State Joint and Several Liability for Rape Committed by Police Officer Abusing Official PositionResponsabilidad civil solidaria del Estado por delito de violación cometido por oficial de Fuerza Pública aprovechando su cargo

**IX.** In the first ground regarding the civil judgment, the representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) alleges a lack of factual and intellectual reasoning regarding the ruling in favor of the civil action for damages. He complains that the Court considered it proven that the accused committed the act while in the exercise of his duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, on February 23, 2010, at around eight o'clock in the evening, in Mata Redonda, San José. That, regarding the time, the act is based on the statement of the victim and her friend [Name [Nombre1]]; however, it is not taken into account that the affected party incurred in serious contradictions. He affirms that, in the complaint before the Policía Judicial, on February 24, 2010, she said she was with [Name [Nombre1]], in La Sabana, at around 9:30 p.m., when the accused and the other police officer arrived. That three days later, on February 25, 2010, before the Ministerio Público, she stated that it was at 8:30 p.m. when she arrived at that site and then was with the accused for about thirty minutes and afterwards went to drop him off by the Más por Menos, at around ten-thirty at night. He indicates that, finally, in the adversarial proceedings, she maintained that the events occurred in February 2010, at around eight o'clock at night. He reproaches that she was asked about this particular point and said she was sure of the time, but not why she remembered it with such accuracy. He indicates that the Court also took into account the version of [Name [Nombre1]], who said he had closed his business at seven o'clock in the evening, met with the victim at around seven-thirty, and then they went to the park in Mata Redonda, and that it was around eight or eight-thirty in the evening. He explains that the victim said she picked up [Name [Nombre1]] in Alajuelita, while he stated it was at [Dirección1], which could be essential due to the different travel time to reach the said park, as it defines the true arrival time. The appellant considers that there is an absence of reasoning in the judgment, since the evidentiary elements are not analyzed rigorously, setting aside the inconsistencies regarding the time contained in the victim's two complaints. He expresses that this difference could be because, between the two complaints, the attendance control logbook was seized, which records that the accused entered work at 10:50 a.m. and left at 9:50 p.m. He considers that the noted variation is important for the witness's credibility issue, and also regarding the State's civil liability. He adds that the versions of the witnesses [Name [Nombre1]] and the victim are not true, which is demonstrated by the record of outgoing and incoming messages and calls from the telephone [Value [Nombre2]], belonging to the victim, evidence admitted and incorporated at trial, through documents from folios 133 to 138 and a CD, determining that calls were made and messages were sent between both persons, on February 23, 2010, between 6:07 p.m. and 8:39 p.m., which implies that both met, to go to Mata Redonda, after 8:39 p.m. He affirms that what the victim stated before the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, to the effect that they had arrived at the park at around 9:30 p.m., is the closest to the truth. He points out that if two people were communicating by phone, it is because they were not together. He expresses that the issue is important because the Court considered it proven that the accused left at 9:30 p.m., which derives from the report on folios 50 to 55 and from what was stated by [Nombre3], Police Chief of that Delegation. He questions that the record of the victim's calls was not assessed by the Court, nor linked with the other existing evidentiary elements. He adds that after the accused was with the victim, she made a call to the telephone of [[Nombre4]], at 10:25:40 p.m., a time that coincides with the affected party's account of the duration of the event, as she stated she was with the accused for half an hour and then drove him near the Más por Menos. He reproaches that said statements and the documentary evidence were not assessed, which demonstrated that, at the time of the event, the accused was already off-duty as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, which implies the State has no civil liability, in addition to the fact that the lawsuit does not indicate, in the facts, why this civil defendant should be held liable. The appellant insists that the inconsistencies between the statements of the victim, the witness [[Nombre4]], and the record of calls and messages determine that the event occurred when the accused had already left work, which determines that the State is not jointly and severally liable for the damages caused. He expresses that it is not possible that the accused left work at 9:30 p.m., then approached the victim, who dropped him off by the Hotel Corobicí, and that the event occurred at 8:30 p.m. He considers it clear that the accused did not return to the Delegation and that the event occurred after signing out. Finally, he points out that it was not taken into account that neither the accused nor his companion were wearing their bulletproof vest (chaleco antibalas), service weapon (arma de reglamento), communication radio, nor motorcycle, since they had already left work, a matter corroborated by the witness [Nombre3]. He considers that the State has been harmed, as it is civilly condemned, based on insufficient factual and intellectual reasoning, and therefore requests the nullity of the ruling. The claim is unmeritorious. Basically, the appellant questions that the Court has incurred in an incorrect weighing of the evidence, by maintaining that the event occurred when the accused was in the exercise of his duties, as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, of the Ministry of Security. He considers that the foregoing is important because it defines the State's joint civil liability. To justify this ground, he provided the statement of [[Nombre5]], who had acted as co-accused in this case, with a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) being issued in his favor, which is final (firme). This Chamber coincides with the extensive reasoning contained in the ruling of the trial court (Tribunal de mérito) to determine that, in this case, the accused did execute the act while exercising his duties as a police officer of the Ministry of Public Security. To this end, it is sufficient to take into account the statement of Mr. [Name [Nombre6]], who indicated at the hearing that they were already finishing their duties, to the extent that he was already handing over the equipment he was carrying, such as the weapon and other items, when he was called by the civil defendant [Name [Nombre7]], who indicated that the victim and her companion were consuming drugs and that he had therefore searched them, but found nothing on them. [Name [Nombre6]] also indicated that he then took charge of checking the victim's companion, the witness [Name [Nombre1]], and even consulted if he had anything pending with the police or the courts, and upon finding he had no outstanding matters with the justice system, told him he could leave or stay at the site, a version corroborated by the witness [Name [Nombre1]]. According to this account, it is clear that even if the accused were about to leave work, or their workday had already ended, they executed acts inherent to their function as police officers, such as searching the victims, under the assumption that they were consuming drugs, which was ultimately not proven. Added to the foregoing is that the officer [Name [Nombre6]] also stated that at the time of carrying out the police action, they were in their work uniforms, which allowed the accused and civil defendant to intimidate the victim in order to subject her to sexual abuse. Now, this is the new evidence that has been provided at the hearing on the appeal of the judgment, but the judges had already assessed other evidentiary elements that determined that the civil defendant acted under the protection of the position he held, since he was not only dressed as a police officer (statement of the victim, witness [Name [Nombre1]], and officer [Name [Nombre6]]), but also performed acts that, to any ordinary citizen, were typical of an authority. On this particular point, the victim was clear that she felt great fear when he told her she was in trouble for carrying a firearm without authorization, and that this could lead her to prison, where she would suffer mistreatment and humiliation, offering her a way to avoid the foregoing somehow if she could, which ultimately translated into sexual favors. The foregoing was clearly assessed by the trial court, when it stated: “… From the beginning, the victim [Name [Nombre2]] was clear that [Name [Nombre7]] was carrying out duties inherent to his position.- He approached her wearing an official uniform of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica.- She herself stated: ‘…I knew [Name [Nombre7]] was a police officer because he was in uniform and came from the police post, it was obvious he was a police officer and was acting like a police officer…’.- Likewise, the victim indicated ‘…He had a blue uniform, which had the shield on one sleeve, it is the police shield, the one that appears in Fuerza Pública advertisements on television and everywhere…’.- With this series of statements, together with official communication number 601-D15-2010 visible at folios 94 and 95 of the file, seizure record (acta de secuestro) number 430107, and the certified copies of the logbook (libro de novedades) of the Policía de Proximidad of Mata Redonda from folio 50 to 55.- As well as the testimony of the witness [Nombre8], which is analyzed in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, where the aforementioned witness stated: ‘…Officer [Name [Nombre7]] was assigned to the Mata Redonda delegation.-’ ‘…Mr. [Name [Nombre7]] was a motorized officer of the Mata Redonda delegation; he had been assigned a State unit…’.- ‘…In Mata Redonda, several schedules with twelve-hour shifts were managed.-’ ‘…The motorized officers worked from nine or nine-thirty in the morning to nine or nine-thirty at night…’.- With these statements, it is accredited that, indeed, on the day of the events, the accused [Name [Nombre7]] was at the Mata Redonda police post carrying out duties inherent to his position.- The Court considers it accredited that [Name [Nombre7]], performing duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica and dressed as such.- Proceeded to approach the victim [Name [Nombre2]], forced her to drive her vehicle around the ICE in La Sabana, and taking advantage of the fact that inside the victim's car there was a firearm and that the victim did not have the respective carry permit.- He used his authority thus to coerce and intimidate the victim, with the sole purpose of satisfying his sexual desires.- Carrying out a clear and forceful intimidation in the opinion of this Court…”. Therefore, the inconsistencies incurred by the victim in indicating different times for when the intervention by the accused and civil defendant [[Nombre9]] occurred are of little importance. As is correctly pointed out in the ruling, and as the lawyer for the civil plaintiff pointed out, given the extremely serious circumstances the victim had to face, it is clear she was not going to be absolutely clear about the exact time they occurred. In any case, what is important is that her account did not vary regarding how the event occurred, namely, the approach, the irregular acts of [[Placa1]], who, without any reason, that is, without proven indication that a crime was being committed, intimidated both the victim and her companion, searched them, and then checked the vehicle, without being authorized to do so either. Finally, the way he intimidated her, when he found the firearm, for which she did not have a permit to carry, since it belonged to her uncle, and in that way forced her to perform sexual acts she was not obliged to endure. On this particular point, there were no inconsistencies in the affected party's account. Moreover, as already indicated, for this Chamber, the accused did perform acts typical of a police officer, or at least presented himself as such to the victim, which allowed him to execute the acts harmful to the sexual freedom of the civil plaintiff. It is not relevant whether or not they had already finished their shift, because the important thing is that they presented themselves as police officers and the defendant executed all the acts that generated the agreed moral damage, taking advantage of his position as a police officer, being dressed in the officer's attire, as detailed by the affected party. Thus, the call records that, as the appellant suggests, could reveal that the victim and [[Nombre4]] met at eight twenty-five in the evening, are not significant given the conclusiveness of the evidence indicating that the accused did present himself as an officer and performed acts that were presumably legitimate for any citizen unaware of the applicable rules, such as searching them and checking the vehicle, without cause to do so. All the argumentation of the Procurador loses relevance in light of the way the accused and civil defendant acted. [Name [Nombre7]] was an officer of the Ministry of Public Security. He committed the act while exercising that function, or else taking advantage of the fact that the State had not taken the necessary measures so that once his workday ended, he would change his attire and not flaunt his official uniform. This allowed him to present himself to the citizen and civil plaintiff as a police officer, and commit the criminal act that generated the moral damage agreed upon by the Trial Court. For these reasons, the ground is dismissed.

