Equating ex-presidents' pensions to legislators' salaries via budget law is unconstitutionalEquiparación de pensiones de expresidentes a salarios de diputados vía ley de presupuesto es inconstitucional

Res. No. 2024-000362 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at twelve hours forty minutes on January tenth, two thousand twenty-four.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre01, attorney, holder of identity card no. CED01 against Article 29 of Law No. 7108 "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988", on the grounds that it violates numerals 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution.

WHEREAS:

1.- By a document received in the Constitutional Chamber at 10:21 hrs. on March 13, 2023, Mr. Nombre01 filed an action of unconstitutionality against Article 29 of Law No. 7108 "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988", on the grounds that it violates numerals 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution.

Detailed analysis of the grievances The challenged numeral seeks to equate the pensions of former presidents of the Republic to the income of deputies and representation expenses, in violation of Articles 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Law No. 7108 modified Law 313 on "Pensiones de Expresidentes" without any technical justification. Such action harmed the public treasury and thus, through an odious privilege, benefits a few people. The action is not intended to attack the pensions of former presidents, as these are acquired rights; however, it does question the equating of pensions to the income of deputies. Such a situation lacks technical foundation and creates an honorary benefit that should not be borne by the people of Costa Rica. The former presidents have already been paid their monthly salary, vacations, Christmas bonus, and corresponding benefits at the end of each presidential term. The equating to the income of deputies does not generate acquired rights but was rather an amendment that created a benefit. As these are groundless technical and legal equation calculations, as well as being excessively high and disproportionate, a privileged caste is created. Since this privilege was not granted through an ordinary law, the provision lacked rigorous discussion by the deputies. The implemented equation allows abuses for paying honorary pensions, without former presidents having contributed, contrary to how magistrates and other public officials do. In the case of former presidents, they not only receive a pension equated to the income of deputies, but it is also greater than "100% of their un-contributed income before the CCSS" and charged to the Republic's budget. They consider that the challenged norm discriminates against those who have contributed and that such circumstances contravene Articles 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution.

On the merits They maintain that there is no explanatory statement whatsoever from the Legislative Assembly for equating the pensions of former presidents to the income of deputies, nor are there technical studies supporting the proposal. Some people, children or heirs of former presidents, without having made any contribution, receive monthly incomes equated to those of deputies "as if they were royalty." They explain that they raise this action for the violation of Articles 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution and not against the pensions of former presidents, since according to Law No. 313, it corresponds to an acquired right. On the contrary, they clarify that they only challenge Article 29 of Law No. 7108 because:

"1) This EQUATION (sic) DOES NOT GENERATE ACQUIRED RIGHTS 2) This EQUATION (sic) is ABUSIVE.

• 3)This EQUATION (sic) HAS NEVER PAID CONTRIBUTIONS (sic) TO THE STATE.
• 4)This EQUATION (sic) LACKS AN EXPLANATORY STATEMENT (sic) OF LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES, NOR DISCUSSION (sic) IN REGULATED DEBATE.
• 5)This EQUATION (sic) lacks FOUNDATION (sic) from the Constitutional Jurisdiction Chamber of the Republic of Costa Rica.
• 6)Because these resources belong to the People, NOT to the Former Presidents or their Heirs.
• 7)BECAUSE ALL MONEYS PAID AS OF THE EQUATION (sic) GENERATED BY ARTICLE (sic) 29 OF LAW 7108 OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC (sic) MUST BE REIMBURSED TO THE STATE COFFERS, THAT IS, TO THE PEOPLE OF COSTA RICA.
• 8)Because Article 29 of Law 7108 of the EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET IS ONLY FOR THAT BUDGET PERIOD, SINCE IN SUBSEQUENT BUDGET LAWS, THEY MUST ALL BE INDICATED IN EACH BUDGET AND THEY CANNOT CREATE ORDINARY LAWS OF PERPETUAL APPLICATION.
• 9)Because Article 29 of Law 7108 of the EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET, DOES NOT EXPRESSLY INDICATE that it additionally modifies Law 313, IT ONLY CREATES AN ORDINARY LAW WITHIN AN EXTRAORDINARY BUDGETARY MODIFICATION (sic) LAW (…)
• 10)Because the LIFETIME PENSIONS OF FORMER PRESIDENTS, PER SE GENERATE ACQUIRED RIGHTS, BUT THE EQUATION (sic) OF LIFETIME PENSIONS TO FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 08, 1988, THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET LAW OF THE REPUBLIC (sic) DOES NOT GENERATE ACQUIRED RIGHTS.
• 11)Because THE EQUATION (sic) OF LIFETIME PENSIONS TO FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 08, 1988, THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET LAW OF THE REPUBLIC (sic), is about AN ODIOUS PRIVILEGE.
• 12)Because THE EQUATION (sic) OF LIFETIME PENSIONS TO FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 08, 1988, THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET LAW OF THE REPUBLIC (sic), requires a POPULAR CONSULTATION IN A REFERENDUM (sic), BECAUSE IT IS AN EQUATION (sic) THAT PROMOTES AN EXPENDITURE (sic) OF PUBLIC RESOURCES (sic) FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, WHO AFTER THEIR DUTIES, ARE EQUAL AMONG EQUALS, THEY THE FORMER PRESIDENTS AND EVEN MORE (sic) THEIR HEIRS." The claimant bases their case on numerals 1, 2, 3, 8, subsection a) of 73, 77, following and related of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (LJC); Articles 7, 10, 11, 27, 28, 33, 39, 42, 48, and 50 of the Political Constitution; paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Based on the arguments presented, the appellant requests: 1) to suspend the payment of the equation of the lifetime pensions of former presidents to the income of deputies and that they be paid only the ordinary pension until the Chamber resolves the action of unconstitutionality; and, 2) that the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law No. 7108 be declared.

2.- By resolution at 19:52 hrs. on April 17, 2023, the Presidency of the Chamber made the following preclusion to the claimant:

"Specify what is the prior pending matter upon which the action is based, or else indicate the reasons that confer legitimacy to sue directly; b.- In the event a prior matter exists, they must provide a certified copy of the document in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norms was invoked, expressly and prior to filing the action, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed violated." 3.- On April 20, 2023, the claimant complied with the preclusion made and stated:

"I am precluded as claimant Nombre01 that within the third day, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the action for non-compliance, I must: Specify what is the prior pending matter upon which I base the action according to Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, 'or else indicate the reasons that confer legitimacy to sue directly'" Therefore, they maintain that they avail themselves of the final lines of the aforementioned, as there is no procedure to challenge atypical norms that were approved through extraordinary budgets of the Republic.

Regarding their legitimacy, the claimant asserts that it stems from the existence of a diffuse interest in the control of public funds. Furthermore, they argue that, being an atypical norm, one is only legitimized in a totally indirect manner, because as a taxpayer they are obliged to the increases in remuneration. They state that once the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) is heard, it will say they lack legitimacy to exercise their challenge, as there is no prior process in which the application of the norm is being discussed. However, they assert that in actions of unconstitutionality filed against atypical norms, a popular action is not established; there is only direct action and exceptionally, in cases of diffuse interest, the action must be admitted without a prior matter, otherwise no citizen could challenge these norms.

4.- By resolution at 11:02 hrs. on May 9, 2023, the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber admitted the present action of unconstitutionality. Additionally, the publication of the corresponding edicts in the Judicial Bulletin was ordered. A hearing was granted to the PGR and to the president of the Legislative Directorate.

5.- By document received in this Constitutional Chamber on May 22, 2023, MAGDA INÉS ROJAS CHAVES, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, responded to the hearing.

On the admissibility requirements:

They consider that, despite the claimant having been precluded, it is not actually adequately and sufficiently explained or argued what the substantial legal situation is that, beyond the mere existence of an atypical norm, legitimizes the claimant to come to the Chamber, as they merely refer to the defense of supposed diffuse interests related to the proper handling of public funds. They state that the foregoing is important because the Chamber has indicated that there is no popular action to challenge atypical norms. In this regard, they cite judgment No. 2016-011975 of 9:30 hrs. on August 24, 2016. In this manner, the PGR considers the action inadmissible and that it must be rejected.

Report on the merits Regarding the special non-contributory pension regime for former presidents, the following historical-normative overview is provided:

"According to what we have referred to in our administrative jurisprudence, as a legal-normative antecedent for the recognition of special pensions to former Presidents of the Republic, we can find Law No. 313 of August 23, 1939, called 'Ley de Pensiones para ex Presidentes,' which granted said benefit to those who constitutionally came to occupy the First Magistracy, and upon their passing, to their widows, for a monthly amount of ¢500.00, not subject to reductions or deductions of any nature.

Subsequently, the aforementioned assignable pension amount was increased on several occasions; for example, by Law No. 259 of November 2, 1948, it was increased to ¢1,000.00 and by Law No. 1124 of December 20, 1949, it was made not subject to revalidation. Later by Law No. 2264 of November 24, 1958, it grew to ¢3,000.00 monthly.

The same occurred with Law No. 5510 of April 19, 1974, called Ley de Pensiones ex-Presidentes, beneméritos y símbolos nacionales, by which said pension was increased to ¢5,000.00 monthly. However, it is noteworthy that with this last regulation, coverage of said benefit was expanded, as it no longer only covered former Presidents of the Republic who had been constitutionally elected, but also the former Vice President of the Republic who had replaced the President of the Republic in absolute absence and who had held the office for more than half of the term. A similar provision was made with Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980, which also increased the assignable pension amount to ¢15,000.00 monthly.

We cannot ignore that through Article 9, the fiftieth norm of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law for 1979 – No. 6305 of December 21, 1978 –, Article 1 of the cited Law 313 was added, in order to include as beneficiaries of a pension equal to that of the widows of former Presidents or former Vice Presidents of the Republic, those persons who had held the condition of First Lady. A situation that came to be ratified by the Budget Laws for 1981 – No. 6542 of December 22, 1981 –, Article 9, norm 49, and for 1982 – No. 6700 of December 23, 1981 –, Article 9, norm 48 (The last two atypical norms were annulled by resolution of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2136 at 14:00 hours on October 23, 1991).

And by Extraordinary Budget Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, its Article 29 – the challenged norm – increased and equated the amount of the pensions of the former Presidents, equal to the salary of a deputy.

With Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, called 'Creación del régimen general de pensiones con cargo al presupuesto nacional, de otros regímenes especiales y reforma a la ley Nº7092 de 21 de abril de 1988 y sus reformas, Ley del impuesto sobre la renta,' known as 'Ley Marco de Pensiones,' which came to unify the requirements for retiring under any of the State's special pension regimes – except those of the Judicial Branch and national teachers –, a Chapter III was provided, called 'Del Régimen de Pensiones de los ex Presidentes de la República,' which came to repeal the specific provisions provided by Law No. 313 and its amendments. Said Chapter stipulates the following:

"Chapter III OF THE PENSION REGIME OF FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC ARTICLE 16.- Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall be entitled to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem payments and representation expenses), as of the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be borne by the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

ARTICLE 17.- The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted whenever the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.

ARTICLE 18.- Upon their death, the heirs established by the Regulations of the Disability, Old Age and Death Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions established therein" In this vein, the PGR considers that the granting of pensions to former presidents of the Republic aims to guarantee that, once they have ceased their office, they can attend to their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that corresponds to them due to the high functions they exercised in the previously held position. Thus, they argue that it cannot be considered a discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privilege. Along these lines, the following is reported:

"A criterion that has been fully shared by this Chamber, considering that the mere existence of such a special pension regime does not, in any way, constitute an infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Constitution's Law (Resolution No. 2018-006137 of 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018).

And it was through that resolution that this Chamber dismissed an action of unconstitutionality filed against Article 16 of the cited Law No. 7302, insofar as it provides that former Presidents shall be entitled to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem payments and representation expenses), as the claimant considered that this benefit lacked a licit cause and violated constitutional ordinal 73.

In that resolution, the Chamber then endorsed the constitutionality of the Pension Regime of former Presidents of the Republic, and citing a resolution of the Colombian Constitutional Court – No. C-989/99 of December 09, 1999 –, among other things, affirmed that the pensions of former presidents '...constitute not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stand as a means to congruently provide for the needs arising from the special position that being a former president of the Republic implies. It is concealed from no one that this position requires leading a life with certain special requirements of decorum, which are not always within the reach of someone who has ceased exercising the first magistracy, either because they lack their own resources or because of the de facto limitation in which someone who has held that position finds themselves in to exercise any type of positions or trades, for reasons that touch precisely upon the dignity of the Nation or even with ethical factors (…).' And based, additionally, on the fact that the creation of the cited special pension regime ultimately responds to the free configuration of the legislator, understood as the possibility that the Legislative Assembly has, before a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, within a plurality of similar and all valid options, in that same resolution the Chamber considered that Article 16 of Law No. 7302, by its ratio legis validly seeks to guarantee the dignified subsistence of those who specifically held the office of President of the Republic, that is, those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of the Nation – constitutional Articles 130, 139, 140 and 147 –. This being a very particular and exceptional case, distinct from the general pension regime provided by Article 73 of the Political Charter, but which finds legal support." Then, regarding the unconstitutionality of atypical budgetary norms, they make the following considerations:

"With respect to the defects alleged by the claimant, especially those referring to the unconstitutionality of the accused atypical budgetary norm, we must indicate the following:

The Budget Law of the Republic is a Law defined both by its procedure and by its content. Articles 176 – first paragraph – and 180 of the Constitution establish the content that the Budget Law of the Republic must have.

In this sense, it must be indicated that, in accordance with the cited constitutional norms, the proper and special subject matter of the Budget Law is that related to the establishment of the list of probable income and the authorization of administration expenditures during the corresponding fiscal period. Furthermore, it is understood that budgetary matters comprise the budget execution norms necessary for a specific fiscal year. It has been accurately specified that it is not proper to create taxes or any other form of income through a Budget Law. In this regard, it is important to cite vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1466-1990 at 15:15 hours on October 30, 1990:

'That this Chamber has expressed its criterion on several occasions to the effect that the only general norms that can be included in budget laws are those that intend to introduce parameters for its execution, that is, the so-called "budget execution norms." (Resolutions 121-89 at 11:00 hours on November 23, 1989, 69-90 at 11:29 hours on January 17, 1990 and others). Even in the first of them, the establishment of a tax in a budget law was considered unconstitutional. Given that, indeed, Law No. 6966 of September 25, 1984 is a modification to the Ordinary Budget for the same year, and that the challenged article establishes a tax on exemptions, it is proper to declare it unconstitutional based on the cited precedents.' Then, it is improper to incorporate norms unrelated to budgetary matters within a Budget Law of the Republic.

Constitutional jurisprudence has coined the concept of 'atypical norm' to designate any provision that, without having any relation to budgetary matters, is, however, included within the budget, and said 'atypicality' arises when the legislator repeals, modifies, interprets, or even creates ordinary laws within the budget. Vote No. 4790-1993 at 8:54 hours on September 30, 1993 is transcribed:

(…)

It is pertinent to note that, although it is undeniable that constitutional Article 105 has provided, in general, that the people, through suffrage, delegate legislative power to Congress, the truth is that subsections 1) and 11) of numeral 121 also of the Constitution distinguish between two different modes and forms of legislating based on the subject matter in question. The first subsection grants the Assembly the general power to enact laws, amend them, repeal them, and give them authentic interpretation – except for the interpretive power of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters. In the exercise of the form of legislating provided in Article 121.1 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly must follow the procedure provided in Articles 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, and 128 of the Constitution, which includes the prerogative of veto by the Executive Branch. On the other hand, numeral 121.11 provides the power to issue the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic for which it must follow the procedure prescribed in ordinals 177, 178, 179, and 180. According to constitutional numeral 125, final part, the Executive Branch lacks the possibility of vetoing the Budget Law that has been approved by the Legislative Assembly.

That is to say, the Constitution has distinguished between the general power to legislate and the power to issue the budget laws of the Republic, in such a way that it is inconsistent with the Constitution to incorporate into said laws, provisions or norms that are unrelated to budgetary matters, as it must be emphasized that, in the exercise of the power provided in numeral 121.11 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly must confine itself to regulating budgetary matters. Vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 121-1989 at 11:00 hours on November 23, 1989 is transcribed:

(…)

It is worth noting that the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated on multiple occasions its jurisprudence regarding the unconstitutionality of atypical budgetary norms. (See votes: 6043-2002 at 15:29 hours on June 18, 2002, 3666-2003 at 14:53 hours on May 7, 2003, No. 3497-2005 at 14:50 hours on March 30, 2005, No. 14102-2006 at 11:20 hours on September 22, 2006, No. 56-2008 at 14:47 hours on January 9, 2008).

Finally, it is convenient to highlight, for the purposes of the present matter, that in its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Chamber has underscored that any provision included in the Budget Law that, however, innovates, modifies, or repeals ordinary Legislation would be presumed to be an atypical norm. Vote No. 242-2001 at 14:44 hours on January 10, 2001 is transcribed, recently reiterated by resolution No. 2022-026652 at 16:31 hrs. on November 9, 2022:

'It has been a reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain norms of a general nature, unrelated to budget matters. That is, the inclusion of atypical norms that deal with the subject matter of ordinary legislation, either for its creation or modification, is not valid.' (Also see vote No. 7137-2007 at 16:47 hours on May 23, 2007)." Thus, in relation to the specific case, they state that the questioned norm regulates matters different from the budgetary, as it is not related to the execution of the budget, but modifies or adds to ordinary legislation, by equating the amount of the non-contributory pension of former presidents of the Republic to the salary of deputies. They consider that the foregoing violates what is prescribed in Articles 121, subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, first paragraph, 177, and 180 first paragraph, all of the Political Constitution, which set the procedure to follow for the discussion, approval, and modification of the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic, distinct from that of ordinary law. In this sense, they assert that the norm in question is unconstitutional.

However, they add the following considerations:

"Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm for formal reasons, since it used the procedure prescribed by the Constitution for issuing the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic to issue or reform, as applicable, an ordinary law, the truth is that subsequently, by an ordinary legal amendment introduced by the General Pension Law charged to the National Budget, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III 'Del Régimen de Pensiones de los Ex presidentes de la República,' its Article 16 provided a similar norm, whereby the monthly pension of constitutionally elected Former Presidents shall be equal to the income of a deputy (per diem payments and representation expenses), as of the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term.

This last aspect clearly diminishes the practical utility of this action of unconstitutionality, since the cited Article 16 of Law No. 7302 was not attacked by the claimant. This without prejudice to the power granted to the Chamber by ordinal 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which, the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law or general provision, could also declare that of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or provision whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence, as well as that of the challenged application acts; an aspect that must be evaluated at the corresponding procedural stage.

Nevertheless, we must recall that 'To undertake an examination of reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Court requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to base its argument, and the same procedural burden corresponds to whoever rebuts the arguments of the action, and the lack of compliance with these requirements makes the allegations of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing, because it is not possible to carry out an analysis of <<reasonableness>> without the existence of a coherent line of argument that is evidentiarily supported. (Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 5236-99 at 14:00 hours on July 7, 1999, reiterated, among many others, in No. 10153-2001 at 14:44 hours on October 10, 2001, and in No. 14392-2016 at 9:05 hours on October 5, 2016). And in this matter, the non-compliance with this unavoidable requirement is more than evident.

In any case, as we alluded to in section B) of our report, by resolution No. 2018-006137 at 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018, the Chamber endorsed the constitutionality of the Pension Regime of former Presidents of the Republic, considering that its mere existence does not, in any way, constitute an infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Constitution's Law." They conclude that the action of unconstitutionality is inadmissible due to the lack of legitimacy of the claimant, even though the challenged norm is indeed unconstitutional. They note that the equation of the pension amount of former presidents to the income of a deputy, legally provided through a later ordinary law (i.e., numeral 16 of Law No. 7302), subsists and is constitutionally reasonable.

6.- The edicts were published in the Judicial Bulletin, numbers 092, 093, and 094 of May 25, 26, and 29, 2023, 093 of May 26, 2023, and 094 of May 29, 2023.

7.- In a document received in this Constitutional Chamber on June 9, 2023, GLORIA NAVAS MONTERO, in her capacity as VICE PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, responded to the hearing.

On the procedure of Law No. 7108 She explains that Law No. 7108 was a modification to Law No. 7089. She clarifies that neither the base text nor the committee report contained numeral 29 that is challenged in this action, but rather said norm was introduced by means of a substantive motion that was approved without discussion in the Comisión de Asuntos Hacendarios (Budgetary Affairs Committee). Said motion was presented by former deputy Méndez Mata and was processed when the bill was being processed in the Plenary, in accordance with Art. 41 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (RAL) in force on that date. She indicates that, except for the art.

29, in Law No. 7108 there is no other regulation concerning the pension of former presidents. She narrates that the law was sanctioned on November 8, 1988, by the Executive Branch and some articles that are not related to the subject of this action were vetoed; furthermore, it was published in La Gaceta No. 215 of November 11, 1988.

Regarding the Merits Concerning the regulation of former presidents' pensions, Deputy Navas Montero states:

“Law 313 of August 23, 1939, the Law of Pensions for Former Presidents, established a pension regime for the former presidents of the Republic of Costa Rica, regulating aspects such as the beneficiaries, the pension amount, limitations and exceptions, and other benefits.

This Law 313 of 1939 was subject to several reforms (express and tacit), interpretations, and additions; among them, Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, which tacitly reformed Law 313, an article whose constitutionality is questioned because it is an atypical norm.

• In 1958, it was reformed by Law No. 2264 of November 24, 1958. • In 1961, it was interpreted by Law No. 2835 of October 23, 1961. • In 1980, it was subject to a reform through Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980. • In 1981, it had an addition through Article 9 of Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981. • In 1985, it was reformed through Article 14 of Law No. 7018 of December 20, 1985. • In 1988, it was tacitly reformed by Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988. • In 1992, it is tacitly reformed by Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, the General Regime of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget, and other special regimes. In this law, a text similar to the text of Article 29 of Law 7108 is introduced.

It is worth noting that Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, the General Regime of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget, in its Chapter III (Articles 16, 17, and 18), regulates matters relating to the Pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic as follows:

“…CHAPTER III OF THE PENSION REGIME OF FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC Article 16.- Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (dietas y gastos de representación), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be chargeable to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Department of Pensions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

Article 17.- The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted whenever the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.

Article 18.- Upon their death, the heirs-at-law (causahabientes) established by the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein.” What is indicated in this Chapter prevails over what is indicated in Law 313 and in Article 29 of Law 7108, as it is a later norm, of the same rank (law), and because an antinomy exists. As can be observed, Law 7302, in Article 16, contains a provision very similar to that of Article 29 of Law 7108. That is, the text of the challenged Article 29 of Law 7108 is superseded by Article 16 of Law 7302.” She explains, regarding atypical norms, that they are provisions incorporated into the national budgets and their amending laws; however, they are not directly related to budgetary matters. She notes that, through constitutional review, the Chamber has declared the unconstitutionality of this type of norm.

Regarding the petitioner's argument that Art. 29 of Law No. 7108 is an atypical norm, she indicates:

“The legislative record does not contain an explanation of why the legislator included this norm in the Budgetary Law. It is possible that the legislator chose to include a regulation of this type in the budgetary norm considering that it was the Public Treasury (Article 2, Law 313) that was responsible for disbursing the pension amounts to former presidents and the vice president who had replaced them absolutely; therefore, by equating the pension of former presidents to the salary of the Deputies, the norm constituted a reform that implied budgetary adjustments.

However, it must be considered that Resolution No. 0121-89 of November 23, 1989, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates that the Full Court had repeatedly resolved to declare the unconstitutionality of several atypical norms processed in budget laws. Moreover, since Law 313, the Law of pensions for former presidents, existed, what was appropriate was to reform that law.

It is worth taking into account that, as can be seen in the following table, Article 29 of Law 7108 was tacitly repealed by Article 16 of Law 7302.

Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988. Amendment to Law 7089 of December 18, 1987, Ordinary Budget for the year 1988. Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Regime of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget “Article 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of the salary of a deputy.” Article 16.- Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy.” She details, regarding the pension regime for former presidents, that the number of beneficiaries as of 2021 was ten people. Furthermore, the average monthly pension is around ₡3,753,207, meaning the monthly expenditure reaches ₡37,532,070. Moreover, she clarifies that the amount included in the National Budget of the Republic for the concept of former presidents' pensions for the year 2023 amounts to ₡426,600,000. Likewise, she explains:

“The pensions also imply the following expenditures that the State must budget:

1. Aguinaldo (calculated the same as for public sector salaried employees) 2. Employer’s Health Insurance Contribution (Cuota Patronal Seguro de Salud): 8.75% of the pension amount 3. State Health Insurance Contribution (Cuota Estatal Seguro de Salud): 0.25% of the pension amount 4. Revaluations (Revalorizaciones): Pensions are revalued for cost of living when the Executive Branch decrees increases for public officials at the same percentage or amount and it takes effect.

Said Regime in turn grants survival pensions (pensiones por sobrevivencia) upon the death of the decedent (former president) to the heirs-at-law indicated by the IVM regulation of the CCSS, who shall be entitled to 75% of the pension (in total, not each one).

As of 2121, the pension was granted to 7 former presidents, 1 former first lady, and 2 heirs-at-law.” She narrates, regarding the remuneration of deputies, that the challenged norm uses the term salary; however, what deputies receive are dietas and other components.

Having clarified the above, the speaker concludes the following:

“2.6.1.- Regarding what is alleged by the petitioner concerning considering Article 29 of Law 7108 as an atypical norm.

Yes, Article 29 of Law 7108 is considered an atypical norm given that it is not a budgetary norm, and this norm should have been processed as a reform to the Law of Pensions for Former Presidents.

It should be noted that, as explained above, Article 29 of Law 7108 is tacitly repealed by Article 16 of Law 7302.

2.6.2.- Regarding what is alleged about the violation of Article 33 and Article 50 of the Political Constitution.

The petitioner's claim that the equating of the norm implied a privilege, or that Article 50 was violated regarding the adequate distribution of wealth, is not shared.

Now, it must indeed be considered that the constitutional conditions and functions of the positions of presidents, later former presidents, and deputies are different; for example, consider that regarding the Salary of the President of the Republic (sic), Law 10159, Public Employment Law of March 8, 2022, in its Article 30, subsection b) indicates that the salary of the President of the Republic shall be the highest salary in the Public Administration.” She requests that Article 29 of Law No. 7108 be declared unconstitutional for being an atypical norm.

8.- By resolution at 11:21 a.m. on June 27, 2023, the Presidency of the Chamber indicated the following:

“The hearings granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the President of the Legislative Directory, in the resolution at eleven hours and two minutes on May ninth, two thousand twenty-three, are deemed answered. The case being ready, let this ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY number 23-005771-0007-CO pass to the office of Magistrate Anamari Garro Vargas, to whom, by turn, the substantive study of the same corresponds.” 9.- In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Fernández Argüello; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- PURPOSE OF THE ACTION. The petitioner challenges the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108, of November 8, 1988. The challenged numeral states the following:

“Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of the salary of a deputy”.

It is claimed that, through this law, Law No. 313 on Pensions for Former Presidents was modified, without any technical justification and under the unhealthy praxis of approving it through a budget law, so that it would go unnoticed during parliamentary discussion, with the consequent damage to the public treasury, which is considered an abuse and an odious privilege.

II.- THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities that must necessarily be fulfilled for this Court to validly rule on the merits of the matter. In Art. 75 of the LJC, the admissibility requirements for actions of unconstitutionality are established, and different situations are regulated. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –no base matter is required– in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

Other formalities must be complied with, namely, the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the components of the constitutional block that are considered infringed (Art. 78 of the LJC).

III.- THE PETITIONER'S STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN). The petitioner considers that he has standing (legitimación) to bring this action of unconstitutionality, which, he asserts, arises from the existence of a diffuse interest in the control of public funds. He argues that, as it is an atypical norm, one is only legitimized in a totally indirect manner, since as a taxpayer, he affirms he is obliged to pay for the increases in such remunerations. The majority of the Chamber agrees with this claim and dismisses the statements formulated in the opposite sense by the Procuraduría General de la República. Certainly, the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court has been clear in that the atypicality of a budgetary norm is not, in itself, a basis for granting standing to any person to challenge it in this venue. It is clear that admitting this possibility would establish a popular action for the challenge of any atypical norm or, in general, of any norm included in a national, extraordinary, or special budget; which must be dismissed, as it is not in accordance with the rules for access to these control mechanisms, provided for in numeral 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. The judgments cited by the Procuradora and many others of this body, among them, No. 1990-1775, reiterated in Nos. 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571, 2013-001496, 2016-011975, and 2020-018840, are absolutely clear in that sense, a criterion also reaffirmed in this case. However, in the sub examine, the situation is very different. What is challenged is a legal norm –included, in effect, within a budget law–, by which it was established that the pensions accrued by those who have held the Presidency of the Republic shall be equal to the salary of a deputy. Thus, given the nature of this special pension regime, of a non-contributory nature and chargeable to the national budget, it is evident that this involves the guardianship and protection of public funds, for which a diffuse interest exists. Note that it is not, therefore, a simple general challenge based on the atypicality of the norm, as the advisory body of this Chamber claims, but rather an action incardinated precisely in the public nature of the funds with which these stipends are paid, which enables the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, to question its constitutional validity, under the terms of numeral 75, second paragraph of the recently cited law. For this reason, the conclusion is reached that the petitioner has active standing (legitimado activamente) to bring this challenge, and consequently, the action filed is declared admissible.

