Flat rejection of unconstitutionality action against RECOPE monopolyRechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra monopolio de RECOPE

Review of the Document 1  Res. No. 2022-014869 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours and zero minutes on the twenty-ninth of June of two thousand twenty-two.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by ALEJANDRO JESÚS DÍAZ CORDERO, of legal age, married, pilot, resident of San Francisco de Dos Ríos, bearer of identity card number 0112250205, DANIEL GERARDO SANCHO VARGAS, of legal age, civil engineer, resident of Calle Blancos, Goicoechea, bearer of identity card number 0108180542, JOSÉ JOAQUÍN DE JESÚS FERNÁNDEZ CORDERO, of legal age, divorced, economist, resident of San Ramón, La Unión, Cartago, bearer of identity card number 0106800051, VICTORIA EUGENIA SELVA MORA, of legal age, married, general practitioner, resident of Calle Blancos, Goicoechea, bearer of identity card number 0108430073, against Law No. 7356 of August 24, 1993, Law "Of the State Monopoly on Hydrocarbons Administered by RECOPE" "Establishes a Monopoly in Favor of the State for the Import, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, Fuels, Asphalts and Naphthas".

Whereas:

1.- By written brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 15:43 on May 24, 2022, the petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of Law No. 7356 of August 24, 1993 be declared. They allege that this law, which is the object of this action, is contrary to Articles 1, 2, 11, 28, 46, 60, 56 and 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, as well as its spirit, letter and spirit, all of which constantly injures the patrimony of the citizenry with grave and ruinous results, not only for the plaintiffs, but for the citizenry as a whole. They state that the action is directed against State practices whose effects, in reality, are confiscatory. Likewise, it is directed against the environmental harm resulting from the effects of the challenged law and in defense of the principle "libertatis" since, as the challenged norms are of general scope, there is a presence of diffuse and collective interests, because the freedoms of the highest legal rank of the citizenry are injured. They also raise the defense of the system of constitutional rights, freedoms and guarantees as a whole since the State, often under the pretext of an international emergency, has implemented temporary measures that are then not repealed when the situation that initially originated them passes, but rather acquire permanent character through legislative formalizations, with which everything ends up being an injury to the Political Constitution. They consider that the challenged law is a manifestation of excess in the powers of the State, which leads to a constant patrimonial aggression against the common citizen. This monopoly created by law, far from pursuing a public purpose, seeks the enrichment of the State through taxes of an expropriatory nature. Article 46 of the Political Constitution not only expressly prohibits the existence of monopolies of a private nature but extends the prohibition "to any act, even one originating in a law, that threatens or restricts freedom of commerce". The plaintiffs consider that the issuance of the challenged law, far from conforming to the will of the constituent power, sought to mask a sustained violation of it, not only in the merely formal aspect but in its practical consequences, since the negative aspects of the monopoly fall upon the entire citizenry, which is reflected in the high taxes that fall on the consumption of hydrocarbons and vehicle ownership. The plaintiffs state that the law injures Article 56 of the Political Constitution. In their view, from an economic perspective, any monopoly, regardless of its nature or industry, unequivocally leads to a loss of well-being that is reflected, among other aspects, in a reduction in investment and an increase in unemployment. It also injures constitutional Article 50, insofar as it provides that the State shall seek the greatest well-being of all the country's inhabitants; the monopoly has effects contrary to that search for well-being. The plaintiffs consider that the original unconstitutionality was consolidated through facts associated with "emergencies" of an international nature. In the Costa Rican legal system, all norms are subject to control of constitutionality, discretion, and legality. The Political Constitution, Articles 121, subsection 7), 140 subsection 4) and 180 contains the doctrine of emergency. Emergencies, real or supposed, have been the most sought-after pretexts to justify the breakdown of constitutional order in all countries, especially when they extend over time and generate the doctrine known as "normalization of emergency." Every legal operator, when interacting with a norm or applying it in a specific case, must carry out an exercise of interpretation under certain logical parameters (sound judgment). The State can only exist to be at the service of the human person. Hence, no authority can take a constitutional norm and use it to break or diminish freedoms. Nor could it give it an interpretation that empties it of content or renders it useless, because as a supreme norm its provisions are directly applicable. Under the principle of unity of the Constitution, Article 46 cannot be interpreted in isolation from Article 28, which contains the minimum sphere of freedoms guaranteed to the citizenry. In this sense, rulings No. 1635-90, 1195-91 and 272-90, among others, indicated that freedom of commerce cannot be limited except under the parameters of Article 28. Thus, it is a contradiction that the State incurs in the same practices and tendencies that the Constitution orders to prevent. The resulting decrease in the sphere of liberty becomes even more burdensome because the indispensable conditions stipulated in Article 28 are not present. By violating Article 46, Articles 50 and 56 are also injured. They consider that the very existence of the challenged law is a tacit admission by the State that the import and commercialization of hydrocarbons is, in principle, a private activity, as productive activities are in general terms. While it is true that the legislator enjoys full freedom to abstract activities such as the import, refining, distribution, and trade of fuels from the private domain, according to its criteria, this position cannot be accepted from a republican perspective. If it were so, what sense would there be in recognizing rights and freedoms in the Constitution? The legislator can issue norms to regulate the exercise of fundamental freedoms, but the norms must submit to the limits that the Constitution itself imposes on the legislator. Thus, in this case, the legislator is obligated to combat any monopolistic practice, to not interfere in private actions that do not harm morality or public order or the rights of third parties, and to abstain from any threat or restriction on freedom of commerce, agriculture and industry. However, regarding the hydrocarbon market, it is indisputable that the State has acted for decades against these constitutional imperatives. According to what has been stated, the monopoly seems to subsist solely as a hidden source of monetary income for the State, so we are facing the substitution of the "general interest" with the "interest of the State." It is thus, according to an expression of the Constitutional Chamber, an "arbitrary and senseless exercise of political power," whose only motivation is to despoil the citizenry for the exclusive benefit of the State. The Constitution, in Articles 2 and 121 subsection 13), establishes as the only lawful means for setting taxes their approval through legislative channels. However, RECOPE and ARESEP have evaded that principle. For decades, the State has financed its activities through the sale of fuels. A price set above the price of free competition is equivalent to a tax. Furthermore, the current tax on fuels, which represents 40% of the final price to the consumer, is not even a mechanism of "distributive justice," but an evident form of punishing the citizen for the use of fuel that only benefits the State. The plaintiffs consider that the monopoly established by the challenged law is unconstitutional due to the harm it causes to the citizen's right to a healthy environment. Research in search of alternative energy sources, in contrast, is a very costly activity lacking in probable short-term returns. It requires large investment and the money must be generated from other, much more lucrative activities. They consider that, in Costa Rica, this investment is not possible because of the existence of the state monopoly in the activity. The resources generated by RECOPE are not reinvested in research of any kind. Nor is there any indication that this situation will change in the short term. James Buchanan, Nobel Prize in Economics for his Public Choice theory, considers that when there is a monopoly, the incentive dies, as there is no one to threaten the company's market share. He also considers that the public employee lacks the incentives that the private employee has and, for that reason, the former can never be efficient or innovative. They consider that the prohibition on private participation that Costa Rica absurdly maintains has pernicious effects on the environment, by eliminating any incentive for innovation and scientific research.

2.- For purposes of admissibility, they indicate that they file the action based on Articles 1, 3 and 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, since they consider that they act in defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity. The action is brought in defense of freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of choice of work and the patrimony of the Costa Rican citizenry and the right to a healthier environment.

3.- By email sent on June 1 and 7, 2022 to the Informes-SC (Authorized to receive reports from the Constitutional Chamber)-Outlook address, Rubén Galeano submits an Amicus Curiae in defense of the RECOPE monopoly.

4.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any motion brought to its cognizance that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar motion that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- REGARDING THE AMICUS CURIAE SUBMITTED BY RUBÉN GALEANO. By email sent to the address authorized by this Constitutional Chamber solely for receiving reports, on June 1 and 7, 2022, Rubén Galeano files an Amicus Curiae motion. In this regard, it should be noted that the amicus is a procedural figure that allows intervention in certain judicial processes - in comparative law or at an international level - by participants who wish to express a founded opinion in defense of a public interest or a relevant institutional issue, but are not parties nor have a subjectively protected right or legitimate interest, therefore, they do not displace or replace the latter nor acquire any right should the process be upheld. It is not an expert or a technical consultant and their activity exceeds that of those directly affected and is characterized because their opinion does not bind the acting Court nor generate costs or fees. However, in our country, the figure is not regulated in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, such that the submitted amicus brief cannot be accepted. Nevertheless, what our legislation does admit, in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, is the figure of joinder. Said numeral establishes that within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending at the date of filing of the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, to assist in the allegations that could justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, where applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them. In this specific case, the amicus request is improper, not only because the motion lacks all formality regarding signature, authentication, and the corresponding stamp of the Bar Association, but also because, since the action is a formal process and the amicus mechanism is not provided for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, it must be rejected. In any case, it is worth remembering that this type of intervention constitutes an accessory procedural intervention and its fate follows that of the main intervention which, for the reasons detailed below, is inadmissible and must be rejected outright. (See in a similar sense ruling number 2020001805 of 11:45 a.m. on January 29, 2020).

II.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. - The plaintiffs indicate, for purposes of admissibility, that their standing derives from Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, insofar as they appear in defense of diffuse and collective interests. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law recognizes the possibility of filing an action without a prior case basis, in cases where "...when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the collectivity as a whole." Both assumptions will be analyzed to determine whether such standing exists or not.

III.- IN RELATION TO DIFFUSE INTERESTS. The legislator introduced in Article 75 of the law governing this jurisdiction the possibility of bringing an action based on the defense of diffuse interests, with the aim of expanding and completing the range of oversight possibilities that citizens have through an unconstitutionality action. Diffuse interests are a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of a collective interest, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter - as has been repeatedly stated - is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is thus the special characteristics of these rights by themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them before them, that are the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions. In this regard, constitutional jurisprudence has considered various rights that enjoy such characteristics, such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity and the sound management of public spending, among others.