**X.** In the second ground, violation of the principle of consistency (principio de congruencia) between the civil lawsuit and the judgment is invoked. The appellant complains that, in the facts of the civil action, the plaintiff merely alludes to the criminal conduct of the accused, without establishing the State's obligation to compensate. He affirms that, in the lawsuit, it is said that the accused's actions were as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of the Ministry of Public Security, but it is not indicated whether the State must be held liable because the accused, using the exercise of his duties, during working hours, on the occasion of his position, or else using the uniform, carried out actions that led him to the commission of 3 crimes of rape. He complains that the Court takes into account factual descriptions from the accusation, but does not take into account the facts of the civil action, nor does it assess said document, meaning it decides the civil matter with arguments outside the civil action, which implies that, ex officio, it proceeded to hear issues not raised by the civil plaintiff. He explains that, given the defects of the civil action, for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), specifically regarding the legal link between the harmful act of the accused and the strict civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) of the State, a claim was made at the beginning of the trial, and exceptions (excepciones) were raised, which were not resolved by the Court, being left for the ruling, which is incorrect, since this should have been done before receiving the evidence. He mentions that the civil plaintiff never mentioned in the lawsuit that the State's duty to respond was because the accused was, on the day of the events, carrying out duties inherent to his position, that is, within the workday, or else using the opportunities of his position, such as his [Placa2] and his authority as an officer of the Fuerza Pública. He affirms that the State is not liable for what its public servants do outside their time of service, as resolved by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in ruling 363-F-1991, except where there is a normative link due to the position they hold, even if not during working hours, as occurs with officers of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, who act outside their workday using their service weapon to intervene in a police situation. He points out that, in the case of Fuerza Pública officers, that link does not exist, and that is why when they leave duty, they must hand over their service weapon and other police equipment. He adds that, in this case, the officer left his service in his police uniform, simply out of consideration, so they wouldn't use their personal clothing, as indicated by the witness [Nombre10]. He insists that, being outside his working hours, that is, not exercising his duties, the State should not be civilly liable for his actions. That civil liability does exist when the official uses the tools or opportunities the position grants, such as using the police uniform, but that this is not part of the facts of the lawsuit, which prevents it from being taken into account. He considers that the Court incurred in the defect of violating the principle of consistency, by taking into account facts not contained in the lawsuit. That is, the use of the uniform to commit the unlawful act and the damages was not part of the facts of the lawsuit, and therefore, the judges could not use it to resolve the civil liability. The ground is dismissed. The principle of consistency, contained, among others, in Articles 99, 153, and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), applicable to the civil action in criminal proceedings by express referral from Article 109 of the Procedural Code (Código Penal), plays a transcendental role in civil compensation. In summary, it implies that the judge cannot take into account facts not contained in the lawsuit, nor claims different from those formulated by the civil plaintiff. The situation is different regarding the law applicable to the facts invoked by the plaintiff, since it corresponds to the court to apply the corresponding substantive norms, based on the principle *iura novit curia*. Hence, it is transcendental that the civil action contains clear, precise, and detailed, or specified facts, as required by Articles 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 290.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This obligation is also expressly regulated in other norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such as in Article 304, which indicates that evidence must be offered, under penalty of admissibility, with special reference to the facts intended to be proven. The same applies to Article 116 ibidem, which regulates the participation of the civil plaintiff in the process, indicating they have the obligation to demonstrate the facts on which their lawsuit is based, a matter also contemplated in Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, the admissibility of evidence is defined based on its utility and relevance, that is, its relationship with the facts of the civil action or its response. Now, in this case, the appellant indicates that the civil plaintiff did not establish, in their lawsuit, the reasons why the State must be liable for the damages suffered by the victim. This Chamber considers that said statement does not conform to reality, since the civil action document sets forth specific facts, establishing the relationship between the accused and the State. Fundamentally, because he was performing his duties as a member of the Fuerza Pública when he committed the criminal act that caused the moral damage agreed upon in favor of the victim. In this sense, the respective document indicates that the State is sued because Mr. [Name [Nombre7]] was acting, on the day of the events, as a police officer of the Fuerza Pública, Ministry of Public Security, assigned to the Delegation of Mata Redonda, La Uruca, Delta 15 (folio 1 of the civil action file). For its part, in the second fact of the lawsuit, it is indicated that the accused and civil defendant, [Name [Nombre7]], presented himself as a uniformed police officer before the victim and her companion and performed acts typical of an officer, such as asking for [Name [Nombre1]]'s identification card, forcing him to take out his belongings, searching him, and calling another officer who was at the police post. That he did the same with the victim, whom he forced to touch her breasts and turn around, and also searched her. He then checked the vehicle she was driving, and upon finding a weapon, for which she did not have a carry permit, he told her he could detain her and take her to a holding cell, where female police officers would beat her, urging her to take some action to free herself from those ills, which culminated in the sexual abuse, held to be proven in the ruling. Further, in the capacity invoked, it was stated that the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages caused, because it involved a police officer, that is, a public official, which is reiterated in the request to be admitted as a party. In the reasoning of the civil action document, it is alluded that the police officers were not there to cause harm, but rather to protect the State, which implies an unlawful activity by a public official, for which the State must be held liable. According to this factual description, it is clear that the civil plaintiff did set forth in the facts the reasons why the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered, specifically because the accused and civil defendant had acted as a police officer and the victim had no reason to doubt it, as he was dressed as a police officer and acted as such. It was not necessary, as the appellant intends, for the lawsuit to indicate that the accused used his duties, during working hours, or on the occasion of his position, since it was already recorded that he was assigned to the Fuerza Pública, was dressed as a police officer, and initially performed acts typical of an officer, which was also reinforced by the action of his companion, who took it upon himself to check if the victim's companion had any pending issues with the justice system. There is no doubt that the civil plaintiff did describe conduct, attributing to the civil defendant that he had acted as a police officer, which translates into an unlawful activity by a public official, and the State must be liable for the damages it caused, as established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, it is also not true that the Court had to resort to the accusation to incorporate facts into the civil action. It is clear that if this had occurred, there would indeed be an absolute defect, since facts not contained in the civil action document cannot be taken into account to justify a ruling, which would imply a violation of the principle of consistency, which is sanctioned with absolute nullity in Articles 194 and 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, as already indicated, the civil action for damages document describes, with clarity and precision, that the accused and civil defendant acted as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, which implies he was a public official, and the State must be held liable under those circumstances. On the other hand, this Chamber does not consider that the civil action document contained defects that warranted a notice for its correction, under the terms of Articles 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 291 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, said document met the requirements of Articles 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure; hence, although the Court should have rejected the appellant's claim at the beginning of the trial, no defect is caused by doing so when ruling in favor of the lawsuit, rejecting the opposition and the exceptions raised by the defendant. The civil plaintiff included in the facts all the requirements demanded by the cited norms, without any defect being apparent that caused defenselessness (indefensión) to the State's representatives. The appellant insists that the accused [Name [Nombre7]] had already left work, but reality demonstrates the opposite, since both the victim, her companion [Name [Nombre1]], and the officer [Name [Nombre6]] were clear that he was still in his uniform and had not yet arrived at the police post when [Name [Nombre7]] decided to search the victims and then continue with the acts that culminated in the sexual abuse. The accused took advantage of his position as a police officer to carry