IV).- ON THE MERITS. Article 29 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic, No. 7108 of November 8, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight, challenged here, provides that: "The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of the salary of a deputy". From its mere reading, it is obvious that its content is clearly alien to budgetary matters. The matter relating to pensions, retirements, and in particular, the definition of the amounts of the benefits established in the corresponding regime, is a matter that must be regulated by ordinary or common law and far exceeds what should be the object of a budget law. All parties involved in this action have acknowledged this: the petitioner, the Procuraduría General de la República, and the Asamblea Legislativa, and this Chamber agrees, having issued, as is widely recognized by the interested parties, profuse jurisprudence on the impossibility of regulating, in public budgets, topics that must be regulated by ordinary law, a practice that –it has been repeatedly said– is contrary to the provisions of numerals 121, subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, first paragraph, 177, and 180, first paragraph, all of the Political Constitution. On this specific topic, this Chamber has long indicated the following:

“III.- On the merits. The challenged article provides: " Article 33.- Add an article, which shall bear the number 12, to the Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice, No. 6739 of April 28, 1982, which shall read: \"Article 12: All servants of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Justice and the General Directorate of Social Adaptation and Crime Prevention may avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry, under the same terms established in Law No. 5 of September 16, 1939, and its reforms. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social shall transfer to the pension fund of the National Registry the totality of the contributions paid by the servants belonging to the aforementioned institutions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime who avail themselves of this law\". As can be observed, the norm in question grants the possibility to a group of public servants to avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry, thereby making a formal and material amendment to the law that regulates that retirement regime. The norm is part of Law No. 6975 of November 30, 1984, which is a budgetary law ("Extraordinary Budget Law"). Regarding the inclusion of non-budgetary provisions in budget laws, the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly expressed the criterion that these are atypical norms that violate the law-making procedure stipulated in the Political Constitution, and therefore must necessarily be considered unconstitutional. Thus, it has declared:

\" ...This Chamber, since Judgment No. 121-89 of 11:00 hrs. of November 23, 1989, has held that \"...it is entirely appropriate to include \"general norms\" in budget laws, provided that they are linked to the specialty that this matter signifies, or what is the same, to the execution of the budget. What is not possible to include in budget laws are norms that do not have this nature, since they must be regulated by the provisions for common or ordinary laws\" (judgment No. 759-92 of 15:00 hrs. of March 17, 1992). Subsections 1) and 11) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution confer upon the Asamblea Legislativa separate, distinct, and exclusive legislative powers in each case. Subsection 1) attributes the power to \"Enact laws, amend them, repeal them, and give their authentic interpretation...\", subsection 11) attributes the power to \"Enact the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic\". The power granted by the first subsection refers to a very broad power generally corresponding to ordinary or common laws, while that of subsection 11) is of a special nature, as deduced from Articles 176, 177, 178, 179, and 180 in relation to 125, all of the Political Constitution. By separately contemplating these powers, the Constitution prescribes that these are different legislative acts, with a different nature and content. It does not matter that the budget is a formal and material law and that other laws also have this character; the case is that the specialty and content of budget laws caused the constituent to create a special and separate procedure for them. Therefore, the budget of the Republic being a formal and material law but special for the matter it constitutes, the Legislative Power cannot validly, in the exercise of the budgetary power, regulate matters of a different nature or content. In short, having established that the challenged norm is a general, non-budgetary norm, enacted through a budget law, with a necessary and inevitable violation of the constitutional procedure, the consequence is to declare it contrary to the Political Constitution” (judgment No. 2765-1993 of 15:09 hours of June 15, 1993, emphasis added. In identical sense, on this type of provisions, see among many others, Nos. 1466-1990 of 15:15 hours of October 30, 1990, No. 4790-1993 of 8:54 hours of September 30, 1993, and No. 121-1989 of 11:00 hours of November 23, 1989) In the case at hand, no reasons are found to vary the criterion already expressed on the subject, nor have matters of public order been raised that justify reconsidering the issue, and under such circumstances, given the evident unconstitutionality affecting the challenged norm, whose content –it is insisted– does not fit within a budgetary law, it is appropriate to uphold this action and annul, as contrary to the Law of the Constitution, Article 29 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic, No. 7108 of November 8, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight. This declaration is declaratory and its effects retroactive to the date of issuance of the provision being annulled, without prejudice to rights of good faith, under the terms of numerals 89 and 90 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction.

• V)DIMENSIONALIZING (DIMENSIONAMIENTO). Moreover, as indicated by the interveners in this matter and as this Chamber has verified, Article 29 of Law No. 7108 –challenged here– was repealed by the so-called Pension Framework Law, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, "Creation of the general regime of pensions chargeable to the national budget, other special regimes, and reform to Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988, and its reforms, Income Tax Law", whose Chapter III, "Of the Pension Regime of the Former Presidents of the Republic", in its Articles 16, 17, and 18, established the following:

"Chapter III. OF THE PENSION REGIME OF THE FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC ARTICLE 16.- The Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (dietas y gastos de representación), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be chargeable to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Department of Pensions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

ARTICLE 17.- The pensions of the Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted whenever the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.

ARTICLE 18.- Upon their death, the heirs-at-law established by the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein”.

It should be noted that this is a defect of origin in the legislative procedure, and since then, more than three decades have passed, with the period of validity of the questioned article having lasted for a period of less than four years, during which the persons who held the Presidency received the pension amount in good faith, a situation that cannot be reversed now, on the occasion of this ruling (doctrine of numeral 34 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 91 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the effects of this unconstitutionality must be dimensionalized (dimensionar), in the sense that the decreed nullity does not affect in any way, nor generates a right to recovery (repetición) of the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension during the validity and on the occasion of that provision; which, it is insisted, must be deemed as received in good faith. It will be so ordered in the operative part of this judgment.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are forewarned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the “Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch", approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

THEREFORE:

By majority, the action is upheld. Consequently, Article 29 of Law No. 7108, “Extraordinary Budget Law of November 8, 1988”, which provides: “Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of the salary of a deputy”, is annulled as unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive to the date of enactment of the annulled norm, without prejudice to acquired rights of good faith. In accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, the effects of this ruling are dimensionalized (dimensionan), in the sense that what is decided in this action does not affect in any way, nor generates a right to recovery (repetición) of the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension during the validity and on the occasion of that provision. Notify the Asamblea Legislativa, publish it integrally in the Judicial Bulletin, and summarize it in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Notify. Magistrate Garro Vargas issues a dissenting vote and dismisses the action for reasons of admissibility.

Fernando Castillo Víquez President Fernando Cruz Castro Paul Rueda Leal Luis Fdo Salazar Alvarado Jorge Araya García Anamari Garro Vargas Hubert Fernández Argüello Res. No. 2024-000362 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS Respectful of the majority's criterion, I dissent and consider that this action must be dismissed for reasons of admissibility.

It should be noted that in the sub lite, the petitioner was forewarned to detail what he considered his standing (legitimación) to initiate this constitutional review process was. Upon responding to the forewarning, he expressed the following:

“And although it can be said that unilaterally, this citizen would not be legitimized, either individually or collectively, it is evident that against norms challenged as atypical, as in the present case, no one would be, except in a totally indirect or reflected manner; I AM ONLY OBLIGATED AS A TAXPAYER, JUST AS WE ALL CITIZENS ARE, to cover the increases in remunerations as in this case occurs WITH THE PAYMENT OF OUR TAXES, to give economic content to an equating of the pensions of the former presidents of the republic to the income of the deputies (sic). I reiterate, without any actuarial study, nor consultations with anyone, creating undue advantages through the deputies who legislate it, using resources that will undoubtedly be obtained, with all certainty, from the taxes that all citizens pay, or have the duty to pay." That is, he limited himself to concretely questioning what is provided in Art. 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, for having been introduced through a budget law and without any basis.

Therefore, I consider that he lacks standing (legitimación) for two reasons. In the first place, the petitioner lacks standing to question this atypical norm, arguing that it damages public funds because, as will be seen, when the Chamber examined its material content, it dismissed such damage.

On this point, it is pertinent to bring up that although the acting president of the Asamblea Legislativa did not specifically refer to the petitioner's standing to bring the action of unconstitutionality, she did report that the concretely questioned norm was tacitly repealed by Art. 16 of Law 7302 of July 8, 1992. This specific point was also highlighted by the PGR in the following terms:

“[T]he truth is that subsequently, by an ordinary legal reform introduced by the General Law of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III “Of the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic”, in its Article 16, a similar norm was provided, by which the monthly pension of constitutionally elected Former Presidents shall be equal to the income of a deputy (dietas y gastos de representación), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term”. (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

This is relevant for the examination of the admissibility of the action, because with said law, the same material content of the provision that had been included in a budgetary law was legislated in an ordinary norm. That is, it is verified that the material content of the norm challenged by the petitioner was indeed replicated in an ordinary law. Art. 16 of the Law of the General Regime of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget, known as the “Pension Framework Law,” expressly states the following:

“Art. 16.- The Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (dietas y gastos de representación), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be chargeable to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Department of Pensions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security”. (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Precisely, that reform has already been examined by the Chamber and it dismissed its unconstitutionality for an alleged injury to public funds. Specifically, in judgment No. 2018-006137, it resolved the following:

“II.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. The petitioner challenges Article 16 of Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Pension Regime Charged to the National Budget, insofar as it establishes that: (…)

The petitioner questions, in general, the existence of the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic, alleging that the granting of such pensions does not respond to any of the contingencies set forth in constitutional Article 73.

III.- ON THE MERITS. This Court considers that the alleged unconstitutionality is not configured. It must be clarified, preliminarily, that this Court has already indicated that the general pension regime and the special pension regimes provided for in Law No. 7302, including the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic, should not be confused, as they have a distinct nature. While the first regime has the character of contributory pensions, in which a labor-type right is recognized that originates in part from the prior contribution of the worker, the aforementioned special pension regimes have the character of non-contributory or grace pensions, which are granted as recognition for the relevance of the work or services that a type of person has performed (judgment No. 4852-95 of 09:42 hrs. of September 1, 1995). In the specific case of Article 16 of Law No. 7302, it is clear that its ratio legis is to guarantee a dignified subsistence to those who specifically held the position of President of the Republic, that is, to those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of The Nation (Articles 130, 139, 140 and 147 of the Political Constitution). It is, consequently, a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for in constitutional Article 73, but which finds sufficient and reasonable legal support in the aim of ensuring a dignified subsistence exclusively for Former Presidents of the Republic, in accordance with the decorum proper to the office they held. On this point, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in legal opinion No. 122-J of July 23, 2003, affirmed that ‘the granting of pensions to former Presidents of the Republic, as in other countries, is intended to ensure that they, once they have ceased from office, can attend to their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised; and with the aim of also establishing, in the event of their death, measures of protection for their closest relatives’ and, furthermore, indicated that ‘the stated purpose, as well as the high office of the position exercised, are sufficient reason to justify that such economic benefits in favor of former Presidents of the Republic, could in no way be considered discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privileges’. Considerations that are shared by this Court, and therefore it cannot be considered that the mere existence of such a special pension regime constitutes per se a violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, or non-discrimination, nor —in general— a violation of the Law of the Constitution.

IV.- It should be reiterated, moreover, that the granting of pensions to Former Presidents is not something exclusive to Costa Rica, but rather, on the contrary, occurs in various American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States of America, Mexico, and Peru. In the Chilean case, for example, the Constitution itself provides, according to the provisions of its Articles 30 and 62, that the former President of the Republic shall receive a per diem equivalent to the remuneration of a Minister of State, including all the corresponding allowances. In Argentina, Law No. 24.018 establishes that the former President of the Nation shall be entitled to a lifelong monthly allowance that shall be the sum that, for all purposes, corresponds to the remuneration of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. In Bolivia, Law No. 376 provides for a ‘Monetary Recognition to Citizens who held the Constitutional Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the State’, for a sum equivalent to ten (10) national minimum monthly salaries, an amount that shall be paid by the National General Treasury (Tesoro General de la Nación, TGN), which they shall receive for life. The Organic Law of Public Service of Ecuador establishes in its Article 135 that: ‘A monthly lifelong pension equivalent to seventy-five percent of the current remuneration is established in favor of former Constitutional Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, who are constitutionally elected by popular vote and have taken office, excepting those officeholders whose mandate is revoked’. In Peru, Law No. 26519 provides, in its Article 1, that ‘former Constitutional Presidents of the Republic shall enjoy a pension equivalent to the total income of an active Congressman’. In the Colombian case, Article 2 of Law No. 48 of 1962 establishes, in its first paragraph, that every former President of the Republic shall have ‘the right to enjoy a lifelong pension or old-age pension if they have remained in the service of the State for twenty continuous or discontinuous years and have reached fifty years of age’. Likewise, the second paragraph of the same numeral provides that ‘so long as they lack either of these requirements, they may enjoy the special pension for the former President’. The Colombian Constitutional Court resolved a constitutional challenge filed against the referred special pension, in which it was alleged, in essence, that the challenged regulation established an unjustified privilege that violated the very essence of the notion of a pension, since it enshrined this right for former Presidents of the Republic in a special and lifelong manner for the mere fact of having held the Presidency under any title and for any period, without consideration for the age or contribution time of the pensioner. However, the Constitutional Court, in judgment No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999, considered —in what is relevant— the following:

‘9. The office of President of the Republic, in a presidential system of government such as the one that governs us, signifies the highest public responsibility. The President embodies the condition of Head of State, Head of Government, and supreme administrative authority. As Head of State, they symbolize and represent national unity and sovereignty, direct international relations, defend territorial integrity, and direct, as supreme commander, the public force, among other things; as Head of Government, they exercise functions such as the political leadership of the State and the direction of the economy; and as supreme administrative authority, they are responsible for the correct execution of the national public function. For these tasks, they are elected by direct popular vote and by an absolute majority of votes, in a national constituency. They therefore have a political backing and a confidence granted directly and exclusively to them by at least half of the electors, a circumstance not present in any other popularly elected position. Not accepting that all these particular circumstances attribute a special dignity to them means ignoring an undeniable political and legal reality.

This particular circumstance places the President in a situation of special desert and respect within society. Regardless of whether their administration is or is not politically shared, it is obvious that the dignity of their office is superior to that of all other citizens. It provides sufficient legal support for the exception introduced by the challenged regulations regarding the requirements for accessing the pension. Indeed, such an exception constitutes not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation but also serves as a means to congruently provide for the needs that originate from the special position implied by being a former President of the Republic. It is not hidden from anyone that this position imposes the need to lead a life with certain special requirements of decorum, which are not always within the reach of one who has ceased to exercise the first magistracy, either for lacking their own resources or because of the de facto limitation in which one who has held that position finds themselves to exercise any type of position or trade, for reasons precisely related to the dignity of the Nation or even to ethical factors.

10. Having effectively held the office of President of the Republic by having been elected by the majority vote of their compatriots, the fact of having been the guarantor of sovereignty and symbolized national unity, having taken on the vast historical responsibility attached to the office of the first head of state, in short, are sufficient reasons to confer the special desert that is recognized to former Presidents. (…)

11. Thus, given the very special dignity and responsibility that the office of President of the Republic entails, it is not equal to any other job or trade performed in the public sector, for which reason the exceptional legal treatment introduced by the accused norms, in principle, responds to this particular difference in situation and is therefore justified before the Constitution. Likewise, such treatment pursues a purpose, which is the aforementioned one of rewarding the former President and providing for their dignified subsistence, and these purposes conform to the Constitution, for the axiology that informs it indicates that it is the task of the State to achieve justice. It is just that the public treasury exceptionally rewards citizens who have also provided exceptional services, and that it does so in a manner proportionate to their needs for personal decorum. If justice consists of giving each one what they deserve, the challenged regulation precisely achieves this notion’.

It then added that:

‘Although it is true that at first glance it might not seem that former Presidents find themselves in a special situation of weakness that warrants public resources being allocated to cover their pension under the exceptional terms enshrined in the law, a deeper examination of the situation reveals that this is not so evident. Indeed, it has been said that one who has held the office of President of the Republic is burdened with special obligations of decorum in their personal life, and that for reasons of the same nature, in addition to others of an ethical character, they are not in a position to access any job position or to carry out any trade or profession. The Nation hopes, with legitimate sentiment, that such persons will preserve for the rest of their lives the dignity that was conferred upon them. It is true that in some cases former Presidents have their own patrimony that allows them to cope with this situation; but the Law, which is enacted to regulate the generality of situations, cannot start from the unproven and unprovable assumption that all of them are or will be in the future in such a situation of abundant economic solvency. Therefore, on the basis that citizens of any economic or social condition can and do accede to the First Magistracy, as history demonstrates, the law provides for their dignified subsistence’.

Considerations that are applicable, also, to the Costa Rican case, in order to understand the foundation that reasonably inspires the content and scope of the norm challenged in the present action.

V.- As a corollary of the foregoing, it cannot be considered that the existence of the cited special pension regime is incompatible with the Law of the Constitution. It must be indicated, in any case, that the creation of said regime ultimately responds to a clear case of the legislator’s freedom of configuration. Regarding the referred freedom of configuration, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2003-5090 of 14:44 hrs. of June 11, 2003, stated:

‘(…) The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract character, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the matter regulated has also been termed legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, in the face of a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as a limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the constitutional block formed by the constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases’.

Wherefore, ultimately, the maintenance of the cited special pension regime depends on the political determination that, in accordance with its broad legislative discretion, the Legislative Assembly adopts, which is called upon to constitute itself as the maximum representative body of the people and of the different political, social, and economic forces that make up the State (Articles 1 and 105 of the Political Constitution), so that within its bosom the plurality of worldviews, thoughts, and interests that integrate Costa Rican society is expressed’ (judgment No. 2013-12014 of 14:30 hrs. of September 11, 2013).

VI.- By reason of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the action under study should be rejected on the merits, as is hereby ordered”. (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

In accordance with the considerations made, it is noted that this Court has already ruled regarding the constitutionality of the pensions granted to former Presidents of the Republic, ruling out that they constitute an unfounded, unreasonable, or disproportionate privilege, since their regulation does not respond to a contributory regime —as the petitioner claims— but rather to a decision of the legislator that seeks to allow these public servants to attend to their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised, which, as reflected in the precedent, is a common norm in Comparative Law.

Therefore, given that the Chamber has already dismissed the notion that this type of determination is unreasonable for causing an alleged injury to public funds, the petitioner’s reproach and the standing invoked are rendered moot.

In the second place, the only grievance that would remain subsisting in this proceeding would be that of the approval of the provision through an extraordinary budget law —an alleged atypical norm. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) stated that the petitioner lacks standing because the Chamber has not admitted direct standing to challenge so-called “atypical norms” solely for the interest of questioning the manner in which they were approved. In the corresponding hearing, the PGR reported the following:

“As can be verified, despite having been cautioned, the petitioner does not actually explain or argue adequately and sufficiently what the substantial legal situation is that, beyond the mere existence of the questioned atypical norm, grants him standing to sue directly, since he merely alludes to the defense of supposed diffuse interests related to the correct management of public funds, involved in the equalization of former Presidents’ pensions to the income of Deputies; an ‘interest of absolutely the entire Costa Rican community’, as he expressly affirms. This is relevant, because this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that a popular action exists to sue against so-called atypical norms, due to a mere interest of seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal order”. (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

That is, as warned by the PGR, regarding the generic allegation about the approval of the law through a budget law, the petitioner lacks direct standing, according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber. On that particular point, this court has stated the following:

“[I]n the knowledge of the jurisdictional consensus that exists on the unconstitutionality of the inclusion of non-budgetary general norms in the National Budget, granting standing for the direct action in this case would practically be equivalent to having to also authorize it against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional defects, even when those conflicts are of another nature, that interest —although laudable— being too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest”. (Judgment No. 1990-1775, which was subsequently reiterated in judgments Nos. 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571, 2013-001496, 2016-011975, and 2020-018840).

In judgment No. 2016-011975, the Chamber expanded its considerations, explaining the following:

“In fact, the petitioner’s arguments are centered solely on reproaching, by itself, the approval procedure of that normative provision, in an apparent mere interest of seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal order; in which case, if the possibility of the petitioner to file an action of unconstitutionality in this matter were admitted, under the conditions intended by him, it would mean —ultimately— recognizing the existence of a popular action, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 hrs. of January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of the procedural competencies that this Constitutional Court has to that effect, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution”. (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Subsequently, in judgment No. 2016-016118, it reiterated:

“This is relevant, because this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that a popular action exists to sue against so-called atypical norms by reason of a mere interest of seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal order”. (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

In which case, following the jurisprudential line of this Court, it can be affirmed that the petitioner does not have sufficient standing to bring this constitutional review proceeding, if what he alleges is that the norm was approved by a budget law. Especially since, as noted, the ordinary legislator itself issued a subsequent regulation that incorporated into an ordinary norm the purpose of equalizing the pensions of former Presidents of the Republic to the salaries of legislators. That provision, as noted before, was not challenged in this constitutional review proceeding and, furthermore, has already been examined by the Chamber and it ruled out that it is unreasonable, disproportionate, or discriminatory.

Moreover, in a precedent of this Court that examined a situation very similar to the one raised in the sub lite case —in which the approval of a norm of ordinary content in a budget law was questioned, but which was later equally approved by an ordinary law— it was concluded that the petitioner lacked standing to initiate the unconstitutionality action because it was equivalent to a popular action, but it equally determined that the proceeding lacked all interest insofar as the situation had been resolved by the legislator itself. Thus, in judgment No. 1993-3183, the following was resolved:

“1st. The petitioner considers that Article 78 of Law 7051 published in La Gaceta number 211 of November 6, nineteen eighty-six, is one of the so-called “atypical norms”, included through an irregular procedure, in the Extraordinary Budget Law 7135 of October 11, nineteen eighty-nine. He adds that, as this Chamber has already declared, those norms are unconstitutional because they were created contrary to the provisions of Articles 121 subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, 177, and 180 of the Political Constitution and requests that they be so declared, annulling the norm from the legal order.

I.The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction allows the filing of an action of unconstitutionality without a ‘base case’, when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole. But as this Chamber has already indicated (judgment number 1182-93), it cannot be interpreted that when the law mentions the rights that concern the community as a whole, it refers to the national community, since this assumption would be equivalent to accepting and recognizing a popular action that does not exist, given the current wording of the cited article. (…) II. On the other hand, this action lacks current interest, as Law number 7334 of April 16 of the current year has promulgated a specific article that allows one hundred percent of the net profit, resulting from the Instant Lottery, to be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda. The norm literally states:

\"Article 11: One hundred percent of the resulting net profit shall be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda for housing investment programs, and for the programs of the Housing Subsidies Fund managed by this latter Institution\".

The discussion, therefore, about whether the norm is atypical or not, lacks any transcendence, because through the ordinary process the transfer of these funds to the housing programs has been authorized. Thus, a ruling on the merits in this action becomes unnecessary, especially since it has not been possible to demonstrate that either in the case of the petitioner or any other citizen, some injury to a legitimate interest has occurred that deserves to be recognized or compensated through the mechanisms established by the administration of justice. The petitioner’s interest seemed to be —according to what is deduced from his filing brief— to achieve the promulgation of the norm through an ordinary law; that requirement has already been met with the recent issuance of the cited legislation, thus satisfying it”.

In summary, in light of the precedents of this Court, I consider that the unconstitutionality action should be dismissed for reasons of admissibility, given that the petitioner lacks standing to challenge the norm invoking the alleged injury to public funds, since in another action this Chamber already dismissed such injury when examining an identical norm. Also, because regarding the other alleged ground of unconstitutionality, that the normative content was included in a budget law, it is not appropriate to invoke direct standing.

Anamari Garro V. Magistrate *CO* PROCESO: ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ACCIONANTE: Nombre01 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fourteen hours twenty-six minutes of June thirteenth, two thousand twenty-four.

Taking into account that Magistrate Jorge Araya García is incapacitated, and in order not to delay the processing of the appeal, let the judgment rendered in the present matter be notified without his signature, which shall be affixed once he returns to his duties.

Fernando Castillo V President *LEYZLXK* FERNANDO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ - PRESIDENTE/A 1 **On the Merits** He maintains that there is no statement of legislative intent whatsoever from the Legislative Assembly to equate the pensions of former presidents to the income of deputies, nor are there technical studies supporting the proposal. Some persons, children or heirs of former presidents, without having made any contribution, receive monthly income equated to that of deputies "as if they were royalty." He explains that he brings the action at hand for the violation of Articles 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution and not against the pensions of former presidents, since according to Law No. 313 it corresponds to a vested right (derecho adquirido). On the contrary, he clarifies that he only challenges Article 29 of Law No. 7108 because:

"1) This EQUATING (sic) DOES NOT GENERATE VESTED RIGHTS 2) This EQUATING (sic) is ABUSIVE. 3) This EQUATING (sic) HAS NEVER PAID A CONTRIBUTION (sic) TO THE STATE. 4) This EQUATING (sic) LACKS A LEGISLATIVE STATEMENT OF INTENT (sic), NOR DISCUSSION (sic) IN A FORMAL DEBATE. 5) This EQUATING (sic) lacks GROUNDS (sic) from the Constitutional Chamber of the Republic of Costa Rica. 6) Because those resources belong to the People, NOT to the Former Presidents or their Heirs. 7) BECAUSE ALL MONIES PAID PURSUANT TO THE EQUATING (sic) GENERATED BY ARTICLE (sic) 29 OF LAW 7108 OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC (sic) MUST BE REIMBURSED TO THE STATE COFFERS, THAT IS, TO THE PEOPLE OF COSTA RICA. 8) Because Article 29 of Law 7108 of the EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET, IS ONLY FOR THAT BUDGETARY PERIOD, SINCE IN THE SUBSEQUENT BUDGET LAWS, THEY MUST BE INDICATED IN EACH BUDGET AND THEY CANNOT CREATE ORDINARY LAWS OF PERPETUAL APPLICATION. 9) Because Article 29 of Law 7108 of the EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET, DOES NOT EXPRESSLY INDICATE that it additionally modifies Law 313, IT ONLY CREATES AN ORDINARY LAW WITHIN A LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY BUDGETARY (sic) MODIFICATION (...) 10) Because the LIFETIME PENSIONS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENTS, PER SE GENERATE VESTED RIGHTS, BUT THE EQUATING (sic) OF THE LIFETIME PENSIONS TO THE FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 8, 1988, LAW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC (sic) DOES NOT GENERATE VESTED RIGHTS. 11) Because THE EQUATING (sic) OF THE LIFETIME PENSIONS TO THE FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 8, 1988, LAW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC (sic), involves AN ODIOUS PRIVILEGE. 12) Because THE EQUATING (sic) OF THE LIFETIME PENSIONS TO THE FORMER PRESIDENTS VIA (sic) ARTICLE (sic) OF LAW 7108 OF NOVEMBER 8, 1988, LAW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC (sic), requires a POPULAR CONSULTATION IN A REFERENDUM (sic), BECAUSE IT INVOLVES AN EQUATING (sic) THAT PROMOTES AN EXPENDITURE (sic) OF PUBLIC RESOURCES (sic) FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, WHO AFTER THEIR TERMS, ARE EQUALS AMONG EQUALS, THEY THE FORMER PRESIDENTS AND ESPECIALLY (sic) THEIR HEIRS".

The claimant bases his argument on numerals 1, 2, 3, 8, 73 subsection a), 77, and following and concordant articles of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, LJC); Articles 7, 10, 11, 27, 28, 33, 39, 42, 48, and 50 of the Political Constitution; Article 8, paragraph 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Based on the arguments presented, the appellant requests: 1) to suspend the payment of the equating of the lifetime pensions of former presidents to the income of deputies and that only the ordinary pension be paid to them until the Chamber resolves the action of unconstitutionality; and, 2) that the unconstitutionality of Article 29 of Law No. 7108 be declared.

**2.-** By resolution at 19:52 hrs. on **April 17, 2023**, the Presidency of the Chamber made the following prevenience to the claimant:

"*Specify which is the prior pending matter to be resolved on which the action is based, or alternatively indicate the reasons that confer standing (legitimación) to bring action directly; b.- If a prior matter exists, you must provide a certified copy of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norms was invoked, expressly and prior to the filing of the action, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered violated*".

**3.-** On **April 20, 2023**, the appellant complied with the prevenience made and indicated:

"*I am prevented as claimant Nombre01 that within the third day, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, I must: Specify which is the prior pending matter to be resolved on which I base the action pursuant to Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, “or alternatively indicate the reasons that confer standing (legitimación) to bring action directly”*" Therefore, he maintains that he accepts the last lines of the above-cited text, since no procedure exists to appeal atypical norms that were approved via extraordinary budgets of the Republic.

Regarding his **standing (legitimación)**, the appellant asserts that it stems from the existence of a diffuse interest in the control of public funds. Furthermore, he argues that, when dealing with an atypical norm, one is only legitimized in a totally indirect manner, since as a taxpayer he is obligated by the increases in remuneration. He states that once the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) is given a hearing, it will state that he lacks standing to exercise his challenge, as there is no prior process in which the application of the norm is discussed. However, he asserts that in actions of unconstitutionality filed against atypical norms, a popular action is not established; only direct action exists and, exceptionally, in cases of diffuse interest, the action must be admitted without a prior matter, since otherwise no citizen could challenge those norms.

**4.-** By means of a resolution at 11:02 hrs. on **May 9, 2023**, the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber admitted the present action of unconstitutionality for processing. Furthermore, the publication of the corresponding edicts in the Judicial Bulletin was ordered. A hearing was granted to the PGR and the president of the Legislative Directorate.

**5.-** By brief received in this Constitutional Chamber on **May 22, 2023**, **MAGDA INÉS ROJAS CHAVES**, in her capacity as **Adjunct Attorney General of the Republic**, responded to the hearing.

**Regarding the admissibility requirements:** She considers that, despite the prevenience made to the appellant, the substantial legal situation which, beyond the mere existence of an atypical norm, confers standing on the appellant to come before the Chamber is not actually explained or argued adequately and sufficiently, since he merely limits himself to referring to the defense of supposed diffuse interests related to the correct handling of public funds. She states that the foregoing is important because the Chamber has indicated that no popular action exists to bring action against atypical norms. In this regard, she cites ruling No. 2016-011975 of 9:30 hrs. on August 24, 2016. In this way, the PGR considers that the action is inadmissible and must be rejected.

