Capacity and insanity in a possession-right deedCapacidad e insania en escritura de derecho de posesión

PJEDITOR Document  Res. 001930-F-S1-2022 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on August twelfth, two thousand twenty-two.

In an ordinary proceeding filed by [Name 030] (represented by the guardian (curador) [Name 019] Alexander [Name 005]) against [Name 002] and [Name 003]. Legal professionals Andrés Pérez González, Johanna María Moreno Bustos, and Eric Badilla Córdoba appear; the first as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff, the second on her own behalf, and the third, representing the interests of the defendant [Name 003], as lead attorney.

Drafted by Magistrate Vargas Vásquez; and,

WHEREAS

I.- Mr. [Name 005], in his capacity as guardian (curador) of the legally incapacitated person (insano) [Name 030], filed a civil lawsuit on March 16, 2005, against [Name 003] and [Name 002] based on the following facts. He stated that Mr. [Name 030] suffered a traffic accident in 1973 that caused very serious injuries. He alleged that unscrupulous persons took advantage of his situation and he went bankrupt; because, due to his "mental incapacity," he lost a highly valuable property through a fraudulent sale. He added that his mother, Mrs. [Name 006], acting as his guardian (curadora), wanted to recover that property through a criminal complaint against the acquirer and against Mr. Jorge Antonio Larios Ugalde. Regarding the property, he reported that more than 30 years ago, the plaintiff acquired possession of the unregistered farm (finca), located in Guadalupe de Liberia, which has the following boundaries: North: [Name 007], [Name 008] and [Name 009]; South: [Name 010] and Quebrada Barreal; East: Public Road highway to Liberia Centro, and West: [Name 010]. He stated that this farm (finca) measures 5,298 square meters and corresponds to cadastral map no. G- 587784- 99. He commented that on March 24, 2003, the plaintiff transferred his possessory right over the aforementioned farm (finca) to Mr. [Name 003], by public deed number 335 of the protocol of Attorney Johanna María Moreno Bustos. He added that the deed stated that the transferred right measured approximately half a hectare and had no map; he also indicated that the sale price was ₡1,000,000, paid with a vehicle, license plate [Value 003], Nissan brand, 1986 model, cabstar style, capacity three persons, gasoline fuel, which was not in the buyer's name, so he committed to carry out the registration procedures to effectively transfer it to [Name 030]'s name. He maintained that this act performed by [Name 030] is completely invalid and absolutely null, since he has been legally incapacitated (insano) since suffering the traffic accident in 1973; which he claims to prove when the Civil Court of Liberia, in case file number 714-79, appointed his mother [Name 006] as his guardian (curadora). He explained that subsequently, due to the death of said guardian (curadora), the proceedings were restarted to appoint a guardian (curador) for him again, and in another medical evaluation, the forensic medical service again ruled that [Name 030] was legally incapacitated (insano), so the Family Court, by judgment at 9 hours 10 minutes on March 8, 2005, declared the legal incapacity (insania), under case file no. 79-100714-386-CL (274-04). He alleged that knowledge of the legal transaction came when Mr. [Name 003] brought the vehicle, claiming it was payment for the transfer of the possessory right that [Name 030] had sold to him. He argued that the deed in which [Name 030] transferred his possessory right is seriously flawed, because knowingly aware of [Name 030]'s problem (a very well-known person in Liberia), he gave as payment a vehicle that was not even in his name, an old model, was damaged, and had encumbrances, which in no way compares to the value of the land measuring nearly 5,000 meters and located near a main road in the surroundings of Liberia centro. He maintained that it is evident that Attorney Johanna Moreno Bustos had knowledge of [Name 030]'s incapacity, because it could be perceived by having a conversation with the plaintiff; for this reason, he considered that the transfer of the possessory right made in said professional's protocol is ineffective; and furthermore, that transaction is ineffective because an object that would soon have little value was given in payment. He requested that it be declared: on the date of the deed under analysis, Mr. [Name 019] was mentally incapacitated to perform a legal act of that nature; the deed suffers from formal and legal requirements; therefore, it is absolutely null; the co-defendants be ordered to pay damages (daños y perjuicios) valued at ₡10,000,000, as well as costs. The co-defendants answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right (derecho), active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), cause (causa), capacity (capacidad), as well as the aphorism sine actione agit. Both co-defendants filed a COUNTERCLAIM in separate briefs; however, they coincide on the following points. They stated that on March 24, 2003, Messrs. [Name 003] and [Name 019] appeared before notary public Johanna Bustos Moreno to execute a deed of sale of a possessory right, over a farm (finca) located in Guadalupe de Liberia, first canton, fifth district of the Province of Guanacaste, with the following boundaries: North: [Name 014] South: [Name 019], West: [Name 019], East: public road, with an approximate measurement of half a hectare; which was paid with vehicle license plate [Value 003], Nissan brand, Cabstar style, and although Mr. [Name 003] was not the registered owner of the vehicle at that time, he committed to putting it in the name of the appearing party [Name 019]. They expressed that this document was executed with full knowledge of what both parties were doing and with full will; with advice and explanation from the notary. For her part, co-defendant [Name 016] stated that on August 9, 2005, she received judicial notification of this ordinary proceeding, in which it was alleged that Mr. [Name 030] was and is legally incapacitated (insano); which, she clarified, is an unknown situation for her; since the sale of the farm (finca) occurred under strict normality of persons who appear and reflect perfect normality in their acts. She argued that the lawsuit caused her unease; and, therefore, moral damage (daño moral), because she is a professional of recognized integrity and moral standing, who has practiced the profession for over 10 years in the Province of Guanacaste, especially in Liberia. She estimated the moral damage (daño moral) at ₡3,000,000. On the other hand, co-defendant [Name 003] indicated that Mr. [Name 019] took possession of the vehicle on the day the deed was signed and took it to his home in good working and functional condition. He commented that he received a visit from the plaintiff's children to inform him "in what terms the deal with Mr. [Name 005] had been made;" he also recalls that the plaintiff himself proposed returning the vehicle and that he pay him "the one million colones according to my payment possibilities, which I did in installments." He asserts that he and the notary were unaware that Mr. [Name 019] was legally incapacitated (insano). He objects that the scope of the legal incapacity (insania) declared for the plaintiff is forward-looking, meaning after the declaration and not before; therefore, the executed act is perfectly legal in every sense. He explained that the lawsuit has caused him moral damage (daño moral), as he claimed to be a very hardworking person, a farmer by trade and of moral standing; and that the plaintiff's bad faith causes him mental distress and unease. He estimated the moral damage (daño moral) at ₡3,000,000. Both counterclaiming defendants sought a declaration that the deed executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos at 15:30 on March 24, 2003, is perfectly valid and effective in law. That the plaintiff-counter-defendant be ordered to pay moral damage (daño moral) and costs. The plaintiff-counter-defendant answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right (derecho) and passive standing (legitimación pasiva). The First Instance Collegiate Civil Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), composed of judges Angélica Delgado Madrigal, Milkyan Sánchez Aguilar, and David Matamoros Salazar, issued judgment no. 4 at 11:27 on October 31, 2018, in which, regarding the lawsuit, it denied the evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor proveer) offered from folios 128 to 132. It also rejected the defenses of lack of: capacity (capacidad), active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), cause (causa), as well as the aphorism sine actione agit. It partially denied the exception of lack of right (derecho), for which reason it upheld the lawsuit to declare that: On the date the public deed was executed where the land under analysis was transferred, the grantor [Name 030] was unable to consent and perform a legal act of that nature; therefore, said deed suffers from legal requirements and is absolutely null and ineffective. The Court also stated that Mr. [Name 030] is entitled to possession as owner (posesión a título de dueño) of the unregistered farm (finca) located in Guadalupe de Liberia, which is agricultural land with an approximate measurement of half a hectare, with the following boundaries: North: [Name 014], South: [Name 019], East: public road, West: [Name 019]. It declared sua sponte the existence of current interest (interés actual) regarding the upheld claims. COUNTERCLAIM. It declared the existence of active and passive standing (legitimación), upheld the exception of lack of right (derecho) regarding all claims made by [Name 016] and [Name 003]; therefore, it dismissed the counterclaim, omitted any pronouncement on current interest (interés actual); and imposed the costs of the proceeding on the losing party.

II.- This case file is tagged with an indication that an older adult participates; covered by the protection offered by the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor), no. 7935, and in what pertains to this area, numeral 3 subsection k), provides that they have the right to "preferential treatment when carrying out administrative procedures in public and private entities." The foregoing, in order that every older adult has the right to a better quality of life, as indicated by said regulation. Thus, regarding this point and as it concerns the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), it is necessary to point out that the virtual folder of the case file under analysis has a pop-up window indicating "Preferential attention to person: -ADULTA MAYOR." This is in order to provide the best possible public service, according to the condition of the user; and to function in accordance with the principles enshrined in the relevant regulations. In this specific case, this Chamber observes that Mr. [Name 030] died as of March 13, 2018, as recorded in the certification provided.

Appeal filed by defendant Moreno Bustos.

Substantive reasons.

III.- She accuses violation of articles 41, 627 subsection 1), 628, 837, and 1007, all of the Civil Code (Código Civil), as well as numeral 41.5 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil, hereinafter CPC Law no. 9342) in relation to the entire appeal. She bases the first ground on the cause of erroneous assessment of documentary evidence, regarding proven facts number one and two, which she transcribes. She points out that on folio one of the case file there is a certification of the judgment issued by the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of Liberia, at 9:10 on March 5, 2005, from case file number 79-100174-0386-CI, in which a declaration of the legal incapacity (insania) of [Name 019] is requested and that his children [Name 019] and [Name 021] both with last names [Name 005] be appointed guardians (curadores). She alludes that it was not until 2005 when the declaration of legal incapacity (insania) of Mr. [Name 019] was expressly requested; since it would not be logical, if he had already been declared legally incapacitated (insano) since 1979, for the declaration of legal incapacity (insania) to be requested again in 2005. She maintains that the act of appointing a guardian (curador) on January 7, 1980, is simply an act of imposing the office of guardian (curador), not a judgment issued by a judge declaring legal incapacity (insania). She expresses that the judgment of legal incapacity (insania) of [Name 019] is dated March 8, 2005, and it is from that pronouncement that it is registered in the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) and the Public Registry (Registro Público). She argues that the above is irrefutable proof, so the Court cannot disregard it. In the second error, she alleges the existence of error in the assessment of evidence and in its interpretation, based on proven facts three and seven of the judgment. She comments that in case file no. 79-100174-0386-CI, Mrs. [Name 006], based on a private medical certificate, requested the appointment of a guardian (curador) for [Name 019], for the purpose of filing a criminal lawsuit; and she emphasized that, on that occasion, she did not request that her son be declared legally incapacitated (insano). She asserts that Mrs. [Name 006] did not provide any final judgment declaring the legal incapacity (insania) of her son. She explains that as of March 24, 2003 —the date when the deed under analysis was executed— there was no final judicial judgment declaring legal incapacity (insania), nor any entry in the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) or the National Registry (Registro Nacional) indicating that said gentleman was declared legally incapacitated (insano). She alleges that no matter how solid the declaration of legal incapacity (insania) in 2005 is, it does not by itself entail incapacity on March 24, 2003, which is the moment when the invalidated purchase-sale agreement was signed in the appealed judgment; nor does it have effects on her or on Mr. [Name 003], because the plaintiff did not have a registered guardian (curador). Therefore, she considers that there is no proof demonstrating even relative nullity in the execution of the deed under analysis. Furthermore, she points out, attending to the meaning of the rules governing evidentiary matters 45.1 and 45.2 both of the CPC Law no. 9342, it is inadmissible for an agreement set down in a public deed to be contradicted and even annulled based on testimonial statements from persons who were not present at the time of executing the disputed public deed, and on a certification from a doctor dating from 1979. She concludes that the witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine a person's mental incapacity, nor whether that incapacity was present when signing the purchase-sale contract. In the third violation, along the same lines of errors in evidentiary assessment, she files the grievance against fact five of the judgment. She begins developing the error by stating that the Court starts from the premise that, as of March 24, 2003, he was declared legally incapacitated (insano) because he had a guardian (curadora) appointed since 1980. Contrary to what was indicated, the appellant states that there is no proof supporting that claim, because there is no certification from the Public Registry (Registro Público) indicating that Mrs. [Name 006] was his guardian (curadora), precisely because she had died as of July 1, 1995. She states that she provides as evidence the death certificate of said lady. In the fourth challenge, she alleges an infringement in the interpretation and assessment of documentary evidence, specifically the public deed containing a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), granted before the defendant's notary office on September 29, 1997. She alludes to an inadequate assessment of the evidence and invokes numeral 45.2 of the CPC Law no. 9342, pointing out that the capacity to act is presumed to exist, and that the grantors in that act were Mr. [Name 019] and his son [Name 005]. Based on the above, the appellant states that Mr. [Name 019], before the judgment declaring legal incapacity (insania) in 2005, was totally capable. With the foregoing, she intends to discredit that Mr. [Name 019] was legally incapacitated (insano) since 1979. And, furthermore, the appellant states, she had no way of knowing that said gentleman was legally incapacitated (insano), firstly because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment on the matter; and furthermore, because his son [Name 005] came to her notary office with the supposedly legally incapacitated person (insano), and both signed that public deed. She clarifies that it is not true, as the Court states, that only Mr. [Name 005] appeared. In the fifth challenge, she accuses violation of article 835 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), because the Court annuls the agreement under analysis, despite not having demonstrated the absence of capacity to act of Mr. [Name 030] and his consent. From the above, she develops the theses of numerals 41, 627, 628, 837, and 1007, all of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Questioning the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta), and indicating that, if it existed (which she does not accept), it would be a relative nullity (nulidad relativa), for not having been declared legally incapacitated (insano) at the time of the act annulled by the judgment.

Appeal of defendant [Name 003].

IV.- In the sole grievance for substantive reasons, the appellant accuses infringement of numeral 41 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). He questions the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the deed under analysis, because in his judgment, it was executed when the incapacity of Mr. [Name 019] had not been judicially declared. He argues that in proven fact no. 1, it is indicated that Mrs. [Name 006] initiated a proceeding before the Civil Court (Juzgado Civil) of Liberia in 1979, requesting to be appointed guardian (curadora) of [Name 030]. The appellant states that the Court later points out that the existence of a guardian (curador) reveals that the person does not have faculties to govern himself for reasons that are clinically verified. He objects that the plaintiff's incapacity was not clinically demonstrated in the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian (curador) filed before the Civil Court (Juzgado Civil) of Liberia, case file no. 714-79. The foregoing, because he points out that the medical opinion that supported the prior proceeding was not issued by a doctor from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, hereinafter CCSS) or a Forensic Doctor of the Supreme Court of Justice. He argues that the medical opinion prepared by a private doctor does not reliably prove that Mr. [Name 019] is incapacitated; since in his judgment, the proceedings for appointing a guardian (curador) are insufficient to demonstrate, clinically speaking, that incapacity. He argues that in the previous Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), canon 847 required a medical opinion from the CCSS to request safeguard measures for persons with disabilities; and then, precept 848 subsection 2) ibidem, ordered the Legal Medicine Department (Departamento de Medicina Legal) of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) to issue a comprehensive opinion on the person's condition. He subsequently asks, why after his mother and guardian (curadora) died (July 1, 1995), was no new guardian (curador) appointed for him? if he had supposedly lost his volitional and cognitive capacity. He alleges that the guardian (curador) representation was not registered in any registry nor publicized to third parties. He states that Mrs. [Name 006] died eight years before the deed under analysis was signed. He argues that the accused infringement occurs when the Court maintains that Mr. [Name 019] is incapacitated, solely based on the fact that a guardian (curador) was appointed for him in judicial proceedings; however, he alleges that the contested pronouncement does not go on to analyze whether he was capable or incapable, nor does it review how that conviction was reached. He challenges that having the declaration of judicial incapacity as of January 7, 1980, with the acceptance and swearing-in of the office of guardian (curador), is an erroneous legal appreciation, because the private medical opinion only served to establish the proceedings for appointing a guardian (curador), but never functioned to declare the plaintiff's incapacity, because the resolution of the Civil Court (Juzgado Civil) of Liberia, dated December 21, 1979, so indicates when it states: "…in view of the medical opinion contained in the record, these present proceedings for the appointment of a guardian (curador) are deemed established…" He asserts that the plaintiff's incapacity was declared for the first time, with all the formality that said act requires, when the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of Liberia, in a judgment at 9 hours 10 minutes on March 8, 2005, appointed his son, Mr. [Name 005], as guardian (curador), and declared Mr. [Name 019] legally incapacitated (insano) for the first time in a judgment, which had never been done before. Therefore, he maintains that deed no. 335 executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos at 15:35 on March 24, 2003, is valid and effective. The appellant did not fail to state that the General Power of Attorney (Poder Generalísimo), granted by Mr. [Name 019] to his son with last name [Name 005], before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos, was granted and signed by both appearing parties on September 29, 1997, for which reason he considers that the considerations of the contested resolution should not be accepted, when it states that only Mr. [Name 019] signed. And then he questions what was the reason for having taken his father, supposedly legally incapacitated (insano), to grant him a General Power of Attorney (Poder Generalísimo); that, although this point is not part of this proceeding, he considers that it must be taken into account to resolve what is debated here. He adds, "in case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, which (sic) is the civil case file of [Name 030] against [Name 027], which (sic) comprises the same facts debated here and is an archived case file […] I consider that said evidence is indispensable and must be respectfully ordered by the Chamber." V.- The Court, in the core matters of interest for the resolution of the filed cassation appeals, pointed out that the object of this proceeding rests on two fundamental pillars: 1. To determine whether Mr. [Name 030] had capacity to act when he executed public deed number 335 at 15:30 on March 24, 2003, granted before notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos; and 2. In the event that the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019] is verified in the execution of said public instrument, to verify whether a harmful act on the part of the defendants arises from said act of disposal, capable of making them debtors for damages (daños y perjuicios) to the plaintiff. Then, regarding the first point, ON THE CAPACITY TO ACT of Mr. [Name 019], the questioned ruling ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In this regard, it stated that when [Name 030] entered into the act of March 24, 2003, "he was unaware of the magnitude of the transaction he was carrying out," because the plaintiff demonstrated, in accordance with article 41.1.1 of the CPC Law no. 9342, that he had been diagnosed with mental incapacity since 1979 and had a guardian (curadora) since January 7, 1980. The Court reasoned, as recorded in a certification issued by the Civil Court (Juzgado Civil) of Liberia, that on January 7, 1980, Mrs. [Name 006] "was informed of her appointment as guardian (curadora) of the incapacitated person [Name 019] and, having understood, stated that she accepts the office conferred upon her as such...". The contested ruling concluded that if in that act Mr. [Name 019] had already been qualified as incapacitated and, for that reason, a guardian (curadora) was appointed for him, the Court did not have to engage in further analysis of whether the plaintiff was incapacitated, or how that conviction was reached; because the evidence provided by the plaintiff regarding the appointment of the guardian (curadora) eliminates any doubt related to his capacity to act. In fact, it added that in the documentary evidence referring to the process through which [Name 006] was appointed guardian (curadora), there is a certificate from doctor Eduardo Guevara Coronado (December 5, 1979) which states, "By means of this I Certify: that Mr. [Name 019] suffers from amnesia and total mental incapacity that may render him irresponsible for his acts" (folio 7 of the physical case file). And it further stated that even if the co-defendants insisted that Mr. [Name 030] behaved "normally" when the sale recorded in the mentioned public deed was made, even if that 'normality' had been demonstrated, they could not be correct regarding the existence of his will to consent to the sale of possession described in proven fact four of this judgment. The foregoing is so, the Court continues, because there was a declaration of incapacity from before the legal transaction was carried out; and against said evidence there is no other contrary evidence from the defendants that allows this court to doubt the documentary evidence added to the record, visible on folios 5 to 12. Consequently, the appealed judgment argued, if the judicially declared incapacitated person acts on his own, and not through the guardian (curador), "the acts or contracts performed... shall be absolutely null" in accordance with article 41 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). The challenged ruling stated that the plaintiff demonstrated that in public deed number 335 at 15:30 on March 24, 2003, executed in the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos, [Name 030] appeared and in said public instrument there is no record of representation by his guardian (curadora) [Name 006]. So, it clarified, if the incapacity is characterized by the person not being able to govern himself, it was of no interest to that Judging Body whether [Name 019]'s participation in the formalized legal transaction was "normal," because, in summary, it produced a null contract, since his guardian (curadora) did not intervene in the act (numerals 41 and 835 subsections 1) and 3) Ibidem). On the other hand, it also mentioned that in the respective answering briefs, both defendants state that it is strange that on September 29, 1997, the plaintiff appeared before the notary office of attorney Moreno Bustos to grant a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo) in favor of his son [Name 005], and they question "if the attorney-in-fact knew that his father was somehow legally incapacitated (insano), why does he appear before notary Moreno Bustos and grant a power of attorney where he will benefit." For the Court, this argument was irrelevant to what is the subject of debate in this proceeding, because there was no claim whatsoever requesting the nullity of the mentioned agency contract, coupled with the fact that, contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. "[Name 019]" —the father— who appeared before the public certifying officer to execute the deed and not "[Name 005]" —the son—, so the latter would not benefit in any way simply by having been appointed as his father's attorney-in-fact. He emphasized that regardless of the granting of the referenced power of attorney, or even other acts of disposal that the legally incapacitated person (insano) [Name 030] might have performed between 1979 and 2005, they in no way modify the reasoning that this jurisdictional body set forth in that same recital, regarding the mental capacity of Mr. [Name 019] and regarding the nullity and ineffectiveness of public deed number 335, executed at 15:30 on March 24, 2003, visible on folios 149 front and back, of the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos. Regarding the second pillar on which this proceeding rests, that is, DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS), the Court pointed out that once the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019] in the execution of said public instrument was verified, it had to be verified whether a harmful act on the part of the defendants derived from said act of disposal, capable of making them debtors for damages (daños y perjuicios) to the plaintiff. It indicated that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for what was invoked in the lawsuit; a point that the Court considers the plaintiff failed to meet, with respect to the fault of Johanna Moreno Bustos. It supported the foregoing based on the fact that the plaintiff did not provide evidence demonstrating that the notary knew of the legal incapacity (insania) or incapacity of Mr. [Name 030], or that she had the means to determine it. It continues that even though there are three testimonies expressing attitudes of Mr. [Name 030] that could make one think that anyone would detect legal incapacity (insania) on his part; it considered that testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff affirms: "any person without being a Psychologist notices the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]." For precisely, that decision-making body affirmed, without technical evidence to determine so, it could not validly conclude what the plaintiff affirms through the mere word of deponents who do not have the status of expert witnesses, or of qualified professionals to issue a scientific opinion on Mr. [Name 030]'s condition. The Court asserted that the only legible medical opinion in the case file is the one on folio 7, regarding which it stated that from this document it does not follow that any contact with Mr. [Name 019] allows a person who is not a "psychologist" to know of his legal incapacity (insania).

Likewise, the lower court continued, the clinical file submitted as documentary evidence from folios 146 to 188 of the case file is unintelligible due to blurriness, and constitutes evidence on which the defendant was not granted a hearing; said document cannot be assessed not only because the adversarial principle was not respected, but also because what is recorded therein cannot be read. The challenged ruling does not set aside the assessment of the party statement given by Johanna Moreno Bustos, and in this regard, it notes that she admitted to knowing the plaintiff's family; however, from the answers given during questioning, the Court did not deduce that the co-defendant admitted to knowing of the incapacity/insanity of Mr. [Name 019]. In reality, her knowledge of don [Name 030]'s family did not allow this decision-making body to conclude that the notary necessarily knew of the situation experienced by him, such that she should have refrained from granting the public deed. It concluded, these being unproven facts, that the notary Moreno Bustos knew of the insanity of don [Name 030], and furthermore, that from the contact produced during the granting of the public deed she must have noticed the insanity of [Name 030]; it excluded the existence of the criterion of attribution necessary to establish the alleged liability of the co-defendant Moreno Bustos.

