Dismissal of unconstitutionality action against Articles 33 and 58 of the Forestry LawInadmisión de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley Forestal

**Exp: 23-020734-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2023024066** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-seventh of September, two thousand twenty-three.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name317 001], identity card no. [Value 001], in his capacity as president with powers of a generalísimo without limit of sum of [Name317 002]., legal identification no. [Value 002], and [Name317 003]., legal identification no. [Value 003], and [Name317 004], identity card no. [Value 004], in his capacity as president with powers of a generalísimo without limit of sum of [Name317 005]., legal identification no. [Value 005]; against Articles 33 and 58 of Law No. 7575, Ley Forestal, published in La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** By a document received in this Chamber at 10:50 hours on August 28, 2023, the appearing party requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 33 and 58 of Law No. 7575, Ley Forestal, published in La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, be declared. This is based on the consideration that they violate numeral 39 of the Political Constitution and the principles of legal reservation, criminal legality, juridical certainty, criminal typicality, specificity (taxatividad), and prohibition of analogy, in the following terms. In our legal system, there have been four forestry laws—among them Law Number 4465 of November 25, 1969, Law Number 7032 of May 2, 1986, Law Number 7174 of July 10, 1990, and the current Law Number 7575 of February 13, 1996. Throughout the first three versions of the forestry laws, different concepts have been maintained that allow for locating different areas such as the areas comprising the "Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal)," however, in the current version of the Ley Forestal, a series of conceptual variations occurred that have led to an improper application of the norm by its legal operators, as is the case corresponding to case file number 12-000022-0611 -PE. The main reasons will be set forth below. **I. First reason for this action of unconstitutionality: State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) and State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado).** The first reason why the claimants consider there is a violation of Article 39 of the Political Constitution lies in the poor conceptual application of the terms "protective zones (zonas protectoras)" and "protection areas (áreas de protección)." Curiously, these concepts that the legislator replaced in this norm came to distort and give another meaning to this law. The three forestry laws prior to the current Law No. 7575 defined "protective zones (zonas protectoras)" as: "b) Protective zones (zonas protectoras): They shall be formed by the forests and lands of forestry suitability, in which the main objective is the protection of the soil, the regulation of the hydrological regime, and the conservation of the environment and hydrographic basins." Those protective zones (zonas protectoras), which are considered areas near watercourses, ceased to be called "protective zones (zonas protectoras)" so that currently, in the valid Ley Forestal, they are called "protection areas (áreas de protección)," and this is evidenced in Article 33 of this norm: “Article 33. Protection areas (Áreas de protección) The following are declared protection areas (áreas de protección): a) Areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the terrain is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is broken. c) A zone of fifty meters measured horizontally on the banks of natural lakes and reservoirs and on artificial lakes or reservoirs built by the State and its institutions. Private artificial lakes and reservoirs are excepted. d) Recharge areas and aquifers of springs (manantiales), whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law.” Now then, the PGR itself, in Opinion (Dictamen) No. C-016-2002 of January 15, makes a distinction between the two concepts, pointing out that: “Different is the case of the so-called 'protection areas (áreas de protección)', regulated in Articles 33 and 34 of Ley Forestal No. 7575, in which, although the cutting or elimination of trees is prohibited, projects declared by the Executive Branch as being of national convenience are permitted as an exception to this rule, such being understood as those 'activities carried out by the centralized dependencies of the State, autonomous institutions, or private enterprise, whose social benefits are greater than the socio-environmental costs (...).' These are the areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes); rivers, streams, or creeks; natural lakes and reservoirs and artificial ones built by the State and its institutions; as well as aquifer recharge zones (Article 33, subsections a), b), c), and d); and their legal regime is different from that which characterizes the protective zones (zonas protectoras): '... differs in the location of the dispositions regarding such zones from all previous laws and preparatory texts, since previously these protection areas (áreas de protección), which were called protective zones (zonas protectoras), were included within the State Forest Heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado), whereas now, the text differentiates between protective zones (zonas protectoras), considered protected wild areas, listed within Title Two, on the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), and the protection areas (áreas de protección), described in Title Three on Private Forest Property, under the chapter called Forest Protection (...)’ (Opinion (Dictamen) C-103 of June 8, 1998). 'Article 34 alluded to in your document refers to the protection areas (áreas de protección) listed in numeral 33 ibidem and refers basically to privately owned lands. (...) They constitute protection areas (áreas de protección), in their true sense, as they are named in the text of that Article 34, rectifying -in part- the erroneous terminology of 'protected areas (áreas protegidas)' with which they are designated in the title [of Article 34].' (Legal Opinion (Opinión jurídica) OJ022-99 of February 19, 1999).” They allege that this confusion gives rise to an inadequate interpretation and application of the rest of the norms regulating what corresponds to the invasion of these zones. To expand on this topic, it is necessary to resort to a full reading of Article 32 of the Ley Forestal, Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, where the concept of "State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)" is defined as follows: “... all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its [the State’s] Name317, and of those belonging to the municipalities, to the autonomous institutions, and to the other bodies of the Public Administration." Reading the Ley Forestal No. 7575, for the first time the legislator introduces the concept of "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)," leaving out the concept of "State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)." This concept did not show a substantial change, because the definition issued for this concept is identical to the one previously granted to "State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)." With the version of the Ley Forestal corresponding to Law No. 4465, its Article 35 indicated that the "State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)" was composed of: forest reserves; protective zones (zonas protectoras); national parks; national wildlife refuges; and biological reserves. However, in Law No. 7575 (the current one), the concept of "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)" has no valid reason for such a change. The reason is that this concept was introduced by the legislator erroneously. In the words of the General Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), Opinion (Dictamen) No. Placa2041 of January 15 states the following: “It is probable that the new Ley Forestal did not include a conceptualization of the management categories by mistake, since, as can be seen in the Minutes of Ordinary Session No. 80 held by the Commission of Agricultural and Natural Resources AFFAIRS, at 14:31 hours on January 23, 1996 (Case File No. 11.003, Volume X, folios 3492 and 3493), the definitions were eliminated from the proposed legal text because they were already included in another project that was being processed at that time (Ley Ambiental), which ultimately did not become a law of the Republic.” Law No. 7575, by abandoning the concept of "State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)" and adopting the term "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)," does not establish the requirements to understand what is meant by this type of zone. However, the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente complements this absence by using "Protected Wild Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas)" to refer to the different "management categories" that make up that heritage. In May 1998 -27 months after Law No. 7575 entered into force, the Biodiversity Law, No. 7878- in its Article 58 defined "protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas)" as "delimited geographic zones, constituted by lands, wetlands, and portions of the sea. They have been declared as such because they represent special significance for their ecosystems, the existence of threatened species, repercussions on reproduction and other needs, and for their historical and cultural significance. These areas shall be dedicated to conservation and protecting biodiversity, soil, water resources, cultural resources, and ecosystem services in general…” “Article 36: Requirements for creating new areas To create protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) owned by the State, whatever the management category it establishes, the following must be previously fulfilled: a) Preliminary physiogeographic, biological diversity, and socioeconomic studies that justify it. b) Definition of objectives and location of the area. c) Technical feasibility and land tenure study. d) Minimum financing to acquire the area, protect it, and manage it. e) Preparation of plans. f) Issuance of the respective Law or decree.” The "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)" is composed of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its [the State’s] Name317, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, as well as of the different "categories" of "protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas)," which, independently of their particularities and differences among themselves, are administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, through differentiated "management plans." The lands that make up the "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)" —including, of course, the "protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas)," are characterized by: Being unseizable and inalienable lands because they are public domain assets. Their possession by private individuals shall not give rise to any right in their favor, and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) for these lands is imprescriptible. They are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry through possessory information; and their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the law. These characteristics were gathered in Article 33 of Laws Numbers 4465, 7032, and 7174; and the current Ley Forestal gathers them in its Article 14. For all the foregoing, the actors consider they have demonstrated that this norm is contrary to Article 39 of the Political Constitution. **Second Reason for this action: Article 58 of the Ley Forestal.** The crime of invasion of protection areas (áreas de protección) is regulated in Article 58 of the current Ley Forestal, which states the following: “Article 58: Imprisonment of three months to three years shall be imposed on whoever: a) Invades a conservation or protection area (área de conservación o protección), whatever its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime, whatever the area occupied; regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration or lands of private domain.” Meanwhile, the previous forestry laws - Laws Numbers 4465, 7032, and 7174, in their Article 118, provided that: “Article 118: Imprisonment of six months to three years shall be imposed on whoever a) Invades a forest reserve, protective zone (zona protectora), national park, national wildlife refuge, biological reserve, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime, whatever the area occupied, regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration.” In the aforementioned Article 118, it is identified that the penalty for the conduct of invasion ranged from six months to three years of imprisonment. Now then, the differentiating element between the three previous versions of the Ley Forestal and the one currently in force lies in the fact that the conduct typified in the current one designates as a crime the invasion of: “a forest reserve, a protective zone (zona protectora), a national park, a national wildlife refuge, a biological reserve, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime.” The foregoing is neither more nor less than a crime that is classified according to what was established regarding the "State Forest Heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado)," a concept stipulated in the three forestry laws prior to the current one; however, there is a variation in the elements comprising the criminal type's definition (tipicidad), since Article 58, subsection a), of the current Ley Forestal indicates that this crime is configured if the subject invades "a conservation or protection area (un área de conservación o protección)," having the consequence that, according to what has been seen with the three previous forestry laws, the legislator introduced a legally speaking incorrect concept, and since then the legal operator has interpreted and applied this norm erroneously. The question arises: What did the legislator refer to when using the term "a conservation or protection area (un área de conservación o protección)?" As a concept, "conservation or protection area (área de conservación o protección)" was not defined by any of the forestry laws or by any other norm. The claimant mentions the following violated juridical principles: the principles violated by the norm challenged here are as follows: **I. Principle of criminal legality:** In the present case, this principle is violated because there is no prior definition of the different zones contemplated in Article 58 of the Ley Forestal. The Constitutional Chamber, in its vote (voto) No. 1739-92 of eleven hours forty-five minutes on July 1, 1992, indicates that there is an obligation: “... procedurally, to order the entire criminal process based on that prior legal definition, which, in this matter, above all, totally excludes not only regulations or other norms inferior to formal law, but also all unwritten sources of law, as well as any analogical or extensive interpretation of the law -substantive or procedural-; both in function of the guarantees owed to the accused, that is, insofar as they do not favor him. It is not idle to reiterate here that the purpose of the criminal process is not to punish the offender, but rather to guarantee him a fair trial.” The Ley Forestal is not clear in determining what those protection zones (zonas de protección) are, a fundamental right that her represented party is seeing violated. As the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber cites, the principle of criminal legality determines and defines the rest of the principles in the criminal process and in substantive law, with an inadequate application of concepts existing in the norm. Precisely, this principle prevents arbitrariness by the State — it prevents abuses of the limits established by the principles specific to criminal matters; however, in this case, due to a poor appreciation by the legislator, this principle so essential to the present case has been violated. **II. Principle of juridical certainty:** Regarding the present action, it is pointed out that there is a violation of the principle of juridical certainty. It starts from the fact that this principle stipulates that “no human action can constitute a crime, even if it seems immoral or contrary to collective interests, if it is not defined as such by a law prior to its execution (…).” In the case of the resolution of fourteen hours twenty-one minutes on April seventeenth of the year two thousand twenty-three, there is no adequate analysis by the legal operator due to the deficiencies already set forth in this action in relation to Articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal. **III. Principle of criminal typicality:** On the other hand, the principle of criminal typicality stipulates that persons cannot be criminally prosecuted for an action or omission that has not been previously stipulated as a crime in a clear and precise manner in a text that is part of a normative body. In the case at hand, the existence of conceptual confusion results in it not being clear or well-defined in the norm which areas the legislator intends to prevent from being invaded, and consequently, this causes a violation of the interests of her represented party. **IV. Principle of specificity (taxatividad):** The principle of specificity (taxatividad) requires “(...) that the legislator employ a technique of creation, of elaboration of the norm, by virtue of which it is possible to know how far it extends, how far the citizen can or cannot act. For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient for it to be wrongful (antijurídica); it is also necessary that it be typified, that is, fully described in a norm, which obeys unsuppressible demands of juridical certainty, since the repressive matter, being that which most intervenes in important legal rights of citizens, requires that these can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability. The guarantee function of criminal law requires that criminal types be drafted with the greatest possible clarity and precision, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as exactly as possible. Precision is necessary because, if criminal types are formulated with very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining which actions are punishable due to the great absorptive power of the legal description is transferred to the Judge, at the time of establishing the subsumption of a conduct to a norm. Clarity, for its part, addresses the necessary understanding that citizens must have of the law, so that they may adapt their behavior to the pretensions of the criminal law (Resolutions 1876-90 and 1877-90 can be consulted in this regard)." The absence of that precision in the technique employed by the legislator in the criminal type of Article 58 means, in the opinion of this representation, that there is insufficient clarity to determine the responsibility of her represented party. As a petition, it indicates the following: In consideration of all the foregoing, the claimants herein request from this Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the following: “That Articles 33 and 58 of Law Number 7575—'Ley Forestal' be declared unconstitutional, because their wording is confusing and incorrectly uses concepts that result in a poor application of the norm. That the resolution of fourteen hours twenty-one minutes on April seventeenth of the year two thousand twenty-three, issued by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz seat, which corresponds to case file number: [Value 006], be rendered null and void.” **2.** The appearing party bases its standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since it indicates as a prior matter judicial case file (expediente) No. [Value 006] which is pending before the Criminal Court of the II Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz seat, where the companies [Name317 002]., [Name317 003]., and [Name 006]. appear as parties, for the alleged crime of “infringement of the Ley Forestal.” It indicates that it is reported that some buildings were constructed within the protection zone (zona de protección) of a stream (quebrada) that is located within the farm that is in the Name317 of its represented parties.