In this case, the plaintiffs allege that they appear in defense of diffuse interests and cite, as affected, freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of choice of work, and the patrimony of the Costa Rican citizenry. However, these freedoms do not fit within the definition of diffuse interests that the Chamber has made because their nature does not allow them to be considered as such. Additionally, this Tribunal, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, as clearly happens in this case, diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, recently, in ruling No. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved:

"III.- ON DIRECT STANDING. The petitioner, in turn, claims to hold direct standing, because he states that the challenged norm not only injures the individual fundamental rights of his represented party, but also violates multiple collective and diffuse ones, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, in ruling No. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Tribunal indicated the following:

"(...) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing of the petitioners in the case under study. The petitioners indicate that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the assumptions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the collectivity can file the action to protect the right that is considered injured. On this subject, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considering, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter - as has been repeatedly stated - is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights by themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them before them, that are the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at three o'clock p.m. on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at two forty-five p.m. on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at one thirty p.m. on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." – see ruling number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest is composed of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first - the subjective - it is clear that it is itself diffused in a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest", but only those imbued with a profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case – see, among others, rulings numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality - which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law -, neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, because in such a case, the standing would derive from that claim – see, among others, rulings numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the petitioners base their standing on the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following considerings.

(...)

In the action now being heard, the same petitioners challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), in this action they focus on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education - which was also indicated in that previous action -, the truth is that the same definition by this Chamber regarding standing, as provided in the cited ruling, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly stated by the Procuraduría General de la República and emphatically stated by the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía), the questioned regulations are indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who exercise a specific activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and its regulations. Thus, it is clear that contrary to the adduced defense of diffuse interests, what is involved is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they exercise or intend to exercise; see that as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy rightly points out, the petitioners are directly related as founders, managers or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unviable to adduce alleged conservation and environmental education problems to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct unconstitutionality action, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements indicated in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as was indicated in considerings II and III of this resolution.

Under this intelligence, and taking into consideration the identity of the petitioners and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of ruling 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as in that previous occasion, the petitioners lack standing to file this process, so it is improper to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Thus, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action" (the underlining is not from the original).

In a similar sense, in ruling No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:

"(...) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law); but neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, because, in such a case, the standing would derive from that claim (...)". (see in this same sense, among others, rulings No. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022)

In this case, it is clear that this law can cause individual effects that, in turn, are susceptible to being materialized in cases of individual application in head of specific persons and that can directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, that is, of those natural or legal persons who are affected by the existence of the established monopoly, and who would be enabled to file the corresponding administrative or judicial claim. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber considers that the petitioners lack direct standing to bring this action.

Regarding the right to a healthy environment, whose defense the plaintiffs invoke as support for their standing, because they consider that the challenged Law injures it, it does not apply in this case. Let us see that the alleged harm to the environment is related to the impossibility of investing in and researching alternative forms of energy. The plaintiffs' assertion that RECOPE is responsible for such research not being carried out due to its cost is a subjective opinion of the plaintiffs, which is not supported by any evidence. Whether RECOPE does not invest in researching alternative forms of energy, whether the cost of such research is high, whether there are no companies that wish or are able to make that investment, are all assertions that the plaintiffs make and that lack foundation, not only legal but also factual. For this reason, they are not admissible.

IV.- ON COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. In relation to another of the possible sources of standing established in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned Article 75, that contained in the expression "interests that concern the collectivity as a whole", the Chamber has already specified that with it the legislator refers to the standing held by a corporate body, when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, but in addition to the above, provided that it concerns the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitute the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group. This, even when, in some cases, the effects of such norms could have an individualized impact on each of its members. Clearly, this assumption does not fit what has been stated in this case, as the petitioners act in their personal capacity. It is necessary to remember that when the law allows the presentation of actions without a prior case, in defense of interests that concern the collectivity as a whole, it maintains what is the cornerstone of the system, namely: that the declaration of unconstitutionality proves useful for defending rights or interests, whether of a person or a group of persons. It is for this reason that there must always be that link between the object of the action, that is, what is pursued with it, and the repercussion that the decision has for the individuals, whether one or several of them associated for the defense of the sphere of their rights and interests. In this case, that link is missing because the interest that binds the petitioners is so general that it loses all nexus with the object of the action, such that no difference is perceived between the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality for them compared to that produced for all the other citizens of the country, thereby practically becoming a popular action in pursuit of the defense of constitutional legality, inadmissible within our current constitutional review system as has been clearly established through the jurisprudence of this Chamber. For the reasons stated, their possible standing under the protection of interests that concern the collectivity as a whole must be ruled out.

V.- Finally, it is important to remember that, when analyzing this issue, the Chamber, in Ruling No. 96-6942, indicated the following:

"In this action, the aim is to challenge a legislative decision taken under the protection of the very text of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by understanding that, in general, the establishment of monopolies is not admissible in a market economy like the one that functions in our country, and in particular because such establishment constitutes an illegitimate limitation on freedom of commerce." However, taking into account that—as stated—there is an express possibility in Article 46 of the Political Constitution for the creation of monopolies in favor of the State, such as the one under discussion, the conclusion is reached that it is solely the reasonableness and suitability of the norm to the pursued end that is under discussion, so it can be affirmed that we are not faced with a complaint of infringement of those rights from which it would be possible to predicate that they give rise in citizens to a diffuse interest in their maintenance and respect, since it could not be affirmed that what is discussed in this action has a pronounced and decisive impact on any of the relevant facets of the development or structuring of Costa Rican society. To admit standing in this matter based on diffuse interests for the protection of said constitutional norms would therefore be to denature the concept, because it would become legally impossible to differentiate from a popular action and the right of citizens for the vigilance and control of constitutional legality, which—as stated—were expressly excluded as forms of standing within our constitutional review system." VI.- CONCLUSION. - Based on the foregoing, the action must be rejected outright, since the claimants lack any standing for the challenge they intend.

VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE. The parties are warned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons regarding diffuse interests. The amicus curiae filed by Rubén Galeano is rejected.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G. Anamari Garro V.

José Roberto Garita N.

Res. No. 2022014869 Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal regarding diffuse interests.

In the majority's opinion, it is unfeasible to claim standing based on diffuse interests when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application and directly impacts the legal sphere of singular, identifiable persons. The undersigned dissents from this assertion for the following reasons.

Diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to a community of persons that is not formally organized, but whose union arises from a social need, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, a personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is diffused or diluted among an unidentified plurality of subjects; in this sense, in light of paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, a challenge based on this type of interest must inexorably refer to that plurality, in the terms stated.

This Chamber has enumerated various constitutional goods and rights in relation to which a diffuse interest can be argued, for example, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, cultural heritage, the territorial integrity of the country, the proper management of public spending, consumer rights, among others.

In this regard, the following clarifications must be made. On the one hand, the aforementioned goods and rights transcend the individual or corporate sphere, because they concern a generality; thus, environmental damage does not only affect the residents of a region, but injures or puts at serious risk the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment of the entire country, even, depending on the scale, of humanity as such. Likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic reflects an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just a specific group.

The distinction is not simple; however, a point of balance must certainly be sought, so that diffuse interests in the stated sense find constitutional protection, without leading to such an extension of the concept that, through this route, a popular action is configured in the various constitutional processes, with the exception of the provisions of Article 105 of the Ley de Biodiversidad.

For such purposes, the constitutional judge must assess case by case, in order to define whether the interest in a specific matter has such a degree of transcendence and the accused problem diffuses its damages with such coverage, as to justify that we are dealing with an interest that concerns the community in general.

Regarding the above, it must be observed that the mere fact that a challenged norm or directive, when it is the object of a constitutional action process, is susceptible to individual application and directly impacts the legal sphere of singular, identifiable persons, does not mean the discarding of a diffuse interest, since there are situations in which both perspectives converge. For example, think of a provision that would exempt a construction on a structure declared cultural heritage from preservation requirements; in such a matter, the measure would affect diffuse interests, since its pernicious consequences would disperse within an entire community, which does not prevent an individual, a regular visitor to such site, from being simultaneously and personally harmed and able to file a claim. Ergo, the existence of a diffuse interest does not exclude a subject from experiencing an injury to their particular interests, even, depending on the circumstances, of greater depth than in the generality of persons. Furthermore, an application of the pro actione principle also leads to interpreting the norms in a manner favorable to the protection of fundamental rights and the safeguarding of constitutional supremacy. Consequently, standing based on diffuse interests becomes appropriate regardless of whether the challenged provision or act was susceptible to individual application.

In the case at hand, however, the existence of some diffuse interest recognized by this Chamber is not clearly determined.

Paul Rueda L.

Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6 Thus, in this case, the legislator is obligated to combat any monopolistic practice, to not interfere in private actions that do not harm public morality or order or the rights of third parties, and to refrain from any threat or restriction on the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry. However, regarding the hydrocarbon market, it is indisputable that the State has acted against these constitutional imperatives for decades. According to what has been stated, the monopoly appears to subsist solely as a veiled source of monetary income for the State, such that we are facing the substitution of the "general interest" for the "interest of the State." It is thus, according to an expression of the Constitutional Chamber, an "arbitrary and senseless exercise of political power," whose sole motivation is to despoil the citizenry for the exclusive benefit of the State. The Constitution, in Articles 2 and 121 subsection 13), establishes the approval through legislative means as the only lawful method for setting taxes. However, RECOPE and ARESEP have evaded that principle. For decades, the State has financed its activities through the sale of fuels. A price set above the free competition price is equivalent to a tax. Furthermore, the current tax on fuels, which represents 40% of the final price to the consumer, is not even a mechanism of "distributive justice," but rather an evident way of punishing the citizen for the use of fuel that only benefits the State. The plaintiffs consider that the monopoly established by the challenged law is unconstitutional due to the harm it causes to the citizen's right to a healthy environment. Research seeking alternative energy sources, in contrast, is a very costly activity lacking probable short-term returns. It requires a large investment, and the money must be generated from other much more lucrative activities. They estimate that, in Costa Rica, such investment is not possible due to the existence of the state monopoly in the activity. The resources generated by RECOPE are not reinvested in research of any kind. Nor is there any indication that this situation will change in the short term. James Buchanan, Nobel Prize winner in Economics for his Public Choice theory, estimates that when a monopoly exists, the incentive dies, as there is no one threatening the company's participation in the market. He also considers that the public employee lacks the incentives of the private employee and, for that reason, the former can never be efficient or innovative. They estimate that the prohibition on private participation that Costa Rica absurdly maintains has pernicious effects on the environment, by eliminating any incentive for innovation and scientific research.

**2.-** For admissibility purposes, they indicate that they file the action based on Articles 1, 3, and 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as they estimate they act in defense of diffuse interests or those affecting the community. The action is brought in defense of the freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of employment choice, and the patrimony of the Costa Rican citizenry, and the right to a healthier environment.

