organization held by the Judicial Branch are complemented by the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), which finds support in subsection d), of the first paragraph, of Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), when it provides that </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“The hierarchy of the sources of the administrative legal system shall be subject to the following order: (…) d) The decrees of the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) that regulate laws, those of the other Supreme Branches in the matter of their competence”</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> . Thus, the superior bodies have the possibility of issuing regulations and service guidelines to organize judicial offices, as usually happens when a tribunal or court needs to reorganize and assume new functions within the competencies established by the legislator. This regulatory power was also addressed by the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) in the cited vote (No. 14286-2005), where the following was stated:</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">I.- B) Regulatory Power of the other Branches and other public entities:</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic"> Having said all of the foregoing, one might conclude that the regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, however, this statement must be understood in the sense that, effectively, the executive regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, but not the autonomous regulatory power. That is, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the possibility is admitted that the other Supreme Branches, other than the Executive Branch, may issue autonomous regulations, be they organizational or service regulations.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic"> The foregoing is based on subsection d) of the first paragraph of Article 6 of the LGAP…</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">(…)</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Now then, specifically regarding the autonomous regulatory power of the Judicial Branch, this derives from the very principle of separation of functions, since, as stated, nothing prevents the same function - not a primary one - from being exercised by two Branches or by all, which is why one cannot speak of a rigid distribution of competencies based on function and subject matter. Thus, the Judicial Branch also has normative power, which also translates into its autonomous regulatory power for aspects related to its internal organization or the services it provides. A power of self-organization recognized, moreover, by Article 167 of the Constitution itself insofar as it establishes the mandatory consultation of legislative projects related to the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch; likewise, Article 48 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states:</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“Article 48.-</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The Supreme Court of Justice is the Superior Tribunal of the Judicial Branch and as the superior body thereof shall exercise the functions of governance and regulation.”</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Thus, it is not surprising that this Chamber has had the opportunity to analyze the powers of the Supreme Court of Justice regarding regulating the functions of the different judicial offices (see Resolution 02-07626 of 14 hours 35 minutes of August 1, 2002 and Resolution 00-05888 of 10 hours 03 minutes of July 13, 2000). In conclusion, as observed, not only the Executive Branch enjoys regulatory power (executive and autonomous), but this power has also been recognized for other Branches and public entities, but with regard to these only if it concerns autonomous regulations (be they organizational or service regulations), since the executive regulatory power remains exclusive to the Executive Branch.”</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> (Emphasis ours). </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">By virtue of the foregoing, the questioned norms are not unconstitutional, given that they grant powers to the superior bodies to self-organize judicial offices in order to provide a quality, efficient, and effective administration of justice service, subject to changes due to incidents that may be arising from certain social situations and where it is required that the budgetarily assigned resources be used in a “sustainable, transparent, and responsible” manner, which was ordered by the Subcommittee Against Organized Crime (Subcomisión Contra la Delincuencia Organizada), the Full Court, and the Superior Council, when the Contingency Plan (Plan de Contingencia) was implemented, in that jurisdiction, under the possibilities that the law establishes regarding judicial offices that handle criminal matters. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; text-decoration:underline">There is no impairment of the Principle of the Natural Judge (Principio de Juez Natural).</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> As indicated, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch number 7333 establishes a series of rules that allow the Full Court and Superior Council to organize judicial offices. Among these rules, it is worth highlighting Articles 46, 59, and 81, which allow the superior bodies to modify territorial jurisdictions (circunscripciones territoriales), overload competencies, or transfer and convert judicial offices, positions, or posts, which must evidently be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service, the specialization of the judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In the case </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">sub examine</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, it should be noted that it is Law No. 9481, which creates the Organized Crime Specialized Jurisdiction, that defines the jurisdiction of the judicial offices that handle that subject matter, which hold jurisdiction at the national level and to perform tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction. This has the consequence that the Judicial Branch, within its power of self-organization, can use human and budgetary resources where it deems pertinent, always attending to good service and the public interest. Thus, the principle of the natural judge establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, pre-established by law, as happened with the creation of the aforementioned specialized jurisdiction, so we are not dealing with an ad hoc constituted jurisdictional body, but rather with courts of justice that were created by a law and whose jurisdiction has also been defined by the legislator, just as the principle of the natural judge requires. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">If we review again the guidelines contained in Circular No. 137-2023, these are consistent with the aforementioned regulations, since in no way do they implement any modification to what is legally provided, but rather they seek that the judges specialized in organized crime (personas juzgadoras especializadas) can hear ordinary matters when circumstances of institutional necessity so require, to guarantee access to justice and efficiency in the administration of justice. This practice is also common in other subject matters, where judicial offices have had to be reorganized due to the approval of new laws that modify or establish new competencies and functions of some Courts of Justice, among others, the Labor Procedural Reform (Reforma Procesal Laboral), the Civil Procedural Reform (Reforma Procesal Civil), and others that are approved but are in the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">vacatio legis</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> period, such as the Family Procedural Code (Código Procesal de Familia), effective as of October 2024, or those that are yet to be approved. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In the specific case, the judges who heard the ordinary proceeding, as explained, are criminal judges who, by legal mandate, have jurisdiction throughout the national territory to hear organized crime or ordinary matters. They were not designated for the specific case, but rather form part of the composition of a specific jurisdictional body whose jurisdiction has been legally defined, and they must hear “ordinary and specialized proceedings” due to the requirement of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime - whose procedure corresponds to the ordinary proceeding - was not judged through the specialized proceeding, but rather was simply processed by specialized judges applying the adjective law of the ordinary proceeding, a situation that in no way affects the legally defined jurisdiction. </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It is important to bring up what was indicated by the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) in opinion number DJ-566-2022, when it analyzed the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Organized Crime Specialized Jurisdiction, under the terms proposed by the Subcommittee of the Criminal Jurisdiction (Sub Comisión de la Jurisdicción Penal). In this regard, the Advisory Unit (Unidad Asesora), as relevant, stated the following:</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&nbsp; </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“It is evident that there is a manifest instrumentality in the resources of this year for the start of the operation of the respective jurisdiction, as stated in the reform of the same transitory provision I when it indicates: “It shall come into effect eighteen months after the necessary budget for its implementation has been granted, in accordance with the technical studies of the Judicial Branch”</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Note how this transitory provision provides that a budget be allocated for the respective jurisdiction 18 months prior, that is, in a previous budgetary period, to the entry into force of the jurisdiction, thus clarifying the possibility of executing the respective resources. It should be remembered that Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration provides the following:</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“Article 16.-</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">1. In no case may acts be issued that are contrary to unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience.”</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Logic dictates that if resources were allocated in 2022 in the context indicated above, it is for purposes of preparing for the start of the respective jurisdiction, derived from the ordinary budget that authorizes the expense and in order for </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">the commencement of the effects of the law to be</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic"> in accordance with the principles of public service, namely: </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“Article 4.- The activity of public entities must be subject, in its entirety, to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of recipients, users, or beneficiaries.”</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The opposite would imply waiting for the law to come into effect to make the necessary investments for its start, which is not the purpose of the budgetary allocation for 2022 nor of the reformed Transitory Provision I of Law 9481, which rather contemplates preparatory acts for its implementation.</span></p> It is even worth noting that it would not be logical either to fail to execute duly foreseen budgetary resources or, by partially implementing the respective plan in the preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, to leave the human resources idle afterwards on the presumption that they cannot exercise jurisdictional or para-jurisdictional functions because Ley 9481 is not in force, when the same law contemplates that in the future, judicial servants may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases, and the Budget Law does not condition its execution on its entry into force.

For the purposes of this criterion, this Directorate analyzed the document presented by Magistrate Zúñiga Morales and, based on the expert technical opinion of the undersigned, it is evident that the use that would be given to the positions would be the following…

(…)

As is evident, the plan contemplates a series of actions by the appointed persons who would be participating in actions necessary for the preparation of the entry into force of the aforementioned Law, which we deem consistent with the provisions of official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, and the agreement between Branches of the Republic that serves as its basis.

This Legal Directorate considers that the legal basis for executing the plan is the ordinary budget 2022, which grants resources so that, ex ante, what is necessary for the implementation of Ley 9481 can be prepared, once the legal preconditions for its entry into force are met.

The contrary would imply supposing that the respective allocated resources could only be used upon the law's entry into force, which would further postpone its effects, contrary to its provisions, the legislator's purpose, and the public interest itself.

It is evident that official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, contemplates financing for preparatory actions for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction, in accordance with Transitory Provision I mentioned herein and with the understanding that said administrative act uses the term "others," in addition to "logistical development, remodeling processes, tenders…" for the destination of the resources.

This Directorate also considers it possible that, once all the necessary technical preparatory actions for the commencement of the respective jurisdiction have been implemented, the human resources can be used for other purposes proper to jurisdictional competencies, with the understanding that the Consejo Superior has the powers to adapt the functions of servants according to the public interest, in the legitimate exercise of ius variandi and given that it would not be possible to apply Ley 9481 until it is in force.

This advisory unit considers that limiting the possibility for designated persons to exercise ordinary functions within the framework of competencies assigned by law or administrative act would imply giving effect to a law that is not yet in force and limiting the effects of the ordinary budget 2022, which does not contemplate limitations or conditions in that sense.

Consequently, once the provisions of official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, have been applied, it must be understood that the effects of the respective roster of positions (relación de puestos) in the ordinary budget 2022 must be applied.

In accordance with the foregoing, it is considered that what is proposed by the Contingency Plan proposal is legally admissible and, to this effect, we recommend the following:

• Order that the resources contemplated in the roster of positions (relación de puestos) and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal primarily be used, in the first place, for all the necessary actions for preparing for the commencement of functions of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Order that once the respective human resources participate in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the jurisdiction against organized crime, they be assigned primarily to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently effective regulations.

• Order that in the event that within the respective territorial competence there are no organized crime cases or they are being processed, the resources may be employed temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of ius variandi, for handling ordinary matters, according to the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

This last recommendation takes into account that even the not-yet-effective law raises the possibility that in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources allocated to this jurisdiction may handle ordinary matters, and with the understanding that, as previously indicated, the ordinary budget 2022 does not contemplate any condition in its content regarding the use of the positions.

It is reiterated that in the case under analysis, we are not, technically speaking, in the presence of a specific destination but rather an additional allocation of budgetary resources in the year 2022, yet without there being an originating law that ordered the specific destination of previously established resources, and where a spirit of liberality on the part of the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement among the Presidents of the Supreme Branches.

This advisory unit considers that in this case, the criteria of interpretation of Article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration and of the Civil Code should be applied, which provide:

"Artículo 10.- 1. The administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, with due respect for the rights and interests of the individual. 2. It must be interpreted and integrated taking into account other related norms and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers." "ARTÍCULO 10.- Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose." It is reiterated in this sense that it would not be logical to interpret an Ordinary Budget Law in the sense that duly foreseen budgetary resources could not be executed, or that if the respective plan were partially implemented in the preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, the human resources could be left idle afterwards on the presumption that they cannot exercise jurisdictional or para-jurisdictional functions because Ley 9481 is not in force, when the same law contemplates that in the future, judicial servants may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases, and the Budget Law does not condition execution in the year 2022 on its entry into force.

V.- Conclusions:

In accordance with the foregoing considerations, this advisory unit believes that the following can be concluded:

I.- The 2022 budget execution, and therefore the entire roster of positions (relación de puestos) related to the positions referred to in the Contingency Plan under analysis, cannot be understood as conditioned upon the entry into force of Ley 9481 itself, given that it is governed by the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic for that year, which does not contemplate any condition or limitation based on the entry into force of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime. It is thus that the execution of said 2022 resources will be based on the Ordinary Budget Law and not on a law that is not yet in force and that cannot limit the 2022 budget execution.

II.- The resources contributed to the 2022 ordinary budget project by official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, cannot be understood as a specific destination, given that there is no originating law that ordered the specific destination of previously established resources, but rather a spirit of liberality on the part of the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement among the Presidents of the Supreme Branches.

III.- In any case, it must be understood that based on the agreement of the Presidents of the Supreme Branches mentioned in official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, by the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency, and in this last administrative act, the resources assigned by modification of the 2022 ordinary budget project were not exclusively foreseen for the execution of the respective law, but also for any preparatory act for its entry into force according to science, technique, logic, and experience, and so that the law's effects are in accordance with the principles of public service, ensuring continuity of service.

IV.- Additionally, it must be understood that as long as it is within the same budget program, nothing prevents the exercise of legitimate ius variandi by the Consejo Superior, as part of the powers assigned by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, given that the ordinary budget 2022 does not contemplate conditions regarding its use and destination, and there is no law creating a specific destination.

IV.- For greater security of the Consejo Superior, we recommend that the respective agreement state the following:

• Order that the resources contemplated in the roster of positions (relación de puestos) and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal primarily be used, in the first place, for all the necessary actions for preparing for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction.

• Order that once the respective human resources participate in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, they be assigned primarily to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently effective regulations.

• Order that in the event that within the respective territorial competence there are no organized crime cases or they are being processed, they may be employed temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of ius variandi, for handling ordinary matters, according to the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the jurisdictional rules of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Criminal Procedure Code, understanding the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of ius variandi regarding the rights of servants, non-affectation of the public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality.

V.- In accordance with the foregoing, the legal possibility is concluded of temporarily using the positions contemplated in the 2022 roster of positions (relación de puestos) granted by the modification of positions made based on official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, within the framework of the very content of the ordinary budget 2022 and given that there is no condition or limitation therein regarding their use.

VI.- The justification for the administrative decision adopted by the Consejo Superior will be based on the considerations and proposals of the respective Contingency Plan, it being thus that the corresponding Jurisdictional Commission will be responsible for the monitoring and control of its execution according to the terms presented and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter." From the foregoing, it is deduced that the budgetary resources were assigned so that the specialized jurisdiction could handle both specialized proceedings and ordinary ones, just as was provided by the legislator, safeguarding the principles of public service and ensuring continuity of service, especially concerning a matter that has generated great social impact in recent years, such as Organized Crime offenses, and where it is known to the entire population that the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive Branches are working diligently on proposing legal reforms to adapt the justice system so that these types of crimes can be confronted with the best legal tools.

Finally, the Constitutional Chamber, in reiterated rulings, has referred to the powers of the ordinary legislator to define the competencies of judicial officers, which "constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative organ known as the 'legislator's free configuration' (libre configuración del legislador)," also called "free legislative design (libre diseño legislativo)." Thus, in ruling number 2017-4005, of ten hours and forty minutes of the fifteenth of March, two thousand seventeen, the following was indicated: "Now then, the fact that the ordinary legislator has chosen to provide the questioned procedure for the substitution of judges constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative organ known as the 'legislator's free configuration' (libre configuración del legislador), also denominated 'free legislative design' (libre diseño legislativo) or 'legislative discretion.' For example, in ruling number 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours of June 11, 2003, it was stated that: 'The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys ample freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program fixed by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the normed matter has also been denominated legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this organ has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as a limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality made up of the precepts and constitutional customs, values and principles - among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out - of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases'. For this Tribunal, the legislative discretion applied to the sub iudice reaches and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered" (ruling 13-011706 of 11:44 hrs of August 30, 2013).

It is necessary to indicate that, stricto sensu, the principle of the natural judge results in the impossibility of being subjected to a proceeding before an authority who is not a judge or who lacks competence to resolve a specific cause, and that the competence of judges and courts is previously established by law, which is fully present in the proceeding where the consultation is raised, without it being possible to derive other effects that prevent the hearing of cases by competent judges formally designated as such by a firm and effective act.

In accordance with the foregoing, the question has no reason to exist, given that the respective cases will be heard by competent, independent, and impartial judges, as evidenced by Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, insofar as it establishes: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." On this subject, Luigi Ferrajoli has indicated: "(…) while the legal pre-constitution of the judge and the inalterability of competencies are guarantees of impartiality, being aimed at preventing instrumental interventions of an individual or general character upon the formation of the judge, the prohibition of special and extraordinary judges is, above all, a guarantee of equality, satisfying the right of all to have the same judges and the same processes." It is not noted that the norms and provisions subject to consultation are contrary to these considerations, and instead, they are consistent, even with the precedents of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the subject, in that this jurisdictional organ has indicated: "It constitutes a basic principle relating to the independence of the judiciary that every person has the right to be judged by ordinary courts of justice in accordance with legally established procedures. The State must not create 'courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to substitute the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to the ordinary courts.'" Case Lori Berenson Mejía Vs. Perú. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. "The State must not create courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to substitute the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to the ordinary courts. This seeks to prevent persons from being judged by special courts, created for the case, or ad hoc." Case Apitz Barbera et al. Vs. Venezuela.

August 5, 2008.

It cites Voto N°1739-1992 of 11:45 a.m. on June 1, 1992, regarding the right to a regular judge:

If, then, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence consists of the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, severity or amount, territory, and level, both jurisdiction—general or by subject matter—and competence are part of due process, since they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by the regular courts, in the aforementioned manner." In a complementary manner, Voto Nº2020-001312 of 9:20 a.m. on January 22, 2020, from that same Chamber, held:

*“In relation to the principle of Natural Judge, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process, presupposes the existence of judicial bodies pre-established permanently by law. Through this principle, the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special ones, to judge specific events or specific persons, without the generality and permanence inherent to judicial courts, is protected. “* It concludes that, in the cases in question, we are not dealing with instances of judges appointed ex professo or ad hoc for specific persons, and what is contemplated in the challenged regulations responds to aspects inherent to the administrative order, in accordance with the objective circumstances considered therein and the need to attend to the justice administration service in the current historical juncture, and on the understanding that the hearing of ordinary jurisdiction cases by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction is provided for by law, in such a way that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific case; rather, the hearing of the proceeding remains in the hands of a Criminal Judge, providing the adequate guarantees indicated ut supra. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is not observed, nor do the petitioners indicate, that the challenged provisions have affected the procedural guarantees held by the parties, have modified the relevant procedural regulations to their detriment, or have per se violated due process regarding their legitimate exercise of the right of defense and hearing, given that the respective processing and resolution of the proceedings will be common to any other proceeding regulated by the procedural rules applicable to criminal matters.

**12.-** By resolution issued at 1:54 p.m. on June 19, 2024, the president of the Chamber deemed the hearings granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the president of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial to have been answered, and forwarded the judicial consultation to the office of the reporting magistrate.

**13.-** By resolution of the investigating magistrate at 3:35 p.m. on July 17, 2024, the material error was corrected that, due to a defect in the electronic system, was contained in the resolution issued at 1:37 p.m. on July 17, 2024, in the sense that it orders, as evidence for a better resolution, the executive director of the Poder Judicial to indicate the date from which the necessary resources for the implementation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada were received by that Branch.

**14.-** By document incorporated into the electronic file on July 24, 2024, Ana Eugenia Romero Jenkins, **Executive Director of the Poder Judicial**, reports that, as indicated in the report from the Dirección de Planificación No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024, the date on which the resources were assigned to the Poder Judicial to implement said Specialized Jurisdiction (Law No. 9481) was starting with the ordinary budget for the year 2022, in which, through Motion 15 approved in the Consecutive meeting of the Comisión de Hacendarios 36, of October 14, 2021, which forms part of the Budget Law 2022 (Law No. 10103 of November 30, 2021, published in Alcance 249 to La Gaceta 235, of December 7, 2021), the Asamblea Legislativa authorized the Poder Judicial to include an amount of ₡2,900 million, which enabled the implementation process of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada to begin. (See attached certification). From the indicated official communication, the following is textually extracted: “*The authorized amount allowed covering the costs corresponding to 413 positions for the implementation of the JEDO on a proportional basis according to their start date, of which 402 are ordinary and 11 are extraordinary. Of this total, 394 positions were projected for two months *(November and December 2022), while 4 positions were projected for 4 months and finally, 15 positions were budgeted for 12 months.* Furthermore, within the authorized budgetary amount, the expense corresponding to computer equipment was included.*” The underlining and bold text are not part of the original document. Likewise, through official communication No. 407-PLA-2023 dated May 12, 2023 (attached), the Dirección de Planificación of the Poder Judicial certifies that through the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para el Ejercicio Económico del 2023, Law No. 10331 published in Alcance Digital No. 267 to La Gaceta No. 235 of December 9, 2022, and its amendments; budgetary content was granted to the Poder Judicial for the preparation and implementation of the law for the Creation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481. In this regard, through official communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 indicated above, the Dirección de Planificación noted that resources in the sum of ₡15,583 million colones were assigned for this 2023 period, which allowed covering the investment for positions and operational expenses. The detail of the budgetary financing for Law 9481 for the implementation of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada can be seen in official communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024, attached.

**15.-** The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Written by Magistrate **Hess Herrera**; and, **Considering:** **I.- AS A PRELIMINARY MATTER. -** Because they participated in the adoption of the agreement of the Corte Suprema de Justicia of January 30, 2023, session No. 003-2023, article VIII, Magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas recused themselves from hearing this matter, a motion that was rejected by resolution issued at 2:44 p.m. on May 24, 2024, by the acting president of the Chamber. Even though Magistrate Araya García and alternate Magistrate Aracelly Pacheco Salazar also formed part of the Court at the time of the adoption of the aforementioned agreement, they did not file a recusal at that time, as they were not forming part of the Tribunal, the former due to incapacity and the latter because she was not designated then. However, in application of the principles pro sentencia and procedural economy (economía procesal), express record is left that they are enabled to hear this matter, as it concerns the same reasons set forth by the indicated proprietary magistrates, which were duly denied as grounds for being separated from hearing the consultation.

**II.- ADMISSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.** Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations; a provision from which some conditioning and fundamental elements for its admissibility can be derived: that it be formulated by a judge; that there exist "founded doubts" regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; that there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied, or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. Such prerequisites were analyzed in detail in judgment No. 01617-97 of this Chamber, at 2:54 p.m. on March 17, 1997, in the following manner:

*“a. that it be formulated by a "judge," a generic term that—of course—applies both to single-member judges and to collegiate courts, and about which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative courts, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that it involves the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since it could hardly be thought that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).* *b. that there exist "founded doubts" regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged, this means that the questioning must be reasonable and considered; it also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also since a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be highlighted, given its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional review (by way of an acción or consulta), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because—in this case—there always exists the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps via amparo or hábeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist regarding the constitutionality of the very norm on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.* *c. that there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. As in the acción de inconstitucionalidad, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called "preliminary" or "principal" matter. Finally,* *d. that, in that preliminary matter, the norm must be applied, or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that—due to its relevance for the case—it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression "must apply the norm or judge the act, conduct, or omission" carries a very defined present meaning and is totally different from if the law were to speak in terms of "may apply the norm or judge the act, conduct, or omission." The judicial consultation is not appropriate before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since—as explained above—this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for them.”* Likewise, article 104 of the same law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within the third day, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended until the Chamber has evacuated the consultation.

**III.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS CONSULTATION.** The consultation is raised by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea seat, through Voto N°2024-462 of 11:30 a.m. on March 19, 2024, corrected by resolution N°2024-713 of 3:05 p.m. on April 29, 2024, issued in file number [Valor 001]. In that case, the Court hears, on appeal, resolution N°437-2023 of 2:22 p.m. on May 10, 2023, issued by the Tribunal Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, “Emerging” Section, an appeal that was admitted and is pending resolution. In the appeal, the defendant's private defense attorney alleges, as the first ground for challenge, the existence of a defective procedural activity due to an absolute defect and violation of the principle of the lawful or natural judge, because an ordinary process, in which a single person is charged with the retention of employer-employee contributions, was assigned to an emerging section of the Tribunal de Delincuencia Organizada and the prosecutor who appeared was designated for that type of matter, which demonstrates the creation of a special court for the case and consolidated *a posteriori*, which implies that the appointment and competence of the judges were not available to the parties to be consulted in a timely manner, but rather emerged after the consummation of the acts charged. It considers that there was a notable violation of criminal due process due to the constitution of an incompetent court, as it turned out to be a court appointed to hear a different nature of proceedings, such as the organized crime section, when internal and international norms indicate that the competent court must be pre-established before the facts. The norms whose constitutionality is challenged are articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, in addition to general provisions issued by the Consejo Superior, which, although they do not have to be applied directly by the consulting court, are related to the grounds and grievances raised by the appellant which it must resolve, since they establish rules of competence for the specialized organized crime jurisdiction, related to the ground of appeal raised. For all the foregoing, the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the II Judicial Circuit of San José has sufficient standing to formulate the consultation.

**IV.- NON-EVACUATION OF THE CONSULTATION REGARDING THE AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA IN AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON JANUARY 30, 2023, ACTA 003-2023, ARTICLE XVIII.** The indicated agreement, adopted by the Full Court, stipulates the following:

*“(…) 2) To accept what was requested by the Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, forwarded through official communication N°S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: To vary the territorial competence (competencia territorial) of the two sections assigned to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, which at this time have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that starting from February 2023, they hear all matters assigned to the different sentence appeals courts in the country, starting with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts in the country, while the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada officially begins to operate. 3.) The Secretaría General de la Corte will take note for the publication of the corresponding circular. Declared a final agreement.”* First of all, it must be indicated that according to the provisions of numeral 108 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the provisions on the legislative consultation of constitutionality and those provided for the acción de inconstitucionalidad are supplementary applicable to the judicial consultation of constitutionality. In the present matter, the Chamber considers that the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the II Judicial Circuit of San José does not have standing to consult on the constitutionality of the agreement of the Full Court, since what was ordered therein does not form part of the objections contained in the appeal that it must resolve and which motivate the formulation of the consultation. The decision adopted by the Court consists of varying the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, so that, starting from February 2023, they hear all matters assigned to the different sentence appeals courts in the country, starting with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts, while the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada officially begins to operate. It should be remembered that what is pending resolution is an appeal against the conviction sentence issued by the Tribunal Penal of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, in an ordinary criminal matter, so the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality of the consulted agreement would have no incidence whatsoever in the matter that the consulting court must resolve, which questions the norms and provisions that support the competence of the sentencing court —the Tribunal Penal of the Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada of San José—. For the indicated reasons, regarding the referred agreement of the Full Court, the consultation is declared non-evacuable.

**V.- NON-EVACUATION OF THE CONSULTATION ON THE AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CONSEJO SUPERIOR DEL PODER JUDICIAL, IN SESSION NUMBER 48-2023, HELD ON JUNE 8, 2023, ARTICLE LXXI.** The challenged agreement authorized the publication of the circular called *“Issuance of directives on practical rules and new processing method of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”*, Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, published in the Boletín Judicial number 119 of July 3, 2023.

*“**CIRCULAR No. 137-2023**_* *_**Subject**: “Issuance of directives on practical rules and new processing method of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”.* TO ALL JUDICIAL OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

BE ADVISED THAT:

This Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommission on Organized Crime, makes known the practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime:

"Practical Rules **On the competence of the JEDO offices:** With the entry into force of Law No. 9481 on the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, as well as Law No. 10369, Reform of Law 7333, the Organic Law of the Judiciary, of May 5, 1993, and reform of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, of May 30, 2023:

1- Matters of organized crime or organized criminality may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or, alternatively, in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime.

2- Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be heard by the ordinary criminal judges (juzgados penales), criminal trial courts (tribunales penales), and criminal sentence appeals courts (tribunales de apelación de sentencia penal) throughout the country.

3- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may hear matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481.

4- Matters submitted for the hearing of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may be brought before the Criminal Judge, the Criminal Trial Court, and the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, as applicable. They shall hear the criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related crimes. Its seat shall be in San José, as well as in the locations and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and it shall have competence over the entire national territory.

**5- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime shall have national-level competence to perform duties within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.** 6- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may hear all organized crime cases for which, at the time of commencement of functions, the person holding the office of Attorney General of the Republic or the person holding the office of Deputy Attorney General (due to the impossibility of the former), requests the competent jurisdictional authority of the JEDO, according to the procedural stage in which the matter is found, to assume jurisdiction of these, upon prior verification of the legal requirements.

7- In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Law 10369, which amends Transitional Provision II of Law 9481, the procedural deadlines established in Article 10 of Law 9481 shall be applicable to organized crime matters that are currently being processed, without the need for an additional jurisdictional resolution. The jurisdictional authorities who have persons subject to any precautionary measure under their order shall, on their own motion or at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, readjust the deadlines as appropriate, by means of a reasoned resolution.

8- Competence to hear the appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) and the special review procedure corresponds to the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice.

**9- In order to guarantee an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, from the commencement of their functions and until it is deemed necessary, shall also perform duties of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.** 10- When circumstances warrant and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform duties in processes of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.

**On the processing of the file in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime:** 1- All processes that are likely to be heard in the new jurisdiction, for which it is deemed appropriate for the Public Prosecutor's Office to request the specialized criminal judge in organized crime to assume jurisdiction thereof, must be processed 100% electronically, through the use of the virtual desktop, the electronic file, and online case management for users.

**2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime shall follow the processing method of the office of origin, meaning that if it has been processed physically, it shall continue in that manner until its conclusion.** **3- Ordinary cases heard by the JEDO shall continue their processing according to the state in which they are assumed until their execution. They shall be returned to the office of origin once they are completely ready for archiving.** Mandatory use of the identification card for officials and employees of JEDO.

The use of the identification card is mandatory for officials and employees working in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, which must be worn in a visible place and used to access the different spaces that require electronic control.

The use of the identification card is personal, as is the responsibility to immediately inform the Security Department of the Judiciary in the event of deterioration, theft, or loss.

Access to the different offices, as well as courtrooms and, in general, to the facilities housing the JEDO that require electronic control, must be made using the identification card.

In the event of forgetfulness, theft, or loss (once such circumstance has been duly reported), a day pass must be requested from the Department of Security for the purpose of facilitating access by electronic means to the various spaces that require it, which will also be for personal use and will be under the responsibility of the official or employee to whom it is granted.

Provisions on documents to be backed up in a physical file (legajo físico) and other operational aspects:

1- For the purpose of creating the physical file to be used by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción de Delincuencia Organizada, JEDO) as a backup, considering that the processing will be 100% electronic, which includes the digital case file (expediente digital), the use of the virtual desktop, and online processing, among other characteristics inherent to the electronic case file (expediente electrónico), the documents that must be backed up in physical form are the following:

PREPARATORY STAGE (ETAPA PREPARATORIA):

- The investigative statement (declaración indagatoria). - The resolution that first imposes pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) or less burdensome precautionary measures (medidas cautelares). - The subsequent resolutions that extend, vary, or order the cessation of a precautionary measure. - The interlocutory appeal resolutions that rule on the precautionary measure. - The resolution ordering the intervention of private communications, its extensions, and the one ordering its cessation (levantamiento). - Detention Order (Tener a la Orden), Release Order (Orden de Libertad), Remands of detainees (Remisiones de detenidos) (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and are printed forms). - The search, registration, and seizure warrant (orden de allanamiento, registro y secuestro). - The order decreeing the lifting of bank secrecy (levantamiento del secreto bancario) and its subsequent extensions. - The dismissal (desestimación). - The definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo). - The request for international cooperation for obtaining evidence and the communications from the requested international authority. - The international capture order (orden de captura internacional). - The extradition request from the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the resolution requiring active extradition, and the various resolutions of the requested country (these documents may also pertain to other stages of the process). - The documentation concerning the notification of the detention of a foreigner to the consulate of their country of nationality. - Resolution deciding on the Public Prosecutor's Office's request for the specialized criminal court for organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case (se arrogue el conocimiento de la causa). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (prescripción) (for example: hearing dates (señalamientos), declarations of default (rebeldías), lifting of a declaration of default (levantamiento de rebeldía), prejudiciality (prejudicialidad), etc.)

INTERMEDIATE STAGE (ETAPA INTERMEDIA):

- The accusation and request for opening of trial (acusación y solicitud de apertura a juicio). - The criminal complaint (querella) and civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). - The minutes of the preliminary hearing (acta de la audiencia preliminar). - The provisional or definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento provisional o definitivo). - The order for opening of trial (auto de apertura a juicio). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: hearing dates, declarations of default, lifting of a declaration of default, prejudiciality, etc.)

TRIAL STAGE (ETAPA DE JUICIO):

- The minutes documenting the application of the special abbreviated procedure (procedimiento especial abreviado) (if applicable). - The trial transcripts (actas del debate). - The definitive dismissal. - The judgment (sentencia). - The resolutions processing appeals (recursos), such as hearings or summons (emplazamientos). - Detention Order, Release Order, Remands of detainees (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and are printed forms). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: hearing dates, declarations of default, lifting of a declaration of default, prejudiciality, etc.) - Resolution of interlocutory appeals (such as those concerning precautionary measures, the resolution deciding on the Public Prosecutor's Office's request for the specialized criminal court for organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case, enforcement (ejecución), etc.).

SENTENCE APPEAL (APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA):

- Extensions of pretrial detention or house arrest with electronic monitoring, or their denial. - The ruling (voto) deciding on the admissibility of the appeal or admitting evidence to be presented in an oral hearing. - The ruling deciding on the sentence appeal.

CASSATION (CASACIÓN):

- The ruling deciding on the admissibility of the appeal or admitting evidence to be presented in an oral hearing. - The ruling deciding on the appeal.

REVIEW (REVISIÓN):

- The ruling deciding on the admissibility of the review procedure. - The ruling deciding on the merits of the review procedure.

SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT STAGE (ETAPA DE EJECUCIÓN DE SENTENCIA):

- The court order for the calculation of the sentence (auto de liquidación de pena). - The resolutions on enforcement incidents (incidentes de ejecución) (interlocutory appeal).

2- Regarding those resolutions issued orally, the judging persons are reminded that the minutes documenting them must contain, in addition to the requirements established by article 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), also the recommendations established by the subcommittee on orality, with special emphasis on containing necessary data such as the parties and other participants, the statement of proven and unproven facts—if any—, the indication of the admitted evidence (depending on the type of hearing and resolution in question), and the complete transcription of the operative part (parte dispositiva).

3- To guarantee the traceability of the backup file (legajo de respaldo), it will begin to be created during the preparatory stage by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and in the successive stages, or when the intervention of a jurisdictional body is necessary, the latter will complete the file with the corresponding resolutions according to the established parameters.

4- It is the duty of each judicial office or department to make the respective change of location in the Management System or Virtual Desktop once the file (backup material) enters and leaves.

5- Once the process is concluded, the custody of said file will correspond to the Criminal Court JEDO, just as is currently done by offices using physical case files.

6- It must be borne in mind that this is a security backup; however, the only valid form of processing for the office and the procedural parties will be the electronic one.

7- It must be taken into account that this is a backup for the exclusive use of judicial offices and departments, which may not be provided to the parties as a case file, because the official form of processing will be electronic.” In accordance with circular No. 67-09 issued by the Court Secretariat on June 22, 2009, it is communicated that by virtue of the principle of gratuity that governs this matter, the publication is exempt from all payment of fees.

Publish once in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial).” San José, June 14, 2023.

Lic. Carlos T. Mora Rodríguez Acting Deputy General Secretary Supreme Court of Justice” If it is taken into consideration that resolution No. 437-2023 of 2:22 p.m. on May 10, 2023, of the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Emergent Section, is prior to the adoption of this circular, the necessary temporal link between the two acts that would allow examining the constitutionality of the circular in question in this consultation does not exist. In other words, if the constitutional doubt of the consulting court has as its point of reference the issuance of the indicated judgment of May 10, 2023, at that time the Superior Council had not yet issued the circular, so it is chronologically impossible for it to have influenced the jurisdictional act on which the consultation is based. Consequently, the consultation is unevaluable with regard to the act issued by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023.

VI.- Object of the consultation. The court raises doubts about the constitutionality of articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), (the latter, added by article 18 of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, reformed by article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

The consulted provisions are transcribed in full, below, for better understanding:

ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIARY, LAW NO. 7333, of May 5, 1993:

A.- "Article 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning the reallocation of competences (recargo de competencias), the transfer and conversion of judicial offices and of positions or posts, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads.

By reason of the volume of work and the obligatory efficiency of the public service of justice, the Court may appoint more members of the courts, on a temporary or permanent basis; it may also open and close - for those same reasons - new offices and bodies attached to the courts, in any part of the country.

In mixed courts (tribunales mixtos), the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the justice administration services are specialized. When the needs of the service so require, the Court may divide a mixed court into specialized courts.

When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial body, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other servants, to travel to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency.” (Thus reformed by article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

B.- "Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:

1.- To inform the other Branches of the State in matters in which the Constitution or the laws determine that it be consulted, and to issue its opinion, when required, regarding reform projects to codified legislation or those affecting the organization or functioning of the Judiciary.

2.- To propose the legislative and regulatory reforms it deems convenient to improve the administration of justice.

3.- To approve the draft budget of the Judiciary, which, once enacted by the Legislative Assembly, it may execute through the Council.

4.- To appoint the proprietary and alternate members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones).

5.- To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction (competencias) that arise between the Chambers of the Court, except as provided by law regarding the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).

6.- To designate, in public voting, the president and vice-president of the Court, for periods of four years and two years, respectively, who may be reelected for equal periods and, if they must be replaced for any cause, the appointed person shall serve a new full period. In cases of temporary absences, the procedure indicated in subsection 1) of article 32 shall be followed. (The previous subsection thus reformed by the sole article of the Law to guarantee transparency in the votes of the Judiciary, No. 10325 of November 9, 2022) 7.- To promulgate, on its own initiative or upon the proposal of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the internal regulations of order and service it deems pertinent.

8.- To hear the appeal of sentence, cassation, and the procedure for review of sentences issued by the Second and Third Chambers, when these act as trial courts or single-instance courts.

(Thus amended the foregoing subparagraph by Article 5 of Law No. 9021 of January 3, 2012) 9.- To permanently appoint the members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), the inspector generals of the judicial inspection tribunal (tribunal de la inspección judicial), the cassation judges (jueces de casación) and those of the collegiate tribunals (tribunales colegiados), the Attorney General of the Republic, the Director and Deputy Director of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial); likewise, the head and deputy head of the Public Defense Service (Defensa Pública).

When dealing with officials appointed for a specific period, the Court must make the new appointment at the first ordinary session of December in which the period ends, and those appointed shall take office on the first working day of the following January.

The Court is also responsible for appointing the substitutes for the officials mentioned in this subparagraph.

10.- To hear the annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial).

11.- To assume jurisdiction (avocar) over the knowledge and decision of matters within the competence of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), when so ordered in a session convened at the request of five of its members or of its President, by a simple majority of the Court. From the moment the request for assumption of jurisdiction (avocamiento) is filed, the decision on the matter by the Superior Council of the Judiciary is suspended, while the Court does not rule, without prejudice to any precautionary measures ordered by the Court.

The Court shall have one month to resolve the matter it ordered to assume jurisdiction (avocar) over. In such a case, the exhaustion of administrative remedies (vía administrativa) shall occur upon notification of the final agreement of the Court. When ordering the assumption of jurisdiction (avocamiento), it may order the suspension of the effects of the Council's agreement.

12.- To exercise disciplinary authority over its own members and those of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in the manner provided in this Law.

13.- To establish the amounts for determining jurisdiction, based on the amount in dispute (cuantía), in all matters of a patrimonial nature.

14.- To establish the amounts for determining the admissibility of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación), by a minimum vote of two-thirds of the total number of Magistrates. This amount may be decreased or increased, once the period set forth herein has elapsed, for which purpose a report on the inflation index shall be previously requested from the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica).

If one month elapses without the report having been received, the Court shall dispense with it and make the corresponding determination. The determination made, both in this case and in that of the preceding subparagraph, shall take effect one month after its first publication in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), for a minimum period of two years.

15.- To propose to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) the creation of Judicial Offices (Despachos Judiciales) in the locations and subject matters it deems necessary for good public service.

16.- To merge two or more judicial offices (despachos judiciales) into a single one or to divide them, to transfer their seat, to set their respective territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction, taking into consideration the best public service.

It may also assign specialized jurisdiction to one or several offices, so that they hear specific matters, within the same subject matter, occurring in one or several districts or in the entire national territory.

17.- To hear the liability lawsuits filed against the Magistrates of the Court's Chambers (Salas de la Corte).

18.- To determine which working committees shall be permanent and to designate the Magistrates who will comprise them.

19.- To incorporate into the budget of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), by internal modification, all money it may receive from the liquidation or non-execution of contracts, interest, damages (daños y perjuicios), and from charges for document photocopying, microfilming, and similar services.

This money shall be deposited in the bank accounts of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial).

20.- To set the days and hours of service of judicial offices and to publish the respective notice in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial).

21.- To issue guidelines (directrices) on the scope of norms, when deemed necessary to make effective the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice (justicia pronta y cumplida).

22.- Others indicated by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and the laws.” C.- “Article 81.- The Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) is responsible for:

1.- Executing the administrative policy of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia).

2.- Appointing, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; transferring them, provisionally or definitively, suspending them, granting them leave with or without pay, and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President.

3.- Appointing interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is verified that the Offices (Despachos) are not up to date.

4.- Exercising disciplinary authority over judicial servants, in accordance with the law and without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Full Court (Corte Plena), the President of the Court, and the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial).

5.- Appointing interim officials to cover vacancies, including those of officials whose permanent appointment corresponds to the Court.

6.- Transferring, provisionally or definitively, suspending, granting leave with or without pay, removing, and reinstating, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial servants, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court.

7.- Approving or disapproving the appointment of subordinate personnel made by each administrative head in their respective Office (Despacho), department, or judicial office. In doing so, it shall verify that the appointment has conformed to the procedure established for this purpose in the Judicial Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Judicial).

8.- (Repealed by Article 23 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

9.- Resolving financial claims made against the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), under any heading, and ordering judicial servants to make reimbursements of funds as appropriate in accordance with the law.

10.- Resolving on bids (licitaciones) and requesting the Full Court (Corte Plena) to agree to the expropriations of real estate or the encumbrance of real rights (derechos reales) that are of interest to the Judiciary (Poder Judicial). Once the expropriation of real estate or the encumbrance of real rights is agreed upon, the Full Court shall publish the agreement in La Gaceta and forward the respective file to the Superior Council so that it may appoint one or more experts, as required, to render an appraisal of the real estate or encumbered real rights. The appraisal shall not take into account any potential surplus value arising from the construction of the work that motivates the expropriation or encumbrance of rights. Once the appraisal is rendered, it shall be made known to the interested parties, by personal notification or at their place of residence, so that they may state, within the following fifteen working days, whether they agree to transfer the real estate or real right in question, for the price indicated in the appraisal accepted by the Council; in which case they shall formalize the transfer before the State Notary's Office (Notaría del Estado), within the following three months.

If for any reason they do not agree to the transfer, the Council shall forward the administrative file, within the following ten working days, to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso-administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) that corresponds by rotation, so that it may initiate the judicial appraisal proceedings for expropriation, in accordance with the procedure contemplated in the Law on expropriations and encumbrance of real rights of the Judiciary (Ley de expropiaciones y afectación de derechos reales del Poder Judicial).

11.- Investing any surpluses that may arise, in accordance with what the Full Court (Corte Plena) orders, in the maintenance and construction of premises and in other items that warrant it.

12.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 13.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 14.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 15.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 16.- Directing, planning, organizing, and coordinating the administrative activities of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial) and proposing the corresponding regulations to the Court.

17.- Hearing and approving the preliminary draft of the Budget of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial).

18.- Granting leave with pay to judicial servants, to undertake studies or projects of interest to the Judiciary (Poder Judicial).

19.- Hearing on appeal (alzada), in cases established by law or regulation, matters resolved by the Executive Director or Deputy Executive Director.

20.- Hearing and approving the vacation schedule of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), with the exception of the vacation schedule of the Court's Chambers (Salas de la Corte).

21.- Issuing internal norms for the better performance of its functions, with the exception of regulations.

22.- Regulating the distribution of judicial matters among Offices (Despachos) of equal territorial jurisdiction, to achieve workload equalization.

23.- Other activities proper to its mission, in everything not expressly provided for in this Law.

24.- Any other attributed to it by law.

When doubt exists as to whether a matter is or is not within the competence of the Council, the latter shall resolve it, unless the conflict is with the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in which case the Court's resolution shall prevail; in both cases without any appeal (recurso). In any case, all the powers of the Council regarding judicial servants shall correspond to the Full Court (Corte Plena), when dealing with permanent or substitute Magistrates.” D.- “Article 101 bis.- To be a judge of the Specialized Organized Crime Court (Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and case-processing judge (juez tramitador) of the Specialized Organized Crime Criminal Tribunal (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Organized Crime Sentence Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada), whether permanent or substitute, the following is required:

1-) To be Costa Rican and in the exercise of citizen rights.

2-) To be at least thirty years of age.

3-) To hold the title of lawyer (abogado or abogada), legally recognized in the country.

4-) To have practiced as a legal professional in the auxiliary or jurisdictional spheres, in criminal matters, for a minimum of five years and to be eligible on the corresponding seniority list (escalafón).

5-) To have a permanent professional appointment status in the Judiciary (Poder Judicial).

6-) To possess specialized training in organized crime provided by the Judicial School (Escuela Judicial) or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Directorate (Dirección de Gestión Humana).

These judges shall earn a salary incentive compared to other judges of the same category.

To be a judge of the Specialized Organized Crime Criminal Tribunal (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction Sentence Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), whether permanent or substitute, the following is required:

1-) To be Costa Rican and in the exercise of citizen rights.

2-) To be at least thirty-five years of age.

3-) To hold the title of lawyer (abogado or abogada) legally recognized in the country.

4-) To have practiced as a legal professional in the auxiliary or jurisdictional spheres, in criminal matters, for a minimum of six years and to be eligible on the corresponding seniority list (escalafón).

5-) To have a permanent professional appointment status in the Judiciary (Poder Judicial).

6-) To possess specialized training in organized crime provided by the Judicial School (Escuela Judicial) or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Directorate (Dirección de Gestión Humana).

These judges shall earn a salary incentive compared to other judges of the Criminal Tribunal (Tribunal Penal) or the Sentence Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), depending on the case.

In the specialized jurisdiction, it is the responsibility of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) to appoint the judges of the Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal) and the case-processing judges (jueces tramitadores), and it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) to appoint the judges of the Criminal Tribunal (Tribunal Penal) and the Sentence Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia). The head of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the director of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), and the director of the Public Defense Service (Defensa Pública) shall, respectively, make the appointments of all professional, technical, and support personnel assigned to the scope of their competence, in said jurisdiction.

The Superior Council and the other directorates of the institution shall do likewise, in accordance with their appointment powers, for the remaining personnel designated as specialized in this jurisdiction. All appointments in this specialized jurisdiction shall be made for a period of up to eight years, without the possibility of reelection for the immediately following period. Once the appointment period ends, the personnel shall return to their permanent position. Their appointment may be extended for the time necessary to conclude ongoing procedural acts or other assignments under their charge, duly justified, or until the person who must assume the new period is appointed.

To serve in the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), it is necessary to hold a permanent appointment in the Judiciary (Poder Judicial) and to pass a rigorous recruitment and selection process, in accordance with the principle of proven suitability (idoneidad comprobada), conducted by the Human Resources Directorate (Dirección de Gestión Humana). Once the appointment in the specialized jurisdiction concludes, the official shall return to their permanent position.

All persons serving in the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) must be evaluated, at a minimum, every two years, by the Human Resources Directorate (Dirección de Gestión Humana), which shall be provided with the necessary personnel and budget, in order to verify that they maintain suitability (idoneidad) to perform the position, as established by the Judicial Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Judicial) and when exceptionally requested by any higher authority, or one responsible for supervising and ensuring compliance with duties of probity; among them, heads of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), Public Defense Service (Defensa Pública), Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), Superior Council, Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), or the Compliance Office (Oficina de Cumplimiento). Unfavorable results of any suitability (idoneidad) evaluation to serve in the specialized jurisdiction shall be forwarded for the knowledge of the authority that made the appointment, which may, among other options, revoke the appointment in this jurisdiction and return the official to their permanent position. Upon the initiation of disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings, the respective head of the reported or investigated person may adopt as an administrative measure, duly justified, the return of the official to their permanent position, to continue with the processing of the respective proceeding.

While serving exclusively in the Specialized Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), those working in said jurisdiction shall earn a salary incentive.

If the sanction resulting from a disciplinary procedure is suspension, it must be served in the permanent position, without earning the aforementioned incentive.

Those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction will have special protection only when risk factors arise from the exercise of their functions that make it necessary, according to the respective technical studies.

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime will also carry out work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Likewise, when circumstances warrant and for specific proceedings, those serving in the ordinary jurisdiction may carry out work in cases of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.

