Constitutionality of Article 96 bis, Clause 1 of the Organic Law of the JudiciaryConstitucionalidad del artículo 96 bis inciso 1 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial

Document Review  Case File: 23-016847-0007-CO Resolution No. 2023020710 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at eleven hours and twenty minutes on the twenty-third of August, two thousand and twenty-three.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name317 001], of legal age, married twice, businessman, identification number [CED168 ], resident of Dirección1432, acting in his personal capacity and as unlimited general attorney-in-fact for the company [Name317 002], legal entity identification number [CED161 ], against article 96 bis, subsection 1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.

**Whereas:** 1.- By document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 9:05 a.m. on July 17, 2023, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of article 96 bis, subsection 1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial be declared. He alleges that the challenged rule establishes that the Tribunal Penal (trial court) be composed of a single judge to hear the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against decisions of the Juez Penal or the Juez de la etapa intermedia. He considers that the rule under review violates the right of defense, the constitutional guarantee of due process (debido proceso), the right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), the principle of equality before the law, and the principle of non-regression (no regresividad) in human rights. He states that the IACHR has indicated that the right to appeal a ruling is a fundamental guarantee that must be respected within the framework of due process of law, in order to allow an adverse judgment to be reviewed by a different judge or court of superior organic hierarchy that can correct jurisdictional decisions contrary to law (case Nombre9087 vs Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2012). He adds that the judge hearing the appeal must possess the jurisdictional characteristics that legitimize him to hear the specific case; otherwise, the procedural stage conducted before him could not be established as valid and legitimate (case Castillo Petruzzi vs. Peru). He points out that, in the words of the IACHR, a true guarantee of reconsideration would be one that meets the requirements of competence, impartiality, and independence established by the Constitution. Given that the judgments issued by the intermediate judge of the process can only be reviewed by a single-judge court (tribunal unipersonal), the challenged rule limits the right of defense of the accused or the victim. Thus, the circumstance that a single judge decides does not satisfy the standards set by the IACHR's jurisprudence regarding due process of law. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the Constitución Política prohibits discrimination lacking objective reasonableness. Differentiated treatment of persons in the same factual situation must be based on criteria of reasonableness that justify it. Articles 93.1 and 93 bis establish that appeals against judgments from trial courts are heard by appeals courts (tribunales a apelaciones) composed of three judges. Furthermore, that decision is subject to cassation appeal, the court for which is composed of five magistrates. Conversely, when the claims of victims and accused persons are rejected in the intermediate stage, they are heard by only two judges: one from the Juzgado Penal and, on appeal, one from the Tribunal Penal. This unequal treatment that the LOPJ grants to accused persons and victims whose claims are resolved through the judgments of judges of the intermediate stage, compared to those who are convicted or acquitted by a trial court, violates the principle of equality before the law, given that all of them should be granted the same procedural mechanisms for challenging unfavorable judgments in protection of their right to effective material defense with equality of arms. Regarding the violation of the principle of non-regression, it is inherent to all human rights instruments and states the impossibility of reducing the protection already granted to a right, which is recognized for all human rights in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This principle would also be a consequence of the criterion of conservation or non-derogation of the most favorable regime for the person. Article 96, subsection 1) of the LOPJ was added by Article 9 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997, called Ley de Reorganización de los Tribunales. This was the law that accompanied the Código Procesal Penal in force since January 1, 1998, with the objective of adapting the structure and operation of the then-new criminal process. Before that date, persons had the right for appeals against investigating judges to be heard and resolved by a court composed of three judges, thereby effectively guaranteeing the fundamental right of access to jurisdiction. In this sense, the introduction of article 96 bis, subsection 1) in 1997, effective January 1, 1998, flagrantly violates the principle of non-regression in matters of fundamental rights, as it worsened the fundamental right of access to justice in relation to the challenge of judgments issued in the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings.

2.- For purposes of standing (legitimación), he states that it derives from Article 75, paragraph 1 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The prior matter is a criminal proceeding being processed under case file No. 16-000226-1220-PE for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta), before the Tribunal Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José. The procedural standing of the claimant's represented party to file this action of unconstitutionality arises from the defense of the rights of the claimant company, regarding the appeal (recurso de apelación) that may have to be filed, should a new order contrary to its represented party's interests be issued, as a new preliminary hearing must be held to resolve the exemption from costs (exoneración en costas). This new preliminary hearing must be held because the Tribunal de Apelación Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (composed as a single-judge body), upon issuing vote No. 001665, which confirmed the declaration of the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the civil damages action (acción civil resarcitoria) contained in the order for elevation to trial (auto de elevación a juicio) of the Juzgado Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Criminal Proceeding against: Nombre14203 and Others, crime: fraudulent administration and others, case file 16-000226-1220-PE), also declared the "ineffectiveness" ("ineficacia") of that order regarding the exemption from costs, ordering the remand of that case file to the originating Court "solely to resolve that point." 3.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that is manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considering:** I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the cited Law of this jurisdiction provides that, to file an action of unconstitutionality, there must be a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, or in a proceeding to exhaust administrative remedies, in which that constitutional objection is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In this specific case, the claimant alleges that his standing derives from Article 75, first paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as there is a criminal proceeding processed under case file No. 16-000226-1220 for the crime of fraudulent administration, in which they appear as aggrieved parties. In this regard, it is appropriate to indicate to the claimant that the action of unconstitutionality is an incidental remedy in favor of any of the parties in said main matter, as a way to assert their rights therein:

“[When] Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, in principle, the existence of a matter pending resolution in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured, as a requirement for filing the action, it does not refer to a simple procedural formality; it is not an innocuous or inconsequential detail to complicate and hinder constitutional control; rather, it is a direct manifestation of the principle according to which the jurisdictional function, of which constitutional control is a substantial and fundamental part, is exercised through the resolution of controversies that are real and find remedy in a final judgment (…). It is also necessary that the action of unconstitutionality be a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured, that is, that with the declaration of unconstitutionality that the Chamber eventually makes, the claimant obtains a benefit within the process or proceeding underlying said action, without this necessarily meaning the full achievement of his claims within the prior matter (…)” (No. 1468-90 of 3:45 p.m. on October 30, 1990; underlining is not from the original).

In this case, the claimant affirms that a preliminary hearing is pending to resolve the issue of exemption from costs. This is because the Tribunal de Apelación Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (composed as a single-judge body), upon issuing vote No. 001665, declared the "ineffectiveness" of the order for elevation to trial of the Juzgado Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José regarding the exemption from costs, ordering the remand of that case file to the originating Court "solely to resolve that point." His represented party is one of the civil claimants, so regarding the decision that the Court may issue, it might find itself needing to file an appeal (recurso de apelación), with the aggravating factor that such appeal will be resolved by a single-judge court (tribunal unipersonal), since orders issued in the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings are heard by a single judge, a member of the appeals section of the Tribunal de Apelación Penal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José. Furthermore, the action meets the admissibility requirements set forth in Articles 73 to 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and its subject matter is among those indicated in numeral 10 of the Constitución Política and Article 73 of the cited Law. Under these circumstances, the action is a reasonable means to protect the right that is considered injured, and therefore it is appropriate to analyze the allegations presented on their merits.

II.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.- The challenged rule states:

“Article 96 bis.- The tribunales penales de juicio shall be constituted with a single one of their members, to hear:

1.- The appeal (recurso de apelación) against decisions of the juez penal.” III.- CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEVANCES.- The representative of the claimant company states that the rule injures the guarantee of due process, the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, the principle of equality before the law, and the principle of non-regression.

IV.- ON DUE PROCESS AND THE JUDICIAL GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION. The representative of the claimant company alleges that the current configuration of the Tribunal de Apelación established in the challenged rule injures due process and the judicial guarantee of effective judicial protection, insofar as it prevents a collegiate court from hearing and resolving what is submitted for its consideration. Regarding due process, in judgment 1992-1739 this Court indicated:

“I - The concept of due process comprehensively involves the progressive development of practically all fundamental rights of a procedural or instrumental nature, as sets of guarantees of enjoyment rights -whose enjoyment immediately satisfies the needs or interests of the human being-, that is, the means aimed at ensuring their validity and effectiveness. (…)”.

It is a fundamental right in a State of Law, which in turn is composed of others, such as the right of defense, the right to present evidence, the rights to procedure, to obtain a just sentence, etc. In our country, there has been extensive jurisprudential development of the constitutional norms that guarantee the procedural and substantive rights of the person subjected to a judicial process or administrative proceeding, where the axis of the procedural guarantee has been Article 41 of the Constitution, interpreted as its primary source. The text of the former states:

"Article 41 - Resorting to the laws, everyone must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered to them promptly, completely, and in strict conformity with the laws." One of the rights that comprises due process is the right to effective judicial protection, that is, the general right to justice. On this topic, the Chamber, in judgment 93-3092, stated:

“A) THE GENERAL RIGHT TO JUSTICE: At the base of every procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of justice administration, that is, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the State's jurisdictional function - to declare the controverted right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases -; which comprises, in turn, a set of independent judicial bodies specialized in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs arising from social life, in a civilized and effective manner, and the guaranteed access to that justice for all people, under conditions of equality and without discrimination.

• a)In this first sense, therefore, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right of petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -specifically- of the Constitution, according to which:

"Article 27 - Freedom of petition is guaranteed, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution." "Article 41 - Resorting to the laws, everyone must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered to them promptly, completely, and in strict conformity with the laws." b) But it also has other implications that are even more immediately enforceable, which may, in turn, concern the justice administration system itself, or the right of access to justice for all people:

(…) 2. And belonging to the latter - the right of everyone equally to access justice -, in addition to the generic right of petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, a series of complementary -but also fundamental- attributes, among which:

(i) the general right and principle of equality - and its counterpart of non-discrimination -, which is reflected in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that their duality demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights; a principle and right which, although not incompatible with certain reasonable distinctions according to the maxim of "equality for equals and inequality for unequals," also known as the principle of substantial equality, in criminal matters does not seem to permit any possible distinction; (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here as they are not directly involved in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informality, etc.; (iii) Finally, the right that that justice be administered completely and promptly.” (vote 92-1739).

In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged rule does not injure the right of access to justice, as it clearly guarantees the possibility of exercising the procedural guarantee, such as the right to appeal before a superior body, so that it may review the conformity of the resolution or judgment issued by the lower body with the corresponding legal system. The Chamber has been clear that the right to appeal is not unrestricted, except in criminal matters against a conviction, against jurisdictional pronouncements that end the case, or procedural or preparatory acts that have their own effect (see, among other judgments, numbers 282-90 of 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 1990, 300-90 of 5:00 p.m. on March 21, 1990, 2015-4382 of 9:30 a.m. on March 27).