out unlawful acts, and, as a public official, the State must be liable for the damages caused to the civil plaintiff. The facts that the trial court has taken into account to sustain the civil condemnatory judgment were duly described in the civil action for damages, which dismisses the existence of a defect of violation of the principle of consistency.” It states that the issue is important because the Trial Court held it as proven that the accused left at 9:30 p.m., which derives from the report on folios 50 to 55 and from the statement of [Name3], Police Chief of that Delegation. It questions that the call log of the victim was not assessed by the Trial Court, nor linked to the other existing evidentiary elements. It adds that after the accused was with the victim, she made a call to the telephone of [Name4] at 10:25:40 p.m., a time that coincides with the account of the affected party regarding the duration of the event, as she stated that she was with the accused for half an hour and then drove him to the vicinity of Más por Menos. It reproaches that said statements and the documentary evidence were not assessed, which demonstrated that, at the time of the act, the accused was already off duty as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, meaning the State has no civil liability, and furthermore, the complaint does not indicate, in the facts, why this civil defendant must answer. The appellant insists that the inconsistencies between the statements of the victim, the witness [Name4], and the call and message log, determine that the act occurred when the accused had already left his work, which determines that the State is not jointly and severally liable for the damages caused. It states that it is not possible for the accused to have left work at 9:30 p.m., then approached the victim, who dropped him off by the Hotel Corobicí, and for the event to have occurred at 8:30 p.m. It considers it clear that the accused did not return to the Delegation and that the act occurred after the sign-out. Finally, it points out that no consideration was given to the fact that neither the accused nor his companion were wearing the bulletproof vest, the regulation weapon, the communication radio, or riding the motorcycle, as they had already left their work, a matter corroborated by the witness [Name3]. It considers that the State has been prejudiced, as it is civilly condemned based on insufficient factual and intellectual reasoning, and therefore requests the annulment of the judgment. *The claim is inadmissible.* Basically, the appellant questions that the Trial Court has incurred in an incorrect assessment of the evidence, by maintaining that the act occurred when the accused was in the exercise of his duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, of the Ministry of Security. It considers that the foregoing is important because it defines the joint and several civil liability of the State. To justify this ground, it provided the statement of [Name5], who had acted as a co-defendant in this case, a final dismissal having been issued in his favor, which is final. This Chamber agrees with the extensive reasoning contained in the judgment of the Trial Court on the merits, to determine that, in this case, the accused did execute the act while exercising his position as a police officer of the Ministry of Public Security. To this end, it suffices to take into account the statement of Mr. [Name [Name6]], who indicated at the hearing that they were already finishing their duties, while he was already turning in the equipment he was carrying, such as the weapon and other items, when he was called by the civil defendant [Name [Name7]], who told him that the victim and her companion were consuming drugs and that was why he searched them, but that he found nothing on them. [Name [Name6]] also indicated that he then undertook to check the victim's companion, the witness [Name [Name1]], and even inquired if he had any pending matters with the police or the courts, and upon finding that he had no outstanding legal issues, told him he could leave or stay at the site, a version corroborated by the witness [Name [Name1]]. According to this account, it is clear that even if the defendants were about to leave work, or if their workday had already ended, they executed acts characteristic of their function as police officers, such as searching the victims, under the assumption that they were consuming drugs, which was ultimately not proven. Added to the above is that officer [Name [Name6]] also stated that at the time of carrying out the police action, they were wearing their work uniform, which allowed the accused and civil defendant to intimidate the victim, in order to subject her to sexual abuse. Now, this is the new evidence that has been provided at the hearing on the appeal of the judgment, but the judges had already assessed other evidentiary elements that determined that the civil defendant acted under the protection of the position he held, since he not only dressed as a police officer (statement of the victim, the witness [Name [Name1]], and officer [Name [Name6]]), but also performed acts that, to any ordinary citizen, were characteristic of an authority. On this matter, the victim was clear in that she felt great fear when he told her she was in trouble for carrying a firearm without authorization, and that this could lead her to jail, where she would suffer mistreatment and humiliation, offering her a way to avoid the above by some means she could manage, which ultimately resulted in sexual favors. The foregoing was clearly assessed by the Trial Court on the merits, when it stated: “…From the beginning, the victim [Name [Name2]] was clear that [Name [Name7]] was performing duties inherent to his position.- He approached her wearing an official uniform of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica.- She herself stated (sic): ‘…I knew [Name [Name7]] was a police officer because he came in uniform and came from the booth, it was obvious he was a police officer and was acting like a police officer…’.- Likewise, the victim indicated ‘…He had a blue uniform, which had the shield on one sleeve, it is the police shield, the one that appears in Fuerza Pública advertisements on television and everywhere…’.- With this series of statements, together with official letter number 601-D15-2010 visible at folios 94 and 95 of the case file, the seizure record number 430107, and the certified copies of the logbook of the Community Policing of Mata Redonda from folio 50 to 55.- As well as the statement of the witness [Name8], which is analyzed in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, wherein the aforementioned witness stated: ‘…Officer [Name [Name7]] was assigned to the Mata Redonda delegation.- …’Mr. [Name [Name7]] was a motorized officer of the Mata Redonda delegation, a State unit had been assigned to him…’.- ‘…In Mata Redonda, various schedules with twelve-hour shifts were managed.- …’The motorized officers were from nine in the morning or nine-thirty in the morning to nine or nine-thirty at night…’.- With these statements, it is accredited that indeed, on the day of the events, the accused [Name [Name7]] was at the Mata Redonda booth performing duties inherent to his position.- The Trial Court holds it as accredited that [Name [Name7]], performing duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica and dressed as such, proceeded to approach the victim [Name [Name2]], forced her to drive her vehicle around the ICE in La Sabana, and taking advantage of the fact that a firearm was inside the victim's car and that the victim did not have the respective carry permit, used his authority to coerce and intimidate the victim, with the sole purpose of satisfying his sexual desires, carrying out a clear and forceful intimidation (sic) in the opinion of this Court…”. In such a way that the inconsistencies incurred by the victim, when indicating various times regarding the moment the intervention of the accused and civil defendant [Name9] occurred, are of little importance. As is well pointed out in the judgment, and as the lawyer for the civil plaintiff noted, given the extremely serious circumstances the victim had to face, it is clear that she would not have been absolutely clear about the time they occurred. In any case, what is important is that her account did not vary regarding the manner in which the act occurred, namely, the approach, the irregular acts of [Badge1], who, without any reason, that is, without any proven indication that a crime was being committed, intimidated both the victim and her companion, searched them, and then inspected the vehicle, without being authorized to do so either. Finally, the way he threatened her when he found the firearm, for which she did not have a carry permit, as it belonged to her uncle, and in that way forced her to perform sexual acts she was not obliged to endure. On this point, there were no inconsistencies in the affected party's account. Furthermore, as already indicated, for this Chamber, the accused did perform acts characteristic of a police officer, or at least presented himself as such to the victim, which allowed him to execute the acts harmful to the sexual freedom of the civil plaintiff. It has no importance whether they had already left their duty or not, since what matters is that they presented themselves as police officers and the defendant executed all the acts that generated the agreed moral damages (daño moral acordado), taking advantage of his position as a police officer, being dressed in the officer's attire, as detailed by the affected party. In such a way that the call logs which, as the appellant suggests, could reveal that the victim and [Name4] met at eight twenty-five at night, have no importance given the strength of the evidence indicating that the accused did present himself as an officer and performed acts that were presumably legitimate to any citizen unfamiliar with the current rules, such as searching them and inspecting the vehicle, without any reason to do so. All the argumentation of the State Attorney loses relevance given the way the accused and civil defendant acted. [Name [Name7]] was an officer of the Ministry of Public Security. He committed the act while exercising that function, or else taking advantage of the fact that the State had not taken the necessary measures so that, once his workday ended, he would change his attire and not flaunt his official uniform. This allowed him to present himself before the citizen and civil plaintiff as a police officer and commit the criminal act that generated the moral damages (daño moral) agreed upon by the Trial Court on the Merits. For these reasons, the ground is rejected.