**Report on the Merits** Regarding the special non-contributory pension regime for former presidents, the following historical-normative summary is provided:

"*As we have noted in our administrative case law, as a legal-normative antecedent to the recognition of special pensions for ex-Presidents of the Republic, we can find Law No. 313 of August 23, 1939, called "Law of Pensions for ex-Presidents," which granted said benefit to those who constitutionally occupied the First Magistracy, and upon their death, to their widows, for a monthly amount of ¢500.00, not subject to reductions or deductions of any nature.* *Subsequently, the cited assignable pension amount was increased on several occasions; for example, by Law No. 259 of November 2, 1948, it was increased to ¢1,000.00, and by Law No. 1124 of December 20, 1949, it was not subject to revalidations. Later, by Law No. 2264 of November 24, 1958, it was enhanced to ¢3,000.00 monthly.* *The same occurred with Law No. 5510 of April 19, 1974, called Law of Pensions for ex-Presidents, national benefactors, and national symbols, by which said pension was increased to ¢5,000.00 monthly. However, it is pertinent to note that with this latter regulation, the coverage of said benefit was expanded, since it no longer only covered ex-Presidents of the Republic who had been constitutionally elected, but also the ex-Vice President of the Republic who had permanently substituted the President of the Republic and who had held the office for more than half a term. A similar provision was made with Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980, which also increased the assignable pension amount to ¢15,000.00 monthly.* *We cannot ignore that through Article 9, the fiftieth norm of the Law of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget for 1979 – No. 6305 of December 21, 1978 – Article 1 of the cited Law 313 was added, in order to include as beneficiaries of a pension equal to that of the widows of ex-Presidents or ex-Vice Presidents of the Republic, those persons who had held the status of First Lady. A situation that came to be ratified by the Budget Laws for 1981 – No. 6542 of December 22, 1981 – Article 9, norm 49, and for 1982 – No. 6700 of December 23, 1981 – Article 9, norm 48 (The last two atypical norms were annulled by resolution of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2136 at 14:00 hours on October 23, 1991).* *And by the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, its Article 29 - the challenged norm - increased and equated the amount of the pensions of the ex-Presidents, to be equal to the salary of a deputy.* *With Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, called "Creation of the general pension regime charged to the national budget, of other special regimes and reform to Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and its reforms, Income Tax Law," known as the "Framework Pension Law," which came to unify the requirements for retirement under any of the special State pension regimes - except those of the Judicial Branch and the National Teaching staff - a Chapter III was provided, called "On the Pension Regime of the ex-Presidents of the Republic," which came to repeal the specific provisions provided by Law No. 313 and its reforms. Said Chapter provides as follows:* "Chapter III ON THE PENSION REGIME OF EX-PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC ARTICLE 16.- Ex-Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected, shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (salary and representation expenses), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. ARTICLE 17.- The pensions of Ex-Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted when the salary of the Deputies is readjusted. ARTICLE 18.- At the time of their death, the causahabientes established by the Regulations of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall have the right to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein"* In this line of thought, the PGR considers that the granting of pensions to former presidents of the Republic has the objective of guaranteeing that, once they have ceased their duties, they can attend to their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum corresponding to them for the high functions they exercised in the previously held position. Thus, it argues that it cannot be considered a discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privilege. In this vein, the following is reported:

"*A criterion that has been fully shared by this Chamber, in considering that the mere existence of such a special pension regime does not, in any way, constitute an infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Law of the Constitution (Resolution No. 2018-006137 of 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018).* *And it was by that resolution that this Chamber declared without merit an action of unconstitutionality filed against Article 16 of the cited Law No. 7302, insofar as it provides that ex-Presidents shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (salary and representation expenses), since the appellant considered that this benefit lacked lawful cause and violated constitutional numeral 73.* *In that resolution, the Chamber thus supported the constitutionality of the Pension Regime of the ex-Presidents of the Republic, and citing a resolution of the Colombian Constitutional Court - No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999 - among other things, affirmed that the pensions of former presidents "... constitute not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stand as a means to congruently provide for the needs that originate in the special position that being an ex-President of the Republic entails. No one is unaware that this position imposes leading a life with certain special decorum requirements, which are not always within the reach of one who has left the first magistracy, either for lack of personal resources or because of the de facto limitation in which one who has held that position finds themselves to exercise any type of posts or trades, for reasons that touch precisely upon the dignity of the Nation or even upon ethical factors (...)."* *And based, additionally, on the fact that the creation of the cited special pension regime obeys, ultimately, the free configuration of the legislator, understood as the possibility that the Legislative Assembly has, when faced with a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of law that it deems just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, within a plurality of similar and all valid options, in that same resolution the Chamber considered that Article 16 of Law No. 7302, by its ratio legis, validly seeks to guarantee the dignified subsistence of those who specifically held the position of President of the Republic, that is, those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of the Nation - Articles 130, 139, 140, and 147 of the Constitution. This being a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for in Article 73 of the Political Charter, but one that finds legal support*".

Then, regarding the unconstitutionality of atypical budgetary norms, she makes the following considerations:

"*Regarding the defects alleged by the appellant, especially those referring to the unconstitutionality of the accused atypical budgetary norm, we must indicate the following:* *The Budget Law of the Republic is a Law defined both by its procedure and by its content. Articles 176 – first paragraph – and 180 of the Constitution, set the content that the Budget Law of the Republic must have.* In this sense, it must be stated that, in accordance with the cited constitutional norms, the proper and specific subject matter of the Budget Law is that related to the establishment of the relationship of probable revenues and the authorization of expenditures of the administration during the corresponding fiscal period. Furthermore, it is understood that budgetary matters include the rules of budget execution necessary for a given fiscal year. It has been stated, with wisdom, that it is not proper to create taxes or any other form of revenue through a Budget Law. In this regard, it is important to cite the vote of the Constitutional Chamber N.°1466-1990 of 15:15 hours on October 30, 1990:

“This Chamber has expressed its opinion on several occasions to the effect that the only general norms that may be included in budget laws are those that intend to introduce parameters for their execution, that is, the so-called 'budget execution rules'. (Resolutions 121-89 of 11:00 hours on November 23, 1989, 69- 90 of 11:29 hours on January 17, 1990, and others). Even in the first of these, the establishment of a tax in a budget law was considered unconstitutional. Given that, effectively, Law N° 6966 of September 25, 1984, is a modification to the Ordinary Budget for the same year, and that the challenged article establishes a tax on exemptions, it is appropriate to declare it unconstitutional based on the cited precedents.” Then, it is improper to incorporate norms foreign to budgetary matters within a Budget Law of the Republic.

Constitutional jurisprudence has coined the concept of “atypical norm” to designate any provision that, having no relation to budgetary matters, is, nevertheless, included within the budget, and said “atypicality” arises when the legislator repeals, modifies, interprets, or even creates ordinary laws within the budget. Vote N.°4790-1993 of 8:54 hours on September 30, 1993, is transcribed:

(…)

It is worth noting that, although it is undeniable that Article 105 of the Constitution has provided, in general, that the people, through suffrage, delegate legislative power to Congress, the truth is that subsections 1) and 11) of numeral 121, also of the Constitution, distinguish between two different modes and forms of legislating by reason of the subject matter involved. The first subsection grants the Assembly the general power to enact laws, amend them, repeal them, and give them authentic interpretation – with the exception of the interpretive power of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters -. In the exercise of the form of legislating provided for in constitutional Article 121.1, the Legislative Assembly must follow the procedure provided for in constitutional Articles 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, and 128, and which comprises the prerogative of veto by the Executive Branch. On the other extreme, numeral 121.11 provides for the power to enact the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic for which it must follow the procedure prescribed in ordinals 177, 178, 179, and 180. According to constitutional numeral 125, final part, the Executive Branch lacks the possibility of vetoing the Budget Law that has been approved by the Legislative Assembly.

That is to say, the Constitution has distinguished between the general power to legislate and the power to enact the budget laws of the Republic, in such a way that it is inconsistent with the Constitution to incorporate into said laws, provisions or norms that are foreign to budgetary matters, because it must be insisted that, in exercise of the power provided for in numeral 121.11 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly must circumscribe itself to regulating budgetary matters. The vote of the Constitutional Chamber N.°121-1989 of 11:00 hours on November 23, 1989, is transcribed:

(…)

It is worth saying that the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated its jurisprudence on multiple occasions in relation to the unconstitutionality of atypical budgetary norms. (See votes: 6043-2002 of 15:29 hours on June 18, 2002, 3666-2003 of 14:53 hours on May 7, 2003, N.° 3497-2005 of 14:50 hours on March 30, 2005, N.° 14102-2006 of 11:20 hours on September 22, 2006, N.° 56-2008 of 14:47 hours on January 9, 2008).

Finally, it is worth highlighting, for the purposes of this present matter, that in its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Chamber has emphasized that any provision included in the Budget Law that, nevertheless, innovates, modifies, or repeals ordinary legislation would be presumed to be an atypical norm. Vote N.° 242-2001 of 14:44 hours on January 10, 2001, recently reiterated by resolution No. 2022-026652 of 16:31 hrs. on November 9, 2022, is transcribed:

“It has been a reiterated criterion of this Chamber, that the Budget Law cannot validly contain general norms, foreign to budget matters. That is, the inclusion of atypical norms addressing matters proper to ordinary legislation is not valid, whether for its creation or modification.” (See also vote N.° 7137-2007 of 16:47 hours on May 23, 2007)”.

Thus, in relation to the specific case, it states that the questioned norm regulates a matter different from the budgetary one, since it is not related to the execution of the budget, but rather modifies or adds to ordinary legislation, by equating the amount of the non-contributory pension of former Presidents of the Republic to the salary of deputies. It considers that the foregoing violates the provisions set forth in Articles 121, subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, first paragraph, 177, and 180, first paragraph, all of the Political Constitution, which set the procedure to be followed for the discussion, approval, and modification of the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic, distinct from that of an ordinary law. In this sense, it asserts that the norm in question is unconstitutional.

However, it adds the following considerations:

“Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm for formal reasons, since the procedure prescribed by the Constitution for enacting the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic was used to enact or reform, as the case may be, an ordinary law, the truth is that subsequently, by ordinary legal reform introduced by the General Law of Pensions Charged to the National Budget, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III “Of the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic,” in its Article 16, a similar norm was provided, whereby the monthly pension of constitutionally elected former Presidents shall be equal to the income of a deputy (per diems and representation expenses), as from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term.

This last aspect deducts evident practical utility from this action of unconstitutionality, since the cited Article 16 of Law No. 7302 was not challenged by the plaintiff. This is without prejudice to the authority granted to the Chamber by ordinal 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which, the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law or general provision, could also declare that of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or provision whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence, as well as that of the challenged application acts; an aspect that must be evaluated at the corresponding procedural moment.

Nevertheless, we must remember that “To undertake an examination of the reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Tribunal requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to support its argumentation, and the same procedural burden corresponds to whoever refutes the arguments of the action, and the failure to comply with these requirements makes the allegations of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing, because it is not possible to carry out an analysis of ‘reasonableness’ without the existence of a coherent argumentative line that is supported by evidence.” (Constitutional Chamber, judgment no. 5236-99 of 14:00 hours on July 7, 1999, reiterated, among many others, in no. 10153-2001 of 14:44 hours on October 10, 2001, and in no. 14392-2016 of 9:05 hours on October 5, 2016). And in this matter, the non-compliance with this unavoidable requirement is more than evident.

In any event, as we alluded to in section B) of our report, by means of resolution No. 2018-006137 of 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018, the Chamber endorsed the constitutionality of the Pension Regime for former Presidents of the Republic, considering that its mere existence does not suppose, in any way, an infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Law of the Constitution.” It concludes, the action of unconstitutionality is inadmissible due to the lack of standing of the plaintiff, even though the challenged norm is indeed unconstitutional. It notes that the equating of the pension amount of former presidents to the income of a deputy, legally provided for by means of a subsequent ordinary law (namely, numeral 16 of Law No. 7302), survives and is constitutionally reasonable.

6.- The edicts were published in the Judicial Bulletin, numbers 092, 093, and 094 of May 25, 26, and 29, 2023, 093 of May 26, 2023, and 094 of May 29, 2023.

7.- In a document received in this Constitutional Chamber on June 9, 2023, GLORIA NAVAS MONTERO, in her capacity as VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, answered the hearing.

On the processing of Law No. 7108 She explains that Law No. 7108 was a modification to Law No. 7089. She clarifies that neither the base text nor the committee report contained numeral 29 challenged in this action, but rather that such norm was introduced by means of a substantive motion that was approved without discussion in the Committee on Treasury Affairs. Said motion was presented by former Deputy Méndez Mata and was processed when the bill was being processed in the Plenary, as established in Art. 41 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (RAL) in force at that date. She indicates that, except for Art. 29, in Law No. 7108 there is no other regulation pertaining to the pension of former presidents. She narrates that the law was sanctioned on November 8, 1988, by the Executive Branch and some articles that are not related to the subject of this action were vetoed; furthermore, it was published in La Gaceta No. 215 of November 11, 1988.

On the merits Regarding the regulation of the pensions of former presidents, Deputy Navas Montero states:

“Law 313 of August 23, 1939, Pension Law for Former Presidents, established a pensions regime for former Presidents of the Republic of Costa Rica, regulated aspects such as beneficiaries, the pension amount, limitations, and exceptions, and other benefits.

This Law 313 of 1939 was subject to several reforms (express and tacit) and interpretations and additions; among them, Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, which tacitly reformed Law 313, an article whose constitutionality is challenged for being an atypical norm.

• In 1958, it was reformed by Law No. 2264 of November 24, 1958. • In 1961, it was interpreted by Law No. 2835 of the 23rd [sic] of the 10th [sic] of 1961. • In the year 1980, it was the subject of a reform by means of Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980. • In 1981, it had an addition by means of Article 9 of Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981. • In the year 1985, it was reformed by means of Article 14 of Law No. 7018 of December 20, 1985. • In 1988, it was tacitly reformed by Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988. • In 1992, it is tacitly reformed by Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Regime of Pensions Charged to the National Budget, of other special regimes. In this law, a text similar to the text of Article 29 of Law 7108 is introduced.

It should be noted that Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Regime of Pensions Charged to the National Budget, in its Chapter III (Articles 16, 17, and 18), regulates matters related to the Pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic in the following manner:

“…CHAPTER III OF THE PENSION REGIME FOR FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC Article 16.- Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diems and representation expenses), as from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

Article 17.- The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted when the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.

Article 18.- At the time of their death, the causahabientes [eligible survivors] established by the Regulations of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and under the same conditions set forth therein shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount.” What is indicated in this Chapter prevails over what is indicated in Law 313 and in Article 29 of Law 7108, for being a subsequent norm, of the same rank (law), and because an antinomy exists. As can be observed, Law 7302, in Article 16, contains a provision very similar to that of Article 29 of Law 7108. That is, the text of the challenged Article 29 of Law 7108 is superseded by Article 16 of Law 7302”.

She states, in relation to atypical norms, that they are provisions that are incorporated in national budgets and their modification laws; however, they are not directly related to budgetary matters. She notes that, through constitutional review, the Chamber has declared the unconstitutionality of this type of norm.

In relation to the plaintiff's argument that Art. 29 of Law No. 7108 is an atypical norm, she indicates:

“An explanation for why the legislator includes this norm in the Budgetary Law is not found in the legislative file. It is possible that the legislator chose to include a regulation of this type in the budgetary norm, considering that it was the Public Treasury (Article 2, Law 313) which was responsible for disbursing the amount of pensions to former presidents and the vice president who had replaced them absolutely; therefore, by equating the pension of former presidents to the salary of Deputies, the norm constituted a reform that implied budgetary adjustments.

Nevertheless, it must be considered that Resolution No. 0121-89 of November 23, 1989, from the Constitutional Chamber, points out that the Plenary Court had repeatedly resolved the declaration of unconstitutionality of several atypical norms processed in budget laws. Furthermore, given that Law 313, Law of pensions of former presidents, existed, what was appropriate was to reform that law.

It is worth taking into account that, as can be seen in the following chart, Article 29 of Law 7108 was tacitly repealed by Article 16 of Law 7302.

She details, in relation to the pension regime for former presidents, that the number of beneficiaries as of 2021 was ten persons. Furthermore, the average monthly pension is around ¢3,753,207, with which the monthly expenditure reaches ¢37,532,070. For its part, she clarifies that the amount included in the National Budget of the Republic for the concept of pension of former presidents for the year 2023 amounts to ¢426,600,000. Likewise, she explains:

“The pensions also imply the following expenditures that the State must budget:

1. Christmas Bonus (aguinaldo) (calculated the same as for public sector salaried employees) 2. Employer’s Contribution for Health Insurance: 8.75% of the pension amount 3.

State Health Insurance Contribution: 0.25% of the pension amount *4. Revaluations: Pensions are revalued for cost of living when the Executive Branch decrees increases for public officials in the same percentage or amount and it takes effect.* Said Regime also grants survivor's pensions upon the death of the pensioner (former president) to the beneficiaries indicated by the IVM regulation of the CCSS, who will be entitled to 75% of the pension (in total, not each).

As of 2021, the pension was granted to 7 former presidents, 1 former first lady, and 2 beneficiaries".

It states, in relation to the remuneration of deputies, that the challenged rule uses the term salary; however, what deputies receive are per diem allowances (dietas) and other components.

Having clarified the above, the speaker concludes the following:

“**2.6.1.- Regarding what the petitioner alleges concerning considering Article 29 of Law 7108 as an atypical rule.** *It is considered that Article 29 of Law 7108 is an atypical rule given that it is not a budgetary rule, and this rule should have been processed as a reform to the Law on pensions for former presidents.* *It should be noted that as explained above, Article 29 of Law 7108 is tacitly repealed by Article 16 of Law 7302.* **2.6.2.- Regarding the allegation concerning the impact on Article 33 and Article 50 of the Political Constitution.** *We do not agree with what the petitioner alleges regarding the fact that the equalization of the rule implied a privilege, or that Article 50 has been affected regarding the adequate distribution of wealth.* *However, it must be considered that the constitutional conditions and functions of the offices are different, for presidents, subsequently former presidents, and for deputies; for example, consider that regarding the Salary of the President of the Republic (sic), Law 10159, Public Employment Law of March 8, 2022, in its Article 30, subsection b) states that the salary of the President of the Republic shall be the highest salary in the Public Administration*".

It requests that Article 29 of Law No. 7108 be declared unconstitutional for being an atypical rule.

**8.-** By resolution at 11:21 hrs. on **June 27, 2023**, the Presidency of the Chamber indicated the following:

“*The hearings granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the President of the Legislative Directorate, in the resolution of eleven hours and two minutes on May nine, two thousand twenty-three, are deemed concluded. The proceedings being complete, let this ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY number 23-005771-0007-CO be referred to the office of Judge Anamari Garro Vargas, to whom, by rotation, the substantive review of the same corresponds*".

**9.**- In the proceedings that have been followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Drafted by Judge **Fernández Argüello**; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Article 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108, of November 8, 1988. The challenged provision reads as follows:

“Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the salary amount of a deputy”.

It is alleged that, through this law, Law No. 313 on Pensions of Former Presidents was modified, without any technical justification and under the unhealthy practice of approving it through a budget law, so that it went unnoticed during parliamentary discussion, with the consequent damage to the public treasury, which is considered an abuse and an odious privilege.

**II.- ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** This Chamber has repeatedly stated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities that must necessarily be met so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. In Art. 75 of the LJC, the admissibility prerequisites for actions of unconstitutionality are established, and different situations are regulated. The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo remedies– or in an administrative one –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –for which no underlying matter is required–, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those pertaining to the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman.

There are other formalities that must be met, namely, the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly grounded, with specific citation of the components of the constitutional block that are considered infringed (Art. 78 of the LJC).

**III.- ON THE STANDING OF THE PETITIONER.** The petitioner considers that they have standing to file this action of unconstitutionality, which, they assert, stems from the existence of a diffuse interest in the control of public funds. They argue that, since it is an atypical rule, they only have standing in a completely indirect manner, because as a taxpayer, they affirm they are obligated to bear the increases in such remuneration. The majority of the Chamber agrees with this argument and dismisses the assertions made to the contrary by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. Certainly, the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court has been clear in the sense that the atypicality of a budgetary rule is not, in itself, grounds to grant standing to any person to challenge it in this venue. Clearly, if that possibility were admitted, it would establish a popular action for challenging any atypical rule or, in general, anything included in a national, extraordinary, or special budget; which must be dismissed, as it is not consistent with the rules for accessing these control mechanisms, provided for in provision 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The judgments cited by the Deputy Attorney General and many others from this body, among them, No. 1990-1775, reiterated in Nos. 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571, 2013-001496, 2016-011975, and 2020-018840, are absolutely clear in this regard, a criterion that is also reaffirmed in this case. However, in the case under review (sub examine), the situation is very different. What is challenged is a legal rule -included, in effect, within a budget law-, by which it was established that the pensions to be received by those who have held the Presidency of the Republic shall be equal to the salary of a deputy. Thus, given the nature of this special pension regime, of a non-contributory nature and charged to the national budget, it is evident that this concerns the protection and safeguarding of public funds, for which a diffuse interest exists. Note, therefore, that this is not -as the advisory body to this Chamber alleges- a simple general challenge, based on the atypicality of the rule, but rather an action embedded precisely in the public nature of the funds with which these stipends are paid, which enables the petitioner, in their capacity as a taxpayer, to question its constitutional validity, in accordance with the terms of provision 75, second paragraph, of the aforementioned law. For this reason, the conclusion is reached that the petitioner has active standing to file this challenge, and, consequently, the filed action is declared admissible.

**IV).- ON THE MERITS.** Article 29 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic, No. 7108 of November 8, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, challenged herein, provides that: *“The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the salary amount of a deputy”.* From a simple reading, it is immediately obvious that its content is clearly unrelated to budgetary matters. Matters related to pensions, retirements, and in particular, the definition of the amounts of the benefits established in the corresponding regime, are matters that must be regulated by ordinary or common law and far exceed what should be the subject of a budget law. All parties involved in this action have so recognized: the petitioner, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and the Legislative Assembly, and this Chamber agrees with this, which, as is widely recognized by the interested parties, has issued extensive jurisprudence on the impossibility of regulating, in public budgets, topics that must be addressed by ordinary law, a practice that -it has been insistently stated- is contrary to what is provided in provisions 121, subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, first paragraph, 177, and 180, first paragraph, all of the Political Constitution. On this specific topic, for a long time this Chamber has indicated the following:

“***III.- On the merits.** The challenged article provides: "Article 33.- Add an article, which shall be numbered 12, to the Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice, No. 6739 of April 28, 1982, which shall read: "Article 12: May avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry all employees of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Justice and of the General Directorate of Social Adaptation and Crime Prevention, under the same terms established in Law No. 5 of September 16, 1939 and its amendments. The Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall transfer to the pension fund of the National Registry, the entirety of the contributions paid by the employees belonging to the aforementioned institutions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime who avail themselves of this law". As observed, the rule in question grants the possibility to a group of public employees to avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry, thereby making a formal and material amendment to the law that regulates that retirement regime. The rule is part of Law No. 6975 of November 30, 1984, which is a budgetary law ("Extraordinary Budget Law"). Regarding the inclusion of non-budgetary provisions in budget laws, the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly expressed the criterion that they are atypical rules that violate the law-making procedure stipulated in the Political Constitution, and must therefore necessarily be considered unconstitutional. Thus, it has been declared:* *" ...This Chamber, since Judgment No. 121-89 of 11:00 hrs. on November 23, 1989, has held that '...it is entirely appropriate to include "general rules" in budget laws, provided they are linked to the specialty that that matter signifies, or in other words, to the execution of the budget. What cannot be included in budget laws are rules that do not have that character, since they must be regulated by the provisions for common or ordinary laws' (judgment No. 759-92 of 15:00 hrs. on March 17, 1992). Subsections 1) and 11) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution confer upon the Legislative Assembly separate, distinct, and exclusive legislative powers in each case. Subsection 1) confers upon it the power to 'Dictate laws, amend them, repeal them, and give authentic interpretation thereof...', subsection 11) confers upon it the power to 'Dictate the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic'. The power conferred by the first subsection refers to a very broad power that corresponds in general to ordinary or common laws, whereas that of subsection 11) is of a special character, as deduced from Articles 176, 177, 178, 179, and 180 in relation to 125, all of the Political Constitution. By contemplating these powers separately, it prescribes that they are different legislative acts, with different nature and content. It matters not that the budget is a formal and material law and the other laws also have that character; the point is that the specialty and content of budget laws caused the constituent assembly to create a special and separate procedure for them. Since the budget of the Republic is therefore a formal and material law but special for the matter it constitutes, the Legislative Branch cannot validly regulate, in the exercise of the budgetary power, matters of a different nature or content. In short, having established that the challenged rule is a general, non-budgetary rule, issued by means of a budget law, with necessary and inevitable violation of the constitutional procedure, the consequence is to declare it contrary to the Political Constitution*” (judgment No. 2765-1993 at 15:09 on June 15, 1993, emphasis added. In an identical sense, regarding this type of provision, see among many others, Nos. 1466-1990 at 15:15 on October 30, 1990, No. 4790-1993 at 8:54 on September 30, 1993, and No. 121-1989 at 11:00 on November 23, 1989) In the instant case, no reasons are found to vary the criterion already expressed on the subject, nor have public order issues been raised that justify reconsidering the matter, and under such circumstances, given the evident unconstitutionality that affects the challenged rule, whose content –it is reiterated– does not fit within a budgetary law, it is appropriate to uphold this action and annul, as contrary to the Law of the Constitution, Article 29 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic, No. 7108 of November 8, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight. This declaration is declaratory, and its effects are retroactive to the date of issuance of the provision being annulled, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, in accordance with the terms of provisions 89 and 90 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**V) DIMENSIONING.** On the other hand, as indicated by the participants in this matter and as this Chamber has verified, Article 29 of Law No. 7108 –challenged herein– was repealed by the so-called Framework Law on Pensions, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, *"Creation of the general pension regime charged to the national budget, other special regimes, and reform to Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and its amendments, Income Tax Law"*, whose Chapter III, "On the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic", in its Articles 16, 17, and 18, established the following:

*"**Chapter III. ON THE PENSION REGIME FOR FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC** **ARTICLE 16.-** Former Presidents of the Republic who were constitutionally elected shall be entitled to a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem allowances and representation expenses), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the National Budget and processed ex officio by the National Department of Pensions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

**ARTICLE 17.-** The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted when the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.

**ARTICLE 18.-** Upon their death, the beneficiaries established by the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein”.* It should be noted that this involves a defect of origin in the legislative procedure, and more than three decades have elapsed since then, with the effective period of the questioned article having extended for a period of less than four years, during which the individuals who held the Presidency received the pension amount in good faith, a situation that cannot now be reversed on the occasion of this ruling (doctrine of provision 34 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of provision 91 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, the effects of this unconstitutionality must be dimensioned, in the sense that the decreed nullity in no way affects, nor generates any right to reimbursement of, the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension during the validity and on the occasion of that provision; which, it is reiterated, must be considered as received in good faith.

It will be so ordered in the operative part of this judgment. &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;**VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.** The parties are warned that if they have provided any document in paper form, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not retrieved within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial”, approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**POR TANTO:** By majority, the action is declared with merit. Consequently, Article 29 of Law No. 7108, “Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988”, which provides: “*Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of the salary of a deputy*”, is annulled as unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date of enactment of the annulled norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. In accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the effects of this pronouncement are dimensioned, in the sense that what is ordered in this action does not affect in any way, nor does it generate a right to repetition of the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension, during the validity and on the occasion of that provision. Notify the Asamblea Legislativa, publish in full in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notify. Magistrate Garro Vargas dissents and declares the action without merit for reasons of admissibility.

&nbsp; &nbsp; Fernando Castillo Víquez &nbsp; &nbsp; Fernando Cruz Castro &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Paul Rueda Leal &nbsp; &nbsp; Luis Fdo Salazar Alvarado&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Jorge Araya García &nbsp; &nbsp; Anamari Garro Vargas &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Hubert Fernández Argüello &nbsp; &nbsp; **Exp. n.°23-005771-007-CO** **Res. n.°2024-000362** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS** Respectful of the majority's opinion, I dissent and consider that this action must be declared without merit for reasons of admissibility.

It should be pointed out that in the *sub lite*, the claimant was warned to detail what he considered to be his standing to initiate this constitutional control process. Upon responding to the warning, he expressed the following:

“*And although it may be said that unilaterally this citizen would not have standing, neither individually nor collectively, it is evident that given the atypical norms challenged as in the present case, no one would, except in a totally indirect or reflected manner; AND ONLY BEING OBLIGATED AS A TAXPAYER, JUST AS ALL OF US CITIZENS ARE, to cover the increases in remuneration as occurs in this case WITH THE PAYMENT OF OUR TAXES, to provide economic content to an equalization of the pensions of the former presidents of the republic to the income of deputies* (sic)*. I reiterate, without any actuarial study existing, nor consultations with anyone, creating undue advantages by means of the deputies who legislate it, through resources that will undoubtedly be obtained, with all certainty, from the taxes that all citizens pay or that we have the duty to pay*.” &nbsp; That is, he limited himself to specifically questioning the provisions of Art. 29 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, for having been introduced through a budget law and without any basis.

Therefore, I consider that he lacks standing for two reasons. In the first place, the claimant lacks standing to challenge this atypical norm, alleging that it harms public funds since, as will be seen, when the Chamber examined its material content, it dismissed such harm.