(Thus added by Article 18 of the Law Creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, No. 9481 of September 13, 2017) (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

VII.- ON THE GUARANTEE OF THE NATURAL JUDGE. The principle of the natural judge is enshrined in Article 35 of the Political Constitution, which provides:

"Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the courts established in accordance with this Constitution. Article 35 guarantees the right that no case may be judged except by a 'competent authority'" In the American Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee under discussion is contained in Article 8.1, which establishes:

"Article 8. Judicial Guarantees 1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against him, or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature (...)" In this regard, the landmark judgment of this Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-1992 of 11:45 hours on June 1, 1992, on due process, stated:

"THE RIGHT TO A REGULAR JUDGE:

This right, which in the Anglo-American tradition has developed as the so-called 'right to a natural judge,' but with very specific profiles that do not correspond to those of our Latin law - since it includes, for example, the right to the judge of one's domicile and, above all, to trial by one's peers which is expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in Roman-Germanic tradition systems have rather produced negative experiences - is embodied in our Constitution especially in Article 35, according to which:

'Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the courts established in accordance with this Constitution.' This principle, which we have called the 'regular judge,' is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152, and 153 and, as applicable, 10, 48, and 49, from which it clearly results, as stated supra, the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the courts dependent on the Judicial Branch, as well as with that of Article 39, in which it must be understood that the 'competent authority' is necessarily the judicial and ordinary authority, the latter because the transcribed Article 35 excludes any possibility of trial by special courts for the case or for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust in the sphere of the Judicial Branch any possibility of creating courts 'established in accordance with this Constitution,' with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for electoral contentious matters.

If, then, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, severity or amount, territory, and procedural stage, both jurisdiction - general or by subject matter - and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by regular courts, in the said manner." Likewise, this Constitutional Tribunal, in Judgment No. 6701-93 of 15:06 hours on December 21, 1993, referred to this guarantee in the following terms:

"The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the 'natural judge' principle is as legal judge, that is, as a 'body' created by law according to the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for that purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, as a principle, of having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact) bodies, or special bodies, to judge certain acts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts. Ultimately, what is sought is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the court, preventing it from being created or chosen by some authority once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not occur in the case under review." (reiterated in Judgments number 000009-94 of 14 hours 54 minutes on January 4, 1994, and 2000-08763 of 15 hours 06 minutes on October 4, 2000).

More recently, in Judgment No. 2020001312 of 9:20 hours on January 22, 2020, the Tribunal held:

"In relation to the principle of the Natural Judge, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process, presupposes the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. What is protected through this principle is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact) bodies, or special bodies, to judge certain acts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts." Thus, the principle of the natural judge or ordinary judge guarantees that a person may only be judged by those courts that have been previously constituted by law, prohibiting the creation of ad-hoc or special bodies to judge specific acts or persons in a concrete manner.

This principle has also been amply protected by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, specifically, in the judgment of November 17, 2009, Case of Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela, it was held, in relevant part:

"75. Article 8.1 of the Convention guarantees the right to be tried by 'a competent court [...] previously established by law,' a provision that relates to the concept of natural judge, one of the guarantees of due process, which has even been recognized by a certain sector of doctrine as a prerequisite thereof. This implies that persons have the right to be tried, in general, by ordinary courts, in accordance with legally established procedures.

76. The natural judge derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, conforming to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.' Consequently, in a State governed by the rule of law, only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." In this way, the creation of the Courts of Justice and the granting of the competence of each one of them is a matter reserved to the law, so only the Legislative Branch can regulate it.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has specified that this right constitutes "a basic principle of due process" (I/A Court H.R. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. vs. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999, and Case of Radilla Pacheco vs. Mexico. Judgment of November 23, 2009) related to the concept of natural judge, which implies that "persons have the right to be tried, in general, by ordinary courts, in accordance with legally established procedures" established prior to the facts subject to trial. Said natural judge "derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, conforming to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the Constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.'" Consequently, in a State governed by the rule of law, "only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." Thus, for example, the Court has declared the international responsibility of a State when it created ad hoc Chambers and Courts and appointed judges to integrate them, at the time when the facts of the case were occurring (I/A Court H.R. Case of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74. para. 114).

It is also pertinent to return to the citations of the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, invoked by the consulting Tribunal and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, where it has been indicated that the constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law "requires, first, that the judicial body has been previously created by the legal norm, that this norm has invested it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the event motivating the judicial proceeding, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be classified as special or exceptional" (STC 47/83 Case Serena). Thus, "the legal predetermination of the judge means that the law, with generality and prior to the case, must contain the criteria for determining competence whose application to each litigious case allows determining which is the judge or court called to hear the case. The generality of the legal criteria guarantees the nonexistence of 'ad hoc' judges; the prior nature of such criteria with respect to the procedural filing of the litigation guarantees that once the judge of a case is determined concretely by virtue of the application of the competence criteria contained in the laws, the judge of the case cannot be dispossessed of its cognizance by virtue of decisions taken by governmental bodies" (STC 101/84, Case Naviera Aznar). It must be noted that the direct interest protected by the right to the ordinary judge predetermined is the impartiality of the judge. And, in turn, the impartiality of the judge forms part of the right to a trial with all guarantees recognized in numerals 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Hence, the other elements – ordinary nature and legal predetermination – are subordinated to that objective, and they make sense insofar as they allow its achievement (Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 2022007481 of 13:01 hours on March 30, 2022).

VIII.- ON THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATOR TO ESTABLISH THE COMPETENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL BODIES. - Articles 152 and 166 of the Political Constitution state:

"Article 152.- The Judicial Power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and by the other courts that the law establishes." "Article 166.- Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number and the duration of the courts, as well as their powers, the principles to which their acts must conform, and the manner of holding them accountable." From the cited norms, the exclusive power that the Legislative Branch possesses is derived to dictate the law creating Courts of Justice, as well as those necessary to regulate matters concerning their powers and their competence, a matter covered by legal reserve. Hence, the creation of Courts of Justice is an exclusive competence of the Legislative Branch. On the other hand, numeral 153 of the Political Constitution provides:

"Article 153: It corresponds to the Judicial Power, in addition to the functions that this Constitution assigns to it, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and administrative contentious cases as well as others that the law establishes, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; to resolve definitively upon them and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the aid of the public force if necessary." This provision grants full discretion to the legislator to create the courts through which the Judiciary exercises its function.

In the matter under analysis, it is necessary to refer to the law of "Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017.

"ARTICLE 1- Purpose. The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime is created, with competence in the investigation and trial of serious crimes committed by adults that meet the criteria provided in this law. The courts and tribunals that apply this law will extend their competence to the cognizance of related crimes with respect to which the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime assumes competence.

For the entire criminal legal system, organized crime shall be understood as any activity that meets the requirements and parameters provided in Articles 8 and 9 of this law." Article 2 defines its competence, in the following terms:

"ARTICLE 2- Competence. Matters of organized crime or organized criminality may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or alternatively, in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. Procedural acts issued in organized crime cases in the ordinary jurisdiction, before the entry into operation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, will maintain their efficacy and validity. For both jurisdictions, the normative in force in this matter applies, including Law 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009, unless expressly provided otherwise.

Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, will be of the cognizance of the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters will be of the cognizance of the ordinary criminal courts, criminal tribunals, and criminal sentence appeal tribunals throughout the country. Matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the cognizance of the Criminal Court, Criminal Tribunal, and Criminal Sentence Appeal Tribunal, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. They will hear the criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as the related crimes. Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they will have competence throughout the national territory. Furthermore, these offices will also have competence at a national level to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (...) (Thus amended by Article 2 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023) Likewise, Article 18 of Law No. 9481, "Additions," contemplates one of the provisions consulted by the tribunal, numeral 101 Bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which is transcribed, in relevant part:

"The following articles are added to Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993: articles 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis. The texts are the following:

(...) Article 101 bis- (...) Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime will also carry out work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019).

Now, as already indicated, the principle of the natural judge establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, pre-established by law, as happened with the creation of the aforementioned specialized jurisdiction, so that we are not before a jurisdictional body constituted ad hoc, but rather before courts of justice that were created through a law and whose competence has also been defined by the legislator, just as the principle of natural judge demands. The criminal judges of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, by legal mandate, have competence throughout the national territory to attend to matters of organized or ordinary crime. They were not designated for the specific case, but rather form part of the composition of a determined jurisdictional body whose competence has been legally defined, having to hear "ordinary and specialized proceedings" due to the requirement of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime - whose processing corresponds to the ordinary proceeding - was not judged under the specialized proceeding, but rather was simply processed by specialized judging persons applying the procedural law of the ordinary proceeding, a situation that in no way affects the legally defined competence.

It is reiterated that the challenged provisions do not contemplate judges named *ex proffeso* or *ad hoc* for specific persons; the questioned regulations respond to aspects inherent to the administrative order of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the objective assumptions considered therein and the need to attend to the justice administration service in the current historical juncture, and on the understanding that the hearing of cases from the ordinary jurisdiction by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction is provided for by law, such that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific assumption, but rather that the hearing of the proceeding remains in the hands of a Criminal Judge, in a process in which due process is guaranteed to the accused.

**IX.- NON-EXISTENCE OF A VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 121.20 AND 166 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** The Criminal Sentence Appeals Court also inquires whether articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the latter added and amended by the Law “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica,” Law N°9481 of September 13, 2017, Law N°9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law N°10369 of May 30, 2023, violate precepts 121 subsection 20) and 166 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it must be reiterated that the competence to hear matters of the ordinary jurisdiction was established by Law N°9481 creating the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, as mandated by the Political Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights, and both the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court. Far from violating the cited constitutional provisions, the truth of the matter is that the rules whose constitutionality is questioned fully comply with articles 121 subsection 20) and 166 of the Constitution, by regulating jurisdictional bodies and their competencies through provisions of legal rank. Therefore, articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the Law of the Constitution, and in that sense, the inquiry is answered.

**X.- CONCLUSION. -** Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the principle of Natural Judge (Juez Natural), protected in numerals 35 and 39 of the Political Constitution and 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, Record 003-2023 - Article XVIII, and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the inquiry is declared unanswerable (inevacuable).

**XI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.** The parties are forewarned that if any documents on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology-produced device have been provided, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all such material that is not retrieved within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic File before the Judicial Branch," approved by the Full Court in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Therefore:** The inquiry formulated by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea venue, is answered, in the sense that articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (the latter added and amended by the Law “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica,” Law N°9481 of September 13, 2017, Law N°9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law N°10369 of May 30, 2023) do not infringe upon the principle of Natural Judge (Juez Natural) nor articles 121 subsection 20 and 166 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in an extraordinary session on January 30, 2023, Record 003-2023 - Article XVIII, and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the inquiry is declared unanswerable (inevacuable). Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents with a separate opinion and declares the inquiry unanswerable (inevacuable). Let this pronouncement be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify the inquiring Court and the parties.

<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse" class="mce-item-table"><tbody><tr><td colspan="2" style="width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" style="width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" style="width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" style="width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Fernando Castillo V.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Presiding Magistrate</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; 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padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Paul Rueda L.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:16.1pt"><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Anamari Garro V.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Ingrid Hess H.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Aracelly Pacheco S.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Alexandra Alvarado P.</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table> **Exp. 24-008738-0007-CO** **Res. 2024021938** **DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL.** With the customary respect, I dissent based on the following reasons.

By resolution issued at 9:03 a.m. on April 26, 2024, the Presidency of this Court forewarned the inquiring judges as follows: “…*they must identify and specify, in a clear and duly individualized manner, which specific agreements of the Full Court (Corte Plena) are intended to be challenged in this inquiry*.” The warning is entirely pertinent, considering the formality of the judicial inquiry process, which includes the need to adequately identify the norm or provision whose constitutionality is questioned.

In addressing this warning, the inquiring court identified the agreement of the Superior Council, adopted in article LXXI of session no. 48-2023 of June 8, 2023, and the agreement of the Full Court (Corte Plena), adopted through article XVIII of the extraordinary session at 8:16 a.m. on January 30, 2023, record 003-2023. I note, with respect to the latter, that, according to official communication no. 81-2024 from the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, the undersigned did not participate in its approval, so there is no ground for me to recuse myself from hearing the *sub lite*.

Now then, I concur with the majority opinion when it declares the inquiry unanswerable (inevacuable) concerning the agreement of the Full Court (Corte Plena). Indeed, this applied to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, which is not the body that issued the appealed judgment in the underlying matter. Therefore, there is no connection between the latter and the challenged agreement.

I also share the majority's view that the inquiry is unanswerable (inevacuable) regarding the agreement of the Superior Council identified by the inquiring Court, since it postdates the issuance of the appealed judgment. An additional element confirms the thesis put forward. In response to a request from the inquiring court, the processing judge of the Criminal Court of San José indicated:

“*According to a consultation made with the coordination of this office as well as with the Specialized Criminal Court for Organized Crime, it is reported that the case [Value 001] was referred to said Court on February 7, 2023, <u>as part of the agreements taken by the Superior Council, on November 3 and 11, 2022</u>*.” (Underlining added).

Thus, it is clear that the agreements identified by the inquiring court do not have the necessary connection with the underlying matter.

Regarding articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, whose constitutionality is indeed analyzed by the majority of this Court, the undersigned objects to the admissibility of the inquiry on two grounds.

First, the inquiry resolution does not perform an analysis of each of them, seeking to contrast them with the constitutional framework, in order to demonstrate a legal antinomy. This requirement is indispensable for the admissibility of any inquiry.

Second, with respect to the cited articles 46, 59, and 81, I determine that they are jurisdictional norms which, for the purposes of the inquiry, should find their development in agreements of the Superior Council or the Full Court (Corte Plena), as the case may be, so that the requirement that the challenged provision be a “…*norm or act that must be applied, or an act, conduct, or omission that must be judged in a case submitted to its knowledge*” (canon 102 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction) is met. Such precepts state:

“*Article 46.- **The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the** establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning **the reallocation of competencies, the transfer and conversion of judicial offices and of posts or positions, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service**, the specialization of judicial organs and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads*…” (Emphasis in the inquiry).

“*Article 59.- The Supreme Court of Justice shall be responsible for:* (…)

*16.- Merging two or more judicial offices into a single one or dividing them, transferring their headquarters, **setting their respective territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction**, taking into consideration the best public service.* ***It may also assign specialized jurisdiction to one or several offices**, so that they hear specific matters, within the same subject-matter, occurring in one or several circumscriptions or throughout the entire national territory*.” (Emphasis in the inquiry).

“*Article 81.- The Superior Council of the Judicial Branch shall be responsible for:* (…)

*2.- Appointing, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; **transferring them, provisionally or definitively**, suspending them, granting them leave with or without pay, and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President*.” (Emphasis in the inquiry).

In other words, for the judicial inquiry not to be an abstract exercise (which would lead to its inadmissibility), the inquiring judges should have established the link between those articles of the Organic Law and the case submitted to their knowledge. Such connection was found, in the criteria of the inquirants, in the challenged agreements. However, given that the admissibility of those was discarded *ut supra*, the cited link was left without support.

Even, it is inferred from the consultation that the consulting office understands the nature of the jurisdictional norms and the need for an agreement that develops or relates them to the specific case, given that it establishes as its claim that “…the Constitutional Chamber determine whether articles 46, 59, 81 and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (…) and the agreements of the Full Court (…) that are supported by those and allow the transfer of case files…” (underline added).

Now, if the consulting authority intended to challenge the cited articles independently (without an agreement that develops them), then the inadmissibility due to the lack of adequate substantiation, as already stated, resurfaces, since a justification of its connection to the specific case would be lacking.

Finally, regarding canon 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it states in its relevant part:

“Article 101 bis- To be a judge of the Specialized Court for Organized Crime and a processing judge of the Specialized Criminal Trial Court for Organized Crime and of the Specialized Criminal Appeals Court for Organized Crime, whether full or substitute, requires:

(…)

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime will also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Similarly, when circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform work in cases of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, or the assignment of a post in that jurisdiction”. (Highlighted by the consultants).

This precept, unlike the previous ones, does not expressly assign powers to the Superior Council or the Full Court. However, in the sub examine, objections to admissibility persist. On the one hand, its link to the specific case is not clearly substantiated, as explained previously. On the other, I emphasize that this provision concerns those who “…serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime…” (underline added), which is not considered applicable to the base matter, given that such jurisdiction had not come into operation at the time of issuing the conviction judgment, so the judging person could not have been “serving” in that jurisdiction.

Given these flaws in the substantiation of the consultation, I consider it not possible to answer.

Paul Rueda L.

The natural judge derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the *“general legal norm, aimed at the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.”* Consequently, in a State governed by the Rule of Law, *only* *the Legislative Power can regulate, through laws, the competence of judges* (Judgment in the case of Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela of November 17, 1999). In the same way, that body has declared the international responsibility of a State when it created *ad hoc* Chambers and courts and designated judges to integrate them, at the same moment the facts of the case were occurring (Judgment in the case of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru of 02.06.2001, para. 114). At the domestic law level, Articles 35 and 39 of the Political Constitution allude to the fact that the criminal trial of a person can only be done by *“competent authority”*. The first of these provisions states: *“No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution.”* Likewise, Article 121.20 of the Political Constitution regulates, as an essential function of Congress: *“In addition to the other powers conferred upon it by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (…) 20) To create the courts of justice and the other bodies for the national service.”* and numeral 166 of the Political Constitution establishes: *“Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number, and the duration of the courts, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their acts, and the manner of demanding responsibility from them.”*. The competent authority is that which the law endows with functions according to subject matter, grade, functionally or objectively must decide the case, all rules that must be fixed prior to that particular matter (in the same sense, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2000-10822, No. 1739-92, No. 1422-95, No. 6701-93, No. 6992-96, No. 8738-97, and No. 2491-96, among others). The consulting court points out that, although the scope of the principle of the regular judge has traditionally been circumscribed to the prohibition of being judged by a judge specifically designated for the conflict or by a body outside the Judicial Power (extraordinary or ad hoc courts), its content was later expanded to the necessary legal pre-existence of the jurisdictional body with respect to the commission of the act (prohibition of ex post facto courts), an expansion that occurs through international human rights instruments which, insofar as they expand the catalog of human rights, have a rank equal to or higher than the Political Constitution as provided for in Articles 7 of the Political Constitution, 73 subsection d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and votes No. 3435-92, No. 2313-95, No. 1319-97, No. 4356-98, and No. 6830-98 of the Constitutional Chamber. The need for courts to exist prior to the commission of the facts has been accepted, in a practically unanimous manner, by the most authoritative doctrine (cites Maier, Julio, Cafferata Nores, José, Tiedemann, Klaus and Antillón Montealegre, Walter). Also, regarding the natural judge, the Spanish Constitutional Court has stated: *“The constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law requires, first, that the judicial body has been previously created by the legal norm, that it has invested it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act motivating the judicial action and process, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be qualified as a special or exceptional body.”* Spanish Constitutional Court, judgment 47/1983. In the same sense and from the same body, votes 102/2001, 170/2002. It also cites pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber (votes No. 2002-06223, No. 6701-93, and No. 2004-12629). According to this principle, then, once competence to hear a process is acquired, it is only lost due to causes pre-established in the law that seek to protect other principles of equal rank (such as impartiality, for example, through excusals or recusals). Now, as has been seen, constitutional and conventional norms and the jurisprudence of the courts that interpret them establish that competence is only acquired by law and that such competence must pre-exist the act being judged. Despite this, there are legal norms, whether prior to the Political Constitution of 1949, such as the Organic Law of the Judicial Power No. 8 issued on November 29, 1937, or subsequent to it, that transfer those powers that higher norms give to the law, to leave them in the hands of administrative bodies of the Judicial Power (Full Court, Superior Council), for which this court doubts whether such provisions imply a hollowing out of said guarantees. Cites Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power (LOPJ), reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997, partially transcribes numerals 59, 81 of the LOPJ, and fully transcribes numeral 101 bis., added by Article 18 of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023. The court indicates that in the present matter, the person was accused of withholding worker-employer contributions during the period from May to December 2017 and January to September 2018. This is a matter pertaining to the ordinary jurisdiction which, by territory, was processed in the ordinary Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, and there has never been, in this process, a declaration of organized crime, which would also not be possible since this requires at least two persons and the accusation against the defendant is individual. The Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime was created through Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017 (which, however, established its entry into force for one year later) and reformed through Law No. 9591 of July 24, 2018, Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023. As can be seen, all these provisions are subsequent to the accused facts. Despite this, this process was transferred from the court where it was located (by subject matter and territory) to the newly created Specialized Court in Organized Crime (of another specialized criminal subject matter and in another location), and this is evident from the heading of the challenged judgment (where the court is called an “emergent section”), from the date of that resolution (May 2023), and from the agreements of the Full Court (among them, the content in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the *“Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime”* that authorize transferring ordinary matters to that jurisdiction, which are complemented by the list of files transferred from the competent body to the newly created one). For all that has been said, there are well-founded doubts as to whether, allowing laws that create courts to be applied to facts that had already occurred, through administrative agreements of the Full Court, generates a violation of the constitutional and conventional principle of the regular, legal, or natural judge, in the modality of the need for a court pre-existing the acts judged. <span style="text-decoration:underline">On procedural matters.</span> The Court remits the matter to the Constitutional Chamber, summons the parties so that, within three days, they appear before said Chamber to express their allegations, convert – if they see fit – the consultation into an action of unconstitutionality, as established by Article 105 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and indicate a place or means within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José to receive their notifications, and suspends the processing of the process (and with it the statute of limitations of the criminal action) until the Constitutional Chamber evacuates this consultation (Articles 34 subsection a) of the Criminal Procedure Code and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

**2.-** In response to the summons conferred upon the parties in the main process, through a brief filed on April 4, 2024, Carlo Díaz Sánchez, Attorney General of the Republic, appears. He refers to the reason for the consultation, insofar as the appellant alleges the existence of a defective procedural activity due to an absolute defect and violation of the principle of the natural judge. Regarding the basis. **I. Principle of the natural judge in the Inter-American Human Rights system**, to which Costa Rica is a party, obliges States to comply with the provisions and resolutions emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, without placing their domestic law above the judgments issued by that high court. Cites numeral XXVI.II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 14.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and mentions numeral 8.1 of the CIDH. To substantiate the formation of a court with judges specialized in organized crime to hear common crimes, and that this does not contravene the principle of the legal or natural judge, as established in the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the following key elements must be analyzed:

**a)** The principle of the natural judge, which establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal pre-established by law; that is, that the judge or judges must be previously defined by the legal system without being constituted *ad hoc* for the specific case, as a fundamental guarantee for due process. In the case *sub examine*, the prosecution has been extensive in highlighting that the judges designated to hear the ordinary process in question were not appointed to hear the specific case, but rather their designation corresponds to a requirement of the justice system, which, moreover, is permitted within the regulations established for such effect. On the other hand, the Public Ministry considers that there is an error of prescriptive interpretation by the appellant regarding the need for courts to exist prior to the punishment of the facts. It is necessary to clarify that both the international conventions signed and the Costa Rican legal system indicate this obligation; and, certainly, the summary [Valor 001] was heard by a pre-constituted court, with the only variant that it was composed of judges specialized in organized crime, a matter that is also authorized by law. Under this reality, while it is true that the Law Against Organized Crime came into effect in September 2018, and the imputed facts correspond to May to December 2017 and January to September 2018, the truth is that crimes in the specialized subject matter were not judged, but rather they were heard and ruled upon by judges appointed in that specialty, a situation that does not limit the competence of those servants to hear ordinary cases. Thus, in no way is the principle of the natural judge transgressed, protected from the human rights instances, nor from its own.

**b)** Functioning of the judicial system in Costa Rica: In the Costa Rican judicial system, the appointment of judges specialized in organized crime responds to the need to more effectively confront certain cases that require specific knowledge. However, the fact that these judges can hear other types of cases, under circumstances of institutional necessity, is based on the flexibility of the system to ensure access to justice and judicial efficiency.

**c)** Applicability of the principle of the natural judge: The assignment of judges specialized in organized crime to cases of common crimes, in exceptional situations and under criteria of institutional necessity and urgency, does not necessarily contravene the principle of the natural judge. The core point in this type of matter is that the designation of this authority is provided for by the legal system, maintaining the criteria of competence, independence, and impartiality, and that it is not carried out for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the trial.

**II. On the principle of the natural judge in Costa Rica:** The Organic Law of the Judicial Power establishes norms relating to the conformation and integration of judicial offices and regulations related to the distribution of work, which admit that, under criteria of service efficiency, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads, they be conformed according to these circumstances. Furthermore, it provides for the possibility that the integration of the courts may be modified in accordance with what is indicated (cites Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power). Regarding the powers of the Superior Council of the Judicial Power, provided for in subsections 1 and 2 of Article 81 of the LOPJ, he points out that it is possible to affirm that the Superior Council has the power both to designate the officials who administer justice and to transfer them, provisionally or definitively, which evidences the powers to modify the work location of the same. The foregoing is observed in the decisions by which other competences are assigned to different judges, by reason of remedial plans, without affecting the principle of the natural judge.

Since the violation of the natural judge is claimed because this matter was heard by the Specialized Court, it is important to first define the term to determine if the alleged violation exists:

“III.- […] a.) On the principle of the natural judge. The guarantee of the natural judge has its basis in what is stipulated in numeral 35 of the Political Constitution, which textually states: “No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution […]” This constitutional precept establishes a protection for the citizen, so that they may only be judged by ordinary judges, designated in a regular manner and previously by the law itself. The Constitutional Chamber has given content to this constitutional principle through the highlighted resolution 1739-1992:

*“[…] C) THE RIGHT TO A REGULAR JUDGE: This right, which in the Anglo-North American tradition has been developed as the so-called 'right to a natural judge', but with very unique profiles that do not correspond to those of our Latin law -since it includes, for example, the right to the judge of the domicile and, above all, to trial by peers which is expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in the systems of the Roman-Germanic tradition have rather produced negative experiences-, in our Constitution is specifically enshrined in Article 35, which states: '[…] Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution […]'.* This principle, which we have called the 'regular judge', is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152, and 153 and, where applicable, 10, 48, and 49 of the Fundamental Charter, from which the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the courts dependent on the Judicial Power is clear, as well as with that of Article 39, from which it is inferred that the 'competent authority' is necessarily the judicial and ordinary authority, the latter because the transcribed Article 35 excludes any possibility of trial by special courts for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust in the sphere of the Judicial Power all possibility of creating courts 'established in accordance with this Constitution', with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for electoral contentious matters. In this way, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution that the law makes of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, gravity or amount, territory, and grade; both jurisdiction and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by the regular courts, in the manner stated (Chamber III of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 770 – 2019 of eleven hours thirty minutes on the twenty-first of June of two thousand nineteen).

See then that this competence by law must be defined, as has been indicated in the particular case, in the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. It is permitted then, by reason of interest, to modify these, attending to work distribution, service efficiency criteria, specialization of judicial bodies, and equity in workloads.

The principle of the natural judge is not violated then, and this has been recognized in other cases when it has been resolved: “[…] the legal reserve in the conformation and designation of judges has not been violated in this instance, because the Organic Law of the Judicial Power, as has been explained, contains express norms that provide for the conformation and integration of the different tribunals and courts, and precepts are also contemplated that regulate the distribution of work, which can even be modified by the superior bodies of the Judicial Power, namely, the Full Court and the Superior Council, attending to criteria of efficiency, specialization, and equity. On the other hand, regarding the functions proper to the Sentence Appeals Court, its competence and conformation is previously defined by Articles 93 and 93 bis, organized by sections composed of three judges, and making the exception that this will be 'according to the needs of the service [...]’ (Chamber III of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 2019-01171 of eleven hours ten minutes on the twentieth of September of two thousand nineteen.)

Finally, it must be indicated that Law No. 9481 for the “Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica”, underlines:

18.- Additions. […] Through this article, several articles are added to Law 7333, the Organic Law of the Judicial Power of May 5, 1993: 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis […]. (Reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019).

Numeral 101 (bis) of that same body of norms states: “[…] Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime shall also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine […]”.

Resting on the provisions of the indicated norms, it can be affirmed that the Superior Council of the Judicial Power, besides designating the officials who administer justice, can transfer them temporarily or definitively. And in the case of judges selected as specialized in Organized Crime, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Judicial Power (reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019), they are legitimized to perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction when institutional requirements so determine. Based on the powers conferred by law, in addition to the sessions of the Superior Council of the Judicial Power, the institutional requirements that determined the need for the Specialized Appeals Court in Organized Crime to collaborate in a remedial plan with different Criminal Sentence Appeals Courts, by reason of workloads, are derived. In session 098-2022 of November 11, 2022, Article II, it was agreed, after hearing legal criterion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, and receiving in audience Magistrate Sandra Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as coordinator of the Subcommission on Organized Crime, Master Roxana Arrieta Meléndez, Internal Director of Human Management, and Licentiate Olga Guerrero Córdoba, interim subdirector, the following: “[…] To have received criterion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what is indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Subcommission on Organized Crime, given that according to the criterion expressed, there is no legal impossibility to carry out the contingency plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime, in the terms that were proposed […]”. Finally, through session 112-2022 dated December 22, 2022, Article V, the Superior Council ordered: “[…] To have received Criterion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what is indicated: 1) To accept the request presented in official letter No. SCJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Subcommission on Organized Crime, given that according to the criterion expressed, there is no legal impossibility to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in the terms that are proposed: (…) However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently expired. 2.) The Subcommission on Organized Crime must: a) Provide that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the list of positions and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be designated primarily for all necessary actions for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Provide that once the respective human resource participates in the actions scheduled in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be designated primarily to the attention of organized crime matters under the currently valid regulations. c.) **Provide that in the event that in the respective territorial competence there are no organized crime cases or these are being processed, it may be used temporarily in legitimate exercise of the ius variandi for the attention of ordinary matters,** in accordance with the broad class to which the respective posts belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the rules of competence of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Criminal Procedure Code, understanding the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi regarding the rights of the servant persons, the non-affectation of the public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality. d.) It will be the responsibility of the Subcommission on Organized Crime to monitor and control its execution according to the terms outlined and the applicable administrative, labor, and criminal regulations.

3.) The Human Resources Directorate will clarify to the officials who would participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is contingent upon the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime, and therefore cannot be applied until it enters into force. This agreement is declared final […].” Regarding the standing that the high authorities of the Judicial Branch have to decide to modify competencies, based on an institutional interest, this can be observed in Article XXXIV of the Full Court session number 22-2022, of May sixteenth, two thousand twenty-two, where official communication No. 251-PLANI-2022, from the Planning Directorate, was considered, and regarding this, it was agreed to expand the competence of the Juvenile Criminal Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, so that for a period of six months, it could hear adult criminal appeal matters from the Santa Cruz Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court. The basis for these decisions is directly related to addressing contingency and remedial plans, the purpose of which is to collaborate with the decongestion of other Criminal Sentencing Appeals offices, thus responding to an institutional interest. It is for the foregoing that, it is considered that the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, having the authority and the legitimate reasons to temporarily vary the assignment of judges, as observed in the Full Court agreements, in strict respect of the cited norms, orders the handling of ordinary cases in order to collaborate with the remedial plan and workload afflicting the counterparts of the Specialized Organized Crime Court, under the cited conditions. It is not true, nor probable, that an “ad hoc” action was taken in the case at hand, or in any other case, since the hearing of cases by the Specialized Criminal Appeals Court for Organized Crime responds solely to an institutional interest and not to hear this specific case, which is clear to the Judicial Branch, as it would be disobeying the international norms to which Costa Rica is committed, as well as the internal legal system that governs our social state of law.

**III.- Regarding the use of positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime:** Prior to the use of the positions corresponding to that specialized jurisdiction, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch issued a consultation to the Legal Directorate of this entity, which provided opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, through which it conducted a budgetary analysis of importance for this topic. The analysis has its background in that, within the budget granted to the Judicial Branch for 2022, an item was granted that paid the corresponding amounts for salaries and other expenses of the institution, for the entry into force of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime. At that time, in the absence of the approval of the transitional provision that would allow training, logistical, and other functions necessary for the implementation of the operation of the new jurisdiction against organized crime to begin in early 2023, it could not be consumed as an initial expense. As a consequence of the foregoing, a contingency plan for the use of the mentioned budget items, to be executed in that year 2022, was submitted for consideration by the competent bodies. The analysis provided the following:

**a)** Proper nature of public budgets: The regulation of public budgets is contained in Article 176 of the Political Constitution, insofar as it provides the following: “[…] Article 176-. Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, which shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides. The ordinary budget of the Republic comprises all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, during the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed that of probable revenues. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the preceding rules when issuing its budgets. The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December.” (emphasis is ours). Complementary to the above, the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law provided the following: “[…] Article 8.- Content of budgets. Budgets shall consider at a minimum: a) The revenue budget, which shall comprise those generated by tax collection, the provision and sale of goods and services, transfers, donations, and others, as well as financing sources, internal or external. b) The expenditure budget, which shall comprise all outlays planned to meet objectives and goals. c) The programming of activities and expected goals for the period, according to the level of detail defined in the regulation. d) The human resource requirements, according to the detail established in the respective regulation. e) The norms that exclusively regulate budget execution, which shall apply during the fiscal year for which said budget is in force […]” In accordance with the above, it is noted that the ordinary budget of the Republic contemplates an authorization of the public expenditure planned for the respective period, in order to meet the respective institutional goals and objectives. In this vein, the Budget Law authorizes the use of human resources for a specific purpose, in accordance with its content and the respective budget program. Consequently, the Budget Law contemplates the possibility of budget execution for the expenditure provided for in the respective staffing schedule, in order to give substance to the human resource requirements contemplated therein. It is the act by which the Government is authorized to dispose of public funds within certain limits and constitutes the validity requirement for administrative acts and contracts that give rise to public expenditure. That is, the budget is a condition of the regularity or legal effectiveness of budgetary operations and, above all, of the execution of public expenditure, which cannot be carried out if the corresponding budgetary coverage does not exist. The need for the activity to conform to the legality in force entails the existence of control mechanisms that guarantee the legality of that activity. In accordance with the above, in order to determine the propriety of administrative expenditure, it is necessary to verify its classification and incorporation into the ordinary budget of the respective budget period, on the understanding that this will determine the opportunity, objective, and content of the expenditure.

In this regard, the following has been indicated: "[…] The items authorized by the Budget Law do not form an indivisible mass. On the contrary, they are specialized. In accordance with the principle of budgetary specialization, the credits opened by the Budget Law are allocated to a determined expenditure. This means that the authorization is given for a precise expenditure and for a determined amount. An amount that constitutes a limit for the Executive. In this way, the destination of a credit is determined by the Law […]” (M, ROJAS: The Executive Branch in Costa Rica, Editorial Juricentro, 1997, p. 346).

Our Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law reserves to the Legislative Branch the following cases of modification to the approved budget: “a) The following are reserved to the Legislative Assembly: i) Those affecting the total amount of the budget. ii) Those entailing an increase in current expenditures to the detriment of capital expenditures. iii) Transfers between budget programs. iv) Those affecting the total amount of indebtedness. v) Transfers between non-personal services and personal services”. It is necessary to highlight that complementary to the above, the origin of the resources destined for the budget expenditure must be taken into consideration, that is, whether it has a specific, pre-defined destination by a law that created the source of the resources and that conditions its possibility of execution.

Regarding this type of revenue allocated to fulfilling a specific purpose, opinion C-358-2020, of September 7, 2020, from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, indicates:

“[…] As is known, the concept of specific destination (destino específico) fundamentally alludes to revenues destined by the legislator to finance the activity of a specific agency. That destination may be general, in the sense that it is destined to finance the entirety of the agency's activity, but it can also happen that the legislator destines specific resources to the financing of a specific activity or project of that agency. In which case the ordinary legislator specifies on what the beneficiary of the destination can spend the resources it receives. It has traditionally been indicated that when the law creates a specific destination, only the legislator can modify it, by reducing the amount or percentage or by expanding it, or by suppressing the destination if it considers that a specific program or purpose does not justify the State reforming the destination. Furthermore, it follows from the above that the Administration lacks the competence to vary the amount or percentage of the destination, to suppress it, or to reassign amounts not executed by a specific entity, unless the legislator authorizes it to do so […]”.

Consequently, it is considered that it must be determined whether the expenditure to be made is provided for in the respective budget, in accordance with its classification and budget program, on the understanding that, if it is under those conditions, an authorization for its use would be contemplated, with the limitations contained within the same budget that provides its basis and, in the case of specific destinations, the law that creates them.

**b)** On the treatment of the fight against organized crime: In accordance with the regulations of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, it is noted that currently there are a series of criminal offenses that respond to the treatment of the prosecution of organized crime. That is, with the currently existing jurisdictional bodies, offenders in this area are being prosecuted, including the Law Against Organized Crime, number 8754 dating from the year 2009 and the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 existing since the year 2017.

The very existence of cases upon the entry into force of Law 9481, insofar as it provides the following:

“[…] SOLE TRANSITIONAL PROVISION- Cases initiated in criminal courts with common competence as of the date of entry into force of this law, which are in the intermediate or trial stages, shall continue to be heard by those courts […]”.

The foregoing must be complemented by the provisions of Article 17 of the same normative body, insofar as it provides:

“[…] ARTICLE 17.- Supplementary norms. The criminal procedure pursued before the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall be the ordinary procedure provided for by Law No. 7594, Criminal Procedure Code, of April 10, 1996, with the exceptions provided for in this law. The actions and resolutions of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall be governed, in matters not expressly provided for in this law, by Law No. 7594, Criminal Procedure Code, of April 10, 1996; Law No. 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009; Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993, and Law No. 7728, Law of Judicial Reorganization, Reforms to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of December 15, 1997”. However, it should be noted that the latter does not have specific financing, but rather the resources for its implementation come from the general allocation made in the respective ordinary budget for the Judicial Branch, including the positions decided to be allocated in the corresponding staffing schedule. In this sense, it must be clear that, while Article 16 of Law 9481 provides for an obligation to grant budgetary content for the operation of the jurisdictional bodies, this is not a specific destination (destino específico) as such. The indicated norm states the following:

“[…] ARTICLE 16.- Budgetary content and initial integration of the courts: The Ministry of Finance must grant sufficient economic content for the operation of the courts and tribunals created by this law. At the time of publication of this law, the Ministry of Finance must transfer, effectively and completely, the necessary resources to allow the Judicial Branch to create the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime; likewise, it must annually transfer the necessary resources to allow the operation of this Jurisdiction. The Judicial Branch must guarantee the necessary resources for the operation of the Jurisdiction created in this law. The Planning Department of the Judicial Branch shall recommend the number of officials who should serve in this Jurisdiction, at the time this law enters into force”.

However, it is considered appropriate to indicate that the incorporation of resources for the positions of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime is based not on the agreement of the Full Court, in session 21-2021 of June 1, 2021, Article II, but rather on official communication DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, through which the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency communicated to the Deputy President of the Permanent Ordinary Commission on Financial Affairs, the following: “Last May 27, the Supreme Powers of the Republic signed a manifesto expressing their will, each within the framework of its legal limits and constitutional competencies, to promote five strategic action points for the fight against the phenomenon of Organized Crime in all its manifestations. The second strategic point was to \"establish mechanisms to strengthen the competent institutions with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime\". To materialize this point, the working group established it necessary \"to generate a joint working space between the Ministry of Finance and the Judicial Branch for the analysis of the requirements for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime and the fight against this scourge\". After a working process, it was determined that the Judicial Branch requires a total of 2,900,000,000 colones for the purpose of incorporating 413 positions of Technical, Professional and Police personnel dedicated both to the implementation of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime, in logistics development, remodeling processes, tenders, and others, in addition to the actual start-up…” In this sense, the general framework of this official communication is the aforementioned agreement between the Powers of the Republic, which indicated the following points of joint work: “Evaluate existing legal frameworks to propose improvements, so that preventive and punitive actions in the matter are effective and forceful. Establish mechanisms to strengthen competent bodies with the technology and human capital necessary to face the challenges of counteracting the phenomenon of organized crime. Manage cooperation and assistance from international organizations and strategic partners, with the implementation of programs to strengthen joint work between the country's authorities and police forces to counteract the effects of organized crime. Enhance management instruments, such as the National Strategy on Drugs and Associated Crimes; the National Plan on Drugs, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; and the National Strategy for Integrity and Prevention of Corruption and similar ones, as a complement to the plans and actions in matters of investigation and criminal justice. Other areas of recommendation deemed necessary to implement.” **c)** On the ius variandi in public employment matters: Additionally, it must be indicated that as long as there is no express or tacit modification to the budget law – e.g., the fulfillment of the different programs of the Judicial Branch – it would not be plausible to consider that the administration of the work of employees is subject to such rigidity that it is not possible to allocate their functions in accordance with the public interest, always ensuring that the modification is within the legal system and in accordance with the legitimate exercise of ius variandi. Regarding the powers that the Administration possesses to totally or partially modify non-substantial aspects of a public employment relationship, it is necessary to highlight that it, like any public or private employer, possesses the faculty of ius variandi, in this regard, citing ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) number 7419-1997 of ten hours fifteen minutes on November eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, case file number 6760-M-97).

This faculty is evidenced as a competence of the Superior Council in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, insofar as said normative body establishes that the following corresponds to this body:

“[…] ARTICLE 81.- The following corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch: 1.- Execute the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice. 2.- Appoint, with the exception of those that correspond to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; transfer them, provisionally or definitively, suspend them and grant them leaves with or without pay, and remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the president […].” In accordance with the above, it is noted that the Superior Council has the power to modify the work location of employees – attending to the respective budget program and legal limits for the exercise of ius variandi – in accordance with the public interest and institutional needs. That is, human resources can be used for other purposes typical of jurisdictional competencies, on the understanding that the Superior Council has the competencies to adapt the functions of employees in accordance with the public interest, in legitimate observance of ius variandi.

Furthermore, the legal advisory body considers that what is proposed by the Contingency Plan proposal is legally appropriate and to that effect recommended:

• Order that the resource contemplated in the staffing schedule and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated, firstly, to all necessary actions for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Order that, once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the jurisdiction against organized crime, it be allocated primarily to the handling of organized crime matters.

• Order that, in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial competence or they are being processed, the resource be used temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of ius variandi, for the handling of ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

Based on the above, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) concludes that this last recommendation implies that the law against organized crime raises the possibility that, in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources allocated to this jurisdiction can handle ordinary matters, without this being considered a violation of the principle of natural judge, but on the contrary, it implies maximizing the use of state resources.

**3.-** By resolution of 9:03 hours on April 26, 2024, the President of the Chamber (Sala) requested the consulting judges, Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Ivette Carranza Cambronero, and Kathya Jiménez Fernández, to identify and specify, in a clear and duly individualized manner, which are the specific agreements of the Full Court that are intended to be challenged in this consultation.

**4.-** In resolution 2024-713 of 15:05 hours on April 29, 2024, issued by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in order to comply with the request, it is indicated firstly that, although the request was directed personally to judges R. Chinchilla, I. Carranza, and K. Jiménez (subscribers of the vote by which the consultation was made), it is clarified that as of this date, judge K. Jiménez is on medical leave, so having her jurisdiction suspended, she cannot be part of the court. She is substituted, in accordance with the rules prevailing for that purpose, by judge C. Ramírez. However, given that the father of judge Ramírez, magistrate J. Ramírez, was part of the body that issued one of the challenged acts, she recused herself and was substituted, by rotation, by judge Max Antonio Escalante Quirós in order to integrate the court and solely respond to what is requested. Secondly, the court indicates, in order to comply with the indicated request, it is clarified that in Considerando III of vote 2024-462, reference was made to “…the agreements of the Full Court (among them the one contained in circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, which contains the “Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime”) that empower the transfer of ordinary matters to that jurisdiction, which are complemented by the list of case files transferred from the competent body to the newly created one.” Having reviewed said circular (which was published in Judicial Bulletin number 119 of July 3, 2023 and can be consulted at: https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/avi-1-0003-9349), it is verified that it was issued by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (and not by the Full Court as indicated, a material error which is hereby corrected as provided for in Article 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code) and adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, Article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime of the Judicial Branch.

In the section titled “On the competence of the JEDO offices,” practical rule 5 (on which the court of origin relied to transfer the case to the organized crime court, and the latter to hear the matter) states: “5- The Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) shall have national-level competence to carry out tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.” Likewise, practical rule 9 states: “9- In order to ensure an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime, from the start of their duties and for as long as is deemed necessary, shall also carry out tasks of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.” Similarly, in the section of that circular titled “On the processing of the case file in the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada),” rules 2 and 3 provide: “2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the specialized jurisdiction in organized crime shall follow the processing form of the office of origin, such that, if it has been processed in physical form, it shall so continue until its conclusion. 3- Ordinary cases heard by the JEDO shall continue their processing according to the status in which they are assumed until their execution. They shall be remitted to the office of origin once they are completely ready for archiving.” However, the issuance of said rules by the Superior Council (Consejo Superior) rests on what was previously resolved by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) (Full Court) in an extraordinary session at 08:16 hours on January 30, 2023, minute 003-2023 (article XVIII, in which the following was definitively agreed: “2) To accept the request of the Subcommission on Organized Crime, submitted via official communication N° S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: To vary the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada), which at this time have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that as of February 2023, they shall hear all matters assigned to the different sentencing appeals courts of the country, beginning with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts of the country, while the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime officially begins to function.”) **5.-** By official communication of May 6, 2024, the Technical Chamber of the Court (Técnica Sala de la Corte) requested from the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice certification of the agreement of the Full Court (Corte Plena), adopted in the extraordinary session of January 30, 2023, minute 003-2023, article XVIII.- Likewise, that it certify which magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) participated in the approval of said agreement.

**6.-** On May 8, 2024, a literal certification of the agreement adopted in extraordinary session Nº03-2023 held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII, was incorporated into the case file. Likewise, the Secretariat of the Court certifies that the magistrates and magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber who participated in the approval of the cited agreement are: Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, Jorge Araya García, Anamari Garro Vargas, and the alternate Aracelly Pacheco Salazar.- **7.-** On May 23, 2024, magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas filed a recusal (inhibitoria), and indicated the reasons for which they believe cause exists for them to withdraw from hearing this matter.

**8.-** By resolution at 14:44 hours on May 24, 2024, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber rejected the request raised by magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Ana Mari Garro Vargas and declared them qualified (habilitados) to hear this matter.

**9.-** By resolution at 9:44 hours on May 27, 2024, the president of the Chamber gave course to the consultation formulated by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José) and granted a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and to the president of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial).

**10.-** By brief filed on June 14, 2024, Iván Vinicio Vincenti Rojas, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), responded to the granted hearing and stated, firstly, regarding **admissibility**, that both unconstitutionality actions and judicial consultations are procedural mechanisms that have a series of requirements to fulfill, the non-observance of which results in their rejection for reasons of admissibility. Petitions before the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) aimed at expelling a norm from the legal system are vested with a series of formalities that are not vain, but rather, on the contrary, seek to discover from the outset that the claim is indeed serious and that it is surrounded by arguments of sufficient caliber. In the case of judicial consultations on constitutionality (consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad), they must be totally objective and, furthermore, the judges who issue them must be clear that their aim is to contribute to ensuring that the legal system is always adjusted to the constitutional order. In that sense, that objectivity must not be synonymous with a futile academic or intellectual purpose, but rather the judge must be faced, with certainty, with the application of the norm that is to be used and which—without ambages—he doubts is constitutional (citing ruling of the Constitutional Chamber N°3905-2007 at 14:44 hours on March 21, 2007). Regarding the admissibility requirements for judicial consultations on constitutionality (as with actions of the same subject matter), it focuses on two of them:

**A.-** that the consulting judge faces a genuine doubt as to the constitutionality of the norm that must be applied, such that—drawing a parallel with the requirements for an unconstitutionality action—the judicial consultation proves to be the suitable means of protecting the right that is considered violated, and **B.-** that the judicial consultation is duly substantiated.

**A.**- If we follow the logical path (iter lógico) that has guided the consulting Tribunal, to suspect the norms of the LOPJ and the agreement of the Superior Council, we will realize that it lacks standing (legitimación) *“…to consult the Constitutional Chamber when it has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of a norm or act that it must apply, or of an act, conduct, or omission that it must judge in a case submitted to its cognizance”* for two reasons: 1.- in the specific case, the challenged norm or norms must NOT be applied nor must the act, conduct, or omission be judged by the consulting Tribunal, and 2.- said norms and agreements must evidence a violation of the constitutional order, without forcing or artificial interpretations.

On this point, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent resolution (N°27.476-2023 at 13:16 hours on October 25, 2023, paraphrasing some other previous resolutions, stated on the subject:

“That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that—due to its relevance to the case—it is appropriate to specify. Indeed, the expression ‘the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,’ carries a very definite present meaning, entirely different from if the law spoke in terms of ‘the norm may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be judged.’” (the emphasis is not in the original).

Let us explain:

1.- from the very account emanating from the resolution that prompts this judicial consultation on constitutionality, it follows that the standing to consult is artificial and forced, since the initiative for the doubt is not of its own making, but rather comes from an allegation by the defense attorney of the accused for the crime of withholding worker-employer contributions (retención de cuotas obrero-patronales), who alleges as one of the grounds for appeal a defective procedural activity (actividad procesal defectuosa), precisely because it is considered that the principle of the lawful or natural judge has been violated, given the mechanics of the appointment of the Trial Court that convicted his client, but more specifically, by the simple statement made by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José), when it classified the belonging Section as **“emergent”** (emergente). Apparently—although other hypotheses are valid—the mere mention of that appellation was enough for the defense attorney to conceive the possibility of being faced with a Court—now at the appellate stage—as a promoter of constitutional violations.

It is indeed necessary to highlight that both the technical defense of the accused in the original case, as well as the material defense of the defendant (inculpado), at no procedural stage nor during the adversarial hearing (contradictorio) expressed doubts about the competence of the Trial Court (the sole incident raised at the conclusion of the adversarial hearing was by the defendant ARIAS RUIZ, who alleged an exception of the statute of limitations).