**3.-** By mail sent on June 1 and 7, 2022, to the address Informes-SC (Authorized to receive reports from the Constitutional Chamber)-Outlook, Rubén Galeano presents an *Amicus Curiae* in defense of RECOPE's monopoly.

**4.-** Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considering:** **I.- ON THE AMICUS CURIAE FILED BY RUBÉN GALEANO.** By electronic mail sent to the address authorized by this Constitutional Chamber solely for receiving reports, on June 1 and 7, 2022, Rubén Galeano files an *Amicus Curiae* petition. In this regard, it should be noted that the amicus is a procedural figure that allows the intervention in certain judicial processes – in comparative law or at the international level – of participants who wish to express a reasoned opinion in defense of a public interest or a relevant institutional matter, but are not parties nor have a subjectively held right or legally protected legitimate interest; therefore, they do not displace or replace the parties nor acquire any right should the process be upheld. It is not a matter of an expert or a technical consultant, and its activity exceeds that of those directly affected, characterized by the fact that its opinion does not bind the acting Court nor generate costs or fees. However, in our country, the figure is not regulated in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, such that the submitted amici brief cannot be accepted. That said, what our legislation does admit, in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, is the figure of joinder (coadyuvancia). Said provision establishes that within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending as of the date the action was filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within the action to join in the allegations that might justify its propriety or impropriety, or to expand, as applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them. In this specific case, the amicus request is improper, not only because the petition lacks all formality regarding signature, authentication, and the corresponding stamp of the Bar Association, but also because, as the action is a formal process and the amicus mechanism is not provided for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, it must be rejected. In any case, it should be remembered that this type of intervention supposes an accessory procedural intervention, and its fate follows that of the main intervention, which, for the reasons detailed *infra*, is inadmissible and must be rejected outright. (See, in a similar sense, ruling number 2020001805 of 11:45 a.m. on January 29, 2020).

**II.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. -** The plaintiffs argue, for admissibility purposes, that their standing derives from Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as they appear in defense of diffuse and collective interests. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law recognizes the possibility of filing an action without a base case, in cases where *"...due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole."* Both scenarios will be analyzed to determine whether such standing exists or not.

**III.- REGARDING DIFFUSE INTERESTS.** The legislator introduced in Article 75 of the law governing this jurisdiction the possibility of bringing an action based on the defense of diffuse interests, in order to broaden and complete the range of oversight possibilities available to citizens through an unconstitutionality action. Diffuse interests are a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest, but which cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with that recognized to all members of society to watch over constitutional legality, since the latter – as has been repeatedly stated – is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is therefore a matter of an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense before this Chamber of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. Thus, it is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them vis-à-vis those rights, that is the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various rulings. In this regard, the constitutional case law has considered various rights that possess such characteristics, such as the environment, the cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the sound management of public spending, among others.

In this case, the plaintiffs claim to appear in defense of diffuse interests and cite, as affected, the freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of employment choice, and the patrimony of the Costa Rican citizenry. However, these freedoms do not fit within the definition of diffuse interests that the Chamber has made, because their nature does not allow them to be considered as such. Additionally, this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, as clearly happens in this case, diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, recently, in vote No. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved:

*"**III.- ON DIRECT STANDING.** The plaintiff, in turn, claims to have direct standing, because he refers that the challenged norm not only harms the fundamental rights of an individual nature of his represented party, but also violates numerous collective and diffuse interests, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action.* Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:

"(…) II.- Regarding diffuse interests and the standing (legitimación) of the petitioners in the case under study. The petitioners state that their standing (legitimación) comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the assumptions in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of that same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. Diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all those interested forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right may affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community may bring the action (acción) to protect the right deemed injured. Regarding this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"It has been stated that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right, recognized for all members of society, to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter —as has been repeatedly stated— is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is thus an interest distributed in each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less ascertainable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights by themselves, and not the particular situation regarding them of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in different resolutions such as 03705-93 of three in the afternoon on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of two forty-five in the afternoon on November ninth of that same year for the defense of the historical heritage, and number 00980-91 of one-thirty in the afternoon on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –see judgment number 360-90- From this definition it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest is made up of an eminently subjective element, relating to its ownership or holding of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first —the subjective one— it is clear that it is diffused among a non-individualized human group, which participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as indeed occurs with the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every 'diffused' interest acquires the legal category of 'diffuse interest,' but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case —see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality —which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action (acción popular) not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—, neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, for in such a case, the standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim —see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of the historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Accordingly, in the case under study, where the petitioners base their standing (legitimación) on the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protecting a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what is appropriate is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.

(…)

In the action (acción) now being heard, the same petitioners challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action (acción) focuses on issues of ex-situ conservation (conservación ex situ) and environmental education (educación ambiental) —which was also pointed out in that previous action (acción)—, the fact is that this Chamber's same determination on standing (legitimación), as ordered in the cited judgment, is fully applicable to this new action (acción). Note that, indeed, as clearly indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República and emphatically stated by the Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, the regulations being challenged are indeed entirely susceptible to individual application and to directly impacting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and its regulations. In this way, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at issue is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that, as the report of the Ministro de Ambiente y Energía rightly states, the petitioners are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unviable to allege supposed problems of conservation and environmental education (educación ambiental), in order to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) circumventing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as was indicated in recitals II and III of this resolution.

Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the petitioners and the regulations challenged, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action (acción) now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, just as in that previous occasion, the petitioners lack standing (legitimación) to bring this proceeding, and it is therefore improper to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Consequently, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action (acción)" (the underlining is not original).

In a similar vein, in judgment no. 2021-01199 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:

"(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action (acción popular) not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, for, in such a case, the standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…)". (see in this same sense, among others, votes no. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021, and no. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022) In this case, it is clear that this law can cause individual impacts that, in turn, are susceptible to being realized in cases of individual application in the person of specific individuals and that can directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, that is, those natural or legal persons who are affected by the existence of the monopoly in question, and who would be enabled to file the corresponding administrative or judicial claim. Consequently, in accordance with the cited jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber considers that the petitioners lack direct standing (legitimación) to bring this action (acción).

Regarding the right to a healthy environment, whose defense the actors invoke as support for their standing (legitimación), considering that the challenged Law injures it, this does not apply in this case. Let us see that the alleged damage to the environment is related to the impossibility of investing in and researching alternative forms of energy.

The plaintiffs' assertion that RECOPE is responsible for such investigation not being carried out due to its cost is a subjective opinion of the plaintiffs, which is not supported by any evidence. Whether RECOPE does not invest in researching alternative forms of energy, whether the cost of such investigations is high, whether there are no companies that wish to or can make that investment, are all affirmations that the plaintiffs make and that lack foundation, not only legal but also factual. For this reason, they are not admissible.

**IV.- ON COLLECTIVE INTERESTS.** In relation to another of the possible sources of standing established in paragraph 2 of Article 75 indicated, that encompassed in the expression *“intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”*, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers with it to the standing held by a corporate body, when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, but also, always provided that it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitute the raison d'être and the binding factor of the grouping. This, even when, in some cases, the effects of such norms could have an individualized impact on each of its members. Clearly, this assumption does not fit what is presented in this case, as the plaintiffs act in their personal capacity. It is necessary to remember that when the law allows the filing of actions without a prior matter, in defense of interests that concern the collectivity as a whole, the cornerstone of the system is maintained, that is: that the unconstitutionality proves useful for defending rights or interests, whether of some person or group of persons. For this reason, there must always be that link between the object of the action, that is, what is pursued through it, and the repercussion that the resolution has for the individuals, whether one or several of them associated for the defense of the sphere of their rights and interests. In this case, that link is missing because the interest that binds the plaintiffs is so general that it loses all nexus with the object of the action, such that no difference is perceived between the effect of the unconstitutionality for them versus that produced for all other citizens of the country, thus practically becoming a popular action in pursuit of the defense of constitutional legality, inadmissible within our current system of constitutional review as has been clearly established through the jurisprudence of this Chamber. For the reasons stated, their possible standing under interests that concern the collectivity as a whole must be ruled out.

**V.-** Finally, it is important to recall that, when analyzing this issue, the Chamber, in judgment N° 96-6942, stated the following:

*“En esta acción, se pretende combatir una decisión legislativa tomada al amparo del propio texto del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, por entender que, en general, no es admisible el establecimiento de monopolios en una economía de mercado como la que funciona en nuestro país, y en particular porque tal instauración resulta una limitación ilegítima de la libertad de comercio. Sin embargo, tomando en cuenta que -como se dijo- existe una posibilidad expresa en el numeral 46 de la Constitución Política para la creación de monopolios a favor del Estado, como el que se discute, se llega a la conclusión que es únicamente la razonabilidad y adecuación al fin perseguido de la norma lo que está en discusión, de modo que puede afirmarse que no se está ante una denuncia de infracción de aquellos derechos de los que sería posible predicar que hacen nacer en los ciudadanos un interés difuso en su mantenimiento y respeto, pues no podría afirmarse que lo que se discute en esta acción, incida de forma acentuada y decisiva en alguna de las facetas relevantes del desarrollo o estructuración de la sociedad costarricense. Admitir entonces en este asunto una legitimación basada en intereses difusos para la protección de dichas normas constitucionales, sería desnaturalizar el concepto, porque vendría a ser jurídicamente imposible de diferenciar de una acción popular y el derecho de los ciudadanos para la vigilancia y control de la legalidad constitucional los que -como se dijo- fueron expresamente excluidos como formas de legitimación dentro de nuestro sistema de revisión constitucional”.* **VI.- CONCLUSION. -** For the reasons stated, the action must be rejected outright, since the plaintiffs lack any standing for the challenge they intend.

**VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.** The parties are warned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal gives different reasons regarding diffuse interests. The amicus curiae submitted by Rubén Galeano is rejected.

Fernando Castillo V.

**Exp: 22-011336-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 2022014869** **Different reasons of Magistrate Rueda Leal regarding diffuse interests**.

In the majority's view, it is not feasible to claim standing based on diffuse interests when the questioned norm is susceptible to individual application and can directly affect the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons. The undersigned dissents from this assertion for the following reasons.

Diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to a community of persons that is not formally organized, but whose union arises from a social need, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, a personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred or diluted among an unidentified plurality of subjects; in this sense, in light of paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the challenge of unconstitutionality based on this type of interest must inexorably refer to that plurality, in the terms set forth.