On this matter, it is pertinent to bring up that although the acting president of the Asamblea Legislativa did not specifically refer to the claimant's standing to file the unconstitutionality action, she did report that the specifically challenged norm was repealed, tacitly, by Art. 16 of Law 7302 of July 8, 1992. This specific point was also highlighted by the PGR in the following terms:

“*[T]he truth is that* ***subsequently, by ordinary legal reform introduced by the Ley General de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III “Del Régimen de Pensiones de los Ex presidentes de la República”, in its article 16 a similar norm was provided, by which the monthly pension of the constitutionally elected Former Presidents shall be equal to the income of a deputy*** *(per diem allowances and representation expenses), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term*.” (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; This is relevant for the examination of the admissibility of the action, because with it the same material content of the provision that had been included in a budget law was legislated in an ordinary norm. That is, it is verified that the material content of the norm challenged by the plaintiff was certainly replicated in an ordinary law. Art. 16 of the Ley del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, known as “Ley Marco de Pensiones”, expressly states the following:

“*Art. 16.-* ***The Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem allowances and representation expenses***)*, starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the Presupuesto Nacional and shall be processed ex officio by the Departamento Nacional de Pensiones of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social*.” (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; Precisely, that reform was already examined by the Chamber and it dismissed its unconstitutionality for an alleged harm to public funds. Specifically in judgment [n.°2018-006137](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743907), it resolved the following:

“*II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The claimant challenges Article 16 of Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, insofar as it establishes that: (…)* &nbsp; *The claimant questions, in general, the existence of the Régimen de Pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República, as he alleges that the granting of such pensions does not respond to any of the contingencies provided for in Article 73 of the Constitution.* &nbsp; *III.- ON THE MERITS. This Tribunal considers that the alleged unconstitutionality is not configured. It must be clarified, preliminarily, that this Tribunal has already indicated that the general pension regime and the special pension regimes provided for in Law No. 7302 should not be confused, including the Régimen de Pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República, insofar as they have a different nature. While the first regime has the character of contributory pensions, in which a labor-type right is recognized that originates in part from the worker's prior contribution, the mentioned special pension regimes have the character of non-contributory or grace pensions, which are granted as recognition for the relevance of the work or services that a type of person has developed (judgment No. 4852-95 of 09:42 hrs. of September 1, 1995). In the specific case of Article 16 of Law No. 7302, it is clear that its* ratio legis *is to guarantee a dignified subsistence to those who specifically held the position of President of the Republic, that is, to those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of The Nation (Articles 130, 139, 140 and 147 of the Constitución Política). It is, consequently, a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for in Article 73 of the Constitution, but which finds sufficient and reasonable legal support in the claim to ensure a dignified subsistence exclusively to the Former Presidents of the Republic, in accordance with the decorum proper to the investiture they held. Regarding this point, the Procuraduría General de la República, in legal opinion No. 122-J of July 23, 2003, affirmed that ‘****the granting of pensions to the former Presidents of the Republic, as in other countries, aims to guarantee that they, once they have ceased in office, can meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised; and with the purpose of also establishing, in the event of their passing, protection measures for the closest relatives’ and, furthermore, it noted ‘the indicated purpose, as well as the high investiture of the exercised office, are sufficient reason to justify that such economic benefits in favor of the former Presidents of the Republic, could in no way be considered as discriminatory, unreasonable and disproportionate privileges***’. ***Considerations that are shared by this Tribunal, so it cannot be considered that the mere existence of such a special pension regime supposes per se an infringement of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality or non-discrimination, nor ‒in general‒ a violation of the Law of the Constitution.*** &nbsp; *IV.- It is worth reiterating, moreover, that the granting of pensions to Ex-Presidents is not something exclusive to Costa Rica, but rather, on the contrary, it occurs in different American countries, as is the case of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States of America, Mexico and Peru. In the Chilean case, for example, it is the Constitution itself that provides, according to the provisions of its Articles 30 and 62, that the Ex-President of the Republic will receive a per diem equivalent to the remuneration of a Minister of State including all the allowances that correspond to them. In Argentina, Law No. 24.018 establishes that the Ex-President of the Nation will be entitled to a lifetime monthly allowance that will be the sum that in all concepts corresponds to the remuneration of the Judges of the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación. In Bolivia, Law No. 376 provides for a ‘Reconocimiento Pecuniario a Ciudadanas y Ciudadanos que ejercieron la Presidencia y Vicepresidencia Constitucional del Estado’, for a sum equivalent to ten (10) national minimum salaries monthly, an amount that will be paid by the Tesoro General de la Nación (TGN), which they will receive for life. The Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público of Ecuador establishes in its Article 135 that: ‘[a] lifetime monthly pension equivalent to seventy-five percent of the current remuneration is established, in favor of the former Constitutional Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Republic, who are constitutionally elected by popular vote and have taken office, excepting those officeholders whose mandate is revoked’. In Peru, Law No. 26519 provides, in its Article 1, that ‘constitutional Ex-Presidents of the Republic shall enjoy a pension equivalent to the total income of an active Congressman’. In the Colombian case, Article 2 of Law No. 48 of 1962 establishes, in its first paragraph, that every former President of the Republic shall have the ‘right to enjoy a lifetime pension or old-age pension if they have remained in the service of the State for twenty continuous or discontinuous years and if they have reached fifty years of age’. Likewise, the second paragraph of that same numeral provides that ‘[w]hile they lack any of these requirements, they may enjoy the special pension of the Ex-President’. The Colombian Corte Constitucional resolved a constitutionality claim filed against the referred special pension, in which it was alleged, in essence, that the challenged regulations established an unjustified privilege that infringed the very essence of the notion of a pension, since it enshrined this right for the former presidents of the Republic in a special and lifetime form for the mere fact of having exercised the Presidency under any title and for any period, without consideration of the age or the contribution time of the pensioner. However, the Corte Constitucional, in judgment No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999, considered ‒in what is relevant‒ the following:* &nbsp; *‘9. The office of president of the Republic, in a presidential system of government such as the one that governs among us, means the highest public responsibility. The president brings together the condition of head of State, head of Government and supreme administrative authority. As head of State, he symbolizes and represents national unity and sovereignty, directs international relations, defends territorial integrity and directs, as supreme commander, the public force,* *among others; as head of Government he exercises functions such as the political leadership of the State and the direction of the economy, and as supreme administrative authority he is responsible for the correct execution of the national public function. For these tasks he is elected by direct popular vote and by an absolute majority of votes, in a national constituency. He therefore has political backing and trust granted directly to him exclusively, by at least half of the electors, a circumstance that is not present in any other popularly elected office. Not accepting that all these particular circumstances attribute a special dignity to him, results in ignoring an undeniable political and legal reality.* *This particular circumstance places the president in a situation of special deservingness and respect within society. Regardless of whether his management is or is not politically shared, it is obvious that the dignity of his investiture is superior to that of all citizens. It provides sufficient legal support for the exception introduced by the challenged regulations regarding the requirements for accessing the pension. Indeed, such an exception constitutes not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stands as a means to congruently provide for the needs that originate in the special position that being an ex-president of the Republic implies. No one is unaware that this position imposes leading a life with certain special decorum requirements, which are not always within the reach of one who has ceased to exercise the first magistracy, either due to lacking their own resources or due to the de facto limitation in which one who has occupied that position finds themselves to exercise any type of positions or trades, for reasons that touch precisely on the dignity of the Nation or even on ethical factors.* *10. Having effectively occupied the office of president of the Republic by having been elected by the majority vote of his compatriots, the fact of having been the guarantor of sovereignty and symbolized national unity, having taken on the vast historical responsibility attached to the office of first leader, in short, are sufficient reasons to confer the special deservingness recognized to the ex-presidents. (…)* *11. Thus, due to the very special dignity and responsibility that the office of president of the Republic entails, it is not equal to any other job or trade performed in the public sector, which is why the exceptive legal treatment introduced by the challenged norms, in principle responds to this particular difference in situation and is therefore justified in the face of the Constitution. Likewise, said treatment pursues a purpose, which is the aforementioned one of rewarding the ex-president and* providing for their dignified subsistence, *and said purposes conform to the Charter, since the axiology that informs it indicates that it is a task of the State to carry out justice. It is just for the public treasury to exceptionally reward citizens who have rendered also exceptional services to it, and to do so in a way proportional to their needs for personal decorum. If justice consists of giving each one what they deserve, the challenged regulations justly realize this idea’.* </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">It then added that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">‘While it is true that at first glance it would not seem that former presidents find themselves in a special situation of weakness that merits public resources being allocated to cover their pension under the exceptional terms enshrined in the law, a deeper examination of the situation reveals that this is not so evident. Indeed, it has been said that a person who has held the office of President of the Republic is burdened with special obligations of decorum in their personal life, and that for reasons of the same nature, in addition to others of an ethical nature, they are not in a position to access just any job or to carry out any trade or profession. The Nation expects, with legitimate feeling, that such persons preserve for the rest of their lives the dignity that was granted to them. It is true that in some cases former presidents have their own assets that allow them to cope with this situation; but the Law, which is issued to regulate the generality of situations, cannot start from the unverified and unverifiable assumption that all of them are or will be in the future in such a situation of ample economic solvency. Therefore, on the basis that citizens of any economic or social condition can and do accede to the First Magistracy, as history demonstrates, the law provides for their dignified subsistence’.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Considerations that are also applicable to the Costa Rican case, in order to understand the rationale that reasonably inspires the content and scope of the rule challenged in this action.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">V.- As a corollary to the foregoing, the existence of the aforementioned special pension regime cannot be deemed incompatible with the Law of the Constitution. It should be noted, in any case, that the creation of said regime ultimately obeys a clear assumption of the legislator's freedom of configuration (libertad de configuración). Regarding this freedom of configuration, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2003-5090 of 14:44 hours on June 11, 2003, stated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">‘(…) The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing general and abstract norms, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it is limited by the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by the constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases’.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">Therefore, ultimately, the maintenance of the aforementioned special pension regime depends on the political determination that, in accordance with its broad legislative discretion, the Legislative Assembly adopts, which is called to constitute itself as the maximum representative body of the people and of the different political, social, and economic forces that make up the State (Articles 1 and 105 of the Political Constitution), so that within it the plurality of worldviews, thoughts, and interests that integrate Costa Rican society is expressed’ (judgment No. 2013-12014 of 14:30 hrs. on September 11, 2013).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">VI.- By reason of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the action under study must be rejected on the merits, as so ordered”.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In accordance with the considerations made, it is noted that this Tribunal has already ruled on the constitutionality of the pensions granted to former Presidents of the Republic, dismissing that it constitutes an unfounded, unreasonable, or disproportionate privilege, since its regulation does not respond to a contributory regime—as the petitioner intends—but rather to a decision by the legislator that seeks to ensure that these public servants can meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum befitting the high functions exercised, which, as reflected in the precedent, is a common norm in Comparative Law. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Therefore, given that the Chamber has already dismissed that this type of determination is unreasonable for allegedly causing harm to public funds, the petitioner's reproach and the standing they invoke are left without substance. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Secondly, the only grievance that would remain subsisting in this proceeding would be the approval of the provision through an extraordinary budget law—an alleged atypical norm (norma atípica). In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) argued that the petitioner lacks standing because the Chamber has not admitted direct standing to challenge so-called “atypical norms” </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">solely on the interest of questioning the manner in which they were approved</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">. During the corresponding hearing, the PGR reported the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“As can be observed, despite having been warned, the petitioner does not actually explain or argue adequately and sufficiently what the substantial legal situation is that, beyond the mere existence of the challenged atypical norm, gives them standing to bring a direct action, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">as they merely allude to the defense of alleged diffuse interests related to the correct handling of public funds, involved in equating the pensions of former Presidents to the income of Deputies; an ‘interest of absolutely the entire Costa Rican community,’ as they expressly affirm. This is relevant, since this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that there is an actio popularis to sue against so-called atypical norms, by reason of a mere interest in seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">”. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">(The highlighted text does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">That is, as the PGR notes, regarding the generic allegation about the approval of the law through a budget law, the petitioner lacks direct standing, according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber. On this particular point, this tribunal has stated the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“Being aware of the jurisdictional consensus that exists regarding the unconstitutionality of including non-budgetary general norms in the National Budget, granting direct standing in this scenario would be practically equivalent to having to authorize it also against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional defects, even when those conflicts are of another nature, since that interest—although laudable—is too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest”.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> (Judgment </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">No. 1990-1775</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, which was subsequently reiterated in judgments numbers </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">2012-010571</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">2013-001496</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">2016-011975 and 2020-018840</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In judgment </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">No. 2016-011975</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> the Chamber expanded its considerations, explaining the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“In fact, the petitioner's arguments focus solely on reproaching, in and of itself, the procedure for approving said normative provision, in an apparent mere interest of seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system; in which case, if the petitioner's possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality in this matter were admitted, under the conditions sought by them, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">it would mean – ultimately – recognizing the existence of an actio popularis, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 hrs. on January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of procedural powers that this Constitutional Tribunal has in this regard</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">, in its functions as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution”.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Subsequently, in judgment </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">No. 2016-016118</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, it reiterated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“This is relevant, since </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that there is an actio popularis to sue against so-called atypical norms</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic"> by reason of a mere interest in seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system”. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">(The highlighted text does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In which case, following the jurisprudential line of this Tribunal, it can be affirmed that the petitioner does not have sufficient standing to file this constitutional review proceeding, if what they assert is that the norm was approved by a budget law. Especially since, as noted, the ordinary legislator itself enacted subsequent legislation that incorporated into an ordinary law the purpose of equating the pensions of former Presidents of the Republic to the salaries of legislators. That provision, as previously noted, was not challenged in this constitutional review proceeding and, furthermore, has already been examined by the Chamber, which dismissed that it is unreasonable, disproportionate, or discriminatory. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Moreover, in a precedent of this Tribunal that examined a situation very similar to the one raised in the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">sub lite</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">—in which the approval of a norm of ordinary content in a budget law was questioned, but which was subsequently also approved by an ordinary law—it was concluded that the petitioner lacked standing to file the action of unconstitutionality as it was equivalent to an actio popularis, but it also determined that the proceeding lacked all interest insofar as the situation had been rectified by the legislator itself. Thus, in judgment </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">No. 1993-3183</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, the following was resolved:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">“1st. The petitioner considers that Article 78 of Law 7051 published in La Gaceta number 211 on November 6, one thousand nine hundred eighty-six, is one of the so-called 'atypical norms', included through an irregular procedure, in the Extraordinary Budget Law 7135 of October 11, one thousand nine hundred eighty-nine. They add that, as this Chamber has already declared, those norms are unconstitutional for having been created in a manner contrary to the provisions of Articles 121 subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, 177, and 180 of the Political Constitution and request that it be so declared, annulling the norm from the legal system.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">I. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction allows the filing of an action of unconstitutionality without a 'preexisting case', when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole. But as this Chamber has already indicated (judgment number 1182-93), it cannot be interpreted that when the law mentions rights that concern the community as a whole, it refers to the national community, since this assumption would be equivalent to accepting and recognizing an actio popularis that does not exist, given the current wording of the cited article. (…) II. On the other hand, this action lacks current interest, since Law number 7334 of April 16 of the current year promulgated a specific article that allows one hundred percent of the net profit, resulting from the Instant Lottery, to be transferred directly to the Mortgage Housing Bank. The norm literally states:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"Article 11: One hundred percent of the resulting net profit shall be transferred directly, to the Mortgage Housing Bank for housing investment programs, and for the programs of the Housing Subsidies Fund that this latter Institution manages".</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The discussion, then, about whether the norm is or is not atypical, lacks any significance, because through the ordinary procedure the transfer of these funds to housing programs has been authorized. Given the circumstances, a ruling on the merits in this action is unnecessary, especially since it has not been possible to demonstrate that either in the petitioner's case or in that of any other citizen, any harm to a legitimate interest that deserves to be recognized or compensated through the mechanisms established by the administration of justice has occurred. The petitioner's interest appeared to be—as deduced from their filing brief—to ensure the norm was promulgated through an ordinary law; that requirement has now been met with the recent enactment of the cited legislation, thus satisfying that interest”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In summary, based on the precedents of this Tribunal, I consider that the action of unconstitutionality should be dismissed for reasons of admissibility, given that the petitioner lacks standing to challenge the norm by invoking the alleged harm to public funds, since in another action this Chamber already dismissed such harm when examining an identical norm. Also, because regarding the other alleged ground of unconstitutionality, that the normative content was included in a budget law, it is not appropriate to invoke direct standing.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Anamari Garro V.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Magistrate</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.45pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.45pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.45pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'WASP 39 H'">*CO*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT; font-weight:bold">EXPEDIENTE: 23-005771-0007-CO</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT; font-weight:bold">PROCESO: ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT; font-weight:bold">ACCIONANTE: Nombre01</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT; font-weight:bold">SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.

San José, at fourteen hours twenty-six minutes on the thirteenth of June, two thousand twenty-four.

Taking into account that Judge Jorge Araya García is on leave, and in order not to delay the processing of the appeal, let the judgment rendered in this matter be served without his signature, which shall be recorded once he returns to his duties.

**Fernando Castillo V** **Presidente** *LEYZLXK* FERNANDO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ - PRESIDENTE/A 1 I reiterate, without any actuarial study, nor consultations with anyone, creating undue advantages by means of the deputies who legislate it, through resources that will be obtained without any doubt, with all certainty, from the taxes paid by or that all citizens have the duty to pay." &nbsp; That is to say, he limited himself to concretely questioning what was provided in Article 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, for having been introduced through a budget law and without any foundation.

Therefore, I consider that he lacks standing for two reasons. First, the plaintiff lacks standing to question this atypical norm, alleging it harms public funds because, as will be seen, when the Chamber examined its material content, it dismissed such harm.

On this point, it is pertinent to bring up that although the acting president of the Legislative Assembly did not specifically refer to the plaintiff's standing to file the unconstitutionality action, she did report that the norm concretely questioned was repealed, tacitly, by Article 16 of Law 7302 of July 8, 1992. This specific point was also highlighted by the PGR in the following terms:

"[T]he truth is that **subsequently, by an ordinary legal reform introduced by the General Pensions Law charged to the National Budget, No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III 'On the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic', in its article 16 a similar norm was provided, by which the monthly pension of constitutionally elected Former Presidents will be equal to the income of a deputy** (per diem allowances (*dietas*) and representation expenses), as of the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term." (The emphasis is not from the original).

&nbsp; This is relevant for the examination of the admissibility of the action, because with it, the same material content of the provision that had been included in a budget law was legislated in an ordinary norm. That is, it is verified that the material content of the norm challenged by the plaintiff was indeed replicated in an ordinary law. Article 16 of the Law of the General Pension Regime Charged to the National Budget, known as the "Ley Marco de Pensiones," expressly states the following:

"Art. 16.- **Constitutionally elected Former Presidents of the Republic shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem allowances (*dietas*) and representation expenses)**, as of the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security." (The emphasis is not from the original).

&nbsp; Precisely, that reform was already examined by the Chamber, and it dismissed its unconstitutionality for a supposed injury to public funds. Specifically, in judgment [n.°2018-006137](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743907), it resolved the following:

"II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The plaintiff challenges Article 16 of Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Pension Regime Charged to the National Budget, insofar as it establishes that: (...)" &nbsp; The plaintiff questions, in general, the existence of the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic, alleging that the granting of such pensions does not correspond to any of the contingencies provided for in Article 73 of the Constitution.

&nbsp; III.- ON THE MERITS. This Court considers that the alleged unconstitutionality is not configured. It must be clarified, preliminarily, that this Court has already indicated that the general pension regime and the special pension regimes provided for in Law No. 7302, including the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic, should not be confused, as they have a different nature. While the first regime has the character of contributory pensions, in which a labor-type right is recognized that originates in part from the worker's prior contributions, the mentioned special pension regimes have the character of non-contributory or grace pensions, which are granted as recognition for the relevance of the work or services that a type of person has developed (judgment No. 4852-95 of 09:42 hrs. of September 1, 1995). In the specific case of Article 16 of Law No. 7302, it is clear that its *ratio legis* is to guarantee a dignified subsistence to those who specifically held the position of President of the Republic, that is, to those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of The Nation (Articles 130, 139, 140, and 147 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, this is a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for in Article 73 of the Constitution, but which finds sufficient and reasonable legal support in the aim of ensuring a dignified subsistence exclusively for Former Presidents of the Republic, in accordance with the decorum proper to the office they held. On this point, the Procuraduría General de la República, in legal opinion No. 122-J of July 23, 2003, affirmed that '**the granting of pensions to former Presidents of the Republic, as in other countries, aims to ensure that they, once they have ceased their term, can meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised; and also with the purpose of establishing, in the event of their death, some protective measures for the closest family members**' and, furthermore, pointed out '**the intended purpose, as well as the high office of the position exercised, are sufficient reason to justify that such economic benefits in favor of former Presidents of the Republic could in no way be considered discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privileges**'. **Considerations that are shared by this Court, so it cannot be held that the mere existence of such a special pension regime implies per se an infringement of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, or non-discrimination, nor -in general- a violation of the Law of the Constitution.** &nbsp; IV.- It is worth reiterating, moreover, that the granting of pensions to Former Presidents is not exclusive to Costa Rica, but, on the contrary, it occurs in different American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States of America, Mexico, and Peru. In the Chilean case, for example, it is the Constitution itself that provides, according to what is set forth in its Articles 30 and 62, that the Former President of the Republic will receive a per diem allowance (*dieta*) equivalent to the remuneration of a Minister of State including all the allowances that correspond to them. In Argentina, Law No. 24,018 establishes that the Former President of the Nation will be entitled to a lifetime monthly allowance that will be the sum that for all purposes corresponds to the remuneration of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. In Bolivia, Law No. 376 provides for a 'Pecuniary Recognition to Citizens who exercised the Constitutional Presidency and Vice Presidency of the State', for a sum equivalent to ten (10) national minimum monthly salaries, an amount that will be paid by the General Treasury of the Nation (TGN), which they will receive for life. The Organic Law of Public Service of Ecuador establishes in its Article 135 that: '[a] monthly lifetime pension equivalent to seventy-five percent of the current remuneration is established for former Constitutional Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Republic, who are constitutionally elected by popular vote and have taken possession of the office, excepting those officeholders whose mandate is revoked'. In Peru, Law No. 26519 provides, in Article 1, that 'former Constitutional Presidents of the Republic shall enjoy a pension equivalent to the total income of an active Congress member'. In the Colombian case, Article 2 of Law No. 48 of 1962 establishes, in its first paragraph, that every former President of the Republic shall have the 'right to enjoy a lifetime pension or old-age pension if they have remained in the service of the State for twenty continuous or discontinuous years and if they have reached fifty years of age'. Likewise, in the second paragraph of that same numeral, it is provided that '[w]hile lacking any of these requirements, they may enjoy the special pension of the ex-President'. The Colombian Constitutional Court resolved a constitutional challenge filed against the referred special pension, in which it was alleged, in essence, that the challenged regulation established an unjustified privilege that infringed the very essence of the notion of a pension, since it enshrined this right for former Presidents of the Republic in a special and lifetime form for the mere fact of having exercised the Presidency under any title and for any period, without consideration of age or the contribution time of the pensioner. However, the Constitutional Court, in judgment No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999, held -in relevant part- the following:

&nbsp; '9. The position of President of the Republic, in a presidential system of government such as that which governs among us, means the highest public responsibility. The president embodies the condition of head of State, head of Government, and supreme administrative authority. As head of State, he symbolizes and represents national unity and sovereignty, directs international relations, defends territorial integrity, and directs, as supreme commander, the public force, among other functions; as head of Government, he exercises functions such as the political leadership of the State and the direction of the economy, and as supreme administrative authority, he is responsible for the correct execution of the national public function. For these tasks, he is elected by direct popular vote and by an absolute majority of votes, in a national constituency. He therefore has political backing and confidence granted directly and exclusively to him by at least half of the voters, a circumstance that is not present in any other popularly elected office.

Not accepting that all these particular circumstances confer a special dignity upon it amounts to ignoring an undeniable political and legal reality.

This particular circumstance places the president in a situation of special merit and respect within society. Regardless of whether one politically agrees with his administration or not, it is obvious that the dignity of his investiture is superior to that of all citizens. This provides sufficient legal support for the exception introduced by the challenged regulations regarding the pension access requirements. Indeed, such an exception constitutes not only a deserved monetary recognition that compensates the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stands as a means to congruently provide for the needs that originate from the special position implied by being a former president of the Republic. It is clear to everyone that this position requires leading a life with certain special decorum requirements, which are not always within the reach of someone who has ceased to hold the first office of the Republic, either due to a lack of personal resources or because of the de facto limitation in which someone who has held that position finds themselves for exercising any type of office or profession, for reasons that precisely touch upon the dignity of the Nation or even ethical factors.

&nbsp; 10. Having effectively held the office of president of the Republic by being elected by the majority vote of his fellow citizens, the fact of having been the guarantor of sovereignty and having symbolized national unity, having assumed the vast historical responsibility attached to the office of the first mandate, in short, these are sufficient reasons to confer the special merit recognized to former presidents. (…)

&nbsp; 11. Thus, given the very special dignity and responsibility entailed by the office of president of the Republic, it is not equal to any other job or occupation performed in the public sector, and therefore the exceptional legal treatment introduced by the challenged norms, in principle, responds to this particular difference in situation and, for that reason, is justified in the face of the Constitution. Likewise, said treatment pursues a purpose, which is the aforementioned one of compensating the former president and providing for his dignified subsistence, and these purposes conform to the Constitution, since the axiology that informs it indicates that achieving justice is a task of the State. It is just that the public treasury exceptionally compensates citizens who have also rendered exceptional services, and that it does so in a manner proportionate to their personal decorum needs. If justice consists of giving each person what they deserve, the challenged regulations justly realize this notion.’ He then added that:

‘Although it is true that, at first glance, it would not appear that former presidents find themselves in a special situation of weakness that warrants public resources being allocated to cover their pension under the exceptional terms established by law, a deeper examination of the situation reveals that this is not so evident. Indeed, it has been said that whoever has held the office of president of the Republic is burdened with special decorum obligations in their personal life, and that for reasons of the same nature, in addition to others of an ethical character, they are not in a position to access just any job or to carry out any occupation or profession. The Fatherland expects, with legitimate feeling, that such persons preserve for the rest of their lives the dignity that was conferred upon them. It is true that in some cases former presidents have personal assets that allow them to cope with this situation; but the Law, which is pronounced to regulate the generality of situations, cannot proceed from the unproven and unprovable assumption that all of them are or will in the future be in such a situation of abundant economic solvency. Therefore, on the basis that citizens of any economic or social condition can and do accede to the First Office of the Republic, as history demonstrates, the law provides for their dignified subsistence.’ &nbsp; ***Considerations that are also applicable to the Costa Rican case, in order to understand the foundation that reasonably inspires the content and scope of the norm challenged in this action.** * &nbsp; V.- As a corollary to the foregoing, it cannot be deemed that the existence of the aforementioned special pension regime is incompatible with Constitutional Law. It must be indicated, in any case, that the creation of said regime ultimately responds to a clear assumption of the legislator's freedom of configuration. Regarding the referenced freedom of configuration, this Chamber, in ruling No. 2003-5090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, stated:

‘(…) The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of conformation to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the subject matter regulated has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit Constitutional Law, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases’.

&nbsp; Therefore, definitively, the maintenance of the aforementioned special pension regime depends on the political determination that, in accordance with its broad legislative discretion, the Legislative Assembly adopts, which is called to constitute itself as the maximum representative body of the people and of the different political, social, and economic forces that make up the State (articles 1 and 105 of the Political Constitution), so that within its bosom the plurality of worldviews, thoughts, and interests that comprise Costa Rican society is expressed’ (ruling No. 2013-12014 of 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013).

&nbsp; VI.- By reason of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the action under study must be rejected on the merits, as is hereby ordered”. (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; In accordance with the considerations made, it is noted that this Tribunal has already pronounced on the constitutionality of the pensions granted to former presidents of the Republic, ruling out that it is an unfounded, unreasonable, or disproportionate privilege, since its regulation does not respond to a contributory regime —as the claimant intends— but rather to a decision by the legislator that seeks to ensure that these public servants can attend to their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum corresponding to the high functions exercised, which, as reflected in the precedent, is a common norm in Comparative Law.

Therefore, given that this Chamber has already ruled out that this type of determination is unreasonable for causing a supposed impairment to public funds, the claimant's reproach and the legitimacy he invokes are rendered moot.

Secondly, the only grievance that would remain subsistent in this proceeding would be that of the approval of the provision through an extraordinary budget law —a presumed atypical norm (norma atípica)—. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) stated that the claimant lacks legitimacy because this Chamber has not admitted direct legitimacy to challenge so-called "atypical norms" (normas atípicas) ***solely out of an interest in questioning the manner in which they were approved***. At the corresponding hearing, the PGR reported the following:

*“As can be verified, despite having been warned, the claimant does not really explain or argue in an adequate and sufficient manner what the substantial legal situation is that, beyond the mere existence of the atypical norm (norma atípica) being challenged, legitimizes him to bring a direct action, **since he merely limits himself to alluding to the defense of supposed diffuse interests related to the correct management of public funds, involved in the equalization of former Presidents' pensions to the income of Deputies; an ‘interest of absolutely the entire Costa Rican community’, as he expressly affirms.*” This is relevant, since this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that a popular action exists to challenge so-called atypical norms, based on a mere interest in seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; That is, as the PGR points out, with respect to the generic claim regarding the approval of the law through a budget law, the claimant lacks direct standing, according to the reiterated case law of this Chamber. In this regard, this court has stated the following:

"[I]n full knowledge of the jurisdictional consensus that exists regarding the unconstitutionality of including non-budgetary general norms in the National Budget, granting direct standing in this case would practically amount to having to authorize it also against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional defects, even when those conflicts are of another nature, since that interest –however laudable– is too vague or broad to constitute in itself a diffuse interest, or a collective one". (Judgment no. 1990-1775, which was subsequently reiterated in judgments numbers 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571, 2013-001496, 2016-011975 and 2020-018840).

&nbsp; In judgment no. 2016-011975, the Chamber expanded its considerations, explaining the following:

"In fact, the claimant's arguments focus solely on reproaching, by itself, the approval procedure for said normative provision, in an apparent mere interest in seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system; in which case, if the possibility of the actor filing an unconstitutionality action in this matter were to be admitted, under the conditions sought by them, it would ultimately mean recognizing the existence of a popular action, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated case law (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of procedural powers that this Constitutional Court has to that effect, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; Then, in judgment no. 2016-016118, it reiterated:

"This is relevant, since this Chamber has indicated that it cannot be considered that a popular action exists to challenge so-called atypical norms, based on a mere interest in seeking objective conformity with the constitutional legal system". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

&nbsp; In which case, following the jurisprudential line of this Court, it can be stated that the claimant lacks sufficient standing to file this constitutional review process, if what they allege is that the norm was approved through a budget law. Especially since, as noted, the ordinary legislator itself issued subsequent legislation that captured in an ordinary norm the purpose of equating the pensions of former Presidents of the Republic to the salaries of legislators. Said provision, as noted before, was not challenged in this constitutional review process and, furthermore, has already been examined by the Chamber and it dismissed it as unreasonable, disproportionate, or discriminatory.