**3.-** By resolution of the Presidency of this Chamber at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023, the appearing party was warned as follows: “(...) that within three days, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denial of processing of the action in case of non-compliance, they must: provide a certified copy of the document invoking the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged herein, showing the date of receipt by the judicial office that processes the base matter of this action (No. [Value 007]). This, in accordance with Articles 79, paragraph 1, and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…).” **4.-** By document received through Gestión en Línea on September 13, 2023, the claimant [Name317 001], stated the following: “With the intention of complying with the warning indicated according to the resolution of fifteen hours fifty-seven minutes on September seventh of two thousand twenty-three, the undersigned requests an extension of the term of said warning due to the fact that the registered office of the represented party is located in San José, and for my represented party to be able to comply with what is indicated, it must travel to Guanacaste, since the process with file number: [Value 006] is in physical format, and it is located in the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz Guanacaste.” **5.-** By document received through Gestión en Línea on September 14, 2023, a copy certified by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz of folios 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, and 514 of the main file of criminal case No. [Value 006], filed against Name17843 , for the crime of Infringement of the Ley Forestal, to the detriment of natural resources, was provided. Certification issued at 09:39 hours on September 12, 2023.

**6.-** Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject on procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previously rejected identical or similar petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- REGARDING THE PROCESSING.** Although the claimant [Name317 001], by document dated September 11, 2023 (received through Gestión en Línea on September 13, 2023), requested an extension of the term to comply with what was warned by resolution at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023; the truth is that he did not indicate the required term, whereas on September 14, 2023, a certification issued at 09:39 hours on September 12, 2023, by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, corresponding to folios 504 to 514 of the main file of criminal case (expediente) No. [Value 006], was contributed to this file. Consequently, this action is proceeded to be resolved without further process.

**II.- REGARDING THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** This Chamber has pointed out, repeatedly, that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities, which must necessarily be fulfilled so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the admissibility assumptions for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including hábeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative one –in the procedure for exhausting that route–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered harmed in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).

There are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the filing document must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the norms challenged, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the components of the constitutional block that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It must also certify the standing conditions (powers and certifications), proceed to the payment of the stamp of the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica), and provide a literal certification of the document in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter (Article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

**III.- REGARDING THE INVOCATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE BASE MATTER.** Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for the purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route -like the present one-, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including hábeas corpus or amparo–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since mere compliance with them is not enough; rather, it is also required that the norm challenged through this route have a direct impact on the matter that serves as the base, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the harmed right or interest within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion of the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule in that regard. It is for the foregoing reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, claimants must certify and provide a literal certification of the document in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited invocation document must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly pointed out that:

“(...) although extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, it is true that it is necessary for the base matter to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action… and for the constitutional norms considered infringed to be indicated…”. (Resolution (Sentencia) No. 2014-000851 of 14:30 hrs. on January 22, 2014).” (Resolution (Sentencia) No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 hours on May 24, 2017).

By resolution (sentencia) No. 2022-5564, of 9:00 hours on March 9, 2022, this Tribunal also pointed out the following:

“(...) In this case, and in relation to the content of Article 17 referring to confiscation (comiso), upon analyzing the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it proves insufficient. The possible constitutional articles violated are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the allegations referring to Article 45 of the Constitution are lacking, which is precisely the right alleged as harmed in the filing document of the action. Finally, regarding Article 20 referenced, it is not mentioned in the invocation document, so its questioning, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.”

**IV.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** In the sub judice, the appearing party mentions as a base matter the judicial process, case file (expediente) No. [Value 006], which is pending before the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz. By virtue of the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023, a certified copy of folios 504 to 514 of the main file of said criminal case file (expediente) was contributed to the record (document with received stamp at 14:20 hours on May 18, 2023), subscribed only by José Manuel Rivera Salas, in his capacity as general judicial representative of the Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (ASECCSS).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it cannot be deemed that the petitioner made an adequate invocation of unconstitutionality in the base case, first, because the brief submitted as a result of the prevention order issued at 3:57 p.m. on September 7, 2023, as a statement of invocation, is actually a brief signed by a third party who is not a party to this unconstitutionality action, since the same José Manuel Rivera Salas states that he is the representative of SECCSS and says:

"The undersigned, JOSÉ MANUEL RIVERA SALAS, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Tibás, bearer of identity card number CED9380, in my capacity as General Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, ASECCSS, which as of today does not formally appear as a party, nor as an interested third party in the present proceeding, however by reason of the notification of the resolution issued at two hours twenty-one minutes on April seventeen, two thousand twenty-three, made to my represented entity on April 26, 2023, by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, I formally appear before your authority as an interested third party in the present proceeding, and in accordance with numerals 437, 438, 439, 452 and 453 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), to file in a timely and proper manner, in view of the fact that the aforementioned resolution has not to date been personally notified to the representatives of the companies [Name 002]., [Name317 003]. and [Name317 007]., as indicated therein, a formal APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) (…)”. (The emphasis is not from the original).

Second, the aforementioned brief does not expressly and unequivocally contain the invocation of the unconstitutionality of articles 33 and 58 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) —challenged herein— with an indication of the norms and principles of Constitutional Law that are considered infringed by the content of those norms and the reasons supporting its position. Consequently, based on the foregoing, the petitioner fails to demonstrate before this Chamber that it duly invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged herein within the base judicial process and, therefore, it cannot be established that this action is a reasonable means of protecting the interests of its represented entities in the base criminal process, as required by articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). This being the case and considering that such invocation must be made prior to the filing of this process, which cannot be corrected for the purposes of this action, the appropriate course is to reject it outright.

V.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, the action under study is to be rejected outright, as so ordered.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial”, approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The action is rejected outright.

Name290 V.

President Fernando Cruz C.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Name319 V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Hubert Fernández A.