This Chamber has listed various constitutional rights and goods in relation to which a diffuse interest can be argued, for example, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, cultural heritage, the territorial integrity of the country, the proper management of public spending, consumer rights, among others.

In this regard, the following clarifications must be made.

On the one hand, the aforementioned assets and rights transcend the individual or corporate sphere, because they concern a generality; thus, environmental damage does not affect only the neighbors of a region, but rather injures or seriously endangers the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment of the entire country, even, depending on the magnitude, of humanity as such. Likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic reflects an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not only of a specific group.

The distinction is not simple; however, a point of equilibrium must certainly be sought, so that diffuse interests in the sense described find constitutional shelter, without arriving at such an extension of the concept that, through that path, a popular action is configured in the various constitutional processes, with the exception of what is provided in Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad).

For such purposes, the constitutional judge must assess case by case, in order to define whether the interest in a given matter carries such a degree of transcendence and the denounced problems disperse their harms with similar coverage, as to justify being before an interest that concerns the community in general.

Regarding the foregoing, it must be observed that the mere fact that a challenged norm or directive, when it is the object of a constitutional action process, is susceptible to individual application and directly impacts the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, does not mean the discarding of a diffuse interest, since there are situations in which both perspectives converge. For example, consider a provision that exempted a work on a structure declared cultural heritage from preservation requirements; in such a matter, the measure would affect diffuse interests, since its pernicious consequences would spread throughout an entire community, which does not prevent that, equally and simultaneously, an individual, a frequent visitor to such site, would be personally harmed and could file a claim. Ergo, the existence of a diffuse interest does not exclude that a subject may experience harm to their particular interests, even, depending on the circumstances, of greater depth than in the generality of persons. More abundantly, an application of the principle pro actione also leads to interpreting norms favorably for the protection of fundamental rights and the protection of constitutional supremacy. Consequently, standing based on diffuse interests becomes appropriate regardless of whether the challenged provision or act was susceptible to individual application.

In the case at hand, however, the existence of any diffuse interest recognized by this Chamber is not clearly determined.

Paul Rueda L.

Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Perpetuo Socorro Church). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, 19th and 21st Streets, 8th and 6th Avenues In any case, it is worth recalling that this type of intervention supposes an accessory procedural intervention and its fate follows that of the principal intervention which, for the reasons detailed infra, is inadmissible and must be rejected outright. (See, in a similar sense, judgment number 2020001805 of 11:45 a.m. on January 29, 2020).

II.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. - The plaintiffs indicate, for admissibility purposes, that their standing (legitimación) derives from Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), insofar as they appear in defense of diffuse and collective interests. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law recognizes the possibility of filing an action without a base matter, in cases where "...when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or that pertain to the community as a whole." Both scenarios will be analyzed to determine whether such standing (legitimación) exists or not.

III.- REGARDING DIFFUSE INTERESTS. The legislator introduced into Article 75 of the law governing this jurisdiction, the possibility of taking action based on the defense of diffuse interests, in order to broaden and complete the range of oversight possibilities that citizens have through an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad). Diffuse interests are a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of collective interest, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized for all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter – as has been repeatedly stated – is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is then an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if one wishes, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is thus the special characteristics of these rights themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions. In this regard, constitutional jurisprudence has considered various rights that enjoy such characteristics, such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the sound management of public spending, among others.

In this case, the plaintiffs claim that they appear in defense of diffuse interests and cite, as affected, freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of choice of work, and the heritage of the Costa Rican citizenry. However, these freedoms do not fit within the definition of diffuse interests that the Chamber has made because their nature does not allow them to be considered as such. Additionally, this Tribunal, by majority, has deemed that when a rule is susceptible to individual application, as clearly happens in this case, it is not appropriate to invoke diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, recently, in vote No. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved:

"III.- ON DIRECT STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA). The plaintiff, in turn, says he holds direct standing (legitimación directa), because he refers that the impugned rule not only injures the fundamental rights of an individual nature of his represented party, but also violates broad collective and diffuse ones, due to the effects it produces. Nonetheless, this Chamber, by majority, has deemed that when the rule being challenged is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Tribunal indicated the following:

"(...) II.- On the diffuse interests and the standing (legitimación) of the plaintiffs in the case under study. The plaintiffs indicate that their standing (legitimación) comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the assumptions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right that is considered injured.

In this regard, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"*It has been pointed out that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital (considerando), but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is, therefore, an interest distributed in each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them vis-à-vis those rights, which is the key for the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests as has been stated in various rulings such as 03705-93 of fifteen hundred hours on the thirtieth of July for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen hundred forty-five hours on the ninth of November of that same year for the defense of the historical patrimony, and number 00980-91 of thirteen hundred thirty hours on the twenty-fourth of May of nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters."* —see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is formed by an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first—the subjective one—it is clear that it is blurred within a non-individualized human group, which participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose conformation does not result from a set of identifiable, encompassable subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "blurred" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with a profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case—see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it merges with the right to ensure constitutional legality—which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action (acción popular) not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—, neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, since in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim—see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of the historical patrimony, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs refer their standing with respect to the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what is appropriate is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.

(…)

In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on topics of ex situ conservation and environmental education—which was also raised in that prior action—, the truth is that the same definition of this Chamber regarding standing, as provided in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action.

Note that, indeed, as the Attorney General's Office clearly points out and the Minister of Environment and Energy emphatically states, the challenged regulations are fully susceptible to individual application and can directly affect the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Wildlife Conservation Law and its regulations. Thus, it is clear that, contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at issue is a certain degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; note that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy well states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to allege presumed problems of conservation and environmental education in order to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, circumventing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, as indicated in recitals II and III of this resolution.

Under this premise, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent set by judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, just as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing to file this proceeding. Therefore, it is improper to hear and rule on the raised aspects. Accordingly, it is appropriate to dismiss this action" (the underlining does not correspond to the original).

In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 at 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:

"(...) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a class action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law); but neither can it be so specific as to allow an individual claim, for, in such case, the standing would derive from that claim (...)." (see in this same sense, among others, votes No. 2021-025373 at 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 at 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022)

In this case, it is clear that this law can cause individual effects that, in turn, are susceptible to being concretized in cases of individual application upon specific persons and that can directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, that is, those natural or legal persons who are affected by the existence of the arranged monopoly and who would be enabled to file the corresponding administrative or judicial claim. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber considers that the plaintiffs lack direct standing to file this action.

Regarding the right to a healthy environment, whose defense the actors invoke to support their standing, considering that the challenged Law harms it, it does not apply in this case. Let us see that the alleged harm to the environment is related to the impossibility of investing in and researching alternative forms of energy. The actors' statement that RECOPE is responsible for such research not being carried out due to its cost is a subjective opinion of the actors, which is not supported by any evidence. Whether RECOPE does not invest in researching alternative forms of energy, whether the cost of such research is high, whether there are no companies that wish or can make that investment, are all statements made by the actors that lack foundation, not only legal but also factual. For this reason, they are not admissible.

IV.- ON COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. In relation to another of the possible sources of standing established in paragraph 2 of Article 75 cited, the one contained in the expression "intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto" (interests concerning the community as a whole), the Chamber has already clarified that with this the legislator refers to the standing held by a corporate body, when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons forming its associative base, but in addition to the foregoing, provided that it involves challenging norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitute the reason for being and the binding factor of the group. This, even when, in some cases, the effects of such norms could have individualized repercussions on each of its members. Clearly, this scenario does not apply to what has been presented in this case, as the plaintiffs act in their personal capacity. It is necessary to remember that when the law allows the filing of actions without a prior case, in defense of interests concerning the community as a whole, the cornerstone of the system is maintained, namely: that the unconstitutionality is useful for defending rights or interests, be it of some person or group of persons.

It is for this reason that there must always be that link between the object of the action (acción), that is, what is pursued through it, and the repercussion that the decision has for private individuals, whether one or several of them associated for the defense of the sphere of their rights and interests. In this case, that link is missing because the interest that binds the claimants (accionantes) is so general that it loses all connection with the object of the action, such that no difference is perceived between the effect of the unconstitutionality for them versus the effect it produces for all other citizens of the country, thereby becoming practically a popular action (acción popular) in pursuit of the defense of constitutional legality, inadmissible within our current system of constitutional review (revisión constitucional) as has been clearly established through the jurisprudence of this Chamber. For the foregoing reasons, their possible legal standing (legitimación) under the protection of interests that concern the community as a whole must be dismissed.

**V.-** Finally, it is important to recall that, when analyzing this issue, the Chamber, in judgment No. 96-6942, indicated the following:

"*In this action, the intent is to challenge a legislative decision taken under the protection of the very text of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, on the understanding that, in general, the establishment of monopolies is not admissible in a market economy such as the one operating in our country, and in particular because such establishment constitutes an illegitimate limitation on the freedom of commerce. However, taking into account that—as stated—there is an express possibility in Article 46 of the Political Constitution for the creation of monopolies in favor of the State, such as the one under discussion, the conclusion is reached that it is solely the reasonableness and suitability for the intended purpose of the rule that is under discussion, such that it can be affirmed that this is not a complaint of infringement of those rights for which it would be possible to predicate that they create in citizens a diffuse interest (interés difuso) in their maintenance and respect, since it could not be affirmed that what is discussed in this action has a pronounced and decisive impact on any of the relevant facets of the development or structuring of Costa Rican society. To admit, then, in this matter a legal standing based on diffuse interests for the protection of said constitutional norms would be to denature the concept, because it would become juridically impossible to differentiate from a popular action and the right of citizens to the vigilance and control of constitutional legality which—as stated—were expressly excluded as forms of legal standing within our system of constitutional review*." **VI.- CONCLUSION. -** By reason of the foregoing, the action (acción) must be flatly rejected, since the claimants (accionantes) lack any legal standing (legitimación) for the challenge (impugnación) they seek." **LBH10/22** The interest, in these cases, is diffused or diluted among an unidentified plurality of subjects; in this sense, in light of paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), a challenge of unconstitutionality based on this type of interest must inexorably be referred to that plurality, in the terms set forth.

This Chamber has enumerated various constitutional assets and rights, in relation to which a diffuse interest can be argued, for example, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, cultural heritage, the territorial integrity of the country, the proper management of public spending, consumer rights, among others.

