Compensation for lost chance in unawarded bidIndemnización por oportunidad perdida en licitación no adjudicada

*150057561027CA* Res. 000271-F-S1-2019 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of March, two thousand nineteen.

Ordinary proceeding (Proceso de conocimiento) filed before the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court by MARIANO OCAMPO ROJAS; against the MUNICIPALITY OF TIBÁS (MUNICIPALIDAD DE TIBÁS), represented by the municipal mayor Carlos Luis Cascante Duarte, administrator, EVELYN GÓMEZ QUIRÓS. The natural persons are of legal age, residents of San José, and with the exceptions noted, married and attorneys.

Authored by Magistrate Molinari Vílchez CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO) I.- According to the facts held as proven in the appealed judgment, the Municipality of Tibás promoted the abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada) No. 2015LA-000008-01, for the contracting of professional legal services for the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) of that locality. Mr. Mariano Ocampo Rojas and Mrs. Evelyn Gómez Quirós submitted their respective bids. By PMCI report of April 14, 2015, the Municipal Procurement Office (Proveeduría Municipal) recommended awarding the contract to Mr. Mariano Ocampo Rojas, considering that he achieved the highest score according to the evaluation criteria of the bid terms (cartel). However, by agreement VII-1, adopted in ordinary session No. 260, held on April 21, 2015, the Municipal Council awarded the contract to Mrs. Evelyn Gómez Quirós. On May 19, 2015, Mr. Ocampo Rojas filed an appeal for revocation and absolute nullity (recurso de revocatoria y nulidad absoluta) against the preceding act, which was rejected by agreement II-1 of ordinary session No. 139 of June 18, 2015, of the Municipal Council.

II.- Disagreeing, Mr. Ocampo initiated this judicial proceeding against the said Municipality, requesting the nullity of the cited agreement No. VII-1 and, instead, that the bidding be awarded to him. Subsidiarily, he requests payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios). By resolution at 15 hours 56 minutes on November 2, 2015, Mrs. Evelyn Gómez was included as a co-defendant and both defendants were given the legal term to answer the complaint. The representation of the municipal entity answered negatively without raising defenses (excepciones). Mrs. Evelyn Gómez answered negatively and raised the defenses of defective complaint (resolved interlocutorily), lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing. By Judgment No. 07-V-2017 at 10 hours 24 minutes on January 31, 2017, the Fifth Section of the Administrative Litigation Court partially granted the complaint. It ordered the Municipality to pay Mr. Mariano Ocampo the sum of ₡24,882,150.00 for lost profits (lucro cesante), plus legal interest from the date of cancellation of each of the payment orders issued by the Municipality of Tibás. Likewise, the sum of ₡1,000,000.00 for moral damages (daño moral), plus legal interest from the finality of the ruling. It imposed the costs of the plaintiff and the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez on the municipal entity. By resolution No. 07-V-2017-BIS at 11 hours 40 minutes on April 3, 2017, the previous judgment was supplemented as follows: “[…] the sums resulting from the established monetary obligations shall be updated to compensate for the variation in purchasing power from the date of cancellation of each of the payment orders issued by the Municipality of Tibás, according to the liquidation presented in the sentence execution stage, and until their effective cancellation. Regarding the sum granted for moral damages, the indexation shall be estimated from the finality of the judgment.” Disagreeing, both co-defendants filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) before this Chamber.

III.- Standing to appeal. This Chamber has indicated that, by procedural principle and in accordance with the doctrine emanating from articles 561 and 598 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil, CPC), applicable in this case by remission of numeral 220 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA), only the party or third party harmed by the decision has standing to appeal it. (On this matter, see, among others, the judgments of this Court numbers 401 at 14 hours 45 minutes on March 25, 2010, 189 at 9 hours 15 minutes on March 3, 2011, 825 at 9 hours 35 minutes on July 4, 2013, and 508 at 8 hours 38 minutes on April 10, 2014). In the case at hand (súbjudice), the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez and the Municipality jointly filed a cassation appeal on February 23, 2017. Only one of the grievances listed therein harms Mrs. Gómez Quirós; the remaining ones pertain exclusively to the territorial entity. Therefore, they will be considered separately, in accordance with the standing held by each defendant. Furthermore, on May 8, 2017, Mrs. Gómez Quirós expanded the previous appeal. In general terms, she disagrees with the order to pay indexation imposed in the clarification and supplementation ruling (No. 07-V-2017-BIS). As this Court observes, the said order is solely against the Municipality, so that particular point did not affect Mrs. Gómez Quirós and, to that extent, she lacks standing to challenge it, which justifies its outright rejection.

Appeal of the Municipality of Tibás Cassation on Procedural Grounds IV.- In the sole procedural grievance, the municipal entity accuses violation of canons 119 of the CPCA and 153 of the CPC. In its view, the Court incurred in the defect of incongruence (incongruencia), for the following reasons: 1) It points out that the plaintiff requested, as a subsidiary claim, the payment of 12 monthly installments of professional fees at the rate of ₡1,800,000.00 per month, for a total of ₡21,600,000.00. However, it argues, the Court departed from what was requested and granted the sums that were effectively paid to Atty. Evelyn Gómez, awarding a greater amount (₡24,882,150.00 in total). 2) It notes that the plaintiff requested, as material damage (daño material), the payment of the emoluments not received; however, the Court modified this claim, establishing that what was requested were losses (perjuicios) and not damage as expressly set forth. In its view, the principle “iura novit curia,” employed by the judges, refers to knowledge of the law, not to changes on points that fall exclusively to the parties, such as the claims of the complaint. 3) It indicates that, as a principal claim, the plaintiff requested the nullity of agreement No. VII-1 and, instead, that the contract for professional services bid out be awarded to him. Subsidiarily, he requested the payment of damages and losses, but without requesting the nullity of the act. In its view, the Court exceeded its powers by establishing damages and losses derived from an act whose nullity was not requested, nor its non-conformity with the legal system. 4) It alleges that the plaintiff did not request the payment of interest on the sum requested for moral damages; however, the Court granted them ex officio, exceeding its prerogatives.

V.- Regarding item 1) cited, the plaintiff in his complaint indeed requested as indemnification for material damage the amount and breakdown set forth by the appellant (₡21,600,000.00 in total); however, as is recorded in the audiovisual record of the preliminary hearing, examined by this Chamber, that claim was adjusted, as permitted by canon 90 of the CPCA. At that opportunity, the plaintiff stated that the required indemnification should be calculated based on the amounts that the Municipality effectively paid to Atty. Evelyn Gómez for the professional services provided, as recorded in the certification issued by the Treasury Department of that entity. Now, from a comprehensive reading of the appealed judgment, it is clear that the indemnification amount (quatum) accepted by the Court was calculated based on the cited documentation, such that what was granted did not exceed what was requested by the plaintiff. Thus, it is evident that the judges did not incur in incongruence, which justifies the rejection of the objection.

VI.- In point 2), the appellant alleges the Court's incongruence in having granted as losses what the plaintiff considered as damages. On this subject, the Court noted that the indemnification amount claimed in the subsidiary claim of the complaint in reality corresponded to losses and not damages as was stated. It reached this conclusion by considering that what was sought was the recognition of the sums not received due to the bidding being awarded to the co-defendant, which it considered consistent with the definition of losses (not damages). For this Court, the conceptual clarification made by the Court did not change what was sought. Note that the object of the claim is the payment of the amounts that the plaintiff did not receive for not being awarded the contract, which he asks to be calculated based on the disbursements made to Atty. Evelyn Gómez in the execution of the contract. Thus, regardless of the denomination or title given, the required indemnification remained intact. The Judge did not exceed his powers, nor did he incur in incongruence by adapting the requested compensation to the legal figure that, in his view, is the appropriate one. This Chamber has noted that when the claimant has given an inadequate legal characterization to their claim, the judge must correct the error and turn to the substance of what is requested, to infer which right the litigant seeks to be protected by the jurisdictional instances. Thus, what is important is the essence of what is petitioned and not the technical particularities of the denomination, which, in accordance with what has been said, do not limit the judicial authority from hearing the case and resolving what is appropriate under the law. (See votes No. 61 at 15 hours 20 minutes on July 23, 1997, No. 998 at 14 hours 50 minutes on December 21, 2005, and No. 301 at 11 hours 15 minutes on April 16, 2007). Under this understanding, the appealed judgment does not suffer from the accused defect and, consequently, the rejection of the charge will be imposed.

VII.- In point 3), the appellant argues the incongruence of the ruling because damages and losses were decreed derived from an act whose nullity was not requested, nor its non-conformity with the legal system. To resolve the objection, it is necessary to consider that in the claims of the complaint, the plaintiff principally requested a declaration of nullity of the act that awarded the professional services contract to Mrs. Evelyn and, instead, that it be awarded to him. Subsidiarily, he requested the payment of damages and losses in case “the principal claim is not accepted, in the sense of taking up the functions of the position once the judgment is final, and for the one-year term of the contract, as it is not possible, the year of the contract having ended before the pronouncement of the judgment.” In accordance with the above, the requested nullity would have two effects according to the stated order of priority: awarding the professional services contract to the plaintiff, principally; or, paying him damages and losses in a subsidiary capacity. In that sense, it is clear that the indemnification underlies as an effect of the noted administrative irregularity and only in the event that the re-awarding was not possible. The Court resolved under this reasoning, insofar as it provided: “[…] from the study of the acts, it is clearly inferred that the defendant Administration engaged in conduct contrary to the legal system. However, it is known to all parties that the administrative conduct in question has already been executed, as it is established in the record that Atty. Evelyn Gómez Quirós provided the professional services that were the subject of the referenced abbreviated bidding, and furthermore that the corresponding fees were paid to her, by virtue of which there would be no interest in decreeing the nullity of the award act. Nevertheless, this does not prevent declaring its non-conformity with the legal system, and consequently, establishing whether said unlawful conduct derived administrative responsibility […].” As observed, the responsibility attributed to the municipal entity derives from the non-conformity of the referenced act with the legal system and the harm that this caused to the rights of the participant Ocampo Rojas. In accordance with precept 90 of the Law on Administrative Contracting: “[…] if the contracting whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the process of execution, a judgment favorable to the claimant may only recognize the payment of the damages and losses caused.” The situation described in that rule occurs in this case, since the payment of damages and losses, requested and accepted in the judgment, arose as an alternative solution given the impossibility of re-awarding the contract to the plaintiff because it had already been executed. Clearly, what was resolved is coherent with what was requested, so the objection must be rejected.

VIII.- In item 4), the appellant notes the defect of incongruence in having granted legal interest on the indemnification sum for moral damages, when this point was not requested by the plaintiff. Incongruence, as a defect of activity, occurs when what is resolved does not correspond with what was petitioned, among other scenarios, by ultra petita, which arises when the judge pronounces on matters not requested. To determine the existence of this defect as a ground for cassation, the operative part of the judgment must necessarily be compared with the claims put forward, in order to determine if there is in fact an evident mismatch between them. In the case under examination (subexamine), upon performing the comparison, it is observed that neither in the claims of the complaint nor in their adjustments at the preliminary hearing did the claimant make a petition on this matter, so its granting was ex officio. This Court has repeatedly understood that interest is subject to the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo); that is, its granting depends on the express request of the interested party (see, among others, votes No. 557 at 10 hours 10 minutes on May 6, 2010, No. 872 at 9 hours 20 minutes on July 22, 2010, No. 881 at 14 hours 3 minutes on July 22, 2010, No. 1037 at 9 hours 35 minutes on September 2, 2010, No. 18 at 9 hours 5 minutes on February 2, 2012, No. 1282 at 9 hours 5 minutes on October 11, 2012, No. 1315 at 10 hours 56 minutes on December 7, 2016). Under this understanding, the Court exceeded its authority by granting a point that was not requested and whose concession depends on the initiative of the party. It is worth clarifying that, although canons 123 and 124 of the CPCA require the Judge to pronounce, even ex officio, on the updating of the value of the sums granted, in this case, such pronouncement was fulfilled in the clarification and supplementation ruling, upon ordering the indexation of the amount awarded for moral damages from the finality of the judgment. Thus, the granting of interest exceeded the Court's prerogatives, meaning the grievance is admissible. Now, as a general thesis, being a procedural defect, the appropriate course would be to annul the judgment and proceed with a remand for a new resolution to be issued in accordance with the law. However, in this case, the appropriate course is its correction directly in this instance, in order to avoid unnecessary delays, as it suffices to annul the part granted in excess to remedy the inaccuracy. Thus, ruling on the merits, the judgment shall be annulled solely insofar as it granted legal interest on the sum of one million colones for moral damages.