Regarding the liability of the defendant [Name 003], the questioned judgment stated, the plaintiff also alleged that he knew of the incapacity of [Name 030] (sixth fact of the complaint), and took advantage of that condition to carry out the legal transaction. With respect to that fact, the Court did not find evidence in the case file; and therefore, it also excluded the criterion of attribution necessary to establish the civil liability of Mr. [Name 003]. The contested ruling could not state either that the payment for the right of possession transferred by don [Name 030] with the vehicle is an act carried out for the sake of taking advantage. Based on the foregoing, the Court did not order the co-defendants/counterclaimants to pay the claimed damages and losses.

Then, regarding the COUNTERCLAIM, the Court noted that the theory of the case presented by the defendant is rendered moot given the object of the proceeding analyzed in Whereas Clause IV of that ruling, which has been set forth earlier in this whereas clause. For that reason, no relevant "proven facts" for resolving that action were recorded, because the claims raised by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] are based on the premise that Mr. [Name 030] acted in the legal transaction under analysis with "full knowledge" and "full will" (second fact of the counterclaim). For the contested judgment, that assertion becomes irrelevant, since that decision developed the point that one who lacks capacity to act has no will to bind himself; consequently, he cannot consent either, and therefore, there would be no possible way for the counterclaimants to demonstrate the knowledge and will of don [Name 030] in the legal transaction under analysis. This is because, the challenged ruling reiterates, there has been the appointment of a curator (curadora) since 1980. Consequently, it was not possible to declare the validity of public deed number 335 at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, granted under the protocol of the public notary Johanna Moreno Bustos.

VI.- Regarding the cassation appeals, this Chamber observes that both cassation appellants insist that at the time of signing public deed no. 335 at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, granted under the protocol of the public notary Johanna Moreno Bustos, the plaintiff [Name 030] had full capacity to act, and therefore, said deed must be valid and effective. To this end, both appellants generally refer to the same errors; and although numbered differently (in one case the breaches are listed separately and in the other a single challenge with different topics is alleged), the arguments coincide. Therefore, for better order, and given that in the appeal of appellant Moreno Bustos the different arguments are numbered, this Chamber will follow the numbering established in the appeal of co-defendant Moreno Bustos. Thus, in the various objections, they consider that the date from which the plaintiff was declared insane is March 5, 2005—because a judicial judgment so declared and it was registered in the respective Public Registries—and not January 7, 1980, as the Court considered. They support this in the first objection by stating that it would not be logical to institute a new insanity (insania) proceeding if the person had already been declared so previously. This decision-making body does not agree with the appellants on this point. Because, whether or not it is logical to have filed the declaratory insanity proceeding in 2005, a date by which such a declaration already existed since 1980, is a mere opinion that does not challenge the central basis of the judgment—Mr. [Name 019] was incapable from when the Civil Court of Liberia appointed a curator for him in 1980—, reducing itself to subjective arguments devoid of any utility for analysis, since one would be facing a case of futile cassation, insofar as it would not be feasible to overturn the challenged ruling, as the argument of the contested decision would subsist because it remains unquestioned.

In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to emphasize that section 9 of the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, no. 9379, indicates the need to review this condition periodically; specifically, that the safeguard (salvaguardia) may be reviewed at any time, and ex officio shall be subject to review by the judge every five years. This domestic regulation is based on the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the purpose of which is to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. Additionally, it is based on the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which have supra-constitutional status because they pertain to human rights, as long as they grant greater rights than the Political Constitution, according to the reiterated case law of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice -see, among others, rulings No. 6856-2005, No. 2313-1995, No. 8892-2012, No. 18896-2014, and No. 20357-2018-; coupled with the fact that it is consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda and Circular 173-2019 regarding the Brasilia Regulations on Access to Justice for Persons in Vulnerable Situations. Hence, having initiated a second proceeding related to the disability of Mr. [Name 019] is protected by national and international legislation; and the argument that states - that it is not logical to present a second proceeding if the plaintiff had already been declared incapable - is, for this Chamber, out of place. For this reason, the ground will be denied.

VII.- In this case, in the second ground, it points out that Mrs. [Name 006] requested, in 1979, proceedings for the appointment of a curator to file a criminal complaint, based on a private medical report, not a declaration of insanity (insania). In this regard, this Chamber agrees with the Court when it indicates that, as of January 7, 1980, in the Civil Court of Liberia, Mrs. [Name 006] "was made aware of her appointment as curator of the incapable [Name 019] and, having understood, stated that she accepts the position conferred upon her as such...". Therefore, this decision-making body holds that, since that date, Mr. [Name 019] had been qualified as a person with a psychosocial disability, and for this reason, the judicial authority deemed necessary the appointment of Mrs. [Name 006] as curator. That is, a judicial authority assessed and ruled on the situation of Mr. [Name 019], appointing a person to represent him, thereby eliminating any doubt that might arise.

Now, any arguments concerning that procedure, such as disagreement with the private nature of the medical report on which the judge relied to decide, should have been raised within that proceeding; and not come later, many years afterward, to challenge issues that should have been ventilated at that time and within that proceeding (canon 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), Law no. 9342). However, for greater clarification, section 847 of Law no. 7130, as amended by Law no. 9379 for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, clearly indicates that the medical report may be issued by a physician of the CCSS, or "...by the treating specialist physician, who certifies the condition of intellectual, mental, or psychosocial disability of the person requesting or for whom the safeguard is requested." —the highlighting is not from the original—. And for this reason, this Chamber holds that if the Court relied in its analysis on the medical report of a private specialist, it acted in accordance with the legal framework, and the error alleged by the cassation appellants does not exist. This is because, this decision-making body considers that the legislation in force allows the parties to request a safeguard based on a private medical report; it is not true, as the cassation appellants claim, that such a request is only permitted based on a report issued by the CCSS.

On the other hand, regarding the argument put forth in the appeals, that witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine a person's mental incapacity, nor whether that incapacity was present when signing the purchase-sale contract, this Chamber considers that this does not constitute an argument alleging an error in the questioned ruling, because rather, that criterion coincides with what the Court stated. Thus, the contested judgment literally states: "Even though there are three testimonies that express attitudes of don [Name 030] that could lead one to think that any person would detect insanity on his part; it is considered that a testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff asserts: 'any person without being a Psychologist notices the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]'." And by virtue of that, that judging body did not find liability on the part of the defendants regarding the granting of the deed under analysis; and did not order them to pay the damages and losses claimed by the plaintiff. Based on the foregoing, the ground will be denied.

VIII.- In the third breach, they allege that the Court assumes that as of March 24, 2003, he was declared insane because he had a curator appointed since 1980; however, for the cassation appellants, there is no evidence to support that statement, because there is no certification from the Public Registry indicating that Mrs. [Name 006] was his curator, precisely because she had passed away on July 1, 1995. At this point, the fifth challenge will also be analyzed, given that it is related to the third cassation ground, when it is alleged that the Court annulled the agreement under analysis, despite the absence of capacity to act of don [Name 030] and his consent not having been proven.

This Chamber holds that here one must make the distinction made by the Court, in the sense that capacity to bind oneself is one thing, and registry publicity (publicidad registral) so that it is opposable to third parties is quite another. This Chamber considers, just as was stated in the questioned ruling, that one who lacks capacity to act cannot bind himself; and therefore cannot consent. Thus establishes section 41 of the Civil Code, when it states: "acts carried out without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null." This is also observed in section 835 subsection 3) ibidem, which provides for the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of acts or contracts executed or entered into by an absolutely incapable person. In this way, when the Court of Liberia in 1980 appointed Mrs. Hermelinda as curator of don [Name 019], it clearly qualified him as incapable. And it is by virtue of this lack of capacity to consent that the contested ruling declared absolutely null and ineffective, deed no. 335 at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, a point with which this Chamber agrees, by virtue of it having been a judicial authority, based on a medical criterion, that appointed a curator for him.

However, moving to the second point of analysis, which impacts the knowledge that third parties may have of the situation of don [Name 019], this Chamber observes that indeed the notary Johanna Moreno Bustos and the appearing party [Name 003] did not know of the insanity of Mr. [Name 019], because from the contact with him on the occasion of the signing of the referenced public instrument, that insanity was not noticeable, and for that reason, they were absolved of liability for the damages and losses claimed by the plaintiff. In sum, registry publicity is not constitutive of the incapacity to consent, as the appellants seem to try to suggest, because in this case, registration in the public registries serves to make the judicial declaration of incapacity or insanity known to third parties. But, as this decision-making body conceives it, the incapacity exists from the moment of its declaration, regardless of its registration; and naturally, by the order in which the facts must occur, it pre-exists the registration.

Section 851 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1989 (Law no. 7130), amended by Law no. 9379, the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, indicates that the judge shall decide whether the applicant or the person for whom the safeguard is requested requires that measure and to what extent; if the request is granted, a person shall be designated to fill the role; and finally, it provides that the establishment of that safeguard shall be communicated to the Public Property Registry for its respective annotation on present or future movable and immovable property owned by the person with a disability. For this Chamber, that norm eliminates any doubt that it is the judge who declares the safeguard for the person for whom it is requested, the extent of the measure, and, furthermore, it is only after being established by the Authority that it is communicated to the Public Registry, to make it known to third parties—canon 455 of the Civil Code, when referring to registry publicity and its effect on third parties states that titles subject to registration that are not registered, do not harm a third party, except from the date of registration—. And in the specific case of the insanity of Mr. [Name 030], it is opposable to third parties as of June 17, 2005, the date from which it is recorded in the National Registry.

For this reason, in the judgment of this Chamber, the Court decided correctly when it indicated that the defendants did not know of the insanity of don [Name 030] at the time the deed under analysis was granted, which is why it absolved them of liability, despite declaring the public instrument under analysis absolutely null, given that the incapacity of don [Name 030] already existed at the time of its granting. Based on the foregoing, the grievance will be denied.

IX.- In the fourth challenge, it alleges an error in the interpretation and assessment of the public deed containing a generalísimo power of attorney, granted before the office of the defendant notary on September 29, 1997, where the grantors in that act were Mr. [Name 019] and his son [Name 019 005]. Based on the above, the cassation appellant states that Mr. [Name 019], before the judgment declaring the insanity in 2005, was totally capable. She also alleges that she had no way of knowing that said gentleman was insane, first because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment in this regard; and furthermore, because his son [Name 019 005] came to her notary office with the supposedly insane person, and both signed that public deed.

Regarding the Generalísimo Power of Attorney, which the cassation appellants indicate must be assessed as evidence of the plaintiff's volitional capacity, this Chamber holds, just as the Court did, that this act is not the object of dispute, and therefore, it goes beyond the limits within which an opinion must be issued in this judgment. In addition to this, this Chamber observes that appellant Moreno Bustos points out that what the Court said is not true, that only Mr. [Name 005]" —the son— appeared. However, that is not the case; the Court pointed out that only the father—[Name 019]—appeared; and it expressly indicates "contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. [Name 019] who appeared before the public certifying officer to grant the deed and not [Name 005]…" Regarding the issue of registry publicity, the cassation appellants are referred to the analysis in the previous point. Consequently, this ground will be denied.

X.- This collegiate body considers, with respect to the evidence offered for better resolution, namely the death certificate of Mrs. [Name 006] and case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, that it should cite canon 69.7.3 of the CPC, Law no. 9342, insofar as it indicates that the admission of evidence in cassation shall have a restrictive and exceptional character. Given that, only that evidence strictly necessary to resolve the points that have been the object of challenge may be admitted, when it could not have been offered or presented previously; and, furthermore, the Chamber may only order evidence ex officio when it is indispensable. In the specific case under study, regarding the two pieces of evidence offered before this instance, neither meets any of the requirements to be admitted. The death certificate already appears in the case file; furthermore, this Chamber does not understand the request to bring case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI into this proceeding, given that this is the case number under analysis. Based on the foregoing, rejection of the offered evidence is warranted.

XI.- By virtue of the reasoning and exposition set forth, the appeal must be declared without merit, and the evidence provided with the appeal, which was not admitted in previous instances, is denied. Costs (costas) correspond to the economic impact that participation in the proceeding implies for the parties. According to the provisions of Article 73.1 of the CPC, Law no. 9342, their pronouncement must be made ex officio in every decision that puts an end to the controversy, and they must be imposed on the losing party, except in those cases where one or more of the statutory exemptions apply (section 73.2 ibidem). Therefore, their resolution requires an evaluative criterion on the part of the jurisdictional authority. The cassation appeal is one of those resolutions, since it definitively decides the dispute and responds to a judgment of utility and necessity. Moreover, its mere filing implies a summons to the counterparty, which will prevent the finality of the appealed judgment, will subject them to continuing the discussion of the matter before a higher instance, will keep the discussion of the points in controversy open, and, likewise, will imply incurring additional expenses for having to appear and take action before said authority. In this way, its pronouncement is appropriate and to that extent, both appeals having been denied in their entirety, and having failed to overturn what was set forth in the questioned ruling, no reason whatsoever is observed that would justify their filing; therefore, both cassation appellants are ordered to pay the costs generated in this phase. The amount to be paid shall be liquidated by the benefiting party in the corresponding procedural stage.

XII. DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE LÓPEZ CASAL

With the profound respect and esteem I hold for my fellow Judges who, in this specific case, constitute the majority of this honorable Cassation Chamber, I dissent from the decision reached by it, I cast my dissenting vote and issue it as follows: I am convinced that the cassation appellants are correct in their grievances, which is why, regarding what was challenged by them, their cassation appeals shall be granted and the first-instance judgment shall be reversed (casar), in the terms to be specified below.

I do not agree with the majority of the Chamber's assertion, which states that as of January seventh, nineteen hundred eighty, when the Civil Court of Liberia designated Mrs. [Name 006] as curator of Mr. [Name 030], this means that, from that moment forward, it is valid and correct to consider said gentleman a person incapable of acting. For the Undersigned dissenting Magistrate, that simple appointment is not legally sufficient to consider Mr. [Name 019] as a person incapable of acting. It was completely necessary that, in said judicial proceeding, there be a conclusive and final judicial pronouncement, by virtue of which, the Judge in charge of said voluntary jurisdiction proceeding (as the Code of Civil Procedure termed it) had declared Mr. [Name 019] incapable. As appellant Johanna Moreno Bustos correctly expressed, the act of appointing a curator for Mr. [Name 019] on January seventh, nineteen hundred eighty, consisted solely of an act of designating a procedural curator (curador procesal), which is far from the necessary judgment or substantive resolution, issued by a Judge of the Republic, after having assessed all the evidence, by virtue of which a person is declared in a state of insanity, a resolution which, it should be noted, had to be registered in the Public Registry of Persons, so that, with said registration, it could be legally susceptible to being opposable to third parties.

Similarly, the majority of the Chamber fails to notice that, as appellant Moreno Bustos also alleged, the purpose of the designation of curator Hermelinda López López within proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI was solely to be able to file a criminal complaint on behalf of Mr. [Name 019]. Based on the foregoing, from no point of view can said gentleman be legally considered insane as of January nineteen hundred eighty, but rather, on the contrary, said modifying state of his capacity to act took effect and had legal effects against third parties (such as, without a doubt, Mrs. Johanna Moreno Bustos and Mr. [Name 003]) with the registration, in the Public Registry of Persons, of the judgment issued by the Family Court of Liberia, at nine hours and ten minutes on March eight, two thousand five, by virtue of which Mr. [Name 030] was declared in a state of insanity.

Based on the foregoing, the provisions of section 41 of the Civil Code would not be applicable, as other courts of Justice have correctly set forth: "the mere fact that Mr. [Name 032] had been declared in a state of guardianship (interdicción) by a final judgment does not make all legal transactions that he entered into by himself, prior to that declaration, absolutely null for lacking mental capacity, as the appellant seems to understand it. This is so because according to section 41 of the Civil Code, 'Acts or contracts carried out without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null.' That is, acts or contracts carried out by the insane person himself are absolutely null, but only those entered into after the declaration of his state of guardianship by a final judgment, and those carried out by him in the same manner while that state has not also been lifted by a final judgment (articles 36 and 41 of the Civil Code and 239 of the Family Code). This is so because, with respect to prior acts, the capacity to bind oneself and contract is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary, all in accordance with articles 627 subsection 1), 628, and 1007 of the Civil Code. In this case, the purchase-sale challenged as null was entered into on February seven, two thousand two, while the state of guardianship of the seller, don [Name 032], was declared by a first-instance judgment issued on August seven, two thousand three, confirmed by the second-instance ruling issued in December two thousand three. This means that it is not a legal transaction covered by the presumption of absolute nullity referred to in the aforementioned article 41 of the Civil Code" (regarding this, see Second Civil Court, Second Section. Ruling number 137 of 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2008, drafted by former Judge, Juan Ramón Coronado Huertas).

On the other hand, the Undersigned Magistrate considers that, in addition to the fact that the presumption of absolute nullity contained in section 41 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the sub judice, the plaintiff did not reliably prove what was truly at issue in this matter, namely, that Mr. [Name 030] did not have, as of March twenty-four, two thousand three, sufficient and necessary mental and volitional faculties to carry out the legal transaction of selling his right of possession over the property with cadastral map G-587784. The majority of the Chamber bases and reiterates the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019] solely on the simple fact that, in nineteen hundred eighty and based on a private medical certificate, Mrs. [Name 006] was designated as curator of the plaintiff in this proceeding. For the Undersigned dissenting Magistrate, this is manifestly insufficient to prove the absence of mental faculties and volitional capacity of Mr. [Name 019] on the day he entered into the sales contract with Mr. [Name 003]. This for several reasons: 1) First, because the private medical report, to which the majority of the Chamber alludes in this specific case, was issued many years before two thousand three, and what was truly relevant was to prove whether the plaintiff had or did not have sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity at the time he entered into the contract with Mr. [Name 003], that is, on March twenty-four, two thousand three; 2) Second, because it is absolutely and completely unknown what methodology and sources the physician Eduardo Guevara Coronado used to conclude that Mr. [Name 019] suffered from amnesia and total mental incapacity that could render him irresponsible for his acts; 3) Third, the majority of the Chamber loses sight of the fact that the private medical report issued by the physician Guevara Coronado was rendered solely to decide whether or not to designate Mrs. [Name 006] as curator of the plaintiff, for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint, and not to resolve what is disputed in this litigation, that is, whether or not he had sufficient mental capacity to carry out by himself the sale made in favor of the defendant [Name 003]; and 4) Fourth, in the insanity proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI, the defendants Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] were not parties, and consequently, they did not have the opportunity to challenge the private medical report, in whatever was unfavorable to them. Based on the reasons set forth, in a minority vote, I grant the cassation appeal filed by the defendants. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is reversed (se casa). Deciding the matter on its merits, the defenses of lack of cause (falta de causa), lack of capacity (falta de capacidad), and the generic defense of sine actione agit are dismissed. The defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing to sue (falta de legitimación activa), and lack of standing to be sued (falta de legitimación pasiva) are upheld. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Succession of Mr. [Name 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] is declared without merit in all its claims. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs owed to the defendants.

On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim, the defenses of lack of right and lack of standing to be sued raised by the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant are declared without merit. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] against the Succession of Mr. [Name 030] is granted. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the public notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos at three thirty in the afternoon on March twenty-four, two thousand three, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant is ordered to pay each of the defendants-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones, as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim.

THEREFORE: In a minority vote, the cassation appeals filed by the defendants are granted. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is reversed (se casa).

Ruling on the merits of the case, the defenses of lack of cause, lack of capacity, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are rejected. The defenses of lack of right, lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa), and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) are admitted. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] is dismissed in all its claims. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs on behalf of the defendants. On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim, the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) filed by the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant are dismissed. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] against the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] is granted. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos at three thirty p.m. on March twenty-fourth, two thousand three, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant is ordered to pay each of the defendants-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim.

POR TANTO

The evidence offered for a better resolution is denied. By majority, the appeals are dismissed, with their costs to be borne by those who filed them. Judge López Casal dissents. ipreinfalk NOTE: Judge DAMARIS VARGAS VÁSQUEZ participated in the decision of this matter; however, she could not sign the preceding resolution because she is on vacation. This is noted in accordance with article 28.2 of the Código Procesal Civil.

 LUIS GUILLERMO RIVAS LOAICIGA - MAGISTRADO/A  IRIS ROCIO ROJAS MORALES - MAGISTRADO/A  YURI LOPEZ CASAL - MAGISTRADO/A  JESSICA JIMÉNEZ RAMÍREZ - MAGISTRADO/A 1 He stated that, on March 24, 2003, the plaintiff transferred his right of possession over the aforementioned property to Mr. [Name 003], via public deed number 335 from the protocol of Attorney Johanna María Moreno Bustos. He added that the deed recorded that the transferred right measured approximately half a hectare and had no plat, and he also indicated that the sale price was ¢1,000,000, paid with a vehicle, license plate [Value 003], make Nissan, model 1986, style cabstar, capacity three persons, fuel gasoline, which was not in the buyer's name, so the latter agreed to carry out the registration procedures to effectively transfer it to [Name 030]'s name. He maintained that this act carried out by [Name 030] is completely invalid and absolutely null, because, since he suffered the traffic accident in 1973, he is insane (insano); which he claims to prove by the fact that the Civil Court of Liberia, in case file number 714-79, appointed his mother [Name 006] as his guardian (curadora). He explained that subsequently, due to the death of said guardian, proceedings were restarted to appoint him a guardian again, and in another medical evaluation, the forensic medical service ruled once more that [Name 030] was insane (insano), for which reason the Family Court, by judgment at 9:10 a.m. on March 8, 2005, declared the insanity (insania), under case file no. 79-100714-386-CL (274-04). He alleged that they became aware of the legal transaction when Mr. [Name 003] brought the vehicle claiming it was payment for the transfer of the right of possession that [Name 030] had sold him. He argued that the deed in which [Name 030] transferred his right of possession is seriously flawed, because, knowing full well about [Name 030]'s problems (a very well-known person in Liberia), he was given as payment a vehicle that was not even in his name, was an old model, was in disrepair, and had encumbrances, which in no way compares to the value of the land measuring almost 5,000 square meters and located near a main road on the outskirts of downtown Liberia. He maintained that it is evident that Attorney Johanna Moreno Bustos was aware of [Name 030]'s incapacity, because it could be perceived upon having a conversation with the plaintiff, which is why he deemed the transfer of the right of possession executed in said professional's protocol to be ineffective; and furthermore, this transaction is ineffective because an object that would soon have little value was given in payment. He requested that it be declared: that on the date of the deed under analysis, Mr. [Name 019] was mentally incapacitated (incapacitado mentalmente) to carry out a legal act of that nature; that the deed lacks formal and legal requirements; therefore, it is absolutely null; and that the co-defendants be ordered to pay damages and losses valued at ¢10,000,000, as well as costs.

The co-defendants answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right, active and passive standing, cause, capacity, as well as the aphorism sine actione agit. Both co-defendants filed a COUNTERCLAIM (RECONVENCIÓN) in separate briefs; however, they coincide on the following points. They said that on March 24, 2003, Messrs. [Name 003] and [Name 019] appeared before notary public Johanna Bustos Moreno to execute a deed of sale of a right of possession, over a property located in Guadalupe de Liberia, first canton, fifth district of the Province of Guanacaste, with the following boundaries: North: [Name 014] South: [Name 019], West: [Name 019], East: public street, with an approximate measurement of half a hectare; which was paid for with the vehicle, license plate [Value 003], make Nissan, style Cabstar, which although at that time Mr. [Name 003] was not the registered owner of the vehicle, he undertook to put it in the name of the appearing party [Name 019]. They expressed that this document was executed with full knowledge of what both parties were doing and with full will; with advice and explanation from the notary. For her part, co-defendant [Name 016] stated that on August 9, 2005, she received judicial notification of this ordinary proceeding, in which it was alleged that Mr. [Name 030] was and is insane (insano); which, she clarified, is an unknown situation for her, since the sale of the property occurred under strict normality from persons who conduct themselves and reflect perfect normality in their acts. She argued that the lawsuit caused her unease, and, therefore, moral harm, because she is a professional of recognized integrity and moral standing, who has practiced the profession for more than 10 years in the Province of Guanacaste, especially in Liberia. She estimated the moral harm at the sum of ¢3,000,000. On the other hand, co-defendant [Name 003] indicated that Mr. [Name 019] took possession of the vehicle on the day the deed was signed and took it to his house in good condition of use and operation. He commented that he received a visit from the plaintiff's children to inform him "under what terms he had done business with Mr. [Name 005]," he also recalls that the plaintiff himself proposed returning the vehicle and that his person pay him "the one million colones according to my payment possibilities, which I was doing in installments." He asserts that he and the notary were unaware that Mr. [Name 019] was insane (insano). He objects that the scope of the declared insanity (insania) for the plaintiff is prospective, that is, after the declaration and not before; therefore, the executed act is perfectly legal in every sense. He explained that the lawsuit has caused him moral harm, as he claims to be a very hardworking person, a farmer by trade and of moral standing; given that the plaintiff's bad faith causes him mental distress and unease. He estimated the moral harm at ¢3,000,000. Both counterclaiming defendants sought that it be declared that the deed executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos, at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, is perfectly valid and effective in law. That the plaintiff-counter-defendant be ordered to pay the moral harm and costs. The plaintiff-counter-defendant answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right and passive standing.