2.- as a consequence of this defective procedural activity and the position of the prosecutor in charge of the case, the consulting Tribunal discerns that the appellant argues a violation of constitutional and conventional norms, and, for its part, the prosecutorial body alleges that the action is enabled by legal norms, and at that procedural stage, to the acting Tribunal “…the doubt arises as to **whether the laws from which the competence of the sentencing body is asserted violate norms of a higher rank**…” (the emphasis is ours).

The constitutional misgiving is thus as it reads: the consulting Tribunal goes back to past moments and hesitates about the norms that gave competence to the judicial body a quo to issue the sentence it is hearing on appeal. And it is on this factual-legal basis that the proposing Tribunal considers itself sufficiently legitimized to elevate to judicial consultation its doubts about the norms that—in its view—it must necessarily apply.

The questions that arise spontaneously would be: is it the role of a Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court to doubt the competence of the lower Court at the time the latter issued the appealed sentence; in other words, is the competence of the a quo body part of the norms that the appellate Tribunal must apply—as provided by the literal wording of Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—(and in this case, to waver on its constitutionality), or was it the role of the judge of the A quo Tribunal (or to be claimed by the defense attorney) to deem a lack of competence, as ordered by Article 169 of the LOPJ:

“Article 169.- When an official deems that he lacks competence to hear the matter submitted to him, except in the case of an extension of competence (prórroga de competencia), he shall so declare sua sponte (de oficio) and order the case file remitted to the official who, in his judgment, should hear it. If an appeal is lodged by any of the parties or if, absent one, this latter official disagrees with that opinion, the superior of both shall decide the competence, without further procedure and as soon as the records are received.” It is equally valid to ask: Is the constitutional doubt of a Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court a new way of losing the competence of the A quo body, or is this lost only by the provisions of Article 163 of the LOPJ, or else, by grounds not exhaustively listed in Article 48 of the CPP?:

“Article 163.- Competence is lost in specific cases:

1.- When the case is concluded and the sentence executed.

2.- When the judge has been commissioned by another to carry out some diligence, once the commission is fulfilled.

3.- When, being accessory, the case is sent to the judge who is hearing the principal case.

4.- When the judge has been declared disqualified by virtue of impediment, excuse, or recusal (impedimento, excusa o recusación).” From what has been said, in no way was the proposing Tribunal ever—or at least in the specific case—going to have as a possible scenario the obligation to apply neither Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the LOPJ, nor the agreement of the Superior Council, nor circular 137-20234, much less when its leitmotiv is to doubt *“…whether the laws from which the competence of the sentencing body is asserted violate norms of a higher rank…”* That is to say, in its role as a Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, hearing on appeal resolution N° 437-2023 at 14:22 hours on May 10, 2023, issued by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, “Emergent” Section, it had the following possibilities:

a.- let us recall that it is evident from the original judicial case file that the first ground of appeal of the defense attorney was to initiate a defective procedural activity, alleging a transgression of the principle of the lawful judge.

From a careful reading of Article 175 of the CPP and the case law of our Courts (including the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice), it is considered certain that the mechanism of defective procedural activity was created to prevent the issuance of a judicial resolution with the non-observance of certain precepts, including conventional ones, **but it is improper to use this figure to appeal judicial resolutions already issued**; on this point, Article 175 of the CPP provides:

“General principle. Acts performed with non-observance of the forms and conditions provided in the Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be valued to support a judicial decision nor used as prerequisites thereof, unless the defect has been cured (saneado), in accordance with the norms that govern the correction of judicial actions.” Indeed, the procedural dynamic that follows from this institution presupposes that the interested party or the person affected by the transgressive acts, prior to the issuance of the judicial decision, raises a defective procedural activity precisely to prevent the consummation of the defects contained in the preceding acts, and that these become integrated into the judicial resolution. Along these lines, the curing of the act would be requested, trying, insofar as possible, not to go back to precluded stages.

As can be observed, said mechanism is impossible to apply after the judicial decision has already been issued, because the defect could neither be corrected nor, even less, could one return to precluded stages; from this it follows that, once the judicial resolution is issued, no objection remains other than challenge through appeal or the corresponding recourse.

Rightly, the resolution of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, N°2004-0054 at 8:50 hours on February 6, 2004, concluded the following:

“The petition must be rejected outright: If the general rule established in Article 175 of the Criminal Procedure Code is observed regarding the cases in which it is appropriate to declare procedural activity as defective, it may be noted that this is possible only in relation to acts that would serve as a basis or prerequisite for a judicial resolution. That is, through the guidelines relating to defective procedural activity, it is not possible to question the resolutions themselves, but only the prior actions on which they are based.” Now then, although we can never know how the consulting Tribunal would have ruled on the defective procedural activity petitioned by the defense attorney as the first ground of appeal against the conviction sentence, the truth is that said petition of the appellant—correcting terms—could not have succeeded, and the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court could have—then—declared the sentence issued by the lower court ineffective, either by accepting **some other ground** of the appellant or else, by using the prerogative conferred by the final part of the third paragraph of Article 462 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which literally provides:

“In any case, the tribunal that confirms a breach of a fundamental right of the involved parties may decree it sua sponte.” and thus, without incurring the serious blunder of believing itself empowered to raise before the Constitutional Chamber a constitutional doubt that is not such (because the invoked articles would not be the subject of analysis on its part, nor should it have even remotely applied them), it could have declared—even sua sponte—a possible preterition (preterición) of a fundamental right of the party, righting things to their normal course and ordering a remand, so that now indeed—from its perspective—the accused would be judged by a lawful or natural judge.

As a corollary of what has been said thus far, we posit the event that the judicial consultation on constitutionality that occupies us has not passed the admissibility test, not only because the invoked norms must not be the subject of analysis nor application by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, but also because doubting the laws that gave competence to the A quo Tribunal to issue the sentence being heard on appeal, contained in past jurisdictional acts, also does not form part of the set of norms that the consulting Tribunal must apply, as orderingly prescribed by Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**B.-** The second admissibility requirement that we wish to analyze rests on the proper substantiation of judicial consultations on constitutionality, as a derivative of the obligation of every judge to deeply reason their criteria, as indicated—for example—by Article 142 of the CPP.

Indicate the defects in reasoning that the advisory body attributes to the judicial consultation of constitutionality, which likewise lead to its inadmissibility:

**a.-** questioning of the entirety of all the articles, without stopping to specify which excerpt from them is the alleged cause of the constitutional injury. Likewise, the approach lacks the comparison or collation between the challenged norms and the articles of the Fundamental Charter, to thereby derive the constitutional transgression. Or, if the comparison had materialized, it would have been insufficient to consider the task of reasoning fulfilled.

**b.-** mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations of national and foreign doctrine without further development, limiting itself to transcribing them, assuming that due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the litigation before us are responsible for the task of integrating the claim with its foundation, ignoring that this task concerns the consulting Court. Special mention deserve the paradigmatic cases that gave rise to the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) and that were used by the consulting Court, about which we will comment further below (…)

(…) despite the fact that around pages 12 to 14 of the document containing the judicial consultation, the petitioning Court already cites certain subsections or paragraphs of the 4 articles of the LOPJ, neither does it fulfill the obligation to collate the challenged articles with constitutional and conventional principles, to thereby derive or demonstrate the denounced transgressions, limiting itself to transcribing them, without greater academic rigor. As observed, neither a consulting Court nor the citizen who files an action of unconstitutionality can afford the luxury of claiming that they fully refute one or several articles and even – as some claimants have done – question the entirety of a law, and expect that – in the first instance – this advisory and impartial Body of the Constitutional Chamber and later the Court of the matter, will unravel in which part of the numeral or numerals the foundation or the injury that sustains the judicial consultation or the citizen's claim is contained.

Nor is it admissible – as already stated – for the petitioning Court to be content with citing the numerals of the LOPJ (in their entirety, although later reducing them to some subsections or paragraphs), the articles of the Fundamental Charter allegedly transgressed, some conventional principles established in international Instruments, and finally, several excerpts from judgments of the Corte IDH, and firmly believe that it fulfilled the task of reasoning its doubts of constitutionality (especially since its final claim is that 4 articles of the LOPJ be removed from the legal system, many of them without the slightest relation to the materialized questioning of constitutionality) and now, it is up to the Court of the matter to harmonize all those inputs and correctly forge a reasoned and founded claim, which was the primary obligation of the claimant or consultant to do.

It is true that from pages 12, 13, and 14 of the document containing the judicial consultation before us, a selection is made of certain paragraphs of the challenged articles of the LOPJ, as if to denote that it is in them where the incorrectness of placing the constitution of courts in the hands of administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch is evidenced, this being a legislative function (thus, for example, numeral 46 is repeated again in its entirety, from 59 subsection 16 is mentioned, from article 81 subsection 2) and from 101 bis the paragraph that allows judging personnel of the JEDO to process ordinary matters.

However, despite that effort of concreteness, it is evident that the admissibility criteria continue to be unfulfilled, concerning the proper reasoning of judicial consultations. This issue will be analyzed on the merits, where it will be demonstrated that the entire claim made regarding the transfer of functions or constitution of courts forms part of the prerogative that article 166 of the Magna Carta offers to the Judicial Branch.

The controversy regarding the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), adopted in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime of the Judicial Branch and which authorizes the publication of the circular called *“Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new form of procedure for the Specialized Jurisdiction of Organized Crime”* (“Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”) (circular 137-2023 of June 14, 2023), which was correctly described even after a prevention from the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber to the consulting Court, deserves separate mention. Said contribution and mention has no more validity than that granted by the fact that many of the moves made by the Superior Council have been based on the scope of circular 137-2023, issued by said Council. To conclude this section, let it suffice to maintain that the only constitutional article that has been developed and its transgression alleged, has been canon 35; the others, namely: 39, 121.20) and 166 of the Fundamental Charter have been included to give the appearance that many numerals of the Political Code are violated, but their development is limited to their mere mention. For that reason, the admissibility analysis performed assumes that only article 35 will be subject to comment later, with the others to be discarded. The same fate befalls the mention of numeral 8.1) of the ACHR, which is indeed only transcribed without further development.

**b.-** mention of summaries of jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Chamber, the Constitutional Court of Spain, and citations of national and foreign doctrine without further development, limiting itself to transcribing them, assuming that due to their scope and authority, the reader and the legal operators who must resolve the litigation before us are responsible for the task of integrating the claim with its foundation, ignoring that this task concerns the consulting Court. Special mention deserve the paradigmatic cases that gave rise to the judgments of the Corte IDH and that were used by the petitioning Court. Following the pattern already set out, the consulting Court bases its opinion on citations of some judgments of the Corte IDH, which have ruled on the issue of the legal or natural judge and whose constitution must be materialized before the criminal act to be heard, votes of the Constitutional Chamber, judgments of the Constitutional Court of Spain, and excerpts of national and foreign doctrine. (…)

1.- regarding the mentioned jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Spain, an excerpt is cited from judgment 47/1983 of May 31, 1983, which speaks of the constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law, but likewise another excerpt from that same resolution explains the possibilities that, for the better public service and, above all, for the public service of the Administration of Justice, there be internal collaboration among servants of the Judicial Branch, to resolve the “dysfunctionalities of the system”:

*“It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be demanded for the body as for its holders, given the various contingencies that may affect these in their personal situation and the requirement, arising from the public interest -the so-called 'needs of the service'-, for the different members of the judicial branch to collaborate within the Administration of Justice in the places where their work may be most effective, making up, as far as possible, for the dysfunctionalities of the system. But, in any case, the procedures established for the designation of the holders must guarantee their independence and impartiality, which constitutes the direct interest protected by the right to the ordinary Judge predetermined by law.”* (the highlighting is not from the original).

(…)

Finally, the judgment STC 55/1990 of March 28, Legal Ground 3, in a sense very similar to the just mentioned 47/1983, declares the following:

*“This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to the ordinary Judge predetermined by law requires, fundamentally, that the judicial body has been created by a legal norm investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act motivating the judicial action or process, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be qualified as a special or exceptional body (STC 47/1983, of May 31, Legal Ground 2). But this guarantee does not imply the right to a Judge determined specifically (STC 97/1987, of June 10, Legal Ground 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special rules of competence in the distribution of matters among the different judicial bodies. The constitutional notion of ordinary Judge predetermined by law is not limited to the legislative establishment of general competences, but is normally integrated by those legal provisions that derogate or alter that general competence.”* (the highlighting is ours).

As observed, despite the commonplace that the conception of the principle of legal or natural judge may signify, it is true that – as we will see when analyzing the merits of this judicial consultation of constitutionality – the issue is not as flat as it is presented nor is its non-compliance consolidated by modifications in the constitution of the courts that will judge the specific case, but rather that there are entirely valid exceptions that are even constitutionally endorsed, whether by the Fundamental Charter itself or the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which, far from transgressing the principle under study, strengthen it. We will address that further below.

Therefore, this advisory and impartial Body of the Constitutional Chamber believes that the judicial consultation before us suffers from some vices of admissibility (which have been duly accredited), which is why we request that these be so expressed, and the present judicial proceeding be declared inadmissible.

On the other hand, with possible incidence on the outcome of this constitutional consultation, this Office does wish to draw attention to the merely literal framing of the alleged preterition of fundamental rights, without demonstrating the true grievance caused to the affected party by being sentenced by a Criminal Court, with the characteristics indicated by the judicial consultation before us. The central theme around which the consulting Court's doubt revolves has only one aspect: if the crime was committed in 2017 and the defendant was tried and convicted by a Trial Court that was created and integrated subsequently, in principle, the fundamental right to a legal judge would have been violated. Although the literal wording of constitutional article 35 does not include this last aspect (the requirement of the necessary pre-existence of the Trial Court), it is a fact that a vast body of doctrine enshrined in international instruments and jurisprudence of Human Rights Courts coincides on the issue. It is noteworthy that in the document comprising the judicial consultation, not a single line is read where the grievance caused to the constitutional legal system, but above all to the accused, by the fact that he was tried by a Court created after the facts and with the series of circumstances and variables that surrounded the judicial case is developed, namely administrative decisions taken by the Corte Plena or by the Superior Council, through agreements, some expressed in circulars (137-2023, for example). The defense attorney, when attempting through an invalid procedural mechanism (raising a defective procedural activity against a judicial sentence) to reverse the conviction, alleges as a grievance violations of the principle of the legal judge and due criminal process, proposing as a claim that the sentence be declared ineffective and that a remand be ordered. It might be thought that the grievance was already raised by the corresponding procedural party and at the appropriate procedural moment, which is why a consulting Court is not required to satisfy this requirement. Indeed, we do not intend to invoke an inadmissibility of the judicial consultation because the petitioning Court did not set forth any grievance, but rather what we wish to place on record is that, despite the fact that indeed the court that adjudicated the original judicial case was constituted after the facts, it also appears that the court's approach seeks a nullity for nullity's sake, since the temporal circumstance of the subsequent constitution of the Court A quo does not appear to represent a real transgression, such that if the individual had been tried by an ordinary Court, the result would have been different. This line of thought has been adopted by the Constitutional Chamber itself, which advocates achieving, through constitutional challenges, whether via judicial consultations or actions of inapplicability, a true protection of the fundamental right considered violated, thus avoiding declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake:

*“Secondly, considering that the protection exercised in this venue is not in abstracto, that is, it is not about declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, but rather it is for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, it must be determined whether with the omission here accused of being unconstitutional, any injury was caused to the fundamental rights of the claimant. In essence, what is claimed as violated is the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge, which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, alleging that by being judged by a court not legally constituted, that principle is violated. The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies pre-established permanently by law. One of the contents of the 'natural judge' principle is as legal judge, that is, as a 'body' created by law in accordance with the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for this purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, in principle, of the possibility of access to one of those judges. According to what is established in Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José de Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or court, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge specific acts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts.”* Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Resolution 6701-1993 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993 (the highlighting is supplied).

It would seem that with such a categorical stance from the Court of the matter and given that the true injury to the allegedly harmed fundamental right has not been demonstrated (more than a formal non-observance of the requirement of prior constitution, but without evidence that its configuration was ex profeso and to judge that particular case), this Constitutional Chamber must likewise reject the present judicial consultation, since there is no record that the right or principle of the legal judge has been violated, in the terms prohibited by constitutional article 35 and all the national and foreign doctrine and jurisprudence that informs it, such as, for example, the Courts constituted in the cases of ALMONACID ARELLANO vs. CHILE and GELMAN vs. URUGUAY.

It must be reiterated that the constitution of the sentencing Court in the specific case was due to requirements and needs to uphold the principle of continuity of the public service “Administration of Justice”, likewise with normative support, so there is no way to demonstrate that any fundamental right of the accused was harmed.

**III.- On the merits.** Points out that the two approaches of the consulting Court are:

**a.-** both the cited articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch in their entirety (although they were later reduced to citations of specific paragraphs or subsections), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council and circular 137-2023, foster the violation of the principle of the legal judge, since the Trial Court that convicted the accused in the original case was constituted after the commission of the criminal acts, and **b.-** likewise, that entire framework of articles and agreements also allows decisions regarding the appointment and constitution of courts to be made, whose origin comes from administrative bodies or lower regulations, which similarly tend to harm the principle of the legal or natural judge. In this regard, the position of the advisory body is:

**a.-** formally speaking, it is a fact that the single-judge judge who tried and convicted the accused ARIAS RUIZ was designated to hear the original judicial case after the commission of the crime (2017). However, it is also possible to argue that this judging person forms part of the roster of official-judges of the Judicial Branch, having been designated in that condition for having met all the required qualifications and who, in turn, is a judge appointed within the recently created Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime (JEDO).

**b.-** the constitution of the adjudicating Court, in the manner it occurred, was not a whim nor was it even acted upon deliberately to, precisely, harm the guarantees defined by constitutional article 35 to the detriment of the accused. Such designation derives from enabling legal norms for both the Corte Plena and the Superior Council, which, based on agreements, decisions, and circulars, have issued a series of guidelines to guarantee the continuity of the public service called “Administration of Justice”. The fact must be emphasized that, while it is true the agreements made by the Corte Plena and the Superior Council have materialized through established administrative mechanisms, it is also true that each one of them (agreements, decisions, circulars, etc.) has a normative origin in law, meaning that complying with the consulting Court's claim that the designation and constitution of the Courts of Justice be rigid and entirely anticipated (solely to comply with the precept that the Court must be constituted not only by law but prior to the fact to be judged), would imply a stagnation in the provision of the “Administration of justice” service and, incidentally, a breach of the attributions granted by the same Fundamental Charter to the Judicial Branch and a severe injury to the principle of swift and complete justice.

**c.-** on the subject, we bring up here the already cited judgment of the Constitutional Court of Spain (47/1983 of May 31, 1983), when it states the following:

*“It is true that the same degree of fixity and predetermination cannot be demanded for the body as for its holders, given the various contingencies that may affect these in their personal situation and the requirement, arising from the public interest -the so-called 'needs of the service'-, for the different members of the judicial branch to collaborate within the Administration of Justice in the places where their work may be most effective, making up, as far as possible, for the dysfunctionalities of the system.* As is obvious, the fact that it is held that the configuration and constitution of courts is contrary to the constitutional order, solely because these movements have been made through administrative decisions coming from administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch, is to ignore not only that said instances have a legal basis, but also that those actions have been absolutely necessary to preserve the continuity of the service provided by the Judicial Branch. The possibilities of mobilizing personnel from one jurisdiction to another different one or any other “dysfunctionality of the system”, have been carried out in the first instance because the challenged legal norms permit it and then, because said changes were and will continue to be necessary.

Recall here what was said by the Constitutional Court of Spain in a resolution mentioned earlier (STC 55/1990 of March 28, Legal Ground 3):

*“This Court has repeatedly declared that the right to the ordinary Judge predetermined by law requires, fundamentally, that the judicial body has been created by a legal norm investing it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the act motivating the judicial action or process, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be qualified as a special or exceptional body (STC 47/1983, of May 31, Legal Ground 2).* But this guarantee does not entail the right to a specific, concretely determined judge (STC 97/1987, of June 10, FJ 4) nor does it exclude, in principle, the possibility of establishing special rules of competence in the distribution of matters among the different judicial bodies." (the highlighting is supplied).

d.- We are greatly interested in rescuing the ruling of our Constitutional Court, mentioned above (6701-1993 of 15:06 hours on December 21, 1993), not only for its richness but also because the solution provided fits the consultation before us. Indeed, in addition to setting the precedent that the pronouncements of that Chamber are not reduced to declaring unconstitutionality for unconstitutionality's sake, it also introduces an element that is particularly interesting and powerful, when it concludes that the mechanism for controlling the constitutionality of norms: "... is for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of those who consider themselves affected, [but] it is necessary to determine if the omission here accused of being unconstitutional caused any injury to the fundamental rights of the claimant." And it is precisely that scenario that is presented in the criminal summary proceeding that gave rise to the judicial consultation before us, because it is not enough to formally verify that the designation of the judge materialized years after the criminal infraction, but rather, it is also necessary to confirm that the judicial action effectively caused the justiciable some injury to their fundamental rights.

And in truth, neither did the consulting Court undertake the task of demonstrating it, nor has this Office detected it, concluding in the affirmation that it will not be known – because it did not occur – whether the accused would have had greater guarantees if he had been tried and convicted by an "ordinary" Trial Court and not an "emergent" one.

For all that has been said, having made the objections regarding the admissibility of this judicial consultation on constitutionality, which we respectfully request be applied, the truth is that the petition and its grounds from the promoting court have not managed to demonstrate that, in the case of the trial of the original judicial summary proceeding, the guarantee established in Article 35 of the Constitution was violated. It is not enough to demonstrate that the constitution of the court occurred after the criminal act judged, if the grievance that this circumstance, permitted by the provisions of the LOPJ, produced on the accused has not been demonstrated. Finally, the provisions, agreements, and circulars adopted by the administrative bodies of the Judicial Branch, constituted on normative-legal bases, turn out to be a necessary recourse to preserve the principle of continuity of the public service called "Administration of Justice," without it having been possible to prove – likewise – how those administrative provisions prevented the justiciable from enjoying the prerogatives of Article 35 of the Constitution.

**11.-** In a brief filed on June 16, 2024, Orlando Aguirre Gómez, in his capacity as president of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, responds to the audience granted, and points out, regarding the **Judicial Consultation,** that it is conducted within case file number [Valor 001], through resolution No. 2024-0462 of eleven hours thirty minutes on March nineteenth, two thousand twenty-four, corrected by resolution No. 2024-713 of fifteen hours and five minutes on April twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty-four, issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. In summary, a consultation is made regarding the constitutionality of Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (the latter, added by Article 18 of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017 - and reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023), as well as the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, adopted in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, which authorized the publication of the circular called "Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, insofar as they *"support… and allow the transfer of case files from ordinary justice to that of organized crime,"* because, in the opinion of the aforementioned Court, they violate the principle of the lawful or natural judge enshrined in Articles 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 35, 39, 121.20, and 166 of the Political Constitution, as they allow an administrative body or laws with a lower rank than the constitutional and conventional norms to modify the competence of the natural judges of a fact, assigning knowledge of the case to courts that did not exist on the date of the facts.

**II.- Background.** 1).- In session of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch No. 95-2022 held on November 3, 2022, article LXXIII, the agreement was made whose operative part literally stated:

"(…)

Before resolving what is appropriate, it was **agreed**: To transfer the request submitted in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of November 1, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, to the Legal Directorate, so that within a period of three days it may issue an opinion on the legal possibility of temporarily using the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in the terms proposed, within the framework of the law that has not yet come into force and, if possible, what the legal basis would be for giving it that distinct use. This agreement is declared final." (The emphasis is ours).

2).- In response to the above, the Legal Directorate issued Opinion No. DJ-566-2022, of November 7, 2022, requested by the superior body, which was made known in session No. 98-2022, held on November 11, 2022, article II, where it was agreed to accept the request presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, signed by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating Magistrate of the Subcommittee Against Organized Crime, given that there is no legal impossibility to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in the terms proposed. In what is relevant, the operative part of the agreement states the following:

"(…)

**It was agreed:** To acknowledge receipt of Opinion No. DJ-566-2022 of November 7, 2022, signed by Master Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Legal Director, and by reason of what is indicated: 1) Accept the request presented in official letter No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 of October 27, 2022, by Dr. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, coordinating magistrate of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, given that according to the opinion expressed, there is no legal impossibility whatsoever to carry out the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in the terms proposed:

[...]

However, some start dates in the work plan must be adjusted, as some are currently expired. 2.) The Subcommittee on Organized Crime must: a) Order that, as a priority, the resource contemplated in the list of positions and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be used, in the first instance, for all actions necessary for the preparation for the commencement of functions of the organized crime jurisdiction. b.) Order that, once the respective human resource participates in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the commencement of the organized crime jurisdiction, it be assigned, as a priority, to the handling of organized crime matters under the currently valid regulations. c.) Order that, in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial competence or they are in process, they may be employed temporarily, in the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, for the handling of ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the rules of competence of Article 47 and concordant articles of the Criminal Procedure Code, in understanding of the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi regarding the rights of the serving persons, non-affectation of the public service, and compliance with the block of administrative legality. d.) The Subcommittee on Organized Crime shall be responsible for the follow-up and control of its execution in accordance with the terms proposed and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter. 3.) The Human Resources Management Department shall clarify to the officials who would participate in the Contingency Plan that the payment of the salary incentive provided for this jurisdiction is conditional upon the official opening of the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, and therefore it cannot be applied until it comes into force. This agreement is declared final." 3).- **The Full Court, in session No. 3-2023, held on January 30, 2023, article XVIII**, modified the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, at that time based in San José, and which provide support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that as of February 2023, they shall hear all matters assigned to the different sentence appeals courts in the country, starting with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts in the country, while the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime officially began to function.

4).- Finally, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, acknowledged receipt of official letter No. S-CJEDO-08-2023, of June 2, 2023, signed by Magistrate Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, and authorized the publication of Circular No. 137-2023, called "Issuance of directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime," and cites it textually.

**III.- On the constitutionality of the norms consulted and the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch.** Legal Authority of the Supreme Court of Justice to organize the functioning of judicial offices. As a first point to highlight, it should be noted that, as stated by the consulting body, our Political Constitution, in its Article 121, subsection 20), establishes that it is the exclusive competence of the Legislative Assembly to create the Courts of Justice. So that, once the courts are established in the various territorial circumscriptions of the country, to achieve adequate functioning, the legislator granted powers to the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch -Superior Council and Full Court- to organize the judicial instances and execute budgetary resources where they are most needed, in order to efficiently and effectively fulfill the service of administration of justice. Thus, numeral 3 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 7333, states the following:

*"ARTICLE 3.- Justice is administered by:* *1.- Lower-value, contraventional, and summary matter courts.* *2.- First instance and criminal courts.* *3.- Collegiate courts.* *4.- Cassation courts.* *5.- Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice.* *6.- Full Court.* ***The Supreme Court of Justice shall establish the number of processing and deciding judges, as well as the other judicial servants that the courts of any category and subject matter must have; for this purpose, it shall take into consideration the needs inherent to the office**, for the sake of the better execution of the public service of justice.* *When there are two or more judges in a court, the coordinator of the body shall be elected internally by their peers.* *If the jurisdictional offices are organized into a judicial circuit, the judges shall elect from among themselves a general coordinator.* *The judge who hears a proceeding shall have the authority to order what is appropriate for the fulfillment of their functions and, in each matter, shall have the power to exercise the disciplinary regime. In other cases, this power corresponds to the body of judges and agreements shall be made by majority vote; if there is a tie, the coordinator shall have a casting vote.* *The name and surnames of the official in charge of the proceeding must be recorded in the resolutions and actions.* ***Collegiate courts shall be composed of the number of judges required for good public service and shall act individually or in panels of three of them, unless the law provides for another form of integration.** * *The coordinator shall distribute the workload, applying the criteria previously established by the judges and always seeking the greatest equity. When they cannot agree, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch or the Supreme Court of Justice, as appropriate, shall set the rules. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)"* (The emphasis is supplied).

For its part, Article 46 of the aforementioned regulatory body provides for the possibility of modifying territorial circumscriptions, overloading competencies, or the relocation and conversion of judicial offices, positions, or posts, which must evidently be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of the judicial organs and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads; aspects that were contemplated at the time the directives on practical rules and a new form of processing for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime were issued, through the agreements of the Full Court, Superior Council, and the questioned circular No. 137-2023.

In this regard, the norm states the following:

*"ARTICLE 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning the overloading of competencies, the relocation and conversion of judicial offices and of positions or posts, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial organs and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads.* *By reason of the volume of work and the obligatory efficiency of the public service of justice, the Court may appoint more members to the courts, on a temporary or definitive basis; it may also open and close - for these same reasons - new offices and organs attached to the courts, anywhere in the country.* *In mixed courts, the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the services of administration of justice are specialized. When the needs of the service so require, the Court may divide a mixed court into specialized courts.* *When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial organ, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other servants to move to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency."* (Thus reformed by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) In this same sense, Article 59 states the following:

*"Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:* *(…)* *15.- To propose to the Legislative Assembly the creation of Judicial Offices in the places and subject matters it deems necessary for good public service.* *16.- To merge two or more judicial offices into one or to divide them, relocate them, establish their respective territorial and subject-matter competence, taking into consideration the best public service.* *It may also assign specialized competence to one or more offices, to hear specific matters, within the same subject matter, occurring in one or several circumscriptions or throughout the national territory."* Note how the regulations grant broad powers to the Court to appoint more members to the courts -temporarily or definitively-, to open and close new offices and organs attached to the courts, to divide functions by subject matter -in order to specialize the services of administration of justice-, to divide mixed courts into specialized ones, to fix territorial and subject-matter competence, to assign judges and other servants to move to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency, as long as it is in accordance with the public interest and the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, as expressed by the Legal Directorate of the Judicial Branch in Opinion No. DJ-566-2022.

Coupled with this, subsections 1, 2, 3, 6, 21, and 22 of Article 81 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch grant the power to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch to organize judicial offices by executing the administrative policy of the institution, in accordance with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

To that effect, the article indicates the following: *“Article 81.- The Superior Council of the Judicial Branch is responsible for:* *1.- Executing the administrative policy of the Judicial Branch, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice.* *2.- Appointing, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory provisions; transferring them, provisionally or definitively, suspending them, granting them leaves of absence with or without pay, and removing them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President.* *3.- Appointing interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is verified that the Offices are not up to date.* *6.- Transferring, provisionally or definitively, suspending, granting leaves of absence with or without pay, removing, and rehabilitating, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial servants, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court.* *(…)* *21.- Issuing internal rules for the better performance of its functions, with the exception of regulations.* *22.- Regulating the distribution of judicial matters among the Offices of equal territorial competence, to achieve workload equalization.”* From the foregoing, it is inferred that, once the Legislative Assembly creates the Courts of Justice, in accordance with the constitutional mandate of article 121.20, it is the responsibility of the Judicial Branch to define the operation of all judicial offices in the country. That is, the purpose of the transcribed legal provisions is to grant this institution the possibility of self-organizing without the need, when courts, tribunals, prosecutors' offices, and other auxiliary bodies are constituted, modified, or eliminated, to resort to the legislator for authorization by means of a law, since that would imply an imminent delay and an unquestionable impact on the provision of the service and on the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, violating Article 41 of our Political Constitution.

Now, in order to safeguard the proper use of public funds, Article 176 of our Political Constitution requires that they be used in a “sustainable, transparent, and responsible” manner, obligations that all public institutions have when executing the budget assigned each year. That is, with regard to the Judicial Branch, all annually assigned budgetary resources must be invested to meet the respective institutional goals and objectives, In this regard, the cited numeral states the following: *“Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, which shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides.* *The ordinary budget of the Republic includes all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, throughout the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed that of probable revenues.* *The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the above rules when issuing its budgets.* *The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December.”* In the same vein, Article 4 of Law No. 8131, called the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, establishes that: “every public budget must be responsive to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads,” that is, the head must prepare the budget formulation for each year, which includes all institutional needs and allocates resources according to the plans for that year. The article indicates the following: *“ARTICLE 4.- Subjection to the National Development Plan* *Every public budget must be responsive to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this Law. The National Development Plan shall constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that corresponds, in conformity with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions. (Sinalevi Note: By means of Article 21 of the Public Investment Law, No. 10441 of March 13, 2024, this article will be amended. In accordance with the aforementioned law, it will enter into force twelve months from its publication, that is, March 22, 2025, so from that date the text of this article shall read as follows:* *Article 4- Subjection to the National Development and Public Investment Plan. Every public budget must be responsive to the annual, medium, and long-term institutional operational plans, adopted by the respective heads, as well as to generally accepted budgetary principles; furthermore, it must contain the secured financing for the corresponding fiscal year, in accordance with the criteria defined in this law. The National Development and Public Investment Plan shall constitute the global framework that will guide the institutional operational plans, according to the level of autonomy that corresponds, in conformity with the pertinent legal and constitutional provisions.”)”* In general terms, if we carefully review the directives issued by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch in the challenged agreement and circular, there is no doubt that they were issued in order to implement a Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, so that both the adjudicating persons and the auxiliary staff remain in their functions, exercising their work efficiently, in order to prevent the resource from being underutilized and, above all, due to the need to strengthen other areas given the difficult situation caused by the increase in crime in the country.

Of special importance, the legislator, with the approval of the Law *“Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica”*, No. 9481, established that this jurisdiction **has competence throughout the national territory, and also has competence at the national level to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction** *“when institutional requirements so determine”*, this was also reiterated in the addition of Article 101 bis to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Therefore, it could not be interpreted that if a matter from the ordinary jurisdiction is handled by adjudicating persons specialized in organized crime, the principle of the natural judge would be violated, as the appellant and the consulting body would have it believed, since these competencies were defined by law, and it is the exclusive and excluding responsibility of the Judicial Branch to allocate the resource where it is most needed.

The cited article states the following:

*“Article 2- Competence. Matters of organized crime or organized criminality may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or alternatively, in the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. Procedural acts issued in organized crime cases in the ordinary jurisdiction, prior to the commencement of operations of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, shall maintain their efficacy and validity. The regulations in force on the matter are applicable to both jurisdictions, including Law 8754, Law Against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009, unless expressly provided otherwise.* *Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be under the cognizance of the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be under the cognizance of the criminal courts, criminal tribunals, and ordinary criminal sentence appeals courts throughout the country. Matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the cognizance of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. These matters may be submitted to the cognizance of the Criminal Court, Criminal Tribunal, and Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime. They shall hear the criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related crimes. Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they shall have competence throughout the national territory. Furthermore, these offices shall also have competence at the national level to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.* *When the Public Prosecutor's Office verifies that, in accordance with current regulations, the investigated facts qualify as organized crime or organized criminality, it may request authorization to apply the rules provided for this type of matter: a) For cases that correspond to the ordinary jurisdiction, the jurisdictional authority in charge of the matter shall verify compliance with the requirements, by means of a reasoned resolution, within forty-eight hours after the request. b) For cases that correspond to the specialized jurisdiction, the request shall be formulated in writing by the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic. The specialized jurisdictional authority may assume competence in a reasoned resolution, after prior verification of the requirements, in accordance with the procedure established in Article 4 of this law. Exceptionally, the request may be managed by the substitute prosecutor, when the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic is prevented from doing so for some duly justified reason. Except for the initial written request from the attorney general or the substitute prosecutor for the Specialized Jurisdiction to assume cognizance of a matter, the other proceedings may be delegated to the specialized prosecutors of said jurisdiction, with the exception of those that, by legal imperative, may only be managed by the person holding the position of attorney general.* *The cassation appeal and the special review procedure shall be the competence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.”* As we can see, by legal mandate, the Full Court or the Superior Council, as the case may be, in their capacity as employer and supreme body of the Judicial Branch, have the power to define the institutional policies of internal organization and structuring, for the purpose of providing quality public service, which, as administrator of justice, it is entrusted with, through the creation or restructuring of judicial offices, as well as with the placement of judicial personnel in offices where temporary, and even permanent, support and collaboration are required, for the better service of the users of the justice access system. In that sense, the questioned directives find support in the organic and budgetary regulations cited above and in the *“Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime in Costa Rica”*, No. 9481, which were promulgated in order to ensure that the Judicial Branch provides an administration of justice service, efficiently and effectively, in compliance with the constitutional mandate of prompt and complete justice, without denial, making efforts to address the current situation that our country is facing due to the constant increase in crime derived from the strengthening of organized crime structures such as drug trafficking and other complex crimes.

For these reasons, Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as well as the agreement of the Superior Council from session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, Article LXXI, and Circular No. 137-2023, do not present any problem of constitutionality; on the contrary, by removing the possibility for the superior bodies of the Judicial Branch to organize the judicial offices and the Courts of Justice, the exercise of the functions constitutionally assigned to this Branch of the Republic would be prevented, violating the Principle of Judicial Independence that Article 9 of the Political Constitution establishes.

Constitutional jurisprudence has been developing this principle from the perspective of “organizational independence”, in the sense that each of the branches of the Republic may issue rules and adopt decisions regarding its operation, its organization, and the development of substantive functions (citing Vote number 14286-2005 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes of October nineteenth, two thousand five) and indicates that the separation of powers and the power of self-organization that the Judicial Branch holds is complemented by the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), which finds support in subsection d), of the first paragraph, of Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration, when it provides that *“The hierarchy of the sources of the administrative legal system shall be subject to the following order: (…) d) The decrees of the Executive Branch that regulate laws, those of the other Supreme Branches in the matter of their competence”*. Thus, the superior bodies have the possibility of issuing regulations and service directives to organize judicial offices, as usually happens when a tribunal or court needs to reorganize and assume new functions within the competencies established by the legislator. This regulatory power was also addressed by the Constitutional Court in the cited vote (No. 14286-2005), where the following was indicated:

*“**I.- B) Regulatory Power of the other Branches and of other public entities:** Having said all of the above, it would seem to be concluded that the regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, however, this statement must be understood in the sense that, indeed, the executive regulatory power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, but not the autonomous regulatory power. That is, **the possibility that the other Supreme Branches, other than the Executive Branch, may issue autonomous regulations, whether of organization or of service, is admitted.** The foregoing is based on subsection d) of the first paragraph of Article 6 of the LGAP…* *(…)* *Now, specifically regarding the autonomous regulatory power of the Judicial Branch, this derives from the very principle of separation of functions, since, as stated, nothing prevents the same function - not primary - from being exercised by two Branches or by all, which is why one cannot speak of a rigid distribution of competencies based on function and subject matter. Thus, the Judicial Branch also has normative power, which also translates into its autonomous regulatory power for aspects referring to its internal organization or to the services it provides. A power of self-organization recognized, moreover, by the same Article 167 of the Constitution as it establishes the mandatory consultation of draft laws referring to the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch; likewise, Article 48 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states:* *“Article 48.-* *The Supreme Court of Justice is the Superior Tribunal of the Judicial Branch and as its superior body shall exercise the functions of government and regulation.”* *In this way, it is not surprising that this Chamber has had the opportunity to analyze the powers of the Supreme Court of Justice regarding regulating the functions of the different judicial offices (see resolution 02-07626 of 14 hours 35 minutes of August 1, 2002, and resolution 00-05888 of 10 hours 03 minutes of July 13, 2000). In conclusion, as observed, not only the Executive Branch enjoys regulatory power (executive and autonomous), but this power has also been recognized for other Branches and public entities, but regarding these only if it involves autonomous regulations (whether of organization or of service), since the executive regulatory power remains exclusive to the Executive Branch.”* (Our emphasis).

By virtue of the foregoing, the challenged rules are not unconstitutional, given that they grant powers to the superior bodies to self-organize the judicial offices in order to provide a quality, efficient, and effective administration of justice service, subject to changes due to incidents that may be occurring due to certain social situations and where it is required that the budgetarily assigned resources be used in a “sustainable, transparent, and responsible” manner, which was ordered by the Subcommission Against Organized Crime, the Full Court, and the Superior Council, when the Contingency Plan was implemented, in that jurisdiction, under the possibilities that the law establishes regarding the judicial offices that handle criminal matters.

<u>There is no impact on the Principle of Natural Judge.</u> As indicated, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch number 7333 establishes a series of rules that allow the Full Court and the Superior Council to organize judicial offices. Among these rules, it is worth highlighting Articles 46, 59, and 81, which allow the superior bodies to modify territorial jurisdictions (circunscripciones territoriales), reassign competencies, or transfer and convert judicial offices, positions, or posts, which evidently must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads.

In the case *sub examine*, it is worth noting that it is Law No. 9481, which creates the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, that defines the competence of the judicial offices handling that matter, which has competence at the national level and to carry out work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction. This has the consequence that the Judicial Branch, within its power of self-organization, can use human and budgetary resources where it deems pertinent, always ensuring good service and the public interest. Thus, the principle of natural judge establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, pre-established by law, as happened with the creation of the aforementioned specialized jurisdiction, so we are not before an ad hoc jurisdictional body, but rather before courts of justice that were created by law and whose competence has also been defined by the legislator, just as the principle of natural judge requires.

If we review again the directives contained in Circular No.

137-2023, these are consistent with the aforementioned regulations, as they in no way implement any modification to what is legally mandated, but rather seek to ensure that judges specialized in organized crime can handle ordinary matters when circumstances of institutional necessity so require, in order to guarantee access to justice and efficiency in the administration of justice. This practice is also common in other areas, where judicial offices have had to be reorganized due to the approval of new Laws that modify or establish new competencies and functions for certain Courts of Justice, among others, the Labor Procedural Reform, the Civil Procedural Reform, and others that have been approved but are in a period of *vacatio legis*, such as the Family Procedural Code, effective as of October 2024, or those that are about to be approved.

In the specific case, the judges who heard the ordinary proceeding, as explained, are criminal judges who, by legal mandate, have jurisdiction throughout the national territory to hear organized crime or ordinary matters. They were not appointed for the specific case, but rather form part of the composition of a specific jurisdictional body whose jurisdiction has been legally defined, and they must hear "ordinary and specialized proceedings" due to the requirements of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime—whose processing corresponds to the ordinary proceeding—was not tried through the specialized proceeding, but rather, it was simply processed by specialized judges applying the procedural law of the ordinary proceeding, a situation that in no way affects the legally defined jurisdiction.

It is important to bring up what was indicated by the Legal Directorate in opinion number DJ-566-2022, when it analyzed the Contingency Plan designed to temporarily use the positions of the Specialized Jurisdiction on Organized Crime, under the terms that were proposed by the Sub-Commission of the Criminal Jurisdiction. In this regard, the Advisory Unit stated the following in relevant part:

*“It is evident that there is a clear instrumentality in this year's resources for the start of the respective jurisdiction's operation, as stated in the reform of Transitory Provision I itself when indicating: ‘It shall enter into force eighteen months after the necessary budget for its implementation has been granted, in accordance with the technical studies of the Judicial Branch’* *Note how this transitory provision foresees that a budget for the respective jurisdiction be assigned 18 months before, that is, in a previous budget period, the entry into force of the jurisdiction, which makes clear the possibility of executing the respective resources. It should be remembered that Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration provides as follows:* *“Article 16.-* *1. In no case may acts contrary to unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience be issued.”* *Logic indicates that if resources were assigned in 2022 in the context indicated *ut supra*, it is for purposes of preparing the start of the respective jurisdiction, derived from the ordinary budget that authorizes the expenditure and so that the commencement of the law's effects is in accordance with the principles of public service, namely:* *“Article 4.- The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of recipients, users, or beneficiaries.”* *The contrary would imply waiting for the Law to be in force to make the necessary investments for its start, which is not the purpose of the 2022 budget allocation nor of the reformed Transitory Provision I of Law 9481, which rather contemplates preparatory acts for its execution.* *Furthermore, it should be noted that it would not even be logical not to execute duly foreseen budget resources nor, upon partially implementing the respective plan in preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, to leave human resources idle afterwards by presuming they cannot exercise jurisdictional or quasi-judicial functions because Law 9481 is not in force, when the same law in the future contemplates that judicial officers may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases and the Budget Law does not condition execution on its being in force.* *For the purposes of this opinion, this Directorate analyzed the document presented by Magistrate Zúñiga Morales and, from the expert technical opinion of the undersigned, it is evident that the use to be given to the positions would be the following…* *(…)* *As evidenced, the plan contemplates a series of actions by the appointed persons who would be participating in actions necessary for preparing the entry into force of the aforementioned Law, which we consider in accordance with what is established in official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, and the agreement between Branches of the Republic that provides its basis.* *This Legal Directorate considers that the legal basis for executing the plan is the 2022 ordinary budget, which grants resources so that what is necessary for the implementation of Law 9481 is prepared *ex ante*, when the legal prerequisites for its effectiveness are met.* *The contrary would imply assuming that it is only with the entry into force of the law that the respective assigned resources could be used, which would further postpone its effects, contrary to its provisions, the legislator's purpose, and the public interest itself.* *It is evident that official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, contemplates financing for preparatory acts for the implementation of the specialized jurisdiction, in accordance with the aforementioned Transitory Provision I and on the understanding that said administrative act uses the term “others,” in addition to “logistical development, remodeling processes, tenders…” for the destination of the resources.* *This Directorate considers that it is also possible that, once all the necessary technical preparatory actions for the start of the respective jurisdiction have been implemented, human resources may be used for other purposes inherent to jurisdictional competencies, on the understanding that the Superior Council has competencies to adapt the functions of judicial officers in accordance with the public interest, in legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, and given that it would not be possible to apply Law 9481 until it is in force.* *This advisory unit considers that limiting the possibility for appointed persons to exercise ordinary functions within the framework of competencies assigned by law or by an administrative act would imply giving effect to a law that is not yet in force and limiting the effects of the 2022 ordinary budget, which does not contemplate limitations or conditions in this regard.* *Consequently, once what is provided in official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, has been applied, it must be understood that the effects of the respective staffing table in the 2022 ordinary budget must be applied.* *In accordance with the foregoing, it is considered that what is proposed in the Contingency Plan proposal is legally appropriate, and we therefore recommend the following:* • Order that the resources contemplated in the staffing table and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated, as a priority, primarily first for all the necessary actions for preparing for the start of the jurisdiction against organized crime.

• Order that once the respective human resources participate in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the start of the jurisdiction against organized crime, they be allocated, as a priority, to hearing organized crime matters under the currently valid regulations.

• Order that in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial jurisdiction or the same are being processed, they may be employed temporarily, in legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, for hearing ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong.

*In this last recommendation, it is noted that even the not-yet-effective law raises the possibility that, in the absence of organized crime cases, the resources destined for this jurisdiction hear ordinary matters, and on the understanding that, as has been indicated, the 2022 ordinary budget does not contemplate any conditioning in its content regarding the use of the positions.* *It is reiterated that in the case under analysis, we are not in the presence of a specific destination, technically speaking, but rather an additional allocation of budget resources in the year 2022, without there being an originating law that ordered the concrete destination of previously established resources, and where a spirit of liberality on the part of the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement of Presidents of the Supreme Branches of Government.* *This advisory unit considers that in this case, the interpretation criteria of Article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration and of the Civil Code must be applied, which provide:* *“Article 10.-* *1. The administrative rule must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect due to the rights and interests of the individual.* *2. It must be interpreted and integrated taking into account other related rules and the nature and value of the conduct and facts to which it refers.”* *“ARTICLE 10.- Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose.”* *It is reiterated in this sense that it would not be logical to interpret an Ordinary Budget Law in the sense that duly foreseen budget resources could not be executed or that, if the respective plan were partially implemented in preparatory activities for the entry into force of the respective jurisdiction, human resources could be left idle afterwards by presuming they cannot exercise jurisdictional or quasi-judicial functions because Law 9481 is not in force, when the same law in the future contemplates that judicial officers may perform ordinary functions when there are no organized crime cases and the Budget Law does not condition execution in the year 2022 on its being in force.* *V.- Conclusions:* *In accordance with the foregoing considerations, this advisory unit considers that the following can be concluded:* *I.- The 2022 budget execution and therefore the entire staffing table related to the positions referred to in the Contingency Plan under analysis cannot be understood as conditioned upon the actual effectiveness of Law 9481, given that it is governed by the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic for that year, which does not contemplate any conditioning or limitation based on the entry into force of the Jurisdiction against Organized Crime. Thus, the execution of said 2022 resources will be based on the Ordinary Budget Law and not on a law that is not yet in force and that cannot limit budget execution in the year 2022.* *II.- The resources contributed to the 2022 ordinary budget project through official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, cannot be understood as a specific destination, given that there is no originating law that ordered the concrete destination of previously established resources, but rather a spirit of liberality on the part of the Ministry of Finance operated within the framework of a prior agreement of Presidents of the Supreme Branches of Government.* *III.- In any case, it must be understood that, based on the agreement of the Presidents of the Supreme Branches of Government mentioned in official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, by the then Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Presidency, and in this last administrative act, the resources assigned through modification of the 2022 ordinary budget project were not foreseen exclusively for the execution of the respective law, but also for any preparatory act for its effectiveness in accordance with science, technique, logic, and experience, and so that the law's effects are in accordance with the principles of public service, ensuring continuity in service.* *IV.- Additionally, it must be understood that as long as it is within the same budget program, nothing prevents the exercise of legitimate ius variandi by the Superior Council, as part of the competencies assigned by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, given that the 2022 ordinary budget does not contemplate conditioning regarding its use and destination, and there is no law creating the specific destination.* *IV.- For greater security of the Superior Council, we recommend that the respective agreement state the following:* *• Order that the resources contemplated in the staffing table and linked to the Contingency Plan proposal be allocated, as a priority, primarily first for all the necessary actions for preparing for the start of the organized crime jurisdiction.* *• Order that once the respective human resources participate in the actions programmed in the Contingency Plan proposal as preparatory for the start of the organized crime jurisdiction, they be allocated, as a priority, to hearing organized crime matters under the currently valid regulations.* *• Order that in the event that there are no organized crime cases in the respective territorial jurisdiction or the same are being processed, they may be employed temporarily, in legitimate exercise of the ius variandi, for hearing ordinary matters, in accordance with the broad class to which the respective positions belong. The foregoing with strict respect for the jurisdictional rules of Article 47 and concordant provisions of the Criminal Procedural Code, in understanding the limits imposed on the legitimate exercise of ius variandi regarding the rights of judicial officers, the non-affectation of public service, and compliance with the administrative legality framework.* *V.- In accordance with the foregoing, the legal possibility of temporarily using the positions contemplated in the 2022 staffing table granted by the staffing modification made based on official letter DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 of October 14, 2021, is concluded, within the framework of the 2022 ordinary budget's own content and given that there is no conditioning or limitation in it regarding its use.* *VI.- The motivation for the administrative decision adopted by the Superior Council will be based on the considerations and proposals of the respective Contingency Plan, it being the case that the corresponding Jurisdictional Commission will be responsible for the follow-up and control of its execution in accordance with the terms proposed and the administrative, labor, and criminal regulations applicable to the matter.”* From the foregoing, it follows that the budget resources were assigned so that the specialized jurisdiction could hear both specialized and ordinary proceedings, just as was provided by the legislator, safeguarding the principles of public service and ensuring the continuity of service, especially in an area that has generated a great social impact in recent years, such as Organized Crime offenses, and where it is not unknown to the entire population that the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive Branches are working hard on proposing legal reforms to adapt the justice system so that this type of crime can be confronted with the best legal tools.