Cassation on Substantive Grounds IX.- First. It argues violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. It explains that the Court granted the plaintiff, as losses, the sum of ₡24,882,140.00, an amount that corresponds to the payments that the Municipality made to Atty. Evelyn Gómez for the provision of her professional services as an advisor to the Municipal Council. It points out that what was paid to Mrs. Evelyn corresponds to her effective work, whereas the claimant would earn the same amount without having provided any professional service to the municipality. It considers the principle of equality violated because the number of work hours of Mrs. Evelyn would not necessarily have been the same as the plaintiff's, since each person has different capacities to perform tasks. It requests that the losses be calculated prudently and reasonably, since, in its view, the payment of an identical sum to what the awardee received constitutes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto) for the claimant.

X.- Regarding this matter, the Court considered that if the territorial Administration had respected the evaluation and scoring rules of the bid terms, Mr. Mariano Ocampo would have been the successful bidder. In this way, it estimated that the items received by the successful bidder would have been paid to the plaintiff, such that his compensatory protection translates into the payment of the sums that he should have received and could not, by virtue of the noted irregularity. To calculate the amount, the judges considered the sums that the Municipality paid to Mrs. Evelyn Gómez for the professional services provided during the contracting period established in the bid terms, for a total of ₡24,882,150.00.

XI.- In summary, the issue giving rise to the appellant's disagreement lies in the calculation of the compensation in favor of the plaintiff. For the Court, the indemnification is composed of the entirety of the amount that was paid to Mrs. Evelyn, a criterion on which the appellant disagrees, considering it disproportionate to indemnify him for 100% of a service he did not provide. In cases similar to the present one, this Chamber has stated: “[…] the frustrated opportunity caused to the one who was not awarded the contract does not equal nor can it be equated with the fullness of the consideration they would have obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated for them, as this would imply unjust or illicit enrichment for someone who, without having fulfilled their consideration, would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract.” (In this regard, see votes No. 478 at 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 at 9 hours 25 minutes on July 4, 2013). For these types of scenarios, it has been understood that fair indemnification for what did not arise or was frustrated is not equivalent to the amount of the consideration established in the contract, since this was not performed. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that, by fully compensating the value of the contract, one would be dispensing with the risk associated with its effective fulfillment. For in such a case, it would be assumed that if the bidder had been awarded the contract, they would have fully complied with it, when such facts are actually uncertain. Precisely for this reason, what should be compensated is the loss of the chance (pérdida de la oportunidad) that the bidder had to be awarded the contract and obtain profits from its execution. This compensation underlies the existence of a serious and real opportunity to obtain a benefit—or avoid a loss—as the case may be, which is truncated as a consequence of illicit or illegitimate conduct that prevents its attainment. That possibility, of course, must be based on circumstances that evidence a high degree of probability regarding its realization. Therefore, mere conjecture, speculation, or expectations do not fall within this scope of indemnification. In the case under examination (subexamine), it was held as proven that the plaintiff had the possibility of being awarded the contract and obtaining profits from the execution and fulfillment of the contract. A possibility that, in this specific case, was becoming serious and real; however, it was snatched from him, a corollary of illegitimate action by the Administration. For the foregoing, it is proper to compensate him, but not with the equivalent of the full value of the contract, as the Court did. The calculation of indemnification for the lost chance, according to modern doctrine and in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see resolutions No. 478 at 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 at 9 hours 25 minutes on July 4, 2013, No. 1040 at 8 hours 40 minutes on August 14, 2013), is established under reasonable, moderate, prudent, and objective judicial discretion, which must be framed within objective criteria and in accordance with the special circumstances surrounding each case. In the case at hand (subjúdice), as stated, the totality of the amount that the Municipality paid for the effective provision of that contract does not constitute the equivalent of the indemnification, but it does serve as an objective parameter for its calculation. This amount constitutes the real value of the contract and, therefore, the amount that Mr. Mariano would presumably have received, had he been awarded the contract and had he fully complied with the requested service. However, since these last two facts did not occur in reality, a percentage must be subtracted from that sum for the random factor referred to above and for the unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) that the claimant would obtain by receiving the full value of the contract without providing any service. Thus, this Chamber considers that compensating Mr. Mariano with an amount equivalent to 50% of the total value that was paid to Mrs. Evelyn for the original duration period of the contract (1 year), being in total the sum of ₡12,441,075.00, is proportional and rational to indemnify the loss under examination. In line with the foregoing, the admission of the charge shall be imposed and, consequently, the appealed judgment shall be annulled insofar as it has been the subject of analysis, in order to, instead, grant the indemnification amount (quamtum) set here.

XII.- Second. It points out that the Court, ex officio, ordered Atty. Evelyn Gómez to be joined to the proceedings (litis) and, despite this, ordered the local entity to pay the costs of said co-defendant, violating the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, justice, and equity. It highlights that Mrs. Evelyn's participation in the proceeding did not depend on the will of the municipality, so it has no duty to bear her costs.

XIII.- It is necessary to emphasize that numeral 12.3 of the CPCA stipulates that the defendant party shall be: “the natural or legal persons who have derived rights or legitimate interests from the administrative conduct that is the object of the proceeding.” In this case, when the complaint requested the nullity of the act by which abbreviated bidding No. 2015LA-000008-01 was awarded to Mrs. Evelyn, the intervention of the latter in the proceeding was necessary, given the subjective right she obtained from the challenged act. Thus, the Court acted correctly in so establishing, since it is a matter of a necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) by provision of Law. Now, in the appealed judgment, the Municipality was ordered to bear the costs of all parties, including those of the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez, because said entity was the only one that incurred in the challenged conduct. This Chamber agrees with the Court. Note that although Mrs. Evelyn appeared as a defendant, she did not participate in the administrative irregularity under examination. It was the Municipality exclusively that caused it, which justifies its condemnation to bear costs not only in favor of its counterpart, but also of Mrs. Gómez Quirós, since her forced participation in the proceeding generated expenses that she has no duty to bear. The anomalous action of the administration harmed the plaintiff and also Mrs. Evelyn, by having to face this judicial dispute in order to defend her right. Therefore, her costs must be covered by the losing party, that is, the defendant local entity. In accordance with the foregoing, the charge shall be rejected.

Appeal of Co-defendant Evelyn Gómez Quirós Cassation on Procedural Grounds XIV.- In the sole charge, the appellant argues the defect of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) because the Court omitted to refer to her petition to order the plaintiff to pay costs. She argues that it neither exempted nor ordered the plaintiff to pay these costs; that is, it did not resolve the mentioned petition, and rather, distorting what was requested, it ordered the Municipality to pay, when this specific matter was never requested.

XV.- In resolving the matter of costs, the Court expressly provided: “In accordance with numeral 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued based on evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this Court considers that the conditions for exemption do not occur, which is why both costs must be charged to the defendant party, and exclusively to the Municipality of Tibás, an entity that must bear the costs of all parties. The latter by virtue of the fact that it was the defendant Administration that incurred in the challenged conduct, that the co-defendant Gómez Quirós did not intervene in the conduct whose illegality is declared, as well as the fact that the plaintiff did not raise pecuniary claims against her.” XVI.- For this Court, the reasoning of a ruling consists of expressing or making manifest the reasons or foundations, factual and legal, for which the decision is adopted. It therefore forms an integral part of due process and the right of defense, as only by knowing the motives for which that determination is reached can the affected party be placed in a position to challenge it. The absence of reasoning is observed in two hypotheses: the first, when it is non-existent, which is precisely when the judge omits to state the bases of their decision. The second scenario occurs in cases where the argumentative deployment of the decision-making body is confusing or exhibits contradictions, which stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the motives that serve as its basis. (On this matter, see, among others, resolutions No. 1568 at 9 hours 30 minutes on November 29, 2012, and No. 184 at 13 hours on February 23, 2009). In the view of the challenger, the appealed judgment suffers from the mentioned defect because it did not refer to her petition to order the plaintiff to pay costs. However, as observed, the Court clearly explained that the condemnation in costs falls upon the losing party, in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA, such that since the Municipality is the losing entity, it is its responsibility to bear the costs of the proceeding, including those of the co-defendant Gómez Quirós, according to the cited reasons. The challenged ruling provides, in a well-founded manner, the reasons that led the Court to resolve as it did. It should be noted that it referred to the regulations governing the scenarios for condemnation and exoneration in costs, which it subsumed in the case under study and explained why it considered that the local entity should be the party obligated to bear that payment. In accordance with the foregoing, the alleged error was not configured in this case and, therefore, the rejection of the censure shall be imposed.

XVII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit, and that of the Municipality is declared partially with merit. Ruling on the merits, the judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for moral damages. Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ₡24,882,150.00 as indemnification in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, said amount is reduced by half (₡12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it remains intact. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must bear the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The municipal entity is exempted from this payment, as its appeal was partially accepted.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit, and that of the Municipality of Tibás is declared partially with merit. The appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for moral damages. Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ₡24,882,150.00 as indemnification in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, said amount is reduced by half (₡12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it remains intact. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must bear the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The municipal entity is exempted from this payment.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero Maribel Seing Murillo Res. 000271-F-S1-2019 **SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of March, two thousand and nineteen.

A declaratory proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) brought before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda by **MARIANO OCAMPO ROJAS**, a person of legal age, a resident of San José, with the exceptions noted, married, and an attorney; against the **MUNICIPALIDAD DE TIBÁS**, represented by its mayor, Carlos Luis Cascante Duarte, an administrator; and **EVELYN GÓMEZ QUIRÓS**, a person of legal age, a resident of San José, with the exceptions noted, married, and an attorney.

**Judge Molinari Vílchez writes for the Court** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.-** According to the facts taken as proven in the appealed judgment, the Municipalidad de Tibás promoted abbreviated bidding process No. 2015LA-000008-01 (licitación abreviada), for the contracting of legal professional services for the Concejo Municipal of that locality. Mr. Mariano Ocampo Rojas and Mrs. Evelyn Gómez Quirós submitted their respective bids. Through PMCI report dated April 14, 2015, the Municipal Procurement Office (Proveeduría Municipal) recommended awarding the contract to Mr. Mariano Ocampo Rojas, considering that he met the highest score according to the evaluation criteria in the bidding documents (cartel). However, by means of agreement VII-1, adopted in ordinary session No. 260, held on April 21, 2015, the Concejo Municipal awarded the contract to Mrs. Evelyn Gómez Quirós. On May 19, 2015, Mr. Ocampo Rojas filed a motion for reconsideration and absolute nullity (revocatoria y nulidad absoluta) against the prior act, which was rejected by agreement II-1 of ordinary session No. 139 of June 18, 2015, of the Concejo Municipal.

