Challenge to Law 9848 (municipal support during Covid-19)Impugnación de la Ley 9848 (apoyo municipal ante Covid-19)

Case File: 20-10290-0007-CO Resolution No. 2023-015596 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at one twenty in the afternoon on the twenty-eighth of June, two thousand twenty-three.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre4699, of legal age, married once, economist, resident of Escazú, identity card CED1962 against Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of Law No. 9848 of May 20, 2020, entitled “Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19.”

WHEREAS:

1.- By brief received in the Constitutional Chamber at 12:12 p.m. on June 10, 2020, Mr. Nombre4699 files an action of unconstitutionality against Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of Law No. 9848.

Regarding Standing For purposes of supporting his standing, the petitioner relies on the absence of individual and direct harm, provided for in Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC). Due to the nature of the rule, it is impossible for a prior proceeding to exist. In the specific case, the absence of individual and direct harm derives from the fact that he is a taxpayer and resident of a municipal district. The challenged rules would bring economic problems to the country due to growth in administrative spending, which will become an additional burden on the citizens of the various cantons, who will have to bear such growth in spending to the detriment of the provision of public services. It will also impact all inhabitants of the country, since the transfer from the State to the Municipalities could increase, which will increase the tax burden.

Regarding the Merits After transcribing the challenged rules, the petitioner points out what he considers the following economic inconsistencies:

Starting with Article 1, this would render the fiscal rule for the central government nugatory, as it will be obligated to transfer the totality of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury or the government's level of indebtedness. Alternatively, it would force the government to make cuts in other areas to comply with the fiscal rule. The government could not conduct the proper analysis of convenience and definition of priorities to determine which items it must cut.

Regarding Article 4, it lacks logic that this provision authorizes, to face a pandemic, an increase in administrative expenses. Article 3 of Law No. 7509 establishes a limit for administrative expenses of 10% of what is collected from real estate taxes, and the rule quadruples this limit. Considering that the real estate tax is the main source of fresh revenue for municipalities, raising the ceiling on administrative spending could instead negatively impact the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of Covid-19.

As for Article 5, it increases to 50% the 40% ceiling on ordinary revenue that the Código Municipal sets for allocation to general administrative expenses. It lacks logic to face the health crisis and puts the provision of public services at risk, since the collection of patent taxes and permits is the second most important source of revenue for municipalities, and it will decrease due to the economic crisis and the closure of businesses caused by the pandemic and by the moratorium on payment of municipal taxes, public prices, and leases. Raising the ceiling for administrative expenses would be incongruous in the face of that drop in revenue and would leave fewer resources to provide municipal services. The blow to municipal services is twofold: the lower collection will impact the provision of services, and the diversion of a greater proportion of what is collected toward the administrative expenses category will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services.

Regarding Article 11, the municipalities, the district municipal councils, and the cantonal sports committees are permanently excluded from compliance with the fiscal rule, and no technical study existed in the legislative file to support it. Furthermore, it is incongruous because the purpose of the law is to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities in the face of the declared national emergency. Although municipal spending does not form a direct part of the fiscal deficit computation, which contemplates only the revenues and expenditures of the central government, it affects it indirectly insofar as the third most important source of fresh resources for the municipalities are the transfers referred to in Article 1 of the law under appeal. The situation of the debt contracted by local governments is worrisome, since according to a report from the Contraloría General de la República (CGR), there will be a drop in revenue in the municipalities. This will accelerate indebtedness and eventually the payment of contracted loans, which in turn would affect the central State due to the guarantees granted in these cases. He warns of the following:

“Given the expected drop in revenue that the municipalities will experience, the indebtedness pattern will accelerate. The drop in revenue, regrettably, will also make it difficult to eventually repay the credits contracted.

As is public and notorious, when a Municipality contracts a loan, the lending entity always demands a State guarantee. Therefore, if the Municipality defaults, then the Ministerio de Hacienda will have to honor the debt.

The impact of municipal loans would increase debt service for the national government, which would increase, in turn, the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels.” The petitioner develops the scope of the content of the principle of financial equilibrium, based on Resolution No. 2006-5979 of the Constitutional Chamber. Said principle alludes to the sustainability of the State's fiscal accounts as a whole, and is applicable to all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold. The Chamber's jurisprudence has established that the purposes of the central and decentralized Public Administration are not unlinked from the budgetary rules contained in the Constitución Política, which he exemplifies in Resolution No. 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Court. The principle of financial equilibrium pursues sound fiscal administration and aims for the following:

“The expenses of public institutions, without exception, adjust to their probable revenues, which cover both their own revenues and those they receive via transfers from the Poder Ejecutivo. There must be, therefore, a reasonable and fiscally healthy relationship between the annual increase in expenses and the probable revenues for each fiscal year of all state institutions.” Furthermore, all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold, have the obligation to adjust the growth of their budgets to the expenditure percentage set annually by the Poder Ejecutivo, and the budget is a technical instrument that organizes the state economy. On the other hand, he refers to the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule, which he considers a derivation of the principle of financial equilibrium, insofar as, he estimates, it is a principle oriented toward limiting the growth of current spending.

After presenting a typology of constitutional principles, he estimates that the fiscal rule, although originating in a law, actually echoes principles and values contained in the Constitución Política. He indicates the following:

“Precisely, the fiscal rule, although expressly enshrined only at the legal level, the truth is that it is a constitutional principle derived from the constitutional norm that enshrines the principle of budgetary equilibrium.” The fiscal rule is a constitutional principle that has the normative force of such principles and, therefore, forms part of the parameter of constitutional validity in our system.

In another line of thought, the petitioner alludes to the scope of the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness, which he estimates as developed by the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and cites Resolution No. 1997-8724 as an example. All laws must conform to the requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and said principle demands that laws must conform to strict technical parameters, since otherwise fundamental rights and society in general are harmed. When the technique indicates that there is only one possible decision, its adoption is mandatory and he points out, regarding the matter, Article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), which he considers extrapolatable to the issuance of legal norms. He invokes, regarding the principle of reasonableness, Resolutions numbers 2012-0266 and 2019-12745 of this Constitutional Chamber. He concludes that both administrative acts and laws must be issued with absolute respect for the laws of science and technique, since otherwise they become absolutely null and void.

Now, concerning Articles 1, 4, and 5 of the challenged law, the petitioner argues that they violate the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness. The logic of this set of provisions is perverse. If the first effect of the pandemic that municipal administrations will feel is the drop in revenue, it seems that the proposed solution of increasing spending is unreasonable and lacks sense. When we add the exemption from the fiscal rule to the effect that the application of Articles 4 and 5 of the challenged legislation will produce, administrative spending will grow disproportionately and not the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality. Municipal administrative structures will become more expensive, without this translating into an improvement in the services that the local government must provide to its citizens. The rules would allow a disproportionate growth of administrative spending and not of what is necessary for the municipalities to perform properly. The foregoing will bring about an additional burden on the citizens of the cantons and eventually on all Costa Ricans, since the costs of municipal public services will increase, or the transfers that the State makes to the municipalities will have to increase. The legal norms subject to this proceeding lack elements of technical reasonableness to justify them. It could even increase public credit, with a state guarantee, which could put the fiscal deficit of the Central Government at risk. He details the following:

“In the present case, there are no technical studies that support the challenged rules, and rather these violate elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique, and therefore are vitiated by unconstitutionality.” On the other hand, he indicates that Article 11 of the law in question is contrary to the constitutional principles of budgetary equilibrium and the fiscal rule. He points out that the law lacks technical grounding and that it establishes a permanent exclusion for municipal corporations, despite having been enacted to confront a specific situation. He insists that given the drop in revenue that municipalities will experience, the indebtedness pattern will accelerate, which will generate difficulty in paying credits and, in turn, due to the guarantees already mentioned, will negatively affect the fiscal deficit. Only the validity of the fiscal rule would prevent the municipalities from going into debt beyond their real possibilities of sound revenue, given that in that case their budgets could not grow freely as authorized by the challenged norm. He affirms that “the challenged norm violates the constitutional principle of the fiscal rule.” He requests that Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 be declared unconstitutional.

2.- Through the resolution of 9:24 a.m. on June 16, 2020, the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber admitted this action of unconstitutionality against Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of Law No. 9848. A hearing was granted to the Procurador General de la República, the President of the Asamblea Legislativa, and the Ministro de Hacienda, and the publication of the corresponding edicts was ordered.

3.- On June 16, 2020, the Secretariat of this Chamber issued the necessary commissions for the purpose of ordering the publication of the edicts mandated by Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC) in the Boletín Judicial.

4.- The edicts referred to in Article 81, second paragraph, of the LJC were published in numbers 120, 121, and 122 of the Boletín Judicial on June 24, 25, and 26, 2020.

5.- By brief received on July 8, 2020, Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith, in his capacity as President of the Asamblea Legislativa, submitted a report.

By way of background, he indicates that the norm originated in the Asamblea Legislativa as part of the measures to confront the Covid-19 pandemic. He mentions that the bill was the product of dialogue work with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica.

He explains the following:

“In that sense, legislative file 21.922, subsequently Law 9848, formed part of the proposals that were born in the heart of the Poder Legislativo, and was the product of the analysis and discussion that took place in a working group established as a response to the emergency, to develop the subject of municipal affairs, in coordination with authorities from that sector, such as the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI). This initiative was presented by 40 male and female deputies from all political factions, and as the statement of motives indicates, that law 'will help to make the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the Municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for economic reactivation.'” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Regarding the merits.

Now, in terms of the constitutional objections, he refutes the idea that the norm obligates the central government to transfer the totality of the resources to the municipalities, for which he reproduces Article 5 of Law No. 8114. What it obligates is that the transfer of resources be done in a timely manner, since the concern of the municipalities has frequently been that the resources were transferred at the end of the budget year and that this hindered their execution. He clarifies that the obligation for such a transfer is actually found in Law 8114 and points out the following:

“In this manner, when Article 1, challenged, indicates that the transfer must be made 'according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law 8114', the only thing it does is reiterate the existing norm, given that this provision does not render nugatory the provisions established in the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (LFFP), No. 9635, of December 3, 2018, in relation to the obligation that the government would have to make transfers under the different scenarios of the fiscal rule.” He reinforces the foregoing with the content of the provisions of Articles 15 and 25 of Law No. 9635.

He points out that perhaps the petitioner's confusion originates from the fact that the original bill did contemplate the obligation to make said transfer, but that the formally enacted and valid law does not. He attaches the following table illustrating the point:

*The highlighting corresponds to the report.

During the legislative debate, the base text was subject to modifications. He emphasizes that Article 1 of the finally approved text adds a provision that obligates the municipalities to have the transfer to be received incorporated into their budgets, as well as the financial schedule for its budgetary execution; that is, it urges them to carry out better planning in the use of resources, as a counterpart to the Tesorería Nacional's obligation to disburse the funds in a timely manner. Note, moreover, that the obligated subject referred to in the challenged article is the Tesorería Nacional, which simply executes the transfer of resources already budgeted, that is, defining the amount to be budgeted is not within its scope of action; a task that corresponds to the Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional or the Ministerio de Hacienda more generally. He concludes in the following sense:

“In view of the foregoing, it is concluded that Law No. 9848 does not expressly introduce an obligation to transfer to the municipalities the totality of the resources referred to in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, because that provision is already contemplated in said Law 8114; whereby the petitioner's arguments based on this assumption lack grounds to request its declaration of unconstitutionality.” Regarding Article 4 of the challenged legal norm, the report details that the petitioner considers that an increase in the tax percentage could be dedicated to financing administrative expenses and that this would imply an increase in expenses, which he considers mistaken. He points out that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a specific expense, but that it does not authorize an increase in said expense. If the entirety of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that the municipalities are preparing to face a significant reduction in their ordinary revenues; this for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity. This will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the patent tax, and delinquencies on all taxes will increase as an effect of the pandemic, including the real estate tax; b) The law under objection itself provides a series of measures that lead to a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: the authorizations to apply a moratorium on municipal patent taxes or licenses (Art. 12); municipal moratorium on fees, public prices, and municipal services (Art. 13); reduction of municipal lease rates (Art. 14), and; payment arrangements (Art. 16). The foregoing means that, in a scenario where the percentage established in Article 3 of the Ley de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles is maintained, the municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to finance the same level of administrative spending, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness by local governments, an aspect that so concerns the petitioner. It should be noted that administrative spending, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term; therefore, not having this authorization could lead to the municipalities not having resources to finance their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided in the challenged Article 4, would allow supplementing that revenue deficiency to finance administrative spending. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said spending, making it incorrect to affirm, as the petitioner does, that the norm authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. Another reason why the premise from which the petitioner starts is invalid relates to the fact that the challenged norm also allows the use of resources generated by lifting the established limit to finance the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; key areas to attend to given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. In this regard, the statement of motives for legislative file 21.922 pointed out that:

“However, these actions must be complemented from the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first-response roles such as the coordination of Local Emergency Committees (part of the Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of indispensable services such as citizen security through municipal police forces, waste collection, and aqueducts in some cases.” From the foregoing, it follows that what the petitioner indicates regarding the norm potentially negatively impacting the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of the virus that causes Covid-19, is also not true. It should be noted that lifting the percentage will apply exceptionally in budget years 2020 and 2021; additionally, the resources cannot be used for the creation of new posts, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to the increase of administrative expenses as the petitioner presupposes, and for which a comparative table is presented between the bill and the finally approved act:

*The highlighting corresponds to the report.

As for Article 5 of the law subject to this action of unconstitutionality, he reiterates what was already said concerning the previous article, as he believes there is an error of appreciation regarding the scope of the provisions of Article 5, since it does not propose an authorization to increase administrative spending, but rather an increase in the authorization of resources that can be used for that purpose. Lifting the ceiling allows financing the existing expenses of the municipalities and thus preventing them from incurring financial non-compliance. He insists on the temporary nature of the measure and on the fact that new posts cannot be created for these purposes. Precisely as a result of the economic projections provided by the petitioner, in relation to the imminent decrease in the collection of municipal entities, it is necessary to lift the indicated ceilings, in order to properly finance their operation. He refutes the petitioner's argument related to the impact on municipal services, by indicating that the norm expressly establishes that water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services may be financed through these mechanisms.

On the other hand, in relation to Article 11 of the challenged law, it is pointed out that the fiscal rule aims to establish a limit on the growth of current spending, which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to the gross domestic product. What the fiscal rule aims to do is establish a limit on the growth of current spending, which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to GDP; for its part, the challenged Article 11 aims to exclude local governments from the scope of application of this norm, but not in its entirety. As the petitioner mentions, municipal spending is not a direct part of the fiscal deficit computation, since the latter only refers to the relationship of revenues and expenditures of the Central Government, whereby he maintains that from that perspective, there would be no direct impact on the Central Government deficit or on the level of indebtedness. The reform included in Article 1 of the challenged Law No. 9848 does not establish an obligation to transfer resources, as the petitioner presupposes, but in addition to that, this law adds, in this Article 11, that the exception to the fiscal rule shall not be applicable to those resources in the budgets of municipalities and district municipal councils originating from transfers made by the Central Government. That is, the municipal budget items financed with these resources would be subject to the fiscal rule, whereby the norm does not compromise the possibility of meeting the goal established by the cited rule, according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government. He emphasizes that the petitioner does not refer to this important provision, which again gives reason to suppose that the action was filed against the base text and not against what was finally enacted, because the text did not include the commented provision. He attaches the following table:

Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: [.]

• d)The country's municipalities and district municipal councils. However, this title shall be applicable to those resources from the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils originating from transfers made by the central Government.
• e)Canton sports committees.

*The highlighted text corresponds to the report.

The petitioner states that the debt situation incurred by local governments is also concerning, especially given the expected drop in revenue that municipalities will experience, which leads him to expect that the borrowing pattern will accelerate. He indicates that the drop in revenue would hinder the eventual repayment of contracted loans, since when a municipality takes out a loan, the lending entity always requires a guarantee from the State; therefore, if the municipality defaults, the Ministry of Finance will have to honor the debt. He affirms that the default on municipal loans would increase the debt service for the national government, which in turn would increase the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels. Regarding the above, he merely points out that the argument includes a series of suppositions or presumptions that need not necessarily materialize and that also would not necessarily occur as a result of the enactment of the challenged law. He adds that, based on the budgetary result data for municipalities for 2019 included in the CGR's Information System on Plans and Budgets (Sistema de Información sobre Planes y Presupuestos, SIPP), of the 81 municipalities (at that time), only seven showed a budget deficit, so the rest show a surplus, which for forty-two of them exceeds one billion colones.

Regarding the principle of technical reasonableness Furthermore, regarding the reproach of technical reasonableness, the President of the Legislative Assembly mentions that the petitioner starts from mistaken interpretations, since at no time is an increase in administrative expenses authorized, and he considers that the challenged rule adheres to criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality, and he proceeds to transcribe interventions by deputies in this regard, within the framework of the discussion of the bill. The following is reported:

"As has been demonstrated throughout this report, the petitioner's arguments start from mistaken interpretations of the rule, given that at no time is an increase in administrative expenses authorized, as he points out. Precisely, considering the reduction in revenue that is foreseen and given the possibility that administrative expenses become unfinanced, what is intended with the rule is to maintain a healthy fiscal balance in the municipalities, allowing them to allocate a greater percentage of tax revenue to meet these needs. One must not lose sight of the fact that the Law also considers the possibility of financing with these resources the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management, provided that they may not be used for the creation of new positions; in addition to the fact that the rule is temporary in nature, which confirms that the intention is not to increase administrative 13 spending. From the above, it follows that elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique are not violated, given that the rules are not tainted by unconstitutionality. Likewise, as has been mentioned, the law subject to challenge was analyzed in the working groups that were implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, so criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were taken into account throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate. This is recorded, for example, in the intervention of Deputy Corrales Chacón, when she stated the following:

"Remind all of you and the citizenry listening to us that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a completely different standard for us. And with this, the municipalities of the entire country have also had to take exceptional actions to carry forward the actions that correspond to them by Municipal Code, but also to be able to collaborate with the Executive Branch in each of the solutions or facilities that can be given precisely to the citizenry in the face of the pandemic. Reason for this was that this file was presented and that the working group was formed, which has truly been an extraordinary group, a group that has allowed us to work as a team, work together, listen precisely to that sector affected by the municipal regime and also listen to the taxpayer who needs precisely those facilities to be able to carry on with their daily life. The bill has undergone consensual modifications, technically reviewed, both by ANAI and by the Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Legislative Assembly who have considered their observations timely. And the reason for this is that today a replacement text has been approved in this Plenary that incorporates many of them and also the other additional motions that were approved. Make it clear to the citizenry that the main changes that have been made are to eliminate the possibility of creating new positions in the municipalities, also the Sicop issue. Fairly significant wording has been done in which those small municipalities are allowed to always make their procurement through this law, but facilitating their forms of payment. And on the other hand, also certain modifications mainly so that municipalities can have that flexibility in spending that they require in the face of the pandemic." In the same vein, Deputy Montero Gómez, in her intervention, details aspects of the dialogue process that took place, both among all parliamentary fractions and with the actors involved in the municipal process and the role that Municipalities play in the proper course given to adequate public service, amidst the health emergency of the pandemic. Her words were as follows:

"Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a bit long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental. With the participation of multiple actors, deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with a great deal of responsibility, but also involving those key actors: Nombre4700, intendencias, the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and some institutions of the Executive Branch. I believe we have managed to gather those concerns to the maximum and the majority of those concerns have been included in this text of the bill to improve, refine, so that what this law says is appropriate and is extremely clear at the time of application, and that this truly is an opportunity to support taxpayers and to strengthen the financial management of the municipalities. We are very clear that the municipalities and district municipal councils have and will have an essential mission during and after the pandemic, because they are the leading institutions in the processes of reconstruction, development processes, and economic reactivation in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the institution, the rest of the Costa Rican institutional framework." These interventions by the deputies, cited as an example, allow, in turn, to refute the petitioner's allegation regarding the lack of technical studies. This is because, as recognized by the Constitutional Court, although their existence is desirable, what is relevant is that what should be expected of the legislator is that when making estimates about the future and the effect of the rule they approve, they have been guided by an objectively acceptable assessment of the information at their disposal, as stated in resolution No. 5374-2003 of June 20, 2003." In that sense, the challenged rules are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the petitioner points out, since their validity is limited to a prudential time, which has been deemed necessary so that municipalities can address the needs resulting from the pandemic and also provide the necessary support for the first steps toward the economic reactivation of the country's cantons.

Regarding the principles of financial equilibrium and the fiscal rule In terms of the principles of financial equilibrium and the fiscal rule, the reporting party indicates that in the statement of legislative intent, it was expressly alleged that the legislative intention was the flexibilization of municipal resources to face the consequences of the emergency, but generally to contribute to economic reactivation.

Furthermore, the budget is an exercise that has to do with the orientation of Government policy. In that sense, it is the Executive Branch that prepares and plans the budget each year, taking into account the constitutional and legal obligations it must fulfill, as well as the investment corresponding to the axes it will develop according to the National Development Plan. The Legislative Branch, within the budget dynamics, has the power to approve or disapprove the expenditure forecast and propose some modifications. That is why the parliamentary exercise is limited by established constitutional and legal norms, to determine the equilibrium of the budget at the global level. In that direction, from the Legislative Branch, a series of decisions have been adopted to enrich the legal system with the intention of cleaning up public finances, and much remains to be done, but it is necessary to give sustainability to the necessary constitutional obligations that constitute us as a Rule of Law. A reflection that coincides with what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber, in advisory opinion No. 2018-019511, regarding the Law to Strengthen Public Finances, 9635. The following is reported:

"Remedies, which, in the case under analysis, were explained by the legislators at the time of casting their votes, such as, for example, Deputy Gourzong Cerdas, when he stated that:

The national emergency declared by the Executive Branch, according to decree number 42227-MP-S which is a product of the Covid-19 pandemic, directly affects the normal development of municipalities. And, indeed, Costa Rican families are experiencing difficulties in their income, especially those in the private and informal sectors, families who have to face debts with payments of municipal patent taxes, merchants and owners of different public services, which directly affect the income of local governments. For this reason, as deputies of the Republic, we must act with agility, in aid, according to our competences, and legislate efficiently and timely in the knowledge and approval of this bill number 21.922, called Ley para Apoyar al Contribuyente Local y Reforzar la Gestión Financiera de las Municipalidades ante la Emergencia Nacional por la Pandemia del Covid 19. And it is, for this reason, it is due to the covid-19 pandemic, that the municipalities' income and their budgets are affected. This bill definitely comes to alleviate the situation of municipal administrations in the use of the specific surplus, to make specific allocations more flexible, and to extend the margin of the fiscal rule established in the Municipal Code, specifically in article 102, as well as in Law 7509, Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, to authorize a higher percentage for administrative spending, that is, it seeks the proper municipal functioning and the efficient attention of the services that the municipality provides." Finally, along the same lines, Deputy Corrales Chacón refers to the arguments pointed out by the petitioner with respect to the fiscal rule and clarified the following:

"With respect to the criticisms and oppositions that this project has suffered, mainly from the Contraloría General de la República, which has inaccurately mentioned that there would be an impact on state public finances with the approval of this project, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule in the municipalities is not going to reduce the central Government's fiscal deficit; what the central Government contributes to local governments represents barely one point zero nine percent of the Republic's budget and practically all of this percentage is directed to investment in the cantonal road network." "Por esta razón, me parece importante también dejar en evidencia que ya el día de hoy las municipalidades del país tienen topes que les impiden justamente hacer gastos excesivos, pero sobre todo también que ya ellas tienen lo que se llama la regla de oro, la regla que les impide un crecimiento exagerado, por esa razón hacer evidencia de que las municipalidades necesitan y les urge, más que todo, en la situación que estamos enfrentando como país, la aprobación de este expediente".

He insists that the approved rule meets the requirements of legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality between the means and the end achieved. He requests that the unconstitutionality action be dismissed. He attaches the certification of the appointment of the President of the Legislative Assembly and as an annex a table of the executed amounts of revenue and expenditures for the year 2019 of the different municipal corporations.

6.- By brief received on July 9, 2020, Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández submitted the report, in his capacity as PROCURADOR GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA.

Regarding admissibility Agreement is expressed regarding the sufficient standing of the petitioner under the protection of the application of norms that do not directly affect the legal sphere of any individual person, but whose consequences are of a general and indirect scope in society as a whole. Likewise, the challenged norms are related to the proper management of public spending and the correct execution of public funds (resolutions 4409 and 9992 of 2004 of the Constitutional Chamber).

Preliminary issue It is necessary to join the present proceeding to those under files 19-013318-0007-CO and 19-0011540-0007-CO to avoid the issuance of contradictory judgments. In these unconstitutionality actions, the constitutional validity of the fiscal rule is questioned, since an administrative autonomy constitutionally conferred on municipalities and public universities is limited by law. The positions expressed by the petitioners in these other processes, in relation to that expressed in this file, are mutually exclusive, so that upholding one could imply denying the other.

In the event that the Constitutional Chamber does not deem the above procedurally appropriate, what was mentioned in the previously mentioned reports regarding the concept, nature, and legal foundation of the fiscal rule is largely reiterated.

Regarding the merits In countries like the United States and some in the European Union, different fiscal rules were enacted in order to face the economic crisis of the previous decade, and on occasions, such rules acquired constitutional rank. With this, the budgetary margin of action of different institutions and territorial organizations was limited, as is the case of the Federated States, the Autonomous Communities, and Local Governments.

It is relevant to consider the principle of budgetary equilibrium, contained in article 176 of the Fundamental Norm and recently developed in resolution 2018-19511 of the Constitutional Chamber and art. 5 subsection c) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. Under this constitutional mandate, applicable to all organs and entities of the Public Administration, regardless of their degree of constitutional autonomy, budgeted expenses may not exceed probable revenues (resolution 2018-19511 and art. 100 of the Municipal Code). In addition, art. 9 of Law 9635 contains the definition of the fiscal rule, which was formulated based on a current expenditure rule. Having been issued by law, the Legislative Assembly is not bound by it, and could therefore legislate in the opposite direction or nuance its scope (as occurred with the law that is the object of the present action). Regarding said rule, the following is stated:

Article 9 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas leans towards this latter type, that is, towards a fiscal rule relative to expenditure that limits, as stated, the growth of current expenditure, subject to a proportion of the average growth of the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the central Government debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus conceived, due to its implications, this canon is more related to the principle of financial sustainability than to the principle of budgetary equilibrium, as we will see later.

The petitioner considers that the fiscal rule has a constitutional basis, derived from the principle of financial equilibrium as a mechanism to limit the growth of current expenditure, in line with resolution 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Chamber. The following is concluded:

For the reasons stated, we must reiterate that, if the Constitutional Chamber considers that the constitutional foundation of the fiscal rule, according to the terms of judgment no. 2018-19511, is sufficient to recognize a transversal character over the entire conglomerate of public Administrations, capable of binding the budgetary formulation of municipalities without violating their autonomy, the legislator's decision to exempt them from its application, through the reform made by article 11 of Law No. 9848 to article 6 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, would be unconstitutional, as it would be legislating in contradiction with a canon understood to be contained in the provisions of article 176 of the Political Constitution.

Now then, the petitioner's arguments regarding financial equilibrium are hypothetical assumptions not verifiable per se. It could not be affirmed that the inclusion of the municipalities and district municipal councils within the exceptions of art. 6 of Law No. 9635 necessarily implies a violation of the principle of financial equilibrium; indeed, art. 11 subsection d) itself establishes that this exclusion is partial, as the fiscal rule is applicable to transfers made by the central government. The disapplication of the fiscal rule would have to be analyzed from the perspective of the constitutional principle of fiscal sustainability, not invoked by the petitioner.

In another order of ideas, arts. 4, 5, and 11 of the challenged law are analyzed from the perspective of the principles of fiscal sustainability and technical reasonableness:

In this regard, the following is explained:

"As is extracted from the legislative background of Law No. 9848, considering file No. 21.922 that documents its parliamentary procedure, the challenged articles 4 and 5 connect with the purpose of “making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency” (folio 4 of the statement of legislative intent, see also, in particular, folios 542 to 545 and 556 and 557 of the debate in the Plenary); by allowing municipalities and district municipal councils an expanded margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of article 4, it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax for administrative expenses, compared to the initial 10% provided in article 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (No. 7509); while, in the case of article 5, an additional 10% is added to the original 40% established in article 102 of the Municipal Code for ordinary municipal revenue, which they could allocate to cover the general administration expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept as “current outlays that do not imply direct costs of municipal services.” So, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on local finances resulting from lower revenue collection in the scenario of economic slowdown caused by the covid-19 pandemic in each canton – and in the country in general –; authorizing municipalities to transfer a greater part of their income to these fixed and permanent expenses, such as the remuneration of their officials, to the detriment of expenses dedicated to municipal services. Therefore, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, given the foreseeable reduction in municipal resources, the challenged provisions authorize them to allocate a greater part of these to the current expenditure that finances, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of municipal public services.

The petitioner, as stated, questions in the first place the reasonableness of the precepts, for promoting the increase in administrative spending of municipalities when at the same time their income will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which in the end would impact the fiscal deficit of the central Government, as he posits that the only way for the territorial Administrations to cover their outlays in these circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which in the final instance would be responsible for these in the event of non-compliance with their financial obligations." The questioning made by the petitioner in pointing out that promoting the increase in administrative spending impacts the central Government's fiscal deficit due to its role as guarantor is merely hypothetical. Additionally, according to the jurisprudential line of the Constitutional Chamber, some element of judgment is necessary to determine the reasonableness of a rule when its disproportionality is alleged and this is not evident (resolution 5236-1999). The petitioner does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree to determine the invalidity of the challenged provisions.

Notwithstanding all of the above, indeed, the legislative file No. 21922 does not contain technical studies for the increases from 10% to 40% for administrative expenses originating from the collection of the property tax, nor for the increase from 40% to 50% of ordinary revenue to cover general administration expenses (arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged law). The Contraloría General de la República referred to the legislative proposal at the time, through official letters DFOE-DL-0567 and DFOE-DL-0842, and determined the absence of the aforementioned technical studies. The legislator, when dealing with specialized matters ‒like the one referred to in this unconstitutionality action‒ is not exempt from technically justifying or substantiating the decision-making that involves the enactment of a law, based on the principle of reasonableness and on arts. 9 and 11 of the Political Constitution. The legislative file does not contain technical studies that support the decision adopted through the law that is the object of this action, nor an analysis of the impact that exceeding the modified budget limits will have on the budget stability and financial sustainability of the municipalities and district municipal councils. The following is pointed out:

We are of the view that this lack of technical substantiation transcends the determination of the State's economic policy as a matter of government, and that we are no longer in the field of suppositions, as it is possible to verify that the increase in the said percentages that would be allocated to administrative expenses or general administration expenses of the territorial corporations, and, eventually, to the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management – since the challenged rules leave this as optional – does not have any type of technical justification or substantiation (…).

Despite the fact that arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged Law establish an exceptional validity for the 2020 and 2021 budget years, technical substantiation is equally required. This absence casts doubt on the reasonableness of the rules and their compatibility with the principle of fiscal sustainability contained in art. 176 of the Political Constitution. In that sense, the Spanish experience, in relation to the principle of financial sustainability, is linked to control over indebtedness levels. By applying such a consideration to the challenged articles, the problem regarding the absence of technical studies to support the impact on public finances reappears.

On the other hand, reference is made to the constitutionality of art. 1 of the law that is the object of the present action:

The aforementioned art. 5 refers to the allocation of revenue from the collection of the single fuel tax, the letter b) of which specifies that 22.25% of 48.60% of its annual product must be transferred, through the Tesorería Nacional, to the municipalities for the attention of the cantonal road network. In accordance with the legislative history of Law No. 9848, the intention of the challenged precept is to streamline the procedure for the transfer of resources with the mere approval of the municipal budget by the controlling body or an adjusted budget in case of disapproval. However, in the matters that concern the petitioner, it did not entail any normative innovation, as it basically comes to reiterate what was already provided by the referred art. 5. b) of Law No. 8114, which imposes a specific allocation on a percentage of what is collected from the single fuel tax to be transferred by the Tesorería Nacional to the municipalities for the conservation and development of the cantonal road network. Consequently, a greater obligation would not be being established for the Executive Branch than how it has been managing those transfers since the approval of the aforementioned law approximately two decades ago. In this, one must recall what was said by this Chamber in vote no. 2018-19511 insofar as budget allocation criteria, as well as each of the particularities related to the control of its growth, constitute the State's economic policy and a matter of government.

Rather, the constitutional problem could lie in the linkage that the ordinary legislator is making of the budget legislator regarding the disposition of public resources or, more precisely, regarding spending and its allocation, in accordance with the budget principles of universality and non-affectation of resources, derived from art. 185 of the Political Constitution.

In that sense, while it is true that for some time the position of that high Court was oscillating on the issue of specific allocations, the stance that has lately prevailed is that “the budget legislator is not bound by the ordinary legislator, except in the cases of constitutionally 'tied' funds and those destined to finance social programs. In relation to the former, by constitutional imperative. As for the latter, because the original constituent opted for a social State of Law, which entails a linking of public powers to this legal and social reality” (judgment no. 15968-2011 of 3:30 p.m. on November 23, 2011, reiterated in resolutions numbers 2016-18351 and 2018-19511).

Considering that the challenged art. 1 and, by connection, art. 5 of the Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, contains a tax with a specific allocation that is not directed to financing a social program, but rather, as stated, to the attention of the cantonal road network, despite the public interest of this work not being in doubt, it does not fit within the context of social rights, thus improperly binding the margin of action of the budget legislator in matters of spending (the definition of its limits and allocation). However, the Procuraduría observes that both precepts were issued in development of the budget allocation contemplated by art.

of Article 170 of the Political Constitution in favor of the municipalities, corresponding to 10% of the ordinary revenues calculated for the corresponding fiscal year, as indeed established by Articles 1 and 5 of the Special Law for the Transfer of Competencies: Full and Exclusive Attention to the Cantonal Road Network (No. 9329 of October 15, 2015), in relation to the General Law for the Transfer of Competencies from the Executive Branch to the Municipalities (No. 8801 of April 28, 2010).

By way of conclusion, the warning regarding the potential consolidation of this proceeding with those already indicated is reiterated.

Regarding Article 11 of the challenged law, the action must be granted if the Constitutional Chamber considers that the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule is the constitutional principle of budgetary balance.

Regarding Articles 4 and 5, it indicates that the action should be granted due to the absence of technical studies.

Finally, regarding Article 1, it concludes that "the linkage that the ordinary legislator makes of the budget to the detriment of the budgetary principles of universality and non-affectation of resources (Article 185 of the Political Constitution) is saved insofar as it is done under the protection of Article 170 of the Constitution, as part of the budgetary allocation to finance the transfer to local governments of the full and exclusive attention to the cantonal road network." 7.- The Presidency of this Constitutional Chamber, through a resolution at 2:01 p.m. on July 16, 2020, deemed the hearings granted to the Attorney General of the Republic and the President of the Legislative Assembly to have been satisfied, but not the hearing granted to the Minister of Finance. Once the proceedings were ready, they were passed to the office corresponding by turn.

8.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Garro Vargas, except for Considerando V, which is drafted by Magistrate Garita Navarro; and

CONSIDERANDO:

Regarding the admissibility of the action I.- The standing of THE petitioning party in this CASE On this matter, it must be noted that Article 75, second paragraph, of the LJC establishes that a pending prior case shall not be necessary when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it involves the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. 2001-8239, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:

"In accordance with the first of the scenarios provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as the base matter (...)".

In the present matter, the petitioning party bases its standing on Article 75, second paragraph, of the LJC, because "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury." The PGR argues that the Chamber has accepted standing in scenarios such as the one at hand, where the application of the challenged norms does not have the capacity to directly affect the legal sphere of any particular person, its consequences being of a general and indirect scope for society as a whole, or at least, as alleged by the petitioner, for the community of residents of the municipalities that avail themselves of the budgetary provisions contained therein. They find no impediment whatsoever that would prevent hearing the present action on its merits, also considering that its object is norms related to the sound management of public spending and the correct execution of public funds.

Consequently, for this Chamber, the hearing and resolution of the present action of unconstitutionality via abstract review is admissible, by virtue of the fact that, indeed, the norm cannot generate an act of individual application.

Regarding the merits of the action of unconstitutionality II.- Object of the challenge The challenged norms are Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of the "Law to Support the Local Taxpayer and Reinforce the Financial Management of Municipalities, Amid the National Emergency Caused by the Covid-19 Pandemic," No. 9848.

In summary, it can be stated that the petitioner challenges Article 1 because, in their view, it renders the fiscal rule for the Central Government nugatory by having to transfer the entirety of the resources set forth therein, without considering the situation of the Public Treasury. Articles 4 and 5 are challenged because they lift the cap on administrative expenses of the municipalities to the detriment or impact of the provision of public services. These numerals, in the petitioner's opinion, entail economic inconsistencies and violate the principle of technical reasonableness, given that administrative spending is increased unreasonably and without technical studies to support the legislative decision. Regarding Article 11, the petitioner questions that municipal corporations will be excluded and exempted from the application of the fiscal rule, which, according to the petitioner, is a constitutional principle derived from the principle of the State's financial balance.

The text of the challenged provisions is the following:

| "Art. 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities. | | 'Art. 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) deberán realizar, de forma oportuna, la transferencia de los recursos a las municipalidades, según el porcentaje dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001, a las municipalidades. | | To carry out said transfer, each municipality must be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in the event of rejection by the oversight body, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) has for this purpose, as well as the financial programming for the budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministry of Finance. | | 'Para realizar dicha transferencia, se le deberá requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), así como la programación financiera de la ejecución presupuestaria, de acuerdo con los formatos emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda. | | Art. 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and the district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 3 of Law 7509, Property Tax Law, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax to administrative expenses. | | 'Art. 4- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 3 de la Ley 7509, Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, de 9 de mayo de 1995, y destinar hasta un cuarenta por ciento (40%) a gastos administrativos del monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. | | These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management; however, they may not be allocated to the creation of new positions. | | 'Estos recursos también podrán ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; sin embargo, no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas. | | Art. 5- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and the district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 102 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, and allocate up to fifty percent (50%) of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administration expenses. | | 'Art. 5- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 102 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998, y destinar hasta un cincuenta por ciento (50%) de sus ingresos ordinarios municipales a atender los gastos generales de administración. | | These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management; however, they may not be allocated to the creation of new positions. | | 'Estos recursos también podrán ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; sin embargo, no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas. | | Art. 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of Title IV "Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic," Chapter I "General Provisions, Object, Scope of Application, Definitions, and Principles," of Law 9635, Strengthening of Public Finances, of December 3, 2018. The texts are the following: | | 'Art. 11- Se adicionan los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del título IV "Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República", capítulo I "Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios", de la Ley 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, de 3 de diciembre de 2018. Los textos son los siguientes: | | Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: | | 'Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones: | | [.] | | '[.] | | d) The municipalities and the district municipal councils of the country. However, this title shall be applicable to those resources from the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils that originate from transfers made by the Central Government. | | 'd) Las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito del país. No obstante, el presente título será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno central. | | e) The cantonal sports committees." | | 'e) Los comités cantonales de deportes." | III.- Regarding Articles 1 and 11 of the law As a prior and special pronouncement: improper invocation of the content of the norms.

As a first aspect of the analysis, it is necessary to warn, as reported by the President of the Legislative Assembly, that the petition filing the action of unconstitutionality lacks an adequate invocation of the content of Articles 1 and 11 of the challenged law, given that, as was corroborated, the petitioner's reproaches were aimed at questioning the text of the bill and not the effective content of the law, as it was finally approved. Indeed, for greater clarity, the text challenged by the petitioner—which, as already indicated, corresponds to the text of the bill—and, in contrast, the text of the regulations finally approved by the Legislative Assembly are transcribed below:

In relation to Article 1, the petitioner questions whether its application would render the fiscal rule for the Central Government nugatory, which "will be obligated to transfer the entirety of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury or the government's level of indebtedness." They alternatively state that the government would be forced to make cuts in other areas to be able to comply with the dual mandate of transferring the entirety of the resources to the municipalities and, additionally, complying with the fiscal rule.

From the petitioner's arguments, this Chamber observes that their reproaches—in addition to the erroneous transcription of the norm—revolve around the alleged obligation to transfer the "entirety of those resources." However, as the President of the Legislative Assembly points out, the provision in question was changed in order to clearly specify that the percentage already set forth in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001, must be transferred. Indeed, a comparative analysis of the texts previously transcribed—in the table added above—allows us to verify that the content challenged by the petitioner—originally provided for in the bill—was emphatic, in the sense that the entirety of the resources must be transferred to the municipalities, while the provision finally approved and which is law of the Republic states that the authorities listed therein must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001. Regarding the content of the norm as finally approved, the petitioner omitted to provide an adequate foundation for the allegations of unconstitutionality and the reasons why, according to their claim, an economic inconsistency is incurred. That omission alone is sufficient reason to dismiss the challenge in this action of unconstitutionality, which this Chamber became aware of after having provided the legally mandated hearings.

Regarding Article 11, it is necessary to highlight again that the action of unconstitutionality suffers from a serious problem of substantiation. The foregoing, since, as can be inferred from the table added above, the petitioner questioned the terms of the proposed norm according to the original bill and not the content and text of the norm as it was finally approved by the Legislative Assembly. In the original terms, all the budgets of the municipalities and the district municipal councils were going to be excluded from the "Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic" title of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances, whereas, according to the norm finally approved, the exclusion will be partial, given that the title will be applicable to those resources from the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils that originate from transfers made by the Central Government. The petitioner did not present any argument of unconstitutionality in relation to the bifurcation finally approved by the Legislative Assembly, which, as already noted, is sufficient reason to declare the action without merit due to the omission to provide an adequate substantiation of the arguments of unconstitutionality against the norm in force and not a mere bill. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that in the judgment in which the challenge to the constitutionality of the application of the fiscal rule to the municipalities was heard, it was warned, regarding the substantiation, that this Chamber cannot sua sponte supply the omissions that the petitioners are responsible for fulfilling (Article 78 of the LJC) and that, by virtue of the principle of self-restraint of the constitutional judge, such a task cannot be assumed by this Court, but rather its fulfillment is the responsibility of the petitioning party (see judgment No. 2022-013101). In view of that position, it is possible to affirm that this action suffers from a serious problem of substantiation, since, as already warned, the norm was invoked, but the content of the one that appeared in the respective bill was challenged, and the final content of the norm was not challenged, nor were specific arguments made regarding it, as it was approved by the Legislative Assembly. This prevents an adequate assessment of the various scenarios that the norm raises and which were not distinguished, as was required, by the petitioner.

Such a deficiency in the substantiation affects the procedural prerequisites that every action of unconstitutionality must meet, and, had it been noticed earlier, it would have been grounds for the inadmissibility of this action with respect to this Article 11, and the same must be said regarding Article 1.

As a corollary of the considerations made, the action of unconstitutionality is declared without merit with respect to Articles 1 and 11 of the Law to Support the Local Taxpayer and Reinforce the Financial Management of Municipalities, Amid the National Emergency Caused by the Covid-19 Pandemic.

IV.- REGARDING ARTS. 4 AND 5 OF THE LAW The petitioner questions the constitutionality of Articles 4 and 5 because, in their opinion, they incur economic inconsistencies. Regarding Article 4, they affirm that it completely lacks logic that, to face the pandemic, it is necessary to increase administrative expenses as authorized by the challenged norm. Considering that the property tax is the main source of fresh revenue for the municipalities, lifting the cap on administrative spending could actually negatively impact the provision of public services. Regarding Article 5, in the same vein, they question the logical sense of raising the ceiling on administrative spending to face a health crisis. The petitioner's arguments—as the PGR points out—revolve around assumptions, related to the fact that the economic slowdown will decrease revenue collection from patent taxes and permits, that the collection of patent taxes will decrease due to business closures resulting from economic contraction, and that municipal revenue collection will fall in 2020 due to the effect of authorized moratoria. They therefore conclude that lifting the ceiling for administrative expenses not only subtracts resources necessary for the provision of municipal services, but that, given the fall in municipal revenues, the blow to municipal services is double: lower revenue collection will impact the provision of services, and the diversion to administrative items will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services. Furthermore, they state that the application of Articles 4 and 5 will cause "administrative spending, and not the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality, to grow disproportionately." They say this will cause administrative structures to become more expensive and will become an additional burden for the citizens of the cantons or will fall on all Costa Ricans—through supposed loans. They assert that the challenged norms lack elements of technical reasonableness to justify them, given that they will promote increases in administrative spending and, in the specific case, no technical studies exist that support the challenged norms.

The President of the Legislative Assembly reported that the petitioner starts from a mistaken premise, as they consider that the increase in the percentage of the tax that may be used to fund administrative expenses necessarily means that the municipalities will increase that type of expense. On the contrary, they state that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a given expense, but it is not authorizing an increase in that expense. They argue that if the entirety of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that municipalities are preparing to face a significant reduction in their ordinary revenues. This is for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity, which will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the patent tax; also, delinquencies in all taxes will increase as a result of the pandemic, including the property tax; b) The law under objection itself provides a series of measures that lead to a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: the authorizations to apply a moratorium on municipal patents or licenses (Article 12); the municipal moratorium on fees, public prices, and municipal services (Article 13); the reduction of municipal lease tariffs (Article 14); and payment arrangements (Article 16). This means that, in a scenario where the percentage established in Article 3 of the "Property Tax Law" is maintained, municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to fund the same level of administrative spending, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness on the part of local governments, an aspect that so concerns the petitioner. Administrative spending, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term; therefore, not having this authorization could lead to municipalities lacking resources to fund their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided in the challenged Article 4, would allow that income deficiency to be made up to fund administrative spending. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said spending, thus it is incorrect to affirm, as the petitioner does, that the norm authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. They add that another reason why the premise from which the petitioner starts is invalid is related to the fact that the challenged norm also allows the resources generated by the lifting of the established limit to be used to fund the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management; key areas to attend to given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. The lifting of the percentage will apply exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 budget years; furthermore, the resources may not be allocated to the creation of new positions, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to increasing administrative expenses, as the petitioner presupposes. As with the objections to Article 4, there is a mistaken appreciation of the scope of what is provided in Article 5, given that here, what is proposed is not an authorization for an increase in administrative spending but rather an increase in the authorization of the resources that can be used for that purpose, such that, in the face of a generalized reduction in revenues, the lifting of the ceiling allows the existing expenses of the municipalities to be funded and thus prevents them from incurring financial breaches, so the measure makes perfect logical sense. On the other hand, as in the previous case, the measure is temporary and does not allow the creation of new positions, precisely with the spirit of not increasing administrative spending. Furthermore, precisely given the outlook announced by the petitioner, the municipalities will require the lifting of the indicated caps to be able to fund their operation. They insist that if what is provided in the norm is read carefully, the indicated resources may fund the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management; with which, contrary to what is challenged, the provisions of challenged Articles 4 and 5 precisely aim to safeguard the funding of these areas so sensitive in times of pandemic. As for the technical reasonableness of the law, they reported that the law under challenge was analyzed in the working groups that were implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were taken into account throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate. In this regard, several passages of interventions made by legislators during the approval process of the regulations challenged by the petitioner are also cited, and they conclude that the challenged norms are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the petitioner claims, since their validity is limited to a prudent period, which has been deemed necessary for the municipalities to meet the needs resulting from the pandemic and also to provide the necessary support for the first steps towards the economic reactivation of the country's cantons.

Regarding these numerals, the Attorney General of the Republic reported that, as can be extracted from the legislative history of Law No. 9848, in view of file No. 21,922 which documents its parliamentary procedure, the challenged Articles 4 and 5 are connected to the purpose of "making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency," by allowing the municipalities and district municipal councils a wide margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of Article 4 it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax to administrative expenses, compared to the initial 10% provided for in Article 3 of the "Property Tax Law" (No. 7509); while in the case of Article 5, an additional 10% is added to the original 40% of ordinary municipal revenues set in Article 102 of the Municipal Code, which they could allocate to cover the general administration expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept as "current expenditures that do not imply direct costs of municipal services." Thus, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on the local treasury resulting from lower revenue collection given the scenario of economic slowdown caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in each canton—and in the country in general—by authorizing municipalities to transfer a greater portion of their revenues to those fixed and permanent expenses, such as the compensation of their employees, to the detriment of expenses dedicated to municipal services. Therefore, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, given the foreseeable decrease in municipal resources, the appealed provisions authorize them to allocate a greater portion of these to the current expenditure that funds, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of municipal public services. The petitioner, as was said, first questions the reasonableness of the precepts, as they promote an increase in the administrative spending of municipalities while at the same time their revenues will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which would ultimately affect the fiscal deficit of the Central Government, as they argue that the only way for the territorial administrations to cover their expenses under those circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which would ultimately be responsible for them in the event of default on their financial obligations. Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to recall the jurisprudential line of this high Court in that it is necessary to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportion is not evident, since, otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective appreciation or value judgment of the petitioner. In this regard, the petitioner does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate their projections to a sufficient degree to determine the constitutional invalidity of the challenged provisions. Nor do they consider that, under the terms of Article 121, subsection 15), of the Political Constitution, loans seeking the State's guarantee must pass through the control of the Legislative Assembly to be approved.

Nevertheless, regarding the lack of technical reports, every time the legislator introduces changes to legislation that go beyond opportunity and convenience in their circumstantial assessment of the public interest, by venturing into specialized areas of knowledge, such as those contained in the contested rules, which relate to finance and economic sciences, where the percentage of administrative expenses that may be taken from revenue collected through the real estate tax is quadrupled and the percentage of all ordinary revenues that may be used for the general expenses of municipal management is raised to one half, despite the broad freedom of legislative configuration that characterizes their work, this does not exempt them from technically justifying or substantiating decisions of that nature at the time of approving a law, by mandate of the aforementioned constitutional principle of reasonableness. The plaintiff states that even though the approval of Articles 4 and 5 was marked by the exceptional situation the country is experiencing due to the pandemic, with their validity being conditioned to the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the requirement for technical basis remained necessary.

For the Constitutional Chamber, before examining the grievances raised by the plaintiff, it is unavoidable to refer to the legislative history that accounts for the procedure for the approval of Law No. 9848, to subsequently examine the content of the rules and the alleged absence of technical reasonableness criticized by the plaintiff.

Regarding the legislative procedure In this regard, it is established that bill 21,922 was introduced into the legislative process on April 13, 2020, a few days after the national state of emergency was declared due to the health situation caused by COVID-19 (Executive Decree No. 42227-MP-S of March 16, 2020). The bill was signed by forty legislators from various legislative factions and has the following statement of purpose:

"Following the national state of emergency, declared by the Executive Branch, according to Decree No. 42227-MP-S dated March 16 of this year, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty generated in the Costa Rican population by the effects occurring in various economic sectors and those that could arise in the future, it is urgently necessary to take measures from Local Governments, as these are the governmental institutions closest to the population, and through which actions can be generated from various areas to counteract this effect that the pandemic may generate on the Costa Rican economy.

State responses for citizens and businesses have begun to emerge through new legislation and administrative provisions, including tax moratoriums, reduction of working hours for the private sector, facilities regarding insurance and employer-employee contributions to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. However, these actions must be complemented at the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first-response roles such as the coordination of Local Emergency Committees (part of the National Risk Management System according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of essential services such as citizen security through municipal police forces, solid waste collection (recolección de residuos), and water supply systems in some cases.

Therefore, both the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI) conducted an analysis based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and data available from Local Governments in the Public Budget Information System (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the revenue and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures.

It should be emphasized that Local Governments manage a total budget of approximately 590 billion colones, an amount that represents 2% of the national budget, but for the 2020 period, it suffered a 1% decrease compared to the year 2019. According to the history of the last 7 years, budgets have had gradual growth, of which an average of 96.7% of what was budgeted has entered municipal coffers and an average of 73.1% of the funds have been executed.

Of the total revenue received, 21.4% (₡126.087 billion) corresponds to the property tax on real estate (impuesto sobre la propiedad de bienes inmuebles), this being its largest source of revenue; 20% (₡118.074 billion) from professional licenses, commercial licenses, and other permits; 17.8% (₡105.110 billion) are capital transfers from the Central Government that are used almost entirely for the maintenance of the Cantonal Road Network; and 15.4% (₡90.879 billion) for environmental sanitation services.

In turn, the behavior of expenditures is distributed as 40% (₡235.949 billion) for the remuneration item, 20.2% (₡119.324 billion) for municipal services, 18.3% (₡108.090 billion) for the purchase of durable goods, and 8.9% (₡52.747 billion) in current transfers. Compared to the year 2019, all had a growth rate of 5%, except for the durable goods item.

Based on the above information, and upon conducting a consensus analysis between the contributions provided by the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL), the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), the Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), Mayors, Deputy Mayors and Intendentes, as well as the consideration of other initiatives already presented, among which are the following bills: No. 21,842, 'AUTHORIZATION OF A TAX MORATORIUM AND EXEMPTION FOR THE MUNICIPAL REGIME AND DISTRICT MUNICIPAL COUNCILS', Bill No. 21,889, 'GENERAL LAW OF AUTHORIZATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPTION AND ADJUSTMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19', Bill No. 21,898 'MUNICIPAL RELIEF LAW FOR TAXPAYERS OF EACH MUNICIPALITY WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE COVID-19 CRISIS', and Bill No. 21,896 'LAW TO MITIGATE THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND ENSURE THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL REGIME IN DECLARATIONS OF NATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY'. The working group formed on municipal matters analyzed and developed this legislative initiative that we submit for consideration by the Deputies of the Republic, which will help to make the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the reactivation of the economy." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

As can be deduced from the foregoing, the bill arises in a specific context in order to offer responses and facilities to citizens and businesses from the local level, based on the premise that the work of the municipalities —the administration of local interests and services in each canton, according to Article 169 of the Political Constitution— is vital in emergency periods, as they carry out a contingency and first-response role to the needs of the residents and, in addition, in many cases they are in charge of providing basic public services within the framework of a health emergency —solid waste collection (recolección de residuos), cleaning of public roads, municipal security, provision of water supply systems, oversight of the ASADAS, etc.—.

Thus, the bill in question establishes two purposes. On one hand, to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities in order to guarantee the continuity of all municipal services, including, among them, the exceptional and temporary measures contemplated in Articles 4 and 5 of the law, related to authorizing municipal governments to exceed limits established in previous regulations. Such authorization aims to regularly meet the general administration expenses and the provision of municipal services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and integrated solid waste management (gestión integral de los residuos). On the other hand, to promote a series of municipal actions to support the taxpayer regarding the payment of municipal taxes. For example, a moratorium on the payment of municipal business licenses (patentes); municipal moratoriums for fees, public prices, and municipal services; discounts of up to fifty percent (50%) on amounts charged for the lease of premises, sections, or stalls in municipal markets; the authorization for municipalities to offer their taxpayers, during 2020, payment arrangements for a term of up to twenty-four months, so they can pay their obligations for fees, public prices, municipal services, taxes, and concession fees; the possibility of suspending the requirement to have municipal licenses for the exercise of certain lucrative activities, etc.

Now, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff, it is established that the bill in question was the product of a consensus analysis with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), who conducted an analysis based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and data available from Local Governments in the Public Budget Information System (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the revenue and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. It is also affirmed that the Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), mayors, deputy mayors, and intendentes participated in the proposal, and in a working group of the Asamblea Legislativa, this project and other parliamentary proposals were evaluated to finally form the initiative under examination.

In relation to the procedure of the bill, it is established that, once presented, the text was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta on April 15, 2020. Subsequently, the Legislative Plenary applied a motion to dispense with procedures so that the bill could be examined by the Plenary itself. Indeed, in the session of April 28, 2020, the order motion was approved with the unanimous vote of forty-seven legislators present (see folio 403 of the digital copy of the legislative file). In addition, the proposition had the support of the Executive Branch, as the bill was convened during the extraordinary sessions of the Asamblea Legislativa (see Executive Decree No. 42302-MP).

Furthermore, from the careful review of the legislative file, it is established that the bill was submitted for institutional consultation to all municipalities in the national territory, and several municipal agreements supporting the initiative are included in the file.

It is also established that the bill was submitted for consultation to the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Registro Nacional, the Defensoría de los Habitantes, and the CGR.

Additionally, the file contains the institutional opinion of the CGR rendered through official letter No. DFOE-DL-0567 of April 15, 2020 (see folios 186-196 of the digital copy of the legislative file), from which the following objections are extracted:

"That is, the bill proposes to authorize Local Governments to exceed spending limits based on certain sources of resources.

Particularly, the percentage of the real estate tax allocated for administrative expenses has been increased from 10% to 40%; and an additional 10% is added, reaching up to 50%, of ordinary municipal revenues, which could be allocated to meet the general administration expenses of the Municipality, thus expanding the availability of resources that already had a legal limit.

However, as in the previous comment, it is considered that it is not being contemplated that the measure extended to two economic exercise periods, 2020 and 2021, could erode revenue and empty the content of the purposes for which the limit was imposed, which could cause an excess and denature that legal maximum that had been established and for which the administrations must already have adjusted their projections for sustainable financial management.

Likewise, the motivation for increasing administrative or general expenses in attending to the emergency is not found, given that the priority would be to direct resources toward care services and to a lesser degree toward items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings could even occur due to social distancing and teleworking measures.

Finally, regarding the possibility of creating new urgent and temporary positions, it is important to emphasize that these may only occur insofar as they are related to the emergency or the provision of the municipal services specified in the article, but it is also opportune that they have adequate justification, proportional and consistent with the emergency, to thus avoid any type of unnecessary expenditure of resources." Subsequently, the motion filed by legislator Floria Segreda Sagot and other deputies is recorded, a motion that was approved, so that the project would be consulted with the following institutions: Ministerio de Hacienda, Budgetary Authority of the Ministerio de Hacienda, CGR, municipalities of the country, district municipal councils, Administrative Board of the Registro Nacional, state banks, and Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal and Ministerio de Salud.