**X.** In the second ground, a violation of the principle of congruence between the civil complaint and the judgment is invoked. The appellant claims that, in the facts of the civil action, the plaintiff limits itself to alluding to the criminal conduct of the accused, without establishing the State's obligation to compensate. It affirms that, in the complaint, it is said that the actions of the accused were as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of the Ministry of Public Security, but it is not indicated if the State must answer because the accused, availing himself of the exercise of his duties, during work hours, on the occasion of his position, or availing himself of the uniform, deployed actions that led him to commit 3 crimes of rape. It claims that the Trial Court takes into account factual descriptions from the accusation, but does not take into account the facts of the civil action, nor does it assess that pleading, that is, it decides the civil matter with arguments foreign to the civil action, which implies that, on its own motion, it took cognizance of matters not raised by the civil plaintiff. It states that given the defects in the civil action, for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically regarding the legal link between the harmful act of the accused and the strict civil liability of the State, a claim was made at the beginning of the trial, and exceptions were raised, which were not resolved by the Trial Court, leaving them for the judgment, which is incorrect, as this should have been prior to the receipt of evidence. It mentions that the civil plaintiff never mentioned in the complaint that the State's duty to answer was because the accused was, on the day of the events, performing duties inherent to his position, that is, within the workday, or availing himself of the opportunities of his position, such as the [Badge2] and his authority as an officer of the Fuerza Pública. It affirms that the State does not answer for what its servants do outside of service time, as resolved by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in decision 363-F-1991, except where there exists, normatively, a link due to the position they hold, even if not within work hours, as happens with officers of the Judicial Investigation Organization, who act outside their workday, using their regulation weapon, to intervene in a police situation. It points out that, in the case of officers of the Fuerza Pública, that link does not exist, and that is why, when they check out, they must hand in their regulation weapon and other police implements. It adds that, in this case, the officer withdrew from his service wearing the police uniform, as a mere courtesy, so they would not wear their personal clothing, as indicated by the witness [Name10]. It insists that, being outside his work hours, that is, not exercising his duties, the State should not answer civilly for his actions. That civil liability does exist when the official uses the tools or opportunities that the position confers, such as availing himself of the police uniform, but that this does not form part of the facts of the complaint, which prevents it from being taken into account. It considers that the Trial Court incurred the defect of violating the principle of congruence by taking into account facts not contained in the complaint. That is, the use of the uniform to commit the unlawful act and the damages did not form part of the facts of the complaint, and therefore, the judges could not use it to decide the civil liability. *The ground is dismissed.* The principle of congruence, contained, among others, in Articles 99, 153, and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the civil action in a criminal venue by express remission of Article 109 of the Penal Code, plays a transcendental role in civil compensation. In summary, it implies that the judge cannot take into account facts not contained in the complaint, nor claims different from those made by the civil plaintiff. The situation regarding the law applicable to the facts invoked by the plaintiff is different, as it is for the court to use the corresponding substantive rules, based on the principle *iura novit curia*. Hence, it is transcendental that the civil action contains clear, precise, and detailed facts, or specified ones, as required by Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 290.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This obligation is also expressly regulated in other norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such as in Article 304, which indicates that evidence must be offered, under penalty of inadmissibility, with special reference to the facts to be proven. The same occurs with Article 116 *ibidem*, which regulates the participation of the civil plaintiff in the process, pointing out that they have the obligation to demonstrate the facts on which their complaint is based, a matter also contemplated in Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, the admissibility of evidence is defined based on usefulness and relevance, that is, its relationship with the facts of the civil action or its answer. Now, in this case, the appellant points out that the civil plaintiff did not establish, in their complaint, the reasons why the State should answer for the damages suffered by the victim. This Chamber considers that said affirmation does not conform to reality, because the civil action brief specifies concrete facts where the relationship between the accused and the State is established. Fundamentally, because he was performing his position as a member of the Fuerza Pública when he committed the criminal act that caused the moral damages (daño moral) agreed in favor of the victim. In this sense, it is indicated in the respective brief that the State is sued because Mr. [Name [Name7]] served, on the day of the events, as a police officer of the Fuerza Pública, Ministry of Public Security, assigned to the Mata Redonda Delegation, La Uruca, Delta 15 (folio 1 of the civil action file). For its part, in the second fact of the complaint, it is indicated that the accused and civil defendant, [Name [Name7]], presented himself as a uniformed police officer before the victim and her companion and performed acts characteristic of an officer, such as asking [Name [Name1]] for his ID, forcing him to take out his belongings, searching him, and calling another officer who was in the booth. That he did the same with the victim, whom he forced to touch her breasts, and to turn around, and also searched her. He then inspected the vehicle she was traveling in, and upon finding a weapon, for which she did not have a carry permit, told her that he could detain her and take her to a cell, where the policewomen would beat her, urging her to perform some act to free herself from those evils, which culminated in the sexual abuse, held as proven in the judgment. For its part, in the capacity invoked, it was stated that the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages caused, as it involved a police officer, that is, a public official, which is reiterated in the request to be admitted as a party. In the legal grounds of the civil action brief, reference is made to the fact that police officers were not there to cause harm, but rather to protect the State, which implies an unlawful activity by a public official, for which they must answer. According to this factual description, it is clear that the civil plaintiff did state in the facts the reasons why the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered, specifically because the accused and civil defendant had acted as a police officer and the victim had no reason to doubt this, since he dressed as a police officer and acted like one. It was not necessary, as the appellant intends, to indicate that the accused was availing himself of his duties, during work hours, or on the occasion of his position, as it had already been recorded that he was assigned to the Fuerza Pública, dressed as a police officer, and initially performed acts characteristic of an officer, which was also reinforced by the action of his companion, who undertook to check if the victim's companion had any pending matters with the justice system. There is no doubt that the civil plaintiff did describe conduct attributing to the civil defendant that he had acted as a police officer, which translates into an unlawful activity by a public official, the State being liable for the damages caused, as established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, it also does not conform to reality that the Trial Court had to resort to the accusation to incorporate facts into the civil action. It is clear that if that were to happen, there would indeed be an absolute defect, since facts not contained in the civil action brief cannot be taken into account to justify a judgment, which would imply a violation of the principle of congruence, which is sanctioned with absolute nullity in Articles 194 and 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, as already indicated, the brief for compensatory civil action describes, with clarity and precision, that the accused and civil defendant acted as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, which implies he was an official, and the State must answer under those circumstances. On the other hand, this Chamber does not find that the civil action brief contained defects meriting a warning for its correction, in terms of Articles 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 291 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, said document met the requirements of Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hence, although the Trial Court should have rejected the appellant's claim at the beginning of the trial, no defect is produced by doing so when ruling to grant the complaint, rejecting the opposition and the exceptions filed by the defendant. The civil plaintiff included in the facts all the requirements demanded by the cited norms, without any defect being observed that has caused defenselessness to the representatives of the State. The appellant insists that the accused [Name [Name7]] had already left work, but reality shows the opposite, since both the victim and her companion [Name [Name1]], as well as officer [Name [Name6]], were clear that he was still in his uniform and had not arrived at the police booth when [Name [Name7]] decided to search the victims and then continue with the acts that culminated in the sexual abuse. The accused took advantage of the position of police officer to carry out unlawful acts, and as a public official, the State must answer for the damages caused to the civil plaintiff.

“IX. In the first ground concerning the civil judgment, the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República alleges a lack of factual and intellectual reasoning regarding the decision to grant the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). He complains that the Trial Court found it proven that the accused committed the act while exercising his duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, on February 23, 2010, at around eight in the evening, in Mata Redonda, San José. Regarding the time, the act is supported by the statement of the victim and her friend [Name [Nombre1]]; however, it is not considered that the affected party incurred in serious contradictions. He states that, in the complaint before the Judicial Police, on February 24, 2010, she said she was with [Name [Nombre1]], in La Sabana, at around 9:30 p.m., when the accused and the other police officer arrived. That three days later, on February 25, 2010, before the Public Prosecutor's Office, she stated that it was at 8:30 at night when she arrived at that place and then was with the accused for about thirty minutes and later took him near the Más por Menos, at around ten-thirty at night. He indicates that, finally, at the adversarial hearing, she maintained that the events occurred in February 2010, at around eight at night. He criticizes that she was asked about this matter and said she was sure of the time, but not why she remembered it with such accuracy. He indicates that the Trial Court also considered the version of [Name [Nombre1]], who said that he had closed the business at seven at night and met with the victim at around seven-thirty and then they went to the Mata Redonda park and that it was around eight or eight-thirty at night. He explains that the victim said she picked up [Name [Nombre1]] in Alajuelita, while he stated it was on [Dirección1], which could be essential due to the different travel time to reach the aforementioned park, as it defines the true arrival time. The appellant considers that there is an absence of reasoning in the judgment, as the evidence is not analyzed with rigor, overlooking the inconsistencies regarding the time contained in the victim’s two complaints. He states that this difference could be because the attendance control logbook was seized between the two complaints, which records that the accused started work at 10:50 a.m. and left at 9:50 at night. He believes that the noted variation is important for the witness’s credibility and for the State's civil liability. He adds that the versions of the witnesses [Name [Nombre1]] and the victim are not true, which is demonstrated by the record of outgoing and incoming messages and calls from the phone [Valor [Nombre2]], belonging to the victim, evidence admitted and incorporated at trial, through documents from folios 133 to 138 and a CD, which determines that calls were made and messages sent between both persons on February 23, 2010, between 6:07 p.m. and 8:39 p.m., implying that they met to go to Mata Redonda after 8:39 p.m. He states that what the victim stated before the Judicial Investigation Agency, that they had arrived at the park around 9:30 p.m., is closest to the truth. He points out that if two people were communicating by phone, it was because they were not together. He states that this topic is important because the Trial Court found it proven that the accused left at 9:30 p.m., which derives from the report on folios 50 to 55 and from the testimony of [Nombre3], Police Chief of that Delegation. He questions that the victim’s call log was not considered by the Trial Court, nor linked to the other existing evidence. He adds that after the accused was with the victim, she