Digitally Signed Document -- Verification Code --  CASE FILE (EXPEDIENTE) N° 23-020734-0007-CO Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección40, Dirección41, 100 meters south of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Dirección42, San José, Dirección43, Dirección44, calles 19 and 21, Dirección45 4465 of November 25, 1969, where the concept of "State Forest Heritage" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) is defined as follows: “… all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its Name317 and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration” Reading the Forest Law No. 7575, for the first time the legislator introduces the concept of "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), leaving behind the concept of "State Forest Heritage" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado). This concept did not show a substantial change, because when a definition of this concept is issued it is identical to the one granted to "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado). With the version of the Forest Law corresponding to Law No. 4465, its article 35 indicated that the "State Forest Heritage" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) was made up of: forest reserves; protective zones; national parks; national wildlife refuges and biological reserves. However, in Law No. 7575 (the current one) the concept of "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) has no valid reason for such a change. The reason is that this concept was introduced by the legislator erroneously. In the words of the Procuraduría General de la República, in Dictamen No. Placa2041 of January 15, which states the following: “It is probable that the new Forest Law did not include a conceptualization of the management categories by mistake, since, as can be seen in the Minutes of Ordinary Session No. 80 held by the Commission on Agricultural Affairs and Natural Resources, at 2:31 p.m. on January 23, 1996 (Expediente No. 11.003, Volume X, folios 3492 and 3493), definitions were eliminated from the proposed legal text because they were already included in another project that was being processed at that time (Environmental Law), which ultimately did not become a law of the Republic”. Law No. 7575, by abandoning the concept of "State Forest Heritage" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) and adopting the term "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), does not establish the requirements to understand what is meant by this type of zone. However, the Organic Environmental Law complements this absence by using “Protected Wilderness Areas” (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas) to refer to the different “management categories” (categorías de manejo) that make up that heritage. In May 1998 —27 months after Law No. 7575 came into effect, the Biodiversity Law, No. 7878— in its article 58, defined "protected wilderness areas" as "delimited geographical zones, constituted by lands, wetlands and portions of sea. They have been declared as such for representing special significance due to their ecosystems, the existence of threatened species, the impact on reproduction and other needs, and for their historical and cultural significance. These areas shall be dedicated to conservation and protecting biodiversity, soil, water resources, cultural resources and ecosystem services in general…” “Article 36: Requirements to create new areas To create protected wilderness areas owned by the State, whatever the management category it establishes, the following must be previously complied with: a) Preliminary physiogeographic, biological diversity and socioeconomic studies that justify it. b) Definition of objectives and location of the area. c) Technical feasibility and land tenure study. d) Minimum financing to acquire the area, protect it and manage it. e) Preparation of maps. f) Issuance of the respective Law or decree”. The "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) is made up of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its Name317 and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration, as well as by the different "categories" of "protected wilderness areas" (áreas silvestres protegidas), which, regardless of their particularities and differences among themselves, are administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, through differentiated "management plans" (planes de manejo). The lands that make up the "State Natural Heritage" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) —including of course the "protected wilderness areas"— are characterized by: Being unseizable and inalienable lands because they are public domain assets. Their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor and the State's action of recovery for those lands is imprescriptible. They are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry through possessory information; and their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the law. Those characteristics were collected in article 33 of Laws numbers 4465, 7032 and 7174; and the current Forest Law collects them in its article 14.

For all of the foregoing, the plaintiffs consider that they have demonstrated that this norm is contrary to article 39 of the Political Constitution. Second Grounds of this action: article 58 of the Forest Law. The crime of invasion of protection areas is regulated in article 58 of the current Forest Law, which states the following: “Article 58: Imprisonment of three months to three years shall be imposed on whoever: a) Invades a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied; regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration or lands of private domain”. Whereas, the previous forest laws — Laws numbers 4465, 7032 and 7174, in their article 118 provided that: “Article 118: Imprisonment of six months to three years shall be imposed on whoever a) Invades a forest reserve, protective zone, national park, national wildlife refuge, biological reserve or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied, regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration”. In the aforementioned article 118 it is identified that the penalty for the conduct of invasion ranged from six months to three years of imprisonment.

Now, the differentiating element between the three previous versions of the Ley Forestal and the one currently in force is that the conduct criminalized in the current law establishes as a crime the invasion of: “a forest reserve, a protective zone, a national park, a national wildlife refuge, a biological reserve, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime.” The foregoing is nothing more nor less than a crime that is criminalized according to what was established as the "forest heritage of the State" (patrimonio forestal del Estado), a concept stipulated in the three forest laws prior to the current one; however, there is a variation in the elements that comprise the criminality (tipicidad) of the criminal offense, since Article 58, subsection a), of the current Ley Forestal indicates that this crime is configured if the subject invades “a conservation or protection area (área de conservación o protección)”, having the consequence that, according to what has been seen with the three previous forest laws, the legislator introduces a legally speaking incorrect concept, and since then the legal operator has erroneously interpreted and applied this norm. The question arises: What was the legislator referring to when using the term "a conservation or protection area"? As a concept, "conservation or protection area" was not defined by any of the forest laws or by any other norm. The petitioner mentions the following violated legal principles: the principles violated by the regulation challenged here are the following: I. Principle of criminal legality: In the present case, this principle is violated because there is no prior definition of the different zones contemplated in Article 58 of the Ley Forestal. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its vote No. 1739-92 of eleven hours forty-five minutes on July 1, 1992, indicates that there is an obligation: “…procedurally, to order the entire criminal case on the basis of that prior legal definition, which, in this matter, above all, totally excludes not only regulations or other norms inferior to formal law, but also all unwritten sources of law, as well as any analogical or extensive interpretation of the law—substantive or procedural—; both in function of the guarantees owed to the accused, that is, to the extent that they do not favor him. It is not idle to reiterate here that the object of the criminal process is not to punish the offender but to guarantee him a fair trial.” The Ley Forestal is not clear in determining what those protection zones are, a fundamental right that her represented party is seeing violated. As cited by the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of criminal legality determines and defines the rest of the principles in criminal procedure and in substantive law, with an inadequate application of concepts existing in the norm. Precisely, this principle prevents arbitrariness in the State—it prevents abuses of the limits established by the principles inherent to criminal matters—, nevertheless, in this case, due to a poor assessment by the legislator, this principle so essential for the present case has been violated. II. Principle of legal certainty: with respect to the present action, indicate that there is a violation of the principle of legal certainty. It starts from the fact that this principle stipulates that “no human action can constitute a crime, even if it seems immoral or contrary to collective interests, if a law prior to its execution does not define it as such (…)”. In the case of the resolution of fourteen hours twenty-one minutes on April seventeenth of the year two thousand twenty-three, there is no adequate analysis by the legal operator due to the shortcomings that have already been exposed in this action in relation to Articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal. III. Principle of criminal typification (tipicidad penal): On the other hand, the principle of criminal typification stipulates that persons cannot be criminally pursued for an action or omission that has not been previously stipulated as a crime in a clear and precise manner in a text that is part of a body of law. In the case at hand, the existence of confusion at a conceptual level causes it not to be clear or well-defined in the norm which areas the legislator intends not to be invaded, and consequently, causes a violation of the interests of her represented party. IV. Principle of specificity (taxatividad): The principle of specificity requires “(…) that the legislator use a technique of creation, of drafting the norm by virtue of which it is possible to know how far it reaches, how far the citizen can or cannot act. For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient that it be unlawful; it is also necessary that it be criminalized, that is, that it be fully described in a norm, which obeys ineradicable requirements of legal certainty, because since repressive matters involve the greatest intervention in important legal interests of citizens, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal responsibility. The guarantee function of criminal law requires that crimes (tipos) be drafted with the greatest possible clarity and precision, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as exactly as possible. Precision obeys the fact that, if criminal offenses are formulated in very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining which actions are punishable is transferred to the Judge, at the moment of establishing the subsumption of a conduct under a norm, due to the great absorptive power of the legal description. Clarity, for its part, attends to the necessary understanding that citizens must have of the law, so that they may adapt their behavior to the pretensions of criminal law (sentences 1876-90 and 1877-90 can be consulted in this regard)." The absence of that precision in the technique employed by the legislator in the criminal offense of Article 58 means that, in the opinion of this representation, there is not sufficient clarity to determine the responsibility on the part of her represented party. As a petition, it indicates the following: In consideration of all the foregoing, the petitioners here request this Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), the following: “That Articles 33 and 58 of Law number 7575— "Ley Forestal", be declared unconstitutional, because their wording is confusing and incorrectly uses concepts that result in a poor application of the norm. That the resolution of fourteen hours twenty-one minutes on April seventeenth of the year two thousand twenty-three, issued by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz venue (Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste sede Santa Cruz), corresponding to case file number: [Valor 006], be rendered void.” 2. The petitioner bases its standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since it indicates as a prior matter the judicial case file No. [Valor 006] that is pending before the Criminal Court of the II Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz venue (Juzgado Penal del II Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Santa Cruz), where the companies [Nombre317 002]., [Nombre317 003]. and [Nombre 006]. appear as parties, for the alleged crime of “violation of the Ley Forestal”. It indicates that it is denounced that some buildings were constructed within the protection zone of a stream that is located within the property that is in the Name317 of its represented parties.

3.- By resolution of the Presidency of this Chamber at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023, the petitioner was warned as follows: "(...) that within three days, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, you must: provide a certified copy of the brief invoking the unconstitutionality of the rules challenged herein, stating the date of receipt by the judicial office processing the underlying matter of this action (no. [Valor 007]). This, pursuant to articles 79, paragraph 1, and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (...)".

4.- By a brief received via Gestión en Línea on September 13, 2023, the petitioner [Nombre317 001], stated the following: "With the intention of complying with the warning indicated in the resolution of fifteen hours fifty-seven minutes of September seventh, two thousand twenty-three, the undersigned requests an extension of the deadline for said warning because the registered office of the represented party is in San José, and for my represented party to comply with the indicated requirement, they must travel to Guanacaste, since the case number: [Valor 006] is in physical format, and it is located in the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste".

5.- By a brief received via Gestión en Línea on September 14, 2023, a copy certified by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz of folios 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, and 514 of the main file of criminal case no. [Valor 006], brought against Nombre17843, for the crime of Violation of the Ley Forestal, to the detriment of natural resources, was provided. Certification issued at 09:39 hours on September 12, 2023.