In the session of April 30, 2020, legislator María José Corrales made the following remarks (folios 534-535 of the digital legislative file):

"Thank you, Mr. President; good afternoon to all, colleagues.

I will be very concise in the words I will mention regarding this project. Likewise, Mr. President, I will send you my speech via WhatsApp so you can attach it to the minutes.

I wish to remind all of you and the citizenry that what is not being heard is that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a completely different course. And with it, municipalities throughout the country have also had to take exceptional actions to carry out the actions that correspond to them by Municipal Code, but also to collaborate with the Executive Branch in each of the solutions or facilities that can be given precisely to the citizenry in the face of the pandemic.

This is the reason why this file was presented and the working group was formed, which has been a truly extraordinary group, a group that has allowed working as a team, working together, listening precisely to that sector affected in the municipal regime, and also listening to the taxpayer who needs precisely the facilities to carry on with their daily life.

The bill has undergone consensus-based, technically reviewed modifications, both by ANAI and by the Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Asamblea Legislativa who have considered their observations opportune. And it is for this reason that today a substitute text has been approved in this Plenary that incorporates many of them and also the other additional motions that were approved." Furthermore, legislator Catalina Montero Gómez stated the following:

"Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a bit long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental.

With the participation of multiple actors, deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with great responsibility, but also involving those key actors: mayors' offices, intendentes, the Unión de Gobierno Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and some institutions of the Executive Branch.

I believe we have managed to gather those concerns to the maximum extent, and the majority of those concerns have been recorded in this project text to improve, refine, so that what this law says is what is appropriate, is extremely clear at the time of applying it, and that it truly is an opportunity to support taxpayers and to strengthen the financial management of municipalities.

We are absolutely clear that municipalities and district municipal councils have and will have an essential mission during and after the pandemic, because they are the leading institutions in the reconstruction processes, the development and economic reactivation processes in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the rest of the Costa Rican institutions.

I want to thank this working group for this responsible work and all the fellow deputies who have contributed to enrich this bill that we are finally approving in the first debate. Many thanks to everyone." Certainly, there were oppositions that are evident from the statements of legislator Yorleny León Marchena, who opposed the categorical exclusion of municipalities from the application of the fiscal rule (see folios 537 et seq.).

Also, the participation of deputy Paola Valladares Rosado, who, when justifying her vote, makes a call for expenditure restraint by the municipalities:

"Good afternoon, thank you, Mr. President, colleagues.

As someone passionate about the municipal regime, I am clearly aware of the need at this moment to support from the legislative plenary the situation that the municipalities are going through, on the understanding that the municipalities mostly depend on their revenues and in this moment of crisis that the country and the entire world are going through, the economic situation has evidently caused that collection to decline, and additionally, an effort is being made so that the municipalities can attend to the needs of each one of their taxpayers, and in this case, that is why the project provides a moratorium so that we can attend to that need and maintain, to the extent possible, that chain and that generation of jobs and the economies at the cantonal levels.

I sincerely thank the working group that made a very great effort; we are clear that it is a bit complex to legislate for 82 completely different realities where the economic situation in and of itself in each of them differs from the others. What we are trying to do in this project is to guarantee a cash flow so that the municipalities can help and provide relief to their business license holders and taxpayers, but at the same time survive so that at the end of the year, each of their officials can receive..., or rather, guarantee their salaries, in this case, and survive in attending to the emergency without canceling the service provisions, where evidently solid waste collection (recolección de basura), many of them that are in charge of municipal water supply systems, and consequently also road cleaning and solid waste collection (recolección de basura), are guaranteed.

However, I believe it is important to remind you, just as I have done in the working groups, I want to state it this afternoon, that the most important thing is that they begin to review their budgets for the purpose of expenditure restraint.

It is necessary that each one of those financial areas have made that revenue projection and adjust everything that is an operational plan accordingly. I know that unfortunately, there are still municipalities that continue processing procurements, whether in road programs or other programs, without being aware that the resource is becoming increasingly limited for their management.

So, I make a call in this sense to each of the municipalities to be responsible for expenditure restraint, starting from the reduction of representation expenses, overtime, and evidently, as limited in the project, the creation of positions.

So, this is a way from the legislative branch to collaborate with the municipalities, but we also need to see that this task is done responsibly so that from all places we are in that collaboration." Likewise, legislator José María Villalta Flórez-Estrada stated the following reflections:

"Thank you, Mr. President, fellow deputies.

I will gladly and with great satisfaction vote for this bill that we have worked on for many weeks, in a working group with representation from practically all legislative factions, representation from local governments, from the Unión de Gobiernos Locales, from IFAM, to support our local governments in the way they are facing and will have to face the emergency we are experiencing.

What does this bill propose? It proposes three things fundamentally (...)

At the same time—and this is the second component of this bill—a series of measures are established to make flexible those rules that regulate the functioning of municipal budgets, so that the municipalities can face the significant reduction in their revenues, which this emergency is causing, not as a consequence of this law.

The fact is that today the municipalities' revenues are significantly reducing, as a result of the fact that many people are not being able to pay their obligations to the municipalities.

Thus, rules are established to exempt municipalities for two years from certain contributions they must make to the Central Government, or they are allowed to use surpluses, transfer them to those expenses, those needs where they are having, where they are going to have, a deficit situation. The rules on the Real Estate Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles), which today has a cap on the resources that can be allocated to administrative expenses, are made flexible.

But if revenues from business licenses or municipal licenses plummet, municipalities will have to see how they redistribute their budgets to be able to cover operating expenses and maintain the functioning of the essential services that municipalities provide: water supply systems, solid waste collection (recolección de basura), security, the various municipal services.

But in addition, municipalities, as deputy Montero Gómez said, are key actors in attending to the emergency. Therefore, they cannot be weakened; their revenues cannot suddenly plummet and we not give them the flexibility we are giving them with this bill so that they can finance those expenses that would rather be increasing in the framework of the emergency." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Subsequently, in the session of April 30, 2020, after extensive analysis, the bill was approved in the first debate with forty-one votes in favor and three against.

It is also recorded that the updated text was consulted with the Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Salud, CGR, state banks, Budgetary Authority of the Ministerio de Hacienda, Administrative Board of the Registro Nacional, municipalities, and district municipal councils (see folios 615 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file).

To that end, the second report of the CGR rendered through official letter No. DFOE-DL-0842 of May 13, 2020 (see folios 908 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file), contains the following:

"Articles 4 and 5:

Regarding these articles, it is requested that exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed: first, the limit set in Articles 3 of the LIBI and its reforms and allocate up to 40% for administrative expenses from the amount corresponding to them from the real estate tax, and increase the limit set in Article 102 of the Municipal Code, and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal revenues for administrative expenses. Indicating also that these resources can be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated solid waste management (gestión integral de residuos), but not for the creation of new positions.

The application of less strict limits such as those proposed in this bill could lead to a significant increase in the administrative expenses of municipalities. If the budget period of the year 2019 is used as an example, the application of the new proposed limits would have generated an additional spending space of ₡90.357 billion, which represents 75% of the total administrative expense executed during that year.

Given the above, it is reiterated that the project does not contain the motivation for increasing administrative or general expenses in attending to the emergency, given that the priority in this context would be to direct resources toward care services and to a lesser degree toward items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings could even occur. In relation to this point, the Contraloría estimated that the municipal sector could generate savings exceeding ₡21 billion due only to the social distancing and teleworking measures that have been implemented, which can be complemented with other savings measures or improvements and efficiency that local governments could implement." After weighing such criteria and conducting subsequent consultations, the bill was brought to a vote in the second debate on May 19, 2020. On that occasion, for example, deputy Gourzong Cerdas stated the following conclusions:

"Thanks to the high level of responsibility of the Unión de Gobiernos Locales, the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, ANAI, the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, IFAM, mayors, deputy mayors, and intendentes, and the working group formed by deputies of this Asamblea Legislativa that analyzed and developed this legislative initiative, I give my absolute support to this project that will allow the flexibility of municipal resource management to face the consequences of this emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be vital in the reactivation of the economy and that follows the route of not generating more unemployment in the different cantons of this country." Additionally, other legislators took the floor, stating the following reflections. For example, deputy María José Corrales Chacón:

"Thank you, Mr. President.

Good afternoon, colleagues.

Along the same lines as deputy Montero Gómez, it is of utmost importance to advance with the processing of this project and cast the vote in the second debate, for which reason I will be sending you my dissertation to be attached to the minutes. (see annex three) I only want to mention one point that I do think is important for all Costa Ricans to hear aloud.

Regarding the criticisms and oppositions that this project has suffered, mainly from the Contraloría General de la República, which has inaccurately mentioned that there would be an impact on state public finances with the approval of this project, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule in the municipalities will not reduce the Central Government's fiscal deficit; what the Central Government contributes to local governments represents just 1.09% of the Republic's budget, and practically all of this percentage is directed to investment in the cantonal road network.

For this reason, I also think it is important to demonstrate that today the country's municipalities already have caps that precisely prevent them from making excessive expenses, but above all, they also already have what is called the golden rule, the rule that prevents them from exaggerated growth; for that reason, to make it evident that the municipalities need and urgently require, more than anything, in the situation we are facing as a country, the approval of this file.

Please, Mr. President, that the text I am going to send your advisor be attached so that it can be appended to the minutes.

Thank you." And also deputy Patricia Villegas Álvarez:

"Thank you, Mr. President; good afternoon to all.

In reality, my speech is short, but I do not want to let it go unnoticed.

I was a member of the working group for bill 21.922, emphatically supporting the local taxpayer during this health crisis, using our local governments as a liaison, which are the institutions close to our cantonal population, our communal population, our neighborhoods of our beloved country, is today a reality through this approval in its second debate.

Local governments are the entities responsible for executing actions that contribute to alleviating, to a certain extent, the aftermath of this pandemic we are facing in our national economy; it is the municipalities that play liaison and coordination roles with the local emergency committees.

In the negotiation table, deputies from different political forces worked arduously, with the inclusion of the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, carrying out analyses based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República on the 2020 municipal budgets, and the data available from local governments in the public budget information system, to provide a broad overview of the income and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. Making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, avoiding institutional and constitutional paralysis, are fundamental axes of this present law.

Today, today here we are responding to the citizens and I ask, with all due respect, for the definitive support for the vote in this second debate.

Thank you very much”.

Finally, with the presence of forty-eight legislators, the vote in the second debate of file 21.922 began, and it was approved with forty-three votes.

Regarding the content and effects of the challenged Articles 4 and 5 In the first place, it should be noted that the challenged Article 4 authorized, exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, that municipalities and district municipal councils could exceed the limit set forth in Article 3 of the Ley sobre Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles and have the possibility of allocating up to forty percent (40%) of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) to administrative expenses. Said norm also expressly provided that such resources could be used in the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. However, the norm warned that this exceptional possibility could not be used for the creation of new municipal positions. The precept alluded to—Article 3 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, No. 7509—orders the following:

“Article 3.- Competence of the municipalities For the purposes of this tax, the municipalities shall have the character of tax administration. They shall be responsible for carrying out valuations of real estate, invoicing, collecting, and processing judicial collection, and administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. They may allocate up to ten percent (10%) of the amount corresponding to them for this tax for administrative expenses. (…)”.

That is to say, of the amount collected from the tax established in favor of the municipalities on the real estate of the canton, it is ordinarily authorized that up to 10% of the amount corresponding to them from that tax be used for administrative expenses. The norm challenged in this action establishes exceptionally and temporarily that municipalities could use up to 40% of the amount received from such taxes, to supply regular municipal expenses and other essential basic services.

Meanwhile, Article 5 authorizes that, exceptionally and only for the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils could exceed the limit set forth in Article 102 of the Código Municipal and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administration expenses. The norm also authorized that these ordinary municipal revenues be used in the provision of essential public services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. The provision was emphatic that said authorization does not imply the possibility of creating new municipal positions. As can be seen, the norm alludes to what is regulated in Article 102 of the Código Municipal, which is framed within the budgetary legal provisions governing local governments. The current precept orders the following:

“Article 102.- Municipalities may not allocate more than forty percent (40%) of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administration expenses.

General administration expenses are the current expenditures that do not imply direct costs of municipal services”.

That is to say, the usual situation is that, by virtue of the cited provision, local governments cannot use more than 40% of their revenues to cover general administration expenses. Consequently, the provision challenged in this action authorized raising said amount by 10% so that municipalities could count on up to 50% of their ordinary revenues, to cover general municipal administration expenses, or, to use them to finance vital municipal services.

Constitutionality analysis After assessing the arguments of unconstitutionality, the reports of the authorities that appeared in this process, the legislative file, and the precedents of this Constitutional Court, it is concluded that the questioned norms are not unconstitutional.

In the first place, contrary to what was alleged by the claimant and what was reported by the PGR in the sense that a specific technical study is lacking, it must be highlighted, according to the legislative background detailed supra, that the legislative proposal in question was not devoid of a specific technical analysis. On the contrary, as was recorded, the legislative proposal—backed by a qualified majority of the organ and of the Executive Branch itself—was preceded by an analysis of the municipal budgets and the income and expenditure projections of the accounts that sustain municipal finances, carried out by the UNGL and the ANAI. Various municipal governments and the IFAM itself also participated in the initiative in working groups carried out and promoted by the legislators. This is textually, and in synthesis, derived from the statement of motives of the bill:

“The working group formed on municipal matters analyzed and developed this present legislative initiative that we submit for consideration by the Deputies of the Republic, which will contribute to making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the reactivation of the economy”.

The fact that the bill emerged as a parliamentary initiative from these “working groups” is significant because it evidences that it was nourished by the knowledge, the fruit of experience, of the members of the Unión de Gobiernos Locales, the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, the IFAM, mayors, and the legislators themselves. The inputs that these people were able to contribute to the working groups—all their experience on the different tasks entrusted to local governments and the reality of their functioning—points to the fact that it was not an arbitrary, hasty, or capricious decision. The foregoing, especially, if one takes into account that the legislation was adopted as a temporary measure for the purpose of attending to a conjunctural situation that affected both the citizens themselves and the administrative machinery of the municipalities, under a particularly uncertain and unprecedented forecast.

Likewise, as was accredited, despite the fact that a motion to waive procedures was applied to the file, the bill was indeed publicized and was widely consulted with various public authorities that contributed their inputs and opinions regarding the bill. As was verified, the bill was consulted with all the municipalities and district municipal councils of the country, with the CGR, the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Registro Nacional, state banks, the Ministerio de Salud, among other authorities. As was recorded in the transcription of several legislative interventions during the legislative approval process, it was evidenced that the bill was agreed upon with various actors in broad working groups and that led a parliamentary majority to approve this bill under the consideration that, by reducing the usual revenues from municipal patents or licenses, municipal corporations were going to have to find a way to make the aforementioned rules more flexible in order to be able to cover operating expenses and maintain essential municipal services.

As already pointed out previously, the bill revolved around two essential axes: authorizing a series of facilities for the local taxpayer in order to face the consequences of the pandemic (reduction of capacity limits, temporary closures, etc.) and trying to reactivate the economy with such facilities and moratoriums. But, on the other hand, such facilities—authorizations to apply a moratorium for the payment of municipal patents or licenses (Article 12); municipal moratorium for the cancellation of fees, public prices, and municipal services (Article 13); reduction of municipal lease rates (Article 14), and other types of payment arrangements (Article 16)—necessarily implied a reduction in the usual revenues of municipal corporations that motivated the legislator to establish the exceptional authorizations provided for in Articles 4 and 5 of the challenged law. The foregoing for the purpose that, through these extraordinary measures, the facilities for local taxpayers could be guaranteed, but also that the municipality could avail itself of the indicated resources (property taxes and ordinary municipal revenues), to finance the regular functioning of the municipality, without authorizing the growth of the municipal payroll and that, in addition, such amounts could be used for the satisfaction of essential services for the benefit of all residents and the population in general.

As has been noted, all these variables were assessed by the legislators—including the disagreements of the CGR—, without it being seen that their decision was arbitrary or harmful to constitutional rights. In that sense, it is necessary to recall that it is true that legislative decisions cannot lack adequate substantiation, but that does not imply that the Legislative Branch—a democratic and deliberative organ—can be forced to submit to a single technical option, but rather that its decisions be the result of an analysis of reasonableness and proportionality and that it involves the technical actors who can provide sufficient arguments to adopt a particular legislative decision.

In the case at hand, according to what could be verified, from the very bosom of the Asamblea Legislativa arose the law proposal, which was agreed upon with other national economic policy actors and, even, as was accredited, it was a legislative proposal that had the support of the Executive Branch regarding the timely summoning of the bill for discussion during the extraordinary sessions period of Congress. Furthermore, the disagreements of the CGR were weighed. However, the Asamblea Legislativa opted to approve this exceptional regulation for the purpose of ensuring flexibility in case there was a financial breakdown due to the decrease in the collection of municipal revenues.

The jurisprudential lines of this Court must be emphasized, in the sense that this Chamber has rejected that "irremediably, all the decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study" because that goes against the very nature of Parliament, in the sense that the legislator has discretion, within the framework of its right to free configuration, in order to weigh and adopt the norms it deems necessary. If it were a strictly technical organ that must adhere to a single criterion, the very nature of legislative activity would be meaningless. Regarding the free configuration of the legislator, this Chamber has said the following:

"The Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract character, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Constitución Política), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this organ has, before a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In this way, the legislator can create public organs, assign them functions or competences, develop diverse institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems opportune and convenient for a specific historical, social, economic, or political conjuncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, since the legislative function cannot be redirected to the simple execution of the Constitution. The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as a limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion usually are more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since, in such matter, the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, whereas, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects". (Decision No. 2003-05090) Attending to the free configuration of the legislator, in a matter such as the one examined in the specific case, the Asamblea Legislativa was in a position to attend to the reality presented to it in various ways, without adhering to a technical criterion in the strict sense, but rather to reason its decision, as was accredited. In this regard, one can consult, for example, Decision No. 2018-000230, through which the Chamber warned that technical studies are not necessary in all instances of Asamblea Legislativa intervention:

"The Chamber rejects that, irremediably, all the decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since this situation would annul the discretion of the legislative organ, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (verbigratia in environmental matters) or when the matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness". (Criterion reiterated in advisory opinion No. 2020-015542).

Likewise, one can consult advisory opinion No. 2020-010160, in which the Chamber resolved some doubts of constitutionality regarding the bill on the regulation of the figure of "usury" in which this Tribunal warned of the following:

"That is to say, given the hypothetical nature of the possible harms with unreasonable and disproportionate effects on a segment of the population or the economy, this Chamber considers that it cannot, under these conditions, validly limit the margin of initiative of the legislator, who is the competent one and obligated to seek a solution to the problem of the omission of the usury rate. The contrary, in these circumstances, would be harmful to the independence of parliament. At this stage, where the proposal has not deployed effects such that one could assess—with objective and certain criteria—whether the result will indeed be negative, capable of stripping the norm of reasonableness and proportionality—due to its effects—, the Chamber considers that it must reserve a broader margin for the legislator, than the one the Chamber has in matters of subsequent judicial control through the procedure of action of unconstitutionality, where it can indeed assess the unconstitutional effects of specific legislation. Without the norm having produced effects that are objectively measurable and with differing technical studies in the file, we are still in the field of hypothesis, and the Chamber would be wrong, without certain evidence, to limit the exercise of constitutional powers proper to the highest organ of popular representation, after a democratic debate spanning more than a decade, without there being clear studies demonstrating that the norm will be disproportionate in its effects".

In said advisory opinion, Justice Castillo Víquez set forth some additional reasons that serve to illustrate the thesis of the Chamber:

"A matter of great depth that is raised in this question—regarding the alleged violation of the principle of technical reasonableness—is whether it is possible to exercise a kind of control of discretion over legislative or parliamentary activity. As is well known, control of discretion is a technique that arises to verify whether the activity of the Public Administration conforms or not to the univocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience. Ergo, the exercise of discretionary powers is subject to the general principles of Law, and to the control of determining facts and indeterminate legal concepts, as well as the regulated elements of the administrative act, by the Judge of contentious-administrative matters. It is evident, and as far as I remember, in no part of the world has this nonsense been reached, that this control be applied to parliamentary activity; this type of control could never be exercised over legislative or parliamentary activity, because Parliament would be reduced to its minimum expression, and a nuclear element of the republican system would be dislocated. What is possible is to exercise a control of constitutionality over parliamentary activity and, consequently, over the final parliamentary act, be it a legislative decree or agreement, for violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality when they are linked to a fundamental right and, consequently, empty its essential content. The foregoing means, in plain language, that the legislator, in the exercise of the power to legislate, the power of self-regulation, of political control, of political direction, etc., has a broad margin of discretion, a kind of legislative policy, for which it can opt for a multiplicity of variables within the framework of a plural, democratic organ, where political agreement constitutes a necessary channel, especially when in a constitutional period or legislature, a political party or the governing party lacks a parliamentary majority. That margin of discretion is exempt from the control of constitutionality, since, if this were not so, the Constitutional Court would come to substitute the will of Parliament, causing a severe dislocation to the democratic system, especially significantly harming the principle of separation of functions. Having said the foregoing, Parliament has broad freedom to follow a specific technical criterion or depart from it, provided that it does not thereby affect the essential content of a fundamental right and, consequently, also breach the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as this Tribunal has established regarding the impact on the environment, where it has required, for the Law to pass constitutional scrutiny, that there be technical studies or the respective compensations demonstrating that there is no harm to the environment. The foregoing is even more true when in the discussion of a bill there are different technical criteria or these are contradictory to each other. In these cases, the legislator is not bound to follow a specific technical criterion, but rather may well adopt a political decision taking into consideration other elements of judgment. In other words, it is not possible to declare a Law unconstitutional because it departed from one or several technical criteria—this is proper to a control over the activity of the Public Administration—, except when such omission entails the violation of the essential content of a fundamental right".

Even in matters of disposition of public funds, although an adequate substantiation of the decision is necessary in order to determine its reasonableness, this Chamber has not demanded technical studies as strict as the one demanded by the claimant. For example, in the legislative consultation for the Ley Marco de Empleo Público, Resolution No. 2021-017098, this Chamber resolved the following:

"Lack of cost study: They indicate that, at the time of incorporating these leaves and permits into the bill, no cost study or source of resources to cover them was taken into consideration. In this regard, one must not lose sight of the fact that the legislator has a broad margin of legislative discretion in the formation of laws; a criterion that has been sustained on repeated occasions by the Constitutional Chamber, noting that, in principle, it is not strictly necessary that all legislative decisions must have technical or financial studies. Thus, for example, in Decision No. 2018-000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018, this Tribunal indicated that: '[t]he Chamber rejects that, irremediably, all the decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since this situation would annul the discretion of the legislative organ, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (verbigratia in environmental matters) or when the matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness'. Thus, not all the decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study because this situation would annul the discretion of the legislative organ, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation, declaring that technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (verbigratia in environmental matters) or when the matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness (criterion reiterated, among others, in Decision No. 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019). In this matter, the Chamber has made reference to the principle of discretion or free configuration of the legislator, mentioned in Decision No. 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, according to which, the Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract character, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Constitución Política), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power; margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter that has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this organ has—limited only by the Law of the Constitution—, before a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (criterion reiterated, among others, in Decision No. 2016-010244 of 9:05 a.m. on July 20, 2016, and recently in Decision 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020). Under this perspective, the consultants are not correct in considering that the leaves and permits contained in these Articles 39 to 41 are unconstitutional for the sole fact that, according to their saying, they are not justified in cost studies or in the corresponding sources of resources that allow covering them. On the other hand, the consultants did not provide sufficient elements of judgment to allow affirming that the consulted norms cause per se, an increase in costs that would put State finances at risk, or that there is a lack of sources of resources for their implementation. Due to these circumstances, the argument raised regarding this point is rejected".

(…)

"Absence of objective reasons or technical criteria to broaden maternity leave grounds: Regarding Article 42, which contemplates the extension of maternity leave, the consultants argue that it is a numeral that contains a series of cases in which that extension is applicable (premature birth, children with severe disability and/or chronic diseases, and multiple births); however, they consider that the bill does not contemplate the objective reasons or the technical or scientific criteria that justify including those grounds and not others. In this regard, it is again observed that the disagreement lies in the exercise of the free configuration or discretion of the legislator and, at its core, the opposition of the consultants lies again in that technical-scientific criteria were not taken into account to define the cases under which the referred leave could be extended. In this regard, what was indicated in Decision No. 2018-000230 must be reiterated, through which the Constitutional Chamber rejects that, irremediably, all the decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study since that, as has been said, would annul the discretion of the legislative organ, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation. In this sense, it is not accredited that, in this case, technical studies were necessary, so the alleged unconstitutionality is discarded".

"Lack of technical studies regarding paternity leave: Regarding the paternity leave of Article 41 of the bill, which grants a leave with full pay for one calendar month, after the day of birth or at the time of adoption of the minor, the consultants complain that the file does not indicate—again—the technical studies or criteria that indicate the cost that granting this leave would have for the State or the source of financing. In this regard, indisputably, on this point the Chamber observes that the arguments of the consultants are reiterated in relation to what was analyzed supra in point a); consequently, it refers to what was indicated there and reiterates that it is a questioning that does not have the virtue of violating the Law of the Constitution, so the formulated claim is rejected".

(…)

The Chamber finds no vices of unconstitutionality in the aspects questioned regarding Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the consulted bill, as it is a matter of legislative discretion, since the mandatory consultation with the CCSS was fulfilled, and since there are no elements to determine that the legislator should have had, in this case, a technical study beforehand. (Highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Finally, in advisory opinion No. 2022-025307, the majority of the Chamber considered that "demanding a technical study in any instance of exercising the legislative function would empty the content of the principle of free configuration of the legislator".

In accordance with the aforementioned background, there is no unavoidable duty of the Asamblea Legislativa to submit to technical studies for any norms it must dictate, but rather to duly justify its decision on criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in light of the pertinent inputs that are brought to the legislative discussion (in this case, the knowledge derived from experience in the exercise of various functions in the municipal sphere, assessment of the municipal budgets, etc.). Said criteria were reasonably met in the specific case which, as has been said, occurred in an unprecedented and particularly uncertain framework, in which it was justified to legislate without demanding exact data, which the conjuncture made it impossible to specify.

Thus, the alleged unconstitutionality defect is dismissed on this point.

In another vein, the claimant argues that the rules in question will cause the administrative expenditure of the municipalities to grow disproportionately, with the potential consequences of affecting public services and even leading to indebtedness that will ultimately impact public finances and the wallets of all taxpayers. On this point, this Chamber finds that the President of the Legislative Assembly is correct in that the challenged provisions ‒arts. 4 and 5 of Law No. 9848‒ do not entail an order or an incentive for municipalities to increase their administrative expenditure, but rather an exceptional possibility to dispose of other resources to finance their regular operation, based on the premise that as a consequence of the pandemic and the relief measures and moratoriums contemplated, they will receive less money in items or revenues that would normally finance their operations ‒licenses, patents, etc.‒. Furthermore, it is necessary to highlight that the possibility of obtaining extraordinary financing from other municipal resources was ordered on a temporary and exceptional basis (budgetary years 2020 and 2021), under the express condition that it must not be used to expand the municipal payroll and, furthermore, that it can be used for the provision of essential services. With this, it is verified that the legislative decision is aimed not only at making the municipality's budgetary resources more flexible, but also at safeguarding the continuity of public services, especially those of the municipalities, which are responsible for the administration of local interests and services in each canton (art. 169 of the Political Constitution). In the second place, this Chamber considers that the PGR is correct in that the claimant's assertions ‒regarding possible indebtedness and the need to resort to public credit‒ are mere speculation and hypothetical assessments that were not accompanied by solid studies that could substantiate his claims. In this regard, the PGR states the following:

“Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to recall the jurisprudential line of this high Court to the effect that it is necessary to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportionality is not evident, because otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective appreciation or value judgment of the claimant (…)

In this respect, the appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a degree sufficient to determine the constitutional invalidity of the challenged provisions, nor does he consider that, pursuant to article 121, subsection 15), of the Political Constitution, loans intended to have the State's guarantee must pass through the control of the Legislative Assembly in order to be approved.” In other words, the unconstitutionality action refers to mere hypothetical scenarios ‒exponential growth of public spending, detriment to public services, and an increase in the tax burden‒ that are also not properly grounded in serious and real economic projections (which is precisely the omission the claimant reproaches). Therefore, in the terms in which the action was filed, without solid arguments or proof, and barely a month after the law's approval, it does not allow for the accreditation of an alleged unreasonableness that has threatened the constitutional principles invoked by the claimant. Likewise, the PGR is correct when it points out that the assumptions made in the brief filing the unconstitutionality action omit to contemplate the rules established in the Political Constitution regarding the approval of loans (arts. 121 subsection 15 and 174).

Without detracting from the foregoing, it is also important to emphasize that the rules questioned here do not entail the annulment of other constitutional and legal provisions that seek to ensure the balance of municipal budgets and prevent, in practice, the pernicious effects that concern the claimant. In this sense, it must be stressed that municipal corporations are subject to the principles of budgetary balance, sustainability, transparency, and responsibility derived from the provisions of art. 176 of the Political Constitution, which orders the following:

“Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides.

The ordinary budget of the Republic shall include all probable income and all authorized expenses of the Public Administration, for the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenses exceed that of probable income.

The Public Administration, in the broad sense, shall observe the preceding rules when issuing its budgets.

The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a one-year term, from January first to December thirty-first.” And, for this purpose, the CGR is concurrently responsible for ensuring that the municipalities annually comply with such constitutional mandates. That is why art. 175 of the Political Constitution establishes that the validity of municipal budgets depends on the approval of the Contraloría, a body responsible for supervising their proper execution. In which case, it is also pertinent to cite the rules of the Municipal Code that regulate the subject of municipal budgets, which are subject to the control of the CGR, but also to specific and concrete rules that prevent them from disproportionately increasing public spending:

“Art. 106. - The ordinary and extraordinary budgets of the municipalities must be approved by the Contraloría General de la República. The ordinary budget must be submitted no later than September 30 of each year, and the extraordinary budgets within fifteen days following their approval. Both deadlines are non-extendable.

All budgets sent to the Contraloría shall be accompanied by a copy of the minutes of the sessions in which they were approved. The complete budget must be transcribed therein; they shall be signed by the secretary and countersigned by the municipal mayor; furthermore, the Annual Operating Plan, the Municipal Development Plan, and the certification from the municipal treasurer regarding the corresponding budgetary backing must be included.

Art. 107. - If the ordinary budget is not submitted to the Contraloría General de la República in a timely manner, the previous year's budget shall govern for the next period, except for expenditures that, by their nature, are only effective in the referenced year. In any case, the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities that may result from such omission must be determined. To resolve this situation, the Council must hear and approve the appropriate extraordinary budgets.

Art. 108. - Once the budget is approved by the Contraloría General de la República, the original shall be sent to the municipal secretariat, where it will be kept in custody, and a copy shall be sent to the municipal mayor, the internal accountant or auditor, each of the incumbent council members, as well as to other offices as agreed by the Council or indicated by the regulation.

Art. 109. - Within the same budgeted program, modifications to current budgets shall proceed when agreed upon by the Council. A vote of two-thirds of its members shall be required for the Council to approve the modification from one program to another.

The ordinary budget may not be modified to increase salaries or create new positions, except in cases of readjustments due to the application of the minimum wage decree or due to collective labor conventions or agreements, in the first case requiring new employees due to the expansion of services or the provision of a new one, in the second case.

Readjustments produced by the conclusion of collective labor conventions or agreements, or any others that imply modifying ordinary budgets, shall only proceed when it is proven, during the processing of disputes or pertinent proceedings, that the cost of living has increased substantially according to the price indexes of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and the General Directorate of Statistics and Censuses.

Art. 110. - Ordinary fixed expenses may only be financed with ordinary income of the municipality.

Extraordinary income may only be obtained through extraordinary budgets, which may be used to reinforce existing or new programs. These budgets may be agreed upon in ordinary or extraordinary sessions.

Art. 111. - The Contraloría General de la República must approve or reject the budget projects it receives. It shall reject them within a period of one month from receipt, in a reasoned resolution, and the approval may be partial or total, due to violation of the legal system or lack of resources.

It may introduce modifications to the projects only with the consent of the Council.

Art. 112. - Municipalities may not make appointments or acquire financial commitments if there is no budget sub-item that covers the expenditure or when the approved sub-item is exhausted or proves insufficient; nor may they pay charges belonging to another expenditure sub-item.

Violation of the foregoing shall be grounds for suspension of the responsible official or employee, and recurrence shall be cause for dismissal.” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

All the preceding provisions remain in force and are of unavoidable application for both municipal governments and the CGR, in order to ensure that municipal budgets are formulated and executed responsibly. Therefore, the application of the exceptions provided for in the challenged rules must be carried out in light of the general mandates that bind the aforementioned authorities with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the order and balance of municipal and national finances.

In summary, the questioned precepts do not entail or imply an incentive to increase public spending but are rather tools of flexibility for the municipalities, in a context of a health emergency and support for local taxpayers, that enable the extension of the established limit regarding municipal taxes and ordinary income for the payment of ordinary expenses of the municipal administration and essential municipal services. The foregoing, it goes without saying, is subject to and conditional upon constitutional principles and the controls that the CGR is responsible for exercising in the approval of municipal budgets.

As a corollary to the considerations made, this Court concludes that the defects of unconstitutionality attributed to the challenged rules have not been substantiated.

V.- FOR ABUNDANT CAUTION. Drafted by Justice Garita Navarro.

From a general standpoint, rules intended to regulate aspects related to the financial regime of public entities, including matters pertaining to financing schemes and spending regimes, under ordinary conditions, require technical analyses that determine the details and content of the proposed regulation. Precisely, these analyses make it possible to define the reasonableness and proportionality of the income, expenditure, and spending allocation regime, allowing for the harmonization of the set of principles and regulations applicable to each of these components of the financial and budgetary structure, both at the level of Constitutional Law (arts. 18, 33, 45, 50, 176, among others) and the applicable legal rules (principles of Law No. 8131 and No. 7635). For example, the modification of a tax rate for a specific burden, as a financing mechanism, requires technical, economic, and accounting approaches to determine that this reformulation does not constitute an illegitimate shift of the contributive duty. Only from this previous analysis could one infer the non-confiscatory nature, progressivity, or equality of such an imposition. The same can be noted regarding percentage allocations of spending, as well as its destination in terms of current or capital expenditure, since the increase or decrease in each of the budget items or accounting accounts included in the budget requires a balance of probable income and spending destination, according to planning schemes, as well as compliance with legal duties regarding the destination of spending or service provision duties.

However, strictly speaking, the law under question was enacted within an exceptional and special context, which is the declaration of the Covid-19 pandemic. Such a historical circumstance cannot and must not be disregarded in this analysis, as it introduces a variable that is non-existent under the normal conditions of the control of reasonableness and technical proportionality of this type of regulation. Looking at this context, the law allows for an increase in the percentage allocated to covering the administrative costs of local entities regarding income derived from the property tax (impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles) (Law No. 7509), whose article 3 sets this limit‒under normal conditions‒at 10% of that income, and in the municipal budget, whose ordinary limit is 40% ‒art. 102 of Law No. 7794, the Municipal Code‒, to allow a temporary ceiling of 50% for the periods 2020 and 2021. This relative increase of 30% and 10% respectively, in each of those sources, is based on the evident risk inherent to the pandemic, of the budgetary financial impact on income items associated with tax burdens that weigh on the residents. Faced with this risk, considering that administrative expenses are operational costs of a current nature, and that they represent budgetary commitments that could not be avoided by the local entity, at its core, the challenged legal rule permits a higher percentage allocation of these revenues to finance that type of expense and, in this manner, prevent a budgetary imbalance or a mismatch in the income regime that would force the imposition of additional burdens on citizens, or the reduction of remuneration expenses or operational expenses. This last option would imply a deterioration in the service provision regime of the public entity, given the reduction of resources allocated to the ordinary activities of the Administration, as well as those directed to paying the staff available for public service, while simultaneously reducing the salary income of that human resource. Certainly, the redirection of spending could generate a decrease in the levels of provision of public services such as water, cemeteries, garbage collection, among others; however, the same regulation enables the allocation of these resources to such purposes.

Faced with this panorama, it is clear that the rule was enacted within the context of a regime of urgency and necessity, a theory which, in light of articles 219 and 226 of the General Law of Public Administration, makes it possible and enables the adoption of singular and exceptional measures to safeguard the public interest, which, in this case, materializes in the continuity of public service through contingent financial health measures. Otherwise, the strict application of the spending allocation percentages, as set out in those rules (10% and 40%), coupled with the reduction of the local entity's ordinary income, would place the principle of financial balance and sustainability emanating from article 176 of the Political Constitution, concerning the public spending regime, in high vulnerability. In this way, faced with the exceptional situation, the authorities chose to resort to mechanisms of social participation, characteristic of a democratic order, through which, with the integration of diverse social actors in working groups, contingency measures and temporary adjustments were determined, which were considered reasonable and convenient to react to the financial risk situation anticipated based on the economic impact generated by said pandemic.

In those terms, note that the questioned rules do not project an increase in municipal spending, but rather a temporary permissibility of internal reallocation within the spending regime, in order to raise the already mentioned limits, to be able to adjust administrative functioning to the costing that the impact on tax revenues could generate. Faced with this historical contingency, it was unlikely to have objective parameters that would allow for a rigorous scientific definition of what measure of increase in spending allocation was necessary. Precisely, the mechanism adopted (working groups) is deemed a legitimate means to react to the immediate consequences of the pandemic on the plane of municipal tax revenues. Furthermore, although a technical unreasonableness in the adopted measures is alleged, the claimant does not provide any element that allows for the analysis he proposes. This Chamber has been consistent regarding the need to provide objective parameters to be able to define the concurrence or not of a technical bias in the adoption of this type of rule. The insufficiency in this matter subjects this Court to speculation about the content of the questioned rule and imposes on it the burden of making comparisons and assessments without having the parameters or minimum elements to do so. Hence, it finds no merit in ordering the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulation.

VI.- CONCLUSION.

This Court concludes that the claimant made an improper invocation of the content of arts. 1 and 11 of the Law to support the local taxpayer, and reinforce the financial management of the municipalities, given the national emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic, No. 9848. The foregoing, given that, as was verified, the allegations of unconstitutionality revolved around the parliamentary proposal and not around the terms in which the rules were approved by the Legislative Assembly. As stated supra, there are sufficient elements to summarily dismiss the action regarding such articles. However, in view of the procedural stage, the Chamber declares them without merit.

Regarding arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged legislation, this Chamber dismissed the claims of unconstitutionality raised.

Therefore, it is necessary to declare the unconstitutionality action without merit.

VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are advised that if they have provided any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device, or one produced by new technologies, these must be collected from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not collected within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.-

POR TANTO:

The action is declared without merit.- Nombre318 .

President . Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V. José Roberto Garita N.

. Nombre4702 .

1 </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">It is public and notorious that when a Municipality contracts a loan, the lending entity always demands a State guarantee. Therefore, if the Municipality defaults, the Ministry of Finance will have to honor the debt. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">The impact of municipal loans would increase the debt service for the national government, which would, in turn, increase the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels" </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The petitioner develops the scope of the content of the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">principle of financial equilibrium</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, based on resolution no. 2006-5979 of the Constitutional Chamber. Said principle alludes to the sustainability of the State's fiscal accounts as a whole, and is applicable to all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold. The Chamber's jurisprudence has established that the aims of the centralized and decentralized Public Administration are not disconnected from the budgetary rules contained in the Political Constitution, which is exemplified in resolution no. 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Court. The principle of financial equilibrium pursues sound fiscal administration and aims for the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"The expenditures of public institutions, without exception, shall adjust to their probable revenues, which cover both their own revenues and those they receive via transfers from the Executive Branch. There must be, therefore, a reasonable and fiscally healthy relationship between the annual increase in expenditures and the probable revenues for each fiscal year of all state institutions". </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Furthermore, all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold, have the obligation to adjust the growth of their budgets to the percentage of expenditures set annually by the Executive Branch, and the budget is a technical and organizing instrument of the state economy. On the other hand, it refers to the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule, which it considers a derivation of the principle of financial equilibrium, insofar as, it estimates, it is a principle oriented towards limiting the growth of current expenditures.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">After presenting a typology of constitutional principles, it considers that the fiscal rule, although originating in a law, actually echoes principles and values contained in the Political Constitution. It indicates the following: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"Precisely, the fiscal rule, although expressly enshrined only at the legal level, is in fact a constitutional principle derived from the constitutional norm that enshrines the principle of budgetary equilibrium". </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The fiscal rule is a constitutional principle that has the normative force of such principles and, therefore, integrates the parameter of constitutional validity in our context. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In another vein, the petitioner refers to the scope of the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">constitutional principle of technical reasonableness</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, which it considers developed by the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and cites resolution no. 1997-8724 as an example. All laws must conform to the requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and said principle demands that laws must adhere to strict technical parameters, for otherwise fundamental rights and society in general are harmed. When the technical standard indicates that only one decision is possible, its adoption becomes mandatory, and it points out in this regard Art. 16 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), which it considers extrapolable to the issuance of legal norms. It invokes, regarding the principle of reasonableness, resolutions numbers 2012-0266 and 2019-12745 of this Constitutional Chamber. It concludes that both administrative acts and laws must be enacted with absolute respect for the laws of science and technique, for otherwise they become absolutely null. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Now then, regarding </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">arts. 1, 4, and 5</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> of the challenged law, the petitioner argues that they violate the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness. The logic of this set of provisions is perverse. If the first effect of the pandemic that municipal administrations will feel is a drop in revenues, the solution proposed of increasing spending seems unreasonable and nonsensical. When we add the effect produced by the application of arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged regulations to the exemption from the fiscal rule, administrative spending will grow disproportionately, rather than the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality. Municipal administrative structures will become more expensive, without this translating into an improvement of the services that the local government must provide to its citizens. The norms would allow a disproportionate growth of administrative spending and not of that necessary for the municipalities to perform properly. The foregoing will foster an additional burden on the citizens of the cantons and eventually on all Costa Ricans, since the costs of municipal public services will increase, or the transfers that the State makes to the municipalities must increase. The legal norms that are the object of this process lack elements of technical reasonableness to justify them. It could even increase public credit, with a state guarantee, which could risk the fiscal deficit of the Central Government. It details the following </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"In the present case, there are no technical studies supporting the challenged norms, and rather, these violate elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique, and are therefore vitiated by unconstitutionality". </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">On the other hand, it indicates that </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">art. 11</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> of the law in question is contrary to the constitutional principles of budgetary equilibrium and the fiscal rule. It points out that the law lacks technical foundation and that it establishes a permanent exclusion for municipal corporations, despite having been enacted to address a specific situation. It insists that given the drop in revenues that the municipalities will experience, the pattern of indebtedness will accelerate, which will generate difficulty in the payment of credits and in turn, due to the guarantees already mentioned, will negatively affect the fiscal deficit. Only the validity of the fiscal rule would prevent municipalities from going into debt beyond their real possibilities of healthy revenues, given that in that case their budgets could not grow freely as authorized by the challenged norm. It affirms that "the challenged norm violates the constitutional principle of the fiscal rule". It requests that arts. 1, 4, 5, and 11 be declared unconstitutional. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">2.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> Through the resolution of </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">9:24 hrs. on June 16, 2020</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, the Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber admitted the present action of unconstitutionality against arts. 1, 4, 5, and 11 of Law No. 9848. A hearing was granted to the Attorney General of the Republic, the President of the Legislative Assembly, and the Minister of Finance, and the publication of the corresponding edicts was ordered.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">3.- </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">On </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">June 16, 2020</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, the Secretariat of this Chamber issued the necessary commissions for the purpose of ordering the publication of the edicts mandated by art. 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, LJC) in the Boletín Judicial. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">4.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The edicts referred to in art. 81, second paragraph, of the LJC were published in numbers 120, 121, and 122 of the Boletín Judicial on </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">June 24, 25, and 26, 2020</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">5.- </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">By brief received on July 8, 2020, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase">Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, in his capacity as </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase">President of the Legislative Assembly,</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> submitted a report. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">As </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">background</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, it indicates that the norm originated in the Legislative Assembly as part of the measures to confront the Covid-19 pandemic. It mentions that the bill was the product of a dialogue effort with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It explains the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"In that sense, legislative file 21.922, later Law 9848, formed part of the proposals that were born within the Legislative Branch, and was the product of the analysis and discussion that took place in a working group established as a response to the emergency, to develop the topic of municipal affairs, in coordination with authorities from that sector, such as the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI). This initiative was presented by 40 deputies from all political factions, and as indicated in the statement of motives, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">that law "will contribute to making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the Municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for economic reactivation</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">". </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">(The highlighting does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">On the merits</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Now then, regarding the constitutionality objections, it refutes the idea that the norm obligates the central government to transfer the totality of the resources to the municipalities, for which it reproduces art. 5 of Law No. 8114. What it obligates is that the transfer of resources be done in a timely manner, as it has been a frequent concern of the municipalities that the resources were transferred at the end of the budget year and that this hindered their execution. It clarifies that the obligation concerning such a transfer is actually found in Law 8114 and points out the following: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"In this way, when the challenged Article 1 points out that the transfer must be made "according to the percentage provided in Article 5 of Law 8114", it only reiterates the existing norm, such that this provision does not render nugatory the provisions established in the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, LFFP), No. 9635, of December 3, 2018, in relation to the obligation the government would have to make transfers under the different scenarios of the fiscal rule" </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It reinforces the foregoing with the content of the provisions in arts. 15 and 25 of Law No. 9635. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It points out that perhaps the petitioner's confusion originates from the fact that the original bill did contemplate the obligation to make said transfer, but the law formally promulgated and in force does not. It attaches the following table illustrating the point:</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Bill No. 21.922</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Law No. 9848</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">of the totality</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> of the resources to the municipalities, as provided in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, “Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency”, of July 4, 2015 to the municipalities. To carry out said transfer, each municipality may only be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget, or, in case of rejection by the comptroller entity, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the comptroller has available for this purpose.</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">according to the percentage</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> provided in Article 5 of Law 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities. To carry out said transfer, each municipality must be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget, or, in case of rejection by the comptroller entity, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) has available for this purpose, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">as well as the financial programming of the budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministry of Finance</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">*What is highlighted corresponds to the report.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">During the legislative debate, the base text was subject to modifications. It highlights that art. 1 of the text finally approved adds a provision requiring municipalities to have the transfer to be received incorporated into their budgets, as well as the budgetary financial programming for its execution; that is, it urges them to carry out better planning in the use of resources, as a counterpart to the obligation of the National Treasury to disburse funds in a timely manner. Note, moreover, that the obligated subject referred to in the challenged article is the National Treasury, which simply executes the transfer of already budgeted resources, meaning it is not within its scope of action to define the amount to be budgeted; a task that corresponds to the Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional or the Ministry of Finance more generally. It concludes in the following sense: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"Given the above, it is concluded that Law No. 9848 does not expressly introduce an obligation to transfer the totality of the resources referred to in Article 5 of Law No. 8114 to the municipalities, as that provision is already contemplated in said Law 8114; with which the petitioner's arguments based on this assumption lack foundation to request its declaration of unconstitutionality". </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Regarding </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">art. 4</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> of the challenged legal norm, the report details that the petitioner considers that an increase in the percentage of the tax could be dedicated to financing administrative expenses and that this would imply an increase in expenses, which it considers mistaken. It points out that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a certain expense, but that it does not authorize an increase in said expense. If the entirety of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that the municipalities are preparing to face a sensitive reduction in their ordinary revenues; this for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity. This will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the business license tax (impuesto de patentes), in addition to the fact that delinquencies in all taxes will increase as an effect of the pandemic, including the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles); b) The objected law itself provides a series of measures that lead to a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: the authorizations to apply a moratorium on municipal business licenses or permits (art.12); municipal moratorium on fees, public prices, and municipal services (art. 13); reduction of municipal rental rates (art.14), and; payment arrangements (art.16). The foregoing means that, in a scenario where the percentage established in art. 3 of the Law on Property Tax is maintained, municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to finance the same level of administrative spending, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness on the part of local governments, an aspect that so concerns the petitioner. It should be taken into account that administrative spending, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term; therefore, not having this authorization could lead to municipalities lacking resources to finance their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided in challenged art. 4, would allow for supplementing that revenue deficiency to finance administrative spending. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said spending, so it is incorrect to affirm, as the petitioner does, that the norm authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. Another reason why the premise from which the petitioner starts is invalid relates to the fact that the challenged norm also allows the use of resources generated by lifting the established limit to finance the provision of municipal water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services; key areas to address given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. In this regard, the statement of motives for legislative file 21.922 pointed out that:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic">"However, these actions must be complemented from the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first-response roles such as the coordination of Local Emergency Committees (part of the National Risk Management System according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of indispensable services like citizen security through municipal police forces, waste collection, and aqueducts in some cases". </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">It follows from the above that what the petitioner indicates is also not true regarding that the norm could negatively impact the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of the virus that causes Covid-19.

Note that the exceptional lifting of the percentage will apply in the 2020 and 2021 budget years; furthermore, the resources may not be used for the creation of new positions, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to increasing administrative expenses as the claimant presupposes, and for which a comparative table between the bill and the finally approved law is presented:

<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Bill No. 21.922</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Law No. 9848</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in article 3 of Law No. 7509, “Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles” and its amendments, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">for</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax. These additional resources may be used, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:line-through">including for the creation of new positions</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">, provided they are urgent and temporary and are related to the emergency or the provision of municipal services of water, security, waste collection, or cemeteries.</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in article 3 of Law 7509, Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">to</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax. These resources may also be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; however, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">they may not be used for the creation of new positions.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">*The highlighted text corresponds to the report.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table> Regarding art. 5 of the law subject to this acción de inconstitucionalidad, it reiterates what has already been said with respect to the previous article, as it considers that there is an error of assessment regarding the scope of the provisions of art. 5, since what is proposed there is not an authorization to increase administrative spending, but rather an increase in the authorization of the resources that may be used for that purpose. The lifting of the ceiling allows financing the existing expenses of the municipalities and thus prevents them from incurring financial non-compliance. It insists on the temporary nature of the measure and on the fact that no new positions can be created for these purposes. Precisely as a result of the economic projections provided by the claimant, in relation to the imminent decrease in the collection of municipal entities, it is necessary to lift the indicated ceilings, in order to properly finance their operation. It refutes the claimant's argument related to the impact on municipal services, by indicating that the rule expressly establishes that water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services may be financed through these mechanisms.

On the other hand, in relation to art. 11 of the challenged law, it is pointed out that the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) seeks to establish a limit on the growth of current expenditure, which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to the gross domestic product. What the fiscal rule seeks is to establish a limit on the growth of current expenditure, which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to the GDP; for its part, the challenged art. 11 seeks to exclude local governments from the scope of application of this rule, but not in its entirety. As the claimant mentions, municipal spending does not directly form part of the calculation of the fiscal deficit, since the latter only refers to the relationship of income and expenditure of the Central Government, with which it maintains that from that perspective there would be no direct impact on the Central Government deficit or the level of indebtedness. The reform included in art. 1 of the challenged Law No. 9848 does not establish an obligation to transfer resources, as the claimant presupposes, but in addition to that, said law adds, in this art. 11, that the exception to the fiscal rule will not be applicable to those resources of the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils, coming from transfers made by the Central Government. That is, the items of the municipal budget financed with these resources would be subject to the fiscal rule, whereby the rule does not compromise the possibility of meeting the goal established by said rule, according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government. It highlights that the claimant does not refer to this important provision, which again gives rise to the assumption that the acción was filed based on the base text and not on what was finally enacted, this because the text did not include the commented provision. It attaches the following table:

<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Bill No. 21.922</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Law No. 9848</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to article 6 of Title IV “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República”, Chapter I “Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios”, of Law No. 9635 “Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas” of December 4, 2018, the text of which shall read: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: […] </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">d) The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">e) The Cantonal Sports Committees</span></p></td><td style="width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">ARTICLE 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to article 6 of Title IV "Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República", Chapter I "Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios", of Law 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, of December 3, 2018. The texts are as follows: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: [.] </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">d) The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">However, this title shall be applicable to those resources in the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils, coming from transfers made by the central Government. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">e) The cantonal sports committees.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">*The highlighted text corresponds to the report. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table> The claimant states that the situation of the debt contracted by local governments is also worrying, especially in view of the expected drop in income that the municipalities will experience, with which it is expected that the indebtedness pattern will accelerate. It indicates that the drop in income would hinder the eventual repayment of the credits contracted, given that when a municipality contracts a loan, the lending entity always requires the State's guarantee, therefore, if the municipality defaults, then the Ministry of Finance will have to honor the debt. It affirms that the non-payment of municipal loans would increase the debt service for the national government, which would increase, in turn, the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels. In relation to the foregoing, it only points out that the argument includes a series of assumptions or presumptions that need not necessarily materialize and that also would not necessarily occur as a result of the validity of the challenged law. It adds that, based on the data from the budget results of the municipalities for the year 2019 included in the Sistema de Información sobre Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP) of the CGR, of the 81 municipalities (at that time), only seven showed a budget deficit, so the rest show a surplus, which for forty-two of them exceeds one billion colones.

**On the Principle of Technical Reasonableness** Furthermore, regarding the criticism of technical reasonableness, the President of the Asamblea Legislativa mentions that the claimant starts from mistaken interpretations, since the increase in administrative expenses is never authorized, and considers that the challenged rule adheres to criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality, and proceeds to transcribe the interventions of deputies in this regard, within the framework of the discussion of the bill. The following is reported:

*“As has been demonstrated throughout this report, the claimant's arguments are based on mistaken interpretations of the rule, since an increase in administrative expenses is never authorized, as he points out. Precisely, considering the reduction in income that is foreseen and given the possibility that administrative expenses become defunded, what the rule intends is to maintain a healthy fiscal balance in the municipalities, allowing them to allocate a greater percentage of tax revenue to meet these needs. It should not be overlooked that the Law also considers the possibility of financing the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management with these resources, and that they may not be used for the creation of new positions; in addition to the fact that the rule is of a temporary nature, which confirms that the intention is not to increase administrative 13 spending. From the foregoing, it follows that elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique are not violated, and that the rules are not vitiated by unconstitutionality. Likewise, as has been mentioned, the law under challenge was analyzed in the working groups that were implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, therefore criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were taken into account throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate. This is on record, for example, in the intervention of Deputy Corrales Chacón, when she stated the following:* *“Remind all of you and the citizenry listening to us that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a completely different tone for us. And with that, the municipalities throughout the country have also had to take exceptional actions to be able to carry out the actions that correspond to them by the Municipal Code, but also to be able to collaborate with the Executive Branch in each of the solutions or facilities that can be given precisely to the citizenry in the face of the pandemic. The reason for this was that this expediente was presented and that the working group was formed, which has been truly an extraordinary group, a group that has allowed working as a team, working together, listening precisely to that sector affected by the municipal regime and also listening to the taxpayer who needs precisely those facilities to be able to carry on with their daily life. The bill has undergone consensual modifications, technically reviewed, both by ANAI, and by the National Union of Local Governments, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Asamblea Legislativa who have considered their observations opportune. And the reason for this is that today a substitute text has been approved in this Plenary that incorporates many of them and also the other additional motions that were approved. Make it clear to the citizenry that the main changes that have been made are eliminating the possibility of creating new positions in the municipalities, also the Sicop issue. A quite important wording has been made that allows those small municipalities to always carry out their contracting through this law, but facilitating the forms of payment. And on the other hand, also certain modifications mainly so that the municipalities can have that flexibility in spending that they require in the face of the pandemic.”* *In the same sense, Deputy Montero Gómez, in her intervention, details aspects of the dialogue process that took place, both among all the parliamentary fractions, and with the actors involved in the municipal process and the role that the Municipalities play in the proper course given to adequate public service, in the midst of the health emergency of the pandemic. Her words were the following:* *“Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a little long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental. With the participation of multiple actors, deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with a great deal of responsibility, but also involving those key actors: Nombre4700, intendencias, the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and some institutions of the Executive Branch. I believe we have managed to gather to the maximum those concerns and the majority of those concerns have been recorded in this text of the bill to improve, to refine, so that what this law says is what corresponds, is extremely clear at the time of applying it, and so that this really becomes an opportunity to support the taxpayer and to strengthen the financial management of the municipalities. We are very clear that the municipalities and district municipal councils have and will have an essential mission during and after the pandemic, because they are the leading institutions of the reconstruction, development, and economic reactivation processes in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the institution, the rest of the Costa Rican institutional framework.”* *Those interventions by the deputies, cited as an example, allow, in turn, to refute the claimant's allegation regarding the lack of technical studies. This, because, as recognized by the Constitutional Court, although their existence is desirable, what is relevant is that what should be expected of the legislator is that when making estimates about the future and the effect of the rule they approve, they should have been guided by an objectively acceptable assessment of the information at their disposal, as recorded in resolution No. 5374-2003 of June 20, 2003.”* In that sense, the challenged rules are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the claimant points out, since their validity is limited to a prudential time, which has been deemed necessary for the municipalities to attend to the needs resulting from the pandemic and also to provide the necessary support for the first steps towards the economic reactivation of the country's cantons.

**On the Principles of Financial Equilibrium and the Fiscal Rule** Regarding the principles of financial equilibrium and the fiscal rule (regla fiscal), the reporting party indicates that the statement of motives expressly alleged that the legislative intention was to make municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, but in general to contribute to economic reactivation.