made a call to the phone of [[Nombre4]] at 10:25:40 p.m., a time consistent with the affected party’s account of how long the event lasted, as she stated she was with the accused for half an hour and then took him near the Más por Menos. He criticizes that these statements and documentary evidence were not assessed, which showed that at the time of the act, the accused was already off duty as an officer of the Fuerza Pública, implying that the State has no civil liability, besides the fact that the claim does not state, in its facts, why this civil defendant must answer. The appellant insists that the inconsistencies among the statements of the victim, the witness [[Nombre4]], and the call and message log determine that the act occurred when the accused had already left work, which determines that the State is not jointly and severally liable for the damages caused. He states that it is impossible for the accused to have left work at 9:30 p.m., then approached the victim, who dropped him off by the Hotel Corobicí, and for the event to have occurred at 8:30 at night. He believes it is clear that the accused did not return to the Delegation and that the act occurred after the departure signature. Finally, he points out that it was not considered that neither the accused nor his companion was wearing the bulletproof vest, service weapon, communication radio, or motorcycle, as they had already left work, a matter corroborated by witness [Nombre3]. He believes the State has been prejudiced, as it is civilly condemned based on insufficient factual and intellectual reasoning, and therefore requests the annulment of the ruling. The claim is not admissible. Basically, the appellant questions that the Trial Court incorrectly assessed the evidence by holding that the act occurred while the accused was exercising his duties as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of the Ministry of Security. He believes the foregoing is important because it defines the State's joint and several civil liability. To justify this ground, he adduced the testimony of [[Nombre5]], who had acted as a co-accused in this case, with a final dismissal ruling in his favor, which is final. This Chamber agrees with the extensive reasoning contained in the Trial Court’s ruling to determine that, in this case, the accused did carry out the act while exercising his role as a police officer of the Ministry of Public Security. To do so, it is sufficient to consider the statement of Mr. [Name [Nombre6]], who indicated at the hearing that they were already finishing their duties, and he was already turning in the equipment he carried, such as the weapon and other items, when he was called by the civil defendant [Name [Nombre7]], who told him that the victim and her companion were consuming drugs and that is why he searched them, but found nothing on them. [Name [Nombre6]] also indicated that he then took charge of checking the victim’s companion, the witness [Name [Nombre1]], and even asked if he had any pending matters with the police or the courts, and upon finding he had no legal issues, told him he could leave or stay at the site, a version corroborated by the witness [Name [Nombre1]]. According to this account, it is clear that even if the accused were about to leave work, or their workday had already ended, they performed acts typical of their role as police, such as searching the victims, under the assumption that they were consuming drugs, which was ultimately not proven. Added to the above is that officer [Name [Nombre6]] also stated that at the time of carrying out the police action, they were in their work uniforms, which allowed the accused and civil defendant to intimidate the victim to subject her to sexual abuse. Now, this is the new evidence provided at the hearing on the appeal of the sentence, but the judges had already assessed other evidentiary elements determining that the civil defendant acted under the protection of the position he held, since he not only dressed as a police officer (testimony of the victim, the witness [Name [Nombre1]], and officer [Name [Nombre6]]), but also performed acts that, to any ordinary citizen, were typical of an authority. On this matter, the victim was clear that she felt great fear when he told her she was in trouble for carrying a firearm without authorization and that this could lead her to prison, where she would suffer mistreatment and abuse, offering to avoid the foregoing in some way she could, which ultimately translated into sexual favors. The foregoing was clearly assessed by the Trial Court, stating “…From the beginning, the victim [Name [Nombre2]] was clear that [Name [Nombre7]] was performing duties of his position.- He approached her wearing an official uniform of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica.- She stated: ‘…I knew [Name [Nombre7]] was a police officer because he was wearing a uniform and came from the guardhouse, it was obvious he was a police officer and was acting like a police officer…’.- Likewise, the victim indicated ‘…He had a blue uniform, which had the crest on one sleeve, it is the police crest that appears in Fuerza Pública advertisements on television and everywhere…’.- With this series of statements together with official letter number 601-D15-2010, visible on folios 94 and 95 of the case file, seizure record number 430107 and the certified copies of the logbook of the Mata Redonda Community Policing, folios 50 to 55.- As well as the testimony of witness [Nombre8], which is analyzed in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, in which the aforementioned witness stated: ‘…Officer [Name [Nombre7]] was assigned to the Mata Redonda delegation.-’ …Don [Name [Nombre7]] was a motorized officer of the Mata Redonda delegation, he had been assigned a State-owned unit…’.- ‘…In Mata Redonda, several twelve-hour service shifts were handled.-’ …The motorized officers worked from nine or nine-thirty in the morning to nine or nine-thirty at night…’.- With these statements, it is proven that indeed, on the day of the events, the accused [Name [Nombre7]] was at the Mata Redonda guardhouse performing duties of his position.- The Trial Court finds it proven that [Name [Nombre7]], performing functions as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of Costa Rica and dressed as such, proceeded to approach the victim [Name [Nombre2]], forced her to drive her vehicle in the vicinity of the ICE in La Sabana, and taking advantage of the fact that inside the victim’s car there was a firearm and that the victim did not have the respective permit to carry, used his authority to coerce and intimidate the victim for the sole purpose of satisfying his sexual desires, carrying out a clear and forceful intimidation in this Court’s opinion…”. Thus, the inconsistencies incurred by the victim in indicating various times regarding when the intervention of the accused and civil defendant [[Nombre9]] occurred are of little importance. As rightly pointed out in the ruling and noted by the civil plaintiff’s lawyer, given the extremely serious circumstances the victim had to face, it is clear she would not have absolutely clear the exact time they occurred. In any case, what matters is that her account did not vary regarding how the act occurred, namely, the approach, the irregular acts of [[Placa1]], who, without any reason—that is, without any proven indication a crime was being committed—intimidated both the victim and her companion, searched them, and then searched the vehicle, without being authorized to do so either. Finally, the way she was intimidated upon finding the firearm, for which she had no permit to carry as it belonged to her uncle, and thus forced to perform sexual acts she was not obligated to endure. On this matter, there were no inconsistencies in the affected party's account. Furthermore, as already indicated, for this Chamber, the accused did perform acts typical of a police officer, or at least presented himself as such to the victim, which allowed him to carry out the acts harmful to the sexual freedom of the civil plaintiff. It is irrelevant whether they had already left their duties, as what matters is that they presented themselves as police officers and the defendant carried out all the acts that generated the agreed moral damage, taking advantage of his role as a police officer by wearing the officer’s clothing, as detailed by the affected party. Thus, the call logs that, as the appellant suggests, might reveal that the victim and [[Nombre4]] met at eight twenty-five at night, are irrelevant given the strength of the evidence showing the accused indeed presented himself as an officer and performed acts that would supposedly be legitimate to any citizen unaware of the rules in force, such as searching them and the vehicle without reason. The entire argument of the State Attorney loses relevance considering how the accused and civil defendant acted. [Name [Nombre7]] was an officer of the Ministry of Public Security. He committed the act while performing that role, or taking advantage of the fact the State had not taken the necessary measures so that once his workday ended, he would change his clothing and not flaunt his official uniform. This allowed him to present himself to the citizen and civil plaintiff as a police officer and commit the criminal act that generated the moral damage agreed upon by the Trial Court. For these reasons, the ground is rejected.

X.In the second ground, a violation of the principle of congruence between the civil claim and the judgment is invoked. The appellant complains that, in the facts of the civil action, the plaintiff party limits itself to alluding to the criminal conduct of the accused, without establishing the State’s obligation to compensate. He states that, in the claim, it is said that the accused’s actions were as an officer of the Fuerza Pública of the Ministry of Public Security, but it does not indicate whether the State must answer because the accused, using the exercise of his duties during working hours, on the occasion of the position, or using the uniform, deployed actions that led him to commit 3 rape offenses. He complains that the Trial Court considers factual descriptions from the accusation, but does not consider the facts of the civil action, nor assess that document; that is, it rules on the civil matter with arguments unrelated to the civil action, implying it sua sponte addressed matters not raised by the civil plaintiff. He explains that, given the defects of the civil action due to non-compliance with the requirements of Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically regarding the legal link between the accused’s harmful act and the State’s strict civil liability, a claim was made at the beginning of the trial, and exceptions were raised, which were not resolved by the Trial Court, leaving them for the judgment, which is incorrect, as this should have occurred before receiving evidence. He mentions that the civil plaintiff never mentioned in the claim that the State’s duty to answer was because the accused was, on the day of the events, performing duties of his position, meaning within the workday, or taking advantage of the opportunities of his position, such as the [Placa2] and his authority as a Fuerza Pública officer. He states that the State does not answer for what its servants do outside of service time, as resolved by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling 363-F-1991, except where there is a normative link due to the position held, even if not within working hours, as occurs with officers of the Judicial Investigation Agency who act outside their workday using their service weapon to intervene in a police situation. He points out that for Fuerza Pública officers, that link does not exist, and that is why when they leave duty, they must hand in their service weapon and other police equipment. He adds that in this case, the officer left his service with the police uniform out of simple consideration, so they do not use their personal clothes, as witness [Nombre10] indicated. He insists that, being outside his work schedule, meaning not exercising his duties, the State should not be civilly liable for his actions. That there is civil liability when the official uses the tools or opportunities the position confers, such as using the police uniform, but that this is not part of the facts of the claim, preventing it from being considered. He believes the Trial Court incurred in the defect of violating the principle of congruence by considering facts not contained in the claim. That is, the use of the uniform to commit the crime and damages did not form part of the facts of the claim, and thus, the judges could not use it to resolve civil liability. The ground is dismissed. The principle of congruence, contained, among others, in Articles 99, 153, and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the civil action in criminal proceedings by express remission of Article 109 of the Penal Code, plays a transcendental role in civil compensation. In essence, it implies that the judge cannot consider facts not contained in the claim, nor claims different from those made by the civil plaintiff. The situation regarding the law applicable to the facts invoked by the plaintiff party is different, as it is the court’s responsibility to use the corresponding substantive rules, based on the principle iura novit curia.”

It is therefore crucial that the civil action contain clear, precise, and detailed facts, or specifically stated facts, as required by articles 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and 290.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). This obligation is also expressly regulated in other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such as article 304, which states that evidence must be offered, under penalty of inadmissibility, with specific reference to the facts it is intended to prove. The same applies to article 116 *ibidem*, which regulates the participation of the civil plaintiff (actor civil) in the proceedings, stating that he has the obligation to prove the facts on which his claim is based, a matter also contemplated in article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, the admissibility of evidence is defined based on its usefulness and relevance, that is, its relationship to the facts of the civil action or the defense against it.