The First Instance Civil Collegiate Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), composed of judges Angélica Delgado Madrigal, Milkyan Sánchez Aguilar, and David Matamoros Salazar, issued judgment no. 4 at 11:27 a.m. on October 31, 2018, in which, regarding the complaint, it denied the evidence offered for a better provision from folios 128 to 132. It also rejected the defenses of lack of: capacity, active and passive standing, cause, as well as the aphorism sine actione agit. It partially denied the exception of lack of right, for which reason it granted the complaint to declare that: On the date when the public deed transferring the land under analysis was executed, the grantor [Name 030] was incapacitated to consent and carry out a legal act of that nature; therefore, said deed lacks legal requirements, and is absolutely null and ineffective. The Court also stated that the possession as owner of the unregistered property located in Guadalupe de Liberia corresponds to Mr. [Name 030], which is agricultural land with an approximate measurement of half a hectare, with the following boundaries: North: [Name 014], South: [Name 019], East: public street, West: [Name 019]. It declared ex officio the existence of current interest with respect to the granted claims. COUNTERCLAIM. It declared the existence of active and passive standing, granted the exception of lack of right with respect to all the claims made by [Name 016] and [Name 003]; therefore, it declared the counterclaim without merit, omitted a ruling on the current interest, and imposed the costs of the proceeding on the losing party.

**II.-** This file is tagged with the indication that an elderly person (persona adulta mayor) is involved, protected by the offer of the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, no. 7935, and as relevant to this area, section 3, subsection k), provides that they have the right to "preferential treatment when carrying out administrative procedures in public and private entities." The foregoing, in order that every elderly person has the right to a better quality of life, as indicated by the aforementioned regulation. Thus, regarding this point and what concerns the Judiciary, it is necessary to point out that the virtual folder of the file under analysis has a pop-up window indicating "Preferential attention to person: -ADULT SENIOR." This is for the sake of providing the best possible public service, according to the condition of the user; and to function in accordance with the principles enshrined in the relevant regulations. In this specific case, this Chamber observes that Mr. [Name 030] died on March 13, 2018, as established in the provided certification.

**Appeal filed by the defendant Moreno Bustos.** **Reasons on the merits.** **III.-** She accuses violation of rules 41, 627 subsection 1), 628, 837, and 1007 all of the Civil Code, as well as section 41.5 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC Law no. 9342) in relation to the entire appeal. The **first** ground is based on the cause of erroneous assessment of documentary evidence, of proven facts numbers one and two, which she transcribes. She indicates that on folio one of the file, there is a certification of the judgment issued by the Family Court of Liberia, at 9:10 a.m. on March 5, 2005, from case file number 79-100174-0386-CI, in which it is requested that the insanity (insania) of [Name 019] be declared, and that his children [Name 019] and [Name 021], both with the surnames [Name 005], be appointed guardians (curadores). She alludes that it was not until 2005 that the declaration of insanity (insania) of Mr. [Name 019] was expressly requested; for it would not be logical, if he was already declared insane (insano) since 1979, that a declaration of insanity (insania) would be requested again in 2005. She maintains that the act of appointing a guardian (curador) on January 7, 1980, is simply an act of imposing the position of guardian (curador), not a judgment issued by a judge declaring insanity (insania). She states that the insanity (insania) judgment of [Name 019] is from March 8, 2005, and it is from that ruling when it is registered in the Civil Registry and the Public Registry. She argues that the foregoing is irrefutable proof, so the Court cannot disregard it. In the **second** error, she alleges the existence of error in the assessment of the evidence and in its interpretation, based on proven facts three and seven of the judgment. She comments that in file no. 79-100174-0386-CI, Mrs. [Name 006], based on a private medical certificate, requested the appointment of a guardian (curador) for [Name 019], for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint; and she emphasized that on that occasion, she did not request that her son be declared insane (insano). She asserts that Mrs. [Name 006] did not provide any final judgment declaring the insanity (insania) of her son. She explains that as of March 24, 2003 — the date when the deed under analysis was executed —, there was no final judicial judgment declaring insanity (insania), nor any entry in the Civil Registry or the National Registry indicating that said man was declared insane (insano). She alleges that no matter how solid the declaration of insanity (insania) in 2005 may be, it does not per se entail incapacity on the date of March 24, 2003, which is the moment when the sale agreement invalidated in the appealed judgment was signed; nor does it have effects on it or on Mr. [Name 003], because the plaintiff had no registered guardian (curador). For this reason, she believes there is no evidence demonstrating even relative nullity in the execution of the deed under analysis. Furthermore, she indicates that, considering the spirit of the rules governing evidentiary matters, 45.1 and 45.2 both of the CPC Law no. 9342, it is inadmissible for an agreement recorded in a public deed to be contradicted and even annulled based on testimonial statements from persons who were not present at the time of the execution of the disputed public deed, and on a medical certification dating from 1979. She concludes that the witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine a person's mental incapacity, nor whether that incapacity was present when signing the sale agreement. In the **third** breach, along the same lines of errors in evidentiary appreciation, she files the grievance against fact five of the judgment. She begins the development of the error by stating that the Court starts from the premise that, as of March 24, 2003, he was declared insane (insano) because he had a guardian (curadora) appointed since 1980. Against what was indicated, the appellant states that there is no evidence supporting that claim, because there is no certification from the Public Registry indicating that Mrs. [Name 006] was his guardian (curadora), precisely because she had died on July 1, 1995. She says she provides the death certificate of the aforementioned lady as proof. In the **fourth** challenge, she alleges an infraction in the interpretation and assessment of the documentary evidence, specifically the public deed containing a general power of attorney, executed before the defendant's notary office on September 29, 1997. She alludes to an inadequate assessment of the evidence and invokes section 45.2 of the CPC Law no. 9342, pointing out that the capacity to act is presumed to exist, and that the grantors in that act were Mr. [Name 019] and his son [Name 005]. Based on the foregoing, the appellant states that Mr. [Name 019], before the judgment declaring the insanity (insania) in 2005, was totally capable. With this, she seeks to discredit the idea that Mr. [Name 019] was insane (insano) since 1979. And furthermore, the appellant says, she had no way of knowing that said man was insane (insano), first because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment in that regard; and also because his son [Name 005] came to her notary office with the allegedly insane (insano) person, and both signed that public deed. She clarifies that it is not true, as the Court says, "that only Mr. [Name 005] appeared." In the **fifth** challenge, she accuses violation of rule 835 of the Civil Code, because the Court annuls the agreement under analysis, despite the absence of capacity to act of Mr. [Name 030] and his consent not having been demonstrated. From the foregoing, she develops the theses of sections 41, 627, 628, 837, and 1007 all of the Civil Code. Questioning the absolute nullity, and indicating that, if there were any (which she does not accept), it would be a relative nullity, as he had not been declared insane (insano) at the time of the act annulled by the judgment.

**Appeal of defendant [Name 003].** **IV.-** In the **sole** grievance on the merits, the appellant accuses an infraction of section 41 of the Civil Code. He questions the absolute nullity of the deed under analysis, because in his view, it was executed when the incapacity of Mr. [Name 019] had not been judicially declared. He argues that in fact deemed proven no. 1, it is indicated that Mrs. [Name 006] filed a proceeding before the Civil Court of Liberia in 1979, requesting to be appointed guardian (curadora) of [Name 030]. The appellant says that the Court then indicates that the existence of a guardian (curador) reveals that the person does not have the faculties to govern themselves for clinically verifiable reasons. He objects that the plaintiff's incapacity was not clinically demonstrated in the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian (curador) filed before the Civil Court of Liberia, file no. 714-79. The foregoing, because he points out that the expert opinion that supported the previous proceeding was not issued by a doctor from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (hereinafter CCSS) or a Forensic Doctor from the Supreme Court. He argues that the expert opinion carried out by a private doctor does not reliably prove that Mr. [Name 019] is incapable; because in his view, the guardian (curador) appointment proceedings are not sufficient, clinically speaking, to demonstrate that incapacity. He argues that in the previous Civil Procedure Code, canon 847 requested a medical opinion from the CCSS to request the safeguard for persons with disabilities; and later, precept 848 subsection 2) ibidem, ordered the Department of Legal Medicine of the Judicial Investigation Organization to issue a comprehensive opinion on the person's condition. He subsequently wonders, why after his mother and guardian (curadora) died (July 1, 1995), was no new guardian (curador) appointed, if he had supposedly lost his volitional and cognitive capacity. He alleges that the representation of the guardian (curador) was not registered in any registry nor was it publicized to third parties. He says that Mrs. [Name 006] died eight years before the deed under analysis was signed. He argues that the accused infraction arises when the Court maintains that Mr. [Name 019] is incapable, just because a guardian (curador) was appointed for him in judicial proceedings; however, he alleges, the contested ruling does not proceed to analyze whether he was capable or incapable, nor does it review how that conviction was reached. He challenges, that considering the judicial declaration of incapacity to have existed since January 7, 1980, with the acceptance and swearing-in to the position of guardian (curador), is an erroneous legal appreciation, since the private medical opinion only served to establish the guardian (curador) appointment proceedings, but never functioned to declare the plaintiff's incapacity, because so indicates the resolution of the Civil Court of Liberia, of December 21, 1979, when it says: "…in view of the medical opinion in the record, these proceedings for the appointment of a guardian (curador) are deemed established…" He asserts that the plaintiff's incapacity was declared for the first time, with all the formality that such act requires, when the Family Court of Liberia, in a judgment at 9:10 a.m. on March 8, 2005, appointed his son, Mr. [Name 005], as guardian (curador), and declared in a judgment for the first time Mr. [Name 019] insane (insano), which had never been done before. For this reason, he maintains that deed no. 335 executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos, at 3:35 p.m. on March 24, 2003, is valid and effective. The appellant did not omit to state that the General Power of Attorney, granted by Mr. [Name 019] to his son with the surnames [Name 005], before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos, was granted and signed by both appearing parties on September 29, 1997, which is why he believes the considerations of the contested resolution should not be accepted when it says that only Mr. [Name 019] signed. And so he questions, what was the reason for having taken his father, supposedly insane (insano), to grant him a General Power of Attorney; which, although this point is not part of this proceeding, he believes it should be taken into account to resolve what is debated here. He adds, "in file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, which (sic) is the civil file of [Name 030] against [Name 027], which (sic) includes the same facts debated here and is an archived file […] I consider that said evidence is indispensable and must, with all due respect, be ordered by the Chamber." **V.-** The Court, on the core matters of interest for resolving the cassation appeals filed, indicated that the object of this proceeding rests on two fundamental pillars: 1. To determine if Mr. [Name 030] had the capacity to act when he executed public deed number 335 at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, granted before notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos; and 2. In the event that the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019] in the execution of said public instrument is verified, to check whether a harmful act arose from said act of disposition on the part of the defendants that is capable of making them debtors for damages and losses before the plaintiff. Then, regarding the first point, ON THE CAPACITY TO ACT of Mr. [Name 019], the challenged ruling agreed with the plaintiff. In this regard, it said that when [Name 030] executed the act of March 24, 2003, "he was unaware of the magnitude of the transaction he was carrying out," inasmuch as the plaintiff party demonstrated, in accordance with article 41.1.1 of the CPC Law no.

9342, that he had been diagnosed with mental incapacity since 1979; and had a guardian (curadora) since January 7, 1980. The Court based its reasoning, as recorded in the certification issued by the Civil Court of Liberia, on the fact that on January 7, 1980, Mrs. [Name 006] "was informed of her appointment as guardian of the incapacitated person [Name 019] and, having understood, stated that she accepts the position conferred upon her as such...". The contested ruling concluded that if, in that very act, Mr. [Name 019] had already been qualified as incapacitated and, for that reason, a guardian was appointed for him, the Court should not proceed to further analyze whether the plaintiff was incapacitated, nor how that conviction was reached; since the evidence provided by the plaintiff regarding the guardian's appointment eliminates any doubt related to his capacity to act. In fact, it added, in the documentary evidence referring to the process through which [Name 006] was appointed guardian, there is a certificate from Doctor Eduardo Guevara Coronado (December 5, 1979) in which it is stated "By means of this document I Certify: that Mr. [Name 019] suffers from amnesia and total mental incapacity that may render him irresponsible for his acts" (folio 7 of the physical file). And furthermore, it stated, even though the co-defendants insisted that Mr. [Name 030] behaved "normally" when the sale recorded in the mentioned public deed took place, even having demonstrated that "normality," they cannot be correct regarding the existence of his will to consent to the sale of the possession described in proven fact four of this judgment. The foregoing is so, the Court continues, because there was a declaration of incapacity from before the legal transaction was carried out; and against said evidence, there is no other evidence presented by the defendants that would allow this court to doubt the documentary evidence added to the case file, visible on folios 5 to 12. Consequently, the contested judgment argued, if the judicially declared incapacitated person acts on their own behalf, and not through the guardian, "the acts or contracts performed... shall be absolutely null" in accordance with Article 41 of the Civil Code. The challenged ruling stated that the plaintiff demonstrated, in public deed number 335, executed at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, recorded in the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos, [Name 030] appeared, and in said public instrument, there is no record of representation by his guardian [Name 006]. Therefore, it clarified, if incapacity is characterized by the person not being able to govern themselves, it lacked interest for that Judging Body whether [Name 019]'s participation in the protocolized legal transaction was "normal," because, in summary, it produced a null contract, as his guardian did not intervene in the act (Articles 41 and 835, sections 1) and 3) Ibidem). On the other hand, it also mentioned that in the respective statements of defense, both defendants stated that it is strange that on September 29, 1997, the plaintiff appeared before the notary office of Attorney Moreno Bustos to grant a general power of attorney in favor of his son [Name 005], and they question "if the attorney-in-fact knew that his father was somehow insane, why does he appear before Notary Moreno Bustos and grant a power of attorney where he will benefit?" For the Court, this argument was inconsequential for the matter under debate in this process, because there was no claim whatsoever requesting the nullity of said mandate contract, coupled with the fact that, contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. "[Name 019]" —the father— who appeared before the public certifying officer to execute the deed and not "[Name 005]" —the son—, in such a way that the latter would not be benefited in any way by the mere fact of having been instituted as his father's attorney-in-fact. It emphasized that, regardless of the granting of said power of attorney, or even other acts of disposal that the insane person [Name 030] might have performed between 1979 and 2005, they in no way modify the reasoning that this jurisdictional body set forth in that same whereas clause, regarding the mental capacity of Mr. [Name 019] and regarding the absolute nullity and ineffectiveness of public deed number 335, executed at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, visible on the front and back of folio 149 of the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos. Regarding the second pillar upon which this process rests, namely DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS), the Court pointed out that, having verified the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019] in the execution of said public instrument, it had to be verified whether a harmful act on the part of the defendants derived from said disposal act, capable of making them debtors for damages before the plaintiff. It indicated that the burden of proof for what was invoked in the claim lies with the plaintiff; an extreme that the Court considers the plaintiff failed to meet, with respect to the fault of Johanna Moreno Bustos. It supported the foregoing based on the fact that the plaintiff did not provide evidence demonstrating that the notary knew of the insanity or incapacity of Mr. [Name 030], or that she had the means to determine it. It continues that, although there are three testimonies that express attitudes of Mr. [Name 030] that could make one think that any person would detect insanity on his part; it considered that a testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff affirms: "any person without being a Psychologist can notice the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]." Because precisely, that decision-making body affirmed, without technical evidence that determines so, it could not validly conclude what the plaintiff affirms through the mere say-so of deponents who do not have the status of expert witnesses, or of qualified professionals to issue a scientific opinion on the condition of Mr. [Name 030]. The Court asserted that the only legible medical opinion existing in the case file is the one found on folio 7, regarding which it stated that this document does not deduce that all contact with Mr. [Name 019] allows a person who is not a "psychologist" to know about his insanity. Likewise, the Lower Court (A quo) continued, the clinical file provided as documentary evidence from folio 146 to 188 of the case file is unintelligible due to being blurry, and it constitutes evidence regarding which the defendant party was not granted an audience; said document cannot be evaluated not only because the adversary principle was not respected, but also because it is impossible to read what is recorded. The contested ruling does not set aside the evaluation of the deposition (declaración de parte) given by Johanna Moreno Bustos, and in this regard, it notes that she accepted knowing the plaintiff's family; however, from the answers given to the interrogation, the Court did not deduce that the co-defendant accepted knowing about the incapacity/insanity of Mr. [Name 019]. In reality, her knowledge about Mr. [Name 030]'s family did not allow that Decision-Making Body to conclude that the notary necessarily knew about the situation experienced by him, such that she should abstain from executing the public deed. It concluded that, as it were unproven facts that Notary Moreno Bustos knew of Mr. [Name 030]'s insanity, and furthermore, that from the contact produced during the execution of the public deed, she should have noticed [Name 030]'s insanity, it excluded the existence of the attribution criterion necessary to configure the liability alleged against co-defendant Moreno Bustos. In relation to the liability of defendant [Name 003], the questioned judgment stated that the plaintiff also alleged that he knew of [Name 030]'s incapacity (sixth fact of the claim), and took advantage of that state to carry out the legal transaction. Regarding that fact, the Court found no evidence in the case file; and therefore, it also excluded the attribution criterion necessary to configure the civil liability of Mr. [Name 003]. The challenged ruling could also not state that the payment for the right of possession transferred by Mr. [Name 030] with the vehicle is an act carried out for the sake of exploitation. Due to the foregoing, the Court did not condemn the counterclaiming co-defendants to pay the claimed damages. Then, regarding the COUNTERCLAIM (RECONVENCIÓN), the Court pointed out that the theory of the case presented by the defendant party is innocuous given the purpose of the process analyzed in whereas clause IV of that ruling, which has been set forth above in this whereas clause. For that reason, no "proven facts" of relevance for resolving that action were recorded, because the claims raised by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] are based on the premise that Mr. [Name 030] acted in the legal transaction under analysis with "full knowledge" and "full will" (second fact of the counterclaim). For the contested judgment, that affirmation becomes irrelevant, since in that resolution it was developed that whoever lacks capacity to act has no will to obligate themselves; consequently, neither can they consent, and then, there would be no possible way for the counterclaimants to succeed in demonstrating the knowledge and will of Mr. [Name 030] in the legal transaction under analysis. This is because, the appealed ruling reiterates, there exists the appointment of a guardian since 1980. Consequently, it was not possible for it to declare the validity of public deed number 335, executed at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, recorded in the protocol of notary public Johanna Moreno Bustos.

**VI.-** Regarding the cassation appeals (recursos de casación), this Chamber observes that both cassation appellants insist that at the time of subscribing to public deed no. 335, executed at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, recorded in the protocol of notary public Johanna Moreno Bustos, the plaintiff [Name 030] had full capacity to act, and therefore, said deed must be valid and effective. To that end, both appellants, in general terms, refer to the same errors; and although numbered differently (in one case the breaches come separately and in the other a single challenge with different topics is alleged), the arguments coincide. Therefore, for better order, and given that in the appeal of cassation appellant Moreno Bustos the different arguments are numbered, this Chamber will follow the numbering established in the appeal of co-defendant Moreno Bustos. Thus, they consider in the different objections that the date from which the plaintiff was declared insane is March 5, 2005 —because a judicial ruling declared it so and it was registered in the respective Public Registries—; and not January 7, 1980, as the Court considered. They support this in the **first** objection by saying that it would not be logical to institute a new insanity process if the person had already been declared so previously. This Decision-Making Body does not agree with the appellants on this point. Because whether it is logical or not to have filed the process for the declaration of insanity in 2005, a date when such a declaration already existed since 1980, is a mere opinion that does not attack the central foundation of the judgment —that Mr. [Name 019] was incapacitated since when the Civil Court of Liberia appointed a guardian for him in the year 1980—, reducing itself to subjective arguments lacking any utility for being analyzed; since it would be a case of useless cassation, insofar as it would not be feasible to break the contested ruling, as the argument of the contested resolution subsists, because it remains unquestioned. In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to emphasize that Article 9 of the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities (Ley para Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad), No. 9379, indicates the need to review this condition periodically; specifically, that the safeguard may be reviewed at any time, and ex officio shall be subject to review by the judging person every five years. This internal regulation is based on the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, whose purpose is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. Furthermore, in the Inter-American Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which have supra-constitutional status because they deal with human rights, insofar as they grant greater rights than the Political Constitution, according to reiterated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice —see, among others, votes No. 6856-2005, No. 2313-1995, No. 8892-2012, No. 18896-2014 and No. 20357-2018—; coupled with the fact of being consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda and Circular 173-2019 on the Brasilia Regulations regarding Access to Justice for People in Vulnerable Situations. Hence, having initiated a second process related to the disability of Mr. [Name 019] is protected under national and international legislation; and the argument indicating —that it is not logical to present a second process if the plaintiff had already been declared *incapaz*— for this Chamber, is out of place. For this reason, the ground will be denied.

**VII.-** In this case, in the **second** ground, he points out that Ms. [Name 006] requested, in 1979, proceedings for the appointment of a guardian to present a criminal complaint, based on a private medical opinion; not for a declaration of insanity. In this regard, this Chamber agrees with the Court when it indicates that, since January 7, 1980, at the Civil Court of Liberia, Mrs. [Name 006] "...*was informed of her appointment as guardian of the incapacitated person [Name 019] and, having understood, stated that she accepts the position conferred upon her as such....*". Therefore, this Decision-Making Body holds that already from that date, Mr. [Name 019] had been qualified as a person with psychosocial disability, and for that reason, the judicial authority deemed it necessary to appoint Ms. [Name 006] as guardian. That is, a judicial authority qualified and resolved on the situation of Mr. [Name 019], appointing a person to represent him, thus eliminating any doubt that could arise. Now then, any arguments that might be had regarding that procedure, such as disagreement with the private nature of the medical opinion upon which the judging person relied to decide, should have been argued within that process; and not to come later, many years after, to challenge issues that should have been ventilated at that time and within that process (canon 33 of the CPC (Civil Procedure Code) Law No. 9342). However, for further elaboration, Article 847 of Law No. 7130, as amended by Law No. 9379 for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, clearly states that the medical opinion may be issued by a CCSS doctor, or "*...**by the treating medical specialist**, who certifies the condition of intellectual, mental or psychosocial disability of the person requesting or for whom the safeguard is requested*." —the emphasis is not from the original—. And for this reason, this Chamber holds that if the Court based its analysis on the medical opinion of a private specialist, it acted in accordance with the legality framework, and the error pointed out by the cassation appellants does not exist. This is because, this Decision-Making Body considers, the legislation in force allows the parties to request the safeguard based on a private medical opinion; it is not true, as the cassation appellants state, that this request is only permitted based on an opinion issued by the CCSS. On the other hand, in relation to the argument set forth in the appeals, that the witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine a person's mental incapacity, nor whether that incapacity was present when subscribing to the purchase-sale contract. This Chamber considers that this does not become an argument invoking an error of the contested ruling, because rather, that criterion coincides with what the Court stated. Thus, the contested judgment literally states: "*Even though there are three testimonies that express attitudes of Mr. [Name 030] that could make one think that any person would detect insanity on his part; it is considered that a testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff affirms: 'any person without being a Psychologist can notice the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]'*". And by virtue of that, that Judging Body did not find liability on the part of the defendants regarding the execution of the deed under analysis; and did not condemn them to pay the damages claimed by the plaintiff. Due to the foregoing, the ground will be denied.