On the other hand, the budget is an exercise that has to do with the orientation of Government policy. In that sense, it is the Executive Branch that prepares and plans the budget for each year, taking into account the constitutional and legal obligations it must fulfill, as well as the investment corresponding to the axes it will develop according to the National Development Plan. The Legislative Branch has, within the budget dynamics, the power to approve or disapprove the expenditure forecast and propose some modifications. That is why the parliamentary exercise is limited by established constitutional and legal rules, to determine the equilibrium of the budget at a global level. In that direction, the Legislative Branch has adopted a series of decisions to enrich the legal system with the intention of cleaning up public finances, and there is still much to do, but it is necessary to sustain the necessary constitutional obligations that make us constitute a Rule of Law. Reflection that coincides with what was stated by the Sala Constitucional, in advisory opinion No. 2018-019511, regarding the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances, 9635. The following is reported:

*“Remedies, which, in the case under analysis, were explained by the legislators at the time of casting their votes, such as, for example, Deputy Gourzong Cerdas, when he stated that:* *The national emergency declared by the Executive Branch, according to decree number 42227-MP-S which is a product of the Covid-19 pandemic, directly affects the normal development of the municipalities. And, indeed, Costa Rican families are experiencing difficulties in their income, especially those who are in the private sectors and in the informal sector, families who have to face debts with payments of municipal patents, merchants and owners of different public services, which directly affect the income of local governments. That is the reason why, as deputies of the Republic, we must act with agility, in aid, according to our competencies, and legislate efficiently and timely in the knowledge and approval of this bill number 21,922, called Law to Support the Local Taxpayer and Reinforce the Financial Management of the Municipalities in the Face of the National Emergency due to the Covid 19 Pandemic. And it is, for this reason, it is because of the covid-19 pandemic, that municipal revenues and their budgets are affected.* This bill of law definitively comes to alleviate the situation of municipal administrations in the use of the specific surplus, to make specific allocations more flexible, and to expand the margin of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) established in the Municipal Code, specifically in article 102, as well as in Law 7509, Real Property Tax Law, to authorize a higher percentage for administrative spending; that is, it seeks the adequate municipal functioning and the efficient attention of the services that the municipality provides." Finally, along the same lines, Deputy Corrales Chacón refers to the arguments pointed out by the plaintiff regarding the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) and clarified the following:

"Regarding the criticisms and opposition that this project has suffered, mainly from the Comptroller General of the Republic, which has inaccurately mentioned that there would be an impact on state public finances with the approval of this project, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) in the municipalities is not going to reduce the fiscal deficit of the central Government; what the central Government contributes to local governments represents barely one point zero nine percent of the Republic's budget and practically all of this percentage is directed to investment in the cantonal road network." For this reason, it also seems important to me to put in evidence that already today the country's municipalities have caps that precisely prevent them from making excessive expenditures, but above all also that they already have what is called the golden rule, the rule that prevents them from exaggerated growth; for that reason, to make evident that the municipalities need and are urgently required, more than anything, in the situation we are facing as a country, the approval of this file.

He insists that the approved norm meets the requirements of legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality between the means and the end achieved. He requests that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit. He attaches the certification of the appointment of the President of the Legislative Assembly and, as an annex, a table of the executed amounts of income and expenditures for the year 2019 of the different municipal corporations.

**6.-** By written submission received on July 9, 2020, **Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández** rendered his report, in his capacity as **ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC.** **On admissibility** The sufficient standing of the plaintiff is concurred with under the protection of the application of norms that do not directly affect the legal sphere of any individual person, but whose consequences are of general and indirect scope across society as a whole. Likewise, the challenged norms relate to the sound management of public spending and the correct execution of public funds (resolutions 4409 and 9992 of 2004 from the Constitutional Chamber).

**Preliminary question** The consolidation of this proceeding with those under files 19-013318-0007-CO and 19-0011540-0007-CO is necessary to avoid the issuance of contradictory judgments. In those unconstitutionality actions, the constitutional validity of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) is questioned, because through a law, the constitutionally conferred administrative autonomy of municipalities and public universities is limited. The positions expressed by the plaintiffs in those other proceedings, in relation to the one expressed in this file, are mutually exclusive, such that upholding one could imply denying the other.

In the event that the Constitutional Chamber does not deem the foregoing appropriate, what was mentioned in the previously cited reports is largely reiterated regarding the concept, nature, and legal basis of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal).

**On the merits** In countries such as the United States and some in the European Union, different fiscal rules were enacted to confront the economic crisis of the previous decade, and on occasions such norms acquired constitutional rank. With this, the budgetary margin of action of different institutions and territorial organizations was limited, as is the case with Federated States, Autonomous Communities, and Local Governments.

It is relevant to consider the principle of budgetary equilibrium, contained in article 176 of the Fundamental Norm and recently developed in resolution 2018-19511 of the Constitutional Chamber and article 5, subsection c) of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets. Under this constitutional mandate, applying to all organs and entities of the Public Administration, regardless of their degree of constitutional autonomy, budgeted expenditures may not exceed probable revenues (resolution 2018-19511 and article 100 of the Municipal Code). Furthermore, article 9 of Law 9635 contains the definition of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal), which was formulated based on a rule of current spending. Having been issued by law, the Legislative Assembly is not bound by it, and thus could legislate to the contrary or nuance its scope (as occurred with the law that is the subject of the present action). The following is stated regarding said rule:

*Article 9 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances leans toward this latter type, that is, a fiscal rule (regla fiscal) related to spending that limits, as was said, the growth of current spending, subject to a proportion of the average growth of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the central Government debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus conceived, given its implications, said canon is more related to the principle of financial sustainability than to the principle of budgetary equilibrium, as we shall see further on.* The plaintiff considers that the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) has a constitutional basis, derived from the principle of financial equilibrium as a mechanism to limit the growth of current spending, in line with resolution 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Chamber. The following is concluded:

*Based on the foregoing, we must reiterate that, if the Constitutional Chamber considers that the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal), in accordance with the terms of judgment no. 2018-19511, is sufficient to recognize it as having a transversal nature over the entire conglomerate of public Administrations, capable of binding the budgetary formulation of municipalities without undermining their autonomy, the legislator's decision to exempt them from its application, through the reform made by article 11 of Law no. 9848 to article 6 of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances, would be unconstitutional, as it would be legislating in contradiction of a canon understood to be contained within the provisions of article 176 of the Political Constitution.* Now then, the plaintiff's arguments regarding financial equilibrium deal with hypothetical assumptions that are not verifiable *per se*. It cannot be affirmed that the inclusion of municipalities and district municipal councils within the exceptions of article 6 of Law No. 9635 necessarily implies a violation of the principle of financial equilibrium; even article 11, subsection d) itself establishes that this exclusion is partial, since the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) does apply to transfers made by the central government. The disapplication of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) would have to be analyzed from the perspective of the constitutional principle of fiscal sustainability, which was not invoked by the petitioner.

In another line of thought, articles 4, 5, and 11 of the challenged law are analyzed from the perspective of the **principles of fiscal sustainability and technical reasonableness**:

In this regard, the following is explained:

*"As can be extracted from the legislative history of Law No. 9848, in view of file No. 21.922 which documents its parliamentary processing, challenged articles 4 and 5 connect with the purpose of 'making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency' (folio 4 of the explanatory memorandum, see also, especially, folios 542 to 545 and 556 and 557 of the debate in the Plenary); by allowing municipalities and district municipal councils a high margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of article 4, it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the real property tax for administrative expenditures, compared to the initial 10% provided for in article 3 of the Real Property Tax Law (No. 7509); while, in the case of article 5, an additional 10% is added to the original 40% established in article 102 of the Municipal Code of ordinary municipal revenues that they could allocate to meet the general administrative expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept as 'the current outlays that do not involve direct costs of municipal services.'* *Thus, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on local finances resulting from lower revenue collection in the scenario of economic slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in each canton – and in the country in general –; authorizing municipalities to transfer a larger portion of their income to these fixed and permanent expenses, such as the remuneration of their officials, to the detriment of expenditures dedicated to municipal services. Therefore, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, in light of the foreseeable reduction in municipal resources, the appealed provisions authorize them to allocate a larger portion of these to the current spending that finances, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of municipal public services.* *The plaintiff, as stated, first questions the reasonableness of the precepts, by promoting the increase in administrative spending of the municipalities when at the same time their revenues will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which ultimately would impact the fiscal deficit of the central Government, since he suggests that the only way for territorial Administrations to cover their outlays in those circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which would ultimately be responsible for these in the event of non-compliance with their financial obligations."* The questioning made by the plaintiff in pointing out that promoting the increase in administrative spending impacts the fiscal deficit of the Central Government due to its condition as guarantor is merely hypothetical. Additionally, according to the jurisprudential line of the Constitutional Chamber, some element of judgment is necessary to determine the reasonableness of a norm when its disproportion is alleged and this is not evident (resolution 5236-1999). The petitioner does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree to determine the invalidity of the challenged provisions.

Despite all the foregoing, indeed, technical studies for the increases from 10% to 40% for administrative expenditures originating from the collection of the real property tax, nor for the increase from 40% to 50% of ordinary revenues to meet general administrative expenses (articles 4 and 5 of the challenged law) do not appear in legislative file No. 21922. The Comptroller General of the Republic referred to the legislative proposal at the time, through official letters DFOE-DL-0567 and DFOE-DL-0842, and determined the absence of the already mentioned technical studies. The legislator, in the case of specialized matters ‒such as the one referred to in this unconstitutionality action‒ is not exempt from justifying or technically substantiating the decision-making that involves the enactment of a law, based on the principle of reasonableness and articles 9 and 11 of the Political Constitution. Technical studies that support the decision adopted through the law that is the subject of this action, nor an analysis of the impact that exceeding the modified budgetary limits will have on the budgetary stability and financial sustainability of the municipalities and district municipal councils, do not appear in the legislative file. The following is pointed out:

*We are of the opinion that this lack of technical substantiation transcends the determination of the State's economic policy as a matter of government, and that we are no longer in the realm of assumptions, as it is possible to verify that the increase in said percentages that would be allocated to administrative or general administration expenses of the territorial corporations, and, eventually, to the provision of municipal water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services – since the challenged norms leave it as something optional – lacks any type of technical justification or substantiation (…).* Although articles 4 and 5 of the challenged Law establish an exceptional validity for the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years, technical substantiation is equally required. Said absence casts doubt on the reasonableness of the norms and their compatibility with the principle of fiscal sustainability contained in article 176 of the Political Constitution. In that sense, the Spanish experience, in relation to the principle of financial sustainability, is linked to control over debt levels. Applying such consideration to the challenged articles brings back the problem concerning the absence of technical studies to support the scope at the level of public finances.

On the other hand, reference is made to the **constitutionality of article 1 of the law that is the subject of the present action**:

The aforementioned article 5 refers to the allocation of revenues from the collection of the single fuel tax, whose letter b) specifies that 22.25% of 48.60% of its annual product must be transferred, through the National Treasury, in favor of the municipalities for the attention of the cantonal road network. In accordance with the legislative history of Law No. 9848, the intention of the challenged precept is to streamline the procedure for the transfer of resources with the mere approval of the municipal budget by the controlling body or an adjusted budget in case of rejection. However, on the issues that concern the petitioner, it did not suppose any normative innovation, as it basically comes to reiterate what is already provided by the referred article 5. b) of Law No. 8114, which imposes a specific allocation on a percentage of what is collected through the single fuel tax to be transferred by the National Treasury to the municipalities for the conservation and development of the cantonal road network. With this, a greater obligation would not be established for the Executive Branch than how it has been handling those transfers since the approval of the cited law approximately two decades ago. In this regard, it must be remembered what was said by this Chamber in vote No. 2018-19511 in that the criteria for budgetary allocation, as well as each one of the particularities related to the control of its growth, constitute the State's economic policy and a matter of government.

Rather, the constitutional problem could lie in the linkage that the ordinary legislator is making of the budgetary legislator in the disposition of public resources or, more precisely, in matters of spending and its allocation, in accordance with the budgetary principles of universality and non-affectation of resources, derived from article 185 of the Political Constitution.

In that sense, although it is true that for some time the position of this high Court was oscillating on the issue of specific allocations, lately the stance has ultimately prevailed that "the budgetary legislator is not bound by the ordinary one, except in cases of constitutionally 'tied' funds and those allocated to finance social programs. In relation to the former, by constitutional imperative. Regarding the latter, because the original constituent opted for a social State of Law, which entails a binding of public powers to this legal and social reality" (judgment No. 15968-2011 of 3:30 p.m. on November 23, 2011, reiterated in resolutions numbers 2016-18351 and 2018-19511).

Taking into account that the challenged article 1 and, by connection, article 5 of the Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, contains a tax with a specific allocation that is not directed at financing a social program, but, as stated, at the attention of the cantonal road network, despite the public interest of this work not being doubted, it does not fit within the context of social rights, thus improperly binding the margin of action of the budgetary legislator in matters of spending (the definition of its limits and allocation). However, the Attorney General's Office observes that both precepts were issued in development of the budgetary allocation contemplated by article 170 of the Political Constitution in favor of the municipalities, corresponding to 10% of the ordinary revenues calculated for the corresponding fiscal year, as indeed established by articles 1 and 5 of the Special Law for the Transfer of Competencies: Full and Exclusive Attention of the Cantonal Road Network (No. 9329 of October 15, 2015), in relation to the General Law for the Transfer of Competencies from the Executive Branch to the Municipalities (No. 8801 of April 28, 2010).

By way of conclusion, the warning regarding the potential consolidation of this proceeding with those already indicated is reiterated.

Regarding article 11 of the challenged law, the action must be upheld if the Constitutional Chamber considers that the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) is the constitutional principle of budgetary equilibrium.

As for articles 4 and 5, it indicates that the action must be upheld due to the absence of technical studies.

Finally, regarding article 1, it concludes that "the linkage that the ordinary legislator makes of the budgetary one to the detriment of the budgetary principles of universality and non-affectation of resources (article 185 of the Political Constitution), is saved insofar as it is done under the protection of constitutional article 170, as part of the budgetary allocation to finance the transfer to local governments of the full and exclusive attention of the cantonal road network." **7.-** The Presidency of this Constitutional Chamber, through a resolution at 2:01 p.m. on July 16, 2020, deemed the hearings granted to the Attorney General of the Republic and to the President of the Legislative Assembly to be satisfied, but not the hearing granted to the Minister of Finance. Once the proceedings were ready, they were passed to the office to which it corresponded by turn.

**8.-** In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Magistrate **Garro Vargas** writes, except for Considerando V which is written by Magistrate **Garita Navarro; and** **CONSIDERANDO:** **On the admissibility of the action** **I.-** **THE STANDING OF THE PLAINTIFF PARTY IN THIS CASE** On this point, it must be noted that art. 75, second paragraph, of the LJC establishes that the prior pending case will not be necessary when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole.

In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. 2001-8239, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:

“In accordance with the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the applicatory act and its consequent use as a base matter (...)”.

In the present matter, the claimant bases its standing (legitimación) on Art. 75, second paragraph, of the LJC, because “due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury.” The PGR argues that the Chamber has accepted standing (legitimación) in scenarios such as the one at hand, where the application of the challenged norms cannot directly affect the legal sphere of any particular individual, its consequences being of general and indirect scope for society as a whole or, at least, as alleged by the petitioner, for the community of residents of the municipalities that avail themselves of the budgetary provisions contained therein. They find no objection whatsoever that would prevent hearing the merits of this action, also taking into account that it targets norms related to the sound management of public spending and the proper execution of public funds.

Consequently, for this Chamber, it is admissible to hear and resolve this action of unconstitutionality by way of abstract review, given that, effectively, the norm cannot generate an act of individual application.

On the merits of the action of unconstitutionality II.- Object of the challenge The challenged norms are Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of the “Law to Support the Local Taxpayer and Strengthen the Financial Management of Municipalities, in the Face of the National Emergency due to the Covid-19 Pandemic,” No. 9848.

Succinctly, it can be stated that the petitioner challenges Article 1 because, in its view, it renders the fiscal rule for the Central Government nugatory by having to transfer the entirety of the resources provided therein, without considering the situation of the Public Treasury. Articles 4 and 5 are challenged because they lift the cap on administrative expenses of municipalities to the detriment or impact of the provision of public services. These articles, in the petitioner's judgment, entail economic incongruities and violate the principle of technical reasonableness, given that administrative spending is increased unreasonably and without technical studies supporting the legislative decision. Regarding Article 11, the petitioner challenges that the municipal corporations will be excluded and excepted from the application of the fiscal rule, which, according to the petitioner, is a constitutional principle derived from the principle of financial equilibrium of the State.

The text of the challenged provisions is as follows:

“Art. 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities.

To carry out said transfer, each municipality must be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in the event of rejection by the controlling entity, a copy of the definitive adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) makes available for this purpose, as well as the financial programming for budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministry of Finance.

Art. 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 3 of Law 7509, Tax on Real Estate, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) to administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the tax on real estate. These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; however, they may not be used for the creation of new positions.

Art. 5- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 102 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, and allocate up to fifty percent (50%) of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administrative expenses. These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; however, they may not be used for the creation of new positions.

Art. 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of title IV “Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic,” chapter I “General Provisions, Object, Scope of Application, Definitions, and Principles,” of Law 9635, Strengthening of Public Finances, of December 3, 2018. The texts are as follows:

Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempted from the scope of coverage of this title:

[.]

• d)The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. However, this title shall be applicable to those resources in the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils, originating from transfers made by the Central Government.
• e)The cantonal sports committees.” III.- Regarding Articles 1 and 11 of the law Preliminary and special ruling: improper invocation of the content of the norms.

As a first point of analysis, it is necessary to note, as reported by the President of the Legislative Assembly, that the filing brief for the action of unconstitutionality lacks an adequate invocation of the content of Articles 1 and 11 of the challenged law, given that, as was verified, the petitioner's objections were directed at challenging the text of the bill and not the effective content of the law, as it was finally approved. Indeed, for greater clarity, the text challenged by the petitioner—which, as already indicated, corresponds to the text of the bill—and, in contrast, the text of the regulation finally approved by the Legislative Assembly are transcribed below:

In relation to Article 1, the petitioner questions that its application would render the fiscal rule for the Central Government nugatory, which “will be obligated to transfer the entirety of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury or the government's level of indebtedness.” It claims that, alternatively, the government would be forced to make cuts in other areas in order to comply with the dual mandate of transferring the entirety of the resources to the municipalities and, additionally, complying with the fiscal rule.

From the petitioner's arguments, this Chamber observes that its objections—in addition to the erroneous transcription of the norm—revolve around the alleged obligation to transfer the “entirety of those resources.” However, as the President of the Legislative Assembly points out, the provision in question was modified to clearly specify that the percentage already set forth in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001, must be transferred. Indeed, a comparative analysis of the texts previously transcribed—in the table added above—allows us to verify that the content challenged by the petitioner—originally provided for in the bill—was categorical, in the sense that the totality of resources had to be transferred to the municipalities, while the provision finally approved and which is law of the Republic states that the authorities named therein must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001. Regarding the content of the norm as finally approved, the petitioner failed to provide an adequate substantiation for the allegations of unconstitutionality and the reasons why, according to its claim, an economic incongruity is incurred. This omission alone is sufficient reason to reject the challenge to this action of unconstitutionality, which this Chamber became aware of after having provided the legal hearings.

In relation to Article 11, it is necessary to emphasize again that the action of unconstitutionality suffers from a serious problem of substantiation. The foregoing, because, as can be inferred from the table added above, the petitioner challenged the terms of the proposed norm according to the original bill and not the content and text of the norm as it was finally approved by the Legislative Assembly. In the original terms, all the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils were going to be excluded from the title on “Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic” of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances, whereas, according to the norm finally approved, the exclusion will be partial, given that the title will indeed be applicable to those resources in the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils originating from transfers made by the Central Government. The petitioner did not make any argument regarding unconstitutionality in relation to the bifurcation finally approved by the Legislative Assembly, which, as already noted, is sufficient reason to dismiss the action due to the failure to adequately substantiate the arguments of unconstitutionality against the current norm and not a mere bill. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that in the judgment in which the challenge to the constitutionality of applying the fiscal rule to municipalities was heard, it was warned, regarding substantiation, that this Chamber cannot officially supply for the omissions that the petitioners are required to fulfill (Article 78 of the LJC) and that, by virtue of the principle of self-restraint of the constitutional judge, such a task cannot be assumed by this Court, but rather its fulfillment is the responsibility of the claimant (see judgment No. 2022-013101). Following that stance, it is possible to state that this action suffers from a serious problem of substantiation, since, as already warned, the norm was invoked, but the content challenged was that which appeared in the respective bill, and the final content of the norm was not challenged, nor were specific arguments made regarding it as approved by the Legislative Assembly.

This prevents an adequate weighing of the various scenarios that the norm raises and that were not distinguished, as they should have been, by the claimant.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Such a deficiency in the legal arguments affects the procedural requirements that every unconstitutionality action must meet and, had it been noticed earlier, would have been grounds for the inadmissibility of this action regarding this art. 11, and the same must be said regarding art. 1.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">As a corollary of the considerations made, the unconstitutionality action is dismissed with regard to arts. 1 and 11 of the Law to support the local taxpayer, and reinforce the financial management of municipalities, in light of the national emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">IV.- REGARDING ARTS. 4 AND 5 OF THE LAW</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">The claimant</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> questions the constitutionality of arts. 4 and 5 because, in their judgment, they incur in economic incongruities. Regarding art. 4, they claim that it lacks all logic that, to face the pandemic, it is necessary to increase administrative expenses as authorized by the contested norm. Considering that the real property tax is the main source of fresh income for municipalities, lifting the cap on administrative spending could instead negatively impact the provision of public services. Regarding art. 5, in the same vein, they question the logical sense of raising the ceiling on administrative spending to face a health crisis. The claimant's arguments —as the PGR points out— revolve around assumptions, regarding that the economic slowdown will decrease revenue from patents and permits, that the collection of patents will decrease due to business closures resulting from economic contraction, and that municipal revenue will fall in 2020 due to the effect of authorized moratoriums. They therefore conclude that lifting the ceiling for administrative expenses not only subtracts necessary resources for the provision of municipal services, but that given the fall in municipal revenues, the blow to municipal services is double: the lower revenue collection will impact the provision of services and the diversion to administrative items will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services. In addition, they state that the application of arts. 4 and 5 will cause “a disproportionate growth in administrative spending and not in the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality.” They say this will cause an increase in the cost of administrative structures and will become an additional burden for the citizens of the cantons or will fall on all Costa Ricans —through supposed loans (empréstitos)—. They assert that the contested norms lack elements of technical reasonableness to justify them since they will promote increases in administrative spending and, in the specific case, there are no technical studies supporting the contested norms. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">The </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">President of the Legislative Assembly</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> reported that the claimant starts from a mistaken premise, since they consider that the increase in the percentage of the tax that may be dedicated to financing administrative expenses necessarily means that the municipalities are going to increase that type of expense. On the contrary, they state that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a specific expense, but it is not authorizing an increase in that expense. They argue that if the entirety of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that the municipalities are preparing to face a significant reduction in their ordinary revenues. This for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity,</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">which will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the patent tax; in addition, delinquencies in all taxes will increase as an effect of the pandemic, including the real property tax; </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">b) The objected law itself provides a series of measures that lead to a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: the authorizations to apply a moratorium for municipal patents or licenses (art. 12); the municipal moratorium for fees, public prices, and municipal services (art. 13); the reduction of municipal lease rates (art. 14); and payment arrangements (art. 16). The foregoing means that, in a scenario where the percentage established in art. 3 of the “Real Property Tax Law” is maintained, the municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to finance the same level of administrative spending, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness on the part of local governments, an aspect that so worries the claimant. Administrative spending, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term; therefore, not having this authorization could lead to municipalities not having resources to finance their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided by challenged art. 4, would allow that revenue deficiency to be supplied to finance administrative spending. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said spending, whereby it is incorrect to affirm, as the claimant does, that the norm authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. They add that another reason why the premise from which the claimant starts is invalid relates to the fact that the contested norm also allows the resources generated by lifting the established limit to be used to finance the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive waste management; key areas to attend to given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. The lifting of the percentage will apply exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 budget years; furthermore, the resources may not be used for the creation of new positions, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to increasing administrative expenses, as the claimant presupposes. As with the objections to art. 4, there is an error of appreciation regarding the scope of what is provided in art. 5, since here an authorization to increase administrative spending is not proposed, but rather an increase in the authorization of the resources that can be used for that purpose, which, given a generalized reduction in revenue, lifting the ceiling allows the existing expenses of the municipalities to be financed and thus prevent them from incurring financial breaches, so the measure makes complete logical sense. On the other hand, as in the previous case, the measure is temporary and does not allow the creation of new positions, precisely with the spirit of not increasing administrative spending. Furthermore, precisely in light of the scenario announced by the claimant, the municipalities will require the lifting of the indicated caps to be able to finance their operation. They insist that if what is provided in the norm is read carefully, the indicated resources may be used to finance the provision of municipal services for water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive waste management; thus, contrary to what is questioned, what is provided in contested arts. 4 and 5 precisely aims to safeguard the financing of these very sensitive areas in times of pandemic. Regarding the technical reasonableness of the law, they reported that the law subject to challenge was analyzed in the working groups that were implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, therefore criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were considered throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate. To this effect, several passages of interventions made by legislators in the approval process of the regulations challenged by the claimant are also cited, and they conclude that the contested norms are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the claimant points out, since their validity is limited to a prudential time, which has been deemed necessary so that municipalities can attend to the needs resulting from the pandemic and, likewise, provide the necessary support for the first steps towards the economic recovery of the country's cantons.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Regarding these articles, the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Attorney General of the Republic</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> reported that a</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">s can be extracted from the legislative background of Law No. 9848, in view of file No. 21.922 documenting its parliamentary process, contested arts. 4 and 5 connect with the purpose</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">of “making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency,” by allowing municipalities and district municipal councils an elevated margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of art. 4, it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the real property tax for administrative expenses, compared to the initial 10% established in art. 3 of the “Real Property Tax Law” (No. 7509); while in the case of art. 5</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">an additional 10% is added to the original 40% set in art. 102 of the Municipal Code of ordinary municipal revenues, which they could allocate to cover the general administration expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept as</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">“current expenses that do not involve direct costs of municipal services.” Thus, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on local finances resulting from lower revenue collection in the scenario of economic slowdown caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in each canton—and in the country in general—, authorizing municipalities to transfer a greater share of their revenues to these fixed and permanent expenses, such as the remuneration of their officials, to the detriment of spending dedicated to municipal services. Therefore, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, given the foreseeable decrease in municipal resources, the appealed provisions authorize them to allocate a greater share of these to current spending that finances, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of public municipal services. The claimant, as stated, questions first the reasonableness of the precepts, by promoting the increase in the administrative spending of municipalities while at the same time their revenue will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which in turn would impact the fiscal deficit of the Central Government, since they propose that the only way for the territorial Administrations to cover their expenses under these circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which would ultimately be responsible for these in the event of non-compliance with their financial obligations. Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to remember</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">the jurisprudential line of this high Court to the effect that it is necessary to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportion is not evident, since, otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective appreciation or value judgment of the claimant.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">In this regard, the appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate their projections to a sufficient degree to determine the constitutional invalidity of the contested provisions. Nor do they consider that under art. 121, subsection 15), of the Political Constitution, loans (empréstitos) to have the State's guarantee must pass through the control of the Legislative Assembly to be approved. However, regarding the lack of technical reports, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">whenever the legislator introduces changes in legislation that go beyond the opportunity and convenience in their circumstantial appreciation of the public interest, by venturing into specialized areas of knowledge, such as those contained in the appealed norms, which relate to finance and economic sciences, where the percentage of administrative expenses that can be taken from real property tax revenue is quadrupled and the percentage of all ordinary revenue that can be used for general municipal management expenses is raised to half, despite the broad freedom of legislative configuration that characterizes their work, it does not exempt them from justifying or technically substantiating decisions of that nature at the time of approving a law by imperative of the aforementioned constitutional principle of reasonableness. They state that even though the approval of arts. 4 and 5 was marked by the exceptional situation the country is experiencing due to the pandemic, with their validity being conditioned to the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the requirement for technical foundation remained necessary. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">For the </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt">Constitutional Chamber</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">, before examining the grievances raised by the claimant, it is inescapable to refer to the legislative background that accounts for the process for the approval of Law No. 9848, to subsequently examine the content of the norms and the alleged absence of technical reasonableness criticized by the claimant.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt">Regarding the legislative process</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">In this regard, it is noted that Bill 21.922 was submitted to the legislative process on </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:0.15pt">April 13, 2020</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">, a few days after the state of national emergency was decreed due to the health situation caused by Covid-19 (Executive Decree No. 42227-MP-S of March 16, 2020). The bill was signed by forty legislators from various legislative factions and contains the following statement of purpose:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">“Following the state of national emergency, declared by the Executive Branch, pursuant to Decree No. 42227-MP-S dated March 16 of this year, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty generated in the Costa Rican population by the effects that are occurring in various economic sectors and those that could arise in the future, it is urgently necessary to take measures from Local Governments, as these are the governmental institutions closest to the population, and through which, actions can be generated that contribute from various areas to counteract this effect that the pandemic may generate on the Costa Rican economy.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">State responses for citizens and for companies have begun to emerge through new legislation and administrative provisions, including tax moratoriums, reduction of working hours for the private sector, facilities in insurance and employer-employee contributions to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). However, </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt">these actions must be complemented from the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first-response roles such as the coordination of Local Emergency Committees (part of the National Risk Management System according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of indispensable services such as citizen security through municipal police forces, waste collection, and aqueducts in some cases</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">For the foregoing reasons</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt">, both the National Union of Local Governments (UNGL) and the National Association of Mayors and Intendants of Costa Rica (ANAI) conducted an analysis based on reports issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and data available from Local Governments in the Public Budgets Information System (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the revenue and expenditure projections of the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">It should be emphasized that Local Governments manage a total budget of approximately 590 billion colones, an amount that represents 2% of the national budget, but which for the 2020 period suffered a 1% decrease compared to 2019. According to the historical data of the last 7 years, budgets have had gradual growth, of which an average of 96.7% of what was budgeted has entered the municipal coffers and an average of 73.1% of the funds has been executed. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">Of the total revenue received, 21.4% (¢126.087 billion) corresponds to the tax on real property, this being its main source of income; 20% (¢118.074 billion) from professional licenses, commercial licenses, and other permits; 17.8% (¢105.110 billion) are capital transfers from the Central Government that are used almost entirely for the maintenance of the Cantonal Road Network; and 15.4% (¢90.879 billion) for environmental sanitation services.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">For its part, the behavior of expenditures is distributed as follows: 40% (¢235.949 billion) for the remuneration line item, 20.2% (¢119.324 billion) for municipal services, 18.3% (¢108.090 billion) in the purchase of durable goods, and 8.9% (¢52.747 billion) in current transfers. Compared to the year 2019, all had a growth rate of 5%, except the durable goods line item.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">Based on the foregoing information, and upon conducting a consensus analysis among the contributions provided by the National Union of Local Governments (UNGL), the National Association of Mayors and Intendants of Costa Rica (ANAI), the Institute for Municipal Advisory Promotion (IFAM), Mayors and Intendants, as well as the consideration of other initiatives already presented, including the following bills: No. 21,842, “AUTHORIZATION OF A TAX MORATORIUM AND WAIVER FOR THE MUNICIPAL REGIME AND DISTRICT MUNICIPAL COUNCILS,” Bill No. 21,889, “GENERAL LAW AUTHORIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX WAIVER AND ADJUSTMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19,” Bill No. 21,898 “MUNICIPAL LAW TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO TAXPAYERS OF EACH MUNICIPALITY WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE COVID-19 CRISIS,” and Bill No. 21,896 “LAW TO MITIGATE THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND ENSURE THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL REGIME IN DECLARATIONS OF STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.” </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt">The working group formed on municipal affairs analyzed and developed this bill that we submit for the consideration of the Honorable Deputies of the Republic, which will help to make the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the economic recovery</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt">”.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt"> (The highlighting is not from the original). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">As can be seen from the foregoing, the bill arose in a specific context to provide responses and facilities to citizens and companies from the local level, based on the premise that the work of municipalities —the administration of the interests and local services in each canton, according to art. 169 of the Political Constitution— is vital in emergency periods, since they carry out a contingency and first-response role to the needs of the residents (munícipes) and, furthermore, in many cases they are in charge of providing essential public services within the framework of a health emergency —waste collection, cleaning of public roads, municipal security, provision of aqueducts, oversight of the ASADAS, etc.—. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt">Thus, two purposes are evidenced by the bill in question. On the one hand, to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities to guarantee the continuity of all municipal services, considering, among them, the exceptional and temporary measures set forth in arts. 4 and 5 of the law, relating to authorizing municipal governments to exceed limits established in previous regulations. Such authorization is intended to regularly meet general administration expenses and the provision of municipal services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive waste management. On the other hand, to promote a series of municipal actions to support the taxpayer regarding the payment of municipal taxes. For example, a moratorium for the payment of municipal patents or licenses; municipal moratoriums for fees, public prices, and municipal services; reductions of up to fifty percent (50%) in the amounts charged for the lease of premises, sections, or stalls in municipal markets; the authorization for municipalities to offer their taxpayers, during 2020, payment arrangements for a term of up to twenty-four months to pay off their obligations for fees, public prices, municipal services, taxes, and concession fees; the possibility of suspending the requirement of having municipal licenses to carry out certain lucrative activities, etc.</span></p> Now, contrary to what the petitioner states, the record shows that the bill in question was the product of a consensus-based analysis with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), who carried out an analysis based on the reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and the data available from Local Governments in the Sistema de Información de Presupuestos Públicos (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the income and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. It is also stated that the Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), mayors, mayoresses, and intendants participated in the proposal, and in a working group of the Legislative Assembly, this project and other parliamentary proposals were evaluated to finally form the initiative under review.

Regarding the processing of the bill, the record shows that, once presented, the text was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta on April 15, 2020. Subsequently, the Legislative Plenary applied a motion to dispense with procedures so that the bill would be examined by the Plenary itself. Indeed, in the session of April 28, 2020, the procedural motion was approved with the unanimous vote of forty-seven legislators present (see folio 403 of the digital copy of the legislative file). Furthermore, the proposal had the support of the Executive Branch, as the bill was convened during the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly (see executive decree No. 42302-MP).

On the other hand, from a careful review of the legislative file, it is evident that the bill was submitted for institutional consultation with all the municipalities of the national territory, and several municipal agreements supporting the initiative are recorded in the file.

It is also shown that the bill was submitted for consultation with the Ministry of Finance, the National Registry, the Ombudsman's Office, and the CGR.

Additionally, the institutional opinion of the CGR is recorded in the file, rendered through official document No. DFOE-DL-0567 of **April 15, 2020** (see folios 186-196 of the digital copy of the legislative file), from which the following objections are extracted:

"That is, the bill proposes to authorize Local Governments to exceed spending limits based on certain sources of resources.

Specifically, the percentage of the property tax (impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles) allocated for administrative expenses has been increased from 10% to 40%; and an additional 10% is added, reaching up to 50% of ordinary municipal revenues that could be used to meet the Municipality's general administrative expenses, thus expanding the availability of resources that already had a legal limit.

However, as in the previous comment, it is considered that the measure extending over two fiscal periods, 2020 and 2021, is not being contemplated, which could erode income and empty the purposes for which the limit was imposed of their content, which could cause an excess and denaturalize that established legal maximum for which the administrations should already have adjusted their projections for sustainable financial management.

Likewise, no motivation is found for increasing administrative or general expenses for the attention of the emergency, given that the priority would be to direct resources toward care services and to a lesser degree toward items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings could even occur due to social distancing and teleworking measures.

Finally, regarding the possibility of creating new urgent and temporary positions, it is important to emphasize that these may only occur as long as they are related to the emergency or the provision of the municipal services specified in the article, but it is also timely that they have adequate justification, proportional and in accordance with the emergency, to thus avoid any type of unnecessary expenditure of resources." Subsequently, the motion filed by legislator Floria Segreda Sagot and other deputies is recorded, a motion that was approved, for the project to be consulted with the following institutions: Ministry of Finance, Budget Authority of the Ministry of Finance, CGR, municipalities of the country, district municipal councils, Administrative Board of the National Registry, state banks and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, and Ministry of Health.

In the session of April 30, 2020, legislator María José Corrales made the following considerations (folios 534-535 of the digital legislative file):

"Thank you, Mr. President; good afternoon everyone, colleagues.

Really, I will be very concise in the words I am going to mention regarding this project. Similarly, Mr. President, I will send you my speech via WhatsApp so you can attach it to the minutes.

To remind all of you and the citizenry that what is not being heard is that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a completely different standard for us. And with this, the municipalities throughout the country have also had to take exceptional actions to carry out the actions that correspond to them by the Municipal Code, but also to be able to collaborate with the Executive Branch in each of the solutions or facilities that can be given precisely to the citizenry in the face of the pandemic.

The reason for this was that this file was presented and the working group was formed, which has truly been an extraordinary group, a group that has allowed for teamwork, working together, listening precisely to that sector affected by the municipal regime and also listening to the taxpayer who precisely needs the facilities to carry on with their daily life.

The bill has undergone consensus-based modifications, reviewed technically, both by ANAI and by the National Union of Local Governments, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Legislative Assembly who have considered their observations timely. And the reason for this is that today a substitute text has been approved in this Plenary that accommodates many of these observations and also the other additional motions that were approved." Furthermore, legislator Catalina Montero Gómez said the following:

"Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a bit long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental.

With the participation of multiple actors, deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with a great deal of responsibility, but also involving those key actors: mayors' offices, intendants' offices, the National Union of Local Governments, and some institutions of the Executive Branch.

I believe we have managed to gather those concerns to the maximum extent, and the majority of those concerns have been recorded in this text of the project to improve and refine it, so that what this law says is what applies, is extremely clear when it comes to applying it, and that this truly is an opportunity to support taxpayers and to strengthen the financial management of the municipalities.

We are perfectly clear that municipalities and district municipal councils have and will have an essential mission during and post-pandemic, because they are the leading institutions in the reconstruction, development, and economic reactivation processes in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the institution, the rest of the Costa Rican institutional framework.

I want to thank this working group for this responsible work and all the fellow deputies who have contributed to enriching this bill that we are finally approving in the first debate. Thank you all very much." Certainly, there were objections that are made manifest with the statements of legislator Yorleny León Marchena, who opposed the categorical exclusion of the municipalities from the application of the fiscal rule (see folios 537 et seq.).

Also, the participation of deputy Paola Valladares Rosado, who, in grounding her vote, makes a call for spending restraint on the part of the municipalities:

"Very good afternoon, thank you, Mr. President, colleagues.

As someone passionate about the municipal regime, I am evidently clear on the need at this time to support from the legislative plenary the situation the municipalities are going through, with the understanding that the municipalities mostly depend on their revenues, and at this moment of crisis that the country and the entire world are going through, the economic situation has evidently caused that collection to decrease, and additionally, we are trying to ensure that the municipalities can meet the needs of each of their taxpayers, and in this case, that is why the project provides a moratorium so that we can address that need and maintain, as far as possible, that linkage and that job generation and the economies at the cantonal levels.

I truly thank the working group that made a very great effort. We are clear that it is a bit complex to legislate for 82 completely different realities where the economic situation already differs one from the other. What we are trying to do with this project is to guarantee cash flow so that the municipalities can help and provide relief to their patent holders and taxpayers, but at the same time survive so that at the end of the year, each of their officials can receive… or rather, guarantee their salaries, in this case, and subsist in attending to the emergency without canceling service provisions, so that evidently garbage collection, many of which are responsible for municipal aqueducts, and consequently also street cleaning and garbage collection, are thus guaranteed.

However, I believe it is important to remind them, as I have done in the working groups, I want to record it this afternoon, that the most important thing is that they begin a review of their budgets for the purpose of spending restraint.

It is necessary that each of those financial areas has made that revenue projection and adjusts the entire operational plan accordingly. I know that unfortunately there are still municipalities that continue processing procurement, whether in road programs or other programs, without being aware that the resource is becoming increasingly limited for their management.

So, I make a call in that sense to each of the municipalities to be responsible for spending restraint, starting with the reduction of representation expenses, extraordinary working hours, and evidently, as limited in the project, the creation of new positions.

Thus, it is a way from the legislative branch to collaborate with the municipalities, but we also need to see that this task is done responsibly so that from all places we are in that collaboration." Likewise, legislator José María Villalta Flórez-Estrada raised the following reflections:

"Thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen deputies.

I will vote with pleasure and great satisfaction for this bill that we have worked on for many weeks, in a working group with representation from practically all the legislative factions, representation of local governments, the Union of Local Governments, IFAM, to support our local governments in the way they are facing and will have to face the emergency we are experiencing.

What does this bill propose? It proposes three things fundamentally (…)

At the same time — and this is the second component of this bill — a series of measures are established to make more flexible those rules that regulate the functioning of municipal budgets, so that the municipalities can face the significant reduction in their income that this emergency represents, not as a consequence of this law.

The fact is that today the municipalities' income is already significantly reducing, as a result of many people not being able to pay their obligations to the municipalities.

So, rules are established to exempt the municipalities for two years from certain contributions they have to make to the Central Government, or they are allowed to use their surpluses, to transfer them to those expenses, those needs where they are having, where they are going to have, a deficit situation. The rules on the Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles), which currently has a cap on the resources that can be allocated to administrative expenses, are made more flexible.

But it happens that if revenues from municipal patents or licenses plummet, the municipalities will have to see how they redistribute their budgets to be able to cover operational expenses and maintain the functioning of the essential services that the municipalities provide: aqueducts, garbage collection, security, the various municipal services.

But also, the municipalities, as deputy Montero Gómez said, are key actors in the attention of the emergency. So, they cannot be weakened. Their income cannot suddenly plummet and we not give them the flexibility we are giving them with this bill so that they can finance those expenses that would rather be increasing within the framework of the emergency." Subsequently, in the session of April 30, 2020, after extensive analysis, the bill was approved in the first debate with forty-one affirmative votes and three against.

It is additionally recorded that the updated text was consulted with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, CGR, state banks, Budget Authority of the Ministry of Finance, Administrative Board of the National Registry, municipalities, and district municipal councils (see folios 615 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file).

To that effect, in the second report of the CGR, rendered through official document No. DFOE-DL-0842 of May 13, 2020 (see folios 908 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file), the following is noted:

"**Articles 4 and 5**:

Regarding these articles, it is requested that exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed: first, the limit established in Article 3 of the LIBI and its reforms and allocate up to 40% to administrative expenses of the amount they are due from the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), and increase the limit established in Article 102 of the Municipal Code, and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal revenues for administrative expenses. Also indicating that these resources can be used in the provision of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management municipal services, but not for the creation of new positions.

The application of less strict limits, such as those proposed in the current project, could lead to a significant increase in the administrative expenses of the municipalities. If the 2019 budget period is used as an example, the application of the new proposed limits would have generated an additional spending space of ₡90,357 million, which represents 75% of the total administrative expenses executed during that year.

Given the foregoing, it is reiterated that the project does not contain the motivation for increasing administrative or general expenses for the attention of the emergency, given that the priority in this context would be to direct resources toward care services and to a lesser degree toward items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings could even occur. In relation to this point, the Comptroller's Office estimated that the municipal sector could generate savings exceeding ₡21,000 million due solely to the social distancing and teleworking measures that have been implemented, which can be complemented with other savings measures or improvements and efficiencies that local governments could implement." After weighing such criteria and conducting subsequent consultations, the bill was brought to a second debate vote on May 19, 2020. On that occasion, for example, deputy Gourzong Cerdas made the following conclusions:

"Thanks to the high level of responsibility of the Union of Local Governments, the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica, ANAI, the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, IFAM, mayors, mayoresses, and intendants, and the working group formed by deputies of this Legislative Assembly that analyzed and developed the present legislative initiative, it is that I offer my absolute support for this project that comes to allow the relaxation of the management of municipal resources to face the consequences of this emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be vital in the reactivation of the economy and that follows the path of not generating more unemployment in the different cantons of this country." Additionally, other legislators took the floor and made the following reflections.

For example, Deputy María José Corrales Chacón:

"Thank you, Mr. President.

Good afternoon, colleagues.

Along the same lines as Deputy Montero Gómez, it is of the utmost importance to move forward with the processing of this bill and to hold the vote in the second debate, for which reason I will be sending you my address to be attached to the record. (see annex three) I merely wish to mention one point that I do believe is important for all Costa Ricans to hear aloud.

Regarding the criticism and opposition that this bill has received, mainly from the Contraloría General de la República, which has inaccurately stated that the approval of this bill would affect state public finances, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule in the municipalities will not reduce the Central Government's fiscal deficit; what the Central Government contributes to local governments represents barely 1.09% of the Republic's budget, and practically this entire percentage is directed toward investment in the cantonal road network.

For this reason, I believe it is also important to put in evidence that, as of today, the country's municipalities already have limits that precisely prevent them from making excessive expenditures, but above all that they already have what is called the golden rule, the rule that prevents exaggerated growth, for that reason to be evidence that the municipalities need and urgently require, above all, in the situation we are facing as a country, the approval of this expediente.

Please, Mr. President, let the text I am going to send to your advisor be attached so that it can be appended to the record.

Thank you." And also Deputy Patricia Villegas Álvarez:

"Thank you, Mr. President; a very good afternoon to one and all.

My speech is actually short, but I do not want to pass it over. I was a member of the working group on expediente 21.922, emphatically supporting the local taxpayer during this health crisis, using our local governments as a link, which are the institutions closest to our cantonal population, our communal population, to our neighborhoods in our beloved country, is today a reality through this approval in its second debate.

Local governments are the entities responsible for executing actions that contribute to appeasing, to a certain extent, in our national economy, the sequelae of this pandemic we are facing; it is the municipalities that play linking and coordination roles with the local emergency committees.

In the negotiation group, deputies from different political forces worked arduously, with the inclusion of the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, conducting analyses based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República on the 2020 municipal budgets, and the data available from local governments in the public budget information system, to provide a broad overview of the income and expenditure projections of the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. Making municipal resource management more flexible to confront the consequences of the emergency, to avoid institutional and constitutional paralysis, are fundamental axes of this present law.

Today, today here we are responding to the citizens and I ask, with all due respect, for the definitive support for the vote in this second debate.

Thank you very much." Finally, with the presence of forty-eight legislators, the vote in the second debate on expediente 21.922 began, and it was approved with forty-three votes.

**Regarding the content and effects of the challenged arts. 4 and 5** First of all, it should be noted that the challenged **art. 4** authorized, on an exceptional basis in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and the municipal district councils to exceed the limit established in art. 3 of the Ley sobre Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles and to have the possibility of allocating up to forty percent (40%) for administrative expenses from the amount corresponding to them from the real estate tax. Said provision also expressly provided that such resources could be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. However, the provision warned that this exceptional possibility could not be used for the creation of new municipal positions. The precept alluded to ‒art. 3 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, n.°7509‒ orders the following:

"Art. 3.- Competence of the municipalities For the purposes of this tax, the municipalities shall have the character of tax administration. They shall be responsible for carrying out valuations of real estate, billing, collecting, and processing judicial collection, and for administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. They may allocate up to ten percent (10%) of the amount corresponding to them from this tax for administrative expenses. (…)".

That is to say, from the amount collected from the tax established in favor of the municipalities on the real estate of the cantón, it is ordinarily authorized that up to 10% of the amount corresponding to them from that tax be used for administrative expenses. The provision challenged in this action establishes on an exceptional and temporary basis that the municipalities could use up to 40% of the amount received from such taxes, to supply regular municipal expenses and other essential basic services.

Meanwhile, art. 5 authorizes that, on an exceptional basis and solely for the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the municipalities and the municipal district councils could exceed the limit established in art. 102 of the Código Municipal and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administrative expenses. The provision also authorized that these ordinary municipal revenues be used in the provision of essential public services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. The provision was emphatic that said authorization does not imply the possibility of creating new municipal positions. As can be seen, the provision alludes to what is regulated in art. 102 of the Código Municipal, which is framed within the budget legal provisions governing local governments. The current precept orders the following:

"Art. 102. - The municipalities may not allocate more than forty percent (40%) of their ordinary municipal revenues to cover general administrative expenses.

General administrative expenses are current expenditures that do not imply direct costs of municipal services." That is, what is usual is that by virtue of the cited provision, local governments cannot use more than 40% of their revenues to cover the general expenses of administration. Consequently, the provision challenged in this action authorized raising said amount by 10% so that the municipalities could count on up to 50% of their ordinary revenues, to cover the general expenses of the municipal administration, or else, use them to finance vital municipal services.

**Constitutionality analysis** After evaluating the arguments of unconstitutionality, the reports of the authorities that appeared in this process, the legislative expediente, and the precedents of this Constitutional Court, it is concluded that the questioned provisions are not unconstitutional.

First of all, contrary to what was alleged by the petitioner and reported by the PGR in the sense that a specific technical study is lacking, it must be pointed out, in accordance with the legislative background detailed supra, that the legislative proposal in question was not devoid of a specific technical analysis. On the contrary, as recorded, the legislative proposal ‒supported by a qualified majority of the body and of the Executive Branch itself‒ was preceded by an analysis of the municipal budgets and the projections of income and expenditures of the accounts that sustain municipal finances, carried out by the UNGL and the ANAI. Several municipal governments and the IFAM itself also participated in the initiative in working groups conducted and promoted by the legislators. This textually emerges, and in summary, from the statement of motives of the bill:

"The working group formed on municipal matters analyzed and developed the present bill that we submit for the consideration of the Deputies of the Republic, which will help to make the management of municipal resources more flexible to confront the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the reactivation of the economy." The fact that the bill emerged as a parliamentary initiative from these "working groups" is significant, because it shows that it was nourished by the knowledge, fruit of the experience, of the members of the Unión de Gobiernos Locales, the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, the IFAM, mayors, and the legislators themselves. The inputs that these persons could contribute to the working groups ‒all their experience on the different tasks entrusted to local governments and the reality of their functioning‒ points to the fact that it was not an arbitrary, hasty, or capricious decision. The foregoing, all the more so, if one considers that the legislation was adopted as a temporary measure with the purpose of attending to a conjunctural situation that affected both the citizens themselves and the administrative machinery of the municipalities, under a particularly uncertain and unprecedented forecast.

Likewise, as was accredited, despite the fact that a motion to dispense with procedures was applied to the expediente, the bill was indeed publicized and was widely consulted with various public authorities that provided their inputs and opinions on the bill. As was verified, the bill was consulted with all the municipalities and municipal district councils of the country, the CGR, the Ministry of Finance, the National Registry, state banks, the Ministry of Health, among other authorities. As recorded in the transcription of several legislative interventions during the legislative approval process, it was evidenced that the bill was agreed upon with various actors in broad working groups and that led a parliamentary majority to approve this bill under the consideration that, upon the reduction of usual revenues from municipal patents or licenses, the municipal corporations were going to have to find a way to make the rules indicated supra more flexible in order to be able to cover operating expenses and maintain essential municipal services.

As was previously pointed out, the bill revolved around two essential axes: authorizing a series of facilities for the local taxpayer to deal with the consequences of the pandemic (reduction of capacity limits, temporary closures, etc.) and trying to reactivate the economy with such facilities and moratoriums. But, on the other hand, such facilities ‒authorizations to apply a moratorium on the payment of municipal patents or licenses (art.12); municipal moratorium on the cancellation of fees, public prices, and municipal services (art.13); reduction of municipal lease rates (art.14), and other types of payment arrangements (art.16)‒ necessarily implied a reduction of the usual revenues of the municipal corporations that motivated the legislator to establish the exceptional authorizations provided for in arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged law. The foregoing with the purpose that, through these extraordinary measures, facilities for local taxpayers could be guaranteed, but also that the municipality could make use of the indicated resources (taxes on real estate and ordinary municipal revenues), to finance the regular functioning of the municipality, without authorizing the growth of the municipal payroll and that, in addition, such amounts can be used in the satisfaction of essential services for the benefit of all residents and the population in general.

As has been noted, all these variables were evaluated by the legislators ‒including the disagreements of the CGR‒, without it appearing that their decision was arbitrary or harmful to constitutional rights. In that sense, it is necessary to recall that it is true that legislative decisions cannot lack adequate foundation, but that does not imply that the Legislative Branch ‒a democratic and deliberative body‒ can be forced to submit to a single technical option, but rather that its decisions are the fruit of an analysis of reasonableness and proportionality and that they involve the technical actors who can provide sufficient arguments to adopt a given legislative decision.

In the sub lite, as could be verified, the bill emerged from within the Legislative Assembly itself, which was agreed upon with other national economic policy actors and, as was accredited, it was a legislative proposal that had the support of the Executive Branch regarding the timely calling of the bill for discussion during the extraordinary sessions period of Congress. Furthermore, the disagreements of the CGR were weighed. However, the Legislative Assembly opted to approve this exceptional law with the purpose of ensuring flexibility in the event of a financial collapse due to the decrease in the collection of municipal revenues.

The jurisprudential lines of this Court must be highlighted, in the sense that this Chamber has rejected the idea that "irremediably, all of the legislator's decisions must contemplate a technical study" because that attacks the very nature of Parliament in the sense that the legislator has discretion, within the framework of its right to free configuration, to weigh and adopt the norms it deems necessary. If it were a strictly technical body that must adhere to a single criterion, the very nature of legislative activity would be meaningless. Regarding the legislator's free configuration, this Chamber has stated the following:

"The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating rules of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In this way, the legislator can create public bodies, assign them functions or competences, develop various institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems opportune and convenient for a determined historical, social, economic, or political juncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, since the legislative function cannot be reduced to the simple execution of the Constitution. The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as a limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality made up of constitutional precepts and customs, values and principles -among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out- of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Tribunal for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since in such matters the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, while, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects." (Sentencia n.°2003-05090) Attending to the free configuration of the legislator, in a matter such as that examined in the specific case, the Legislative Assembly was in a position to attend to the reality presented before it in diverse ways, without adhering to a technical criterion in the strict sense, but yes to reasoning its decision, as was accredited. In this regard, one can consult, for example, sentencia n.°2018-000230 through which the Chamber warned that technical studies are not necessary in all cases of intervention by the Legislative Assembly:

"The Chamber rejects that, irremediably, all of the legislator's decisions must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, submitting it to the criterion of third parties who lack democratic representation." Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule on the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness.” (Criterion reiterated in advisory opinion no. 2020-015542).

Likewise, advisory opinion no. 2020-010160 can be consulted, in which the Chamber resolved some doubts of constitutionality regarding the bill on the regulation of the figure of “usury,” in which this Court noted the following:

“That is, given the hypothetical nature of the possible injuries with unreasonable and disproportionate effects on a segment of the population or the economy, this Chamber considers that under those conditions it cannot validly limit the margin of initiative of the legislator, who is competent and obliged to seek a solution to the problem of the omission of the usury rate. The contrary, in these circumstances, would be harmful to the independence of parliament. At this stage, in which the proposal has not yet produced effects such as to assess—with objective and certain criteria—whether the result will actually be negative, capable of stripping the norm of reasonableness and proportionality—because of its effects—the Chamber considers that it must reserve a broader margin for the legislator than the Chamber has in matters of subsequent judicial review through the action of unconstitutionality procedure, where it can indeed assess the unconstitutional effects of a given piece of legislation. As long as the norm has not produced effects that are objectively measurable and there are disparate technical studies in the case file, we are still in the realm of hypothesis, and the Chamber would do wrong, without certain evidence, to limit the exercise of constitutional powers inherent to the highest body of popular representation, after a democratic debate that has spanned more than a decade, without clear studies demonstrating that the norm will be disproportionate in its effects.” In said advisory opinion, Justice Castillo Víquez recorded additional reasons that serve to illustrate the Chamber’s thesis:

“A deeply significant issue raised in this question—regarding the alleged violation of the principle of technical reasonableness—is whether it is possible to exercise a kind of review of discretion over legislative or parliamentary activity. As is well known, the review of discretion is a technique that arises to verify whether the activity of the Public Administration conforms or not to the univocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience. Ergo, the exercise of discretionary powers is subject to the general principles of Law, and to the review of determining facts and indeterminate legal concepts, as well as the regulated elements of the administrative act, by the Judge of administrative litigation. It is evident, and as far as I remember, nowhere in the world has this aberration been reached, that this review be applied to parliamentary activity; this type of review could never be exercised over legislative or parliamentary activity, because Parliament would be reduced to its minimum expression, and a core element of the republican system would be dislocated. What is possible is to exercise a review of constitutionality of parliamentary activity and, consequently, of the final parliamentary act, be it a legislative decree or agreement, for violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality when they are linked to a fundamental right and, consequently, empty its essential content. The foregoing means, in plain language, that the legislator, in exercising the power to legislate, the self-regulatory power, the power of political control, political direction, etc., has a broad margin of discretion, a kind of legislative policy, and can therefore choose from a multiplicity of variables within the framework of a plural, democratic body, where political consensus constitutes a necessary channel, especially when in a constitutional term or legislature, a political party or the governing party lacks a parliamentary majority. That margin of discretion is exempt from the review of constitutionality, since, if this were not so, the Constitutional Court would come to substitute the will of Parliament, causing a severe dislocation to the democratic system, especially by very significantly harming the principle of separation of powers. That said, Parliament has broad freedom to follow a specific technical criterion or to depart from it, provided that in doing so it does not affect the essential content of a fundamental right and, consequently, also breach the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as this Court has established regarding the impact on the environment, where it has required, for the Law to pass constitutional muster, that there be technical studies or the respective compensations that demonstrate there is no harm to the environment. The foregoing is even more certain when in the discussion of a bill there are different technical criteria or these are contradictory among themselves. In these cases, the legislator is not bound to follow a specific technical criterion, but rather can validly adopt a political decision taking into consideration other elements of judgment. In other words, it is not possible to declare a Law unconstitutional because it departed from one or several technical criteria—this is typical of a review over the activity of the Public Administration—, except when such omission entails the violation of the essential content of a fundamental right.” Even in matters of the disposition of public funds, although an adequate basis for the decision is necessary in order to determine its reasonableness, this Chamber has not demanded technical studies as strict as that which the petitioner demands. For example, in the legislative consultation of the Ley Marco de Empleo Público, resolution no. 2021-017098, this Chamber resolved the following:

“Lack of cost study: They indicate that, at the time of incorporating these leaves and permits into the bill, no cost study or source of resources to cover them was taken into consideration. In this regard, it cannot be lost sight of that the legislator has a broad margin of legislative discretion in the formation of laws; a criterion that has been repeatedly upheld by the Constitutional Chamber, pointing out that, in principle, it is not strictly necessary that all legislative decisions must have technical or financial studies. Thus, for example, in judgment no. 2018-000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018, this Court stated that: ‘[t]he Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all the legislator’s decisions must contemplate a technical study, since said situation would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the judgment of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule on the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness’. Thus, not all the legislator’s decisions must contemplate a technical study, since said situation would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the judgment of third parties who lack democratic representation, stating that technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule on the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment no. 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019). In this matter, the Chamber has referred to the principle of discretion or free configuration of the legislator (libre configuración del legislador), mentioned in judgment no. 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, according to which, the Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (article 121, section 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power; a margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter that has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has—limited only by the Law of the Constitution—, in the face of a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment no. 2016-010244 of 9:05 a.m. on July 20, 2016 and recently in judgment 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020). Under this perspective, the consultants are not correct in considering that the leaves and permits contained in these articles 39 to 41 are unconstitutional for the sole reason that, according to their claim, they are not justified by cost studies or the corresponding sources of resources to cover them. On the other hand, the consultants did not provide sufficient elements of judgment to affirm that the consulted norms cause, per se, an increase in costs that would put State finances at risk, or that there are no sources of resources for their implementation. Due to these circumstances, the argument raised regarding this point is rejected.