**II.-** Dissatisfied, Mr. Ocampo initiated this judicial proceeding against the aforementioned Municipality, seeking the nullity of the cited agreement No. VII-1 and, in its place, that the contract be awarded to him. In the alternative, he seeks payment for damages (daños y perjuicios). By resolution of 15 hours 56 minutes on November 2, 2015, Mrs. Evelyn Gómez was deemed a co-defendant, and the legal deadline to answer the complaint was granted to both defendants. The municipal entity's representative answered in the negative without raising any defenses (excepciones). Mrs. Evelyn Gómez answered negatively and raised the defenses of a defective complaint (resolved by an interlocutory decision), lack of right, lack of present interest, and lack of standing. By judgment No. 07-V-2017 of 10 hours 24 minutes on January 31, 2017, the Sección Quinta of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo partially granted the complaint. It ordered the Municipality to pay Mr. Mariano Ocampo the sum of ¢24,882,150.00 for lost profit (lucro cesante), plus legal interest from the payment date of each of the payment orders issued by the Municipalidad de Tibás. It also ordered payment of the sum of ¢1,000,000.00 for moral damages (daño moral), plus legal interest from the date the judgment becomes final. It imposed the plaintiff's and co-defendant Evelyn Gómez's legal costs on the municipal entity. By resolution No. 07-V-2017-BIS of 11 hours 40 minutes on April 3, 2017, the previous judgment was supplemented as follows: “[…] *the sums resulting from the established monetary obligations must be updated to compensate for the variation in purchasing power from the payment date of each of the payment orders issued by the Municipalidad de Tibás, according to the liquidation that is submitted in the judgment enforcement stage, and until their effective cancellation. Regarding the sum awarded for moral damages, the indexing must be calculated from the date the judgment becomes final*.” Dissatisfied, both co-defendants filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) before this Chamber.

**III.- Standing to appeal (Legitimación para recurrir).** This Chamber has indicated that, by procedural principle and in accordance with the doctrine emanating from articles 561 and 598 of the Código Procesal Civil (CPC), applicable in this case by remission of numeral 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), only the party or third party harmed by the decision has standing to appeal it. (On this matter, see, among others, judgments from this Chamber numbers 401 of 14 hours 45 minutes on March 25, 2010; 189 of 9 hours 15 minutes on March 3, 2011; 825 of 9 hours 35 minutes on July 4, 2013; and 508 of 8 hours 38 minutes on April 10, 2014). In the case at hand (*súbjudice*), co-defendant Evelyn Gómez and the Municipality jointly filed a cassation appeal on February 23, 2017. Only one of the grievances listed therein harms Mrs. Gómez Quirós; the remaining ones pertain exclusively to the territorial entity. Therefore, they will be examined separately, in accordance with the standing that assists each defendant. On the other hand, on May 8, 2017, Mrs. Gómez Quirós amplified the previous appeal. In general terms, she disagrees with the order to pay the indexing imposed in the clarification and supplementation ruling (No. 07-V-2017-BIS). As this Chamber observes, the referred order is solely against the Municipality, so this particular point did not affect Mrs. Gómez Quirós, and, to that extent, she lacks standing to challenge it, which justifies its outright rejection.

**Appeal of the Municipalidad de Tibás** **Cassation on procedural grounds** **IV.-** In the **sole** procedural grievance, the municipal entity alleges the violation of canons 119 of the CPCA and 153 of the CPC. In its opinion, the Tribunal incurred in the defect of inconsistency (incongruencia), for the following reasons: **1)** It points out that the plaintiff requested, as an alternative claim, the payment of 12 monthly professional fee installments at a rate of ¢1,800,000.00 per month, for a total of ¢21,600,000.00. However, it argues, the Tribunal deviated from what was requested and granted the sums that were actually paid to Licda. Evelyn Gómez, awarding a higher amount (¢24,882,150.00 in total). **2)** It notes that the plaintiff requested, by way of material damage (daño material), the payment of the emoluments not received; however, the Tribunal modified that petition, establishing that what was sought were damages (perjuicios) and not damage (daño) as was expressly set forth. In its opinion, the principle “*iura novit curia*”, used by the judges, refers to knowledge of the law, not to changes to matters that belong exclusively to the parties, such as the claims in the complaint. **3)** It indicates that, as the main claim, the plaintiff requested the nullity of agreement No.

VII-1 and, in its place, that the contract for professional services put out to bid be awarded to him. In the alternative, he requested payment of damages, but without seeking the nullity of the act. In its view, the Court exceeded its powers by establishing damages derived from an act whose nullity—or non-conformity with the legal system—was not requested. 4) He alleges that the plaintiff did not request payment of interest on the amount sought for moral damages; nevertheless, the Court granted it on its own motion, exceeding its prerogatives.

V.- With respect to section 1) cited above, the plaintiff in his claim certainly requested as compensation for material damages the amount and breakdown set forth by the appellant (a total of ¢21,600,000.00); however, as is evident in the audiovisual record of the preliminary hearing, examined by this Chamber, that claim was adjusted, as permitted by canon 90 of the CPCA. On that occasion, the plaintiff indicated that the compensation sought should be calculated based on the amounts that the Municipality actually paid to Evelyn Gómez, Esq., for the professional services rendered, as evidenced by the certification issued by that entity's Department of the Treasury. That said, a comprehensive reading of the appealed judgment reveals that the compensation amount (quatum) accepted by the Court was calculated based on the cited documentation, such that what was awarded did not exceed what was requested by the plaintiff. Thus, it is evident that the judges did not fall into inconsistency, which justifies the rejection of the objection.

VI.- Under point 2), the appellant alleges the Court’s inconsistency in having awarded as lost profits (perjuicios) what the plaintiff considered as damages (daños). On this issue, the Court warned that the compensation amount claimed in the alternative claim of the lawsuit actually corresponded to lost profits and not damages as it was recorded. It reached that conclusion by taking into account that what was sought was recognition of the sums left unearned when the bidding process was awarded to the co-defendant, which it considered consistent with the definition of lost profits (not damages). For this Chamber, the conceptual precision made by the Court did not change what was sought. Note that the object of the claim is the payment of the amounts the plaintiff left unearned by not being awarded the contract, which he asks to calculate based on the disbursements made to Evelyn Gómez, Esq., in the execution of the contract. Thus, regardless of the denomination or title given, the compensation sought remained intact. The Judge did not exceed his powers, nor did he fall into inconsistency by adapting the requested remedy to the legal concept that, in his view, is the correct one. This Chamber has warned that when the plaintiff has given an inadequate legal characterization to their claim, the judge must correct the error and look to the substance of what is requested, in order to infer which right the litigant seeks to have protected by the jurisdictional instances. Therefore, what is important is the essence of what was petitioned and not the technical particularities of the denomination, which, by virtue of what has been said, do not limit the judicial authority from hearing the case and resolving what is appropriate under the law. (See rulings No. 61 of 3:20 p.m. on July 23, 1997, No. 998 of 2:50 p.m. on December 21, 2005, and No. 301 of 11:15 a.m. on April 16, 2007). Under that reasoning, the appealed judgment does not suffer from the defect alleged, and consequently, the charge will be rejected.

VII.- Under point 3), the appellant argues the inconsistency of the ruling for having granted damages and lost profits derived from an act whose nullity, or non-conformity with the legal system, was not requested. To resolve this objection, it is necessary to consider that in the claims of the lawsuit, the plaintiff primarily requested declaring the nullity of the act that awarded the contract for professional services to Ms. Evelyn and, in its place, that it be awarded to him. In the alternative, he requested payment of damages and lost profits in the event “the main claim is not accepted, in the sense of assuming the functions of the position once the judgment becomes final, and for the one-year term of the contract, as it is not possible, the contract year having ended before the judgment was issued.” In accordance with the foregoing, the nullity sought would have two effects according to the stated priority: awarding the contract for professional services to the plaintiff, as the primary one; or paying him damages and lost profits, in the alternative. In that sense, it is clear that the compensation underlies as an effect of the administrative irregularity identified and only in the event that re-awarding was not possible. The Court resolved in that order, as it ordered: “[...] from the study of the acts, it is clearly inferred that the defendant Administration engaged in conduct contrary to the legal system. However, it is known to all parties that the administrative conduct in question has already been executed, as it is evident in the case file that Evelyn Gómez Quirós, Esq., rendered the professional services that were the object of the referenced abbreviated bidding process, and furthermore that the corresponding fees were paid to her, by virtue of which it would be pointless to decree the nullity of the award act. Nevertheless, this does not prevent declaring its non-conformity with the legal system, and consequently, establishing whether said act contrary to law derived administrative responsibility [...]”. As can be observed, the responsibility attributed to the municipal entity derives from the non-conformity of the referred act with the legal system and the harm that this caused to the rights of the participant Ocampo Rojas. According to precept 90 of the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa): “[...] if the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the process of execution, the judgment favorable to the plaintiff may only recognize the payment of the damages and lost profits caused.” The situation described in that rule occurs in the present case, as the payment of damages and lost profits requested and accepted in the judgment arose as an alternative solution in light of the impossibility of re-awarding the contract to the plaintiff because it had already been executed. Clearly, what was resolved is consistent with what was requested, so the objection must be rejected.

VIII.- In section 4), the appellant warns of the defect of inconsistency for having awarded legal interest on the compensatory sum for moral damages, when such an aspect was not requested by the plaintiff. Inconsistency, as a procedural defect, arises when what is resolved does not correspond with what was requested, among other scenarios, by ultra petita, which occurs when the judge rules on matters not requested. To determine the existence of this defect as grounds for appeal (casación), the operative part of the judgment must necessarily be compared with the claims put forward, in order to determine if there is indeed an evident misalignment between them. In the subexamine case, having made the comparison, it is observed that neither in the claims of the lawsuit nor in their adjustments at the preliminary hearing did the plaintiff make a request on this particular point, meaning its granting was on the court's own motion. This Chamber has repeatedly understood that interest is subject to the party presentation principle (principio dispositivo), meaning its granting depends on the express request of the interested party (see, among others, rulings No. 557 of 10:10 a.m. on May 6, 2010, No. 872 of 9:20 a.m. on July 22, 2010, No. 881 of 2:03 p.m. on July 22, 2010, No. 1037 of 9:35 a.m. on September 2, 2010, No. 18 of 9:05 a.m. on February 2, 2012, No. 1282 of 9:05 a.m. on October 11, 2012, No. 1315 of 10:56 a.m. on December 7, 2016). Under that reasoning, the Court exceeded its powers by granting an aspect that was not requested and whose granting depends on the initiative of the party. It is worth clarifying that, although canons 123 and 124 of the CPCA require the Judge to rule, even on their own motion, on the updating of the value of the sums awarded, in the present case, such a ruling was fulfilled in the clarification and addition judgment, by ordering the indexation (indexación) of the amount awarded for moral damages starting from the date the judgment becomes final. Thus, the granting of interest exceeded the prerogatives of the Court, so the grievance is admissible. Now, as a matter of principle, because it is a procedural defect, the judgment should be annulled and the case remanded so that a new resolution can be issued in accordance with the law. However, in this case, it is appropriate to correct it directly at this instance, in order to avoid unnecessary delays, as it suffices to annul the part granted in excess to remedy the inaccuracy. Thus, ruling on the merits, the judgment will be annulled only insofar as it granted legal interest on the sum of one million colones for moral damages.