Now, in this case, the appellant argues that the civil plaintiff did not establish, in his claim, the reasons why the State must be liable for the damages suffered by the victim. This Chamber finds that this assertion does not conform to reality, because the civil action brief sets forth specific facts establishing the relationship between the accused and the State. Fundamentally, because he was performing his duties as a member of the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) when he committed the criminal act that caused the moral damages awarded in favor of the victim. In this regard, it is stated in the respective brief that the State is sued because Mr. [Name [Name7]] was acting, on the day of the events, as a police officer of the Public Force, Ministry of Public Security, stationed at the Mata Redonda, La Uruca, Delta 15 station (folio 1 of the civil action file). For its part, in the second fact of the claim, it is stated that the accused and civil defendant, [Name [Name7]], presented himself as a uniformed police officer to the victim and her companion and performed acts typical of an officer, such as asking [Name [Name1]] for his identification card, forcing him to take out his belongings, frisking him, and calling another officer who was at the guard post. That he did the same with the victim, whom he forced to touch her breasts, turn around, and he frisked her as well. He then searched the vehicle she was traveling in, and upon finding a weapon, for which she did not have a carry permit, he told her that he could detain her and take her to a cell, where the female police officers would beat her, coercing her into doing something to free herself from those ills, which culminated in the sexual abuse, held as proven in the judgment. For its part, in the capacity he invoked, it was set forth that the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages caused, as it concerned a police officer, that is, a public official, which is reiterated in the request to be admitted as a party. In the grounds for the civil action brief, reference is made to the fact that police officers were not there to cause harm, but rather to protect the State, which implies an illegal activity by a public official for which the State must answer.

According to this factual description, it is clear that the civil plaintiff did set forth in the facts the reasons why the State was jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered, specifically because the accused and civil defendant had acted as a police officer and the victim had no reason to doubt this, since he was dressed as a police officer and acted as one. It was not necessary, as the appellant claims, to state that the accused was using his functions during work hours or on the occasion of his position, because it had already been recorded that he was stationed in the Public Force, was dressed as a police officer, and initially performed acts typical of an officer, which was also reinforced by the action of his partner, who took charge of checking whether the victim's companion had any pending matters with the justice system. There is no doubt whatsoever that the civil plaintiff did describe conduct, attributing to the civil defendant that he had acted as a police officer, which translates into an illegal activity of a public official, and the State must be liable for the damages he caused, as established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Therefore, it also does not conform to reality that the Trial Court had to resort to the accusation to incorporate facts into the civil action. It is clear that if that occurred, there would indeed be an absolute defect, for facts not contained in the civil action brief cannot be taken into account to justify a judgment, which would imply a violation of the principle of congruence (principio de congruencia), which is sanctioned with absolute nullity in articles 194 and 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, as already indicated, the civil action brief for compensation describes, with clarity and precision, that the accused and civil defendant acted as an officer of the Public Force, which implies that he was an official and the State must be liable under those circumstances.

Furthermore, this Chamber does not perceive that the civil action brief contained defects warranting a preventive order for its correction, in the terms of articles 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 291 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, said document met the requirements of articles 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure; hence, although the Trial Court should have rejected the appellant's claim at the beginning of the trial, no defect is caused by its having done so when granting the claim, rejecting the opposition and the defenses filed by the defendant. The civil plaintiff included in the facts all the requirements demanded by the cited provisions, without any defect being perceived that would have caused a lack of defense for the representatives of the State. The appellant insists that the accused [Name [Name7]] had already left work, but reality demonstrates the contrary, because the victim, her companion [Name [Name1]], and officer [Name [Name6]] were all clear that he was still in his uniform and they had not arrived at the police post when [Name [Name7]] decided to frisk the victims and then continue with the acts that culminated in the sexual abuse. The accused took advantage of the position of police officer to perform illegal acts, and as a public official, the State must be liable for the damages caused to the civil plaintiff. The facts that the Trial Court of merit has taken into account to support the civil conviction were duly described in the civil compensation action (acción civil resarcitoria), which discards the existence of a defect of violation of the principle of congruence.

“IX. En el primer motivo sobre la condena civil, el representante de la Procuraduría General de la República alega falta de fundamentación fáctica e intelectiva, en cuanto a la declaratoria con lugar de la acción civil resarcitoria. Reclama que el Tribunal tuvo por demostrado que el imputado cometió el hecho, cuando se encontraba en el ejercicio de su cargo como oficial de la Fuerza Pública, el 23 de febrero de 2010, a eso de las veinte horas, en Mata Redonda de San José. Que, en cuanto a la hora, el hecho se sustenta en la declaración de la ofendida y su amigo [Nombre [Nombre1]], sin embargo, no se toma en cuenta que la afectada incurrió en serias contradicciones. Afirma que, en la denuncia ante la Policía Judicial, el 24 de febrero de 2010, dijo que se encontraba con [Nombre [Nombre1]], en la Sabana, a eso de las 21:30 horas, cuando llegó el imputado y el otro policía. Que tres días después, el 25 de febrero de 2010, ante el Ministerio Público, expuso que fue a las 8:30 horas de la noche, cuando llegó a ese sitio y luego estuvo con el imputado unos treinta minutos y después lo fue a dejar por el Más por Menos, a eso de las diez y treinta de la noche. Indica que, finalmente, en el contradictorio, sostuvo que los hechos ocurrieron en febrero del 2010, a eso de las ocho de la noche. Reprocha que se le preguntó sobre el particular y dijo estar segura de la hora, pero no del por qué la recordaba con tanto exactitud. Indica que el Tribunal tomó en cuenta, además, la versión de [Nombre [Nombre1]], quien dijo que había cerrado el negocio a las siete de la noche y se reunió con la ofendida como a las siete y media y luego se fueron para el parque de Mata Redonda y que eran como las ocho u ocho y treinta de la noche. Expone que la ofendida dijo que recogió a [Nombre [Nombre1]] en Alajuelita, mientras que él expuso que fue en el [Dirección1] , lo que puede resultar esencial por el diferente tiempo de recorrido para llegar al referido parque, pues define la verdadera hora de llegada. Considera el recurrente que existe una ausencia de motivación en la sentencia, pues no se analizan los elementos de prueba con rigurosidad, dejándose de lado las inconsistencias sobre la hora, contenidas en las dos denuncias de la víctima. Expresa que esa diferencia puede obedecer a que entre las dos denuncias se decomisó el libro de control de asistencia, donde consta que el imputado entró a laborar a las 10:50 horas y salió a las 9:50 horas, de la noche. Estima que la variación apuntada es importante para el tema de credibilidad de la testigo, y también sobre la responsabilidad civil del Estado. Agrega que las versiones de los testigos [Nombre [Nombre1]] y la ofendida no son ciertas, lo que se demuestra con el registro de mensajes y llamadas salientes y entrantes del teléfono [Valor [Nombre2]], perteneciente a la víctima, prueba admitida e incorporada en el juicio, por medio de documentos de folios 133 a 138 y un CD, se determina que se realizaron llamadas y se enviaron mensajes, entre ambas personas, el 23 de febrero de 2010, entre las 18:07 horas y las 20:39 horas, lo que implica que ambos se reunieron, para dirigirse a Mata Redonda, después de las 20:39 horas. Afirma que lo expuesto por la víctima ante el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, en el sentido de que habían llegado al parque, a eso de las 21:30 horas, es la más cercana a la verdad. Señala que si dos personas se estaban comunicando por teléfono es porque no se encontraban reunidas. Expresa que el tema es importante porque el Tribunal tuvo por demostrado que el imputado salía a las 21:30 horas, lo que deriva del reporte de folios 50 a 55 y de lo expuesto por [Nombre3] , Jefe Policial de esa Delegación. Cuestiona que el registro de llamadas de la ofendida no fue valorado por el Tribunal, ni relacionado con los otros elementos probatorios existentes. Agrega que luego de que el imputado anduvo con la víctima, ella realizó una llamada al teléfono de [[Nombre4] ], a las 22:25:40 horas, tiempo que