In the case of the challenged rule, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such appeal is not heard by a multi-member body – as the claimant party demands – does not per se entail emptying the purpose of the appeal of its content or impeding its proper functioning, which is to allow for an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, with the insurmountable limit being the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Constitución Política and in accordance with what is established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. In the case of the challenged rule, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such appeal is not heard by a multi-member body – as the claimant party demands – does not per se entail emptying the purpose of the appeal of its content or impeding its proper functioning, which is to allow for an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, with the insurmountable limit being the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Constitución Política and in accordance with what is established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. Regarding the legislator's freedom of configuration, the Chamber has stated:

“(…) constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body such as the “free legislative configuration” (“libre configuración del legislador”), also called “free legislative design” or “legislative discretion.” For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, it was stated that: “The Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Constitución Política), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that that body has, faced with a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it considers fairest, most adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, values and principles - among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process and defense stand out - of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases.” For this Court, the legislative discretion applied to the sub iudice reaches and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered viable the elimination of the public auction in the allocation of licenses for the sale of beverages with alcoholic content and to have proceeded in that manner, especially since in this way adequate normative treatment is given to the true legal nature of a license.” (Vote 13-011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013) And it is that, as long as the legislator exercises its discretionary power of configuration within the limits of the Law of the Constitution, its actions should not give rise to constitutional questions. It is not logical to think that the conditions for exercising the right to appeal must remain immutable, in all instances, in all matters, when the truth is that, precisely, the legislator can adapt it to historical circumstances, those inherent to the process, to the instance in which it is exercised, and to the type of matter involved. Continuing with that central idea, the objective of protection in these cases is related to monitoring and protecting that legislative activity complies with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, which implies that the norm is not injurious to the principles of legality, proportionality, and reasonableness (vote 8744-00); that the legal power of every subject of law to resort to jurisdictional bodies to demand the resolution of a conflict of interests is respected, including the rights to have the broadest freedom and the unconditional guarantee of access to the process, to obtain a decision on the merits based on law, as well as absolute respect for judicial rulings, their effective compliance, and respect for the finality of judicial decisions (vote 5742-96); the rights to legality, to the regular judge, to a hearing and defense, to a just sentence, which includes a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the State's jurisdictional function, that is, to declare the controverted right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially, and to protect the purpose of the criminal process, which is a fair trial (vote 440-98).

Along these lines, when hearing about the regulation of a certain appeal in a jurisdictional venue, the Chamber pointed out that:

“(…) the fact that such appeal is not heard by a multi-member body – as the claimant demands – does not per se entail emptying the purpose of the appeal of its content or impeding its proper functioning, which is to make it possible to objectively review the legality or appropriateness of what was decided in the first instance. Even more, when hearing about the regulation of a certain appeal in a jurisdictional venue, this Chamber pointed out that:

“(…) The fact that an eventual appeal is heard by a civil court of higher amount and not by a superior court does not cause defenselessness to the appellant because both jurisdictional authorities are obliged to apply the legal system and cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. The fact that in one case it involves a single-judge court (juez unipersonal) and in another a collegiate court (tribunal colegiado) does not alter the essence or raison d'être of the appeal, which pursues the objective that another body review what was decided by the first-instance judge.” (Vote No. 2000-04546 of 3:42 p.m. on May 31, 2000) (vote No. 09210 – 2019).

This thesis was reiterated in vote No. 2004-13779 of 2:50 p.m. on December 1, 2004:

“(…) It is also indicated that while ordinary labor trials are heard by a single judge "through the common civil procedure" (sic), that of Law 3664 "is processed by a Collegiate Court which even holds an oral and public trial." Frankly, the Chamber does not understand wherein there could be any restriction whatsoever on due process here, as both modalities of prosecution are common in judicial processes of this and other matters, without any of them necessarily having to be considered per se as worse or better than the other.” V.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the claimant indicates that the Constitución Política prohibits discrimination lacking objective reasonableness. Differentiated treatment of persons in the same factual situation must be based on criteria of reasonableness that justify it. Thus, Articles 93.1 and 93 bis establish that appeals against judgments from trial courts are heard by appeals courts composed of three judges. This unequal treatment that the LOPJ grants to accused persons and victims whose claims are resolved through the judgments of judges of the intermediate stage, compared to those who are convicted or acquitted by a trial court, violates the principle of equality before the law, given that all of them should be granted the same procedural mechanisms for challenging unfavorable judgments in protection of their right to effective material defense with equality of arms.

Regarding the principle of equality referred to procedural situations, this Court, in judgment No. 2001-12220, hearing a consultation in criminal matters on the different composition of bodies hearing a certain matter, resolved:

“IV.- The consulting Judges assert that the greater guarantee of the collegiate court was unjustifiably not contemplated for defamation cases and that therefore, such differentiated treatment should be considered a violation of the right to equality. In this regard, from what has been explained, it is now possible to reach a conclusion. The circumstance causing the doubt in the consultation, by itself, is not sufficient to violate that constitutional principle. In other words, the fact that the legislator, who has discretionary power to determine judicial procedures as seen, provided for the trial of defamation crimes differently from those of slander and libel, assigning the hearing of the former to a single-judge court (tribunal unipersonal), does not constitute an illegitimate difference, because it objectively does not impair the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a diminishment in their formal faculties or their right of defense. Furthermore, nor does that circumstance violate the dignity of the subjects in said cases, nor place them in a legally harmful or injurious situation in relation to the generality of criminal proceedings.” (emphasis does not correspond to the original) The same criterion was reiterated in judgment No. 2006-15261 of 2:42 p.m. on October 10, 2006, the Chamber indicated:

“Only. Through a judicial consultation raised by the Juzgado Penal Juvenil of Turrialba, processed before this Chamber under case file 97-001024-007-CO, that judge consulted whether the difference between the common criminal process and the one established for the specific case of minors was valid, insofar as a process against the latter shall be resolved by a single judge (juez unipersonal), while for adults that task corresponds to a collegiate court.

The Chamber, in its turn, addressed the argument, indicating that the fact that in juvenile criminal justice the trial stage is not held by a collegiate court in cases of offenses punishable by a prison sentence exceeding three years does not contradict articles 33 and 39 of the Political Constitution." (emphasis not in the original. In the same vein, judgment no. 1997-02908 of 4:33 p.m. on May 27, 1997).

VI.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSIVITY. The claimant states that the rule violates the principle of non-regressivity, which states the impossibility of reducing the protection already afforded to a right. In the claimant's opinion, the introduction of article 96 bis, subsection 1) of 1997, effective as of January 1, 1998, worsened the fundamental right of access to justice in relation to the challenge of judgments issued in the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings, which constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity. Article 96, subsection 1), of the LOPJ was added by article 9 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997, called the Court Reorganization Law (Ley de Reorganización de los Tribunales). This was the law that accompanied the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) in force since January 1, 1998, with the aim of adapting the structure and operation of the then-new criminal process. The claimant states that before that date, individuals had the right for appeals from investigating judges (jueces de instrucción) to be heard and decided by a court composed of three judges, which effectively guaranteed the fundamental right of access to jurisdiction (acceso a la jurisdicción), so the reform carried out constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity. Regarding this principle, the Chamber has stated:

"(…) The principle of progressivity demands that, as a State's level of development improves, its level of commitment to guaranteeing rights improves. In theory, the idea is that the more resources a State has, the greater its capacity to provide services that guarantee rights. The obligation of progressive implementation contains the prohibition of non-regressivity, which can be subject to judicial review in the event of non-compliance. When a State recognizes, respects, and satisfies a fundamental right, it is prohibited from reducing the levels of protection of existing rights or eliminating those already existing. A decision or public policy can be considered regressive when its results worsen, compared to the results of a previous starting point that has been chosen as a parameter, and in the field of legal norms, if when comparing a new norm, previously existing rights are eliminated, limited, or restricted. In that sense, doctrine has established that once a particular right has been formally recognized as inherent to the human person, it is definitively and irrevocably integrated into the category of human rights whose protection is mandatory. However, for it to be claimed that there is a violation of the principle of progressivity and non-regressivity, it is required that a fundamental right existed that had been recognized and that it be limited or restricted without any reasonable justification..." Judgment 11088-13 "…the legislators publicized from the beginning of the legislative process the intention to eliminate the ground of violation of due process (debido proceso) within the procedure for review of the judgment, explaining the reasons why they considered the reform should be made.(…)" ." (vote 2013-11088 of 3:30 p.m. on August 21, 2013).

Law No. 7728, the Judicial Reorganization Law (Ley de Reorganización Judicial), was enacted for the purpose of making possible the implementation of the 1998 Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), which caused a profound reform of the criminal legal system that, in turn, necessitated a reorganization of the courts, especially those of the criminal jurisdiction. In that sense, it is important to remember that one of the objectives in enacting Law No. 7728 was to consolidate a more equitable and accessible legal system, for which the organization and assignment of competencies of some judicial offices were renewed. As a result of this comprehensive reform made by the legislator, there was a profound change in the design of the criminal process that encompassed, of course, the means of appeal (medios de impugnación): which decisions could be appealed, which bodies would hear such appeals, and their composition, among other aspects. In that sense, the fact that before the 1998 reform, individuals had the right for appeals from investigating judges (jueces de instrucción) to be heard and decided by a court composed of three judges, and, after the reform, some appeals are heard by a single-judge court (tribunal unipersonal) does not worsen the fundamental right of access to jurisdiction (acceso a la jurisdicción) nor does it constitute a violation of the principle of progressivity. To assert such a thing, simply because an appeal is heard by a single-judge court instead of a collegiate one, is to have a very biased view of the issue. The 1998 reform, in general terms, represented a modernization of the criminal justice system, and allowed for the transition from one criminal procedural system to another, in an optimal manner. This was done, precisely, because in accordance with the rule of progressivity of economic, social, and cultural rights, recognized in article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Costa Rican State was obliged to develop and execute policies aimed at progressively achieving what is established in constitutional article 41, regarding "prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws." It was a comprehensive reform, which has been developed over the long term, with the aim of achieving a better and more complete exercise of the fundamental rights related to access to justice and the principles of due process (debido proceso).

VII.- CONCLUSION.- The fact that a single-judge court is the one that hears a specific appeal does not violate any fundamental right because that circumstance, objectively, does not worsen the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a diminution in their formal powers or their right of defense. Due to the foregoing, the action is rejected on the merits.

VIII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judicial Branch" ("Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial"), approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

The action is rejected on the merits.

Name290 V.

President Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Name444 .

Name319 V.

Jose Roberto Garita N.

Document Signed Digitally -- Verification Code --  Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Address40 , Address41 , 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Address42 , San José, Address43 , Address44 , calles 19 y 21, Address45 It is a fundamental right in a Rule-of-Law State, which in turn is composed of other rights, such as the right of defense, the right to present evidence, the rights to procedure, to obtain a just judgment, etc. In our country, there has been extensive jurisprudential development of the constitutional norms that guarantee the procedural and substantive rights of the person subjected to a judicial process or administrative procedure, where the axis of the procedural guarantee has been Article 41 of the Constitution, interpreted as its primary source. The text of the first states:

"Article 41 - Seeking recourse to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." One of the rights that comprises due process is the right to effective judicial protection, which is to say, the general right to justice. Regarding this matter, the Chamber, in judgment 93-3092, stated:

"**A) THE GENERAL RIGHT TO JUSTICE:** At the base of all procedural order is the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of administration of justice, that is, of a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State (*función jurisdiccional del Estado*)—to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases—; which comprises, in turn, a set of specialized independent judicial organs in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination.

• a)In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that reason, which require the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right of petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution, according to which:

"Article 27 - The freedom of petition is guaranteed, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution." "Article 41 - Seeking recourse to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." b) But it also has other implications even more immediately demandable, which may, in turn, concern the system of administration of justice itself, per se, or the right of access to justice for all persons:

**(…) 2.** And belonging to the latter—the right of everyone equally to access justice—in addition to the generic right of petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the already-cited Constitution, are a series of complementary—but also fundamental—attributes, among which:

(i) the general right and principle of equality—and its counterpart of non-discrimination—which is set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international Human Rights instruments, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights; a principle and right that, although they are not incompatible with certain reasonable distinctions according to the maxim of "equality for equals and inequality for unequals," also known as the principle of substantial equality, in criminal matters does not appear to permit any possible distinction; (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here as they are not directly involved in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informalism, etc.; (iii) Finally, the right that such justice be administered completely and promptly." (vote 92-1739).