6.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is merely the reiteration or reproduction of a previous identical or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- REGARDING THE PROCESSING. Although the petitioner [Nombre317 001], by a brief dated September 11, 2023 (received via Gestión en Línea on September 13, 2023), requested an extension of the deadline to comply with the warning issued by the resolution at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023; the fact is that he did not indicate the required deadline, instead, on September 14, 2023, a certification issued at 09:39 hours on September 12, 2023, by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, corresponding to folios 504 to 514 of the main file of criminal case no. [Valor 006] was provided to this case file. Consequently, this action is resolved without further processing.

II.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities, which must necessarily be met for this Court to validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the admissibility requirements for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including remedies of habeas corpus or amparo– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure to exhaust this channel–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned rule is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –which does not require an underlying matter–, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

There are other formalities that must be met, namely, the brief of filing must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality that are considered infringed (article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). The conditions of standing must also be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), payment must be made for the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, and a literal certification must be provided of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules was invoked in the underlying matter (article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

III.- REGARDING THE INVOCATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE UNDERLYING MATTER. Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental channel –like the present one–, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a purely formal matter, as mere compliance with them is not sufficient; rather, it is also required that the rule challenged through this channel has a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that the resolution of the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the harmed right or interest within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, petitioners must accredit and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the rules in the underlying matter, in order to verify their impact on that matter. Regarding the requirements that said invocation brief must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly stated that:

"(...) although an extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of a rule, it is indeed necessary that the unconstitutionality of the rule challenged in the action be expressly invoked in the underlying matter... and the constitutional rules considered infringed be indicated...". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 14:30 hrs. of January 22, 2014)." (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 hours of May 24, 2017).

By judgment No. 2022-5564, of 9:00 hours of March 9, 2022, this Court also stated the following:

"(...) In this case and regarding the content of article 17 referring to seizure (comiso), upon examining the memorandum in which the unconstitutionality of the rule was invoked, it proves insufficient. The possible violated constitutional articles are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referring to article 45 of the Constitution, which is precisely the right alleged to be violated in the action's filing brief, are missing. Finally, regarding article 20 in question, it is not mentioned in the invocation brief, so its challenge, lacking a minimum legal basis, is inadmissible."

IV.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. In the sub judice, the petitioner mentions as the underlying matter the judicial proceeding case no. [Valor 006] pending before the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz. By virtue of the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber at 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023, a certified copy of folios 504 to 514 of the main file of said criminal case (brief stamped received at 14:20 hours on May 18, 2023), subscribed solely by José Manuel Rivera Salas, in his capacity as general judicial representative (apoderado general judicial) of the Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (ASECCSS), was provided to the case file. Despite the foregoing, it cannot be considered that the petitioner made an adequate invocation of unconstitutionality in the underlying matter, first, because the brief he provided as a result of the warning of 15:57 hours on September 7, 2023, as a petition for invocation, is actually a brief signed by a third party who is not a party to this action of unconstitutionality, since the same José Manuel Rivera Salas indicates he is a representative of SECCSS and states:

"The undersigned, JOSÉ MANUEL RIVERA SALAS, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Tibás, bearer of identity card number CED9380, in my capacity as General Judicial Representative of the Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, ASECCSS, which as of today does not formally appear as a party, nor as an interested third party in the present proceeding, however, by reason of the notification of the resolution of fourteen hours twenty-one minutes of April seventeenth, two thousand twenty-three, made to my represented entity on April 26, 2023, by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, I formally appear before your authority as an interested third party in the present proceeding, and in accordance with numerals 437, 438, 439, 452, and 453 of the Código Procesal Penal, to file in a timely and proper manner, given that the aforementioned resolution has not to date been personally notified to the representatives of the companies [Nombre 002]., [Nombre317 003]. and [Nombre317 007]., as indicated therein, a formal APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) (...)". (The highlighting is not from the original).

Second, in the aforementioned brief, the invocation of the unconstitutionality of articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal –challenged herein– does not appear in an express and unequivocal manner, with an indication of the rules and principles of Constitutional Law that are deemed infringed by the content of those rules and the reasons supporting their position. Consequently, based on the foregoing, the petitioner fails to demonstrate before this Chamber having duly invoked the unconstitutionality of the rules challenged herein within the underlying judicial proceeding and, therefore, it cannot be established that this action is a reasonable means to protect the interests of his represented parties in the underlying criminal proceeding, as required in articles 75 and 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. This being the case, and seeing that such invocation must be made prior to the filing of this process, which cannot be corrected for the purposes of this action, the appropriate course is to reject it outright.

V.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the foregoing, the action under study is rejected outright, as hereby ordered.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if any document was provided on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, all material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

The action is summarily dismissed.

Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Nombre319 V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Hubert Fernández A.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --   Res. Nº 2023024066 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.

San José, at nine hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-seventh of September, two thousand twenty-three.

Unconstitutionality action brought by [Name317 001], identity card no. [Value 001], in his capacity as president with powers of general attorney without sum limit of [Name317 002]., legal ID no. [Value 002], and [Name317 003]., legal ID no. [Value 003], and [Name317 004], identity card no. [Value 004], in his capacity as president with powers of general attorney without sum limit of [Name317 005]., legal ID no. [Value 005]; against **articles 33 and 58 of Law No. 7575, Ley Forestal, published in La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996.** **RESULTANDO:** **1.-** By filing received in this Chamber at 10:50 hours on August 28, 2023, the plaintiffs request that the unconstitutionality of articles 33 and 58 of Law No. 7575, Ley Forestal, published in La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, be declared. This, because they consider that they violate numeral 39 of the Political Constitution and the principles of legal reserve, criminal legality, legal certainty, criminal definition, strict construction, and prohibition of analogy in the following terms. In our legal system, there have been four forestry laws — among them Law number 4465 of November 25, 1969, Law number 7032 of May 2, 1986, Law number 7174 of July 10, 1990, and the current Law number 7575 of February 13, 1996. Throughout the first three versions of the forestry laws, different concepts have been maintained that allow locating various areas such as the areas encompassed by the "Forestry Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal)", however, in the current version of the Ley Forestal, a series of variations occurred at a conceptual level that have led to an improper application of the rule by its legal operators, as is the case corresponding to file number 12-000022-0611 -PE. The main reasons will be set forth below. **I. First reason for this unconstitutionality action: State Forestry Heritage and State Natural Heritage.** The first reason why the plaintiffs consider that there is a violation of article 39 of the Political Constitution lies in the poor conceptual application of the terms "protection zones (zonas protectoras)" and "protection areas (áreas de protección)". Curiously, these concepts that the legislator replaced in this rule came to distort and give another meaning to this law. The three forestry laws prior to the current Law No. 7575 defined "protection zones (zonas protectoras)" as: "b) Protection zones: They shall be formed by forests and lands of forestry aptitude, in which the main objective is soil protection, regulation of the hydrological regime, and conservation of the environment and hydrographic basins." Those protection zones, which are considered areas near watercourses, ceased to be called "protection zones (zonas protectoras)" so that currently, in the current Ley Forestal, they are called "protection areas (áreas de protección)", and this is evident in article 33 of this rule: "Article 33. Protection areas. The following are declared protection areas: a) The areas bordering permanent springs, defined in a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the land is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the land is broken. c) A zone of fifty meters measured horizontally on the banks of lakes and natural reservoirs and on lakes or artificial reservoirs built by the State and its institutions. Private artificial lakes and reservoirs are excepted. d) The recharge areas and aquifers of the springs, whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law." Now then, the same Attorney General's Office (PGR) in Opinion No. C-016-2002 of January 15 makes a distinction between both concepts, pointing out that: *“Different is the case of the so-called "protection areas (áreas de protección)", regulated in articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575, in which, although the cutting or elimination of trees is prohibited, projects declared by the Executive Branch as of national convenience are permitted as an exception to this rule, being understood as such those "activities carried out by the centralized dependencies of the State, the autonomous institutions, or private enterprise, whose social benefits are greater than the socio-environmental costs (...). These are the areas bordering permanent springs; rivers, streams, or creeks; lakes and natural and artificial reservoirs built by the State and its institutions; as well as aquifer recharge zones (article 33, clauses a), b), c) and d); and their legal regime is different from that which characterizes the protection zones: "… differs in the location of the provisions on such zones, from all previous laws and preparatory texts, because previously these protection areas, which were called protection zones, were included within the State forestry heritage, whereas now, the text differentiates between protection zones, considered protected wilderness areas, listed within Title Two, of the State Natural Heritage, and the protection areas, described in Title Three on Private Forestry Property, under the chapter called Forest Protection (…)" (Opinion C-103 of June 8, 1998).* *"The aforementioned article 34 refers to the protection areas listed in numeral 33 ibidem and basically refers to privately owned lands. (...) They constitute protection areas, in their true sense, as they are called in the text of that article 34, rectifying -in part- the erroneous terminology of "protected areas" with which they are designated in the title [of article 34]." (Legal opinion OJ022-99 of February 19, 1999)”.* The plaintiff alleges that this confusion gives rise to an inadequate interpretation and application of the rest of the rules that regulate matters corresponding to the invasion of these zones. To elaborate on this topic, it is necessary to resort to an integral reading of article 32 of the Ley Forestal of Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, where the concept of "State Forestry Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)" is defined as follows: *“… all forests and forestry lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its Name317 and of those belonging to the municipalities, to the autonomous institutions and to the other organisms of the Public Administration”* *Upon reading the Ley Forestal No. 7575, for the first time the legislator introduces the concept of "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)", leaving out the concept of "State Forestry Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado)". This concept did not show a substantial change, because at the time a definition of this concept is issued, it is identical to that which was granted to the "State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)".* With the version of the Forest Law corresponding to Law No. 4465, its Article 35 indicated that the "Forest Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) consisted of: forest reserves; protective zones; national parks; national wildlife refuges; and biological reserves. However, in Law No. 7575 (the current one), the concept of "Natural Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) has no valid reason for such a change. The reason is that this concept was introduced by the legislator erroneously. In the words of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) in Opinion No. Placa2041 of January 15, which states the following: “It is likely that the new Forest Law did not include a conceptualization of the management categories (categorías de manejo) by mistake, since, as can be seen in the Minutes of Ordinary Session No. 80 held by the Commission on Agricultural Affairs and Natural Resources (Comisión de ASUNTOS Agropecuarios y Recursos Naturales), at 2:31 p.m. on January 23, 1996 (Expediente No. 11.003, Volume X, pages 3492 and 3493), the definitions were removed from the proposed legal text because they were already included in another project that was being processed at that time (Environmental Law), which ultimately did not become a law of the Republic.” Law No. 7575, by abandoning the concept of "Forest Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) and adopting the term "Natural Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), does not establish the requirements to understand what is meant by this type of zone. However, the Organic Environmental Law complements this absence by using "Protected Wild Areas" (Areas Silvestres Protegidas) to refer to the different "management categories" (categorías de manejo) that make up that heritage. In May 1998—27 months after Law No. 7575 came into force—the Biodiversity Law, No. 7878, in its Article 58, defined "protected wild areas" (áreas silvestres protegidas) as "delimited geographic zones, consisting of lands, wetlands, and portions of the sea. They have been declared as such for representing special significance due to their ecosystems, the existence of threatened species, their impact on reproduction and other needs, and their historical and cultural significance. These areas will be dedicated to conserving and protecting biodiversity, soil, water resources, cultural resources, and ecosystem services in general…” “Article 36: Requirements for creating new areas. To create protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) owned by the State, whatever the management category (categoría de manejo) it establishes, the following must be previously fulfilled: a) Preliminary physiogeographic, biological diversity, and socioeconomic studies that justify it. b) Definition of objectives and location of the area. c) Technical feasibility and land tenure study. d) Minimum financing to acquire, protect, and manage the area. e) Preparation of maps. f) Issuance of the respective Law or decree.” The "Natural Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) is composed of the forests and forest lands of national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its Name317 and those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, as well as the different "categories" of "protected wild areas" (áreas silvestres protegidas), which, regardless of their particularities and differences among themselves, are administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía), through differentiated "management plans" (planes de manejo). The lands that make up the "Natural Heritage of the State" (Patrimonio Natural del Estado)—including, of course, the "protected wild areas" (áreas silvestres protegidas)—are characterized by: Being unseizable and inalienable lands because they are public domain assets. Their possession by private individuals will not create any right in their favor, and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) of these lands is imprescriptible. They are not subject to registration in the Public Registry by means of possessory information; and their invasion and occupation will be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the law. These characteristics were set forth in Article 33 of Laws Nos. 4465, 7032, and 7174; and the current Forest Law sets them forth in its Article 14.