**VIII.-** In the **third** breach, they allege that the Court starts from the premise that as of March 24, 2003, he was declared insane because he had a guardian appointed since 1980; however, for the cassation appellants, there is no evidence to support that statement, because there is no certification from the Public Registry indicating that Mrs. [Name 006] was his guardian, precisely because she had died on July 1, 1995. At this point, the **fifth** challenge will also be analyzed, given that it is related to the third cassation ground, when it is alleged that the Court annulled the pact under analysis, despite the absence of the capacity to act of Mr. [Name 030] and his consent not having been proven. This Chamber holds that here a distinction must be made as the Court did, in the sense that the capacity to obligate oneself is one thing, and register publicity for it to be enforceable against third parties is another. This Chamber considers, as set forth in the contested ruling, that whoever lacks capacity to act cannot obligate themselves; and therefore cannot consent. This is established by Article 41 of the Civil Code, when it states "*acts performed without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null*." Thus, Article 835, section 3) Ibidem is also observed, where the absolute nullity of acts or contracts executed or entered into by an absolutely incapacitated person is provided for. In this way, when the Court of Liberia in the year 1980 appointed Mrs. Hermelinda as guardian of Mr. [Name 019], it clearly qualified him as incapacitated. And it is by virtue of this lack of capacity to consent that the challenged ruling declared absolutely null and ineffective, deed no. 335 executed at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, an extreme with which this Chamber agrees, by virtue of a judicial authority having imposed a guardian upon him, based on a medical opinion. However, moving to the second point of analysis, which affects the knowledge that third parties may have of Mr. [Name 019]'s situation, this Chamber observes that indeed Notary Johanna Moreno Bustos and the appearing party [Name 003] did not know of the *insanity* of Mr. [Name 019], because from contact with him on the occasion of the signing of said public instrument, that *insanity* was not noticeable, and for that reason, they were absolved of liability for the damages claimed by the plaintiff. In short, register publicity is not constitutive of the incapacity to consent, as the appellants seem to try to make it appear, because in this case, registration in the public registries is so that the judicial declaration of incapacity or insanity is of public knowledge to third parties. But, as this Decision-Making Body conceives it, incapacity exists from the moment of its declaration, independently of its registration; and naturally, due to the order in which facts must occur, it pre-exists the registration. Article 851 of the 1989 Civil Procedure Code (Law No. 7130), amended by Law No. 9379, the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, states that the judging person shall resolve whether the requesting person or the person for whom the safeguard is requested requires that measure and in what proportion; if it grants the request, it shall designate a person to occupy the place; and finally, it provides that the establishment of this safeguard shall be communicated to the Public Property Registry for its respective annotation on present or future movable and immovable property owned by the person with a disability. For this Chamber, that rule eliminates all doubt that the judging person is the one who declares the safeguard for the person for whom it is requested, the proportion of the measure, and, in addition, it is only after it is established by the Authority that it is communicated to the Public Registry to make it known to third parties —canon 455 of the Civil Code, when it refers to register publicity and its effect on third parties: thus, titles subject to registration that are not registered do not harm a third party, except from the date of registration—.

And in the specific case of the insanity (insania) of Mr. [Nombre 030], it is enforceable against third parties as of June 17, 2005, the date from which it appears in the National Registry. For this reason, in the judgment of this Chamber, the Tribunal resolved correctly when it stated that the defendants did not know of the insanity of Mr. [Nombre 030] at the time the deed under analysis was granted, and therefore it absolved them of liability, despite having declared the public instrument under analysis absolutely null, given that the incapacity of Mr. [Nombre 030] already existed at the time of its granting. By virtue of the foregoing, the grievance will be denied.

**IX.-** In the **fourth** challenge, the appellant alleges an error in the interpretation and assessment of the public deed containing an unlimited power of attorney, granted before the notary of the defendant on September 29, 1997, where the grantors in that act were Mr. [Nombre 019] and his son [Nombre 019 005]. Based on the foregoing, the cassation appellant states, Mr. [Nombre 019], before the judgment declaring the *insanity* in the year 2005, was fully capable. She also alleges she had no way of knowing that said gentleman was *insane*, first because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment in this regard; and furthermore, because his son [Nombre 019 005] came to her notary office with the allegedly insane person, and both signed that public deed. Regarding the Unlimited Power of Attorney, which the cassation appellants indicate must be assessed as proof of the plaintiff's volitional capacity, this Chamber holds, as did the Tribunal, that this act is not the subject of dispute, and therefore, it exceeds the limits within which a criterion must be issued in this judgment. In addition, this Chamber observes, the appellant Moreno Bustos points out that what the Tribunal stated, that only Mr. [Nombre 005]” —the son— appeared, is not true. However, that is not the case; the Tribunal stated that only the father —[Nombre 019]— appeared; and it expressly indicates “*contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. [Nombre 019] who appeared before the public attestor to grant the deed and not [Nombre 005]…*”. Regarding the issue of public registry notice, the cassation appellants are referred to the analysis in the previous point. Consequently, this ground must be denied.

**X.-** This Collegiate Body considers, with respect to the evidence offered for a better decision, namely the death certificate of Mrs. [Nombre 006]; and case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, it is appropriate to cite canon 69.7.3 of the CPC Law no. 9342, insofar as it indicates that the admission of evidence in cassation shall have a restrictive and exceptional nature. Given that, only that strictly necessary evidence to resolve the points that have been the subject of challenge may be admitted, when it could not have been offered or produced previously; and, in addition, the Chamber may only order evidence ex officio when it is indispensable. In the specific case under study, regarding the two pieces of evidence offered before this instance, neither meets any of the requirements for admission. The death certificate is already in the case file; moreover, this Chamber does not understand the request to bring case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI into this proceeding; given that this is the number of the case under analysis. Based on the foregoing, the rejection of the evidence offered is imposed.

**XI.-** By virtue of what has been reasoned and set forth, the appeal must be declared without merit, denying the evidence provided with the appeal that has not been admitted in previous instances. Costs correspond to the economic impact that participation in the process implies for the parties. As established in Article 73.1 of the CPC Law no. 9342, their pronouncement must be made ex officio in any resolution that puts an end to the controversy, and must be charged to the losing party, except in those cases where one or more of the exemption scenarios provided for in the law are present (numeral 73.2 ibidem). Therefore, its resolution requires an evaluative criterion on the part of the jurisdictional authority. The cassation appeal is one of those resolutions, since it definitively decides the dispute and responds to a judgment of utility and necessity. Furthermore, its mere filing implies a summons to the opposing party, which will prevent the finality of the appealed judgment, will subject them to continuing the discussion of the matter before a higher instance, will keep the discussion of the points in controversy open, and likewise, will imply incurring additional expenses for having to appear and act before said authority. In this way, its pronouncement is appropriate and in that regard, having denied both appeals in their entirety, and having failed to break the provisions of the challenged ruling, no reason is observed that would justify their filing, and therefore both cassation appellants are ordered to pay the costs generated in this phase. The amount to be paid must be settled by the benefited party at the corresponding procedural stage.

**XII. DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE LÓPEZ CASAL** : With the profound respect and appreciation I profess towards my fellow female Magistrates and towards my fellow male Magistrate who, in this specific case, constitute the majority of this honorable Cassation Chamber, I depart from the decision taken by it, I dissent from my vote and cast it in the following manner: I am convinced that the cassation appellants are correct in their grievances, and therefore, regarding what was challenged by them, their cassation appeals will be granted and the first-instance judgment will be overturned, in the terms that will be specified later. I do not agree with the statement made by the majority of the Chamber, which reads that as of January seven, nineteen eighty, when the Civil Court of Liberia appointed Mrs. [Nombre 006] as guardian (curadora) of Mr. [Nombre 030], this means that, from that moment, it is valid and correct to consider said gentleman as a person incapable of acting. For the Undersigned dissenting Magistrate, that simple appointment is not legally sufficient to consider Mr. [Nombre 019] as a person incapable of acting. It was completely necessary that, in said judicial proceeding, there be a conclusive and final judicial pronouncement, by virtue of which the Judge in charge of said voluntary jurisdiction proceeding (as the Code of Civil Procedure termed it), would have declared Mr. [Nombre 019] incapable. As the cassation appellant Johanna Moreno Bustos well expressed, the act of appointing a guardian for Mr. [Nombre 019] on January seven, nineteen eighty, consisted solely of an act designating a procedural guardian, which is far from the necessary judgment or decision on the merits, issued by a Judge of the Republic, after having assessed all the evidence, by virtue of which the person is declared in a state of insanity (insania), a resolution which, it should be noted, had to be registered in the Public Registry of Persons so that, with said registration, it would be legally susceptible to being enforceable against third parties. In the same way, the majority of the Chamber does not realize that, as also alleged by the cassation appellant Moreno Bustos, the purpose of appointing the guardian Hermelinda López López within proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI was solely to be able to file a criminal complaint on behalf of Mr. [Nombre 019]. Based on the above, from no point of view can said gentleman be legally considered insane (insano) as of January of nineteen eighty, but rather, on the contrary, said status modifying his capacity to act operated and took legal effect against third parties (such as, without a doubt, Mrs. Johanna Moreno Bustos and Mr. [Nombre 003]) with the registration, in the Public Registry of Persons, of the judgment issued by the Family Court of Liberia, at nine hours ten minutes on March eight, two thousand five, by virtue of which Mr. [Nombre 030] was declared in a state of insanity. Based on the foregoing, the provisions of numeral 41 of the Civil Code would not be applicable, since, as other courts of Justice have well expressed, *“the mere fact that Mr. [Nombre 032] had been declared in a state of interdiction (interdicción) by a final judgment does not make all the legal transactions he carried out by himself, prior to that declaration, absolutely null due to lacking mental capacity, as the appellant seems to understand it. This is so because according to the provisions of Article 41 of the Civil Code, ‘Acts or contracts carried out without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null.’ That is, acts or contracts carried out by the insane person by himself are absolutely null, but only those entered into after the declaration of his state of interdiction by a final judgment, and those carried out by him in the same manner while that status has not been lifted also by a final judgment (Articles 36 and 41 of the Civil Code and 239 of the Family Code). This is so because regarding previous ones, the capacity to obligate oneself and contract is presumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary, all in accordance with the provisions of Articles 627 subsection 1), 628 and 1007 of the Civil Code. In this case, the sale that is challenged as null was entered into on February seven, two thousand two, while the state of interdiction of the seller, Mr. [Nombre 032], was declared by a first-instance judgment issued on August seven, two thousand three, confirmed by the second-instance judgment issued in December two thousand three. This means that it is not a legal transaction covered by the presumption of absolute nullity referred to in the aforementioned Article 41 of the Civil Code”* **(in this regard see Second Civil Tribunal, Second Section. Vote number 137 of 10:00 hours on May 30, 2008, drafted by former Judge, Juan Ramón Coronado Huertas).** On the other hand, the Undersigned Magistrate considers that, in addition to the presumption of absolute nullity contained in numeral 41 of the Civil Code not being applicable to the sub judice, the plaintiff party also did not reliably prove what was truly relevant in this matter, namely, that Mr. [Nombre 030] did not possess, on March twenty-four, two thousand three, sufficient and necessary mental and volitional faculties to carry out the legal transaction of selling his right of possession over the property with cadastral plan G-587784. The majority of the Chamber anchors and reiterates the incapacity to act of Mr. [Nombre 019], solely for the simple fact that, in the year nineteen eighty and based on a private medical certificate, Mrs. [Nombre 006] was designated as the guardian of the plaintiff in this proceeding. For the Undersigned dissenting Magistrate, this is manifestly insufficient to prove the absence of mental faculties and volitional capacity of Mr. [Nombre 019] on the day he entered into the sales contract with Mr. [Nombre 003]. This is for several reasons: 1) First, because the private medical opinion, to which the majority of the Chamber alludes in this specific case, was issued many years before the year two thousand three, and what was truly relevant was to prove whether the plaintiff had or did not have sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity at the time he entered into the contract with Mr. [Nombre 003], that is, on March twenty-four, two thousand three; 2) Second, because it is absolutely and completely unknown what methodology and sources Doctor Eduardo Guevara Coronado used to conclude that Mr. [Nombre 019] suffered from amnesia and total mental incapacity that *could* make him irresponsible for his acts; 3) Third, the majority of the Chamber loses sight of the fact that the private medical opinion, issued by the physician Guevara Coronado, was rendered solely to resolve whether or not to appoint Mrs. [Nombre 006] as the plaintiff's guardian, for the purposes of filing a criminal complaint, and not to resolve what is being discussed in this litigation, that is, whether or not he had sufficient mental capacity to carry out, by himself, the sale made in favor of the defendant [Nombre 003]; and 4) Fourth, in the insanity proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI, the defendants Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] were not parties, and consequently, did not have the opportunity to contest the private medical opinion, in whatever was unfavorable to them. Based on the reasons set forth, in a minority vote, I grant the cassation appeal filed by the defendants. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is overturned. Ruling on the merits of the matter, the defenses of lack of cause, lack of capacity, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are rejected. The defenses of lack of right, lack of active standing, and lack of passive standing are upheld. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] is declared without merit in all its claims. The plaintiff party is ordered to pay the costs for the defendants. On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim, the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing filed by the plaintiff-counterdefendant are declared without merit. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] against the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] is granted. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos at fifteen hours thirty minutes on March twenty-four, two thousand three, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterdefendant party is ordered to pay each of the defendant-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones, for subjective moral damages. The plaintiff-counterdefendant party is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim. **THEREFORE:** In a minority vote, the cassation appeals filed by the defendants are granted. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is overturned. Ruling on the merits of the matter, the defenses of lack of cause, lack of capacity, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are rejected. The defenses of lack of right, lack of active standing, and lack of passive standing are upheld. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] is declared without merit in all its claims. The plaintiff party is ordered to pay the costs for the defendants. On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim, the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing filed by the plaintiff-counterdefendant are declared without merit. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Nombre 003] against the Estate of Mr. [Nombre 030] is granted. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos at fifteen hours thirty minutes on March twenty-four, two thousand three, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterdefendant party is ordered to pay each of the defendant-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones, for subjective moral damages. The plaintiff-counterdefendant party is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim.

**THEREFORE** The evidence offered for a better decision is denied. By majority, the appeals are declared without merit, with their costs to be borne by those who filed them. Magistrate López Casal dissents. ipreinfalk **NOTE:** Magistrate **DAMARIS VARGAS VÁSQUEZ** participated in the decision of this matter; however, she could not sign the preceding resolution as she is on vacation.

This is recorded in accordance with article 28.2 of the Civil Procedure Code.

 

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style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"></span><br><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">S43N843KCIKPG61</span><br><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">LUIS GUILLERMO RIVAS LOAICIGA - MAGISTRADO/A</span></p> | <img 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 Signature page for Voto No. 2024-003040, issued by the Tribunal Agrario of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, on April 3, 2024, at 4:05 p.m.

ERROR: Response terminated early without producing a complete translation.

He or she has the right to “preferential treatment when conducting administrative procedures in public and private entities” (subsection 3.k). The foregoing, in order to ensure that every older adult has the right to a better quality of life. Regarding the Judiciary, the virtual folder of the case file under analysis has a pop-up window stating: “Preferential attention to person: -OLDER ADULT-”. This is to provide the best possible public service, according to the condition of the user and to operate in accordance with the principles enshrined in the relevant regulations (voto 1930-F-2022).

The objection in cassation is unfounded; it is illogical to file a new interdiction (insania) proceeding if the person had already been declared as such previously; a view this Chamber does not share. Subsection 9 of the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities (Ley para Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad) indicates the need to review this condition periodically, specifically, that the safeguard (salvaguardia) may be reviewed at any time and ex officio by the judge, every five years. This rule is based on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the purpose of which is to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. Also, on the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, both of which have supra-constitutional status as they relate to human rights, insofar as they grant greater rights than the Political Constitution (see resolutions 6856-2005, 2313-1995, 8892-2012, 18896-2014, and 20357-2018 of the Constitutional Chamber); in addition to being consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda and circular 173-2019 on the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People. Hence, the filing of a second interdiction (insania) proceeding related to a man's disability is supported by national and international legislation (voto 1930-F-2022).

Subsection 847 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil, Law 7130), as amended by the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities (Law 9379), clearly states that the medical opinion (dictamen) may be issued by a physician from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or “by the treating specialist physician, who certifies the condition of intellectual, mental, or psychosocial disability of the person requesting or for whom the safeguard (salvaguardia) is requested.” Therefore, this Chamber holds that if the Court based its analysis on the medical opinion (dictamen) of a private specialist, it acted in accordance with the rule of law (voto 1930-F-2022).

A person lacking the capacity to act cannot be obligated. Therefore, he or she cannot consent. This is established in subsection 41 of the Civil Code, which states: “acts performed without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null.” Also, provision 835.3 ibidem provides for the absolute nullity of acts or contracts executed or entered into by an absolutely incapable person. When the Court, in 1980, appointed the mother as guardian (curadora) of her son, it clearly classified him as incapable. And it is by virtue of this lack of capacity to consent that the challenged judgment declared the deed of sale of a possession right over a property absolutely null and void; with which this Chamber agrees, by virtue of a judicial authority having, based on a medical criterion, imposed a guardian (curadora) on him (voto 1930-F-2022).

The principle of registry publicity is not constitutive of the incapacity to consent. Registration in public registries is so that the judicial declaration of incapacity or interdiction (insania) is known to third parties. But the incapacity exists from the moment of its declaration, regardless of its registration. Subsection 851 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil, Law 7130), as amended by the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities (Law 9379), indicates that the judge shall decide whether the person requesting, or for whom the safeguard (salvaguardia) is requested, requires that measure and to what extent; if the request is granted, a person shall be appointed to fill the position; the establishment of this safeguard (salvaguardia) shall be communicated to the Public Property Registry for its respective annotation on the present or future movable and immovable property owned by the person with a disability. The foregoing, to make it known to third parties (canon 455 Civil Code). Titles subject to registration that are not registered do not prejudice a third party, except from the date of registration. In this Chamber’s view, the Court resolved correctly when it indicated that the defendants did not know of the seller's interdiction (insania) at the time the deed was granted. That is why they were absolved of liability, even though the public instrument was declared absolutely null, given that his incapacity already existed at the time of granting (voto 1930-F-2022).

The admission of evidence in cassation is restrictive and exceptional in nature (canon 69.7.3 Civil Procedure Code). Only that evidence strictly necessary to resolve the points that have been challenged may be admitted, when it could not have been offered or practiced previously, and, furthermore, the Chamber may only order evidence ex officio when it is indispensable. In the present case, regarding the two pieces of evidence offered before this instance, neither meets the requirements to be admitted; therefore, they are rejected (voto 1930-F-2022).

Costs (costas) correspond to the economic impact that participation in the proceeding implies for the parties. Their pronouncement must be made ex officio in every resolution that ends the controversy, and they must be charged to the losing party, except in those cases where one or more of the legal exemption scenarios concur (subsections 73.1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code). Their resolution requires a value judgment by the court. The cassation appeal is one of those resolutions, since it definitively decides the dispute and responds to a criterion of usefulness and necessity. Furthermore, its mere filing implies a summons to the counterparty, which will prevent the appealed judgment from becoming final, will oblige them to continue the discussion of the matter before a higher court, will keep the points in controversy open for discussion, and will likewise entail additional expenses for them, for having to appear and take action before said authority.

Since both appeals were denied in their entirety and failed to overturn the challenged ruling, there is no observed reason that justified their filing; therefore, both cassation appellants are ordered to pay the costs generated in this phase; the amount to be paid must be liquidated by the benefited party in the corresponding procedural stage (voto 1930-F-2022).

Res. 001930-F-S1-2022 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on the twelfth of August of two thousand twenty-two.

In an ordinary proceeding brought by [Nombre 030] (represented by the guardian [Nombre 019] Alexander [Nombre 005]) against [Nombre 002] and [Nombre 003]. The legal professionals Andrés Pérez González, Johanna María Moreno Bustos, and Eric Badilla Córdoba are participating; the first acting as the special judicial representative of the plaintiff, the second on her own behalf, and the third representing the interests of the defendant [Nombre 003], in the capacity of lead counsel.

The magistrate Vargas Vásquez drafts the opinion; and,

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Mr. [Nombre 005], in his capacity as guardian of the mentally ill [Nombre 030], filed a civil lawsuit on March 16, 2005, against [Nombre 003] and [Nombre 002] based on the following facts. He said that Mr. [Nombre 030] suffered a traffic accident in 1973 that caused very serious injuries. He alleged that unscrupulous people took advantage of his situation and he went bankrupt; because due to his "mental incapacity," he lost, through a fraudulent sale, a property of great value. He added that his mother, Mrs. [Nombre 006], acting as his guardian, wanted to recover said property through a criminal complaint against the acquirer and against Mr. Jorge Antonio Larios Ugalde. Regarding the real estate, he reported that more than 30 years ago, the plaintiff acquired possession of an unregistered farm (finca), located in Guadalupe de Liberia, which has the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008], and [Nombre 009]; South: [Nombre 010] and Quebrada Barreal; East: Public Street highway to Liberia Centro, and West: [Nombre 010]. He stated that this farm (finca) measures 5,298 square meters and corresponds to the surveyed plan (plano catastrado) no. G- 587784- 99. He remarked that on March 24, 2003, the plaintiff transferred his possession right over the mentioned farm (finca) to Mr. [Nombre 003], through public deed number 335 of the protocol of Ms. Johanna María Moreno Bustos.