(…)

**Absence of objective reasons or technical criteria to expand grounds for maternity leave:** Regarding article 42, which provides for the extension of maternity leave, the consultants argue that it is a numeral containing a series of cases in which this extension is applicable (premature birth, children with severe disabilities and/or chronic illnesses, and multiple births); however, they consider that the bill does not contemplate the objective reasons or the technical or scientific criteria that justify including these grounds and not others. In this regard, it is again observed that the disagreement lies in the exercise of the free configuration or discretion of the legislator and, at its core, the opposition of the consultants lies again in that technical-scientific criteria were not taken into account to define the cases under which said leave could be extended. In this regard, it must be reiterated what was indicated in judgment no. 2018-00230, by which the Constitutional Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all the legislator’s decisions must contemplate a technical study, since that, as has been said, would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the judgment of third parties who lack democratic representation. In this sense, it is not proven that, in this case, technical studies were necessary, so the alleged unconstitutionality is dismissed.

**Lack of technical studies regarding paternity leave:** Regarding the paternity leave of article 41 of the bill, which grants a leave with pay for one calendar month, after the day of birth or at the time of adoption of the minor, the consultants claim that the case file does not indicate—once again—the studies or technical criteria that indicate the cost to the State of granting this leave nor the source of financing. In this regard, indisputably, on this point the Chamber observes that the arguments of the consultants are reiterated in relation to what was analyzed supra in point a); consequently, it refers to what was indicated there and reiterates that it is a questioning that does not have the virtue of violating the Law of the Constitution, and therefore the formulation raised is rejected. (…) The Chamber finds no defects of unconstitutionality in the aspects questioned regarding articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the consulted bill, as it is a matter of legislative discretion, the mandatory consultation with the CCSS having been fulfilled, and not having elements that must determine that the legislator had to have a prior technical study in this case.” (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Finally, in advisory opinion no. 2022-025307, the majority of the Chamber considered that “demanding a technical study in any and all cases of exercise of the legislative function would empty the principle of free configuration of the legislator (libre configuración del legislador) of content.” In accordance with the cited background, there is no inescapable duty of the Asamblea Legislativa to submit to technical studies for any and all norms it must issue, but rather to duly justify its decision on criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in light of the pertinent inputs that are brought to the legislative discussion (in this case, the knowledge derived from experience in the exercise of various functions in the municipal sphere, assessment of municipal budgets, etc.). Said criteria were reasonably met in the specific case which, as has been said, occurred in an unprecedented and particularly uncertain framework, in which it was justified to legislate without demanding exact data, which the situation made impossible to specify. Thus, in this regard, the alleged defect of unconstitutionality is dismissed.

In another vein, the plaintiff argues that the rules in question will cause the administrative spending of the municipalities to grow disproportionately, with the eventual consequences that public services will be affected and, they could even cause indebtedness that ultimately impacts public finances and the pockets of all taxpayers. In this regard, this Chamber considers that the President of the Legislative Assembly is correct in the sense that the challenged provisions—arts. 4 and 5 of law no. 9848—do not imply an order or an incentive for the municipalities to increase their administrative spending, but rather an exceptional possibility to dispose of other resources to finance their regular operation, based on the premise that as a consequence of the pandemic and the facilities and moratoriums contemplated, they will receive less money in items or revenues that would normally finance their management—licenses, patents, etc.—. Furthermore, it is necessary to highlight that the possibility of extraordinary financing with other municipal resources was ordered temporarily and exceptionally (budgetary years 2020 and 2021), under the express condition that it must not be used to expand the municipal payroll and that, in addition, they can be used for the provision of essential services. Thus, it is verified that the legislative decision is aimed not only at making the budgetary resources of the municipality more flexible, but also at safeguarding the continuity of public services, especially those of the municipalities, which are responsible for the administration of local interests and services in each canton (art. 169 of the Political Constitution). Secondly, this Chamber considers that the PGR is correct in the sense that the claims made by the plaintiff—about possible indebtedness and the need to resort to public credit—are nothing more than mere speculation and hypothetical assessments that were not accompanied by solid studies that could substantiate their claims. In this regard, the PGR states the following:

“Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to recall the jurisprudential line of this high Court regarding the need to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportionality is not evident, because otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective assessment or value judgment of the plaintiff (…) In this respect, the appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree to determine the constitutional invalidity of the challenged provisions, nor does he consider that, pursuant to article 121, subsection 15), of the Political Constitution, loans intended to have the State guarantee must pass through the control of the Legislative Assembly in order to be approved.” In other words, the action of unconstitutionality refers to mere hypothetical scenarios—exponential growth of public spending, detriment to public services, and an increase in the tax burden—that are also not properly substantiated by serious and real economic projections (which is precisely the omission the plaintiff criticizes). So, in the terms in which the action was raised, without solid arguments or evidence, and barely a month after approval, they do not allow for the accreditation of an alleged unreasonableness that has threatened the constitutional principles invoked by the plaintiff. Likewise, the PGR is correct when it points out that the assumptions made in the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality omit to contemplate the rules established in the Political Constitution regarding the approval of loans (arts. 121 subsection 15 and 174).

Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is also important to emphasize that the rules questioned here do not entail the nullification of other constitutional and legal provisions that seek to ensure the balance of municipal budgets and prevent, in practice, the pernicious effects that concern the plaintiff. In this sense, it must be stressed that the municipal corporations are subject to the principles of budgetary balance, sustainability, transparency, and responsibility derived from the provisions of art. 176 of the Political Constitution, which orders the following:

“Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, which shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides. The ordinary budget of the Republic includes all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, throughout the entire economic year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenses exceed that of probable revenues. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the foregoing rules when issuing its budgets. The budget of the Republic shall be issued for the term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December.” And, for this purpose, the CGR is concurrently responsible for ensuring that the municipalities annually comply with such constitutional mandates. This is why art. 175 of the Political Constitution establishes that the validity of municipal budgets depends on the approval of the Contraloría, the body responsible for overseeing their proper execution. In which case it is also appropriate to cite the rules of the Municipal Code that regulate the subject of municipal budgets, which are subject to the control of the CGR, but also to specific and concrete rules that prevent them from disproportionately increasing public spending:

“Art. 106. - The ordinary budget and the extraordinary budgets of the municipalities must be approved by the Contraloría General de la República. The ordinary budget must be submitted no later than September 30 of each year and the extraordinary ones, within fifteen days following their approval. Both terms shall be non-extendable. All budgets sent to the Contraloría must be accompanied by a copy of the minutes of the sessions in which they were approved. In these, the respective budget must be transcribed in full, they shall be signed by the secretary and countersigned by the municipal mayor: in addition, the Annual Operational Plan, the Municipal Development Plan, and the certification of the municipal treasurer regarding the corresponding budgetary backing must be included.

Art. 107. - If the ordinary budget is not presented in a timely manner to the Contraloría General de la República, the previous year's budget shall govern for the next period, except for expenditures that, by their nature, are only effective in the referenced year. In any case, the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities that may result from such omission must be determined. To resolve this situation, the Council must hear and approve the pertinent extraordinary budgets.

Art. 108. - Once the budget is approved by the Contraloría General de la República, the original shall be sent to the municipal secretariat, where it will remain in custody, and a copy shall be sent to the municipal mayor, to the internal accountant or auditor, to each of the proprietary council members, as well as to the other offices as agreed by the Council or indicated by the regulation.

Art. 109. - Within a single budgeted program, modifications to the current budgets shall proceed when so agreed by the Council. The approval of the Council, with the vote of two-thirds of its members, shall be required for a modification from one program to another. The ordinary budget may not be modified to increase salaries or create new positions, except in the case of adjustments due to the application of the minimum wage decree or due to collective labor conventions or agreements, in the first case where new employees are required due to the expansion of services or the provision of a new one, in the second case. Adjustments produced by the negotiation of collective labor conventions or agreements or any others that imply modifying ordinary budgets shall only proceed when it is proven, during the processing of disputes or in the pertinent proceedings, that the cost of living has increased substantially according to the price indices of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and the Dirección General de Estadística y Censos.

Art. 110. - Ordinary fixed expenses may only be financed with ordinary income of the municipality. Extraordinary income may only be obtained through extraordinary budgets, which may be used to reinforce existing or new programs. These budgets may be agreed upon in ordinary or extraordinary sessions.

Art. 111. - The Contraloría General de la República must approve or reject the budget projects it receives. It shall reject them within a period of one month from receipt, in a reasoned resolution, and the approval may be partial or total, for violation of the legal system or for lack of resources. It may introduce modifications to the projects only with the consent of the Council.

Art. 112. - The municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments if there is no existing budget sub-item that covers the expenditure or when the approved sub-item is depleted or proves insufficient; nor may they pay with charge to one expenditure sub-item for expenditures that correspond to another. The violation of the foregoing shall be grounds for suspension of the responsible official or employee, and recidivism shall be grounds for separation.” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

All the foregoing provisions remain in force and are inevitably applicable to both municipal governments and the CGR, in order to ensure that municipal budgets are formulated and executed responsibly. So the application of the exceptions provided for in the challenged rules must be carried out in light of the general mandates that bind the aforementioned authorities with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the order and balance of municipal and national finances.

In summary, the questioned precepts do not entail or imply an incentive to increase public spending, but rather are flexibility tools so that the municipalities, in a context of health emergency and support for local taxpayers, can enable expanding the established ceiling regarding municipal taxes and ordinary income for the payment of ordinary expenses of the municipal administration and essential municipal services. The foregoing, of course, is subject and subordinate to constitutional principles and the controls that the CGR is responsible for exercising in the approval of municipal budgets.

As a corollary of the considerations made, this Court concludes that the defects of unconstitutionality attributed to the challenged rules were not substantiated.

**V.- FOR ABUNDANT CAUTION. Drafter: Magistrate Garita Navarro.** From a general standpoint, rules that seek to regulate aspects related to the financial regime of public entities, within this, matters concerning financing schemes and spending regimes, under ordinary conditions, require technical analyses that determine the details and content of the proposed regulation. Precisely, these analyses make it possible to define the reasonableness and proportionality of the regime of income, expenses, and direction of spending, allowing for the harmonization of the set of principles and regulations applicable to each of those components of the financial and budgetary structure, both at the level of Constitutional Law (arts. 18, 33, 45, 50, 176, among others), and the applicable legal norms (principles of Law No. 8131 and No. 7635). For example, the modification of a tax rate for a specific levy, as a financing mechanism, requires technical, economic, and accounting approaches to determine that this reworking does not constitute an illegitimate transfer of the contributory duty. Only from that antecedent analysis could one infer the non-confiscatory nature, progressivity, or equality of that imposition. The same can be said of percentage allocations of spending, as well as its destination in terms of current or capital expenditure, for the increase or decrease in each of the budget items or accounting accounts inserted in the budget requires a balance of probable income and destination of spending, in accordance with planning schemes, as well as compliance with legal duties regarding the destination of spending or service-provision duties.

However, strictly speaking, the law being questioned was issued within an exceptional and special context, which is the declaration of the Covid-19 pandemic. Such a historical circumstance cannot and should not be set aside in this analysis, as it introduces a non-existent variable under the normal conditions of technical reasonableness and proportionality control of this type of regulation. If one looks at that context, the law allows an increase in the percentage allocated to defraying administrative expenses of local entities regarding income derived from the tax on real estate (Ley No. 7509), whose clause 3 sets—under normal conditions—10% of that income, and in the municipal budget, whose ordinary ceiling is 40%—art. 102 of Law No. 7794, Municipal Code—to allow a temporary ceiling for the periods 2020 and 2021 of 50%. That relative increase of 30% and 10% respectively, in each of those sources, is based on the evident risk inherent to the pandemic, of the budgetary financial impact on the revenue items associated with fiscal burdens that weigh on the residents. Faced with that risk, considering that administrative expenses are operational costs of a current nature, and that they involve budgetary commitments that could not be avoided by the local entity, in essence, the challenged legal norm allows a higher percentage allocation of that income to finance that type of spending and thereby not generate a budgetary imbalance or an imbalance in the revenue regime that forces imposing additional burdens on the administered parties, or else, reducing remuneration expenses or operational expenses. This latter option would entail a deterioration in the service-provision regime of the public entity, given the reduction of resources allocated to the ordinary activities of the Administration, as well as those directed to defraying the personnel available for public service, but at the same time, diminishing the salary income of that human resource. Certainly, the redirection of spending could generate a decrease in the levels of provision of public services of water, cemeteries, garbage collection, among others, however, the same regulation enables the allocation of those resources to such purposes.

Given this panorama, it is clear that the norm is issued in the context of a regime of urgency and necessity, a theory that, in light of clauses 219 and 226 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, enables and empowers the adoption of singular and exceptional measures that allow the public interest to be protected, which, in this case, is realized in the continuity of the public service through contingent measures of financial health. Otherwise, the strict application of the percentage spending allocation rules, embodied in those norms (10% and 40%), coupled with the reduction of the local entity's ordinary income, would put the principle of financial balance and sustainability emanating from clause 176 of the Political Constitution, regarding the public spending regime, at high vulnerability. Thus, given the exceptional situation, the authorities opted to appeal to mechanisms of social participation, characteristic of a democratic order, by means of which, with the integration of the various social actors in working groups, contingency measures, of temporary adjustment, were determined, which were considered reasonable and convenient to react to the financial risk situation that was anticipated from the economic impact generated by the aforementioned pandemic.

In these terms, it should be noted that the questioned rules do not project an increase in municipal spending, but rather a temporary permissibility of internal reallocation of the spending regime, for the purpose of raising the aforementioned ceilings, in order to adjust administrative operation to the costing that the impact on tax revenues could generate. Faced with this historical contingency, it was unlikely to have objective parameters that would allow defining, with scientific rigor, what measure of increase in the spending allocation was necessary. Precisely, the mechanism adopted (working groups) is considered a legitimate means to react to the immediate consequences of the pandemic in the sphere of municipal tax revenues. Furthermore, even though a technical unreasonableness in the adopted measures is alleged, the plaintiff provides no element that allows for the proposed analysis. This Chamber has been consistent regarding the need to provide objective parameters in order to define the concurrence or not of a technical bias in the adoption of this type of norm. The insufficiency in this matter subjects this Court to speculation about the content of the questioned rule and imposes on it the burden of making comparisons and assessments without having the parameters or minimum elements to do so. Hence, it finds no merit to declare the unconstitutionality of the questioned regulations.

**VI.- CONCLUSION.** This Court concludes that the plaintiff incurred in an improper invocation of the content of arts. 1 and 11 of the Law to support the local taxpayer, and reinforce the financial management of the municipalities, before the national emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic, no. 9848. The foregoing, since, as was verified, the allegations of unconstitutionality revolved around the parliamentary proposal and not the terms in which the rules were approved by the Legislative Assembly. As stated *supra*, there are sufficient elements to outright reject the action regarding such clauses. However, in view of the procedural status, the Chamber declares them without merit.

Regarding arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged legislation, this Chamber dismissed the grievances of unconstitutionality raised.

Therefore, it is necessary to declare the action of unconstitutionality without merit.

**VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.** The parties are warned that if any document was provided on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new technology-produced device, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, all material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.-

POR TANTO:

The action is dismissed.- Nombre318 .

. Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V. José Roberto Garita N.

. Nombre4702 .

1 Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule to that effect (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness. (Criterion reiterated in advisory opinion n.°2020-015542).

Likewise, one may consult advisory opinion n.°2020-010160, in which the Chamber resolved certain doubts of constitutionality regarding the bill on the regulation of the concept of "usury," in which this Court noted the following:

"Thus, given the hypothetical nature of the possible harms with unreasonable and disproportionate effects on a segment of the population or the economy, this Chamber considers that it cannot, under those conditions, validly limit the margin of initiative of the legislator, who is the competent body obligated to seek a solution to the problem of the omission of the usury rate. The contrary, in these circumstances, would be harmful to the independence of parliament. At this stage, where the proposal has not produced effects such that it can be assessed—with objective and certain criteria—whether the result will actually be negative, capable of stripping the rule of reasonableness and proportionality—due to its effects—, the Chamber considers that it must reserve a broader margin for the legislator than the margin the Chamber has in matters of subsequent judicial review through the procedure of an acción de inconstitucionalidad, where it can indeed assess the unconstitutional effects of a given piece of legislation. As long as the rule has not produced effects that are objectively measurable and there are disparate technical studies in the case file, we are still in the realm of hypothesis, and the Chamber would be remiss, without certain evidence, to limit the exercise of constitutional powers belonging to the highest body of popular representation, following a democratic debate spanning more than a decade, without clear studies demonstrating that the rule will result disproportionate in its effects." In that advisory opinion, Justice Castillo Víquez set forth additional reasons that serve to illustrate the Chamber's thesis:

"A matter of great depth raised in this question—regarding the alleged violation of the principle of technical reasonableness—is whether it is possible to exercise a kind of review of discretion over legislative or parliamentary activity. As is well known, the review of discretion is a technique that arose to verify whether the activity of the Public Administration conforms to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience. Ergo, the exercise of discretionary powers is subject to the general principles of Law, and to the review of determinative facts and indeterminate legal concepts, as well as the regulated elements of the administrative act, by the Judge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. It is evident, and as far as I recall, nowhere in the world has this aberration been reached, that this review be applied to parliamentary activity; this type of review could never be exercised over legislative or parliamentary activity, as Parliament would be reduced to a minimum expression, and a core element of the republican system would be dislocated. What is possible is to exercise a constitutional review of parliamentary activity and, consequently, of the final parliamentary act, be it a legislative decree or agreement, for violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality when they are linked to a fundamental right and, consequently, empty its essential content. The foregoing means, in plain terms, that the legislator, in the exercise of the power to legislate, the power of self-regulation, of political control, of political direction, etc., has a broad margin of discretion, a kind of legislative policy, and may therefore opt for a multiplicity of variables within the framework of a plural, democratic body, where political concertation constitutes a necessary channel, especially when, in a constitutional term or legislature, a political party or the governing party lacks a parliamentary majority. That margin of discretion is exempt from constitutional review, for if this were not so, the Constitutional Court would substitute the will of Parliament, causing a severe dislocation to the democratic system, especially by very significantly harming the principle of separation of powers. That said, Parliament has ample freedom to follow a particular technical criterion or depart from it, provided it does not thereby affect the essential content of a fundamental right and, consequently, also violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as this Court has established regarding impact on the environment, where it has required, for the Law to pass constitutional scrutiny, that there be technical studies or respective compensations demonstrating that there is no harm to the environment. The foregoing is even truer when, during the discussion of a bill, there are different or contradictory technical criteria. In such scenarios, the legislator is not bound to follow a particular technical criterion, but may well adopt a political decision taking other elements of judgment into consideration. In other words, it is not possible to declare a Law unconstitutional because it departed from one or more technical criteria—this is typical of a review of the activity of the Public Administration—except when such omission entails the violation of the essential content of a fundamental right." Even in matters of disposition of public funds, while a proper justification of the decision is necessary to determine its reasonableness, this Chamber has not demanded technical studies as strict as the one requested by the petitioner. For example, in the legislative consultation on the Ley Marco de Empleo Público, resolution n.°2021-017098, this Chamber resolved the following:

"Lack of cost study: [Consultants] indicate that, at the time of incorporating these leaves and permits into the bill, no cost study or source of resources to cover them was taken into consideration. In this regard, one must not lose sight of the fact that the legislator has a broad margin of legislative discretion in the formation of laws; a criterion that has been repeatedly upheld by the Constitutional Chamber, noting that, in principle, it is not strictly necessary for all legislative decisions to be accompanied by technical or financial studies. Thus, for example, in judgment n° 2018-000230 of 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018, this Court stated that: '[t]he Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule to that effect (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness.' Thus, not all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation, stating that technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule to that effect (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter demands them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment n° 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019). In this matter, the Chamber has referred to the principle of discretion or free configuration of the legislator, mentioned in judgment n° 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, according to which the Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing rules of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (article 121, subsection 1°, of the Constitución Política), enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program set by the Constituent Power; a margin of maneuver regarding the regulated subject matter that has also been termed legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has—limited only by the Law of the Constitution—, faced with a specific need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment n° 2016-010244 of 9:05 a.m. on July 20, 2016, and recently in judgment 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020). From this perspective, the consultants are not correct in considering that the leaves and permits contained in these articles 39 to 41 are unconstitutional solely because, according to their claim, they are not justified by cost studies or the corresponding sources of resources to cover them. On the other hand, the consultants did not provide sufficient elements of judgment to allow affirming that the consulted rules cause, per se, an increase in costs that would put State finances at risk, or that there are no sources of resources for their implementation. Due to these circumstances, the argument raised regarding this point is rejected.

(…)

Absence of objective reasons or technical criteria for expanding grounds for maternity leave: Regarding article 42, which contemplates the extension of maternity leave, the consultants argue that it is a provision containing a series of scenarios in which that extension is applicable (premature birth, children with severe disability and/or chronic illnesses, and multiple births); however, they consider that the bill does not contemplate the objective reasons or the technical or scientific criteria that justify including those grounds and not others. In this regard, it is again observed that the disagreement lies in the exercise of the free configuration or discretion of the legislator, and, at its core, the consultants' opposition again lies in the fact that technical-scientific criteria were not taken into account to define the scenarios under which the aforementioned leave could be extended. In this regard, one must reiterate what was stated in judgment n° 2018-00230, whereby the Constitutional Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since that, as has been said, would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. In this sense, it is not proven that, in this case, technical studies were necessary, so the alleged unconstitutionality is dismissed.

Lack of technical studies regarding paternity leave: Regarding the paternity leave in article 41 of the bill, which grants a leave with full pay for one calendar month after the day of birth or the moment of adoption of the minor, the consultants complain that the file does not indicate—again—the studies or technical criteria indicating the cost to the State of granting this leave, nor the source of financing. In this regard, indisputably, on this point the Chamber observes that the consultants' arguments are reiterated in relation to what was analyzed supra in point a); consequently, it refers to what was stated there and reiterates that this is a questioning that does not have the virtue of violating the Law of the Constitution, so the formulation raised is rejected.

(…)

The Chamber finds no defects of unconstitutionality in the aspects questioned regarding articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the consulted bill, as it is a matter of legislative discretion, having fulfilled the mandatory consultation with the CCSS, and lacking elements to determine that the legislator was required, in this case, to have a prior technical study." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Finally, in advisory opinion n.°2022-025307, the majority of the Chamber considered that "demanding a technical study in any and all cases of exercise of the legislative function would empty the principle of the legislator's free configuration of its content." In accordance with the cited precedents, there is no unavoidable duty of the Asamblea Legislativa to submit to technical studies for any rules it must issue, but rather to duly justify its decision based on criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in light of the pertinent inputs brought to the legislative discussion (in this case, the knowledge derived from experience in the exercise of various functions in the municipal sphere, assessment of municipal budgets, etc.). These criteria were reasonably met in the specific case, which, as has been said, occurred in an unprecedented and particularly uncertain context, in which legislating without demanding exact data—data the situation prevented from being precise—was justified. Therefore, in this regard, the alleged defect of unconstitutionality is dismissed.

In another vein, the petitioner argues that the rules in question will cause the administrative expenditure of the municipalities to grow disproportionately, with the eventual consequences of affecting public services and even possibly causing indebtedness that will ultimately impact public finances and the pockets of all taxpayers. In this regard, this Chamber considers that the President of the Asamblea Legislativa is correct in that the impugned provisions —arts. 4 and 5 of Law n.° 9848— do not imply an order or an incentive for municipalities to increase their administrative expenses, but rather an exceptional possibility to dispose of other resources to finance their regular operation, starting from the premise that, as a consequence of the pandemic and the relief and moratorium measures contemplated, they will receive less money in items or revenues that would normally finance their management —licenses, patents, etc.—. Furthermore, it is necessary to highlight that the possibility of extraordinary financing with other municipal resources was ordered temporarily and exceptionally (budget years 2020 and 2021), under the express condition that it must not be used to expand the municipal payroll and that, additionally, it may be used for the provision of essential services. Thereby, it is confirmed that the legislative decision is aimed not only at making the municipality's budgetary resources more flexible but also at safeguarding the continuity of public services, especially those of the municipalities, which are responsible for the administration of local interests and services in each canton (art. 169 of the Constitución Política). Secondly, this Chamber considers that the PGR is correct in that the statements made by the petitioner —about possible indebtedness and the need to resort to public credit— are mere speculations and hypothetical assessments that were not accompanied by solid studies that could substantiate his claims. In this regard, the PGR states the following:

"Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is worth recalling the jurisprudential line of this high Court to the effect that it is necessary to have some element of judgment or contrast to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportion is not evident, for otherwise its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective assessment or value judgment of the petitioner.

(…)

In this respect, the appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a degree sufficient to determine the constitutional invalidity of the impugned provisions; nor does he consider that, pursuant to article 121, subsection 15), of the Constitución Política, loans, in order to have the State's endorsement, must pass through the control of the Asamblea Legislativa to be approved." In other words, the acción de inconstitucionalidad refers to mere hypothetical scenarios —exponential growth of public spending, detriment to public services, and increase in the tax burden— that are also not duly based on serious and real economic projections (which is precisely the omission the petitioner reproaches). Therefore, in the terms in which the action was filed, without solid arguments or evidence, and barely a month after approval, it does not allow proving an alleged unreasonableness that threatened the constitutional principles invoked by the petitioner. Likewise, the PGR is correct in noting that the assumptions made in the brief filing the acción de inconstitucionalidad omit considering the rules established in the Constitución Política regarding the approval of loans (arts. 121 subsection 15 and 174).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also important to emphasize that the rules questioned here do not imply rendering ineffective other provisions of constitutional and legal order that seek to ensure the balance of municipal budgets and prevent, in practice, the harmful effects that concern the petitioner. In this sense, it must be stressed that municipal corporations are subject to the principles of budgetary balance, sustainability, transparency, and responsibility derived from the provisions of art. 176 of the Constitución Política, which orders the following:

"Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides.

The ordinary budget of the Republic comprises all probable revenues and all authorized expenditures of the Public Administration for the entire fiscal year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenditures exceed that of probable revenues.

The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the foregoing rules in issuing its budgets.

The budget of the Republic shall be issued for the term of one year, from the first of January to the thirty-first of December." And to this end, the CGR is correspondingly responsible for ensuring that municipalities annually comply with such constitutional mandates. That is why art. 175 of the Constitución Política establishes that the validity of municipal budgets depends on the approval of the Contraloría, the body responsible for overseeing their proper execution. In which case, it is also appropriate to cite the rules of the Código Municipal that regulate the subject of municipal budgets, which are subject to the control of the CGR, but also to specific and concrete rules that prevent them from disproportionately increasing public spending:

"Art. 106. - The ordinary budget and the extraordinary budgets of the municipalities must be approved by the Contraloría General de la República. The ordinary budget must be submitted no later than September 30 of each year, and the extraordinary budgets within fifteen days following their approval. Both deadlines shall be non-extendable.

To all budgets sent to the Contraloría, a copy of the minutes of the sessions in which they were approved shall be attached." In them, the respective budget must be transcribed in full, be signed by the secretary, and be countersigned by the municipal mayor: in addition, the Annual Operating Plan (Plan operativo anual), the Municipal Development Plan (Plan de desarrollo municipal), and the certification of the municipal treasurer regarding the corresponding budgetary backing must be included.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 107. - If the ordinary budget is not submitted in a timely manner to the Contraloría General de la República, the previous year's budget shall govern for the next period, except for expenditures which, by their nature, are effective only in the referenced year. In any case, the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities that may result from such omission must be determined. To resolve this situation, the Council (Concejo) must hear and approve the relevant extraordinary budgets.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 108. - Once the budget has been approved by the Contraloría General de la República, the original shall be sent to the municipal secretary's office, where it shall remain in custody, and copies shall be sent to the municipal mayor, to the accountant or internal auditor, to each of the proprietary council members (regidores propietarios), as well as to the other offices agreed upon by the Council or indicated in the regulation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 109. - Within the same budgeted program, modifications to the current budgets shall proceed when agreed upon by the Council. The modification from one program to another shall require the Council's approval by a vote of two-thirds of its members.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The ordinary budget may not be modified to increase salaries or create new positions, except in the case of adjustments due to the application of the minimum wage decree or due to collective labor conventions or agreements, in the first case when new employees are required due to the expansion of services or the provision of a new one, in the second case</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Adjustments produced by the negotiation of collective labor conventions or agreements or any others that imply modifying the ordinary budgets shall only proceed when it is proven, in the course of processing disputes or in the pertinent proceedings, that the cost of living has increased substantially according to the price indices of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and the Dirección General de Estadística y Censos.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 110. - Ordinary fixed expenses may only be financed with ordinary income of the municipality.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Extraordinary income may only be obtained through extraordinary budgets, which may be allocated to reinforce existing or new programs. These budgets may be agreed upon in ordinary or extraordinary sessions.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 111. -</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The Contraloría General de la República must approve or reject the budget projects it receives. It shall reject them within a period of one month from receipt, in a reasoned resolution, and approval may be partial or total, for violation of the legal system or lack of resources.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">It may introduce modifications to the projects only with the consent of the Council</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Art. 112. -</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments if there is no budget sub-line item (subpartida presupuestaria) that covers the expenditure or when the approved sub-line item is exhausted or proves insufficient; neither may they pay, charged to one expenditure sub-line item, amounts that correspond to another.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Violation of the foregoing provision shall be grounds for suspension of the responsible official or employee, and recidivism shall be cause for removal.”</span><span> </span><span>(The emphasis does not correspond to the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>All the foregoing provisions remain in force and are of unavoidable application both for municipal governments and for the CGR, to ensure that municipal budgets are formulated and executed responsibly. Therefore, the application of the exceptions provided for in the challenged rules must be carried out in light of the general mandates that bind the aforementioned authorities, with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the order and balance of municipal and national finances.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>In sum, the questioned precepts do not entail or imply an incentive to increase public spending; rather, they are flexibility tools so that municipalities, in a context of a health emergency and support for local taxpayers, enable expanding the established ceiling for municipal taxes and ordinary income used to pay ordinary expenses of the municipal administration and essential municipal services. The foregoing, of course, subject to and conditioned by constitutional principles and the controls that the CGR is responsible for exercising in the approval of municipal budgets.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>As a corollary of the considerations made, this Court concludes that the defects of unconstitutionality attributed to the challenged rules were not proven.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">V.- BY WAY OF FURTHER AMPLIFICATION. Written by Magistrate Garita Navarro.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>From a general standpoint, rules that seek to regulate aspects related to the financial regime of public entities, within that, matters pertaining to financing schemes and spending regimes under ordinary conditions, require technical analyses that determine the details and content of the proposed regulation. Precisely, those analyses make it possible to define the reasonableness and proportionality of the regime of revenues, expenditures, and allocation of spending, allowing the harmonization of the set of principles and regulations applicable to each of those components of the financial and budgetary structure, both at the level of Constitutional Law (Articles 18, 33, 45, 50, 176, among others) and of the applicable legal norms (principles of Ley No. 8131 and No. 7635). For example, modifying a tax rate for a specific levy, as a financing mechanism, requires technical, economic, and accounting approaches to determine that this redesign does not constitute an illegitimate transfer of the contributive duty. Only based on that prior analysis could one infer the non-confiscatory nature, progressivity, or equality of that imposition. The same can be said of percentage allocations of spending, as well as its destination in terms of current or capital expenditure, since the increase or decrease in each of the line items or accounting accounts included in the budget requires a balance of probable income and destination of spending, according to planning schemes, as well as compliance with legal duties regarding spending destination or service-provision duties.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>However, strictly speaking, the law being challenged is issued within an exceptional and special context, namely the declaration of the Covid-19 pandemic. Such a historical circumstance cannot and should not be set aside in this analysis, as it introduces a variable that does not exist under the normal conditions of controlling the reasonableness and technical proportionality of this type of regulation. Looking at that context, the law permits an increase in the percentage allocated to covering the administrative expenses of local entities from the revenues derived from the real estate tax (Ley No. 7509), whose Article 3 sets —under normal conditions— 10% of that revenue, and from the municipal budget, whose ordinary ceiling is 40% —Art. 102 of Ley No. 7794, Código Municipal— to allow a temporary ceiling for the 2020 and 2021 periods of 50%. That relative increase of 30% and 10%, respectively, in each of those sources, is based on the obvious risk inherent in the pandemic, of the budgetary and financial impact on the revenue line items associated with tax burdens on the residents. Faced with that risk, considering that administrative expenses are operational costs of a current nature and represent budgetary commitments that could not be avoided by the local entity, in essence, the challenged legal rule allows a higher percentage allocation of those revenues to finance that type of spending and thus not generate a budgetary imbalance or an imbalance in the revenue regime that forces the imposition of additional burdens on the administered parties, or else, reducing remunerations or operational expenses. This last option would entail a deterioration in the service-provision regime of the public entity, due to the reduction of resources allocated to the ordinary activities of the Administration, as well as to those directed to paying the personnel available for public service, but at the same time, decreasing the salary income of that human resource. Certainly, redirecting spending could generate a decrease in the levels of provision of public services such as water, cemeteries, garbage collection, among others; however, the same regulation enables the allocation of those resources to such purposes.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>In view of this panorama, it is clear that the rule is issued in the context of a regime of urgency and necessity, a theory which, in light of articles 219 and 226 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, enables and authorizes the adoption of singular and exceptional measures that allow safeguarding the public interest, which, in this case, is realized in the continuity of public service through contingent measures of financial health. Otherwise, the strict application of the spending allocation percentages set forth in those rules (10% and 40%), coupled with the reduction in ordinary income of the local entity, would put the principle of financial balance and sustainability that emanates from Article 176 of the Constitución Política, regarding the public spending regime, in high vulnerability. Thus, given the exceptional situation, the authorities opted to resort to mechanisms of social participation characteristic of a democratic order, through which, with the integration of various social actors at working groups (mesas de trabajo), contingent measures of temporary adjustment were determined, which were deemed reasonable and convenient to react to the situation of financial risk anticipated from the economic impact generated by the said pandemic.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>In those terms, note that the challenged rules do not project an increase in municipal spending, but rather a temporary permissibility of internal reallocation of the spending regime, in order to raise the already-mentioned ceilings to adjust the administrative functioning to the costing that the impact on tax revenues could generate. Faced with that historical contingency, it was unlikely to have objective parameters that would allow defining, with scientific rigor, what measure of increase in spending allocation was necessary. Precisely, the adopted mechanism (working groups) is considered a legitimate means to react to the immediate consequences of the pandemic at the level of municipal fiscal revenues. Moreover, although a technical unreasonableness in the adopted measures is alleged, the claimant provides no element that permits the proposed analysis. This Chamber has been consistent regarding the need to provide objective parameters to be able to define the concurrence or not of a technical bias in the adoption of this type of rule. The insufficiency on this point subjects this Court to speculation about the content of the challenged rule and imposes on it the burden of making comparisons and assessments without having the minimum parameters or elements for doing so. Hence, it finds no merit to declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VI.- CONCLUSION.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>This Court concludes that the claimant improperly invoked the content of Articles 1 and 11 of the Law to support the local taxpayer, and reinforce the financial management of municipalities, in the face of the national emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic, No. 9848. The foregoing, since, as was verified, the claims of unconstitutionality revolved around the parliamentary proposal and not the terms in which the rules were approved by the Asamblea Legislativa. As stated</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">supra</span><span>, there are sufficient elements to dismiss the action outright with respect to such articles. However, in view of the procedural stage, the Chamber declares them without merit.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>Regarding Articles 4 and 5 of the challenged legislation, this Chamber dismissed the alleged grievances of unconstitutionality.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10.5pt\"><span>Therefore, it is proper to declare the acción de inconstitucionalidad without merit.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span>CO10/23</span></p></div></body></html>" PRINCIPLES WITH JURISPRUDENCE", "resultado": "Without merit", "despachoOrden": "8", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "fecha": "2023-06-28", "tipoDocumento": "EXT", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "tipoContenido": "Majority vote", "sourceName": "Documentos", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">PRINCIPLE OF FREE CONFIGURATION OF THE LEGISLATOR. “…</span><span>The jurisprudential lines of this Court must be highlighted in the sense that this Chamber has rejected that “irremediably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study” because that attacks the very nature of Parliament in the sense that the legislator has discretion, within the framework of its right to free configuration, in order to weigh and adopt the norms it deems necessary. If it were a strictly technical body that must adhere to a single criterion, the very nature of legislative activity would be meaningless…” CO11/23</span></p></div></body></html>" }, "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "3", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "despachoOrden": "8", "enteSistematizador": "SALA CONSTITUCIONAL", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "0", "esVotoSalvado": "0", "expediente": "200102900007CO", "fecha": "2023-06-28", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "hora": "13:20", "id": "sen-1-0007-1178013", "numeroDocumento": "15596", "observaciones": "voted by ballot", "redactor": [ "Anamari Garro Vargas", "Jose Roberto Garita Navarro" ], "sentenciasRelacionadas": "sen-1-0007-1288058", "sentenciasMismoExpediente": "sen-1-0007-979491", "sourceName": "Documentos", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "resultado": "Without merit", "controlCons": "Dismissing Judgment", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:Calibri; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Exp: 20-10290-0007-CO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Res. No. 2023-015596</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at thirteen hours and twenty minutes on the twenty-eighth of June of two thousand twenty-three. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Action of unconstitutionality filed by </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Nombre4699</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">of legal age, married once, economist, resident of Escazú, identity card CED1962 against articles 1, 4, 5 and 11 of law No. 9848 of May 20, 2020, called “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">RESULTANDO:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">1.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By document received in the Sala Constitucional at 12:12 hrs. on June 10, 2020, Mr. Nombre4699</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, files an action of unconstitutionality against articles 1, 4, 5 and 11 of law No. 9848. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Regarding standing (legitimación)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">For purposes of supporting his standing (legitimación), the petitioner resorts to the absence of individual and direct harm, provided for in article 75, second paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC). Due to the nature of the norm, it is impossible for a prior process to exist. In the specific case, the absence of individual and direct harm derives from the fact that he is a taxpayer and resident of a municipal jurisdiction. The challenged norms would bring economic problems to the country due to an increase in administrative spending, which would become an additional burden on the citizens of the different cantons, who will have to bear the cost of such growth in spending and to the detriment of the provision of public services. It will also impact all the inhabitants of the country, as the State's transfer to the Municipalities could increase, which will increase the tax burden.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">On the merits </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">After transcribing the challenged norms, the petitioner points out what he considers the following economic inconsistencies:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Starting with </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 1</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, this would make the fiscal rule for the central government nugatory, which will be obliged to transfer the totality of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) or the government's level of indebtedness. Alternatively, it would force the government to make cuts in other areas to comply with the fiscal rule. The government could not make the proper convenience analysis and definition of priorities to determine which items it must cut. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 4</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, it lacks logic that this numeral authorizes, to face a pandemic, an increase in administrative expenses. Article 3 of law No. 7509 establishes a limit for administrative expenses of 10% of what is collected from real estate and the norm quadruples this limit. Considering that the real estate tax is the main source of fresh income for the municipalities, lifting the administrative spending cap could rather negatively impact the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of Covid-19. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 5</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, it increases to 50% the cap of 40% of ordinary income that the Código Municipal establishes to allocate to general administration expenses. It lacks logic to face the health crisis and puts the provision of public services at risk, because the collection of business licenses (patente) and permits is the second most important source of income for municipalities, and it will decrease due to the economic crisis and the closure of businesses caused by the pandemic and by the moratorium on payment of municipal taxes, public prices, and leases. Raising the ceiling for administrative expenses would be inconsistent in the face of that drop in income and would leave fewer resources to provide municipal services. The blow to municipal services is double: the lower collection will impact the provision of services, and the diversion to the administrative expenses category of a greater proportion of what is collected will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 11,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> the municipalities, the district municipal councils, and the cantonal sports committees are permanently excluded from compliance with the fiscal rule, and there has been no technical study in the legislative file that supports it. Furthermore, it is inconsistent since the purpose of the law is to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities in the face of the declared national emergency. Although municipal spending is not a direct part of the fiscal deficit calculation, which only contemplates the central government's income and expenditures, it affects it indirectly since the third most important source of fresh resources for municipalities are the transfers referred to in article 1 of the law under appeal. The debt situation incurred by local governments is worrying, because according to a report by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR), there will be a drop in income in the municipalities. This will accelerate indebtedness and eventually the payment of contracted loans, which in turn would affect the central State due to the guarantees granted in these cases. He warns of the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Given the expected drop in income that municipalities will experience, the pattern of indebtedness will accelerate. The drop in income, unfortunately, will also hinder the eventual repayment of the credits contracted. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">As is public and notorious, when a Municipality enters into a loan (empréstito), the lending entity always demands the State's guarantee. Therefore, if the Municipality defaults, then the Ministerio de Hacienda will have to honor the debt. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">The impact of municipal loans (empréstitos) would increase the debt service for the national government, which would increase, in turn, the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The petitioner develops the scope of the content of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">principle of financial equilibrium</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, based on resolution No. 2006-5979 of the Sala Constitucional. Said principle alludes to the sustainability of the State's fiscal accounts as a whole, and is applicable to all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold. The jurisprudence of the Chamber has established that the purposes of the central and decentralized Public Administration are not disconnected from the budgetary rules contained in the Political Constitution, which he exemplifies in resolution No. 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Court. The principle of financial equilibrium pursues sound fiscal administration and intends the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“The expenses of public institutions, without exception, adjust to their probable income, which covers both their own income and what they receive via transfers from the Executive Branch. There must be, therefore, a reasonable and fiscally healthy relationship between the annual increase in expenses and the probable income for each fiscal year of all state institutions”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Furthermore, all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold, have the obligation to adjust the growth of their budgets to the percentage of expenses fixed annually by the Executive Branch, and the budget is a technical and organizing instrument of the state economy. On the other hand, he refers to the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule, which he considers a derivation of the principle of financial equilibrium, insofar as, he estimates, it is a principle oriented to limiting the growth of current spending.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">After presenting a typology of constitutional principles, he estimates that the fiscal rule, although originating in a law, actually echoes principles and values contained in the Political Constitution. He indicates the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Precisely, the fiscal rule, although expressly only enshrined at the legal level, the truth is that it is a constitutional principle derived from the constitutional norm that enshrines the principle of budgetary equilibrium”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The fiscal rule is a constitutional principle that has the normative force of such principles and, therefore, integrates the parameter of constitutional validity in our system. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In another vein, the petitioner alludes to the scope of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">constitutional principle of technical reasonableness</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, which he estimates developed by the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and cites as an example resolution No. 1997-8724. All laws must adjust to the demands of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and said principle demands that laws must adjust to strict technical parameters, because otherwise fundamental rights and society in general are harmed. When the technical criteria indicate that only one decision is possible, its adoption is obligatory, and he points out, in this regard, article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), which he considers extrapolatable to the issuance of legal norms. He invokes, regarding the principle of reasonableness, resolutions numbers 2012-0266 and 2019-12745 of this Sala Constitucional. He concludes that both administrative acts and laws must be issued with absolute respect for the laws of science and technique, since otherwise they become absolutely null. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Now, regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">articles 1, 4, and 5</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the challenged law, the petitioner argues that they violate the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness. The logic of this set of provisions is perverse. If the first effect of the pandemic that municipal administrations will feel is the drop in income, it seems that the solution proposed of increasing spending is unreasonable and lacks sense. When we add to the exemption from the fiscal rule the effect that the application of articles 4 and 5 of the challenged regulation will produce, administrative spending will grow disproportionately and not the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality. The municipal administrative structures will become more expensive, without this translating into an improvement in the services that the local government must provide to its citizens. The norms would allow a disproportionate growth in administrative spending and not in what is necessary for the municipalities to perform properly. The above will propitiate an additional burden on the citizens of the cantons and eventually on all Costa Ricans, because the costs of municipal public services will increase, or the transfers that the State makes to the municipalities will have to be increased. The legal norms that are the subject of this process lack elements of technical reasonableness that justify them. It could even increase public credit, with a state guarantee, which could risk the fiscal deficit of the Central Government. He details the following </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In the present case, there are no technical studies that support the challenged norms, and rather these violate elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique, for which they are vitiated with unconstitutionality”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On the other hand, he indicates that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 11</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the law in question is contrary to the constitutional principles of budgetary equilibrium and the fiscal rule. He points out that the law lacks technical justification and that it establishes a permanent exclusion for municipal corporations, despite having been enacted to face a specific juncture. He insists that in the face of the drop in income that municipalities will experience, the pattern of indebtedness will accelerate, which will generate difficulty in the payment of credits and in turn, due to the guarantees already mentioned, will negatively affect the fiscal deficit. Only the validity of the fiscal rule would prevent municipalities from going into debt beyond their real possibilities of healthy income, given that in that case their budgets could not grow freely as authorized by the challenged norm. He affirms that “the challenged norm violates the constitutional principle of the fiscal rule”. He requests that articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 be declared unconstitutional. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">2.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> Through the resolution of </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">9:24 hrs. of June 16, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the Presidency of the Sala Constitucional gave course to the present action of unconstitutionality, against articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of law No. 9848. A hearing was granted to the Procurador General de la República, the President of the Asamblea Legislativa, and the Ministro de Hacienda, and the publication of the corresponding edicts was ordered.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">3.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">June 16, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the Secretariat of this Chamber issued the necessary commissions for the purpose of ordering the publication of the edicts ordered by article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC) in the Boletín Judicial. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">4.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The edicts referred to in article 81, second paragraph of the LJC were published in numbers 120, 121, and 122 of the Boletín Judicial of the days </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">24, 25, and 26 of June 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">5.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By document received on July 8, 2020, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase\">Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, in his capacity as </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase\">President of the Asamblea Legislativa, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">submitted a report.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By way of </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">background</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, he indicates that the norm originated in the Asamblea Legislativa as part of the measures to confront the Covid-19 pandemic. He mentions that the bill was the product of a dialogue effort with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He explains the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In that sense, legislative file 21.922, later Law 9848, formed part of the proposals that were born within the Legislative Branch, and was the product of the analysis and discussion that took place in a working group that was established as a response to the emergency, to develop the topic of municipal affairs, in coordination with authorities from that sector, such as the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI). This initiative was presented by 40 deputies from all political factions, and as the statement of motives points out, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">that law “will contribute to making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the Municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for economic reactivation</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">”. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(The highlighting does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">On the merits</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Now, regarding the constitutional reproaches, he refutes the idea that the norm obliges the central government to transfer all the resources to the municipalities, for which he reproduces article 5 of law No. 8114. What it obliges is that the transfer of resources be done in a timely manner, since the concern of municipalities that resources were transferred at the end of the budgetary year and that this hindered their execution has been frequent. He clarifies that the obligation of such a transfer is really found in law 8114 and points out the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In this way, when challenged article 1 points out that the transfer must be made “according to the percentage set forth in article 5 of Law 8114”, the only thing it does is to redound on the existing norm, it being that this provision does not make nugatory the provisions established in the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (LFFP), No. 9635, of December 3, 2018, in relation to the obligation that the government would have to make transfers before the different scenarios of the fiscal rule” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He reinforces the above with the content of the provisions in articles 15 and 25 of law No. 9635. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He points out that perhaps the petitioner's confusion originates from the fact that the original bill did contemplate the obligation to make said transfer, but that the formally enacted and valid law does not.PRINCIPLES WITH JURISPRUDENCE", "resultado": "Without merit", "despachoOrden": "8", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "fecha": "2023-06-28", "tipoDocumento": "EXT", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "tipoContenido": "Majority vote", "sourceName": "Documentos", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">PRINCIPLE OF FREE CONFIGURATION OF THE LEGISLATOR. “…</span><span>The jurisprudential lines of this Court must be highlighted in the sense that this Chamber has rejected that “irremediably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study” because that attacks the very nature of Parliament in the sense that the legislator has discretion, within the framework of its right to free configuration, in order to weigh and adopt the norms it deems necessary. If it were a strictly technical body that must adhere to a single criterion, the very nature of legislative activity would be meaningless…” CO11/23</span></p></div></body></html>" }, "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "3", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "despachoOrden": "8", "enteSistematizador": "SALA CONSTITUCIONAL", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "0", "esVotoSalvado": "0", "expediente": "200102900007CO", "fecha": "2023-06-28", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "hora": "13:20", "id": "sen-1-0007-1178013", "numeroDocumento": "15596", "observaciones": "voted by ballot", "redactor": [ "Anamari Garro Vargas", "Jose Roberto Garita Navarro" ], "sentenciasRelacionadas": "sen-1-0007-1288058", "sentenciasMismoExpediente": "sen-1-0007-979491", "sourceName": "Documentos", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "resultado": "Without merit", "controlCons": "Dismissing Judgment", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:Calibri; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Exp: 20-10290-0007-CO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Res. No. 2023-015596</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at thirteen hours and twenty minutes on the twenty-eighth of June of two thousand twenty-three. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Action of unconstitutionality filed by </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Nombre4699</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">of legal age, married once, economist, resident of Escazú, identity card CED1962 against articles 1, 4, 5 and 11 of law No. 9848 of May 20, 2020, called “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">RESULTANDO:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">1.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By document received in the Sala Constitucional at 12:12 hrs. on June 10, 2020, Mr. Nombre4699</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, files an action of unconstitutionality against articles 1, 4, 5 and 11 of law No. 9848. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Regarding standing (legitimación)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">For purposes of supporting his standing (legitimación), the petitioner resorts to the absence of individual and direct harm, provided for in article 75, second paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC). Due to the nature of the norm, it is impossible for a prior process to exist. In the specific case, the absence of individual and direct harm derives from the fact that he is a taxpayer and resident of a municipal jurisdiction. The challenged norms would bring economic problems to the country due to an increase in administrative spending, which would become an additional burden on the citizens of the different cantons, who will have to bear the cost of such growth in spending and to the detriment of the provision of public services. It will also impact all the inhabitants of the country, as the State's transfer to the Municipalities could increase, which will increase the tax burden.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">On the merits </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">After transcribing the challenged norms, the petitioner points out what he considers the following economic inconsistencies:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Starting with </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 1</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, this would make the fiscal rule for the central government nugatory, which will be obliged to transfer the totality of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) or the government's level of indebtedness. Alternatively, it would force the government to make cuts in other areas to comply with the fiscal rule. The government could not make the proper convenience analysis and definition of priorities to determine which items it must cut. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 4</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, it lacks logic that this numeral authorizes, to face a pandemic, an increase in administrative expenses. Article 3 of law No. 7509 establishes a limit for administrative expenses of 10% of what is collected from real estate and the norm quadruples this limit. Considering that the real estate tax is the main source of fresh income for the municipalities, lifting the administrative spending cap could rather negatively impact the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of Covid-19. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 5</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, it increases to 50% the cap of 40% of ordinary income that the Código Municipal establishes to allocate to general administration expenses. It lacks logic to face the health crisis and puts the provision of public services at risk, because the collection of business licenses (patente) and permits is the second most important source of income for municipalities, and it will decrease due to the economic crisis and the closure of businesses caused by the pandemic and by the moratorium on payment of municipal taxes, public prices, and leases. Raising the ceiling for administrative expenses would be inconsistent in the face of that drop in income and would leave fewer resources to provide municipal services. The blow to municipal services is double: the lower collection will impact the provision of services, and the diversion to the administrative expenses category of a greater proportion of what is collected will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 11,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> the municipalities, the district municipal councils, and the cantonal sports committees are permanently excluded from compliance with the fiscal rule, and there has been no technical study in the legislative file that supports it. Furthermore, it is inconsistent since the purpose of the law is to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities in the face of the declared national emergency. Although municipal spending is not a direct part of the fiscal deficit calculation, which only contemplates the central government's income and expenditures, it affects it indirectly since the third most important source of fresh resources for municipalities are the transfers referred to in article 1 of the law under appeal. The debt situation incurred by local governments is worrying, because according to a report by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR), there will be a drop in income in the municipalities. This will accelerate indebtedness and eventually the payment of contracted loans, which in turn would affect the central State due to the guarantees granted in these cases. He warns of the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Given the expected drop in income that municipalities will experience, the pattern of indebtedness will accelerate. The drop in income, unfortunately, will also hinder the eventual repayment of the credits contracted. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">As is public and notorious, when a Municipality enters into a loan (empréstito), the lending entity always demands the State's guarantee. Therefore, if the Municipality defaults, then the Ministerio de Hacienda will have to honor the debt. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">The impact of municipal loans (empréstitos) would increase the debt service for the national government, which would increase, in turn, the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The petitioner develops the scope of the content of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">principle of financial equilibrium</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, based on resolution No. 2006-5979 of the Sala Constitucional. Said principle alludes to the sustainability of the State's fiscal accounts as a whole, and is applicable to all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold. The jurisprudence of the Chamber has established that the purposes of the central and decentralized Public Administration are not disconnected from the budgetary rules contained in the Political Constitution, which he exemplifies in resolution No. 2018-19511 of this Constitutional Court. The principle of financial equilibrium pursues sound fiscal administration and intends the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“The expenses of public institutions, without exception, adjust to their probable income, which covers both their own income and what they receive via transfers from the Executive Branch. There must be, therefore, a reasonable and fiscally healthy relationship between the annual increase in expenses and the probable income for each fiscal year of all state institutions”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Furthermore, all public institutions, regardless of the degree of autonomy they hold, have the obligation to adjust the growth of their budgets to the percentage of expenses fixed annually by the Executive Branch, and the budget is a technical and organizing instrument of the state economy. On the other hand, he refers to the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule, which he considers a derivation of the principle of financial equilibrium, insofar as, he estimates, it is a principle oriented to limiting the growth of current spending.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">After presenting a typology of constitutional principles, he estimates that the fiscal rule, although originating in a law, actually echoes principles and values contained in the Political Constitution. He indicates the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Precisely, the fiscal rule, although expressly only enshrined at the legal level, the truth is that it is a constitutional principle derived from the constitutional norm that enshrines the principle of budgetary equilibrium”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The fiscal rule is a constitutional principle that has the normative force of such principles and, therefore, integrates the parameter of constitutional validity in our system. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In another vein, the petitioner alludes to the scope of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">constitutional principle of technical reasonableness</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, which he estimates developed by the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court and cites as an example resolution No. 1997-8724. All laws must adjust to the demands of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and said principle demands that laws must adjust to strict technical parameters, because otherwise fundamental rights and society in general are harmed. When the technical criteria indicate that only one decision is possible, its adoption is obligatory, and he points out, in this regard, article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), which he considers extrapolatable to the issuance of legal norms. He invokes, regarding the principle of reasonableness, resolutions numbers 2012-0266 and 2019-12745 of this Sala Constitucional. He concludes that both administrative acts and laws must be issued with absolute respect for the laws of science and technique, since otherwise they become absolutely null. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Now, regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">articles 1, 4, and 5</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the challenged law, the petitioner argues that they violate the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness. The logic of this set of provisions is perverse. If the first effect of the pandemic that municipal administrations will feel is the drop in income, it seems that the solution proposed of increasing spending is unreasonable and lacks sense. When we add to the exemption from the fiscal rule the effect that the application of articles 4 and 5 of the challenged regulation will produce, administrative spending will grow disproportionately and not the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality. The municipal administrative structures will become more expensive, without this translating into an improvement in the services that the local government must provide to its citizens. The norms would allow a disproportionate growth in administrative spending and not in what is necessary for the municipalities to perform properly. The above will propitiate an additional burden on the citizens of the cantons and eventually on all Costa Ricans, because the costs of municipal public services will increase, or the transfers that the State makes to the municipalities will have to be increased. The legal norms that are the subject of this process lack elements of technical reasonableness that justify them. It could even increase public credit, with a state guarantee, which could risk the fiscal deficit of the Central Government. He details the following </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In the present case, there are no technical studies that support the challenged norms, and rather these violate elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique, for which they are vitiated with unconstitutionality”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On the other hand, he indicates that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">article 11</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the law in question is contrary to the constitutional principles of budgetary equilibrium and the fiscal rule. He points out that the law lacks technical justification and that it establishes a permanent exclusion for municipal corporations, despite having been enacted to face a specific juncture. He insists that in the face of the drop in income that municipalities will experience, the pattern of indebtedness will accelerate, which will generate difficulty in the payment of credits and in turn, due to the guarantees already mentioned, will negatively affect the fiscal deficit. Only the validity of the fiscal rule would prevent municipalities from going into debt beyond their real possibilities of healthy income, given that in that case their budgets could not grow freely as authorized by the challenged norm. He affirms that “the challenged norm violates the constitutional principle of the fiscal rule”. He requests that articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 be declared unconstitutional. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">2.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> Through the resolution of </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">9:24 hrs. of June 16, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the Presidency of the Sala Constitucional gave course to the present action of unconstitutionality, against articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of law No. 9848. A hearing was granted to the Procurador General de la República, the President of the Asamblea Legislativa, and the Ministro de Hacienda, and the publication of the corresponding edicts was ordered.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">3.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">June 16, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, the Secretariat of this Chamber issued the necessary commissions for the purpose of ordering the publication of the edicts ordered by article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC) in the Boletín Judicial. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">4.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The edicts referred to in article 81, second paragraph of the LJC were published in numbers 120, 121, and 122 of the Boletín Judicial of the days </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">24, 25, and 26 of June 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">5.- </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By document received on July 8, 2020, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase\">Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, in his capacity as </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase\">President of the Asamblea Legislativa, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">submitted a report.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">By way of </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">background</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, he indicates that the norm originated in the Asamblea Legislativa as part of the measures to confront the Covid-19 pandemic. He mentions that the bill was the product of a dialogue effort with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He explains the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In that sense, legislative file 21.922, later Law 9848, formed part of the proposals that were born within the Legislative Branch, and was the product of the analysis and discussion that took place in a working group that was established as a response to the emergency, to develop the topic of municipal affairs, in coordination with authorities from that sector, such as the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI). This initiative was presented by 40 deputies from all political factions, and as the statement of motives points out, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">that law “will contribute to making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the Municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for economic reactivation</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">”. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">(The highlighting does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">On the merits</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Now, regarding the constitutional reproaches, he refutes the idea that the norm obliges the central government to transfer all the resources to the municipalities, for which he reproduces article 5 of law No. 8114. What it obliges is that the transfer of resources be done in a timely manner, since the concern of municipalities that resources were transferred at the end of the budgetary year and that this hindered their execution has been frequent. He clarifies that the obligation of such a transfer is really found in law 8114 and points out the following: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In this way, when challenged article 1 points out that the transfer must be made “according to the percentage set forth in article 5 of Law 8114”, the only thing it does is to redound on the existing norm, it being that this provision does not make nugatory the provisions established in the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (LFFP), No. 9635, of December 3, 2018, in relation to the obligation that the government would have to make transfers before the different scenarios of the fiscal rule” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He reinforces the above with the content of the provisions in articles 15 and 25 of law No. 9635. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">He points out that perhaps the petitioner's confusion originates from the fact that the original bill did contemplate the obligation to make said transfer, but that the formally enacted and valid law does not. </span></p> The following table is attached to illustrate the point:</span></p><table cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse\"><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Proyecto de ley n.°21.922</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">ley n.°9848</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport must timely transfer </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the entirety</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the resources to the municipalities, as provided in Article 5 of Law No. 8114, “Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias”, of July 4, 2015 to the municipalities. To make said transfer, each municipality may only be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in case of disapproval by the comptroller entity, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the comptroller's office has for this purpose.</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 1- The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) must timely transfer the resources to the municipalities, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">according to the percentage</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> provided in Article 5 of Law 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities. To make said transfer, each municipality shall be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in case of disapproval by the comptroller entity, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) has for this purpose, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">as well as the financial programming of budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministry of Finance</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">*The highlighted text corresponds to the report.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">During the legislative debate, the base text was subject to modifications. It is noteworthy that Article 1 of the finally approved text adds a provision that obliges municipalities to have the transfer to be received incorporated into their budgets, as well as the financial budget execution programming; that is, it urges them to carry out better planning in the use of resources, as a counterpart to the obligation of the National Treasury to disburse the funds in a timely manner. Note, additionally, that the obligated subject referred to in the challenged article is the National Treasury, which simply executes the transfer of already budgeted resources, that is, defining the amount to be budgeted is not within its scope of action; a task that corresponds to the Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional or the Ministry of Finance more generally. It concludes in the following sense: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“In view of the foregoing, it is concluded that Law No. 9848 does not expressly introduce an obligation to transfer the entirety of the resources referred to in Article 5 of Law No. 8114 to the municipalities, as that provision is already contemplated in said Law 8114; therefore, the plaintiff's arguments based on this assumption lack grounds to request its declaration of unconstitutionality”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Article 4</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the challenged legal norm, the report details that the plaintiff considers that an increase in the tax percentage could be used to finance administrative expenses and that this would imply an increase in expenses, which he considers erroneous. It points out that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a specific expense, but does not authorize an increase in said expense. If the integrality of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that the municipalities are preparing to face a significant reduction in their ordinary revenues; this for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity. This will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the business license tax (impuesto de patentes), in addition to the fact that delinquencies on all taxes will increase as an effect of the pandemic, including the property tax (bienes inmuebles); b) The objected law itself provides a series of measures that lead to a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: authorizations to apply a moratorium for municipal patents or licenses (Article 12); municipal moratorium for fees, public prices, and municipal services (Article 13); reduction of municipal lease rates (Article 14), and; payment arrangements (Article 16). The foregoing means that, in a scenario where the percentage established in Article 3 of the Property Tax Law (Ley de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) is maintained, municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to finance the same level of administrative expense, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness on the part of local governments, an aspect that so concerns the plaintiff. Take into account that administrative expense, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term; therefore, not having this authorization could lead to municipalities lacking resources to finance their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided in the challenged Article 4, would allow this income deficiency to be supplied to finance administrative expenses. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said expense, so it is incorrect to affirm, as the plaintiff does, that the norm authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. Another reason why the premise from which the plaintiff starts is invalid relates to the fact that the challenged norm also allows the use of resources generated by lifting the established limit to finance the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; key areas to attend to given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. In this regard, the statement of motives of legislative file 21.922 indicated that:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“However, these actions must be complemented from the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first response roles such as the coordination of the Local Emergency Committees (part of the National Risk Management System according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of indispensable services such as citizen security through municipal police forces, waste collection, and aqueducts in some cases”. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">From the foregoing, it follows that what the plaintiff indicates is also not true regarding the norm potentially negatively impacting the provision of public services such as aqueducts and sanitation, essential to prevent the spread of the virus causing Covid-19. Note that lifting the percentage will apply exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years; furthermore, the resources may not be used for the creation of new positions, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to increasing administrative expenses as the plaintiff presumes, and for which a comparative table is presented between the law proposal and the finally approved project: </span></p><table cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse\"><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Proyecto de ley n.°21.922</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">ley n.°9848</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit provided in Article 3 of Law No. 7509, “Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles” and its amendments, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">for</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax. These additional resources may be used, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:line-through\">including for the creation of new positions</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">, as long as these are of an urgent and temporary nature and are related to the emergency or the provision of municipal services of water, security, waste collection, or cemeteries.</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 4- Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit provided in Article 3 of Law 7509, Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">to</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax. These resources may also be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management; however, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">they may not be used for the creation of new positions.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">*The highlighted text corresponds to the report.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Regarding </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Article 5</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the law subject to this unconstitutionality action, it reiterates what was already said regarding the previous article, as it estimates there is an error of appreciation regarding the scope of the provisions in Article 5, given that an authorization for an increase in administrative expense is not proposed therein, but rather an increase in the authorization of the resources that may be used for such purpose. Lifting the cap allows financing the existing expenses of the municipalities and thus prevents them from incurring financial defaults. It insists on the temporality of the measure and on the fact that new positions cannot be created for these purposes. Precisely as a result of the economic projections provided by the plaintiff, in relation to the imminent decrease in the collection of municipal entities, it is necessary to lift the indicated caps, in order to properly finance their operation. It refutes the plaintiff's argument related to the impact on municipal services, indicating that the norm expressly establishes that water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services may be financed through these mechanisms. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On the other hand, in relation to </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Article 11</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\"> of the challenged law, it is pointed out that the fiscal rule (regla fiscal) intends to establish a limit on the growth of current expenditure (gasto corriente), which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to the gross domestic product. The fiscal rule intends to establish a limit on the growth of current expenditure, which will be defined according to the level of indebtedness of the Central Government with respect to the GDP; for its part, the challenged Article 11 intends to exclude local governments from the scope of application of this norm, but not in its entirety. Just as the plaintiff mentions, municipal expenditure is not directly part of the calculation of the fiscal deficit, since the latter only refers to the relationship of revenues and expenses of the Central Government, with which it maintains that from that perspective there would be no direct impact on the Central Government's deficit or the level of indebtedness. The reform included in Article 1 of the challenged law No. 9848 does not establish an obligation to transfer resources, as the plaintiff assumes, but in addition to that, said law adds, in this Article 11, that the exception to the fiscal rule will not be applicable to those resources from the budgets of municipalities and district municipal councils, coming from transfers made by the Central Government. That is, the municipal budget items financed with these resources would be subject to the fiscal rule, so the norm does not compromise the possibility of meeting the goal established by the cited rule, depending on the level of indebtedness of the Central Government. It highlights that the plaintiff does not refer to this important provision, which again gives grounds to assume that the action was filed against the base text and not against what was finally enacted, this because the text did not include the commented provision. The following table is attached: </span></p><table cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"width:468.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border:0.5pt single; border-collapse:collapse\"><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">Proyecto de ley n.°21.922</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-bottom:0.5pt single; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">ley n.°9848</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:222.95pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-right:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 11- Add subsections d) and e) to Article 6 of Title IV “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República”, Chapter I “Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios”, of Law No. 9635 “Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas” of December 4, 2018, whose text shall read: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: […] </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">d) The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">e) The Cantonal Sports Committees</span></p></td><td style=\"width:222.9pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; -aw-border-left:0.5pt single; -aw-border-top:0.5pt single\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">ARTICLE 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of Title IV \"Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República\", Chapter I \"Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios\", of Law 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, of December 3, 2018. The texts are as follows: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title: [.] </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">d) The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold\">However, this title shall be applicable to those resources from the budgets of municipalities and district municipal councils, coming from transfers made by the Central Government. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">e) The cantonal sports committees.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">*The highlighted text corresponds to the report. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">The plaintiff states that the situation of the debt contracted by local governments is also worrying, especially given the expected drop in revenues that municipalities will experience, thus he expects that the indebtedness pattern will accelerate. He indicates that the drop in revenues would hinder the eventual repayment of contracted loans, given that when a municipality contracts a loan, the lending entity always requires the guarantee of the State; therefore, if the municipality defaults, then the Ministry of Finance will have to honor the debt. He affirms that the default of municipal loans would increase the debt service for the national government, which would increase, in turn, the financial deficit and public indebtedness at a time when both indicators have already reached unsustainable and intolerable levels. In relation to the foregoing, it is only pointed out that the argument includes a series of suppositions or presumptions that do not necessarily have to materialize and that would also not necessarily occur as a result of the validity of the challenged law. It adds that, based on the budgetary result data of the municipalities for 2019 included in the Information System on Plans and Budgets (Sistema de Información sobre Planes y Presupuestos, SIPP) of the CGR, of the 81 municipalities (at that time), only seven showed a budgetary deficit, so the rest show a surplus, which for forty-two of them exceeds one billion colones.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Regarding the principle of technical reasonableness</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">On the other hand, regarding the reproach of technical reasonableness, the President of the Legislative Assembly mentions that the plaintiff starts from mistaken interpretations, as at no time is an increase in administrative expenses authorized, and considers that the challenged norm adheres to criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality, and proceeds to transcribe interventions by deputies in this sense, within the framework of the discussion of the bill. The following is reported:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“As has been demonstrated throughout this report, the plaintiff's arguments are based on mistaken interpretations of the norm, as at no time is an increase in administrative expenses authorized, as he points out. Precisely, considering the reduction of revenues that is foreseen and given the possibility that administrative expenses may become unfinanced, what the norm intends is to maintain a healthy fiscal balance in the municipalities, allowing them to allocate a higher percentage of tax revenue to meet these needs. It should not be lost sight of that the Law also considers the possibility of financing with these resources the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management, and that they may not be used for the creation of new positions; in addition, the norm is temporary in nature, which confirms that the intention is not to increase administrative expense. From the foregoing, it follows that elementary principles of financial and fiscal technique are not violated, and the norms are not tainted with unconstitutionality. Likewise, as has been mentioned, the law subject to challenge was analyzed in the working groups implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, therefore, criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were taken into account throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate.</span></p> This is recorded, for example, in the intervention of Deputy Corrales Chacón, when she stated the following:

"Remind all of you and the citizens listening to us that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a completely different course for us. And with this, the municipalidades of the entire country have also had to take exceptional actions to be able to carry forward the actions that correspond to them under the Código Municipal, but also to be able to collaborate with the Poder Ejecutivo in each of the solutions or facilities that can be provided to citizens precisely in the face of the pandemic. It is for this reason that this expediente was presented and that the working group was formed, which has truly been an extraordinary group, a group that has allowed us to work as a team, to work together, to listen precisely to that sector affected by the municipal regime and also to listen to the taxpayer who precisely needs those facilities to be able to move forward with their daily life. The bill has undergone consensual modifications, technically reviewed, both by ANAI and by the Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Asamblea Legislativa who have considered their observations pertinent. And it is for this reason that a substitute text has been approved today in this Plenary that incorporates many of them and also the other additional motions that were approved. Make it clear to the citizenry that the main changes that have been made are eliminating the possibility of creating new positions in the municipalidades, also the Sicop issue. A quite important wording has been carried out in which those small municipalidades are allowed to always carry out their contracting through this law, but facilitating their forms of payment. And on the other hand, also certain modifications mainly so that the municipalidades can have that flexibility in spending that they require in the face of the pandemic." In the same vein, Deputy Montero Gómez, in her intervention, details aspects of the dialogue process that was carried out, both among all parliamentary factions and with the actors involved in the municipal process and the role that the Municipalidades play in the proper course given to adequate public service, amidst the health emergency of the pandemic. Her words were the following:

"Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a little long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental. With the participation of multiple actors, male and female deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with a great deal of responsibility, but also involving those key actors: Nombre4700, intendencias, the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and some institutions of the Poder Ejecutivo. I believe we have managed to gather those concerns to the maximum extent and most of those concerns have been set out in this bill's text to improve, refine, so that what this law says is what is appropriate, is extremely clear when applying it, and that this truly is an opportunity to support taxpayers and to strengthen the financial management of the municipalidades. We are very clear that the municipalidades and the consejos municipales de distrito have and will have an essential mission during and after the pandemic, because they are the leading institutions in the reconstruction processes, the development and economic reactivation processes in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the institution, the rest of the Costa Rican institutional framework." These interventions by the deputies, cited by way of example, allow, in turn, the refutation of the plaintiff's allegation regarding the lack of technical studies. This is because, as recognized by the Tribunal Constitucional, while their existence is desirable, what is relevant is what is to be expected of the legislator, which is that when making estimates about the future and the effect of the norm being approved, they were guided by an objectively acceptable assessment of the information within their reach, as recorded in resolution No. 5374-2003 of June 20, 2003." In that sense, the challenged norms are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the plaintiff indicates, since their validity is circumscribed to a prudential time, which has been deemed necessary so that the municipalidades can address the needs resulting from the pandemic and likewise, provide the necessary support for the first steps towards the economic reactivation of the country's cantons.

Regarding the principles of financial equilibrium and the fiscal rule Regarding the principles of financial equilibrium and the fiscal rule, the undersigned indicates that the statement of motives expressly alleged that the legislative intention was the flexibilization of municipal resources to confront the consequences of the emergency, but in general to contribute to economic reactivation.

On the other hand, the budget is an exercise that has to do with the orientation of Government policy. In that sense, it is the Poder Ejecutivo that prepares and plans the budget each year, considering the constitutional and legal obligations it must fulfill, as well as the investment corresponding to the strategic axes it will develop according to the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. The Poder Legislativo has, within the budgetary dynamic, the power to approve or disapprove the expenditure forecast and propose some modifications. That is why the parliamentary exercise is limited by established constitutional and legal norms, to determine the equilibrium of the budget at a global level. In this direction, the Poder Legislativo has adopted a series of decisions to enrich the legal system with the intention of cleaning up public finances, and much remains to be done, but it is necessary to sustain the necessary constitutional obligations that make us constitute a Estado de Derecho. A reflection that coincides with the statements of the Sala Constitucional, in advisory opinion No. 2018-019511, regarding the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, 9635. The following is reported:

"Remedies, which, in the case under analysis, were explained by the legislators at the time of casting their votes, as for example, Deputy Gourzong Cerdas, when he stated that: The national emergency declared by the Poder Ejecutivo, according to decree number 42227-MP-S which is a product of the Covid-19 pandemic, directly affects the normal development of the municipalidades. And, indeed, Costa Rican families are experiencing difficulties in their incomes, especially those in the private sectors and in the informal sector, families that have to face debts with municipal license payments, merchants, and owners of different public services, which directly affect the income of local governments. For this reason, as deputies of the Republic, we must act with agility, in assistance, according to our competencies, and legislate efficiently and timely in the knowledge and approval of this bill number 21.922, called Ley para Apoyar al Contribuyente Local y Reforzar la Gestión Financiera de las Municipalidades ante la Emergencia Nacional por la Pandemia del Covid 19. And it is for this reason, it is because of the covid-19 pandemic, that the income of the municipalidades and their budgets are affected. This bill definitively comes to alleviate the situation of municipal administrations in the use of the specific surplus, to make specific allocations more flexible, and to expand the margin of the fiscal rule established in the Código Municipal, specifically in Article 102, as well as in Law 7509, Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, to authorize a higher percentage for administrative expenditure, that is, it seeks the adequate municipal functioning and the efficient attention of the services that the municipalidad provides".

Finally, along those same lines, Deputy Corrales Chacón refers to the arguments that the plaintiff indicates regarding the fiscal rule and clarified the following: "With respect to the criticisms and oppositions that this project has suffered, mainly from the Contraloría General de la República, which has inaccurately mentioned that there would be an impact on state public finances with the approval of this project, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule in the municipalidades will not come to reduce the fiscal deficit of the central Government, what the central Government contributes to local governments represents barely one point zero nine percent of the Republic's budget and practically all of this percentage is directed to investment in the cantonal road network"." For this reason, it also seems important to me to put in evidence that already today the country's municipalidades have limits that precisely prevent them from making excessive expenditures, but above all also that they already have what is called the golden rule, the rule that prevents them from exaggerated growth, for that reason to make evidence that the municipalidades need and are urgently required, above all, in the situation we are facing as a country, the approval of this expediente." He insists that the approved norm meets the requirements of legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality between the means and the end achieved. He requests that the acción de inconstitucionalidad be declared without merit. He attaches the certification of the appointment of the President of the Asamblea Legislativa and as an annex a table of the executed amounts of income and expenditures for the year 2019 of the different municipal corporations.

6.- By brief received on July 9, 2020, Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández submitted the report, in his capacity as PROCURADOR GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA.

Regarding admissibility Concurrence is given on the sufficient standing of the plaintiff under the application of norms that do not directly affect the legal sphere of any individual person, but whose consequences are of general and indirect scope on society as a whole. Likewise, the challenged norms relate to the proper management of public spending and the correct execution of public funds (resolutions 4409 and 9992 of 2004 of the Sala Constitucional).

Preliminary question It is necessary to join the present process to those under expediente numbers 19-013318-0007-CO and 19-0011540-0007-CO to avoid the issuance of contradictory judgments. In those acciones de inconstitucionalidad, the constitutional validity of the fiscal rule is questioned, since by means of a law, the constitutionally conferred administrative autonomy of the municipalidades and public universities is limited. The positions expressed by the plaintiffs in these other processes, in relation to the one expressed in this expediente, are mutually exclusive, so accepting one could imply denying the other.

In the event that the Sala Constitucional does not deem the foregoing appropriate, what was mentioned in the previously mentioned reports is largely reiterated, regarding the concept, nature, and legal basis of the fiscal rule.

Regarding the merits In countries such as the United States and some in the European Union, different fiscal rules were enacted, for the purpose of confronting the economic crisis of the previous decade, and on occasions such norms acquired constitutional rank. With this, the budgetary margin of action of different institutions and territorial organizations was limited, as is the case of the Federated States, the Autonomous Communities, and Local Governments.

It is relevant to consider the principle of budgetary equilibrium, contained in Article 176 of the Norma Fundamental and recently developed in resolution 2018-19511 of the Sala Constitucional and Article 5, subsection c) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. Under this constitutional mandate, applying to all organs and entities of the Administración Pública, regardless of their degree of constitutional autonomy, budgeted expenses may not exceed probable income (resolution 2018-19511 and Art. 100 of the Código Municipal). Furthermore, Article 9 of Law 9635 contains the definition of the fiscal rule, which was formulated based on a current expenditure rule. Having been issued by law, the Asamblea Legislativa is not bound by it, whereby it could legislate in a contrary sense or rather nuance its scope (as occurred with the law that is the object of the present action). Regarding said rule, the following is stated:

Article 9 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas leans toward this last type, that is, toward a fiscal rule relative to expenditure that limits, as stated, the growth of current expenditure, subject to a proportion of the average growth of the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the central Government debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus conceived, by its implications, said canon is more related to the principle of financial sustainability than to the principle of budgetary equilibrium, as we shall see later on.

The plaintiff considers that the fiscal rule has constitutional grounding, derived from the principle of financial equilibrium as a mechanism to limit the growth of current expenditure, in consonance with resolution 2018-19511 of this Sala Constitucional. The following is concluded:

For the foregoing reasons, we must reiterate that, if the Sala Constitucional deems that the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule, in accordance with the terms of judgment No. 2018-19511, is sufficient to recognize it as having a transversal character over the entire conglomerate of Public administrations, capable of binding the budgetary formulation of the municipal ones without violating their autonomy, the legislator's decision to except them from its application, through the amendment made by Article 11 of Law No. 9848 to Article 6 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, would be unconstitutional, as it would be legislating in contradiction of a canon that is understood to be contained in the provisions of Article 176 of the Constitución Política.

Now then, the plaintiff's arguments regarding financial equilibrium deal with hypothetical assumptions not verifiable per se. It could not be affirmed that the inclusion of the municipalidades and the consejos municipales de distrito within the exceptions of Art. 6 of Law No. 9635 necessarily implies a violation of the principle of financial equilibrium; even Art. 11, subsection d) itself establishes that said exclusion is partial, inasmuch as the fiscal rule does apply to transfers made by the central government. The disapplication of the fiscal rule would have to be analyzed from the perspective of the constitutional principle of fiscal sustainability, not invoked by the appellant.

In another line of thought, Arts. 4, 5, and 11 of the challenged law are analyzed from the perspective of the principles of fiscal sustainability and technical reasonableness:

In this regard, the following is explained:

"As extracted from the legislative history of Law No. 9848, in view of expediente No. 21.922 documenting its parliamentary procedure, challenged Articles 4 and 5 connect with the purpose of 'making the management of municipal resources more flexible to confront the consequences of the emergency' (folio 4 of the statement of motives, see also, especially, folios 542 to 545 and 556 and 557 of the Plenary debate); by allowing municipalities and the consejos municipales de distrito a high margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of Article 4, it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the tax on immovable property for administrative expenses, compared to the initial 10% provided in Article 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (No. 7509); whereas, in the case of Article 5, an additional 10% is added to the original 40% fixed in Article 102 of the Código Municipal of ordinary municipal income, which they could allocate to cover the general administration expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept, as 'the current expenditures that do not imply direct costs of municipal services.' So, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on the local treasury resulting from a lower collection in the scenario of economic deceleration caused by the covid-19 pandemic in each canton – and in the country in general –; authorizing municipalities to transfer a greater part of their income to those fixed and permanent expenses, such as the remuneration of their officials, to the detriment of the expenses dedicated to municipal services. Therefore, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, in the face of the foreseeable decrease in municipal resources, the challenged provisions authorize them to allocate a greater part of these to the current expenditure that finances, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of municipal public services.

The plaintiff, as stated, questions first the reasonableness of the precepts, by promoting the increase of administrative spending of the municipalidades when at the same time their income will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which in the end would impact the fiscal deficit of the central Government, as he posits that the only way for territorial Administrations to cover their expenditures in those circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which would ultimately answer for these in the event of non-compliance with their financial obligations." The questioning made by the plaintiff in pointing out that promoting the increase of administrative spending impacts the fiscal deficit of the Central Government due to its condition as guarantor is merely hypothetical. Additionally, according to the jurisprudential line of the Sala Constitucional, some element of judgment is necessary to determine the reasonableness of a norm when its disproportion is alleged and it is not evident (resolution 5236-1999). The appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree to determine the invalidity of the challenged provisions.

Notwithstanding all of the above, indeed, legislative expediente No. 21922 does not contain technical studies for the increases from 10% to 40% for administrative expenses originating from the collection of the tax on immovable property, nor for the increase from 40% to 50% of ordinary income to address general administration expenses (Arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged law). The Contraloría General de la República referred to the legislative proposal at the time, through official letters DFOE-DL-0567 and DFOE-DL-0842, and determined the absence of the already referred-to technical studies. The legislator, in dealing with specialized matters ‒such as the one referred to in this acción de inconstitucionalidad‒ is not exempt from justifying or technically grounding the adoption of decisions that imply the enactment of a law, based on the principle of reasonableness and on Arts. 9 and 11 of the Constitución Política. The legislative expediente does not contain technical studies that support the decision adopted through the law object of this action, nor an analysis of the impact that exceeding the modified budgetary limits will have on the budgetary stability and financial sustainability of the municipalidades and the consejos municipales de distrito.

The following is noted:

*We are of the opinion that this lack of technical basis transcends the determination of the State's economic policy as a matter of government, and that we are no longer in the realm of assumptions, since it is possible to verify that the increase in the said percentages that would be allocated to administrative expenses or general administration of the territorial corporations, and, eventually, to the provision of municipal water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services – since the challenged rules leave it as something optional – does not have any type of justification or technical basis (…).* Although Articles 4 and 5 of the challenged Law establish an exceptional validity for the 2020 and 2021 budget years, a technical basis is still required. This absence casts doubt on the reasonableness of the rules and their compatibility with the principle of fiscal sustainability contained in Article 176 of the Political Constitution. In that sense, the Spanish experience, in relation to the principle of financial sustainability, is linked to the control over indebtedness levels. Applying this consideration to the challenged articles, the problem of the absence of technical studies to support the scope at the level of public finances reappears.

On the other hand, reference is made to the **constitutionality of Article 1 of the law subject to this action**:

The aforementioned Article 5 refers to the destination of the income from the collection of the single fuel tax, whose subsection b) specifies that 22.25% of the 48.60% of its annual product must be transferred, through the National Treasury, to the municipalities for the maintenance of the cantonal road network. According to the legislative history of Law No. 9848, the intention of the challenged precept is to streamline the procedure for the transfer of resources with only the approval of the municipal budget by the oversight body or an adjusted budget in case of rejection. However, on the issues that concern the petitioner, it did not imply any regulatory innovation, as it basically comes to reiterate what was already provided by the referred Article 5. b) of Law No. 8114, which imposes a specific destination for a percentage of what is collected from the single fuel tax to be transferred by the National Treasury to the municipalities for the conservation and development of the cantonal road network. With this, it would not be establishing a greater obligation on the Executive Branch than how it has been managing these transfers since the approval of the cited law approximately two decades ago. In this, it is necessary to recall what was stated by this Chamber in decision (voto) No. 2018-19511, in that the budgetary allocation criteria, as well as each of the particularities related to the control of their growth, constitute the State's economic policy and a matter of government.

Rather, the constitutional problem could be found in the linkage that the ordinary legislator is creating for the budgetary legislator regarding the disposition of public resources or, more precisely, regarding expenditure and its destination, in accordance with the budgetary principles of universality and non-affectation of resources, derived from Article 185 of the Political Constitution.

In that sense, while it is true that for some time the position of this high Court was oscillating on the subject of specific destinations, the stance that has ultimately prevailed is that “the budgetary legislator is not bound by the ordinary one, except in cases of constitutionally 'tied' funds and those destined to finance social programs. Regarding the first, by constitutional mandate. Regarding the second, because the original constituent opted for a social State of Law, which entails a linking of public powers to this legal and social reality” (judgment No. 15968-2011 of 3:30 p.m. on November 23, 2011, reiterated in resolutions numbers 2016-18351 and 2018-19511).

Taking into account that the challenged Article 1 and, by connection, Article 5 of the Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, contains a tax with a specific destination that is not intended to finance a social program, but, as stated, for the maintenance of the cantonal road network, although the public interest of this work is not doubted, it does not fit within the context of social rights, thus improperly binding the margin of action of the budgetary legislator regarding expenditure (the definition of its limits and destination). However, the Attorney General's Office observes that both precepts were issued in development of the budgetary allocation provided for by Article 170 of the Political Constitution in favor of the municipalities, corresponding to 10% of the ordinary income calculated for the corresponding economic year, as indeed established by Articles 1 and 5 of the Special Law for the Transfer of Competencies: full and exclusive maintenance of the cantonal road network (No. 9329 of October 15, 2015), in relation to the General Law for the Transfer of Competencies from the Executive Branch to the Municipalities (No. 8801 of April 28, 2010).

By way of conclusion, the warning about the potential accumulation of this proceeding with those already indicated is reiterated.

Regarding Article 11 of the challenged law, the action must be granted if the Constitutional Chamber considers that the constitutional basis of the fiscal rule is the constitutional principle of budgetary balance.

Regarding Articles 4 and 5, it indicates that the action must be granted due to the absence of technical studies.

Finally, regarding Article 1, it concludes that “the linkage that the ordinary legislator makes of the budgetary one to the detriment of the budgetary principles of universality and non-affectation of resources (Article 185 of the Political Constitution), is saved insofar as it is done under the protection of Article 170 of the Constitution, as part of the budgetary allocation to finance the transfer to local governments of the full and exclusive maintenance of the cantonal road network.” **7.-** The Presidency of this Constitutional Chamber, through a resolution at 2:01 p.m. on July 16, 2020, considered the hearings granted to the Attorney General of the Republic and the President of the Legislative Assembly to have been fulfilled, but not the hearing granted to the Minister of Finance. The proceedings being ready, the file was passed to the office corresponding by turn.

**8.-** The legal requirements have been met in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate **Garro Vargas**, except for consideration V, which is drafted by Magistrate **Garita Navarro; and** **CONSIDERING:** **Regarding the admissibility of the action** **I.- THE STANDING OF THE PETITIONING PARTY IN THIS CASE** On this particular matter, it must be noted that paragraph two of Article 75 of the LJC establishes that a prior pending case will not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. 2001-8239, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:

*“In accordance with the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the challenged rule must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as a base case (...).”* In the present matter, the **petitioner** bases their standing on paragraph two of Article 75 of the LJC, because “due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm.” The **PGR** argues that the Chamber has accepted standing in scenarios such as this one, where the application of the challenged rules does not have the virtue of directly impacting the legal sphere of any particular person, its consequences being of a general and indirect scope on society as a whole or, at least, as alleged by the petitioner, on the community of residents of the municipalities that adopt the budgetary provisions contained therein. They find no objection whatsoever that prevents hearing the present action on its merits, also considering that its object is rules related to the sound management of public spending and the correct execution of public funds.

Consequently, for this **Chamber**, the hearing and resolution of this unconstitutionality action via abstract review is admissible, by virtue of the fact that, indeed, the rule cannot generate an act of individual application.

**Regarding the merits of the unconstitutionality action** **II.- Object of the challenge** The challenged rules are Articles 1, 4, 5, and 11 of the “Law to support the local taxpayer and reinforce the financial management of municipalities, in the face of the national emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic,” No. 9848.

Synthetically, it can be stated that the petitioner challenges Article 1 because, in their opinion, it renders the fiscal rule for the Central Government nugatory by having to transfer the totality of the resources provided therein, without considering the situation of the Public Treasury. Articles 4 and 5 because they lift the ceiling on administrative expenses of municipalities to the detriment or impact of the provision of public services. These articles, in the petitioner's judgment, entail economic inconsistencies and violate the principle of technical reasonableness, given that administrative spending is increased unreasonably and without technical studies to support the legislative decision. In relation to Article 11, the petitioner questions that municipal corporations will be excluded and exempted from the application of the fiscal rule, which, according to the actor, is a constitutional principle derived from the principle of the State's financial balance.

The text of the challenged provisions is as follows:

*“**Art. 1-** The National Treasury and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Law 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities.* *To carry out this transfer, each municipality must be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Comptroller General of the Republic, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in case of rejection by the oversight body, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems available for this purpose by the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), as well as the financial schedule for budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministry of Finance.* * **Art. 4-** Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 3 of Law 7509, Property Tax Law, of May 9, 1995, and allocate up to forty percent (40%) of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax to administrative expenses. These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services; however, they may not be used for the creation of new positions.* * **Art. 5-** Exceptionally, in the 2020 and 2021 budget years, municipalities and district municipal councils may exceed the limit set forth in Article 102 of Law 7794, Municipal Code, of April 30, 1998, and allocate up to fifty percent (50%) of their ordinary municipal income to cover general administration expenses. These resources may also be used for the provision of municipal water, cemetery, security, and integrated waste management services; however, they may not be used for the creation of new positions.* * **Art. 11-** Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of Title IV “Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic,” Chapter I “General Provisions, Object, Scope of Application, Definitions and Principles,” of Law 9635, Strengthening of Public Finances, of December 3, 2018. The texts are as follows:* *Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title:* *[.]* *d) The municipalities and district municipal councils of the country. However, this title shall be applicable to those resources from the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils, coming from transfers made by the Central Government.* *e) The cantonal sports committees.”* **III.- Regarding Articles 1 and 11 of the law** **As a prior and special pronouncement: improper invocation of the content of the rules.** As a first aspect of analysis, it is necessary to warn, as reported by the President of the Legislative Assembly, that the brief filing the unconstitutionality action lacks an adequate invocation of the content of Articles 1 and 11 of the challenged law, given that, as could be verified, the petitioner's reproaches were aimed at challenging the text of the bill and not the effective content of the law, as it was finally approved. Indeed, for greater clarity, the text challenged by the petitioner —which, as already indicated, corresponds to the text of the bill— and, in contrast, the text of the regulation finally approved by the Legislative Assembly are transcribed below:

To carry out said transfer, each municipality may only be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Contraloría General de la República, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in the event of disapproval by the oversight body, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the contraloría has for this purpose.

**ARTICLE 1-** The Tesorería Nacional and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) **must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Ley 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, of July 4, 2001, to the municipalities**.

To carry out said transfer, each municipality shall be required to provide a copy of the municipal budget, accompanied by the approval letter from the Contraloría General de la República, demonstrating that the transfer to be received is duly incorporated into its budget or, in the event of disapproval by the oversight body, a copy of the final adjusted budget as it was entered into the computer systems that the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) has for this purpose, as well as the financial programming of budget execution, in accordance with the formats issued by the Ministerio de Hacienda.

**ARTICLE 11-** Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of Title IV "Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic" (Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República), Chapter I "General Provisions: Object, Scope of Application, Definitions and Principles" (Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios), of Ley N.° 9635 "Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas" of December 4, 2018, the text of which shall read:

Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title:

[...]

• d)The country's municipalities and district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito).
• e)The Cantonal Sports Committees (Comités Cantonales de Deportes).

ARTICLE 11- Subsections d) and e) are added to Article 6 of Title IV "Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic" (Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República), Chapter I "General Provisions: Object, Scope of Application, Definitions and Principles" (Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios), of Ley 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, of December 3, 2018. The texts are as follows:

Article 6- Exceptions The following institutions are exempt from the scope of coverage of this title:

[.]

• d)The country's municipalities and district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito). **However, this title shall be applicable to those resources from the budgets of municipalities and district municipal councils, originating from transfers made by the central Government**.
• e)The cantonal sports committees (comités cantonales de deportes).

*Highlighting is ours **Regarding Article 1**, the plaintiff questions whether its application would render the fiscal rule for the central Government nugatory, which "will be obligated to transfer the totality of those resources without considering the situation of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) or the government's level of indebtedness." He says that, alternatively, the government would be forced to make cuts in other areas to be able to fulfill the dual mandate of transferring the totality of the resources to the municipalities and also complying with the fiscal rule.

From the plaintiff's allegations, this Chamber observes that his reproaches—in addition to the erroneous transcription of the rule—revolve around the presumed obligation to transfer the "totality of those resources." However, as the President of the Asamblea Legislativa points out, the provision in question was modified to clearly specify that the percentage already set forth in Article 5 of Ley n.°8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, of July 4, 2001, must be transferred. Indeed, a comparative analysis of the previously transcribed texts—in the table added above—allows us to verify that the content questioned by the plaintiff—originally provided for in the draft law—was emphatic, in the sense that the totality of the resources had to be transferred to the municipalities, while the provision finally approved and which is law of the Republic states that the authorities named therein must carry out, in a timely manner, the transfer of resources to the municipalities, according to the percentage set forth in Article 5 of Ley n.°8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, of July 4, 2001. Regarding the content of the finally approved rule, the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate substantiation of the allegations of unconstitutionality and the reasons why, according to his claim, an economic inconsistency is incurred. That omission alone is sufficient grounds to reject the challenge of this action of unconstitutionality, which this Chamber became aware of after having provided the legally mandated hearings.

**Regarding Article 11**, it is necessary to highlight again that the action of unconstitutionality suffers from a serious problem of substantiation. The foregoing, because, as can be inferred from the table added above, the plaintiff questioned the terms of the proposed rule according to the original draft law and not the content and text of the rule as finally approved by the Asamblea Legislativa. In the original terms, all the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils were going to be excluded from the "Fiscal Responsibility of the Republic" (Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República) title of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, whereas, according to the finally approved rule, the exclusion will be partial, given that the title will be applicable to those resources from the budgets of the municipalities and district municipal councils, originating from transfers made by the central Government. The plaintiff did not make any unconstitutionality argument regarding the bifurcation finally approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, which, as already noted, is sufficient grounds to dismiss the action for the omission of providing an adequate substantiation of the unconstitutionality arguments against the rule in force and not a mere draft law. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that in the ruling that addressed the questioning of the constitutionality of applying the fiscal rule to the municipalities, it was warned, regarding substantiation, that this Chamber cannot ex officio supply the omissions that the plaintiffs are responsible for fulfilling (Article 78 of the LJC) and that, by virtue of the principle of self-restraint of the constitutional judge, such a task cannot be assumed by this Court, but rather its fulfillment is the responsibility of the plaintiff (see ruling **n.°2022-013101**). In accordance with that position, it is possible to affirm that this action suffers from a serious problem of substantiation, since, as already warned, the rule was invoked, but the content of that which appeared in the respective draft law was challenged, and the final content of the rule was not challenged, and no specific arguments were made regarding it, as finally approved by the Asamblea Legislativa. This prevents an adequate weighing of the various scenarios that the rule raises and that were not distinguished, as should have been, by the plaintiff.

Such a flaw in substantiation affects the procedural requirements that every action of unconstitutionality must fulfill and, if it had been noticed earlier, it would have been grounds for inadmissibility of this action regarding this Article 11, and the same must be said regarding Article 1.

As a corollary of the considerations made, the action of unconstitutionality is dismissed regarding Articles 1 and 11 of the Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19.

**IV.- REGARDING ARTS. 4 AND 5 OF THE LAW** **The plaintiff** questions the constitutionality of Arts. 4 and 5 because, in his opinion, they incur in economic inconsistencies. Regarding Article 4, he affirms that it lacks all logic that, to face the pandemic, it is necessary to increase administrative expenses as authorized by the challenged rule. Considering that the property tax (impuesto de bienes inmuebles) is the main source of fresh income for the municipalities, lifting the ceiling on administrative expenses could instead negatively impact the provision of public services. As for Article 5, along the same lines, he questions the logical sense of raising the ceiling on administrative expenses to confront a health crisis. The plaintiff's arguments—as the PGR warns—revolve around assumptions, regarding that the economic slowdown will decrease revenue collection from patents and permits, that patent collection will decrease due to business closures resulting from economic contraction, and that municipal revenue collection will fall in 2020 due to the effect of the authorized moratoriums. He therefore concludes that lifting the ceiling for administrative expenses not only subtracts necessary resources for the provision of municipal services, but that, given the fall in municipal revenues, the blow to municipal services is double: the lower collection will impact service provision and the diversion to administrative items will leave even fewer resources available for the provision of municipal services. Furthermore, he states that the application of Arts. 4 and 5 will cause "administrative spending and not the spending necessary for the development of the substantive activity of the municipalities, which is the provision of basic services to the population of their municipality," to grow disproportionately. He says that this will cause administrative structures to become more expensive and will become an additional burden for the citizens of the cantons or will fall upon all Costa Ricans—through supposed loans. He asserts that the challenged rules lack elements of technical reasonableness that justify them, given that they will promote increases in administrative spending and, in this specific case, there are no technical studies that support the challenged rules.

**The President of the Asamblea Legislativa** reported that the plaintiff starts from a mistaken premise, as he considers that the increase in the percentage of tax revenue that may be used to finance administrative expenses necessarily means that the municipalities will increase that type of expense. On the contrary, he says that the law authorizes an increase in the percentage of resources that can be allocated to a specific expense, but it is not authorizing an increase in that expense. He argues that if the comprehensive nature of the law and the context in which it is issued are analyzed, it is determined that the municipalities are preparing to face a significant reduction in their ordinary revenues. This for two reasons: a) The decrease in local economic activity, which will reduce tax revenues related to this variable, such as the patent tax (impuesto de patentes); furthermore, delinquencies in all taxes will increase as an effect of the pandemic, including the property tax (bienes inmuebles); b) The law being objected to itself provides a series of measures that entail a reduction in municipal revenues, such as, for example: the authorizations to apply a moratorium on municipal patents or licenses (Art. 12); the municipal moratorium on fees, public prices, and municipal services (Art. 13); the reduction of municipal rental rates (Art. 14); and payment arrangements (Art. 16). The foregoing means that, faced with a scenario in which the percentage established in Article 3 of the "Ley de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles" is maintained, the municipalities would have a smaller amount of resources in absolute terms to finance the same level of administrative spending, causing a financial imbalance that could lead to deficits and greater indebtedness on the part of local governments, an aspect that so concerns the plaintiff. Administrative spending, composed especially of salaries and the payment of operational services, tends to be inflexible in the short term, therefore, not having this authorization could lead to the municipalities not having resources to finance their operation. Increasing the percentage, as provided in challenged Article 4, would allow for the sufficiency of income to finance administrative spending. It does not necessarily imply that there will be an increase in said spending, thus it is incorrect to affirm, as the plaintiff does, that the rule authorizes an increase in administrative expenses. He adds that another reason why the premise from which the plaintiff starts is invalid relates to the fact that the challenged rule also allows the use of resources generated by lifting the established limit to finance the provision of municipal water services, cemeteries (cementerios), security, and comprehensive solid waste management (gestión integral de residuos); key areas to address given the pandemic situation the country is experiencing. The lifting of the percentage will apply exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 budget years; furthermore, the resources may not be used for the creation of new positions, which reaffirms that the intention is not to dedicate them to increasing administrative expenses, as the plaintiff presupposes. As with the objections to Article 4, there is an error of appreciation regarding the scope of what is provided in Article 5, as it does not propose an authorization for an increase in administrative spending, but rather an increase in the authorization of the resources that can be used for that purpose, which, faced with a generalized reduction in income, lifting the ceiling allows for financing the existing expenses of the municipalities and thus avoiding their incurring in financial non-compliance, for which reason the measure makes complete logical sense. On the other hand, as in the previous case, the measure is temporary and does not allow the creation of new positions, precisely with the spirit of not increasing administrative spending. In addition, precisely given the scenario announced by the plaintiff, the municipalities will require the lifting of the indicated caps to be able to finance their operation. He insists that if what is provided in the rule is read carefully, the indicated resources may be used to finance the provision of municipal water services, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management; whereby, contrary to what is questioned, what is provided in challenged Arts. 4 and 5 precisely intends to safeguard the financing of these areas so sensitive in times of pandemic. Regarding the technical reasonableness of the law, he reported that the law under challenge was analyzed in the working groups that were implemented to analyze actions to minimize the effects of the emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, so criteria of legality, necessity, suitability, and proportionality were taken into account throughout the legislative debate process, so that local governments would have the necessary tools to continue offering public service, which constitutes a constitutional mandate. To this effect, several passages of interventions made by legislators during the approval process of the regulations questioned by the plaintiff are also cited, and he concludes that the challenged rules are not unreasonable or "nonsensical," as the plaintiff states, since their validity is limited to a reasonable time, which has been assessed as necessary so that the municipalities can address the needs arising from the pandemic and likewise, provide the necessary support for the first steps toward the economic reactivation of the country's cantons.

Regarding these articles, the **Procurador General de la República** reported that, as can be extracted from the legislative background of Ley n.°9848, in view of expediente n.°21.922 documenting its parliamentary process, challenged Arts. 4 and 5 connect with the purpose of "making the management of municipal resources more flexible to confront the consequences of the emergency," by allowing the municipalities and district municipal councils an elevated margin of budgetary action for the years 2020 and 2021, since in the case of Art. 4, it allows them to allocate up to 40% of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) for administrative expenses, compared to the initial 10% provided in Art. 3 of the "Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles" (n.°7509); while in the case of Art. 5, an additional 10% is added to the original 40% set in Art. 102 of the Código Municipal of ordinary municipal revenues, which they could allocate to address the general administration expenses of the corporation, defined by the same precept as "current expenses that do not involve direct costs of municipal services." Therefore, both precepts seek to mitigate the impact on the local treasury resulting from lower collection given the scenario of economic deceleration caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in each canton—and in the country in general—by authorizing the municipalities to transfer a greater portion of their revenues to those fixed and permanent expenses, such as their employees' remunerations, to the detriment of expenses dedicated to municipal services. So, instead of applying more drastic spending containment measures, such as reducing their payroll, faced with the foreseeable decrease in municipal resources, the contested provisions authorize them to allocate a greater portion of these to current spending that finances, for example, salaries, subtracting from the percentage allocated to the provision of municipal public services. The plaintiff, as stated, first questions the reasonableness of the precepts, by promoting the increase in administrative spending of the municipalities when at the same time their revenues will be substantially diminished as a result of the health emergency, which ultimately would impact the fiscal deficit of the central Government, since he posits that the only way for the territorial Administrations to cover their expenditures in those circumstances is by resorting to public credit with the State as guarantor, which would ultimately answer for these in the event of non-compliance with their financial obligations. Again, the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to recall the jurisprudential line of that high Court regarding the need to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportion is not evident, since, otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective assessment or value judgment of the plaintiff. In this regard, the appellant does not provide any type of evidence or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree to determine the constitutional invalidity of the challenged provisions. Nor does he consider that according to Article 121, subsection 15) of the Constitución Política, loans to have the State's guarantee must pass through the control of the Asamblea Legislativa to be approved.

Nevertheless, regarding the lack of technical reports, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">every time the legislator introduces changes to legislation that go beyond opportunity and convenience in their circumstantial assessment of the public interest, by venturing into specialized areas of knowledge, such as those contained in the challenged norms, which relate to finance and economic sciences, where the percentage of administrative expenses that may be taken from the revenue generated by the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) is quadrupled and the percentage of all ordinary income that may be used for the general expenses of municipal management is raised to one half, despite the broad freedom of legislative configuration that characterizes their work, this does not exempt them from justifying or technically substantiating decisions of that nature at the time of approving a law, by imperative of the aforementioned constitutional principle of reasonability. It states that even though the approval of articles 4 and 5 was marked by the exceptional situation the country is experiencing due to the pandemic, with their validity being conditioned to the 2020 and 2021 budget years, the requirement of a technical basis was still necessary. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">For the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Sala Constitucional</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">, before examining the grievances raised by the claimant, it is unavoidable to refer to the legislative background that accounts for the process of approving Law No. 9848, in order to subsequently examine the content of the norms and the alleged absence of technical reasonability reproached by the claimant.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Regarding the legislative process</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">In this regard, it is noted that Legislative Bill 21.922 was introduced into the legislative process on </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">April 13, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">, just a few days after the national state of emergency was declared due to the health situation caused by Covid-19 (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 42227-MP-S of March 16, 2020). The bill was signed by forty legislators from various legislative factions and has the following statement of purpose:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">“Following the national state of emergency, declared by the Executive Branch, according to decree No. 42227-MP-S dated March 16 of this year, resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty it generates in the Costa Rican population regarding the effects that are occurring in various economic sectors and those that could arise in the future, there is an urgent need to take measures from Local Governments, as these are the governmental institutions closest to the population, and through which actions can be generated that contribute from various areas to counteract this effect that the pandemic may generate on the Costa Rican economy.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">State responses for citizens and for businesses have begun to emerge through new legislation and administrative provisions, including tax moratoriums, reduction of working hours for the private sector, relief in insurance and employer-worker contributions to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. However, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">these actions must be complemented at the local level, since municipalities in times of emergency play contingency and first-response roles such as the coordination of Local Emergency Committees (part of the National Risk Management System according to Law No. 8488), and the provision of indispensable services like citizen security through municipal police forces, waste collection, and aqueducts in some cases</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">For the above reasons</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">, both the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI) conducted an analysis based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and data available from Local Governments in the Sistema de Información de Presupuestos Públicos (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the revenue and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">It should be emphasized that Local Governments manage a total budget of approximately 590 billion colones, an amount that represents 2% of the national budget, but which for the 2020 period suffered a 1% decrease compared to 2019. According to the historical data of the last 7 years, budgets have had gradual growth, of which an average of 96.7% of what was budgeted has entered municipal coffers, and an average of 73.1% of the funds have been executed. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Of the total income received, 21.4% (₡126.087 billion) corresponds to the tax on real property, this being its largest source of income; 20% (₡118.074 billion) for professional, commercial, and other licenses; 17.8% (₡105.110 billion) are capital transfers from the Central Government which are used almost entirely for the maintenance of the Cantonal Road Network; and 15.4% (₡90.879 billion) for environmental sanitation services.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">For its part, the behavior of expenditures is distributed as 40% (₡235.949 billion) for the remuneration line item, 20.2% (₡119.324 billion) for municipal services, 18.3% (₡108.090 billion) in the purchase of durable goods, and 8.9% (₡52.747 billion) in current transfers. Compared to 2019, all had a growth rate of 5%, except for the durable goods line item.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Based on the above information, and upon conducting a consensus analysis among the contributions provided by the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL), the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), the Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), Mayors, and district intendants, as well as the consideration of other initiatives already presented, among which are the following legislative bills No. 21.842, “AUTHORIZATION OF A TAX MORATORIUM AND CONDONATION FOR THE MUNICIPAL REGIME AND MUNICIPAL DISTRICT COUNCILS”, Legislative Bill No. 21.889, “GENERAL LAW AUTHORIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX CONDONATION AND ADJUSTMENT IN THE COVID-19 SITUATION”, Legislative Bill No. 21.898 “MUNICIPAL LAW FOR RELIEF TO THE TAXPAYERS OF EACH MUNICIPALITY WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE COVID-19 CRISIS”, and Legislative Bill No. 21.896 “LAW TO MITIGATE THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND ENSURE THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL REGIME IN DECLARATIONS OF NATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY”. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">The working group formed on municipal matters analyzed and developed the present legislative initiative that we submit for consideration by the Deputies of the Republic, which will help make the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the reactivation of the economy</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">”.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\"> (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">As can be deduced from the above, the legislative bill arises in a specific context for the purpose of offering responses and relief to citizens and businesses from the local level, based on the premise that the work of the municipalities—the administration of local interests and services in each canton, according to Article 169 of the Political Constitution—is vital in emergency periods, as they carry out a contingency and first-response role to the needs of the residents, and, furthermore, in many cases they are in charge of providing essential public services within the framework of a health emergency—waste collection, cleaning of public roads, municipal security, provision of aqueducts, oversight of the ASADAS, etc.—. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Thus, two purposes are substantiated with the legislative bill in question. On the one hand, to reinforce the financial management of the municipalities in order to guarantee the continuity of all municipal services, contemplating, among them, the exceptional and temporary measures provided for in Articles 4 and 5 of the law, related to authorizing municipal governments to exceed limits established in previous regulations. Said authorization aims to regularly attend to general administration expenses and the provision of municipal services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and comprehensive solid waste management. On the other hand, to promote a series of municipal actions to support the taxpayer regarding the payment of municipal taxes. For example, a moratorium on the payment of municipal patents or licenses; municipal moratoriums on rates, public prices, and municipal services; reductions of up to fifty percent (50%) in the amounts charged for the lease of premises, sections, or stalls in municipal markets; the authorization for municipalities to offer their taxpayers, during 2020, payment arrangements for a term of up to twenty-four months, to pay off their obligations for rates, public prices, municipal services, taxes, and concession fees; the possibility of suspending the requirement to have municipal licenses for the exercise of certain lucrative activities, etc. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Now, contrary to what was stated by the claimant, it is substantiated that the legislative bill in question was the product of a consensus analysis with the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) and the Asociación Nacional de Alcaldías e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), who conducted an analysis based on reports issued by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) on 2020 municipal budgets and data available from Local Governments in the Sistema de Información de Presupuestos Públicos (SIPP), to provide a broad overview of the revenue and expenditure projections for the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. It is also affirmed that the Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), mayors, and district intendants participated in the proposal, and in a working group of the Legislative Assembly, this project and other parliamentary proposals were evaluated to finally shape the initiative under review. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">In relation to the processing of the bill, it is substantiated that, once presented, the text was published in the official newspaper La Gaceta on April 15, 2020. Subsequently, the Legislative Plenary applied a motion to dispense with procedures so that the bill could be examined by the Plenary itself. Indeed, during the session of April 28, 2020, the procedural motion was approved with the unanimous vote of forty-seven legislators present (see page 403 of the digital copy of the legislative record). Furthermore, the proposal had the support of the Executive Branch, as the bill was convened during the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly (see Decreto Ejecutivo No. 42302-MP). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">On the other hand, from a careful review of the legislative record, it is noted that the bill was submitted for institutional consultation to all the municipalities of the national territory, and several municipal agreements supporting the initiative are on record. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">It is also substantiated that the bill was submitted for consultation to the Ministry of Finance, the National Registry, the Ombudsman's Office, and the CGR. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Furthermore, the institutional opinion of the CGR, rendered through official communication No. DFOE-DL-0567 of </span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">April 15, 2020</span><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">, is on record (see pages 186-196 of the digital copy of the legislative record), from which the following objections are drawn:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“That is, the bill proposes authorizing Local Governments to exceed spending limits based on certain revenue sources.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Specifically, the percentage of the property tax that is allocated for administrative expenses has been increased from 10% to 40%; and an additional 10% is added, reaching up to 50%, of ordinary municipal income, that could be used to cover the general administration expenses of the Municipality, thus expanding the availability of resources that already had a legal limit.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">However, as in the previous comment, it is considered that it is not being contemplated that the measure extended to two fiscal years, 2020 and 2021, could erode the revenue and empty the purposes for which the limit was imposed of content, which could cause an excess and distort that legal maximum that had been established and for which the administrations should have already adjusted their projections for sustainable financial management.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Likewise, the motivation to increase administrative or general expenses in addressing the emergency is not found, given that the priority would be to direct resources toward service delivery and to a lesser degree toward line items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings might even occur due to social distancing and teleworking measures.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Finally, regarding the possibility of creating new, urgent, and temporary positions, it is important to emphasize that these may only occur insofar as they are related to the emergency or the provision of the municipal services specified in the article, but it is also appropriate that they have adequate justification, proportional and in accordance with the emergency, so as to avoid any type of unnecessary expenditure of resources.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; letter-spacing:0.15pt\">Then, there is on record the motion raised by Legislator Floria Segreda Sagot and other deputies, a motion that was approved, for the project to be consulted with the following institutions: Ministry of Finance, Budgetary Authority of the Ministry of Finance, CGR, municipalities of the country, municipal district councils, Administrative Board of the National Registry, state banks and Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, and Ministry of Health. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In the session of April 30, 2020, Legislator María José Corrales made the following considerations (pages 534-535 of the digital legislative record):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Thank you, Mr. President; good afternoon to all, colleagues.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">Really, I am going to be very concise in the words that I am going to mention with respect to this project. Likewise, Mr. President, I will send you my speech via WhatsApp so you can attach it to the minutes.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">To remind all of you and the citizenry, what is not being heard is that the country's reality in the face of the pandemic is an exception that is setting a totally different standard for us. And with that, the municipalities throughout the country have also had to take exceptional actions to carry out the actions that correspond to them by Municipal Code, but also to be able to collaborate with the Executive Branch in each of the solutions or relief measures that can be provided precisely to the citizenry in the face of the pandemic.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">The reason for this was that this record was presented and that the working group was formed, which has truly been an extraordinary group, a group that has allowed teamwork, working together, listening precisely to that sector affected, the municipal regime, and also listening to the taxpayer who needs precisely those relief measures to be able to carry on with their daily life.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">The bill has undergone consensus modifications, technically reviewed, both by ANAI and by the Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and also with contributions from all the deputies of this Legislative Assembly who have considered their observations appropriate. And the reason for this is that today a substitute text has been approved in this Plenary that incorporates many of them and also the other additional motions that were approved.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'\">In addition, Legislator Catalina Montero Gómez said the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">“Today we are concluding a process of consultation, dialogue, and agreements. It has been a little long, it has been very intense, but it has been fundamental.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">With the participation of multiple actors, deputies, a working group that has been broad and has worked with great responsibility, but also involving those key actors: mayor's offices, intendants' offices, the Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, and some institutions of the Executive Branch.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">I believe we have managed to gather those concerns to the maximum extent, and the majority of those concerns have been consigned in this text of the project to improve it, refine it, so that what this law says is what corresponds, is extremely clear when applying it, and that this truly is an opportunity to support taxpayers and to strengthen the financial management of municipalities.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">It is very clear to us that municipalities and municipal district councils have and will have an essential mission during and post-pandemic, because they are the leading institutions in the reconstruction processes and the economic development and reactivation processes in each of their cantons, logically, hand in hand with the institution, the rest of the Costa Rican institutional framework.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-style:italic\">I want to thank this working group for this responsible work and all the fellow deputies who have contributed to enrich this bill that we are finally approving in the first debate." Thank you very much to everyone.” Certainly, there were objections that are evident from the statements of legislator Yorleny León Marchena, who opposed the categorical exclusion of municipalities from the application of the fiscal rule (see folios 537 et seq.).