In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged norm does not harm the right of access to justice, since it clearly guarantees the possibility of exercising the procedural guarantee, such as the right to appeal before a superior body, so that it reviews the conformity of the resolution or judgment issued by the lower body with the corresponding legal system. The Chamber has been clear that the right to appeal is not unrestricted, except in criminal matters against a condemnatory judgment, against jurisdictional pronouncements that put an end to the cause, or procedural or preparatory acts that have their own effect (see, among others, judgments numbers 282-90 of 17:00 hours on March 13, 1990, 300-90 of 17:00 hours on March 21, 1990, 2015-4382 of 9:30 a.m. on March 27).

In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such an appeal is not heard by a multi-member body—as the claimant claims—does not per se presuppose emptying the purpose of the appeal or impeding its due function, which is to allow an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in accordance with what is established in the innumerable precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such an appeal is not heard by a multi-member body—as the claimant claims—does not per se presuppose emptying the purpose of the appeal or impeding its due function, which is to allow an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in accordance with what is established in the innumerable precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. Regarding the legislator's freedom of configuration, the Chamber has indicated:

"(…) constitutes a prerogative proper to that legislative body such as the 'free configuration of the legislator,' also called 'free legislative design' or 'legislative discretion.' For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours on June 11, 2003, it was noted that: 'The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract character, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power. That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the normed matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that said body has, in the face of a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (...) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since its limit is the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, values and principles—among which proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases.' For this Tribunal, the legislative discretion applied to the sub iudice extends to and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered the elimination of public auction in the assignment of licenses for the sale of beverages with alcoholic content viable and proceeded in that manner, especially since in this way an appropriate normative treatment is given to the true legal nature of a license." (Vote 13-011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013) And it is that as long as the legislator exercises their discretionary power of configuration within the limits of the Law of the Constitution, their actions should not give rise to constitutional challenges. It is not logical to think that the conditions for the exercise of the right to appeal must remain immutable, in all instances, in all matters, when the truth is that, precisely, the legislator can adapt it to historical circumstances, those proper to the process, to the instance in which it is exercised, to the type of matter involved.

Continuing with that central idea, the objective of protection in these cases is related to monitoring and ensuring that legislative activity complies with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, which implies that the norm must not violate the principles of legality, proportionality, and reasonableness (voto 8744-00); that the legal power of every subject of law to resort to jurisdictional bodies to demand the resolution of a conflict of interests be respected, including the rights to the broadest freedom and the unconditional guarantee of access to the process, to obtain a decision on the merits founded in law, as well as absolute respect for judicial rulings, their effective compliance, and respect for the finality of judicial decisions (voto 5742-96); the rights to legality, to a regular judge, to a hearing and defense, to a just sentence, which includes a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State, that is, to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially, and to protect the object of the criminal process, which is a fair trial (voto 440-98).

In this line, when addressing the regulation of a specific appeal before a jurisdictional venue, the Chamber indicated that:

"(…) the fact that such an appeal is not heard by a multi-member body –as claimed by the plaintiff– does not, per se, empty the purpose of the appeal or impede its proper functioning, which is to enable an objective review of the legality or propriety of what was decided in the first instance. In fact, when addressing the regulation of a specific appeal before a jurisdictional venue, this Chamber indicated that:

"(…) The fact that a potential appeal is heard by a higher-value civil court and not by a superior tribunal does not cause defenselessness for the appellant because both jurisdictional authorities are obligated to apply the legal system and cannot act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The fact that in one case it involves a single-judge body (juez unipersonal) and in another a collegiate tribunal (tribunal colegiado) does not alter the essence or reason for being of the appeal, whose objective is for another body to review what was decided by the judge of the first instance." (Voto No. 2000-04546 of 3:42 p.m. on May 31, 2000) (voto n° 09210 – 2019).

This thesis was reiterated in voto n° 2004-13779 of 2:50 p.m. on December 1, 2004:

"(…) It is also indicated that while ordinary labor trials are heard by a single judge 'through common civil procedure' (sic), the one under Law 3664 'is processed by a Collegiate Tribunal which even holds an oral and public trial'. The Chamber frankly does not understand where there could be any restriction whatsoever of due process here, since both forms of adjudication are common in judicial proceedings of this and other matters, without either having to be considered per se as necessarily worse or better than the other." **V.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY**. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the plaintiff indicates that the Political Constitution prohibits discrimination lacking objective reasonableness. Differentiated treatment of persons in the same factual situation must be based on criteria of reasonableness that justify it. Thus, articles 93.1 and 93 bis establish that appeals of judgments from trial tribunals are heard by appellate tribunals composed of three judges. This unequal treatment that the LOPJ grants to defendants and victims whose claims are resolved through the judgments of the judges of the intermediate stage, and those who, instead, are convicted or acquitted by a trial tribunal, violates the principle of equality before the law, given that they should all be granted the same procedural mechanisms for challenging unfavorable judgments in protection of their right to an effective material defense with equality of arms.

Regarding the principle of equality referred to procedural situations, this Tribunal, in judgment n° 2001-12220, addressing a consultation on criminal matters regarding the different composition of bodies hearing a specific matter, resolved:

"IV.- The consulting Judges assert that the greater guarantee of the collegiate tribunal was unjustifiably not contemplated for defamation matters and that therefore, this differentiated treatment should be considered a violation of the right to equality. In this regard, from what has been stated, a conclusion can now be reached. The circumstance causing the doubt in the consultation, by itself, is not sufficient to violate this constitutional principle. In other words, the fact that the legislator, who has discretionary power to determine judicial procedures as seen, provided for the trial of defamation crimes differently from those of slander and libel, assigning the hearing of the former to a single-judge tribunal, **does not constitute an illegitimate difference, because it objectively does not worsen the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a diminution in their formal powers or in their right of defense. Moreover, this circumstance does not violate the dignity of the subjects in said cases, nor does it place them in a juridically harmful or injurious situation in relation to the generality of criminal processes.**" (emphasis not in original) The same criterion was reiterated in judgment n° 2006-15261 of 2:42 p.m. on October 10, 2006, the Chamber indicated:

"Single. Through a judicial consultation raised by the Juvenile Criminal Court of Turrialba, processed in this Chamber under expediente 97-001024-007-CO, that judge consulted whether the difference between the common criminal process and that provided for the specific case of minors was valid, in that a process against minors will be resolved by a single judge, while for adults, this task corresponds to a collegiate tribunal. The Chamber, in its turn, addressed the question indicating that **the fact that in juvenile criminal justice the trial stage is not held by a collegiate tribunal in cases of crimes punishable by a prison sentence exceeding three years, does not contradict articles 33 and 39 of the Political Constitution.**" (emphasis not in original. In the same sense, judgment n° 1997-02908 of 4:33 p.m. on May 27, 1997).

**VI.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSIVENESS.** The plaintiff states that the norm injures the principle of non-regressiveness, which enunciates the impossibility of reducing the protection already agreed upon for a right. In the plaintiff's opinion, the introduction of article 96 bis section 1) of 1997, effective as of January 1, 1998, worsened the fundamental right of access to justice in relation to the challenging of judgments issued in the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings, which constitutes an injury to the principle of progressivity. Article 96, paragraph 1), of the LOPJ was added by article 9 of Law n° 7728 of December 15, 1997, called the Law of Reorganization of the Tribunals. This was the law that accompanied the Code of Criminal Procedure effective since January 1, 1998, with the objective of adapting the structure and functioning of the then-new criminal process. The plaintiff states that before that date, persons had the right for appeals from investigating judges to be heard and resolved by a tribunal composed of three judges, thereby effectively guaranteeing the fundamental right of access to the jurisdiction, such that the reform carried out constitutes an injury to the principle of progressivity. In relation to this principle, the Tribunal has noted:

"(…) The principle of progressivity demands that as the level of development of a State improves, so does the level of commitment to guarantee rights. In theory, the idea is that the more resources a State has, the greater its capacity to provide services that guarantee rights. The obligation of progressive implementation contains the prohibition of non-regressiveness, which can be subjected to judicial control in the event of non-compliance. When a State recognizes, respects, and satisfies any fundamental right, it is prohibited from reducing the levels of protection of existing rights or suppressing those already in place. A decision or public policy can be considered regressive when its results worsen compared to the results of a previous starting point that has been chosen as a parameter, and in the field of legal norms, if when comparing a new norm, previously existing rights are suppressed, limited, or restricted. In that sense, the doctrine has established that once a specific right has been formally recognized as inherent to the human person, it becomes definitively and irrevocably integrated into the category of human rights whose protection is mandatory. Now, to be able to indicate that there is an injury to the principle of progressivity and non-regressiveness, it is required that a fundamental right existed that was recognized and that it is limited or restricted without any reasonable justification…" Judgment 11088-13 "…the legislators publicized, from the beginning of the legislative process, the intention to eliminate the cause of violation of due process within the procedure for reviewing the sentence, explaining the reasons why they considered the reform should be made.(…)” .” (voto 2013-11088 of 3:30 p.m. on August 21, 2013).

Law n° 7728, the Law of Judicial Reorganization, was enacted with the aim of making the implementation of the 1998 Code of Criminal Procedure possible, which caused a profound reform of the criminal legal system, which in turn made a reorganization of the tribunals necessary, especially those of the criminal jurisdiction. In that sense, it is important to remember that one of the objectives in promulgating Law n° 7728 was to consolidate a more equitable and accessible legal system, for which the organization and assignment of competencies of some judicial offices were renewed. As a product of this comprehensive reform made by the legislator, there was a profound change in the design of the criminal process that covered, of course, the means of challenge: which resolutions could be appealed, which bodies would hear such appeals, and the composition of these, among other aspects. In that sense, the circumstance that before the 1998 reform, persons had the right for appeals from investigating judges to be heard and resolved by a tribunal composed of three judges, and after the reform, some appeals are heard by a single-judge tribunal does not worsen the fundamental right of access to the jurisdiction nor does it constitute an injury to the principle of progressivity. To affirm such a thing simply because an appeal is heard by a single-judge tribunal instead of a collegiate one is to have a very biased view of the matter. The 1998 reform, in general terms, represented a modernization of the criminal justice system and allowed for the transition from one criminal procedural system to another in an optimal manner. This was done precisely because, in compliance with the rule of progressivity of economic, social, and cultural rights, recognized in article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Costa Rican State was obligated to develop and execute policies aimed at progressively achieving what is established in constitutional article 41, regarding "prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws". It was a comprehensive, long-term reform, with the aim of achieving a better and fuller exercise of the fundamental rights related to access to justice and the principles of due process.

**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** The circumstance that a single-judge tribunal is the one hearing a specific appeal does not injure any fundamental right because that circumstance, objectively, does not worsen the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a diminution in their formal powers or in their right of defense. Due to what has been stated, the action is dismissed on the merits.

**VIII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE.** The parties are warned that if any document on paper has been provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, any material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is dismissed on the merits.

The methodology used included the identification of survey areas based on the analysis of satellite images and cartographic information on land-use capacity (capacidad de uso del suelo). Thirty-six sampling points were selected where water, soil, and biotic factor samples were taken, following the methodology described in the executive decree that created the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), published in La Gaceta No. 28 of February 9, 1996. The samples were analyzed at the Soil and Foliar Laboratory of the Agronomic Research Center, the Environmental Analysis Laboratory of the National University, and the Soils and Waters Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. With the data obtained, map overlaps were produced to determine the potential land use (uso potencial del suelo) and the land-use conflicts (conflictos de uso del suelo) present in the area.