He added that the deed stated that the transferred right measured approximately half a hectare and had no survey plan (plano). He further indicated that the sale price was ¢1,000,000, paid with a vehicle, license plate [Valor 003], make Nissan, model 1986, style Cabstar, capacity three persons, fuel gasoline, which was not in the buyer's name, so the latter agreed to carry out the registration procedures to effectively transfer it to [Nombre 030]'s name. He maintained that this act carried out by [Nombre 030] is completely invalid and absolutely null, because he has been *insane* (insano) since suffering a traffic accident in 1973; which he claims to prove when the Civil Court of Liberia, in case file number 714-79, appointed his mother [Nombre 006] as his guardian (curadora). He explained that later, due to the death of said guardian, proceedings were reinitiated to appoint a new guardian for him, and in another medical assessment, the forensic medical service again determined that [Nombre 030] was *insane*, so the Family Court, by judgment at 9:10 a.m. on March 8, 2005, declared the *insanity* (insania), under case file no. 79-100714-386-CL (274-04). He alleged that the legal transaction became known when Mr. [Nombre 003] brought the vehicle, claiming it was payment for the transfer of the right of possession that [Nombre 030] had sold him. He argued that the deed in which [Nombre 030] transferred his right of possession is seriously flawed, because, knowing full well [Nombre 030]'s problems (a well-known person in Liberia), he was given as payment a vehicle that was not even in his name, was an old model, was in poor condition, and had encumbrances (gravámenes), which in no way compares to the value of the land measuring nearly 5,000 meters and located near a main road on the outskirts of downtown Liberia. He maintained that it is evident that attorney Johanna Moreno Bustos was aware of [Nombre 030]'s incapacity, because it could be perceived by having a conversation with the plaintiff, which is why he considered the transfer of the right of possession executed in said professional's protocol to be ineffective. Moreover, he claimed that transaction is ineffective because an object that would soon have little value was given in payment. He requested that the court declare: as of the date of the deed under analysis, Mr. [Nombre 019] was *mentally incapacitated* (incapacitado mentalmente) to perform a legal act of that nature; the deed lacks the formal and legal requirements; therefore, it is absolutely null; and that the co-defendants be ordered to pay damages and losses valued at ¢10,000,000, as well as costs. The co-defendants filed a negative response and raised the defenses of lack of: right (derecho), active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), cause (causa), capacity (capacidad), as well as the aphorism *sine actione agit*. Both co-defendants filed a **COUNTERCLAIM** (RECONVENCIÓN) in separate briefs, which are, however, coincident on the following points. They stated that on March 24, 2003, Messrs. [Nombre 003] and [Nombre 019] appeared before notary public Johanna Bustos Moreno to execute a deed of sale for a right of possession over a property located in Guadalupe de Liberia, first canton, fifth district of the Province of Guanacaste, with the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 014], South: [Nombre 019], West: [Nombre 019], East: public street, with an approximate measurement of half a hectare; which was paid for with the vehicle license plate [Valor 003], make Nissan, style Cabstar, and although at that time Mr. [Nombre 003] was not the registered owner of the vehicle, he committed to putting it in the name of the appearing party [Nombre 019]. They expressed that said document was executed with full knowledge of what both parties were doing and with full will; with the advice and explanation of the notary. For her part, co-defendant [Nombre 016] stated that on August 9, 2005, she received judicial notification of this ordinary proceeding, in which it was alleged that Mr. [Nombre 030] was and is *insane*; which, she clarified, is an unknown situation for her, since the sale of the property occurred under strict normality of persons who see and reflect perfect normality in their acts. She argued that the lawsuit caused her unease and, therefore, moral damage (daño moral), because she is a professional of recognized integrity and moral standing, who has practiced the profession for more than 10 years in the Province of Guanacaste, especially in Liberia. She estimated the moral damage at the sum of ¢3,000,000. On the other hand, co-defendant [Nombre 003] indicated that Mr. [Nombre 019] took possession of the vehicle on the day the deed was signed and took it to his house in good working and functional condition. He commented that he received a visit from the plaintiff's children to inform him "on what terms he had done business with Mr. [Nombre 005]," and he also recalls that the plaintiff himself proposed returning the vehicle and having him pay "the one million colones according to my payment possibilities, which I did in installments." He asserts that both he and the notary were unaware that Mr. [Nombre 019] was insane. He objects to the scope of the insanity declared for the plaintiff being prospective, that is, after the declaration and not before; therefore, the act executed is perfectly legal in all senses. He explained that the lawsuit has caused him moral damage, as he claims to be a very hard-working person, a farmer by trade and of moral standing; the plaintiff's bad faith causing him mental distress and unease. He estimated the moral damage at ¢3,000,000. Both defendants-counterclaimants sought a declaration that the deed executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, is perfectly valid and effective in law. They requested that the plaintiff-counterdefendant be ordered to pay moral damages and costs. The plaintiff-counterdefendant filed a negative response and raised the defenses of lack of: right and passive standing. The Collegiate Trial Court for Civil Matters of the First Instance of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), composed of the judges Angélica Delgado Madrigal, Milkyan Sánchez Aguilar, and David Matamoros Salazar, issued judgment no. 4 at 11:27 a.m. on October 31, 2018, in which, regarding the complaint, it denied the additional evidence for a better decision (prueba para mejor proveer) offered from folios 128 to 132. It also rejected the defenses of lack of: capacity, active and passive standing, cause, as well as the aphorism *sine actione agit*. It partially denied the exception of lack of right, which is why it upheld the complaint to declare that: as of the date when the public deed transferring the land under analysis was executed, the grantor [Nombre 030] was incapacitated to consent and perform a legal act of that nature; therefore, said deed lacks legal requirements and is absolutely null and ineffective. The Court also stated that Mr. [Nombre 030] is entitled to possession as owner of the unregistered farm located in Guadalupe de Liberia, which is agricultural land with an approximate measurement of half a hectare, with the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 014], South: [Nombre 019], East: public street, West: [Nombre 019]. It declared, on its own motion (de oficio), the existence of current interest regarding the upheld claims. **COUNTERCLAIM.** It declared the existence of active and passive standing, upheld the exception of lack of right regarding all claims made by [Nombre 016] and [Nombre 003]; therefore, it declared the counterclaim without merit, omitted any ruling on current interest, and imposed the costs of the proceeding on the losing party.

**II.-** This case file is flagged with the indication that an older adult participates; protected by the provisions of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, no. 7935, and as relevant to this area, section 3 subsection k) provides that they have the right to "preferential treatment when carrying out administrative procedures in public and private entities." This is to ensure that every older adult has the right to a better quality of life, as indicated by the aforementioned regulations. Thus, regarding this point and as it pertains to the Judicial Branch, it is necessary to note that the virtual folder of the case file under analysis has a pop-up window stating "Preferential attention to person: -OLDER ADULT-." This is to provide the best possible public service, according to the condition of the user-person; and to operate in accordance with the principles enshrined in the relevant regulations. In this specific case, this Chamber observes that Mr. [Nombre 030] died on March 13, 2018, as recorded in the certification provided.

**Appeal filed by defendant Moreno Bustos.** **Arguments on the Merits.** **III.-** She alleges a violation of rules 41, 627 subsection 1), 628, 837, and 1007 of the Civil Code, as well as section 41.5 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC Law no. 9342) in relation to the entire appeal. The **first** argument is based on the ground of erroneous assessment of documentary evidence, regarding proven facts one and two, which she transcribes. She points out that at folio one of the case file is the certification of the judgment issued by the Family Court of Liberia, at 9:10 a.m. on March 5, 2005, in case file number 79-100174-0386-CI, which requested that the insanity of [Nombre 019] be declared and that his children [Nombre 019] and [Nombre 021], both with the last name [Nombre 005], be appointed as guardians. She alludes that it was not until 2005 that the declaration of insanity for Mr. [Nombre 019] was expressly requested; for it would be illogical, if he had already been declared insane since 1979, to request the declaration of insanity again in 2005. She maintains that the act of appointing a guardian on January 7, 1980, is simply an act of conferring the position of guardian, not a judgment issued by a judge declaring insanity. She expresses that the judgment of *insanity* for [Nombre 019] is dated March 8, 2005, and it is from that ruling that it was registered in the Civil Registry and the Public Registry. She argues that the foregoing is irrefutable proof, which the Court cannot disregard. In the **second** error, she alleges the existence of error in the assessment of evidence and its interpretation, based on proven facts three and seven of the judgment. She comments that in case file no. 79-100174-0386-CI, Mrs. [Nombre 006], based on a private medical certificate, requested the appointment of a guardian for [Nombre 019] for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint; and she emphasized that, on that occasion, she did not ask for her son to be declared insane. She asserts that Mrs. [Nombre 006] did not provide any final judgment declaring her son's insanity. She explains that by March 24, 2003 —the date the deed under analysis was executed—, there was no final judicial judgment declaring insanity, nor any entry in the Civil Registry or the National Registry indicating that said gentleman had been declared insane. She argues that however solid the declaration of insanity in 2005 may be, it does not in itself entail incapacity on March 24, 2003, which is the moment when the purchase-sale agreement invalidated in the appealed judgment was signed; nor does it have effects on her or on Mr. [Nombre 003], because the plaintiff did not have a registered guardian. She therefore considers that there is no evidence demonstrating even relative nullity in the execution of the deed under analysis. Moreover, she points out that, in accordance with the understanding of the rules governing evidentiary matters 45.1 and 45.2 of the CPC Law no. 9342, it is inadmissible for an agreement recorded in a public deed to be contradicted and even annulled based on testimonial statements from persons who were not present at the time of executing the public deed in question, and a certification from a doctor dating back to 1979. She concludes that the witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine a person's mental incapacity, nor whether that incapacity was present when the purchase-sale contract was signed. In the **third** breach, along the same lines of errors in evidentiary assessment, she raises a challenge against fact five of the judgment. She begins developing the error by stating that the Court assumes that, as of March 24, 2003, he was declared insane because he had a guardian appointed since 1980. Contrary to this, the appellant states that there is no evidence supporting that assertion, because there is no certification from the Public Registry indicating that Mrs. [Nombre 006] was his guardian, precisely because she had died on July 1, 1995. She says she provides the death certificate of said lady as evidence. In the **fourth** challenge, she alleges an infringement in the interpretation and assessment of documentary evidence, specifically the public deed containing a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), executed before the defendant's notary office on September 29, 1997. She alludes to an inadequate assessment of evidence and invokes section 45.2 of the CPC Law no. 9342, noting that the capacity to act is presumed to exist, and that the grantors in that act were Mr. [Nombre 019] and his son [Nombre 005]. Based on the foregoing, the appellant states that Mr. [Nombre 019], before the judgment declaring insanity in 2005, was fully capable. With this, she seeks to discredit the claim that Mr. [Nombre 019] was insane since 1979. And, furthermore, the appellant says she had no way of knowing that said gentleman was insane, first because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment to that effect; and also, because his son [Nombre 005] appeared at her notary office with the supposedly insane person, and both signed that public deed. She clarifies, "it is not true, as the Court says, that only Mr. [Nombre 005] appeared." In the **fifth** challenge, she alleges a violation of rule 835 of the Civil Code, because the Court annuls the agreement under analysis, despite the lack of capacity to act and lack of consent on the part of Mr. [Nombre 030] not having been proven. Based on the foregoing, she develops the theses of sections 41, 627, 628, 837, and 1007 of the Civil Code. She questions the absolute nullity, indicating that if it existed (which she does not accept), it would be a relative nullity, because he had not been declared insane at the time of the act annulled by the judgment.

**Appeal by defendant [Nombre 003].** **IV.-** In the **sole** argument on the merits, the appellant alleges an infringement of section 41 of the Civil Code. He questions the absolute nullity of the deed under analysis, because in his view, it was executed when Mr. [Nombre 019]'s incapacity had not been judicially declared. He argues that in the fact deemed proven no. 1, it is indicated that Mrs. [Nombre 006] initiated a proceeding before the Civil Court of Liberia in 1979, requesting to be appointed as guardian (curadora) for [Nombre 030]. The appellant says the Court then points out that the existence of a guardian reveals that the person does not have the faculties to govern himself for reasons that are clinically verified. He objects that the plaintiff's incapacity was not clinically proven in the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian filed before the Civil Court of Liberia, case file no. 714-79. The foregoing, because he points out, the expert report that supported the previous proceeding was not issued by a doctor from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (hereinafter CCSS) or a Forensic Doctor from the Supreme Court. He argues that an expert report prepared by a private physician does not conclusively prove that Mr. [Nombre 019] is incapable; since in his view, the proceedings for appointing a guardian are not sufficient, clinically speaking, to prove that incapacity. He argues that in the former Civil Procedure Code, canon 847 required a medical report from the CCSS to request safeguards for persons with disabilities; and then, precept 848 subsection 2) ibidem, ordered the Department of Legal Medicine of the Judicial Investigation Agency to issue a comprehensive report on the person's condition. He subsequently asks, why after his mother and guardian died (July 1, 1995), was a new guardian not appointed for him? if he had supposedly lost his volitional and cognitive capacity. He claims that the representation of the guardian was not registered in any registry nor was it made public to third parties. He says that Mrs. [Nombre 006] died eight years before the deed under analysis was signed. He argues that the alleged infringement occurs when the Court holds that Mr. [Nombre 019] is incapable, solely by the fact that a guardian was appointed for him in judicial proceedings; however, he claims the contested ruling does not analyze whether he was capable or incapable, nor does it review how that conviction was reached. He challenges that having the declaration of judicial incapacity since January 7, 1980, with the acceptance and swearing-in of the guardian position, is an erroneous legal assessment, given that the private medical report only served to establish the proceedings for appointing a guardian, but never functioned to declare the plaintiff's incapacity, because the resolution of the Civil Court of Liberia of December 21, 1979, indicates as much, stating: "…in view of the medical report on file, the present proceedings for the appointment of a guardian are deemed established…" He asserts that the plaintiff's incapacity was declared for the first time, with all the formality that said act requires, when the Family Court of Liberia, in a judgment at 9:10 a.m. on March 8, 2005, appointed his son, Mr. [Nombre 005], as guardian, and for the first time declared Mr. [Nombre 019] insane in a judgment, which had never been done before. For this reason, he maintains that deed no. 335 executed before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos at 3:35 p.m. on March 24, 2003, is valid and effective. The appellant did not fail to state that the General Power of Attorney (Poder Generalísimo) granted by Mr. [Nombre 019] to his son with the last name [Nombre 005], before notary Johanna María Moreno Bustos, was executed and signed by both appearing parties on September 29, 1997, which is why he believes the considerations of the contested resolution should not be accepted when it says that only Mr. [Nombre 019] signed. And then he questions what the reason was for bringing his father, supposedly insane, to grant him a General Power of Attorney; which, although this point is not part of this proceeding, he believes it must be taken into account to resolve the matter debated here. He adds, "in case file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, which (sic) is a civil case file of [Nombre 030] against [Nombre 027], which (sic) comprises the same facts debated here and is an archived case file […] I consider that said evidence is indispensable and must, with all due respect, be ordered by the Chamber." **V.-** The Court, in its core reasoning and of interest for the resolution of the filed cassation appeals, pointed out that the object of this proceeding rests on two fundamental pillars: 1. To determine whether Mr. [Nombre 030] had the capacity to act when he executed public deed number 335 at 3:30 p.m. on March 24, 2003, executed before notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos; and 2. In the event that Mr. [Nombre 019]'s incapacity to act in the execution of said public instrument is verified, to ascertain whether a harmful act derives from said act of disposition by the defendants that is capable of making them debtors for damages and losses to the plaintiff. Thus, regarding the first point, ON THE CAPACITY TO ACT of Mr. [Nombre 019], the questioned ruling found in favor of the plaintiff. In this regard, it stated that when [Nombre 030] entered into the act on March 24, 2003, "he was unaware of the magnitude of the transaction he was conducting," because the plaintiff demonstrated, in accordance with article 41.1.1 of the CPC Law no. 9342, that he had been diagnosed with mental incapacity since 1979; and had a guardian (curadora) since January 7, 1980. The Court based its finding on a certification issued by the Civil Court of Liberia stating that on January 7, 1980, Mrs. [Nombre 006] "was informed of her appointment as guardian of the incapacitated person [Nombre 019] and, understanding it, stated that she accepts the position conferred upon her as such...". The questioned ruling concluded that if in that act Mr. [Nombre 019] had already been classified as incapacitated and, for that reason, a guardian was appointed for him, the Court should not conduct any further analysis of whether the plaintiff was incapable, or how that conviction was reached; since the evidence provided by the plaintiff regarding the appointment of the guardian eliminates any doubt related to his capacity to act.

In fact, it added, in the documentary evidence referring to the process through which [Name 006] was appointed guardian (curadora), there is a certificate from physician Eduardo Guevara Coronado (December 5, 1979) stating "<i>I hereby Certify: that Mr. [Name 019] suffers from amnesia and total mental incapacity that may make him irresponsible for his acts</i>" (folio 7 of the physical file). And it also said, even though the co-defendants insisted that Mr. [Name 030] behaved "<i>normally</i>" when the sale recorded in the mentioned public deed took place, even having demonstrated that "normality" could not support the existence of his will to consent to the sale of the possession described in proven fact four of this judgment. The foregoing is so, the Trial Court continues, because there was a declaration of incapacity before the legal transaction was carried out; and against said evidence there is no other evidence presented by the defendants that allows this court to doubt the documentary evidence added to the record, visible from folios 5 to 12. Consequently, the appealed judgment argued, if a judicially declared incapable person acts on their own, and not through the guardian (curador), "<i>the acts or contracts carried out... shall be absolutely null</i>" in accordance with Article 41 of the Civil Code. The contested ruling stated, the plaintiff demonstrated, in public deed number 335 at 15:30 hours on March 24, 2003, granted in the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos; [Name 030] appeared and in said public instrument there is no representation by his guardian (curadora) [Name 006]. Then, it clarified, if incapacity is characterized by the person not being able to govern themselves, it lacked interest for that Judging Body whether [Name 019]'s participation in the protocolized legal transaction was "<i>normal</i>", because, in summary, it produced a null contract, since his guardian (curadora) did not intervene in the act (Articles 41 and 835 subsections 1) and 3) Ibid.). On the other hand, it also mentioned that in the respective statements of defense, both defendants state that it is strange that on September 29, 1997, the plaintiff appeared before the notary office of licensed notary Moreno Bustos to grant a general power of attorney in favor of his son [Name 005], and they question “<i>if the attorney-in-fact knew that his father was somehow insane, why does he appear before notary Moreno Bustos and grant a power of attorney where he is going to benefit</i>”. For the Trial Court, this argument was inconsequential for the subject of debate in this proceeding, because there was no claim whatsoever through which the nullity of the mentioned agency contract was requested, coupled with the fact that, contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. “[Name 019]”—the father—who appeared before the public certifying officer to grant the deed and not “[Name 005]”—the son—, such that the latter would not benefit in any way from the simple fact of having been instituted as his father's attorney-in-fact. It underscored, regardless of the granting of the referenced power of attorney, or even other acts of disposition that the insane [Name 030] may have granted, between 1979 and 2005, they in no way modify the reasoning that that jurisdictional body expressed in that same recital, regarding the mental capacity of Mr. [Name 019] and regarding the nullity and ineffectiveness of public deed number 335, at 15:30 hours on March 24, 2003, visible on folios 149 front and back, of the protocol of notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos. Regarding the second pillar upon which this proceeding rests, that is, DAMAGES AND LOSSES, the Trial Court indicated, once the incapacity of Mr. [Name 019] to act in the granting of said public instrument was verified, it had to be determined whether a harmful act by the defendants derived from said act of disposition, capable of making them debtors for damages and losses to the plaintiff. It indicated, the plaintiff bears the evidentiary burden of what is invoked in the complaint; an aspect which the Trial Court considers the plaintiff failed to meet, with respect to the fault of Johanna Moreno Bustos. It supported the foregoing, based on the fact that the plaintiff did not provide evidence demonstrating that the notary knew of the insanity or incapacity of Mr. [Name 030], or that she had the means to determine it. It continues, even though there are three testimonies that express attitudes of Mr. [Name 030] that could suggest that any person would detect insanity on his part; it considered that testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff affirms: "<i>any person without being a Psychologist notices the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]</i>". Because precisely, that deciding body affirmed, without technical evidence to determine it, it could not validly conclude what the plaintiff affirms through the mere words of deponents who do not have the status of expert witnesses, or of qualified professionals to issue a scientific opinion on the condition of Mr. [Name 030]. The Trial Court asserted, the only legible medical opinion in the record is the one on folio 7, regarding which it said, that document does not show that any contact with Mr. [Name 019] allows a person who is not a <i>"psychologist"</i> to know of his insanity. Likewise, the lower court (A quo) continued, the clinical record provided as documentary evidence from folios 146 to 188 of the file is unintelligible due to blurriness, and constitutes evidence on which the defendant party was not granted a hearing; said document not only cannot be assessed because the adversarial principle was not respected, but also because what is recorded cannot be read. The questioned judgment does not set aside the assessment of the party statement given by Johanna Moreno Bustos, and in this regard it points out, she accepted knowing the plaintiff's family, however, from the answers given to the interrogation, the Court did not deduce that the co-defendant accepted knowing of the <i>incapacity/insanity</i> of Mr. [Name 019]. In reality, her knowledge of Mr. [Name 030]'s family did not allow that Deciding Body to conclude that the notary necessarily knew of the situation experienced by him; so as to abstain from granting the public deed. It concluded, as it were non-proven facts that the notary Moreno Bustos knew of the insanity of Mr. [Name 030], and furthermore, that from the contact produced during the granting of the public deed she should have noticed the insanity of [Name 030], it excluded the existence of the criterion of attribution necessary to configure the alleged liability of the co-defendant Moreno Bustos. Regarding the liability of the defendant [Name 003], the questioned judgment stated, the plaintiff also alleged that he knew of the incapacity of [Name 030] (sixth fact of the complaint), and took advantage of that state to carry out the legal transaction. With respect to that fact, the Court did not find evidence in the record; and therefore, it also excluded the criterion of attribution necessary to configure the civil liability of Mr. [Name 003]. The contested ruling could also not state that the payment of the possessory right transferred by Mr. [Name 030] with the vehicle is an act carried out for the sake of taking advantage. By reason of the foregoing, the Court did not order the co-defendant counterclaimants to pay the claimed damages and losses. Then, regarding the COUNTERCLAIM, the Court indicated, the theory of the case presented by the defendant party is ineffective in light of the subject matter of the proceeding analyzed in recital IV of that judgment, and which has been set forth above in this recital. For that reason, no "<i>proven facts</i>" of relevance for resolving that action were recorded, because the claims raised by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] are based on the premise that Mr. [Name 030] acted in the legal transaction under analysis, with "<i>full knowledge</i>" and "<i>full will</i>" (second fact of the counterclaim). For the contested judgment, that affirmation becomes irrelevant, since it was developed in that resolution that whoever lacks the capacity to act has no will to bind themselves; consequently, they also cannot consent, and therefore, there would be no possible way for the counterclaimants to succeed in demonstrating the knowledge and will of Mr. [Name 030] in the legal transaction under analysis. This is because, the challenged ruling reiterates, there has been the appointment of a guardian (curadora) since 1980. Consequently, it was not possible for it to declare the validity of public deed number 335 at 15:30 hours on March 24, 2003, granted in the protocol of notary public Johanna Moreno Bustos.

**VI.-** Regarding the cassation appeals, this Chamber observes, both cassation appellants insist that at the time of signing public deed no. 335 at 15:30 hours on March 24, 2003, granted in the protocol of notary public Johanna Moreno Bustos, the plaintiff [Name 030], had full capacity to act, and therefore, said deed must be valid and effective. To that end, both appellants generally refer to the same errors; and although numbered differently (in one case the breaches are separated and in the other a single challenge with different topics is alleged), the allegations coincide. Therefore, for better order, and given that in the appeal of cassation appellant Moreno Bustos the different allegations are numbered, this Chamber will follow the numbering set forth in the appeal of co-defendant Moreno Bustos. Thus, they consider in the various objections, the date from which the plaintiff was declared insane is March 5, 2005—because a judicial judgment declared it so and it was registered in the respective Public Registries—; and not January 7, 1980, as the Trial Court considered. They support this in the **first** objection by saying that it would not be logical to institute a new insanity proceeding, if the person had already been declared so previously. This Deciding Body does not agree with the appellants on this point. Because, whether or not it is logical to have filed the proceeding for declaration of insanity in 2005, a date when such a declaration had already existed since 1980, is a mere opinion that does not attack the central foundation of the judgment—that Mr. [Name 019] was incapable since the Civil Court of Liberia appointed a guardian (curadora) for him in 1980—, being reduced to subjective arguments devoid of any utility for analysis; since it would be a case of useless cassation, insofar as it would not be feasible to quash the challenged ruling, as the argument of the contested resolution subsists, because it remains unquestioned. In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to emphasize, Article 9 of the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, no. 9379, indicates the need to review this condition periodically, specifically, that the safeguard may be reviewed at any time, and shall be subject to ex officio review by the judging person every five years. That internal regulation is based on the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, whose purpose is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. Furthermore, in the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which have supra-constitutional status as they deal with human rights, insofar as they grant greater rights than the Political Constitution, according to reiterated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice -see among others, votes No. 6856-2005, No. 2313-1995, No. 8892-2012, No. 18896-2014 and No. 20357-2018-; coupled with the fact of being consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda and Circular 173-2019 on the Brasilia Rules regarding Access to Justice for persons in vulnerable situations. Hence, having brought a second proceeding related to the disability of Mr. [Name 019] is protected by national and international legislation; and the argument that indicates -that it is illogical to present a second proceeding if the plaintiff had already been declared <i>incapable-</i> for this Chamber, is out of place. Reason for which, the ground will be denied.