Finally, the Constitutional Chamber, in repeated rulings, has referred to the powers of the ordinary legislator to define the jurisdiction of judges, which *“constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body as the ‘free configuration of the legislator’”*, also called *“free legislative design”*.

Thus, in vote number 2017-4005, of ten hours and forty minutes on March fifteenth, two thousand seventeen, the following was indicated: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“Now, the fact that the ordinary legislator opted to establish the questioned procedure for the substitution of judges constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body as the “free configuration of the legislator,” also called “free legislative design” or “legislative discretion.” For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours on June 11, 2003, it was stated that: “The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing general and abstract norms, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since its limit is the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence issued by this Court for similar cases.” For this Court, the legislative discretion applied to the sub iudice is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered”</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> (vote 13-011706 of 11:44 hrs on August 30, 2013).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It is necessary to indicate that </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">stricto sensu</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, the principle of the natural judge results in the impossibility of being subjected to a proceeding before an authority who is not a judge or who lacks competence (competencia) to resolve a specific case, and that the competence of judges and courts must be previously established by law, which is fully present in the proceeding where the consultation is raised, without it being possible to derive other effects that prevent the hearing of cases by competent judges formally designated as such by a firm and effective act. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In accordance with the foregoing, the matter questioned has no reason to be, since the respective cases will be heard by competent, independent, and impartial judges, as evidenced by Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which establishes: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">On this subject, Luigi Ferrajoli has indicated: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">"(…) while the legal pre-constitution of the judge and the inalterability of competencies are guarantees of impartiality, being aimed at preventing instrumental interventions of an individual or general nature on the formation of the judge, the prohibition of special and extraordinary judges is, above all, a guarantee of equality, which satisfies the right of all to have the same judges and the same processes"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It is not noted that the norms and provisions subject to consultation are contrary to these considerations; on the contrary, they are consistent, including with the precedents of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the subject, insofar as this jurisdictional body has indicated: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“It constitutes a basic principle relating to the independence of the judiciary that every person has the right to be tried by ordinary courts of justice in accordance with legally established procedures. The State must not create ‘courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to substitute the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to ordinary courts’” </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Case of Lori Berenson Mejía Vs. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“The State must not create courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms to substitute the jurisdiction that normally corresponds to ordinary courts. This seeks to prevent persons from being tried by special courts, created for the case, or ad hoc” </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Case of Apitz Barbera et al. Vs. Venezuela. August 5, 2008.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It cites Vote N°1739-1992 of 11:45 hours on June 1, 1992, regarding the right to a regular judge:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">If, therefore, jurisdiction (jurisdicción) consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence consists of the distribution that the law makes of the different spheres of knowledge of the courts based on criteria of subject matter, severity or amount, territory, and degree, both jurisdiction—general or by subject matter—and</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">competence are part of due process, since they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by regular courts, in the manner stated." </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In a complementary manner, Vote Nº2020-001312</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">of 9:20 hours on January 22, 2020, from that same Chamber provided:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In relation to the principle of the Natural Judge, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process, presupposes the existence of judicial bodies pre-established permanently by law. Through this principle, the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special ones, to judge specific acts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts, is protected.“</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It concludes that, in the cases in question, we are not dealing with situations of judges appointed ex professo or ad hoc for specific persons, and what is contemplated in the challenged regulations responds to aspects inherent to the administrative order, in accordance with the objective assumptions considered therein and the need to attend to the service of administration of justice in the current historical juncture, and on the understanding that the hearing of cases of ordinary jurisdiction by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción de la Delincuencia Organizada) is provided for by law, in such a way that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific case, but rather the hearing of the proceeding continues in the hands of a Criminal Judge, providing the adequate guarantees indicated supra. Note also that it is not observed, nor do the petitioners indicate, that with the objected provisions the procedural guarantees held by the parties have been affected, that the pertinent procedural regulations have been modified to their detriment, or that due process has been violated per se regarding their legitimate exercise of the right of defense and hearing, given that the respective processing and resolution of the proceedings will be common to any other proceeding regulated by the procedural norms applicable to criminal matters.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">12.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> By resolution of 13:54 hours on June 19, 2024, the president of the Chamber considered the hearings granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and to the president of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) as answered, and forwarded the judicial consultation to the office of the reporting magistrate.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">13.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> By resolution of the investigating magistrate of 15:35 hours on July 17, 2024, the material error contained in the resolution issued at 13:37 hours on July 17, 2024, due to a defect in the electronic system, was corrected, to the effect that it orders, as evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), the Executive Director of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial) to indicate the date from which the necessary resources for the implementation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) were received by that Branch.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">14.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> By a document incorporated into the electronic docket on July 24, 2024, Ana Eugenia Romero Jenkins, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Executive Director of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial)</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, reports that, as indicated in the report of the Planning Directorate No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024, the date on which resources were assigned to the Judiciary to implement said Specialized Jurisdiction (Law No. 9481) was starting from the ordinary budget for the year 2022, in which, through Motion 15 approved in the Consecutive of the Finance Committee (Comisión de Hacendarios) 36, of October 14, 2021, which forms part of the Budget Law 2022, (Law No. 10103 of November 30, 2021, published in Supplement (Alcance) 249 to La Gaceta 235, of December 7, 2021), the Legislative Assembly authorized the Judiciary to include an amount of ¢2.900 billion, which authorized the start of the implementation process of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime. (See attached certification). From the indicated official communication, it is textually extracted: “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">The authorized amount allowed covering the costs corresponding to 413 positions for the implementation of the JEDO proportionally according to their start date, of which 402 are ordinary and 11 are extraordinary. Of this total, 394 positions were projected for two months </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">(November and December 2022), while 4 positions were projected for 4 months and finally, 15 positions were budgeted for 12 months.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\"> Furthermore, within the authorized budget amount, the expense corresponding to computer equipment was included.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> The underlining and bold do not correspond to the original document. Likewise, through official communication No. 407-PLA-2023 dated May 12, 2023 (attached), the Planning Directorate of the Judiciary certifies that through the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for the Economic Year 2023, Law No. 10331 published in Digital Supplement (Alcance Digital) No. 267 to La Gaceta No. 235 of December 9, 2022, and its amendments; budgetary content was granted to the Judiciary for the preparation and implementation of the law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law N° 9481. In this regard, through the aforementioned official communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024, the Planning Directorate indicated that resources in the sum of ¢15.583 billion colones were assigned for this 2023 period, which allowed covering the investment for positions and operational expenses. The detail of the budget financing for Law 9481 for the implementation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime can be seen in the attached official communication No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 of July 22, 2024.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">15.- </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The legal requirements have been fulfilled in the proceedings.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Drafted by</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> Magistrate </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Hess </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Herrera</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> and,</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Considering (Considerando):</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">I.- PRELIMINARY MATTER (DE PREVIO). -</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> For having participated in the adoption of the agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) of January 30, 2023, session N°003-2023, article VIII, Magistrates Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, and Anamari Garro Vargas recused themselves from hearing this matter, a request that was rejected by resolution of 14:44 hours on May 24, 2024, by the acting president of the Chamber. Despite the fact that Magistrate Araya García and substitute Magistrate Aracelly Pacheco Salazar also formed part of the Court at the time of the adoption of the aforementioned agreement, they did not file a recusal motion at that opportunity, as they were not part of the Tribunal at that time, the former due to incapacity and the latter because she was not appointed then. However, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; color:#242424\">in application of the principles pro sentencia and procedural economy, express record is left that they are authorized to hear this matter, as it involves the same reasons expressed by the indicated permanent magistrates, which were timely denied as grounds for being separated from hearing the consultation.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; color:#242424\">II.- ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the requirements for the admission of judicial consultations; a provision from which some conditioning and fundamental elements for its admissibility emerge: that it be formulated by a judge; that there exist "founded doubts" about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; that there is a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission giving rise to the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. Such requirements were analyzed in detail in judgment No. 01617-97 of 14:54 hrs. of March 17, 1997, of this Chamber, as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“a. that it be formulated by a "judge," a generic term that—of course—applies both to single-judge adjudicators and to collegiate courts, and about which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">b. that there exist "founded doubts" about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged, this means that the questioning must be reasonable and weighted; it also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional review (by way of an action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because—in this case—the possibility of a constitutional violation always exists, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">c. that there is a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. As with the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or by mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called "prior" or "principal" matter. Finally,</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">d. that, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission giving rise to the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that—due to its relevance for the case—it is convenient to clarify. Indeed, the expression "must be applied the norm or must be judged the act, conduct or omission," carries a very defined current meaning, totally different from if the law spoke in terms of "may be applied the norm or may be judged the act, conduct or omission." The judicial consultation does not proceed upon the mere eventuality that those circumstances may occur, since—as explained above—this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for him.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Likewise, Article 104 of the same law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within three days, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended until the Chamber has resolved the consultation. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.45pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">III.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS CONSULTATION.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> The consultation is raised by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal)</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea venue, by vote N°2024-462 of 11:30 hours on March 19, 2024, corrected by resolution N°2024-713 of 15:05 hours on April 29, 2024, issued in case file number [Valor 001]. In that case, the Tribunal hears on appeal the resolution N°437-2023 of 14:22 hours on May 10, 2023, issued by the Criminal Trial Court (Tribunal Penal) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, “Emerging” Section, an appeal that was admitted and is pending resolution. In the appeal, the private defense counsel for the accused alleges, as the first ground for challenge, the existence of a defective procedural activity due to an absolute defect and violation of the principle of the legal or natural judge, because an ordinary proceeding, in which a single person is accused of withholding worker-employer contributions (retención de cuotas obrero patronales), was assigned to an emerging section of the Organized Crime Court (Tribunal de Delincuencia Organizada) and the prosecutor who attended was designated for that type of matter, which evidences the creation of a special court for the case and consolidated </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">a posteriori</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, which</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">implies that the appointment and competence of the adjudicators were not within reach of the parties to be consulted in a timely manner, but rather emerged after the consummation of the acts charged. He considers that there was a notable violation of due criminal process due to the formation of a non-competent court, as it resulted in being a court appointed to hear another nature of proceedings, such as the organized crime section, when internal and international norms indicate that the competent court must be pre-constituted before the facts. The norms whose constitutionality is challenged are articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), in addition to general provisions issued by the Superior Council, which, although they do not have to be applied directly by the consulting tribunal, are related to the grounds and grievances raised by the appellant which it must resolve, since they establish rules of competence for the specialized jurisdiction of organized</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">crime, related to the ground of appeal raised. For all the foregoing, the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the II Judicial Circuit of San José has sufficient standing to formulate the consultation. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase\">IV.- INVIABILITY OF THE CONSULTATION REGARDING THE </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF JANUARY 30, 2023, MINUTES 003-2023, ARTICLE XVIII. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The indicated agreement, adopted by the Full Court, stipulates the following: </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“(…) 2) To accept what was requested by the Subcommission on Organized Crime (Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada), forwarded by official communication N°S-CJEDO/02/2023, consequently: To vary the territorial competence of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada), which at this time have their seat in San José and provide support as a remedial plan to the counterpart office in Guadalupe, so that starting from February 2023, they hear all matters assigned to the different sentencing appeals tribunals in the country, beginning with San Ramón, and provide collaboration to the rest of the appeals tribunals in the country, while the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime officially begins to operate. 3.) The General Secretariat of the Court will take note for the publication of the corresponding circular.”</span></p> The decision is declared firm.

In the first place, it must be noted that according to the provisions of numeral 108 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the provisions on the legislative consultation of constitutionality and those provided for the action of unconstitutionality are supplementarily applicable to the judicial consultation of constitutionality. In the present matter, the Chamber considers that the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José lacks standing to consult on the constitutionality of the Full Court's decision, since the provisions established therein do not form part of the objections contained in the appeal (recurso de apelación) that it must resolve and which motivate the formulation of the consultation. The decision adopted by the Court consists of varying the territorial jurisdiction (competencia territorial) of the two sections assigned to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada), so that, starting from February 2023, it hears all matters assigned to the different criminal sentence appeals courts of the country, beginning with San Ramón, and provides collaboration to the rest of the appeals courts, while the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime officially begins to operate. It should be remembered that what is pending resolution is an appeal against the conviction handed down by the Criminal Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Tribunal Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), in an ordinary criminal matter, so the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality of the consulted decision would have no incidence whatsoever on the matter that the consulting court must resolve, which questions the rules and provisions that support the jurisdiction of the sentencing court (tribunal sentenciador) —the Criminal Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime of San José—. For the stated reasons, regarding the referred decision of the Full Court, the consultation is declared unprocessable.

**V.— UNPROCESSABILITY OF THE CONSULTATION ON THE DECISION ADOPTED BY THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, IN SESSION NUMBER 48-2023, HELD ON JUNE 8, 2023, ARTICLE LXXI.** The questioned decision authorized the publication of the circular called *“Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime” (Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado)*, Circular No. 137-2023 of June 14, 2023, published in Judicial Bulletin number 119 of July 3, 2023.

***“CIRCULAR No. 137-2023*** ***Subject***: *“Issuance of guidelines on practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime”.* ***TO ALL JUDICIAL OFFICES AND DEPARTMENTS NATIONWIDE.*** ***IT IS HEREBY MADE KNOWN THAT:*** *This Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, at the request of the Subcommittee on Organized Crime, makes known the practical rules and new processing method for the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime:* *“Practical rules* ***On the jurisdiction of JEDO offices:** * *With the entry into force of Law No. 9481 on the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, as well as Law No. 10369 Reform of Law 7333, Organic Law of the Judiciary, of May 5, 1993, and reform of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, of May 30, 2023:* *1- Matters of organized delinquency or organized crime may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or, alternatively, in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime.* *2- Matters that comply with the parameters established in article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be heard by the ordinary criminal courts, criminal trial courts, and criminal sentence appeals courts of the entire country.* *3- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may hear matters that, in addition to complying with the provisions of article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481.* *4- Matters submitted to the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may be submitted before the Criminal Court, Criminal Trial Court, and Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, as appropriate. They shall hear the criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as connected offenses. Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and shall have jurisdiction throughout the national territory.* ***5- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime shall have nationwide jurisdiction to carry out tasks within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.** * *6- The Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime may hear all organized crime cases that, at the commencement of operations, are requested by the person holding the position of Attorney General of the Republic or the person holding the position of Deputy Attorney General (due to the former's inability) from the competent jurisdictional authority of the JEDO, according to the procedural stage in which the matter is found, to assume jurisdiction over them, upon prior verification of the legal requirements.* *7- According to the provisions of Article 7 of Law 10369, which reforms Transitory Provision II of Law 9481, the procedural time limits established in article 10 of Law 9481 shall apply to organized crime matters that are in progress, without the need for an additional jurisdictional resolution. The jurisdictional authorities who have persons subject to a precautionary measure under their direction shall, ex officio or at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, readjust the time limits as appropriate, by means of a reasoned resolution.* *8- Jurisdiction to hear the cassation appeal and the special review procedure corresponds to the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.* ***9- In order to guarantee an adequate workload and the rational use of public resources, those who work in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime shall, from the commencement of their functions and until deemed necessary, also perform tasks of the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine.** * *10- When circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who work in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform tasks in processes of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.* ***On the processing of the case file in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime:** * *1- All processes that are susceptible to being heard in the new jurisdiction, in which it is deemed appropriate for the Public Prosecutor's Office to request the specialized criminal court for organized crime to assume jurisdiction over them, must be processed 100% electronically, through the use of the virtual desktop, the electronic case file, and online management for users.* ***2- Ordinary cases that come to be heard in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime shall continue the processing method of the office of origin, meaning that, if it has been processed physically, it shall continue in that manner until its conclusion.** * ***3- Ordinary cases heard by the JEDO shall continue their processing according to the state in which they are assumed until their execution. They shall be returned to the office of origin once they are completely ready for archiving.** * *Mandatory use of the identification card for officials and employees of JEDO.* *It is mandatory to use the identification card for officials and employees working in the specialized jurisdiction for organized crime, which must be worn in a visible place and used to access the different spaces that require electronic control.* *The use of the identification card is personal, as is the responsibility to immediately inform the Security Department of the Judiciary in case of deterioration, theft, or loss.* *Access to the different offices and departments, as well as to the courtrooms and, in general, to the facilities housing the JEDO that require electronic control, must be done using the identification card.* In the event of forgetfulness, theft, or loss (once such circumstance has been duly reported), a day pass must be requested from the Department of Security for the purpose of facilitating access by electronic means to the various spaces that require it, which will also be for personal use and will be under the responsibility of the official or employee to whom it is granted.

Provisions on documents to be backed up in a physical file (legajo físico) and other operational aspects:

1- For the purpose of creating the physical file to be used by the Organized Crime Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción de Delincuencia Organizada, JEDO) as a backup, considering that the processing will be 100% electronic, which includes the digital case file (expediente digital), the use of the virtual desktop, and online processing, among other characteristics inherent to the electronic case file (expediente electrónico), the documents that must be backed up in physical form are the following:

PREPARATORY STAGE (ETAPA PREPARATORIA):

- The investigative statement (declaración indagatoria). - The resolution that first imposes pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) or less burdensome precautionary measures (medidas cautelares). - The subsequent resolutions that extend, vary, or order the cessation of a precautionary measure. - The interlocutory appeal resolutions that rule on the precautionary measure. - The resolution ordering the intervention of private communications, its extensions, and the one ordering its cessation (levantamiento). - Detention Order (Tener a la Orden), Release Order (Orden de Libertad), Remands of detainees (Remisiones de detenidos) (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and are printed forms). - The search, registration, and seizure warrant (orden de allanamiento, registro y secuestro). - The order decreeing the lifting of bank secrecy (levantamiento del secreto bancario) and its subsequent extensions. - The dismissal (desestimación). - The definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo). - The request for international cooperation for obtaining evidence and the communications from the requested international authority. - The international capture order (orden de captura internacional). - The extradition request from the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the resolution requiring active extradition, and the various resolutions of the requested country (these documents may also pertain to other stages of the process). - The documentation concerning the notification of the detention of a foreigner to the consulate of their country of nationality. - Resolution deciding on the Public Prosecutor's Office's request for the specialized criminal court for organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case (se arrogue el conocimiento de la causa). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (prescripción) (for example: hearing dates (señalamientos), declarations of default (rebeldías), lifting of a declaration of default (levantamiento de rebeldía), prejudiciality (prejudicialidad), etc.)

INTERMEDIATE STAGE (ETAPA INTERMEDIA):

- The accusation and request for opening of trial (acusación y solicitud de apertura a juicio). - The criminal complaint (querella) and civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). - The minutes of the preliminary hearing (acta de la audiencia preliminar). - The provisional or definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento provisional o definitivo). - The order for opening of trial (auto de apertura a juicio). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: hearing dates, declarations of default, lifting of a declaration of default, prejudiciality, etc.)

TRIAL STAGE (ETAPA DE JUICIO):

- The minutes documenting the application of the special abbreviated procedure (procedimiento especial abreviado) (if applicable). - The trial transcripts (actas del debate). - The definitive dismissal. - The judgment (sentencia). - The resolutions processing appeals (recursos), such as hearings or summons (emplazamientos). - Detention Order, Release Order, Remands of detainees (all these documents have a consecutive number that is recorded and are printed forms). - Resolutions that interrupt and suspend the statute of limitations (for example: hearing dates, declarations of default, lifting of a declaration of default, prejudiciality, etc.) - Resolution of interlocutory appeals (such as those concerning precautionary measures, the resolution deciding on the Public Prosecutor's Office's request for the specialized criminal court for organized crime to assume jurisdiction over the case, enforcement (ejecución), etc.).

SENTENCE APPEAL (APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA):

- Extensions of pretrial detention or house arrest with electronic monitoring, or their denial. - The ruling (voto) deciding on the admissibility of the appeal or admitting evidence to be presented in an oral hearing. - The ruling deciding on the sentence appeal.

CASSATION (CASACIÓN):

- The ruling deciding on the admissibility of the appeal or admitting evidence to be presented in an oral hearing. - The ruling deciding on the appeal.

REVIEW (REVISIÓN):

- The ruling deciding on the admissibility of the review procedure. - The ruling deciding on the merits of the review procedure.

SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT STAGE (ETAPA DE EJECUCIÓN DE SENTENCIA):

- The court order for the calculation of the sentence (auto de liquidación de pena). - The resolutions on enforcement incidents (incidentes de ejecución) (interlocutory appeal).

2- Regarding those resolutions issued orally, the judging persons are reminded that the minutes documenting them must contain, in addition to the requirements established by article 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), also the recommendations established by the subcommittee on orality, with special emphasis on containing necessary data such as the parties and other participants, the statement of proven and unproven facts—if any—, the indication of the admitted evidence (depending on the type of hearing and resolution in question), and the complete transcription of the operative part (parte dispositiva).

3- To guarantee the traceability of the backup file (legajo de respaldo), it will begin to be created during the preparatory stage by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and in the successive stages, or when the intervention of a jurisdictional body is necessary, the latter will complete the file with the corresponding resolutions according to the established parameters.

4- It is the duty of each judicial office or department to make the respective change of location in the Management System or Virtual Desktop once the file (backup material) enters and leaves.

5- Once the process is concluded, the custody of said file will correspond to the Criminal Court JEDO, just as is currently done by offices using physical case files.

6- It must be borne in mind that this is a security backup; however, the only valid form of processing for the office and the procedural parties will be the electronic one.

7- It must be taken into account that this is a backup for the exclusive use of judicial offices and departments, which may not be provided to the parties as a case file, because the official form of processing will be electronic.” In accordance with circular No. 67-09 issued by the Court Secretariat on June 22, 2009, it is communicated that by virtue of the principle of gratuity that governs this matter, the publication is exempt from all payment of fees.

Publish once in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial).” San José, June 14, 2023.

Lic. Carlos T. Mora Rodríguez Acting Deputy General Secretary Supreme Court of Justice” If it is taken into consideration that resolution No. 437-2023 of 2:22 p.m. on May 10, 2023, of the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Emergent Section, is prior to the adoption of this circular, the necessary temporal link between the two acts that would allow examining the constitutionality of the circular in question in this consultation does not exist. In other words, if the constitutional doubt of the consulting court has as its point of reference the issuance of the indicated judgment of May 10, 2023, at that time the Superior Council had not yet issued the circular, so it is chronologically impossible for it to have influenced the jurisdictional act on which the consultation is based. Consequently, the consultation is unevaluable with regard to the act issued by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session number 48-2023 held on June 8, 2023.

VI.- Object of the consultation. The court raises doubts about the constitutionality of articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), (the latter, added by article 18 of the Law for the Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017, reformed by article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

The consulted provisions are transcribed in full, below, for better understanding:

ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIARY, LAW NO. 7333, of May 5, 1993:

A.- "Article 46.- The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the establishment and definition of a territorial circumscription, or those concerning the reallocation of competences (recargo de competencias), the transfer and conversion of judicial offices and of positions or posts, must be based on the inescapable efficiency of the service, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional courts, and the necessary equity of workloads.

By reason of the volume of work and the obligatory efficiency of the public service of justice, the Court may appoint more members of the courts, on a temporary or permanent basis; it may also open and close - for those same reasons - new offices and bodies attached to the courts, in any part of the country.

In mixed courts (tribunales mixtos), the Court may divide functions by subject matter, so that the justice administration services are specialized. When the needs of the service so require, the Court may divide a mixed court into specialized courts.

When the workload does not warrant opening another jurisdictional or judicial body, the Court or the Council may assign itinerant judges and other servants, to travel to the places where the service must be provided with greater efficiency.” (Thus reformed by article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

B.- "Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:

1.- To inform the other Branches of the State in matters in which the Constitution or the laws determine that it be consulted, and to issue its opinion, when required, regarding reform projects to codified legislation or those affecting the organization or functioning of the Judiciary.

2.- To propose the legislative and regulatory reforms it deems convenient to improve the administration of justice.

3.- To approve the draft budget of the Judiciary, which, once enacted by the Legislative Assembly, it may execute through the Council.

4.- To appoint the proprietary and alternate members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones).

5.- To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction (competencias) that arise between the Chambers of the Court, except as provided by law regarding the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).

6.- To designate, in public voting, the president and vice-president of the Court, for periods of four years and two years, respectively, who may be reelected for equal periods and, if they must be replaced for any cause, the appointed person shall serve a new full period. In cases of temporary absences, the procedure indicated in subsection 1) of article 32 shall be followed. (The previous subsection thus reformed by the sole article of the Law to guarantee transparency in the votes of the Judiciary, No. 10325 of November 9, 2022) 7.- To promulgate, on its own initiative or upon the proposal of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the internal regulations of order and service it deems pertinent.

8.- To hear the appeal of sentence, cassation, and the procedure for review of sentences issued by the Second and Third Chambers, when these act as trial courts or single-instance courts.

(As amended by Article 5 of Law No. 9021 of January 3, 2012) 9.- Permanently appoint the members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the inspector generals of the judicial inspection court, the cassation judges and those of the collegiate courts, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Director and Deputy Director of the Judicial Investigation Agency; likewise, the head and deputy head of the Public Defense.

When dealing with officials appointed for a fixed term, the Court must make the new appointment at the first ordinary session in December in which the term ends, and the appointees shall take office on the first business day of the following January.

The Court is also responsible for appointing the substitutes for the officials mentioned in this paragraph.

10.- Review the annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary.

11.- Avocar (assume) jurisdiction and decision-making over matters within the competence of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, when so ordered in a session convened at the request of five of its members or its President, by a simple majority of the Court. From the moment the request for avocamiento (assumption of jurisdiction) is submitted, the decision on the matter by the Superior Council of the Judiciary is suspended until the Court rules, without prejudice to any precautionary measures the Court may order.

The Court shall have one month to resolve the matter it ordered to avocar (assume) before it. In such case, the exhaustion of the administrative remedy shall occur upon communication of the final agreement of the Court. When ordering the avocamiento, the Court may order the suspension of the effects of the Council's agreement.

12.- Exercise the disciplinary regime over its own members and those of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in the manner provided in this Law.

13.- Establish the amounts to determine competence, based on the sum in dispute, in all matters of a financial nature.

14.- Establish the amounts to determine the admissibility of the appeal of cassation, by a minimum vote of two-thirds of all Magistrates. This amount may be decreased or increased, once the period established herein has elapsed, for which purpose a report on the inflation rate shall be previously requested from the Central Bank of Costa Rica.

If one month elapses without the report having been received, the Court shall dispense with it and make the corresponding determination. The determination made, both in this case and in that of the preceding paragraph, shall take effect one month after its first publication in the Judicial Bulletin, for a minimum period of two years.

15.- Propose to the Legislative Assembly the creation of Judicial Offices in the locations and subject matters it deems necessary for good public service.

16.- Merge two or more judicial offices into one or divide them, transfer their seat, fix their respective territorial and subject-matter competence, taking into account the better public service.

It may also assign specialized competence to one or several offices, for them to handle specific matters, within the same subject matter, occurring in one or several circumscriptions or throughout the whole national territory.

17.- Hear the liability lawsuits filed against the Magistrates of the Chambers of the Court.

18.- Determine which working committees shall be permanent and designate the Magistrates who shall be members.

19.- Incorporate into the budget of the Judiciary, by means of internal modification, all money it may receive from the liquidation or non-performance of contracts, interest, damages, and from the charging for document photocopying, microfilming, and similar services.

This money shall be deposited in the bank accounts of the Judiciary.

20.- Set the days and hours of service of judicial offices and publish the respective notice in the Judicial Bulletin.

21.- Issue directives on the scope of rules, when deemed necessary to make effective the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice.

22.- Such other duties as indicated by the Political Constitution and the laws.” C.- “Article 81.- The Superior Council of the Judiciary has the following powers:

1.- Execute the administrative policy of the Judiciary, within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

2.- Designate, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory rules; transfer them, provisionally or definitively, suspend them, grant them leaves of absence with or without pay, and remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President.

3.- Designate interim or substitute officials who administer justice, when it is verified that the Offices are not up to date.

4.- Exercise disciplinary authority over judicial employees, in accordance with the law and without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Full Court, the President of the Court, and the Court of Judicial Inspection.

5.- Designate interim appointments to fill vacancies, including for officials whose permanent appointment corresponds to the Court.

6.- Transfer, provisionally or definitively, suspend, grant leaves of absence with or without pay, remove, and reinstate, in accordance with the corresponding provisions, all judicial employees, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President of the Court.

7.- Approve or reject the designation of subordinate personnel made by each administrative head in their respective Office, department, or judicial office. In doing so, it shall verify that the appointment complied with the procedure established for this purpose in the Judicial Service Statute.

8.- (Repealed by Article 23 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997).

9.- Resolve claims of an economic nature made to the Judiciary, of any kind, and order judicial employees to reimburse funds as appropriate under the law.

10.- Resolve on tenders (licitaciones) and request the Full Court to agree on the expropriation of real estate or the encumbrance of real rights of interest to the Judiciary. Once the expropriation of real estate or the encumbrance of real rights is agreed upon, the Full Court shall publish the agreement in La Gaceta and forward the respective administrative file (expediente) to the Superior Council so that it may appoint one or several experts, as required, to render an appraisal of the real estate or encumbered real rights. The appraisal shall not take into account any eventual increased value (plusvalía) arising from the construction of the project that motivates the expropriation or encumbrance of rights. Once the appraisal is rendered, it shall be made known to the interested parties, by means of personal notification or at the place of residence, so that they may state, within the following fifteen business days, whether they agree to transfer the real estate or real right in question, for the price set in the appraisal accepted by the Council; in which case they shall formalize the transfer before the State Notary, within the following three months.

If for any reason they do not agree to the transfer, the Council shall forward the administrative file, within the following ten business days, to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso-administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) that corresponds by rotation, so that it may initiate the judicial proceedings for expropriation appraisal, in accordance with the procedure contemplated in the Law on Expropriations and Encumbrance of Real Rights of the Judiciary.

11.- Invest the surpluses that may arise, in the maintenance and construction of buildings and in other items that merit it, in accordance with what the Full Court orders.

12.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 13.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 14.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 15.- (Repealed by Article 2 of Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018) 16.- Direct, plan, organize, and coordinate the administrative activities of the Judiciary and propose the corresponding regulations to the Court.

17.- Review and approve the preliminary draft Budget of the Judiciary.

18.- Grant leaves of absence with pay to judicial employees, to undertake studies or projects of interest to the Judiciary.

19.- Hear on appeal, in the cases established by law or by regulation, the decisions of the Executive Director or Deputy Director.

20.- Review and approve the vacation schedule of the Judiciary, with the exception of the vacation schedule of the Chambers of the Court.

21.- Issue internal rules for the better performance of its functions, with the exception of regulations.

22.- Regulate the distribution of judicial matters among Offices of equal territorial competence, to achieve an equalization of work.

23.- Such other activities as are proper to its purpose, in everything not expressly provided for in this Law.

24.- Any other attributed to it by law.

When doubt exists as to whether a matter falls within the competence of the Council or not, the Council shall decide, unless the conflict is with the Supreme Court of Justice, in which case the decision of the latter shall prevail; in both cases with no appeal whatsoever.

In any case, all the powers of the Council regarding judicial employees shall correspond to the Full Court, when dealing with permanent or substitute Magistrates.” D.- “Article 101 bis.- To be a judge of the Specialized Court for Organized Crime (Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and a procedural judge of the Specialized Criminal Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Sentencing Appeals Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada), permanent or substitute, the following requirements apply:

1-) Be a Costa Rican in exercise of their citizen rights.

2-) Be at least thirty years of age.

3-) Hold the title of attorney, legally recognized in the country.

4-) Have practiced as a legal professional in auxiliary or jurisdictional justice roles, in criminal matters, for a minimum of five years and be eligible on the corresponding career ladder (escalafón).

5-) Hold a permanent professional appointment status in the Judiciary.

6-) Have specialized training in organized crime provided by the Judicial School or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Directorate.

These judges shall receive a salary incentive relative to other judges of the same category.

To be a judge of the Specialized Criminal Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Sentencing Appeals Court of the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), permanent or substitute, the following requirements apply:

1-) Be a Costa Rican in exercise of their citizen rights.

2-) Be at least thirty-five years of age.

3-) Hold the title of attorney, legally recognized in the country.

4-) Have practiced as a legal professional in auxiliary or jurisdictional justice roles, in criminal matters, for a minimum of six years and be eligible on the corresponding career ladder (escalafón).

5-) Hold a permanent professional appointment status in the Judiciary.

6-) Have specialized training in organized crime provided by the Judicial School or in coordination with it, or validated by the institution through the Human Resources Directorate.

These judges shall receive a salary incentive relative to other judges of the Criminal Court (Tribunal Penal) or of the Sentencing Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), as the case may be.

In the specialized jurisdiction, it corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judiciary to designate the judges of the Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal), and the procedural judges, and to the Supreme Court of Justice to appoint the judges of the Criminal Court (Tribunal Penal) and the Sentencing Appeals Court. The head of the Public Ministry, the director of the Judicial Investigation Agency, and the director of the Public Defense office shall make, respectively, the appointments of all professional, technical, and support personnel assigned to the scope of their competence, in said jurisdiction.

Similarly, the Superior Council and the other directorates of the institution shall do so, in accordance with their appointment competences, with the remaining personnel designated as specialized in this jurisdiction. All appointments in this specialized jurisdiction shall be made for a period of up to eight years, without the possibility of reelection for the next immediate term. Once the appointment term expires, the personnel shall return to their permanent post. Their appointment may be extended for the time necessary to conclude procedural acts or other ongoing assignments under their responsibility, duly justified, or until the person who must assume the new term is appointed.

To serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, it is necessary to hold a permanent appointment in the Judiciary and to pass a rigorous recruitment and selection process, in accordance with the principle of demonstrated suitability, under the responsibility of the Human Resources Directorate. Once the appointment in the specialized jurisdiction concludes, the official shall return to their permanent post.

All persons serving in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime must be evaluated, at a minimum every two years, by the Human Resources Directorate, which shall be provided with the necessary personnel and budget, to verify that they maintain the suitability to perform in the position, as established by the Judicial Service Statute and when exceptionally requested by any higher instance, or one responsible for supervision and compliance with probity duties; among them, heads of the Public Ministry, Public Defense, Judicial Investigation Agency, Superior Council, Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice, or the Compliance Office. Unfavorable results of any suitability evaluation to serve in the specialized jurisdiction shall be forwarded for the knowledge of the authority that made the appointment, which, among other options, may revoke the appointment in this jurisdiction and return the official to their permanent post. Upon the opening of a disciplinary and/or criminal proceeding, the respective leadership of the person denounced or investigated may adopt as a duly justified administrative measure the return of the official to their permanent post, to continue with the development of the respective procedure.

While serving exclusively in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime, those working in said jurisdiction shall receive a salary incentive.

In the event that the sanction resulting from a disciplinary procedure is suspension, it must be served in the permanently-held position, without receiving the aforementioned incentive.

Those who serve in the specialized jurisdiction shall have special protection, only when risk factors arise from the exercise of their functions that make it necessary, according to the respective technical studies.

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Likewise, when circumstances warrant it and for specific proceedings, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform work in processes of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a position in that jurisdiction.

(Thus added by Article 18 of Law Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, No. 9481 of September 13, 2017) (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023).

VII.- ON THE GUARANTEE OF THE NATURAL JUDGE. The principle of the natural judge (juez natural) is enshrined in Article 35 of the Political Constitution, which provides:

"Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution. Article 35 guarantees the right that no case may be judged except by a 'competent authority'" In the American Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee under discussion is contained in Article 8.1, which establishes:

"Article 8. Judicial Guarantees 1. Every person has the right to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against them, or for the determination of their rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature (…)" In this regard, the distinguished ruling of this Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1739-1992 of 11:45 a.m. on June 1, 1992, on due process, stated:

"THE RIGHT TO THE REGULAR JUDGE (JUEZ REGULAR):

This right, which in the Anglo-American tradition has been developed as the so-called 'right to the natural judge', but with very specific characteristics that do not correspond to those of our Latin law -since it includes, for example, the right to the judge of one's domicile and, above all, to trial by one's peers which is expressed, in turn, in the lay jury, concepts that in systems of the Roman-Germanic tradition have rather produced negative experiences-, is collected in our Constitution especially in Article 35, according to which:

'Article 35 - No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution.' This principle, which we have called the 'regular judge', is complemented, in turn, by those of Articles 9, 152 and 153 and, where applicable, 10, 48 and 49, from which clearly results, as stated supra, the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the tribunals dependent on the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), as well as with that of Article 39, in which it must be understood that the 'competent authority' is necessarily the judicial and ordinary one, the latter because Article 35 cited excludes any possibility of trial by special tribunals for the case or for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust within the scope of the Judicial Branch any possibility of creating tribunals 'established in accordance with this Constitution', with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Supremo de Elecciones) for electoral contentious matters.

If, therefore, jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution made by law of the different spheres of knowledge of the tribunals based on criteria of subject matter, gravity or amount, territory, and degree, both jurisdiction -general or by subject matter- and competence are part of due process, since they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by regular tribunals, in the manner stated." Likewise, this Constitutional Tribunal, in ruling No. 6701-93 of 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993, referred to this guarantee in the following terms:

"The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the 'natural judge' principle is as a legal judge, that is, as an 'body' created by law according to the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for this purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, as a principle, in having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José of Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special ones, to judge certain acts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial tribunals. Ultimately, what is sought is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal by preventing it from being created or chosen by any authority once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not occur in the case under examination." (reiterated in rulings number 000009-94 of 2:54 p.m. on January 4, 1994, 2000-08763 of 3:06 p.m. on October 4, 2000).

More recently, in ruling No. 2020001312 of 9:20 a.m. on January 22, 2020, the Tribunal held:

"In relation to the principle of the Natural Judge, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that this guarantee, an integral element of due process (debido proceso), presupposes the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. What is protected through this principle is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special ones, to judge certain acts or certain persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial tribunals." Thus, the principle of the natural judge or ordinary judge guarantees that a person can only be judged by those tribunals that have been previously constituted by law, prohibiting the creation of ad-hoc or special bodies to judge specific acts or persons in a concrete manner.

This principle has also been broadly protected by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, specifically, in the ruling of November 17, 2009, Case of Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela, in relevant part, it was held:

"75. Article 8.1 of the Convention guarantees the right to be judged by 'a competent tribunal […] previously established by law', a provision related to the concept of the natural judge, one of the guarantees of due process, which has even been recognized by a certain sector of doctrine as a prerequisite thereof. This implies that persons have the right to be judged, in general, by ordinary tribunals, in accordance with legally established procedures.

76. The natural judge derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, conforming to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.' Consequently, in a State of Law, only the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo) can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." In this way, the creation of Courts of Justice and the granting of competence to each of them is a matter reserved to the law, so only the Legislative Branch can regulate it.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has specified that this right constitutes "a basic principle of due process" (IACHR. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. vs Peru. Ruling of May 30, 1999, and Case of Radilla Pacheco vs. Mexico. Ruling of November 23, 2009) related to the concept of the natural judge, which implies that "persons have the right to be judged, in general, by ordinary tribunals, in accordance with procedures legally established" prior to the facts subject to trial. Said natural judge "derives its existence and competence from the law, which has been defined by the Court as the 'legal norm of a general nature, conforming to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative bodies, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the Constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.'" Consequently, in a State of Law "only the Legislative Branch can regulate, through laws, the competence of the judges." Thus, for example, the Court has declared the international responsibility of a State when it created ad hoc Chambers and Courts and designated the judges that integrated them at the time the facts of the case were occurring (IACHR. Case of Ivcher Bronstein vs Peru. Merits, reparations, and costs. Ruling of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74. para. 114).

It is also pertinent to take up the citations of the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, invoked by the petitioning Tribunal and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), where it has been indicated that the constitutional right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law "requires, in the first place, that the judicial body has been previously created by the legal norm, that this norm has invested it with jurisdiction and competence prior to the event motivating the judicial process action, and that its organic and procedural regime does not allow it to be qualified as special or exceptional" (STC 47/83 Caso Serena). So that "the legal predetermination of the judge means that the law, with generality and prior to the case, must contain the criteria for determining competence whose application to each litigious situation allows for the determination of which judge or tribunal is called to hear the case. The generality of the legal criteria guarantees the nonexistence of 'ad hoc' judges; the prior nature of such criteria with respect to the procedural presentation of the litigation guarantees that once the judge for a case is concretely determined by virtue of the application of the competence criteria contained in the laws, the judge of the case may not be dispossessed of its knowledge by virtue of decisions taken by governmental bodies" (STC 101/84, caso Naviera Aznar). It must be noted that the direct interest protected by the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law is the impartiality of the judge. And, in turn, the impartiality of the judge forms part of the right to a process with all guarantees recognized in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution and Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Hence, the other elements - ordinary nature and legal predetermination - are subordinate to that objective, and make sense insofar as they allow its achievement (Constitutional Chamber, ruling No. 2022007481 of 1:01 p.m. on March 30, 2022).

VIII.- ON THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATOR TO ESTABLISH THE COMPETENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL BODIES. - Articles 152 and 166 of the Political Constitution state:

"Article 152.- The Judicial Branch is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and by the other tribunals that the law may establish." "Article 166.- Regarding matters not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall stipulate the jurisdiction, the number, and the duration of the tribunals, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their actions, and the manner of holding them accountable." From the cited norms, the exclusive power possessed by the Legislative Branch to dictate the laws creating Courts of Justice, as well as those necessary to regulate matters relating to their powers and competence, a matter covered by legal reserve (reserva legal), is extracted. Hence, the creation of Courts of Justice is an exclusive competence of the Legislative Branch. On the other hand, Article 153 of the Political Constitution provides:

"Article 153: It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions that this constitution assigns to it, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and administrative contentious cases, as well as the others that the law may establish, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved may be; to resolve definitively upon them and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the help of public force if necessary." That provision confers full discretion on the legislator to create the tribunals through which the Judiciary exercises its function.

In the matter under analysis, it is necessary to refer to the law on "Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime," Law No. 9481 of September 13, 2017.

"ARTICLE 1- Purpose. The Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime is created, with competence in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed by persons of legal age and that meet the criteria provided for in this law. The courts and tribunals that apply this law shall extend their competence to hear related crimes for which the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime asserts its competence.

For the entire criminal legal system, organized crime shall be understood as any activity that meets the requirements and parameters provided for in Articles 8 and 9 of this law." Article 2 defines its competence, in the following terms:

"ARTICLE 2- Competence. Matters of organized crime or organized criminality may be processed in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, or in the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime. Procedural acts issued in organized crime cases in the ordinary jurisdiction, before the entry into operation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime, shall maintain their efficacy and validity. For both jurisdictions, the regulations in force on the matter apply, including Law 8754, Law against Organized Crime, of July 22, 2009, unless expressly provided otherwise.

Matters that meet the parameters established in Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, shall be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction. These matters shall be heard by the ordinary criminal courts, criminal tribunals, and criminal sentence appeals tribunals throughout the country. Matters that, in addition to meeting the provisions of Article 1 of Law 8754, of July 22, 2009, conform to the provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 9481, Creation of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime in Costa Rica, of September 13, 2017, may be submitted to the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime. These matters may be submitted to the Criminal Court, Criminal Tribunal, and Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal, all of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime. They shall hear criminal acts that meet the indicated parameters, as well as related crimes. Their seat shall be in San José, as well as in the places and in the manner determined by the Supreme Court of Justice, and they shall have competence throughout the national territory. Furthermore, these offices shall also have competence at the national level to perform work within the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (…) (Thus reformed by Article 2 of Law No. 10369 of May 30, 2023) Likewise, Article 18 of Law No. 9481, "Additions," contemplates one of the provisions consulted by the tribunal, Article 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), which is transcribed, in relevant part:

"The following are added to Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993: Articles 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis, and 107 bis. The texts are as follows:

(…) Article 101 bis- (…) Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime shall also perform work within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 9769 of October 18, 2019).

Now then, as already indicated, the principle of the natural judge establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, pre-established by law, as occurred with the creation of the aforementioned specialized jurisdiction, so that we are not faced with a jurisdictional body constituted ad hoc, but rather with courts of justice that were created by a law and whose competence has also been defined by the legislator, just as required by the principle of the natural judge. The criminal judges of the Specialized Jurisdiction in Organized Crime, by legal mandate, have competence throughout the national territory to attend to matters of organized or ordinary crime. They were not designated for the specific case but rather form part of the integration of a specific jurisdictional body whose competence has been legally defined, having to hear "ordinary and specialized processes" due to the requirement of the justice system, the public interest, and the correct use of public funds. It is evident that a crime was not judged -whose processing corresponds to the ordinary process- through the specialized process, but rather it was simply processed by specialized judges applying the procedural law of the ordinary process, a situation which in no way affects the legally defined competence.