Also, the participation of Deputy Paola Valladares Rosado, who, in explaining her vote, calls for spending restraint (contención del gasto) on the part of the municipalities:

“Good afternoon, thank you, Mr. President, colleagues.

As someone passionate about the municipal regime, I am clearly aware of the need at this time to support, from the legislative plenary, the situation that municipalities are going through, on the understanding that municipalities depend mostly on their income and at this time of crisis that the country and the entire world are experiencing, the economic situation has clearly caused that collection to decrease and additionally, the effort is to enable municipalities to meet the needs of each of their taxpayers and in this case, that is why the project provides a moratorium so that we can address that need and maintain, to the extent possible, that linkage and that job creation and the economies at the cantonal levels.

I truly thank the working group that made a very large effort, we are clear that it is a bit complex to legislate for 82 completely different realities where the economic situation itself in each one of them differs from the others, what we are trying to do in this project is to guarantee a cash flow so that the municipalities can help and provide relief to their patent holders and taxpayers, but at the same time survive so that at the end of the year each of their officials can receive…, or rather, guarantee, their salaries, in this case, and subsist in addressing the emergency without, well, canceling service provisions, that clearly garbage collection, many of them that are responsible for municipal aqueducts, and consequently also street cleaning and garbage collection, are therefore guaranteed.

However, I believe it is important to remind you, just as I have done in the working groups, I want to leave it on the record this afternoon, that the most important thing is that they begin a review of their budgets for the purpose of spending restraint (contención del gasto).

It is necessary that each of those financial areas has made that income projection and adjusted the entire operational plan accordingly. I know that unfortunately there are still municipalities that continue to process contracts, whether in road programs or other programs, without being aware that the resources are becoming increasingly limited for their management.

So, I call in that sense on each of the municipalities to be responsible for the spending restraint (contención del gasto), starting with a reduction of representation expenses, overtime and clearly, as limited in the project, the creation of positions.

So, it is a form of collaboration from the legislative branch to the municipalities, but we also need to see that this task is done responsibly so that from all places we are collaborating on this.” Likewise, legislator José María Villalta Flórez-Estrada offered the following reflections:

“Thank you, Mr. President, fellow deputies.

I am going to vote with pleasure and great satisfaction for this bill that we have worked on for many weeks, in a working group with representation from practically all the legislative factions, representation of local governments, the Union of Local Governments, IFAM, to support our local governments in the way they are facing and will have to face the emergency we are experiencing.

What does this bill propose? It essentially proposes three things (…)

At the same time — and this is the second component of this bill — a series of measures are established to make more flexible those norms that regulate the operation of municipal budgets, so that municipalities can face the significant reduction in their income, which this emergency is representing, not as a consequence of this law.

The fact is that today the income of municipalities is already decreasing significantly, as a result of many people not being able to pay their obligations to the municipalities.

So, norms are established to exempt municipalities for two years from certain contributions they have to make to the Central Government or they are allowed to use surpluses, transfer them to those expenses, those needs where they are having, where they are going to have, a deficit situation. The norms on the Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles) are made more flexible, which currently has a cap on the resources that can be allocated to administrative expenses.

But if the income from municipal patents or licenses collapses, the municipalities will have to see how they redistribute their budgets to be able to cover operating expenses and maintain the operation of the essential services provided by the municipalities: the aqueducts, garbage collection, security, the different municipal services.

But in addition, the municipalities, as Deputy Montero Gómez said, are key actors in addressing the emergency. Therefore, they cannot be weakened, their income cannot suddenly collapse without us giving them the flexibility that we are granting them with this bill so they can finance those expenses that would instead be increasing within the framework of the emergency.” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Subsequently, in the session of April 30, 2020, after extensive analysis, the bill was approved in the first debate with forty-one votes in favor and three against.

It is additionally recorded that the updated text was consulted with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, CGR, state banks, Budgetary Authority of the Ministry of Finance, Administrative Board of the National Registry, municipalities and district municipal councils (see folios 615 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file).

For these purposes, the second report from the CGR provided through official letter No. DFOE-DL-0842 of May 13, 2020 (see folios 908 et seq. of the digital copy of the legislative file) states the following:

“Articles 4 and 5:

Regarding these articles, it is requested that exceptionally in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years (ejercicios presupuestarios), municipalities and district municipal councils be allowed to exceed: first the limit established in articles 3 of the LIBI and its reforms and allocate up to 40% for administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), and increase the limit established in article 102 of the Municipal Code, and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal income for administrative expenses. Also indicating that these resources can be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security and integrated waste management, but not for the creation of new positions.

The application of less strict limits as proposed in this project, could lead to a significant increase in the administrative expenses of the municipalities. If the 2019 fiscal year period is used as an example, the application of the proposed new limits would have generated an additional spending space of ₡90,357 million, which represents 75% of the total administrative expenditure executed during that year.

Given the above, it is reiterated that the project does not contain the motivation to increase administrative or general expenses in addressing the emergency, given that the priority in this context would be to direct resources towards care services and to a lesser degree towards items associated with administrative or general expenses, regarding which savings could even occur. Regarding this point, the Comptroller General’s Office estimated that the municipal sector could generate savings exceeding ₡21,000 million due only to the social distancing and telework measures that have been implemented, which can be complemented with other savings or improvement and efficiency measures that local governments could implement.” After weighing such criteria and conducting subsequent consultations, the bill was brought to a vote for the second debate on May 19, 2020. On that occasion, for example, Deputy Gourzong Cerdas drew the following conclusions:

“Thanks to the high level of responsibility of the Union of Local Governments, the National Association of Mayors and Intendants of Costa Rica, ANAI, the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory, IFAM, mayors and intendants, and the working group formed by deputies of this Legislative Assembly who analyzed and developed the present legislative initiative, I give my absolute support to this project which comes to allow the increased flexibility (flexibilización) of the management of municipal resources to face the consequences of this emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be vital in the reactivation of the economy and that follows the path of not generating more unemployment in the different cantons of this country.” Additionally, other legislators took the floor, offering the following reflections. For example, Deputy María José Corrales Chacón:

“Thank you, Mr. President.

Good afternoon, fellow members.

In the same vein as Deputy Montero Gómez, it is of utmost importance to be able to move forward with the processing of this project and provide the vote in the second debate, for which reason I will be sending my dissertation to be attached to the minutes. (see exhibit three) I only want to mention one point that I do consider important for all Costa Ricans to hear out loud.

Regarding the criticisms and objections that this project has suffered, mainly from the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), which has inaccurately mentioned that there would be an effect on state public finances with the approval of this project, I want to make it clear that the fiscal rule in the municipalities is not going to reduce the fiscal deficit of the Central Government; what the Central Government contributes to local governments represents just 1.09% of the Republic's budget and practically all this percentage is directed to investment in the cantonal road network.

For this reason, it also seems important to me to demonstrate that today the country's municipalities already have caps that precisely prevent them from making excessive expenditures, but above all also that they already have what is called the golden rule, the rule that prevents them from exaggerated growth, for that reason to demonstrate that the municipalities need and are urgently in need, more than anything, in the situation we are facing as a country, of the approval of this file.

Please, Mr. President, let the text I am going to send to your advisor be attached so it can be appended to the minutes.

Thank you.” And also Deputy Patricia Villegas Álvarez:

“Thank you, Mr. President; very good afternoon to everyone.

Actually, my speech is short, but I do not want to overlook it. I was a member of the working group for project 21.922, emphatically supporting the local taxpayer during this health crisis, using as a link our local governments, which are the institutions closest to our cantonal population, our communal population, to our neighborhoods in our beloved country, this is today a reality through this approval in its second debate.

Local governments are the entities responsible for the execution of actions that contribute to appeasing, to some extent, in our national economy the aftermath of this pandemic we are facing, it is the municipalities that play liaison and coordination roles with the local emergency committees.

At the negotiation table, deputies from different political forces worked arduously, with the inclusion of the National Union of Local Governments and the National Association of Mayors and Intendants of Costa Rica, carrying out analyses based on reports issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic on the 2020 municipal budgets, and data available from local governments in the public budgets information system, to provide a broad overview of the projections of income and expenditures of the main accounts that sustain municipal finances and to propose the respective measures. Making the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, avoiding institutional and constitutional paralysis, are fundamental axes of this present law.

Today, here today we are providing answers to the citizens and I ask, with all due respect, for the definitive support for the vote in this second debate.

Thank you very much.” Finally, with the presence of forty-eight legislators, the vote on the second debate of file 21,922 began, and it was approved with forty-three votes.

On the content and effects of the challenged Articles 4 and 5 First of all, it is relevant to observe that the challenged Article 4 exceptionally authorized, in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years (ejercicios presupuestarios), that municipalities and district municipal councils could exceed the limit established in Art. 3 of the Property Tax Law (Ley sobre Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) and have the possibility of allocating up to forty percent (40%) to administrative expenses of the amount corresponding to them from the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). That norm also expressly provided that such resources could be used in the provision of municipal services of water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. However, the norm warned that this exceptional possibility could not be used for the creation of new municipal positions. The precept referred to — Art. 3 of the Property Tax Law, No. 7509 — orders the following:

“Art. 3.- Powers of the municipalities For the purposes of this tax, the municipalities shall have the character of tax administration. They shall be responsible for carrying out valuations of real property, billing, collecting, and processing judicial collection and for administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. They may allocate up to ten percent (10%) of the amount corresponding to them from this tax for administrative expenses. (…)”.

That is to say, of the amount collected from the tax established in favor of the municipalities on the real property of the canton, it is ordinarily authorized that up to 10% of the amount corresponding to them from that tax be used for administrative expenses. The norm challenged in this action establishes exceptionally and temporarily that municipalities could use up to 40% of the amount received from such taxes, to cover regular municipal expenses and other essential basic services.

Meanwhile, Art. 5 authorizes that exceptionally and solely for the fiscal years (ejercicios presupuestarios) 2020 and 2021, municipalities and district municipal councils could exceed the limit established in Art. 102 of the Municipal Code and allocate up to 50% of their ordinary municipal income to cover general administration expenses. The norm also authorized that these ordinary municipal incomes be used in the provision of essential public services, such as water, cemeteries, security, and integrated waste management. The provision was emphatic that this authorization does not imply the possibility of creating new municipal positions. As can be seen, the norm refers to what is regulated in Art. 102 of the Municipal Code which is framed within the budgetary legal provisions governing local governments. The current precept orders the following:

“Art. 102. - Municipalities may not allocate more than forty percent (40%) of their ordinary municipal income to cover general administration expenses.

General administration expenses are current expenditures that do not involve direct costs of municipal services.” That is to say, it is usual that under the cited provision, local governments cannot use more than 40% of their income to cover general administration expenses. Consequently, what the provision challenged in this action authorized was to raise that amount by 10% so that the municipalities could have up to 50% of their ordinary income, to cover the general administration expenses of the municipality, or else, use them to finance vital municipal services.

**Constitutionality analysis** After evaluating the arguments of unconstitutionality, the reports from the authorities that appeared in this process, the legislative file, and the precedents of this Constitutional Court, it is concluded that the questioned norms are not unconstitutional.

In the first place, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiff and what was reported by the PGR in the sense that a specific technical study was lacking, it must be pointed out, according to the legislative background *supra* detailed, that the legislative proposal in question was not devoid of a specific technical analysis. On the contrary, as recorded, the legislative proposal—backed by a qualified majority of the body and of the Executive Branch itself—was preceded by an analysis of the municipal budgets and the revenue and expenditure projections of the accounts that sustain municipal finances, carried out by the UNGL and the ANAI. Various municipal governments and the IFAM itself also participated in the initiative through working groups held and promoted by the legislators. This is textually demonstrated, and in summary, in the statement of purpose of the bill:

*“The working group formed on municipal matters analyzed and developed this legislative initiative that we submit for consideration by the Deputies of the Republic, which will help make the management of municipal resources more flexible to face the consequences of the emergency, sustain the basic services provided by the municipality, and avoid the paralysis of an institutional and constitutional regime that will be of primary importance for the reactivation of the economy.”* The fact that the bill arose as a parliamentary initiative from these “working groups” is significant because it shows that it was nourished by the knowledge, the fruit of experience, of the members of the Unión de Gobiernos Locales, the Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, the IFAM, mayors, and the legislators themselves. The input that these individuals could contribute to the working groups—all their experience regarding the various tasks entrusted to local governments and the reality of their functioning—suggests that it was not an arbitrary, hasty, or capricious decision. This is all the more so, if one takes into account that the legislation was adopted as a temporary measure with the purpose of addressing a conjunctural situation that affected both the citizens themselves and the administrative machinery of the municipalities, under a particularly uncertain and unprecedented forecast.

Likewise, as was proven, despite the fact that a motion to dispense with procedural formalities was applied to the file, the bill was publicized and widely consulted with various public authorities that contributed their input and opinions regarding the bill. As was verified, the bill was consulted with all the municipalities and municipal district councils of the country, the CGR, the Ministry of Finance, the National Registry, state banks, the Ministry of Health, among other authorities. As recorded in the transcription of several legislative interventions during the legislative approval process, it was evidenced that the bill was agreed upon with various actors in broad working groups and that led a parliamentary majority to approve this bill under the consideration that, by reducing the usual income from municipal patents or licenses, the municipal corporations were going to have to find a way to make the rules *supra* indicated more flexible in order to cover operating expenses and maintain essential municipal services.

As was previously noted, the bill revolved around two essential axes: authorizing a series of facilities for the local taxpayer in order to face the consequences of the pandemic (capacity reductions, temporary closures, etc.) and trying to reactivate the economy with such facilities and moratoriums. But, on the other hand, such facilities—authorizations to apply a moratorium for the payment of municipal patents or licenses (art.12); a municipal moratorium for the cancellation of rates, public prices, and municipal services (art.13); reduction of municipal lease fees (art.14), and other types of payment arrangements (art.16)—necessarily implied a reduction in the usual income of the municipal corporations that motivated the legislator to establish the exceptional authorizations provided for in arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged law. The purpose was so that through these extraordinary measures, the facilities for local taxpayers could be guaranteed, but also the municipality could make use of the indicated resources (real estate taxes and ordinary municipal income) to finance the regular operation of the municipality, without authorizing the growth of the municipal payroll and that, in addition, such amounts could be used to satisfy essential services for the benefit of all residents and the general population.

As has been noted, all these variables were assessed by the legislators—including the disagreements of the CGR—without it appearing that their decision was arbitrary or harmful to constitutional rights. In that sense, it is necessary to remember that it is true that legislative decisions cannot lack an adequate foundation, but that does not imply that the Legislative Branch—a democratic and deliberative body—can be forced to submit to a single technical option, but rather that its decisions be the fruit of an analysis of reasonableness and proportionality and that it involve the technical actors who can provide sufficient arguments to adopt a determined legislative decision.

In the *sub lite* case, as could be verified, the legislative proposal emerged from the bosom of the Legislative Assembly itself, which was agreed upon with other actors of the national economic policy and, even, as was proven, it was a legislative proposal that had the support of the Executive Branch regarding the timely convening of the bill for discussion during the extraordinary session period of Congress. In addition, the disagreements of the CGR were weighed. However, the Legislative Assembly opted to approve this exceptional regulation with the purpose of ensuring flexibility in the event of a financial collapse due to the decrease in the collection of municipal revenues.

The jurisprudential lines of this Court must be highlighted, in the sense that this Chamber has rejected that “all decisions of the legislator must inevitably contemplate a technical study” because that is contrary to the very nature of Parliament, in the sense that the legislator has discretion, within the framework of its right to free configuration, in order to weigh and adopt the norms it deems necessary. If it were a strictly technical body that must adhere to a single criterion, the very nature of legislative activity would be meaningless. Regarding the legislator's free configuration, this Chamber has stated the following:

*“The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program fixed by the Constituent Power. This extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has, faced with a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation. In this way, the legislator can create public bodies, assign them functions or competencies, develop various institutions, or regulate reality, as it deems appropriate and convenient for a given historical, social, economic, or political juncture. Evidently, legislative discretion is much broader than administrative discretion, since the legislative function cannot be reduced to the simple execution of the Constitution. The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles—among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out—of that nature, and the jurisprudence rendered by this Court for similar cases. The limits to legislative discretion tend to be more intense when it comes to the legal regulation of fundamental rights, since in such matter the extension, content, and scope of the freedoms of the human person are under discussion, being that, in contrast, such limits are more lax in merely organizational aspects.”* (Judgment No. 2003-05090) Attending to the legislator's free configuration, in a matter such as the one examined in the specific case, the Legislative Assembly was in a position to address the reality presented to it in various ways, without adhering to a technical criterion in a strict sense, but by reasoning its decision, as was proven. In this regard, one can consult, for example, judgment No. 2018-000230 through which the Chamber warned that technical studies are not necessary in all cases of intervention by the Legislative Assembly:

*“The Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since this situation would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation. Technical studies are necessary when there is an express norm in this regard (for example, in environmental matters) or when the matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness.”* (Criterion reiterated in advisory opinion No. 2020-015542).

Likewise, one can consult the advisory opinion No. 2020-010160 in which the Chamber resolved some doubts of constitutionality regarding the bill on the regulation of the figure of "usury" in which this Court warned the following:

*“That is, given the **hypothetical nature** of the possible harm with unreasonable and disproportionate effects on a segment of the population or the economy, this Chamber considers that it cannot, under these conditions, validly limit the margin of initiative of the legislator, who is the competent party and obligated to seek a solution to the problem of the omission of the usury rate. The opposite, in these circumstances, would be harmful to the independence of parliament. At this stage, in which the proposal has not produced effects such as to assess—with objective and certain criteria—if the result is truly going to be negative, capable of stripping the norm of reasonableness and proportionality—due to its effects—the Chamber estimates that **it must reserve a broader margin for the legislator** than the Chamber has in terms of subsequent judicial control through the unconstitutionality action procedure, where it can assess the unconstitutional effects of a specific legislation. Without the norm having produced effects that are objectively measurable and there being dissimilar technical studies in the file, we are still in the field of hypothesis, and the Chamber would be wrong, without certain evidence, to limit the exercise of constitutional powers proper to the highest body of popular representation, after a democratic debate that has lasted more than a decade, without there being clear studies that demonstrate that the norm will be disproportionate in its effects.”* In said advisory opinion, Justice Castillo Víquez set forth some additional reasons that serve to illustrate the Chamber's thesis:

*“A topic of great depth that arises in this question—regarding the alleged violation of the principle of technical reasonableness—is whether it is possible to exercise a kind of discretion control over legislative or parliamentary activity. As is well known, discretion control is a technique that arises to verify whether the activity of the Public Administration conforms or not to the univocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience. Ergo, the exercise of discretionary powers is subject to the general principles of Law, and to the control of determining facts and indeterminate legal concepts, as well as the regulated elements of the administrative act, by the Judge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. It is evident, and as far as I recall, nowhere in the world has this exorbitance been reached, that this control be applied to parliamentary activity; this type of control could never be exercised over legislative or parliamentary activity, because Parliament would be reduced to the minimum expression, and a core element of the republican system would be dislocated. What is possible is to exercise a control of constitutionality over parliamentary activity and, consequently, over the final parliamentary act, be it a legislative decree or agreement, for violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality when they are linked to a fundamental right and, consequently, its essential content is emptied. The foregoing means, in plain language, that the legislator, in the exercise of the power to legislate, the self-regulatory power, the power of political control, of political direction, etc., has a broad margin of discretion, a sort of legislative policy, for which it can choose from a multiplicity of variables within the framework of a plural, democratic body, where political concertation constitutes a necessary channel, especially when in a constitutional or legislative term, a political party or the governing party lacks a parliamentary majority. This margin of discretion is exempt from constitutionality control, since, if this were not so, the Constitutional Court would come to substitute the will of Parliament, causing a severe dislocation to the democratic system, especially significantly harming the principle of separation of functions. That said, Parliament has broad freedom to follow a specific technical criterion or depart from it, provided that it does not thereby affect the essential content of a fundamental right and, consequently, also violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as this Court has established regarding environmental impact, where it has required, for the Law to pass the constitutional filter, that there be technical studies or the respective compensations that demonstrate that there is no harm to the environment. The foregoing is even more certain when in the discussion of a bill there are different technical criteria or these are contradictory to each other. In these cases, the legislator is not bound to follow a specific technical criterion but can well adopt a political decision taking into consideration other elements of judgment. In other words, it is not possible to declare a Law unconstitutional because it departed from one or several technical criteria—this is characteristic of control over the activity of the Public Administration—except when such omission entails the violation of the essential content of a fundamental right.”* Even in matters of disposal of public funds, although an adequate foundation of the decision is necessary to determine its reasonableness, this Chamber has not required technical studies as strict as the one demanded by the plaintiff. For example, in the legislative consultation of the Ley Marco de Empleo Público, resolution No. 2021-017098, this Chamber resolved the following:

***“Lack of cost study:** They indicate that, at the time of incorporating these leaves and permits into the bill, no cost study or source of resources to cover them was taken into consideration. **In this regard**, it cannot be lost sight of that the legislator has a broad margin of legislative discretion in the formation of laws; a criterion that has been repeatedly sustained by the Constitutional Chamber, pointing out that, in principle, it is not strictly necessary that all legislative decisions must have technical or financial studies. Thus, for example, in judgment no. 2018-000230 at 10:40 a.m. on January 10, 2018, this Court stated that: “[t]he Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study, since this situation would annul the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criterion of third parties that lack democratic representation.* Technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule on the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness.” Thus, not all decisions of the legislator must include a technical study, since such a situation would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation, manifesting that technical studies are necessary when there is an express rule on the matter (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter requires them, under penalty of transforming discretion into arbitrariness (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment No. 2019-020596 of 7:15 p.m. on October 25, 2019). In this matter, the Chamber has referred to the principle of discretion or free configuration of the legislator (libre configuración del legislador), mentioned in judgment No. 2003-05090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003, according to which, the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of dictating norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in a formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1, of the Political Constitution), enjoys a broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power; a margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter that has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that this body has—limited only by the Law of the Constitution—, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law that it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgment No. 2016-010244 of 9:05 a.m. on July 20, 2016, and recently in judgment 2020-015542 of 11:40 a.m. on August 19, 2020). Under this perspective, the petitioners are not correct in considering that the licenses and permits contained in these articles 39 to 41 are unconstitutional by the mere fact that, according to their claim, they are not justified by cost studies or by the corresponding sources of resources that would allow them to be covered. On the other hand, the petitioners did not provide sufficient elements of judgment to allow for the affirmation that the consulted norms cause, per se, an increase in costs that would put State finances at risk, or that there is a lack of resource sources for their implementation. By reason of these circumstances, the argument raised regarding this point is rejected.

(…)

**Absence of objective reasons or technical criteria to broaden maternity leave grounds (licencia de maternidad):** Regarding Article 42, which contemplates the extension of maternity leave (licencia de maternidad), the petitioners argue that it is a numeral that contains a series of scenarios in which that extension is applicable (premature birth, children with severe disability and/or chronic illnesses, and multiple births); however, they consider that the bill does not contemplate the objective reasons or the technical or scientific criteria that justify including these grounds and not others. In this regard, it is once again observed that the disagreement lies in the exercise of the free configuration or discretion of the legislator and, at its core, the petitioners' opposition again lies in the fact that technical-scientific criteria were not taken into account to define the scenarios under which the aforementioned leave could be extended. In this regard, it must be reiterated what was indicated in judgment No. 2018-00230 by which the Constitutional Chamber rejects that, inevitably, all decisions of the legislator must contemplate a technical study since that, as has been said, would nullify the discretion of the legislative body, subjecting it to the criteria of third parties who lack democratic representation. In this sense, it is not proven that, in this case, the technical studies were necessary, and therefore the alleged unconstitutionality is dismissed.

**Lack of technical studies regarding paternity leave (permiso de paternidad):** Regarding the paternity leave (permiso de paternidad) in Article 41 of the bill, which grants a leave with salary for one calendar month after the day of birth or the moment of adoption of the minor, the petitioners complain that the file does not indicate—once again—the technical studies or criteria that indicate the cost that the granting of this leave would have for the State, nor the source of financing. In this regard, indisputably, on this point the Chamber observes that the petitioners' arguments are reiterated in relation to what was analyzed supra in point a); consequently, it refers to what was indicated there and reiterates that this is a questioning that does not have the virtue of violating the Law of the Constitution, and therefore the formulated approach is rejected.

(…)

The Chamber finds no vices of unconstitutionality in the aspects questioned regarding Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the consulted bill, as it is a matter of legislative discretion, the mandatory consultation with the CCSS having been fulfilled, and there being no elements that must determine that the legislator needed to have a prior technical study, in this case.” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Finally, in advisory opinion No. 2022-025307, the majority of the Chamber considered that “demanding a technical study in any case of exercise of the legislative function would empty the content of the principle of free configuration of the legislator (libre configuración del legislador).” According to the aforementioned precedents, there is no unavoidable duty for the Legislative Assembly to submit to technical studies for any rules it must issue, but rather to duly justify its decision based on criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in light of the pertinent inputs that are brought to the legislative discussion (in this case, the knowledge derived from experience in the exercise of various functions in the municipal sphere, assessment of municipal budgets, etc.). Those criteria were reasonably met in the specific case, which, as has been said, occurred in an unprecedented and particularly uncertain framework, in which legislating was justified without demanding exact data that the situation made it impossible to specify. Therefore, in this regard, the alleged vice of unconstitutionality is dismissed.

In another order of ideas, the plaintiff argues that the rules in question will cause the administrative expenses of the municipalities to grow disproportionately, with the eventual consequences that public services are affected and could even cause indebtedness that ultimately impacts public finances and the pockets of all taxpayers. In this regard, this Chamber considers that the President of the Legislative Assembly is correct in the sense that the challenged provisions—Arts. 4 and 5 of Law No. 9848—do not imply an order or an incentive for the municipalities to increase their administrative expenses, but rather an exceptional possibility to dispose of other resources to be able to finance their regular operation, based on the premise that as a consequence of the pandemic and the facilities and moratoriums contemplated, they will receive less money in items or revenues that would normally finance their management—licenses, patents, etc.—. Furthermore, it is necessary to highlight that the possibility of being financed extraordinarily with other municipal resources was ordered on a temporary and exceptional basis (budget years 2020 and 2021), under the express condition that it must not be used to expand the municipal payroll and that, in addition, they may be used for the provision of essential services. With this, it is verified that the legislative decision is aimed not only at making the municipality's budgetary resources more flexible, but at safeguarding the continuity of public services, especially those of the municipalities, which are responsible for the administration of local interests and services in each canton (Art. 169 of the Political Constitution). Secondly, this Chamber considers that the PGR is correct in the sense that the statements made by the plaintiff—about possible indebtedness and the need to resort to public credits—are nothing more than mere speculations and hypothetical assessments that were not accompanied by solid studies that could substantiate his statements. In this regard, the PGR states the following:

“Again the assumption is purely hypothetical. It is important to recall the jurisprudential line of this high Court regarding the need to have some element of judgment or contrast that serves to determine the reasonableness of a normative provision when the alleged disproportion is not evident, because otherwise, its constitutional validity would be made to depend on a subjective appreciation or value judgment of the plaintiff (…)

In this respect, the appellant does not provide any type of proof or economic model that serves as an element of judgment to demonstrate his projections to a sufficient degree as to determine the constitutional invalidity of the challenged provisions, nor does he consider that according to Article 121, subsection 15), of the Political Constitution, loans to have the State's endorsement must go through the control of the Legislative Assembly to be approved.” In other words, the action of unconstitutionality refers to mere hypothetical scenarios—exponential growth of public spending, detriment of public services, and increase in the tax burden—that are also not duly substantiated by serious and real economic projections (which is precisely the omission that the appellant reproaches). So, in the terms in which the action was filed, without solid arguments or proof, and barely a month after it was approved, they do not allow for the substantiation of an alleged unreasonableness that has threatened the constitutional principles invoked by the appellant. Likewise, the PGR is correct when it points out that the assumptions made in the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality omit to contemplate the rules established in the Political Constitution regarding the approval of loans (Arts. 121 subsection 15 and 174).

Without detriment to the foregoing, it is also necessary to emphasize that the rules questioned here do not imply the annulment of other constitutional and legal provisions that seek to ensure the balance of municipal budgets and prevent, in practice, the pernicious effects that concern the appellant. In this sense, it must be stressed that municipal corporations are subject to the principles of budgetary balance, sustainability, transparency, and responsibility derived from the provisions of Art. 176 of the Political Constitution, which orders the following:

“Article 176- Public management shall be conducted in a sustainable, transparent, and responsible manner, which shall be based on a multi-year budgeting framework, in pursuit of the continuity of the services it provides.

The ordinary budget of the Republic includes all probable revenues and all authorized expenses of the Public Administration, throughout the entire economic year. In no case may the amount of budgeted expenses exceed that of probable revenues.

The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall observe the above rules when issuing its budgets.

The budget of the Republic shall be issued for a term of one year, from January first to December thirty-first.” And, for this purpose, the CGR is concurrently responsible for ensuring that the municipalities annually comply with such constitutional mandates. That is why Art. 175 of the Political Constitution establishes that the validity of municipal budgets depends on the approval of the Comptroller's Office, a body which is responsible for overseeing their proper execution. In which case, it is also appropriate to cite the rules of the Municipal Code that regulate the subject of municipal budgets, which are subject to the control of the CGR, but also to specific and concrete rules that prevent them from excessively increasing public spending:

“Art. 106. - The ordinary budget and the extraordinary budgets of the municipalities must be approved by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). The ordinary budget must be submitted no later than September 30 of each year, and the extraordinary ones, within fifteen days following their approval. Both terms are non-extendable.

All budgets sent to the Comptroller's Office must be accompanied by a copy of the minutes of the sessions in which they were approved. In these minutes, the respective budget must be fully transcribed, signed by the secretary, and countersigned by the municipal mayor: furthermore, the annual operational plan, the municipal development plan, and the municipal treasurer's certification regarding the corresponding budgetary backing must be included.

Art. 107. - If the ordinary budget is not submitted in a timely manner to the Comptroller General of the Republic, the previous year's budget shall govern for the next period, except for expenditures that, due to their nature, are only effective in the referenced year. In any case, the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities that may result from such omission must be determined. To resolve this situation, the Council must hear and approve the applicable extraordinary budgets.

Art. 108. - Once the budget is approved by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the original shall be sent to the municipal secretariat, where it shall remain in custody, and a copy shall be sent to the municipal mayor, the internal accountant or auditor, each of the proprietary council members, as well as to the other offices that the Council agrees upon or the regulation indicates.

Art. 109. - Within the same budgeted program, modifications to the current budgets shall proceed when agreed upon by the Council. The modification from one program to another shall require the Council's approval by a two-thirds vote of its members.

The ordinary budget may not be modified to increase salaries or create new positions, except in the case of adjustments due to the application of the minimum wage decree or due to collective bargaining agreements or contracts, in the first case where new employees are required due to the expansion of services or the provision of a new one, in the second case.

Adjustments produced by the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements or contracts, or any others that imply modifying the ordinary budgets, shall only proceed when it is proven, in the course of the processing of disputes or in the pertinent procedures, that the cost of living has increased substantially according to the price indices of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and the General Directorate of Statistics and Censuses.

Art. 110. - Fixed ordinary expenses may only be financed with ordinary income of the municipality.

Extraordinary income may only be obtained through extraordinary budgets, which may be allocated to reinforce current or new programs. These budgets may be agreed upon in ordinary or extraordinary sessions.

Art. 111. - The Comptroller General of the Republic must approve or reject the budget projects it receives.

It shall reject them within a period of one month from receipt, in a reasoned resolution, and the approval may be partial or total, due to a violation of the legal system or lack of resources.

*It may introduce modifications to the projects only with the consent of the Council.* *Art. 112. - The municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments if there is no budgetary line item (subpartida presupuestaria) covering the expenditure or when the approved line item is exhausted or proves insufficient; nor may they pay from one expenditure line item for expenses corresponding to another.* *The violation of the foregoing provision shall be grounds for suspension of the responsible official or employee, and recidivism shall be cause for separation.”* (The highlighting is not part of the original).

All the foregoing provisions remain in force and are of unavoidable application for both municipal governments and the CGR, in order to ensure that municipal budgets are formulated and executed responsibly. Thus, the application of the exceptions provided for in the challenged rules must be carried out in light of the mandates of a general nature, which bind the aforementioned authorities with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the order and balance of municipal and national finances.

In summary, the questioned precepts do not entail or imply an incentive to increase public spending, but rather are tools of flexibility so that municipalities, in a context of a health emergency and support for local taxpayers, can expand the established ceiling regarding municipal taxes and ordinary revenues for the payment of ordinary municipal administration expenses and essential municipal services. The foregoing, of course, is subject to and contingent upon constitutional principles and the controls that the CGR is responsible for exercising in the approval of municipal budgets.

As a corollary of the considerations made, this Tribunal concludes that the defects of unconstitutionality attributed to the challenged norms were not substantiated.

**V.- BY WAY OF FURTHER AMPLIFICATION. Authored by Magistrate Garita Navarro.** From a general standpoint, norms that seek to regulate aspects related to the financial regime of public entities, including matters pertaining to financing schemes and spending regimes under ordinary conditions, require technical analyses that determine the details and content of the proposed regulation. Precisely, these analyses make it possible to define the reasonableness and proportionality of the regime of revenue, expenditure, and spending allocation, allowing for the harmonization of the set of principles and regulations applicable to each of those components of the financial and budgetary structure, both at the level of Constitutional Law (arts. 18, 33, 45, 50, 176, among others) and the applicable legal norms (principles of Ley No. 8131 and No. 7635). For example, the modification of a tax rate for a specific levy, as a financing mechanism, requires technical, economic, and accounting approaches to determine that such restructuring does not constitute an illegitimate transfer of the duty to contribute. Only from that preceding analysis could one infer regarding the non-confiscatory nature, progressivity, or equality of that imposition. The same can be noted for percentage allocations of spending, as well as its destination in terms of current or capital expenditure, since the increase or decrease in each of the budget line items or accounting accounts inserted in the budget requires a balance of probable income and spending destination, in accordance with planning schemes, as well as compliance with legal duties regarding the destination of spending or service obligations.

However, strictly speaking, the law being questioned was enacted within an exceptional and special context, which is the declaration of the Covid-19 pandemic. This historical circumstance cannot and should not be set aside in this analysis, as it introduces a variable nonexistent under the normal conditions of reasonableness and technical proportionality review of this type of regulation. Looking at that context, the law allows for an increase in the percentage allocated to covering administrative expenses of local entities regarding revenues derived from the property tax (impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles) (Ley No. 7509), whose numeral 3 sets —under normal conditions— at 10% of that revenue, and in the municipal budget, whose ordinary ceiling is 40% —art. 102 of Ley No. 7794, Código Municipal— to allow a temporary ceiling for the 2020 and 2021 periods of 50%. That relative increase of 30% and 10% respectively, in each one of those sources, is based on the obvious risk inherent to the pandemic, of the budgetary financial impact on the revenue items associated with tax burdens borne by municipal residents. Faced with that risk, considering that administrative expenses are operating costs of a current nature, and that they entail budgetary commitments that could not be avoided by the local entity, in essence, the challenged legal norm allows a greater percentage allocation of those revenues to finance that type of expense and thus, not generate a budgetary imbalance or an imbalance in the revenue regime that would force the imposition of additional burdens on the administered parties, or else, reduce remuneration expenses or operating expenses. This last option would entail a deterioration in the service provision regime of the public entity, given the reduction of resources assigned to the ordinary activities of the Administration, as well as to those directed to paying the personnel available for public service, but at the same time, reducing income from the salaries of that human resource. Certainly, the redirection of spending could generate a decrease in the levels of provision of public services such as water, cemeteries, garbage collection, among others, however, the same regulation enables the allocation of those resources to such purposes.

Faced with this panorama, it is clear that the norm is issued in the context of an urgency and necessity regime, a theory which, in light of ordinals 219 and 226 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, makes it possible and enables the adoption of singular and exceptional measures to protect the public interest, which, in this case, is realized in the continuity of public service through contingent measures of financial health. Otherwise, the strict application of the spending allocation percentages, set forth in those norms (10% and 40%), combined with the reduction of ordinary revenues of the local entity, would place at high vulnerability the principle of financial balance and sustainability emanating from ordinal 176 of the Constitución Política, regarding the public spending regime. Thus, given the exceptional situation, the authorities chose to appeal to mechanisms of social participation, characteristic of a democratic order, through which, with the integration of various social actors in working groups (mesas de trabajo), contingency measures, of temporary adjustment, were determined, which were considered reasonable and convenient to react to the situation of financial risk anticipated from the economic impact generated by the cited pandemic.

In those terms, note that the questioned norms do not project an increase in municipal spending, but rather a temporary permissibility of internal reallocation of the spending regime, for the purpose of raising the ceilings already indicated, in order to adjust the administrative functioning to the costing that the impact on tax revenues could generate. Faced with that historical contingency, it was highly unlikely to have objective parameters that would allow for defining, with scientific rigor, what measure of increase in spending allocation was necessary. Precisely, the adopted mechanism (working groups) is considered a legitimate means to react to the immediate consequences of the pandemic in the area of municipal fiscal revenues. Furthermore, although a technical unreasonableness in the adopted measures is alleged, the claimant provides no element that permits the proposed analysis. This Chamber has been consistent regarding the need to provide objective parameters to be able to define the concurrence or not of a technical bias in the adoption of this type of norm. The insufficiency in this matter subjects this Tribunal to speculation about the content of the questioned norm and imposes on it the burden of making comparisons and assessments without having the minimum parameters or elements to do so. Hence, it finds no merit in ordering the unconstitutionality of the questioned regulations.

**VI.- CONCLUSION.** This Tribunal concludes that the claimant incurred in an improper invocation of the content of arts. 1 and 11 of the Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19, n.°9848. The foregoing, given that, as was verified, the allegations of unconstitutionality revolved around the parliamentary proposal and not the terms in which the norms were approved by the Asamblea Legislativa. As stated *supra*, there are sufficient elements to summarily dismiss the action regarding such numerals. However, in view of the procedural stage, the Chamber declares them without merit.

Regarding arts. 4 and 5 of the challenged legislation, this Chamber dismissed the grievances of unconstitutionality raised.

Therefore, it is necessary to declare the unconstitutionality action without merit.

**VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.** The parties are warned that if any paper document was provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new technology-produced device, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.- **POR TANTO:** The action is declared without merit.

Nombre318 .

. Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V. José Roberto Garita N.

. Nombre4702 .

Res. No. 2023-015596 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las trece horas con veinte minutos del veintiocho de junio de dos mil veintitrés.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por Nombre4699 mayor, casado una vez, economista, vecino de Escazú, cédula de identidad CED1962 en contra de los arts. 1, 4, 5 y 11 de la ley n.°9848 del 20 de mayo 2020, denominada “Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19”.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Sala Constitucional a las 12:12 hrs. del 10 de junio de 2020, el señor Nombre4699 , interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra de los arts. 1, 4, 5 y 11 de la ley n.°9848.

Sobre la legitimación Para efectos de sustentar su legitimación, el accionante acude a la ausencia de lesión individual y directa, prevista en el art. 75 segundo párrafo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC). Por la naturaleza de la norma se imposibilita que exista un proceso previo. En el caso concreto, la ausencia de una lesión individual y directa se deriva del hecho de que es contribuyente y vecino de una circunscripción municipal. Las normas impugnadas traerían problemas económicos al país por un crecimiento del gasto administrativo, lo cual se convertirá en una carga adicional sobre los ciudadanos de los distintos cantones, quienes deberán costear tal crecimiento en el gasto y en detrimento de la prestación de servicios públicos. También impactará a todos los habitantes del país, por cuanto se podría incrementar la transferencia del Estado a las Municipalidades, lo cual acrecentará la carga tributaria.

Sobre el fondo Luego de transcribir las normas impugnadas, señala el accionante lo que considera las siguientes incongruencias económicas:

Iniciando con el art. 1°, este haría nugatoria la regla fiscal para el gobierno central el cual estará obligado a transferir la totalidad de esos recursos sin considerar la situación de la Hacienda Pública ni el nivel de endeudamiento del gobierno. Alternativamente, obligaría al gobierno a hacer recortes en otras áreas para cumplir con la regla fiscal. El gobierno no podría hacer el debido análisis de conveniencia y definición de prioridades para determinar cuáles rubros debe recortar.

Respecto del art. 4, carece de lógica que este numeral autorice, para enfrentar una pandemia, aumentar los gastos administrativos. El art. 3 de la ley n.°7509 establece un límite para gastos administrativos del 10% de lo recaudado por concepto de bienes inmuebles y la norma cuadriplica este límite. Considerando que el impuesto de bienes inmuebles es la principal fuente de ingresos frescos de las municipalidades, levantar el tope del gasto administrativo más bien podría impactar negativamente la prestación de servicios públicos como acueductos y saneamiento, esenciales para evitar la propagación del Covid-19.

En cuanto al art. 5, incrementa a un 50% el tope del 40% de los ingresos ordinarios que el Código Municipal establece para destinar a los gastos generales de administración. Carece de lógica que para afrontar la crisis sanitaria y pone en riesgo la prestación de servicios públicos, pues el cobro de patente y permisos es la segunda fuente más importante de ingresos de las municipalidades, y disminuirá por la crisis económica y el cierre de empresas provocada por la pandemia y por la moratoria de pago de tributos municipales, precios públicos y arrendamientos. Elevar el techo para gastos administrativos resultaría incongruente frente a esa caída de ingresos y dejaría menos recursos para prestar servicios municipales. El golpe a los servicios municipales es doble: la menor recaudación impactará la prestación de los servicios, y el desvío hacia el rubro de gastos administrativos de una mayor proporción de lo recaudado dejará aún menos recursos disponibles para la prestación de los servicios municipales.

En lo atinente al art. 11, las municipalidades, los concejos municipales de distrito y los comités cantonales de deportes quedan permanentemente excluidos del cumplimiento de la regla fiscal, y no ha existido un estudio técnico en el expediente legislativo que lo avale. Además, resulta incongruente por cuando el propósito de la ley es reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades ante la emergencia nacional decretada. Si bien el gasto municipal no forma parte directa del cómputo del déficit fiscal, que contempla únicamente los ingresos y las erogaciones del gobierno central, lo afecta de manera indirecta en el tanto que la tercera fuente en importancia de recursos frescos para las municipalidades son las transferencias a que se refiere el art. 1 de la ley recurrida. Es preocupante la situación de la deuda contraída por los gobiernos locales, pues según un informe de la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), habrá una caída de ingresos en las municipalidades. Esto acelerará el endeudamiento y eventualmente el pago de empréstitos contraídos, lo cual a su vez afectaría al Estado central por los avales otorgados en estos supuestos. Advierte lo siguiente:

“Ante la esperada caída de ingresos que van a experimentar las municipalidades, el patrón de endeudamiento se aceleraré. La caída de ingresos, lamentablemente, también dificultaría el eventual repago de los créditos contraídos.

Como es público y notorio cuando una Municipalidad contrae un empréstito el ente prestamistas siempre exige el aval del Estado. Por tanto, si la Municipalidad entra en impago, entonces el Ministerio de Hacienda tendrá que honrar la deuda.

El impacto de los empréstitos municipales incrementaría el servicio de la deuda para el gobierno nacional, lo cual incrementaría, a su vez, el déficit financiero y el endeudamiento público en momentos en que ambos indicadores ya han alcanzado niveles insostenibles e intolerables” El accionante desarrolla los alcances del contenido del principio de equilibrio financiero, con base en la resolución n.°2006-5979 de la Sala Constitucional. Dicho principio alude a la sostenibilidad de las cuentas fiscales del Estado como un todo, y es aplicable a todas las instituciones públicas, indistintamente del grado de autonomía que ostenten. La jurisprudencia de la Sala ha establecido que los fines de la Administración Pública central y descentralizada no se encuentran desvinculados de las reglas presupuestarias contenidas en la Constitución Política, lo cual ejemplifica en la resolución n.°2018-19511 de este Tribunal Constitucional. El principio de equilibrio financiero persigue una sana administración fiscal y que pretende lo siguiente:

“Los gastos de las instituciones públicas, sin excepción, se ajusten a sus ingresos probables, los cuales cubren tanto sus ingresos propios como los que reciben vía transferencias del Poder Ejecutivo. Tiene que haber, por tanto, una relación razonable y fiscalmente saludable entre el aumento anual de los gastos y los ingresos probables para cada año fiscal de todas las instituciones estatales”.

Además, todas las instituciones públicas, indistintamente del grado de autonomía que ostenten, tiene la obligación de ajustar el crecimiento de sus presupuestos al porcentaje de gastos fijado anualmente por el Poder Ejecutivo y el presupuesto es un instrumento técnico y organizador de la economía estatal. Por otro lado, se refiere al fundamento constitucional de la regla fiscal que considera una derivación del principio de equilibrio financiero, en el tanto, estima, es un principio que se orienta a limitar el crecimiento del gasto corriente.

Luego de exponer una tipología de los principios constitucionales, estima que la regla fiscal, si bien originada en una ley, en realidad hace eco de principios y valores contenidos en la Constitución Política. Indica lo siguiente:

“Justamente, la regla fiscal, aunque de manera expresa sólo se encuentra consagrada a nivel legal, lo cierto es que se trata de un principio constitucional derivado de la norma constitucional que consagra el principio de equilibrio presupuestario”.

La regla fiscal es un principio constitucional que tiene la fuerza normativa de tales principios y, por lo tanto, integra el parámetro de validez constitucional en nuestro medio.

En otro orden de ideas, alude el accionante a los alcances del principio constitucional de razonabilidad técnica, que estima desarrollados por la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal Constitucional y cita como ejemplo la resolución n.°1997-8724. Todas las leyes deben ajustarse a las exigencias de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad y dicho principio demanda que las leyes deban ajustarse a estrictos parámetros técnicos, pues de lo contrario se lesionan los derechos fundamentales y a la sociedad en general. Cuando la técnica señala que solo existe una decisión posible, su adopción resulta obligatoria y señala a propósito el art. 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), que considera extrapolable a la emisión de normas legales. Invoca, a propósito del principio de razonabilidad, las resoluciones números 2012-0266 y 2019-12745 de esta Sala Constitucional. Concluye que tanto los actos administrativos como las leyes deben dictarse con respecto absoluto de las leyes de la ciencia y de la técnica, pues de lo contrario devienen en absolutamente nulas.

Ahora bien, en lo atinente a los arts. 1, 4 y 5 de la ley impugnada, el accionante argumenta que violan el principio constitucional de razonabilidad técnica. La lógica de este conjunto de disposiciones es perversa. Si el primer efecto de la pandemia que sentirán las administraciones municipales es la caída de ingresos, pareciera que la solución que se plantea de incrementar el gasto es irrazonable y carece de sentido. Cuando a la exoneración de la regla fiscal le sumamos el efecto que producirá la aplicación de los arts. 4 y 5 de la normativa impugnada, crecerá desproporcionadamente el gasto administrativo y no el gasto necesario para el desarrollo de la actividad sustantiva de las municipales, cual es la prestación de los servicios básicos a la población de su municipio. Se encarecerá las estructuras administrativas municipales, sin que ello se traduzca en una mejora de los servicios que el gobierno local debe brindar a sus ciudadanos Las normas permitirían un crecimiento desproporcionado del gasto administrativo y no del necesario para que las municipalidades se desempeñen debidamente. Lo anterior propiciará una carga adicional sobre los ciudadanos de los cantones y eventualmente sobre todos los costarricenses, pues se incrementarán los costos de los servicios públicos municipales, o bien deberán incrementar las transferencias que el Estado realiza a las municipalidades. Las normas legales objeto de este proceso carecen de elementos de razonabilidad técnica que las justifiquen. Incluso podría aumentar el crédito público, con aval estatal, lo cual podría arriesgar el déficit fiscal del Gobierno Central. Detalla lo siguiente “En el presente caso, no existen estudios técnicos que avalen las normas impugnadas y más bien estas violan principios elementales de la técnica financiera y fiscal, por lo que están viciados de inconstitucionalidad”.

Por otro lado, indica que el art. 11 de la ley en cuestión es contrario a los principios constitucionales de equilibrio presupuestario y de regla fiscal. Señala que la ley carece de fundamentación técnica y que establece una exclusión permanente a las corporaciones municipales, pese a haberse promulgado para hacerle frente a una coyuntura puntual. Insiste en que ante la caída de ingresos que las municipalidades van a experimentar, el patrón de endeudamiento se acelerará, lo cual generará dificultad en el pago de créditos y a su vez, por los avales ya mencionados, afectará negativamente el déficit fiscal. Sólo la vigencia de la regla fiscal evitaría que las municipalidades se endeuden más allá de sus posibilidades reales de ingresos sanos dado que en ese caso sus presupuestos no podrían crecer a la libre tal y como lo autoriza la norma impugnada. Afirma que “la norma impugnada viola el principio constitucional de la regla fiscal”. Solicita que se declaren los arts. 1, 4, 5 y 11 inconstitucionales.

2.- A través de la resolución de las 9:24 hrs. del 16 de junio de 2020, la Presidencia de la Sala Constitucional dio curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, en contra de los arts. 1, 4, 5 y 11 de la ley n.°9848. Se le confirió audiencia al Procurador General de la República, al Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa y al Ministro de Hacienda y se ordenó la publicación de los edictos correspondientes.

3.- En fecha 16 de junio del 2020, la Secretaría de esta Sala expidió las comisiones necesarias para efectos de ordenar la publicación de los edictos que ordena el art. 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (LJC) en el Boletín Judicial.

4.- Los edictos a que se refiere el art. 81 párrafo segundo de la LJC fueron publicados en los números 120, 121 y 122 del Boletín Judicial de los días 24, 25 y 26 de junio de 2020.

5.- Por escrito recibido el 8 de julio de 2020 rindió informe Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith, en su condición de Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa.

A título de antecedentes, indica que la norma se originó en la Asamblea Legislativa como parte de las medidas para afrontar la pandemia del Covid-19. Menciona que el proyecto fue producto de un trabajo de diálogo con la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales y la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica.

“En ese sentido, el expediente legislativo 21.922, posterior Ley 9848, formó parte de las propuestas que nacieron en el seno del Poder Legislativo, y fue producto del análisis y discusión que se dio en una mesa de trabajo que se instauró como 2 respuesta a la emergencia, para desarrollar el tema de asuntos municipales, en coordinación con autoridades de ese sector, como lo es la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) y la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI). Esta iniciativa fue presentada por 40 diputados y diputadas de todas las fracciones políticas, y conforme señala la exposición de motivos, esa ley “coadyuvará a flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia, sostener los servicios básicos prestados por la Municipalidad y evitar la parálisis de un régimen institucional y constitucional que será de primera importancia para la reactivación económica”. (Lo resaltado no corresponde la original).

Sobre el fondo.

Ahora bien, en cuanto a los reproches de constitucionalidad, refuta la idea de que la norma obligue al gobierno central a transferir a las municipalidades la totalidad de los recursos, para lo cual reproduce el art. 5 de la ley n.°8114. A lo que obliga es a que el traslado de los recursos se haga de forma oportuna, pues ha sido frecuente la inquietud de las municipalidades de que los recursos se transferían al final del ejercicio presupuestario y que ello obstaculizaba su ejecución. Aclara que realmente la obligación de tal transferencia se encuentra en la ley 8114 y señala lo siguiente:

“De esta manera, cuando el artículo 1, impugnado, señala que la transferencia se debe hacer “según el porcentaje dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley 8114”, lo único que hace es redundar en la norma existente, siendo que esta disposición no hace nugatorias las disposiciones establecidas en la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (LFFP), N° 9635, del 3 de diciembre de 2018, en relación con la obligación que tendría el gobierno de realizar transferencias ante los distintos escenarios de la regla fiscal” Lo anterior lo refuerza con el contenido de lo dispuesto en los arts. 15 y 25 de la ley n.°9635.

Señala que quizás la confusión del accionante se origina en que el proyecto original sí contemplaba la obligación de realizar dicha transferencia, pero que la ley formalmente promulgada y vigente no. Adjunta el siguiente cuadro que ilustra el punto:

Proyecto de ley n.°21.922 ley n.°9848 ARTÍCULO 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes deberán realizar de forma oportuna la transferencia de la totalidad de los recursos a las municipalidades, según lo dispone el artículo 5 de la Ley N° 8114, “Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias”, de 4 de julio de 2015 a las municipalidades. Para realizar dicha transferencia, solamente se le podrán requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la contraloría.

ARTÍCULO 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) deberán realizar, de forma oportuna, la transferencia de los recursos a las municipalidades, según el porcentaje dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001, a las municipalidades. Para realizar dicha transferencia, se le deberá requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), así como la programación financiera de la ejecución presupuestaria, de acuerdo con los formatos emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda.

*Lo destacado corresponde al informe.

Durante el debate legislativo el texto base fue objeto de modificaciones. Destaca que el art. 1 del texto finalmente aprobado agrega una disposición que obliga a las municipalidades a tener incorporado en sus presupuestos la transferencia a recibir, así como la programación financiera presupuestaria de su ejecución; es decir, las conmina a realizar una mejor planificación en el uso de los recursos, como contraparte a la obligación de la Tesorería Nacional de girar oportunamente los fondos. Nótese, además, que el sujeto obligado a que hace referencia el artículo impugnado es la Tesorería Nacional, quien simplemente ejecuta el traslado de los recursos ya presupuestados, es decir, no está bajo su ámbito de acción el definir el monto a presupuestar; labor que corresponde a la Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional o al Ministerio de Hacienda de forma más general. Concluye en el siguiente sentido:

“Visto lo anterior, se concluye que la Ley N° 9848, no introduce, expresamente, una obligación de trasladar a las municipalidades la totalidad de los recursos a que refiere el artículo 5 de la Ley N° 8114, pues esa disposición ya está contemplada en dicha Ley 8114; con lo cual las argumentaciones del accionante que se basan en esta suposición carecen de fundamento para solicitar su declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad”.

Respecto del art. 4 de la norma legal impugnada, se detalla en el informe que el accionante considera que un incremento en el porcentaje del impuesto podría dedicarse a financiar gastos administrativos y que ello implicaría el aumento de gastos, lo cual considera equivocado. Señala que la ley autoriza un incremento en el porcentaje de recursos que se pueden destinar a un determinado gasto, pero que no autoriza a un incremento en dicho gasto. Si se analiza la integralidad de la ley y el contexto en el que se emite, se determina que las municipalidades se aprestan a enfrentar una reducción sensible en sus ingresos ordinarios; esto por dos razones: a) La disminución en la actividad económica local. Esto hará reducir los ingresos tributarios relacionados con esta variable, como el impuesto de patentes, además que las morosidades en todos los tributos aumentarán como efecto de la pandemia, entre ellos el de bienes inmuebles; b) La propia ley objetada dispone una serie de medidas que conllevan a una reducción de los ingresos municipales, como, por ejemplo: las autorizaciones para aplicar una moratoria por concepto de patentes o licencias municipales (art.12); moratoria municipal por concepto de tasas, precios públicos y servicios municipales (art. 13); reducción de tarifas de arrendamientos municipales (art.14), y; arreglos de pagos (art.16). Lo anterior significa que, ante un escenario en el que se mantiene el porcentaje establecido en el art. 3 de la Ley de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, las municipalidades contarían con una menor cantidad de recursos en términos absolutos para financiar el mismo nivel de gasto administrativo, provocando un desequilibrio financiero que podría conllevar a déficits y mayor endeudamiento por parte de los gobiernos locales, aspecto que tanto preocupa el accionante. Tómese en cuenta que el gasto administrativo, compuesto especialmente por salarios y el pago de servicios operativos tiende a ser inflexible en el corto plazo, por lo tanto, el no disponer de esta autorización puede conllevar a que las municipalidades no dispongan de recursos para financiar su operación. El aumentar el porcentaje, tal y como lo dispone el art. 4 impugnado, permitiría suplir esa deficiencia de ingresos para financiar el gasto administrativo. No necesariamente implica que se dará un aumento en dicho gasto, con lo cual es incorrecto afirmar, como lo hace el accionante, que la norma autoriza un incremento en los gastos administrativos Otra razón por la cual la premisa de la que parte el accionante es inválida se relaciona con el hecho de que la norma impugnada también permite utilizar los recursos generados por el levantamiento del límite establecido para financiar la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; áreas claves de atender ante la situación de pandemia que vive el país. Al respecto la exposición de motivos del expediente legislativo 21.922, señaló que:

“Sin embargo, estas acciones deben complementarse desde lo local, ya que las municipalidades en tiempos de emergencia juegan roles de contingencia y primera respuesta tales como la coordinación de los Comités Locales de Emergencia (parte del Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo según la Ley N° 8488), y la prestación de servicios indispensables como seguridad ciudadana por medio de los cuerpos de policía municipal, recolección de residuos y acueductos en algunos casos”.

De lo anterior se desprende que tampoco es cierto lo que indica el accionante en cuanto a que la norma podría impactar negativamente la prestación de servicios públicos como acueductos y saneamiento, esenciales para evitar la propagación del virus que causa el Covid-19. Obsérvese que el levantamiento del porcentaje aplicará de forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021; además que los recursos no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas, lo cual reafirma que la intención no es dedicarlos al incremento de gastos administrativos como lo presupone el accionante y para lo cual se presenta un cuadro comparativo entre la propuesta de ley y el proyecto finalmente aprobado:

Proyecto de ley n.°21.922 ley n.°9848 ARTÍCULO 4- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 3 de la Ley N° 7509, “Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles” y sus reformas, de 9 de mayo de 1995, y destinar hasta un cuarenta por ciento (40%) para gastos administrativos del monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Estos recursos adicionales podrán ser utilizados, inclusive para la creación de nuevas plazas, siempre y cuando estas sean de carácter urgente y temporal y estén relacionadas con la emergencia o la prestación de los servicios municipales de agua, seguridad, recolección de residuos o cementerios.