**VII.-** In this case, in the **second** ground, it points out that Mrs. [Name 006] requested in 1979 proceedings for the appointment of a guardian (curador) to file a criminal complaint, based on a private medical report; not for a declaration of insanity. In this regard, this Chamber agrees with the Court when it indicates, since January 7, 1980, at the Civil Court of Liberia, Mrs. [Name 006] "<i>was informed of her appointment as guardian (curadora) of the incapable [Name 019] and understanding she said she accepts the position conferred upon her as such...</i>". Therefore, this Deciding Body maintains, already from that date Mr. [Name 019] had been classified as a person with psychosocial disability, and for that reason, the judicial authority deems necessary the appointment of Mrs. [Name 006] as guardian (curadora). That is, a judicial authority classified and resolved on the situation of Mr. [Name 019], appointing a person to represent him, thus eliminating any doubt that could arise. Now then, the allegations that may have existed regarding that procedure, such as the disagreement with the private nature of the medical report on which the judging person based their decision, would have been within that proceeding where they should have been alleged; and not to come later and many years after, to challenge issues that should have been dealt with at that time and within that proceeding (Article 33 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Law no. 9342). However, for greater clarity, Article 847 of Law no. 7130, as thus amended by Law no. 9379 for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, clearly states, the medical report can be issued by a CCSS doctor, or “…<b><i>by the treating specialist physician</i></b> <i>who certifies the condition of intellectual, mental or psychosocial disability of the person requesting or for whom the safeguard is requested</i>.” —the highlighting is not from the original—. And therefore, this Chamber maintains, if the Court based its analysis on the medical report of a private specialist, it did so in accordance with the legal framework, and the error pointed out by the cassation appellants does not exist. This is because, this Deciding Body considers, the current legislation allows the parties to request the safeguard based on a private medical report, it is not true, as the cassation appellants say, that such a request is only permitted based on a report issued by the CCSS. On the other hand, in relation to the allegation presented in the appeals, regarding that the witnesses do not have the necessary knowledge to determine the mental incapacity of a person, nor whether that incapacity was present when signing the purchase-sale contract. This Chamber considers, that does not constitute an allegation invoking an error of the questioned judgment, because rather, that criterion coincides with what the Court stated. Thus, the contested judgment textually says: “<i>Even though there are three testimonies that express attitudes of Mr. [Name 030] that could suggest that any person would detect insanity on his part; it is considered that a testimony is not suitable evidence to determine what the plaintiff affirms: "any person without being a Psychologist notices the mental deficiencies of Mr. [Name 019]</i>". And by virtue of that, that Judging Body did not find liability on the part of the defendants, regarding the granting of the deed under analysis; and did not order them to pay the damages and losses claimed by the plaintiff. By reason of the foregoing, the ground will be denied.

**VIII.-** In the **third** breach, they allege, the Court starts from the premise that by March 24, 2003, he was declared insane because he had a guardian (curadora) appointed since 1980, however for the cassation appellants, there is no evidence to support that statement, because there is no certification from the Public Registry indicating that Mrs. [Name 006] was his guardian (curadora), precisely because she had died since July 1, 1995. On this point, the **fifth** challenge will also be analyzed, given that it is related to the third cassation ground, when it is alleged that the Court annulled the agreement under analysis, despite the absence of capacity to act of Mr. [Name 030] and his consent not having been demonstrated. This Chamber maintains, here a distinction must be made, as performed by the Court, in the sense that one thing is the capacity to bind oneself, and quite another, the registral publicity for it to be enforceable against third parties. This Chamber considers, as was set forth in the questioned ruling, whoever lacks the capacity to act cannot bind themselves; and therefore cannot consent. This is established by Article 41 of the Civil Code, when it states “<i>acts carried out without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null</i>.” Also observed is Article 835 subsection 3) ibidem, which provides for the absolute nullity of acts or contracts executed or entered into by an absolutely incapable person. In this manner, when the Court of Liberia in 1980 imposed Mrs. [Name 006] as guardian (curadora) of Mr. [Name 019], it clearly classified him as incapable. And it is by virtue of this lack of capacity to consent, that the contested ruling declared absolutely null and ineffective, deed no. 335 at 15:30 hours on March 24, 2003, a point with which this Chamber agrees, by virtue of it having been a judicial authority, based on a medical opinion, that imposed a guardian (curadora) on him. However, moving to the second point of analysis, which impacts the knowledge that third parties may have of the situation of Mr. [Name 019], this Chamber observes, as indeed the notary Johanna Moreno Bustos and the appearing party [Name 003] did not know of the <i>insanity</i> of Mr. [Name 019], because from the contact with him, on the occasion of signing the referenced public instrument, that <i>insanity</i> was not noticeable, and therefore, they were acquitted from liability for the damages and losses claimed by the plaintiff. In summary, registral publicity is not constitutive of the incapacity to consent, as the appellants seem to try to make it appear, because in this case, registration in the public registries is so that the judicial declaration of incapacity or insanity is known to third parties. But, as this Deciding Body conceives it, the incapacity exists from the moment of its declaration, regardless of its registration; and naturally, due to the order in which the events must occur, it preexists the registration. Article 851 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1989 (Law no. 7130), amended by regulation 9379, Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, states, the judging person shall decide whether the person requesting or for whom the safeguard is requested requires that measure and in what proportion; if the request is granted, they shall designate a person to occupy the place; and finally it provides, the establishment of that safeguard shall be communicated to the Real Property Registry, for its respective annotation on the present or future movable and immovable property owned by the person with disability. For this Chamber, that regulation eliminates all doubt that it is the judging person who declares the safeguard for whom it is requested, the proportion of the measure and, furthermore, it is only after being established by the Authority that it is communicated to the Public Registry, to make it known to third parties—Article 455 of the Civil Code, when referring to registral publicity and its effect on third parties thus, titles subject to registration that are not registered do not prejudice a third party except from the date of registration—.

And in the specific case of the insanity (insania) of Mr. [Name 030], it is enforceable against third parties as of June 17, 2005, the date from which it is recorded in the National Registry. For this reason, in the opinion of this Chamber, the Trial Court resolved correctly when it indicated that the defendants did not know of the insanity (insania) of Mr. [Name 030] at the time the deed under analysis was granted, and therefore it absolved them of liability, despite having declared the public instrument under analysis absolutely null and void, given that the incapacity of Mr. [Name 030] already existed at the time of its granting. By virtue of the foregoing, the grievance will be denied.

**IX.-** In the **fourth** challenge, it alleges an infringement in the interpretation and assessment of the public deed containing a general power of attorney (poder generalísimo), granted before the notary public of the defendant on September 29, 1997, where the grantors in that act were Mr. [Name 019] and his son [Name 019 005]. Based on the foregoing, the cassation appellant states that Mr. [Name 019], prior to the judgment declaring the insanity (insania) in 2005, was fully capable. She also alleges that she had no way of knowing that said gentleman was insane (insano), first because there was no declaration registered in any Registry, nor a final judgment in that regard; and furthermore, because his son [Name 019 005] came to her notary office with the allegedly insane person, and both signed that public deed. Regarding the General Power of Attorney (Poder Generalísimo) indicated by the cassation appellants, which must be assessed as evidence of the plaintiff's volitional capacity, this Chamber holds, as the Trial Court did, that this act is not the subject of the dispute, and therefore, it exceeds the limits within which a criterion must be issued in this judgment. In addition to this, this Chamber observes that the appellant Moreno Bustos points out that what the Trial Court says is not true, that only Mr. [Name 005]”—the son—“appeared. However, that is not the case; the Trial Court indicated that only the father—[Name 019]—appeared; and it is expressly stated: “contrary to what the defendants indicate, it was Mr. [Name 019] who appeared before the public certifier to grant the deed and not [Name 005]…” Regarding the issue of registry publicity, the cassation appellants are referred to the analysis in the previous point. Consequently, this ground must be denied.

**X.-** This Collegiate Body deems, with respect to the evidence offered for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), namely the death certificate of Mrs. [Name 006] and file no. 05-100174-0386-CI, to cite canon 69.7.3 of the CPC Ley no. 9342, as it indicates that the admission of evidence in cassation shall have a restrictive and exceptional character. Given that, only that evidence strictly necessary to resolve the points that have been the object of challenge may be admitted, when it could not have been offered or produced previously; and, furthermore, the Chamber may only order evidence ex officio when it is indispensable. In the specific case under study, regarding the two pieces of evidence offered before this instance, neither meets any of the requirements to be admitted. The death certificate is already in the case file; furthermore, this Chamber does not understand the request to bring file no. 05-100174-0386-CI into this proceeding; given that this is the case number under analysis. Based on the foregoing, the rejection of the offered evidence is imposed.

**XI.-** By virtue of what has been reasoned and set forth, the appeal must be declared without merit, denying the evidence provided with the appeal that has not been admitted in preceding instances. Costs correspond to the economic repercussion that participation in the proceeding implies for the parties. According to the provisions of article 73.1 of the CPC Ley no. 9342, their pronouncement must be made ex officio in any resolution that puts an end to the controversy, and must be imposed on the losing party, except in those cases where one or more of the exemption assumptions provided for in the law apply (numeral 73.2 ibidem). Therefore, their resolution requires an evaluative criterion by the jurisdictional authority. The cassation appeal is one of those resolutions, since it definitively decides the contradictory proceedings and responds to a judgment of utility and necessity. Furthermore, its mere filing implies a summons to the opposing party, which will prevent the finality of the appealed judgment, will subject them to continuing the discussion of the matter before a higher instance, will keep the discussion of the points in controversy open, and likewise, will imply incurring additional expenses for having to appear and act before said authority. In this way, its pronouncement is appropriate and to that extent, both appeals having been denied in their entirety, and not having succeeded in overturning what was set forth in the challenged ruling, no reason whatsoever is observed that would justify their filing, and therefore both cassation appellants are ordered to pay the costs generated in this phase. The amount to be paid must be settled by the benefited party in the corresponding procedural stage.

**XII. DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE LÓPEZ CASAL:** With the profound respect and esteem I profess for my colleague Judges who, in this specific case, constitute the majority of this honorable Cassation Chamber, I depart from the decision taken by it, save my vote, and cast it in the following manner: I am convinced that the cassation appellants are correct in their grievances, and therefore, with respect to what was challenged by them, their cassation appeals shall be declared with merit, and the first-instance judgment shall be vacated (casar la sentencia), in the terms specified below. I do not agree with the statement made by the majority of the Chamber, which reads that since January 7, 1980, when the Civil Court of Liberia appointed Mrs. [Name 006] as guardian (curadora) of Mr. [Name 030], this means that, from that moment, it is valid and correct to consider said gentleman as a person incapable of acting. For the Undersigned dissenting Judge, that simple appointment is not legally sufficient to consider Mr. [Name 019] as a person incapable of acting. It was completely necessary that, in said judicial proceeding, there be a conclusive and final judicial pronouncement, by virtue of which the Judge in charge of said voluntary jurisdiction (jurisdicción voluntaria) proceeding (as it was called by the Code of Civil Procedure), had declared Mr. [Name 019] incapable. As the cassation appellant Johanna Moreno Bustos rightly expressed, the act of appointing a guardian (curador), which was done for Mr. [Name 019] on January 7, 1980, consisted only of an act of designation of a procedural guardian (curador procesal), which is far from the necessary judgment or decision on the merits, issued by a Judge of the Republic, after having assessed all the evidentiary record, by virtue of which a person is declared in a state of insanity (insania), a resolution which, it must be said in passing, had to be registered in the Public Registry of Persons, so that, with said registration, it would be legally susceptible to being enforceable against third parties. Likewise, the majority of the Chamber fails to notice that, as the cassation appellant Moreno Bustos also alleged, the purpose of the designation of the guardian (curadora) Hermelinda López López within proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI was, solely, to be able to file a criminal complaint on behalf of Mr. [Name 019]. Based on the foregoing, from no point of view can said gentleman be legally considered insane (insano) as of January 1980, but rather, on the contrary, said modifying state of his capacity to act became effective and produced legal effects against third parties (such as, without a doubt, Mrs. Johanna Moreno Bustos and Mr. [Name 003]) with the registration, in the Public Registry of Persons, of the judgment issued by the Family Court of Liberia, at nine hours ten minutes on March 8, 2005, by virtue of which Mr. [Name 030] was declared in a state of insanity (insania). Based on the foregoing, the provisions of numeral 41 of the Civil Code would not be applicable, as other Courts of Justice have rightly stated: *“the mere fact that Mr. [Name 032] had been declared in a state of interdiction (interdicción) by a final judgment does not make all legal transactions (negocios jurídicos) that he entered into by himself, prior to that declaration, absolutely null for lacking mental capacity, as the appellant seems to understand it. This is so because according to the provisions of article 41 of the Civil Code, ‘Acts or contracts entered into without volitional and cognitive capacity shall be relatively null, unless the incapacity is judicially declared, in which case they shall be absolutely null.’ That is, acts or contracts carried out by the insane (insano) person by himself are absolutely null, but only those entered into after the declaration of his state of interdiction by final judgment, and those carried out by him in the same manner while that state has not been lifted also by final judgment (articles 36 and 41 of the Civil Code and 239 of the Family Code). This is so because with respect to previous ones, the capacity to obligate oneself and contract is presumed, unless proven otherwise, all in accordance with the provisions of articles 627 subsection 1), 628 and 1007 of the Civil Code. In this case, the sale that is challenged as null was entered into on February 7, 2002, while the state of interdiction of the seller, Mr. [Name 032], was declared by a first-instance judgment issued on August 7, 2003, confirmed by the second-instance judgment issued in December 2003. This means that it is not a legal transaction covered by the presumption of absolute nullity referred to in the aforementioned article 41 of the Civil Code”* **(in this regard, see Second Civil Tribunal, Second Section. Vote number 137 from 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2008, drafted by former Judge Juan Ramón Coronado Huertas).** On the other hand, the Undersigned Judge considers that, in addition to the fact that the presumption of absolute nullity contained in numeral 41 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the *sub júdice* case, the plaintiff party also did not reliably prove what was truly relevant in this matter, namely, that Mr. [Name 030] did not have, on March 24, 2003, sufficient and necessary mental and volitional faculties to carry out the legal transaction (negocio jurídico) of selling his right of possession (derecho de posesión) over the property with cadastral map G-587784. The majority of the Chamber bases and reiterates the incapacity to act of Mr. [Name 019], solely on the simple fact that, in the year 1980 and based on a private medical certificate, Mrs. [Name 006] was designated as guardian (curadora) of the plaintiff in this proceeding. For the Undersigned dissenting Judge, this is manifestly insufficient to prove the absence of mental faculties and volitional capacity of Mr. [Name 019] on the day he entered into the sales contract with Mr. [Name 003]. This is for several reasons: 1) Firstly, because the private medical opinion, to which the majority of the Chamber alludes in this specific case, was issued many years before the year 2003, and what was truly relevant was to prove whether the plaintiff had or did not have sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity at the time he entered into the contract with Mr. [Name 003], that is, on March 24, 2003; 2) Secondly, because it is absolutely and completely unknown what methodology and sources the physician Eduardo Guevara Coronado used to conclude that Mr. [Name 019] suffered from amnesia and total mental incapacity that *may* make him irresponsible for his acts; 3) Thirdly, the majority of the Chamber loses sight of the fact that the private medical opinion, issued by the physician Guevara Coronado, was rendered solely to resolve whether or not to designate Mrs. [Name 006] as guardian (curadora) of the plaintiff, for the purposes of filing a criminal complaint, and not to resolve what is being discussed in this litigation, that is, whether or not he had sufficient mental capacity to carry out by himself the sale made in favor of defendant [Name 003]; and 4) Fourthly, in the insanity (insania) proceeding number 79-100174-386-CI, the defendants Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] were not parties, and consequently, they did not have the opportunity to challenge the private medical opinion, in whatever was unfavorable to them. Based on the reasons set forth, in a minority vote, I declare the cassation appeal filed by the defendants with merit. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is vacated (se casa la sentencia). Deciding the matter on the merits, the defenses (excepciones) of lack of cause, lack of capacity, and the generic defense of *sine actione agit* are rejected. The defenses of lack of right, lack of active standing (legitimación activa), and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) are upheld. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Estate (Sucesión) of Mr. [Name 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] is declared without merit in all its petitions. The plaintiff party is ordered to pay the costs borne by the defendants. On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim (reconvención), the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing filed by the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant are declared without merit. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] against the Estate of Mr. [Name 030] is declared with merit. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos at fifteen hours and thirty minutes on March 24, 2003, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant party is ordered to pay each of the defendant-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones, for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant party is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim. **THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** In a minority vote, the cassation appeals filed by the defendants are declared with merit. Consequently, the first-instance judgment is vacated (se casa la sentencia). Deciding the matter on the merits, the defenses of lack of cause, lack of capacity, and the generic defense of *sine actione agit* are rejected. The defenses of lack of right, lack of active standing, and lack of passive standing are upheld. The present ordinary lawsuit filed by the Estate of Mr. [Name 030] against Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] is declared without merit in all its petitions. The plaintiff party is ordered to pay the costs borne by the defendants. On the other hand, regarding the counterclaim, the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing filed by the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant are declared without merit. The counterclaim filed by Johanna Moreno Bustos and [Name 003] against the Estate of Mr. [Name 030] is declared with merit. Consequently, it is declared that the deed granted before the notary public Johanna María Moreno Bustos at fifteen hours and thirty minutes on March 24, 2003, is valid and effective. The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant party is ordered to pay each of the defendant-counterclaimants the sum of one million colones, for subjective moral damages. The plaintiff-counterclaim defendant party is ordered to pay the costs of the counterclaim.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** The evidence offered for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) is denied. By majority, the appeals are declared without merit, with their costs borne by those who filed them. Judge López Casal dissents. ipreinfalk **NOTE:** Judge **DAMARIS VARGAS VÁSQUEZ** participated in the decision of this matter, however, she could not sign the preceding resolution as she is on vacation.

It is hereby certified in accordance with article 28.2 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil).

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Voto 4654-2003 **File 97-001470-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 2004013695** **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours and eight minutes of the tenth of December of two thousand four.** An action of unconstitutionality filed by JESSICA JIMÉNEZ RAMÍREZ, of legal age, with identity card number 0-000-000, against Article 49, subsection a) of the Urban Planning Law, Law No. 4240 of November 15, 1968, and its amendments. Intervention of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. Magistrate Instructor: Luis Paulino Mora M.

Documento PJEDITOR  Res. 001930-F-S1-2022 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del doce de agosto de dos mil veintidós.

En proceso ordinario interpuesto por [Nombre 030] (representado por el curador [Nombre 019] Alexander [Nombre 005]) contra [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 003]. Intervienen, las personas profesionales en derecho, Andrés Pérez González, Johanna María Moreno Bustos y Eric Badilla Córdoba; el primero en calidad de apoderado especial judicial de la parte actora, la segunda en su propia representación y el tercero, representando los intereses del demandado [Nombre 003], en calidad de abogado director.

Redacta la magistrada Vargas Vásquez; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El señor [Nombre 005], en su calidad de curador del insano [Nombre 030], presentó demanda civil el 16 de marzo de 2005, contra [Nombre 003] y [Nombre 002] con fundamento en los siguientes hechos. Dijo, el señor [Nombre 030], en 1973 sufrió un accidente de tránsito que le causó heridas muy graves. Alegó, personas inescrupulosas se aprovecharon de su situación y llegó a la quiebra; pues debido a su “incapacidad mental” , perdió a través de una venta fraudulenta, una propiedad de gran valor. Adicionó, su madre, la señora [Nombre 006], actuando como curadora de él; quiso recuperar dicha propiedad mediante una denuncia penal contra el adquirente y contra el licenciado Jorge Antonio Larios Ugalde. Con relación al inmueble, informó, hace más de 30 años, el actor, adquirió la posesión de la finca sin inscribir, situada en Guadalupe de Liberia que cuenta con los siguientes linderos: Norte: [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008] y [Nombre 009]; Sur: [Nombre 010] y Quebrada Barreal; Este: Calle Pública carretera a Liberia Centro, y Oeste: [Nombre 010] . Manifestó, esa finca mide 5.298 metros cuadrados y corresponde al plano catastrado no. G- 587784- 99. Comentó, el 24 de marzo de 2003, el accionante traspasó su derecho de posesión sobre la mencionada finca al señor [Nombre 003] , mediante escritura pública número 335 del protocolo de la Licenciada Johanna María Moreno Bustos. Agregó, en la escritura se consignó que el derecho traspasado medía aproximadamente media hectárea y que no tenía plano, indicó, además, que el precio de la venta era de ¢1.000.000, cancelado con un vehículo placas [Valor 003], marca Nissan, modelo 1986, estilo cabstar, capacidad tres personas, combustible gasolina, el cual no estaba a nombre del comprador, por lo que, éste se comprometió a realizar los trámites de inscripción para traspasarlo efectivamente a nombre de [Nombre 030]. Sostuvo, ese acto efectuado por [Nombre 030] carece de total validez y es absolutamente nulo, por cuanto, él desde que sufrió el accidente de tránsito en 1973 es insano ; lo cual dice probar cuando el Juzgado Civil de Liberia en el expediente número 714-79 le nombró como curadora a su madre [Nombre 006] .

las diligencias para volver a nombrarle un curador, y en otra valoración médica, la medicatura forense dictaminó otra vez, [Nombre 030] era insano , por lo que el Juzgado de Familia mediante sentencia de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 8 de marzo de 2005, declaró la insania, bajo el expediente no. 79-100714-386-CL (274-04). Alegó, se tuvo conocimiento del negocio jurídico, cuando el señor [Nombre 003] llevó el vehículo aduciendo que era un pago por el traspaso del derecho de posesión que [Nombre 030] le había vendido. Argumentó, la escritura en la cual [Nombre 030] traspasó su derecho de posesión se encuentra gravemente viciada, porque a sabiendas de la problemática de [Nombre 030] (persona muy conocida en Liberia), le dio como pago un vehículo que ni siquiera estaba a nombre de él, de un modelo viejo, estaba malo, y con gravámenes, lo cual en nada se compara al valor del terreno que mide casi 5.000 metros y está cerca de una carretera principal en los alrededores de Liberia centro. Sostuvo, es evidente, que la licenciada Johanna Moreno Bustos tenía conocimiento de la incapacidad de [Nombre 030] , porque se podía captar al tener una conversación con el actor, razón por la cual, estimó, el traspaso del derecho de posesión efectuado en el protocolo de dicha profesional es ineficaz; y además, ese negocio resulta ineficaz porque se dio en pago un objeto que en poco tiempo no tendría gran valor. Pidió, se declare: a la fecha de la escritura en análisis, el señor [Nombre 019] se encontraba incapacitado mentalmente para realizar un acto jurídico de esa naturaleza; la escritura adolece de los requisitos formales y legales; por ende, es absolutamente nula; se condene a los co-demandados al pago de daños y perjuicios valorados en ¢10.000.000, así como las costas. Los codemandados contestaron de forma negativa, e interpusieron las defensas de falta de: derecho, legitimación activa y pasiva, causa, capacidad, así como el aforismo sine actione agit . Ambos co-accionados interpusieron RECONVENCIÓN en escritos separados, sin embargo, son coincidentes en los siguientes puntos. Dijeron, el 24 de marzo de año 2003 los señores [Nombre 003] y [Nombre 019] comparecieron ante la notaria pública Johanna Bustos Moreno, a otorgar una escritura de venta de un derecho de posesión, sobre una finca ubicada en Guadalupe de Liberia, cantón primero, distrito quinto de la Provincia de Guanacaste, con los siguientes linderos: Norte: [Nombre 014] Sur: [Nombre 019], Oeste: [Nombre 019], Este: calle pública, con una medida aproximada de media hectárea; la cual fue cancelada con el vehículo placas [Valor 003], marca Nissan, estilo Cabstar, que aunque en ese momento el señor [Nombre 003] no era el dueño registral del vehículo, se comprometió a ponerlo a nombre del compareciente [Nombre 019]. Expresaron, ese documento se otorgó con pleno conocimiento de lo que hacían ambas partes y con plena voluntad; con asesoría y explicación de parte de eñor Rog la notaria. Dijo por su parte la codemandada [Nombre 016], el 9 de agosto de 2005, recibió la notificación judicial de este proceso ordinario, en el cual se alegó, el señor [Nombre 030] era y es insano; lo cual, aclaró, para ella es una situación desconocida; pues la venta de la finca se sucedió bajo estricta normalidad de personas que se ven y reflejan perfecta normalidad de sus actos. Adujo, la demanda le causó intranquilidad; y, por ende, daño moral, porque ella es una profesional de reconocida integridad e idoneidad moral, quien ejerce la profesión desde hace más de 10 años en la Provincia de Guanacaste, especialmente en Liberia. Estimó el daño moral en la suma de ¢3.000.000. Por otro lado, el codemandado [Nombre 003] indicó, el señor [Nombre 019] entró en posesión del vehículo el día de la firma de la escritura y se lo llevó para su casa en buen estado de uso y funcionamiento. Comentó, recibió la visita de los hijos del actor para informarle "en qué términos había hecho el negocio con el señor [Nombre 005]", asimismo recuerda que el propio actor le propuso devolverle el vehículo y que su persona le pagara " el millón de colones conforme a mis posibilidades de pago, lo cual fui haciendo en tractos". Asevera, él y la notaria, desconocían que el señor [Nombre 019] , era insano. Objeta, el alcance de la insania declarada al accionante es a futuro, es decir, después de la declaratoria y no anterior; por ello, el acto otorgado es perfectamente legal en todos sus sentidos. Explicó, la demanda le ha causado un daño moral, pues dijo ser una persona muy trabajadora, agricultor de oficio y de idoneidad moral; siendo que le acarrea trastorno mental e intranquilidad la mala fe del actor. Estimó el daño moral en ¢3.000.000. Ambos demandados-reconvenidos pretendieron, se declare que la escritura otorgada ante la notaria Johanna María Moreno Bustos, a las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003 es perfectamente válida y eficaz en derecho. Se condene a la parte actora contrademandada al pago del daño moral y de las costas. El actor-reconvenido, contestó de forma negativa e interpuso las defensas de falta de: derecho y legitimación pasiva. El Tribunal Colegiado Primera Instancia Civil del I Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste (Liberia), integrado por las personas juzgadoras Angélica Delgado Madrigal, Milkyan Sánchez Aguilar y David Matamoros Salazar, emitió la sentencia no. 4 de las 11 horas 27 minutos del 31 de octubre de 2018, en la cual, con relación a la demanda, denegó la prueba para mejor proveer ofrecida del folio 128 a 132. También rechazó las defensas de falta de: capacidad, legitimación activa y pasiva, causa, así como el aforismo sine actione agit. Denegó parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho, razón por la cual acogió la demanda para declarar que: A la fecha cuando se otorgó la escritura pública donde se traspasó el terreno en análisis, el otorgante [Nombre 030], se encontraba incapacitado para consentir y realizar un acto jurídico de esa naturaleza, por ende, dicha escritura, adolece de requisitos legales, y es absolutamente nula e ineficaz. También dijo el Tribunal, le corresponde al señor [Nombre 030] la posesión a título de dueño de la finca sin inscribir situada en Guadalupe de Liberia, que es terreno para agricultura con una medida aproximada de media hectárea, con los siguientes linderos: Norte: [Nombre 014], Sur: [Nombre 019], Este: calle pública, Oeste: [Nombre 019]. De oficio declaró la existencia de interés actual con respecto a las pretensiones acogidas. RECONVENCIÓN. Declaró la existencia de legitimación activa y pasiva, acogió la excepción de falta de derecho con respecto a la totalidad de las pretensiones formuladas por [Nombre 016] y [Nombre 003]; por ende, declaró sin lugar la contrademanda, omitió pronunciamiento sobre el interés actual; e impuso las costas del proceso a cargo de la parte vencida.