In this regard, the following clarifications must be made. On the one hand, the aforementioned assets and rights transcend the individual or corporate sphere, because they concern a generality; thus, environmental damage does not affect only the neighbors of a region, but injures or seriously endangers the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment of the entire country, even, depending on the scale, of humanity as such. Likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic reflects an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not only of a specific group.

The distinction is not simple; however, a balance point must certainly be sought, so that diffuse interests in the aforementioned sense find constitutional protection, without such an extension of the concept being reached that, through that avenue, a popular action is configured in the various constitutionality proceedings, with the exception of the provisions of Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad).

For such purposes, the constitutional judge must evaluate case by case, in order to define whether the interest in a given matter is of such a degree of importance and the problem accused diffuses its harms with similar coverage, as to justify that this is an interest that concerns the community in general.

With respect to the foregoing, it must be observed that the mere fact that a questioned norm or directive, when this is the object of a constitutional action proceeding (acción de constitucionalidad), is susceptible to individual application and directly affects the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, does not mean the discarding of a diffuse interest, since there are situations in which both perspectives converge. For example, consider a provision that exempts a project in a structure declared cultural heritage from preservation requirements; in such a matter, the measure would affect diffuse interests, since its pernicious consequences would be dispersed throughout an entire community, which does not prevent that, equally and simultaneously, an individual, a frequent visitor to such site, could be personally harmed and could bring a claim. Therefore, the existence of a diffuse interest does not exclude that a subject may experience harm to their particular interests, even, depending on the circumstances, more profound than in the generality of persons. Furthermore, an application of the *pro actione* principle also leads to interpreting norms favorably for the protection of fundamental rights and the protection of constitutional supremacy. Consequently, standing based on diffuse interests becomes appropriate regardless of whether the provision or act challenged was susceptible to individual application.

In the case at hand, however, the existence of any diffuse interest recognized by this Chamber is not clearly determined.

**Paul Rueda L.** **LBH10/22** &nbsp; &nbsp; <br> They also raise the defense of the system of constitutional rights, freedoms, and guarantees as a whole, since the State, often under the pretext of an international emergency, has implemented temporary measures that are later not repealed when the situation that initially gave rise to them passes, but rather acquire permanent character through legislative formalizations, whereby everything ends up being an injury to the Political Constitution. They consider that the challenged law is a manifestation of the excess in the State's powers, which leads to a constant patrimonial aggression against the ordinary citizen. That monopoly created by law, far from pursuing a public purpose, seeks the enrichment of the State through taxes of an expropriatory nature. Article 46 of the Political Constitution not only expressly prohibits the existence of monopolies of a private nature, but also extends the prohibition "to any act, even one originating in a law, that threatens or restricts the freedom of commerce." The plaintiffs consider that the issuance of the challenged law, far from conforming to the will of the constituent, sought to mask a sustained violation thereof, not only in the merely formal aspect, but in its practical consequences, since the negative aspects of the monopoly fall upon all citizens, which is reflected in the high taxes levied on the consumption of hydrocarbons and the ownership of vehicles. The plaintiffs state that the law injures Article 56 of the Political Constitution. In their view, from an economic perspective, any monopoly, regardless of the nature or industry, unequivocally leads to a loss of well-being that is reflected, among other aspects, in a reduction in investment and an increase in unemployment. It also injures constitutional Article 50, insofar as it provides that the State shall strive for the greatest well-being of all the country's inhabitants; the monopoly has effects contrary to that pursuit of well-being. The plaintiffs consider that the unconstitutionality of origin was consolidated through events associated with "emergencies" of an international nature. In the Costa Rican legal system, all norms are subject to control of constitutionality, discretion, and legality. The Political Constitution, Articles 121, subsection 7), 140 subsection 4) and 180 contain the doctrine of emergency. Emergencies, real or supposed, have been the most sought-after pretext to justify the rupture of the constitutional order in all countries, especially when they extend over time and generate the doctrine known as "normalization of the emergency." Every legal operator, when interacting with a norm or applying it in a specific case, must engage in an exercise of interpretation under certain logical parameters (sound judgment). The State can only exist to be at the service of the human person. Hence, no authority can take a constitutional norm and use it to break or diminish freedoms. Nor could it give it an interpretation that empties it of content or renders it useless, since as the supreme norm, its provisions are directly applicable. Under the principle of the unity of the Constitution, Article 46 cannot be interpreted in isolation from Article 28, which contains the minimum sphere of freedoms guaranteed to the citizenry. In this regard, the votes No. 1635-90, 1195-91 and 272-90, among others, indicated that the freedom of commerce cannot be limited except under the parameters of Article 28. Thus, it is a contradiction for the State to incur in the same practices and tendencies that the Constitution orders to be prevented. The resulting decrease in the sphere of freedom becomes even more burdensome because the indispensable conditions stipulated in Article 28 are not present. By violating Article 46, Articles 50 and 56 are also injured. They consider that the very existence of the challenged law is a tacit admission by the State that the importation and commercialization of hydrocarbons is, in principle, a private activity, as productive activities are in general terms. While it is true that the legislator enjoys full freedom to abstract from the private order, according to its criteria, activities such as the importation, refining, distribution, and commerce of fuels, this position cannot be accepted from a republican perspective. If it were, what sense would it make to recognize rights and freedoms in the Constitution. The legislator may issue norms to regulate the exercise of fundamental freedoms, but the norms must submit to the limits that the Constitution itself imposes on the legislator. Thus, in this case, the legislator is obliged to combat any monopolistic practice, not to interfere in private actions that do not harm morality or public order or the rights of third parties, and to refrain from any threat or restriction to the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry. However, regarding the hydrocarbon market, it is indisputable that the State has acted for decades against these constitutional imperatives. According to the foregoing, the monopoly appears to subsist solely as a concealed source of monetary income for the State, so that we are facing the substitution of the "general interest" for the "interest of the State." It is thus, according to an expression of the Constitutional Chamber, an "arbitrary and senseless exercise of political power," whose sole motivation is to despoil the citizenry for the exclusive benefit of the State. The Constitution, in Articles 2 and 121 subsection 13), establishes the legislative process as the only lawful means for setting taxes. However, RECOPE and ARESEP have evaded that principle. For decades, the State has financed its activities through the sale of fuels. A price set above the free-competition price is equivalent to a tax. Moreover, the current tax on fuels, which represents 40% of the final consumer price, is not even a mechanism of "distributive justice," but rather an evident way of punishing the citizen for the use of fuel that only benefits the State. The plaintiffs consider that the monopoly established by the challenged law is unconstitutional due to the harm it causes to the citizens' right to a healthy environment. Research into alternative energy sources, in contrast, is a very costly activity lacking probable short-term returns. It requires large investment, and the money must be generated from other, much more lucrative activities. They consider that in Costa Rica, this investment is not possible due to the existence of the state monopoly in the activity. The resources generated by RECOPE are not reinvested in any type of research. Nor is there any indication that this situation will change in the short term. James Buchanan, Nobel Prize in Economics for his Public Choice theory, considers that when there is a monopoly, the incentive dies, as there is no one to threaten the company's participation in the market. He also considers that the public employee lacks the incentives that the private employee has and, for that reason, the former can never be efficient or innovative. They consider that the prohibition on private participation that Costa Rica absurdly maintains has pernicious effects on the environment, by eliminating any incentive for scientific innovation and research.

2.- For admissibility purposes, they indicate that they file the action based on Articles 1, 3 and 75, 2nd paragraph of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, since they consider that they act in defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community. The action is brought in defense of the freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of choice of work, and the patrimony of the Costa Rican citizenry, and the right to a healthier environment.

3.- Through an email sent on June 1 and 7, 2022, to the Informes-SC (Authorized to receive reports from the Constitutional Chamber)-Outlook address, Rubén Galeano presents an Amicus Curiae in defense of RECOPE's monopoly.

4.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that is manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- ON THE AMICUS CURIAE PRESENTED BY RUBÉN GALEANO. Through an email sent to the address authorized by this Constitutional Chamber solely to receive reports, on June 1 and 7, 2022, Rubén Galeano files an Amicus Curiae petition. In this regard, it should be noted that the amicus is a procedural figure that allows the intervention in certain judicial processes —in comparative law or at the international level— of participants who wish to express a reasoned opinion in defense of a public interest or a relevant institutional issue, but who are not parties nor do they have a subjective right or legally protectable legitimate interest; therefore, they do not displace or replace the latter nor acquire any right if the process is upheld. It is not an expert or a technical consultant, and its activity exceeds that of those directly affected, and it is characterized by the fact that its opinion does not bind the acting Court nor generate costs or fees. However, in our country, the figure is not regulated in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, so the amici brief submitted cannot be accepted. Now, what our legislation does admit, in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, is the figure of joinder. Said numeral establishes that within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending at the date of the filing of the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within the action to assist in the allegations that may justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, where applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter of interest to them.

In this specific case, the request for amicus curiae is inadmissible, not only because the filing lacks all formality regarding signature, authentication, and the corresponding stamp of the Bar Association, but also because, since the action is a formal process and the amicus mechanism is not provided for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, it must be rejected. In any case, it is worth recalling that this type of intervention constitutes an accessory procedural intervention and its fate follows that of the principal intervention which, for the reasons detailed *infra*, is inadmissible and must be rejected outright. (See, in a similar vein, judgment number 2020001805 of 11:45 hours on January 29, 2020).

**II.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. -** The plaintiffs state, for admissibility purposes, that their standing derives from Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, insofar as they appear in defense of diffuse and collective interests. The second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law recognizes the possibility of filing an action without a base case, in cases where *“...when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or that concern the community as a whole.”* Both assumptions will be analyzed to determine whether such standing exists or not.

**III.- REGARDING DIFFUSE INTERESTS.** The legislator introduced in Article 75 of the law governing this jurisdiction the possibility of bringing an action based on the defense of diffuse interests, in order to broaden and complete the range of oversight possibilities available to citizens through an unconstitutionality action. Diffuse interests are a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of a collective interest, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, then, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediated if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance to the adequate and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights in themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them vis-à-vis those rights, are therefore the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions. In this regard, constitutional jurisprudence has considered various rights that possess such characteristics, such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the sound management of public spending, among others.