For all the foregoing, the plaintiffs consider that they have demonstrated that this regulation is contrary to Article 39 of the Political Constitution. Second Ground for this action: Article 58 of the Forest Law. The crime of invasion of protected areas is regulated in Article 58 of the current Forest Law, which states the following: “Article 58: Imprisonment of three months to three years shall be imposed on anyone who: a) Invades a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category (categoría de manejo), or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied; regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration or lands of private domain”. Meanwhile, the previous forest laws—Laws Nos. 4465, 7032, and 7174—in their Article 118 provided that: “Article 118: Imprisonment of six months to three years shall be imposed on anyone who a) Invades a forest reserve, protective zone, national park, national wildlife refuge, biological reserve, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied, regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other bodies of the Public Administration”. In the aforementioned Article 118, it is identified that the penalty for the conduct of invasion ranged from six months to three years in prison.

Now, the differentiating element between the three previous versions of the Ley Forestal and the one currently in force is that the conduct typified in the current one defines as a crime the invasion of: “a forest reserve (reserva forestal), a protective zone (zona protectora), a national park (parque nacional), a national wildlife refuge (refugio nacional de vida silvestre), a biological reserve (reserva biológica), or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime (régimen forestal).” The foregoing is nothing more nor less than a crime that is typified according to what was established as the "State forest patrimony (patrimonio forestal del Estado)", a concept stipulated in the three forest laws prior to the current one; however, there is a variation in the elements that comprise the typicity of the criminal type, since Article 58, subsection a), of the current Ley Forestal states that this crime is configured if the subject invades “a conservation or protection area (área de conservación o protección)”, with the consequence that, according to what was seen with the three previous forest laws, the legislator introduces a legally incorrect concept, and since then the legal operator has erroneously interpreted and applied this norm.

The question arises: What was the legislator referring to when using the term "a conservation or protection area (área de conservación o protección)"? As a concept, "conservation or protection area" was not defined by any of the forest laws or by any other norm. The petitioner mentions the following violated legal principles: the principles violated by the regulation challenged here are the following: I. Principle of Criminal Legality (Principio de legalidad criminal): In the present case, this principle is violated because there is no prior definition of the different zones contemplated in Article 58 of the Ley Forestal. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its vote No. 1739-92 of eleven forty-five hours on July 1, 1992, points out that there is an obligation: “…procedurally, to order the entire criminal case on the basis of that prior legal definition, which, in this matter, above all, totally excludes not only regulations or other norms inferior to formal law, but also all unwritten sources of law, as well as any analogical or extensive interpretation of the law —substantial or procedural—; both in light of the guarantees due to the accused, that is, to the extent that they do not favor him. It is not idle to reiterate here that the object of the criminal process is not to punish the delinquent but to guarantee him a fair trial.” The Ley Forestal is not clear in determining which are those protection zones, a fundamental right that her represented party is seeing violated. As the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber cites, the principle of criminal legality determines and defines the rest of the principles in criminal procedure and substantive law, with an inadequate application of concepts in the norm existing. Precisely this principle prevents arbitrariness in the State — it prevents abuses of the limits established by the principles inherent to criminal matters — however, in this case, due to a poor appreciation by the legislator, this principle so essential for the present case has been violated. II. Principle of Legal Certainty (Principio de seguridad jurídica): with respect to the present action, to point out that there is a violation of the principle of legal certainty. It starts from the fact that this principle stipulates that “no human action can constitute a crime, even if it seems immoral or contrary to collective interests, if a law prior to its execution does not define it as such (…)”. In the case of the resolution of fourteen twenty-one hours on April 17 of the year two thousand twenty-three, there is no adequate analysis by the legal operator due to the shortcomings that have already been exposed in this action in relation to Articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal. III. Principle of Criminal Typicity (Principio de tipicidad penal): On the other hand, the principle of criminal typicity stipulates that persons cannot be criminally prosecuted for an action or omission that has not been previously stipulated as a crime in a clear and precise manner in a text that is part of a normative body. In the case at hand, the existence of confusion at a conceptual level causes that it is not clear or well defined in the norm which areas the legislator intends not to be invaded, and consequently, causes a violation of the interests of her represented party. IV. Principle of Taxativeness (Principio de taxatividad): The principle of taxativeness requires “(…) that the legislator employ a technique of creation, of drafting the norm by virtue of which it is possible to know how far it reaches, how far the citizen can or cannot act. For conduct to be constitutive of a crime, it is not sufficient that it is unlawful; it is also necessary that it be typified, that is, that it be fully described in a norm, which responds to unsuppressible demands of legal certainty, since repressive matter being the one of greatest intervention in important legal rights of citizens, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which are the actions they must refrain from committing, under the penalty of incurring criminal responsibility. The guarantee function of criminal law requires that types be drafted with the greatest clarity and precision possible, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as exactly as possible. Precision responds to the fact that, if criminal types are formulated with very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining which actions are punishable is transferred to the Judge, at the moment of establishing the subsumption of conduct to a norm, due to the great absorption power of the legal description. Clarity, for its part, addresses the necessary understanding that citizens must have of the law, so that they adapt their behavior to the pretensions of criminal law (sentences 1876-90 and 1877-90 can be consulted in this regard)." The absence of that precision in the technique employed by the legislator in the criminal type of Article 58 produces that, in the opinion of this representation, there is not sufficient clarity to determine the responsibility on the part of her represented party. As a petition, it indicates the following: In consideration of all the above stated, the petitioners here request from this Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), the following: “That Articles 33 and 58 of Law number 7575— 'Ley Forestal', be declared unconstitutional, because their drafting is confusing and incorrectly employs concepts that derive in a misapplication of the norm. That the resolution of fourteen twenty-one hours on April 17 of the year two thousand twenty-three, issued by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz venue (Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste sede Santa Cruz), corresponding to case file number: [Valor 006], be nullified.” 2. The petitioner party bases its standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since it indicates as a prior matter judicial case file No. [Valor 006] pending before the Criminal Court of the II Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz venue, where the companies [Nombre317 002]., [Nombre317 003]. and [Nombre 006]. appear as parties, for the alleged crime of “infraction of the Ley Forestal”. It indicates that it is denounced that some buildings were constructed within the protection zone of a stream that is located within the property that is under the name of its represented parties.