II.- Este expediente está etiquetado con la indicación de que participa una persona adulta mayor; cobijada por la protección ofrecida por la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, no. 7935, y en lo que a este ámbito respecta, el numeral 3 inciso k), prevé que ella tiene derecho a un “trato preferencial cuando efectúe gestiones administrativas en las entidades públicas y privadas”. Lo anterior, en aras de que toda persona adulta mayor tiene derecho a una mejor calidad de vida, según lo indica la mencionada normativa. Así, en cuanto a este extremo y en lo que atañe al Poder Judicial, es menester señalar, la carpeta virtual del expediente en análisis tiene una ventana emergente donde señala “Atención preferencial a persona: -ADULTA MAYOR .” Ello en aras, de brindar el mejor servicio público posible, acorde a la condición de la persona usuaria; y funcionar conforme a los principios consagrados en la normativa atinente. En este caso concreto, esta Sala observa, el señor [Nombre 030], murió desde el 13 de marzo de 2018, según consta en la certificación aportada.

Recurso presentado por la accionada Moreno Bustos.

Razones de fondo.

III.- Acusa violación de las normas 41, 627 inciso 1), 628, 837 y 1007 todos del Código Civil, así como del numeral 41.5 del Código Procesal Civil (en adelante CPC Ley no. 9342) con relación a todo el recurso. El primer motivo, lo sustenta en la causal de errónea valoración de la prueba documental, de los hechos probados número uno y dos, los cuales transcribe. Señala, a folio uno del expediente consta la certificación de la sentencia emitida en el Juzgado de Familia de Liberia, de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 5 de marzo del 2005, del expediente número 79-100174-0386-CI, en el cual, se solicita se declare la insania de [Nombre 019] y se les nombre curadores a los hijos [Nombre 019] y [Nombre 021] ambos con apellidos [Nombre 005]. Alude, es hasta el año 2005 cuando se solicita expresamente la declaratoria de insania del señor [Nombre 019]; pues no tendría lógica, si él ya estaba declaro insano desde el año 1979, que se pidiera nuevamente la declaratoria de insania en el año 2005. Sostiene, el acto de nombramiento de curador del 7 de enero de 1980 es simplemente un acto de imposición de cargo de curador, no una sentencia dictada por un juez de declaratoria de insania. Expresa, la sentencia de insania de [Nombre 019] es del 8 de marzo de 2005, y es a partir de ese pronunciamiento, cuando se inscribe en el Registro Civil y en el Registro Público. Aduce, la anterior es prueba irrefutable, por lo que el Tribunal no la puede desconocer. En el segundo yerro, alega la existencia de error en la valoración de la prueba y en la interpretación de esta, con base en los hechos probados tres y siete de la sentencia. Comenta, en el expediente no, 79-100174-0386-CI, doña [Nombre 006], con base en un certificado médico privado, lo solicitado fue el nombramiento de curador para [Nombre 019], con el fin de presentar una demanda penal; e hizo hincapié, en que, en esa ocasión, ella no pidió declarar insano a su hijo. Asevera, doña [Nombre 006] , no aportó ninguna sentencia firme de declaratoria de insania de su hijo. Explica, para el 24 de marzo de 2003 —fecha cuando se otorgó la escritura de análisis—, no había ninguna sentencia judicial firme de declaratoria de insania, ni ninguna inscripción en el Registro Civil ni en el Registro Nacional que indicara que dicho señor estaba declarado insano. Alega, por sólida que sea la declaratoria de insania en el año 2005, esta no acarrea por sí, la incapacidad al día 24 de marzo de 2003, que es el momento cuando se suscribió el convenio de compraventa invalidado en la sentencia recurrida; ni que tenga efectos sobre ella o sobre el señor [Nombre 003], porque el actor no tenía curador inscrito. Por ello estima, no existe prueba que demuestre ni siquiera nulidad relativa, en el otorgamiento de la escritura en análisis. Además, señala, atendiendo a la inteligencia de las normas que rigen el tema probatorio 45.1 y 45.2 ambas del CPC Ley no. 9342, es inadmisible que un pacto asentado en escritura pública sea desdicho y hasta anulado a partir de declaraciones testimoniales, que no estuvieron presentes al momento del otorgamiento de la escritura pública en discusión y de una certificación de un médico que data del año 1979. Concluye, las personas testigos no tienen el conocimiento necesario para determinar la incapacidad mental de una persona, ni tampoco, si esa incapacidad estaba presente al suscribir el contrato de compraventa. En el tercer quebranto, en la misma línea de los errores de apreciación probatoria, interpone el agravio contra el hecho cinco de la sentencia. Inicia el desarrollo del yerro, diciendo que el Tribunal parte de que, para el 24 de marzo de 2003, estaba declaro insano porque tenía una curadora nombrada desde 1980. Contra lo indicado, la recurrente refiere, no hay prueba que sustente ese dicho, porque no hay ninguna certificación del Registro Público, que indique, la señora [Nombre 006] era su curadora, precisamente porque ella había fallecido desde el 1 de julio de 1995. Dice, aporta como prueba la certificación de defunción de la mencionada señora. En el cuarto embate, alega infracción en la interpretación y valoración de la prueba documental, concretamente de la escritura pública que contiene un poder generalísimo, otorgado ante la notaría de la demandada el 29 de setiembre de 1997. Alude una inadecuada valoración de la prueba e invoca el numeral 45.2 del CPC Ley no. 9342, señalando que la capacidad de actuar se presume existente, y que los otorgantes en ese acto fueron el señor [Nombre 019] y su hijo [Nombre 005]. Con base en lo anterior, manifiesta la casacionista, el señor [Nombre 019], antes de la sentencia que declara la insania en el año 2005, era totalmente capaz. Con lo anterior, pretende desacreditar que el señor [Nombre 019] , era insano desde el año 1979. Y, además, dice la casacionista, ella no tenía manera de saber que dicho señor estaba insano, primero porque no había ninguna declaratoria inscrita en ningún Registro, ni sentencia firme al respecto; y además, porque su hijo [Nombre 005], acudió a su notaria con el supuesto insano, y ambos firmaron esa escritura pública. Aclara, no es cierto, como lo dice el Tribunal, que sólo compareció el señor [Nombre 005]”. En el quinto embate, acusa violación de la norma 835 del Código Civil, porque el Tribunal anula el pacto en análisis, pese a no haberse demostrado la ausencia de capacidad para actuar de don [Nombre 030] y de su consentimiento. A partir de lo anterior, desarrolla las tesis de los numerales 41, 627, 628, 837 y 1007 todos del Código Civil. Cuestionando la nulidad absoluta, e indicando que, de haberla (lo que no acepta), sería una nulidad relativa, por no haber sido declarado insano, al momento del acto que anula la sentencia.

Recurso del demandado [Nombre 003].

IV.- En el único agravio por razones de fondo, el casacionista acusa infracción del numeral 41 del Código Civil. Cuestiona la nulidad absoluta de la escritura en análisis, porque a su juicio, fue otorgada cuando no se había declarado judicialmente la incapacidad del señor [Nombre 019] . Aduce, en el hecho tenido por demostrado no. 1, se indica, doña [Nombre 006] instauró un proceso ante el Juzgado Civil de Liberia en el año 1979, solicitando ser nombrada curadora de [Nombre 030]. Dice el recurrente, luego el Tribunal señala, la existencia de curador revela que la persona no tiene facultades para gobernarse a sí misma por motivos que se comprueban clínicamente. Objeta, la incapacidad del actor no fue demostrada clínicamente en las diligencias para el nombramiento de curador entabladas ante el Juzgado Civil de Liberia, el proceso anterior no fue emitido por un médico de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (en adelante CCSS) o Médico Forense de la Corte Suprema. Aduce, el dictamen realizado por un médico privado no prueba de forma fehaciente que el señor [Nombre 019] es incapaz; pues a su juicio, no son suficientes las diligencias de nombramiento de curador, para demostrar clínicamente hablando, esa incapacidad. Aduce, en el Código Procesal Civil anterior, en el canon 847, se pedía un dictamen médico de la CCSS para solicitar la salvaguardia para las personas con discapacidad; y luego, el precepto 848 inciso 2) ibidem, ordenaba al Departamento de Medicina Legal del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, que emitiera un dictamen integral de la condición de la persona. Posteriormente se pregunta, ¿por qué después de muerta su madre y curadora (1 de julio de 1995), no se le nombró nuevo curador?, si supuestamente había perdido su capacidad volitiva y cognitiva. Alega, la representación de curador, no se inscribió en ningún registro ni se les dio publicidad a terceras personas. Dice, doña [Nombre 006] murió ocho años antes de que se firmara la escritura de análisis. Arguye, la infracción acusada se suscita cuando, el Tribunal sostiene que, el señor [Nombre 019] es incapaz, sólo por el hecho de que se le nombrara curador en diligencias judiciales, sin embargo, alega, el pronunciamiento combatido, no entra a analizar si era capaz o incapaz, ni tampoco revisan cómo se llegó a ese convencimiento. Impugna, tener la declaratoria de incapacidad judicial, desde el 7 de enero de 1980 con la aceptación y juramentación del cargo de curador, es una errónea apreciación jurídica, pues el dictamen médico privado, sólo sirvió para establecer las diligencias de nombramiento de curador, pero nunca funcionó para declarar la incapacidad del actor, porque así lo indica la resolución del Juzgado Civil de Liberia, del 21 de diciembre de 1979, cuando dice: “…con vista del dictamen médico que obra en autos se tienen por establecidas las presentes diligencias de nombramiento de curador…” Asevera, la incapacidad del accionante fue declarada por primera vez, con toda la formalidad que requiere dicho acto, cuando el Juzgado de Familia de Liberia, en sentencia de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 8 de marzo de 2005, nombró como curador a su hijo, el señor [Nombre 005], y declaró por primera vez insano en sentencia al señor [Nombre 019] , lo cual nunca se había hecho. Por ello, sostiene, la escritura no. 335 otorgada ante la notaria Johanna María Moreno Bustos, a las 15 horas 35 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003, es válida y eficaz. No omitió manifestar el casacionista, el Poder Generalísimo, otorgado por el señor [Nombre 019] a su hijo de apellidos [Nombre 005] , ante la notaria Johanna María Moreno Bustos, fue otorgado y firmado por ambos comparecientes el 29 de setiembre de 1997, razón por la cual estima, las consideraciones de la resolución combatida no deben ser de recibo, cuando dice, que sólo el señor [Nombre 019] firmó. Y entonces se cuestiona, cuál fue la razón de haber llevado a su padre, supuestamente insano, a otorgarle un Poder Generalísimo; que, aunque si bien este extremo no es parte de este proceso, estima que ello debe ser tomado en cuenta para resolver lo aquí debatido. Agrega, “en el expediente no. 05-100174-0386-CI, el cuál (sic) es expediente civil de [Nombre 030] contra [Nombre 027], el cuál (sic) comprende los mismos hechos aquí debatidos y es expediente archivado […] Considero que dicha prueba es indispensable y debe ser con todo respeto ordenada por la Sala.” V.- El Tribunal, en lo medular y de interés para la resolución de los recursos de casación incoados, señaló que el objeto de este proceso descansa sobre dos pilares fundamentales: 1. Determinar si el señor [Nombre 030] contaba con capacidad de actuar cuando otorgó la escritura pública número 335 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003, otorgada ante la notaria pública Johanna María Moreno Bustos; y 2. En caso de que se verifique la incapacidad de actuar del señor [Nombre 019] en el otorgamiento del instrumento público dicho, comprobar si de dicho acto de disposición deriva un hecho dañoso por parte de los demandados que sea capaz de hacerlos deudores por concepto de daños y perjuicios ante el accionante. Entonces, con relación al primer punto, SOBRE LA CAPACIDAD DE ACTUAR del señor [Nombre 019], el fallo cuestionado le dio la razón al accionante. Al respecto, dijo, cuando [Nombre 030] celebró el acto del 24 de marzo de 2003 "desconocía la magnitud del negocio que estaba efectuando", por cuanto la parte actora demostró, de conformidad con el artículo 41.1.1 del CPC Ley no. 9342, que este se encontraba diagnosticado con incapacidad mental desde el año 1979; y contaba con una persona curadora desde el día 7 de enero de 1980. Fundamentó el Tribunal, según consta en certificación emitida por el Juzgado Civil de Liberia, el día 7 de enero de 1980, la señora [Nombre 006] "fue impuesta de su nombramiento como curadora del incapaz [Nombre 019] y entendida dijo que acepta el cargo que se le confiere como tal...". El fallo cuestionado concluyó, si ya en dicho acto se había calificado al señor [Nombre 019] como incapaz y por ello, se le nombró curadora, el Tribunal no debía entrar a hacer ulterior análisis, de si el accionante era incapaz, ni cómo se llegó a ese convencimiento; pues la prueba aportada por el actor respecto del nombramiento de la curadora elimina cualquier duda relacionada a su capacidad de actuar. De hecho, agregó, en la prueba documental referida al proceso a través del cual [Nombre 006] fue nombrada curadora, consta un certificado del médico Eduardo Guevara Coronado (5 de diciembre de 1979) en el cual se indica "Por medio de la presente Certifico: que el Sr. [Nombre 019] adolece de amnesia y total incapacidad mental que puede hacerlo a él irresponsable de sus actos " (folio 7 del expediente físico). Y además dijo, aun cuando los coaccionados insistieron en que don [Nombre 030] se comportó " normal" cuando se realizó la venta que consta en la escritura pública mencionada, incluso habiéndose demostrado esa "normalidad' no podrían llevar razón en la existencia de su voluntad para consentir la venta de la posesión descrita en el hecho probado cuarto de esta sentencia. Lo anterior es así, continúa el Tribunal, porque si había declaratoria de incapacidad desde antes de que se efectuara el negocio jurídico; y contra dicha probanza no hay ninguna otra opuesta por los demandados que permita a este tribunal dudar de la prueba documental que consta agregada en autos visible de los folios 5 al 12. Consecuentemente, adujo la sentencia impugnada, si el declarado judicialmente incapaz actuara por sí mismo, y no a través del curador, "los actos o contratos que se realicen..., serán absolutamente nulos " de conformidad con el ordinal 41 del Código Civil. Manifestó el fallo endilgado, el actor demostró, en la escritura pública número 335 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003, otorgada en el protocolo de la notaria pública Johanna María Moreno Bustos; compareció [Nombre 030] y en dicho instrumento público no consta representación de su curadora [Nombre 006] . Entonces, aclaró, si la incapacidad se caracteriza porque la persona no es capaz de gobernarse a sí misma, carecía de interés para ese Órgano juzgador, si la participación de [Nombre 019] en el negocio jurídico protocolizado fue "normal ", pues, en resumen, produjo un contrato nulo, al no haber intervención de su curadora en el acto (numerales 41 y 835 incisos 1) y 3) Ibidem). Por otro lado, mencionó, además, que en los respectivos escritos de contestación, ambos accionados manifiestan que es extraño que el 29 de setiembre de 1997, el actor compareciera ante la notaría de la licenciada Moreno Bustos a otorgar poder generalísimo a favor de su hijo [Nombre 005], y se cuestionan “si el apoderado sabía que su padre estaba de alguna forma insano, por qué comparece ante la notaria Moreno Bustos y otorga un poder donde él va a salir beneficiado”. Para el Tribunal, este argumento resultó intrascendente para lo que es objeto de debate en este proceso, porque no existió pretensión alguna, mediante al cual se solicitara la nulidad del mencionado contrato de mandato, aunado al hecho de que, contrario a lo que indican los demandados, fue el señor “[Nombre 019] ” —padre— quien compareció ante la fedataria pública a otorgar la escritura y no “[Nombre 005] ” —hijo—, de forma tal, que este último no se vería beneficiado de forma alguna con el simple hecho de haber sido instituido como apoderado de su padre. Subrayó, independientemente del otorgamiento del referido poder, o incluso otros actos de disposición que pudiese haber otorgado el insano [Nombre 030] , entre el año 1979 y 2005, en nada modifican el razonamiento que ese órgano jurisdiccional vertió en ese mismo considerando, sobre la capacidad mental del señor [Nombre 019] y sobre la nulidad e ineficacia de la escritura pública número 335, de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003, visible en los folios 149 frente y vuelto, del protocolo de la notaria pública Johanna María Moreno Bustos. En cuanto al segundo pilar sobre el cual descansa este proceso, sean LOS DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS, el Tribunal señaló, verificada la incapacidad para actuar del señor [Nombre 019] en el otorgamiento del instrumento público dicho, debía comprobarse si de dicho acto de disposición derivaba un hecho dañoso por parte de los demandados, capaz de hacerlos deudores por concepto de daños y perjuicios ante el accionante. Indicó, sobre la parte accionante pesa la carga probatoria de lo invocado en la demanda; extremo que estima el Tribunal, la parte actora incumplió, con respecto a la culpa de Johanna Moreno Bustos. Sustentó lo anterior, basado en que la parte actora no aportó prueba donde se demostrara, la notaria sabía de la insania o incapacidad de don [Nombre 030] , o bien, que, tenía medios para determinarla. Continúa, aun cuando hay tres testimonios que expresan actitudes de don [Nombre 030] que podrían hacer pensar que cualquier persona detectaría una insania por parte de este; estimó, un testimonio no es prueba idónea para determinar lo que el actor afirma: " cualquier persona sin ser Psicóloga se percata de las deficiencias mentales del señor [Nombre 019] ". Pues precisamente, afirmó ese órgano decisor, sin una probanza técnica que así lo determine, no podría concluir válidamente lo que el actor afirma a través del mero dicho de deponentes que no tienen condición de testigos peritos, o, de profesionales calificados para emitir un criterio científico sobre la condición de don [Nombre 030] . Aseveró el Tribunal, el único criterio médico legible que consta en el expediente, es el que se encuentra en el folio 7, respecto del cual dijo, de ese documento no se desprende que todo contacto con el señor [Nombre 019] permite a una persona que no sea "psicóloga" conocer de su insania. Asimismo, siguió el A quo, el cual no fue otorgada audiencia a la parte demandada; dicho documento no sólo no se puede valorar por no haberse respetado el contradictorio, sino porque no se le logra leer lo consignado. El fallo cuestionado no deja de lado la valoración de la declaración de parte rendida por Johanna Moreno Bustos, y al respecto hace ver, ella aceptó conocer a la familia del actor, no obstante, de las respuestas dadas al interrogatorio, el Tribunal no desprendió que la codemandada aceptara conocer de la incapacidad/insania del señor [Nombre 019]. En realidad, su conocimiento sobre la familia de don [Nombre 030] no permitió a ese Órgano decisor concluir, que la notaria necesariamente conociera de la situación vivida por éste; como para abstenerse a otorgar la escritura pública. Concluyó, siendo hechos no demostrados, que la notaria Moreno Bustos sabía de la insania de don [Nombre 030] , y además, que del contacto producido con ocasión del otorgamiento de la escritura pública debió haber advertido la insania de [Nombre 030] , excluyó la existencia del criterio de atribución necesario para configurar la responsabilidad alegada sobre la coaccionada Moreno Bustos. Con relación a la responsabilidad del demandado [Nombre 003] , la sentencia cuestionada dijo, la parte actora también alegó que él sabía de la incapacidad de [Nombre 030] (hecho sexto de la demanda), y se aprovechó de ese estado para realizar el negocio jurídico. En lo que respecta a ese hecho, el Tribunal no encontró pruebas en el expediente; y por eso, también excluyó el criterio de atribución necesario para configurar la responsabilidad civil del señor [Nombre 003]. El fallo endilgado, tampoco pudo manifestar, que el pago del derecho de posesión trasmitida por don [Nombre 030] con el vehículo, es un hecho realizado en aras del aprovechamiento. En razón de lo los daños y perjuicios reclamados. Luego, sobre la RECONVENCIÓN, el Tribunal señaló, la teoría del caso presentada por la parte demandada resulta inocua ante el objeto del proceso analizado en el considerando IV ese fallo, y que ha sido expuesto líneas arriba de este considerando. Por ese motivo, no se hicieron constar "hechos demostrados" de relevancia para resolver esa acción, por cuanto las pretensiones planteadas por Johanna Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003] parten de la base de que el señor [Nombre 030] actuó en el negocio jurídico de análisis, con " pleno conocimiento" y " plena voluntad” (hecho segundo de la contrademanda). Para la sentencia combatida, esa afirmación deviene en irrelevante, toda vez que en esa resolución se desarrolló, que quien carece de capacidad de actuar no tiene voluntad para obligarse; por consiguiente, tampoco puede consentir, y entonces, no habría forma posible de que los reconventores lograran demostrar el conocimiento y la voluntad de don [Nombre 030] en el negocio jurídico de análisis. Ello por cuanto reitera el fallo impugnado, existe el nombramiento de una curadora desde 1980. Por consiguiente, no le fue posible declarar la validez de la escritura pública número 335 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003 otorgada en el protocolo de la notaria pública Johanna Moreno Bustos.