It is reiterated that the challenged provisions do not contemplate judges appointed <span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">ex proffeso</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> or </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">ad hoc</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> for specific persons; the questioned regulations correspond to aspects inherent to the administrative order of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the objective assumptions considered therein and the need to attend to the justice administration service in the current historical context, and on the understanding that the hearing of ordinary jurisdiction cases by the Jurisdicción de la Delincuencia Organizada is provided for by law, such that it is neither surprising nor particularized to a person or specific situation, but rather the hearing of the proceeding remains in the hands of a Criminal Judge, in a process where due process is guaranteed to the accused.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">IX.- NON-EXISTENCE OF VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 121.20 AND 166 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The Criminal Sentence Appeals Court also inquires whether Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), the latter added and amended by the Law “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica” Law N°9481 of September 13, 2017, Law N°9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law N°10369 of May 30, 2023</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">violate precepts 121 subsection 20) and 166 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, it bears reiterating that the jurisdiction to hear ordinary jurisdiction matters was established by Law N°9481 creating the Jurisdicción Especializada Delincuencia Organizada, as mandated by the Political Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights, and both the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court. Far from violating the cited constitutional provisions, the fact of the matter is that the norms whose constitutionality is questioned fully comply with Articles 121 subsection 20) and 166 of the Constitution, by regulating jurisdictional bodies and their jurisdictions through provisions of legal rank; therefore, Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the Law of the Constitution, and in that sense the inquiry is evacuated.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">X.- CONCLUSION. -</span><span style=\"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch do not violate the principle of the Natural Judge (Juez Natural), protected in numerals 35 and 39 of the Political Constitution and 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in extraordinary session</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of January 30, 2023, Record 003-2023 -Article XVIII </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the inquiry is declared not subject to evacuation (inevacuable)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">XI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Full Court in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Therefore (Por tanto):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The inquiry formulated by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea seat, is evacuated in the sense that Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (the latter added and amended by the Law “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica” Law N°9481 of September 13, 2017, Law N°9769 of October 18, 2019, and Law N°10369 of May 30, 2023) do not infringe upon the principle of the Natural Judge (Juez Natural) nor Articles 121 subsection 20 and 166 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice, adopted in extraordinary session of January 30, 2023, Record 003-2023 -Article XVIII and the Agreement adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 48-2023, held on June 8, 2023, article LXXI, the inquiry is declared not subject to evacuation (inevacuable). Judge Rueda Leal dissents and declares the inquiry not subject to evacuation. Let this pronouncement be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify the inquiring Court and the parties. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Liberation Serif'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><table cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"border-collapse:collapse\" class=\"mce-item-table\"><tbody><tr><td colspan=\"2\" style=\"width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan=\"2\" style=\"width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan=\"2\" style=\"width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td colspan=\"2\" style=\"width:457.65pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Fernando Castillo V</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">President</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Paul Rueda L</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Jorge Araya G</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr style=\"height:16.1pt\"><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Anamari Garro V.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Ingrid Hess H.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:223.45pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Aracelly Pacheco S.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:223.4pt; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Alexandra Alvarado P.</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Exp. 24-008738-0007-CO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Res. 2024021938</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:28pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> With the customary respect, I dissent based on these grounds.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:28pt; margin-bottom:28pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By resolution issued at 9:03 a.m. on April 26, 2024, the Presidency of this Court warned the inquiring judges as follows: “…</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">they must identify and specify, in a clear and duly individualized manner, which specific agreements of the Full Court (Corte Plena) are intended to be challenged in this inquiry</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">”. The warning is entirely pertinent, considering the formality of the judicial inquiry process, which includes the need to adequately identify the norm or provision whose constitutionality is challenged.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:28pt; margin-bottom:28pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In addressing that warning, the inquiring court identified the agreement of the Superior Council, adopted in article LXXI of session no. 48-2023 of June 8, 2023, and the agreement of the Full Court, adopted through article XVIII of the extraordinary session at 8:16 a.m. on January 30, 2023, record 003-2023. I note, regarding the latter, that according to official letter no. 81-2024 from the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, the undersigned did not participate in its approval, and therefore I have no grounds to recuse myself from hearing the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">sub lite</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> matter.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:28pt; margin-bottom:28pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Now, I concur with the majority opinion when it declares the inquiry not subject to evacuation (inevacuable) regarding the Full Court agreement. Indeed, this applied to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, which is not the instance that issued the appealed judgment in the underlying matter. Therefore, there is no connection between the latter and the challenged agreement.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:28pt; margin-bottom:28pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">I also share the majority's view that the inquiry is not subject to evacuation regarding the Superior Council agreement identified by the inquiring Court, since it is subsequent to the issuance of the appealed judgment. An additional element confirms the thesis put forward. In response to a request from the inquiring court, the processing judge of the Criminal Court of San José indicated: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:28pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">According to a consultation made with the coordination of this office as well as with the Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, it is reported that case [Valor 001] was referred to said Court on February 7, 2023, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">as part of the agreements adopted by the Superior Council on November 3 and 11, 2022</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">”. (Underlining added).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Thus, it is evident that the agreements identified by the inquiring court lack the necessary connection with the underlying matter. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Concerning Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, whose constitutionality is indeed analyzed by the majority of this Court, the undersigned objects to the admissibility of the inquiry on two grounds.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">First, the inquiry resolution does not carry out an analysis of each of them, seeking to contrast them with the block of constitutionality, for the purpose of demonstrating the legal antinomy. This requirement is indispensable for the admissibility of any inquiry. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Second, regarding the cited Articles 46, 59, and 81, I determine that they are jurisdictional norms that, for the purposes of the inquiry, should find their development in agreements of the Superior Council or the Full Court, as the case may be, so that the requirement is met that the challenged provision be a “…</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">norm or act that must be applied, or an act, conduct, or omission that must be judged in a case submitted to its knowledge</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">” (canon 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Those precepts state:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&nbsp;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Article 46.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The agreements and provisions of the Court relating to the</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\"> establishment and definition of a territorial jurisdiction (circunscripción territorial), or those concerning the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">additional assignment of jurisdictions (recargo de competencias), the transfer and conversion of judicial offices and positions or posts, must be based on the unavoidable efficiency of the service</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, the specialization of judicial bodies and jurisdictional tribunals, and the necessary equity of workloads</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">…” (Emphasis by the inquirants). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Article 59.- It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(…)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">16.- Merge two or more judicial offices into one or divide them, transfer them from their seat, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">set their respective territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction (competencia territorial y por materia)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, taking into consideration the best public service.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">It may also assign specialized jurisdiction (competencia especializada) to one or several offices</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, so that they hear specific matters, within the same subject area, occurring in one or several jurisdictions (circunscripciones) or throughout the national territory</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">”. (Emphasis by the inquirants).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; line-height:107%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Article 81.- It corresponds to the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(…)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">2.- Appoint, with the exception of those corresponding to the Court, the officials who administer justice, in accordance with the corresponding legal and regulatory norms; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">transfer them, provisionally or definitively</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, suspend them and grant them leave with or without pay and remove them, all in accordance with the corresponding provisions, without prejudice to the powers attributed to the President</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(Emphasis by the inquirants).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In other words, for the judicial inquiry not to be an abstract exercise (which would entail its inadmissibility), the inquiring judges had to establish the link between those articles of the Organic Law and the case submitted to their knowledge. Such connection was found, in the opinion of the inquirants, in the challenged agreements. However, given that the admissibility of those was ruled out </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">ut supra</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the aforementioned link was left without support.</span></p> Indeed, it is inferred from the consultation that the consulting office understands the nature of the jurisdictional norms and the need for an agreement that develops or relates them to the specific case, given that it establishes as its claim that “… the Constitutional Chamber determine whether Articles 46, 59, 81, and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (…) and the agreements of the Corte Plena (…) that support those and allow the transfer of case files (expedientes)…” (underlining added).

Now, if the consulting authority intended to challenge the cited articles autonomously (without an agreement developing them), then the inadmissibility for lack of adequate legal argument (fundamentación) reappears, as already stated, since a justification of the connection to the specific case would be lacking.

Finally, regarding canon 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), it states in the pertinent part:

“Article 101 bis - To be a judge of the Specialized Court for Organized Crime (Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and processing judge of the Specialized Criminal Trial Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada) and of the Specialized Sentence Appeals Court for Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada), whether permanent or substitute, it is required:

(…)

Those who serve in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) shall also perform duties within the ordinary jurisdiction, when institutional requirements so determine. Likewise, when circumstances warrant it and for specific procedures, those who serve in the ordinary jurisdiction may perform duties in proceedings of the specialized jurisdiction, without this entailing the recognition of the salary incentive provided for the specialized jurisdiction, nor the assignment of a post in that jurisdiction”. (Emphasis by the consultants).

This precept, unlike the previous ones, does not expressly assign jurisdictional powers (competencias) to the Superior Council (Consejo Superior) or the Corte Plena. However, in the sub examine, objections to admissibility remain. On the one hand, its link to the specific case is not clearly argued, as explained previously. On the other, I emphasize that this provision concerns those who “…serve (desempeñen) in the Specialized Jurisdiction for Organized Crime (Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada)…” (underlining added), which is not considered applicable to the base matter, given that such jurisdiction had not come into operation at the time the conviction was issued, so the judging person could not have been “serving” in that jurisdiction.

Given these deficiencies in the legal argument (fundamentación) of the consultation, I deem it unanswerable (inevacuable).

**Paul Rueda L.**

Revisión del Documento 1 *CO* Res. Nº 2024021938 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las trece horas quince minutos del treinta y uno de julio de dos mil veinticuatro.

Consulta judicial formulada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, sede Goicoechea, mediante voto N°2024-462 de las once horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de marzo de dos mil veinticuatro, corregido por resolución N°2024-713 de las quince horas cinco minutos del veintinueve de abril de dos mil veinticuatro, dictadas en el expediente número [Valor 001].

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 4 de abril de 2024, y con fundamento en el artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el tribunal consultante solicita a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad de las siguientes disposiciones: a) los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (este último adicionado y reformado por la Ley Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica -Ley nro. 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017- Ley nro.9769 de 18 de octubre de 2019 y Ley nro. 10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023); b) los acuerdos de Corte Plena (entre ellos el contenido en la circular 137-2023 de 14 de junio de 2023 que contiene la “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado” en cuanto -según indica el Tribunal consultante- “apoyan... y permiten el traslado de expedientes de la justicia ordinaria a la de delincuencia organizada”, a fin de que la Sala Constitucional determine si “vulneran el principio de juez legal o natural recogido por los artículos 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 35, 39, 121.20 y 166 de la Constitución Política en tanto permiten que un órgano administrativo o leyes con menor rango que las normas constitucionales y convencionales modifiquen la competencia de los jueces naturales de un hecho, asignando el conocimiento de la causa a tribunales que, para la fecha de los hechos, no existían”. En cuanto a los antecedentes. Indica el tribunal consultante que el licenciado José Gerardo Montoya Hernández, defensor particular del imputado, interpuso recurso de apelación contra la sentencia dictada en autos; en el primer motivo alega la existencia de una actividad procesal defectuosa por defecto absoluto y violación al principio de juez legal o natural, porque este asunto, que es un proceso ordinario, en que a una sola persona se le atribuye la retención de cuotas obrero patronales, fue asignado a una sección emergente del Tribunal de Delincuencia Organizada y la fiscal que asistió era designada para ese tipo de materia, lo que evidencia la creación de un tribunal especial para el caso y consolidado a posteriori, lo que implica que el nombramiento y la competencia de los juzgadores no estaba al alcance de las partes para ser consultado oportunamente, sino que emergió de forma posterior a la consumación de los hechos que se acusan. Estima que hubo una notable violación al debido proceso penal por la conformación de un tribunal no competente para ello, al resultar el mismo ser un tribunal nombrado para conocer otra naturaleza de procesos como resulta ser la sección de crimen organizado, cuando las normas internas e internacionales señalan que el tribunal competente debe estar preconstituido antes de los hechos, conforme lo dispuesto en los numerales 35 de la Constitución Política y 3 del Código Procesal Penal, y añade que, conforme al numeral 178 inciso 2 del Código Procesal Penal, son defectos absolutos los relacionados con el nombramiento, capacidad y constitución de jueces o tribunales. Considera que lo resuelto genera un agravio irreparable, pues el imputado fue juzgado por un tribunal nombrado con posterioridad a la supuesta comisión delictiva descrita en la pieza acusatoria, y pide la nulidad de la sentencia y el reenvío correspondiente al órgano competente. Al contestar el recurso la representación fiscal indicó que el reclamo debe rechazarse, entre otros motivos porque el artículo 81 inciso 2) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establece que el Consejo Superior tiene la potestad, no sólo de designar a los funcionarios que administran justicia, sino también de trasladarlos provisional o definitivamente. Además, la ley de creación de la jurisdicción especializada número 9481, reformada por la número 9769 y la número 10369 establece, en su artículo 18, adiciones al artículo 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial para posibilitar que quienes se desempeñan en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, también realicen labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. Se refiere a la circular número 137-2023, que establece la emisión de reglas prácticas y la forma de tramitación de la jurisdicción especializada de crimen organizado, en relación con lo dispuesto en la ley número 9481. Considera la representación fiscal que el reclamo es infundado y ayuno de agravio, razón por la cual procede su rechazo. Agrega el Tribunal consultante que el apelante alude al quebranto de normas constitucionales y convencionales y la representación fiscal afirma que la actuación está posibilitada por normas legales (de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial o de las leyes relacionadas con la delincuencia organizada, éstas últimas posteriores a la fecha de los hechos acusados), razón por la que al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del II Circuito Judicial de San José le surge la duda de si las leyes de las que se afirma la competencia del órgano sentenciador, violentan normas de superior rango. Sobre la legitimación. Indica el tribunal consultante que cuenta con legitimación para hacer la consulta, pues de lo que se decida, dependerá lo que deba resolverse en este asunto sobre el alegato de fondo planteado. En cuanto al fondo. Apunta el tribunal consultante que Costa Rica ratificó la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), como parte de su derecho interno, por ley N° 4534 el 23 de febrero de 1970 y que el 07 de febrero de 1980 aceptó la competencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Además, ratificó la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados según ley N°7615 del 24 de julio de 1996, además, que la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia N°2313-95 indicó que los pronunciamientos de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en tanto intérprete de la Convención, tienen el mismo rango de ésta y que los instrumentos sobre derechos humanos son ejecutivos y ejecutables, predominan sobre la ley y adquieren rango supra constitucional (voto número 282-90). Cita los artículos 8.1 CIDH, el numeral XXVI.II de la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre así como el numeral 14.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, en los cuales se consagra la garantía del Juez Natural y reitera que, resultan de aplicación directa los pronunciamientos que, tanto sobre la jerarquía normativa, como sobre el tema del juez regular o natural, ha establecido Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Sobre lo primero, cita el aparte 123 de la sentencia del caso Almonacid Arellano contra Chile (reiterada en el fallo Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso contra Perú, aparte 128 y la sentencia Gelman contra Uruguay, del 20 de marzo de 2013) respecto al control de convencionalidad). Señala que, desde esta perspectiva, resultaría de aplicación lo que específicamente sobre el juez legal o natural ha dicho la Corte Interamericana, a saber “76. El juez natural deriva su existencia y competencia de la ley, la cual ha sido definida por la Corte como la “norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las constituciones de los Estados Partes para la formación de las leyes”. El juez natural deriva su existencia y competencia de la ley, la cual ha sido definida por la Corte como la “norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las constituciones de los Estados Partes para la formación de las leyes”. Consecuentemente, en un Estado de Derecho sólo el Poder Legislativo puede regular, a través de leyes, la competencia de los juzgadores» (Sentencia del caso Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela de 17 de noviembre de 1999). Del mismo modo, ese órgano ha declarado la responsabilidad internacional de un Estado, cuando este creó Salas y juzgados ad hoc y designó jueces/juezas que los integraran, en el mismo momento en que ocurrían los hechos del caso (Sentencia del caso Ivcher Bronstein vs. Perú del 06.02.2001, párr. 114). A nivel de derecho interno, los artículos 35 y 39 de la Constitución Política aluden a que el juzgamiento penal de una persona solo puede hacerse por “autoridad competente”. Dice la primera de esas disposiciones: “Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución” Asimismo, el artículo 121.20 de la Constitución Política regula, como función esencial del Congreso: “Además de las otras atribuciones que le confiere esta Constitución, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa: (…) 20) Crear los tribunales de justicia y los demás organismos para el servicio nacional” y el numeral 166 de la Constitución Política establece: “En cuanto a lo que no esté previsto por esta Constitución, la ley señalará la jurisdicción, el número y la duración de los tribunales, así como sus atribuciones, los principios a los cuales deben ajustar sus actos y la manera de exigirles responsabilidad.”. La autoridad competente es aquella a la que la ley le dota de funciones según materia, grado, funcional u objetivamente debe decidir el caso, reglas todas que deben fijarse con antelación a ese asunto en particular (en el mismo sentido los votos de la Sala Constitucional Nº2000-10822, Nº1739-92, Nº1422-95, Nº6701-93, Nº6992-96, Nº8738-97 y Nº2491-96, entre otros). Señala el tribunal consultante que, aunque los alcances del principio de juez regular tradicionalmente se han circunscrito a la prohibición de ser juzgado por un/a juez/a específicamente designado/a para el conflicto o por un órgano ajeno al Poder Judicial (tribunales de excepción o ad hoc) luego se amplió su contenido a la necesaria preexistencia legal del órgano jurisdiccional respecto a la comisión del hecho (prohibición de tribunales ex post facto), ampliación esa que se da a través de instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos que, en cuanto amplíen el catálogo de derechos humanos, tienen rango igual o superior a la Constitución Política por así disponerlo los artículos 7 de la Constitución Política, 73 inciso d) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y los votos Nº3435-92, Nº2313-95, Nº1319-97, Nº4356-98 y Nº6830-98 de la Sala Constitucional. La necesidad de que los tribunales existan previamente a la comisión de los hechos ha sido aceptada, en forma prácticamente unánime, por la doctrina más autorizada (cita a Maier, Julio, Cafferata Nores, José, Tiedemann, Klaus y Antillón Montealegre, Walter) También, respecto al juez natural se ha referido el Tribunal Constitucional Español, indicando: “El derecho constitucional al juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley exige, en primer lugar, que el órgano judicial haya sido creado previamente por la norma jurídica, que ésta lo haya investido de jurisdicción y competencia con anterioridad al hecho motivador de la actuación y proceso judicial, y que su régimen orgánico y procesal no permita calificarle de órgano especial o excepcional”. Tribunal constitucional español, sentencia 47/1983. En igual sentido y del mismo órgano los votos 102/2001, 170/2002. También cita pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional (votos Nº2002-06223, N°6701-93 y Nº2004-12629) Según ese principio, entonces, una vez adquirida la competencia para conocer de un proceso, ésta sólo se pierde por causas preestablecidas en la ley que buscan tutelar otros principios de igual rango (como el de imparcialidad, por ejemplo, a través de las excusas o recusaciones). Ahora bien, como se ha visto, las normas constitucionales y convencionales y la jurisprudencia de los tribunales que las interpretan, establecen que la competencia solo se adquiere por ley y que tal competencia debe preexistir al hecho que se juzga. Pese a ello, hay normas legales, ya sea anteriores a la Constitución Política de 1949 como la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial No. 8 emitida el 29 de noviembre de 1937, o posteriores a ésta, que trasladan esas facultades que las normas superiores dan a la ley, para dejarlas en manos de órganos administrativos del Poder Judicial (Corte Plena, Consejo Superior), por lo que este tribunal duda de si tales disposiciones implican un vaciamiento de las garantías dichas. Cita el artículo 46 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ), reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley N°7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, transcribe parcialmente los numerales 59, 81 de la LOPJ e íntegramente el numeral 101 bis., adicionado por el artículo 18 de la Ley Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, N°9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017, reformada por el artículo 1° de la ley N°10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023. Señala el tribunal que en el presente asunto, la persona fue acusada por retener cuotas obrero-patronales durante el período de mayo a diciembre de 2017 y enero a setiembre de 2018. Se trata de un hecho propio de la jurisdicción ordinaria que, por territorio, se tramitaba en el Tribunal de Juicio ordinario del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José y nunca ha habido, en este proceso, una declaratoria de delincuencia organizada, la cual tampoco sería posible pues ésta requiere al menos dos personas y la acusación contra el encartado es individual. La Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada fue creada mediante leyes No. 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017 (que, sin embargo, establecía su vigencia para un año después) y reformada mediante leyes No. 9591 de 24 de julio de 2018, No. 9769 de 18 de octubre de 2019 y No. 10369 de 30 de mayo de 2023. Como puede verse, todas esas disposiciones son posteriores a los hechos acusados. Pese a ello, este proceso fue trasladado desde el tribunal en el que radicaba (por materia y territorio) hasta el creado Tribunal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada (de otra materia penal especializada y en otro lugar) y así se desprende del encabezado de la sentencia impugnada (en donde el tribunal se denomina “sección emergente”), de la fecha de esa resolución (mayo de 2023) y de los acuerdos de Corte Plena (entre ellos el contenido en la circular 137-2023 de 14 de junio de 2023 que contiene la “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado” que facultan a trasladar asuntos ordinarios a esa jurisdicción, los cuales se complementan con el listado de expedientes trasladados del órgano competente al recién creado. Por todo lo dicho, existen dudas fundadas de si, permitir que, por acuerdos administrativos de Corte Plena, se apliquen leyes que crean tribunales a hechos que ya habían sucedido, genera una violación al principio constitucional y convencional de juez regular, legal o natural, en la modalidad de necesidad de tribunal preexistente a los hechos juzgados. Sobre cuestiones procesales. El Tribunal remite el asunto a la Sala Constitucional, emplaza a las partes para que, dentro de tercer día, comparezcan ante dicha Sala a fin de que expresen sus alegatos, conviertan –si lo tienen a bien- la consulta en acción de inconstitucionalidad, conforme lo establece el artículo 105 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y señalen lugar o medio dentro del perímetro del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, para atender sus notificaciones y suspende la tramitación del proceso (y con ella la prescripción de la acción penal) hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional evacue la presente consulta (artículos 34 inciso a del Código Procesal Penal y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

2.- En atención al emplazamiento conferido a las partes en el proceso principal, por escrito presentado el 4 de abril de 2024, se apersona Carlo Díaz Sánchez, Fiscal General de la República. Se refiere al motivo de la consulta, en tanto el apelante alega la existencia de una actividad procesal defectuosa por defecto absoluto y violación al principio de juez natural. En cuanto al fundamento. I. Principio de juez natural en el sistema interamericano de Derechos Humanos, del cual Costa Rica es parte, obliga a los Estados a cumplir con las disposiciones y resoluciones emanadas de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, sin anteponer su derecho interno, sobre las sentencias emitidas por ese alto tribunal. Cita el numeral XXVI.II de la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, el artículo 14.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y menciona el numeral 8.1 de la CIDH. Para fundamentar la conformación de un tribunal con jueces especializados en delincuencia organizada para conocer delitos comunes, y que esto no contraviene el principio de juez legal o natural, según lo establecido en la Convención Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, se debe analizar los siguientes elementos claves:

• a)El principio de juez natural, que establece que toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída por un tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial preestablecido por la ley; es decir, que el juez o jueces deben ser definidos anteriormente por el ordenamiento jurídico sin que se constituya ad hoc para el caso concreto, como garantía fundamental para el debido proceso. En el caso sub examine, la fiscalía ha sido amplia al destacar que, los jueces designados para conocer el proceso ordinario en cuestión, no fueron nombrados para conocer el caso concreto, sino que su designación corresponde a un requerimiento del sistema de justicia, que, además, está permitido dentro de la normativa establecida para tal efecto. Por otra parte, considera el Ministerio Público que existe un error de interpretación preceptiva de quien recurre, en cuanto a la necesidad de que los tribunales existan, previamente a la punición de los hechos. Es necesario aclarar que, tanto los convenios internacionales suscritos, como el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense señalan esta obligación; y, ciertamente la sumaria [Valor 001] fue conocida por un tribunal preconstituido, con la única variante de que esta se compuso con jueces especializados en delincuencia organizada, asunto que también se encuentra autorizado por la ley. Bajo esta realidad, si bien es cierto, la Ley Contra la Delincuencia Organizada entró en vigencia en setiembre de 2018, y los hechos imputados corresponden de mayo a diciembre de 2017 y de enero a setiembre de 2018, lo cierto es que, no se juzgaron delitos en la materia especializada, sino que, fueron conocidos y dictaminados por jueces nombrados en esa especialidad, situación que no limita la competencia de esos servidores, a conocer causas ordinarias. Es así como, de ninguna manera se transgrede el principio de juez natural protegido desde las instancias de derechos humanos, ni de las propias.
• b)Funcionamiento del sistema judicial en Costa Rica: En el sistema judicial costarricense, el nombramiento de jueces especializados en delincuencia organizada, obedece a la necesidad de enfrentar de manera más efectiva, ciertas causas que requieren conocimiento específico. Sin embargo, el hecho de que estos jueces puedan conocer otro tipo de casos, bajo circunstancias de necesidad institucional, se fundamenta en la flexibilidad del sistema, para asegurar el acceso a la justicia y la eficiencia judicial.
• c)Aplicabilidad del principio de juez natural: La asignación de jueces especializados en delincuencia organizada a casos de delitos comunes, en situaciones excepcionales y bajo criterios de necesidad y urgencia institucional, no necesariamente contraviene el principio de juez natural. El punto medular en este tipo de asuntos, es que la designación de esta autoridad, esté prevista por el ordenamiento jurídico, manteniendo los criterios de competencia, independencia e imparcialidad, y que no se realice con el propósito de influir en el resultado del juicio.

II.Sobre el principio de juez natural en Costa Rica: La Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, establece normas atinentes a la conformación e integración de los despachos judiciales y regulaciones relacionadas con la distribución de trabajo, las cuales admiten que, bajo criterios de eficiencia del servicio, especialización de los órganos judiciales y equidad en las cargas de trabajo, sean conformadas según interese a estas circunstancias. Además, prevé la posibilidad de que la integración de los tribunales, pueda ser modificada de conformidad con lo indicado (cita el artículo 46 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). Sobre las atribuciones del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, previstas en los incisos 1 y 2 del artículo 81 de la LOPJ, señala que es posible afirmar que el Consejo Superior tiene la potestad tanto de designar a los funcionarios que administran justicia, así como trasladarlos, provisional o definitivamente, con lo cual se evidencia las potestades de modificación de la ubicación laboral de los mismos. Lo anterior, se observa en las decisiones por las cuales se asignan en razón de planes remediales, otras competencias a distintos jueces, sin que con ello se afecte el principio de juez natural.

Puesto que se reclama la violación al juez natural con el conocimiento de este asunto, por parte del Tribunal Especializado, es importante para ello definir primero el término, para determinar si existe la violación acusada:

“III.- […] a.) Sobre el principio de juez natural. La garantía del juez natural tiene su base en lo estipulado en el numeral 35 de la Constitución Política, que textualmente dispone: “Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión, tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución […]” Este precepto constitucional establece una protección para el ciudadano, de manera que solo podrá ser juzgado a través de los jueces ordinarios, designados de forma regular y de forma previa por la propia ley. La Sala Constitucional ha dado contenido a ese principio constitucional, a través de la destacada resolución 1739-1992:

“[…] C) EL DERECHO AL JUEZ REGULAR: Este derecho, que en la tradición anglo norteamericana se ha desarrollado como el llamado "derecho al juez natural", pero con perfiles muy propios que no corresponden a los de nuestro derecho latino -ya que comprende, por ejemplo el derecho al juez del domicilio y, sobre todo, al juzgamiento por los pares que se expresa, a su vez, en el jurado lego, conceptos que en los sistemas de tradición romano-germánica más bien han producido experiencias negativas-, en nuestra Constitución se recoge especialmente en el artículo 35, que dispone: "[…] Artículo 35 - Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución […]".

Este principio, que hemos llamado del "juez regular", se complementa, a su vez, con los de los artículos 9, 152 y 153 y, en su caso, 10, 48 y 49 de la Carta Fundamental, de los cuales resulta clara la exclusividad y universalidad de la función jurisdiccional en manos de los tribunales dependientes del Poder Judicial, así como con el del artículo 39, del cual se desprende que la "autoridad competente" es necesariamente la judicial y ordinaria, esto último porque el 35 transcrito excluye toda posibilidad de juzgamiento por tribunales especiales para casos concretos, y porque el 152 y 153 agotan en el ámbito del Poder Judicial toda posibilidad de creación de tribunales "establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución", con la única salvedad del Supremo de Elecciones para el contencioso electoral. De esta manera, la jurisdicción consiste, en general, en la potestad de administrar justicia, y la competencia en la distribución que hace la ley de las diferentes esferas de conocimiento de los tribunales con base en criterios de materia, gravedad o cuantía, territorio y grado, tanto la jurisdicción como la competencia, son parte del debido proceso, pues garantizan que los conflictos sean resueltos por los tribunales regulares, en la forma dicha (Sala III de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución Nº770 – 2019 de las once horas treinta minutos del veintiuno de junio de dos mil diecinueve).

Véase entonces que esta competencia por ley debe estar definida, tal como se ha indicado en el caso particular, en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Se permite entonces, en razón del interés, modificar éstas, atendiendo a distribución de trabajo, criterios de eficiencia en el servicio, especialización de los órganos judiciales y equidad en las cargas de trabajo.

No se violenta entonces el principio de juez natural, y así se ha conocido en otros casos cuando se ha resuelto: “ […] la reserva legal en la conformación y designación de los jueces no ha sido conculcada en la especie, pues la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, según se ha explicado, contiene normas expresas que disponen la conformación e integración de los distintos tribunales y juzgados, y también se contemplan preceptos que regulan la distribución de trabajo, la cual inclusive puede ser modificada por los órganos superiores del Poder Judicial, a saber, Corte Plena y Consejo Superior atendiendo a criterios de eficiencia, especialización y equidad. Por otra parte, en lo que concierne a las funciones propias del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, la competencia y conformación del mismo está definida previamente por los artículos 93 y 93 bis, organizado por secciones integradas por tres jueces, y haciendo la salvedad que ello será “de acuerdo con las necesidades del servicio […] " (Sala III de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 2019-01171 de las once horas diez minutos del veinte de setiembre de dos mil diecinueve.)

Finalmente, hay que indicar que la Ley N°9481 de “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica”, subraya:

18.- Adiciones. […] Por medio de este artículo se adiciona a la Ley 7333, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial del 5 de mayo de 1993, varios artículos: 93 ter. 96 ter, 101 bis y 107 bis […]. (Reformado por el artículo 1° de la ley N°9769 del 18 de octubre del 2019).

El numeral 101 (bis) de ese mismo cuerpo de normas, apunta: “[…]Quienes se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada también realizarán labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen […]”.

Descansando en lo dispuesto por las normas indicadas, se puede afirmar que, el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, además de designar a los funcionarios que administran justicia, puede trasladarlos temporal o definitivamente. Y en el caso de los jueces elegidos como especializados en Delincuencia Organizada, de conformidad con la ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (reformado por el artículo 1° de la ley N°9769 del 18 de octubre del 2019), están legitimados para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. A partir de las potestades conferidas por la ley, además de las sesiones del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, se derivan los requerimientos institucionales que determinaron la necesidad de que el Tribunal de Apelación Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, colabore en un plan remedial con distintos Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, en razón de las cargas de trabajo. En sesión 098-2022 del 11 de noviembre de 2022, artículo II, se convino, luego de conocer el criterio jurídico No. DJ-566-2022 del 07 de noviembre de 2022 y recibir en audiencia a la señora magistrada Sandra Zúñiga Morales, en su condición de coordinadora de la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, a la master Roxana Arrieta Meléndez, Directora Interna de Gestión Humana y licenciada Olga Guerrero Córdoba, subdirectora interina, lo siguiente: “ […] Tener por recibido el criterio N° DJ-566-2022 del 07 de noviembre del 2022, suscrito por el máster Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Director Jurídico y en razón de lo indicado: 1) Acoger la gestión presentada en oficio N° S-CJEDO-16-2022 de 27 de octubre de 2022, por la doctora Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, magistrada coordinadora de la Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, dado que conforme el criterio vertido no existe ninguna imposibilidad legal de llevar a cabo el plan de contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. en los términos que se propusieron […]”. Finalmente, mediante sesión 112-2022 de fecha 22 de diciembre de 2022, artículo V el Consejo Superior dispuso: " […] Tener por recibido el Criterio N° DJ-566-2022 del 07 de noviembre del 2022, suscrito por el máster Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Director Jurídico y en razón de lo indicado: 1) Acoger la gestión presentada en oficio N° SCJEDO-16-2022 de 27 de octubre de 2022, por la doctora Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, magistrada coordinadora de la Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, dado que conforme el criterio vertido no existe ninguna imposibilidad legal de llevar a cabo el Plan de contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en los términos que se proponen: (…) No obstante, se deberá ajustar algunas fechas de inicio en el plan de trabajo, por estar algunas actualmente vencidas. 2.) La Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, deberá: a) Disponer que prioritariamente el recurso contemplado en la relación de puestos y vinculado a la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia, sea destinado en primer término para todas las acciones necesarias para la preparación para el inicio de funciones de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado. b.) Disponer que una vez que el respectivo recurso humano participe en las acciones programadas en la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia como preparatorias para el inicio de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado, sea destinado prioritariamente a la atención de asuntos de crimen organizado bajo la normativa actualmente vigente. c.) Disponer que en el caso de que en la respectiva competencia territorial no existan casos de crimen organizado o los mismos se encuentren en trámite, se podrá emplear de manera temporal en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi para la atención de asuntos ordinarios, conforme la clase ancha a que pertenecen los puestos respectivos. Lo anterior con estricto respecto de las reglas de competencia del artículo 47 y concordantes del Código Procesal Penal en entendido de los límites que se imponen al legítimo ejercicio del ius variandi en cuanto a los derechos de las personas servidoras, la no afectación al servicio público y el cumplimiento del bloque de legalidad administrativa. d.) Corresponderá a la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada el seguimiento y control de su ejecución conforme los términos planteados y los ordenamientos administrativos, laborales y penales aplicables a la materia. 3.) La Dirección de Gestión Humana aclarará a las personas funcionarias que participarían en el Plan de Contingencia, que el pago del incentivo salarial previsto para esta jurisdicción está supeditado a la apertura oficial de la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, por lo que no podrá ser aplicado, hasta tanto entre en vigencia. Se declara este acuerdo firme […].” Respecto a la legitimación que tienen las altas autoridades del Poder Judicial para decidir modificar las competencias, en razón de un interés institucional, se puede observar en el artículo XXXIV de la sesión de Corte Plena número 22-2022, del dieciséis de mayo de dos mil veintidós, donde se conoció el oficio Nº 251-PLANI-2022, de la Dirección de Planificación, y al respecto se acordó ampliar la competencia del Tribunal de Apelación Penal Juvenil del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, para que durante un período de seis meses, puedan conocer asuntos de apelación penal de adultos del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Santa Cruz. El sustento de estas decisiones tiene que ver directamente con la atención de planes de contingencia y remediales, cuyo fin es colaborar con el descongestionamiento de otros despachos de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, respondiendo así a un interés institucional. Es por lo anterior que, se considera que el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, teniendo la potestad y las razones legítimas para variar temporalmente la designación de jueces, tal como se observa de los acuerdos de Corte Plena, en estricto respeto de las normas citadas, dispone la atención de casos ordinarios en aras de colaborar con el plan remedial y carga que aqueja a los homólogos del Tribunal Especializado de Crimen Organizado, en las condiciones citadas. No es cierto, ni probable que se haya realizado un “ad hoc” en el caso que nos ocupa, ni en ningún otro caso, puesto que el conocimiento de los procesos por el Tribunal Penal de Apelación Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, responde únicamente a un interés institucional y no, para conocer este caso en específico, lo cual tiene claro el Poder Judicial, pues estaría desobedeciendo las normas internacionales a las cuales Costa Rica está comprometida, así como el ordenamiento jurídico interno que rige nuestro estado social de derecho.

III.- En cuanto a la utilización de los puestos de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada: Previo a la utilización de los puestos que corresponden a esa jurisdicción especializada, el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial emitió una consulta ante la Dirección Jurídica de este ente, que brindó el criterio N°DJ-566-2022 de 07 de noviembre de 2022, mediante el que realizó un análisis presupuestario de importancia parta este tema. El análisis tiene su antecedente en que, dentro del presupuesto otorgado al Poder Judicial para el 2022, fue otorgada una partida que abonó lo correspondiente a sueldos y otros gastos de la institución, para la entrada en vigencia de la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada. En ese momento, a falta de la aprobación del transitorio que permitiría iniciar funciones de capacitación, logística y otros necesarios para la implementación de la operación de la nueva jurisdicción contra la delincuencia organizada a principios del año 2023, no podría consumirse como un gasto de entrada. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, se sometió a consideración de los órganos competentes, un plan de contingencia para la utilización de las mencionadas partidas presupuestarias, a ejecutarse en ese año 2022. El análisis dispuso lo siguiente:

• a)Naturaleza propia de los presupuestos públicos: La regulación propia de los presupuestos públicos está contenida en el artículo 176 de la Constitución Política, en tanto dispone lo siguiente: “[…] Artículo 176-. La gestión pública se conducirá de forma sostenible, transparente y responsable, la cual se basará en un marco de presupuestación plurianual, en procura de la continuidad de los servicios que presta. El presupuesto ordinario de la República comprende todos los ingresos probables y todos los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública, durante todo el año económico. En ningún caso, el monto de los gastos presupuestos podrá exceder el de los ingresos probables. La Administración Pública, en sentido amplio, observará las reglas anteriores para dictar sus presupuestos. El presupuesto de la República se emitirá para el término de un año, del primero de enero al treinta y uno de diciembre.” (el destacado es nuestro) Complementario con lo anterior, la Ley de la Administración Financiera y de Presupuestos Públicos dispuso lo siguiente: “[…] Artículo 8.- Contenido de los presupuestos. Los presupuestos considerarán como mínimo: a) El presupuesto de ingresos, que comprenderá los generados por la recaudación de tributos, la prestación y venta de bienes y servicios, las transferencias, donaciones y otros, así como las fuentes de financiamiento, internas o externas. b) El presupuesto de gastos, que comprenderá todos los egresos previstos para cumplir los objetivos y las metas. c) La programación de actividades y metas esperadas para el período, según el nivel de detalle definido en el reglamento. d) Los requerimientos de recursos humanos, según el detalle que se establezca en el reglamento respectivo. e) Las normas que regulen exclusivamente la ejecución presupuestaria, las cuales se aplicarán durante el ejercicio económico para el que dicho presupuesto esté vigente […]” Conforme lo anterior, se advierte que el presupuesto ordinario de la República contempla una autorización del gasto público previsto para el respectivo período, a fin de cumplir las respectivas metas y objetivos institucionales. En este orden de ideas, la Ley de Presupuesto autoriza el empleo de recursos humanos para un objeto específico, conforme lo indicado su contenido y el respectivo programa presupuestario. Consecuentemente, la Ley de Presupuesto contempla la posibilidad de ejecución del presupuesto para el gasto contemplado en la respectiva relación de puestos, a efecto de dar contenido a los requerimientos de recursos humanos contemplados en la misma. Es el acto por el cual se autoriza al Gobierno para disponer de los fondos públicos dentro de ciertos límites y constituye el requisito de validez de los actos administrativos y de los contratos que originen el gasto público. Es decir, el presupuesto es una condición de la regularidad o la eficacia jurídica de las operaciones presupuestarias y, sobre todo, de la ejecución del gasto público, que no puede realizarse si no existe la correspondiente cobertura presupuestaria. La necesidad de que la actividad se ajuste a la legalidad vigente entraña la existencia de mecanismos de control que garantizan la legalidad de esa actividad. Conforme a lo anterior, a efecto de determinar la procedencia del gasto administrativo, es menester verificar su clasificación e incorporación en el presupuesto ordinario del respectivo período presupuestario, en el entendido de que este determinará la oportunidad, objetivo y contenido del gasto.

Al respecto, se ha indicado lo siguiente: " […] Las partidas autorizadas por la Ley de Presupuesto no forman una masa indivisible. Por el contrario, son especializadas. Conforme con el principio de especialización presupuestaria, los créditos abiertos por la Ley de Presupuesto están afectados a un gasto determinado. Lo que significa que la autorización es dada para un gasto preciso y por un monto determinado. Monto que constituye un límite para el Ejecutivo. De esa forma, el destino de un crédito está determinado por la Ley […]", (M, ROJAS: El Poder Ejecutivo en Costa Rica, Editorial Juricentro, 1997, p. 346).

Nuestra Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos reserva al Poder Legislativo, los siguientes supuestos de modificación del presupuesto aprobado: “a) Quedan reservados a la Asamblea Legislativa: i) Los que afecten el monto total del presupuesto. ii) Los que conlleven un aumento de los gastos corrientes en detrimento de los gastos de capital. iii) Las transferencias entre programas presupuestarios. iv) Los que afecten el monto total de endeudamiento. v) Las transferencias entre servicios no personales y servicios personales”. Es menester destacar que complementario con lo anterior, debe tomarse en consideración el origen de los recursos destinados al gasto presupuestario, sea si posee un destino específico definido previamente por una ley que creo el origen de los recursos y que condiciona su posibilidad de ejecución.

Acerca de este tipo de ingresos afectados al cumplimiento de un fin determinado, el dictamen C-358-2020, del 7 de setiembre de 2020 de la Procuraduría General de la República, indica:

“[…] Como es sabido, el concepto de destino específico alude fundamentalmente a los ingresos destinados por el legislador para financiar la actividad de un determinado organismo. Ese destino puede ser general en el sentido de que está destinado a financiar la globalidad de la actividad del organismo, pero también puede suceder que el legislador destine determinados recursos al financiamiento de una actividad o proyecto concreto de ese organismo. Caso en el cual el legislador ordinario específica en qué puede gastar el beneficiario del destino los recursos que recibe. Tradicionalmente se ha indicado que cuando la ley crea un destino específico, solo el legislador puede modificarlo, reduciendo el monto o porcentaje o ampliándolo o bien, suprimiendo el destino si considera que determinado programa o fin no justifica que el Estado reformara el destino. Además, se deriva de lo anterior que la Administración carece de competencia para variar el monto o porcentaje del destino, para suprimirlo o bien, para reasignar los montos no ejecutados por una determinada entidad, salvo que el legislador lo autorice a ello […]”.

Consecuentemente, se estima que debe determinarse si el gasto a efectuar se encuentra previsto en el presupuesto respectivo, conforme su clasificación y programa presupuestario, entendiéndose que, de estar en esas condiciones, se contemplaría una autorización de uso del mismo, con las limitantes contenidas dentro del mismo presupuesto que le da base y en el caso de los destinos específicos, la ley que crea los mismos.

• b)Sobre el tratamiento de la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada: Conforme las regulaciones propias del Código Penal y el Código Procesal Penal, se advierte que en la actualidad existen una serie de tipos penales que responden al tratamiento de la persecución contra el crimen organizado. Es decir, con los órganos jurisdiccionales actualmente existentes, se está procesando a personas infractoras en dicha materia, inclusive la Ley Contra la Delincuencia Organizada, número 8754 data del año 2009 y la Ley de Creación de la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada en Costa Rica, Ley N°9481 existe desde el año 2017.

La existencia misma de causas a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 9481, en tanto dispone lo siguiente:

“[…] TRANSITORIO ÚNICO- Las causas iniciadas en los tribunales penales con competencia común a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, que se encuentren en las etapas intermedia o de juicio, seguirán siendo conocidas por esos tribunales […]”.

Lo anterior debe complementarse con lo dispuesto en el artículo 17 del mismo cuerpo normativo, en tanto dispone:

“[…] ARTÍCULO 17.- Normas supletorias. El proceso penal seguido ante la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada será el ordinario previsto por la Ley N.° 7594, Código Procesal Penal, de 10 de abril de 1996, con las excepciones previstas en la presente ley. Las actuaciones y resoluciones de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada se regirán, en lo no previsto expresamente en esta ley, por la Ley N. 7594, Código Procesal Penal, de 10 de abril de 1996; la Ley N.°8754, Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada, de 22 de julio de 2009; la Ley N.°7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, y la Ley N.°7728, Ley de Reorganización Judicial, Reformas a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 15 de diciembre de 1997”. Empero, es de destacar que esta última no tiene un financiamiento específico, sino que los recursos para su implementación provienen de la asignación general que se realice en el respectivo presupuesto ordinario para el Poder Judicial, incluidas las plazas que se decida asignar en la correspondiente relación de puestos. En este sentido, debe tener claro que, si bien el artículo 16 de la Ley 9481 prevé una obligación de otorgamiento de contenido presupuestario para la operación de los órganos jurisdiccionales, el mismo no es un destino específico como tal. La indicada norma señala lo siguiente:

“[…] ARTÍCULO 16.- Contenido presupuestario e integración inicial de los tribunales: El Ministerio de Hacienda deberá otorgar el contenido económico suficiente para la operación de los juzgados y tribunales que se crean mediante la presente ley. Al momento de la publicación de la presente ley, el Ministerio de Hacienda deberá girar, de forma efectiva y completa, los recursos necesarios que permitan al Poder Judicial la creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada; asimismo, deberá girar anualmente los recursos necesarios que permitan el funcionamiento de esta Jurisdicción. El Poder Judicial deberá garantizar los recursos necesarios para el funcionamiento de la Jurisdicción creada en la presente ley. El Departamento de Planificación del Poder Judicial recomendará el número de funcionarios que se deberán desempeñar en esta Jurisdicción, al momento de entrar en vigencia la presente ley”.

No obstante, se estima oportuno indicar que la incorporación de recursos para las plazas de la Jurisdicción contra la Delincuencia Organizada, se fundan no en el acuerdo de Corte Plena, en sesión 21-2021 del 01 de junio de 2021, artículo II, sino más bien en el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021, mediante el cual, el entonces Ministro de Hacienda y la Ministra de la Presidencia le comunican a la Diputada Presidenta de la Comisión Permanente Ordinaria de Asuntos Hacendarios, lo siguiente: “El pasado 27 de mayo los Supremos Poderes de la República firmaron un manifiesto en el que se expresa su voluntad, cada uno en el marco de sus límites legales y competencias constitucionales, de impulsar cinco puntos de acción estratégicos en pro del combate al fenómeno del Crimen Organizado en todas sus manifestaciones. Como segundo punto estratégico estaba el "establecer mecanismos para fortalecer a las instituciones competentes de la tecnología y el capital humano necesario para hacer frente a los retos que significa contrarrestar el fenómeno del crimen organizado". Para materializar este punto, la fuera (sic) de trabajo estableció necesario "generar un espacio de trabajo conjunto entre el Ministerio de Hacienda y el Poder Judicial para el análisis de los requerimientos para la implementación de la jurisdicción especializada en crimen organizado y la lucha contra este flagelo". Luego de un proceso de trabajo, se determinó que el Poder Judicial requiere de un total de 2.900.000.000 de colones con fin de incorporar 413 plazas de personal Técnico, Profesional y Policial dedicado tanto para la implementación de la Ley de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, en el desarrollo logístico, proceso de remodelaciones, licitaciones y otros, además de la propia puesta en marcha…” En este sentido, el marco general de este oficio es el acuerdo entre Poderes de la República en mención, en donde se indica los siguientes puntos de trabajo conjunto: “Evaluar los marcos legales existentes para proponer mejoras, a efectos de que las acciones preventivas y punitivas en la materia sean eficaces y contundentes. Establecer mecanismos para fortalecer a las instancias competentes de la tecnología y el capital humano necesario para hacer frente a los retos que significa contrarrestar el fenómeno del crimen organizado. Gestionar la cooperación y asistencia de organismos internacionales y socios estratégicos, con la implementación de programas que permitan fortalecer el trabajo conjunto entre las autoridades y cuerpos policiales del país para contrarrestar los efectos del crimen organizado. Potenciar los instrumentos de gestión, como la Estrategia Nacional sobre Drogas y Delitos Asociados; el Plan Nacional sobre Drogas, Legitimación de Capitales y Financiamiento al Terrorismo; Evaluación Nacional de Riesgos de Legitimación de Capitales y Financiamiento al Terrorismo y la Estrategia Nacional de Integridad y Prevención de la Corrupción y similares, como complemento a los planes y actuaciones en materia de investigación y justicia penal. Otros ámbitos de recomendación que se considere necesario implementar”.

• c)Sobre el ius variandi en materia de empleo público: De manera adicional, debe indicarse que siempre y cuando no haya una modificación expresa o tácita a la ley de presupuesto – v.g. el cumplimiento de los diferentes programas del Poder Judicial- no sería dable considerar que la administración de la labor de las personas servidoras está sometida a una rigidez tal que no sea posible destinar sus funciones conforme al interés público, siempre atendiendo a que la modificación sea dentro del ordenamiento jurídico y conforme al ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi. Con respecto a las potestades que posee la Administración para modificar total o parcialmente aspectos no sustanciales de una relación de empleo público, es menester destacar que la misma, al igual que cualquier patrono público o privado, posee la facultad del ius variandi, al respecto, cita la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional número 7419- 1997 de las diez horas quince minutos del once de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, expediente número 6760-M-97).

Esta facultad se evidencia como una competencia del Consejo Superior en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en tanto que dicho cuerpo normativo establece que corresponde a este órgano lo siguiente:

“[…] ARTICULO 81.- Corresponde al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial: 1.- Ejecutar la política administrativa del Poder Judicial, dentro de los lineamientos establecidos por la Corte Suprema de Justicia. 2.- Designar, con excepción de los que corresponden a la Corte, a los funcionarios que administran justicia, de conformidad con las normas legales y reglamentarias correspondientes; trasladarlos, provisional o definitivamente, suspenderlos y concederles licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él y removerlos, todo con arreglo de las disposiciones correspondientes, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al presidente […].” Conforme a lo anterior, se advierte que el Consejo Superior tiene potestades de modificación de la ubicación laboral de las personas servidoras – atendiendo el respectivo programa presupuestario y límites legales para el ejercicio del ius variandi- conforme al interés público y las necesidades institucionales. Es decir, se puede utilizar el recurso humano para otros fines propios de las competencias jurisdiccionales, en el entendido de que el Consejo Superior cuenta con competencias para adecuar las funciones de las personas servidoras conforme el interés público, en apego legítimo del ius variandi.

Además, estima el órgano asesor jurídico que lo planteado por la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia resulta jurídicamente procedente y al efecto recomendó:

• Disponer que prioritariamente el recurso contemplado en la relación de puestos y vinculado a la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia, sea destinado en primer término para todas las acciones necesarias para la preparación para el inicio de funciones de la jurisdicción contra la delincuencia organizada.

• Disponer que una vez que el respectivo recurso humano participe en las acciones programadas en la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia como preparatorias para el inicio de la jurisdicción contra la delincuencia organizada, sea destinado prioritariamente a la atención de asuntos de crimen organizado.

• Disponer que en el caso de que en la respectiva competencia territorial no existan casos de delincuencia organizada o los mismos se encuentren en trámite, emplear de manera temporal en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi para la atención de asuntos ordinarios, conforme la clase ancha a que pertenecen los puestos respectivos.

Con base en lo anterior concluye el representante del Ministerio Público que esta última recomendación se entiende que la ley contra el crimen organizado plantea la posibilidad que, en ausencia de casos de crimen organizado, los recursos destinados a esta jurisdicción pueden atender asuntos ordinarios, sin que esto se considere una violación al principio de juez natural, sino por el contrario, implica maximizar el uso de los recursos estatales.

3.- Por resolución de las 9:03 horas del 26 de abril de 2024, el presidente de la Sala previno a las juezas consultantes, Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Ivette Carranza Cambronero y Kathya Jiménez Fernández, identificar y especificar, de forma clara y debidamente individualizada, cuáles son los acuerdos concretos de Corte Plena que se pretenden cuestionar en la presente consulta.