ARTÍCULO 4- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 3 de la Ley 7509, Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, de 9 de mayo de 1995, y destinar hasta un cuarenta por ciento (40%) a gastos administrativos del monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Estos recursos también podrán ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; sin embargo, no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas.

*Lo destacado corresponde al informe.

En cuanto al art. 5 de la ley objeto de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, reitera lo ya dicho a propósito del artículo anterior, pues estima que existe un error de apreciación sobre el alcance de lo dispuesto en el art. 5, ya que no se plantea allí una autorización de incremento de gasto administrativo, sino un incremento en la autorización de los recursos que pueden utilizarse para tal fin. El levantamiento del tope permite financiar los gastos existentes de las municipalidades y así evitar que incurran en incumplimientos financieros. Insiste en la temporalidad de la medida y en el hecho de que no se pueden crear nuevas plazas para estos efectos. Precisamente a raíz de las proyecciones económicas que aporta el accionante, en relación con la inminente disminución en la recaudación de los entes municipales, es que se requiere levantar los topes señalados, a efectos de financiar debidamente su operación. Refuta el argumento del accionante relacionado con la afectación de servicios municipales, al indicar que la norma expresamente establece que los servicios de agua, cementerio, seguridad y gestión integral de residuo podrán ser financiados a través de estos mecanismos.

Por otro lado, en relación con el art. 11 de la ley impugnada, se señala que la regla fiscal pretende establecer un límite al crecimiento del gasto corriente, el cual se definirá según el nivel de endeudamiento del Gobierno Central con respecto al producto interno bruto. La regla fiscal lo que pretende es establecer un límite al crecimiento del gasto corriente, el cual se definirá según sea el nivel de endeudamiento del Gobierno Central con respecto al PIB; por su parte, el art. 11 impugnado lo que pretende es excluir a los gobiernos locales del ámbito de aplicación de esta norma, pero no en su totalidad. Tal cual lo menciona el accionante, el gasto municipal no forma parte directa del cómputo del déficit fiscal, pues este último solo se refiere a la relación de ingresos y gastos del Gobierno Central, con lo cual sostiene que desde esa perspectiva no habría una afectación directa al déficit del Gobierno Central ni al nivel de endeudamiento. La reforma incluida en el art. 1 de la ley impugnada n.°9848 no establece una obligación de transferir recursos, como lo presupone el accionante, pero además de eso, dicha ley agrega, en este art. 11, que la excepción a la regla fiscal no será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno Central. Es decir, las partidas del presupuesto municipal financiadas con estos recursos, sí estarían sometidas a la regla fiscal, con lo cual la norma no compromete la posibilidad de cumplir con la meta establecida por la citada regla, según sea el nivel de endeudamiento del Gobierno Central. Destaca que el accionante no haga referencia a esta importante disposición, lo que de nuevo da pie a suponer que la acción se planteó sobre el texto base y no sobre lo que finalmente se promulgó, esto por cuanto el texto no incluía la disposición comentada. Adjunta el siguiente cuadro:

Proyecto de ley n.°21.922 ley n.°9848 ARTÍCULO 11- Adiciónense los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del Título IV “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República”, Capítulo I “Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios”, de la Ley N.° 9635 “Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas” de 4 de diciembre de 2018, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones: […]

• d)Las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito del país.
• e)Los Comités Cantonales de Deportes ARTÍCULO 11- Se adicionan los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del título IV "Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República", capítulo I "Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios", de la Ley 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, de 3 de diciembre de 2018. Los textos son los siguientes:

Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones: [.]

• d)Las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito del país. No obstante, el presente título será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno central.
• e)Los comités cantonales de deportes.

*Lo destacado corresponde al informe.

Manifiesta el accionante que es preocupante también la situación de la deuda contraída por los gobiernos locales, sobre todo ante la esperada caída de ingresos que van a experimentar las municipalidades, con lo cual espera que el patrón de endeudamiento se acelerará. Indica que la caída de ingresos dificultaría el eventual repago de los créditos contraídos, siendo que cuando una municipalidad contrae un empréstito el ente prestamista siempre exige el aval del Estado, por tanto, si la municipalidad entra en impago, entonces el Ministerio de Hacienda tendrá que honrar la deuda. Afirma que el impago de los empréstitos municipales incrementaría el servicio de la deuda para el gobierno nacional, lo cual incrementaría, a su vez, el déficit financiero y el endeudamiento público en momentos en que ambos indicadores ya han alcanzado niveles insostenibles e intolerables. En relación con lo anterior, únicamente señala que el argumento incluye una serie de suposiciones o presunciones que no necesariamente deberán concretarse y que tampoco necesariamente ocurrirían producto de la vigencia de la ley impugnada. Agrega que, con base en los datos del resultado presupuestario de las municipalidades para el año 2019 incluidos en el Sistema de Información sobre Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP) de la CGR, de las 81 municipalidades (de ese momento), únicamente siete mostraban un déficit presupuestario, de manera que el resto muestra un superávit, que para cuarenta y dos de ellas, supera los mil millones de colones.

Sobre el principio de razonabilidad técnica Por otra parte, en cuanto al reproche de la razonabilidad técnica, menciona el señor Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa que el accionante parte de interpretaciones equivocadas, pues en ningún momento se autoriza el incremento de los gastos administrativos y considera que la norma impugnada se apega a criterios de legalidad, necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad y procede a transcribir intervenciones de diputados y diputadas en este sentido, en el marco de la discusión del proyecto de ley. Se informa lo siguiente:

“Tal y como se ha demostrado a lo largo de este informe, los argumentos del accionante parten de interpretaciones equivocadas de la norma, siendo que en ningún momento se autoriza un incremento de los gastos administrativos, como él lo señala. Precisamente, considerando la reducción de los ingresos que se prevé y ante la posibilidad de que los gastos administrativos queden desfinanciados, lo que se pretende con la norma es mantener el sano balance fiscal en los municipios, permitiéndoles destinar un mayor porcentaje del ingreso por impuestos a solventar estas necesidades. No debe perderse de vista que la Ley considera, además, la posibilidad de financiar con estos recursos la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos, siendo que no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas; además de que la norma es de carácter temporal, con lo cual se confirma que la intención no es incrementar el gasto 13 administrativo. De lo anterior, se desprende que no se violan principios elementales de la técnica financiera y fiscal, siendo que las normas no están viciadas de inconstitucionalidad. Asimismo, como se ha mencionado, la ley objeto de impugnación, fue analizada en las mesas de trabajo que se implementaron para analizar las acciones para minimizar los efectos de la emergencia ocasionada por la pandemia del Covid-19, por lo que se tomaron en cuenta criterios de legalidad, necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad en todo el proceso del debate legislativo, para que los gobiernos locales tuvieran las herramientas necesarias para continuar ofreciendo el servicio público, que constituye un mandato constitucional. Así consta, por ejemplo, en la intervención de la diputada Corrales Chacón, cuando manifestó lo siguiente:

“Recordarles a todos ustedes y a la ciudadanía que nos escucha que la realidad del país ante la pandemia es una excepción que nos está marcando una pauta totalmente distinta. Y con ello las municipalidades de todo el país también han tenido que tomar acciones excepcionales para poder llevar adelante las acciones que les corresponden por Código Municipal, pero también para poder colaborarle al Poder Ejecutivo en cada una de las soluciones o facilidades que se le puede dar justamente a la ciudadanía ante la pandemia. Razón de ello fue que se presentó este expediente y que se conformó la mesa de trabajo, que ha sido realmente una mesa extraordinaria, una mesa que ha permitido trabajar en equipo, trabajar en conjunto, escuchar justamente a ese sector afectado al régimen municipal y también escuchar al contribuyente que necesita justamente esas facilidades para poder llevar adelante su vida cotidiana. El proyecto de ley ha sufrido modificaciones consensuadas, revisadas técnicamente, tanto por ANAI, como por la Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, y también con aportes de todos los diputados de esta Asamblea Legislativa que han considerado oportunas sus observaciones. Y razón de ello es que hoy se ha aprobado en este Plenario un texto sustitutivo que acoge muchas de ellas y también las otras mociones adicionales que se aprobaron. Dejar claro a la ciudadanía que los principales cambios que se han hecho en eliminar la posibilidad de crear nuevas plazas en las municipalidades, también el tema del Sicop. Se ha realizado una redacción bastante importante en el que se les permite a esas municipalidades pequeñas realizar siempre sus contrataciones por medio de esta ley, pero facilitándoles las formas de pago. Y por otro lado, también ciertas modificaciones principalmente para que las municipalidades puedan tener esa flexibilización en el gasto que requieren ante la pandemia”.

En el mismo sentido, la diputada Montero Gómez, en su intervención, detalla aspectos del proceso de diálogo que se llevó a cabo, tanto entre todas las fracciones parlamentarias, como con los actores involucrados en el proceso municipal y el papel que desempeñan las Municipalidades en el buen curso que se otorgue al adecuado servicio público, en medio de la emergencia sanitaria de la pandemia. Sus palabras fueron las siguientes:

“Hoy estamos concluyendo un proceso de consulta, de diálogo y de acuerdos. Ha sido un poquito largo, ha sido muy intenso, pero ha sido fundamental. Con la participación de múltiples actores, diputados, diputadas, una mesa de trabajo que ha sido amplia y ha trabajado con muchísima responsabilidad, pero además involucrando a aquellos actores claves: Nombre4700, intendencias, la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales y algunas instituciones del Poder Ejecutivo. Creo que hemos logrado recoger al máximo esas inquietudes y se han consignado en este texto del proyecto la mayoría de esas inquietudes para mejorar, afinar, de manera que lo que diga esta ley sea lo que corresponda, esté sumamente claro a la hora de aplicarla y que realmente esta sea una oportunidad para apoyar a las personas contribuyentes y para fortalecer la gestión financiera de las municipalidades. Tenemos clarísimo que las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito tienen y tendrán una misión esencial durante y post pandemia, porque son las instituciones líderes de los procesos de reconstrucción, los procesos de desarrollo y reactivación económica en cada uno de sus cantones, lógicamente, de la mano con la institución, el resto de la institucionalidad costarricense”.

Esas intervenciones de las diputadas, citadas a manera de ejemplo, permiten a su vez, rebatir el alegato del accionante en cuanto a la falta de estudios técnicos. Ello por cuando, como lo reconocido el Tribunal Constitucional, si bien es deseable su existencia, lo relevante es que lo debe esperarse del legislador, es que a la hora de hacer estimaciones acerca del futuro y del efecto de la norma que aprueba, se haya guiado por una apreciación objetivamente aceptable de la información a su alcance, según se consigna en la resolución N° 5374-2003 del 20 de junio del 2003”.

En ese sentido, las normas impugnadas no son irrazonables o “disparatadas”, como señala el accionante, pues su vigencia de circunscribe a un tiempo prudencial, que se ha valorado necesario para que las municipalidades puedan atender las necesidades producto de la pandemia y asimismo, dar el apoyo necesario para los primeros pasos a la reactivación económica de los cantones del país.

Sobre los principios de equilibrio financiero y de la regla fiscal En cuanto a los principios de equilibrio financiero y de la regla fiscal, indica quien informa que en la exposición de motivos se alegó expresamente que la intención legislativa era la flexibilización de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia, pero en general a coadyuvar en la reactivación económica.

Por otra parte, el presupuesto es un ejercicio que tiene que ver con la orientación de la política del Gobierno. En ese sentido, es el Poder Ejecutivo quien elabora y planifica el presupuesto de cada año, tomando en cuenta las obligaciones constitucionales y legales que debe cumplir, así como la inversión correspondiente a los ejes que va a desarrollar conforme el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. El Poder Legislativo, tiene dentro de la dinámica presupuestaria la potestad de aprobar o improbar la previsión de gasto y proponer algunas modificaciones. Es por eso que el ejercicio parlamentario está limitado por normas constitucionales y legales establecidas, para determinar el equilibrio del presupuesto a nivel global. En esa dirección, desde el Poder Legislativo se han adoptado una serie de decisiones para enriquecer el ordenamiento jurídico con la intención de sanear las finanzas públicas, y aún queda mucho por hacer, pero es menester dar sostenimiento a las obligaciones constitucionales necesarias que nos hacen constituir un Estado de Derecho. Reflexión que es coincidente por lo manifestado por la Sala Constitucional, en la opinión consultiva n.°2018-019511, respecto de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, 9635. Se informa lo siguiente:

“Remedios, que, en el caso en análisis, fueron explicados por los legisladores al momento de emitir sus votos, como por ejemplo, el diputado Gourzong Cerdas, cuando manifestó que:

La emergencia nacional declarada por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, según el decreto número 42227-MP-S que es producto de la pandemia Covid-19, afecta de manera directa el desarrollo normal de las municipalidades. Y, efectivamente, las familias costarricenses están pasando dificultades en sus ingresos, especialmente aquellos que están en los sectores privados y en el sector informal, familias que tienen que enfrentar deudas con pagos de patentes municipales, comerciantes y dueños de diferentes servicios públicos, que incidan directamente en los ingresos de los gobiernos locales. Razón por la cual, como diputados de la República, debemos de actuar con agilidad, en auxilio, de acuerdo a nuestras competencias y legislar de manera eficiente y oportuna en el conocimiento y aprobación de este proyecto de ley número 21.922, denominado Ley para Apoyar al Contribuyente Local y Reforzar la Gestión Financiera de las Municipalidades ante la Emergencia Nacional por la Pandemia del Covid 19. Y es, por esta razón, es por la pandemia del covid-19, que los ingresos de las municipalidades y sus presupuestos se ven afectados. Este proyecto de ley definitivamente viene a aliviar la situación de las administraciones municipales en el uso del superávit específico, flexibilizar los destinos específicos y ampliar el margen de la regla fiscal establecida en el Código Municipal, concretamente en el artículo 102, así como en la Ley 7509, Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, para autorizar un porcentaje más alto para el gasto administrativo, es decir, busca el adecuado funcionamiento municipal y la atención eficiente de los servicios que brinda la municipalidad”.

Finalmente, en esa misma línea, la diputada Corrales Chacón, hace referencia a los argumentos que señala el accionante con respecto a la regla fiscal y aclaró lo siguiente:

“Con respecto a las críticas y oposiciones que ha sufrido este proyecto, principalmente de la Contraloría General de la República, la cual ha mencionado de manera inexacta que existiría una afectación en las finanzas públicas estatales con la aprobación de este proyecto, quiero dejar claro que la regla fiscal en las municipalidades no va a venir a reducir el déficit fiscal del Gobierno central, lo que aporta el Gobierno central a los gobiernos locales representa apenas un uno coma cero nueve por ciento del presupuesto de la República y prácticamente todo este porcentaje va dirigido a inversión de la red vial cantonal””.

Por esta razón, me parece importante también dejar en evidencia que ya el día de hoy las municipalidades del país tienen topes que les impiden justamente hacer gastos excesivos, pero sobre todo también que ya ellas tienen lo que se llama la regla de oro, la regla que les impide un crecimiento exagerado, por esa razón hacer evidencia de que las municipalidades necesitan y les urge, más que todo, en la situación que estamos enfrentando como país, la aprobación de este expediente”.

Insiste en que la norma aprobada cumple los requisitos de legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad entre el medio y el fin alcanzado. Solicita que se declare sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Adjunta la certificación del nombramiento del Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa y como anexo una tabla de los montos ejecutados de ingresos y egresos del año 2019 de las diferentes corporaciones municipales.

6.-Por escrito recibido el 09 de julio de 2020, rindió el informe Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández, en su condición de PROCURADOR GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA.

Sobre la admisibilidad Se concurre sobre la suficiente legitimación de la parte accionante al amparo de la aplicación de normas que no inciden directamente en la esfera jurídica de alguna persona individual, pero cuyas consecuencias son de alcance general e indirecto en el conjunto de la sociedad. Asimismo, las normas impugnadas se relacionan con el buen manejo del gasto público y la correcta ejecución de los fondos públicos (resoluciones 4409 y 9992 de 2004 de la Sala Constitucional).

Cuestión preliminar Es necesaria la acumulación del presente proceso a aquellos bajo expedientes 19-013318-0007-CO y 19-0011540-0007-CO para evitar la emisión de sentencias contradictorias. En dichas acciones de inconstitucionalidad se cuestiona la validez constitucional de la regla fiscal, ya que por medio de una ley se limita la autonomía administrativa constitucionalmente conferida a las municipalidades y a las universidades públicas. Las posturas expresadas por los accionantes de estos otros procesos, en relación con la expresada en este expediente, son excluyentes, de manera que acoger una podría implicar denegar la otra.

En caso de que la Sala Constitucional no estime procedente lo anterior, se reitera en buena medida lo mencionado en los informes anteriormente dichos, a propósito del concepto, naturaleza y fundamento jurídico de la regla fiscal.

Sobre el fondo En países como Estados Unidos y algunos de la Unión Europea se promulgaron distintas reglas fiscales, a efectos de enfrentar la crisis económica de la década anterior y en ocasiones tales normas adquirieron rango constitucional. Con ello, se limitó el margen de acción presupuestario de distintas instituciones y organizaciones territoriales, como es el caso de los Estados Federados, las Comunidades Autónomas y los Gobiernos Locales.

Resulta relevante considerar el principio de equilibrio presupuestario, contenido en el artículo 176 de la Norma Fundamental y desarrollado recientemente en la resolución 2018-19511 de la Sala Constitucional y el art. 5 inciso c) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. Bajo este mandato constitucional, aplicando a todos los órganos y entes de la Administración Pública, indistintamente de su grado de autonomía constitucional, los gastos presupuestados no podrán exceder los ingresos probables (resolución 2018-19511 y art. 100 del Código Municipal). Además, el art. 9 de la ley 9635 contiene la definición de la regla fiscal, que se formuló sobre la base de una regla del gasto corriente. Al haberse emitido por ley, la Asamblea Legislativa no se encuentra vinculada por ella, con lo cual podría legislar en sentido contrario o bien matizar sus alcances (tal cual ocurrió con la ley objeto de la presente acción). Se expone, sobre dicha regla, lo siguiente:

El artículo 9 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas se inclina por este último tipo, esto es, por una regla fiscal relativa al gasto que límite, como se dijo, el crecimiento del gasto corriente, sujeto a una proporción del promedio del crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) nominal y a la relación deuda del Gobierno central-PIB. Así concebido, por sus implicaciones, dicho canon está más relacionado con el principio de sostenibilidad financiera que con el principio de equilibrio presupuestario, según veremos más adelante.

El accionante considera que la regla fiscal cuenta con asidero constitucional, derivado del principio de equilibrio financiero como mecanismo para limitar el crecimiento del gasto corriente, en consonancia con la resolución 2018-19511 de esta Sala Constitucional. Se concluye lo siguiente:

Por lo expuesto, debemos reiterar que, si la Sala Constitucional estima que el fundamento constitucional de la regla fiscal, de acuerdo con los términos de la sentencia no. 2018-19511, es suficiente para reconocerle un carácter transversal sobre todo el conglomerado de Administraciones públicas, capaz de vincular la formulación presupuestaria de las municipales sin atentar contra su autonomía, la decisión del legislador de exceptuarlas de su aplicación, mediante la reforma que hizo el artículo 11 de la Ley no. 9848 al artículo 6 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, sería inconstitucional, pues estaría legislando en contradicción de un canon que se entiende contenido en lo dispuesto por el artículo 176 de la Constitución Política.

Ahora bien, los argumentos del accionante sobre el equilibrio financiero se tratan de supuestos hipotéticos no verificables per se. No podría afirmarse que la inclusión de las municipalidades y de los concejos municipales de distrito dentro de las excepciones del art. 6 de la ley n.°9635 implique necesariamente una violación al principio de equilibrio financiero; incluso, el propio art. 11 inciso d) establece que dicha exclusión es parcial, por cuanto la regla fiscal sí resulta aplicable a las transferencias realizadas por el gobierno central. La desaplicación de la regla fiscal tendría que ser analizada desde la perspectiva del principio constitucionalidad de sostenibilidad fiscal, no invocado por el recurrente.

En otro orden de ideas, se analizan los arts. 4, 5 y 11 de la ley impugnada, desde la perspectiva de los principios de sostenibilidad fiscal y razonabilidad técnica:

Al respecto, se explica lo siguiente:

“Tal y como se extrae de los antecedentes legislativos de la Ley n.°9848, con vista del expediente n.°21.922 que documenta su trámite parlamentario, los artículos 4 y 5 impugnados conectan con el propósito de “flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia” (folio 4 de la exposición de motivos, ver también, en especial, los folios 542 a 545 y 556 y 557 del debate en el Plenario); al permitir a los municipios y los concejos municipales de distrito un margen elevado de acción presupuestaria para los años 2020 y 2021, ya que en el caso del artículo 4, les permite disponer para gastos administrativos hasta un 40% sobre el monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, ante el 10% inicial previsto en el artículo 3 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (n.°7509); mientras que, en el caso del artículo 5, se suma un 10% al 40% original fijado en el artículo 102 del Código Municipal de los ingresos ordinarios municipales, que podrían destinar para atender los gastos generales de administración de la corporación, definidos por el mismo precepto, como “los egresos corrientes que no impliquen costos directos de los servicios municipales”.

De manera que, ambos preceptos buscan mitigar el impacto en la hacienda local fruto de una menor recaudación ante el escenario de desaceleración económica provocada por la pandemia del covid-19 en cada cantón – y en el país en general –; autorizando a los municipios a trasladar una mayor parte de sus ingresos a esos gastos fijos y permanentes, como las remuneraciones de sus funcionarios, en detrimento de los gastos dedicados a los servicios municipales. Por lo que, en lugar de aplicar medidas más drásticas de contención del gasto, como la reducción de su planilla, ante la previsible disminución de los recursos municipales, las disposiciones recurridas les autorizan a destinar una mayor parte de estos al gasto corriente que financia, por ejemplo, los salarios, restándole al porcentaje destinado a la prestación de los servicios públicos municipales.

El accionante, como se dijo, cuestiona en primer lugar la razonabilidad de los preceptos, al promover el aumento del gasto administrativo de las municipalidades cuando al mismo tiempo sus ingresos se verán mermados sustancialmente fruto de la emergencia sanitaria, lo que a la postre, repercutiría en el déficit fiscal del Gobierno central, pues plantea que la única vía para que las Administraciones territoriales puedan cubrir sus egresos en esas circunstancias es acudiendo al crédito público con el Estado como avalista, el cual en última instancia respondería por estas ante el incumplimiento de sus obligaciones financieras”.

El cuestionamiento que hace el accionante al señalar que promover el aumento del gasto administrativo repercute en el déficit fiscal del Gobierno Central por su condición de avalista, es meramente hipotético. Adicionalmente, según la línea jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional, es necesario algún elemento de juicio para determinar la razonabilidad de una norma cuando se alegue su desproporción y esta no resulte evidente (resolución 5236-1999). El recurrente no aporta ningún tipo de prueba o modelo económico que sirva como elemento de juicio para demostrar sus proyecciones en grado suficiente como para determinar la invalidez de las disposiciones impugnadas.

No obstante todo lo anterior, en efecto no constan en el expediente legislativo n.°21922 estudios técnicos para los aumentos del 10% al 40% para gastos administrativos originados en la recaudación del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, ni para del aumento del 40% al 50% de los ingresos ordinarios para atender gastos generales de administración (arts. 4 y 5 de la ley impugnada). La Contraloría General de la República se refirió a la propuesta legislativa en su momento, a través de los oficios DFOE-DL-0567 y DFOE-DL-0842, y determinó la ausencia de los ya referidos estudios técnicos. El legislador, en tratándose de materias especializadas ‒como la referida en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad‒ no está exento de justificar o fundamentar técnicamente la toma de decisiones que implican la promulgación de una ley, con base en principio de razonabilidad y en los arts. 9 y 11 de la Constitución Política. No constan en el expediente legislativo estudios técnicos que respalden la decisión adoptada a través de la ley objeto de esta acción ni un análisis del impacto que el rebasamiento de los límites presupuestarios modificados tendrá en la estabilidad presupuestaria y en la sostenibilidad financiera de las municipalidades y de los concejos municipales de distrito. Se señala lo siguiente:

Somos del criterio que esa falta de fundamentación técnica trasciende la determinación de la política económica del Estado como materia de gobierno, y que ya no nos encontramos en el campo de las suposiciones, pues es posible verificar que el incremento en los porcentajes dichos que irían destinados a gastos administrativos o generales de administración de las corporaciones territoriales, y, eventualmente, a la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos – ya que las normas impugnadas lo dejan como algo potestativo- no cuenta con ningún tipo de justificación o fundamentación técnica (…).

Pese a que los arts. 4 y 5 de la Ley impugnada establecen una vigencia excepcional a los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, igualmente se requiere fundamentación técnica. Dicha ausencia hace dudar de la razonabilidad de las normas y su compatibilidad con el principio de sostenibilidad fiscal contenido en el art. 176 de la Constitución Política. En ese sentido, la experiencia española, en relación con el principio de sostenibilidad financiera, está vinculada con el control sobre los niveles de endeudamiento. Al aplicar tal consideración a los artículos impugnados reaparece el problema sobre la ausencia de estudios técnicos para respaldar los alcances a nivel de finanzas públicas.

Por otro lado, se hace referencia a la constitucionalidad del art. 1 de la ley objeto de la presente acción:

El aludido art. 5 se refiere al destino de los ingresos provenientes de la recaudación del impuesto único sobre los combustibles, cuya letra b) especifica que un 22,25% del 48,60% de su producto anual deberá ser girado, por intermedio de la Tesorería Nacional, a favor de las municipalidades para la atención de la red vial cantonal. De conformidad con los antecedentes legislativos de la ley n.°9848, la intención del precepto impugnado es agilizar el procedimiento para el giro de los recursos con la sola aprobación del presupuesto municipal por el órgano contralor o un presupuesto ajustado en caso de improbación. Empero, en los temas que preocupan al recurrente no supuso ninguna innovación normativa, pues básicamente viene a recalcar lo ya dispuesto por el referido art. 5. b) de la ley n.°8114, que impone un destino específico a un porcentaje de lo recaudado por el impuesto único sobre los combustibles a ser transferido por la Tesorería Nacional a las municipalidades para la conservación y desarrollo de la red vial cantonal. Con lo cual, no se estaría estableciendo una mayor obligación al Poder Ejecutivo de cómo ha venido manejando esas transferencias desde la aprobación de la citada ley hace aproximadamente dos décadas. En esto, hay que recordar lo dicho por esa Sala en el voto n.°2018-19511 en cuanto a que los criterios de asignación presupuestaria, así como cada una de las particularidades relacionadas con el control de su crecimiento, constituyen política económica del Estado y materia de gobierno.

Más bien, el problema constitucional podría hallarse en la vinculación que el legislador ordinario está haciendo del legislador presupuestario en la disposición de los recursos públicos o, más exactamente, en materia del gasto y su destino, conforme con los principios presupuestarios de universalidad y no afectación de los recursos, derivados del art. 185 de la Constitución Política.

En ese sentido, si bien es cierto que durante algún tiempo la posición de ese alto Tribunal fue oscilante sobre el tema de los destinos específicos, últimamente terminó primando la postura de que “el legislador presupuestario no está vinculado por el ordinario, salvo en los casos de fondos “atados” constitucionalmente y aquellos que se destinan a financiar los programas sociales. En relación con los primeros, por imperativo constitucional. En cuanto a los segundos, porque el constituyente originario optó por un Estado social de Derecho, lo que conlleva una vinculación de los poderes públicos a esta realidad jurídica y social” (sentencia n.°15968-2011 de las 15:30 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2011, reiterada en las resoluciones números 2016-18351 y 2018-19511).

Tomando en cuenta que el art. 1° impugnado y, por conexidad, el art. 5 de la Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, contiene un impuesto con destino específico que no va dirigido a financiar un programa social, sino, como se dijo, a la atención de la red vial cantonal, pese a que no se duda del interés público de esta labor, no encaja en el contexto de los derechos sociales, vinculando así de forma indebida el margen de acción del legislador presupuestario en materia de gasto (la definición de sus límites y destino). No obstante, la Procuraduría observa que ambos preceptos fueron emitidos en desarrollo de la asignación presupuestaria contemplada por el art. 170 de la Constitución Política a favor de las municipalidades, correspondiente a un 10% de los ingresos ordinarios calculados para el año económico correspondiente, como en efecto así lo establece los artículos 1 y 5 de la Ley especial para la transferencia de competencias: atención plena y exclusiva de la red vial cantonal (n.°9329 del 15 de octubre del 2015), en relación con la Ley general de transferencia de competencias del Poder Ejecutivo a las municipalidades (n.°8801 del 28 de abril del 2010).

A título de conclusión, se reitera la advertencia sobre la potencial acumulación de este proceso a los ya indicados.

Respecto del art. 11 de la ley impugnada, la acción debe acogerse si la Sala Constitucional estima que el sustento constitucional de la regla fiscal es el principio constitucional de equilibrio presupuestario.

En cuanto a los arts. 4 y 5, indica que la acción debe estimarse por la ausencia de estudios técnicos.

Por último, respecto del art. 1° concluye que “la vinculación que el legislador ordinario hace del presupuestario en detrimento de los principios presupuestarios de universalidad y no afectación de los recursos (art. 185 de la Constitución Política), queda salvada en tanto se hace al amparo del art. 170 constitucional, como parte de la asignación presupuestaria para financiar el traslado a los gobiernos locales de la atención plena y exclusiva de la red vial cantonal”.

7.- La Presidencia de esta Sala Constitucional, a través de resolución de las 14:01 hrs. del 16 de julio de 2020 tuvo por atendidas las audiencias conferidas al Procurador General de la República y al Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa, no así la audiencia otorgada al Ministro de Hacienda. Listos los autos se pasó a la oficina que por turno le correspondía.

8.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la magistrada Garro Vargas, excepto el considerando V que lo redacta el magistrado Garita Navarro; y

CONSIDERANDO:

Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción I.- La legitimación de lA PARTE accionante en este CASO Sobre el particular, debe señalarse que el art. 75 párrafo segundo de la LJC establece que no será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En este sentido la Sala Constitucional, en su sentencia n.º2001-8239, se refirió a los intereses difusos, en los siguientes términos:

“De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base (...)”.

En el presente asunto, la parte accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el art. 75 párrafo segundo de la LJC, debido a que “por la naturaleza del asunto, no existe lesión individual y directa”.

La PGR argumenta que la Sala ha aceptado la legitimación en supuestos como el de la especie, en que la aplicación de las normas impugnadas no tiene la virtud de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de persona alguna en particular, siendo sus consecuencias de alcance general e indirecto en el conjunto de la sociedad o cuando menos, según se alega por el recurrente, en la comunidad de vecinos de los municipios que se acojan a las previsiones presupuestarias contenidas en ellas. No encuentran reparo alguno que impida conocer por el fondo la presente acción, tomando en cuenta también que tiene por objeto normas relacionadas con el buen manejo del gasto público y la correcta ejecución de los fondos públicos.

En consecuencia, para esta Sala resulta admisible el conocimiento y resolución de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad por vía del control abstracto, en virtud de que, efectivamente, la norma no puede ser generadora de un acto de aplicación individual.

Sobre el fondo de la acción de inconstitucionalidad II.- Objeto de la impugnación Las normas cuestionadas son los arts. 1, 4, 5 y 11 de la “Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19”, n.°9848.

De forma sintética se puede afirmar que el accionante cuestiona el art. 1° porque, según su criterio, hace nugatoria la regla fiscal para el Gobierno Central al tener que transferir la totalidad de los recursos allí dispuestos, sin tomar en consideración la situación de la Hacienda Pública. Los arts. 4 y 5 porque levantan el tope de los gastos administrativos de las municipalidades en perjuicio o impacto de la prestación de los servicios públicos. Dichos numerales, a juicio del accionante, conllevan incongruencias económicas y lesionan el principio de razonabilidad técnica, dado que se aumenta el gasto administrativo de forma irrazonable y sin estudios técnicos que respalden la decisión legislativa. En lo relativo al art. 11, el accionante cuestiona que las corporaciones municipales quedarán excluidas y exceptuadas de la aplicación de la regla fiscal, la que, según el actor, es un principio constitucional derivado del principio del equilibrio financiero del Estado.

El texto de las disposiciones impugnadas es el siguiente:

“Art. 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) deberán realizar, de forma oportuna, la transferencia de los recursos a las municipalidades, según el porcentaje dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001, a las municipalidades.

Para realizar dicha transferencia, se le deberá requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), así como la programación financiera de la ejecución presupuestaria, de acuerdo con los formatos emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda.

Art. 4- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 3 de la Ley 7509, Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, de 9 de mayo de 1995, y destinar hasta un cuarenta por ciento (40%) a gastos administrativos del monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Estos recursos también podrán ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; sin embargo, no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas.

Art. 5- De forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrán sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 102 de la Ley 7794, Código Municipal, de 30 de abril de 1998, y destinar hasta un cincuenta por ciento (50%) de sus ingresos ordinarios municipales a atender los gastos generales de administración. Estos recursos también podrán ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; sin embargo, no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas.

Art. 11- Se adicionan los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del título IV “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República”, capítulo I “Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios”, de la Ley 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, de 3 de diciembre de 2018. Los textos son los siguientes:

Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones:

[.]

• d)Las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito del país. No obstante, el presente título será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno central.
• e)Los comités cantonales de deportes”.

III.- Sobre los artículos 1 y 11 de la ley De previo y especial pronunciamiento: indebida invocación del contenido de las normas.

Como primer aspecto de análisis, es preciso advertir, según lo informó el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa, que el libelo de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad carece de una adecuada invocación del contenido de los arts. 1° y 11 de la ley impugnada, dado que, según se pudo constatar, los reproches del accionante estaban dirigidos a cuestionar el texto del proyecto de ley y no el efectivo contenido de la ley, tal y como finalmente se aprobó. En efecto, para mayor claridad, a continuación se transcribe el texto impugnado por el accionante ‒que, como ya se indicó, corresponde al texto del proyecto de ley‒ y, en contraposición, el texto de la normativa finalmente aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa:

Texto impugnado (texto del proyecto de ley) Texto aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa ARTÍCULO 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes deberán realizar de forma oportuna la transferencia de la totalidad de los recursos a las municipalidades, según lo dispone el artículo 5 de la Ley N° 8114, “Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias”, de 4 de julio de 2015 a las municipalidades. Para realizar dicha transferencia, solamente se le podrán requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la contraloría.

ARTÍCULO 1- La Tesorería Nacional y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) deberán realizar, de forma oportuna, la transferencia de los recursos a las municipalidades, según el porcentaje dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001, a las municipalidades.

Para realizar dicha transferencia, se le deberá requerir a cada municipalidad que aporte copia del presupuesto municipal, acompañado del oficio de aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, que demuestre que la transferencia a recibir está debidamente incorporada en su presupuesto o, en caso de improbación por parte del ente contralor, copia del presupuesto definitivo ajustado tal y como haya sido ingresado en los sistemas informáticos que para este fin dispone la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), así como la programación financiera de la ejecución presupuestaria, de acuerdo con los formatos emitidos por el Ministerio de Hacienda.

ARTÍCULO 11- Adiciónense los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del Título IV “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República”, Capítulo I “Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios”, de la Ley N.° 9635 “Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas” de 4 de diciembre de 2018, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones:

[…]

• d)Las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito del país.
• e)Los Comités Cantonales de Deportes.

ARTÍCULO 11- Se adicionan los incisos d) y e) al artículo 6 del título IV "Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República", capítulo I "Disposiciones Generales Objeto, Ámbito de Aplicación, Definiciones y Principios", de la Ley 9635, Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, de 3 de diciembre de 2018. Los textos son los siguientes:

Artículo 6- Excepciones Quedan exentas del ámbito de cobertura del presente título, las siguientes instituciones:

[.]

• d)Las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito del país. No obstante, el presente título será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno central.
• e)Los comités cantonales de deportes.

*Lo destacado es propio En relación con el art. 1° el actor cuestiona que su aplicación haría nugatoria la regla fiscal para el Gobierno central, el cual “estará obligado a transferir la totalidad de esos recursos sin considerar la situación de la Hacienda Pública ni el nivel de endeudamiento del gobierno”. Dice que alternativamente se obligaría al gobierno a hacer recortes en otras áreas para poder cumplir con el doble mandato de transferir la totalidad de los recursos a las municipalidades y además cumplir con la regla fiscal.

De los alegatos del accionante, esta Sala observa que sus reproches ‒además de la transcripción errónea de la norma‒ giran en torno a la presunta obligación de transferir la “totalidad de esos recursos”. No obstante, como lo apunta el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa, la disposición en cuestión fue variada a efecto de precisar, claramente, que debe trasladarse el porcentaje ya dispuesto en el art. 5 de la ley n.°8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001. En efecto, un análisis comparativo de los textos previamente transcritos ‒en la tabla arriba agregada‒ permite constatar que el contenido cuestionado por el accionante ‒previsto, originalmente, en el proyecto de ley‒ era tajante, en el sentido de que se debía trasladar la totalidad de los recursos a las municipalidades, mientras que la disposición finalmente aprobada y que es ley de la República refiere que las autoridades allí enunciadas deberán realizar, de forma oportuna, la transferencia de los recursos a las municipalidades, según el porcentaje dispuesto en el art. 5 de la ley n.°8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, de 4 de julio de 2001. Sobre el contenido de la norma finalmente aprobada, el accionante omitió realizar una adecuada fundamentación de los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad y los motivos por los cuales, según su dicho, se incurre en una incongruencia económica. Ya solo esa omisión es motivo suficiente para rechazar la impugnación de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, de la cual esta Sala se percató luego de haber brindado las audiencias de ley.

En lo relativo al art. 11, es preciso destacar nuevamente que la acción de inconstitucionalidad padece un grave problema de fundamentación. Lo anterior, por cuanto, como se puede colegir de la tabla arriba agregada, el accionante cuestionó los términos de la norma propuesta según el proyecto de ley original y no el contenido y el texto de la norma conforme finalmente fue aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa. En los términos originales, todos los presupuesto de las municipalidades y de los concejos municipales de distrito iban a quedar excluidos del título de “Responsabilidad Fiscal de la República” de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas, mientras que, según la norma finalmente aprobada, la exclusión va a ser parcial, dado que, el título sí será aplicable a aquellos recursos de los presupuestos de las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito, provenientes de transferencias realizadas por el Gobierno central. El accionante no realizó argumentación alguna de inconstitucionalidad en relación con la bifurcación finalmente aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa, lo que, como ya se apuntó, es un motivo suficiente para declarar sin lugar la acción por la omisión de realizar una adecuación fundamentación de los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad contra la norma vigente y no un mero proyecto de ley. Al respecto, corresponde enfatizar que en la sentencia en la que se conoció del cuestionamiento a la constitucionalidad de la aplicación de la regla fiscal a las municipalidades, se advirtió, en lo relativo a la fundamentación, que esta Sala no puede suplir oficiosamente las omisiones que corresponde cumplir a los accionantes (art. 78 de la LJC) y que, en virtud del principio de autocontención del juez constitucional, tal tarea no puede ser asumida por este Tribunal, sino que su cumplimiento es responsabilidad de la parte accionante (ver sentencia n.°2022-013101). Atendiendo a dicha postura, es posible afirmar que esta acción padece un grave problema de fundamentación, pues, como ya se advirtió, se invocó la norma, pero se impugnó el contenido de aquel que constaba en el respectivo proyecto de ley y no se impugnó el contenido final de la norma, y no se realizaron argumentaciones específicas en torno a esta, tal y como fue aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa. Esto impide realizar una adecuada ponderación de los diversos escenarios que la norma plantea y que no fueron distinguidos, tal y como correspondía, por parte del accionante.

Tal falencia en la fundamentación incide en los presupuestos procesales que debe cumplir toda acción de inconstitucionalidad y, si hubiese sido advertida antes, habría sido motivo de inadmisibilidad de esta en cuanto a este art. 11 y lo mismo se debe decir respecto del art. 1.

Corolario de las consideraciones realizadas, se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad en lo relativo a los arts. 1 y 11 de la Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19.

IV.- SOBRE LOS ARTS. 4 Y 5 DE LA LEY El accionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad de los arts. 4 y 5 porque, a su juicio, incurren en incongruencias económicas. Respecto del art. 4 afirma que carece de toda lógica que, para enfrentar la pandemia. sea necesario incrementar los gastos administrativos tal y como lo autoriza la norma impugnada. Considerando que el impuesto de bienes inmuebles es la principal fuente de ingresos frescos de las municipalidades, levantar el tope del gasto administrativo más bien podría impactar negativamente la prestación de servicios públicos. En cuanto al art. 5, en el mismo sentido, cuestiona el sentido lógico de subir el techo del gasto administrativo para enfrentar una crisis sanitaria. Los argumentos del accionante ‒tal y como lo advierte la PGR‒ giran en torno a suposiciones, con relación a que la desaceleración de la economía disminuirá la recaudación por concepto de patentes y permisos, que disminuirá el cobro de patentes por el cierre de empresas resultante de contracción económica y que caerá la recaudación municipal en el 2020 por el efecto de las moratorias autorizadas. Concluye por lo tanto que el levantamiento del techo para los gastos administrativos no solo resta recursos necesarios para la prestación de los servicios municipales, sino que ante la caída de los ingresos municipales, el golpe a los servicios municipales es doble: la menor recaudación impactará en la prestación de los servicios y el desvío hacia rubros administrativos dejará aún menos recursos disponibles para la prestación de los servicios municipales. Además, refiere que la aplicación de los arts. 4 y 5 hará crecer “desproporcionadamente el gasto administrativo y no el gasto necesario para el desarrollo de la actividad sustantiva de las municipalidades, cual es la prestación de los servicios básicos a la población de su municipio”. Dice que esto va a provocar el encarecimiento de las estructuras administrativas y se convertirá en una carga adicional para los ciudadanos de los cantones o recaerá sobre todos los costarricenses ‒por supuestos empréstitos‒. Asevera que las normas impugnadas carecen de elementos de razonabilidad técnica que las justifiquen dado que promoverán el aumentos del gasto administrativo y, en el caso concreto, no existen estudios técnicos que avalen las normas impugnadas.

El Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa informó que el accionante parte de una premisa equivocada, pues considera que el incremento en el porcentaje del impuesto que podrá dedicarse a financiar gastos administrativos significa necesariamente que las municipalidades van a aumentar ese tipo de gastos. Por el contrario, dice que la ley autoriza un incremento en el porcentaje de recursos que se puede destinar a determinado gasto, más no está autorizando un incremento en ese gasto. Aduce que si se analiza la integralidad de la ley y el contexto en el que se emite, se determina que las municipalidades se aprestan a enfrentar una reducción sensible en sus ingresos ordinarios. Esto por dos razones: a) La disminución en la actividad económica local, lo que hará reducir los ingresos tributarios relacionados con esta variable, como el impuesto de patentes; además que las morosidades en todos los tributos aumentarán como efecto de la pandemia, entre ellos, el de bienes inmuebles; b) La propia ley objetada dispone una serie de medidas que conllevan a una reducción de los ingresos municipales, como, por ejemplo: las autorizaciones para aplicar una moratoria por concepto de patentes o licencias municipales (art.12); la moratoria municipal por concepto de tasas, precios públicos y servicios municipales (art. 13); la reducción de tarifas de arrendamientos municipales (art.14) y los arreglos de pagos (art.16). Lo anterior significa que, ante un escenario en el que se mantiene el porcentaje establecido en el art. 3 de la “Ley de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles”, las municipalidades contarían con una menor cantidad de recursos en términos absolutos para financiar el mismo nivel de gasto administrativo, provocando un desequilibrio financiero que podría conllevar a déficits y mayor endeudamiento por parte de los gobiernos locales, aspecto que tanto preocupa el accionante. El gasto administrativo, compuesto especialmente por salarios y el pago de servicios operativos, tiende a ser inflexible en el corto plazo, por lo tanto, el no disponer de esta autorización puede conllevar a que las municipalidades no cuenten con recursos para financiar su operación. El aumentar el porcentaje, tal y como lo dispone el art. 4 impugnado, permitiría suplir esa deficiencia de ingresos para financiar el gasto administrativo. No necesariamente implica que se dará un aumento en dicho gasto, con lo cual es incorrecto afirmar, como lo hace el accionante, que la norma autoriza un incremento en los gastos administrativos. Agrega que otra razón por la cual la premisa de la que parte el accionante es inválida se relaciona con el hecho de que la norma impugnada también permite utilizar los recursos generados por el levantamiento del límite establecido para financiar la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; áreas claves de atender ante la situación de pandemia que vive el país. El levantamiento del porcentaje aplicará de forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021; además los recursos no podrán destinarse a la creación de nuevas plazas, lo cual reafirma que la intención no es dedicarlos al incremento de gastos administrativos, como lo presupone el accionante. Al igual que ocurre con las objeciones al art. 4, existe un error de apreciación sobre el alcance de lo dispuesto en el art. 5, ya que acá no se plantea una autorización de incremento en el gasto administrativo, sino un incremento en la autorización de los recursos que pueden utilizarse para tal fin, que, ante una reducción generalizada de ingresos, el levantamiento del techo permite financiar los gastos existentes de las municipalidades y así evitar que incurran en incumplimientos financieros, por lo que la medida tiene todo el sentido lógico. Por otra parte, al igual que en el caso anterior, la medida es temporal y no permite la creación de nuevas plazas, precisamente con el espíritu de no incrementar el gasto administrativo. Además, justamente ante el panorama anunciado por el accionante, las municipalidades requerirán del levantamiento de los topes señalados para poder financiar su operación. Insiste que si se lee con atención lo dispuesto en la norma, con los recursos señalados se podrá financiar la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos; con lo cual, contrario a lo que se cuestiona, lo dispuesto en los arts. 4 y 5 impugnados pretende precisamente salvaguardar el financiamiento de estas áreas tan sensibles en tiempos de pandemia. En cuanto a la razonabilidad técnica de la ley, informó que la ley objeto de impugnación fue analizada en las mesas de trabajo que se implementaron para analizar las acciones para minimizar los efectos de la emergencia ocasionada por la pandemia del Covid-19, por lo que se tomaron en cuenta criterios de legalidad, necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad en todo el proceso del debate legislativo, para que los gobiernos locales tuvieran las herramientas necesarias para continuar ofreciendo el servicio público, que constituye un mandato constitucional. Al efecto, se cita, además, varios pasajes de intervenciones realizadas por legisladores en el trámite de aprobación de la normativa cuestionada por el accionante y concluye que las normas impugnadas no son irrazonables o “disparatadas”, como señala el accionante, pues su vigencia de circunscribe a un tiempo prudencial, que se ha valorado necesario para que las municipalidades puedan atender las necesidades producto de la pandemia y asimismo, dar el apoyo necesario para los primeros pasos a la reactivación económica de los cantones del país.

En lo relativo a estos numerales, el Procurador General de la República informó que tal y como se extrae de los antecedentes legislativos de la ley n.°9848, con vista del expediente n.°21.922 que documenta su trámite parlamentario, los arts. 4 y 5 impugnados conectan con el propósito de “flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia”, al permitir a los municipios y los concejos municipales de distrito un margen elevado de acción presupuestaria para los años 2020 y 2021, ya que en el caso del art. 4 les permite disponer para gastos administrativos hasta un 40% sobre el monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, ante el 10% inicial previsto en el art. 3 de la “Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles” (n.°7509); mientras que en el caso del art. 5 se suma un 10% al 40% original fijado en el art. 102 del Código Municipal de los ingresos ordinarios municipales, que podrían destinar para atender los gastos generales de administración de la corporación, definidos por el mismo precepto, como “los egresos corrientes que no impliquen costos directos de los servicios municipales”. De manera que ambos preceptos buscan mitigar el impacto en la hacienda local fruto de una menor recaudación ante el escenario de desaceleración económica provocada por la pandemia del Covid-19 en cada cantón ‒y en el país en general‒, autorizando a los municipios a trasladar una mayor parte de sus ingresos a esos gastos fijos y permanentes, como las remuneraciones de sus funcionarios, en detrimento de los gastos dedicados a los servicios municipales. Por lo que, en lugar de aplicar medidas más drásticas de contención del gasto, como la reducción de su planilla, ante la previsible disminución de los recursos municipales, las disposiciones recurridas les autorizan a destinar una mayor parte de estos al gasto corriente que financia, por ejemplo, los salarios, restándole al porcentaje destinado a la prestación de los servicios públicos municipales. El accionante, como se dijo, cuestiona en primer lugar la razonabilidad de los preceptos, al promover el aumento del gasto administrativo de las municipalidades cuando al mismo tiempo sus ingresos se verán mermados sustancialmente fruto de la emergencia sanitaria, lo que a la postre repercutiría en el déficit fiscal del Gobierno central, pues plantea que la única vía para que las Administraciones territoriales puedan cubrir sus egresos en esas circunstancias es acudiendo al crédito público con el Estado como avalista, el cual en última instancia respondería por estas ante el incumplimiento de sus obligaciones financieras. De nuevo el supuesto es netamente hipotético. Importa recordar la línea jurisprudencial de ese alto Tribunal en cuanto a que resulta necesario contar con algún elemento de juicio o de contraste que sirva para determinar la razonabilidad de una disposición normativa cuando la desproporción que se alega no resulta evidente, pues, de lo contrario, su validez constitucional se haría depender de una apreciación subjetiva o juicio de valor del accionante. A este respecto, el recurrente no aporta ningún tipo de prueba o modelo económico que sirva como elemento de juicio para demostrar sus proyecciones en grado suficiente como para determinar la invalidez constitucional de las disposiciones impugnadas. Tampoco considera que a tenor del art. 121 inciso 15) de la Constitución Política los empréstitos para contar con el aval del Estado deben pasar por el control de la Asamblea Legislativa para poder ser aprobados. No obstante, en lo relativo a la falta de informes técnicos, cada vez que el legislador introduce cambios en la legislación que van más allá de la oportunidad y la conveniencia en su apreciación coyuntural del interés público, al incursionar en áreas especializadas del conocimiento, como los recogidos en las normas recurridas, que se relacionan con las finanzas y las ciencias económicas, en donde se cuadriplica el porcentaje de gastos administrativos que podrá tomarse de lo ingresado por el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles y se eleva a la mitad el porcentaje de todos los ingresos ordinarios que podrán ser usados para los gastos generales de la gestión municipal, pese a la amplia libertad de configuración legislativa que caracteriza su labor, no lo exime de justificar o fundamentar técnicamente las decisiones de esa naturaleza al momento de aprobar una ley por imperativo del aludido principio constitucional de razonabilidad. Expone que aun cuando la aprobación de los arts. 4 y 5 estuvo marcada por la situación de excepcionalidad que está viviendo el país en razón de la pandemia, quedando condicionada su vigencia a los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, el requisito del fundamento técnico seguía siendo necesario.

Para la Sala Constitucional, antes de examinar los agravios planteados por el accionante, resulta ineludible hacer referencia a los antecedentes legislativos que dan cuenta del trámite para la aprobación de la ley n.°9848, para posteriormente examinar el contenido de las normas y la supuesta ausencia de razonabilidad técnica reprochada por el accionante.

Sobre el trámite legislativo Al respecto, se tiene que el proyecto de ley 21.922 fue presentado en la corriente legislativa el día 13 de abril de 2020, pocos días después de haberse decretado el estado de emergencia nacional debido a la situación sanitaria provocada por el Covid-19 (decreto ejecutivo n.°42227-MP-S de 16 de marzo de 2020). El proyecto de ley fue suscrito por cuarenta legisladores de diversas fracciones legislativas y cuenta con la siguiente exposición de motivos:

“Tras el estado de emergencia nacional, declarado por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, según decreto N⁰ 42227-MP-S con fecha 16 de marzo del año producto de la pandemia de COVID-19 y la incertidumbre que genera en la población costarricense los efectos que se están presentando en diversos sectores económicos y los que podrían surgir a futuro, se requiere urgentemente tomar medidas desde los Gobiernos Locales, al ser estos las instituciones gubernamentales de mayor cercanía con la población, y por la cual, se pueden generar acciones que contribuyan desde varios ámbitos para contrarrestar este efecto que pueda generar la pandemia en la economía costarricense.

Las respuestas estatales para los ciudadanos y para las empresas han empezado a surgir a través de nueva legislación y disposiciones administrativas, entre ellas moratoria de impuestos, reducción de la jornada laboral para el sector privado, facilidades en seguros y aportes obrero patronales a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Sin embargo, estas acciones deben complementarse desde lo local, ya que las municipalidades en tiempos de emergencia juegan roles de contingencia y primera respuesta tales como la coordinación de los Comités Locales de Emergencia (parte del Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo según la Ley N° 8488), y la prestación de servicios indispensables como seguridad ciudadana por medio de los cuerpos de policía municipal, recolección de residuos y acueductos en algunos casos.

Por lo anterior, tanto la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) y la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI) realizaron un análisis a partir de los informes emitidos por la Contraloría General de la República (CGR) sobre presupuestos municipales 2020 y los datos disponibles por los Gobiernos Locales en el Sistema de Información de Presupuestos Públicos (SIPP), para brindar un panorama amplio de las proyecciones de ingresos y egresos de las principales cuentas que sostienen las finanzas municipales y plantear las medidas respectivas.

Cabe recalcar que los Gobiernos Locales manejan un presupuesto total de 590 millones de colones aproximadamente, monto que representa un 2% del presupuesto nacional, pero que para el periodo 2020 sufrió una disminución del 1% en comparación con el año 2019. Según el histórico de los últimos 7 años los presupuestos han tenido crecimientos paulatinos, de los cuales ha ingresado en promedio a las arcas municipales un 96,7% de lo presupuestado y se ha ejecutado en promedio el 73,1% de los fondos.

Del total de ingresos recibidos el 21,4% (¢126.087 millones) corresponde al impuesto sobre la propiedad de bienes inmuebles, siendo esta su mayor fuente de ingreso; 20% (¢118.074 millones) por concepto de licencias profesionales, comerciales y otros permisos; el 17,8% (¢105.110 millones) son transferencias de capital del Gobierno Central que son utilizadas casi en su totalidad para la atención de la Red Vial Cantonal; y el 15,4% (¢90.879 millones) por concepto de servicios de saneamiento ambiental.

Por su parte, el comportamiento de los egresos se distribuye un 40% (¢235.949 millones) para la partida de remuneraciones, 20,2% (¢119.324 millones) para servicios municipales, 18,3% (¢108.090 millones) en la compra de bienes duraderos y 8,9% (¢52.747 millones) en transferencias corrientes. En comparación con el año 2019 todos tuvieron una tasa de crecimiento del 5%, excepto la partida de bienes duraderos.

Con base en la información anterior, y al realizar un análisis consensuado entre los aportes que brindaron la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL), la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), el Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), Alcaldes, Alcaldesas e intendentes, así como la consideración de otras iniciativas ya presentadas, entre los que se encuentran los siguientes proyectos de ley N° 21.842, “AUTORIZACIÓN DE UNA MORATORIA Y CONDONACIÓN TRIBUTARIA AL RÉGIMEN MUNICIPAL Y A LOS CONCEJOS MUNICIPALES DE DISTRITO”, el Proyecto de Ley N° 21. 889, “LEY GENERAL DE AUTORIZACIÓN A LOS GOBIERNOS LOCALES PARA LA CONDONACION Y AJUSTE TRIBUTARIO EN LA COYUNTURA DEL COVID-19”, el Proyecto de Ley N° 21.898 “LEY DE MUNICIPAL DE ALIVIO A LOS SUJETOS PASIVOS DE CADA MUNICIPIO Y QUE HAN SIDO AFECTADOS POR LA CRISIS DEL COVID-19”, y el Proyecto de Ley N° 21.896 “LEY PARA MITIGAR LOS EFECTOS ECONÓMICOS DE LA PANDEMIA COVID-19 Y ASEGURAR LA ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA DEL RÉGIMEN MUNICIPAL EN DECLARATORIAS DE ESTADO DE EMERGENCIA NACIONAL”. La mesa de trabajo conformada sobre asuntos municipales analizó y desarrolló la presente iniciativa de ley que sometemos a consideración de los señores (as) Diputados de la República, el cual coadyuvará a flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia, sostener los servicios básicos prestados por la municipalidad y evitar la parálisis de un régimen institucional y constitucional que será de primera importancia para la reactivación de la economía”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Conforme se desprende de lo anterior, el proyecto de ley surge en un contexto concreto a efecto de ofrecer respuestas y facilidades a los ciudadanos y a las empresas desde lo local, partiendo de la premisa que la labor de las municipalidades ‒la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, según art. 169 de la Constitución Política‒ es vital en períodos de emergencia, pues llevan a cabo un papel de contingencia y de primera respuesta ante las necesidades de los munícipes y, además, en muchos casos están a cargo de la prestación de servicios públicos de primera necesidad en el marco de una emergencia sanitaria ‒recolección de residuos, limpieza de vías públicas, seguridad municipal, prestación de acueductos, vigilancia sobre las ASADAS, etc.‒.