Appeal based on substantive grounds (Casación por motivos sustantivos) IX.- First. He argues a violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. He explains that the Court awarded the plaintiff, as lost profits, the sum of ¢24,882,140.00, an amount that corresponds to the payments the Municipality made to Evelyn Gómez, Esq., for the rendering of her professional services as an advisor to the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal). He points out that what was paid to Ms. Evelyn corresponds to her effective work, whereas the plaintiff would earn the same amount without having rendered any professional service to the municipality. He considers the principle of equality violated because the number of hours Ms. Evelyn worked would not necessarily have been the same as the plaintiff’s, since each person has different capacities for performing tasks. He requests that the lost profits be calculated in a prudential and reasonable manner, as, in his view, paying an identical sum to what the awardee received constitutes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto) for the plaintiff.

X.- Regarding this issue, the Court considered that if the territorial Administration had respected the evaluation and scoring rules of the bid specifications (cartel), Mr. Mariano Ocampo would have been awarded the contract. Thus, it estimated that the items received by the awardee would have been paid to the plaintiff, so his compensatory protection translates into the payment of the sums he should have received and could not due to the noted irregularity. In order to calculate the amount, the judges took into account the sums the Municipality paid to Mrs. Evelyn Gómez for the professional services rendered during the contract term established in the bid specifications, for a total of ¢24,882,150.00.

XI.- In summary, the issue that raises the appellant's disagreement stems from the calculation of the remedy in favor of the plaintiff. For the Court, the compensation is made up of the total amount that was paid to Ms. Evelyn, a criterion with which the appellant disagrees, as he considers it disproportionate to compensate him 100% for a service he did not render. In cases similar to the present one, this Chamber has indicated: “[...] the frustrated opportunity caused to the person who was not awarded the contract does not equal, nor can it be equated to, the fullness of the consideration they would have obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated for them, because that would imply unjust or illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto o ilícito) for someone who, without having fulfilled their own consideration, would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract.” (On this matter, rulings No. 478 of 2:30 p.m. on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 of 9:25 a.m. on July 4, 2013, can be consulted). For these types of scenarios, it has been understood that the just compensation for what did not materialize or was frustrated is not equivalent to the amount of the provision established in the contract, since this was not carried out. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that, by fully compensating the value of the contract, one would be disregarding the risk associated with the effective fulfillment of it. For in such a case, one would be assuming that if the offeror had been the awardee, they would have fully complied with the contract, when such data is actually uncertain. Precisely for that reason, what it entails to compensate is the loss of the opportunity (pérdida de la oportunidad) the offeror had to be awarded the contract and obtain profits from its execution. This remedy underlies the existence of a serious and real opportunity to obtain a benefit—or avoid a loss—as the case may be, which is truncated as a consequence of unlawful or illegitimate conduct that prevents its attainment. That possibility, of course, must be based on circumstances that evidence a high degree of probability regarding its realization. So mere conjectures, speculations, or expectations do not fall within this compensatory spectrum. In the subexamine case, it was proven that the plaintiff had the possibility of being awarded the contract and obtaining profits from the execution and fulfillment of the contract. A possibility that, in this specific case, was serious and real; however, it was snatched from him, a corollary of an illegitimate action by the Administration. Therefore, it is appropriate to compensate him, but not with the equivalent of the full value of the contract, as the Court did. The calculation of the compensation for the lost opportunity (oportunidad perdida), according to modern doctrine and in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see resolutions No. 478 of 2:30 p.m. on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 of 9:25 a.m. on July 4, 2013, No. 1040 of 8:40 a.m. on August 14, 2013), is established under reasonable, restrained, prudent, and objective jurisdictional discretion, which must be framed within objective criteria and in accordance with the special circumstances surrounding each case. In the subjúdice case, as stated, the total amount the Municipality paid for the effective provision of that contract does not constitute the equivalent of the compensation, but it does serve as an objective parameter for its calculation. This amount constitutes the real value of the contract and, therefore, what Mr. Mariano would presumably have received, had he been awarded the contract and had he fully complied with the service requested. However, since these last two events did not occur in reality, a percentage must be subtracted from that sum for the random factor mentioned supra and for the enrichment without cause (enriquecimiento sin causa) the plaintiff would obtain by receiving the full value of the contract, without providing any service. Thus, this Chamber considers that compensating Mr. Mariano with an amount equivalent to 50% of the total value that was paid to Ms. Evelyn for the original duration of the contract (1 year), being the total sum of ¢12,441,075.00, is proportional and rational for compensating the detriment under examination. In accordance with the foregoing, the charge will be accepted and, consequently, the appealed judgment will be annulled in what has been the object of analysis, in order to grant, in its place, the compensation amount (quamtum) established herein.

XII.- Second. He points out that the Court, on its own motion, ordered that Evelyn Gómez, Esq., be joined to the litis (integrar a la litis) and, despite this, ordered the local entity to pay the costs of said co-defendant, violating the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, justice, and equity. He emphasizes that Ms. Evelyn's participation in the process did not depend on the will of the municipality, so it has no duty to cover her costs.

XIII.- It is important to note that numeral 12.3 of the CPCA establishes that the defendant shall be: “the natural or legal persons that have derived rights or legitimate interests from the administrative conduct that is the object of the process.” In this case, since the lawsuit requested the nullity of the act through which abbreviated bidding process No. 2015LA-000008-01 was awarded to Ms. Evelyn, the latter's intervention in the process was necessary, given the subjective right she obtained from the challenged act. The Court was correct in so establishing, as this represents a necessary passive litis consortium (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) by operation of law. Now, in the appealed judgment, the Municipality was ordered to assume the costs of all parties, including those of the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez, because it was said entity that solely incurred in the challenged conduct. For this Chamber, the Court was correct. Note that although Ms. Evelyn appeared as a defendant, she did not participate in the administrative irregularity under examination. It was the Municipality alone that caused it, which justifies its condemnation to pay costs not only in favor of its counterparty, but also of Mrs. Gómez Quirós, because her forced participation in the process generated expenses that she has no duty to bear. The anomalous action of the administration harmed the plaintiff and also Ms. Evelyn, by forcing her to face the present judicial dispute in order to defend her right. Therefore, her costs must be covered by the losing party, namely the defendant local entity. In line with the foregoing, the charge will be rejected.

**Appeal of the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez Quirós** **Cassation on procedural grounds** **XIV.-** In the **sole** ground, the appellant argues the defect of lack of reasoning because the Court failed to address her request to order the plaintiff to pay costs. She argues that it neither exempted nor ordered the plaintiff to make that payment, that is, it did not resolve the request in question and, rather, distorting what was requested, ordered the Municipality, when that particular matter was never requested.

**XV.-** When resolving the issue of costs, the Court expressly ordered: *"In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. The waiver of this order is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this Court considers that the prerequisites for its waiver do not occur, which is why both costs must be borne by the defendant party, and exclusively by the Municipality of Tibás, an entity that must assume the costs of all parties. The latter by virtue of the fact that it was (sic) the sued Administration that engaged in the challenged conduct, that the co-defendant Gómez Quirós did not participate in the conduct whose illegality is declared, as well as the fact that the plaintiff did not establish patrimonial claims against her."* **XVI.-** For this Chamber, the reasoning of a judgment consists of setting down or making manifest the reasons or foundations, factual and legal, for which the decision is adopted. Therefore, it forms an integral part of due process and the right of defense, since only by knowing the reasons for arriving at that determination can the affected party be placed in a position to challenge it. The absence of reasoning is noted in two hypotheses: the first, when it is non-existent, which is precisely when the judge or judges omit to record the foundations of their decision. The second scenario occurs in those cases where the argumentative display of the decision-making body is confusing or exhibits contradictions, which stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the reasons that serve as its basis. (On this matter, one can consult, among others, resolutions No. 1568 of 9 hours 30 minutes of November 29, 2012 and No. 184 of 13 hours of February 23, 2009). In the challenger's opinion, the appealed judgment suffers from the aforementioned defect because it did not refer to her request to order the plaintiff to pay costs. However, as observed, the Court clearly explained that the costs order falls upon the losing party, in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA, such that since the Municipality is the losing entity, it is its responsibility to assume the costs of the proceedings, including those of the co-defendant Gómez Quirós, according to the cited reasons. The questioned ruling provides, in a grounded manner, the reasons that led the Court to resolve as it did. Note that it referred to the regulations governing the scenarios for ordering and waiving costs, which it subsumed into the case under study and explained why it considered the local entity should be the one obligated to pay. In accordance with the foregoing, the error argued was not configured in this case and, therefore, the rejection of the complaint will be imposed.

**XVII.-** On the merits of the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit (sin lugar), and that of the Municipality is partially with merit (parcialmente con lugar). Ruling on the merits, the judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for non-material damage (daño moral). Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ¢24,882,150.00 in compensation in favor of the plaintiff. In its place, said amount is reduced by half (¢12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it remains intact. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must pay the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The Municipality is exempted from that payment, as its appeal was partially upheld.

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit (sin lugar), and that of the Municipality of Tibás is partially with merit (parcialmente con lugar). The appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for non-material damage (daño moral). Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ¢24,882,150.00 in compensation in favor of the plaintiff. In its place, said amount is reduced by half (¢12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it remains intact. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must pay the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The municipal entity is exempted from that payment.

ERAMIREZCA Therefore, it exceeded its authority by granting a claim not requested and whose granting depends on the party's initiative (principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo)) (voto 271-F-2019).

When the plaintiff has given an inadequate legal characterization to her petition, the judge must correct the error and address the substance of what is being requested, to infer which right the litigant seeks to have protected by the jurisdictional instances (voto 271-F-2019).

The defendant Municipality promoted a bidding process (licitación) for the contracting of professional legal services. Although the Procurement Department recommended awarding the contract to one person, considering they met the highest score according to the tender document's (cartel) evaluation criteria, the Municipal Council awarded it to another. In the present proceeding, the plaintiff requested the annulment (nulidad) of the agreement and, in its place, that the bidding process be awarded to him. In the alternative, damages (daños y perjuicios). The Tribunal partially granted the lawsuit and ordered the payment of lost profits (lucro cesante), non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), indexation (indexación), interest (intereses), and costs (costas). The appellant argues the judgment is incongruent because damages were decreed deriving from an act whose annulment was not requested. This Chamber finds, in accordance with Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), that if the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, a judgment favorable to the plaintiff may only recognize the payment of the damages caused. The foregoing occurs in the present case, as the payment of damages requested and granted in the judgment arose as an alternative solution due to the impossibility of re-awarding the contract to the plaintiff, as it had already been executed (voto 271-F-2019).

Interest (Intereses) is subject to the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo), meaning its granting depends on the express request of the interested party. In that sense, consult rulings 557-2010, 872-2010, 881-2010, 1037-2010, 18-2012, 1282-2012, and 1315-2016 (voto 271-F-2019).

Canons 123 and 124 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) oblige the Judge to rule, even sua sponte (de oficio), on the updating of the value of the sums granted. In the present case, such a ruling was fulfilled in the clarification and addition judgment, by ordering the indexation (indexación) of the amount given for non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) from the date the judgment becomes final (firmeza) (voto 271-F-2019).

The Tribunal exceeded its authority by granting a claim (statutory interest (intereses legales)) that was not requested. In principle, as it is a procedural defect (vicio de orden procesal), it would be appropriate to annul the judgment and proceed with the remand (reenvío) for a new resolution to be issued according to law. However, in this case, the proper course is its correction directly in this instance, in order to avoid unnecessary delays, since it suffices to annul the part granted in excess to remedy the inaccuracy (voto 271-F-2019).