Moreover, in a precedent of this Court that examined a situation very similar to the one raised in the sub lite –in which the approval of a norm of ordinary content in a budget law was questioned, but which was later also approved by an ordinary law– it was concluded that the claimant lacked standing to bring the unconstitutionality action because it was equivalent to a popular action, but it also determined that the process lacked all interest to the extent that the situation had been resolved by the legislator itself. Thus, in judgment no. 1993-3183, the following was resolved:

"1. The claimant considers that Article 78 of Law 7051 published in La Gaceta number 211 of November 6, nineteen eighty-six, is one of the so-called 'atypical norms,' included through an irregular procedure in the Extraordinary Budget Law 7135 of October 11, nineteen eighty-nine. They add that as this Chamber has already declared, these norms are unconstitutional because they were created in a manner contrary to the provisions of articles 121 subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, 177 and 180 of the Political Constitution and requests that it be so declared, annulling the norm from the legal system.

I.The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction allows for the filing of an unconstitutionality action without a 'base case,' when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole. But as this Chamber has already indicated (judgment number 1182-93), it cannot be interpreted that when the law mentions rights that concern the community as a whole, it refers to the national community, since this assumption would be equivalent to accepting and recognizing a popular action which does not exist, given the current wording of the cited article. (...) II. On the other hand, this action lacks current interest, since Law number 7334 of April 16 of this year promulgated a specific article that allows one hundred percent of the net profit resulting from the Instant Lottery to be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda. The norm textually states:

&nbsp; 'Article 11: One hundred percent of the resulting net profit shall be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda for housing investment programs, and for the programs of the Housing Subsidies Fund that this latter Institution manages.' &nbsp; The discussion, therefore, of whether the norm is atypical or not, lacks any transcendence, because through the ordinary procedure the transfer of these funds to the housing programs has been authorized. Thus, things being as they are, a decision on the merits in this action is unnecessary, especially since it has not been possible to demonstrate that, in the case of the claimant or any other citizen, any harm to a legitimate interest has occurred that merits being recognized or compensated through the mechanisms established by the administration of justice. The claimant's interest seemed to be –as deduced from their filing brief– ensuring that the norm was promulgated through an ordinary law; that requirement has already been met with the recent enactment of the cited legislation, thus that interest is satisfied." &nbsp; In summary, based on the precedents of this Court, I consider that the unconstitutionality action must be dismissed on admissibility grounds, given that the claimant lacks standing to challenge the norm by invoking the alleged harm to public funds, since in another action this Chamber already dismissed such harm when examining an identical norm.

Also\nbecause regarding the other alleged ground of unconstitutionality, that the normative content was included in a budget law, it is not appropriate to invoke direct standing.

&nbsp; &nbsp; **Anamari Garro V.** **Magistrada** **CO08/24** The same occurred with Law No. 5510 of April 19, 1974, called the Pensions for Ex-Presidents, National Benefactors, and National Symbols Law, by which said pension was increased to ¢5,000.00 per month. However, it is important to note that this latter law expanded the coverage of said benefit, as it no longer only protected ex-Presidents of the Republic who had been constitutionally elected, but also the ex-Vice President of the Republic who had replaced the President in their absolute absence and who had held the office for more than half a term. A similar provision was made with Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980, which also increased the assignable pension amount to ¢15,000.00 per month.

We cannot ignore the fact that through Article 9, the fiftieth norm of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law for 1979 – No. 6305 of December 21, 1978 – Article 1 of the cited Law 313 was added, in order to include as beneficiaries of a pension equal to that of the widows of ex-Presidents or ex-Vice Presidents of the Republic, those persons who had held the status of First Lady. This situation was subsequently ratified by the Budget Laws for 1981 – No. 6542 of December 22, 1981 – Article 9, norm 49, and for 1982 – No. 6700 of December 23, 1981 – Article 9, norm 48 (The last two atypical norms were annulled by ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 2136 at 2:00 p.m. on October 23, 1991).

And by Extraordinary Budget Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, its Article 29 – the challenged norm – increased and equalized the amount of the pensions of former Presidents to the salary of a Deputy.

With Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, called "Creation of the general pension regime with charge to the national budget, of other special regimes and reform to Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988, and its reforms, Income Tax Law," known as the "Marco Law of Pensions" (Ley Marco de Pensiones), which unified the requirements for retirement under any of the State's special pension regimes – except those of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial) and National Educators – there was provided a Chapter III, called "On the Pension Regime for Ex-Presidents of the Republic," which derogated the specific provisions provided by Law No. 313 and its reforms. Said Chapter provides as follows:

"Chapter III OF THE PENSION REGIME FOR EX-PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC ARTICLE 16.- Ex-Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a Deputy (dietas and representation expenses), starting the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be the responsibility of the National Budget (Presupuesto Nacional) and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department (Departamento Nacional de Pensiones) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

ARTICLE 17.- The pensions of Ex-Presidents of the Republic shall be adjusted whenever the salary of the Deputies is adjusted.

ARTICLE 18.- Upon their death, the successors established by the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein.” In this vein, the PGR considers that the granting of pensions to ex-presidents of the Republic aims to guarantee that, once they have left office, they can meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that corresponds to them for the high functions they exercised in the position previously held. Thus, it argues that it cannot be considered a discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privilege. In this line, the following is reported:

“A criterion that has been fully shared by this Chamber, upon considering that the mere existence of such a special pension regime does not, in any way, represent an infringement upon the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Law of the Constitution (Resolution No. 2018-006137 at 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018).

And it was by that resolution that this Chamber declared without merit an action of unconstitutionality filed against Article 16 of the cited Law No. 7302, insofar as it provides that ex-Presidents shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a Deputy (dietas and representation expenses), as the plaintiff considered that this benefit lacked lawful cause and violated Article 73 of the Constitution.

In that resolution, the Chamber then upheld the constitutionality of the Pension Regime for Ex-Presidents of the Republic, and quoting a ruling of the Colombian Constitutional Court - No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999 -, stated, among other things, that the pensions of ex-presidents '...constitute not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stand as a means to suitably provide for the needs arising from the special position that being an ex-president of the Republic entails. It is hidden from no one that this position requires leading a life with certain special requirements of decorum, which are not always within the reach of someone who has ceased to exercise the first magistracy, either due to lack of personal resources or due to the de facto limitation that someone who has occupied that position finds themselves in to exercise any type of office or trade, for reasons touching precisely upon the dignity of the Nation or even ethical factors (…).’ And based, additionally, on the fact that the creation of the cited special pension regime obeys, finally, the free configuration of the legislator (libre configuración del legislador), understood as the possibility that the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, from within a plurality of similar and all valid options, in that same resolution the Chamber considered that Article 16 of Law No. 7302, by its ratio legis, validly seeks to guarantee the dignified subsistence of those who specifically held the office of President of the Republic, that is, those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of the Nation - Articles 130, 139, 140, and 147 of the Constitution. This is a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for by Article 73 of the Political Charter (Carta Política), but which finds legal support.” Subsequently, regarding the unconstitutionality of the atypical budget norms, it makes the following considerations:

“With respect to the defects alleged by the plaintiff, especially those referring to the unconstitutionality of the accused atypical budget norm, we must indicate the following:

The Budget Law of the Republic (Ley de Presupuesto de la República) is a Law defined both by its procedure and by its content. Articles 176 – first paragraph – and 180 of the Constitution set the content that the Budget Law of the Republic must have.

In this sense, it is imperative to indicate that, in accordance with the cited constitutional norms, the proper and special subject matter of the Budget Law is that related to the establishment of the statement of probable revenues and the authorization of administration expenditures during the corresponding fiscal period. Furthermore, it is understood that the budget subject matter comprises the budget execution norms necessary for a given fiscal year. It has been aptly specified that it is not proper to create taxes or any other form of revenue through a Budget Law. In this regard, it is important to cite the vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1466-1990 at 3:15 p.m. on October 30, 1990:

‘That this Chamber has expressed its criterion on several occasions to the effect that the only general norms that can be included in budget laws are those that intend to introduce parameters for their execution, that is, the so-called "budget execution norms" (normas de ejecución presupuestaria). (Resolutions 121-89 at 11:00 a.m. on November 23, 1989; 69-90 at 11:29 a.m. on January 17, 1990, and others). In fact, in the first of them, the establishment of a tax in a budget law was considered unconstitutional. Given that, effectively, Law No. 6966 of September 25, 1984, is a modification to the Ordinary Budget for that same year, and that the challenged article establishes a tax on exemptions, the proper course is to declare it unconstitutional based on the cited precedents.’ Therefore, it is improper to incorporate norms foreign to the budget subject matter within a Budget Law of the Republic.

Constitutional jurisprudence has coined the concept of ‘atypical norm’ (norma atípica) to denominate any provision that, without having any relation to the budget subject matter, is, however, included within the budget, and said ‘atypicality’ arises when the legislator derogates, modifies, interprets, or even creates ordinary laws within the budget. Vote No. 4790-1993 at 8:54 a.m. on September 30, 1993, is transcribed:

(…)

It is worth noting that, while it is undoubtedly true that Article 105 of the Constitution has generally provided that the people, through suffrage, delegate legislative power to Congress, the truth is that subsections 1) and 11) of Article 121, also of the Constitution, distinguish between two different modes and forms of legislating based on the subject matter in question. The first subsection grants the Assembly the general power to enact laws, reform them, derogate them, and give them authentic interpretation – except for the interpretive power of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) in electoral matters. In the exercise of the form of legislating provided for in Article 121.1 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly must follow the procedure laid out in Articles 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, and 128 of the Constitution, which includes the prerogative of veto by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo). On the other extreme, Article 121.11 provides the power to enact the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic, for which it must follow the procedure prescribed in Articles 177, 178, 179, and 180. Pursuant to Article 125 of the Constitution, in fine, the Executive Branch lacks the possibility of vetoing the Budget Law that has been approved by the Legislative Assembly.

That is to say, the Constitution has distinguished between the general power to legislate and the power to enact the budget laws of the Republic, such that it is in disagreement with the Constitution to incorporate into said laws provisions or norms that are foreign to the budget subject matter, for it must be insisted that, in the exercise of the power provided in Article 121.11 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly must confine itself to regulating the budget subject matter. Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 121-1989 at 11:00 a.m. on November 23, 1989, is transcribed:

(…)

It is worth saying that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has reiterated on multiple occasions its jurisprudence regarding the unconstitutionality of atypical budget norms. (See votes: 6043-2002 at 15:29 hours on June 18, 2002; 3666-2003 at 14:53 hours on May 7, 2003; No. 3497-2005 at 14:50 hours on March 30, 2005; No. 14102-2006 at 11:20 hours on September 22, 2006; No. 56-2008 at 14:47 hours on January 9, 2008).

Finally, it is pertinent to highlight, for the purposes of the present matter, that, in its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has emphasized that any provision included in the Budget Law that, nevertheless, innovates, modifies, or derogates ordinary legislation would be presumed to be an atypical norm. Vote No. 242-2001 at 14:44 hours on January 10, 2001, recently reiterated by Resolution No. 2022-026652 at 16:31 hrs. on November 9, 2022, is transcribed:

‘It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain norms of a general character, foreign to the budget subject matter. That is, the inclusion of atypical norms that deal with subject matter proper to ordinary legislation, either for its creation or modification, is not valid.’ (See also vote No. 7137-2007 at 16:47 hours on May 23, 2007).” Thus, in relation to the specific case, it states that the questioned norm regulates subject matter different from the budget subject matter, as it is not related to budget execution, but rather modifies or adds to ordinary legislation, by equalizing the amount of the non-contributory pension of the ex-presidents of the Republic to the salary of the deputies. It considers the foregoing violates the provisions of Articles 121, subsections 1 and 11; 124; 125; 176, first paragraph; 177; and 180, first paragraph; all of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which set the procedure to be followed for the discussion, approval, and modification of the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic, distinct from that of ordinary law. In this sense, it asserts that the norm in question is unconstitutional.

However, it adds the following considerations:

“Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm for formal reasons, since it utilized the procedure prescribed by the Constitution for enacting the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic to enact or reform, as the case may be, an ordinary law, the truth is that subsequently, by an ordinary legal reform introduced by the General Law of Pensions with Charge to the National Budget (Ley General de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional), No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III ‘On the Pension Regime for Ex-Presidents of the Republic,’ Article 16 provided a similar norm, whereby the monthly pension of constitutionally elected Ex-Presidents shall be equal to the income of a Deputy (dietas and representation expenses), starting the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term.

This last aspect clearly diminishes the practical utility of this action of unconstitutionality, since the cited Article 16 of Law No. 7302 was not challenged by the plaintiff. This is without prejudice to the power granted to the Chamber by Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), according to which, the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law or general disposition may also declare the unconstitutionality of the other precepts thereof, or of any other law or disposition whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence, as well as that of the challenged application acts; an aspect that must be evaluated at the appropriate procedural moment.

Nevertheless, we must recall that ‘To undertake an examination of the reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Court requires the party to provide proof or at least elements of judgment to support their argumentation, and an equal procedural burden corresponds to whoever rebuts the arguments of the action, and the failure to fulfill these requirements makes the allegations of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing, because it is not possible to conduct a <<reasonableness>> analysis without the existence of a coherent line of argumentation that is evidentially supported.’ (Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), judgment No. 5236-99 at 14:00 hours on July 7, 1999, reiterated, among many others, in No. 10153-2001 at 14:44 hours on October 10, 2001, and in No. 14392-2016 at 9:05 hours on October 5, 2016). And in this matter, the non-compliance with this unavoidable requirement is more than evident.

In any case, as we alluded to in section B) of our report, through Resolution No. 2018-006137 at 09:20 hrs. on April 20, 2018, the Chamber upheld the constitutionality of the Pension Regime for Ex-Presidents of the Republic, upon considering that its mere existence does not, in any way, constitute an infringement upon the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-discrimination, nor in general a violation of the Law of the Constitution.” It concludes that the action of unconstitutionality is inadmissible due to the plaintiff's lack of standing (legitimación), even though the challenged norm is indeed unconstitutional. It notes that the equalization of the pension amount for ex-presidents to the income of a Deputy, legally provided for through a subsequent ordinary law (i.e., Article 16 of Law No. 7302), subsists and is constitutionally reasonable.

6.- The edicts were published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), numbers 092, 093, and 094 of May 25, 26, and 29, 2023; 093 of May 26, 2023; and 094 of May 29, 2023.

7.- In a brief received in this Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on June 9, 2023, GLORIA NAVAS MONTERO, in her capacity as VICE PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (VICEPRESIDENTA DE LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA), answered the hearing.

Regarding the processing of Law No. 7108 She explains that Law No. 7108 was a modification to Law No. 7089. She clarifies that neither the base text nor the committee report (dictamen) contained Article 29 that is being challenged in this action, but rather that said norm was introduced through a substantive motion (moción de fondo) that was approved without discussion in the Financial Affairs Committee (Comisión de Asuntos Hacendarios). Said motion was presented by former Deputy Méndez Mata and was processed when the bill was being processed in the Plenary, as established in Article 41 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, RAL) in force at that time. She indicates that, except for Article 29, there is no other regulation in Law No. 7108 pertaining to the pension of ex-presidents. She recounts that the law was sanctioned on November 8, 1988, by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) and some articles unrelated to the subject of this action were vetoed; furthermore, it was published in La Gaceta No. 215 on November 11, 1988.

Regarding the merits Concerning the regulation of ex-presidents' pensions, Deputy Navas Montero states:

“Law 313 of August 23, 1939, the Pension Law for Ex-Presidents (Ley de Pensiones para Expresidentes), established a pension regime for the ex-presidents of the Republic of Costa Rica, regulating aspects such as the beneficiaries, the pension amount, limitations and exceptions, and other benefits.

This Law 313 of 1939 was subject to several reforms (express and tacit), interpretations, and additions; among them, Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, which tacitly reformed Law 313, an article whose constitutionality is questioned for being an atypical norm.

• In 1958, it was reformed by Law No. 2264 of November 24, 1958. • In 1961, it was interpreted by Law No. 2835 of October 23, 1961. • In the year 1980, it was subject to a reform through Law No. 6413 of May 5, 1980. • In 1981, it had an addition through Article 9 of Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981. • In the year 1985, it was reformed through Article 14 of Law No. 7018 of December 20, 1985. • In 1988, it was tacitly reformed by Article 29 of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988. • In 1992, it was tacitly reformed by Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, the General Pension Regime with Charge to the National Budget, of other special regimes." This law introduces text similar to the text of article 29 of law 7108.

*It is worth noting that Law 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Pension Regime Charged to the National Budget, in its Chapter III (Articles 16, 17, and 18), regulates matters relating to the Pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic as follows:* *“…* ***CHAPTER III OF THE PENSION REGIME FOR FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC*** ***Article 16.-** Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall have the right to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy *(dietas y gastos de representación)*, starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be charged to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pension Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.* ***Article 17.-** The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted whenever the salary of the Deputies is readjusted.* ***Article 18.-** At the time of their death, the beneficiaries established by the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the pension amount, under the same conditions set forth therein.”* *What is provided in this Chapter prevails over what is provided in Law 313 and in article 29 of Law 7108, as it is a later norm, of the same rank (law), and because an antinomy exists. As can be observed, law 7302, in article 16, contains a provision very similar to that of article 29 of Law 7108. That is, the text of the questioned article 29 of Law 7108 is superseded by article 16 of Law 7302*”.

It states, in relation to atypical norms, that these are provisions incorporated into national budgets and their amending laws; however, they bear no direct relation to budgetary matters. It notes that, through constitutional review, the Chamber has declared the unconstitutionality of this type of norm.

Regarding the petitioner’s argument that art. 29 of law no. 7108 is an atypical norm, it indicates:

“*The legislative file does not contain an explanation of why the legislator included this norm in the Budget Law. It is possible that the legislator chose to include a regulation of this type in the budgetary norm considering that it was the Public Treasury (article 2, Law 313) that was responsible for disbursing the amount of the pensions to the former presidents and to the vice president who had replaced them absolutely; therefore, by equating the pension of the former presidents to the salary of the Deputies, the norm constituted a reform that implied budgetary adjustments.* *However, it must be considered that Resolution No. 0121-89 of November 23, 1989, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates that the Full Court had* ***repeatedly*** *resolved the declaration of unconstitutionality of several atypical norms processed in budget laws. Furthermore, given that Law 313, the Pension Law for former presidents, existed, the appropriate course of action was to reform that law.* &#xa0; *It is worth considering that, as can be seen in the following table, Article 29 of law 7108 was tacitly repealed by Article 16 of law 7302.* &#xa0;

&#xa0; It details, in relation to the pension regime for former presidents, that the number of beneficiaries as of 2021 was ten people. Furthermore, the average monthly pension is around ¢3,753,207, meaning the monthly expenditure reaches ¢37,532,070. For its part, it clarifies that the amount included in the National Budget of the Republic for the concept of former presidents’ pensions for the year 2023 amounts to ¢426,600,000. It likewise explains:

“*The pensions also imply the following expenditures that the State must budget for:* *1. Year-end bonus (Aguinaldo) (calculated the same as for public sector salaried employees)* *2. Employer’s Contribution for Health Insurance (Cuota Patronal Seguro de Salud): 8.75% of the pension amount* *3. State Contribution for Health Insurance (Cuota Estatal Seguro de Salud): 0.25% of the pension amount* *4. Revaluations (Revalorizaciones): Pensions are revalued for cost of living when the Executive Branch decrees increases for public officials in the same percentage or amount and it comes into effect.* *Said Regime also grants, upon the death of the decedent (former president), survival pensions to the beneficiaries indicated by the IVM regulation of the CCSS, who will be entitled to 75% of the pension (in total, not each one).* *As of 2121, the pension was granted to 7 former presidents, 1 former first lady, and 2 beneficiaries*”.

It recounts, in relation to the remuneration of deputies, that the challenged norm uses the term salary; however, deputies receive per diem payments (dietas) and other components.

Having clarified the foregoing, the speaker concludes the following:

“***2.6.1.- Regarding what is alleged by the petitioner concerning considering article 29 of Law 7108 as an atypical norm.*** *It is considered that article 29 of Law 7108 is an atypical norm given that it is* ***not*** *a budgetary norm, and this norm should have been processed as a reform to the* ***Pension Law for former presidents.*** *It should be noted that, as explained above, article 29 of law 7108 is* ***tacitly repealed*** *by article 16 of law 7302.* ***2.6.2.- Regarding the allegation concerning the violation of article 33 and article 50 of the Political Constitution.*** *We do not share what is alleged by the petitioner that the* ***equating*** *of the norm implied a privilege, or that article 50 has been violated regarding the* ***adequate distribution of wealth.*** *Now then, it must be considered that the constitutional* ***conditions and functions*** *of the* ***positions*** *are distinct, of the presidents, then former presidents and of the* ***deputies*** *; for example, consider that regarding the Salary of the President of the* ***Republic*** *(sic), Law 10159, Public Employment Law of March 8, 2022, in its* ***article 30, subsection b)*** *states that the salary of the President of the Republic shall be the* ***highest salary in the Public Administration***”.

It requests that article 29 of law no. 7108 be declared unconstitutional for being an atypical norm.

**8.-** By resolution at 11:21 hrs. on **June 27.** **of 2023**, the Presidency of the Chamber indicated the following:

“*The hearings granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and to the President of the Legislative Directorate, in the resolution of eleven hours two minutes of May ninth, two thousand twenty-three, are deemed answered. The proceedings being ready, let this ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY number 23-005771-0007- CO be sent to the office of Magistrate Anamari Garro Vargas, to whom, by turn, the substantive study of the same corresponds*”.

**9.** - In the proceedings followed, the legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate **Fernández Argüello**; and, **WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):** **I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The petitioner challenges the unconstitutionality of article 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108, of November 8, 1988. The questioned numeral states the following:

*“Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of a deputy’s salary.”* &#xa0; It is alleged, through this law, Law No. 313 on Pensions for Former Presidents was modified, without any technical justification and under the unhealthy practice of approving it through a budget law, so that it would go unnoticed during the parliamentary discussion, with the consequent damage to the public treasury, which is considered an abuse and an odious privilege.

**II.- OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities that must necessarily be fulfilled for this Court to validly rule on the merits of the matter. In art. 75 of the LJC, the admissibility requirements for actions of unconstitutionality are established and different situations are regulated. In the first paragraph, the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required, be it in a judicial forum –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in the administrative forum –in the procedure for exhausting this channel–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. In the second and third paragraphs, the direct action is regulated –a base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).

Other formalities must also be fulfilled, namely, the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality considered infringed (art. 78 of the LJC).

**III.- ON THE STANDING OF THE PETITIONER.** The petitioner considers they have standing to file this action of unconstitutionality, which, they assert, stems from the existence of a diffuse interest in the control of public funds. They argue, as it involves an atypical norm, they are only legitimized in a completely indirect way, since as a taxpayer, they affirm they are obligated to defray the increases in such remuneration. The majority of the Chamber agrees with this allegation and dismisses the assertions that, to the contrary, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic formulates. Certainly, the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court has been clear, in the sense that the atypicality of a budgetary norm is not, in itself, grounds to legitimize any person to challenge it in this venue. It is clear, if that possibility were admitted, a popular action would be established for the challenge of any atypical norm or, in general, of any norm included in a national, extraordinary, or special budget; which must be dismissed, as it is not consistent with the rules for access to these control mechanisms, provided in numeral 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The rulings cited by the Attorney General and many others from this body, among them, No. 1990-1775, reiterated in Nos. 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571, 2013-001496, 2016-011975, and 2020-018840, are absolutely clear in that sense, a criterion that is also reaffirmed in this case. However, in the *sub examine*, the situation is very different. What is challenged is a legal norm -included indeed, within a budget law-, through which it was established that the pensions that those who have held the Presidency of the Republic will earn shall be equal to the salary of a deputy. Thus, given the nature of this special pension regime, of a non-contributory nature and charged to the national budget, it is evident that it involves the guardianship and protection of public funds, for which a diffuse interest exists. Note, it is not then -as the advisory body to this Chamber alleges- a simple general challenge, based on the atypicality of the norm, but rather an action centered precisely on the public nature of the funds with which those stipends are paid, which enables the petitioner, in their condition as a taxpayer, to question its constitutional validity, this, in the terms of numeral 75, second paragraph of the law just cited. For that reason, it is concluded that the petitioner has active standing to formulate this challenge and, consequently, the action filed is declared admissible.

**IV.- ON THE MERITS.** Article 29 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic, No. 7108 of November eighth, nineteen ninety-eight, challenged herein, provides that: *“The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of a deputy’s salary.”* From a mere reading, it is glaringly obvious that its content is evidently foreign to matters of a budgetary nature. Matters relating to pensions, retirements, and in particular, the definition of the benefit amounts established in the corresponding regime, are matters that must be regulated by ordinary or common law and far exceed what should be the object of a budget law. This has been recognized within this action by all the parties involved: the plaintiff, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and the Legislative Assembly, and this Chamber agrees, which, as is widely recognized by the interested parties, has issued profuse jurisprudence on the impossibility of regulating, in public budgets, topics that must be addressed through ordinary law, a practice that -it has been insistently stated-, is contrary to the provisions of numerals 121, subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, first paragraph, 177, and 180 first paragraph, all of the Political Constitution. On this specific topic, this Chamber has indicated the following for a long time:

“***III.- On the merits.** The challenged article provides: "Article 33.- Add an article, which shall be number 12, to the Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice, No. 6739 of April 28, 1982, which shall read: "Article 12: They may avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry all servers of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Justice and of the General Directorate of Social Adaptation and Crime Prevention, under the same terms established in law No.5 of September 16, 1939 and its reforms.* The Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) shall transfer to the pension fund of the National Registry (Registro Nacional) the entirety of the contributions paid by the servers belonging to the aforementioned institutions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) who avail themselves of this law.” As can be observed, the rule in question grants the possibility to a group of public servants to avail themselves of the pension regime of the National Registry, thereby making a formal and material amendment to the law that regulates that retirement regime. The rule is part of Law No. 6975 of November 30, 1984, which is a budget law (“Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario”). Regarding the inclusion of non-budgetary provisions in budget laws, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has repeatedly expressed the criterion that they are atypical norms (normas atípicas) that violate the procedure for the formation of laws stipulated in the Political Constitution, and therefore must necessarily be considered unconstitutional. Thus, it has been declared:

“...This Chamber, since Judgment No. 121-89 of 11:00 a.m. on November 23, 1989, has held that ‘...it is entirely appropriate to include “general norms” in budget laws, provided they are linked to the specialty that this matter implies, or what is the same, to budget execution. What is not possible to include in budget laws are norms that do not have this character, since they must be governed by the provisions for common or ordinary laws’ (Judgment No. 759-92 of 3:00 p.m. on March 17, 1992). Subparagraphs 1) and 11) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution confer upon the Legislative Assembly separate, distinct, and exclusive legislative powers in each case. Subparagraph 1) attributes the power to ‘Enact laws, amend them, repeal them, and give them authentic interpretation...’, while subparagraph 11) attributes the power to ‘Enact the ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the Republic’. The attribution given by the first subparagraph refers to a very broad power that corresponds in general to ordinary or common laws, whereas that of subparagraph 11) is of a special character, as deduced from Articles 176, 177, 178, 179, and 180 in relation to Article 125, all of the Political Constitution. By contemplating these powers separately, the Constitution prescribes that they are different legislative acts, with a different nature and content. It does not matter that the budget is a formal and material law and the other laws also have this character; the case is that the specialty and content of budget laws caused the constituent to create a special and separate procedure for them. Being, then, the budget of the Republic a formal and material law but special for the matter that constitutes it, the Legislative Branch cannot validly regulate, in the exercise of the budgetary power, matters of a different nature or content. In short, having established that the challenged norm is a general, non-budgetary norm, issued through a budget law, with necessary and inevitable violation of the constitutional procedure, the consequence is to declare it contrary to the Political Constitution” (Judgment N°2765-1993 of 3:09 p.m. on June 15, 1993, emphasis added. In identical terms, on this type of provisions, see among many others, N°1466-1990 of 3:15 p.m. on October 30, 1990, N°4790-1993 of 8:54 a.m. on September 30, 1993, and N°121-1989 of 11:00 a.m. on November 23, 1989) In the present case, there are no grounds to vary the criterion already expressed on the matter, nor have issues of public order been raised that would justify reconsidering the question, and in such circumstances, given the evident unconstitutionality affecting the challenged norm, the content of which—it is reiterated—does not fit within a budget law, it is appropriate to grant this action and annul, as contrary to the Law of the Constitution, Article 29 of the Law of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic, N°7108 of November 8, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight. This declaration is declaratory and its effects retroactive to the date of issuance of the provision being annulled, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, under the terms of numerals 89 and 90 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

**V) SCOPING (DIMENSIONAMIENTO).** On the other hand, as indicated by the participants in this matter and as verified by this Chamber, Article 29 of Law N°7108—challenged here—was repealed by the so-called Framework Pension Law (Ley Marco de Pensiones), Nº7302 of July 8, 1992, “Creation of the general pension regime chargeable to the national budget, other special regimes, and reform of Law Nº7092 of April 21, 1988, and its reforms, Income Tax Law”, whose Chapter III, “On the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic”, in its Articles 16, 17, and 18, established the following:

“**Chapter III. ON THE PENSION REGIME OF FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC** **ARTICLE 16.-** Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall be entitled to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem allowances and representation expenses), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be chargeable to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

**ARTICLE 17.-** The pensions of Former Presidents of the Republic shall be readjusted when the salary of Deputies is readjusted.