coincide con el relato de la afectada, sobre el tiempo que tardó el evento, pues manifestó que estuvo una media hora con el acusado y luego lo llevó a las cercanías del Más por Menos. Reprocha que no se valoró dichas declaraciones y la prueba documental, lo que demostraba que, al momento del hecho, ya el acusado se encontraba fuera de sus funciones como oficial de la Fuerza Pública, lo que implica que el Estado no tiene responsabilidad civil, además de que en la demanda no se indica, en los hechos, por qué debe responder este demandado civil. El recurrente insiste en que las inconsistencias entre las declaraciones de la víctima, del testigo [[Nombre4] ] y el registro de llamadas y mensajes, determinan que el hecho sucedió cuando el imputado ya había salido de su trabajo, lo que determina que el Estado no resulta solidariamente obligado por los daños producidos. Expresa que no es posible que el imputado saliera del trabajo a las 9:30 pm, luego abordara a la víctima, quien lo dejó por el Hotel Corobicí, y que el evento se produjera a las 8:30 de la noche. Estima que es claro que el imputado no regresó a la Delegación y que luego de la firma de salida se produjo el hecho. Finalmente, señala que no se tomó en cuenta que ni el imputado, ni su acompañante portaban el chaleco antibalas, el arma de reglamento, el radio de comunicación, ni la motocicleta, pues ya habían salido de su trabajo, cuestión corroborada por el testigo [Nombre3] . Estima que el Estado se ha visto perjudicado, pues se le condena civilmente, partiendo de una motivación fáctica e intelectiva insuficiente, por lo que pide la nulidad del fallo. No es atendible el reclamo. Básicamente, el recurrente cuestiona que el Tribunal ha incurrido en una incorrecta valoración de la prueba, al sostener que el hecho se produjo cuando el imputado se encontraba en el ejercicio de sus funciones, como oficial de la Fuerza Pública, del Ministerio de Seguridad. Estima que lo anterior es importante porque define la responsabilidad civil solidaria del Estado. Para justificar este motivo aportó la declaración de [[Nombre5] ], quien había fungido como co-imputado en esta causa, dictándose a su favor un sobreseimiento definitivo, que se encuentra firme. Esta Cámara coincide con la amplia motivación que contiene el fallo del Tribunal de mérito, para determinar que, en este caso, el imputado sí ejecutó el hecho, cuando se encontraba ejerciendo su cargo como oficial de policía, del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. Para ello basta tomar en cuenta la manifestación de don [Nombre [Nombre6]], quien indicó en la audiencia que ellos ya iban terminando labores, al tanto que ya él estaba entregando el equipo que portaba, como el arma y otros bienes, cuando fue llamado por el demandado civil [Nombre [Nombre7]], quien le indicó que la víctima y su acompañante estaban consumiendo drogas y que por eso los requisó, pero que no les encontró nada. [Nombre [Nombre6]] también indicó que entonces él se encargó de revisar al acompañante de la víctima, el testigo [Nombre [Nombre1]], e incluso consultó si tenía algo pendiente con la policía o los tribunales y al no encontrar que tuviese cuentas con la justicia, le dijo que podía retirarse o quedarse en el sitio, versión corroborada por el testigo [Nombre [Nombre1]]. De acuerdo con este relato es claro que aún y cuando los imputados estuviesen a punto de salir del trabajo, o ya hubiese vencido su jornada laboral, ejecutaron actos propios de su función como policía, como el requisar a las víctimas, bajo el supuesto de que se encontraban consumiendo drogas, lo que al final no se demostró. A lo anterior se suma que el oficial [Nombre [Nombre6]] también expuso que al momento de realizar la actuación policial, ellos se encontraban con el uniforme de trabajo, lo que le permitió al imputado y demandado civil intimidar a la ofendida, a efecto de someterla al abuso sexual. Ahora bien, esta es la prueba nueva que se ha aportado en la audiencia sobre el recurso de apelación de sentencia, pero ya los juzgadores habían valorado otros elementos probatorios que determinaban que el demandado civil actuó amparado al cargo de ostentaba, pues no solo vestía como policía (declaración de la víctima, del testigo [Nombre [Nombre1]] y del oficial [Nombre [Nombre6]]), sino que realizó actos que ante cualquier ciudadano común, eran propios de una autoridad. Sobre este particular la ofendida fue clara en cuando a que ella sintió mucho temor, cuando él le dijo que se encontraba en problemas por portar un arma de fuego, sin autorización, y que ello la podría llevar a la cárcel, donde sufriría maltratos y vejaciones, ofreciéndole evitar lo anterior de alguna forma que ella pudiera, lo que al final se tradujo en favores sexuales. Lo anterior fue claramente valorado por el Tribunal de mérito, al señalar “… Desde un inició la ofendida [Nombre [Nombre2]] tuvó (sic) claro que [Nombre [Nombre7]] se encontraba en funciones propias de su cargo.- La abordó vistiendo un uniforme oficial de la Fuerza Pública de Costa Rica.- La misma manifesto (sic): “…Yo sabía que [Nombre [Nombre7]] era policía por que venía con uniforme y venía de la caseta, era obvio que era policía y venía actuando como un policía…”.- Así mismo la ofendida indicó “…El tenía un uniforme azul, que tenía en una manga el escudo, es el escudo de los policías, es el que sale en propagandas de la fuerza pública por televisión y por todo lado…”.- Con esta serie de manifestaciones aunado al oficio número 601-D15-2010 visible a folios 94 y 95 del expediente, el acta de secuestro número 430107 y las copias certificadas del libro de novedades de la Policía de Proximidad de Mata Redonda de folio 50 a 55.- Así como la declaración del testigo [Nombre8] , la cual se analiza de forma concatenada con el resto de la prueba en donde el supra mencionado testigo manifestó: “…El oficial [Nombre [Nombre7]] estaba designado a la delegación de Mata Redonda.- “…Don [Nombre [Nombre7]] era oficial motorizado de la delegación de Mata Redonda se le había asignado una unidad del Estado…”.- “…En Mata Redonda se manejaban varios horarios con doce horas de servicio.- “…Los motorizados estaban de las nueve de la mañana o nueve y media de la mañana a las nueve o nueve y media de la noche…”.- Con estas declaraciones se acredita que efectivamente que el día de los hechos el imputado [Nombre [Nombre7]] se encontraba en la caseta de Mata Redonda realizando labores propias de su cargo.- El Tribunal tiene por acreditado que [Nombre [Nombre7]], realizando funciones como oficial de la Fueza Pública de Costa Rica y vestido como tal.- Procedió abordar a la ofendida [Nombre [Nombre2]], la obligó a conducir su vehículo en los alrededores del ICE de la Sabana y valiéndose, de que dentro del carro de la ofendida, se encontraba un arma de fuego y que la ofendida no contaba con el respectivo permiso de portación.- Utilizó su envestidura para, así coaccionar e intimidar a la ofendida, con la única finalidad de satisfacer sus deseos sexuales.- Realizando una intimidación clara y contundente (sic) a criterio de éste Tribunal…”. De tal manera que poca importancia tiene las inconsistencias en que incurrió la víctima, al señalar diversas horas, sobre el momento en que se produjo la intervención del imputado y demandado civil [[Nombre9] ]. Como bien se señala en el fallo y lo hizo ver el abogado de la actora civil, ante las gravísimas circunstancias que tuvo que afrontar la víctima, es claro que no iba a tener absolutamente claro la hora en que se produjeron. En todo caso lo importante es que no varió su relato en relación con la forma en que se produjo el hecho, a saber, el abordaje, los actos irregulares de [[Placa1] ], quien, sin motivo alguno, es decir, sin indicio comprobado de que se estaba cometiendo un delito, intimidó tanto a la víctima como a su acompañante, los requisó y luego revisó el vehículo, sin que tampoco estuviese autorizado para ello. Finalmente, la forma en que la amedrentó, cuando encontró el arma de fuego, sobre la cual ella no tenía permiso para portarla, pues pertenecía a su tío, y de esa forma la obligó a realizar actos sexuales que no estaba obligada a soportar. Sobre este particular no hubo inconsistencias en el relato de la afectada. Por lo demás, como ya se indicó, para esta Cámara el imputado sí realizó actos propios de un oficial de policía, o al menos así se presentó ante la víctima, lo que le permitió ejecutar los hechos lesivos a la libertad sexual de la actora civil. No tiene trascendencia si ellos ya habían salido o no de su función, pues lo importante es que se presentaron como policías y el demandado ejecutó todos los hechos, que generaron el daño moral acordado, aprovechando su cargo como oficial de policía, al encontrarse con la vestimenta de oficial, tal y como lo detalló la afectada. De tal manera que los registros de llamadas que, como sugiere el recurrente podrían revelar que la víctima y [[Nombre4] ] se reunieron a las ocho y veinticinco minutos de la noche, no tienen trascendencia ante la contundencia de la prueba, que señala que el imputado sí se presentó como oficial y realizó actos que presuntamente eran legítimos para cualquier ciudadano que no conozca las reglas vigentes, como el requisarlos y revisar el vehículo, sin que existiera motivo para ello. Toda la argumentación de señor Procurador pierde relevancia ante la forma en que actuó el imputado y demandado civil. [Nombre [Nombre7]] era oficial del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. Cometió el hecho cuando ejercía esa función, o bien aprovechando que el Estado no había tomado las medidas necesarias para que una vez que cesara su día de trabajo, cambiara su vestimenta y no hiciera alarde de su uniforme oficial. Esto le permitió presentarse ante la ciudadana y actora civil, como oficial de policía, y cometer el hecho delictivo que generó el daño moral acordado por el Tribunal de Mérito. Por tales razones se rechaza el motivo.