Analysis on the calculation of compensation for the lost opportunity (pérdida de oportunidad). See judgments 478-2012, 823-2013, and 1040-2013. The frustrated opportunity caused to the non-awardee is not equivalent to, nor can it be equated with, the full consideration they would have obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit the prevented contractual relationship could have generated, as this would entail unjust or illicit enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto o ilícito) for someone who, without having fulfilled their consideration, would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract. What must be compensated is the loss of the opportunity that the offeror had to be awarded the contract and to obtain profits from its execution. In the case at hand (subjúdice), the total amount that the Municipality paid to the co-defendant for the effective provision of legal professional services under the contract does not constitute the equivalent of the compensation, but serves as an objective parameter for its calculation. This amount constitutes the real value of the contract and, therefore, the amount the plaintiff would presumably have received, had they been the awardee and had they fully complied with the requested service. However, since these facts did not occur in reality, a percentage must be subtracted from that sum for the referred-to random factor (factor aleatorio) and for the unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) the plaintiff would obtain by entirely receiving the value of the contract without providing the service. Thus, this Chamber finds that compensating an amount equivalent to 50% of the total value that was paid to the defendant, for the original duration term of the contract (1 year), is proportional and rational (voto 271-F-2019).

The defendant party shall be individuals or legal entities that have derived rights or legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) from the administrative conduct that is the subject of the proceeding (subsection 12.3 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)). In this case, since the lawsuit requested the annulment (nulidad) of the act by which the bidding process (licitación) was awarded to a legal professional, her intervention in the proceeding was necessary, given the legal right (derecho subjetivo) she obtained from the questioned act. Thus, the Tribunal acted correctly in so establishing, as this is a case of compulsory joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) by provision of Law (voto 271-F-2019).

In the present proceeding, the Tribunal joined the awardee of a bidding process (licitación), given the legal right (derecho subjetivo) she obtained from the act questioned for annulment (nulidad), as this is a case of compulsory joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario). In the appealed judgment, the Municipality was ordered to bear the costs (costas) of all parties, including those of the co-defendant, since said entity was the only one that incurred in the challenged conduct; which this Chamber upholds. It was the Municipality that influenced this, which justifies its condemnation to pay costs (costas) not only in favor of its opposing party, but also of the co-defendant, since her forced participation in the proceeding generated expenses she has no duty to bear. Therefore, the costs (costas) must be covered by the losing party, that is, the defendant local entity (voto 271-F-2019).

Analysis on the absence of reasoning (motivación) in a judgment. See resolutions 184-2009 and 1568-2012. In the appellant's opinion, the appealed judgment suffers from this defect because it did not refer to her request to condemn the plaintiff to pay costs (costas). It is observed that the Tribunal clearly explained that this condemnation falls on the losing party (canon 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)), such that since the defendant Municipality is the losing entity, it is responsible for bearing the costs (costas) of the proceeding, including those of the co-defendant.

In the questioned ruling, the court provides a well-founded explanation of the reasons that led the Tribunal to decide as it did. It referred to the regulations governing the assumptions for condemnation and exoneration in costs (costas), which it subsumed into the case under study and explained why it considered that the local entity should be the one obligated to bear that payment. Therefore, the alleged error did not occur in this case (voto 271-F-2019).

In its view, the principle of *“iura novit curia”*, used by the judges, refers to knowledge of the law, not to changes regarding matters that are the exclusive domain of the parties, such as the claims of the lawsuit. **3)** He points out that, as his main claim, the plaintiff sought the annulment of agreement No. VII-1 and, instead, that the competitively bid professional services contract be awarded to him. Subsidiarily, he requested the payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), but without requesting the annulment of the act. In his view, the Trial Court exceeded its powers by establishing damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) arising from an act whose annulment, or whose non-conformity with the legal system, was not requested. **4)** He alleges that the plaintiff did not request the payment of interest on the sum sought for non-material damage (daño moral); however, the Trial Court granted them on its own motion, exceeding its prerogatives.

**V.-** In relation to point **1)** cited above, the plaintiff in his lawsuit indeed sought as compensation for material damage (daño material) the amount and breakdown set forth by the appellant for cassation (¢21,600,000.00 in total); however, as recorded in the audiovisual record of the preliminary hearing, reviewed by this Chamber, that claim was adjusted, as permitted by article 90 of the CPCA. At that opportunity, the plaintiff indicated that the compensation sought should be calculated according to the amounts that the Municipality actually paid to Evelyn Gómez, Esq. in payment for the professional services rendered, as recorded in the certification issued by the Finance Department of that entity. Now, from a comprehensive reading of the appealed judgment, it can be deduced that the indemnity amount (quatum) accepted by the Trial Court was calculated based on the cited documentation, so that what was granted did not exceed what was requested by the plaintiff. Thus, it is evident that the judges did not incur in inconsistency, which justifies the rejection of the objection.

**VI.-** Regarding point **2)**, the appellant for cassation alleges inconsistency on the part of the Trial Court for having granted, as losses (perjuicios), what the plaintiff claimed as damages (daños). On this issue, the Trial Court noted that the indemnity amount claimed in the subsidiary claim of the lawsuit actually corresponded to losses (perjuicios) and not damages (daños) as stated. It reached that conclusion by considering that what was sought was the recognition of the sums not received because the tender was awarded to the co-defendant, which it considered consistent with the definition of losses (perjuicios) (not damages (daños)). For this Chamber, the conceptual clarification made by the Trial Court did not change what was claimed. Note that the object of the claim is the payment of the amounts that the plaintiff did not receive for not being the awardee, which he asks to be calculated based on the disbursements made to Evelyn Gómez, Esq. in the execution of the contract. Thus, regardless of the designation or title given, the compensation sought remained intact. The Judge did not overstep his powers, nor did he incur in inconsistency by adapting the redress sought to the legal concept which, in his view, is the appropriate one. This Chamber has warned that when the plaintiff has given an inadequate legal characterization to their claim, the judge must correct the mistake and turn to the substance of what is requested, to infer which right the litigant seeks to be protected by the jurisdictional bodies. Thus, what is important is the essence of what is petitioned, and not the technical particularities of the designation, which, in accordance with the above, do not limit the judicial authority from hearing the case and resolving what is appropriate in law. (See decisions No. 61 of 15 hours 20 minutes on July 23, 1997, No. 998 of 14 hours 50 minutes on December 21, 2005, and No. 301 of 11 hours 15 minutes on April 16, 2007). Under that understanding, the appealed judgment does not suffer from the attributed defect and, consequently, the rejection of the charge will be imposed.

**VII.-** Regarding point **3)**, the appellant argues that the judgment is inconsistent because damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) were decreed arising from an act whose annulment, or whose non-conformity with the legal system, was not requested. To resolve the objection, it is necessary to consider that in the claims of the lawsuit, the plaintiff primarily requested to declare the annulment of the act that awarded the professional services contract to Mrs. Evelyn and, instead, that it be awarded to him. Subsidiarily, he requested the payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) in the event *“the main petition is not granted, in the sense of assuming the functions of the position once the judgment becomes final, and for the one-year term of the contract, because it is not possible, the year of the contract having ended before the judgment is issued”*. According to the foregoing, the requested annulment would have two effects according to the said order: awarding the professional services contract to the plaintiff, as the primary remedy; or, paying him damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) in a subsidiary character. In that sense, it is clear that the compensation underlies as an effect of the administrative irregularity noted and only in the event that re-awarding was not possible. The Trial Court resolved in that order, as it ordered: *“[...] from the study of the acts, it can be clearly inferred that the sued Administration incurred in conduct contrary to the legal system. However, it is known to all parties that the administrative conduct in question has already been executed, as it is recorded in the case file that Evelyn Gómez Quirós, Esq., provided the professional services that were the object of the referenced abbreviated tender, and also that the corresponding fees were paid to her, by virtue of which it would be of no interest to decree the annulment of the award act. Nevertheless, that does not prevent declaring its non-conformity with the legal system, and consequently, establishing whether said unlawful action derived administrative liability [...]”* According to what is observed, the liability attributed to the municipal entity derives from the non-conformity of the referenced act with the legal system and the harm that this caused to the rights of the participant Mr. Ocampo Rojas. In accordance with article 90 of the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa): *“[...] if the procurement whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, a judgment favorable to the plaintiff may only recognize the payment of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused”.* The situation described in that rule occurs in the present case, since the payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) requested and granted in the judgment arose as an alternative solution given the impossibility of re-awarding the contract to the plaintiff because it had already been executed. Clearly, what was resolved is consistent with what was requested, so the objection must be rejected.

**VIII.-** In point **4)**, the appellant notes the defect of inconsistency because legal interest was granted on the compensatory sum for non-material damage (daño moral), when such matter was not requested by the plaintiff. Inconsistency, as a procedural defect, occurs when what is resolved does not correspond to what was petitioned, among other situations, for *ultra petita*, which arises when the judge rules on issues not requested. To determine the existence of this defect as a ground for cassation, the operative part of the judgment must necessarily be compared with the claims put forward, in order to determine if there really is an evident mismatch between them. In the case *sub examine*, upon performing the comparison, it is observed that neither in the claims of the lawsuit nor in their adjustments at the preliminary hearing, did the plaintiff make a petition on the matter, so its granting was done on the court's own motion. This Chamber has repeatedly understood that interest is subject to the party presentation principle, that is, its granting depends on the express request of the interested party (see, among others, decisions No. 557 of 10 hours 10 minutes on May 6, 2010, No. 872 of 9 hours 20 minutes on July 22, 2010, No. 881 of 14 hours 3 minutes on July 22, 2010, No. 1037 of 9 hours 35 minutes on September 2, 2010, No. 18 of 9 hours 5 minutes on February 2, 2012, No. 1282 of 9 hours 5 minutes on October 11, 2012, No. 1315 of 10 hours 56 minutes on December 7, 2016). In that understanding, the Trial Court exceeded its authority by granting a matter that was not requested and whose granting relies on the initiative of the party. It should be clarified that, although articles 123 and 124 of the CPCA require the Judge to rule, even on its own motion, on the updating of the value of the sums granted, in the present case, such pronouncement was fulfilled in the clarification and addition judgment, by ordering the indexation of the amount granted for non-material damage (daño moral) from the date the judgment becomes final. Thus, the granting of interest exceeded the prerogatives of the Trial Court, so the grievance is acceptable. Now, as a matter of principle, since it is a procedural defect, it would be appropriate to annul the judgment and proceed with a remand so that a new resolution can be issued in accordance with the law. However, in this case, the appropriate course is to correct it directly in this instance, in order to avoid unnecessary delays, since it suffices to annul the part granted in excess to remedy the inaccuracy. Thus, ruling on the merits, the judgment will be annulled only regarding the granting of legal interest on the sum of one million colones for non-material damage (daño moral).

**Cassation on Substantive Grounds** **IX.- First.** He argues a violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. He explains that the Trial Court granted the plaintiff, as losses (perjuicios), the sum of ¢24,882,140.00, an amount that corresponds to the payments the Municipality made to Evelyn Gómez, Esq. for the provision of her professional services as an advisor to the Municipal Council. He points out that what was paid to Mrs. Evelyn corresponds to her effective work, while the plaintiff would earn the same amount without having provided any professional service to the municipality. He considers the principle of equality to have been violated because the number of working hours for Mrs. Evelyn would not necessarily have been the same for the plaintiff, since each person has different capacities to perform tasks. He requests that the losses (perjuicios) be calculated in a prudent and reasonable manner, since, in his view, the payment of a sum identical to what the awardee received constitutes unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.

**X.-** Regarding this issue, the Trial Court considered that if the territorial Administration had respected the evaluation and scoring rules of the tender specifications, Mr. Mariano Ocampo would have been the successful bidder. In this way, it deemed that the items received by the awardee would have been paid to the plaintiff, so his compensatory relief translates into payment of the sums he should have received and could not by virtue of the noted irregularity. In order to calculate the amount, the judges took into account the sums that the Municipality paid to Mrs. Evelyn Gómez for the professional services provided during the contract term established in the tender specifications, for a total of ¢24,882,150.00.