**ARTICLE 18.-** At the time of their death, the beneficiaries established by the Regulations of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall be entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) of the amount of the pension, under the same conditions set forth therein.” Note that this involves a defect of origin in the legislative procedure, and since then, more than three decades have elapsed, with the period of validity of the article in question having extended for a period of less than four years, during which the persons who held the Presidency received the amount of the pension in good faith, a situation that cannot be reversed now on the occasion of this ruling (doctrine of numeral 34 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 91 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the effects of the present unconstitutionality must be scoped (dimensionados), meaning that the decreed nullity does not in any way affect, nor does it generate a right to recovery of the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension, during its validity and on the occasion of that provision; which, it is reiterated, must be considered as received in good faith. It will be so ordered in the operative part of this judgment.

**VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.** The parties are warned that if any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, has been provided, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the “Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial)”, approved by the Full Court in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

**THEREFORE:** By majority vote, the action is granted. Consequently, Article 29 of Law N°7108, “Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario of November 8, 1988, which provides: “*Art. 29.- The amount of the pensions of the former Presidents of the Republic shall be equal to the amount of a deputy’s salary*”, is annulled as unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive to the date of enactment of the annulled norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. In accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the effects of this pronouncement are scoped, in the sense that what is ordered in this action does not in any way affect, nor does it generate a right to recovery of, the amounts received by the beneficiaries of said pension, during the validity and on the occasion of that provision. Let it be communicated to the Legislative Assembly, published in full in the Judicial Bulletin, and summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Let it be notified. Magistrate Garro Vargas dissents and declares the action dismissed for reasons of admissibility.

Fernando Castillo Víquez Fernando Cruz Castro Paul Rueda Leal Luis Fdo Salazar Alvarado Jorge Araya García Anamari Garro Vargas Hubert Fernández Argüello **File No. 23-005771-007-CO** **Resolution No. 2024-000362** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS** Respectful of the majority criterion, I dissent and consider that this action should be dismissed for reasons of admissibility.

It should be noted that in the *sub lite* matter, the petitioner was warned to detail what he considered his standing (legitimación) to be to bring this constitutional control process. When responding to the warning, he stated the following:

“*And although it may be said that this citizen would unilaterally lack standing, either individually or collectively, it is evident that regarding the challenged atypical norms, as in the present case, no one would have it, except in a totally indirect or reflected manner; AND ONLY BEING OBLIGATED AS A TAXPAYER, JUST AS ALL CITIZENS ARE, to cover the increases in remunerations as in this case occurs WITH THE PAYMENT OF OUR TAXES, to give economic content to an equalization of the pensions of former presidents of the republic to the income of deputies* (sic)*. I reiterate, without any actuarial study existing, nor consultations with anyone, creating undue advantages through the deputies who legislate it, using resources that will undoubtedly be obtained, with all certainty, from the taxes that all citizens pay or have the duty to pay*”.

That is, he limited himself to concretely questioning the provision of Art. 29 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7108 of November 8, 1988, for having been introduced through a budget law and without any foundation.

Therefore, I consider that he lacks standing for two reasons. Firstly, the petitioner lacks standing to challenge this atypical norm, alleging that it harms public funds, since, as will be seen, when the Chamber examined its material content, it dismissed such harm.

In this regard, it is pertinent to recall that although the acting president of the Legislative Assembly did not specifically refer to the petitioner's standing to bring the unconstitutionality action, she did report that the concretely challenged norm was tacitly repealed by Art. 16 of Law 7302 of July 8, 1992. This specific point was also highlighted by the PGR (Procuraduría General de la República) in the following terms:

“*[T]he truth is that* ***subsequently, through an ordinary legal reform introduced by the General Law of Pensions Chargeable to the National Budget (Ley General de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional), No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, in Chapter III “On the Pension Regime of Former Presidents of the Republic”, its Article 16 provided a similar norm, whereby the monthly pension of constitutionally elected Former Presidents shall be equal to the income of a deputy*** *(per diem allowances and representation expenses), starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term*.” (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

This is relevant for the examination of the admissibility of the action, because with said law, the same material content of the provision that had been included in a budget law was legislated in an ordinary norm. That is, it is verified that the material content of the norm challenged by the actor was certainly replicated in an ordinary law. Art. 16 of the Law of the General Pension Regime Chargeable to the National Budget, known as “Ley Marco de Pensiones”, expressly states the following:

“*Art. 16.-* ***Former Presidents of the Republic who have been constitutionally elected shall be entitled to enjoy a monthly pension equal to the income of a deputy (per diem allowances and representation expenses***)*, starting from the month immediately following the end of the corresponding presidential term. These pensions shall be chargeable to the National Budget and shall be processed ex officio by the National Pensions Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security*.” (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Precisely, that reform was already examined by the Chamber, and it dismissed its unconstitutionality for an alleged harm to public funds. Concretely, in judgment [n.°2018-006137](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743907), it resolved the following:

“*II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The petitioner challenges Article 16 of Law No. 7302 of July 8, 1992, General Pension Regime Chargeable to the National Budget, insofar as it establishes that: (…)* *The petitioner generally questions the existence of the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic, while alleging that the granting of such pensions does not correspond to any of the contingencies provided for in constitutional article 73.* *III.- ON THE MERITS. This Tribunal considers that the alleged unconstitutionality is not configured. It must be preliminarily clarified that this Tribunal has already indicated that the general pension regime and the special pension regimes provided for in Law No. 7302, including the Pension Regime for Former Presidents of the Republic, should not be confused, as they have a different nature. While the first regime has the character of contributory pensions, in which a labor-type right is recognized that originates in part from the prior contribution of the worker, the aforementioned special pension regimes have the character of non-contributory or grace pensions, which are granted as recognition for the relevance of the work or services that a type of person has performed (Judgment No. 4852-95 of 09:42 a.m. on September 1, 1995). In the specific case of Article 16 of Law No. 7302, it is clear that its ratio legis is to guarantee a dignified subsistence to those who specifically held the position of President of the Republic, that is, to those who have rendered their services in the highest position of leadership and responsibility of The Nation (Articles 130, 139, 140, and 147 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, this is a very particular and exceptional case, different from the general pension regime provided for in constitutional article 73, but one that finds sufficient and reasonable legal support in the attempt to ensure a dignified subsistence exclusively to the Former Presidents of the Republic, in accordance with the decorum proper to the office they held. Regarding this point, the Attorney General's Office, in legal opinion No.

122-J of July 23, 2003, affirmed that ‘</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the granting of pensions to former Presidents of the Republic, as in other countries, is intended to ensure that they, once they have ceased to hold office, can meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised; and also with the purpose of establishing, in the event of their passing, some measures of protection for their closest family members´ and, furthermore, noted ‘the stated purpose, as well as the high investiture of the office exercised, are sufficient grounds to justify that such economic benefits in favor of former Presidents of the Republic, could in no way be considered as discriminatory, unreasonable, and disproportionate privileges</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">’. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Considerations which are shared by this Court, and therefore it cannot be deemed that the mere existence of such a special pension regime constitutes per se a violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, or non-discrimination, nor ‒in general‒ a violation of the Law of the Constitution.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">IV.- It should be reiterated, moreover, that the granting of pensions to former Presidents is not something exclusive to Costa Rica, but rather, on the contrary, it occurs in various American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States of America, Mexico, and Peru. In the Chilean case, for example, it is the Constitution itself that provides, according to the provisions of its articles 30 and 62, that the former President of the Republic shall receive an allowance equivalent to the remuneration of a Minister of State, including all the corresponding assignments. In Argentina, Law No. 24,018 establishes that the former President of the Nation shall receive a lifetime monthly allowance, which shall be the sum that, for all purposes, corresponds to the remuneration of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. In Bolivia, Law No. 376 provides for a ‘Pecuniary Recognition for Citizens who Exercised the Constitutional Presidency and Vice Presidency of the State,’ for a sum equivalent to ten (10) national minimum salaries monthly, an amount to be paid by the General Treasury of the Nation (TGN), which they shall receive for life. The Organic Law of the Public Service of Ecuador establishes in its article 135 that: ‘a monthly lifetime pension equivalent to seventy-five percent of the current remuneration is established, in favor of the former Constitutional Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Republic, who are constitutionally elected by popular vote and have taken office, except for those officials whose mandate is revoked.’ In Peru, Law No. 26519 provides, in its article 1, that ‘former Constitutional Presidents of the Republic shall enjoy a pension equivalent to the total income of an active Congressperson.’ In the Colombian case, article 2 of Law No. 48 of 1962 establishes, in its first paragraph, that every former President of the Republic shall have the ‘right to enjoy a lifetime pension or old-age pension if they have remained in the service of the State for twenty continuous or discontinuous years and if they have reached fifty years of age.’ Likewise, the second paragraph of that same section provides that ‘[w]hile they lack any of these requirements, they may enjoy the special pension for the former President.’ The Colombian Constitutional Court resolved a constitutional challenge filed against the aforementioned special pension, in which it was alleged, in essence, that the challenged regulation established an unjustified privilege that infringed upon the very essence of the notion of a pension, since it enshrined this right for former Presidents of the Republic in a special and lifetime manner simply by having exercised the Presidency under any title and for any period, without consideration of the pensioner’s age or contribution time. However, the Constitutional Court, in judgment No. C-989/99 of December 9, 1999, considered ‒as relevant‒ the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">‘</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; color:#2d2d2d\">9. The office of President of the Republic, in a presidential system of government such as the one that governs among us, signifies the highest public responsibility. The President combines the condition of Head of State, Head of Government, and supreme administrative authority. As Head of State, they symbolize and represent national unity and sovereignty, direct international relations, defend territorial integrity, and direct, as supreme commander, the public force, among other things; as Head of Government, they exercise functions such as the political leadership of the State and the direction of the economy, and as supreme administrative authority, they are responsible for the correct execution of the national public function. For these tasks they are elected by direct popular vote and by an absolute majority of votes, in a national constituency. They have, therefore, political support and confidence granted directly and exclusively to them, by at least half of the electors, a circumstance that is not present for any other office of popular election. Not accepting that all these particular circumstances attribute a special dignity to them means ignoring an undeniable political and legal reality.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; color:#2d2d2d\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; color:#2d2d2d\">This particular circumstance places the president in a situation of special merit and respect within society. Regardless of whether their administration is or is not politically shared, it is obvious that the dignity of their investiture is superior to that of all citizens. It provides sufficient legal support for the exception introduced by the challenged regulations regarding the pension access requirements. In effect, such an exception constitutes not only a well-deserved monetary recognition that rewards the special service rendered to the Nation, but also stands as a means to provide congruously for the needs that originate from the special position implied by being a former President of the Republic. It is not hidden from anyone that this position imposes a life with certain special requirements of decorum, which are not always within reach of someone who has ceased to exercise the first magistracy, either for lack of own resources or because of the de facto limitation in which someone who has occupied that position finds themselves to exercise any type of office or profession, for reasons that precisely touch upon the dignity of the Nation or even ethical factors.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; color:#2d2d2d; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">10. The fact of having effectively occupied the office of President of the Republic by having been elected by the majority vote of their compatriots, the fact of having been the guarantor of sovereignty and symbolized national unity, of having taken charge of the immense historical responsibility attached to the office of first official, in short, are sufficient reasons to confer the special merit recognized to former presidents. (…)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; color:#2d2d2d\">11. Thus, because of the very special dignity and responsibility involved in the office of President of the Republic, it is not equal to any other job or trade performed in the public sector, and therefore the exceptional legal treatment introduced by the accused norms, in principle, responds to this particular difference in situation and is therefore justified in light of the Constitution. Likewise, such treatment pursues a purpose, which is the already mentioned one of rewarding the former president and providing for their dignified subsistence, and these purposes conform to the Charter, because the axiology that informs it indicates that it is the duty of the State to achieve justice. It is just that the public treasury exceptionally reward the citizens who have also rendered exceptional services, and that it does so in a manner proportional to their needs of personal decorum. If justice consists of giving each one what they deserve, the challenged regulations precisely realize this notion’.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">It then added that:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">‘While it is true that at first glance it might not seem that former presidents are in a special situation of weakness that merits public resources being allocated to cover their pension under the exceptional terms enshrined in the law, a deeper examination of the situation reveals that this is not so evident. Indeed, it has been said that someone who has occupied the office of President of the Republic remains burdened with special duties of decorum in their personal life, and that for reasons of the same nature, besides others of an ethical nature, they are not in a position to access any job or to carry out any trade or profession. The Fatherland legitimately expects that such persons maintain for the rest of their lives the dignity that was granted to them. It is true that in some cases former presidents have their own assets that allow them to bear this situation; but the Law, which is issued to regulate the generality of situations, cannot start from the unproven and unprovable assumption that all of them are or will be in the future in such a situation of ample economic solvency. Therefore, on the basis that citizens of any economic or social condition can and do accede to the First Magistracy, as history demonstrates, the law provides for their dignified subsistence’.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Considerations that are also applicable to the Costa Rican case, in order to understand the rationale that reasonably inspires the content and scope of the provision challenged in the present action.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">V.- As a corollary of the foregoing, the existence of the aforementioned special pension regime cannot be considered incompatible with the Law of the Constitution. It must be noted, in any case, that the creation of said regime ultimately responds to a clear assumption of the legislator’s freedom of configuration. Regarding the aforementioned freedom of configuration, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2003-5090 of 14:44 hours on June 11, 2003, stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">‘(…) The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power. This extensive room for maneuver regarding the subject matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, faced with a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, as it has the Law of the Constitution as its limit, that is, the constitutional block conformed by constitutional provisions and customs, values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence issued by this Court for similar cases’.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Therefore, ultimately, the maintenance of the aforementioned special pension regime depends on the political determination that, in accordance with its broad legislative discretion, the Legislative Assembly adopts, which is called to constitute itself as the highest representative body of the people and of the different political, social, and economic forces that make up the State (articles 1 and 105 of the Political Constitution), so that within its bosom the plurality of worldviews, thoughts, and interests that integrate Costa Rican society are expressed’ (judgment No. 2013-12014 of 14:30 hrs. on September 11, 2013).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">VI.- By reason of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that it is appropriate to reject the action under study on the merits, as so ordered.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> (The highlighting does not belong to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In accordance with the considerations made, it is noted that this Court has already ruled regarding the constitutionality of the pensions granted to former Presidents of the Republic, discarding that it is an unfounded, unreasonable, or disproportionate privilege, since its regulation does not respond to a contributory regime ‒as intended by the petitioner‒, but rather to a decision of the legislator intended to enable these public servants to meet their personal and political needs with the dignity and decorum that correspond to the high functions exercised, which, as reflected in the precedent, is a common norm in Comparative Law. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Therefore, given that the Chamber has already discarded that this type of determination is unreasonable for causing a supposed injury to public funds, the petitioner’s reproach and the standing invoked remain unsubstantiated. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Secondly, the only grievance that would remain subsistent in this proceeding would be the approval of the provision through an extraordinary budget law ‒a presumed atypical norm. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) stated that the petitioner lacks standing because the Chamber has not admitted direct standing to challenge the so-called “atypical norms” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">solely for the interest of questioning the manner in which they were approved</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. At the corresponding hearing, the PGR reported the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“As can be seen, despite having been warned, the petitioner does not actually explain or argue adequately and sufficiently what the substantial legal situation is that, beyond the mere existence of the challenged atypical norm, grants them standing to file a direct action, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">since they limit themselves to alluding to the defense of supposed diffuse interests related to the correct management of public funds involved in equating the pensions of former Presidents to the income of Deputies; the ‘interest of absolutely the entire Costa Rican community,’ as they expressly affirm. This is relevant because this Chamber has noted that it cannot be deemed that a popular action exists to challenge the so-called atypical norms, by reason of a mere interest in seeking objective adequacy with the constitutional legal order</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">”. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(The highlighting does not belong to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">That is, as noted by the PGR, regarding the generic allegation about the law’s approval through a budget law, the petitioner lacks direct standing, according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber. In that regard, this court has stated the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“[A]ware of the jurisdictional consensus that exists on the unconstitutionality of including non-budgetary general norms in the National Budget, granting standing for a direct action in this case would practically be equivalent to having to also authorize it against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional flaws, even when those conflicts are of another nature, that interest —however laudable— being too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> (Judgment </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">No. 1990-1775</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, which was subsequently reiterated in judgments numbers </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">2012-010571</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">2013-001496</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">2016-011975, and 2020-018840</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In judgment </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">No. 2016-011975</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the Chamber expanded its considerations, explaining the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In fact, the petitioner’s arguments focus solely on reproaching, by itself, the approval procedure of said normative provision, in an apparent mere interest in seeking objective adequacy with the constitutional legal order; in which case, if the possibility were admitted for the petitioner to file an unconstitutionality action in this matter, under the conditions intended by them, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">it would imply —ultimately— recognizing the existence of a popular action, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 hrs. on January 20, 2016), does not fit within the framework of the procedural competencies that this Constitutional Court has for this purpose</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> (The highlighting does not belong to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Subsequently, in judgment </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">No. 2016-016118</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, it reiterated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“This is relevant, because </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">this Chamber has noted that it cannot be deemed that a popular action exists to challenge the so-called atypical norms</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\"> by reason of a mere interest in seeking objective adequacy with the constitutional legal order.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(The highlighting does not belong to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In which case, following the jurisprudential line of this Court, it can be affirmed that the petitioner does not have sufficient standing to file this constitutional review proceeding, if what they assert is that the provision was approved by a budget law. Especially since, as noted, the ordinary legislator itself issued a subsequent regulation that enshrined in an ordinary norm the purpose of equating the pensions of former Presidents of the Republic to the salaries of legislators. Said provision, as noted before, was not challenged in this constitutional review proceeding and, furthermore, has already been examined by the Chamber, which discarded that it is unreasonable, disproportionate, or discriminatory. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Moreover, in a precedent of this Court that examined a situation very similar to the one raised in the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">sub lite</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> ‒in which the approval of a norm of ordinary content in a budget law was challenged, but which was subsequently also approved by an ordinary law‒ it was concluded that the petitioner lacked standing to bring the unconstitutionality action as it was equivalent to a popular action, but it was equally determined that the proceeding lacked any interest to the extent that the situation had been resolved by the legislator itself. Thus, in judgment </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">No. 1993-3183</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the following was resolved:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“1. The petitioner considers that article 78 of Law 7051 published in La Gaceta number 211 of November six, nineteen eighty-six, is one of the so-called 'atypical norms,' included through an irregular procedure, in the Extraordinary Budget Law 7135 of October eleven, nineteen eighty-nine. They add that, as this Chamber has already declared, those norms are unconstitutional as they are created in a manner contrary to the provisions of articles 121 subsections 1 and 11, 124, 125, 176, 177, and 180 of the Political Constitution, and request that it be so declared, annulling the norm from the legal order.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">I. Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction allows the filing of an unconstitutionality action without a 'base case,' when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole.</span></p> But as this Chamber has already indicated (judgment number 1182-93), it cannot be interpreted that when the law mentions the rights that concern the community as a whole, it refers to the national community, since that supposition would be equivalent to accepting and recognizing a public-interest standing (acción popular) that does not exist, given the current wording of the cited article. (...) II. On the other hand, this action lacks current interest, since Law number 7334 of April sixteenth of this year promulgated a specific article that allows one hundred percent of the net profit resulting from the Instant Lottery to be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda. The text of the provision reads verbatim:

"Article 11: One hundred percent of the resulting net profit shall be transferred directly to the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda for housing investment programs, and for the Fondo de Subsidios para la Vivienda programs managed by the latter Institution." The discussion, then, as to whether the provision is atypical or not, lacks any significance, because through the ordinary procedure the transfer of these funds to housing programs has been authorized. Thus, a substantive ruling in this action is unnecessary, especially since it has not been possible to demonstrate that either in the case of the petitioner or in that of any other citizen, any injury has been caused to a legitimate interest that deserves to be recognized or compensated through the mechanisms established by the administration of justice. The petitioner's interest seemed to be—as deduced from his filing brief—to ensure that the provision was enacted through an ordinary law; that requirement has already been met with the recent issuance of the aforementioned legislation, thus satisfying that interest." In summary, in light of the precedents of this Tribunal, I consider it appropriate to dismiss the acción de inconstitucionalidad on grounds of admissibility, given that the petitioner lacks standing to challenge the provision by invoking the alleged injury to public funds, since in another action this Chamber already discarded such injury when examining an identical provision. Also because with respect to the other ground of unconstitutionality alleged, that the normative content was included in a budget law, it is not appropriate to invoke direct standing.

Anamari Garro V.

PROCESO: ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ACCIONANTE: Nombre01 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fourteen hundred hours and twenty-six minutes on the thirteenth of June of two thousand twenty-four.

Taking into account that Magistrate Jorge Araya García is on sick leave, and in order not to delay the processing of the appeal, let the judgment issued in this matter be notified without his signature, which shall be affixed once he returns to his duties.

Fernando Castillo V

Res. N°2024-000362 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas cuarenta minutos del diez de enero de dos mil veinticuatro.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por Nombre01, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad n.°CED01 en contra del artículo 29 de la ley n.°7108 “Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988”, por estimar que infringe los numerales 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Sala Constitucional a las 10:21 hrs. del 13 de marzo de 2023, el señor Nombre01 interpuso acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra del art. 29 de la ley n.°7108 “Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988”, por estimar que infringe los numerales 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política.

Análisis pormenorizado de los agravios El numeral impugnado busca equiparar las pensiones de los expresidentes de la República a los ingresos de diputados y gastos de representación, en violación de los arts. 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política. La ley n.°7108 modificó la ley 313 de “Pensiones de Expresidentes” sin justificación técnica alguna. Tal acción perjudicó el erario público y así, mediante un privilegio odioso, se benefician pocas personas. La acción no tiene como fin atacar las pensiones de los expresidentes, pues son derechos adquiridos; empero, sí cuestiona que se equiparen la pensiones a los ingresos de los diputados. Tal situación carece de fundamento técnico y crea un beneficio de honor que no debe ser costeado por el pueblo de Costa Rica. A los expresidentes ya se les pagó el salario mensual, las vacaciones, el aguinaldo y las prestaciones correspondientes al final de cada periodo presidencial. La equiparación a los ingresos de los diputados no genera derechos adquiridos, sino que se trató de una reforma que creó un beneficio. Al ser equiparaciones sin fundamento técnico ni legal, así como elevadísimas y desproporcionadas, se crea una casta privilegiada. Al no haberse dado ese privilegio mediante una ley ordinaria, la norma careció de una discusión rígida de parte de los diputados. La equiparación implementada permite abusos para pagar pensiones de honor, sin que los expresidentes hayan cotizado, contrario a como sí lo hacen los magistrados y demás funcionarios públicos. En el caso de los expresidentes no solo reciben una pensión equiparada a los ingresos de los diputados, sino que también es superior al “100% de sus ingresos no cotizados ante la CCSS” y con cargo al presupuesto de la República. Considera que la norma impugnada discrimina a quienes sí han cotizado y que tales circunstancias contravienen los arts. 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política.

Sobre el fondo Sostiene que no existe exposición de motivos alguna de parte de la Asamblea Legislativa para equiparar las pensiones de los expresidentes a los ingresos de los diputados, ni existen estudios técnicos que apoyen la propuesta. Algunas personas, hijos o herederos de expresidentes, sin haber realizado cotización alguna, reciben ingresos mensuales equiparados a los diputados “como si fueran realeza”. Explica que plantea la acción de marras por la violación de los arts. 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política y no contra las pensiones de los expresidentes, pues según la ley n.°313 corresponde a un derecho adquirido. Al contrario, aclara que solo impugna el artículo 29 de la ley n.°7108 porque:

“1) Esa EQUIPARACION (sic) NO GENERA DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS 2) Esa EQUIPARACION (sic) es ABUSIVA.

• 3)Esa EQUIPARACION (sic) NO HA PAGADO COTIZACION (sic) AL ESTADO NUNCA.
• 4)Esa EQUIPARACION (sic) NO CUENTA CON EXPOSICION (sic) DE MOTIVOS LEGISLATIVOS, NI DISCUSION (sic) EN DEBATE REGLADO.
• 5)Esa EQUIPARACION (sic) no cuenta con FUNDAMENTACION (sic) de parte de la Sala de la Jurisdicción Constitucional de la República de Costa Rica.
• 6)Porque esos recursos pertenecen al Pueblo, NO a los Expresidentes o sus Herederos.
• 7)PORQUE TODOS LOS DINEROS PAGADOS A PARTIR DE LA EQUIPARACION (sic) QUE GENERA EL ARTICULO (sic) 29 DE LA LEY 7108 DE PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO DE LA REPUBLICA (sic) DEBEN SER REINTEGRADOS A LAS ARCAS DEL ESTADO, O SEA AL PUEBLO DE COSTA RICA.
• 8)Porque el Artículo 29 de la Ley 7108 de PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO, ES SOLO PARA ESE PERIODO PRESUPUESTARIO, YA QUE EN LAS LEYES DE PRESUPUESTO DE SIGUIENTES, EN TODAS DEBEN INDICARSE EN CADA PRESUPUESTO Y NO PUEDEN CREAR LEYES ORDINARIAS DE APLICACIÓN PERPETUA.
• 9)Porque el Artículo 29 de la Ley 7108 de PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO, NO INDICA EXPRESAMENTE además modifica la Ley 313, SOLO CREA UNA LEY ORDINARIA DENTRO DE UNA LEY DE MODIFICACION (sic) PRESUPUESTARIA EXTRAORDINARIA (…)
• 10)Porque las PENSIONES VITALICIAS DE LOS EXPRESIDENTES, PER SE GENERAN DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS, PERO LA EQUIPARACION (sic) DE LAS PENSIONES VITALICIAS A LOS EXPRESIDENTES VIA (sic) ARTICULO (sic) DE LA LEY 7108 DEL 08 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1988, LEY DE PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO DE LA REPUBLICA (sic) NO GENERA DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS.
• 11)Porque LA EQUIPARACION (sic) DE LAS PENSIONES VITALICIAS A LOS EXPRESIDENTES VIA (sic) ARTICULO (sic) DE LA LEY 7108 DEL 08 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1988, LEY DE PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO DE LA REPUBLICA (sic), se trata de UN PRIVILEGIO ODIOSO.
• 12)Porque LA EQUIPARACION (sic) DE LAS PENSIONES VITALICIAS A LOS EXPRESIDENTES VIA (sic) ARTICULO (sic) DE LA LEY 7108 DEL 08 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1988, LEY DE PRESUPUESTO EXTRAORDINARIO DE LA REPUBLICA (sic), requiere de CONSULTA POPULAR EN REFERENDUM (sic), POR TRATARSE DE UNA EQUIPARACION (sic) QUE PROMUEVE UNA EROGACION (sic) DE RECURSOS PUBLICOS (sic) PARA BENEFICIO DE PERSONAS PARTICULARES, QUE LUEGO DE SUS FUNCIONES, SON IGUALES ENTRE IGUALES, ELLOS LOS EXPRESIDENTES Y MAS (sic) SUS HEREDEROS”.

El accionante se fundamenta en los numerales 1, 2, 3, 8, 73 inciso a), 77, siguientes y concordantes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC); los arts. 7, 10, 11, 27, 28, 33, 39, 42, 48 y 50 de la Constitución Política; 8 párrafo 1° de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, así como el art. 10 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, art. 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos.

Con base en los argumentos expuestos, el recurrente solicita: 1) suspender el pago de la equiparación de las pensiones vitalicias de los expresidentes a los ingresos de los diputados y que solo se les pague la pensión ordinaria hasta tanto la Sala no resuelva la acción de inconstitucionalidad; y, 2) que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del art. 29 de la ley n.°7108.

2.- Por resolución de las 19:52 hrs. de 17 de abril de 2023 la Presidencia de la Sala realizó la siguiente prevención a la parte accionante:

“Especificar cuál es el asunto previo pendiente de resolver sobre el cual basa la acción, o bien señalar las razones que le confieren legitimación para accionar directamente; b.- En caso de existir asunto previo, deberá aportar copia certificada del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas cuestionadas, de manera expresa y con anterioridad a la interposición de la acción, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima vulnerado”.

3.- El 20 de abril de 2023, el accionante dio cumplimiento a la prevención realizada e indicó:

“Se me previene como accionante Nombre01 que dentro del tercero día, contado a partir del siguiente a la notificación de esta resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, que deberé: Especificar cuál es el asunto previo pendiente de resolver sobre el cual baso la acción según artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción de Constitucionalidad, “o bien señalar las razones que le confieren legitimación para accionar directamente” Por lo que sostiene que se acoge a las líneas finales de lo supracitado, pues no existe procedimiento para recurrir normas atípicas que se aprobaron mediante presupuestos extraordinarios de la República.

En cuanto a su legitimación, el accionante asevera que proviene de la existencia de un interés difuso en el control de los fondos públicos. Además, arguye que, al tratarse de una norma atípica, solo se está legitimado de una manera totalmente indirecta, pues como contribuyente está obligado los aumentos de las remuneraciones. Manifiesta que una vez que se le de audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), esta dirá que no tiene legitimidad para ejercer su impugnación, al no existir un proceso previo en el que se discuta la aplicación de la norma. Empero, asevera que en acciones de inconstitucionalidad planteadas contra normas atípicas no se establece una acción popular, solo existe la acción directa y excepcionalmente, en casos de interés difuso, debe admitirse la acción sin un asunto previo, pues de lo contrario ningún ciudadano podría impugnar esas normas.

4.- Mediante resolución de las 11:02 hrs. del 9 de mayo de 2023, la Presidencia de la Sala Constitucional dio curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Además, se ordenó la publicación de los edictos correspondientes en el Boletín Judicial. Se le confirió audiencia a la PGR y al presidente del Directorio Legislativo.

5.- Por escrito recibido en esta Sala Constitucional el día 22 de mayo de 2023 contestó la audiencia MAGDA INÉS ROJAS CHAVES en su condición de Procuradora General Adjunta de la República Sobre los presupuestos de admisibilidad:

Considera que, pese habérsele prevenido al accionante, en realidad no se explica ni argumenta de forma adecuada y suficiente cuál es la situación jurídica sustancial que, más allá de la mera existencia de una norma atípica, legitime al accionante a acudir a la Sala, pues se limita a hacer referencia a la defensa de supuestos intereses difusos relacionados con el correcto manejo de los fondos públicos. Manifiesta que lo anterior es importante porque la Sala ha señalado que no existe una acción popular para accionar contra las normas atípicas. En este sentido cita la sentencia n.°2016-011975 de las 9:30 hrs. del 24 de agosto de 2016. De esta manera, la PGR considera que la acción es inadmisible y debe ser rechazada.