</p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">3.- </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">By order of the Presidency of this Chamber at 3:57 p.m. on September 7, 2023, the claimant was warned as follows: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“(…) that within three days, counted from the day following notification of this order and under warning of denial of processing of the action in case of non-compliance, you must: provide a certified copy of the writing invoking the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged herein, indicating the date of receipt by the judicial office processing the underlying matter of this action (no. [Valor 007]). This, in accordance with articles 79, paragraph 1, and 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (…)”</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">4.- </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">By writing received via Online Filing on September 13, 2023, the claimant [Nombre317 001], stated as follows: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“With the intention of complying with the warning indicated in the order of three fifty-seven p.m. on September seven, two thousand twenty-three, the undersigned requests an extension of the deadline for said warning on the grounds that the registered office of the represented party is in San José, and for my represented party to be able to comply with what has been indicated, they must travel to Guanacaste, since process file number: [Valor 006] is in physical format, and it is located in the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”. </span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">5.- </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">By writing received via Online Filing on September 14, 2023, a copy certified by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz was provided of folios 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, and 514 of the principal file of criminal case no. [Valor 006], brought against Nombre17843</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">, for the crime of Infraction of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), to the detriment of natural resources. Certification issued at 9:39 a.m. on September 12, 2023.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">6.- </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject on a preliminary basis or on the merits, at any time, including from its presentation, any motion presented for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, identical, or similar rejected motion.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Drafted by Magistrate </span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">Castillo Víquez</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">; and,</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">I.- REGARDING THE PROCEEDINGS (TRÁMITE). </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Although the claimant [Nombre317 001], by writing dated September 11, 2023 (received via Online Filing on September 13, 2023), requested an extension of the deadline to comply with what was ordered by order of 3:57 p.m. on September 7, 2023; the fact is that he did not indicate the required deadline, however, on September 14, 2023, a certification issued at 9:39 a.m. on September 12, 2023, by the judicial coordinator of the Criminal Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, was provided to this file, corresponding to folios 504 through 514 of the principal file of criminal case no. [Valor 006]. Consequently, this action is to be resolved without further proceedings.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">II.- REGARDING THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which must necessarily be fulfilled so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, either in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in the administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the underlying matter is not required– in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">There are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality that are considered infringed (article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). In addition, standing conditions must be proven (powers of attorney and certifications), payment of the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) stamp must be made and</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">a literal certification must be provided of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the underlying matter (article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:9.9pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"width:7.1pt; display:inline-block; -aw-tabstop-align:left; -aw-tabstop-pos:7.1pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"width:28.9pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">III.- REGARDING THE INVOCATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE UNDERLYING MATTER.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Article 75, first paragraph, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">in fine</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route –as in the present case–, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, either before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo proceedings–, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative venue, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is considered harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since mere compliance with them is not sufficient, but it is also required that the norm challenged through this route has a direct impact on the matter that serves as a basis, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the harmed right or interest within the prior matter. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">Conversely (A contrario sensu)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, claimants must prove and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying matter, in order to verify their impact on such matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited invocation brief must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that: </span></p><p style=\"margin:9.9pt 59.15pt 12pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; line-height:95%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:95%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">“(…)</span><span style=\"line-height:95%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> although an extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the fact is that it is necessary that in the underlying matter, the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action is expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms that are considered infringed are indicated…”. (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014).</span><span style=\"line-height:95%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">” (Judgment no. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">By judgment no. 2022-5564, of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Court also stated the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin:8pt 59.15pt 12pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; line-height:107%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:107%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"line-height:107%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">(…) </span><span style=\"line-height:107%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">In this case and in relation to the content of article 17 referring to confiscation, after analyzing the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it is insufficient. The possible harmed constitutional articles are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referring to article 45 of the Constitution are lacking, which is precisely the right that is alleged as harmed in the brief initiating the action. Finally, regarding the referred article 20, it is not mentioned in the invocation brief, so its challenge, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">IV.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">In the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">sub judice</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">, the claimant mentions as the underlying matter the judicial proceeding file no. [Valor 006] pending before the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz. By virtue of the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber at 3:57 p.m. on September 7, 2023, a certified copy of folios 504 through 514 of the principal file of said criminal case was provided to the record (brief stamped as received at 2:20 p.m. on May 18, 2023), signed solely by José Manuel Rivera Salas, in his capacity as general judicial representative (apoderado general judicial) of the Solidarity Association of Employees of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, ASECCSS). Despite the foregoing, it cannot be considered that the claimant has made an adequate invocation of unconstitutionality in the underlying matter, first, because the brief he provided as a result of the warning of 3:57 p.m. on September 7, 2023, as the invocation brief, is actually a brief signed by a third party who is not a party to this action of unconstitutionality, since the same José Manuel Rivera Salas indicates he is a representative of SECCSS and says:</span></p><p style=\"margin:12pt 59.15pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“The undersigned, JOSÉ MANUEL RIVERA SALAS, of legal age, married, lawyer, resident of Tibás, bearer of identity card number CED9380</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">, </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">in my capacity as General Judicial Representative of the Solidarity Association of Employees of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, ASECCSS, which as of today does not formally appear as a party, nor as an interested third party in the present proceeding</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">, however, by reason of the notification of the order of two twenty-one p.m. on April seventeenth, two thousand twenty-three, made to my represented party on April 26, 2023, by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, I formally appear before your authority as an interested third party in the present proceeding, and in accordance with numerals 437, 438, 439, 452, and 453 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to timely and properly file, given that the aforementioned order has not been personally notified to date to the representatives of the companies [Nombre 002]., [Nombre317 003]. and [Nombre317 007]., as indicated therein, a formal APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) (…)”</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">. (The emphasis is not from the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-right:2.45pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Second, in the aforementioned brief, the invocation of unconstitutionality of articles 33 and 58 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) –challenged herein– is not expressly and unequivocally recorded, indicating the norms and principles of Constitutional Law that are considered infringed by the content of those norms and the reasons supporting their position. Consequently, based on the foregoing, the claimant fails to demonstrate before this Chamber having duly invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged herein within the underlying judicial proceeding and, therefore, it is not possible to establish that this action is a reasonable means of protecting the interests of its represented companies in the underlying criminal proceeding, as required by articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. This being the case and given that such invocation must be made prior to the filing of this process, which cannot be rectified for the purposes of this action, the appropriate course is to reject it outright.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">V.- IN CONCLUSION.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject outright the action under study, as is hereby ordered. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">. The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment.</span></p> Otherwise, any material that is not removed within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

The action is flatly rejected.

Salazar A.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img src=\"\" width=\"164\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img src=\"\" width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Nombre319</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">V.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Ronald Salazar Murillo</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Hubert Fernández A.</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Digitally Signed Document</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">-- Verification Code --</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"></span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">W47O8X5Q6NJO61 </span></p><div style=\"-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">EXPEDIENTE N° 23-020734-0007-CO </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; 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Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic Address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección40 , Dirección41 , 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Dirección42</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">, San José, Dirección43 , Dirección44</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">, calles 19 y 21, Dirección45</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></div></div></body></html>"