X.En el segundo motivo se invoca violación al principio de congruencia entre la demanda civil y la sentencia. El impugnante reclama que, en los hechos de la acción civil, la parte actora se limita a hacer alusión a la conducta delictiva del imputado, sin establecer la obligación del Estado de reparar. Afirma que, en la demanda, se dice que las acciones del imputado fueron como oficial de la Fuerza Pública del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, pero no se indica si el Estado debe responder porque, el imputado, valiéndose del ejercicio de sus funciones, durante el horario de trabajo, con ocasión del cargo o bien valiéndose del uniforme, desplegó acciones que lo llevaron a la comisión de 3 delitos de violación. Reclama que el Tribunal toma en cuenta descripciones fácticas de la acusación, pero no toma en cuenta los hechos de la acción civil, ni valora dicha pieza, es decir, falla el tema civil, con argumentaciones ajenas a la acción civil, lo que implica que, oficiosamente, entró a conocer cuestiones que no planteó el actor civil. Expone que ante los defectos de la acción civil, por incumplimiento de los requisitos del artículo 112 del Código Procesal Penal, concretamente, en cuanto al vínculo jurídico entre el hecho dañoso del acusado y la responsabilidad civil objetiva del Estado, se formuló un reclamo, al inicio del juicio, y se planteó excepciones, las cuales no fueron resueltas por el Tribunal, dejándolas para el fallo, lo que es incorrecto, pues esto debió ser previo a la recepción de la prueba. Menciona que el actor civil nunca mencionó en la demanda que el deber del Estado de responder obedecía a que el imputado se encontraba, el día de los hechos, en funciones propias de su cargo, es decir, dentro de la jornada laboral, o bien valiéndose de las oportunidades de su cargo, como lo es el [Placa2] y su investidura de oficial de la fuerza pública. Afirma que el Estado no responde por lo que hagan sus servidores fuera del tiempo de servicio, conforme lo ha resuelto la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el fallo 363-F-1991, excepto que exista, normativamente, una vinculación por el cargo que ostentan, aunque no se encuentre dentro del horario de trabajo, como sucede con los oficiales del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, que actúan fuera de su jornada laboral, utilizando su arma de reglamento, para intervenir en una situación policial. Señala que, en el caso de los oficiales de la Fuerza Pública, esa vinculación no existe, y que por eso es que cuando se retiran, deben entregar su arma de reglamento y demás implementos policiales. Agrega que, en este caso, el oficial se retiró de su servicio, con el uniforme policial, por simple consideración, para que no usen las vestimentas personales, como lo indicó el testigo [Nombre10] . Insiste en que, al encontrarse fuera de su horario de trabajo, es decir, no ejerciendo sus funciones, el Estado no debe responder civilmente para sus actuaciones. Que sí existe responsabilidad civil, cuando el funcionario utiliza las herramientas u oportunidades que el cargo le confiere, como el valerse del uniforme policial, pero que esto no forma parte de los hechos de la demanda, lo que impide tomarlo en cuenta. Estima que el Tribunal incurrió en el vicio de violación al principio de congruencia, al tomar en cuenta hechos no contenidos en la demanda. Es decir, el uso del uniforme, para cometer el ilícito y los daños, no formó parte de los hechos de la demanda y, entonces, no podía utilizarlo los juzgadores para resolver la resolver la responsabilidad civil. Sin lugar el motivo. El principio de congruencia, contenido, entre otros, en los artículos 99, 153 y 155 del Código Procesal Civil, aplicable a la acción civil en sede penal por remisión expresa del artículo 109 del Código Penal, juego un papel trascendental en la reparación civil. En síntesis, implica que el juzgador no puede tomar en cuenta hechos no contenidos en la demanda, ni pretensiones diversas a las formuladas por el actor civil. Diversa es la situación sobre el derecho aplicable a los hechos invocados por la parte actora, pues corresponde al tribunal utilizar las normas sustantivas que correspondan, con fundamento en el principio iura novit curia. De ahí que es trascendental que la acción civil contenga hechos claros, precisos y circunstanciados, o bien especificados, como lo exigen los artículos 112 del Código Procesal Penal, y 290.2 del Código Procesal Civil. Esa obligación también se regula, expresamente, en otras normas del Código Procesal Penal, como por ejemplo en el artículo 304, en el cual se indica que la prueba debe ofrecerse, bajo pena de admisibilidad, con especial referencia a los hechos que se pretenden demostrar. Lo propio sucede con el artículo 116 ibidem, que regula la participación del actor civil en el proceso, señalando que tiene la obligación de demostrar los hechos en que sustenta su demanda, cuestión que también se contempla en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil. De igual manera, la admisibilidad de la prueba se define con fundamento en la utilidad y pertinencia, es decir, con su relación con los hechos de la acción civil o su contestación. Ahora bien, en este caso el recurrente señala que el actor civil no estableció, en su demanda, las razones por las cuales el Estado debe responder por los daños sufridos por la víctima. Esta Cámara estima que dicha afirmación no se ajusta a la realidad, pues en el escrito de acción civil se señalan hechos concretos, donde se establece la relación entre el imputado y el Estado. Fundamentalmente porque se encontraba desempeñando su cargo como miembro de la Fuerza Pública, cuando cometió el hecho delictivo, que provocó el daño moral acordado a favor de la víctima. En este sentido se indica en el escrito respectivo, que se demanda al Estado, porque el señor [Nombre [Nombre7]] fungía, el día de los hechos, como oficial de policía de la Fuerza Pública, Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, destacado en la Delegación de Mata Redonda, La Uruca, Delta 15 (folio 1 del legajo de acción civil). Por su parte, en el hecho segundo de la demanda, se indica que el imputado y demandado civil, [Nombre [Nombre7]], se presentó como policía uniformado ante la víctima y su acompañante y realizó actos propios de un oficial, como pedir la cédula a [Nombre [Nombre1]], lo obligó a sacar sus pertenencias, lo requisó y llamó a otro oficial que se encontraba en la caseta. Que lo propio hizo con la víctima, a quien obligó a tocarse sus senos, y que se diera vuelta, y también la requisó. De seguido revisó el vehículo en que ella se desplazaba, y al encontrar un arma, sin que contara con permiso de portación, le dijo que la podía detener y llevarla a una celdas, donde las mujeres policías le pegarían, conminándola a realizar alguna conducta para librarse de la esos males, lo que culminó con el abuso sexual, tenido por demostrado en el fallo. Por su parte, en el carácter que invocaba, se expuso que el Estado era solidariamente responsable, por los daños producidos, por tratarse de un oficial de policía, es decir, un funcionario público, lo que se reitera en la petición de ser admitido como parte. En la fundamentación del escrito de acción civil, se alude a que los oficiales de policía no estaban para hacer daño, sino más bien para proteger al Estado, lo que implica una actividad ilícita de un funcionario público, por la cual debe responder. De acuerdo con esta descripción fáctica, resulta claro que el actor civil sí expuso en los hechos, las razones por la cuales el Estado era responsable, solidariamente, por los daños sufridos, concretamente porque el imputado y demandado civil había actuado como oficial de policía y la víctima no tenía razones para dudar de ello, pues vestía como policía y actuaba como tal. No hacía falta, como pretende el recurrente, que se indicara que el imputado se valía de sus funciones, durante el horario de trabajo o con ocasión del cargo, pues ya se había consignado que estaba destacado en la fuerza pública, vestía como policía e, inicialmente, realizó actos propios de un oficial, lo que también se vio reforzado con la actuación de su compañero, quien se encargó de revisar si el acompañante de la víctima tenía algo pendiente con la justicia. No cabe la menor duda de que el actor civil sí describió una conducta, atribuyéndole al demandado civil que había actuado como oficial de policía, lo que se traduce en una actividad ilícita de un funcionario público, debiendo responder el Estado por los daños que produjo, conforme se establece en el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que tampoco se ajuste a la realidad que el Tribunal haya tenido que acudir a la acusación, para incorporar hechos a la acción civil. Resulta claro que si ello sucediera sí existiría un vicio absoluto, pues no pueden tomarse en cuenta hechos no contenidos en el escrito de acción civil, para justificar un fallo, lo que implicaría una violación al principio de congruencia, lo que se encuentra sancionado con nulidad absoluta en los artículos 194 y 197 del Código Procesal Civil. Sin embargo, como ya se indicó, el escrito de acción civil resarcitoria describe, con claridad y precisión, que el imputado y demandado civil actuó como oficial de la fuerza pública, lo que implica que era funcionario y el Estado debe responder ante esas circunstancias. Por otro lado, no aprecia esta Cámara que el escrito de acción civil contuviese defectos que ameritaran una prevención para su corrección, en los términos de los artículos 15 del Código Procesal Penal y 291 del Código Procesal Civil. Al contrario, dicho documento reunía los requisitos de los artículos 112 del Código Procesal Penal y 290 del Código Procesal Civil, de ahí que, aunque el Tribunal debió rechazar el reclamo del recurrente al inicio del juicio, ningún defecto produce el que lo hiciese al declarar con lugar la demanda, rechazando la oposición y las excepciones formuladas por la demandada. El actor civil incluyó en los hechos, todos los requisitos exigidos por las citadas normas, sin que se aprecie algún vicio que haya causado indefensión a los representantes del Estado. El recurrente insiste en que al imputado [Nombre [Nombre7]] ya había salido del trabajo, pero la realidad demuestra lo contrario, pues tanto la víctima, como su acompañante [Nombre [Nombre1]], así como el oficial [Nombre [Nombre6]], fueron claros en que todavía estaba con su uniforme y no habían llegado a la caseta policial, cuando [Nombre [Nombre7]] decidió requisar a las víctimas y luego continuar con los actos que culminaron el abuso sexual. El imputado aprovechó el cargo de oficial de policía para realizar actos ilícitos y, como funcionario público, el Estado debe responder por los daños ocasionados a la actora civil. Los hechos que ha tomado en cuenta el Tribunal de mérito, para sustentar la sentencia condenatoria civil, se encontraban debidamente descritos en la acción civil resarcitoria, lo que desecha la existencia de un vicio de violación al principio de congruencia.”