Informe sobre el fondo En cuanto al régimen especial no contributivo de pensiones de expresidentes se realiza la siguiente reseña histórico-normativa:

“Según hemos referido en nuestra jurisprudencia administrativa, como antecedente jurídico-normativo del reconocimiento de pensiones especiales a los ex Presidentes de la República, podemos encontrar la Ley Nº313 de 23 de agosto de 1939, denominada "Ley de Pensiones para ex Presidentes", la que otorgaba dicho beneficio a quienes llegasen a ocupar constitucionalmente la Primera Magistratura, y fallecidos éstos, a sus viudas, por un monto mensual de ¢500,oo, no sujeto a mermas ni deducciones de ninguna naturaleza.

Posteriormente, el citado monto de pensión asignable se incrementó en varias oportunidades; por ejemplo, mediante la Ley Nº259 de 2 de noviembre de 1948 se aumentó a ¢1.000,oo y por Ley Nº1124 de 20 de diciembre de 1949, fue no sujeta a revalidaciones. Luego por Ley Nº2264 de 24 de noviembre de 1958 se acrecentó a ¢3.000,oo mensuales.

Igual ocurrió con la Ley Nº5510 de 19 de abril de 1974, denominada Ley de Pensiones ex-Presidentes, beneméritos y símbolos nacionales, por la que se incrementó dicha pensión a ¢5.000,oo mensuales. Sin embargo, interesa advertir que con esta última normativa se amplió la cobertura de dicho beneficio, pues ya no sólo amparaba a los exPresidentes de la República que hubieren sido elegidos constitucionalmente, sino también al exVicepresidente de la República que hubiere reemplazado en ausencia absoluta al Presidente de la República, y que hubiese ocupado el cargo por más de medio período. Similar previsión se hizo con la Ley Nº6413 de 5 de mayo de 1980, que también incrementó el monto de la pensión asignable a ¢15.000,oo mensuales.

No podemos obviar que a través del artículo 9º, norma quincuagésima de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario para 1979 –Nº6305 de 21 de diciembre de 1978-, se adicionó el artículo 1º de la citada Ley 313, a efecto de incluir como beneficiarias de una pensión igual a la de las viudas de los ex Presidentes o ex Vicepresidentes de la República, a aquellas personas que hubieran tenido la condición de Primera Dama. Situación que vino a ser ratificada por las Leyes de Presupuesto para 1981 –Nº6542 de 22 de diciembre de 1981-, artículo 9º, norma 49, y para 1982 –Nº6700 de 23 de diciembre de 1981-, artículo 9º, norma 48 (Las dos últimas normas atípicas fueron anulados por resolución de la Sala Constitucional Nº 2136 de las 14:00 horas del 23 de octubre de 1991).

Y por Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, No. 7108 de 8 de noviembre de 1988, su artículo 29 -norma impugnada- incrementó y equiparó el monto de las pensiones de los señores ex Presidentes, igual al salario de un diputado.

Con la Ley Nº7302 de 8 de julio de 1992, denominada " Creación del régimen general de pensiones con cargo al presupuesto nacional, de otros regímenes especiales y reforma a la ley Nº7092 de 21 de abril de 1988 y sus reformas, Ley del impuesto sobre la renta", conocida como "Ley Marco de Pensiones", que vino a unificar los requisitos para jubilarse por cualquiera de los regímenes especiales de pensiones del Estado –salvo los del Poder Judicial y del magisterio Nacional-, se previó un Capítulo III, denominado "Del Régimen de Pensiones de los ex Presidentes de la República", que vino a derogar las disposiciones específicas previstas por la Ley Nº313 y sus reformas. Dicho Capítulo dispone lo siguiente:

"Capítulo III DEL REGIMEN DE PENSIONES DE LOS EXPRESIDENTES DE LA REPUBLICA ARTICULO 16.- Los Expresidentes de la República que hubiesen sido electos constitucionalmente, tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente. Estas pensiones estarán a cargo del Presupuesto Nacional y serán tramitadas de oficio por el Departamento Nacional de Pensiones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

ARTICULO 17.- Las pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República se reajustarán, cuando se reajuste el salario de los Diputados.

ARTICULO 18.- En el momento de su fallecimiento, tendrán derecho a un setenta y cinco por ciento (75%) del monto de la pensión, los causahabientes que establece el Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y en las mismas condiciones consignadas en él” En este orden de ideas, la PGR considera que el otorgamiento de pensiones a los expresidentes de la República tiene por objetivo garantizar que, una vez que hayan cesado su cargo, puedan atender sus necesidades personales y políticas con la dignidad y decoro que les corresponde por las altas funciones que ejercieron en el puesto previamente desempeñado. Así, arguye que no puede considerarse que se trata de un privilegio discriminatorio, irrazonable y desproporcionado. En esta línea, se informa lo siguiente:

“Criterio que ha sido plenamente compartido por esa Sala, al estimar que la mera existencia de tal régimen especial de pensiones no supone, de ningún modo, una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad proporcionalidad y no discriminación, ni en general una violación al Derecho de la Constitución (Resolución No. 2018-006137 de las 09:20 hrs. del 20 de abril de 2018).

Y fue por esa resolución que esa Sala declaró sin lugar una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el artículo 16 de la citada Ley No. 7302, en tanto dispone que los ex Presidentes tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), pues el accionante estimó que ese beneficio carecía de causa lícita y violaba el ordinal 73 constitucional.

En aquella resolución la Sala respaldó entonces la constitucionalidad del Régimen de Pensiones de los ex Presidentes de la República, y citando una resolución de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana -No. C-989/99 del 09 de diciembre de 1999-, entre otras cosas afirmó, que las pensiones de los expresidentes “… constituye no sólo un merecido reconocimiento monetario que retribuye el especial servicio prestado a la Nación, sino que se erige en un medio para proveer congruamente a las necesidades que se originan en la especial posición que implica el ser ex presidente de la República. A nadie se le oculta que esta posición impone el llevar una vida con ciertos requerimientos especiales de decoro, que no siempre están al alcance de quien ha dejado de ejercer la primera magistratura, bien por carecer de recursos propios o bien por la limitación de hecho en que se encuentra quien ha ocupado esa posición para ejercer cualquier tipo de cargos u oficios, por razones que tocan justamente con la dignidad de la Nación o incluso con factores éticos (…).” Y basada, adicionalmente, en que la creación del citado régimen especial de pensiones obedece, finalmente, a la libre configuración del legislador, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene la Asamblea Legislativa, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, dentro de una pluralidad de opciones similares y todas válidas, en aquella misma resolución la Sala estimó que el artículo 16 de la Ley No. 7302, por su ratio legis busca válidamente garantizar la subsistencia digna de quienes ocuparon específicamente el cargo de Presidente de la República, sea, a quienes han prestado sus servicios en la más alta posición de conducción y de responsabilidad de la Nación -arts. 130, 139, 140 y 147 constitucionales-. Tratándose de un supuesto muy particular y excepcional, diverso al régimen general de pensiones previsto por el artículo 73 de la Carta Política, pero que encuentra sustento jurídico”.

Luego, en lo relativo a la inconstitucionalidad de las normas atípicas presupuestarias realiza las siguientes consideraciones:

“Con respecto a los vicios alegados por el accionante, especialmente aquellos referidos a la inconstitucionalidad de la norma atípicas presupuestaria acusada, debemos indicar lo siguiente:

La ley de Presupuesto de la República es una Ley que se define tanto por su procedimiento, como por su contenido. Los artículos 176 –párrafo primero – y 180 constitucionales, fijan el contenido que debe tener la Ley de Presupuesto de la República.

En este sentido, se impone indicar que, conforme con las normas constitucionales citadas, la materia propia y especial de la Ley de Presupuesto es la relacionada con el establecimiento de la relación de ingresos probables y de la autorización de gastos de la administración durante el período fiscal correspondiente. Además, se entiende que la materia presupuestaria comprende las normas de ejecución presupuestaria necesarias para un determinado ejercicio económico. Se ha precisado, con tino, que no es procedente crear impuestos o cualquier otra forma de ingresos a través de una Ley de Presupuesto. A este respecto, importa citar el voto de la Sala Constitucional N.°1466-1990 de las 15:15 horas del 30 de octubre de 1990:

“Que esta Sala ha externado criterio en varias oportunidades en el sentido de que las únicas normas generales que pueden ser incluidas en las leyes de presupuesto son las que pretendan introducir parámetros de su ejecución, esto es, las denominadas "normas de ejecución presupuestaria". (Resoluciones 121-89 de las 11:00 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1989, 69- 90 de las 11:29 horas del 17 de enero de 1990 y otras). Inclusive en la primera de ellas se consideró inconstitucional el establecimiento de un impuesto en una ley de presupuesto. Siendo que, efectivamente, la ley N 6966 del 25 de setiembre de 1984 es una modificación al Presupuesto Ordinario para el mismo año, y que el artículo impugnado establece un impuesto a las exoneraciones, lo procedente es declararlo inconstitucional con fundamento en los precedentes citados.” Luego, es improcedente que se incorporen normas ajenas a la materia presupuestaria dentro de una Ley de Presupuesto de la República.

La jurisprudencia constitucional ha acuñado el concepto de “norma atípica” para denominar a toda disposición que, sin tener ninguna relación con la materia presupuestaria, sea, sin embargo, incluida dentro del presupuesto y nace dicha “atipicidad” cuando el legislador deroga, modifica, interpreta o incluso crea leyes ordinarias dentro del presupuesto. Se transcribe el voto N.°4790-1993 de las 8:54 horas del 30 de setiembre de 1993:

(…)

Conviene acotar que, si bien es indudable que el artículo 105 constitucional ha previsto, en general, que el pueblo, a través del sufragio le delega la potestad legislativa al Congreso, lo cierto es que los incisos 1) y 11) del numeral 121 también de la Constitución, distinguen entre dos diferentes modos y formas de legislar en razón de la materia de que se trate. El primer inciso le otorga a la Asamblea la potestad general de dictar leyes, reformarlas, derogarlas y darles interpretación auténtica – salvedad hecha de la potestad interpretativa del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en materia electoral -. En el ejercicio de la forma de legislar previsto en el artículo 121.1 constitucional, la Asamblea Legislativa debe seguir el procedimiento previsto en los artículos 123, 124, 125, 126, 127 y 128 constitucionales, y el cual comprende la prerrogativa de veto por parte del Poder Ejecutivo. De otro extremo, el numeral 121.11 prevé la potestad de dictar los presupuestos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la República para lo cual debe seguir el procedimiento prescrito en los ordinales 177,178, 179 y 180. Conforme el numeral 125 constitucional, parte in fine, el Poder Ejecutivo carece de la posibilidad de vetar la Ley de Presupuesto que haya sido aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa.

Es decir, que la Constitución ha distinguido entre la potestad general de legislar y la potestad de dictar las leyes de presupuesto de la República, de tal forma que es disconforme con la Constitución que se incorporen a dichas leyes, disposiciones o normas que sean ajenas a la materia presupuestaria, pues debe insistirse en que, en ejercicio de la potestad prevista en el numeral 121.11 de la Constitución, la Asamblea Legislativa debe circunscribirse a regular la materia presupuestaria. Se transcribe el voto de la Sala Constitucional N.°121-1989 de las 11:00 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1989:

(…)

Valga decir que la Sala Constitucional ha reiterado en múltiples ocasiones su jurisprudencia en relación con la inconstitucionalidad de las normas presupuestarias atípicas. (Ver votos: 6043-2002 de las 15:29 horas del 18 de junio de 2002, 3666-2003 de las 14:53 horas del 7 de mayo de 2003, N.° 3497-2005 de las 14:50 horas del 30 de marzo de 2005, N.° 14102-2006 de las 11:20 horas del 22 de setiembre de 2006, N.° 56-2008 de las 14:47 horas del 9 de enero de 2008).

Finalmente, conviene destacar, para efectos del presente asunto que, en su jurisprudencia, la Sala Constitucional ha destacado que se presumiría norma atípica toda aquella disposición incluida en la Ley de Presupuesto y que, sin embargo, innove, modifique o derogue la Legislación ordinaria. Se transcribe el voto N.° 242-2001 de las 14:44 horas del 10 de enero de 2001, reiterado recientemente por la resolución No. 2022-026652 de las 16:31 hrs. del 9 de noviembre de 2022:

“Ha sido criterio reiterado de esta Sala, que la Ley de Presupuesto, no puede válidamente contener normas de carácter general, ajenas a la materia de presupuesto. Es decir, no es válida la inclusión de normas atípicas que versen sobre materia propia de la legislación ordinaria, ya sea para la creación o modificación de ésta.” (Ver también voto N.° 7137-2007 de las 16:47 horas del 23 de mayo de 2007)”.

Así, en relación con el caso concreto, expone que la norma cuestionada regula materia diferente a la presupuestaria, pues no está relacionada con la ejecución del presupuesto, sino que modifica o adiciona la legislación ordinaria, al equiparar el monto de la pensión no contributiva de los expresidentes de la República al salario de los diputados. Considera que lo expuesto viola lo preceptuado en los arts. 121, incisos 1 y 11, 124, 125, 176, párrafo primero, 177 y 180 primer párrafo, todos de la Constitución Política, que fijan el procedimiento a seguir para la discusión, aprobación y modificación de los presupuestos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la República, distinto al de la ley ordinaria. En este sentido, asevera que la norma en cuestión es inconstitucional.

Empero, agrega las siguientes consideraciones:

“No obstante la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada por razones formales, pues con ella se utilizó el procedimiento prescrito por la Constitución para dictar los presupuestos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la República, para dictar o reformar, en su caso, una ley ordinaria, lo cierto es que posteriormente, por reforma legal ordinaria introducida por la Ley General de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, No. 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992, en el Capítulo III “Del Régimen de Pensiones de los Ex presidentes de la República”, en su artículo 16 se dispuso una norma similar, por la cual la pensión mensual de los Expresidentes constitucionalmente electos será igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente.

Aspecto este último que le resta evidente utilidad práctica a esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, pues el citado artículo 16 de la Ley No. 7302 no fue atacado por el accionante. Ello sin perjuicio de la facultad que otorga a la Sala el ordinal 89 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, conforme al cual, la sentencia que declare la inconstitucionalidad de una norma o ley o disposición general, podría declarar tam- bien la de los demás preceptos de ella, o de cualquier otra ley o disposición cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o consecuencia, así como la de los actos de aplicación cuestionados; aspecto que deberá ser evaluado en el momento procesal correspondiente.

No obstante, debemos recordar que “Para emprender un examen de razonabilidad de una norma, el Tribunal Constitucional requiere que la parte aporte prueba o al menos elementos de juicio en los que sustente su argumentación e igual carga procesal le corresponde a quien rebata los argumentos de la acción y la falta en el cumplimiento de estos requisitos, hace inaceptables los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior, debido a que no es posible hacer un análisis de <<razonabilidad>> sin la existencia de una línea argumentativa coherente que se encuentre probatoriamente respaldada." (Sala Constitucional, sentencia n.° 5236-99 de las 14:00 horas del 7 de julio de 1999, reiterada, entre muchas otras en la n.° 10153-2001 de las 14:44 horas del 10 de octubre del 2001 y en la n.° 14392-2016 de las 9:05 horas del 5 de octubre de 2016). Y en este asunto, el incumplimiento de este requisito insoslayable es más que evidente.

En todo caso, tal y como aludimos en el acápite B) de nuestro informe, mediante la resolución No. 2018-006137 de las 09:20 hrs. del 20 de abril de 2018, la Sala respaldó la constitucionalidad del Régimen de Pensiones de los ex Presidentes de la República, al estimar que su mera existencia no supone, de ningún modo, una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad proporcionalidad y no discriminación, ni en general una violación al Derecho de la Constitución”.

Concluye, la acción de inconstitucionalidad es inadmisible por la falta de legitimación del accionante, a pesar de que la norma impugnada sí sea inconstitucional. Acota que la equiparación del monto de la pensión de expresidentes al ingreso de un diputado, legalmente prevista mediante una ley ordinaria posterior (sea, el numeral 16 de la ley n.°7302), subsiste y resulta constitucionalmente razonable.

6.- Los edictos se publicaron en el Boletín Judicial, números 092, 093 y 094 del 25, 26 y 29 de mayo de 2023, 093 del 26 de mayo de 2023 y 094 del 29 de mayo de 2023.

7.- En escrito recibido en esta Sala Constitucional el día 9 de junio de 2023, contestó la audiencia GLORIA NAVAS MONTERO, en su condición de VICEPRESIDENTA DE LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA.

Sobre el trámite de la ley n.°7108 Sobre el fondo Atinente a la regulación de las pensiones de expresidentes, la diputada Navas Montero expone:

“La Ley 313 del 23 de agosto de 1939 Ley de Pensiones para Expresidentes estableció un régimen de pensiones para los expresidentes de la República de Costa Rica, reguló aspectos como los beneficiarios, el monto de la pensión, limitaciones y excepciones y otros beneficios.

Esta Ley 313 de 1939, fue objeto de varias reformas (expresas y tácitas) e interpretaciones y adiciones; entre ellas, el artículo 29 de la Ley No. 7108 del 08 de noviembre de 1988 que reformó tácitamente la Ley 313, articulo que se cuestiona su constitucionalidad, por tratarse de una norma atípica.

• En 1958, fue reformada por la Ley N° 2264 de 24 de noviembre de 1958.

• En 1961, fue interpretada por la Ley No. 2835 del 23 del 10 de 1961.

• En el año 1980, fue objeto de una reforma mediante Ley No. 6413 del 05 de mayo de 1980.

• En 1981, tuvo una adición mediante el artículo 9° de la Ley No. 6700 del 23 de diciembre de 1981.

• En el año 1985, se reformó mediante el artículo 14 de la Ley No. 7018 del 20 de diciembre de 1985.

• En 1988, fue reformada tácitamente, por el artículo 29 de la Ley No. 7108 del 08 de noviembre de 1988.

• En 1992, es reformada tácitamente, por la Ley 7302 del 8 de julio de 1992 Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, de otros regímenes especiales. En esta ley se introduce un texto similar al texto del artículo 29 de la ley 7108.

Cabe destacar que la Ley 7302 del 8 de julio de 1992 Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, en su Capítulo III (Artículos 16, 17 y 18), regula lo relativo a las Pensiones de los Expresidentes de la Republica de la siguiente manera:

“…CAPITULO III DEL REGIMEN DE PENSIONES DE LOS EXPRESIDENTES DE LA REPUBLICA Artículo 16.- Los Expresidentes de la República que hubiesen sido electos constitucionalmente, tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente. Estas pensiones estarán a cargo del Presupuesto Nacional y serán tramitadas de oficio por el Departamento Nacional de Pensiones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

Artículo 17.- Las pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República se reajustarán, cuando se reajuste el salario de los Diputados.

Artículo 18.- En el momento de su fallecimiento, tendrán derecho a un setenta y cinco por ciento (75%) del monto de la pensión, los causahabientes que establece el Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y en las mismas condiciones consignadas en él.” Lo señalado en este Capítulo, priva sobre lo señalado en la Ley 313 y en el artículo 29 de la Ley 7108, por ser una norma posterior, del mismo rango (ley), y por existir una antinomia. Como puede observarse la ley 7302, en el artículo 16, contiene una disposición muy similar a la del artículo 29 de la Ley 7108. Es decir, el texto del artículo 29 de la Ley 7108 cuestionado, está superado por el artículo 16 de Ley 7302”.

En relación con el argumento del accionante respecto a que el art. 29 de la ley n.°7108 es una norma atípica indica:

“No se encuentra en el expediente legislativo una explicación del porque el legislador incluye esta norma en la Ley Presupuestaria. Es posible que el legislador optó por incluir una regulación de este tipo en la norma presupuestaria considerando que era al Tesoro Público (artículo 2, Ley 313) a quien le correspondía girar el monto de las pensiones a los expresidentes y al vicepresidente que lo hubiera remplazado en forma absoluta; por lo que al equiparar la pensión de los expresidentes al salario de los Diputados, la norma constituía una reforma que implicaba ajustes presupuestarios.

No obstante, debe considerarse que la Resolución No. 0121-89 de 23 de noviembre de 1989, de la Sala Constitucional, señala que la Corte Plena había resuelto reiteradamente la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de varias normas atípicas tramitadas en leyes de presupuesto. Además, siendo que existía la Ley 313, Ley de pensiones de los expresidentes, lo que correspondía, era reformar esa ley.

Valga tomar en cuenta que, como se puede apreciar en el siguiente cuadro el Artículo 29 de la ley 7108, fue derogado tácitamente por el Artículo 16 de la ley 7302.

Ley No. 7108 del 08 de noviembre de 1988. Modificación a la Ley 7089 del 18 de diciembre de 1987, Presupuesto Ordinario para el año 1988.

Ley 7302 del 8 de julio de 1992 Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional “Artículo 29.- El monto de las pensiones de los señores ex Presidentes de la República será igual al monto del salario de un diputado.” Artículo 16.- Los Expresidentes de la República que hubiesen sido electos constitucionalmente, tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado.” Detalla, en relación con el régimen de pensiones de expresidentes, que el número de beneficiados al 2021 era de diez personas. Además, la pensión promedio mensual ronda los ¢3.753.207, con lo cual el gasto mensual alcanza ¢37.532.070. Por su parte, aclara que el monto incluido en el Presupuesto Nacional de la República por concepto de pensión de expresidentes para el año 2023 asciende ¢426.600.000. De igual forma, explica:

“Las pensiones también implican las siguientes erogaciones que el Estado debe presupuestar:

1. Aguinaldo (se calcula igual que para los asalariados del sector público) 2. Cuota Patronal Seguro de Salud: 8.75% del monto de la pensión 3. Cuota Estatal Seguro de Salud: 0.25% del monto de la pensión 4. Revalorizaciones: Las pensiones se revalorizan por costo de vida cuando el Poder Ejecutivo decrete incrementos para los funcionarios públicos en igual porcentaje o monto y rige.

Dicho Régimen conceden a su vez, pensiones por sobrevivencia a partir de la muerte del causante (expresidente) para los causahabientes que indique el reglamento de IVM de la CCSS, quienes tendrán derecho al 75% de la pensión (en total, no cada uno).

Al 2121 la pensión se otorgaba a 7 expresidentes, 1 exprimera dama y 2 causahabientes”.

Narra, en relación con la remuneración de los diputados, que la norma impugnada utiliza el término salario; empero, los diputados lo que reciben son dietas y otros componentes.

Aclarado lo anterior, concluye la exponente lo siguiente:

“2.6.1.- En cuanto a lo alegado por el accionante respecto de considerar el artículo 29 de la Ley 7108 como norma atípica.

Sí se considera que el artículo 29 de la Ley 7108 es una norma atípica dado que no es una norma presupuestaria, y esta norma debió tramitarse como una reforma a la Ley de pensiones de expresidentes.

Cabe hacer ver que como se explicó líneas atrás, el artículo 29 de la ley 7108, está derogado de forma tácita por el artículo 16 de la ley 7302.

2.6.2.- En cuanto a lo alegado sobre a la afectación del artículo 33 y el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política.

No se comparte lo alegado por el accionante respecto de que la equiparación de la norma implicó un privilegio, o que se haya afectado el artículo 50 en cuanto al adecuado reparto de la riqueza.

Ahora bien, sí debe considerar que las condiciones y funciones constitucionales de los cargos son distintas, de los presidentes, que luego expresidentes y de los diputados; por ejemplo, considérese que cuanto al Salario del Presidente de la República (sic), la Ley 10159, Ley de Empleo Público del 08 de 03 de 2022, en su artículo 30, inciso b) señala que el salario del Presidente de la República será el salario más alto de la Administración Pública”.

Solicita que se declare inconstitucional el artículo 29 de la ley n.°7108 por ser una norma atípica.

8.- Por resolución de las 11:21 hrs. de 27 de junio. de 2023, la Presidencia de la Sala indicó lo siguiente:

“Se tienen por contestadas las audiencias conferidas a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Presidente del Directorio Legislativo, en la resolución de las once horas dos minutos del nueve de mayo de dos mil veintitrés. Listos los autos, pase esta ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD número 23-005771-0007- CO, a la oficina de la Magistrada Anamari Garro Vargas, a quien por turno corresponde el estudio de fondo de la misma”.

9.- En los procedimientos seguidos se ha observado las prescripciones legales.

Redacta el Magistrado Fernández Argüello; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. El accionante acusa la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 29 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, N°7108, del 08 de noviembre de 1988. El numeral cuestionado dice lo siguiente:

“Art. 29.- El monto de las pensiones de los señores ex Presidentes de la República será igual al monto del salario de un diputado”.

Se acusa, por medio de esta ley se modificó la ley n.°313 de Pensiones de Expresidentes, sin justificación técnica alguna y bajo la malsana praxis de aprobarla mediante una ley de presupuesto, a efecto de que durante la discusión parlamentaria pasara inadvertida, con la consecuente lesión al erario público, lo que considera un abuso y un privilegio odioso.

II.- DE LOS REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades que necesariamente deben cumplirse para que este Tribunal pueda pronunciarse válidamente sobre el fondo del asunto. En el art. 75 de la LJC se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo‒ o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía‒, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base‒, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

Existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber, el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (art. 78 de la LJC).

III.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DEL ACCIONANTE. La parte accionante estima, le asiste legitimación para formular la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, la cual, asevera, proviene de la existencia de un interés difuso en el control de los fondos públicos. Aduce, al tratarse de una norma atípica, solo se está legitimado de una manera totalmente indirecta, pues como contribuyente, afirma está obligado a sufragar los aumentos de tales remuneraciones. La mayoría de la Sala, concuerda con ese alegato y descarta las afirmaciones que, en sentido contrario, formula la Procuraduría General de la República. Ciertamente, la jurisprudencia reiterada de este Tribunal ha sido clara, en el sentido que la atipicidad de una norma presupuestaria no es, en si misma, fundamento para legitimar a cualquier persona para impugnarla en esta sede. Es claro, de admitirse esa posibilidad, se estaría instaurando una acción popular para la impugnación de cualquier norma atípica o en general, de cualquiera incluida en un presupuesto nacional, extraordinario o extraordinario; lo cual debe descartarse, al no ser conteste con las reglas para el acceso a estos mecanismos de control, previstas en el numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Las sentencias citadas por la señora Procuradora y muchas otras de este órgano, entre ellas, la N°1990-1775, reiterada en las N°1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571 2013-001496, 2016-011975 y 2020-018840, son absolutamente claras en ese sentido, criterio que se reafirma también en este caso. Empero, en el sub examine, la situación es muy distinta. Lo impugnado, es una norma legal -incluida en efecto, dentro de una ley de presupuesto-, mediante la cual se estableció que las pensiones que devengarán quienes hayan ocupado la Presidencia de la República, serán iguales al salario de una persona diputada. Así las cosas, dada la naturaleza de ese régimen especial de pensiones, de naturaleza no contributiva y con cargo al presupuesto nacional, resulta evidente que se está frente a la tutela y protección de fondos públicos, para lo cual existe un interés difuso. Nótese, no se trata entonces -como alega el órgano asesor de esta Sala- de una simple impugnación general, fundada en la atipicidad de la norma, sino más bien de una acción incardinada justamente, en la naturaleza pública de los fondos con que se sufragan esos estipendios, lo que habilita al actor, en su condición de contribuyente, para cuestionar su validez constitucional, ello, en los términos del numeral 75, párrafo segundo de la ley recién citada. Por esa razón, se arriba a la conclusión que el accionante se encuentra legitimado activamente para formular esta impugnación y, en consecuencia, se declara admisible la acción interpuesta.