In this case, the plaintiffs allege that they appear in defense of diffuse interests and cite, as affected, the freedom of commerce, freedom of industry, freedom of choice of work, and the wealth of the Costa Rican citizenry. However, these freedoms do not fit within the definition of diffuse interests made by the Chamber because their nature does not allow them to be considered as such. Additionally, this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, as clearly happens in this case, it is not appropriate to invoke diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, recently, in Vote No. 2022-011649 of 9:20 hours on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved:

*“**III.- ON DIRECT STANDING.** The petitioner, in turn, claims to have direct standing, because he states that the challenged norm not only injures the fundamental rights of an individual nature of his represented party but also violates several collective and diffuse ones, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:* *“(…)* *”**II.- On diffuse interests and the standing of the petitioners in the case under study.** The petitioners state that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the assumptions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, that can be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right deemed injured. On the matter, the Chamber's reiterated jurisprudence indicates that:* *“ “It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective one just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, then, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediated if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of a singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them vis-à-vis those rights are the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on the ninth of November of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty hours on the twenty-fourth of May, nineteen ninety-one, for electoral matters.” –see judgment number 360-90-* *“From this definition, it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest is formed by an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first—the subjective one—it is clear that it is diffused among a non-individualized human group, which participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur with the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every “diffuse” interest acquires the legal category of “diffuse interest,” but only those imbued with a deep social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case—see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality—which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—neither can it be so concrete that it allows for an individual claim, since in such a case, standing would derive from that claim—see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the petitioners refer their standing with respect to the defense of diffuse interests in the area of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what corresponds is to pronounce as indicated in the following recitals.* *(…)* *“In the action now being heard, the same petitioners challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), in this action they focus on topics of ex-situ conservation and environmental education—which was also pointed out in that action—the truth is that this Chamber's definition regarding standing, as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action.* Note that, certainly, just as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) clearly indicates and the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) emphatically states, the challenged regulations are indeed fully susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons who carry out a specific activity subject to the regulation indicated in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulations. Thus, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), what is at issue is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) well states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies linked to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Therefore, it is untenable to allege supposed conservation and environmental education problems in order to use the figure of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, obviating the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), as indicated in recitals II and III of this resolution.

Under this reasoning, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing (legitimación) to file this proceeding, and therefore it is improper to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Accordingly, the proper course is to dismiss this action” (the underlining does not correspond to the original).

In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:

“(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest (interés difuso) cannot be so broad and generic that it merges with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)); but neither can it be so specific that it allows for an individual claim, since, in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…).” (see, in this same sense, among others, votes No. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021, and No. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022).

In this case, it is clear that this law can cause individual impacts that, in turn, are susceptible to becoming concrete through cases of individual application affecting specific persons and that can directly impact the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, that is, those natural or legal persons affected by the existence of the monopoly established, who would be enabled to file the corresponding administrative or judicial claim. Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, this Chamber considers that the plaintiffs lack direct standing (legitimación directa) to bring this action.

Regarding the right to a healthy environment, whose defense the plaintiffs invoke as support for their standing (legitimación), considering that the challenged Law harms it, it does not apply in this case. Let us see that the alleged damage to the environment is related to the impossibility of investing and investigating alternative forms of energy. The plaintiffs’ assertion that RECOPE is responsible for such research not being conducted due to its cost is a subjective opinion of the plaintiffs, not supported by any evidence. Whether RECOPE does not invest in researching alternative forms of energy, whether the cost of such research is high, whether there are no companies that wish or are able to make that investment, are all assertions made by the plaintiffs that lack foundation, not only legally but also factually. For this reason, they are not admissible.

IV.- COLLECTIVE INTERESTS (INTERESES COLECTIVOS). In relation to another of the possible sources of standing (legitimación) established in paragraph 2 of Article 75 indicated, that encompassed by the expression “interests concerning the community as a whole”, this Chamber has already clarified that with it, the legislator refers to the standing (legitimación) held by a corporate body when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its associative base, but in addition to the foregoing, provided always that it concerns the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that nucleus of rights or interests that constitute the raison d'être and the binding factor of the group. This is so even when, in some cases, the effects of such norms could have an individualized impact on each of its members. Clearly, this scenario does not fit what is presented in this case, insofar as the plaintiffs act in their personal capacity. It is necessary to recall that when the law permits the filing of actions without a prior proceeding, in defense of interests concerning the community as a whole, the cornerstone of the system is maintained, namely: that the unconstitutionality must prove useful for defending rights or interests, whether of some person or group of persons. That is why there must always exist that link between the object of the action, that is, what is pursued with it, and the repercussion that the decision has for individuals, whether one or several of them associated for the defense of the sphere of their rights and interests. In this case, this link is missing because the interest binding the plaintiffs is so general that it loses all nexus with the object of the action, so that no difference is perceived between the effect of the unconstitutionality for them compared to that produced for all other citizens of the country, thereby becoming practically a popular action in pursuit of the defense of constitutional legality, inadmissible within our current system of constitutional review as has been clearly established through the jurisprudence of this Chamber. For the foregoing reasons, their possible standing (legitimación) under the protection of interests concerning the community as a whole must be discarded.

V.- Finally, it is important to remember that, in analyzing this issue, this Chamber, in judgment No. 96-6942, indicated the following:

“In this action, the aim is to challenge a legislative decision taken under the protection of the very text of Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), based on the understanding that, in general, the establishment of monopolies is not admissible in a market economy such as that which functions in our country, and in particular because such establishment constitutes an illegitimate limitation on the freedom of commerce. However, taking into account that - as stated - there is an express possibility in Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) for the creation of State monopolies, such as the one under discussion, the conclusion reached is that it is solely the reasonableness and suitability for the pursued end of the norm that is under discussion, so it can be affirmed that this is not a complaint of an infringement of those rights from which it would be possible to predicate that they give rise in citizens to a diffuse interest (interés difuso) in their maintenance and respect, as it could not be affirmed that what is discussed in this action has an accentuated and decisive impact on any of the relevant facets of the development or structuring of Costa Rican society. To admit standing (legitimación) in this matter based on diffuse interests (intereses difusos) for the protection of said constitutional norms would be to denature the concept, because it would become legally impossible to differentiate from a popular action and the right of citizens to monitor and control constitutional legality, which - as stated - were expressly excluded as forms of standing (legitimación) within our system of constitutional review.” VI.- CONCLUSION.- For the reasons stated, the action must be summarily rejected, since the plaintiffs do not have any standing (legitimación) for the challenge they intend.

VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that, if they have provided any document in paper form, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial)", approved by the Full Court in Session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch in Session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is summarily rejected. Justice Rueda Leal gives different reasons regarding diffuse interests (intereses difusos).

The amicus curiae filed by Rubén Galeano is rejected.

Fernando Castillo V.

<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:141.15pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Fernando Cruz C.</span></p></td><td style="width:109.55pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:172.75pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Paul Rueda L.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:141.15pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Luis Fdo. Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style="width:109.55pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:172.75pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:141.15pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">Anamari Garro V.</span></p></td><td style="width:109.55pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; widows:2; orphans:2"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:172.75pt; padding-right:3pt; padding-left:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'">José</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> Roberto Garita N.</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span></p></td></tr></table> **Exp: 22-011336-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 2022014869** **Different reasons of Judge Rueda Leal regarding diffuse interests (intereses difusos).** In the majority's opinion, it is unfeasible to claim standing based on diffuse interests (intereses difusos) when the challenged rule is susceptible to individual application and directly affects the legal sphere of singular, identifiable persons. The undersigned disagrees with this assertion for the following reasons.

Diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to a community of persons that is not formally organized, but whose union arises from a social need, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, a personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred or diluted among an unidentified plurality of subjects; in this sense, in light of paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), an unconstitutionality challenge based on this type of interest must inexorably refer to that plurality, in the terms set forth.

This Chamber has enumerated various constitutional goods and rights, in relation to which a diffuse interest (interés difuso) may be argued, for example, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, cultural heritage, the territorial integrity of the country, the proper management of public spending, consumer rights, among others.

In this regard, the following clarifications must be made. On the one hand, the aforementioned goods and rights transcend the individual or corporate sphere, because they concern a generality; thus, environmental damage does not affect only the neighbors of a region, but rather injures or places at serious risk the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment of the entire country, even, depending on the magnitude, of humanity as such. Likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic reflects an interest of all inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of a specific group.

The distinction is not simple; however, a point of balance must certainly be sought, so that diffuse interests (intereses difusos) in the aforementioned sense find constitutional protection, without extending the concept to such an extent that, through this avenue, a popular action (acción popular) is configured in the various constitutionality proceedings, with the exception of what is provided in Article 105 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad).

For such purposes, the constitutional judge must assess case by case, in order to define whether the interest in a given matter is of such a degree of transcendence and the alleged problem disperses its harms with such coverage, as to justify being before an interest that concerns the community in general.

Regarding the foregoing, it must be observed that the mere fact that a challenged rule or directive, when it is the object of a constitutionality action proceeding (acción de constitucionalidad), is susceptible to individual application and directly affects the legal sphere of singular, identifiable persons, does not mean the discarding of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), since there are situations in which both perspectives converge. For example, consider a provision that exempts a construction on a structure declared cultural heritage from preservation requirements; in such a matter, the measure would affect diffuse interests, since its pernicious consequences would be dispersed throughout an entire community, which does not preclude that, equally and simultaneously, an individual, a frequent visitor to such site, could be personally harmed and could bring a claim. Therefore, the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) does not exclude that a subject may experience an injury to their particular interests, even, depending on the circumstances, of greater depth than in the generality of persons. Furthermore, an application of the principle *pro actione* also leads to interpreting the rules favorably for the protection of fundamental rights and the safeguarding of constitutional supremacy. Consequently, standing based on diffuse interests (intereses difusos) becomes appropriate regardless of whether the challenged provision or act was susceptible to individual application.

In the case at hand, however, the existence of any diffuse interest (interés difuso) recognized by this Chamber is not clearly determined.

**Paul Rueda L.** **EXPEDIENTE N° 22-011336-0007-CO**

Revisión del Documento 1  Res. Nº 2022-014869 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas y cero minutos del veintinueve de junio de dos mil veintidós.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por ALEJANDRO JESÚS DÍAZ CORDERO, mayor, casado, piloto, vecino de San Francisco de Dos Ríos, portador de la cédula de identidad número 0112250205, DANIEL GERARDO SANCHO VARGAS, mayor, ingeniero civil, vecino de Calle Blancos, Goicoechea, portador de la cédula de identidad número 0108180542, JOSÉ JOAQUÍN DE JESÚS FERNÁNDEZ CORDERO, mayor, divorciado, economista, vecino de San Ramón, La Unión, Cartago, portador de la cédula de identidad número 0106800051, VICTORIA EUGENIA SELVA MORA, mayor, casada, medica general, vecina de Calle Blancos, Goicoechea, portadora de la cédula de identidad número 0108430073, contra la Ley N° 7356 de 24 de agosto de 1993, Ley “Del Monopolio Estatal de Hidrocarburos Administrado por RECOPE" "Establece Monopolio a favor del Estado para la Importación, Refinación y Distribución de Petróleo, Combustibles, Asfaltos y Naftas".