 Res. Nº 2023024066 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas quince minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de dos mil veintitres .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre317 001], cédula de identidad n.° [Valor 001], en su condición de presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de [Nombre317 002]., cédula jurídica n.° [Valor 002], y [Nombre317 003]., cédula jurídica n.° [Valor 003], y [Nombre317 004], cédula de identidad n.° [Valor 004], en su condición de presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de [Nombre317 005]., cédula jurídica n.° [Valor 005]; contra los artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley n.° 7575, Ley Forestal, publicada en La Gaceta n.° 72 del 16 de abril de 1996.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por escrito recibido en esta Sala a las 10:50 horas del 28 de agosto de 2023, la parte accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley n.° 7575, Ley Forestal, publicada en La Gaceta n.° 72 del 16 de abril de 1996. Esto, por considerar que violan el numeral 39 de la Constitución Política y los principios de reserva de ley, legalidad criminal, seguridad jurídica, tipicidad penal, taxatividad y prohibición de la analogía en los siguientes términos. En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico han existido cuatro leyes forestales — entre ellas la ley número 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969, la ley número 7032 del 02 de mayo de 1986, la ley número 7174 de 10 de julio de 1990 y la actual ley número 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996-. A lo largo de las tres primeras versiones de las leyes forestales se han mantenido diferentes conceptos que permiten ubicar distintas áreas como las áreas que abarcan el "Patrimonio Forestal", sin embargo, en la actual versión de la Ley Forestal se dieron una serie de variaciones a nivel conceptual que han llevado a una indebida aplicación de la norma por parte de sus operadores jurídicos como es el caso que corresponde al expediente número 12-000022-0611 -PE. A continuación, se expondrá los principales motivos. I. Primer motivo de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad: Patrimonio Forestal del Estado y Patrimonio Natural del Estado. El primer motivo por el que los accionantes consideran que existe una violación al artículo 39 de la Constitución Política radica en la mala aplicación conceptual en los términos de "zonas protectoras" y "áreas de protección". Curiosamente estos conceptos que reemplazó el legislador en esta norma vinieron a desvirtuar y darle otro sentido a esta ley. En las tres leyes forestales previas a la actual Ley n.° 7575 definían a las "zonas protectoras" como: "b) Zonas protectoras: Estarán formadas por los bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal, en que el objetivo principal sea la protección del suelo, la regulación del régimen hidrológico y la conservación del ambiente y de las cuencas hidrográficas." Esas zonas protectoras, que se consideran áreas próximas a los cauces dejaron de llamarse "zonas protectoras" para que actualmente en la vigente Ley Forestal se llamen "áreas de protección", y así se evidencia en el artículo 33 de esta norma: “Artículo 33. Áreas de protección Se declaran áreas de protección las siguientes: a) Las áreas que bordeen nacientes permanentes, definidas en un radio de cien metros medidos de modo horizontal. b) Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado. c) Una zona de cincuenta metros medida horizontalmente en las riberas de los lagos y embalses naturales y en los lagos o embalses artificiales construidos por el Estado y sus instituciones. Se exceptúan los lagos y embalses artificiales privados. d) Las áreas de recarga y los acuíferos de los manantiales, cuyos límites serán determinados por los órganos competentes establecidos en el reglamento de esta ley”. Ahora bien, la misma PGR en el Dictamen n.° C-016-2002 del 15 de enero hace una distinción de ambos conceptos señalando que: “Diferente es el caso de las denominadas "áreas de protección", reguladas en los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal No. 7575, en las que, aunque se prohíbe la corta o eliminación de árboles, sí se permiten como excepción a esta regla proyectos declarados por el Poder Ejecutivo como de conveniencia nacional, entendiéndose como tales aquellas "actividades realizadas por las dependencias centralizadas del Estado, las instituciones autónomas o la empresa privada, cuyos beneficios sociales sean mayores que los costos socioambientales(...). Se trata de las áreas que bordean nacientes permanentes; ríos, quebradas o arroyos; lagos y embalses naturales y artificiales construidos por el Estado y sus instituciones; así como zonas de recarga acuífera (artículo 33, incisos a), b), c) y d); y su régimen legal es distinto al que caracteriza las zonas protectoras: “… difiere en la ubicación de las disposiciones sobre tales zonas, de todas las leyes anteriores y los textos preparatorios, pues anteriormente estas áreas de protección, que eran llamadas zonas protectoras, se incluían dentro del patrimonio forestal del Estado, mientras que ahora, diferencia el texto entre zonas protectoras, consideradas áreas silvestres protegidas, enumeradas dentro del Título Segundo, del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, y las áreas de protección, descritas en el Título Tercero de la Propiedad Forestal Privada, bajo el capítulo llamado de la Protección Forestal (…)” (Dictamen C-103 de 8 de junio de 1998). "El artículo 34 aludido en su escrito se contrae a las áreas de protección que enumera el numeral 33 ibídem y se refiere básicamente a terrenos de propiedad privada. (...) Constituyen áreas de protección, en su verdadero sentido, como se les denomina en el texto de ese artículo 34, rectificando -en parte- la errónea terminología de "áreas protegidas" con que se les designa en el título [del artículo 34]. " (Opinión jurídica OJ022-99 de 19 de febrero de 1999)”. Alega que esa confusión da pie a una inadecuada interpretación y aplicación del resto de normas que regulan lo correspondiente a la invasión de estas zonas. Para ampliar sobre este tema se hace necesario recurrir a la lectura integra del artículo 32 de la Ley Forestal de la Ley No. 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969, donde se define el concepto de "Patrimonio Forestal del Estado" de la siguiente manera: “… todos los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su Nombre317 y de las pertenecientes a las municipalidades, a las instituciones autónomas y a los demás organismos de la Administración Pública" Haciendo una lectura de la Ley Forestal No. 7575, por primera vez el legislador introduce el concepto de "Patrimonio Natural del Estado", dejando por fuera el concepto de "Patrimonio Forestal del Estado". Este concepto no mostró un cambio sustancial, debido a que a la hora de que se emite una definición de este concepto resulta idéntica a la que se le concedía al "Patrimonio Natural del Estado”. Con la versión de la Ley Forestal que corresponde a la Ley n.° 4465 se indicaba en su artículo 35 que el "Patrimonio Forestal del Estado" lo conformaban: las reservas forestales; las zonas protectoras; los parques nacionales; los refugios nacionales de vida silvestre y las reservas biológicas. Sin embargo, en la Ley n.° 7575 (la vigente) el concepto de "Patrimonio Natural del Estado" no tiene un motivo válido para tal cambio. La razón es que este concepto fue introducido por el legislador de forma errónea. En palabras de la Procuraduría General de la República está en el Dictamen No. Placa2041 del 15 de enero que señala lo siguiente: “Es probable que en la nueva Ley Forestal no se incluyera una conceptualización de las categorías de manejo por error, ya que, como puede verse en el Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria No. 80 celebrada por la Comisión de ASUNTOS Agropecuarios y Recursos Naturales, a las 14:31 horas del 23 de enero de 1996 (Expediente No. 11.003, Tomo X, folios 3492 y 3493), de la propuesta de texto legal se eliminaron las definiciones porque ya estaban incluidas en otro proyecto que se estaba tramitando en ese momento (Ley Ambiental), que en última instancia no llegó a ser ley de la República”. La Ley n.° 7575 al abandonar el concepto de "Patrimonio Forestal del Estado" y adoptar el término de "Patrimonio Natural del Estado" no establece los requisitos para entender lo que se entiende por este tipo de zona. Sin embargo, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente complementa esta ausencia al utilizar “Áreas Silvestres Protegidas” para referirse a las diferentes “categorías de manejo” que conforman ese patrimonio. En mayo de 1998 -27 meses después de que entró en vigencia la Ley n.° 7575, la Ley de Biodiversidad, n.° 7878- en su artículo 58, definió las "áreas silvestres protegidas" como "zonas geográficas delimitadas, constituidas por terrenos, humedales y porciones de mar. Han sido declaradas como tales por representar significado especial por sus ecosistemas, la existencia de especies amenazadas, la repercusión en la reproducción y otras necesidades y por su significado histórico y cultural. Estas áreas estarán dedicadas a conservación y proteger la biodiversidad, el suelo, el recurso hídrico, los recursos culturales y los servicios de los ecosistemas en general…” “Artículo 36: Requisitos para crear nuevas áreas Para crear áreas silvestres protegidas propiedad del Estado, cualquiera sea la categoría de manejo que él establezca, deberá cumplirse previamente con lo siguiente: a) Estudios preliminares fisiogeograficos, de diversidad biológica y socioeconómicos, que la justifiquen. b) Definición de objetivos y ubicación del área. c) Estudio de factibilidad técnica y tenencia de la tierra. d) Financiamiento mínimo para adquirir el área, protegerla y manejarla. e) Confección de planos. f) Emisión de la Ley o el decreto respectivo”. El "Patrimonio Natural del Estado" está conformado por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su Nombre317 y de las pertenecientes a municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, así como por las diferentes "categorías" de "áreas silvestres protegidas", las que independientemente de sus particularidades y diferencias entre sí, son administradas por el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, a través de "planes de manejo" diferenciados. Los terrenos que conforman el "Patrimonio Natural del Estado" —incluidas por supuesto las "áreas silvestres protegidas", se caracterizan por: Ser terrenos inembargables e inalienables por tratarse de bienes de dominio público. Su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por esos terrenos es imprescriptible. No son susceptibles de inscripción en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria; y su invasión y ocupación serán sancionadas conforme con las disposiciones de la ley. Esas características eran recogidas en el artículo 33 de las Leyes números 4465,7032 y 7174; y la actual Ley Forestal las recoge en su artículo 14. Por todo lo anterior, consideran los actores que dejan demostrado que esta norma es contraria al artículo 39 de la Constitución Política. Segundo Motivo de esta acción: artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal. El delito de invasión a las áreas de protección se encuentra regulado en el artículo 58 de la actual Ley Forestal que indica lo siguiente: “Artículo 58: Se impondrá prisión de tres meses a tres años a quien: a) Invada un área de conservación o protección, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, u otras áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal, cualquiera que sea el área ocupada; independientemente de que se trate de terrenos privados del Estado u otros organismos de la Administración Pública o de terrenos de dominio particular”. Mientras que, las anteriores leyes forestales - Leyes números 4465, 7032 y 7174, en su artículo 118 disponía que: “Artículo 118: Se impondrá prisión de seis meses a tres años a quien a) Invada una reserva forestal, zona protectora, parque nacional, refugio nacional de vida silvestre, reserva biológica u otras áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal, cualquiera que sea el área ocupada independientemente de que se trate de terrenos privados del Estado u otros organismos de la Administración Pública”. En el ya mencionado artículo 118 se identifica que la penalidad a la conducta por invasión iba de los seis meses a los tres años de prisión. Ahora bien, el elemento diferenciador entre las tres versiones anteriores de la Ley Forestal y la que se encuentra vigente, está en que la conducta tipificada en la actual señala como delito la invasión a: “una reserva forestal, una zona protectora, un parque nacional, un refugio nacional de vida silvestre, una reserva biológica, u otras áreas de bosque o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal”. Lo anterior no es más ni menos que un delito que se tipifica de acuerdo a lo que se establecía al "patrimonio forestal del Estado", concepto que se estipula en las tres leyes forestales previas a la actual, sin embargo, existe una variación en los elementos que comprenden la tipicidad del tipo penal, ya que, el artículo 58, inciso a), de la actual Ley Forestal señala que este delito se configura si el sujeto invade “un área de conservación o protección”, teniendo como consecuencia que según lo visto con las tres anteriores leyes forestales el legislador introduce un concepto jurídicamente hablando incorrecto, y desde entonces el operador jurídico ha interpretado y aplicado de manera errónea esta norma. Surge la interrogante: ¿A qué se refería el legislador cuando utilizó el término "un área de conservación o protección? Como concepto, "área de conservación o protección", no fue definido por ninguna de las leyes forestales ni por ninguna otra norma. El accionante menciona los siguientes principios jurídicos violados: los principios vulnerados por la normativa aquí accionada son los siguientes: I. Principio de legalidad criminal: En el presente caso este principio se violenta a razón que no existe una definición previa de las diferentes zonas que contempla el artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal. La Sala Constitucional en su voto n.° 1739-92 de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del 1° de julio de 1992, señala que existe una obligación: “…procesalmente, a ordenar toda la causa penal sobre la base de esa previa definición legal, que, en esta materia, sobre todo, excluye totalmente no sólo los reglamentos u otras normas inferiores a la ley formal, sino también todas las fuentes no escritas del derecho, así como toda interpretación analógica o extensiva de la ley -sustancial o procesal-; unos y otras en función de las garantías debidas al reo, es decir, en medida en que no le favorezcan. No es ocioso reiterar aquí que el objeto del proceso penal no es el de castigar al delincuente sino el de garantizarle un juzgamiento justo”. La Ley Forestal no es clara en determinar cuáles son esas zonas de protección, un derecho fundamental que su representada está viendo violarse. Como cita la resolución de la Sala Constitucional, el principio de legalidad criminal determina y define el resto de los principios en el proceso penal y en el derecho de fondo existiendo una inadecuada aplicación de conceptos en la norma. Justamente este principio evita que existan arbitrariedades en el Estado — evita que se den abusos a los límites establecidos por los principios propios de la materia penal-, sin embargo, en este caso por una mala apreciación del legislador se ha violentado este principio tan esencial para el presente caso. II. Principio de seguridad jurídica: con respecto a la presente acción, señalar que hay una violación al principio de seguridad jurídica. Parte del hecho que este principio estipula que “ninguna acción humana puede constituir delito, aunque parezca inmoral o contraria a los intereses colectivos, si no la define como tal, una ley anterior a su ejecución (…)”. En el caso de la resolución de las catorce horas veintiún minutos del diecisiete de abril del año dos mi veintitrés no existe un análisis adecuado por parte del operador jurídico por las falencias que ya han expuesto en esta acción en relación a los artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley Forestal. III. Principio de tipicidad penal: Por otra parte, el principio de tipicidad penal estipula que a las personas no se les puede perseguir penalmente por una acción u omisión que no haya sido previamente estipulada como delito de forma clara y precisa en un texto que sea parte de un cuerpo normativo. En el caso que nos ocupa al existir una confusión a nivel conceptual causa que no se tenga claro ni bien definido en la norma cuales son las áreas que el legislador pretende que no se invadan, y consecuentemente, causa una violación a los intereses de su representada. IV. Principio de taxatividad: El principio de taxatividad exige “(…) que el legislador emplee una técnica de creación, de elaboración de la norma en virtud de la cual sea posible conocer hasta dónde llega éste, hasta dónde puede o no puede actuar el ciudadano. Para que una conducta sea constitutiva de delito no es suficiente que sea antijurídica, es necesario además que esté tipificada, sea que se encuentre plenamente descrita en una norma, lo cual obedece a exigencias insuprimibles de seguridad jurídica, pues siendo la materia represiva la de mayor intervención en bienes jurídicos importantes de los ciudadanos, es necesario éstos puedan tener cabal conocimiento de cuáles son las acciones que deben abstenerse de cometer, bajo la pena de incurrir en responsabilidad criminal. La función de garantía de la ley penal exige que los tipos sean redactados con la mayor claridad y precisión posible, para que tanto su contenido como sus límites puedan deducirse del texto lo más exactamente posible. La precisión obedece a que, si los tipos penales se formulan con términos muy amplios, ambiguos o generales, se traslada al Juez, al momento de establecer la subsunción de una conducta a una norma, la tarea de determinar cuáles acciones son punibles por el gran poder de absorción de la descripción legal. La claridad, por su parte, atiende a la necesaria compresión que los ciudadanos deben tener de la ley, para que así adecuen su comportamiento a las pretensiones de la ley penal (pueden consultarse al respecto las sentencias 1876-90 y 1877-90)." La ausencia de esa precisión en la técnica empleada por el legislador en el tipo penal del artículo 58 produce que a criterio de esta representación no existe suficiente claridad para determinar la responsabilidad por parte de su representada. Como petitoria indica lo siguiente: En consideración de todo lo anteriormente expuesto, los aquí accionantes solicitan a esta Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, lo siguiente: “Que se declare inconstitucional los artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley número 7575— "Ley Forestal", debido a que su redacción es confusa y emplea de manera incorrecta conceptos que derivan en una mala aplicación de la norma. Que se deje sin efecto la resolución de las catorce horas veintiún minutos del diecisiete de abril del año dos mil veintitrés emitida por el Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste sede Santa Cruz, que corresponde al expediente número: [Valor 006]”.