Salazar A.

| | | ![image](data:image/png;base64...Nombre444  .

| ![image](data:image/jpeg;base64...Nombre319  V.

| | | ![image](data:image/jpeg;base64...Jose Roberto Garita N.

    Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --   CHQVJ1EZULI61       **PENAL. APELACIÓN CONTRA RESOLUCIONES** Sentencia: 020710-23 de 23 de agosto de 2023 Tipo de asunto: Acción de inconstitucionalidad Norma impugnada: Artículo 96 bis 1 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Parte dispositiva: Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

  **II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION (ACCIÓN).-** The challenged provision states:

**_“Article 96 bis.-_** _**The criminal trial courts (tribunales penales de juicio) shall be constituted with only one of their members, to hear:** _ **_1.-_** _**The appeal (recurso de apelación) against the decisions of the criminal judge (juez penal)”** _.

**III.- CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEVANCES (AGRAVIOS DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD).-** The representative of the petitioning company states that the provision violates the guarantee of due process (debido proceso), the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), the principle of equality before the law, and the principle of non-regressivity.

**IV.- ON DUE PROCESS AND THE JUDICIAL GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION**. The representative of the plaintiff company alleges that the current configuration of the Court of Appeal (Tribunal de Apelación) set forth in the challenged provision violates due process and the judicial guarantee of effective judicial protection, insofar as it prevents a collegiate court from hearing and deciding the matters submitted to its jurisdiction.

Regarding due process, in judgment 1992-1739 this Court stated:

“**I -** The concept of due process comprehensively involves the progressive development of practically all <u>fundamental rights of a procedural or instrumental nature</u>, as sets of <u>**guarantees of the rights of enjoyment**</u>—whose exercise immediately satisfies the needs or interests of the human being—that is, of the means intended to ensure their validity and effectiveness. (…)”.

It is a fundamental right in a State of Law (Estado de Derecho), which in turn is composed of others, such as the right to defense, the right to present evidence, the rights to procedure, to obtain a just decision, etc. In our country, there has been an extensive jurisprudential development of the constitutional norms that guarantee the procedural and substantive rights of the person subject to a judicial process or administrative proceeding, where the axis of the procedural guarantee has been Article 41 of the Constitution, interpreted as its primary source. The text of the former states:

"Article 41 - Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." One of the rights that makes up due process is the right to effective judicial protection, that is, the general right to justice. On this subject, the Chamber, in judgment 93-3092 stated:

“**A) THE GENERAL RIGHT TO JUSTICE:** At the base of every procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of justice administration, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the <u>jurisdictional function of the State</u>—declaring the disputed right or restoring the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in concrete cases—; which comprises, in turn, a set of <u>independent specialized judicial bodies</u> in that exercise, the <u>availability of that apparatus</u> to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that originate in social life, in a civilized and effective manner, and the guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under <u>conditions of equality and without discrimination</u>.

**a)** In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the <u>right of petition</u>, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution, according to which:

"Article 27 - The freedom of petition is guaranteed, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution." "Article 41 - Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." **b)** But it also has other implications that are even more immediately demandable, which may, in turn, concern the system of justice administration itself, in itself, or the right of <u>access to justice</u> for all persons:

**(…) 2.** And belonging to the latter—the equal right of all to access justice—, in addition to the generic <u>right of petition</u> of Article 27 and the specific <u>right to justice</u> of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, are a series of complementary—but also fundamental—attributes, among which:

(i) the general right and principle of equality—and its counterpart of non-discrimination—, which is set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international Human Rights instruments, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion of interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that the latter is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights; a principle and right which, although not incompatible with certain reasonable distinctions in accordance with the maxim "equality for equals and inequality for unequals," also known as the principle of substantial equality, in criminal matters does not seem to permit any possible distinction; (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here because they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informality, etc.; (iii) Finally, the right to have that justice administered completely and promptly.” (judgment 92-1739).

In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged norm does not harm the right of access to justice, since it clearly guarantees the possibility of exercising the procedural guarantee, such as the right to appeal before a higher body, so that it may review the conformity of the resolution or judgment issued by the lower body with the corresponding legal system. The Chamber has been clear that the right of appeal is not unrestricted, except in criminal matters against a conviction, against jurisdictional decisions that put an end to the case or procedural or preparatory acts that have their own effect (see, among others, judgments numbers 282-90 of 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 1990, 300-90 of 5:00 p.m. on March 21, 1990, 2015-4382 of 9:30 a.m. on March 27).

In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body (órgano pluripersonal)—as claimed by the petitioner—does not *per se* empty the purpose of the appeal remedy of its content or prevent its due functioning, which is to allow the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body to be reviewed in an objective manner. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial proceedings, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right to defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what is established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body (órgano pluripersonal)—as claimed by the petitioner—does not *per se* empty the purpose of the appeal remedy of its content or prevent its due functioning, which is to allow the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body to be reviewed in an objective manner. In this sense, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial proceedings, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right to defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what is established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. Regarding the legislator's freedom of configuration, the Chamber has indicated:

“(…) it constitutes a prerogative proper to that legislative body such as the ‘free configuration of the legislator,’ also called ‘free legislative design’ or ‘legislative discretion.’ For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, it was stated that: ‘The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing general and abstract norms, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that that body has, faced with a certain need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as a limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the constitutional block formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature and the jurisprudence issued by this Court for similar cases.’ For this Court, the legislative discretion applied to the *sub iudice* matter suffices and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered viable the elimination of the public auction in the assignment of licenses for the sale of beverages with alcoholic content and to proceed in that manner, especially since in this way adequate normative treatment is given to the true legal nature of a license.” (Judgment 13-011706 of 11:44 a.m. on August 30, 2013) And it is that as long as the legislator exercises its discretionary power of configuration within the limits of the Law of the Constitution, its actions should not give rise to constitutional challenges. It is not logical to think that the conditions for exercising the right of appeal must remain immutable, in all instances, in all matters, when the truth is that, precisely, the legislator can adapt it to historical circumstances, those specific to the process, the instance in which it is exercised, the type of matter involved. Continuing with that central idea, the objective of protection in these cases relates to monitoring and protecting that the legislative activity complies with the requirement of creating laws that guarantee fundamental rights, which implies that the norm does not harm the principles of legality, proportionality, and reasonableness (judgment 8744-00); that it respects the legal power that every subject of law has to resort to jurisdictional bodies to claim the resolution of a conflict of interests, including the rights to have the broadest freedom and the unconditional guarantee of access to the process, to obtain a decision on the merits grounded in law, as well as absolute respect for judicial rulings, their effective compliance, and respect for the finality of judicial decisions (judgment 5742-96); the rights to legality, to the regular judge, to a hearing and defense, to a just judgment, which includes a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the State's jurisdictional function, that is, declaring the disputed right or restoring the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially, and protecting the object of the criminal process which is a fair trial (judgment 440-98).

Along these lines, when reviewing the regulation of a certain appeal remedy in the jurisdictional venue, the Chamber stated that:

“**(…)** the fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body (órgano pluripersonal)—as claimed by the petitioner—does not *per se* empty the purpose of the appeal remedy of its content or prevent its due functioning, which is to make it possible to review in an objective manner the legality or appropriateness of what was decided in the first instance. Even when reviewing the regulation of a certain appeal remedy in the jurisdictional venue, this Chamber stated that:

“(…) The fact that an eventual appeal remedy is heard by a civil court of higher amount and not by a superior court does not cause defenselessness to the appellant because both jurisdictional authorities are obliged to apply the legal system and cannot act in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” The fact that in one case it involves a single-judge court (juez unipersonal) and in another a collegiate court (tribunal colegiado) does not alter the essence or rationale of the appeal (recurso de apelación), which seeks as its objective that another body review what was decided by the first-instance judge.” (Voto No. 2000-04546 de las 15:42 horas del 31 de mayo del 2000) (voto n° 09210 – 2019).

This thesis was reiterated in voto n° 2004-13779 de las 14:50 horas del 1° de diciembre de 2004:

“(…) It is also indicated that while ordinary labor trials are heard by a single-judge court ‘through the common civil procedure’ (sic), that of Ley 3664 ‘is processed by a Collegiate Court which even holds an oral and public trial.’ The Chamber frankly does not understand how there could possibly be any restriction whatsoever on due process here, since both modalities of prosecution are common in judicial proceedings in this and other matters, without either one having to be considered per se as necessarily worse or better than the other.” **V.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY**. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the claimant indicates that the Political Constitution prohibits discrimination lacking objective reasonableness. Differential treatment of persons situated in the same factual situation must be based on criteria of reasonableness that justify it. Thus, Articles 93.1 and 93 bis establish that appeals of judgments from trial courts are heard by appellate courts composed of three judges. This unequal treatment that the LOPJ grants to defendants and victims whose claims are resolved through the rulings of judges at the intermediate stage, and those who, instead, are convicted or acquitted by a trial court, violates the principle of equality before the law, since all of them should be granted the same procedural mechanisms for challenging unfavorable rulings in protection of their right to an effective material defense with equality of arms.

Regarding the principle of equality as it relates to procedural situations, this Court, in judgment n° 2001-12220, hearing a consultation in criminal matters regarding the different composition of bodies that hear a specific matter, resolved:

“IV.- The consulting Judges assert that the greater guarantee of the collegiate court was unjustifiably not contemplated with respect to cases of defamation and that, therefore, this differential treatment must be deemed a violation of the right to equality. In this regard, it is now possible to reach a conclusion from the foregoing. The circumstance that causes the doubt of the consultation, by itself alone, is not sufficient to violate that constitutional principle. In other words, the fact that the legislator, who has discretionary power to determine judicial procedures as indicated, provided for the prosecution of defamation offenses in a manner different from that of calumny and slander, assigning the hearing of the former to a single-judge court, does not constitute an illegitimate difference, because it objectively does not diminish the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a reduction in their formal powers or their right of defense. Moreover, that circumstance also does not violate the dignity of the subjects in said causes, nor does it place them in a legally harmful or injurious situation in relation to the generality of criminal proceedings.” (the emphasis does not correspond to the original) The same criterion was reiterated in judgment n° 2006-15261 de las 14:42 horas del 10 de octubre de 2006, in which the Chamber stated:

“Only. Through a judicial consultation raised by the Juvenile Criminal Court of Turrialba, processed in this Chamber under expediente 97-001024-007-CO, that judge consulted whether the difference between the ordinary criminal process and that provided for the specific case of minors was valid, in that a proceeding against the latter will be resolved by a single-judge court, while for adults that task falls to a collegiate court. The Chamber in its opportunity addressed the argument, indicating that the fact that in juvenile criminal justice the trial stage is not conducted by a collegiate court in the case of offenses punishable by a custodial sentence exceeding three years does not contradict Articles 33 and 39 of the Political Constitution.” (the emphasis is not from the original. In the same sense, judgment n° 1997-02908 de las 16:33 horas del 27 de mayo de 1997).