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:43 del 24 de mayo de 2022, los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 7356 de 24 de agosto de 1993. Alegan que esta ley, que es el objeto de esta acción, es contraria a los artículos 1, 2, 11, 28, 46, 60, 56 y 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, así a su espíritu, letra y espíritu, todo lo cual lesiona de forma constante, el patrimonio de la ciudadanía con graves y ruinosos resultados, no solo para los actores, sino para la ciudadanía en su conjunto. Manifiestan que la acción se dirige contra prácticas del Estado cuyos efectos, en la realidad, son confiscatorios. Asimismo, se dirige contra el perjuicio ambiental resultante de los efectos de la ley impugnada y en defensa del principio “libertatis” pues, al ser las normas impugnadas de alcance general, se está en presencia de intereses difusos y colectivos, pues se lesionan las libertades de máximo rango jurídico de la ciudadanía. Plantean, también, la defensa del sistema de derechos, libertades y garantías constitucionales en su conjunto pues el Estado, a menudo bajo el pretexto de una emergencia internacional, ha implementado medidas temporales que luego no son derogadas cuando pasa la situación que inicialmente las originó, sino que más bien, adquieren carácter permanente mediante formalizaciones legislativas, con lo cual todo termina siendo una lesión a la Constitución Política. Consideran que la ley impugnada es una manifestación del exceso en las potestades del Estado, que desemboca en una constante agresión patrimonial al ciudadano común. Ese monopolio creado por ley, lejos de perseguir un fin público, busca el enriquecimiento del Estado a través de tributos con carácter expropiatorio. El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, no solo prohíbe de forma expresa la existencia de monopolios de carácter particular, sino que extiende la prohibición “a cualquier acto, incluso originado en una ley, que amenace o restrinja la liberta de comercio”. Consideran los actores que la emisión de la ley impugnada lejos de ajustarse a la voluntad del constituyente, procuró enmascarar una violación sostenida de esta, no sólo en el aspecto meramente formal, sino en sus consecuencias prácticas, pues los aspectos negativos del monopolio recaen sobre toda la ciudadanía lo que se refleja en los altos impuestos que recaen sobre el consumo de hidrocarburos y la propiedad de vehículos. Manifiestan los actores que la ley lesiona el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política. A su juicio, desde la perspectiva económica, cualquier monopolio, sin importar la naturaleza o industria, conduce inequívocamente a una pérdida de bienestar que se refleja, entre otros aspectos, en una reducción en la inversión y un aumento del desempleo. También lesiona el artículo 50 constitucional, en tanto este dispone que el Estado procurará el mayor bienestar de todos los habitantes del país; el monopolio tiene efectos contrarios a esa búsqueda de bienestar. Consideran los actores que la inconstitucionalidad de origen, se fue consolidando a través de hechos asociados con “emergencias” de carácter internacional. En el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, todas las normas están sometidas al control de constitucionalidad, discrecionalidad y legalidad. La Constitución Política, artículos 121, inciso 7), 140 inciso 4) y 180 contiene la doctrina de la emergencia. Las emergencias, reales o supuestas, han sido el pretexto más socorrido para justificar la ruptura del orden constitucional en todos los países, sobre todo cuando se extienden en el tiempo y generan la doctrina conocida como “normalización de la emergencia”. Todo operador jurídico, a interactuar con una norma o aplicarla en un caso específico, debe hacer un ejercicio de interpretación bajo ciertos parámetros lógicos (sana crítica). El Estado solo puede existir para estar al servicio de la persona humana. De ahí que ninguna autoridad puede tomar una norma constitucional y valerse de ella para romper o disminuir libertades. Tampoco podría darle una interpretación que la vacíe de contenido o la vuelva inútil, pues como norma suprema sus disposiciones son directamente aplicables. Bajo el principio de unidad de la Constitución, el artículo 46 no puede interpretarse aisladamente del artículo 28, que contiene la esfera mínima de libertades garantizadas a la ciudadanía. En tal sentido, los votos N° 1635-90, 1195-91 y 272-90, entre otros, señalaron que la libertad de comercio no puede limitarse sino bajo los parámetros del artículo 28. Así, es un contrasentido que el Estado incurra en las mismas prácticas y tendencias que la Constitución ordena impedir. La disminución resultante en el ámbito de libertad, viene a ser aún más gravosa por no mediar las indispensables condiciones estipuladas en el artículo 28. Al violarse el artículo 46, se lesionan también los artículos 50 y 56. Estiman que la existencia misma de la ley impugnada, es una admisión tácita por parte del Estado, de que la importación y comercialización de hidrocarburos es en principio, una actividad privada, como lo son en términos generales, las actividades productivas. Si bien es cierto el legislador goza de plena libertad para abstraer del orden privado, según su criterio, actividades como la importación, refinación, distribución y comercio de combustibles, esta posición no puede ser recibida desde la óptica republicana. De serlo, que sentido tendría reconocer derechos y libertades en la Constitución. El legislador puede emitir normas para reglamentar el ejercicio de libertades fundamentales, pero las normas deben someterse a los límites que la propia Constitución impone al legislador. Así, en este caso, el legislador está obligado a combatir cualquier práctica monopolística, a no interferir en las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público ni los derechos de terceros y a abstenerse de cualquier amenaza o restricción a la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria. No obstante, en cuanto al mercado de hidrocarburos, es indiscutible que el Estado ha obrado por décadas en contra de estos imperativos constitucionales. Según lo expuesto, el monopolio pareciera subsistir únicamente como una fuente solapada de ingresos monetarios para el Estado, de manera que estamos ante la sustitución del “interés general” por el “interés del Estado”. Se trata así, según expresión de la Sala Constitucional de un “ejercicio arbitrario y sin sentido del poder político”, cuya única motivación es expoliar a la ciudadanía en beneficio exclusivo del Estado. La Constitución, en los artículos 2 y 121 inciso 13), establece como único medio lícito para la fijación de impuestos su aprobación en vía legislativa. Sin embargo, RECOPE y ARESEP han evadido ese principio. A través de décadas, el Estado ha financiado sus actividades a través de la venta de combustibles. Un precio fijado por encima del precio de la libre competencia, equivale a un impuesto. Además, el impuesto vigente sobre los combustibles, que representa un 40% del precio final al consumidor, no es siquiera un mecanismo de “justicia distributiva”, sino una forma evidente de castigar al ciudadano por el uso de combustible que solamente beneficia al Estado. Consideran los actores que el monopolio establecido por la ley impugnada es inconstitucional por el perjuicio que ocasiona al derecho ciudadano a un ambiente sano. La investigación en busca de fuentes alternativas de energía, en contraste, es una actividad muy costosa y carente de réditos probables en el corto plazo. Requiere de gran inversión y el dinero debe ser generado desde otras actividades mucho más lucrativas. Estiman que, en Costa Rica, esa inversión no es posible por la existencia del monopolio estatal en la actividad. Los recursos generados por RECOPE no son reinvertidos en investigación de ningún tipo. Tampoco existe indicio alguno de que esta situación vaya a cambiar a corto plazo. James Buchanan, Premio Nobel de Economía por su teoría del Public Choise, estima que cuando hay monopolio, el incentivo muere, al no existir nadie que amenace la participación de la empresa en el mercado. También considera que el empleado público carece de los incentivos que tiene el empleado privado y, por esa razón, el primero nunca podrá ser eficiente ni innovador. Estiman que la veda a la participación privada que absurdamente mantiene Costa Rica, tiene efectos perniciosos en el ambiente, al eliminar cualquier incentivo a la innovación e investigación científica.

2.- Para efectos de admisibilidad, señalan que interponen la acción con fundamento en los artículos 1, 3 y 75, párrafo 2° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues estiman que actúan en defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad. La acción se plantea en defensa de la libertad de comercio, libertad de industria, libertad de elección de trabajo y del patrimonio de la ciudadanía costarricense y derecho a un ambiente más sano.

3.- Por correo remitido el 1 y 7 de junio de 2022 a la dirección Informes-SC (Autorizado para recibir informes de la Sala Constitucional)-Outlook, Rubén Galeano presenta un Amicus Curiae en defensa del monopolio de RECOPE.

4.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LA AMICUS CURIAE PRESENTADA POR RUBÉN GALEANO. Mediante correo electrónico remitido a la dirección autorizada por esta Sala Constitucional, únicamente, para recibir informes, del 1 y 7 de junio de 2022, Rubén Galeano interpone una gestión de Amicus Curiae. Al efecto, cabe destacar que el amicus es una figura procesal que permite la intervención en ciertos procesos judiciales -en el derecho comparado o a nivel internacional- de participantes que desean expresar una opinión fundada en defensa de un interés público o de un tema institucional relevante, pero no son partes ni tienen derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo jurídicamente tutelable, por lo tanto, no desplazan o reemplazan a éstas ni adquieren ningún derecho en caso de ser estimado el proceso. No se trata de un perito o de un consultor técnico y su actividad excede el de los directamente afectados y se caracteriza porque su opinión no vincula al Tribunal actuante ni genera costas u honorarios. No obstante, en nuestro país, la figura no está regulada en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de tal forma que no puede aceptarse el escrito de amici presentado. Ahora bien, lo que nuestra lesgislación sí admite, de conformidad con el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, es la figura de la coadyuvancia. Dicho numeral establece que en los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso a que alude el párrafo segundo del artículo 81, las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha de la interposición de la acción, o aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, para coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa. En este caso concreto, la solicitud de amicus resulta improcedente, no solo porque la gestión carece de toda formalidad en cuanto a firma, autenticación y el correspondiente timbre del Colegio de Abogados, sino también, porque al ser la acción un proceso formal y al no estar previsto el mecanismo amicus en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, debe rechazarse. En todo caso, cabe recordar que este tipo de intervenciones supone una intervención procesal accesoria y su suerte sigue la de la intervención principal que, por los motivos que se detallan infra, resulta inadmisible y debe ser rechazada de plano. (Véase en similar sentido la sentencia número 2020001805 de las 11:45 horas del 29 de enero de 2020).