**XI.-** In summary, the issue giving rise to the appellant's disagreement lies in the calculation of the compensation in favor of the plaintiff. For the Trial Court, the indemnity consists of the total amount that was paid to Mrs. Evelyn, a criterion on which the appellant for cassation disagrees, as he considers it disproportionate to compensate him 100% for a service he did not provide. In cases similar to the present one, this Chamber has stated: *“[...] the frustrated opportunity caused to the unsuccessful bidder is not equivalent to, nor can it be equated with, the totality of the consideration that would have been obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated, because that would imply unjust or unlawful enrichment for someone who, without having fulfilled their consideration, would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract”.* (In this regard, see decisions No. 478 of 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 of 9 hours 25 minutes on July 4, 2013). For these types of scenarios, it has been understood that the fair compensation for what did not materialize or was frustrated is not equivalent to the amount of the consideration established in the contract, since this was not performed. Furthermore, it must be considered that, by fully compensating the value of the contract, the risk associated with its effective fulfillment would be disregarded. For in such a case, it would be assumed that if the offeror had been the awardee, they would have fully performed the contract, when such facts are actually uncertain. Precisely for that reason, what is to be compensated is the loss of the opportunity that the offeror had to be the successful bidder and obtain benefits from its execution. This compensation underlies the existence of a serious and real opportunity to obtain a benefit—or avoid a loss—as appropriate, which is cut short as a consequence of unlawful or illegitimate conduct that prevents its attainment. That possibility, of course, must be based on circumstances that evidence a high degree of probability regarding its realization. Thus, mere conjecture, speculation, or expectations do not fall within this compensatory spectrum. In the case *sub examine*, it was held as proven that the plaintiff had the possibility of being the successful bidder and obtaining benefits from the execution and fulfillment of the contract. A possibility that, in this specific case, was serious and real; however, it was snatched from him, a corollary of an illegitimate action by the Administration. Therefore, it is appropriate to compensate him, but not with the equivalent of the full value of the procurement, as the Trial Court did. The calculation of compensation for the lost opportunity, according to modern doctrine and in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see resolutions No. 478 of 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, and No. 823 of 9 hours 25 minutes on July 4, 2013, No. 1040 of 8 hours 40 minutes on August 14, 2013), is established under reasonable, measured, prudent, and objective jurisdictional discretion, which must be framed within objective criteria and in accordance with the special circumstances surrounding each case. In the case *sub júdice*, as stated, the total amount that the Municipality paid for the effective provision of that contract does not constitute the equivalent of the compensation, but it does serve as an objective parameter for its calculation. This amount constitutes the real value of the contract and, therefore, the sum that Mr. Mariano would presumably have received, had he been the successful bidder and had he fully performed the requested service. However, since these last two events did not occur in reality, a percentage must be subtracted from that sum for the random factor referred to *supra* and for the unjust enrichment that the plaintiff would obtain by integrally receiving the value of the contract, without providing any service. Thus, this Chamber considers that compensating Mr. Mariano with an amount equivalent to 50% of the total value that was paid to Mrs. Evelyn for the original duration term of the contract (1 year), being the total sum of ¢12,441,075.00, is proportional and rational to indemnify the detriment under examination. Consistent with the foregoing, acceptance of the charge will be imposed and, consequently, the appealed judgment will be annulled regarding the matter that has been subject to analysis, in order to instead grant the indemnity amount (quamtum) set forth herein.

**XII.- Second.** He points out that the Trial Court, on its own motion, ordered that Evelyn Gómez, Esq. be joined to the litigation (litis) and, despite this, ordered the local entity to pay the costs of said co-defendant, violating the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, justice, and equity. He highlights that Mrs. Evelyn's participation in the process did not depend on the will of the municipality, so it has no duty to pay her costs.

**XIII.-** It is necessary to emphasize that article 12.3 of the CPCA provides that the following shall be a defendant party: *“natural or legal persons who have derived rights or legitimate interests from the administrative conduct that is the object of the process”.* In this case, as the lawsuit requested the annulment of the act through which abbreviated tender No. 2015LA-000008-01 was awarded to Mrs. Evelyn, the intervention of the latter in the process was necessary, given the subjective right she obtained from the challenged act. Thus, the Trial Court correctly so established, as it is a matter of necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) by provision of Law. Now, in the appealed judgment, the Municipality was ordered to bear the costs of all parties, including those of the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez, because it was said entity that was solely responsible for the challenged conduct. For this Chamber, the Trial Court is correct. Note that, although Mrs. Evelyn appeared as a defendant, she did not participate in the administrative irregularity under examination. It was the Municipality exclusively that influenced this, which justifies its condemnation for costs not only in favor of its counterpart but also in favor of Mrs. Gómez Quirós, since her forced participation in the process generated expenses that she has no duty to bear. The anomalous action of the administration harmed the plaintiff and also Mrs. Evelyn, by having to face the present judicial dispute in order to defend her right. Therefore, her costs must be covered by the losing party, that is, the sued local entity. Consistent with the foregoing, the rejection of the charge is appropriate.

**Appeal of the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez Quirós** **Cassation on procedural grounds** **XIV.-** In the **sole** ground, the appellant argues the defect of lack of reasoning because the Chamber failed to address her request to order the plaintiff to pay costs. She argues that it neither exempted nor ordered the plaintiff to make that payment, that is, it did not resolve the request in question and, rather, distorting what was requested, ordered the Municipalidad, when that particular matter was never requested.

**XV.-** When resolving the issue of costs, the Chamber expressly ordered: *"In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Waiver of this award is only viable when, in the Chamber's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this Chamber considers that the conditions for its waiver do not occur, for which reason both costs must be borne by the defendant, and exclusively by the Municipalidad de Tibás, entity that must assume the costs of all parties. The latter by virtue of the fact that it was (sic) the sued Administration that engaged in the challenged conduct, that the co-defendant Gómez Quirós did not participate in the conduct whose illegality is declared, as well as the fact that the plaintiff did not establish patrimonial claims against her."* **XVI.-** For this Court, the reasoning of a judgment consists of setting forth or revealing the factual and legal reasons or grounds upon which the decision is adopted. Therefore, it forms an integral part of due process and the right of defense, since only by knowing the motives for reaching that determination is the affected party placed in a position to challenge it. The absence of reasoning is noted in two hypotheses: the first, when it is nonexistent, which is precisely when the judge omits to state the foundations of their decision. The second scenario occurs in those cases where the argumentative exposition of the deciding body is confusing or exhibits contradictions, which stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the motives that serve as its basis. (On this matter, see, among others, resolutions No. 1568 of 9 hours 30 minutes of November 29, 2012 and No. 184 of 13 hours of February 23, 2009). In the opinion of the challenger, the appealed judgment suffers from the defect in question because it did not refer to her request to order the plaintiff to pay costs. However, as can be observed, the Chamber clearly explained that the award of costs falls upon the losing party, in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA, so that since the Municipalidad is the losing entity, it must assume the costs of the process, including those of the co-defendant Gómez Quirós, according to the cited reasons. The questioned judgment provides, in a well-founded manner, the reasons that led the Chamber to resolve as it did. Note, it alluded to the regulations governing the conditions for awarding and exempting from costs, which it subsumed into the case under study and explained why it considered the local entity should be the one obligated to bear that payment. In accordance with the foregoing, the alleged error did not materialize in this case and, therefore, the rejection of the objection must be imposed.

**XVII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit, and that of the Municipalidad is declared partially with merit. Ruling on the merits, the judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for moral damages. Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ¢24,882,150.00 in compensation in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, said amount is reduced by half (¢12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it shall remain unchanged. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must bear the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The Municipalidad is exempted from this payment, as its appeal was partially upheld.

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal filed by the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez is declared without merit, and that of the Municipalidad de Tibás is declared partially with merit. The appealed judgment is annulled insofar as it granted legal interest on the amount awarded for moral damages. Likewise, insofar as it granted the sum of ¢24,882,150.00 in compensation in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, said amount is reduced by half (¢12,441,075.00). In all other respects, it remains unchanged. In accordance with precept 150.3 of the CPCA, the co-defendant Evelyn Gómez must bear the costs generated by the filing of her appeal. The municipal entity is exempted from this payment.

ERAMIREZCA 1

20170004000209-1743951-1.rtf *150057561027CA* Res. 000271-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiséis de marzo de dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por MARIANO OCAMPO ROJAS; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE TIBÁS, representada por el alcalde municipal Carlos Luis Cascante Duarte, administrador, EVELYN GÓMEZ QUIRÓS. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, vecinos de San José, y con las salvedades hechas, casados y abogados.

Redacta el magistrado Molinari Vílchez

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Según los hechos tenidos por demostrados en la sentencia recurrida, la Municipalidad de Tibás promovió la licitación abreviada No. 2015LA-000008-01, para la contratación de servicios profesionales jurídicos para el Concejo Municipal de esa localidad. El señor Mariano Ocampo Rojas y la señora Evelyn Gómez Quirós presentaron sus respectivas ofertas. Mediante informe PMCI del 14 de abril de 2015, la Proveeduría Municipal recomendó adjudicar el contrato al señor Mariano Ocampo Rojas, al considerar que cumplía con el mayor puntaje según los criterios de evaluación del cartel. No obstante, mediante el acuerdo VII-1, adoptado en la sesión ordinaria No. 260, celebrada el 21 de abril de 2015, el Concejo Municipal adjudicó el contrato a la señora Evelyn Gómez Quirós. En fecha 19 de mayo de 2015, el señor Ocampo Rojas planteó recurso de revocatoria y nulidad absoluta contra el acto anterior, el cual fue rechazado mediante el acuerdo II-1 de sesión ordinaria No. 139 del 18 de junio de 2015 del Concejo Municipal.

II.- Inconforme el señor Ocampo incoó el presente proceso judicial contra la referida Municipalidad, requiriendo la nulidad del acuerdo No. VII-1 citado y, en su lugar, se le adjudique a él la licitación. De manera subsidiaria, pide el pago de daños y perjuicios. Mediante resolución de las 15 horas 56 minutos del 2 de noviembre de 2015, se tuvo como demandada a la señora Evelyn Gómez y se le confirió a ambos accionados el plazo de Ley para contestar la demanda. La representación del ente municipal contestó negativamente sin oponer excepciones. La señora Evelyn Gómez contestó de forma negativa e interpuso las excepciones de demanda defectuosa (resuelta interlocutoriamente), falta de derecho, de interés actual y de legitimación. Mediante sentencia No. 07-V-2017 de las 10 horas 24 minutos del 31 de enero de 2017, la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Condenó a la Municipalidad a pagar al señor Mariano Ocampo la suma de ¢24,882,150.00 por concepto de lucro cesante, más intereses legales desde la fecha de cancelación de cada una de las órdenes de pago emitidas por la Municipalidad de Tibás. Asimismo, la suma de ¢1,000,000.00 por concepto de daño moral, más intereses legales a partir de la firmeza del fallo. Impuso las costas del actor y de la co-accionada Evelyn Gómez a cargo del ente municipal. Mediante resolución No. 07-V-2017-BIS de las 11 horas 40 minutos del 3 de abril de 2017, se adicionó la sentencia anterior en lo siguiente: “[…] las sumas que resulten de las obligaciones dinerarias establecidas deberán actualizarse para compensar la variación en el poder adquisitivo a partir de la fecha de cancelación de cada una de las órdenes de pago emitidas por la Municipalidad de Tibás, según la liquidación que se presente en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, y hasta su efectiva cancelación. En lo concerniente a la suma otorgada por daño moral, la indexación deberá estimarse a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia”. Inconforme ambos co-demandados entablaron recurso de casación ante esta Sala.