IV).- SOBRE EL FONDO. El artículo 29 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República, N°7108 del 08 de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, aquí impugnado, dispone que: “El monto de las pensiones de los señores ex Presidentes de la República será igual al monto del salario de un diputado”. De su sola lectura salta a la vista, su contenido es evidentemente ajeno a cuestiones de orden presupuestario. La materia relativa a las pensiones, jubilaciones y en particular, la definición de los montos de los beneficios establecidos en el régimen que en su caso correspondan, es asunto que debe regularse mediante la ley ordinaria o común y que excede por mucho, lo que debe ser objeto de una ley de presupuesto. Así lo han reconocido dentro de esta acción, todas las partes involucradas: la actora, la Procuraduría General de la República y la Asamblea Legislativa y con ello concuerda esta Cámara, que como se reconoce ampliamente por los interesados, ha emitido una profusa jurisprudencia sobre la imposibilidad de regular, en los presupuestos públicos, temáticas que han de serlo mediante ley ordinaria, práctica que -se ha dicho insistentemente-, resulta contraria a lo dispuesto en los numerales 121, incisos 1 y 11, 124, 125, 176, párrafo primero, 177 y 180 párrafo primero, todos de la Constitución Política. En este tema específico, desde vieja data esta Sala ha indicado lo siguiente:

“III.- Sobre el fondo. El artículo impugnado dispone: " Artículo 33.- Agréguese un artículo, que llevará el número 12, a la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Justicia, No. 6739 del 28 de abril de 1982, que dirá: "Artículo 12: Podrán acogerse al régimen de pensiones del Registro Nacional todos los servidores de la Administración Central del Ministerio de Justicia y de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social y Prevención del Delito, en los mismos términos establecidos en la ley No.5 del 16 de setiembre de 1939 y sus reformas. La Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social girará al fondo de pensiones del Registro Nacional, la totalidad de las cuotas pagadas por los servidores pertenecientes a las instituciones precitadas al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte que se acogen a esta ley". Como se observa, la norma en cuestión otorga la posibilidad a un grupo de servidores públicos de acogerse al régimen de pensiones del Registro Nacional, haciendo con ello una modificación formal y material a la ley que regula ese régimen jubilatorio. La norma es parte de la Ley No. 6975 de 30 de noviembre de 1984, que es una ley presupuestaria ("Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario"). Sobre la inclusión de disposiciones de carácter no presupuestario en leyes de presupuesto, la Sala Constitucional en forma reiterada ha manifestado el criterio de que se trata de normas atípicas que violentan el procedimiento de formación de las leyes estipulado en la Constitución Política, por lo que necesariamente deben ser consideradas inconstitucionales. Así, se ha declarado:

" ...Esta Sala, desde la Sentencia No. 121-89 de las 11:00 hrs. del 23 de noviembre de 1989, ha sostenido que "...es enteramente procedente que se incluyan "normas generales" en las leyes de presupuesto, siempre y cuando ellas se encuentren ligadas a la especialidad que esa materia significa, o lo que es lo mismo decir, a la ejecución del presupuesto. Lo que no es posible incluir en las leyes de presupuesto son las normas que no tienen ese carácter, ya que ellas deben regularse por lo dispuesto para las leyes comunes u ordinarias" (sentencia No.759-92 de las 15:00 hrs. del 17 de marzo de 1992). Los incisos 1) y 11) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, confieren a la Asamblea Legislativa, potestades legislativas separadas, distintas y exclusivas en cada caso. El inciso 1) le atribuye la potestad de "Dictar las leyes, reformarlas, derogarlas y de darles interpretación auténtica...", el 11) le atribuye la potestad de "Dictar los presupuestos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la República". La atribución dada por el inciso primero se refiere a una potestad muy amplia que corresponde en general a las leyes ordinarias o comunes, en tanto que la del inciso 11) es de carácter especial, como se deduce de los artículos 176, 177, 178, 179 y 180 en relación con el 125, todos de la Constitución Política. Esta, al contemplar en forma separada esas facultades, prescribe que se trata de actos legislativos diferentes, con distinta naturaleza y contenido. No importa que el presupuesto sea una ley formal y material y las demás leyes tengan también ese carácter, el caso es que la especialidad y contenido de las leyes de presupuesto hicieron que el constituyente creara un procedimiento especial y separado para ellas. Siendo, entonces, el presupuesto de la República una ley formal y material pero especial para la materia que la constituye, no puede válidamente el Poder Legislativo regular en ejercicio de la potestad presupuestaria materias de diferente naturaleza o contenido. En fin, asentado que la norma impugnada es una norma de carácter general no presupuestaria, emitida por medio de una ley de presupuesto, con necesaria e inevitable violación del procedimiento constitucional, la consecuencia es la de declararla contraria a la Constitución Política” (sentencia N°2765-1993 de las 15:09 horas del 15 de junio de 1993, énfasis agregado. En idéntico sentido, sobre este tipo de disposiciones, véanse entre muchas otras, las N°1466-1990 de las 15:15 horas del 30 de octubre de 1990, N°4790-1993 de las 8:54 horas del 30 de setiembre de 1993 y N°121-1989 de las 11:00 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1989) En la especie, no se encuentran motivos para variar el criterio ya expresado sobre el tema, ni se han planteado cuestiones de orden público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión y en tales circunstancias, dada la evidente inconstitucionalidad que afecta a la norma impugnada, cuyo contenido -se insiste- no cabe dentro de una ley de orden presupuestario, procede acoger esta acción y anular por contraria al Derecho de la Constitución, el artículo 29 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República, N°7108 del 08 de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho. Esta declaratoria es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos a la fecha de emisión de la disposición que se anula, sin perjuicio de derechos de buena fe, ello, en los términos de los numerales 89 y 90 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

• V)DIMENSIONAMIENTO. Por otra parte, tal y como lo señalan los intervinientes en este asunto y lo ha constatado esta Sala, el artículo 29 de la Ley N°7108 -aquí impugnado-, fue derogado por la denominada Ley Marco de Pensiones, Nº7302 de 8 de julio de 1992, "Creación del régimen general de pensiones con cargo al presupuesto nacional, de otros regímenes especiales y reforma a la ley Nº7092 de 21 de abril de 1988 y sus reformas, Ley del impuesto sobre la renta", cuyo capítulo III, "Del Régimen de Pensiones de los ex Presidentes de la República", en sus artículos 16, 17 y 18, estableció lo siguiente:

"Capítulo III. DEL REGIMEN DE PENSIONES DE LOS EXPRESIDENTES DE LA REPUBLICA ARTICULO 16.- Los Expresidentes de la República que hubiesen sido electos constitucionalmente, tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente. Estas pensiones estarán a cargo del Presupuesto Nacional y serán tramitadas de oficio por el Departamento Nacional de Pensiones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

ARTICULO 17.- Las pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República se reajustarán, cuando se reajuste el salario de los Diputados.

ARTICULO 18.- En el momento de su fallecimiento, tendrán derecho a un setenta y cinco por ciento (75%) del monto de la pensión, los causahabientes que establece el Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y en las mismas condiciones consignadas en él”.

Adviértase, que se trata de un vicio de origen en el procedimiento legislativo y desde entonces han transcurrido más de tres décadas, habiéndose extendido el período de vigencia del artículo cuestionado por un período inferior a los cuatro años, en los cuales, las personas que ocuparon la Presidencia percibieron el monto de la pensión de buena fe, situación que no cabe revertirla ahora, con ocasión de este fallo (doctrina del numeral 34 de la Constitución Política). En consecuencia, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 91 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, se deben dimensionar los efectos de la presente inconstitucionalidad, en el sentido que la nulidad decretada no afecta en modo alguno, ni genera derecho a repetición de los montos percibidos por las personas beneficiarias de dicha pensión, durante la vigencia y con ocasión de esa disposición; los cuales, se insiste, deben tenerse como percibidos de buena fe. Así se dispondrá en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.

VI.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.°43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

Por mayoría, se declara con lugar la acción. En consecuencia, se anula por inconstitucional el artículo 29 de la Ley N°7108, “Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario del 08 de noviembre de 1988, que dispone: “Art. 29.- El monto de las pensiones de los señores ex Presidentes de la República será igual al monto del salario de un diputado”. Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos a la fecha promulgación de la norma anulada, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se dimensionan los efectos de este pronunciamiento, en el sentido que lo dispuesto en esta acción, no afecta en modo alguno, ni genera derecho a repetición de los montos percibidos por las personas beneficiarias de dicha pensión, durante la vigencia y con ocasión de esa disposición. Comuníquese a la Asamblea Legislativa, publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notifíquese. La Magistrada Garro Vargas salva el voto y declara sin lugar la acción por razones de admisibilidad.

Fernando Castillo Víquez Fernando Cruz Castro Paul Rueda Leal Luis Fdo Salazar Alvarado Jorge Araya García Anamari Garro Vargas Hubert Fernández Argüello Res. n.°2024-000362 VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS Respetuosa del criterio de la mayoría, salvo mi voto y considero que esta acción debe declararse sin lugar por razones de admisibilidad.

Cabe poner de manifiesto que en el sub lite el accionante fue prevenido de que detallara cuál estimaba que era su legitimación para incoar este proceso de control de constitucionalidad. Al responder la prevención, expresó lo siguiente:

“Y pese a que puede decirse que unilateralmente no estaría éste ciudadano legitimado, ni individual, ni colectivamente, es evidente que frente a las normas impugnadas por atípicas como en presente, nadie lo estaría, salvo de una manera totalmente indirecta o refleja; Y SOLO ESTAR OBLIGADO COMO CONTRIBUYENTE, AL IGUAL QUE LO ESTAMOS TODOS LOS CIUDADANOS, a cubrir los aumentos de las remuneraciones como en éste caso se dá CON EL PAGO DE NUESTROS IMPUESTOS, para dar contenido económico a una equiparación de las pensiones de los expresidentes de la república a los ingresos de los diputados (sic). Reitero, sin que exista ningún estudio actuarial, ni consultas a nadie, creándose ventajas indebidas por medio de los diputados que lo legislan, mediante recursos que se obtendrán sin duda alguna, con toda certeza, de los impuestos que pagan o que tenemos el deber de pagar todos los ciudadanos”.

Es decir, se limitó a cuestionar concretamente lo dispuesto en el art. 29 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, n.°7108 del 08 de noviembre de 1988, por haber sido introducido mediante una ley de presupuesto y sin fundamento alguno.

Entonces, considero que carece de legitimación por dos motivos. En primer lugar, el accionante carece de legitimación para cuestionar esta norma atípica, aduciendo que lesiona fondos públicos pues, como se verá, cuando la Sala examinó su contenido material, descartó tal lesión.

Sobre el particular, es pertinente traer a colación que aunque la presidenta en ejercicio de la Asamblea Legislativa no se refirió de forma específica a la legitimación del accionante para plantear la acción de inconstitucionalidad, sí informó que la norma concretamente cuestionada fue derogada, de forma tácita, por el art. 16 de la ley 7302 del 8 de julio de 1992. Este punto en concreto también fue destacado por la PGR en los siguientes términos:

“[L]o cierto es que posteriormente, por reforma legal ordinaria introducida por la Ley General de Pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, No. 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992, en el Capítulo III “Del Régimen de Pensiones de los Ex presidentes de la República”, en su artículo 16 se dispuso una norma similar, por la cual la pensión mensual de los Expresidentes constitucionalmente electos será igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Esto es relevante de cara al examen de la admisibilidad de la acción, porque con dicha se legisló en una norma ordinaria el mismo contenido material de la disposición que había sido incluida una ley presupuestaria. Es decir, se constata que ciertamente el contenido material de la norma impugnada por el actor fue replicada en una ley ordinaria. El art. 16 de la Ley del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, conocida como “Ley Marco de Pensiones”, dice expresamente lo siguiente:

“Art. 16.- Los Expresidentes de la República que hubiesen sido electos constitucionalmente, tendrán derecho a disfrutar de una pensión mensual igual al ingreso de un diputado (dietas y gastos de representación), a partir del mes inmediato siguiente a la finalización del período presidencial correspondiente. Estas pensiones estarán a cargo del Presupuesto Nacional y serán tramitadas de oficio por el Departamento Nacional de Pensiones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Precisamente, esa reforma ya fue examinada por la Sala y esta descartó su inconstitucionalidad por una supuesta lesión a los fondos públicos. Concretamente en la sentencia n.°2018-006137, resolvió lo siguiente:

“II.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. El accionante impugna el artículo 16 de la Ley No. 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992, Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, en cuanto establece que: (…)

El accionante cuestiona, en general, la existencia del Régimen de Pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República, en tanto alega que el otorgamiento de tales pensiones no obedece a alguna de las contingencias previstas en el artículo 73 constitucional.

III.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Considera este Tribunal que no se configura la alegada inconstitucionalidad. Debe aclararse, preliminarmente, que este Tribunal ya ha señalado que no debe confundirse el régimen general de pensiones y los regímenes especiales de pensiones previstos en la Ley No. 7302, incluido el Régimen de Pensiones de los Expresidentes de la República, en tanto que tienen una naturaleza distinta. Mientras que el primer régimen tiene el carácter de pensiones contributivas, en las cuales se reconoce un derecho de tipo laboral que se origina en parte en la previa cotización del trabajador, los mencionados regímenes especiales de pensiones tienen un carácter de pensiones no contributivas o de gracia , las cuales se otorgan como reconocimiento por la relevancia de la labor o servicios que han desarrollado un tipo de personas (sentencia No. 4852-95 de las 09:42 hrs. del 01 de setiembre de 1995). En el caso específico del artículo 16 de la Ley No. 7302, es claro que su ratio legis es garantizar una subsistencia digna a quienes ocuparon específicamente la posición de Presidente de la República, sea, a quienes le han prestado sus servicios en la más alta posición de conducción y de responsabilidad de La Nación (artículos 130, 139, 140 y 147 de la Constitución Política). Se trata, en consecuencia, de un supuesto muy particular y excepcional, diverso al régimen general de pensiones previsto en el artículo 73 constitucional, pero que encuentra sustento jurídico suficiente y razonable en la pretensión de asegurar una subsistencia digna exclusivamente a los Expresidentes de la República, en concordancia con el decoro propio de la investidura que ostentaron. En cuanto a este punto, la Procuraduría General de la República, en la opinión jurídica No. 122-J del 23 de julio de 2003, afirmó que ‘el otorgamiento de pensiones a los exPresidentes de la República, al igual que en otros países, tiene por objeto garantizar que éstos, una vez que hayan cesado del cargo, puedan atender sus necesidades personales y políticas con la dignidad y el decoro que corresponden a las altas funciones ejercidas; y con el fin de establecer también, en el caso de que se produzca su traspaso, unas medidas de protección de los familiares más próximos´ y, además, señaló ‘la finalidad apuntada, así como la alta investidura del cargo ejercido, son motivo suficiente para justificar que tales prestaciones económicas a favor de los exPresidentes de la República, no podrían de ningún modo considerarse como privilegios discriminatorios, irrazonables y desproporcionados’. Consideraciones que son compartidas por este Tribunal, por lo que no puede estimarse que la mera existencia de tal régimen especial de pensiones suponga per se una infracción a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad o no discriminación, ni ‒en general‒ una violación al Derecho de la Constitución.

IV.- Cabe reiterar, por lo demás, que el otorgamiento de pensiones a los Expresidentes no es algo exclusivo de Costa Rica, sino que, por el contrario, así ocurre en distintos países americanos, como es el caso de Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Estados Unidos de América, México y Perú. En el caso chileno, por ejemplo, es la propia Constitución la que prevé, según lo dispuesto en sus artículos 30 y 62, que el Ex Presidente de la Republica recibirá una dieta equivalente a la remuneración de un Ministro de Estado incluidas todas las asignaciones que a estos correspondan. En Argentina, la Ley No. 24.018 establece que al Ex Presidente de la Nación le corresponderá una asignación mensual vitalicia que será la suma que por todo concepto corresponda a la remuneración de los Jueces de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación. En Bolivia, en la Ley No. 376, se prevé un ‘Reconocimiento Pecuniario a Ciudadanas y Ciudadanos que ejercieron la Presidencia y Vicepresidencia Constitucional del Estado’, por una suma equivalente a diez (10) salarios mínimos nacionales mensualmente, monto que será pagado por el Tesoro General de la Nación (TGN), que percibirá de por vida. La Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público, de Ecuador, establece en su artículo 135 que: ‘[s]e fija una pensión vitalicia mensual equivalente al setenta y cinco por ciento de la remuneración vigente, a favor de las y los señores ex Presidentes y Vicepresidentes Constitucionales de la República, que sean elegidos constitucionalmente por votación popular y se hayan posesionado en el cargo, se exceptúan los mandatarios a quienes se les revoque el mandato’. En Perú, la Ley No. 26519 dispone, en su artículo 1, que los ‘ex Presidentes Constitucionales de la República gozarán de una pensión equivalente al total de los ingresos de un Congresista en actividad’. En el caso colombiano, el artículo 2 de Ley No. 48 de 1962 establece, en su párrafo primero, que todo ex - Presidente de la República tendrá ‘derecho a disfrutar de pensión vitalicia o pensión de vejez si ha permanecido al servicio del Estado durante veinte años continuos o discontinuos y si ha cumplido cincuenta años de edad’. Asimismo, en el párrafo segundo de ese mismo numeral se prevé? que ‘[m]ientras careciera de cualquiera de estos requisitos, podrá gozar de la pensión especial del ex-Presidente’. La Corte Constitucional colombiana resolvió? una demanda de constitucionalidad interpuesta en contra de la referida pensión especial, en la que se alegaba, en esencia, que la normativa impugnada establecía un privilegio injustificado que infringía la esencia misma de la noción de pensión, ya que consagraba para los expresidentes de la República este derecho en forma especial y vitalicia por el sólo hecho de haber ejercido la Presidencia a cualquier título y por cualquier lapso, sin consideración a la edad ni al tiempo de cotización del pensionado. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional, en la sentencia No. C-989/99 del 09 de diciembre de 1999, estimó ‒en lo que interesa‒ lo siguiente:

‘9. El cargo de presidente de la República, en un sistema de gobierno presidencial como el que rige entre nosotros, significa la más alta responsabilidad pública. El presidente reúne en sí la condición de jefe de Estado, de jefe de Gobierno y de suprema autoridad administrativa. Como jefe de Estado, simboliza y representa la unidad y la soberanía nacional, dirige las relaciones internacionales, defiende la integridad territorial y dirige, como comandante supremo, la fuerza pública, entre otras; como jefe de Gobierno ejerce funciones como el liderazgo político del Estado y la dirección de la economía, y como suprema autoridad administrativa es responsable de la correcta ejecución de la función pública nacional. Para estos cometidos es elegido por votación popular directa y por mayoría absoluta de votos, en circunscripción nacional. Cuenta, por tanto, con un respaldo político y una confianza concedidos directamente a él en forma exclusiva, por la mitad al menos de los electores, circunstancia que no está presente en ningún otro cargo de elección popular. No aceptar que todas estas circunstancias particulares le atribuyen una especial dignidad, resulta desconocer una realidad política y jurídica innegable.

Esta particular circunstancia pone al presidente en situación de especial merecimiento y respeto dentro de la sociedad. Independientemente de que su gestión sea o no compartida políticamente, resulta obvio que la dignidad de su investidura es superior a la de todos los ciudadanos. Ella da soporte jurídico suficiente a la excepción introducida por la normatividad demandada respecto de los requisitos de acceso a la pensión. En efecto, tal excepción constituye no sólo un merecido reconocimiento monetario que retribuye el especial servicio prestado a la Nación, sino que se erige en un medio para proveer congruamente a las necesidades que se originan en la especial posición que implica el ser ex presidente de la República. A nadie se le oculta que esta posición impone el llevar una vida con ciertos requerimientos especiales de decoro, que no siempre están al alcance de quien ha dejado de ejercer la primera magistratura, bien por carecer de recursos propios o bien por la limitación de hecho en que se encuentra quien ha ocupado esa posición para ejercer cualquier tipo de cargos u oficios, por razones que tocan justamente con la dignidad de la Nación o incluso con factores éticos.

10. El haber efectivamente ocupado el cargo de presidente de la República por haber sido elegido por el voto mayoritario de sus compatriotas, el hecho de haber sido garante de la soberanía y simbolizado la unidad nacional, el haberse hecho cargo de la amplísima responsabilidad histórica aneja al cargo de primer mandatario, en fin, son razones suficientes para conferir el especial merecimiento que se reconoce a los ex presidentes. (…)

11. Así las cosas, por la especialísima dignidad y responsabilidad que comporta el cargo de presidente de la República, no es igual a cualquier otro trabajo u oficio que se desempeñe en el sector público, por lo cual el tratamiento legal exceptivo introducido por las normas acusadas, en principio responde a esta particular diferencia de situación y por ello resulta justificado de cara a la Constitución. Así mismo, dicho trato persigue una finalidad, cual es la ya mencionada de retribuir al ex presidente y proveer a su subsistencia digna, y dichas finalidades se ajustan a la Carta, pues la axiología que la informa indica que es cometido del Estado realizar la justicia. Es justo que el erario público retribuya excepcionalmente a los ciudadanos que le han prestado servicios también excepcionales, y que lo haga en forma proporcionada a sus necesidades de decoro personal. Si la justicia consiste en dar a cada cual lo que merece, la normatividad demandada justamente realiza esta noción’.

Luego añadió que:

‘Si bien es cierto que a primera vista no pareciera que los ex presidentes se encuentren en situación especial de debilidad que amerite que los recursos públicos se destinen a cubrir su pensión en los términos excepcionales que consagra la ley, un examen más profundo de la situación revela que ello no es tan evidente. En efecto, se ha dicho que quien ha ocupado el cargo de presidente de la República queda gravado con especiales obligaciones de decoro en su vida personal, y que por razones de la misma índole, además de otras de carácter ético, no está en posición de acceder a cualquier puesto de trabajo o de llevar a cabo cualquier oficio o profesión. La Patria espera, con legítimo sentimiento, que tales personas conserven por el resto de su vida la dignidad que les fue concedida. Es cierto que en algunos casos los ex presidentes cuentan con un patrimonio propio que les permite sobrellevar esta situación; pero la Ley, que es proferida para regular la generalidad de las situaciones, no puede partir del supuesto no comprobado ni comprobable, de que todos ellos se encuentran o se encontrarán en un futuro en tal situación de sobrada solvencia económica. Por ello, sobre la base de que a la Primera Magistratura pueden acceder y acceden, ciudadanos de cualquier condición económica o social, como lo demuestra la historia, la ley provee a su subsistencia digna’.

Consideraciones que son aplicables, también, al caso costarricense, a fin de comprender el fundamento que inspira, de forma razonable, el contenido y el alcance de la norma impugnada en la presente acción.

V.- Como corolario lo de anterior, no puede estimarse que la existencia del citado régimen especial de pensiones sea incompatible con el Derecho de la Constitución. Debe indicarse, en todo caso, que la creación de dicho régimen obedece, finalmente, a un claro supuesto de libertad de configuración del legislador. En cuanto a la referida libertad de configuración, esta Sala, en sentencia No. 2003-5090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, señaló:

‘(…) La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (…) La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares’.

Por lo que, en definitiva, el mantenimiento del citado régimen especial de pensiones depende de la determinación política que, conforme a su amplia discrecionalidad legislativa, adopte la Asamblea Legislativa, que está llamada a constituirse en el máximo órgano representativo del pueblo y de las diferentes fuerzas políticas, sociales y económicas que conforman el Estado (artículos 1 y 105 de la Constitución Política), de forma que en su seno se expresa la pluralidad de cosmovisiones, pensamientos e intereses que integran la sociedad costarricense’ (sentencia No. 2013-12014 de las 14:30 hrs. del 11 de setiembre de 2013).

VI.- En razón de lo anterior, considera esta Sala que procede rechazar por el fondo la acción en estudio, como así se dispone”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Conforme a las consideraciones realizadas, se advierte que este Tribunal ya se pronunció en relación con la constitucionalidad de las pensiones concedidas a los expresidentes de la República, descartando que se trate de un privilegio infundado, irrazonable o desproporcionado, pues su regulación no responde a un régimen contributivo ‒como lo pretende el accionante‒, sino a una decisión del legislador que procura que estos servidores puedan atender sus necesidades personales y políticas con la dignidad y el decoro que corresponden a las altas funciones ejercidas, lo cual, como se refleja en el precedente, es una norma común en el Derecho Comparado.

Entonces, dado que la Sala ya descartó que este tipo de determinaciones sean irrazonables por provocar una supuesta lesión a los fondos públicos queda insubsistente el reproche del accionante y la legitimación que invoca.

En segundo lugar, el único agravio que quedaría subsistente en este proceso sería el de la aprobación de la disposición a través de una ley presupuestaria extraordinaria ‒presunta norma atípica‒. Al respecto, la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) expuso que el actor carece de legitimación porque la Sala no ha admitido una legitimación directa para impugnar las denominadas “normas atípicas” únicamente por el interés de cuestionar la forma en que se aprobaron. En la audiencia correspondiente, la PGR informó lo siguiente:

“Según puede constatarse, pese a haber sido prevenido, el accionante en realidad no explica ni argumenta de forma adecuada y suficiente, cuál es la situación jurídica sustancial que, más allá de la mera existencia de la norma atípica cuestionada, lo legitima a accionar directamente, pues se limita a aludir la defensa de supuestos intereses difusos relacionados con el correcto manejo de los fondos públicos, involucrados en la equiparación de las pensiones de los ex Presidentes al ingreso de los Diputados; “interés de absolutamente toda la comunidad costarricense”, según afirma de forma expresa. Esto resulta de relevancia, por cuanto esta Sala ha señalado que no puede estimarse que exista una acción popular para accionar en contra de las denominadas normas atípicas, en razón de un mero interés de buscar la adecuación objetiva al ordenamiento jurídico constitucional”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Esto es, tal y como lo advierte la PGR, respecto del alegato genérico sobre la aprobación de la ley a través de una ley de presupuesto, el actor no cuenta con legitimación directa, según la reiterada jurisprudencia de esta Sala. En ese particular, este tribunal ha dicho lo siguiente:

“[A] sabiendas del consenso jurisdiccional que existe sobre la inconstitucionalidad de la inclusión de normas generales no presupuestarias en el Presupuesto Nacional, el legitimar la acción directa en este supuesto equivaldría prácticamente a tener que autorizarla también contra toda la demás legislación ordinaria aprobada con vicios inconstitucionales, aún cuando esos roces sean de otra índole, siendo ese interés –aunque loable‒, demasiado vago o amplio como para constituir por sí mismo un interés difuso, o colectivo”. (Sentencia n.°1990-1775, que fue posteriormente reiterada en las sentencias números 1992-2524, 1992-3198, 1992-3294, 2012-010571 2013-001496, 2016-011975 y 2020-018840).

En la sentencia n.°2016-011975 la Sala amplió sus consideraciones, al explicar lo siguiente:

“De hecho, los argumentos del accionante se centran, únicamente, en reprochar, por sí solo, el procedimiento de aprobación de dicha disposición normativa, en un aparente mero interés de buscar la adecuación objetiva al ordenamiento jurídico constitucional; en cuyo caso, de admitirse la posibilidad del actor de plantear una acción de inconstitucionalidad en esta materia, en las condiciones pretendidas por este, supondría – en definitiva- reconocer la existencia de una acción popular, la cual, como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional en su reiterada jurisprudencia (ver sentencia No. 2016-000787 de las 9:05 hrs. de 20 de enero de 2016), no se adecua al marco de las competencias procesales que al efecto tiene este Tribunal Constitucional, en sus funciones de intérprete último y guardián de la Constitución”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Luego, en la sentencia n.°2016-016118, reiteró:

“Esto resulta de relevancia, por cuanto, esta Sala ha señalado que no puede estimarse que exista una acción popular para accionar en contra de las denominadas normas atípicas en razón de un mero interés de buscar la adecuación objetiva al ordenamiento jurídico constitucional”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En cuyo caso, siguiendo la línea jurisprudencial de este Tribunal, se puede afirmar que el actor no goza de legitimación suficiente para interponer este proceso de control de constitucionalidad, si lo que aduce es que la norma fue aprobada por una ley presupuestaria. Máxime que, como se apuntó, el propio legislador ordinario dictó una normativa posterior que recogió en una norma ordinaria el propósito de equiparar las pensiones de los expresidentes de la República a los salarios de los legisladores. Dicha disposición, como se advirtió antes, no fue atacada en este proceso de control de constitucionalidad y, además, ya fue examinada por la Sala y esta descartó que sea irrazonable, desproporcionada o discriminatoria.

Por lo demás, en un precedente de este Tribunal que examinó una situación muy similar a la planteada en el sub lite ‒en que se cuestionó la aprobación de una norma de contenido ordinario en una ley presupuestaria, pero que después fue aprobada igualmente por una ley ordinaria‒ se concluyó que el actor carecía de legitimación para incoar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por ser equivalente a una acción popular, pero igualmente determinó que el proceso carecía de todo interés en la medida que la situación había sido solventada por el propio legislador. Así, en la sentencia n.°1993-3183, se resolvió lo siguiente:

“1o. El accionante considera que el artículo 78 de la Ley 7051 publicada en La Gaceta número 211 del seis de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta y seis, es una de las llamadas "normas atípicas", incluida através de un procedimiento irregular, en la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario 7135 del once de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve. Añade que conforme lo ha declarado ya esta Sala, esas normas son inconstitucionales por crearse en forma contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 incisos 1 y 11, 124, 125, 176, 177 y 180 de la Constitución Política y pide que así se declare anulándose la norma del ordenamiento jurídico.

Io. El artículo 75 párrafo segundo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional permite la interposición de una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin "juicio base", cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. Pero como ya lo ha indicado esta Sala (sentencia número 1182-93), no puede interpretarse que cuando la ley hace mención a los derechos que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, se refiera a la colectividad nacional, pues este supuesto equivaldría a aceptar y reconocer una acción popular que no existe, dada la actual redacción del artículo citado. (…) IIo. Por otra parte, esta acción carece de interés actual, al haberse promulgado en la Ley número 7334 de dieciséis de abril del año en curso, un artículo específico que permite que el cien por ciento de la utilidad neta, resultante de la Lotería Instantánea, se gire directamente al Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda. La norma dice textualmente:

"Artículo 11: El cien por ciento de la utilidad neta resultante se girará directamente, al Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda para los programas de inversión en vivienda, y para los programas del Fondo de Subsidios para la Vivienda que maneja esta última Institución".

La discusión pues, sobre si la norma es o no atípica, carece de trascendencia alguna, porque a través del trámite ordinario se ha autorizado la transferencia de estos fondos a los programas de vivienda. Así las cosas resulta innecesario el pronunciamiento de fondo en esta acción, sobre todo que no se ha podido demostrar que ni en el caso del accionante o de ningún otro ciudadano, se haya producido alguna lesión a un interés legítimo que merezca ser reconocido o resarcido a través de los mecanismos que establece la administración de justicia. El interés del accionante parecía ser -según se deduce de su escrito de interposición-, el lograr que la norma se promulgara a través de ley ordinaria, ese requisito ya se dio al dictarse recientemente la citada legislación quedando así aquél satisfecho”.

En síntesis, atendiendo a los precedentes de este Tribunal, considero que corresponde declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad por razones de admisibilidad, dado que el actor carece de legitimación para cuestionar la norma invocando la supuesta lesión a los fondos públicos, pues en otra acción ya esta Sala descartó tal lesión al examinar idéntica norma. También porque respecto del otro motivo de inconstitucionalidad alegado, que el contenido normativo haya sido incluido en una ley presupuestaria, no procede invocar una legitimación directa.

Anamari Garro V.

*CO* PROCESO: ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ACCIONANTE: Nombre01 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas veintiséis minutos del trece de junio de dos mil veinticuatro.

Tomando en cuenta que el magistrado Jorge Araya García se encuentra incapacitado, y con el fin de no retrasar la tramitación del recurso, notifíquese la sentencia dictada en el presente asunto sin su firma, la cual será consignada una vez que se reincorpore a sus labores.

Fernando Castillo V *LEYZLXK* FERNANDO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ - PRESIDENTE/A 1