II.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN. - Los actores señalan, para efectos de admisibilidad, que su legitimación deriva del artículo 75, párrafo 2° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto acuden en defensa de intereses difusos y colectivos. El párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción sin asunto base, en los casos en que “...cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.” Se analizarán ambos supuestos para determinar si tal legitimación existe o no.

III.- EN RELACIÓN CON LOS INTERESES DIFUSOS. El legislador introdujo en el artículo 75 de la ley que rige esta jurisdicción, la posibilidad de accionar con sustento en la defensa de intereses difusos, con el fin de ampliar y completar la gama de posibilidades de fiscalización que tienen los ciudadanos por intermedio de una acción de inconstitucionalidad. Los intereses difusos son un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del interés colectivo, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata entonces de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, ante esta Sala, de algunos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son entonces las especiales características de estos derechos por sí mismos y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos, tal y como se ha manifestado en distintas resoluciones. Al respecto, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha considerado diversos derechos que gozan de tales características, como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y el buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros.

En este caso, los actores alegan que acuden en defensa de intereses difusos y citan, como afectados, la libertad de comercio, la libertad de industria, la libertad de elección de trabajo y del patrimonio de la ciudadanía costarricense. Sin embargo, estas libertades no encuadran dentro de la definición de intereses difusos que ha hecho la Sala porque su naturaleza no permite considerarlos como tal Adicionalmente, este Tribunal, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, como claramente sucede en este caso, no cabe invocar los intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, recientemente, en el voto N° 2022-011649 de las 9:20 horas del 25 de mayo de 2022, esta Sala resolvió:

“III.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA. El accionante, a su vez, dice ostentar legitimación directa, porque refiere que la norma impugnada no solo lesiona los derechos fundamentales de carácter individual de su representado, sino que vulnera sendos colectivos y difusos, por los efectos que produce. No obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que:

"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas. En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-. Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.

(…)

En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción. Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento. De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer ; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística. Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución.

Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).

En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que:

“(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)”. (véase en este mismo sentido, entre otros, los votos nro. 2021-025373 de las 9:20 horas del 10 de noviembre de 2021 y nro. 2022-007466 de las 9:45 horas del 30 de marzo de 2022) En este caso, es claro que esta ley puede provocar afectaciones individuales que, a su vez, son susceptibles de concretizarse en casos de aplicación individual en cabeza de personas específicas y que pueden incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares y plenamente identificables sea, de aquellas personas física o jurídicas, a quienes les afecte la existencia del monopolio dispuesto, y que estarían habilitadas para plantear la correspondiente reclamación administrativa o judicial. En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales precitados, esta Sala estima que los accionantes carecen de legitimación directa para plantear esta acción.

En cuanto al derecho a un ambiente sano, cuya defensa los actores invocan como sustento de su legitimación, por estimar que la Ley cuestionada lo lesiona, no aplica en este caso. Veamos que el presunto perjuicio al medio ambiente, está relacionado con la imposibilidad de invertir e investigar en formas alternativas de energía. La afirmación de los actores en el sentido de que RECOPE es responsable de que tal investigación no se realice en razón de su costo, es una opinión subjetiva de los actores, que no está apoyada en prueba alguna. Si RECOPE no invierte en investigar en formas alternativas de energía, si el costo de tales investigaciones es alto, si no hay empresas que deseen o puedan hacer esa inversión, son todas afirmaciones que los actores hacen y que carecen de fundamento, no solo jurídico sino también de hecho. Por tal razón, no son de recibo.

IV.- SOBRE LOS INTERESES COLECTIVOS. En relación con otra de las posibles fuentes de legitimación establecidas en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 señalado, la recogida en la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, ya la Sala ha precisado que con ella se refiere el legislador a la legitimación que ostenta un cuerpo corporativo, cuando actúa como tal por intermedio de sus representantes, en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa, pero además de lo anterior, siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que inciden en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituyen la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación. Esto, incluso, cuando en algunos casos, los efectos de tales normas pudieran repercutir de manera individualizada en cada uno de sus miembros. Claramente este supuesto no se ajusta a lo expuesto en este caso, en tanto los accionantes actúan en su condición personal. Es necesario recordar que cuando la ley permite la presentación de acciones sin asunto previo, en defensa de intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, se mantiene lo que es la piedra angular del sistema, a saber: que la inconstitucionalidad resulte útil para defender derechos o intereses, sea de alguna persona o grupo de personas. Es por ello que debe existir siempre ese ligamen entre el objeto de la acción, es decir lo que se persigue con ella y la repercusión que tenga lo resuelto para los particulares, ya sea uno o varios de ellos asociados para la defensa de la esfera de sus derechos e intereses. En este caso, ese ligamen falta porque es tan general el interés que vincula a los accionantes que pierde todo nexo con el objeto de la acción, de manera que no se percibe ninguna diferencia entre el efecto de la inconstitucionalidad para ellos frente al que produce para todos los demás ciudadanos del país, volviéndose con ello prácticamente una acción popular en procura de la defensa de la legalidad constitucional, inadmisible dentro de nuestro actual sistema de revisión constitucional según ha quedado claramente establecido a través de la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Por lo expuesto, debe descartarse su posible legitimación al amparo de intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.

V.- Finalmente, es importante recordar que, al analizar este tema, la Sala, en la sentencia N° 96-6942, señaló lo siguiente:

“En esta acción, se pretende combatir una decisión legislativa tomada al amparo del propio texto del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, por entender que, en general, no es admisible el establecimiento de monopolios en una economía de mercado como la que funciona en nuestro país, y en particular porque tal instauración resulta una limitación ilegítima de la libertad de comercio. Sin embargo, tomando en cuenta que -como se dijo- existe una posibilidad expresa en el numeral 46 de la Constitución Política para la creación de monopolios a favor del Estado, como el que se discute, se llega a la conclusión que es únicamente la razonabilidad y adecuación al fin perseguido de la norma lo que está en discusión, de modo que puede afirmarse que no se está ante una denuncia de infracción de aquellos derechos de los que sería posible predicar que hacen nacer en los ciudadanos un interés difuso en su mantenimiento y respeto, pues no podría afirmarse que lo que se discute en esta acción, incida de forma acentuada y decisiva en alguna de las facetas relevantes del desarrollo o estructuración de la sociedad costarricense. Admitir entonces en este asunto una legitimación basada en intereses difusos para la protección de dichas normas constitucionales, sería desnaturalizar el concepto, porque vendría a ser jurídicamente imposible de diferenciar de una acción popular y el derecho de los ciudadanos para la vigilancia y control de la legalidad constitucional los que -como se dijo- fueron expresamente excluidos como formas de legitimación dentro de nuestro sistema de revisión constitucional”.

VI.- CONCLUSIÓN. - En razón de lo expuesto, la acción debe ser rechazada de plano, puesto que no le asiste a los accionantes ninguna legitimación para la impugnación que pretende VII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción. El Magistrado Rueda Leal da razones diferentes respecto a los intereses difusos. Se rechaza la amicus curiae presentada por Rubén Galeano.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

José Roberto Garita N.

Res. Nº 2022014869 Razones diferentes del magistrado Rueda Leal respecto a los intereses difusos.

En criterio de la mayoría, resulta inviable alegar legitimación por intereses difusos, cuando la norma cuestionada es susceptible de aplicación individual e incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables. El infrascrito disiente de esta aserción por los siguientes motivos.

Intereses difusos son aquellos, cuya titularidad pertenece a una comunidad de personas que no se encuentra organizada formalmente, pero cuya unión se produce a partir de una necesidad social, una característica física, el origen étnico, una orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado o diluido entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos; en este sentido, a la luz del párrafo 2°, del ordinal 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la impugnación por inconstitucional con base en este tipo de interés inexorablemente debe estar referida a esa pluralidad, en los términos expuestos.

Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos bienes y derechos constitucionales, en relación con los cuales se puede argüir un interés difuso, verbigracia, el ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el patrimonio cultural, la integridad territorial del país, el buen manejo del gasto público, los derechos del consumidor, entre otros.

Al respecto, deben efectuarse las siguientes precisiones. Por un lado, los mencionados bienes y derechos trascienden la esfera individual o corporativa, porque incumben a una generalidad; así, un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado de todo el país, incluso, según la envergadura, de la humanidad como tal. De igual forma, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República refleja un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no solo de un grupo específico.

La distinción no es sencilla; empero, ciertamente se debe buscar un punto de equilibrio, de modo que los intereses difusos en el sentido expuesto hallen cobijo constitucional, sin que se llegue a una extensión tal del concepto, que por esa vía se configure una acción popular en los diversos procesos de constitucionalidad, con excepción de lo dispuesto en el artículo 105 de la Ley de Biodiversidad.

Para tales efectos, el juez constitucional debe valorar caso por caso, a fin de definir si el interés en un determinado asunto reviste tal grado de trascendencia y la problemática acusada difumina sus perjuicios con semejante cobertura, como para justificar que se esté ante un interés que atañe a la comunidad en general.

En cuanto a lo antedicho, se debe observar que el mero hecho de que una norma o directriz cuestionada, cuando ello es objeto de un proceso de acción de constitucionalidad, sea susceptible de aplicación individual e incidir de forma directa en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, no significa el descarte de un interés difuso, toda vez que hay situaciones en las que confluyen ambas perspectivas. Por ejemplo, piénsese en una disposición que de los requerimientos de preservación eximiera a una obra en una estructura declarada patrimonio cultural; en un asunto así, la medida afectaría intereses difusos, toda vez que sus consecuencias perniciosas se dispersarían dentro de toda una comunidad, lo que no obsta para que, igual y simultáneamente, un individuo, asiduo visitante de tal sitio, se viera perjudicado en lo personal y pudiera entablar un reclamo. Ergo, la existencia de un interés difuso no excluye que un sujeto pueda experimentar una lesión en sus intereses particulares, incluso, según las circunstancias, de mayor calado que en la generalidad de personas. A mayor abundamiento, una aplicación del principio pro actione también lleva a interpretar las normas de manera favorable para la tutela de los derechos fundamentales y la protección de la supremacía constitucional. Por consiguiente, la legitimación por intereses difusos deviene procedente independientemente de que la disposición o el acto impugnado fuese susceptible de aplicación individual.

En el caso de marras, empero, no se determina con claridad la existencia de algún interés difuso reconocido por esta Sala.

Paul Rueda L.