**VI.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION.** The claimant states that the provision violates the principle of non-regression, which enunciates the impossibility of reducing the protection already granted to a right. In the claimant's opinion, the introduction of Article 96 bis, paragraph 1) of 1997, effective as of January 1, 1998, deteriorated the fundamental right of access to justice in relation to the challenge of rulings issued at the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings, which constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity. Article 96, paragraph 1), of the LOPJ was added by Article 9 of Ley n° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, called the Law for the Reorganization of the Courts. This was the law that accompanied the Code of Criminal Procedure in force since January 1, 1998, with the objective of adapting the structure and functioning of the then-new criminal process. The claimant states that before that date, persons had the right to have appeals from investigating judges heard and resolved by a court composed of three judges, thereby effectively guaranteeing the fundamental right of access to the jurisdiction, so the reform made constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity. In relation to this principle, the Court has stated:

“(…) The principle of progressivity requires that as a State's level of development improves, its level of commitment to guaranteeing rights improves. In theory, the idea is that the more resources a State has, the greater its capacity to provide services that guarantee rights. The obligation of progressive implementation contains the prohibition of non-regression, which may be subject to judicial review in the event of non-compliance. When a State recognizes, respects, and satisfies a fundamental right, it is prohibited from reducing the levels of protection of existing rights or eliminating those already existing. A decision or public policy may be considered regressive when its results worsen, compared to the results of a previous starting point that has been chosen as a parameter, and in the field of legal norms, if when comparing a new norm, previously existing rights are eliminated, limited, or restricted. In that sense, the doctrine has established that once a given right has been formally recognized as inherent to the human person, it is integrated definitively and irrevocably into the category of human rights whose protection is mandatory. Now, in order to state that there is a violation of the principle of progressivity and non-regression, it is required that a fundamental right had been recognized and that the same is limited or restricted without any reasonable justification…” Judgment 11088-13 “…the legislators publicized from the beginning of the legislative process the intention to eliminate the ground of violation of due process within the procedure for reviewing the judgment, explaining the reasons why they considered the reform should be made.(…)” . (voto 2013-11088 de las 15:30 horas de 21 de agosto de 2013).

Ley n° 7728, the Law on Judicial Reorganization, was enacted with the purpose of making possible the implementation of the 1998 Code of Criminal Procedure, which prompted a profound reform of the criminal legal system that, in turn, made a reorganization of the courts necessary, especially those in the criminal jurisdiction. In that sense, it is important to recall that one of the objectives in enacting Ley n° 7728 was to consolidate a more equitable and accessible legal system, for which the organization and allocation of powers of some judicial offices were renewed. As a result of that comprehensive reform made by the legislator, there was a profound change in the design of the criminal process that encompassed, of course, the means of challenge: which rulings could be appealed, which bodies would hear such appeals and their composition, among other aspects. In that sense, the circumstance that before the 1998 reform, persons had the right to have appeals from investigating judges heard and resolved by a court composed of three judges, and, after the reform, some appeals are heard by a single-judge court does not undermine the fundamental right of access to the jurisdiction nor does it constitute a violation of the principle of progressivity. To assert such a thing, simply because an appeal is heard by a single-judge court instead of a collegiate one, is to have a very biased view of the issue. The 1998 reform, in general terms, represented a modernization of the criminal justice system, and allowed the transition from one criminal procedural system to another to be carried out optimally. This was done, precisely, because in accordance with the rule of progressivity of economic, social, and cultural rights, recognized in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Costa Rican State was obliged to develop and implement policies aimed at progressively achieving what is established in Article 41 of the Constitution, regarding “swift, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.” It was a comprehensive reform, which has been developed over the long term, with the goal of achieving better and fuller exercise of the fundamental rights related to access to justice and the principles of due process.

**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** The circumstance that a single-judge court is the one that hears a specific appeal does not violate any fundamental right because that circumstance, objectively, does not undermine the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a reduction in their formal powers or their right of defense. Due to the foregoing, the action is dismissed on the merits.

CO10/23 The fact that such recourse is not heard by a multi-member body (órgano pluripersonal)—as the plaintiff claims—does not per se empty the purpose of the appeal recourse of its content or impede its proper functioning, which is to allow an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body (órgano inferior). In this regard, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, with the insurmountable limit being the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process (debido proceso), in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what has been established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence on this matter. In the case of the challenged rule, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower one. The fact that such recourse is not heard by a multi-member body (órgano pluripersonal)—as the plaintiff claims—does not per se empty the purpose of the appeal recourse of its content or impede its proper functioning, which is to allow an objective review of the legality or appropriateness of what was decided by the lower body (órgano inferior). In this regard, it is important to remember that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, with the insurmountable limit being the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process (debido proceso), in accordance with what is ordered by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what has been established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence on this matter. ..” CO10/23 On this subject, the Chamber, in judgment 93-3092, stated:

“**A) THE GENERAL RIGHT TO JUSTICE:** At the base of every procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of administration of justice, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State (función jurisdiccional del Estado) —to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in concrete cases—; which in turn comprises a set of independent specialized judicial bodies (órganos judiciales independientes especializados) in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus (la disponibilidad de ese aparato) to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and the guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination (condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación).

**a)** In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency and effectiveness of a judicial and procedural system suitable precisely for guaranteeing that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right of petition (derecho de petición), which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 —in general— and 41 —in particular— of the Constitution, according to which:

“Article 27 - The freedom of petition, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution, is guaranteed.” “Article 41 - Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice in strict conformity with the laws.” **b)** But it also has other implications that are even more immediately demandable, which may, in turn, concern the system of administration of justice itself, per se, or the right of access to justice (acceso a la justicia) for all persons:

**(…) 2.** And those belonging to the second category —the equal right of all to access justice— include, in addition to the generic right of petition (derecho de petición) of Article 27 and the specific right to justice (derecho a la justicia) of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, a series of complementary —but also fundamental— attributes, among which:

(i) the general right and principle of equality —and its counterpart of non-discrimination—, embodied in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the peculiarity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that it is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights; a principle and right which, although not incompatible with certain reasonable distinctions according to the maxim of "equality for equals and inequality for unequals," also known as the principle of substantial equality, in criminal matters does not seem to permit any possible distinction; (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here since they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuitousness of justice, informalism, etc.; (iii) Finally, the right that such justice be administered completely and promptly.” (vote 92-1739).

In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged norm does not injure the right of access to justice (acceso a la justicia), since it clearly guarantees the possibility of exercising the procedural guarantee, such as the right to appeal before a superior body, so that it may review the conformity of the resolution or judgment issued by the lower body with the corresponding legal order. The Chamber has been clear that the right of appeal is not unrestricted, except in criminal matters against a conviction, against jurisdictional pronouncements that put an end to the case, or procedural or preparatory acts that have their own effect (see, among other judgments, numbers 282-90 of 17:00 hours on March 13, 1990, 300-90 of 17:00 hours on March 21, 1990, 2015-4382 of 9:30 hrs. on March 27).

In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body —as the plaintiff claims— does not imply per se the emptying of the content of the purpose of the appeal or impeding its due functioning, which is to allow for an objective review of the legality or propriety of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to recall that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordained by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what has been established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. In the case of the challenged norm, it guarantees access to a judicial body to review what was decided by the lower body. The fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body —as the plaintiff claims— does not imply per se the emptying of the content of the purpose of the appeal or impeding its due functioning, which is to allow for an objective review of the legality or propriety of what was decided by the lower body. In this sense, it is important to recall that the legislator has discretionary power to structure and regulate judicial procedures, having as an insurmountable limit the obligation to respect the right of defense and the principle of due process, in accordance with what is ordained by the Political Constitution and in conformity with what has been established in the countless precedents of constitutional jurisprudence regarding that matter. Regarding the legislator's freedom of configuration, the Chamber has indicated:

“(…) it constitutes a prerogative inherent to that legislative body, known as the "free configuration of the legislator," also called "free legislative design" or "legislative discretion." For example, in judgment number 2003-05090 of 14:44 hours on June 11, 2003, it was pointed out that: "The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, section 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys a wide freedom of conformation to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power. That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, in the face of a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases." For this Tribunal, the legislative discretion applied to the sub iudice reaches and is sufficient in itself for the legislator to have considered viable the elimination of the public auction in the allocation of licenses for the sale of beverages with alcoholic content and to proceed in that manner, especially since in this way an adequate normative treatment is given to the true legal nature of a license.” (Vote 13-011706 of 11:44 hrs on August 30, 2013) And it is that as long as the legislator exercises their discretionary power of configuration within the limits of the Law of the Constitution, their actions should not give rise to constitutional challenges. It is not logical to think that the conditions for the exercise of the right of appeal must remain immutable, in all instances, in all matters, when the truth is that, precisely, the legislator can adapt it to historical circumstances, those specific to the process, to the instance in which it is exercised, to the type of matter at issue. Continuing with that central idea, the objective of protection in these cases is related to supervising and protecting that the legislative activity complies with the requirement of creating laws that safeguard fundamental rights, which implies that the norm is not injurious to the principles of legality, proportionality, and reasonableness (vote 8744-00); that the legal power of every subject of law to resort to jurisdictional bodies to claim the resolution of a conflict of interests is respected, including the rights to have the broadest freedom and the unconditional guarantee of access to the process, to obtain a decision on the merits founded in law, as well as absolute respect for judicial rulings, their effective enforcement, and respect for the finality of judicial decisions (vote 5742-96); the rights to legality, to a regular judge, to a hearing and defense, to a just sentence, which includes a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the State's jurisdictional function, that is, to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially, and to safeguard the object of the criminal process, which is a fair trial (vote 440-98).

In this line, when hearing the regulation of a specific appeal remedy in the jurisdictional venue, the Chamber indicated that:

“**(…)** the fact that such a remedy is not heard by a multi-member body —as the plaintiff claims— does not imply per se the emptying of the content of the purpose of the appeal or impeding its due functioning, which is to make it possible to review in an objective manner the legality or propriety of what was decided in the first instance.” Even when hearing a specific appeal in the judicial venue, this Chamber indicated that:</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 30.8pt 0pt 28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 30.8pt 0pt 28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">“(…)</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">The fact that an eventual appeal is heard by a higher-value civil court and not by a superior tribunal does not cause defenselessness to the appellant because both jurisdictional authorities are obliged to apply the legal system and cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. The fact that in one case it is a single-judge court (juez unipersonal)</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">and in another a</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">collegiate court (tribunal colegiado)</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">does not alter the essence or purpose of the appeal, which seeks as its objective that another body review what was decided by the first-instance judge.</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> (Voto No. 2000-04546 of 15:42 hours on May 31, 2000) (voto n° 09210 – 2019).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">This thesis was reiterated in voto n° 2004-13779 of 14:50 hours on December 1, 2004:</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 30.8pt 0pt 28.35pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“(…) It is also indicated that while ordinary labor trials are heard by a single-judge court “through the common civil procedure” (sic), that of Law 3664 “is processed by a Collegiate Court which even holds an oral and public trial.” Frankly, the Chamber does not understand in what way there could be any restriction whatsoever to due process here, since both modalities of prosecution are common in judicial processes of this and other matters, without either of them necessarily having to be considered per se as necessarily worse or better than the other.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">V.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the claimant indicates that the Political Constitution prohibits discrimination lacking objective reasonableness. Differentiated treatment of persons situated in the same factual situation must be based on criteria of reasonableness that justify it. Thus, Articles 93.1 and 93 bis establish that appeals of sentences from trial courts are heard by appellate courts composed of three judges. That unequal treatment that the LOPJ grants to defendants and victims whose claims are resolved through sentences by intermediate-stage judges, compared to those who are convicted or acquitted by a trial court, violates the principle of equality before the law, given that all of them should be granted the same procedural mechanisms for challenging unfavorable sentences in protection of their right to effective material defense with equality of arms.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">As to the principle of equality referring to procedural situations, this Court, in judgment n° 2001-12220, hearing a consultation in criminal matters regarding the different composition of bodies hearing a specific matter, resolved:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 30.9pt 0pt 28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“IV.- The consulting Judges assert that the greater guarantee of the collegiate court was unjustifiably not contemplated for defamation matters and that, therefore, that differentiated treatment must be deemed violative of the right to equality. In this regard, from what has been explained, it is feasible now to reach a conclusion. The circumstance that causes the doubt in the consultation, by itself alone, is not sufficient to violate that constitutional principle. In other words, the fact that the legislator, who has discretionary power to determine judicial procedures as seen, provided for the judging of defamation crimes differently from those of slander and insult, assigning the hearing of the former to a single-judge court, does not constitute an illegitimate difference, because it objectively does not impair the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor does it create a diminution in their formal powers or in their right of defense. Furthermore, that circumstance does not violate the dignity of the subjects in said causes, nor place them in a legally harmful or injurious situation in relation to the generality of criminal proceedings.</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">” </span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">(the emphasis is not from the original</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The same criterion was reiterated in judgment n° 2006-15261 of 14:42 hours on October 10, 2006, the Chamber indicated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“Only.</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">By means of judicial consultation raised by the Juvenile Criminal Court of Turrialba,</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">processed in this Chamber under file 97-001024-007-CO, that judge consulted whether the difference between the common criminal process and the one provided for the specific case of minors was valid, in that a process followed against minors is resolved by a single-judge court, while in adults that task corresponds to a collegiate court.</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">The Chamber in due course addressed the question indicating that </span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">the fact that in juvenile criminal justice the trial stage is not held by a collegiate court in the case of crimes punishable by a prison sentence exceeding three years does not contradict Articles 33 and 39 of the Political Constitution</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">.” </span><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">(the emphasis is not from the original. In the same sense, judgment n° 1997-02908 of 16:33 hours</span><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">of</span><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">May 27, 1997).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">VI.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The claimant states that the rule harms the principle of non-regression, which enunciates the impossibility of reducing the protection already accorded to a right. In the claimant's view, the introduction of Article 96 bis, inc. 1) of 1997, effective as of January 1, 1998, impaired the fundamental right of access to justice in relation to challenging sentences issued in the intermediate stage of criminal proceedings, which constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity. Article 96, subsection 1), of the LOPJ was added by Article 9 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997, called the Law of Reorganization of the Courts. This was the law that accompanied the Code of Criminal Procedure in force since January 1, 1998, with the objective of adapting the structure and functioning of the then-new criminal process. The plaintiff states that before that date, persons had the right that appeals from investigating judges be heard and resolved by a court composed of three judges, which effectively guaranteed the fundamental right of access to jurisdiction, such that the reform made constitutes a violation of the principle of progressivity.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">In relation to this principle, the Court has stated:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 30.8pt 0pt 28.35pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“(…) The principle of progressivity demands that as a State’s level of development improves, the level of commitment to guarantee rights improves. In theory, the idea is that the more resources a State has, the greater its capacity to provide services that guarantee rights. The obligation of progressive implementation contains the prohibition of non-regression that can be subjected to judicial review in case of non-compliance. When a State recognizes, respects, and satisfies a fundamental right, it is prohibited from reducing the levels of protection of existing rights or suppressing those already existing. A decision or public policy can be considered regressive when its results worsen, compared to the results of a prior starting point chosen as a benchmark, and in the field of legal norms, if when comparing a new norm, previously existing rights are suppressed, limited, or restricted. In that sense, doctrine has established that once a specific right has been formally recognized as inherent to the human person, it is definitively and irrevocably integrated into the category of human rights whose protection is mandatory. Now, for it to be pointed out that there is a violation of the principle of progressivity and non-regression, it is required that there be a fundamental right that had been recognized and that the same be limited or restricted without any reasonable justification…” Judgment 11088-13 “…the legislators publicized from the beginning of the legislative process the intention to eliminate the ground of violation of due process within the procedure for review of the sentence, explaining the reasons why they considered that the reform should be made.(…)” .” (voto 2013-11088 of 15:30 hours of August 21, 2013).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Law No. 7728, the Law of Judicial Reorganization, was enacted with the purpose of making possible the implementation of the 1998 Code of Criminal Procedure, which brought about a profound reform to the criminal legal system that, in turn, made a reorganization of the courts necessary, especially those of criminal jurisdiction.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">In that sense, it is important to remember that one of the objectives when enacting Law No. 7728 was to consolidate a more equitable and accessible legal system, for which the organization and assignment of competencies of some judicial offices were renewed. As a result of this comprehensive reform made by the legislator, there was a profound change in the design of the criminal process that encompassed, of course, the means of challenge: which resolutions could be appealed, which bodies would hear such appeals, and the composition thereof, among other aspects. In that sense, the circumstance that before the 1998 reform, persons had the right that appeals from investigating judges be heard and resolved by a court composed of three judges and, after the reform, some appeals are heard by a single-judge court does not impair the fundamental right of access to jurisdiction nor constitute a violation of the principle of progressivity. To assert such a thing, simply because an appeal is heard by a single-judge court instead of a collegiate one, is to have a very partial view of the issue.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The 1998 reform, in general terms, represented a modernization of the criminal justice system and made it possible to transition from one criminal procedural system to another in an optimal manner. This was done, precisely, because in keeping with the rule of progressivity of economic, social, and cultural rights, recognized in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Costa Rican State was obligated to develop and execute policies aimed at progressively achieving what is established in Article 41 of the Constitution, regarding “prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws”. It was a comprehensive reform, developed over the long term, with the goal of achieving a better and fuller exercise of the fundamental rights related to access to justice and the principles of due process. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">VII.- CONCLUSION.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The circumstance that a single-judge court is the one hearing a specific appeal does not harm any fundamental right because that circumstance, objectively, does not impair the procedural guarantees of the parties in those matters, nor create a diminution in their formal powers or in their right of defense. Based on the foregoing, the action is dismissed on the merits.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">VIII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">. The parties are warned that if any document on paper was provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology-produced device, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.</span></p> Otherwise, any material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

The action is rejected on the merits.

The image appears at the end of the document, showing a stamp/seal that reads:

Luis Fdo.

Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img src=\"

Revisión del Documento  Res. Nº 2023020710 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas veinte minutos del veintitres de agosto de dos mil veintitres .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre317 001], mayor, casado dos veces, empresario, cédula [CED168 ], vecino de Dirección1432, , actuando en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad [Nombre317 002], cédula de persona jurídica número [CED161 ] contra el artículo 96 bis, inciso 1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.

Resultando:

1.-Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 9:05 del 17 de julio de 2023, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 96 bis, inciso 1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Alega que la norma impugnada establece la integración del Tribunal Penal (tribunal de juicio) por un solo juez para conocer del recurso de apelación interpuesto contra resoluciones del Juez Penal o del Juez de la etapa intermedia. Estima que la norma en examen viola el derecho de defensa, la garantía constitucional del debido proceso, el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, el principio de igualdad ante la ley y el principio de no regresividad en derechos humanos. Manifiesta que la CIDH ha señalado que el derecho a recurrir un fallo es una garantía primordial que se debe respetar en el marco del debido proceso legal, en aras de permitir que una sentencia adversa pueda ser revisada por un juez o tribunal distinto y de superior jerarquía orgánica que pueda corregir las decisiones jurisdiccionales contrarias a derecho (caso Nombre9087 vs Argentina. Excepciones preliminares, fondo, reparaciones y costas. Sentencia de 23 de noviembre 2012. Agrega que es preciso que el juez que conozca el recurso reúna las características jurisdiccionales que lo legitiman para conocer el caso concreto pues, de lo contrario, no podría establecerse como válida y legítima la etapa procesal que se desarrolla ante él (caso Castillo Petruzzi vs. Perú). Señala que, en palabras de la CIDH, una verdadera garantía de reconsideración sería aquella que atienda las exigencias de competencia, imparcialidad e independencia que la Constitución establece. Dado que las sentencias que dicte el juez intermedio del proceso solo pueden ser revisadas por un tribunal unipersonal, la norma impugnada limita el derecho de defensa del imputado o de la víctima. Así, la circunstancia de que resuelva un solo juez no permite satisfacer los estándares fijados por la jurisprudencia de la CIDH en materia de debido proceso legal. En relación con la violación al principio de igualdad, la Constitución Política prohíbe la discriminación carente de razonabilidad objetiva. El trato diferenciado a personas ubicadas en la misma situación de hecho, debe fundarse en criterios de razonabilidad que lo justifiquen. Los artículos 93.1 y 93 bis establecen que las apelaciones de las sentencias de los tribunales de juicio son conocidas por tribunales a apelaciones integrados por tres jueces. Además, esa resolución tiene recurso de casación, cuyo tribunal está integrado por cinco magistrados. Por el contrario, cuando las pretensiones de las víctimas e imputados son rechazadas en la etapa intermedia, solo hay conocimiento de dos jueces: uno del Juzgado Penal y, en apelación, uno del Tribunal Penal. Ese trato desigual que la LOPJ otorga a los imputados y víctimas cuyas pretensiones se resuelven mediante las sentencias de los jueces de la etapa intermedia y lo que, en cambio, son condenados o absueltos por un tribunal de juicio, viola el principio de igualdad ante la ley, dado que a todos ellos deberían concedérseles los mismos mecanismos procesales de impugnación de las sentencias desfavorables en tutela de su derecho a una defensa material eficaz con igualdad de armas. En relación con la violación al principio de no regresividad, es inherente a todos los instrumentos de derechos humanos y enuncia la imposibilidad de que se reduzca la protección ya acordada a un derecho, lo cual está reconocido para todos los derechos humanos en el artículo 4 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Este principio vendría a ser, además, una consecuencia del criterio de conservación o no derogación del régimen más favorable para la persona. El artículo 96 inciso 1) de la LOPJ fue adicionado por el artículo 9 de la Ley n° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, denominada Ley de Reorganización de los Tribunales. Esta fue la ley que acompañó al Código Procesal Penal vigente desde el 1° de enero de 1998, con el objetivo de adecuar la estructura y funcionamiento del entonces nuevo proceso penal. Antes de esa fecha, las personas tenían derecho a que las apelaciones de los jueces de instrucción fueran conocidas y resueltas por un tribunal integrado por tres jueces, con lo cual se garantiza, de manera efectiva, el derecho fundamental de acceso a la jurisdicción. En ese sentido, la introducción del artículo 96 bis inc. 1) de 1997, vigente a partir del 1° de enero de 1998, viola de manera flagrante el principio de no regresividad en materia de derechos fundamentales, pues desmejoró el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia en relación con la impugnación de las sentencias dictadas en la etapa intermedia de los procesos penales 2.- Para efectos de legitimación, manifiesta que deriva del artículo 75, párrafo 1° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. El asunto previo es un proceso penal que se tramita en el expediente n° 16-000226-1220-PE por el delito de administración fraudulenta, ante el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José. La legitimación procesal de la representada del actor para interponer esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, proviene de la defensa de los derechos de la empresa accionante, de cara al recurso de apelación que es posible que se deba formular, en caso de dictarse un nuevo auto contrario a los intereses de su representada, ya que deberá celebrarse una nueva audiencia preliminar para resolver sobre la exoneración en costas. Esa nueva audiencia preliminar deberá celebrarse en virtud de que el Tribunal de Apelación Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José ( integrado de manera unipersonal), al dictar el voto n° 001665 que confirmó la declaratoria de prescripción de la acción civil resarcitoria, contenida en el auto de elevación a juicio del Juzgado Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José (Proceso Penal contra: Nombre14203 y Otros, delito: administración fraudulenta y otros, expediente 16-000226-1220-PE) también declaró la "ineficacia" de ese auto en cuanto la exoneración en costas, ordenando el reenvío de ese expediente al Juzgado de origen "únicamente para resolver el punto”.