III.- Legitimación para recurrir. Esta Sala ha indicado que, por principio procesal y conforme a la doctrina emanada de los artículos 561 y 598 del Código Procesal Civil (CPC), de aplicación en la especie por remisión del numeral 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), sólo la parte o tercero perjudicado con la decisión es el legitimado para recurrirla. (Sobre el particular pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de esta Cámara números 401 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2010, 189 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 3 de marzo de 2011, 825 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 4 de julio de 2013 y 508 de las 8 horas 38 minutos del 10 de abril de 2014). En el súbjudice, la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez y la Municipalidad interpusieron conjuntamente recurso de casación en fecha 23 de febrero de 2017. Sólo una de las disconformidades allí enlistadas perjudica a la señora Gómez Quirós, las restantes atañen en exclusiva al ente territorial, por ello, procederá conocerlas por separado, en concordancia con la legitimación que le asiste a cada accionado. Por otra parte, en fecha 8 de mayo de 2017, la señora Gómez Quirós amplió el recurso anterior. En términos generales, disiente de la condena al pago de la indexación impuesta en el fallo de aclaración y adición (No. 07-V-2017-BIS). Según observa esta Cámara, la referida condena es únicamente contra la Municipalidad, de modo que ese punto en particular no afectó a la señora Gómez Quirós y, en ese tanto, carece de legitimación para impugnarlo, lo que justifica su rechazo de plano.

Recurso de la Municipalidad de Tibás Casación por motivos procesales IV.- En el único agravio procesal, el ente municipal acusa la infracción de los cánones 119 del CPCA y 153 del CPC. En su criterio, el Tribunal incurrió en el vicio de incongruencia, por los siguientes motivos: 1) Señala, el actor solicitó como pretensión subsidiaria el pago de 12 mensualidades de honorarios profesionales a razón de ¢1,800,000.00 por mes, para un total de ¢21,600,000.00. Sin embargo, arguye, el Tribunal se apartó de lo requerido y concedió las sumas que fueron efectivamente pagadas a la Licda. Evelyn Gómez, otorgando un monto mayor (¢24,882,150.00 en total). 2) Advierte, el demandante solicitó a título de daño material el pago de los emolumentos no recibidos; sin embargo, el Tribunal modificó esa petitoria, estableciendo que lo requerido eran perjuicios y no daño como expresamente fue planteado. En su criterio, el principio “iura novit curia”, empleado por los juzgadores, refiere al conocimiento del derecho, no a cambios sobre extremos que compete en exclusiva a las partes, como son las pretensiones de la demanda. 3) Apunta, como pretensión principal, el accionante solicitó la nulidad del acuerdo No. VII-1 y, en su lugar, se adjudicase a él el contrato por servicios profesionales licitado. De manera subsidiaria pidió el pago de daños y perjuicios, pero sin requerir la nulidad del acto. En su criterio, el Tribunal extralimitó sus facultades al establecer daños y perjuicios derivados de un acto sobre el cual no se pidió su nulidad, ni su disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico. 4) Alega, el demandante no solicitó el pago de intereses sobre la suma requerida por daño moral; no obstante, el Tribunal los concedió oficiosamente, extralimitando sus prerrogativas.

V.- En relación con el acápite 1) citado, ciertamente el actor en su demanda solicitó como indemnización por daño material el monto y desglose expuestos por el casacionista (¢21,600,000.00 en total); no obstante, tal cual consta en el soporte audiovisual de la audiencia preliminar, examinado por esta Sala, esa pretensión fue ajustada, según lo permite el canon 90 del CPCA. En tal oportunidad, el accionante indicó que la indemnización requerida debía calcularse con los montos que la Municipalidad efectivamente canceló a la licenciada Evelyn Gómez en pago de los servicios profesionales brindados, y que constan en la certificación emitida por el Departamento de Hacienda de esa entidad. Ahora bien, de la lectura integral de la sentencia recurrida se extrae que el quatum indemnizatorio acogido por el Tribunal fue calculado con base en la documentación citada, de modo que lo otorgado no extralimitó lo requerido por el actor. Así, es evidente que los juzgadores no incurrieron en incongruencia, lo que justifica el rechazo del reparo.

VI.- En el punto 2), el casacionista alega la incongruencia del Tribunal al haber concedido a título de perjuicios, lo que el actor estimó como daños. Sobre este tema, el Tribunal advirtió que el monto indemnizatorio reclamado en la pretensión subsidiaria de la demanda en realidad obedecía a perjuicios y no daños como fue consignado. A esa conclusión arribó al tomar en cuenta que lo pretendido era el reconocimiento de las sumas dejadas de percibir al adjudicarse a la codemandada la licitación, lo que consideró acorde con la definición de perjuicios (no de daños). Para esta Cámara, la precisión conceptual hecha por el Tribunal no varió lo pretendido. Nótese, el objeto de la pretensión es el pago de los montos que el actor dejó de percibir por no resultar adjudicatario, los cuales pide calcular con base en los desembolsos hechos a la Licda. Evelyn Gómez en la ejecución del contrato. Así, independientemente de la denominación o título que se dio, la indemnización requerida se mantuvo intacta. No se extralimitó el Juzgador en sus potestades, ni incurrió en incongruencia al adecuar el resarcimiento pedido a la figura jurídica que, en su criterio, es la idónea. Esta Sala ha advertido que cuando la parte accionante ha dado una calificación jurídica inadecuada a su pretensión, debe el juzgador enderezar el desacierto y acudir al fondo de lo que se pide, para inferir cuál es el derecho que el litigante busca sea tutelado por las instancias jurisdiccionales. Así lo importante es la esencia de lo peticionado y no las particularidades técnicas de la denominación, las que, al tenor de lo dicho, no limitan a la autoridad judicial para conocer la causa y resolver lo que en derecho corresponda. (Consúltese los votos No. 61 de las 15 horas 20 minutos del 23 de julio de 1997, No. 998 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 21 de diciembre de 2005 y No. 301 de las 11 horas 15 minutos el 16 de abril de 2007). Bajo esa inteligencia, la sentencia recurrida no adolece del vicio endilgado y, por consiguiente, se impondrá la denegatoria del cargo.

VII.- En el punto 3), el recurrente arguye la incongruencia del fallo al haberse decretado daños y perjuicios derivados de un acto sobre el cual no se solicitó su nulidad, ni su disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico. Para la resolución del reproche, es preciso considerar que en las pretensiones de la demanda, el accionante pidió, de manera principal, declarar la nulidad del acto que adjudicó el contrato de servicios profesionales a doña Evelyn y, en su lugar, se le adjudicara a él. De manera subsidiaria, requirió el pago de daños y perjuicios en caso “de no ser acogida la petitoria principal, en el sentido de asumir funciones del cargo una vez firme la sentencia, y por el año de plazo de la contratación, por no ser posible, al haber finalizado el año de contratación antes del dictado de la sentencia”. De acuerdo con lo anterior, la nulidad solicitada tendría dos efectos según la prelación dicha: adjudicarle el contrato de servicios profesionales al actor, como principal; o, pagarle daños y perjuicios en carácter subsidiario. En ese sentido, queda claro que la indemnización subyace como efecto de la irregularidad administrativa advertida y sólo en el caso de que no fuera posible la readjudicación. Bajo ese orden resolvió el Tribunal, en tanto dispuso: “[…] del estudio de los actos se infiere con claridad que la Administración accionada incurrió en una conducta contraria al ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, es de conocimiento de todas las partes que la conducta administrativa en cuestión ya ha sido ejecutada pues consta en autos que la Licda. Evelyn Gómez Quirós, prestó los servicios profesionales objeto de la licitación abreviada de referencia, y además que le fueron cancelados los honorarios correspondientes, en virtud de lo cual carecería de interés decretar la nulidad del acto de adjudicación. No obstante, ello no impide declarar su disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico, y en consecuencia, establecer si dicha actuación contraria a derecho derivó responsabilidad administrativa […]”. Según se observa, la responsabilidad atribuida al ente municipal deriva de la disconformidad del referido acto con el ordenamiento jurídico y la lesión que ello provocó en los derechos del participante Ocampo Rojas. De acuerdo con el precepto 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa: “[…] si la contratación cuya adjudicación se impugna ha sido ejecutada o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, la sentencia favorable al accionante sólo podrá reconocer el pago de los daños y perjuicios causados”. La situación descrita en esa norma acontece en el presente, pues el pago de daños y perjuicios requerido y acogido en sentencia surgió como solución alterna ante la imposibilidad de readjudicarle el contrato al actor por ya haber sido ejecutado. Claramente, lo resuelto es coherente con lo pedido, por lo que deberá rechazarse el reproche.

VIII.- En el acápite 4), el recurrente advierte el vicio de incongruencia al haberse concedido intereses legales sobre la suma indemnizatoria por daño moral, cuando tal extremo no fue pedido por el actor. La incongruencia, como vicio de actividad, se presenta cuando lo resuelto no guarda correspondencia con lo peticionado, entre otros supuestos, por ultra petita, que surge cuando el juzgador se pronuncia sobre cuestiones no pedidas. Para determinar la existencia de este vicio como causal de casación ha de confrontarse, necesariamente, la parte resolutiva de la sentencia con las pretensiones aducidas, a fin de determinar si en realidad existe entre estos evidente desajuste. En el subexamine, realizado el cotejo, se observa que ni en las pretensiones de la demanda ni en sus ajustes en audiencia preliminar, el demandante hizo petición sobre el particular, de manera que su otorgamiento fue de manera oficiosa. En forma reiterada esta Cámara ha entendido que los intereses están sujetos al principio dispositivo, es decir, su otorgamiento depende del requerimiento expreso de la parte interesada (consúltense, entre otros, los votos No. 557 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 6 de mayo de 2010, No. 872 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 22 de julio de 2010, No. 881 de las 14 horas 3 minutos del 22 de julio de 2010, No. 1037 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 2 de setiembre de 2010, No. 18 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 2 de febrero de 2012, No. 1282 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 11 de octubre de 2012, No. 1315 de las 10 horas 56 minutos del 7 de diciembre de 2016). En esa inteligencia, se extralimitó el Tribunal al conceder un extremo que no fue pedido y cuya concesión pende de la iniciativa de la parte. Conviene aclarar que, si bien los cánones 123 y 124 del CPCA imponen al Juzgador pronunciarse aún de oficio sobre la actualización del valor de las sumas concedidas, en el presente caso, tal pronunciamiento se cumplió en el fallo de aclaración y adición, al ordenarse la indexación del monto dado por daño moral a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia. De ese modo, el otorgamiento de los intereses sobrepasó las prerrogativas del Tribunal, por lo que el agravio resulta de recibo. Ahora bien, en tesis de principio, por ser un vicio de orden procesal, correspondería anular la sentencia y proceder con el reenvío para que se dicte una nueva resolución conforme a derecho. Sin embargo, en este caso, lo procedente es su corrección directamente en esta instancia, a fin de evitar dilaciones innecesarias, pues basta con anular la parte concedida de más para sanear la inexactitud. Así, fallando por el fondo, se anulará la sentencia únicamente en cuanto concedió intereses legales sobre la suma de un millón de colones por daño moral.