Entonces, con el proyecto de ley en cuestión se acreditan dos propósitos. De una parte, reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades a efectos de garantizar la continuidad de todos los servicios municipales, contemplándose, entre ellas, las medidas excepcionales y temporales contempladas en los arts. 4 y 5 de la ley, relativos a autorizar a los gobiernos municipales a que puedan sobrepasar límites establecidos en normativas previas- Tal autorización tiene por fin atender con regularidad los gastos generales de administración y la prestación de servicios municipales, como agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de los residuos. Por otra, promover una serie de acciones municipales para apoyar al contribuyente en lo relativo al pago de los tributos municipales. Como por ejemplo, una moratoria por concepto de pago de patentes o licencias municipales; unas moratorias municipales por concepto de tasas, precios públicos y servicios municipales; unas rebajas hasta de un cincuenta por ciento (50%) en los montos cobrados por concepto de arrendamiento de locales, tramos o puestos de los mercados municipales; la autorización a las municipalidades para ofrecer a sus contribuyentes, durante el 2020, arreglos de pago por un plazo hasta de veinticuatro meses, para que cancelen sus obligaciones por concepto de tasas, precios públicos, servicios municipales, impuestos y cánones por concesión; la posibilidad de suspender el requerimiento de contar con licencias municipales para el ejercicio de determinadas actividades lucrativas, etc.

Ahora bien, contrario a lo manifestado por el accionante, se acredita que el proyecto de ley en cuestión fue producto de un análisis consensuado con la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales (UNGL) y la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica (ANAI), quienes realizaron un análisis a partir de los informes emitidos por la Contraloría General de la República (CGR) sobre presupuestos municipales 2020 y los datos disponibles por los Gobiernos Locales en el Sistema de Información de Presupuestos Públicos (SIPP), para brindar un panorama amplio de las proyecciones de ingresos y egresos de las principales cuentas que sostienen las finanzas municipales y plantear las medidas respectivas. También se afirma que en la propuesta participaron el Instituto de Fomento de Asesoría Municipal (IFAM), alcaldes, alcaldesas e intendentes, y en una mesa de trabajo de la Asamblea Legislativa se evaluaron este proyecto y otras propuestas parlamentarias para finalmente conformar la iniciativa que se examina.

En relación con el trámite del proyecto de ley se acredita que, una vez presentado, el texto fue publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta el 15 de abril de 2020. Luego, el Plenario Legislativo le aplicó una moción de dispensa de trámites para que el proyecto de ley fuera examinado por el propio Plenario. En efecto, en la sesión del día 28 de abril de 2020 se aprobó la moción de orden con el voto unánime de cuarenta y siete legisladores presentes (ver folio 403 de la copia digital del expediente legislativo). Además, la proposición contó con el apoyo del Poder Ejecutivo, pues el proyecto de ley fue convocado durante las sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver decreto ejecutivo n.°42302-MP).

De otra parte, de la atenta revisión del expediente legislativo, se tiene que el proyecto de ley fue sometido a consulta institucional de todas las municipalidades del territorio nacional y constan en el expediente varios acuerdos municipales apoyando la iniciativa.

También se acredita que el proyecto de ley fue sometido a consulta del Ministerio de Hacienda, el Registro Nacional, la Defensoría de los Habitantes y la CGR.

Además consta en el expediente el criterio institucional de la CGR rendido mediante oficio n.°DFOE-DL-0567 de 15 de abril de 2020 (ver folios 186-196 de la copia digital del expediente legislativo), del que se extraen las siguientes objeciones:

“Es decir, en el proyecto de ley, se propone autorizar a los Gobiernos Locales a sobrepasar límites de gasto en función de ciertas fuentes de recursos.

Particularmente se aumentado de un 10 % a un 40 % el porcentaje, que del impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, se destina para gastos administrativos; y se suma un 10 %, llegando hasta el 50 %, de los ingresos ordinarios municipales, que se podría destinar para atender los gastos generales de administración del Municipio, ampliando así la disponibilidad de recursos que ya tenían un límite legal.

Empero, al igual que en el comentario anterior, se considera que no se está contemplando que la medida extendida a dos periodos de ejercicio económico, 2020 y 2021, podría desgastar el ingreso y vaciar de contenido los fines para los que se impuso el límite, lo cual podría provocar un exceso y desnaturaliza ese máximo legal que había sido establecido y para el cual, las administraciones, ya deben tener ajustada sus proyecciones para una gestión financiera sostenible.

Asimismo, no se encuentra la motivación para aumentar los gastos administrativos o generales en la atención de la emergencia, siendo que la prioridad sería orientar los recursos hacia los servicios de atención y en menor grado en partidas asociadas a gastos administrativos o generales, respecto de las cuales incluso podría presentarse un ahorro debido a las medidas de distanciamiento social y teletrabajo.

Finalmente, respecto de la posibilidad de crear plazas nuevas de carácter urgente y temporal, es importante recalcar que las mismas solo podrán darse en el tanto tengan relación con la emergencia o la prestación de los servicios municipales especificados en el artículo, pero además es oportuno que cuenten con una adecuada justificación, proporcional y acorde a la emergencia, para evitar así cualquier tipo de gasto innecesario de recursos”.

Luego, consta la moción planteada por la legisladora Floria Segreda Sagot y otros diputados, moción que fue aprobada, para que el proyecto se consultara a las siguientes instituciones: Ministerio de Hacienda, Autoridad Presupuestaria del Ministerio de Hacienda, CGR, municipalidades del país, concejos municipales de distrito, Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, bancos estatales y Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal y Ministerio de Salud.

En la sesión del 30 de abril de 2020 la legisladora María José Corrales realizó las siguientes consideraciones (folios 534-535 del expediente legislativo digital):

“Gracias, señor presidente; buenas tardes tengan todos, compañeros y compañeras.

Realmente, voy a ser muy concisa en las palabras que voy a hacer mención con respecto a este proyecto. De igual manera, señor presidente, le voy a hacer llegar por WhatsApp mi discurso para que lo pueda adjuntar al acta.

Recordarles a todos ustedes y a la ciudadanía que no se escucha que la realidad del país ante la pandemia es una excepción que nos está marcando una pauta totalmente distinta. Y con ello las municipalidades de todo el país también han tenido que tomar acciones excepcionales para poder llevar adelante las acciones que les corresponden por Código Municipal, pero también para poder colaborarle al Poder Ejecutivo en cada una de las soluciones o facilidades que se le puede dar justamente a la ciudadanía ante la pandemia.

Razón de ello fue que se presentó este expediente y que se conformó la mesa de trabajo, que ha sido realmente una mesa extraordinaria, una mesa que ha permitido trabajar en equipo, trabajar en conjunto, escuchar justamente a ese sector afectado al régimen municipal y también escuchar al contribuyente que necesita justamente las facilidades para poder llevar adelante su vida cotidiana.

El proyecto de ley ha sufrido modificaciones consensuadas, revisadas técnicamente, tanto por ANAI, como por la Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales y también con aportes de todos los diputados de esta Asamblea Legislativa que han considerado oportuna sus observaciones. Y razón de ello es que hoy se ha aprobado en este Plenario un texto sustitutivo que acoge muchas de ellas y también las otras mociones adicionales que se aprobaron”.

Además, la legisladora Catalina Montero Gómez dijo lo siguiente:

“Hoy estamos concluyendo un proceso de consulta, de diálogo y de acuerdos. Ha sido un poquito largo, ha sido muy intenso, pero ha sido fundamental.

Con la participación de múltiples actores, diputados, diputadas, una mesa de trabajo que ha sido amplia y ha trabajado con muchísima responsabilidad, pero además involucrando a aquellos actores claves: alcaldías, intendencias, la Unión de Gobiernos Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, y algunas instituciones del Poder Ejecutivo.

Creo que hemos logrado recoger al máximo esas inquietudes y se han consignado en este texto del proyecto la mayoría de esas inquietudes para mejorar, afinar, de manera que lo que diga esta ley sea lo que corresponda, esté sumamente claro a la hora de aplicarla y que realmente esta sea una oportunidad para apoyar a las personas contribuyentes y para fortalecer la gestión financiera de las municipalidades.

Tenemos clarísimo que las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito tienen y tendrán una misión esencial durante y Post pandemia, porque son las instituciones líderes de los procesos de reconstrucción, los procesos de desarrollo y reactivación económica en cada uno de sus cantones, lógicamente, de la mano con la institución, el resto de la institucionalidad costarricense.

Quiero agradecer a esta mesa de trabajo este trabajo responsable y a todos los compañeros y compañeras diputados y diputadas que han aportado para enriquecer este proyecto de ley que finalmente estamos aprobando en primer debate. Muchas gracias a todos”.

Ciertamente hubo oposiciones que quedan de manifiesto con las declaraciones de la legisladora Yorleny León Marchena, quien se opuso a la exclusión tajante de las municipalidades de la aplicación de la regla fiscal (ver folios 537 y ss.).

También la participación de la diputada Paola Valladares Rosado, que al fundamentar su voto, hace un llamado a la contención del gasto por parte de las municipalidades:

“Muy buenas tardes, gracias, señor presidente, compañeros y compañeras.

Como apasionada del régimen municipal evidentemente tengo claro la necesidad de en este momento apoyar desde el plenario legislativo la situación por la cual atraviesan las municipalidades, en el entendido de que las municipalidades mayoritariamente dependen de sus ingresos y en este momento de crisis por los cuales atraviesa el país y el mundo entero evidentemente la situación económica ha hecho que descienda esa recaudación y adicionalmente se está tratando de que los municipios puedan atender las necesidades de cada uno de sus contribuyentes y en este caso por eso el proyecto aporta una moratoria para que podamos atender esa necesidad y mantener dentro de la medida de lo posible ese encadenamiento y esa generación de empleos y las economías a niveles cantonales.

Agradezco de verdad a la mesa que hizo un esfuerzo bastante grande, tenemos claro que es un poco complejo legislar para 82 realidades completamente diferentes donde la situación económica ya de por sí en cada una de ellas pues difiere una de la otra lo que tratamos en este proyecto es garantizar un flujo de caja para que los municipios puedan ayudar y dar alivio a sus patentados y contribuyentes, pero a la misma vez sobrevivir para que a fin de año cada uno de sus funcionarios pueda recibir…, o se garantice, más bien, sus salarios, en este caso, y subsistir en la atención de la emergencia sin pues, cancelar lo que son las prestaciones de servicio, que evidentemente la recolección de basura, muchas de ellas que tienen a cargo los acueductos municipales, y por consiguiente también lo que es aseo de vía y recolección de basura, entonces se vean garantizados.

Sin embargo, creo que es importante recordarles, así como lo he hecho en las mesas, quiero dejarlo plasmado esta tarde, que lo más importante es que comiencen a hacer una revisión de sus presupuestos para el hecho de la contención del gasto.

Es necesario que cada una de esas áreas financieras haya hecho esa proyección de ingresos y ajustar en el sentido todo lo que es un plan operativo. Conozco que lamentablemente aún hay municipios que siguen tramitando contrataciones, ya sea en programas de caminos o en los otros programas, sin tener conciencia de que el recurso cada vez va siendo más limitado para su gestión.

Entonces, hago llamado en ese sentido a cada uno de los municipios para que sea responsable de la contención del gasto, a partir de reducción de gastos de representación, tiempos extraordinarios y evidentemente, como se limitó en el proyecto, la creación de plazas.

Entonces, es una forma desde el legislativo de colaborar a las municipalidades, pero también necesitamos ver que se haga esa tarea de forma responsable para que desde todos los lugares estemos en esa colaboración”.

Asimismo, el legislador José María Villalta Flórez-Estrada dejó planteadas las siguientes reflexiones:

“Gracias, señor presidente, señoras diputadas, señores diputados.

Voy a votar gustoso y con mucha satisfacción este proyecto de ley que hemos trabajado durante muchísima semanas, en una mesa de trabajo con representación de prácticamente todas las fracciones legislativas, representación de los gobiernos locales, de la Unión de Gobiernos Locales, del IFAM, para apoyar a nuestros gobiernos locales en la forma en que están enfrentando y van a tener que enfrentar la emergencia que estamos viviendo.

¿Qué plantea este proyecto de ley? Plantea tres cosas fundamentalmente (…)

Al mismo tiempo — y ese es el segundo componente de este proyecto de ley — se establecen una serie de medidas para flexibilizar aquellas normas que regulan el funcionamiento de los presupuestos municipales, para que las municipalidades puedan enfrentar la merma significativa de sus ingresos, que está representando esta emergencia, no como consecuencia de esta ley.

Es que ya hoy los ingresos de las municipalidades están reduciendo significativamente, producto de que hay muchas personas que no están pudiendo pagar sus obligaciones con las municipalidades.

Entonces, se establecen normas de eximir durante dos años a las municipalidades de ciertas contribuciones que tienen que hacer al Gobierno Central o se les permite utilizarlos superávits, trasladarlos a aquellos gastos, aquellas necesidades dónde están teniendo, donde van a tener, una situación deficitaria. Se flexibilizan las normas sobre la Ley del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, que tiene hoy un tope de los recursos que se pueden destinar a gastos administrativos.

Pero es que si los ingresos por patentes o licencias municipales se desploman, van a tener las municipalidades que ver cómo redistribuyen sus presupuestos para poder cubrir los gastos operativos y mantener el funcionamiento de los servicios esenciales que brindan las municipalidades: los acueductos, la recolección de basura, la seguridad, los distintos servicios municipales.

Pero además, las municipalidades, como decía la diputada Montero Gómez, son actores claves en la atención de la emergencia. Entonces, no pueden estar debilitadas, no puede de pronto desplomarse sus ingresos y que no les demos la flexibilidad que les estamos dando con este proyecto de ley para que puedan financiar esos gastos que más bien se estarían incrementando en el marco de la emergencia”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Posteriormente, en la sesión del 30 de abril de 2020, luego de un amplio análisis, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate con cuarenta y un votos afirmativos y tres en contra.

Consta, adicionalmente, que el texto actualizado fue consultado al Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Salud, CGR, bancos estatales, Autoridad Presupuestaria del Ministerio de Hacienda, Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito (ver folios 615 y ss. de la copia digital del expediente legislativo).

A tales efectos, en el segundo informe de la CGR rendido mediante oficio n.°DFOE-DL-0842 de 13 de mayo de 2020 (ver folios 908 y ss. de la copia digital del expediente legislativo) se recoge lo siguiente:

“Artículos 4 y 5:

Sobre estos artículos se solicita que de forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito puedan sobrepasar: primero el límite dispuesto en los artículos 3 de la LIBI y sus reformas y destinar hasta un 40% para gastos administrativos del monto que les corresponde del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, y aumentar el límite dispuesto en el artículo 102 del Código Municipal, y destinar hasta un 50% de sus ingresos ordinarios municipales para gastos administrativos. Indicando además, que esos recursos se pueden utilizar en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos, pero no para la creación de nuevas plazas.

La aplicación de límites menos estrictos como los propuestos en el presente proyecto, podría llevar a un incremento significativo en los gastos administrativos de las municipalidades. Si se utiliza como ejemplo el periodo presupuestario del año 2019, la aplicación de los nuevos límites propuestos hubiese generado un espacio de gasto adicional de ₡90.357 millones, lo que representa un 75% del gasto administrativo total ejecutado durante ese año.

Dado lo anterior, se reitera que en el proyecto no se encuentra la motivación para incrementar los gastos administrativos o generales en la atención de la emergencia, siendo que la prioridad en este contexto sería orientar los recursos hacia los servicios de atención y en menor grado hacia partidas asociadas a gastos administrativos o generales, respecto de los cuales incluso podría presentarse un ahorro. En relación con este punto, la Contraloría estimó que el sector municipal podría generar un ahorro que superaría los ₡21.000 millones debido solo a las medidas de distanciamiento social y teletrabajo que se han implementado, lo cual puede complementarse con otras medidas de ahorro o mejoras y eficiencia que pudieran implementar los gobiernos locales”.

Luego de sopesar tales criterios y realizar las consultas posteriores, el proyecto de ley fue llevado a votación de segundo debate el día 19 de mayo de 2020. En dicha ocasión, por ejemplo, el diputado Gourzong Cerdas realizó las siguientes conclusiones:

“Gracias al alto nivel de responsabilidad de la Unión de Gobiernos Locales, de la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, ANAI, del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, IFAM, alcaldes, alcaldesas e intendentes, y la mesa de trabajo con formada por diputados y diputadas de esta Asamblea Legislativa que analizaron y desarrollaron la presente iniciativa de ley, es que brindo mi apoyo absoluto este proyecto que viene a permitir la flexibilización de la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de esta emergencia, sostener los servicios básicos prestados por la municipalidad y evitar la parálisis de un régimen institucional y constitucional que será vital en la reactivación de la economía y que sigue la ruta de no generar más desempleo en los diferentes cantones de este país”.

Adicionalmente, hicieron el uso de la palabra otras legisladoras, quienes realizaron las siguientes reflexiones. Por ejemplo, la diputada María José Corrales Chacón:

“Gracias, señor presidente.

Buenas tardes, compañeras y compañeros.

En la misma línea de la diputada Montero Gómez, es de suma importancia poder avanzar con la tramitación de este proyecto y dar la votación en segundo debate, por lo cual le estaré haciendo llegar mi disertación para que sea adjuntada al acta. (ver anexo tres) Únicamente quiero hacer mención de un punto que sí me parece importante que todos los costarricenses puedan escuchar a viva voz.

Con respecto a las críticas y oposiciones que ha sufrido este proyecto, principalmente de la Contraloría General de la República, la cual ha mencionado de manera inexacta que existiría una afectación en las finanzas públicas estatales con la aprobación de este proyecto, quiero dejar claro que la regla fiscal en las municipalidades no va a venir a reducir el déficit fiscal del Gobierno central, lo que aporta el Gobierno central a los gobiernos locales representa apenas un 1,09 % del presupuesto de la República y prácticamente todo este porcentaje va dirigido a inversión de la red vial cantonal.

Por esta razón, me parece importante también dejar en evidencia que ya el día de hoy las municipalidades del país tienen topes que les impiden justamente hacer gastos excesivos, pero sobre todo también que ya ellas tienen lo que se llama la regla de oro, la regla que les impide un crecimiento exagerado, por esa razón a ser evidencia de que las municipalidades necesitan y les urge, más que todo, en la situación que estamos enfrentando como país, la aprobación de este expediente.

Por favor, señor presidente, que se adjunte el texto que le voy a enviar a su asesor para que pueda ser adjuntado al acta.

Gracias”.

Y también la diputada Patricia Villegas Álvarez:

“Gracias, señor presidente; muy buenas tardes para todos y para todas.

En realidad es pequeño mi discurso, pero sí no lo quiero dejar pasar por alto. Fui miembro de la mesa de trabajo del proyecto 21.922, enfáticamente apoyar al contribuyente local durante esta crisis sanitaria, utilizando como enlace a nuestros gobiernos locales, que son las instituciones cercanas a nuestra población cantonal, nuestra población comunal, a nuestros barrios de nuestro querido país, es hoy una realidad por medio de esta aprobación en su segundo debate.

Los gobiernos locales son los entes encargados para la ejecución de acciones que contribuyan a apaciguar, en cierta medida, en nuestra economía nacional las secuelas de esta pandemia que estamos enfrentando, son las municipalidades quienes juegan roles de enlace y de coordinación con los comités locales de emergencia.

En la mesa de negociación se trabajó de manera ardua, diputados, diputadas de diferentes fuerzas políticas, con la inclusión de la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales y de la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, realizando análisis a partir de informes emitidos por la Contraloría General de la República sobre los presupuestos municipales 2020, y los datos disponibles por los gobiernos locales en el sistema de información de presupuestos públicos, para brindar un panorama amplio de las proyecciones de ingresos y de egresos de las principales cuentas que sostienen las finanzas municipales y plantear las medidas respectivas. Flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia, evitar la parálisis institucional y constitucional, son ejes fundamentales de esta presente ley.

Hoy, hoy aquí estamos dando respuesta a los ciudadanos y pido, con todo respeto, el apoyo definitivo para la votación en este segundo debate.

Muchísimas gracias”.

Finalmente con la presencia de cuarenta y ocho legisladores se inició la votación en segundo debate del expediente 21.922, y fue aprobado con cuarenta y tres votos.

Sobre el contenido y efectos de los arts. 4 y 5 impugnados En primer lugar, corresponde observar que el art. 4 impugnado autorizó, de forma excepcional en los ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021, a que las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito pudieran sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el art. 3 de la Ley sobre Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles y tuvieran la posibilidad de destinar hasta un cuarenta por ciento (40%) a gastos administrativos del monto que les correspondía del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Dicha norma también dispuso expresamente que tales recursos podrían ser utilizados en la prestación de servicios municipales de agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos. Sin embargo, la norma advirtió que esa posibilidad excepcional no podría emplearse para la creación de nuevas plazas municipales. El precepto al que se alude ‒art. 3 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, n.°7509‒ ordena lo siguiente:

“Art. 3.- Competencia de las municipalidades Para efectos de este impuesto, las municipalidades tendrán el carácter de administración tributaria. Se encargarán de realizar valoraciones de bienes inmuebles, facturar, recaudar y tramitar el cobro judicial y de administrar, en sus respectivos territorios, los tributos que genera la presente Ley. Podrán disponer para gastos administrativos hasta de un diez por ciento (10%) del monto que les corresponda por este tributo. (…)”.

Es decir, del monto recaudado por el impuesto establecido a favor de las municipalidades sobre los bienes inmuebles del cantón, se autoriza, ordinariamente, a que se utilice hasta un 10% del monto que les corresponda por ese tributo, para emplearlos en gastos administrativos. La norma impugnada en esta acción establece de forma excepcional y temporal que las municipalidades podrían utilizar hasta un 40% del monto percibido por tales impuestos, para suplir los gastos regulares municipales y otros servicios básicos esenciales.

Mientras tanto, el art. 5 autoriza que de forma excepcional y únicamente para los ejercicios presupuestarios de los años 2020 y 2021, las municipalidades y los concejos municipales de distrito podrían sobrepasar el límite dispuesto en el art. 102 del Código Municipal y destinar hasta un 50% de sus ingresos ordinarios municipales para atender los gastos generales de administración. La norma también autorizó a que estos ingresos ordinarios municipales fueran empleados en la prestación de servicios públicos esenciales, tales como agua, cementerios, seguridad y gestión integral de residuos. La disposición fue enfática que dicha autorización no implica la posibilidad de crear nuevas plazas municipales. Como se aprecia, la norma alude a lo regulado en el art. 102 del Código Municipal que se enmarca en las disposiciones legales presupuestarias que rigen a los gobiernos locales. El precepto vigente ordena lo siguiente:

“Art. 102. - Las municipalidades no podrán destinar más de un cuarenta por ciento (40%) de sus ingresos ordinarios municipales a atender los gastos generales de administración.

Son gastos generales de administración los egresos corrientes que no impliquen costos directos de los servicios municipales”.

Es decir, lo usual es que en virtud de la disposición citada, los gobiernos locales no puedan emplear más del 40% de sus ingresos en atender los gastos generales de la administración. En consecuencia, la disposición impugnada en esta acción lo que autorizó fue subir dicho monto en un 10% para que las municipalidades pudieran contar con hasta un 50% de sus ingresos ordinarios, para atender los gastos generales de la administración municipal, o bien, emplearlos para financiar servicios municipales vitales.

Análisis de constitucionalidad Luego de valorar los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad, los informes de las autoridades que se apersonaron a este proceso, el expediente legislativo y los antecedentes de este Tribunal Constitucional, se concluye que las normas cuestionadas no son inconstitucionales.

En primer término, contrario a lo aducido por el accionante y lo informado por la PGR en el sentido de que se carece de un estudio técnico concreto, se debe de poner de manifiesto, conforme a los antecedentes legislativos supra detallados, que la propuesta legislativa en cuestión no estuvo desprovista de un análisis técnico concreto. Por el contrario, tal y como se consignó, la propuesta legislativa ‒respaldada por una mayoría calificada del órgano y del propio Poder Ejecutivo‒ estuvo precedida de un análisis sobre los presupuestos municipales y las proyecciones de ingresos y egresos de las cuentas que sostienen las finanzas municipales, realizados por la UNGL y la ANAI. También participaron de la iniciativa varios gobiernos municipales y el propio IFAM en mesas de trabajo llevadas a cabo e impulsadas por los legisladores. Así se desprende textualmente, y en síntesis, de la exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley:

“La mesa de trabajo conformada sobre asuntos municipales analizó y desarrolló la presente iniciativa de ley que sometemos a consideración de los señores (as) Diputados de la República, el cual coadyuvará a flexibilizar la gestión de los recursos municipales para enfrentar las consecuencias de la emergencia, sostener los servicios básicos prestados por la municipalidad y evitar la parálisis de un régimen institucional y constitucional que será de primera importancia para la reactivación de la economía”.

El hecho de que el proyecto de ley haya surgido como una iniciativa parlamentaria a partir de estas “mesas de trabajo” es significativo, porque evidencia que estuvo nutrido del conocimiento, fruto de la experiencia, de las personas integrantes de la Unión de Gobiernos Locales, la Asociación Nacional de Nombre4700 e Intendencias de Costa Rica, el IFAM, alcaldes y los propios legisladores. Los insumos que estas personas pudieron aportar a las mesas de trabajo ‒toda su experiencia sobre las distintas tareas encomendadas a los gobiernos locales y la realidad sobre el funcionamiento de estos‒ apunta a que no se trató de una decisión arbitraria, precipitada, antojadiza. Lo anterior, máxime, si se toma en cuenta que la legislación se adoptó como una medida temporal con el propósito de atender una situación coyuntural que afectaba tanto a los ciudadanos mismos como al engranaje administrativo de las municipalidades, bajo un pronóstico particularmente incierto y sin precedentes.

Asimismo, según se acreditó, pese a que el expediente se le aplicó una moción de dispensa de trámites, el proyecto de ley sí fue publicitado y fue ampliamente consultado a varias autoridades públicas que aportaron sus insumos y opiniones en torno al proyecto de ley. Según se constató, el proyecto fue consultado a todas las municipalidades y concejos municipales de distrito del país, a la CGR, al Ministerio de Hacienda, al Registro Nacional, bancos estatales, Ministerio de Salud, entre otras autoridades. Según se consignó en la transcripción de varias intervenciones legislativas durante el proceso de aprobación legislativa, se evidenció que el proyecto de ley fue consensuado con varias actores en amplias mesas de trabajo y que llevaron a una mayoría parlamentaria a aprobar este proyecto de ley bajo la consideración de que al reducirse los ingresos usuales por concepto de patentes o licencias municipales, las corporaciones municipales iban a tener que encontrar una forma de flexibilizar las reglas supra señaladas con el fin de poder cubrir los gastos operativos y mantener los servicios esenciales municipales.

Como ya se apuntó previamente, el proyecto de ley giraba en torno a dos ejes esenciales, autorizar una serie de facilidades para el contribuyente local a efecto de hacer frente a las consecuencias de la pandemia (reducción de aforos, cierres temporales, etc.) y tratar de reactivar la economía con tales facilidades y moratorias. Pero, de otra parte, tales facilidades ‒autorizaciones para aplicar una moratoria por concepto de pago de patentes o licencias municipales (art.12); moratoria municipal por cancelación de tasas, precios públicos y servicios municipales (art.13); reducción de tarifas de arrendamientos municipales (art.14), y otros tipos de arreglos de pagos (art.16)‒ implicaban necesariamente una reducción de los ingresos usuales de las corporaciones municipales que motivaron al legislador a establecer las autorizaciones excepcionales previstas en los arts. 4 y 5 de la ley impugnada. Lo anterior con el propósito de que a través de estas medidas extraordinarias se pudieran garantizar las facilidades a los contribuyentes locales, pero también la municipalidad pudiera echar mano de los recursos señalados (impuestos por bienes inmuebles e ingresos ordinarios municipales), para financiar el funcionamiento regular de la municipalidad, sin que se autorice el crecimiento de la planilla municipal y que, además, tales montos puedan ser empleados en la satisfacción de servicios esenciales en beneficio de todos los munícipes y la población en general.

Como se ha advertido, todas estas variables fueron valoradas por los legisladores ‒incluso las disconformidades de la CGR‒, sin que se aprecie que su decisión haya sido arbitraria o lesiva de derechos constitucionales. En ese sentido, es preciso recordar que es verdad que las decisiones legislativas no pueden carecer de una adecuada fundamentación, pero eso no implica que se le pueda obligar al Poder Legislativo ‒órgano democrático y deliberante‒ que se someta a una exclusiva opción técnica, sino que sus decisiones sean fruto de un análisis de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y que involucre a los actores técnicos que puedan aportar suficientes argumentos para adoptar una determinada decisión legislativa.

En el sub lite, según se pudo comprobar, del propio seno de la Asamblea Legislativa surgió la propuesta de ley, la cual fue consensuada con otros actores de la política económica nacional e, incluso, como se acreditó, fue una propuesta legislativa que contó con el respaldo del Poder Ejecutivo en lo relativo a la oportuna convocatoria del proyecto de ley a la discusión durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias del Congreso. Además, se sopesaron las disconformidades de la CGR. Sin embargo, la Asamblea Legislativa optó por aprobar esta normativa excepcional con el propósito de asegurar una flexibilidad en caso de que hubiera un descalabro financiero por la disminución en la recaudación de los ingresos municipales.

Deben destacarse las líneas jurisprudenciales de este Tribunal en el sentido de que esta Sala ha rechazado que “irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico” porque eso atenta contra la naturaleza misma del Parlamento en el sentido de que el legislador cuenta con discrecionalidad, en el marco de su derecho a la libre configuración, a efecto de ponderar y adoptar las normas que estime necesarias. Si fuera un órgano estrictamente técnico que debe apegarse a un único criterio, carecería de sentido la naturaleza misma de la actividad legislativa. Sobre la libre configuración del legislador, esta Sala ha dicho lo siguiente:

“La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa. De esa forma, el legislador puede crear órganos públicos, asignarles funciones o competencias, desarrollar diversas instituciones o normar la realidad, según lo estime oportuno y conveniente para una coyuntura histórica, social, económica o política determinada. Evidentemente, la discrecionalidad legislativa es mucho más amplia que la administrativa, puesto que, la función legislativa no se puede reconducir a la simple ejecución de la Constitución. La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y las jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares. Los límites a la discrecionalidad legislativa suelen ser más intensos cuando se trata de la regulación legal de los derechos fundamentales, puesto que, en tal materia se encuentra en discusión la extensión, contenido y alcances de las libertades de la persona humana, siendo que, en contraposición, tales límites son más laxos en aspectos meramente organizacionales”. (Sentencia n.°2003-05090) Atendiendo a la libre configuración del legislador, en una materia como la que se examina en el caso concreto, la Asamblea Legislativa estaba en la posibilidad de atender la realidad que se le presentaba de diversas maneras, sin atenerse a un criterio técnico en estricto sentido, pero sí a razonar su decisión, tal y como se acreditó. Al respecto, puede consultarse, por ejemplo, la sentencia n.°2018-000230 mediante la cual la Sala advirtió que los estudios técnicos no son necesarios en todos los supuestos de intervención de la Asamblea Legislativa:

“La Sala rechaza que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad”. (Criterio reiterado en la opinión consultiva n.°2020-015542).

Asimismo, se puede consultar la opinión consultiva n.°2020-010160 en la cual la Sala resolvió unas dudas de constitucionalidad en torno al proyecto de ley sobre la regulación de la figura de la “usura” en que este Tribunal advirtió lo siguiente:

“Es decir, dada la naturaleza hipotética de las posibles lesiones con efectos irrazonables y desproporcionados en un segmento de la población o de la economía, estima esta Sala que no puede bajo esas condiciones limitar válidamente el margen de iniciativa del legislador, que es el competente y obligado a buscar una solución al problema de la omisión de la tasa de usura. Lo contrario, en estas circunstancias, sería lesivo de la independencia del parlamento. En esta etapa en que la propuesta no ha desplegado efectos como para valorar -con criterios objetivos y ciertos-, si efectivamente el resultado va a ser negativo, capaz de despojar la norma de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad -por sus efectos-, estima la Sala que, debe reservar un margen más amplio al legislador, que el que tiene la Sala en materia de control judicial posterior mediante el procedimiento de acción de inconstitucionalidad, donde sí puede valorar, los efectos inconstitucionales, de una determinada legislación. Sin que la norma haya producido efectos que sean medibles objetivamente y existan estudios técnicos disímiles en el expediente, estamos aún en el campo de la hipótesis, y mal haría la Sala, sin evidencia cierta, limitar el ejercicio de potestades constitucionales propias del máximo órgano de representación popular, luego de un debate democrático que suma más de una década, sin que existan estudios claros que demuestren que la norma resultará desproporcionada en sus efectos”.

En dicha opinión consultiva el magistrado Castillo Víquez consignó unas razones adicionales que sirven para ilustrar la tesis de la Sala:

“Tema de gran calado que se plantea en esta cuestión -a propósito de la alegada violación del principio de razonabilidad técnica-, es si es posible ejercer una especie de control de discrecionalidad sobre la actividad legislativa o parlamentaria. Como es bien sabido, el control de discrecionalidad es una técnica que surge para verificar si la actividad de la Administración Pública se ajusta o no a las reglas unívoca de la ciencia o de la técnica, o a principios elementales de justicia, lógica y conveniencia. Ergo, el ejercicio de las potestades discrecionales está sujetas a los principios generales del Derecho, y al control de los hechos determinantes y los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, así como los elementos reglados del acto administrativo, por parte del Juez de lo contencioso-administrativo. Es evidente, y hasta donde yo recuerdo en ninguna parte del mundo se ha llegado a este exabrupto, que se aplique este control a la actividad parlamentaria; este tipo de control jamás se podría ejercer sobre la actividad legislativa o parlamentaria, pues el Parlamento quedaría reducido a la mínima expresión, y se dislocaría un elemento nuclear del sistema republicano. Lo que sí es posible, es ejercer un control de constitucionalidad de la actividad parlamentaria y, por consiguiente, del acto parlamentario final, sea este un decreto o un acuerdo legislativos, por vulnerar los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad cuando están vinculados a un derecho fundamental y, por consiguiente, vacía su contenido esencial. Lo anterior significa, en buen castellano, que el legislador, en el ejercicio de la potestad de legislar, la potestad autonormativa, de control político, de dirección política, etc. tiene un amplio margen de discrecionalidad, una suerte de política legislativa, por lo que puede optar por una multiplicidad de variables en el marco de un órgano plural, democrático, donde la concertación política constituye un cauce necesario, en especial cuando en un periodo constitucional o legislación, un partido político o el partido de gobierno carece de la mayoría parlamentaria. Ese margen de discrecionalidad está exento del control de constitucionalidad, toda vez que, si esto no fuese así, el Tribunal Constitucional vendría a sustituir la voluntad del Parlamento, provocando una severa dislocación al sistema democrático, en especial lesionado de manera muy significativa el principio de separación de funciones. Dicho lo anterior, el Parlamento tiene una amplia libertad para seguir un determinado criterio técnico o apartarse de él, siempre y cuando con ello no afecté el contenido esencial de un derecho fundamental y, por consiguiente, también quebrante los principios de razonabilidad y de proporcionalidad, tal y como ha establecido este Tribunal en cuanto a la afectación del medio, donde ha requerido para que la Ley pase el tamiz constitucional que hayan estudios técnicos o las compensaciones respectivas que demuestren que no hay quebranto al medio ambiente. Lo anterior es aún más cierto cuando en la discusión de un proyecto de ley hay distintos criterios técnicos o éstos son contradictorios entre sí. En estos supuestos, el legislador no está vinculado a seguir un determinado criterio técnico, sino que bien puede adoptar una decisión política tomando en consideración otros elementos de juicio. En otras palabras, no es posible declarar inconstitucional una Ley porque se apartó de uno o varios criterios técnicos -esto es propio de un control sobre la actividad de la Administración Pública-, salvo cuando tal omisión conlleva la vulneración del contenido esencial de un derecho fundamental”.

Incluso, en temas de disposición de fondos públicos, si bien es preciso una adecuada fundamentación de la decisión a efecto de determinar su razonabilidad, esta Sala no ha exigido estudios técnicos tan estrictos como el que demanda el accionante. Por ejemplo, en la consulta legislativa de la Ley Marco de Empleo Público, resolución n.°2021-017098 esta Sala resolvió lo siguiente:

“Falta de estudio de costos: Indican que, al momento de incorporar al proyecto de ley estas licencias y permisos, no se tomó en consideración ningún estudio de costos ni fuente de recursos para cubrirlos. Al respecto, no puede perderse de vista que el legislador cuenta con un amplio margen de discrecionalidad legislativa en la formación de leyes; criterio que ha sido sostenido en reiteradas ocasiones por la Sala Constitucional, señalándose que, en principio, no resulta estrictamente necesario que todas las decisiones legislativas deban contar con estudios técnicos o financieros. Así, por ejemplo, en la sentencia n° 2018-000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018, este Tribunal señaló que: “[l]a Sala rechaza que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad”. Así, no todas las decisiones del legislador deben contemplar un estudio técnico toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática, manifestándose que los estudios técnicos son necesarios cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad (criterio reiterado, entre otras, en la sentencia n° 2019-020596 de las 19:15 horas del 25 de octubre de 2019). En esta materia, la Sala ha hecho referencia al principio de discrecionalidad o libre configuración del legislador, mencionado en la sentencia n°2003-05090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003, según el cual, la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente; margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada que se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano -limitado solo por el Derecho de la Constitución-, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (criterio reiterado, entre otras, en la sentencia n° 2016-010244 de las 09:05 horas del 20 de julio de 2016 y recientemente en la sentencia 2020-015542 de las 11:40 horas del 19 de agosto de 2020). Bajo esta perspectiva, no llevan razón los consultantes al estimar que las licencias y permisos contenidos en estos artículos 39 a 41, sean inconstitucionales por el solo hecho de que, según su dicho, no estén justificados en estudios de costos o en las correspondientes fuentes de recursos que permitan cubrirlos. Por otro lado, los consultantes no brindaron elementos de juicio suficientes que permitan afirmar que las normas consultadas ocasionan per se, un aumento de costos que pondría en riesgo las finanzas del Estado, o que se carezca de fuentes de recursos para su implementación. En razón de estas circunstancias, se rechaza el argumento que se plantea en cuanto a este extremo.

(…)

Ausencia de razones objetivas o de criterios técnicos para ampliar causales de licencia de maternidad: En cuanto al artículo 42 que contempla la ampliación de la licencia de maternidad, argumentan los consultantes que se trata de un numeral que contiene una serie de supuestos en que es aplicable esa ampliación (nacimiento prematuro, niños o niñas con discapacidad severa y/o enfermedades crónicas y partos múltiples); no obstante, estiman que el proyecto no contempla las razones objetivas ni los criterios técnicos o científicos que justifiquen incluir esas causales y otras no. Al respecto, nuevamente se observa que la disconformidad radica en el ejercicio de la libre configuración o discrecionalidad del legislador y, en el fondo, la oposición de los consultantes radica de nuevo en que no se tomaron en cuenta criterios técnico-científicos para definir los supuestos bajo los cuales se podría ampliar la referida licencia. Al respecto, se debe reiterar lo indicado en la sentencia n°2018-00230 mediante la cual, la Sala Constitucional rechaza que, irremediablemente, todas las decisiones del legislador deban contemplar un estudio técnico toda vez que ello, como se ha dicho, anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. En este sentido, no se acredita que, en este caso, los estudios técnicos fueran necesarios, de modo que se descarta la alegada inconstitucionalidad.

Falta de estudios técnicos en cuanto al permiso de paternidad: En cuanto al permiso de paternidad del artículo 41 del proyecto que otorga un permiso con goce de salario por un mes calendario, posterior al día del nacimiento o al momento de adopción de la persona menor de edad, los consultantes reclaman que en el expediente no se señalan -nuevamente- los estudios o criterios técnicos que indiquen el costo que tendría para el Estado el otorgamiento de este permiso ni la fuente de financiamiento. Al respecto, indiscutiblemente, en este extremo la Sala observa que los argumentos de los consultantes se reiteran en relación con lo analizado supra en el punto a); en consecuencia, se remite a lo ahí indicado y se reitera que se trata de un cuestionamiento que no tiene la virtud de vulnerar el Derecho de la Constitución, por lo que se rechaza el planteamiento formulado.

(…)

La Sala no encuentra vicios de inconstitucionalidad en los aspectos cuestionados sobre los artículos 39, 40, 41 y 42 del proyecto de ley consultado, al tratarse de un tema de discrecionalidad legislativa, al haberse cumplido con la consulta obligatoria a la CCSS y al no contarse con elementos que deban determinar que el legislador debía contar de previo, en este caso, con un estudio técnico”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Finalmente, en la opinión consultiva n.°2022-025307 la mayoría de la Sala consideró que “demandar un estudio técnico en cualesquiera casos de ejercicio de la función legislativa, vaciaría de contenido el principio de libre configuración del legislador”.

Conforme a los antecedentes señalados, no existe un deber ineludible de la Asamblea Legislativa de someterse a estudios técnicos para cualesquiera normas que deba dictar, sino a justificar debidamente su decisión en criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad a la luz de los insumos pertinentes que sean allegados a la discusión legislativa (en este caso, el conocimiento derivado de la experiencia en el ejercicio de diversas funciones en el ámbito municipal, valoración de los presupuestos municipales, etc.). Dichos criterios fueron cumplidos razonablemente en el caso concreto que, como se ha dicho, se dio en un marco sin precedentes y particularmente incierto, en el que se justificaba legislar sin exigir datos exactos, que la coyuntura impedía precisar. De manera que al respecto se descarta el vicio de inconstitucionalidad alegado.

En otro orden de ideas, el accionante argumenta que las normas en cuestión harán que crezca desproporcionadamente el gasto administrativo de las municipalidades, con las eventuales consecuencias de que se afecten los servicios públicos e, incluso, podrán provocar endeudamientos que a la postre impacten en las finanzas públicas y en el bolsillo de todos los contribuyentes. Al respecto, esta Sala considera que lleva razón el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa en el sentido de que las disposiciones impugnadas ‒arts. 4 y 5 de la ley n.°9848‒ no implican una orden o un incentivo para que las municipalidades acrecienten sus gastos administrativos, sino una posibilidad excepcional de disponer de otros recursos para poder financiar su funcionamiento regular, partiendo de la premisa de que por consecuencia de la pandemia y de las facilidades y moratorias contempladas, van a percibir menos dinero en rubros o rentas que normalmente financiarían su gestión ‒licencias, patentes, etc.‒. Además, se hace preciso evidenciar que la posibilidad de financiarse extraordinariamente con otros recursos municipales se ordenó de forma temporal y excepcional (ejercicios presupuestarios 2020 y 2021), bajo la expresa condición de que no se debe emplear para ampliar la planilla municipal y que, además, se pueden utilizar para la prestación de servicios esenciales. Con lo cual, se constata que la decisión legislativa está encaminada no solo a flexibilizar los recursos presupuestarios de la municipalidad, sino a salvaguardar la continuidad de los servicios públicos, máxime, de las municipalidades, a las que les corresponde la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón (art. 169 de la Constitución Política). En segundo lugar, considera esta Sala que lleva razón la PGR en el sentido de que las afirmaciones que realiza el accionante ‒sobre los posibles endeudamientos y necesidad de recurrir a créditos públicos‒ no pasa de ser meras especulaciones y apreciaciones hipotéticas que no estuvieron acompañadas de estudios sólidos que pudieran acreditar sus afirmaciones. Al respecto, dice la PGR lo siguiente:

“De nuevo el supuesto es netamente hipotético. Importa recordar la línea jurisprudencial de ese alto Tribunal en cuanto a que resulta necesario contar con algún elemento de juicio o de contraste que sirva para determinar la razonabilidad de una disposición normativa cuando la desproporción que se alega no resulta evidente, pues de lo contrario, su validez constitucional se haría depender de una apreciación subjetiva o juicio de valor del accionante (…)

A este respecto, el recurrente no aporta ningún tipo de prueba o modelo económico que sirva como elemento de juicio para demostrar sus proyecciones en grado suficiente como para determinar la invalidez constitucional de las disposiciones impugnadas, tampoco considera que a tenor del artículo 121, inciso 15), de la Constitución Política los empréstitos para contar con el aval del Estado deben pasar por el control de la Asamblea Legislativa para poder ser aprobados”.

En otras palabras, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se refiere a meros escenarios hipotéticos ‒crecimiento exponencial del gasto público, detrimento de los servicios públicos y aumento de la carga tributaria‒ que tampoco están debidamente fundamentados en proyecciones económicas serias y reales (que justamente es la omisión que reprocha el accionante). De manera que, en los términos en que fue planteada la acción, sin argumentos sólidos o probanzas, y apenas a un mes de aprobada, no permiten acreditar una supuesta irrazonabilidad que haya amenazado los principios constitucionales invocados por el accionante. Asimismo, lleva razón la PGR cuando señala que las suposiciones realizadas en el libelo de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad omiten contemplar las reglas establecidas en la Constitución Política respecto de la aprobación de empréstitos (arts. 121 inciso 15 y 174).

Sin demérito de lo anterior, también corresponde enfatizar en que las normas acá cuestionadas no suponen dejar sin efecto otras disposiciones de orden constitucional y legal que buscar asegurar por el equilibrio de los presupuestos municipales e impedir, en la práctica, los efectos perniciosos que preocupan al accionante. En tal sentido, debe hacerse hincapié en que las corporaciones municipales están sometidas a los principios de equilibrio presupuestario, sostenibilidad, transparencia y responsabilidad que se derivan de lo dispuesto en el art. 176 de la Constitución Política el cual ordena lo siguiente:

“Artículo 176- La gestión pública se conducirá de forma sostenible, transparente y responsable, la cual se basará en un marco de presupuestación plurianual, en procura de la continuidad de los servicios que presta.

El presupuesto ordinario de la República comprende todos los ingresos probables y todos los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública, durante todo el año económico. En ningún caso, el monto de los gastos presupuestos podrá exceder el de los ingresos probables.

La Administración Pública, en sentido amplio, observará las reglas anteriores para dictar sus presupuestos.

El presupuesto de la República se emitirá para el término de un año, del primero de enero al treinta y uno de diciembre”.

Y, para tal fin, paralelamente le compete a la CGR velar porque las municipalidades anualmente cumplan con tales mandatos constitucionales. Es por ello que el art. 175 de la Constitución Política establece que la vigencia de los presupuestos municipales depende de la aprobación de la Contraloría, órgano al cual le corresponde fiscalizar su adecuada ejecución. En cuyo caso corresponde también citar las normas del Código Municipal que regulan la temática de los presupuestos municipales, los cuales están sometidos al control de la CGR, pero también a reglas específicas y concretas que les impiden incrementar desmedidamente el gasto público:

“Art. 106. - El presupuesto ordinario y los extraordinarios de las municipalidades, deberán ser aprobados por la Contraloría General de la República. El presupuesto ordinario deberá remitirse a más tardar el 30 de setiembre de cada año y los extraordinarios, dentro de los quince días siguientes a su aprobación. Ambos términos serán improrrogables.

A todos los presupuestos que se envíen a la Contraloría se les adjuntará copia de las actas de las sesiones en que fueron aprobados. En ellas, deberá estar transcrito íntegramente el respectivo presupuesto, estarán firmadas por el secretario y refrendadas por el alcalde municipal: además, deberá incluirse el Plan operativo anual, el Plan de desarrollo municipal y la certificación del tesorero municipal referente al respaldo presupuestario correspondiente.

Art. 107. - Si el presupuesto ordinario no fuere presentado oportunamente a la Contraloría General de la República, el presupuesto del año anterior regirá para el próximo período, excepto los egresos que, por su carácter, solo tengan eficacia en el año referido. En todo caso, deberán determinarse las responsabilidades administrativas, civiles y penales que puedan resultar de tal omisión. Para solventar esta situación, el Concejo deberá conocer y aprobar los presupuestos extraordinarios procedentes.

Art. 108. - Una vez aprobado el presupuesto por la Contraloría General de la República, el original se enviará a la secretaría municipal, donde quedará en custodia, y se remitirá copia al alcalde municipal, al contador o auditor interno, a cada uno de los regidores propietarios, así como a los demás despachos que acuerde el Concejo o indique el reglamento.

Art. 109. - Dentro de un mismo programa presupuestado, las modificaciones de los presupuestos vigentes procederán, cuando lo acuerde el Concejo. Se requerirá que el Concejo apruebe la modificación de un programa a otro, con la votación de las dos terceras partes de sus miembros.

El presupuesto ordinario no podrá ser modificado para aumentar sueldos ni crear nuevas plazas, salvo cuando se trate de reajustes por aplicación del decreto de salarios mínimos o por convenciones o convenios colectivos de trabajo, en el primer caso que se requieran nuevos empleados con motivo de la ampliación de servicios o la prestación de uno nuevo, en el segundo caso.

Los reajustes producidos por la concertación de convenciones o convenios colectivos de trabajo o cualesquiera otros que impliquen modificar los presupuestos ordinarios, sólo procederán cuando se pruebe, en el curso de la tramitación de los conflictos o en las gestiones pertinentes, que el costo de la vida ha aumentado sustancialmente según los índices de precios del Banco Central de Costa Rica y la Dirección General de Estadística y Censos.

Art. 110. - Los gastos fijos ordinarios solo podrán financiarse con ingresos ordinarios de la municipalidad.

Los ingresos extraordinarios solo podrán obtenerse mediante presupuestos extraordinarios, que podrán destinarse a reforzar programas vigentes o nuevos. Estos presupuestos podrán acordarse en sesiones ordinarias o extraordinarias.

Art. 111. - La Contraloría General de la República deberá aprobar o improbar los proyectos de presupuesto que reciba. Los improbará dentro del plazo de un mes contado a partir del recibo, en resolución razonada y la aprobación podrá ser parcial o total, por violación del ordenamiento jurídico o por falta de recursos.

Podrá introducir modificaciones a los proyectos únicamente con anuencia del Concejo.

Art. 112. - Las municipalidades no podrán efectuar nombramientos ni adquirir compromisos económicos, si no existiere subpartida presupuestaria que ampare el egreso o cuando la subpartida aprobada esté agotada o resulte insuficiente; tampoco podrán pagar con cargo a una subpartida de egresos que correspondan a otra.

La violación de lo antes dispuesto será motivo de suspensión del funcionario o empleado responsable, y la reincidencia será causa de separación”. (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Todas las disposiciones anteriores se mantienen vigentes y resultan de ineludible aplicación tanto para los gobiernos municipales como para la CGR, a efecto de asegurar que los presupuestos municipales se formulen y ejecuten de forma responsable. De manera que la aplicación de las excepciones previstas en las normas impugnadas debe realizarse a la luz de los mandatos de carácter general, que vinculan a las autoridades mencionadas con el propósito último de resguardar el orden y el equilibrio de las finanzas municipales y nacionales.

En síntesis, los preceptos cuestionados no conllevan o implican un incentivo a que se aumente el gasto público, sino que se trata de unas herramientas de flexibilización para que las municipalidades, en un contexto de emergencia sanitaria y de apoyo a los contribuyentes locales, que habilitan ampliar el tope establecido respecto de los impuestos municipales e ingresos ordinarios para el pago de los gastos ordinarios de la administración municipal y los servicios municipales esenciales. Lo anterior, claro está, sometido y supeditado a los principios constitucionales y a los controles que le corresponde ejercer a la CGR en la aprobación de los presupuestos municipales.

Como corolario de las consideraciones realizadas, este Tribunal concluye que no se acreditaron los vicios de inconstitucionalidad atribuidos a las normas impugnadas.

V.- A MAYOR ABUNDAMIENTO. Redacta el magistrado Garita Navarro.

Desde el plano general, las normas que pretendan regular aspectos relacionados al régimen financiero de los entes públicos, dentro de este, lo atinente a los esquemas de financiamiento y régimen de gasto, en condiciones ordinarias, precisan de análisis técnicos que determinen los pormenores y contenido de la regulación propuesta. Justamente, esos análisis posibilitan definir la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad del régimen de ingresos, egresos y direccionamiento del gasto, permitiendo armonizar el conjunto de principios y regulaciones que son aplicables a cada uno de esos componentes de la estructura financiera y presupuestaria, tanto a nivel del Derecho de la Constitución (arts. 18, 33, 45, 50, 176, entre otros), como de las normas legales aplicables (principios de la Ley No. 8131 y No. 7635). Por ejemplo, la modificación de una cuota tributaria para una carga determinada, como mecanismo de financiamiento, requiere de abordajes técnicos, económicos, contables para determinar que ese replanteamiento no constituya un traslado ilegítimo del deber contributivo. Solamente a partir de ese análisis antecedente se podría inferir sobre la no confiscatoriedad, progresividad o igualdad de esa imposición. Lo mismo cabe señalar de las asignaciones porcentuales del gasto, así como su destino en términos de gasto corriente o de capital, pues el aumento o disminución en cada una de las partidas o cuentas contables insertas en el presupuesto, requiere de un balance de ingreso probable y destino del gasto, conforme a esquemas de planificación, así como al cumplimiento de deberes legales en cuanto a destino del gasto o deberes prestacionales.

Empero, en rigor, la ley que se cuestiona se emite dentro de un contexto excepcional y especial, cual es la declaratoria de la pandemia Covid-19. Tal circunstancia histórica no puede ni debe dejarse de lado en este análisis, por cuanto introduce una variable inexistente en las condiciones normales del control de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad técnica de este tipo de normativa. Si se mira ese contexto, la ley permite un crecimiento en el porcentaje destinado al costeo de gastos administrativos de los entes locales en cuanto a los ingresos derivados del impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles (Ley No. 7509), cuyo numeral 3 fija ‒en condiciones normales‒ en un 10% de ese ingreso, y en el presupuesto municipal, cuyo tope ordinario es del 40% ‒art. 102 de la Ley No. 7794, Código Municipal‒, para permitir un techo temporal para los períodos 2020 y 2021 del 50%. Ese incremento relativo del 30% y 10% respectivamente, en cada una de esas fuentes, se sustenta en el evidente riesgo inherente a la pandemia, del impacto financiero presupuestario en las partidas de ingresos asociados a cargas fiscales que pesan sobre los munícipes. Frente a ese riesgo, considerando que los gastos administrativos son costos operativos de naturaleza corriente, y que suponen compromisos presupuestarios que no podrían ser esquivados por el ente local, en el fondo, la norma legal cuestionada permite una asignación porcentual mayor de esos ingresos para financiar ese tipo de gasto y de esa manera, no generar un desequilibrio presupuestario o un desbalance en el régimen de ingresos que obligue a imponer cargas adicionales a los administrados, o bien, reducir los gastos de remuneraciones o gastos operativos. Esta última opción supondría un deterioro en el régimen prestacional del ente público, ante la reducción de recursos asignados a las actividades ordinarias de la Administración, así como a las direccionadas a sufragar el personal disponible para el servicio público, pero a la vez, mermando los ingresos por salarios de ese recurso humano. Ciertamente, el redireccionamiento del gasto podría generar un decremento en los niveles de prestación de los servicios públicos de agua, cementerios, recolección de basura, entre otros, empero, la misma normativa habilita la asignación de esos recursos a dichas finalidades.

Ante ese panorama, es claro que la norma se emite en el contexto de un régimen de urgencia y necesidad, teoría que a la luz de los ordinales 219 y 226 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, posibilita y habilita la adopción de medidas singulares y excepcionales que permitan tutelar el interés público, el cual, en este caso se concreta en la continuidad del servicio público mediante medidas contingentes de salud financiera. De otro modo, la aplicación en rigor de los porcentajes de asignación del gasto, plasmado en aquellas normas (10% y 40%), aparejado a la reducción de los ingresos ordinarios del ente local, pondría en alta vulnerabilidad el principio de equilibrio y sostenibilidad financieros que dimana del ordinal 176 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto al régimen de gasto público. De esa manera, ante la situación excepcional, las autoridades optaron por apelar a mecanismos de participación social, propios de un orden democrático, mediante los cuales, con la integración de los diversos actores sociales, en mesas de trabajo, se determinan medidas de contingencia, de ajuste temporal, que se estimaron razonables y convenientes para reaccionar frente a la situación de riesgo financiero que se anticipaba a partir del impacto económico que generó la citada pandemia.

En esos términos, nótese que las normas cuestionadas no proyectan un incremento en el gasto municipal, sino una permisibilidad temporal de reasignación interna del régimen de gasto, a efectos de elevar los topes ya señalados, para poder ajustar el funcionamiento administrativo al costeo que el impacto en los ingresos tributarios podía generar. Frente a esa contingencia histórica, resultaba poco probable tener parámetros objetivos que permitieran definir, con rigurosidad científica, qué medida de incremento en la asignación del gasto resultaba necesaria. Justamente, el mecanismo adoptado (mesas de trabajo) se estima como un medio legítimo para reaccionar a las consecuencias inmediatas de la pandemia en el plano de los ingresos fiscales municipales. Por demás, si bien se acusa una irrazonabilidad técnica en las medidas adoptadas, el accionante no aporta ningún elemento que permita el análisis que propone. Esta Sala ha sido conteste en cuanto a la necesidad de aportar parámetros objetivos para poder definir la concurrencia o no de un sesgo técnico en la adopción de este tipo de normas. La insuficiencia en esta cuestión somete a este Tribunal a una especulación sobre el contenido de la norma cuestionada y le impone la carga de realizar comparaciones y valoraciones sin contar con los parámetros o elementos mínimos para ello. De ahí que no encuentre mérito para disponer la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa cuestionada.

VI.- CONCLUSIÓN.

Este Tribunal concluye que el accionante incurrió en una indebida invocación del contenido de los arts. 1 y 11 de la Ley para apoyar al contribuyente local, y reforzar la gestión financiera de las municipalidades, ante la emergencia nacional por la pandemia del Covid-19, n.°9848. Lo anterior, toda vez que, según se constató, los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad giraron en torno a la propuesta parlamentaria y no a los términos en que las normas fueron aprobadas por la Asamblea Legislativa. Como se dijo supra, hay suficientes elementos para rechazar de plano la acción respecto de tales numerales. Sin embargo, en vista del estado procesal, la Sala los declara sin lugar.

En lo relativo a los arts. 4 y 5 de la legislación impugnada, esta Sala descartó los agravios de inconstitucionalidad planteados.

Por lo tanto, se impone declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

VII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.-

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar la acción.- Nombre318 .

. Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V. José Roberto Garita N.

. Nombre4702 .

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