3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN. El artículo 75 de la citada Ley de esta jurisdicción dispone que, para interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad, es necesario que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, inclusive de habeas corpus o de amparo, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconformidad constitucional como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En el caso concreto, el accionante alega que su legitimación deriva del artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues existe un proceso penal que se tramita en el expediente n° 16-000226-1220 por el delito de administración fraudulenta, en el cual figuran como ofendidos. En este sentido es oportuno indicar al accionante que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un remedio incidental a favor de cualquiera de las partes en dicho asunto principal, como una forma de hacer valer sus derechos en él:

“[Cuando] el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, en principio, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolución en que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado, como requisito para la interposición de la acción, no hace referencia a una simple formalidad procesal; no se trata de un detalle inocuo o intrascendente para complicar y entorpecer el control constitucional; antes bien, es una manifestación directa del principio según el cual la función jurisdiccional, de la cual forma parte sustancial y fundamental el control constitucional, se ejerce mediante la resolución de controversias, que sean reales y encuentren remedio en una sentencia definitiva (…). Es preciso además, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad sea medio razonable de amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado, esto es, que con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que eventoualmente realice la Sala, el accionante obtenga un beneficio dentro del proceso o procedimiento subyacente a dicha acción, sin que necesariamente ello signifique la obtención plena de sus pretensiones dentro del asunto previo (…)” (Nº 1468-90 de las 15:45 horas del 30 de octubre de 1990; el subrayado no es del original).

En este caso, el actor afirma que está pendiente de realizar una audiencia preliminar para resolver el tema de la exoneración de costas. Esto por cuanto el Tribunal de Apelación Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José (integrado de manera unipersonal), al dictar el voto n° 001665 declaró la "ineficacia" del auto de elevación a juicio del Juzgado Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José en cuanto la exoneración en costas, ordenando el reenvío de ese expediente al Juzgado de origen "únicamente para resolver el punto”. Su representada es uno de los actores civiles, por lo que de cara a la resolución que puede dictar el Juzgado, podría verse en la necesidad de formular un recurso de apelación, con el agravante que tal recurso será resuelto por un tribunal unipersonal, pues los autos dictados en la etapa intermedia del proceso penal son conocidos por un solo juez(a), integrante de la sección de apelación del Tribunal de Apelación Penal del I Circuito Judicial de San José. Además, la acción cumple los requisitos de admisibilidad dispuestos por los artículos 73 a 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, y su objeto es de los indicados en los numerales 10 de la Constitución Política y 73 de la Ley citada. En estas circunstancias, la acción es medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se estima lesionado, por lo que procede analizar los alegatos presentados por el fondo.

II.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN.- La norma cuestionada dispone:

“Artículo 96 bis.- Los tribunales penales de juicio se constituirán con uno solo de sus miembros, para conocer:

1.- Del recurso de apelación contra las resoluciones del juez penal”.

III.- AGRAVIOS DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD.- El representante de la sociedad accionante manifiesta que la norma lesiona la garantía del debido proceso, el derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, el principio de igualdad de la ley y el principio de no regresividad.

IV.- SOBRE EL DEBIDO PROCESO Y LA GARANTÍA JUDICIAL A LA TUTELA JUDICIAL EFECTIVA. El representante de la sociedad actora alega que la configuración actual del Tribunal de Apelación dispuesta en la norma cuestionada, lesiona el debido proceso y la garantía judicial a la tutela judicial efectiva, en tanto impide que sea un tribunal colegiado, el que conozca y resuelva lo sometido a su conocimiento. En cuanto al debido proceso, en la sentencia 1992-1739 este Tribunal señaló:

“I - El concepto del debido proceso envuelve comprensivamente el desarrollo progresivo de prácticamente todos los derechos fundamentales de carácter procesal o instrumental, como conjuntos de garantías de los derechos de goce -cuyo disfrute satisface inmediatamente las necesidades o intereses del ser humano-, es decir, de los medios tendientes a asegurar su vigencia y eficacia. (…)”.

Se trata de un derecho fundamental en un Estado de Derecho, que a su vez está integrado por otros, como el derecho de defensa, el derecho a aportar prueba, los derechos al procedimiento, a obtener una sentencia justa, etc. En nuestro país se ha producido un amplio desarrollo jurisprudencial de las normas constitucionales que garantizan los derechos procesales y sustantivos de la persona sometida a un proceso judicial o procedimiento administrativo, donde el eje de la garantía procesal ha sido el artículo 41 de la Constitución, interpretado como su fuente primaria. Dice el texto del primero:

"Artículo 41 - Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida y en estricta conformidad con las leyes".

Uno de los derechos que integra el debido proceso es el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, es decir, el derecho general a la justicia. Sobre este tema, la Sala, en la sentencia 93-3092 manifestó:

“A) EL DERECHO GENERAL A LA JUSTICIA: En la base de todo orden procesal está el principio y, con él, el derecho fundamental a la justicia, entendida como la existencia y disponibilidad de un sistema de administración de la justicia, valga decir, de un conjunto de mecanismos idóneos para el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional del Estado -declarar el derecho controvertido o restablecer el violado, interpretándolo y aplicándolo imparcialmente en los casos concretos-; lo cual comprende, a su vez, un conjunto de órganos judiciales independientes especializados en ese ejercicio, la disponibilidad de ese aparato para resolver los conflictos y corregir los entuertos que origina la vida social, en forma civilizada y eficaz, y el acceso garantizado a esa justicia para todas las personas, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación.

• a)En este primer sentido, pues, el debido proceso tiene, ante todo, dimensiones programáticas, no por esta menos vinculantes jurídicamente, que exigen la existencia, suficiencia y eficacia de un sistema judicial y procesal idóneo para garantizar precisamente ese derecho fundamental a la justicia, que no es, por otra parte, más que una consecuencia del monopolio de la fuerza, asumido por el Estado, y la más importante manifestación del derecho de petición, que en Costa Rica se consagra, en los artículos 27 -en general- y 41 -en especial- de la Constitución, conforme a los cuales:

"Artículo 27 - Se garantiza la libertad de petición, en forma individual o colectiva, ante cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial, y el derecho a obtener pronta resolución".

"Artículo 41 - Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida y en estricta conformidad con las leyes".

• b)Pero tiene también otras implicaciones aun más inmediatamente exigibles, las cuales pueden, a su vez, atañer al sistema mismo de administración de la justicia, en sí, o al derecho de acceso a la justicia para todas las personas:

(…) 2. Y pertenecen a los segundo -derecho de todos por igual a acceder a la justicia-, además del genérico derecho de petición del artículo 27 y del específico derecho a la justicia del artículo 41 de la Constitución ya citados, una serie de atributos complementarios -pero también fundamentales-, entre los cuales:

(i) el derecho y principio generales de igualdad -y su contrapartida de no discriminación-, que recoge el artículo 33 de la Constitución, así como todos los instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos, por ejemplo los artículos 1.1 y 24 de la Convención Americana, con la particularidad de que la dualidad de éstos demuestra que la igualdad, además de criterio de interpretación y aplicación de los derechos fundamentales, es ella misma un derecho fundamental, de modo que también se viola éste cuando se discrimina respecto de derechos no fundamentales; principio y derecho que, si bien no son incompatibles con ciertas distinciones razonables conforme a la máxima de "igualdad para los iguales y desigualdad para los desiguales", también conocido como principio de igualdad sustancial, en materia penal no parece permitir ninguna posible distinción; (ii) en general, el acceso universal a la justicia para toda persona, indiferentemente de su sexo, edad, color, nacionalidad, origen o antecedentes, o cualquier otra condición social, todo lo cual plantea, a su vez, consecuencias que no es necesario examinar aquí por no estar implicadas directamente en el caso en consulta, como la gratuidad de la justicia, el informalismo, etc.; (iii) Finalmente, el derecho a que esa justicia se administre cumplida y prontamente.” (voto 92-1739).

A la luz de lo expuesto, la Sala estima que la norma cuestionada no lesiona el derecho de acceso a la justicia, pues esta claramente garantiza la posibilidad de ejercer la garantía procesal, como es el derecho de apelar ante un órgano superior, para que revise la conformidad de la resolución o sentencia dictada por el inferior, con el ordenamiento jurídico correspondiente. La Sala ha sido clara en que el derecho apelación no es irrestricto, salvo en materia penal contra el fallo condenatorio, contra pronunciamientos jurisdiccionales que pongan fin a la causa o actos de procedimiento o preparatorios que tengan efecto propio (ver entre otras sentencias números 282-90 de 17:00 horas del 13 de marzo de 1990, 300-90 de las 17:00 horas del 21 de marzo de 1990, 2015-4382 de las 9:30 hrs. del 27 de marzo).

En el caso de la norma cuestionada, ésta garantiza el acceso a un órgano judicial para revisar lo resuelto por el inferior. El hecho que tal recurso no sea conocido por un órgano pluripersonal –como lo reclama la parte accionante- no supone per se vaciar de contenido el propósito del recurso de apelación o impedir su debido funcionamiento, como lo es permitir que se revise de manera objetiva la legalidad o procedencia de lo resuelto por el órgano inferior. En este sentido, es importante recordar que el legislador tiene potestad discrecional para estructurar y regular los procedimientos judiciales, teniendo como límite infranqueable la obligación de respetar el derecho de defensa y el principio del debido proceso, de acuerdo con lo ordenado por la Constitución Política y conforme con lo establecido en los innumerables antecedentes de la jurisprudencia constitucional respecto de esa materia. En el caso de la norma cuestionada, ésta garantiza el acceso a un órgano judicial para revisar lo resuelto por el inferior. El hecho que tal recurso no sea conocido por un órgano pluripersonal –como lo reclama la parte accionante- no supone per se vaciar de contenido el propósito del recurso de apelación o impedir su debido funcionamiento, como lo es permitir que se revise de manera objetiva la legalidad o procedencia de lo resuelto por el órgano inferior. En este sentido, es importante recordar que el legislador tiene potestad discrecional para estructurar y regular los procedimientos judiciales, teniendo como límite infranqueable la obligación de respetar el derecho de defensa y el principio del debido proceso, de acuerdo con lo ordenado por la Constitución Política y conforme con lo establecido en los innumerables antecedentes de la jurisprudencia constitucional respecto de esa materia. En cuanto a la libertad de configuración del legislador, la Sala ha señalado:

“(…) constituye una prerrogativa propia de ese órgano legislativo como la “libre configuración del legislador”, también denominada “libre diseño legislativo” o “discrecionalidad legislativa”. Verbigracia, en sentencia número 2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, se señaló que: “La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (…) La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y las jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares”. Para este Tribunal, la discrecionalidad legislativa aplicada al sub iudice alcanza y se basta a sí misma para que el legislador considerara viable la eliminación del remate público en la asignación de licencias para el expendio de bebidas con contenido alcohólico y procediera de esa manera, máxime que de este modo se da un tratamiento normativo adecuado a la verdadera naturaleza jurídica de una licencia.” (Voto 13-011706 de las 11:44 hrs del 30 de agosto del 2013) Y es que en tanto el legislador ejerza su potestad discrecional de configuración dentro de los límites del Derecho de la Constitución, sus actuaciones no deben dar pie a cuestionamientos constitucionales. No es lógico pensar que las condiciones para el ejercicio del derecho de apelación tienen que permanecer inmutables, en todas las instancias, en todas las materias, cuando lo cierto es que, precisamente, el legislador puede adecuarlo a las circunstancias históricas, aquellas propias del proceso, de la instancia en que se ejerza, del tipo de materia de que se trate. Siguiendo con esa idea central, el objetivo de tutela en estos casos, tiene relación con vigilar y proteger que la actividad legislativa cumpla con la exigencia de crear leyes garantistas de los derechos fundamentales, lo que implica, que la norma no sea lesiva de los principios de legalidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad (voto 8744-00); que se respete el poder jurídico que tiene todo sujeto de derecho de acudir a los órganos jurisdiccionales para reclamar la resolución de un conflicto de intereses, incluyendo los derechos a tener la más amplia libertad y la garantía incondicional de acceso al proceso, a obtener una resolución de fondo fundada en derecho, así como el absoluto respeto a los fallos judiciales, su efectivo cumplimiento y el respeto a la firmeza de las decisiones judiciales (voto 5742-96); los derechos a la legalidad, al juez regular, a la audiencia y defensa, a una sentencia justa, lo que incluye un conjunto de mecanismos idóneos para el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional del Estado, es decir, declarar el derecho controvertido o restablecer el violado, interpretándolo y aplicándolo imparcialmente y, tutelar el objeto del proceso penal que es un juzgamiento justo (voto 440-98).