Casación por motivos sustantivos IX.- Primero. Arguye violación a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Explica, el Tribunal le concedió al actor a título de perjuicios la suma de ¢24,882,140.00, monto que corresponde a los pagos que hizo la Municipalidad a la Licda. Evelyn Gómez por la prestación de sus servicios profesionales como asesora del Concejo Municipal. Apunta, lo que fue pagado a doña Evelyn responde a su trabajo efectivo, en cambio el accionante devengaría la misma cantidad sin haber prestado ningún servicio profesional al ayuntamiento. Estima conculcado el principio de igualdad porque la cantidad de horas de trabajo de doña Evelyn, no necesariamente habrían sido las mismas del actor, por cuanto cada persona tiene distintas capacidades para realizar labores. Pide calcular los perjuicios de manera prudencial y razonable, pues, a su parecer, el pago de una suma idéntica a lo que recibió la adjudicataria constituye un enriquecimiento injusto del accionante.

X.- En lo que a este tema respecta, el Tribunal consideró que si la Administración territorial hubiera respetado las reglas de valoración y puntuación del cartel, don Mariano Ocampo habría resultado adjudicatario. De ese modo, estimó que los rubros percibidos por quien resultó adjudicado, habrían sido pagados al actor, por lo que su tutela resarcitoria se traduce en el pago de las sumas que debió recibir y no pudo en virtud de la irregularidad apuntada. A fin de calcular el monto, los juzgadores tomaron en cuenta los importes que la Municipalidad canceló a la señora Evelyn Gómez por los servicios profesionales prestados durante el plazo de contratación establecido en el cartel, para un total de ¢24,882,150.00.

XI.- En síntesis, el tema que suscita la disconformidad del recurrente estriba en el cálculo del resarcimiento a favor del actor. Para el Tribunal, la indemnización se compone de la totalidad del monto que fue pagado a doña Evelyn, criterio sobre el cual disiente el casacionista, en tanto estima desproporcional indemnizarle el 100% de un servicio que no prestó. En casos similares al presente, esta Sala ha señalado: “[…] la frustrada oportunidad causada a quien no resultó adjudicatario, no equivale ni puede equipararse con la plenitud de la contraprestación que hubiera obtenido en el supuesto de la ejecución plena del contrato no firmado, ni la utilidad que le pudo generar la relación contractual impedida, pues ello implicaría un enriquecimiento injusto o ilícito para quien sin haber cumplido con su contraprestación, obtendría todos los beneficios derivados del contrato”. (Al respecto se pueden consultar los votos No. 478 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 12 de abril de 2012 y No. 823 de las 9 horas 25 minutos del 4 de julio de 2013). Para este tipo de escenarios, se ha entendido que la indemnización justa por lo que no nació o se frustró, no es equivalente al monto de la prestación establecida en el contrato, pues esta no se efectuó. Además, debe tomarse en cuenta que, al resarcirse íntegramente el valor del contrato, se estaría prescindiendo del riesgo asociado al efectivo cumplimiento de aquel. Pues en tal caso, se estaría asumiendo que si el oferente hubiese sido el adjudicado, habría cumplido a cabalidad el contrato, cuando tales datos en realidad son inciertos. Precisamente por eso, lo que comporta indemnizar es la pérdida de la oportunidad que tenía el oferente de resultar adjudicatario y obtener réditos con su ejecución. Este resarcimiento subyace ante la existencia de una oportunidad seria y real de obtener un beneficio -o evitar una pérdida- según sea el caso, que se ve truncada, como consecuencia de una conducta ilícita o ilegítima que impide su obtención. Esa posibilidad, claro está, debe cimentarse sobre circunstancias que evidencien un alto grado de probabilidad en cuanto a su realización. De modo que las meras conjeturas, especulaciones o expectativas no entran dentro de este espectro indemnizatorio. En el subexamine, se tuvo por probado que el actor tenía la posibilidad de resultar adjudicatario y obtener réditos con la ejecución y cumplimiento del contrato. Posibilidad que, en este caso concreto se tornaba seria y real; sin embargo, le fue birlada, corolario de una actuación ilegítima de la Administración. Por lo anterior, es dable resarcirlo, mas no con el equivalente del valor pleno de la contratación, como lo hizo el Tribunal. El cálculo de la indemnización por la oportunidad perdida, según la doctrina moderna y en concordancia con la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (véanse las resoluciones No. 478 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 12 de abril de 2012 y No. 823 de las 9 horas 25 minutos del 4 de julio de 2013, No. 1040 de las 8 horas 40 minutos del 14 de agosto de 2013), se instaura bajo la razonable, comedida, prudente y objetiva discrecionalidad jurisdiccional, la que debe enmarcarse dentro de criterios objetivos y de conformidad con las circunstancias especiales que rodean cada caso. En el subjúdice, según se dijo, la totalidad del monto que pagó la Municipalidad por la prestación efectiva de ese contrato, no constituye el equivalente de la indemnización, pero sí sirve como parámetro objetivo para su cálculo. Este monto configura el valor real del contrato y, por ende, el que presumiblemente habría recibido don Mariano, de haber resultado adjudicatario y de haber cumplido a cabalidad con el servicio pedido. Sin embargo, como estos dos últimos hechos no ocurrieron en la realidad, a esa suma debe restársele un porcentaje por el factor aleatorio referido supra y por el enriquecimiento sin causa que obtendría el accionante, al percibir integralmente el valor del contrato, sin prestar servicio alguno. Así, estima esta Sala que resarcir a don Mariano con monto equivalente a un 50% del valor total que fue cancelado a doña Evelyn por el plazo de duración original del contrato (1 año), siendo en total la suma de ¢12,441,075.00, resulta proporcional y racional para indemnizar el detrimento en examen. A tono con lo expuesto, se impondrá el recibo del cargo y, en consecuencia, se anulará la sentencia recurrida en lo que ha sido objeto de análisis, para en su lugar, otorgar el quamtum indemnizatorio aquí fijado.

XII.- Segundo. Apunta, el Tribunal, de manera oficiosa, ordenó integrar a la litis a la Licda. Evelyn Gómez y, pese a ello, condenó al ente local al pago de las costas de dicha co-demandada, violentando los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, justicia y equidad. Resalta, la participación de doña Evelyn en el proceso no dependió de la voluntad de la municipalidad, por lo que no tiene el deber de sufragar sus costas.

XIII.- Precisa destacar que el numeral 12.3 del CPCA estatuye que será parte demandada: “las personas físicas o jurídicas que hayan derivado derechos o intereses legítimos de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso”. En este caso, al solicitarse en la demanda la nulidad del acto mediante el cual se adjudicó la licitación abreviada No. 2015LA-000008-01 a doña Evelyn, resultaba necesario la intervención de esta última en el proceso, dado el derecho subjetivo que obtuvo del acto cuestionado. De ese modo, hizo bien el Tribunal al así establecerlo, pues se trata de un litis consorcio pasivo necesario por disposición de Ley. Ahora bien, en la sentencia recurrida se impuso a la Municipalidad asumir las costas de todas las partes, incluida las de la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez, por cuanto fue dicha entidad la única que incurrió en la conducta impugnada. Para esta Cámara lleva razón el Tribunal. Nótese, aunque doña Evelyn figuró como demandada, no participó en la irregularidad administrativa en examen. Fue la Municipalidad en exclusiva quien incidió en ello, lo que justifica su condena en costas no sólo a favor de su contraparte, sino también de la señora Gómez Quirós, pues su forzosa participación en el proceso le generó gastos que no tiene el deber de soportar. El actuar anómalo de la administración perjudicó al actor y también a doña Evelyn, al tener que hacer frente a la presente contienda judicial, a fin de defender su derecho. Por ello, sus costas deben ser cubiertas por la parte perdidosa, sea el ente local demandado. En consonancia con lo expuesto, procederá rechazar el cargo.

Recurso de la co-accionada Evelyn Gómez Quirós Casación por motivos procesales XIV.- En el único cargo, la recurrente arguye el vicio de falta de motivación porque el Tribunal omitió referirse a su petitoria de condenar en costas al actor. Arguye, no eximió ni condenó al accionante a ese pago, es decir, no resolvió la petitoria de comentario y, más bien, tergiversando lo requerido condenó a la Municipalidad, cuando nunca se pidió ese particular.

XV.- Al resolver el tema de costas, el Tribunal expresamente dispuso: “De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena sólo es viable cuando existe, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, estima este Tribunal, que no ocurren los supuestos para su dispensa, motivo por el cual ambas costas deben ser cargadas a la parte demandada, y de forma exclusiva a la Municipalidad de Tibás, ente que debe asumir las costas de todas las partes. Esto último en virtud de fue (sic) la Administración accionada la que incurrió en la conducta impugnada, que la codemandada Gómez Quirós no intervino en la conducta cuya ilegalidad se declara, así como en el hecho de que el demandante no estableció pretensiones patrimoniales en su contra”.

XVI.- Para esta Cámara, la motivación de un fallo consiste en plasmar o poner en manifiesto las razones o fundamentos, fácticos y jurídicos, por los que se adopta la decisión. Por ello forma parte integrante del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa, pues sólo conociendo los motivos por los que se arriba a esa determinación, es que se coloca al afectado en posibilidad de combatirla. La ausencia de motivación se advierte en dos hipótesis, la primera, cuando es inexistente, que es precisamente cuando el juzgador o juzgadora omiten consignar los cimientos de su decisión. El segundo supuesto se produce en aquellos casos en que el despliegue argumentativo del órgano decisor resulta confuso o exhibe contradicciones, que se erigen como obstáculo para determinar de forma diáfana los motivos que le sirven de base. (Sobre el particular se pueden consultar, entre otras, las resoluciones No. 1568 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 29 de noviembre de 2012 y No. 184 de las 13 horas del 23 de febrero de 2009). En criterio de la impugnante, la sentencia recurrida adolece del vicio en mención porque no se refirió a su petición de condenar en costas al actor. No obstante, según se observa, el Tribunal explicó claramente que la condena en costas recae sobre el vencido, de conformidad con el canon 193 del CPCA, de modo que al ser la Municipalidad la entidad perdidosa le corresponde asumir las costas del proceso, incluyendo las de la co-accionada Gómez Quirós, según los motivos citados. En el fallo cuestionado se brinda de forma cimentada las razones que condujeron al Tribunal a resolver como lo hizo. Obsérvese, aludió a la normativa que regula los supuestos de condena y exoneración en costas, lo cual subsumió en el caso de estudio y explicó por qué consideró debía ser el ente local el obligado a costear ese pago. De conformidad con lo expuesto, el yerro argüido no se configuró en la especie y, por ende, se impondrá el rechazo de la censura.

XVII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, se declarará sin lugar el recurso de casación formulado por la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez y parcialmente con lugar el de la Municipalidad. Fallando por el fondo, se anulará la sentencia en cuanto concedió intereses legales sobre el monto otorgado por daño moral. Asimismo, en cuanto otorgó la suma de ¢24,882,150.00 de indemnización a favor del actor. En su lugar, dicho importe se reducirá a la mitad (¢12,441,075.00). En lo demás, se mantendrá incólume. De conformidad con el precepto 150.3 del CPCA, deberá la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez sufragar las cosas generadas con la interposición de su recurso. Se eximirá de ese pago a la Municipalidad, en tanto su recurso fue acogido parcialmente.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación formulado por la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez y parcialmente con lugar el de la Municipalidad de Tibás. Se anula la sentencia recurrida en cuanto concedió intereses legales sobre el monto otorgado por daño moral. Asimismo, en cuanto otorgó la suma de ¢24,882,150.00 de indemnización a favor del actor. En su lugar, dicho importe se reduce a la mitad (¢12,441,075.00). En lo demás, se mantiene incólume. De conformidad con el precepto 150.3 del CPCA, debe la co-demandada Evelyn Gómez sufragar las costas generadas con la interposición de su recurso. Se exime de ese pago al ente municipal.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero Maribel Seing Murillo ERAMIREZCA 1