4.- En la resolución 2024-713 de las 15:05 horas del 29 de abril de 2024, dictada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a fin de cumplir lo prevenido, se indica en primer término que, aunque la prevención se dirigió en forma personal a las juezas R. Chinchilla, I. Carranza y K. Jiménez (suscriptoras del voto mediante el que se hizo la consulta) se aclara que a esta fecha la jueza K. Jiménez se encuentra incapacitada médicamente por lo que, al tener suspendida su jurisdicción, no puede integrar el tribunal. Ella es sustituida, conforme a las reglas imperantes al efecto, por la jueza C. Ramírez. No obstante, dado que el padre de la jueza Ramírez, el magistrado J. Ramírez integró el órgano que dictó uno de los actos recurridos, esta se inhibió y fue sustituida, por rol, por el juez Max Antonio Escalante Quirós a fin de integrar el tribunal y únicamente responder a lo solicitado. En segundo lugar, señala el tribunal, con el fin de cumplir la prevención indicada se aclara que en el considerando III del voto 2024-462 se aludió a “…los acuerdos de Corte Plena (entre ellos el contenido en la circular 137-2023 de 14 de junio de 2023 que contiene la “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”) que facultan a trasladar asuntos ordinarios a esa jurisdicción, los cuales se complementan con el listado de expedientes trasladados del órgano competente al recién creado.” Revisada que fuera dicha circular (la cual fue publicada en el Boletín Judicial número 119 del 03 de julio de 2023 y puede ser consultada en: https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/avi-1-0003-9349) se constata que esta fue dictada por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial (y no por Corte Plena como se indicó, error material que en este acto se corrige conforme lo prevé el artículo 146 del Código Procesal Penal) y adoptada en sesión número 48-2023 celebrada el 08 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI, a solicitud de la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada del Poder Judicial. En el apartado titulado “Sobre competencia de los despachos JEDO” la regla práctica 5 (en la que se basó el tribunal de origen para trasladar la causa al tribunal de delincuencia organizada y este para conocer el asunto) indica: “5- La Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada tendrá competencia a nivel nacional para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen.” Asimismo, la regla práctica 9 refiere: “9- A efectos de garantizar una adecuada carga de trabajo y el uso racional de recursos públicos, quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, desde el inicio de sus funciones y hasta que se considere necesario, también realizarán labores de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen.” De igual forma, en el apartado de esa circular titulado “Sobre la tramitación del expediente en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada” las reglas 2 y 3 disponen: “2- Las causas ordinarias que pasen a ser conocidas en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada seguirán la forma de tramitación del despacho de origen, siendo que, si la misma se viene tramitando de forma física, así se continuará hasta su finalización. 3- Las causas ordinarias que se conozcan por la JEDO, continuarán su trámite según el estado en que se asuman hasta su ejecución. Serán remitidas al despacho de origen una vez que estén complemente listas para archivar.” Empero, la emisión de dichas reglas por parte del Consejo Superior, se apoya en lo resuelto previamente por la Corte Suprema de Justicia (Corte Plena) en sesión extraordinaria de las 08:16 horas del 30 de enero de 2023, acta 003-2023 (artículo XVIII en que se acordó en firme: “2) Acoger lo solicitado por la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, remitido mediante oficio N° S-CJEDO/02/2023, en consecuencia: Variar la competencia territorial de las dos secciones asignadas al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, que a este momento tienen su asiento en San José y dan soporte como plan remedial al despacho homólogo de Guadalupe, para que a partir del febrero de 2023, conozcan de todos los asuntos asignados a los diferentes tribunales de apelación de sentencia del país, iniciando por San Ramón, y den colaboración al resto de tribunales de apelación del país, en tanto empieza a funcionar oficialmente la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada.” 5.- Por oficio de 6 de mayo de 2024 la Técnica Sala de la Corte, solicitó a la Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia certificación del acuerdo de Corte Plena, adoptado en sesión extraordinaria del 30 de enero de 2023, acta 003-2023, artículo XVIII.- Asimismo, que certifique cuáles magistrados de la Sala Constitucional, participaron en la aprobación de dicho acuerdo.

6.- El 8 de mayo de 2024 se incorporó al expediente certificación literal del acuerdo adoptado en sesión extraordinaria Nº03-2023 celebrada el 30 de enero del 2023, artículo XVIII. Asimismo, la Secretaría de la Corte certifica que los señores magistrados y señora magistrada de la Sala Constitucional que participaron en la aprobación del citado acuerdo son: Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado, Jorge Araya García, Anamari Garro Vargas, y la suplente Aracelly Pacheco Salazar.- 7.- El 23 de mayo de 2024 los magistrados Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado y Anamari Garro Vargas plantean inhibitoria, e indican los motivos por los que estiman les asiste motivo para separarse del conocimiento de este asunto.

8.- Por resolución de las 14:44 horas del 24 de mayo de 2024 la presidenta a.i. de la Sala Constitucional rechaza la gestión planteada por los magistrados Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado y Ana Mari Garro Vargas y los declara habilitados para conocer de este asunto.

9.- Por resolución de las 9:44 horas del 27 de mayo de 2024, el presidente de la Sala dio curso a la consulta formulada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José y confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial.

10.- Por escrito presentado el 14 de junio de 2024, Iván Vinicio Vincenti Rojas, en su condición de Procurador General de la República, contesta la audiencia conferida y manifiesta, en primer término, con respecto a la admisibilidad, que tanto las acciones de inconstitucionalidad como las consultas judiciales son mecanismos procesales que tienen una serie de requisitos a cumplir, cuya inobservancia acarrea su rechazo por razones de admisibilidad. Las gestiones ante el Tribunal Constitucional tendentes a expulsar del sistema jurídico una norma, están revestidas de una serie de formalismos que no son vanos, sino que, al contrario, procuran descubrir desde su inicio que efectivamente la pretensión es seria y que se halla rodeada de argumentos de suficiente calibre. En el caso de las consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad deben ser totalmente objetivas y, además, los juzgadores que las expiden deben tener claro que su afán es de coadyuvar a que el sistema jurídico esté siempre ajustado al ordenamiento constitucional. En ese sentido, esa objetividad no debe ser sinónimo de un fútil propósito académico o intelectual, sino que el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certeza, a la aplicación de la norma que va a emplear y que –sin ambages- duda de su constitucionalidad (cita la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional N°3905-2007 de las 14:44 horas del 21 de marzo de 2007). En cuanto a los requisitos de admisibilidad de las consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad (al igual que a las acciones de la misma materia), se enfoca en dos de ellos:

A.- que el juzgador consultante se enfrente a una verdadera duda de constitucionalidad de la norma que tiene que aplicar, de forma tal que –haciendo un parangón con los requisitos de la acción de inconstitucionalidad-, la consulta judicial resulte ser el medio idóneo de proteger el derecho que se considera lesionado y B.- que la consulta judicial esté debidamente fundamentada.

A.- Si hilamos el iter lógico que ha guiado al Tribunal consultante, para sospechar de las normas de la LOPJ y del acuerdo del Consejo Superior, podremos caer en la cuenta que no le asiste la legitimación “…para consultarle a la Sala Constitucional cuando tenga dudas fundadas sobre la constitucionalidad de una norma o acto que deba aplicar, o de un acto, conducta u omisión que deba juzgar en un caso sometido a su conocimiento.” por partida doble: 1.- en el caso concreto, la norma o normas impugnadas NO deben ser aplicadas ni tampoco juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión por parte del Tribunal consultante y 2.- dichas normas y acuerdos deben evidenciar una conculcación del ordenamiento constitucional, sin forzamiento o interpretaciones artificiosas.

Sobre el particular, la Sala Constitucional en una resolución de reciente data (N°27.476-2023 de 13:16 horas del 25 de octubre de 2023, parafraseando algunas otras resoluciones anteriores, señaló sobre el tema:

“Que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que -por su relevancia para el caso- resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión "deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión", conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que "pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión." (lo destacado no es del original).

Nos explicamos:

1.- del propio relato que dimana de la resolución que propicia la presente consulta judicial de constitucionalidad, se deriva que la legitimación para consultar es artificial y forzada, ya que la iniciativa de la duda no es de su propia cosecha, sino que proviene de un alegato del abogado defensor del acusado por el delito de retención de cuotas obrero-patronales, quien alega como uno de los motivos de la apelación una actividad procesal defectuosa, precisamente por considerar que se ha lesionado el principio de juez legal o natural, dada la mecánica del nombramiento del Tribunal de Juicio que condenó a su cliente pero más concretamente, por el simple enunciado que hizo el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, cuando catalogó a la Sección perteneciente como “emergente”. Al parecer –aunque son válidas otras hipótesis- bastó la mención de dicho apelativo, para que surgiera en el intelecto del abogado defensor la posibilidad de hallarse frente a un Tribunal –ahora sí en etapa recursiva- como propiciador de lesiones constitucionales.

Sí es necesario resaltar que tanto la defensa técnica del acusado en el caso de origen, así como la propia defensa material del inculpado, en ninguna etapa procesal ni en el contradictorio expresaron dudas acerca de la competencia del Tribunal de Juicio (la única incidencia presentada al finalizar el contradictorio fue por parte del justiciable ARIAS RUIZ, quien alegó una excepción de prescripción).

2.- a consecuencia de esta actividad procesal defectuosa y la postura de la fiscal encargada del caso, el Tribunal consultante avizora que la parte apelante arguye violación de normas constitucionales y convencionales y, por su parte, el órgano fiscal alega que la actuación está posibilitada por normas legales y en ese estadio procesal, al Tribunal actuante “…le surge la duda de si las leyes de las que se afirma la competencia del órgano sentenciador violentan normas de superior rango…” (el destacado nos pertenece).

El recelo de constitucionalidad es así como se lee: el Tribunal consultante se retrotrae a momentos pretéritos y titubea acerca de las normas que competenciaron al órgano judicial a quo, a dictar la sentencia que conoce en alzada. Y es con esa base fáctico-jurídica, que el Tribunal proponente se considera suficientemente legitimado para elevar a consulta judicial sus dudas acerca de las normas que –en su criterio-, forzosamente debe aplicar.

Las preguntas que surgen en forma espontánea serían: ¿le corresponde a un Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal dudar de la competencia del Tribunal inferior, al momento de emitir éste la sentencia apelada; en otras palabras, la competencia del a quo es parte de las normas que el Tribunal de alzada deba aplicar –conforme lo dispone la literalidad del artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- (y en este caso, vacilar de su constitucionalidad), o le correspondía a la persona juzgadora del Tribunal A quo (o reclamar al abogado defensor) estimar su incompetencia, conforme lo ordena el artículo 169 de la LOPJ:

“Artículo 169.- Cuando un funcionario estimare que es incompetente para conocer del asunto que se le somete, salvo el caso de prórroga de competencia, lo declarará así de oficio y ordenará remitir el expediente al funcionario que a su juicio corresponda conocer. Si mediare apelación de alguna de las partes o si, no habiéndola, este último funcionario disintiere de esa opinión, será el superior de ambos quien decida la competencia, sin más trámite y tan pronto como reciba los autos.” Igualmente es válido preguntarse: ¿la duda de constitucionalidad de un Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal es una nueva forma de perder la competencia del A quo, o esta se malogra solo por lo dispuesto en el artículo 163 de la LOPJ o bien, por las causales no señaladas taxativamente en el artículo 48 del CPP ?:

“Artículo 163.- La competencia se pierde en causas determinadas:

1.- Cuando está fenecida la causa y ejecutada la sentencia.

2.- Cuando el juez ha sido comisionado por otro para practicar alguna diligencia, al quedar cumplido el encargo.

3.- Cuando, por ser accesoria, se mande la causa al juez que conoce de la principal.

4.- Cuando el juez ha sido declarado inhábil en virtud de impedimento, excusa o recusación.” De lo que viene dicho, de manera alguna el Tribunal promovente nunca –o al menos en el caso concreto- iba a tener como escenario posible la obligación de aplicar ni los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la LOPJ, ni el acuerdo del Consejo Superior ni la circular 137-20234, muchos menos cuando su leitmotiv es dudar “…si las leyes de las que se afirma la competencia del órgano sentenciador violentan normas de superior rango…” Es decir, en su papel de Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, que conoce en alzada de la resolución N° 437-2023 de las 14:22 horas del 10 de mayo de 2023, dictada por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección “Emergente”, tenía las siguientes posibilidades:

a.- recordemos que se desprende del expediente judicial original, que el primer motivo de apelación del abogado defensor fue incoar una actividad procesal defectuosa, alegando una transgresión al principio de juez legal.

De una detenida lectura del artículo 175 del CPP y jurisprudencia de nuestros Tribunales (incluida la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), se tiene por cierto que el mecanismo de la actividad procesal defectuosa fue creado para evitar el dictado de una resolución judicial con inobservancia de algunos preceptos, incluso convencionales, pero es impropio emplear dicha figura para apelar resoluciones judiciales ya dictadas; sobre el particular, dispone el artículo 175 del CPP:

“Principio general. No podrán ser valorados para fundar una decisión judicial ni utilizados como presupuestos de ella, los actos cumplidos con inobservancia de las formas y condiciones previstas en la Constitución, en el Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigentes en Costa Rica y en este Código salvo que el defecto haya sido saneado, de acuerdo con las normas que regulan la corrección de las actuaciones judiciales.” En efecto, la dinámica procesal que se desprende de este instituto, supone que el interesado o afectado por los actos transgresores y previos a que se dicte la decisión judicial, plantee una actividad procesal defectuosa precisamente para evitar la consumación de los vicios que contienen los actos precedentes, y que estos se integren en la resolución judicial. De la mano de lo anterior, se solicitaría la subsanación del acto procurando, dentro de lo posible, no retrotraerse a etapas precluidas.

Como se observa, dicho mecanismo es imposible de aplicar luego de que ya se dictó la decisión judicial, porque no podría ni corregirse el vicio ni menos regresarse a etapas precluidas; de ello se deriva que, emitida la resolución judicial, no cabe más reparo que la impugnación a través de la apelación o el medio recursivo que proceda.

Con acierto, la resolución de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N°2004-0054 de las 8:50 horas del 6 de febrero de 2004 concluyó lo siguiente:

“La gestión debe rechazarse de plano: Si se aprecia la regla general establecida en el artículo 175 del Código Procesal Penal en cuanto a los casos en los que procede declarar la actividad procesal como defectuosa, podrá observarse que ello es posible únicamente en relación con actos que servirían de fundamento o presupuesto de una resolución judicial. Es decir, mediante los lineamientos relativos a la actividad procesal defectuosa no es posible cuestionar las resoluciones en sí, sino sólo las actuaciones previas en que se basan.” Ahora bien, aunque nunca podremos saber cómo hubiera fallado el Tribunal consultante ante la actividad procesal defectuosa gestionada por el abogado defensor, como primer motivo de apelación de la sentencia condenatoria, es lo cierto que dicha gestión del apelante -en corrección de términos-, no podría haber prosperado y el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal habría podido –entonces- declarar ineficaz la sentencia venida en alzada, ya sea aceptando algún otro motivo del apelante o bien, utilizando la prerrogativa que le confiere la parte final del párrafo tercero del artículo 462 del Código Procesal Penal, que a la letra dispone:

“En cualquier caso, el tribunal que constate el quebranto a un derecho fundamental de las partes involucradas podrá decretarlo de oficio.” y así, sin incurrir en el grave gazapo de creerse facultado para elevar ante la Sala Constitucional una duda de constitucionalidad que no es tal (porque los artículos invocados no serían objeto de análisis de su parte ni por asomo debía de aplicarlos), pudo haber declarado –aun de oficio- una posible preterición a un derecho fundamental de la parte, enderezando las cosas a su cauce normal y ordenar el reenvío, para que ahora sí –desde su óptica- el imputado fuera juzgado por un juez legal o natural.

Como corolario de lo dicho hasta ahora, dejamos planteado el evento de que la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad que nos ocupa no ha superado el test de admisibilidad, no solo porque las normas invocadas no deben ser objeto de análisis ni de aplicación por parte del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, sino también porque dudar de las leyes que competenciaron al Tribunal A quo a dictar la sentencia que se conoce en alzada, contenida en actos jurisdiccionales pretéritos, tampoco integran el elenco de normas que el Tribunal consultante deba aplicar, conforme lo prescribe ordenatoriamente el artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

B.- El segundo requisito de admisibilidad que deseamos analizar, se sustenta en la debida fundamentación de las consultas judiciales de constitucionalidad, como un derivado de la obligación de todo juzgador de razonar profundamente sus criterios, conforme lo señala –por ejemplo- el artículo 142 del CPP. Señala los defectos de fundamentación que el órgano asesor le achaca a la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad, que acarrean igualmente su inadmisibilidad:

a.- cuestionamiento de la integralidad de todos los artículos, sin detenerse a especificar cuál extracto de ellos es el presunto causante de la lesión constitucional. Igualmente, el planteamiento carece de la comparación o cotejo entre las normas cuestionadas con los artículos de la Carta Fundamental, para de ahí derivar la transgresión constitucional. O bien, si se hubiera materializado la comparación, habría sido insuficiente como para tener por cumplida la tarea de fundamentación.

b.- mención de sumarios de jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Sala Constitucional, Tribunal Constitucional de España y citas de doctrina nacional y extranjera sin mayor desarrollo, limitándose a transcribirlos, asumiendo que por su alcance y autoridad el lector y los operadores del Derecho que deben resolver el litigio que nos atrae, les corresponde hacer la tarea de integrar el reclamo con el fundamento, desconociendo que esa tarea le atañe al Tribunal consultante. Especial mención ameritan los casos paradigmáticos que provocaron las sentencias de la Corte IDH y que fueron utilizados por el Tribunal consultante, de lo que haremos un comentario líneas más adelante (…)

(…) a pesar de que por ahí de las páginas 12 a 14 del libelo que contiene la consulta judicial, ya el Tribunal promovente cita algunos incisos o párrafos de los 4 artículos de la LOPJ, tampoco cumple la obligación de cotejar los artículos combatidos con los principios constitucionales y convencionales, para de ahí derivar o evidenciar las transgresiones denunciadas, limitándose a transcribirlos, sin mayor rigor académico. Como se observa, ni un Tribunal consultante ni el ciudadano que instaure una acción de inconstitucionalidad, se pueden dar el lujo de afirmar que refutan íntegramente un artículo o varios e incluso –como lo han hecho algunos accionantes-, cuestionar la totalidad de una ley, y esperar que –en primera instancia- este Órgano asesor e imparcial de la Sala Constitucional y luego el Tribunal de la materia, desentrañen en qué parte del numeral o numerales está contenido el fundamento o la lesión que sostiene la consulta judicial o el reclamo del ciudadano.

Tampoco es admisible –como ya fue dicho- que el Tribunal promovente se conforme con citar los numerales de la LOPJ (íntegramente, aunque luego los reduzca a algunos incisos o párrafos), los artículos presuntamente transgredidos de la Carta Fundamental, algunos principios convencionales dispuestos en Instrumentos internacionales y finalmente, varios extractos de sentencias de la Corte IDH, y crea firmemente que cumplió con la tarea de razonar sus dudas de constitucionalidad (máxime que su pretensión final es que se eliminen del ordenamiento jurídico 4 artículos de la LOPJ, muchos de ellos sin la más mínima relación con el cuestionamiento de constitucionalidad materializado) y ahora, le corresponda a la Sala de la materia armonizar todos esos insumos y forjar correctamente un reclamo razonado y fundamentado, que era obligación primaria de hacerlo por parte del accionante o consultante.

Es cierto que a partir de las páginas 12, 13 y 14 del libelo que contiene la consulta judicial que nos atrae, se hace una selección de ciertos párrafos de los artículos de la LOPJ cuestionados, como para denotar que es en ellos donde se evidencia la incorrección de poner en manos de órganos administrativos del Poder Judicial, la constitución de los tribunales, siendo ello función legislativa (así por ejemplo, el numeral 46 se vuelve a repetir íntegro, del 59 se menciona el inciso 16, del artículo 81 el inciso 2) y del 101 bis el párrafo que permite que personal juzgador de la JEDO puede tramitar materia ordinaria).

No obstante, a pesar de ese esfuerzo de concreción, es evidente que aún se siguen incumpliendo los criterios de admisibilidad, en lo que concierne a la debida fundamentación de las consultas judiciales. Este tema será analizado por el fondo, donde se evidenciará que todo el reclamo realizado sobre el traslado de funciones o constitución de tribunales, forma parte de la prerrogativa que le ofrece al Poder Judicial el artículo 166 de la Carta Magna.

Mención aparte merece la controversia sobre el acuerdo del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, adoptado en sesión número 48-2023 celebrada el 08 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI, a solicitud de la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada del Poder Judicial y que autoriza publicar la circular denominada “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado” (circular 137-2023 de 14 de junio de 2023), el que fuera descrito correctamente incluso después de una prevención de la Presidencia de la Sala Constitucional al Tribunal consultante. Dicho aporte y mención no tiene más validez que aquella que le otorga el hecho de que muchos de los movimientos que ha realizado el Consejo Superior, se han basado en los alcances de la circular 137-2023, emitida por dicho Consejo. Para finalizar este acápite, bástenos con sostener que el único artículo constitucional que ha sido desarrollado y alegada su transgresión, ha sido el canon 35; los demás, a saber: 39, 121.20) y 166 de la Carta Fundamental han sido incluidos para dar la apariencia de que son muchos los numerales del Código Político conculcados, pero su desarrollo se circunscribe a su simple mención. Por esa razón, el análisis de admisibilidad realizado supone que solamente el artículo 35 será objeto de comentario más adelante, siendo que los demás deben ser descartados. Igual suerte corre la mención del numeral 8.1) de la CADH, del que efectivamente solo se transcribe sin mayor desarrollo.

b.- mención de sumarios de jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Sala Constitucional, Tribunal Constitucional de España y citas de doctrina nacional y extranjera sin mayor desarrollo, limitándose a transcribirlos, asumiendo que por su alcance y autoridad el lector y los operadores del Derecho que deben resolver el litigio que nos atrae, les corresponde hacer la tarea de integrar el reclamo con el fundamento, desconociendo que esa tarea le atañe al Tribunal consultante. Especial mención ameritan los casos paradigmáticos que provocaron las sentencias de la Corte IDH y que fueron utilizados por el Tribunal promovente. Siguiendo con la tónica ya expuesta, el Tribunal consultante fundamenta su criterio con citas de algunas sentencias de la Corte IDH, que se han pronunciado sobre el tema del juez legal o natural y cuya constitución debe estar materializada antes del hecho delictivo que vaya a conocer, votos de la Sala Constitucional, sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional de España y extractos de doctrina nacional y extranjera. (…)

1.-acerca de la jurisprudencia mencionada del Tribunal Constitucional de España, se cita un extracto de la sentencia 47/1983 de 31 de mayo de 1983, que habla del derecho constitucional al juez ordinario predeterminado por ley, pero igualmente otro extracto de esa misma resolución, explica las posibilidades de que, para el mejor servicio público y, sobre todo, para el servicio público de la Administración de Justicia, se dé una colaboración interna entre servidores del Poder Judicial, para solventar las “disfuncionalidades del sistema”:

“Es cierto que no cabe exigir el mismo grado de fijeza y predeterminación al órgano que a sus titulares, dadas las diversas contingencias que pueden afectar a éstos en su situación personal y la exigencia, dimanante del interés público -las llamadas «necesidades del servicio»-, de que los distintos miembros del poder judicial colaboren dentro de la Administración de Justicia en los lugares en que su labor pueda ser más eficaz, supliendo, en la medida de lo posible, las disfuncionalidades del sistema. Pero, en todo caso, los procedimientos fijados para la designación de los titulares han de garantizar la independencia e imparcialidad de éstos, que constituye el interés directo protegido por el derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado.” (lo destacado no es del original).

(…)

Finalmente, la sentencia STC 55/1990 de 28 de marzo, FJ 3, en un sentido muy similar a la recién expuesta 47/1983, declara lo siguiente:

“Este Tribunal ha declarado reiteradamente que el derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley exige, fundamentalmente, que el órgano judicial haya sido creado por una norma legal invistiéndolo de jurisdicción y competencia con anterioridad al hecho motivador de la actuación o proceso judicial, y que su régimen orgánico y procesal no permita calificarlo de órgano especial o excepcional (STC 47/1983, de 31 de mayo, FJ 2). Pero esta garantía no supone el derecho a un Juez determinado en concreto (STC 97/1987, de 10 de junio, FJ 4) ni excluye, en principio, la posibilidad de establecer reglas especiales de competencia en la distribución de los asuntos entre los distintos órganos judiciales. La noción constitucional de Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley no se concreta en el establecimiento legislativo de unas competencias en general, sino que se integra normalmente de aquellas disposiciones legales que derogan o alteran esa competencia general.” (lo destacado nos pertenece).

Como se observa, a pesar del lugar común que pueda significar la concepción del principio de juez legal o natural, es lo cierto que –como lo veremos al analizar por el fondo la presente consulta judicial de constitucionalidad-, el tema no es tan plano como se presenta ni su incumplimiento se consolida por modificaciones en la constitución de los tribunales que juzgarán el caso concreto, sino que existen excepciones totalmente válidas e incluso avaladas constitucionalmente, ya sea por la propia Carta Fundamental o la jurisprudencia del Tribunal constitucional, que lejos de transgredir el principio bajo estudio lo fortalecen. De eso nos ocuparemos líneas más adelante.

Por lo que se lleva dicho, cree este Órgano asesor e imparcial de la Sala Constitucional, que la consulta judicial que nos ocupa adolece de algunos vicios de admisibilidad (los que han sido debidamente acreditados), razón por la cual solicitamos que así se expresen, declarando inadmisible la presente gestión judicial.

Por otra parte, de posible incidencia en el destino de la presente consulta de constitucionalidad, sí quiere llamar la atención esta Oficina del planteamiento meramente literal de la presunta preterición de derechos fundamentales, sin demostrar el verdadero agravio que le provocó al afectado el que fuera sentenciado por un Tribunal Penal, con las características que le señala la consulta judicial que nos ocupa. El planteamiento central sobre el que gira la duda del Tribunal consultante, tiene solo una cara: si el delito fue cometido en el año 2017 y el imputado fue juzgado y condenado por un Tribunal de Juicio que fue creado e integrado con posterioridad, en tesis de principio se habría lesionado el derecho fundamental de tener un juez legal. A pesar de que la literalidad del artículo 35 constitucional no recoge este último aspecto (la exigencia de la necesaria preexistencia del Tribunal juzgador), es un hecho que multitudinaria doctrina sentada en instrumentos internacionales y jurisprudencia de Tribunales de Derechos Humanos son coincidentes en el tema. Destaca que en el libelo que conforma la consulta judicial, no se lee una línea en donde se desarrolle el agravio que le provocó al ordenamiento jurídico-constitucional, pero sobre todo al acusado, que éste hubiera sido juzgado por un Tribunal creado con posterioridad a los hechos y con la serie de circunstancias y variables que rodearon el caso judicial, dígase decisiones administrativas tomadas por la Corte Plena o por el Consejo Superior, a través de acuerdos, algunos plasmados en circulares (137-2023, por ejemplo). El abogado defensor, cuando intenta a través de un mecanismo procesal inválido (plantear una actividad procesal defectuosa contra una sentencia judicial) revertir la condena, alega como agravio violaciones al principio de juez legal y al debido proceso penal, exponiendo como pretensión que se declare ineficaz la sentencia y que se ordene el reenvío. Podría pensarse que el agravio ya fue expuesto por la parte procesal que le correspondía y en el momento procesal oportuno, razón por la cual no le es exigible a un Tribunal consultante satisfacer este requisito. Efectivamente, no pretendemos invocar una inadmisibilidad de la consulta judicial porque el Tribunal promovente no expuso agravio alguno, sino que lo que queremos dejar constancia es que, a pesar de que efectivamente el Tribunal fallador del caso judicial de origen fue constituido con posterioridad a los hechos, también lo que parece es que el planteamiento tribunalicio procura una nulidad por la nulidad misma, ya que la circunstancia temporal de la constitución posterior del Tribunal A quo no aparenta una transgresión real, de tal forma que si se hubiera procedido a juzgarlo por un Tribunal ordinario, el resultado hubiera sido otro. Esta línea de pensamiento ha sido recogida por la propia Sala Constitucional, quien aboga por lograr con cuestionamientos constitucionales, ya sea a través de consultas judiciales o de acciones de inaplicabilidad, una verdadera tutela del derecho fundamental que se considera conculcado, evitando así declarar la inconstitucionalidad por la inconstitucionalidad misma:

“En segundo lugar, considerando que la tutela que se ejerce en esta vía no lo es en abstracto, es decir, no se trata de declarar la inconstitucionalidad por la inconstitucionalidad misma, sino que lo es con el fin de tutelar los derechos fundamentales de quienes se consideren afectados, hay que determinar si con la omisión que aquí se acusa de inconstitucional, se causó alguna lesión a los derechos fundamentales del accionante. En esencia, lo que se reclama como violado es la garantía constitucional al juez natural, que forma parte de la garantía genérica al debido proceso, alegando que al ser juzgado por un tribunal no constituido legalmente, se viola ese principio. La garantía del juez natural significa la existencia de órganos judiciales preestablecidos en forma permanente por la ley. Uno de los contenidos del principio "juez natural" es como juez legal, es decir, como "órgano" creado por ley conforme a la competencia que para ello la Constitución asigna al Congreso. El derecho a la jurisdicción consiste, precisamente, como principio, en tener posibilidad de acceso a uno de esos jueces. Según lo establece el artículo 8,1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José de Costa Rica, el derecho a la jurisdicción y la garantía de los jueces naturales, es el derecho que toda persona tiene a ser oída con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley. Lo que se tutela a través del principio del juez natural es la prohibición de crear organismos ad-hoc, o ex post facto (después del hecho), o especiales, para juzgar determinados hechos o a determinadas personas, sin la generalidad y permanencia propias de los tribunales judiciales.” Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Resolución 6701-1993 de las 15:06 horas del 21 de diciembre de 1993 (lo resaltado es suplido).

Pareciera que con una postura tan tajante de la Sala de la materia y al no demostrarse la verdadera lesión al derecho fundamental presuntamente damnificado (más que una inobservancia formal del requisito de la previa constitución, pero sin evidenciarse que su configuración fue ex profeso y para juzgar ese caso en especial), debe esa Sala Constitucional igualmente rechazar la presente consulta judicial, ya que no existe constancia de que el derecho o principio del juez legal haya sido violentado, en los términos prohibidos por el artículo 35 constitucional y toda la doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional y extranjera que la informa, como por ejemplo, los Tribunales constituidos en los casos de ALMONACID ARELLANO vs. CHILE y GELMAN vs. URUGUAY.

Debe reiterarse que la configuración del Tribunal sentenciador en el caso concreto, obedeció a requerimientos y necesidades para sostener el principio de continuidad del servicio público “Administración de Justicia”, igualmente con soporte normativo, por lo que no hay forma de demostrar que se haya lesionado algún derecho fundamental del acusado.

III.- Sobre el fondo. Señala que los dos planteamientos del Tribunal consultante, son:

a.- tanto los artículos citados de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial en su integralidad (aunque luego fueron reducidos a citas de párrafos o incisos específicos), así como el acuerdo del Consejo Superior y la circular 137-2023, propician que se conculque el principio de juez legal, ya que el Tribunal de Juicio que condenó al encartado en la causa de origen, fue constituido con posterioridad a la comisión de los hechos delictivos, y b.- igualmente, todo ese tramado de artículos y acuerdos también permiten que se tomen decisiones acerca del nombramiento y constitución de tribunales, cuyo origen proviene de órganos administrativos o reglamentaciones inferiores, que similarmente propenden a lesionar el principio de juez legal o natural. Al respecto, la postura del órgano asesor es:

a.- formalmente hablando, es un hecho que el juez unipersonal que juzgó y condenó al encartado ARIAS RUIZ, fue designado para conocer el caso judicial de origen con posterioridad a la comisión del delito (2017). Sin embargo, también es dable sostener que esa persona juzgadora integra la nómina de funcionarios-jueces del Poder Judicial, que ha sido designada en esa condición por haber cumplido con todos los atestados requeridos y que, a su vez, es una juez nombrada dentro de la recientemente creada Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada (JEDO).

b.- la constitución del Tribunal fallador, en la forma que se dio, no fue un capricho y ni siquiera se actuó en forma deliberada para, precisamente, lesionar las garantías que define el artículo 35 constitucional en perjuicio del encartado. Tal designación, deriva de normativa legal habilitante tanto a la Corte Plena como al Consejo Superior, quienes, fundados en acuerdos, decisiones y circulares, han dictado una serie de pautas para garantizar la continuidad del servicio público denominado “Administración de Justicia”. Debe remarcarse el hecho de que, si bien es cierto los acuerdos tomados por la Corte Plena y el Consejo Superior se han materializado a través de los mecanismos administrativos establecidos, también lo es que cada uno de ellos (acuerdos, decisiones, circulares, etc.) tienen origen normativo de ley, por lo que cumplir con la pretensión de Tribunal consultante, de que la designación y constitución de los Tribunales de Justicia sea pétrea y totalmente anticipada (solo por cumplir con el precepto de que el Tribunal debe estar constituido no solo por ley sino con anterioridad al hecho que se va a juzgar), implicaría un estancamiento en la prestación del servicio “Administración de justicia” y de paso, un incumplimiento de las atribuciones otorgadas por la misma Carta Fundamental al Poder Judicial y una severa lesión al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida.

c.- sobre el tema, traemos aquí a colación la ya citada sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de España (47/1983 de 31 de mayo de 1983), cuando sostiene lo siguiente:

“Es cierto que no cabe exigir el mismo grado de fijeza y predeterminación al órgano que a sus titulares, dadas las diversas contingencias que pueden afectar a éstos en su situación personal y la exigencia, dimanante del interés público -las llamadas «necesidades del servicio»-, de que los distintos miembros del poder judicial colaboren dentro de la Administración de Justicia en los lugares en que su labor pueda ser más eficaz, supliendo, en la medida de lo posible, las disfuncionalidades del sistema.

Como es ostensible, el hecho de que se sostenga que la configuración y constitución de los tribunales es contraria al ordenamiento constitucional, solo por el hecho de que estos movimientos se han realizado a través de decisiones administrativas provenientes de órganos administrativos del Poder Judicial, es desconocer no solo que dichas instancias tienen asiento legal, sino también que esas actuaciones han sido absolutamente necesarias para preservar la continuidad del servicio que presta el Poder Judicial. Las posibilidades de movilización de personal de una jurisdicción a otra diferente o cualquier otra “disfuncionalidad del sistema”, se han hecho en primera instancia porque las normas legales cuestionadas lo permiten y luego, porque dichos cambios eran y seguirán siendo necesarios.

Recuérdese aquí lo dicho por el Tribunal Constitucional de España en una resolución mencionada líneas atrás (STC 55/1990 de 28 de marzo, FJ 3):

“Este Tribunal ha declarado reiteradamente que el derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley exige, fundamentalmente, que el órgano judicial haya sido creado por una norma legal invistiéndolo de jurisdicción y competencia con anterioridad al hecho motivador de la actuación o proceso judicial, y que su régimen orgánico y procesal no permita calificarlo de órgano especial o excepcional (STC 47/1983, de 31 de mayo, FJ 2). Pero esta garantía no supone el derecho a un Juez determinado en concreto (STC 97/1987 Pero esta garantía no supone el derecho a un Juez determinado en concreto (STC 97/1987, de 10 de junio, FJ 4) ni excluye, en principio, la posibilidad de establecer reglas especiales de competencia en la distribución de los asuntos entre los distintos órganos judiciales.” (lo resaltado es suplido).

d.- nos interesa sobremanera rescatar la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional patrio, arriba mencionada (6701-1993 de las 15:06 horas del 21 de diciembre de 1993), no solo por su riqueza sino también porque la solución otorgada se ajusta a la consulta que nos ocupa. En efecto, además de sentar el precedente acerca de que los pronunciamientos de esa Sala no se reducen a declarar la inconstitucionalidad por la inconstitucionalidad misma, también introduce un elemento de suyo interesante y poderoso, cuando concluye que el mecanismo de control de la constitucionalidad de las normas : “... lo es con el fin de tutelar los derechos fundamentales de quienes se consideren afectados, [pero] hay que determinar si con la omisión que aquí se acusa de inconstitucional, se causó alguna lesión a los derechos fundamentales del accionante.” Y es que ese escenario es el que precisamente se presenta en la sumaria penal que dio base a la consulta judicial que nos atrae, porque no basta que formalmente se compruebe que la designación del juzgador se materializó años después de la infracción penal, sino que, también, es menester confirmar que efectivamente la actuación judicial le propició al justiciable alguna lesión a sus derechos fundamentales.

Y en honor a la verdad, ni el Tribunal consultante se dio a la tarea de demostrarlo, ni tampoco esta Oficina lo ha detectado, concluyendo en la afirmación de que no se sabrá –porque no aconteció- si el acusado hubiera tenido mayores garantías si hubiera sido juzgado y condenado por un Tribunal de Juicio “ordinario” y no uno “emergente.” Por todo lo que viene dicho, hechos los reparos de admisibilidad a la presente consulta judicial de constitucionalidad, que respetuosamente solicitamos sean aplicados, es lo cierto que el libelo y sus fundamentos del tribunal promovente no han logrado demostrar que, en el caso del juzgamiento de la sumaria judicial original, se haya conculcado la garantía establecida en el artículo 35 constitucional. No basta con demostrar que la constitución del tribunal aconteció con posterioridad al hecho delictivo juzgado, si no se ha logrado demostrar el agravio que esa circunstancia, permitida por las disposiciones de la LOPJ, produjo en el acusado. Finalmente, las disposiciones, acuerdos y circulares adoptadas por los órganos administrativos del Poder Judicial, constituidas sobre bases normativo-legales, resultan ser resorte necesario para preservar el principio de continuidad del servicio público denominado “Administración de Justicia”, sin que se haya podido probar –igualmente- como esas disposiciones administrativas impidieron al justiciable el goce de las prerrogativas del artículo 35 constitucional.

11.- En memorial presentado el 16 de junio de 2024, Orlando Aguirre Gómez, en su condición de presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial contesta la audiencia conferida, y señala, sobre la Consulta Judicial, que se realiza dentro del expediente número [Valor 001], mediante resolución No. 2024-0462 de las once horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de marzo de dos mil veinticuatro, corregida por resolución No. 2024-713 de las quince horas con cinco minutos del veintinueve de abril de dos mil veinticuatro, dictadas por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. En resumen, se consulta sobre la constitucionalidad de los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (este último, adicionado por el artículo 18 de la Ley de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica Ley No. 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017 -y reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley No. 10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023), así como el acuerdo del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, adoptado en sesión número 48-2023, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI, que autorizó publicar la circular denominada “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”, Circular No. 137-2023 del 14 de junio de 2023, en cuanto “apoyan… y permiten el traslado de expedientes de la justicia ordinaria a la de delincuencia organizada”, pues, a juicio del referido Tribunal vulneran el principio de juez legal o natural recogido por los artículos 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 35, 39, 121.20 y 166 de la Constitución Política, en tanto permiten que un órgano administrativo o leyes con menor rango que las normas constitucionales y convencionales modifiquen la competencia de los jueces naturales de un hecho, asignando el conocimiento de la causa a tribunales que para la fecha de los hechos no existían.

II.- Antecedentes. 1).- En sesión del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial No. 95-2022 celebrada el 3 de noviembre del 2022, artículo LXXIII, se tomó el acuerdo cuya parte dispositiva literalmente indicó:

“(…)

Previamente a resolver lo que corresponda, se acordó: Trasladar la gestión presentada en oficio N° S-CJEDO-16-2022 del 1 de noviembre de 2022, suscrito por la doctora Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, magistrada coordinadora de la Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, a la Dirección Jurídica, para que en el plazo de tres días emita un criterio sobre la posibilidad legal de utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en los términos que se proponen, en el marco de la ley que todavía no ha entrado en vigor y si de ser posible cuál sería el amparo para darle esa utilización distinta. Se declara acuerdo firme”. (El destacado es nuestro).

2).- En atención a lo anterior, la Dirección Jurídica rindió el criterio No. DJ-566-2022, del 7 de noviembre de 2022, solicitado por el órgano superior, que fue conocido en la sesión No. 98-2022, celebrada el 11 de noviembre de 2022, artículo II, donde se acordó acoger la gestión presentada en oficio No. S-CJEDO-16-2022 de 27 de octubre de 2022, suscrito por la doctora Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, Magistrada coordinadora de la Subcomisión Contra la Delincuencia Organizada, dado que no existe ninguna imposibilidad legal de llevar a cabo el Plan de contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en los términos que se proponen. En lo que interesa, la parte dispositiva del acuerdo indica lo siguiente:

“(…)

Se acordó: Tener por recibido el Criterio N°DJ-566-2022 del 07 de noviembre del 2022, suscrito por el máster Rodrigo Campos Hidalgo, Director Jurídico y en razón de lo indicado: 1) Acoger la gestión presentada en oficio N° S-CJEDO-16-2022 de 27 de octubre de 2022, por la doctora Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, magistrada coordinadora de la Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, dado que conforme el criterio vertido no existe ninguna imposibilidad legal de llevar a cabo el Plan de contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en los términos que se proponen:

[…]

No obstante, se deberá ajustar algunas fechas de inicio en el plan de trabajo, por estar algunas actualmente vencidas. 2.) La Subcomisión Delincuencia Organizada, deberá: a) Disponer que prioritariamente el recurso contemplado en la relación de puestos y vinculado a la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia, sea destinado en primer término para todas las acciones necesarias para la preparación para el inicio de funciones de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado. b.) Disponer que una vez que el respectivo recurso humano participe en las acciones programadas en la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia como preparatorias para el inicio de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado, sea destinado prioritariamente a la atención de asuntos de crimen organizado bajo la normativa actualmente vigente. c.) Disponer que en el caso de que en la respectiva competencia territorial no existan casos de crimen organizado o los mismos se encuentren en trámite, se podrá emplear de manera temporal en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi para la atención de asuntos ordinarios, conforme la clase ancha a que pertenecen los puestos respectivos. Lo anterior con estricto respecto de las reglas de competencia del artículo 47 y concordantes del Código Procesal Penal en entendido de los límites que se imponen al legítimo ejercicio del ius variandi en cuanto a los derechos de las personas servidoras, la no afectación al servicio público y el cumplimiento del bloque de legalidad administrativa. d.) Corresponderá a la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada el seguimiento y control de su ejecución conforme los términos planteados y los ordenamientos administrativos, laborales y penales aplicables a la materia. 3.) La Dirección de Gestión Humana aclarará a las personas funcionarias que participarían en el Plan de Contingencia, que el pago del incentivo salarial previsto para esta jurisdicción está supeditado a la apertura oficial de la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, por lo que no podrá ser aplicado, hasta tanto entre en vigencia. Se declara este acuerdo firme.” 3).- La Corte Plena en sesión No. 3-2023, celebrada el 30 de enero de 2023, artículo XVIII, modificó la competencia territorial de las dos secciones asignadas al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, para ese momento con asiento en San José y dan soporte como plan remedial al despacho homólogo de Guadalupe, para que a partir de febrero de 2023, conozcan de todos los asuntos asignados a los diferentes tribunales de apelación de sentencia del país, iniciando por San Ramón y den colaboración al resto de tribunales de apelación del país, en tanto empezara a funcionar oficialmente la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada.

4).- Por último, el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en sesión No. 48-2023, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI, tuvo por conocido el oficio No. S-CJEDO-08-2023, del 2 de junio de 2023, suscrito por la Magistrada Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, en su condición de Coordinadora de la Sub Comisión de Delincuencia Organizada y autorizó la publicación Circular No. 137-2023, denominada “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”, y la cita textualmente.

III.- Sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas consultadas y el acuerdo del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Potestad Legal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para organizar el funcionamiento de los despachos judiciales. Como un primer punto a destacar, conviene señalar que tal y como lo señala el órgano consultante, nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 121, inciso 20), establece que es competencia exclusiva de la Asamblea Legislativa crear los Tribunales de Justicia. De manera que, una vez que se establecen los tribunales en las distintas circunscripciones territoriales del país, para lograr un adecuado funcionamiento, el legislador les otorgó potestades a los órganos superiores del Poder Judicial -Consejo Superior y Corte Plena- para organizar las instancias judiciales y ejecutar los recursos presupuestarios donde más se necesiten, con el fin de cumplir de manera eficiente y eficaz con el servicio de administración de justicia. Así, en el numeral 3 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, número 7333, se indica lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 3.- Administran la justicia:

1.-Juzgados y tribunales de menor cuantía, contravencionales y de asuntos sumarios.

2.-Juzgados de primera instancia y penales.

3.-Tribunales colegiados.

4.-Tribunales de casación.

5.-Salas de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

6.-Corte Plena.

La Corte Suprema de Justicia establecerá el número de jueces tramitadores y decisores, así como de los otros servidores judiciales que deben tener los tribunales de cualquier categoría y materia; para ello, tomará en consideración las necesidades propias del despacho, en aras de la mejor realización del servicio público de la justicia.

Cuando en un tribunal existan dos o más jueces, el coordinador del órgano será elegido internamente por sus iguales.

Si los despachos jurisdiccionales se organizaren en un circuito judicial, los jueces nombrarán entre ellos al coordinador general.

El juez que conozca de un proceso tendrá la facultad de ordenar lo que corresponda, para el cumplimiento de sus funciones y, en cada asunto, tendrá la potestad de ejercer el régimen disciplinario. En los demás casos, esa potestad le corresponde al cuerpo de jueces y los acuerdos se tomarán por mayoría; si hubiere empate, el coordinador tendrá doble voto.

En las resoluciones y las actuaciones, deberán consignarse el nombre y los apellidos del funcionario a cargo del proceso.

Los tribunales colegiados estarán conformados por el número de jueces que se requieran para el buen servicio público y actuarán individualmente o en colegios de tres de ellos, salvo que la ley disponga otra forma de integración.

El coordinador distribuirá la carga de trabajo, aplicando los criterios que hayan fijado los jueces con anterioridad y buscando siempre la mayor equidad. Cuando no se pongan de acuerdo, el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial o la Corte Suprema de Justicia, según corresponda, fijará las reglas. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley de Reorganización Judicial No.7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997)” (El énfasis es suplido).

Por su parte, el artículo 46 del citado cuerpo normativo prevé la posibilidad de que se modifiquen las circunscripciones territoriales, recargo de competencias o el traslado y conversión de despachos judiciales, cargos o puestos, los cuales evidentemente se tendrán que fundamentar en la ineludible eficiencia del servicio, la especialización de los órganos judiciales y de los tribunales jurisdiccionales y la equidad necesaria de las cargas de trabajo; aspectos que fueron contemplados en el momento que se emitieron las directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado, mediante los acuerdos de Corte Plena, Consejo Superior y la circular No. 137-2023, cuestionada.

Al respecto, la norma señala lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 46.- Los acuerdos y las disposiciones de la Corte relativas al establecimiento y la definición de una circunscripción territorial, o los que conciernan al recargo de competencias, el traslado y la conversión de despachos judiciales y de cargos o puestos, deberán fundamentarse en la ineludible eficiencia del servicio, la especialización de los órganos judiciales y de los tribunales jurisdiccionales y la equidad necesaria de las cargas de trabajo.

En razón del volumen de trabajo y la obligada eficiencia del servicio público de la justicia, la Corte podrá nombrar más integrantes de los tribunales, en forma temporal o definitiva; también podrá abrir y cerrar - por esas mismas razones- nuevas oficinas y órganos adscritos a los tribunales, en cualquier lugar del país.

En los tribunales mixtos, la Corte podrá dividir funciones por materia, de manera que se especialicen los servicios de administración de justicia. Cuando las necesidades del servicio lo impongan, la Corte podrá dividir un tribunal mixto en tribunales especializados.

Cuando la carga de trabajo no amerite abrir otro órgano jurisdiccional ni judicial, la Corte o el Consejo podrán asignar jueces y otros servidores itinerantes, para que se trasladen a los lugares donde deba brindarse el servicio con mayor eficiencia.” (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley de Reorganización Judicial No.7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997) En este mismo sentido el artículo 59 señala lo siguiente:

“Artículo 59.- Corresponde a la Corte Suprema de Justicia:

(…)

15.- Proponer, a la Asamblea Legislativa, la creación de Despachos Judiciales en los lugares y las materias que estime necesario para el buen servicio público.

16.- Refundir dos o más despachos judiciales en uno solo o dividirlos, trasladarlos de sede, fijarles la respectiva competencia territorial y por materia, tomando en consideración el mejor servicio público.

También podrá asignarle competencia especializada a uno o varios despachos, para que conozcan de determinados asuntos, dentro de una misma materia, ocurridos en una o varias circunscripciones o en todo el territorio nacional.” Nótese como la normativa le otorga amplias potestades a la Corte para nombrar más integrantes en los tribunales -de forma temporal o definitiva-, abrir y cerrar nuevas oficinas y órganos adscritos a los tribunales, dividir funciones por materia - con el fin de especializar los servicios de administración de justicia-, dividir tribunales mixtos en especializado, fijar competencia territorial y por materia, asignar jueces y otros servidores para que se trasladen a los lugares donde deba brindarse el servicio con mayor eficiencia, siempre y cuando sea conforme al interés público y al ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi, como lo ha expresado la Dirección Jurídica del Poder Judicial en el criterio No. DJ-566-2022.