VI.- Con relación a los recursos de casación, observa esta Sala, ambos casacionistas insisten, en que al momento de la suscripción de la escritura pública no. 335 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003 otorgada en el protocolo de la notaria pública Johanna Moreno Bustos, el actor [Nombre 030], tenía plena capacidad para actuar, y por ende, dicha escritura debe ser válida y eficaz. Para ello, ambos recurrentes en términos generales se refieren a los mismos yerros; y aunque numerados de diferente manera (en un caso los quebrantos vienen separados y en el otro se alega un único embate con diferentes temas), los alegatos coinciden. Por lo cual, para un mejor orden, y dado que en el recurso de la casacionista Moreno Bustos los diferentes alegatos están numerados, esta Cámara seguirá la numeración estatuida en el recurso de la coaccionada Moreno Bustos. Así, estiman en los diferentes reparos, la fecha a partir de la cual el actor fue declarado insano es 5 de marzo del 2005 —porque así lo declaró una sentencia judicial y fue inscrito en los Registros Públicos respectivos—; y no el 7 de enero de 1980, como lo estimó el Tribunal. Ello lo sustentan en el primer reparo diciendo que, no tendría lógica instaurar un nuevo proceso de insania, si la persona ya había sido declarada así anteriormente. Este Órgano decisor, no concuerda con los recurrentes en este punto. Por cuanto, si tiene lógica o no, haber interpuesto el proceso de declaratoria de insania en el año 2005, fecha para cuando ya se tenía tal declaratoria desde 1980, es una mera opinión que no ataca el fundamento central de la sentencia —el señor [Nombre 019] era incapaz desde cuando el Juzgado Civil de Liberia le nombró curadora en el año de 1980—, reduciéndose a argumentos subjetivos carentes de toda utilidad para ser analizados; pues se estaría ante un supuesto de casación inútil, en el tanto no sería factible quebrar el fallo impugnado, al subsistir el argumento de la resolución combatida, porque se mantiene incuestionado. Además de lo anterior, es menester subrayar, el numeral 9 de la Ley para Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, no. 9379, señala la necesidad de estar revisando esta condición cada cierto tiempo, en concreto, que la salvaguardia podrá ser revisada en cualquier momento, y de oficio estará sujeta a revisión por parte de la persona juzgadora cada cinco años. Esa normativa interna está basada en lo dispuesto por la Convención de Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad, cuyo propósito es promover, proteger y asegurar el goce pleno y en condiciones de igualdad de los los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales por las personas con discapacidad, y promover el respeto de su dignidad inherente. Además, en la Convención Interamericana para la Eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra las personas con discapacidad, las cuales tienen carácter supraconstitucional por tratarse de derechos humanos, en tanto otorguen mayores derechos que la Constitución Política, según reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia -ver entre otros, los votos N° 6856-2005, N° 2313-1995, N° 8892-2012, N° 18896-2014 y N° 20357-2018-; aunado al hecho de ser conteste con los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de la Agenda 2030 y la Circular 173-2019 sobre las Reglas de Brasilia sobre el Acceso a la Justicia de las personas en situación de vulnerabilidad. De ahí, el haber entablado un segundo proceso relacionado con la discapacidad del señor [Nombre 019] , está amparado en la legislación nacional e internacional; y el argumento que indica -que no tiene lógica presentar un segundo proceso si el actor ya había sido declarado incapaz- para esta Sala, queda fuera de lugar. Razón por la cual, el motivo será denegado.

VII.- En la especie, en el segundo motivo, señala que doña [Nombre 006] solicitó en el año de 1979 diligencias de nombramiento de curador para presentar una demanda penal, con base en un dictamen médico privado; no de declaratoria de insania. Al respecto, esta Cámara coincide con el Tribunal cuando indica, desde el 7 de enero de 1980, en el Juzgado Civil de Liberia, la señora [Nombre 006] "fue impuesta de su nombramiento como curadora del incapaz [Nombre 019] y entendida dijo que acepta el cargo que se le confiere como tal...". Entonces, sostiene este Órgano decisor, ya desde esa fecha el señor [Nombre 019] , había sido calificado como una persona con discapacidad psicosocial, y por ello, la autoridad judicial estima necesario el nombramiento de doña [Nombre 006] como curadora. O sea, una autoridad judicial calificó y resolvió sobre la situación del señor [Nombre 019] , nombrándole una persona para que lo representara, eliminado así cualquier duda que pudiera surgir. Ahora bien, los alegatos que se tuvieran sobre aquel procedimiento, como la inconformidad por la naturaleza privada del dictamen médico en el cual se basó la persona juzgadora para resolver, sería dentro de aquel proceso donde se debía alegar; y no venir de forma ulterior y muchos años después, a impugnar cuestiones que se debían ventilar en ese momento y dentro de ese proceso (canon 33 del CPC Ley no. 9342). Sin embargo, para mayor abundamiento, el numeral 847 de la Ley no. 7130, así reformado por la Ley no. 9379 para Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, claramente señala, el dictamen médico puede ser emitido por un médico de la CCSS, o “…por el médico especialista tratante , que acredite la condición de discapacidad intelectual, mental o psicosocial de la persona que solicita o para la que se solicita la salvaguardia.” —el resaltado no es del original—. Y por ello, sostiene esta Cámara, si el Tribunal se basó en su análisis, en el dictamen médico de un especialista privado, lo hizo ajustado al bloque de legalidad, y no existe el yerro apuntado por los casacionistas. Ello por cuanto, estima este Órgano decisor, la legislación vigente permite a las partes solicitar la salvaguarda con fundamento en un dictamen médico privado, no es cierto, como lo dicen los casacionistas, que sólo se permita esa solicitud con base en un dictamen emitido por la CCSS. Por otro lado, en relación con el alegato expuesto en los recursos, en cuanto a que las personas testigos no tienen el conocimiento necesario para determinar la incapacidad mental de una persona, ni tampoco, si esa incapacidad estaba presente al suscribir el contrato de compraventa. Estima esta Sala, ello no viene a constituirse en un alegato que invoque un error del fallo cuestionado, porque más bien, ese criterio coincide con lo expuesto por el Tribunal. Así, la sentencia combatida, textualmente dice: “Aun cuando hay tres testimonios que expresan actitudes de don [Nombre 030] que podrían hacer pensar que cualquier persona detectaría una insania por parte de este; se estima que un testimonio no es prueba idónea para determinar lo que el actor afirma: "cualquier persona sin ser Psicóloga se percata de las deficiencias mentales del señor [Nombre 019]". Y en virtud de ello, ese Órgano juzgador, no encontró responsabilidad de parte de los accionados, con relación al otorgamiento de la escritura en análisis; y no los condenó al pago de los daños y perjuicios reclamados por la parte actora. En razón de lo anteriormente expuesto, el motivo será denegado.

VIII.- En el tercer quebranto, alegan, el Tribunal parte de que para el 24 de marzo de 2003, estaba declarado insano porque tenía una curadora nombrada desde 1980, sin embargo para los casacionistas, no hay prueba que sustente ese dicho, porque no hay ninguna certificación del Registro Público, donde se indique, la señora [Nombre 006] era su curadora, precisamente porque ella había fallecido desde el 1 de julio de 1995. En este punto, también se analizará el quinto embate, dado que está relacionado con el tercer motivo de casación, cuando se alega, el Tribunal anuló el pacto en análisis, pese a no haberse demostrado la ausencia de capacidad para actuar de don [Nombre 030] y de su consentimiento. Sostiene esta Cámara, aquí hay que hacer la distinción realizada por el Tribunal, en el sentido de que una cosa es la capacidad para obligarse, y otra distinta, la publicidad registral para que sea oponible a terceros. Esta Sala estima, al igual que se expuso en el fallo cuestionado, quien carece de capacidad para actuar, no puede obligarse; y por ende no puede consentir. Así lo establece el numeral 41 del Código Civil, cuando dice “ los actos que se realicen sin capacidad volitiva y cognitiva serán relativamente nulos, salvo que la incapacidad esté declarada judicialmente, en cuyo caso serán absolutamente nulos.” Así también se observa el numeral 835 inciso 3) ibidem, donde se prevé la nulidad absoluta de los actos o contratos ejecutados o celebrados por persona absolutamente incapaz. De esta manera, cuando el Juzgado de Libera en el año de 1980 impuso a doña Hermelinda como curadora de don [Nombre 019] , claramente a él lo calificó como incapaz. Y es virtud de esta falta de capacidad para consentir, que el fallo endilgado, declaró absolutamente nula e ineficaz, la escritura no. 335 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de marzo de 2003, extremo con el cual, esta Sala coincide, en virtud de haber sido una autoridad judicial, con fundamento en un criterio médico, que le impuso una curadora. Sin embargo, pasando al segundo punto de análisis, que repercute sobre el conocimiento que terceros tengan de la situación de don [Nombre 019] , observa esta Cámara, como en efecto la notaria Johanna Moreno Bustos y el compareciente [Nombre 003], no sabían de la insania del señor [Nombre 019], porque del contacto con él, con ocasión de la firma del referido instrumento público, no se notaba esa insania, y por ello, resultaron absueltos de responsabilidad por los daños y perjuicios reclamados por la parte actora. En suma, la publicidad registral no es constitutiva de la incapacidad para consentir, tal y como pareciera que los recurrentes pretenden hacerlo ver, porque en este caso, la inscripción en los registros públicos es para que la declaratoria judicial de incapacidad o insania sea de conocimiento de terceros. Pero, según concibe este Órgano decisor, la incapacidad existe desde el momento de su declaratoria, independientemente de su inscripción; y naturalmente por el orden en el cual se deben dar los hechos, preexiste a la inscripción. El numeral 851 del Código Procesal Civil de 1989 (Ley no. 7130), reformado por la norma 9379, Ley para Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, señala, la persona juzgadora resolverá si la persona solicitante o a la que se le solicita la salvaguardia, requiere de esa medida y en qué proporción; si resuelve con lugar la solicitud, designará a una persona para ocupar el lugar; y finalmente prevé, el establecimiento de esa salvaguardia se comunicará al Registro Público de la Propiedad, para su respectiva anotación en los bienes muebles e inmuebles presentes o futuros, propiedad de la persona con discapacidad. Para esta Cámara, esa norma elimina toda duda en cuanto a que, es la persona juzgadora quien declara la salvaguardia para quien se solicite, la proporción de la medida y, además, es hasta después de establecida por la Autoridad, que se comunica al Registro Público, para hacerlo de conocimiento de terceros —canon 455 del Código Civil, cuando hace referencia a la publicidad registral y su afectación a terceros así, los títulos sujetos a inscripción que no estén inscritos, no perjudican a tercero, sino desde la fecha de inscripción—. Y en el caso concreto de la insania del señor [Nombre 030] , es oponible a terceros desde el 17 de junio de 2005, fecha a partir de la cual consta en el Registro Nacional. En razón de ello, a juicio de esta Sala, el Tribunal resolvió acertadamente, cuando indicó, los accionados no sabían de la insania de don [Nombre 030] al momento cuando se otorgó la escritura de análisis, por eso los absolvió de responsabilidad, pese a que declaró absolutamente nulo el instrumento público de análisis, dado que la incapacidad de don [Nombre 030] ya existía al momento de su otorgamiento. En mérito de lo IX.- En el cuarto embate, alega infracción en la interpretación y valoración de la escritura pública que contiene un poder generalísimo, otorgado ante la notaría de la demandada el 29 de setiembre de 1997, donde los otorgantes en ese acto fueron el señor [Nombre 019] y su hijo [Nombre 019 005]. Con base en lo anterior, manifiesta la casacionista, el señor [Nombre 019] , antes de la sentencia que declara la insania en el año 2005, era totalmente capaz. Alega también, ella no tenía manera de saber que dicho señor estaba insano, primero porque no había ninguna declaratoria inscrita en ningún Registro, ni sentencia firme al respecto; y además, porque su hijo [Nombre 019 005] , acudió a su notaría con el supuesto insano, y ambos firmaron esa escritura pública. En relación con el Poder Generalísimo, que indican los casacionistas, debe valorarse como prueba de la capacidad volitiva del actor, esta Sala sostiene, al igual como lo hizo el Tribunal; ese acto no es objeto de contienda, y por ende, rebasa los límites dentro los cuales se debe emitir criterio en esta sentencia. Aunado a ello, esta Cámara observa, la recurrente Moreno Bustos señala, no es cierto lo que dice el Tribunal, que sólo compareció el señor [Nombre 005] ” —hijo—. Sin embargo, eso no es así, el Tribunal señaló que sólo compareció el padre —[Nombre 019] —; y expresamente se indica “contrario a lo que indican los demandados, fue el señor [Nombre 019] quien compareció ante la fedataria pública a otorgar la escritura y no [Nombre 005]…” En cuanto al tema de la publicidad registral, se remite a los casacionistas a lo analizado en el punto anterior. En consecuencia, este motivo deberá ser denegado.

X.- Este Órgano colegiado estima, con respecto a la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver, sea el certificado de defunción de la señora [Nombre 006] ; y el expediente no. 05-100174-0386-CI, citar el canon 69.7.3 del CPC Ley no. 9342, en cuanto indica, la admisión de prueba en casación tendrá un carácter restrictivo y excepcional. Siendo que, sólo se podrá admitir aquella estrictamente necesaria para resolver los puntos que han sido objeto de impugnación, cuando no se haya podido ofrecer o practicar anteriormente; y, además, la Sala, sólo podrá ordenar prueba de oficio cuando sea indispensable. En el caso concreto de estudio, en relación con las dos probanzas ofrecidas ante esta instancia, ninguna cumple alguno de los requisitos para ser admitida. El certificado de defunción ya consta en el proceso el expediente no. 05-100174-0386-CI; dado que ese es el número del caso en análisis. Por lo anteriormente expuesto, se impone el rechazo de las probanzas ofrecidas.

XI.- En mérito de lo razonado y expuesto, el recurso deberá ser declarado sin lugar, denegándose la prueba aportada con el recurso, que no haya sido admitida en instancias precedentes. Las costas corresponden a la repercusión económica que implica para las partes su participación en el proceso. Según lo establecido en el artículo 73.1 del CPC Ley no. 9342, su pronunciamiento debe realizarse de oficio en toda resolución que ponga fin a la controversia, debiendo imponerse cargo de la parte vencida, salvo aquellos casos en los que concurra uno o más de los supuestos de exención previstos en la ley (numeral 73.2 ibidem). Por ende, su resolución requiere de un criterio valorativo por parte de la autoridad jurisdiccional. El recurso de casación es una de esas resoluciones, ya que con esta se decide definitivamente el contradictorio y responde a un juicio de utilidad y necesidad. Además, su sola presentación implica un emplazamiento a la contraparte, lo que impedirá la firmeza de la sentencia recurrida, le sujetará a continuar la discusión del asunto ante una instancia superior, mantendrá abierta la discusión de los puntos en controversia, y de igual forma, le implicará incurrir en gastos adicionales por tener que apersonarse y gestionar ante dicha autoridad. De este modo, es que resulta procedente su pronunciamiento y en ese tanto, al haberse denegado en su totalidad ambos recursos, y no haber logrado quebrar lo expuesto en el fallo cuestionado, no se observa motivo alguno que justificara su interposición, por lo que se condena a ambos casacionistas al pago de las costas generadas en esta fase. El monto por cancelar deberá ser liquidado por la parte beneficiada en la etapa procesal correspondiente.

XII. VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO LÓPEZ CASAL

Con el acentuado respeto y aprecio que profeso hacia mis colegas Magistradas y hacia mi colega Magistrado que, en este caso concreto, conforman la mayoría de esta honorable Sala de Casación, me aparto de la decisión tomada por ella, salvo mi voto y lo emito de la siguiente manera: Estoy convencido que los casacionistas llevan razón en sus agravios, motivo por el cual, en lo que fue impugnado por ellos, se declararán con lugar sus recursos de casación y se casará la sentencia de primera instancia, en los términos que más adelante se especificarán. No estoy de acuerdo con la afirmación que hace la mayoría de la Sala, que reza que desde el siete de enero de mil novecientos ochenta, cuando el Juzgado Civil de Liberia designó a la señora [Nombre 006] como curadora del señor [Nombre 030], ello signifique que, desde aquel momento, sea válido y correcto tener, a dicho señor, como una persona incapaz de actuar. Para el Infrascrito Magistrado disidente, ese simple nombramiento no es jurídicamente suficiente para considerar al señor [Nombre 019] como una persona incapaz de actuar. Era completamente necesario que, en dicho procedimiento judicial, hubiese un pronunciamiento judicial conclusivo y final, en virtud del cual, el Juez a cargo de dicho procedimiento de jurisdicción voluntaria (así lo denominaba el Código de Procedimientos Civiles), hubiese declarado incapaz al señor [Nombre 019]. Como bien lo expresó la casacionista Johanna Moreno Bustos, el acto de nombramiento de curador, que se le hizo al señor [Nombre 019] el siete de enero de mil novecientos ochenta, solamente consistió en un acto de designación de curador procesal, lo cual dista mucho de la necesaria sentencia o resolución de fondo, dictada por un Juez de la República, después de haber valorado todo el acervo probatorio, en virtud de la cual declara en estado de insania a una persona, resolución que, dicho sea de paso, debía ser inscrita en el Registro Público de Personas, para que, con dicha inscripción, fuese jurídicamente susceptible de resultar oponible frente a terceros. Del mismo modo, la mayoría de la Sala no se percata de que, como también lo alegó la casacionista Moreno Bustos, la finalidad de la designación de la curadora Hermelinda López López dentro del procedimiento número 79-100174-386-CI era, únicamente, para poder presentar una denuncia penal en representación del señor [Nombre 019] . Con base en lo anterior, desde ningún punto de vista puede considerarse jurídicamente insano a dicho señor desde enero de mil novecientos ochenta, sino que, por el contrario, dicho estado modificativo de su capacidad de actuar operó y surtió efectos jurídicos frente a terceros (como lo son, sin lugar a dudas, la señora Johanna Moreno Bustos y el señor [Nombre 003]) con la inscripción, en el Registro Público de Personas, de la sentencia dictada por el Juzgado de Familia de Liberia, a las nueve horas diez minutos del ocho de marzo de dos mil cinco, en virtud de la cual se declaró, en estado de insania, al señor [Nombre 030] . Con base en lo expuesto, no sería aplicable lo dispuesto en el numeral 41 del Código Civil, pues, como bien lo han expuesto otros tribunales de Justicia, "el solo hecho de que el señor [Nombre 032]. hubiera sido declarado en estado de interdicción por sentencia ya firme, no hace que todos los negocios jurídicos que celebró por sí mismo, anteriores a esa declaratoria, sean absolutamente nulos por faltarle capacidad mental, como parece que lo entiende la recurrente. Eso es así porque según lo dispone el artículo 41 del Código Civil, "Los actos o contratos que se realicen sin capacidad volitiva y cognocitiva serán relativamente nulos, salvo que la incapacidad esté declarada judicialmente, en cuyo caso serán absolutamente nulos." Es decir, son absolutamente nulos los actos o contratos realizados por sí mismo por el insano, pero solamente los celebrados con posterioridad a la declaratoria de su estado de interdicción mediante sentencia firme, y los realizados por él en esa misma forma mientras ese estado no haya sido levantado también mediante sentencia firme (artículos 36 y 41 del Código Civil y 239 del Código de Familia). Eso es así porque con respecto a los anteriores la capacidad para obligarse y contratar se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, todo de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 627 inciso 1), 628 y 1007 del Código Civil. En este caso la compraventa que se cuestiona de nula se celebró el siete de febrero de dos mil dos, mientras que el estado de interdicción del vendedor, don [Nombre 032] , se declaró mediante sentencia de primera instancia dictada el siete de agosto de dos mil tres, confirmada por la de segunda instancia emitida en diciembre de dos mil tres. Quiere decir que no se trata de un negocio jurídico cobijado por la presunción de nulidad absoluta a que se refiere el ya citado artículo 41 del Código Civil" (al respecto ver Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda. Voto número 137 de las 10:00 horas del 30 de mayo de 2008, redactado por el ex-Juez, Juan Ramón Coronado Huertas). Por otro lado, el Infrascrito Magistrado considera que, además de que no resulta aplicable, al sub júdice, la presunción de nulidad absoluta contenida en el numeral 41 del Código Civil, la parte actora tampoco probó, de manera fehaciente, lo que realmente interesaba en este asunto, a saber, que el señor [Nombre 030] no tuviese, al día veinticuatro de marzo de dos mil tres, facultades mentales y volitivas, suficientes y necesarias, para realizar el negocio jurídico de venta de su derecho de posesión sobre la finca con plano catastrado G-587784. La mayoría de la Sala afinca y reitera la incapacidad de actuar del señor [Nombre 019], únicamente por el simple hecho de que, en el año mil novecientos ochenta y con base en un certificado médico privado, se hubiese designado a la señora [Nombre 006] como curadora del actor del presente proceso. Para el Infrascrito Magistrado disidente, ello resulta manifiestamente insuficiente para acreditar la ausencia de facultades mentales y de capacidad volitiva del señor [Nombre 019] el día en el cual celebró el contrato de venta con el señor [Nombre 003] . Esto por varias razones: 1) En primer lugar, porque el dictamen médico privado, al cual hace alusión la mayoría de la Sala en este caso concreto, fue emitido muchísimos años antes del año dos mil tres y lo verdaderamente relevante era acreditar si el actor tenía o no tenía suficiente capacidad volitiva y cognoscitiva en el momento en el cual celebró el contrato con el señor [Nombre 003], es decir, el día veinticuatro de marzo de dos mil tres; 2) En segundo lugar, porque se desconoce, absoluta y completamente, cuál fue la metodología y las fuentes que utilizó el médico Eduardo Guevara Coronado para concluir que el señor [Nombre 019] padecía de amnesia y total incapacidad mental que puede hacerlo irresponsable de sus actos; 3) En tercer lugar, la mayoría de la Sala pierde de vista que el dictamen médico privado, emitido por el galeno Guevara Coronado, fue rendido únicamente para resolver si se designaba o no a la señora [Nombre 006] como curadora del actor, para efectos de interposición de una denuncia penal y no para resolver lo que se discute en este litigio, esto es, si él contaba o no, con capacidad mental suficiente para realizar por sí solo la venta efectuada a favor del demandado [Nombre 003] y; 4) En cuarto lugar, en el proceso de insania número 79-100174-386-CI, los demandados Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003] no fueron parte, y en consecuencia, no tuvieron la oportunidad de combatir el dictamen médico privado, en lo que les fuera desfavorable. Con base en las razones expuestas, en voto de minoría, declaro con lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por los demandados. En consecuencia, se casa la sentencia de primera instancia. Fallando el asunto por el fondo, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de causa, falta de capacidad y la genérica de sine actione agit. Se acogen las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y falta de legitimación pasiva. Se declara sin lugar, en todos sus extremos petitorios, la presente demanda ordinaria interpuesta por la Sucesión del señor [Nombre 030] contra Johanna Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003] . Se condena a la parte actora al pago de las costas a cargo de los demandados. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la reconvención, se declaran sin lugar las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación pasiva interpuestas por el actor-reconvenido. Se declara con lugar la reconvención interpuesta por Johanna Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003] contra la Sucesión del señor [Nombre 030]. En consecuencia, se declara que la escritura otorgada ante la notaria pública Johanna María Moreno Bustos a las quince horas y treinta minutos del veinticuatro de marzo de dos mil tres es válida y eficaz. Se condena a la parte actora-reconvenida a pagarles, a cada uno de los demandados-reconventores, la suma de un millón de colones, por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. Se condena a la parte actora-reconvenida al pago de las costas de la reconvención. POR TANTO: En voto de minoría, se declaran con lugar los recursos de casación interpuestos por los demandados. En consecuencia, se casa la sentencia de primera instancia. Fallando el asunto por el fondo, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de causa, falta de capacidad y la genérica de sine actione agit. Se acogen las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y falta de legitimación pasiva. Se declara sin lugar, en todos sus extremos petitorios, la presente demanda ordinaria interpuesta por la Sucesión del señor [Nombre 030] contra Johanna Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003]. Se condena a la parte actora al pago de las costas a cargo de los demandados. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la reconvención, se declaran sin lugar las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación pasiva interpuestas por el actor-reconvenido. Se declara con lugar la reconvención interpuesta por Johanna Moreno Bustos y [Nombre 003] contra la Sucesión del señor [Nombre 030]. En consecuencia, se declara que la escritura otorgada ante la notaria pública Johanna María Moreno Bustos a las quince horas y treinta minutos del veinticuatro de marzo de dos mil tres es válida y eficaz. Se condena a la parte actora-reconvenida a pagarles, a cada uno de los demandados-reconventores, la suma de un millón de colones, por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. Se condena a la parte actora-reconvenida al pago de las costas de la reconvención.

POR TANTO

Se deniegan las pruebas ofrecidas para mejor resolver. Por mayoría, se declaran sin lugar los recursos, son sus costas a cargo de quienes los interpusieron. El Magistrado López Casal salva el voto. ipreinfalk NOTA: La Magistrada DAMARIS VARGAS VÁSQUEZ intervino en la decisión de este asunto, no obstante, no pudo firmar la resolución que antecede por encontrarse de vacaciones. Se hace constar de conformidad con el artículo 28.2 del Código Procesal Civil.

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