2. La parte accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que indica como asunto previo el expediente judicial n.° [Valor 006] que pende ante el Juzgado Penal del II Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Santa Cruz, donde figuran como partes las sociedades [Nombre317 002]., [Nombre317 003]. y [Nombre 006]., por el supuesto delito de “infracción a la Ley Forestal”. Indica que se denuncia que se construyeron algunas edificaciones dentro de la zona de protección de una quebrada que está ubicada dentro de la finca que está a Nombre317 de sus representadas.

3.- Por resolución de la Presidencia de esta Sala de las 15:57 horas del 7 de septiembre de 2023, se previno a la parte accionante lo siguiente: “(…) que dentro de tercero día, contado a partir del siguiente a la notificación de esta resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, deberán: aportar copia certificada del escrito de invocación de la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas, donde conste la fecha de recibido por el despacho judicial que tramita el asunto base de esta acción (n.° [Valor 007]). Esto, conforme a los artículos 79, párrafo 1°, y 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)”.

4.- Por escrito recibido mediante Gestión en Línea el 13 de septiembre de 2023, el accionante [Nombre317 001], manifestó lo siguiente: “Con la intención de cumplir con la prevención señalada según la resolución de las quince horas cincuenta y siete minutos del siete de setiembre de dos mil veintitrés el suscrito solicita ampliar el plazo de dicha prevención a razón de que el domicilio social de la representada se encuentra en San José, y para que mi representada pueda cumplir con lo señalado debe de trasladarse hasta Guanacaste, ya que el proceso número de expediente: [Valor 006] se encuentra en formato físico, y el mismo está ubicado en el Juzgado Penal de Santa Cruz Guanacaste”.

5.- Por escrito recibido mediante Gestión en Línea el 14 de septiembre de 2023, se aportó copia certificada por la coordinadora judicial del Juzgado Penal de Santa Cruz de los folios 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513 y 514 del legajo principal de la causa penal n.° [Valor 006], seguida contra Nombre17843 , por el delito de Infracción a la Ley Forestal, en perjuicio de los recursos naturales. Certificación extendida a las 09:39 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2023.

6.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- SOBRE EL TRÁMITE. Si bien el accionante [Nombre317 001], por escrito de fecha 11 de setiembre de 2023 (recibido mediante Gestión en Línea el 13 de setiembre de 2023), solicitó ampliación del plazo para cumplir con lo prevenido por resolución de las 15:57 horas del 7 de septiembre de 2023; lo cierto es que no indicó el plazo requerido, en cambio, el 14 de setiembre de 2023 fue aportada a este expediente una certificación expedida a las 09:39 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2023 por la coordinadora judicial del Juzgado Penal de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, correspondiente a los folios 504 al 514 del legajo principal del expediente penal n.° [Valor 006]. En consecuencia, se procede a resolver esta acción sin más trámite.

II.- DE LOS REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que necesariamente deben cumplirse para que este Tribunal pueda pronunciarse válidamente sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

Existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber, el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

III.- DE LA INVOCACIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD EN EL ASUNTO BASE. El artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental -como la presente-, la existencia de un asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo-, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento de los mismos, sino que se requiere, además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción sirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés lesionado dentro del asunto previo. A contrario sensu, si no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo impugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto. Es por lo anterior, que, de conformidad con los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes deben acreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, a efecto de verificar su incidencia en tal asunto. En cuanto a los requisitos que debe cumplir el citado escrito de invocación, esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que:

“(…) si bien, en la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, no se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es, que sí resulta necesario que en el asunto base se invoque expresamente, la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la acción... y se indiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren infringidas…”. (Sentencia No. 2014-000851 de las 14:30 hrs. del 22 de enero de 2014).” (Sentencia n.° 2017-007744 de las 9:15 horas del 24 de mayo de 2017).

Por sentencia n.° 2022-5564, de las 9:00 horas del 9 de marzo de 2022, este Tribunal también señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) En este caso y relación con el contenido del artículo 17 referido al comiso, analizado el memorial en que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma, el mismo resulta insuficiente. Se mencionan los posibles artículos constitucionales lesionados, pero no se indican las razones. Sobre todo, se echa de menos los alegatos referidos al artículo 45 constitucional que es, precisamente, el derecho que se alega como lesionado en el escrito de interposición de la acción. Por último, en cuanto al artículo 20 referido, no es mencionado en el escrito de invocación, por lo que su cuestionamiento, carente del mínimo fundamento jurídico, es inadmisible.” IV.- DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. En el sub judice, la parte accionante menciona como asunto base el proceso judicial expediente n.° [Valor 006] que pende ante el Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz. En virtud de la prevención de la Presidencia de esta Sala de las 15:57 horas del 7 de septiembre de 2023, fue aportada a los autos copia certificada de los folios 504 al 514 del legajo principal de dicho expediente penal (escrito con sello de recibido a las 14:20 horas del 18 de mayo de 2023), suscrito únicamente por José Manuel Rivera Salas, en su condición de apoderado general judicial de la Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (ASECCSS). Pese a lo anterior, no puede estimarse que el accionante haya realizado una adecuada invocación de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto base, primero, porque el escrito que aportó a raíz de la prevención de las 15:57 horas del 7 de setiembre de 2023, como libelo de invocación, en realidad es un escrito suscrito por un tercero que no es parte en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, pues el mismo José Manuel Rivera Salas indica ser representante de SECCSS y dice:

“El suscrito, JOSÉ MANUEL RIVERA SALAS, mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de Tibás, portador de la cedula (sic) de identidad número CED9380 , en mi condición de Apoderado General Judicial de la Asociación Solidarista de Empleados de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, ASECCSS, la cual al día de hoy realmente no figura formalmente como parte, ni tercera interesada en el presente proceso, no obstante en razón de la notificación de la resolución de las catorce horas veintiún minutos del diecisiete de abril del año dos mil veintitrés, realizada a mi representada el día 26 de abril de 2023, por parte del Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, me apersono de manera formal ante su autoridad como tercera interesada en el presente proceso, y de conformidad con los numerales 437, 438, 439, 452 y 453 del Código Procesal Penal, a interponer en tiempo y en forma, en vista de que la resolución supra citada a la fecha no ha sido personalmente notificada a los representantes de las sociedades [Nombre 002]., [Nombre317 003]. y [Nombre317 007]., tal y como se señala en la misma, formal RECURSO DE APELACIÓN (…)”. (El destacado no corresponde al original).

Segundo, en el escrito precitado no consta de manera expresa e inequívoca la invocación de la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley Forestal -aquí impugnados-, con indicación de las normas y principios del Derecho de la Constitución que estima infringidos por el contenido de esas normas y las razones que sustentan su postura. En consecuencia, a partir de lo anterior, la parte accionante no logra demostrar ante esta Sala haber invocado debidamente la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas dentro del proceso judicial base y, por ende, no se logra establecer que esta acción sea un medio razonable de amparar los intereses de sus representadas en el proceso penal base, conforme lo requerido en los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Así las cosas y visto que tal invocatoria debe realizarse de previo a la interposición de este proceso, lo cual no puede ser subsanado para los efectos de esta acción, lo procedente es rechazarla de plano.

V.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano la acción en estudio, como así se dispone.

VI.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Nombre290 V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Nombre319 V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Hubert Fernández A.

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