Aunado, los incisos 1, 2, 3, 6, 21 y 22 del artículo 81 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, otorgan la potestad al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial para organizar los despachos judiciales ejecutando la política administrativa de la institución, de acuerdo con los lineamientos establecidos por la Corte Suprema de Justicia. A esos efectos el ordinal indica lo siguiente:

“Artículo 81.- Corresponde al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial:

1.- Ejecutar la política administrativa del Poder Judicial, dentro de los lineamientos establecidos por la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

2.- Designar, con excepción de los que corresponden a la Corte, a los funcionarios que administran justicia, de conformidad con las normas legales y reglamentarias correspondientes; trasladarlos, provisional o definitivamente, suspenderlos y concederles licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él y removerlos, todo con arreglo de las disposiciones correspondientes, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al Presidente.

3.- Designar funcionarios interinos o suplentes que administran justicia, cuando se compruebe que los Despachos no se encontraren al día.

6.- Trasladar, provisional o definitivamente, suspender, conceder licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él, remover y rehabilitar, con arreglo a las disposiciones correspondientes, a todos los servidores judiciales, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al Presidente de la Corte.

(…)

21.- Dictar las normas internas para el mejor desempeño de sus funciones, con excepción de los reglamentos.

22.- Regular la distribución de los asuntos judiciales entre los Despachos de igual competencia territorial, para obtener la equiparación del trabajo.” De lo anterior se colige que, una vez que la Asamblea Legislativa crea los Tribunales de Justicia, conforme al mandato constitucional del artículo 121.20, corresponde al Poder Judicial definir el funcionamiento de todos los despachos judiciales del país, o sea, el objeto de las normas legales transcritas es otorgarle a esta institución la posibilidad de auto organizarse sin necesidad de que cuando se constituyan, modifiquen o eliminen los tribunales, juzgados, fiscalías y otros órganos auxiliares, se tenga que acudir ante el legislador para que sea por medio de una ley que se autorice, ya que eso implicaría una demora inminente y una afectación incuestionable a la prestación del servicio y al mandato constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida, violentando el artículo 41 de nuestra Constitución Política.

Ahora bien, con el fin de resguardar el buen uso de los fondos públicos, el artículo 176 de nuestra Constitución Política, exige que estos sean utilizados de forma “sostenible, transparente y responsable”, obligaciones que tienen todas las instituciones públicas en el momento de ejecutar el presupuesto asignado cada año. Es decir, en lo que respecta al Poder Judicial todos los recursos presupuestarios asignados anualmente deben invertirse para cumplir las respectivas metas y objetivos institucionales, Al respecto, el citado numeral dice lo siguiente:

“Artículo 176- La gestión pública se conducirá de forma sostenible, transparente y responsable, la cual se basará en un marco de presupuestación plurianual, en procura de la continuidad de los servicios que presta.

El presupuesto ordinario de la República comprende todos los ingresos probables y todos los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública, durante todo el año económico. En ningún caso, el monto de los gastos presupuestos podrá exceder el de los ingresos probables.

La Administración Pública, en sentido amplio, observará las reglas anteriores para dictar sus presupuestos.

El presupuesto de la República se emitirá para el término de un año, del primero de enero al treinta y uno de diciembre.” En igual sentido, el artículo 4 de la Ley No. 8131, denominada Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, que establece: “todo prepuesto público deberá responde a los planes operativos institucionales anuales, de mediano y largo plazo, adoptados por los jerarcas respectivos”, o sea, el jerarca debe preparar la formulación del presupuesto para cada año, donde se incluyen todas las necesidades institucionales y se destinan los recursos de acuerdo a los planes que se tienen para ese año. El artículo indica lo siguiente:

“ARTÍCULO 4.- Sujeción al Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Todo presupuesto público deberá responder a los planes operativos institucionales anuales, de mediano y largo plazo, adoptados por los jerarcas respectivos, así como a los principios presupuestarios generalmente aceptados; además, deberá contener el financiamiento asegurado para el año fiscal correspondiente, conforme a los criterios definidos en la presente Ley. El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo constituirá el marco global que orientará los planes operativos institucionales, según el nivel de autonomía que corresponda de conformidad con las disposiciones legales y constitucionales pertinentes. (Nota de Sinalevi: Mediante el artículo 21 de la Ley de Inversión Pública, N° 10441 del 13 de marzo de 2024, se reformará este numeral. De conformidad con la ley antes mencionada la misma entrará a regir doce meses a partir de su publicación es decir el 22 de marzo de 2025, por lo que a partir de esa fecha el texto de este artículo se leerá de la siguiente manera:

Artículo 4- Sujeción al Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y de Inversión Pública. Todo presupuesto público deberá responder a los planes operativos institucionales anuales, de mediano y largo plazos, adoptados por los jerarcas respectivos, así como a los principios presupuestarios generalmente aceptados; además, deberá contener el financiamiento asegurado para el año fiscal correspondiente, conforme a los criterios definidos en la presente ley. El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y de Inversión Pública constituirá el marco global que orientará los planes operativos institucionales, según el nivel de autonomía que corresponda, de conformidad con las disposiciones legales y constitucionales pertinentes.")” En términos generales, si revisamos con detenimiento las directrices emitidas por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial en el acuerdo y circular cuestionadas, no queda duda de que fueron dictadas con el fin de implementar un Plan de Contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, de manera que tanto las personas juzgadoras como el personal auxiliar permanezca en funciones, ejerciendo su labor de manera eficiente, para así evitar que el recurso sea subutilizado y sobre todo por la necesidad de fortalecer otras áreas dada la difícil situación por el aumento de la criminalidad en el país.

De especial importancia, el legislador con la aprobación de la Ley “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica”, No. 9481, estableció que esta jurisdicción tiene competencia en todo el territorio nacional, además tiene competencia a nivel nacional para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria “cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen”, esto también fue reiterado en la adición del artículo 101 bis a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Entonces, no podría interpretarse que si un asunto de la jurisdicción ordinaria es atendido por personas juzgadoras especializadas en delincuencia organizada, se estaría violentando el principio de juez o jueza natural, como lo quiere hacer ver la persona apelante y el órgano consultante, pues, estas competencias fueron definidas mediante una ley, correspondiendo al Poder Judicial de manera exclusiva y excluyente destinar el recurso donde más se requiera.

El citado artículo señala lo siguiente:

“Artículo 2- Competencia. Los asuntos de delincuencia organizada o criminalidad organizada podrán ser tramitados en la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, o bien, en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. Los actos procesales dictados en los casos de crimen organizado en la jurisdicción ordinaria, antes de la entrada en funcionamiento de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, mantendrán su eficacia y validez. Para ambas jurisdicciones es de aplicación la normativa vigente en la materia, incluyendo la Ley 8754, Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada, de 22 de julio de 2009, salvo disposición expresa en contrario.

Serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción ordinaria los asuntos que cumplan con los parámetros establecidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de Julio de 2009.

Estos asuntos serán de conocimiento de los juzgados penales, tribunales penales y tribunales de Apelación de sentencia penal ordinaries de todo el país. Podrán ser sometidos a conocimiento de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada los asuntos que, además de cumplir con lo establecido en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de julio de 2009, se ajusten a las previsiones de los artículos 8 y 9 de la Ley 9481, Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, de 13 de setiembre de 2017. Estos asuntos podrán ser sometidos a conocimiento del Juzgado Penal, Tribunal Penal y Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, todos de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. Conocerán los hechos delictivos que cumplan con los parámetros indicados, así como los delitos conexos. Su asiento será en San José, así como en los lugares y en la forma que determine la Corte Suprema de Justicia y tendrán competencia en todo el territorio nacional. Además, estos despachos también tendrán competencia a nivel nacional para realizar labores dentro de la Jurisdicción penal ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen.

Cuando el Ministerio Público constate que, de acuerdo con la normativa vigente, los hechos investigados califican como delincuencia organizada o criminalidad organizada podrá solicitar que se autorice la aplicación de las normas previstas para este tipo de asuntos: a) Para los casos que correspondan a la jurisdicción ordinaria, la autoridad jurisdiccional que tenga a su cargo el asunto verificará el cumplimiento de los requisitos, mediante resolución fundada, dentro de las cuarenta y ocho horas posteriores a la solicitud. b) Para los casos que correspondan a la jurisdicción especializada, la solicitud será formulada de forma escrita por la persona que ocupe el cargo de fiscal general de la República. La autoridad jurisdiccional especializada podrá arrogarse la competencia en resolución fundada, previa Verificación de los requisitos, de acuerdo con el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 4 de esta ley. De modo excepcional, la solicitud la podrá gestionar la persona fiscal subrogante, cuando esté impedida, por algún motive debidamente justificado, la persona que ostente el cargo de fiscal general de la República. Salvo la solicitud inicial escrita del fiscal general o del fiscal subrogante para que la Jurisdicción especializada se arrogue el conocimiento de un asunto, las demás diligencias podrán ser delegadas en los fiscales especializados de dicha jurisdicción, a excepción de aquellas que por imperative legal únicamente puedan ser gestionadas por la persona que ocupe el puesto del fiscal general.

El recurso de casación y el procedimiento especial de revisión serán de competencia de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.” Como vemos, por mandato legal, la Corte Plena o el Consejo Superior, según sea el caso, en su carácter de patrono y órgano supremo del Poder Judicial, tienen la potestad de definir las políticas institucionales de organización y estructuración internas, con el propósito de brindar el servicio público de calidad, que, como administrador de justicia tiene por encargo, mediante la creación o reestructuración de los despachos judiciales, así como con la ubicación del personal judicial en las oficinas donde se requiera del apoyo y colaboración temporal, e incluso permanente, para la mejor atención de las personas usuarias del servicio de acceso a la justicia. En ese sentido, las directrices cuestionadas encuentran sustento en la normativa orgánica y presupuestaria supra citada y en la “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica”, No. 9481, que fueron promulgadas con el fin de lograr que el Poder Judicial brinde un servicio de administración de justicia, de manera eficiente y eficaz, en cumplimiento al mandato constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida, sin denegación, haciendo esfuerzos para atender la situación actual a la que se está enfrentando nuestro país por el constante aumento en la criminalidad derivada del fortalecimiento de las estructuras de crimen organizado como el tráfico de drogas y otros delitos complejos.

Por tales motivos, los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, así como el acuerdo del Consejo Superior de la sesión número 48-2023, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI y la Circular No. 137-2023, no presentan ningún problema de constitucionalidad; en sentido contrario, de quitarle la posibilidad a los órganos superiores del Poder Judicial para organizar los despachos judiciales y los Tribunales de Justicia, se estaría impidiendo el ejercicio de las funciones asignadas constitucionalmente a este Poder de la República, violentando el Principio de Independencia Judicial que dispone el artículo 9 de la Constitución Política.

La jurisprudencia constitucional ha ido desarrollando este principio desde la “independencia organizativa”, en el sentido de que cada uno de los poderes de la República puedan dictar normas y adoptar decisiones respecto a su funcionamiento, su organización y al desarrollo de las funciones sustantivas (cita el voto número 14286-2005 de las catorce horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del diecinueve de octubre de dos mil cinco) y señala que la separación de poderes y la potestad de auto organización que tiene el Poder Judicial se complementa con la potestad reglamentaria, que encuentra sustento en el inciso d), del apartado primero, del artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, cuando dispone que “La jerarquía de las fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo se sujetará al siguiente orden: (…) d) Los decretos del Poder Ejecutivo que reglamentan las leyes, los de los otros Supremos Poderes en la materia de su competencia” . Así las cosas, los órganos superiores tienen la posibilidad de emitir reglamentos y directrices de servicio para organizar los despachos judiciales, como usualmente sucede cuando un tribunal o juzgado necesite reorganizarse y asumir nuevas funciones dentro de las competencias establecidas por el legislador. Esta potestad reglamentaria también fue abordada por el Tribunal Constitucional en el voto de cita (No.14286-2005), donde se indicó lo siguiente:

“I.- B) Potestad Reglamentaria de los otros Poderes y de otras entidades públicas: Dicho todo lo anterior, pareciera concluirse que la potestad reglamentaria es exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo, sin embargo, esta afirmación debe entenderse en el entendido de que, efectivamente la potestad reglamentaria ejecutiva es exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo, no así la potestad reglamentaria autónoma. Es decir, se admite la posibilidad de que los otros Supremos Poderes, distintos al Poder Ejecutivo, puedan emitir reglamentos autónomos, sea de organización o de servicio. Lo anterior tiene su fundamento en el inciso d) del apartado primero del artículo 6º de la LGAP…

(…)

Ahora bien, concretamente sobre la potestad reglamentaria autónoma del Poder Judicial, ésta deriva del principio mismo de separación de funciones, pues como se dijo, nada impide que una misma función -no primaria- sea ejercida por dos Poderes o por todos, razón por la que no se puede hablar de una rígida distribución de competencias en razón de la función y la materia. De tal forma que el Poder Judicial tiene también potestad normativa, que se traduce también en su potestad reglamentaria autónoma para aspectos referidos a su organización interna o a los servicios que presta. Potestad de auto-organización reconocida por demás por el mismo artículo 167 Constitucional en cuanto establece la consulta obligatoria de proyectos de ley referidos a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, asimismo, el artículo 48 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial dice:

“Artículo 48.- La Corte Suprema de Justicia es el Tribunal Superior del Poder Judicial y como órgano superior de éste ejercerá las funciones de gobierno y de reglamento.” De esta forma, no es de extrañar que esta Sala haya tenido la oportunidad de analizar las potestades de la Corte Suprema de Justicia respecto de normar las funciones de los distintos despachos judiciales (ver resolución 02-07626 de las 14 horas 35 minutos del 01 de agosto del 2002 y resolución 00-05888 de las 10 horas 03 minutos del 13 de julio del 2000). En conclusión, como se observa, no sólo el Poder Ejecutivo goza de potestad reglamentaria (ejecutiva y autónoma), sino que se ha reconocido esta potestad también a otros Poderes y entidades públicas, pero en cuanto a éstos únicamente si se trata de reglamentos autónomos (sea de organización o de servicio), pues la potestad reglamentaria ejecutiva sigue siendo exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo.” (El destacado es nuestro).

En virtud de lo expuesto, las normas cuestionadas no resultan inconstitucionales, dado que le otorgan potestades a los órganos superiores para auto organizar los despachos judiciales con el fin de brindar un servicio de administración de justicia de calidad, eficiente y eficaz, sujeto a cambios por las incidencias que se puedan estar presentando debido a ciertas situaciones sociales y donde se requiere que los recursos asignados presupuestariamente sean utilizados de manera “sostenible, transparente y responsable”, lo cual se dispuso por parte de la Subcomisión Contra la Delincuencia Organizada, la Corte Plena y el Consejo Superior, cuando se implementó el Plan de Contingencia, en esa jurisdicción, bajo las posibilidades que la ley establece en cuando a los despachos judiciales que atienden la materia penal.

No existe afectación al Principio de Juez Natural. Como se indicó, la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial número 7333, establece una serie de normas que permiten a la Corte Plena y Consejo Superior organizar los despachos judiciales. Entre estas normas, cabe destacar los artículos 46, 59 y 81, que permite a los órganos superiores la modificación de las circunscripciones territoriales, recargo de competencias o el traslado y conversión de despachos judiciales, cargos o puestos, los cuales evidentemente se tendrán que fundamentar en la ineludible eficiencia del servicio, la especialización de los órganos judiciales y de los tribunales jurisdiccionales y la equidad necesaria de las cargas de trabajo.

En el caso sub examine, cabe advertir que es la Ley No. 9481 que crea la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, la que define la competencia de los despachos judiciales que atienden esa materia, cuya competencia la tienen a nivel nacional y para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria. Esto tiene como consecuencia que el Poder Judicial dentro de su potestad de auto organización pueda utilizar los recursos humanos y presupuestarios donde considere pertinente, atendiendo siempre el buen servicio y el interés público. Así, el principio de juez natural establece que toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída por un tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, prestablecido por ley, como sucedió con la creación de la referida jurisdicción especializada, de manera que no estamos ante un órgano jurisdiccional constituido ad hoc, sino ante tribunales de justicia que fueron creados mediante una ley y cuya competencia también ha sido definida por el legislador, tal y como lo exige el principio de juez natural.

Si revisamos nuevamente las directrices contenidas en la Circular No. 137-2023, estas son acordes con la normativa mencionada, pues de ninguna manera implementan alguna modificación a lo que se dispone legalmente, sino que buscan que las personas juzgadoras especializadas en delincuencia organizada puedan atender asuntos ordinarios, cuando las circunstancias de la necesidad institucional así lo requieran, para garantizar el acceso a la justicia y la eficiencia en la administración de justicia. Esta práctica también es común el otras materias, donde se han tenido que reorganizar los despachos judiciales con motivo de la aprobación de nuevas Leyes, que modifican o establecen nuevas competencias y funciones de algunos Tribunales de Justicia, entre otras, la Reforma Procesal Laboral, la Reforma Procesal Civil, y otras que se encuentran aprobadas pero que están en período de vacatio legis, como el Código Procesal de Familia, vigente a partir de octubre de 2024, o las que están por aprobarse.

En el caso concreto las personas juzgadoras que conocieron el proceso ordinario, como se explicó, son jueces penales que por mandato legal tienen competencia en todo el territorio nacional para atender asuntos de delincuencia organizada u ordinarios. No fueron designados para el caso concreto, sino que forman parte de la integración de un determinado órgano jurisdiccional cuya competencia ha sido definida legalmente, debiendo conocer “procesos ordinarios y especializados” por el requerimiento del sistema de justicia, el interés público y el correcto uso de los fondos públicos. Es evidente, que no se juzgó un delito -cuyo trámite corresponde al proceso ordinario-, mediante el proceso especializado, sino que, simplemente fue tramitado por personas juzgadoras especializadas aplicando la ley adjetiva del proceso ordinario, situación que de ningún modo afecta la competencia definida legalmente.

Es importante, traer a colación lo indicado por la Dirección Jurídica en el criterio número DJ-566-2022, cuando analizó el Plan de Contingencia diseñado para utilizar de forma temporal las plazas de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, en los términos que fueron propuestos por la Sub Comisión de la Jurisdicción Penal. Al respecto la Unidad Asesora en lo que interesa señaló lo siguiente:

“Es evidente que existe una instrumentalidad manifiesta en los recursos del presente año para el inicio de la operación de la respectiva jurisdicción como así se manifiesta de la reforma del mismo transitorio I al indicar: “Entrará en vigencia dieciocho meses después de que se haya otorgado el presupuesto necesario para su implementación, conforme a los estudios técnicos del Poder Judicial” Nótese como este transitorio prevé que se asigne presupuesto para la respectiva jurisdicción 18 meses antes, es decir en un período presupuestario anterior, a la entrada en vigencia de la jurisdicción, con lo que queda clara la posibilidad de ejecución de los respectivos recursos. Debe recordarse que el artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone lo siguiente:

“Artículo 16.- 1. En ningún caso podrán dictarse actos contrarios a reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica, o a principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia”.

La lógica indica que si se asignaron recursos en el año 2022 en el contexto indicado ut supra es para efectos de preparación de inicio de la respectiva jurisdicción, derivado del presupuesto ordinario que autoriza el gasto y a efecto de que el inicio de los efectos de la ley sean conforme a los principios del servicio público, a saber:

“Artículo 4.- La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad en el trato de los destinatarios, usuarios o beneficiarios”.

Lo contrario implicaría esperar a la vigencia de la Ley para hacer las inversiones necesarias para su inicio, lo cual no es el propósito de la asignación presupuestaria del año 2022 ni del transitorio I reformado de la Ley 9481, que más bien contempla actos preparatorios para su ejecución.

Inclusive es de advertir que no sería ni lógico no ejecutar recursos presupuestarios debidamente previstos ni al implementarse parcialmente el respectivo plan en las actividades preparatorias para la entrada en vigencia de la jurisdicción respectiva, dejar el recurso humano ocioso con posterioridad por presumir que no puede ejercer funciones jurisdiccionales o para jurisdiccionales por no estar en vigencia de la Ley 9481, cuando la misma a futuro contempla que las personas servidoras judiciales podrán realizar funciones ordinarias cuando no hayan caso de delincuencia organizada y la Ley de Presupuesto no condiciona la ejecución a su vigencia.

Para efectos del presente criterio, esta Dirección analizó el documento presentado por la Magistrada Zúñiga Morales y del criterio técnico experto de la suscribiente, se evidencia que el uso que se daría a las plazas sería el siguiente…

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Como se evidencia, el plan contempla una serie de acciones por parte de las personas nombradas que estarían participando en acciones necesarias para la preparación de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley en mención, lo que estimamos acorde con lo establecido en el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021 y el acuerdo entre Poderes de la República que le da base.

Estima esta Dirección Jurídica que la base jurídica de ejecución del plan es el presupuesto ordinario 2022 que otorga recursos para que ex ante se prepare lo necesario para la puesta en ejecución de la Ley 9481, cuando se cumplan los presupuestos de la ley para su vigencia.

Lo contrario implicaría suponer que no es sino con la entrada en vigencia de la ley que se podría hacer uso de los respectivos recursos asignados, lo que pospondría aún más sus efectos, en contra de sus disposiciones, el propósito del legislador y del propio interés público.

Es evidente que el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021 contempla el financiamiento para actos preparatorios de la implementación de la jurisdicción especializada, conforme el propio transitorio I mencionado y en el entendido de que dicho acto administrativo emplea el término “otros”, además de “desarrollo logístico, proceso de remodelaciones, licitaciones…” para el destino de los recursos.

Considera esta Dirección que también resulta posible que una vez implementadas todas las acciones técnicas preparatorias necesarias para el inicio de la respectiva jurisdicción, se pueda utilizar el recurso humano para otros fines propios de las competencias jurisdiccionales, en el entendido de que el Consejo Superior cuenta con competencias para adecuar las funciones de las personas servidoras conforme el interés público, en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi y dado que no sería posible aplicar la ley 9481hasta tanto no esté vigente.

Estima esta unidad asesora que limitar la posibilidad de que personas designadas puedan ejercer funciones ordinarias dentro de marco de competencias asignado por ley o por acto administrativo, implicaría dar efectos a una ley que aún no se encuentra vigente y limitar los efectos del presupuesto ordinario 2022, el cual no contempla limitaciones o condicionamientos en tal sentido.

Por consiguiente, una vez aplicado lo dispuesto en el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021, debe entenderse que deben aplicarse los efectos de la respectiva relación de puestos en el presupuesto ordinario 2022.

Conforme a lo anterior, se estima que lo planteado por la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia resulta jurídicamente procedente y al efecto recomendamos lo siguiente:

• Disponer que prioritariamente el recurso contemplado en la relación de puestos y vinculado a la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia, sea destinado en primer término para todas las acciones necesarias para la preparación para el inicio de funciones de la jurisdicción contra la delincuencia organizada.

• Disponer que una vez que el respectivo recurso humano participe en las acciones programadas en la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia como preparatorias para el inicio de la jurisdicción contra la delincuencia organizada, sea destinado prioritariamente a la atención de asuntos de crimen organizado bajo la normativa actualmente vigente.

• Disponer que en el caso de que en la respectiva competencia territorial no existan casos de delincuencia organizada o los mismos se encuentren en trámite, se podrá emplear de manera temporal en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi para la atención de asuntos ordinarios, conforme la clase ancha a que pertenecen los puestos respectivos.

En esta última recomendación se atiende a que inclusive la ley aún no vigente plantea la posibilidad que en ausencia de casos de crimen organizado, los recursos destinados a esta jurisdicción atienda asuntos ordinarios y en el entendido de que como se ha indicado, el presupuesto ordinario 2022 no contempla condicionamiento alguno en su contenido respecto del uso de las plazas.

Se reitera que en el caso de análisis no estamos en presencia de un destino específico técnicamente hablando sino una asignación adicional de recursos presupuestarios en el año 2022, mas sin que exista una ley de origen que ordenara el destino concreto de recursos previamente establecidos y en donde operó un ánimo de liberalidad del Ministerio de Hacienda en el marco de un acuerdo previo de Presidentes de Supremos Poderes.

Estima esta unidad asesora que en el caso deben aplicarse los criterios de interpretación de los artículos 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y del Código Civil que disponen:

“Artículo 10.- 1. La norma administrativa deberá ser interpretada en la forma que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige, dentro del respeto debido a los derechos e intereses del particular.

2. Deberá interpretarse e integrarse tomando en cuenta las otras normas conexas y la naturaleza y valor de la conducta y hechos a que se refiere.” “ARTÍCULO 10.- Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas”.

Se reitera en este sentido que no sería ni lógico interpretar una Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario en el sentido de que no se podría ejecutar recursos presupuestarios debidamente previstos o que de implementarse parcialmente el respectivo plan en las actividades preparatorias para la entrada en vigencia de la jurisdicción respectiva, se pudiera dejar el recurso humano ocioso con posterioridad por presumir que no puede ejercer funciones jurisdiccionales o para jurisdiccionales por no estar en vigencia la Ley 9481, cuando la misma a futuro contempla que las personas servidoras judiciales podrán realizar funciones ordinarias cuando no hayan caso de delincuencia organizada y la Ley de Presupuesto no condiciona la ejecución en el año 2022 a su vigencia.

V.- Conclusiones:

Conforme las anteriores consideraciones, estima esta unidad asesora que se puede concluir lo siguiente:

I.- La ejecución presupuestaria del 2022 y por ende toda la relación de puestos relacionada con las plazas a que se hace referencia en el Plan de Contingencia de análisis no puede entenderse condicionada a la vigencia misma de la Ley 9481, toda vez que se rige por la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República de ese año, la cual no contempla condicionamiento ni limitación alguna en función de la entrada en vigencia de la Jurisdicción contra el Delincuencia Organizada. Es así como la ejecución de dichos recursos del año 2022 estará fundada en la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y no con base en una ley que aún no se encuentra vigente y que no puede limitar la ejecución presupuestaria en el año 2022.

II.- Los recursos aportados al proyecto de presupuesto ordinario 2022 por el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021 no pueden entenderse como un destino específico, dado que no existe una ley de origen que ordenara el destino concreto de los recursos previamente establecidos, sino que más bien operó un ánimo de liberalidad del Ministerio de Hacienda en el marco de un acuerdo previo de Presidentes de Supremos Poderes.

III.- En todo caso debe entenderse que con base en el acuerdo de Presidentes de Supremos Poderes mencionado en el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021, del entonces Ministro de Hacienda y la Ministra de la Presidencia y en este último acto administrativo, los recursos asignados mediante modificación al proyecto de presupuesto ordinario 2022, no fueron previstos exclusivamente para la ejecución de la respectiva ley, sino también para cualquier acto preparatorio para su vigencia conforme a la ciencia, la técnica, la lógica y la experiencia y a efecto de los efectos de la ley sean conforme a los principios del servicio público, asegurando continuidad en el servicio.

IV.- De manera adicional debe entenderse siempre y cuando se esté del mismo programa presupuestario, nada impide el ejercicio del ius variandi legítimo por parte del Consejo Superior, como parte de las competencias asignadas por la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, toda vez que el presupuesto ordinario 2022 no contempla condicionamiento en cuanto a su uso y destino y no hay ley que cree el destino específico.

IV.- Para mayor seguridad del Consejo Superior, recomendamos en el acuerdo respectivo se indique lo siguiente:

• Disponer que prioritariamente el recurso contemplado en la relación de puestos y vinculado a la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia, sea destinado en primer término para todas las acciones necesarias para la preparación para el inicio de funciones de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado.

• Disponer que una vez que el respectivo recurso humano participe en las acciones programadas en la propuesta de Plan de Contingencia como preparatorias para el inicio de la jurisdicción de crimen organizado, sea destinado prioritariamente a la atención de asuntos de crimen organizado bajo la normativa actualmente vigente.

• Disponer que en el caso de que en la respectiva competencia territorial no existan casos de crimen organizado o los mismos se encuentren en trámite, se podrá emplear de manera temporal en ejercicio legítimo del ius variandi para la atención de asuntos ordinarios, conforme la clase ancha a que pertenecen los puestos respectivos. Lo anterior con estricto respecto de las reglas de competencia del artículo 47 y concordantes del Código Procesal Penal en entendido de los límites que se imponen al legítimo ejercicio del ius variandi en cuanto a los derechos de las personas servidoras, la no afectación al servicio público y el cumplimiento del bloque de legalidad administrativa.

V.- Conforme a lo anterior, se concluye en la posibilidad legal de utilizar de forma temporal las plazas contempladas en la relación de puestos del año 2022 otorgadas por la modificación de puestos realizada con base en el oficio DM-995-2021 -DM-1083-2021 de 14 de octubre de 2021, en el marco del contenido mismo del presupuesto ordinario 2022 y toda vez que no existe en el mismo condicionamiento ni limitación en cuanto a su uso.

VI.- La motivación de la decisión administrativa que adopte el Consejo Superior será con base en las consideraciones y propuestas del respectivo Plan de Contingencia, siendo así que corresponderá a la Comisión Jurisdiccional correspondiente el seguimiento y control de su ejecución conforme los términos planteados y los ordenamientos administrativos, laborales y penales aplicables a la materia.” De lo anterior se deduce que, los recursos presupuestarios fueron asignados para que la jurisdicción especializada pudiera atender tanto los procesos especializados, como los ordinarios, tal y como fue dispuesto por el legislador, resguardando los principios del servicio público y asegurando la continuidad del servicio, especialmente ante una materia que ha generado un gran impacto social en los últimos años, como son los delitos de Delincuencia Organizada, y donde no es ajeno al conocimiento de toda la población, que tanto el Poder Legislativo, el Judicial y el Ejecutivo se encuentran arduamente trabajando en el planteamiento de las reformas legales para adecuar el sistema de justicia y que este tipo de delitos puedan ser enfrentados con las mejores herramientas legales.

Por último, la Sala Constitucional en reiterados votos se ha referido a las potestades del legislador ordinario para definir las competencias de las personas juzgadoras, lo cual “constituye una prerrogativa propia de ese órgano legislativo como la “libre configuración del legislador”, también llamada “libre diseño legislativo”. Así en el voto número 2017-4005, de las diez horas y cuarenta minutos del quince de marzo de dos mil diecisiete, se indicó lo siguiente:

“Ahora bien, el hecho de que el legislador ordinario haya optado por disponer el procedimiento cuestionado para la sustitución de los jueces constituye una prerrogativa propia de ese órgano legislativo como la “libre configuración del legislador”, también denominada “libre diseño legislativo” o “discrecionalidad legislativa”. Verbigracia, en sentencia número 2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, se señaló que: “La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (…) La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y las jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares”. Para este Tribunal, la discrecionalidad legislativa aplicada al sub iudice alcanza y se basta a sí misma para que el legislador considerara” (voto 13-011706 de las 11:44 hrs del 30 de agosto del 2013).

Es menester indicar que stricto sensu, el principio de juez natural deviene en la imposibilidad de ser sometido a un proceso ante la autoridad de quien no es juez o que carece de competencia para resolver determinada causa y que la competencia de los jueces y tribunales se encuentre previamente establecida por ley, lo cual se presenta plenamente en el proceso en donde se plantea la consulta, sin que sea dable derivar otros efectos que impidan el conocimiento de causas por jueces competentes designados formalmente como tales por acto firme y eficaz.

Conforme lo anterior, lo cuestionado no lleva razón de ser, toda vez que las respectivas causas serán conocidas por jueces competentes, independientes e imparciales, lo que se evidencia del artículo 10 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, en tanto establece:

"Toda persona tiene derecho en condiciones de plan igualdad, a ser oída públicamente y con justicia por un tribunal independiente e imparcial, para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones o para el examen de cualquier acusación contra ella en materia penal." Sobre este tema Luigi Ferrajoli ha indicado:

"(…) mientras la preconstitución legal del juez y la inalterabilidad de las competencias son garantías de imparcialidad, al estar dirigidas a impedir intervenciones instrumentales de carácter individual o general sobre la formación del juez, la prohibición de jueces especiales y extraordinarios es, sobre todo, una garantía de igualdad, que satisface el derecho de todos a tener los mismos jueces y los mismos procesos" No se advierte que las normas y disposiciones objeto de consulta sean contrarias a estas consideraciones y por el contrario, es acorde, inclusive con los precedentes de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos sobre el tema, en tanto que este órgano jurisdiccional ha indicado:

“Constituye un principio básico relativo a la independencia de la judicatura que toda persona tiene derecho a ser juzgada por tribunales de justicia ordinarios con arreglo a procedimientos legalmente establecidos. El Estado no debe crear ‘tribunales que no apliquen normas procesales debidamente establecidas para sustituir la jurisdicción que corresponda normalmente a los tribunales ordinarios’” Caso Lori Berenson Mejía Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2004.

“Estado no debe crear tribunales que no apliquen normas procesales debidamente establecidas para sustituir la jurisdicción que corresponda normalmente a los tribunales ordinarios. Con esto se busca evitar que las personas sean juzgadas por tribunales especiales, creados para el caso, o ad hoc” Caso Apitz Barbera y otros Vs. Venezuela. 5 de agosto de 2008.

Cita el voto N°1739-1992 de las 11:45 horas del 1 de junio de 1992, en cuanto al derecho al juez regular:

Si, pues, la jurisdicción consiste, en general, en la potestad de administrar justicia, y la competencia en la distribución que hace la ley de las diferentes esferas de conocimiento de los tribunales con base en criterios de materia, gravedad o cuantía, territorio y grado, tanto la jurisdicción -general o por materia- como la competencia son parte del debido proceso, pues garantizan que los conflictos sean resueltos por los tribunales regulares, en la forma dicha." De manera complementaria, el voto Nº2020-001312 de las 9:20 horas del 22 de enero de 2020 de esa misma Sala dispuso:

“En relación con el principio de Juez Natural, la Sala Constitucional ha indicado que esta garantía, elemento integral del debido proceso, supone la existencia de órganos judiciales preestablecidos en forma permanente por la ley. Se tutela a través de este principio, la prohibición de crear organismos ad-hoc, o ex post facto (después del hecho), o especiales, para juzgar determinados hechos o a determinadas personas, sin la generalidad y permanencia propias de los tribunales judiciales. “ Concluye, que, en los casos en cuestión no estamos en supuestos de jueces nombrados ex proffeso o ad hoc para determinadas personas y lo contemplado en las normativas cuestionadas responde a aspectos propios del orden administrativo, conforme los supuestos objetivos considerados en éstas y la necesidad de atención del servicio de administración de justicia en la coyuntura histórica actual y en el entendido de que el conocimiento de las causas de la jurisdicción ordinaria por la Jurisdicción de la Delincuencia Organizada está prevista por la ley, de manera tal que no es ni sorpresiva ni particularizada a una persona o supuesto concreto, sino que el conocimiento del proceso continua en manos de un Juez Penal, dando las adecuadas garantías que se señalan ut supra. Nótese además que no se advierte, ni los consultantes indican, que con las disposiciones objetadas se haya afectado las garantías procesal que poseen las partes, se haya modificado en perjuicio las regulaciones procesales atinentes o se haya violado per se el debido proceso en cuanto a su legítimo ejercicio del derecho de defensa y audiencia, toda vez que la tramitación y resolución respectiva de los procesos serán comunes a cualquier otro proceso regulado por la normativa procesal aplicable a la materia penal.

12.- Por resolución de las 13:54 horas del 19 de junio de 2024, el presidente de la Sala tuvo por contestadas las audiencias conferidas a la Procuraduría General de la República y al presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, y trasladó la consulta judicial a la oficina de la magistrada ponente.

13.- Mediante resolución de magistrada instructora de las 15:35 horas del 17 de julio de 2024, se corrigió el error material que, por un defecto del sistema electrónico, contenía la resolución dictada a las 13:37 horas del 17 de julio de 2024, en el sentido que en ella se ordena, como prueba para mejor resolver, a la directora ejecutiva del Poder Judicial, indicar la fecha a partir de la cual se recibieron en ese Poder los recursos necesarios para la implementación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada.

14.- Por escrito incorporado al expediente electrónico en fecha 24 de julio de 2024, Ana Eugenia Romero Jenkins, Directora Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial, informa que según se señala en el informe de la Dirección de Planificación No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 del 22 de julio 2024, que la fecha en que fueron asignados los recursos al Poder Judicial para implementar dicha Jurisdicción Especializada (Ley No. 9481) fue a partir del presupuesto ordinario del año 2022, en el cual mediante Moción 15 aprobada en el Consecutivo de la Comisión de Hacendarios 36, del 14 de octubre de 2021, la cual forma parte de la Ley de Presupuesto 2022, (Ley No. 10103 de 30 de noviembre de 2021, publicada en el Alcance 249 a La Gaceta 235, de 7 de diciembre de 2021), la Asamblea Legislativa autorizó al Poder Judicial, la inclusión de un monto de ¢2.900 millones, que facultaron iniciar con el proceso de implementación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. (Ver certificación adjunta). Del oficio señalado, se extrae textualmente “El monto autorizado, permitió cubrir los costos correspondientes a 413 plazas de implementación de la JEDO de manera proporcional según su fecha de inicio, de las cuales 402 son ordinarias y 11 son extraordinarias. De este total, 394 plazas se proyectaron por dos meses (noviembre y diciembre 2022), mientras que 4 plazas se proyectaron por 4 meses y finalmente, 15 plazas se presupuestaron por 12 meses. Además, dentro del monto presupuestario autorizado, se incluyó el gasto correspondiente al equipo de cómputo.” Lo subrayado y negrita no corresponde al documento original. Asimismo, mediante oficio No. 407-PLA-2023 de fecha12 de mayo de 2023 (adjunto), la Dirección de Planificación del Poder Judicial certifica que mediante Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para el Ejercicio Económico del 2023, Ley No. 10331 publicada en el Alcance Digital No. 267 a La Gaceta No. 235 del 09 de diciembre de 2022 y sus reformas; se otorgó al Poder Judicial contenido presupuestario para la preparación e implementación de la ley de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, Ley N° 9481. Al respecto, mediante el oficio No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 indicado anteriormente, la Dirección de Planificación señaló que fueron asignados para este periodo 2023 recursos por la suma de ¢15.583 millones de colones, que permitió cubrir la inversión por concepto de plazas y gastos operativos. El detalle del financiamiento presupuestario a la Ley 9481 para la implementación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada puede verse en el oficio No. 908-PLA-MI(PL)-2024 del 22 de julio 2024, adjunto.

15.- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la magistrada Hess Herrera; y,

Considerando:

I.- DE PREVIO. - Por haber participado en la adopción del acuerdo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del 30 de enero de 2023, sesión N°003-2023, artículo VIII, los magistrados Fernando Castillo Víquez, Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado y Anamari Garro Vargas, se inhibieron del conocimiento de este asunto, gestión que fue rechazada por resolución de las 14:44 horas del 24 de mayo de 2024 de la presidenta a.i. de la Sala. Pese a que el magistrado Araya García y la magistrada suplente Aracelly Pacheco Salazar también integraron la Corte al momento de la adopción del mencionado acuerdo, no formularon inhibitoria en esa oportunidad, al no estar integrando el Tribunal, por incapacidad el primero y la segunda por no encontrarse designada entonces. Sin embargo, en aplicación de los principios pro sentencia y de economía procesal, se deja expresa constancia de que se encuentran habilitados para conocer de este asunto, al tratarse de las mismas razones expuestas por los indicados magistrados propietarios, oportunamente denegadas como motivo para ser separados del conocimiento de la consulta.

II.- ADMISIBILIDAD DE LAS CONSULTAS JUDICIALES DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD. El artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisión de las consultas judiciales; disposición de la que se desprenden algunos elementos condicionantes y fundamentales para su procedencia: que sea formulada por un juez; que existan "dudas fundadas" sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar; que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal; y que en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad. Tales presupuestos fueron analizados en detalle en la sentencia de esta Sala No. 01617-97 de las 14:54 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 1997, de la siguiente manera:

“a. que la formule un "juez", término genérico que -desde luego- se aplica tanto a los juzgadores unipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario precisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder jurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales administrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los asuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es que se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una sentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b) que el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente habilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución que sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio a un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).

b. que existan "dudas fundadas" sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar, esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y ponderado; además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya constitucionalidad la sala ya se haya pronunciado. ello es así no sólo porque aceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las resoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas circunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. pero subráyese, por su relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva de aquéllos pronunciamientos en que la sala haya validado expresamente la adecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros constitucionales, en consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen explícito de constitucionalidad (en vía de acción o consulta), no sería viable un nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de un acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque -en este caso- siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya no en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. a la inversa, el hecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente (quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquéllos se fundamenten. y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.

c. que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. al igual que en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución del llamado "asunto previo" o "principal". finalmente, d. que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que -por su relevancia para el caso- resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión "deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión", conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que "pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión". La consulta judicial no procede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que -como se explicó arriba- esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los recursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o doctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o al juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad.” Asimismo, el artículo 104 de la misma ley, exige que la consulta judicial se formule en resolución fundada, se emplace a las partes dentro de tercero día y se suspenda la tramitación del proceso, hasta tanto la Sala no haya evacuado la consulta.

III.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA CONSULTA. La consulta es planteada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, sede Goicoechea, mediante voto N°2024-462 de las 11:30 horas del 19 de marzo de 2024, corregido por resolución N°2024-713 de las 15:05 horas del 29 de abril de 2024, dictados en el expediente número [Valor 001]. En esa causa, el Tribunal conoce en alzada de la resolución N°437-2023 de las 14:22 horas del 10 de mayo de 2023, dictada por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección “Emergente”, apelación que fue admitida y está pendiente de resolver. En el recurso de apelación, el defensor particular del imputado alega, como primer motivo de impugnación, la existencia de una actividad procesal defectuosa por defecto absoluto y violación al principio de juez legal o natural, porque un proceso ordinario, en que a una sola persona se le atribuye la retención de cuotas obrero patronales, fue asignado a una sección emergente del Tribunal de Delincuencia Organizada y la fiscal que asistió era designada para ese tipo de materia, lo que evidencia la creación de un tribunal especial para el caso y consolidado a posteriori, lo que implica que el nombramiento y la competencia de los juzgadores no estaba al alcance de las partes para ser consultado oportunamente, sino que emergió de forma posterior a la consumación de los hechos que se acusan. Estima que hubo una notable violación al debido proceso penal por la conformación de un tribunal no competente, al resultar el mismo ser un tribunal nombrado para conocer otra naturaleza de procesos, como resulta ser la sección de crimen organizado, cuando las normas internas e internacionales señalan que el tribunal competente debe estar preconstituido antes de los hechos. Las normas cuya constitucionalidad se acusa son los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, además de disposiciones generales emitidas por el Consejo Superior, que, si bien no tienen que ser aplicadas directamente por el tribunal consultante, guardan relación con los motivos y agravios planteados por el apelante los cuales debe resolver, ya que establecen reglas de competencia para la jurisdicción especializada de crimen organizado, relacionadas con el motivo de apelación planteado. Por todo lo anterior, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del II Circuito Judicial de San José cuenta con legitimación suficiente para formular la consulta.

IV.- INEVACUABILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA EN CUANTO Al ACUERDO ADOPTADO POR LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA EN SESIÓN EXTRAORDINARIA DEL 30 DE ENERO DE 2023, ACTA 003-2023, ARTÍCULO XVIII. El indicado acuerdo, adoptado por la Corte Plena, estipula lo siguiente:

“(…) 2) Acoger lo solicitado por la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, remitido mediante oficio N°S-CJEDO/02/2023, en consecuencia: Variar la competencia territorial de las dos secciones asignadas al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, que a este momento tienen su asiento en San José y dan soporte como plan remedial al despacho homólogo de Guadalupe, para que a partir del febrero de 2023, conozcan de todos los asuntos asignados a los diferentes tribunales de apelación de sentencia del país, iniciando por San Ramón, y den colaboración al resto de tribunales de apelación del país, en tanto empieza a funcionar oficialmente la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. 3.) La Secretaría General de la Corte tomará nota para la publicación de la circular correspondiente. Se declara acuerdo firme.” En primer término, debe indicarse que según lo dispuesto en el numeral 108 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, son aplicables a la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad, supletoriamente, las disposiciones sobre la consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad y lo previsto para la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En el presente asunto, estima la Sala que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del II Circuito Judicial de San José no está legitimado para consultar la constitucionalidad del acuerdo de la Corte Plena, ya que lo allí dispuesto no forma parte de las objeciones contenidas en el recurso de apelación que debe resolver y motivan la formulación de la consulta. La decisión adoptada por la Corte consiste en variar la competencia territorial de las dos secciones asignadas al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, para que, a partir del febrero de 2023, conozca de todos los asuntos asignados a los diferentes tribunales de apelación de sentencia del país, iniciando por San Ramón, y dé colaboración al resto de tribunales de apelación, en tanto empieza a funcionar oficialmente la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. Recuérdese que lo que está pendiente de resolver es un recurso de apelación contra la sentencia condenatoria dictada por el Tribunal Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, en un asunto penal ordinario, por lo que la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del acuerdo consultado, no tendría incidencia alguna en el asunto que debe resolver el tribunal consultante, que cuestiona las normas y disposiciones que sustentan la competencia del tribunal sentenciador -Tribunal Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada de San José-. Por las indicadas razones, en cuanto al referido acuerdo de la Corte Plena, se declara inevacuable la consulta.

V.- INEVACUABILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA SOBRE EL ACUERDO ADOPTADO POR EL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DEL PODER JUDICIAL, EN SESIÓN NÚMERO 48-2023, CELEBRADA EL 8 DE JUNIO DE 2023, ARTÍCULO LXXI. El acuerdo cuestionado autorizó publicar la circular denominada “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”, Circular No. 137-2023 del 14 de junio de 2023, publicada en el Boletín judicial número 119 del 3 de julio de 2023.

“CIRCULAR No. 137-2023 Asunto: “Emisión de directrices sobre reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado”. - A TODAS LOS DESPACHOS Y OFICINAS JUDICIALES DEL PAIS.

SE LES HACE SABER QUE:

Este Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en sesión número 48-2023 celebrada el 08 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI, a solicitud de la Subcomisión de Delincuencia Organizada, hace de conocimiento las reglas prácticas y nueva forma de tramitación de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Crimen Organizado:

“Reglas prácticas Sobre competencia de los despachos JEDO:

Con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley N° 9481 de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, así como de la ley N° 10369 Reforma de la ley 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993 y reforma de la ley 9481, Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, de 13 de setiembre de 2017, de 30 de mayo de 2023:

1- Los asuntos de delincuencia organizada o criminalidad organizada podrán ser tramitados en la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, o bien, en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada.

2- Serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción ordinaria los asuntos que cumplan con los parámetros establecidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de julio de 2009. Estos asuntos serán conocidos por los juzgados penales, tribunales penales y tribunales de apelación de sentencia penal ordinarios de todo el país.

3-La Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada podrá conocer los asuntos que, además de cumplir con lo establecido en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de julio de 2009, se ajusten a las previsiones de los artículos 8 y 9 de la Ley 9481.

4-Los asuntos sometidos a conocimiento de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada podrán ser sometidos ante el Juzgado Penal, Tribunal Penal y Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, todos de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, según corresponda. Conocerán los hechos delictivos que cumplan con los parámetros indicados, así como los delitos conexos. Su asiento será en San José, así como en los lugares y en la forma que determine la Corte Suprema de Justicia y tendrá competencia en todo el territorio nacional.

5- La Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada tendrá competencia a nivel nacional para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen.

6- La Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada podrá conocer de todos las causas de delincuencia organizada que al momento de inicio de funciones, la persona que ocupe el cargo de fiscal general de la República o bien la persona que ocupe el cargo de fiscal subrogante (por imposibilidad del primero), solicite a la autoridad jurisdiccional competente de la JEDO, según la etapa procesal en que se encuentre el asunto, que se arrogue el conocimiento de estas, previa comprobación de los requisitos de ley.

7- De acuerdo a lo establecido en el Artículo 7 de la Ley 10369 que reforma el Transitorio II de la Ley 9481, a los asuntos de delincuencia organizada que se encuentren en trámite, le serán aplicables, sin necesidad de resolución jurisdiccional adicional, los plazos procesales establecidos en el artículo 10 de la Ley 9481. Las autoridades jurisdiccionales que tengan a su orden personas sometidas a alguna medida cautelar, de oficio o a petición del Ministerio Público, readecuarán los plazos según corresponda, mediante resolución fundada.

8- La competencia para conocer del recurso de casación y el procedimiento especial de revisión corresponde a la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

9- A efectos de garantizar una adecuada carga de trabajo y el uso racional de recursos públicos, quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, desde el inicio de sus funciones y hasta que se considere necesario, también realizarán labores de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen.

10- Cuando las circunstancias lo ameriten y para diligencias específicas, quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción ordinaria podrán realizar labores en procesos de la jurisdicción especializada, sin que ello lleve aparejado el reconocimiento del incentivo salarial previsto para la jurisdicción especializada, ni la asignación de una plaza en esa jurisdicción.