En esta línea al conocer de la regulación de determinado recurso de apelación en sede jurisdiccional, la Sala señaló que:

“(…) el hecho que tal recurso no sea conocido por un órgano pluripersonal –como así lo reclama el accionante- no supone per se vaciar de contenido el propósito del recurso de apelación o impedir su debido funcionamiento, como lo es posibilitar que se revise de manera objetiva la legalidad o procedencia de lo resuelto en primera instancia. Incluso, al conocer de la regulación de determinado recurso de apelación en sede jurisdiccional, esta Sala señaló que:

“(…) El hecho de que un eventual recurso de apelación sea conocido por un juzgado civil de mayor cuantía y no por un tribunal superior, no le causa indefensión al recurrente porque ambas autoridades jurisdiccionales están obligadas a aplicar el ordenamiento jurídico y no pueden actuar en forma arbitraria o antojadiza. El hecho de que en un caso se trate de un juez unipersonal y en otro de un tribunal colegiado no altera la esencia o razón de ser del recurso de apelación que persigue como objetivo que otro órgano revise lo resuelto por el juzgador de primera instancia.” (Voto No. 2000-04546 de las 15:42 horas del 31 de mayo del 2000) (voto n° 09210 – 2019).

Esta tesis fue reiterada en el voto n° 2004-13779 de las 14:50 horas del 1° de diciembre de 2004:

“(…) Se indica también que mientras que los juicios ordinarios laborales son conocidos por un juez unipersonal "mediante el procedimiento civil común" (sic), el de la ley 3664 "es tramitado por un Tribunal Colegiado el cual incluso celebra un juicio oral y público". Francamente no comprende la Sala en qué podría haber aquí restricción de ninguna especie al debido proceso, ya que ambas modalidades de enjuiciamiento son comunes en los procesos judiciales de ésta y otras materias, sin que ninguno de ellos deba estimarse per se como necesariamente peor o mejor que el otro.” V.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE IGUALDAD. En relación con la violación al principio de igualdad, el accionante indica la Constitución Política prohíbe la discriminación carente de razonabilidad objetiva. El trato diferenciado a personas ubicadas en la misma situación de hecho, debe fundarse en criterios de razonabilidad que lo justifiquen. Así, los artículos 93.1 y 93 bis establecen que las apelaciones de las sentencias de los tribunales de juicio son conocidas por tribunales a apelaciones integrados por tres jueces. Ese trato desigual que la LOPJ otorga a los imputados y víctimas cuyas pretensiones se resuelven mediante las sentencias de los jueces de la etapa intermedia y lo que, en cambio, son condenados o absueltos por un tribunal de juicio, viola el principio de igualdad ante la ley, dado que a todos ellos deberían concedérseles los mismos mecanismos procesales de impugnación de las sentencias desfavorables en tutela de su derecho a una defensa material eficaz con igualdad de armas.

En cuanto al principio de igualdad referido a situaciones procesales, este Tribunal, en la sentencia n° 2001-12220, conociendo de una consulta en materia penal sobre la diferente integración de órganos que conocen una determinada materia, resolvió:

“IV.- Los Jueces consultantes aseveran que la mayor garantía del tribunal colegiado, injustificadamente no se contempló respecto de los asuntos por difamación y que por ello, ese trato diferenciado debe ser estimado como violatorio del derecho de igualdad. Al respecto, de lo expuesto es factible llegar ahora a una conclusión. La circunstancia que causa la duda de la consulta, por sí sola, no es suficiente para vulnerar ese principio constitucional. En otras palabras, el hecho de que el legislador, quien tiene potestad discrecional para determinar los procedimientos judiciales conforme se vio, hubiere previsto el juzgamiento de los delitos de difamación en forma distinta de los de calumnia e injuria, asignando el conocimiento de aquellos a un tribunal unipersonal, no constituye una diferencia ilegítima, porque objetivamente no desmejora las garantías procesales de las partes en esos asuntos, ni crea una disminución en sus facultades formales ni en su derecho de defensa. Además, tampoco esa circunstancia viola la dignidad de los sujetos en dichas causas, ni los pone en una situación jurídicamente dañina o lesiva en relación con la generalidad de los procesos penales.” (el destacado no corresponde al original) El mismo criterio fue reiterado en la sentencia n° 2006-15261 de las 14:42 horas del 10 de octubre de 2006, la Sala indicó:

“Único. Mediante consulta judicial planteada por el Juzgado Penal Juvenil de Turrialba, tramitada en esta Sala bajo el expediente 97-001024-007-CO, ese juzgador consultó si era válida la diferencia entre el proceso penal común y el previsto para el caso específico de los menores de edad en cuanto un proceso seguido contra éstos lo resolverá un juez unipersonal, mientras que en los adultos esa labor le corresponde a un tribunal colegiado. La Sala en su oportunidad atendió el planteamiento indicando que el hecho de que en la justicia penal juvenil la etapa de juicio no la celebre un tribunal colegiado en caso de delitos sancionados con pena privativa de libertad superior a tres años, no contradice los artículos 33 y 39 de la Constitución Política.” (el destacado no es del original. En el mismo sentido, sentencia n° 1997-02908 de las 16:33 horas del 27 de mayo de 1997).

VI.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE NO REGRESIVIDAD. La parte accionante manifiesta que la norma lesiona el principio de no regresividad, el cual enuncia la imposibilidad de que se reduzca la protección ya acordada a un derecho. A juicio del accionante, la introducción del artículo 96 bis inc. 1) de 1997, vigente a partir del 1° de enero de 1998, desmejoró el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia en relación con la impugnación de las sentencias dictadas en la etapa intermedia de los procesos penales, lo cual supone una lesión al principio de progresividad. El artículo 96, inciso 1), de la LOPJ fue adicionado por el artículo 9 de la Ley n° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, denominada Ley de Reorganización de los Tribunales. Esta fue la ley que acompañó al Código Procesal Penal vigente desde el 1° de enero de 1998, con el objetivo de adecuar la estructura y funcionamiento del entonces nuevo proceso penal. Manifiesta el actor que antes de esa fecha, las personas tenían derecho a que las apelaciones de los jueces de instrucción fueran conocidas y resueltas por un tribunal integrado por tres jueces, con lo cual se garantizaba, de manera efectiva, el derecho fundamental de acceso a la jurisdicción, por lo que la reforma realizada supone una lesión al principio de progresividad. En relación con este principio, el Tribunal ha señalado:

“(…) El principio de progresividad exige que a medida que mejora el nivel de desarrollo de un Estado, mejore el nivel de compromiso de garantizar los derechos. En teoría, la idea es que, entre más recursos tenga un Estado, mayor será su capacidad para brindar servicios que garanticen los derechos. La obligación de implementación progresiva contiene la prohibición de no regresividad que puede ser sometida a control judicial en caso de incumplimiento. Cuando un Estado reconoce, respeta y satisface algún derecho fundamental, tiene prohibido reducir los niveles de protección de los derechos vigentes o suprimir los ya existentes. Una decisión o política pública puede considerarse regresiva cuando sus resultados desmejoran, en comparación con los resultados de un punto de partida anterior que ha sido escogido como parámetro y en el campo de las normas jurídicas, si al comparar una nueva norma, se suprimen, limitan o restringen derechos anteriormente existentes. En ese sentido, la doctrina ha establecido que una vez que un determinado derecho ha sido formalmente reconocido como inherente a la persona humana, queda integrado en forma definitiva e irrevocable a la categoría de los derechos humanos cuya tutela resulta obligatoria. Ahora bien, para que pueda señalarse que existe una lesión al principio de progresividad y no regresividad, se requiere que exista un derecho fundamental que se hubiera reconocido y que el mismo sea limitado o restringido sin justificación razonable alguna…” Sentencia 11088-13 “…los legisladores publicitaron desde el inicio del trámite legislativo, la intención de eliminar la causal de violación al debido proceso dentro del procedimiento de revisión de la sentencia, explicando las razones por las cuales consideraron que debía hacerse la reforma.(…)” .” (voto 2013-11088 de las 15:30 horas de 21 de agosto de 2013).

La Ley n° 7728, Ley de Reorganización Judicial, se dictó con el objeto de hacer posible la implementación del Código Procesal Penal de 1998, que provocó una profunda reforma al ordenamiento jurídico penal que, a su vez, hizo necesaria una reorganización de los tribunales, especialmente lo de la jurisdicción penal. En ese sentido, es importante recordar que uno de los objetivos al promulgar la Ley n° 7728, fue consolidar un sistema jurídico más equitativo y accesible, para lo cual se renovó la organización y la asignación de competencias de algunas oficinas judiciales. Producto de esa reforma integral que hizo el legislador, hubo un cambio profundo en el diseño del proceso penal que abarcó, por supuesto, los medios de impugnación: cuáles resoluciones podía ser apeladas, qué órganos conocerían de tales recursos y la conformación de estos, entre otros aspectos. En ese sentido, la circunstancia de que antes de la reforma de 1998, las personas tuvieran derecho a que las apelaciones de los jueces de instrucción fueran conocidas y resueltas por un tribunal integrado por tres jueces y, luego de la reforma, algunas apelaciones son conocidas por un tribunal unipersonal no desmejora el derecho fundamental de acceso a la jurisdicción ni supone una lesión al principio de progresividad. Afirmar tal cosa, simplemente porque un recurso lo conoce un tribunal unipersonal en lugar de uno colegiado, es tener una visión muy parcializada del tema. La reforma de 1998, en términos generales, supuso una modernización del sistema de justicia penal, y permitió hacer la transición de un sistema procesal penal a otro, de manera óptima. Esto se hizo, justamente, porque en atención a la regla de progresividad de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, reconocida en el artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, el Estado costarricense estaba obligado a elaborar y ejecutar políticas tendientes a lograr progresivamente, lo que establece el artículo 41 constitucional, en cuanto a “justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”. Se trató de una reforma integral, que se ha desarrollado a largo plazo, con el fin de lograr un mejor y más pleno ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales relacionados con el acceso a la justicia y los principios del debido proceso.

VII.- CONCLUSIÓN.- La circunstancia de que un tribunal unipersonal sea quien conozca de un recurso de apelación en concreto, no lesiona ningún derecho fundamental porque esa circunstancia, objetivamente, no desmejora las garantías procesales de las partes en esos asuntos, ni crea una disminución en sus facultades formales ni en su derecho de defensa. Debido a lo expuesto, la acción se rechaza por el fondo.

VIII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Nombre290 V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Nombre444 .

Nombre319 V.

Jose Roberto Garita N.

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