Sobre la tramitación del expediente en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada:

1- Todos los procesos que sean susceptibles de conocerse en la nueva jurisdicción, en los cuales se estime oportuno hacer solicitud por parte del Ministerio Público al juzgado penal especializado en delincuencia organizada para que se arrogue el conocimiento de éstos, deberán ser tramitados de forma 100% electrónica, ello mediante el uso del escritorio virtual, el expediente electrónico y gestión en línea para las personas usuarias 2- Las causas ordinarias que pasen a ser conocidas en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada seguirán la forma de tramitación del despacho de origen, siendo que, si la misma se viene tramitando de forma física, así se continuará hasta su finalización.

3- Las causas ordinarias que se conozcan por la JEDO, continuarán su trámite según el estado en que se asuman hasta su ejecución. Serán remitidas al despacho de origen una vez que estén complemente listas para archivar.

Uso obligatorio del carnet para funcionarios y empleados de JEDO.

Es obligatorio el uso del carnet para funcionarios y empleados que laboren en la jurisdicción especializada en delincuencia organizada, el cual deberá portarse en un lugar visible y hacer uso del mismo para acceder a los distintos espacios que requieren control electrónico.

La utilización del carnet es personal, así como la responsabilidad de informar de manera inmediata al Departamento de Seguridad del Poder Judicial en caso de deterioro, robo o extravío.

El acceso a las diferentes oficinas y despachos, así como a las salas de juicio y, en general, a las instalaciones que albergan la JEDO que requieran control electrónico, deberá hacerse mediante el carnet. En caso de olvido, robo o extravío (una vez que dicha circunstancia sea debidamente informada), deberá solicitarse al Departamento de Seguridad un pase por el día a efectos de facilitar el acceso por medios electrónicos a los distintos espacios que así lo requieran, el cual también será de uso personal y estará bajo la responsabilidad del funcionario o empleado al que se le otorgue.

Disposiciones sobre documentos a respaldar en legajo físico y otros aspectos operativos:

1- A efectos de la confección del legajo físico que se utilizará por la Jurisdicción de Delincuencia Organizada (JEDO) como respaldo, considerando que la tramitación será de forma 100% electrónica, lo que incluye el expediente digital, el uso del escritorio virtual y la tramitación en línea, entre otras características propias del expediente electrónico, los documentos que deben ser respaldados de forma física son los siguientes:

ETAPA PREPARATORIA:

- La declaración indagatoria.

- La resolución que fija por primera vez la prisión preventiva o medidas cautelares menos gravosas.

- Las posteriores resoluciones que prorroguen, varíen u ordenen el cese de medida cautelar.

- Las resoluciones de apelación interlocutoria que se pronuncien sobre la medida cautelar.

- La resolución que ordena la intervención de las comunicaciones privadas, sus prórrogas y la que ordena su levantamiento.

- Tener a la Orden, Orden de Libertad, Remisiones de detenidos (todos estos documentos tienen un consecutivo que se registra y se trata de formularios impresos).

- La orden de allanamiento, registro y secuestro.

- La orden que decreta el levantamiento del secreto bancario y sus posteriores prórrogas.

- La desestimación.

- El sobreseimiento definitivo.

- La solicitud de cooperación internacional para la obtención de prueba y las comunicaciones de la autoridad internacional requerida.

- La orden de captura internacional.

- La solicitud de extradición del Ministerio Público, la resolución que requiere la extradición activa y las distintas resoluciones del país requerido (estos documentos también pueden obedecer a otras etapas del proceso).

- La documentación referente al comunicado de la detención de un extranjero al consulado del país de su nacionalidad.

- Resolución que resuelve solicitud del Ministerio Público para que el juzgado penal especializado en delincuencia organizada se arrogue el conocimiento de la causa.

- Resoluciones que interrumpen y suspenden la prescripción (por ejemplo: señalamientos, rebeldías, levantamiento de rebeldía, prejudicialidad, etc.)

ETAPA INTERMEDIA:

- La acusación y solicitud de apertura a juicio.

- La querella y acción civil resarcitoria.

- El acta de la audiencia preliminar.

- El sobreseimiento provisional o definitivo.

- El auto de apertura a juicio.

- Resoluciones que interrumpen y suspenden la prescripción (por ejemplo: señalamientos, rebeldías, levantamiento de rebeldía, prejudicialidad, etc.)

ETAPA DE JUICIO:

- El acta en que conste aplicación del procedimiento especial abreviado (en caso de que sea procedente).

- Las actas del debate.

- El sobreseimiento definitivo.

- La sentencia.

- Las resoluciones en que se dé trámite a recursos, tales como audiencias o emplazamientos.

- Tener a la Orden, Orden de Libertad, Remisiones de detenidos (todos estos documentos tienen un consecutivo que se registra y se trata de formularios impresos).

- Resoluciones que interrumpen y suspenden la prescripción (por ejemplo: señalamientos, rebeldías, levantamiento de rebeldía, prejudicialidad, etc.)

- Resolución de apelaciones interlocutorias (tales como de medidas cautelares, de la resolución que resuelve solicitud del Ministerio Público para que el juzgado penal especializado en delincuencia organizada se arrogue el conocimiento de la causa, ejecución, etc.).

APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA:

- Las prórrogas de prisión preventiva o arresto domiciliario con monitoreo electrónico o su rechazo.

- El voto que resuelve admisibilidad del recurso o admita prueba para ser evacuada en audiencia oral.

- El voto que resuelve sobre el recurso de apelación de sentencia.

CASACIÓN:

- El voto que resuelve admisibilidad del recurso o admita prueba para ser evacuada en audiencia oral.

- El voto que resuelve el recurso.

REVISIÓN:

- El voto que resuelve sobre la admisibilidad del procedimiento de revisión.

- El voto que resuelve sobre el fondo del procedimiento de revisión.

ETAPA DE EJECUCIÓN DE SENTENCIA:

- El auto de liquidación de pena.

- Las resoluciones sobre incidentes de ejecución (apelación interlocutoria).

2- Respecto de aquellas resoluciones que se dicten de manera oral, se recuerda a las persona juzgadoras que el acta en que se documenten las mismas debe contener, además de los requisitos que establece el artículo 136 del Código Procesal Penal, también las recomendaciones que ha establecido la subcomisión de oralidad, haciendo especial hincapié en que contengan datos necesarios tales como las partes y demás intervinientes, la enunciación de hechos acreditados y los no probados -en caso de que los hubiere-, la indicación de la prueba admitida (según el tipo de audiencia y resolución de que se trate) y la trascripción completa de la parte dispositiva.

3- A efectos de garantizar la trazabilidad del legajo de respaldo, el mismo iniciará a ser confeccionado durante la etapa preparatoria por parte del Ministerio Público y en las sucesivas etapas, o bien ante la necesidad de que un órgano jurisdiccional intervenga, éste completará el legajo con las resoluciones que corresponda según los parámetros fijados.

4- Es deber de cada despacho u oficina hacer el respectivo cambio de ubicación en el Sistema de Gestión o Escritorio Virtual una vez que ingresa y sale el expediente (respaldo material).

5- Una vez concluido el proceso, el resguardo de dicho legajo le corresponderá al Tribunal Penal JEDO, tal y como se hace actualmente por parte de los despachos que usan expediente físico.

6- Debe tenerse en cuenta de que se trata de un respaldo de seguridad, sin embargo la única forma válida de tramitación para el despacho y las partes procesales será la electrónica.

7- Debe tomarse en cuenta que se trata de un respaldo de uso exclusivo de las oficinas y despachos judiciales, que no podrá ser facilitado a las partes como expediente, porque la forma de tramitación oficial será la electrónica.” De conformidad con la circular N° 67-09 emitida por la Secretaría de la Corte el 22 de junio de 2009, se le comunica que en virtud del principio de gratuidad que rige esta materia, la publicación está exenta de todo pago de derechos.

Publíquese una sola vez en el Boletín Judicial.” San José, 14 de junio de 2023.

Lic. Carlos T. Mora Rodríguez Subsecretario General interino Corte Suprema de Justicia” Si se toma en consideración que la resolución N° 437-2023 de las 14:22 horas del 10 de mayo de 2023 del Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Emergente, es anterior a la adopción de esta circular, no existe el vínculo temporal necesario, entre los dos actos, que permita examinar la constitucionalidad de la circular en cuestión en esta consulta. En otras palabras, si la duda de constitucionalidad del tribunal consultante tiene como punto de referencia el dictado de la indicada sentencia, de 10 de mayo de 2023, para ese momento el Consejo Superior aún no había dictado la circular, por lo que es cronológicamente imposible que hubiera influido en el acto jurisdiccional en el que se basa la consulta. Por consiguiente, la consulta es inevacuable en lo que atañe al acto emitido por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en sesión número 48-2023 celebrada el 08 de junio de 2023.

VI.- Objeto de la consulta. El tribunal plantea dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, (este último, adicionado por el artículo 18 de la Ley de Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica Ley No. 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017, reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley No. 10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023).

Las disposiciones consultadas se trascriben en forma completa, de seguido, para mejor comprensión:

LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL, LEY Nº 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993:

A.-“Artículo 46.- Los acuerdos y las disposiciones de la Corte relativas al establecimiento y la definición de una circunscripción territorial, o los que conciernan al recargo de competencias, el traslado y la conversión de despachos judiciales y de cargos o puestos, deberán fundamentarse en la ineludible eficiencia del servicio, la especialización de los órganos judiciales y de los tribunales jurisdiccionales y la equidad necesaria de las cargas de trabajo.

En razón del volumen de trabajo y la obligada eficiencia del servicio público de la justicia, la Corte podrá nombrar más integrantes de los tribunales, en forma temporal o definitiva; también podrá abrir y cerrar - por esas mismas razones- nuevas oficinas y órganos adscritos a los tribunales, en cualquier lugar del país.

En los tribunales mixtos, la Corte podrá dividir funciones por materia, de manera que se especialicen los servicios de administración de justicia. Cuando las necesidades del servicio lo impongan, la Corte podrá dividir un tribunal mixto en tribunales especializados.

Cuando la carga de trabajo no amerite abrir otro órgano jurisdiccional ni judicial, la Corte o el Consejo podrán asignar jueces y otros servidores itinerantes, para que se trasladen a los lugares donde deba brindarse el servicio con mayor eficiencia.” (Así reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley N° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997).

B.-“Artículo 59.- Corresponde a la Corte Suprema de Justicia:

1.- Informar a los otros Poderes del Estado en los asuntos en que la Constitución o las leyes determinen que sea consultada, y emitir su opinión, cuando sea requerida, acerca de los proyectos de reforma a la legislación codificada o los que afecten la organización o el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial.

2.- Proponer las reformas legislativas y reglamentarias que juzgue convenientes para mejorar la administración de justicia.

3.- Aprobar el proyecto de presupuesto del Poder Judicial, el cual, una vez promulgado por la Asamblea Legislativa, podrá ejecutar por medio del Consejo.

4.- Nombrar a los miembros propietarios y suplentes del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

5.- Resolver las competencias que se susciten entre las Salas de la Corte, excepto lo dispuesto por la ley respecto de la Sala Constitucional.

6.- Designar, en votación pública, al presidente y al vicepresidente de la Corte, por períodos de cuatro años y de dos años, respectivamente, quienes podrán ser reelegidos por períodos iguales y, si hubiera que reponerlos por cualquier causa, la persona nombrada lo será por un nuevo período completo. En los casos de faltas temporales se procederá en la forma que indica el inciso 1) del artículo 32. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo único de la Ley para garantizar transparencia en las votaciones del Poder Judicial, N° 10325 del 9 de noviembre del 2022) 7.- Promulgar, por iniciativa propia o a propuesta del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, los reglamentos internos de orden y servicio que estime pertinentes.

8.- Conocer del recurso de apelación de sentencia, de casación y del procedimiento de revisión de las sentencias dictadas por las Salas Segunda y Tercera, cuando estas actúan como tribunales de juicio o de única instancia. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 5° de la ley N° 9021 del 3 de enero de 2012) 9.- Nombrar en propiedad a los miembros del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, los inspectores generales del tribunal de la inspección judicial, los jueces de casación y los de los tribunales colegiados, el Fiscal General de la República, el Director y el Subdirector del Organismo de Investigación Judicial; asimismo, al jefe y al subjefe de la Defensa Pública.

Cuando se trate de funcionarios nombrados por un período determinado, la Corte deberá realizar el nuevo nombramiento en la primera sesión ordinaria de diciembre en que termine el período y los nombrados tomarán posesión el primer día hábil de enero siguiente.

También le corresponde a la Corte, nombrar a los suplentes de los funcionarios mencionados en este inciso.

10.- Conocer el informe anual del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial.

11.- Avocar el conocimiento y la decisión de los asuntos de competencia del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, cuando así se disponga en sesión convocada a solicitud de cinco de sus miembros o de su Presidente, por simple mayoría de la Corte. Desde que se presenta la solicitud de avocamiento, se suspende la decisión del asunto por parte del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, mientras la Corte no se pronuncie, sin perjuicio de las medidas cautelares que disponga la Corte.

La Corte dispondrá de un mes para resolver el asunto que dispuso avocar ante ella. En tal supuesto, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa se producirá con la comunicación del acuerdo final de la Corte. Al disponer el avocamiento, podrá ordenarse suspender los efectos del acuerdo del Consejo.

12.- Ejercer el régimen disciplinario sobre sus propios miembros y los del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la forma dispuesta en esta Ley.

13.- Establecer los montos para determinar la competencia, en razón de la cuantía, en todo asunto de carácter patrimonial.

14.- Establecer los montos para determinar la procedencia del recurso de casación, por votación mínima de dos terceras partes de la totalidad de los Magistrados. Este monto podrá disminuirse o aumentarse, una vez transcurrido el plazo aquí fijado, para lo cual previamente se solicitará al Banco Central de Costa Rica, un informe sobre el índice inflacionario.

Si transcurriere un mes sin haberse recibido el informe, la Corte prescindirá de él y hará la fijación que corresponda. La fijación que se realice, tanto en este caso como en el del inciso anterior, regirá un mes después de su primera publicación en el Boletín Judicial, por un período mínimo de dos años.

15.- Proponer, a la Asamblea Legislativa, la creación de Despachos Judiciales en los lugares y las materias que estime necesario para el buen servicio público.

16.- Refundir dos o más despachos judiciales en uno solo o dividirlos, trasladarlos de sede, fijarles la respectiva competencia territorial y por materia, tomando en consideración el mejor servicio público.

También podrá asignarle competencia especializada a uno o varios despachos, para que conozcan de determinados asuntos, dentro de una misma materia, ocurridos en una o varias circunscripciones o en todo el territorio nacional.

17.- Conocer de las demandas de responsabilidad que se interpongan contra los Magistrados de las Salas de la Corte.

l8.- Disponer cuáles comisiones de trabajo serán permanentes y designar a los Magistrados que las integrarán.

19.- Incorporar al presupuesto del Poder Judicial, mediante modificación interna, todo el dinero que pueda percibir por liquidación o inejecución de contratos, intereses, daños y perjuicios, y por el cobro de los servicios de fotocopiado de documentos, microfilmación y similares.

Este dinero será depositado en las cuentas bancarias del Poder Judicial.

20.- Fijar los días y las horas de servicio de las oficinas judiciales y publicar el aviso respectivo en el Boletín Judicial.

21.- Emitir las directrices sobre los alcances de las normas, cuando se estime necesario para hacer efectivo el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida.

22.- Las demás que señalan la Constitución Política y las leyes.” C.- “Artículo 81.- Corresponde al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial:

1.- Ejecutar la política administrativa del Poder Judicial, dentro de los lineamientos establecidos por la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

2.- Designar, con excepción de los que corresponden a la Corte, a los funcionarios que administran justicia, de conformidad con las normas legales y reglamentarias correspondientes; trasladarlos, provisional o definitivamente, suspenderlos y concederles licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él y removerlos, todo con arreglo de las disposiciones correspondientes, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al Presidente.

3.- Designar funcionarios interinos o suplentes que administran justicia, cuando se compruebe que los Despachos no se encontraren al día.

4.- Ejercer la potestad disciplinaria respecto de los servidores judiciales, de conformidad con la ley y sin perjuicio de las facultades conferidas a la Corte Plena, al Presidente de la Corte y al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial.

5.- Designar interinos para suplir las vacancias, incluso de los funcionarios cuyo nombramiento en propiedad corresponde a la Corte.

6.- Trasladar, provisional o definitivamente, suspender, conceder licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él, remover y rehabilitar, con arreglo a las disposiciones correspondientes, a todos los servidores judiciales, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al Presidente de la Corte.

7.- Aprobar o improbar la designación del personal subalterno que hiciere cada jefe administrativo en su respectivo Despacho, departamento u oficina judicial. Al hacerlo, verificará que el nombramiento se haya ajustado al procedimiento establecido para ello en el Estatuto de Servicio Judicial.

8.- (Derogado por el artículo 23 de la Ley N° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997).

9.- Resolver sobre los reclamos de carácter económico que se hagan al Poder Judicial, en cualquier concepto, y ordenar a los servidores judiciales, los reintegros de dineros que procedan conforme a la ley.

10.- Resolver sobre las licitaciones y solicitar a la Corte Plena que acuerde las expropiaciones de inmuebles o la afectación de derechos reales que interesen al Poder Judicial. Acordada la expropiación de un inmueble o la afectación de derechos reales, la Corte Plena publicará el acuerdo en La Gaceta y pasará el expediente respectivo al Consejo Superior para que nombre uno o varios peritos, según se requiera, que rindan un avalúo del inmueble o derechos reales afectados. El avalúo no tomará en cuenta la eventual plusvalía originada en la construcción de la obra que motiva la expropiación o afectación de derechos. Rendido el avalúo, se pondrá en conocimiento de los interesados, mediante notificación personal o en la casa de habitación, a fin de que manifiesten, dentro de los quince días hábiles siguientes, si están de acuerdo en traspasar el inmueble o derecho real en cuestión, por el precio señalado en el avalúo acogido por el Consejo; caso en el cual formalizarán el traspaso ante la Notaría del Estado, dentro de los tres meses siguientes.

Si por cualquier razón no convinieren en el traspaso, el Consejo remitirá el expediente administrativo, dentro de los diez días hábiles siguientes, al Juzgado de lo Contencioso-administrativo y Civil de Hacienda que, por turno corresponda, para que inicie las diligencias judiciales de avalúo por expropiación, conforme el procedimiento contemplado en la Ley de expropiaciones y afectación de derechos reales del Poder Judicial.

11.- Invertir, en el mantenimiento y construcción de locales y en otros rubros que lo ameritan, los excedentes que pudieran producirse de acuerdo con lo que disponga la Corte Plena.

12.- (Derogado por el artículo 2° de la ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018) 13.- (Derogado por el artículo 2° de la ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018) 14.- (Derogado por el artículo 2° de la ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018) 15.- (Derogado por el artículo 2° de la ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018) 16.- Dirigir, planificar, organizar y coordinar las actividades administrativas del Poder Judicial y proponer a la Corte, los reglamentos correspondientes.

17.- Conocer y aprobar el anteproyecto de Presupuesto del Poder Judicial.

18.- Conceder licencias con goce de sueldo a los servidores judiciales, para realizar estudios o proyectos que interesen al Poder Judicial.

19.- Conocer en alzada, en los casos establecidos por la ley o por el reglamento, de lo resuelto por el Director o el Subdirector Ejecutivos.

20.- Conocer y aprobar el plan de vacaciones del Poder Judicial; con excepción del plan de vacaciones de las Salas de la Corte.

21.- Dictar las normas internas para el mejor desempeño de sus funciones, con excepción de los reglamentos.

22.- Regular la distribución de los asuntos judiciales entre los Despachos de igual competencia territorial, para obtener la equiparación del trabajo.

23.- Las demás actividades que sean propias de su cometido, en todo lo que no esté previsto de modo expreso en la presente Ley.

24.- Cualquier otra que le atribuya la ley.

Cuando existiere duda sobre si un asunto es o no es de competencia del Consejo, éste resolverá, salvo que el conflicto sea con la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el cual se estará a lo que ésta resuelva; en ambos casos sin recurso alguno.

En cualquier caso, todas las potestades del Consejo respecto de los servidores judiciales corresponderán a la Corte Plena, cuando se trate de Magistrados propietarios o suplentes.” D.- “Artículo 101 bis-Para ser jueza o juez del Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada y juez o jueza tramitadora del Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada y del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, titular o suplente, se requiere:

1-) Ser costarricense en ejercicio de sus derechos ciudadanos.

2-) Tener al menos treinta años de edad.

3-) Poseer el título de abogado o abogada, legalmente reconocido en el país.

4-) Haber ejercido como profesional en derecho en los ámbitos auxiliar de justicia o jurisdiccional, en materia penal, por un mínimo de cinco años y estar elegible en el escalafón correspondiente.

5-) Poseer una condición de nombramiento profesional en propiedad en el Poder Judicial.

6-) Poseer capacitación especializada en delincuencia organizada impartida por la Escuela Judicial o en coordinación con ella, o bien, validada por la institución a través de la Dirección de Gestión Humana.

Estos jueces devengarán un incentivo salarial respecto de los demás jueces de la misma categoría.

Para ser jueza o juez del Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada y del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, titular o suplente, se requiere:

1-) Ser costarricense en ejercicio de sus derechos ciudadanos.

2-) Tener al menos treinta y cinco años de edad.

3-) Poseer el título de abogado o abogada legalmente reconocido en el país.

4-) Haber ejercido como profesional en derecho en los ámbitos auxiliar de justicia o jurisdiccional, en materia penal, por un mínimo de seis años y estar elegible en el escalafón correspondiente.

5-) Poseer una condición de nombramiento profesional en propiedad en el Poder Judicial.

6-) Poseer capacitación especializada en delincuencia organizada impartida por la Escuela Judicial o en coordinación con ella, o bien, validada por la institución a través de la Dirección de Gestión Humana.

Estos jueces devengarán un incentivo salarial respecto de los demás jueces del Tribunal Penal o del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, según cada caso.

En la jurisdicción especializada corresponde al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial designar a los jueces y las juezas del Juzgado Penal, y a los jueces y las juezas tramitadores, y a la Corte Suprema de Justicia nombrar a los jueces y las juezas del Tribunal Penal y del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia. La persona jerarca del Ministerio Público, la persona directora del Organismo de Investigación Judicial y la persona directora de la Defensa Pública harán, respectivamente, los nombramientos de todo el personal, profesional, técnico y de apoyo, adscrito al ámbito de su competencia, en dicha jurisdicción.

De igual forma lo hará el Consejo Superior y las otras direcciones de la institución, de acuerdo con sus competencias de nombramiento, con el restante personal designado como especializado en esta jurisdicción. Todos los nombramientos de esta jurisdicción especializada se harán por un período hasta de ocho años, sin posibilidad de reelección para el período siguiente inmediato. Vencido el plazo de nombramiento, el personal retornará a su puesto en propiedad. Su nombramiento podrá ser ampliado por el término necesario para finalizar actos procesales u otras asignaciones en curso, a su cargo, debidamente justificados, o hasta que se nombre a la persona que deberá asumir el nuevo período.

Para desempeñarse en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, será necesario tener nombramiento en propiedad en el Poder Judicial y aprobar un riguroso proceso de reclutamiento y selección, conforme al principio de idoneidad comprobada, a cargo de la Dirección de Gestión Humana. Una vez concluido el nombramiento en la jurisdicción especializada, la persona funcionaria retornará a su puesto en propiedad.

Todas las personas que se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada deberán ser valoradas, como mínimo, cada dos años, por la Dirección de Gestión Humana, a la que se dotará del personal y presupuesto necesario, con el fin de constatar que mantienen la idoneidad para desempeñarse en el cargo, según lo establece el Estatuto de Servicio Judicial y cuando excepcionalmente sea solicitado por cualquier instancia superior, o que tenga a cargo la supervisión y el cumplimiento de los deberes de probidad; entre ellos, jerarcas del Ministerio Público, Defensa Pública, Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Consejo Superior, Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, o bien, la Oficina de Cumplimiento. Los resultados no favorables de cualquier valoración de idoneidad para desempeñarse en la jurisdicción especializada serán remitidos a conocimiento de la autoridad que realizó el nombramiento, la cual, entre otras opciones, podrá revocar el nombramiento en esta jurisdicción y devolver a la persona funcionaria a su puesto en propiedad. Ante la apertura de un procedimiento disciplinario y/o penal, la jefatura respectiva de la persona denunciada o investigada podrá adoptar como medida administrativa, debidamente justificada, el retorno de la persona funcionaria a su puesto en propiedad, para continuar con el desarrollo del trámite respectivo.

Mientras se estén desempeñando de manera exclusiva en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, quienes laboren en dicha jurisdicción devengarán un incentivo salarial. En caso de que la sanción producto de un procedimiento disciplinario sea la suspensión, esta deberá ser cumplida en la plaza en propiedad, sin devengar el mencionado incentivo.

Quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción especializada tendrán protección especial, solamente cuando surjan factores de riesgo por el ejercicio de sus funciones que así lo hagan necesario, según los estudios técnicos respectivos.

Quienes se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada también realizarán labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. De igual forma, cuando las circunstancias lo ameriten y para diligencias específicas, quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción ordinaria podrán realizar labores en procesos de la jurisdicción especializada, sin que ello lleve aparejado el reconocimiento del incentivo salarial previsto para la jurisdicción especializada, ni la asignación de una plaza en esa jurisdicción.” (Así adicionado por el artículo 18 de la Ley Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, N° 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017) (Así reformado por el artículo 1° de la ley N° 10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023).

VII.- SOBRE LA GARANTIA DE JUEZ NATURAL. El principio del juez natural está consagrado en el artículo 35 de la Constitución Política, que dispone:

“Artículo 35 - Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución El artículo 35 garantiza el derecho a que ninguna causa pueda ser juzgada sino por una "autoridad competente" En la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos, la garantía en comentario está contenida en el artículo 8.1, que establece:

“Artículo 8. Garantías Judiciales 1. Toda Persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter (…)” Al respecto, la destacada sentencia de esta Sala Constitucional N°1739-1992 de las 11:45 horas del 1 de junio de 1992, sobre el debido proceso, indicó:

“EL DERECHO AL JUEZ REGULAR:

Este derecho, que en la tradición anglo norteamericana se ha desarrollado como el llamado "derecho al juez natural", pero con perfiles muy propios que no corresponden a los de nuestro derecho latino -ya que comprende, por ejemplo el derecho al juez del domicilio y, sobre todo, al 1 juzgamiento por los pares que se expresa, a su vez, en el jurado lego, conceptos que en los sistemas de tradición romano-germánica más bien han producido experiencias negativas-, en nuestra Constitución se recoge especialmente en el artículo 35, según el cual:

"Artículo 35 - Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución".

Este principio, que hemos llamado del "juez regular", se complementa, a su vez, con los de los artículos 9, 152 y 153 y, en su caso, 10, 48 y 49, de los cuales resulta claramente, como se dijo supra, la exclusividad y universalidad de la función jurisdiccional en manos de los tribunales dependientes del Poder Judicial, así como con el del artículo 39, en el cual debe entenderse que la "autoridad competente" es necesariamente la judicial y ordinaria, esto último porque el 35 transcrito excluye toda posibilidad de juzgamiento por tribunales especiales para el caso o para casos concretos, y porque el 152 y 153 agotan en el ámbito del Poder Judicial toda posibilidad de creación de tribunales "establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución", con la única salvedad del Supremo de Elecciones para el contencioso electoral.

Si, pues, la jurisdicción consiste, en general, en la potestad de administrar justicia, y la competencia en la distribución que hace la ley de las diferentes esferas de conocimiento de los tribunales con base en criterios de materia, gravedad o cuantía, territorio y grado, tanto la jurisdicción -general o por materia- como la competencia son parte del debido proceso, pues garantizan que los conflictos sean resueltos por los tribunales regulares, en la forma dicha." Asimismo, este Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia No. 6701-93 de las 15:06 horas del 21 de diciembre de 1993, se refirió a esta garantía en los siguientes términos:

“La garantía del juez natural significa la existencia de órganos judiciales preestablecidos en forma permanente por la ley. Uno de los contenidos del principio "juez natural" es como juez legal, es decir, como "órgano" creado por ley conforme a la competencia que para ello la Constitución asigna al Congreso. El derecho a la jurisdicción consiste, precisamente, como principio, en tener posibilidad de acceso a uno de esos jueces. Según lo establece el artículo 8,1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José de Costa Rica, el derecho a la jurisdicción y la garantía de los jueces naturales, es el derecho que toda persona tiene a ser oída con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley. Lo que se tutela a través del principio del juez natural es la prohibición de crear organismos ad-hoc, o ex post facto (después del hecho), o especiales, para juzgar determinados hechos o a determinadas personas, sin la generalidad y permanencia propias de los tribunales judiciales. En definitiva, lo que se pretende es asegurar la independencia e imparcialidad del tribunal evitando que sea creado o elegido, por alguna autoridad, una vez que el caso sucede en la realidad, lo que evidentemente no ocurrió en el caso en examen.” (reiterada en las sentencias número 000009-94 de las 14 horas 54 minutos del 4 de enero de 1994 2000-08763 de las 15 horas 06 minutos de 4 de octubre de 2000).

Más recientemente, en la sentencia No. 2020001312 de las 9:20 horas del 22 de enero de 2020 el Tribunal dispuso:

“En relación con el principio de Juez Natural, la Sala Constitucional ha indicado que esta garantía, elemento integral del debido proceso, supone la existencia de órganos judiciales preestablecidos en forma permanente por la ley. Se tutela a través de este principio, la prohibición de crear organismos ad-hoc, o ex post facto (después del hecho), o especiales, para juzgar determinados hechos o a determinadas personas, sin la generalidad y permanencia propias de los tribunales judiciales. “ De manera que el principio de juez natural o juez ordinario, garantiza que una persona sólo puede ser juzgada por aquellos tribunales que hayan sido constituidos previamente por ley, prohibiéndose la creación de organismos ad-hoc, o especiales para juzgar determinados hechos o personas en forma concreta.

Este principio también ha sido ampliamente tutelado por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y, específicamente, en la sentencia de 17 de noviembre de 2009, Caso Barreto Leiva vs. Venezuela, en lo que interesa, se dispuso:

“75. El artículo 8.1 de la Convención garantiza el derecho a ser juzgado por “un tribunal competente […] establecido con anterioridad a la ley”, disposición que se relaciona con el concepto de juez natural, una de las garantías del debido proceso, a las que inclusive se ha reconocido, por cierto sector de la doctrina, como un presupuesto de aquél. Esto implica que las personas tienen derecho a ser juzgadas, en general, por tribunales ordinarios, con arreglo a procedimientos legalmente establecidos.

76. El juez natural deriva su existencia y competencia de la ley, la cual ha sido definida por la Corte como la “norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las constituciones de los Estados Partes para la formación de las leyes” Consecuentemente, en un Estado de Derecho sólo el Poder Legislativo puede regular, a través de leyes, la competencia de los juzgadores” De esta forma, la creación de los Tribunales de Justicia y el otorgamiento de la competencia de cada uno de ellos, es materia reservada a la ley, por lo que sólo el Poder Legislativo puede regularla.

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha precisado que este derecho constituye “un principio básico del debido proceso” (Corte IDH. Caso Castillo Petruzzi y otros, vs Perú. Sentencia de 30 de mayo de 1999 y Caso Rodilla Pacheco vs. México. Sentencia de 23 de noviembre de 2009) relacionado con el concepto de juez natural, que implica que “las personas tienen derecho a ser juzgadas, en general, por tribunales ordinarios, con arreglo a procedimientos legalmente establecidos” de manera previa a los hechos materia de juicio. Dicho juez natural “deriva su existencia y competencia de la ley, la cual ha sido definida por la Corte como la “norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las Constituciones de los Estados Parte para la formación de las leyes”. En consecuencia, en un Estado de Derecho “solo el Poder Legislativo puede regular, a través de leyes, la competencia de los juzgadores”. Así, por ejemplo, la Corte ha declarado la responsabilidad internacional de un Estado, cuando este creó Salas y Juzgados ad hoc y designó jueces que integran los mismos, en el momento en que ocurrían los hechos del caso (Corte IDH. Caso Ivcher Bronstein vs Perú. Fondo, reparaciones y costas. Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001. Serie C N.74. párr. 114).

También es atinente retomar las citas de las decisiones del Tribunal Constitucional Español, invocadas por el Tribunal consultante y la Procuraduría General de la República, donde se ha indicado que el derecho constitucional al juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley “exige, en primer término, que el órgano judicial haya sido previamente creado por la norma jurídica, que ésta le haya investido de jurisdicción y competencia con anterioridad al hecho motivador de la actuación proceso judicial y que su régimen orgánico y procesal no permita calificarle de especial o excepcional”(STC 47/83 Caso Serena). De manera que “la predeterminación legal del juez significa que la ley, con generalidad y con antelación al caso, ha de contener los criterios de determinación competencial cuya aplicación a cada supuesto litigioso permita determinar cuál es el juez o tribunal llamado a conocer del caso. La generalidad de los criterios legales garantiza la inexistencia de jueces “ad hoc”; la anterioridad de tales criterios respecto al planteamiento procesal del litigio garantiza que una vez determinado en concreto el juez de un caso en virtud de la aplicación de los criterios competenciales contenidos en las leyes, el juez del caso no podrá ser desposeído de su conocimiento en virtud de decisiones tomadas por órganos gubernativos” (STC 101/84, caso Naviera Aznar). Ha de notarse que el interés directo protegido por el derecho al juez ordinario predeterminado es la imparcialidad del juez. Y, a su vez, la imparcialidad del juez forma parte del derecho a un proceso con todas las garantías reconocido en los numerales 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política y 8 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. De allí que los demás elementos, -carácter ordinario y predeterminación legal- están subordinados a ese objetivo, y cobran sentido, en cuanto permiten su consecución (Sala Constitucional, sentencia No. 2022007481 de las 13:01 horas del 30 de marzo de 2022).

VIII.- SOBRE LA POTESTAD DEL LEGISLADOR PARA ESTABLECER LAS COMPETENCIAS DE LOS ÓRGANOS JURISDICCIONALES. - Los artículos 152 y 166 de la Constitución Política señalan:

“Artículo 152.- El Poder Judicial se ejerce por la Corte Suprema de Justicia y por los demás tribunales que establezca la ley”.

“Artículo 166.- En cuanto a lo que no esté previsto por esta Constitución, la ley señalará la jurisdicción, el número y la duración de los tribunales, así como su atribuciones, los principios a los cuales deben ajustar sus actos y la manera de exigirles responsabilidad”.

De las normas citadas se extrae la potestad exclusiva que posee el Poder Legislativo para dictar las leyes creadoras de Tribunales de Justicia, así como las que sean necesarias para regular lo relativo a sus atribuciones y a su competencia, materia cobijada por reserva legal. De allí que la creación de Tribunales de Justicia es una competencia exclusiva del Poder Legislativo. Por otra parte, el numeral 153 de la Constitución Política dispone:

"Artículo 153: Corresponde al Poder Judicial, además de las funciones que esta constitución le señala, conocer de las causas civiles, penales, comerciales, de trabajo y contencioso-administrativo así como de las otras que establezca la ley, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza y la calidad de las personas que intervengan; resolver definitivamente sobre ellas y ejecutar las resoluciones que pronuncie, con la ayuda de la fuerza pública si fuere necesario" Esa disposición confiere plena discrecionalidad al legislador para crear los tribunales por los que la Judicatura ejerce su función.

En el asunto que se analiza, es preciso hacer referencia a la ley de “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada”, Ley No. 9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017.

“ARTÍCULO 1-Objeto. Se crea la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, con competencia en investigación y el juzgamiento de los delitos graves que sean cometidos por personas mayores de edad y que cumplan con los criterios previstos en la presente ley. Los juzgados y tribunales que apliquen la presente ley extenderán su competencia al conocimiento de los delitos conexos respecto de los cuales la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada se arrogue su competencia.

Para todo el ordenamiento jurídico penal, por delincuencia organizada se entenderá toda actividad que reúna los requisitos y parámetros previstos en los artículos 8 y 9 de la presente ley.” El artículo 2 define su competencia, en los siguientes términos:

“ARTÍCULO 2- Competencia. Los asuntos de delincuencia organizada o criminalidad organizada podrán ser tramitados en la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, o bien, en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. Los actos procesales dictados en los casos de crimen organizado en la jurisdicción ordinaria, antes de la entrada en funcionamiento de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, mantendrán su eficacia y validez. Para ambas jurisdicciones es de aplicación la normativa vigente en la materia, incluyendo la Ley 8754, Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada, de 22 de julio de 2009, salvo disposición expresa en contrario.

Serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción ordinaria los asuntos que cumplan con los parámetros establecidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de julio de 2009. Estos asuntos serán de conocimiento de los juzgados penales, tribunales penales y tribunales de apelación de sentencia penal ordinarios de todo el país. Podrán ser sometidos a conocimiento de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada los asuntos que, además de cumplir con lo establecido en el artículo 1 de la Ley 8754, de 22 de julio de 2009, se ajusten a las previsiones de los artículos 8 y 9 de la Ley 9481, Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica, de 13 de setiembre de 2017. Estos asuntos podrán ser sometidos a conocimiento del Juzgado Penal, Tribunal Penal y Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, todos de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada. Conocerán los hechos delictivos que cumplan con los parámetros indicados, así como los delitos conexos. Su asiento será en San José, así como en los lugares y en la forma que determine la Corte Suprema de Justicia y tendrán competencia en todo el territorio nacional. Además, estos despachos también tendrán competencia a nivel nacional para realizar labores dentro de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. (…) (Así reformado por el artículo 2° de la ley N° 10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023) Asimismo, el artículo 18 de la Ley N°9481, “Adiciones”, contempla una de las disposiciones consultadas por el tribunal, el numeral 101 Bis de la ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, que se transcribe, en lo conducente:

“Se adicionan a la Ley N. º 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, los artículos 93 ter, 96 ter, 101 bis y 107 bis. Los textos son los siguientes:

(…) Artículo 101 bis- (…) Quienes se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada también realizarán labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. (Así reformado por el artículo 1° de la ley N° 9769 del 18 de octubre del 2019).

Ahora bien, como ya se indicó, el principio de juez natural establece que toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída por un tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, prestablecido por ley, como sucedió con la creación de la referida jurisdicción especializada, de manera que no estamos ante un órgano jurisdiccional constituido ad hoc, sino ante tribunales de justicia que fueron creados mediante una ley y cuya competencia también ha sido definida por el legislador, tal y como lo exige el principio de juez natural. Los jueces penales de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, por mandato legal, tienen competencia en todo el territorio nacional para atender asuntos de delincuencia organizada u ordinarios. No fueron designados para el caso concreto, sino que forman parte de la integración de un determinado órgano jurisdiccional cuya competencia ha sido definida legalmente, debiendo conocer “procesos ordinarios y especializados” por el requerimiento del sistema de justicia, el interés público y el correcto uso de los fondos públicos. Es evidente, que no se juzgó un delito -cuyo trámite corresponde al proceso ordinario-, mediante el proceso especializado, sino que, simplemente fue tramitado por personas juzgadoras especializadas aplicando la ley adjetiva del proceso ordinario, situación que de ningún modo afecta la competencia definida legalmente. Se reitera que las disposiciones cuestionadas no contemplan jueces nombrados ex proffeso o ad hoc para determinadas personas; la normativa cuestionada responde a aspectos propios del orden administrativo del Poder Judicial, conforme los supuestos objetivos considerados en éstas y la necesidad de atención del servicio de administración de justicia en la coyuntura histórica actual y en el entendido de que el conocimiento de las causas de la jurisdicción ordinaria por la Jurisdicción de la Delincuencia Organizada está prevista por la ley, de manera tal que no es ni sorpresiva ni particularizada a una persona o supuesto concreto, sino que el conocimiento del proceso continúa en manos de un Juez Penal, en un proceso en el que se garantiza al imputado el debido proceso.

IX.- INEXISTENCIA DE QUEBRANTO DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 121.20 Y 166 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal consulta, además, si los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, este último adicionado y reformado por la Ley “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica” Ley N°9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017, Ley N°9769 de 18 de octubre de 2019 y la Ley N°10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023, lesionan los preceptos 121 inciso 20) y 166 de la Constitución Política. Al respecto, cabe reiterar que la competencia para conocer asuntos de la jurisdicción ordinaria fue establecida por la Ley N°9481 de creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada Delincuencia Organizada, como lo imponen la Constitución Política, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y tanto la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal Constitucional, como de la Corte Interamericana. Lejos de violentar las disposiciones constitucionales citadas, lo cierto del caso es que las normas sobre cuya constitucionalidad se duda, dan cabal cumplimiento a los ordinales 121 inciso 20) y 166 de la Constitución, al regular órganos jurisdicciones y sus competencias por medio de disposiciones de rango legal, por lo que los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial no lesionan el Derecho de la Constitución, y en ese sentido se evacúa la consulta.

X.- CONCLUSIÓN. - Los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial no lesionan el principio de Juez Natural, tutelado en los numerales 35 y 39 de la Constitución Política y 8.1 de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos. En cuanto al Acuerdo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, adoptado en sesión extraordinaria del 30 de enero de 2023, Acta 003-2023 -Artículo XVIII y el Acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión número 48-2023, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI se declara inevacuable la consulta.

XI.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se evacúa la consulta formulada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, sede Goicoechea, en el sentido de que los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (este último adicionado y reformado por la Ley “Creación de la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada en Costa Rica” Ley N°9481 del 13 de setiembre de 2017, Ley N°9769 de 18 de octubre de 2019 y Ley N°10369 del 30 de mayo de 2023) no infringen el principio de Juez Natural ni los artículos 121 inciso 20 y 166 de la Constitución Política. En cuanto al Acuerdo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, adoptado en sesión extraordinaria del 30 de enero de 2023, Acta 003-2023 -Artículo XVIII y el Acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión número 48-2023, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2023, artículo LXXI se declara inevacuable la consulta. El magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara inevacuable la consulta. Reséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese al Tribunal consultante y a las partes.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

Aracelly Pacheco S.

Alexandra Alvarado P.

Res. 2024021938 VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL. Con el respeto acostumbrado, salvo el voto con sustento en estos motivos.

Mediante resolución de las 9:03 horas del 26 de abril de 2024, la Presidencia de este Tribunal previno a los jueces consultantes lo siguiente: “…deberán identificar y especificar, de forma clara y debidamente individualizada, cuáles son los acuerdos concretos de Corte Plena que se pretenden cuestionar en la presente consulta”. La prevención es del todo atinente, si se toma en cuenta la formalidad del proceso de consulta judicial, que incluye la necesidad de identificar adecuadamente la norma o disposición, cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona.

Al atender esa prevención, el tribunal consultante identificó el acuerdo del Consejo Superior, adoptado en el artículo LXXI de la sesión nro. 48-2023 del 8 de junio de 2023, y el acuerdo de la Corte Plena, adoptado mediante el artículo XVIII de la sesión extraordinaria de las 8:16 horas del 30 de enero de 2023, acta 003-2023. Acoto, con relación a este último, que, según el oficio nro. 81-2024 de la Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el infrascrito no participó en su aprobación, por lo que no me cubre motivo alguno para inhibirme del conocimiento del sub lite.

Ahora bien, coincido con el criterio de mayoría, cuando declara inevacuable la consulta en lo concerniente al acuerdo de Corte Plena. En efecto, este aplicaba al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de la Jurisdicción Especializada de Delincuencia Organizada, que no es la instancia que dictó la sentencia recurrida en el asunto base. Ergo, no hay conexidad entre el último y el acuerdo impugnado.

También comparto con la mayoría que la consulta resulta inevacuable respecto del acuerdo del Consejo Superior señalado por el Tribunal consultante, ya que es posterior al dictado de la sentencia impugnada. Un elemento adicional confirma la tesis esgrimida. En respuesta a una gestión del tribunal consultante, la jueza tramitadora del Tribunal Penal de San José indicó:

“Según consulta realizada con la coordinación de este despacho así como con el Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, se informa que la causa [Valor 001] fue remitida a dicho Tribunal el pasado 07 de febrero 2023, como parte de los acuerdos tomados por el Consejo Superior, en fechas 03 y 11 de noviembre de 2022”. (El subrayado es agregado).

Así, es patente que los acuerdos, identificados por el tribunal consultante, no guardan la conexidad necesaria con el asunto base.

Concerniente a los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, cuya constitucionalidad sí es analizada por la mayoría de este Tribunal, el infrascrito objeta la admisibilidad de la consulta por dos motivos.

En primer lugar, la resolución de consulta no efectúa un análisis de cada uno de ellos, buscando contrastarlos con el bloque de constitucionalidad, a los efectos de demostrar la antinomia jurídica. Este requisito es indispensable para la admisibilidad de cualquier consulta.

En segundo, en lo referido a los citados ordinales 46, 59 y 81, determino que son normas competenciales que, a los efectos de la consulta, deberían encontrar su desarrollo en acuerdos del Consejo Superior o la Corte Plena, según sea el caso, de manera que se cumpla el requisito de que la disposición cuestionada sea una “…norma o acto que deba aplicar, o de un acto, conducta u omisión que deba juzgar en un caso sometido a su conocimiento” (canon 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Tales preceptos señalan:

“Artículo 46.- Los acuerdos y las disposiciones de la Corte relativas al establecimiento y la definición de una circunscripción territorial, o los que conciernan al recargo de competencias, el traslado y la conversión de despachos judiciales y de cargos o puestos, deberán fundamentarse en la ineludible eficiencia del servicio, la especialización de los órganos judiciales y de los tribunales jurisdiccionales y la equidad necesaria de las cargas de trabajo…” (Destacado por los consultantes).

“Artículo 59.- Corresponde a la Corte Suprema de Justicia:

(…)

16.- Refundir dos o más despachos judiciales en uno solo o dividirlos, trasladarlos de sede, fijarles la respectiva competencia territorial y por materia, tomando en consideración el mejor servicio público.

También podrá asignarle competencia especializada a uno o varios despachos, para que conozcan de determinados asuntos, dentro de una misma materia, ocurridos en una o varias circunscripciones o en todo el territorio nacional”. (Destacado por los consultantes).

“Artículo 81.- Corresponde al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial:

(…)

2.- Designar, con excepción de los que corresponden a la Corte, a los funcionarios que administran justicia, de conformidad con las normas legales y reglamentarias correspondientes; trasladarlos, provisional o definitivamente, suspenderlos y concederles licencias con goce de sueldo o sin él y removerlos, todo con arreglo de las disposiciones correspondientes, sin perjuicio de las potestades atribuidas al Presidente”. (Destacado por los consultantes).

En otras palabras, para que la consulta judicial no sea un ejercicio abstracto (lo que conllevaría su inadmisibilidad), los juzgadores consultantes debieron establecer el vínculo entre esos ordinales de la Ley Orgánica y el caso sometido a su conocimiento. Tal conexión se encontraba, en criterio de los consultantes, en los acuerdos impugnados. Sin embargo, dado que la admisibilidad de aquellos fue descartada ut supra, el citado vínculo quedó sin sustento.

Incluso, se infiere de la consulta que el despacho consultante comprende la naturaleza de las normas competenciales y la necesidad de que exista un acuerdo que las desarrolle o relacione con el caso concreto, visto que establece como pretensión que “…la Sala Constitucional determine si los artículos 46, 59, 81 y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (…) y los acuerdos de Corte Plena (…) que apoyan en aquellos y permiten el traslado de expedientes…” (el subrayado es agregado).

Ahora, si la autoridad consultante pretendiera la impugnación de los citados ordinales de manera autónoma (sin un acuerdo que les desarrolle), entonces resurge la inadmisibilidad por la falta de adecuada fundamentación, ya expuesta, pues se extrañaría una justificación de la conexidad con el caso concreto.

Finalmente, atinente al canon 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, este señala en lo conducente:

“Artículo 101 bis-Para ser jueza o juez del Juzgado Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada y juez o jueza tramitadora del Tribunal Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada y del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, titular o suplente, se requiere:

(…)

Quienes se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada también realizarán labores dentro de la jurisdicción ordinaria, cuando los requerimientos institucionales así lo determinen. De igual forma, cuando las circunstancias lo ameriten y para diligencias específicas, quienes se desempeñen en la jurisdicción ordinaria podrán realizar labores en procesos de la jurisdicción especializada, sin que ello lleve aparejado el reconocimiento del incentivo salarial previsto para la jurisdicción especializada, ni la asignación de una plaza en esa jurisdicción”. (Destacado por los consultantes).

Este precepto, a diferencia de los anteriores, no asigna expresamente competencias para el Consejo Superior o la Corte Plena. Sin embargo, en el sub examine, subsisten objeciones de admisibilidad. Por un lado, no se fundamenta de manera clara su vínculo con el caso concreto, según se explicó anteriormente. Por otro, subrayo que esa disposición atañe a quienes “…se desempeñen en la Jurisdicción Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada…” (el subrayado es agregado), lo que no se considera aplicable al asunto base, visto que tal jurisdicción no había entrado en funcionamiento al momento del dictado de sentencia condenatoria, por lo que la persona juzgadora no podía estarse “desempeñando” en esa jurisdicción.

Ante estas falencias en la fundamentación de la consulta, la estimo inevacuable.

Paul Rueda L.

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