1536 of December 10, 1952, indicates that the electoral bodies are: the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civil Registry, and the Electoral Boards. For its part, numeral 39 of the same regulatory source distributes the Electoral Boards into: Cantonal Boards, one in each canton, and Vote Receiving Boards (Juntas Receptoras de Votos), in each electoral district as many as may be established for each election.
II.—Subsection 3) of Article 102 of the Political Constitution grants the Supreme Electoral Tribunal the power to interpret, exclusively and bindingly, the constitutional and legal provisions concerning electoral matters. Subsection c) of Article 19 of the Electoral Code, in developing that constitutional precept, provides where pertinent: "Such interpretations may be given ex officio or at the request of the members of the Superior Executive Committee of the registered political parties." This electoral body, through resolution No. 1863 at 9:40 a.m. on September 23, 1999, specified that such ex officio interpretations are appropriate when the Tribunal, at any time, perceives the need to interpret or supplement the legal system, with respect to those of its provisions that are not clear or sufficient, when their literal understanding leads to the non-application or distortion of their guiding principles or to a contradiction with constitutional mandates, or when the provisions require subsequent practical complementation to produce their effects.
III.—In accordance with Article 1 of our Political Constitution, Costa Rica is a democratic, free, and independent republic. Costa Rican democracy is the product of a series of efforts and sacrifices that Costa Ricans have made over time, such that the political and institutional system we enjoy today and that allows us to carry out all our activities in various fields: economic, labor, cultural, civic, etc., is possible thanks to the constitutional and legal structure itself that governs us, as well as the social conscience that exists to respect and put into practice said structure.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the practice of going to the electoral polls to elect our leaders is an unavoidable fact of the highest legal and civic transcendence; hence the ethical and patriotic value that our constituent assigned to the institution of suffrage. Article 93 of our Magna Carta enshrines said institution in the following way: "Suffrage is a primordial and obligatory civic function and is exercised before the Electoral Boards in a direct and secret vote, by citizens registered in the Civil Registry." This Tribunal, in session No. 7707 of June 13, 1983, interpreted that when speaking, in the transcribed article, of Electoral Boards, it must be understood as Vote Receiving Boards (Juntas Receptoras de Votos), since it is only before these that the right to suffrage is exercised by the electors.
Just as suffrage is a primordial and obligatory civic function, which is exercised only before the Vote Receiving Boards (Juntas Receptoras de Votos), so too is being a member of said electoral body that facilitates or allows citizens to exercise the sacred right to vote, in addition to being honorific. Under that understanding, Article 41 of the Electoral Code, where pertinent, establishes: "The position of member of the Electoral Boards is honorific and obligatory; with the exception of Article 17, it carries attached immunity and therefore, from the appointment until the corresponding election proclamation, no member of a Board may be arrested, except if by written order of a competent judge or in the event of having been caught by the authority in flagrante delicto. (...)." For its part, Article 17 of the Electoral Code contemplates as an inescapable obligation of the board members, for whose fulfillment they cannot claim the cited immunity, that attendance at the sessions of the Electoral Boards is obligatory, and it is obligatory in such a way that the member who refuses to attend shall be brought by the public force to fulfill their functions if so requested by any of their fellow Board members, the Delegate of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, or the representative of any political party. The aforementioned numeral adds that "notwithstanding said compulsory recourse, anyone who evades compliance after having been required to appear shall incur the penalty indicated in subsection b) of Article 149"; that is, they shall be penalized with a fine of one to five base salaries, which implies a considerable pecuniary punishment for the board member who fails in their duty.
The provision under comment is fully justified, since, as has been indicated, the exercise of suffrage, the guarantor of our democratic system, can only be made effective before the Vote Receiving Boards (Juntas Receptoras de Votos), which are not an abstract concept in themselves, but are composed of diligent, responsible citizens with civic and social conscience who, precisely to guarantee their freedom of action in the delicate work entrusted to them by the legal system, are protected by the veil of immunity, which extends even beyond the day on which their fundamental work originally concludes: election day.
There is no doubt that our legislator intended to protect the members of the Electoral Boards in such a way that no exogenous element could prevent the fulfillment of their work, since the immunity they enjoy is only granted to officials who require it to exercise their function without external conditions hindering their actions, as is the case, for example, of the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic, the Deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and other members of the Supreme Branches, among other high officials of the State. Thus, our legal system aims to protect the board member in such a way that their actions are not prevented or obstructed by external threats. A superior interest exists for board members to be able to carry out their work without obstacles or threats of any kind, making said interest prevail over that of the Administration itself, should a conflict exist between them, and, with even more reason, placing it before any private interest in case of a conflict between them. (Article 113 subsections 2) and 3) of the General Law of Public Administration).
By virtue of the transcendence of suffrage in our democratic system, the legislator, seeking to ensure that every citizen has sufficient time to exercise it, provided in Article 168 of the Electoral Code that "Workers or employees may leave their work on election day, for one hour – to be designated by the superior chief – in order to cast their vote without being subject to penalty or salary reduction. (...)" (The underlining is not in the original). Said provision resolves the inconvenience that citizens who must work on election day may have. The labor legislator went even further and created an electoral provision that better guarantees the right of citizens to fulfill their civic obligation to vote, such that, thinking of the workers, subsection j) of Article 69 stipulated: "Article 69.—In addition to those contained in other articles of this Code, in its Regulations, and in its supplementary or related laws, the obligations of employers are: (...) j) To grant workers the necessary time to exercise the vote in popular elections, without salary reduction;" (The underlining is not in the original). The transcribed provision is imbued with the same philosophy that highlights the value of suffrage and the importance of the Electoral Boards, such that its spirit imposes on employers the obligation to allow both workers who are electors and those who are members of a Vote Receiving Board (Junta Receptora de Votos) to exercise the right-duty of suffrage and to facilitate said right, respectively, without penalizing the worker in any way, which also encompasses the inadmissibility of a salary reduction in any case.
Certainly, if the employer is unable to reduce the salary for the time the worker must use to travel to exercise their right to suffrage, regardless of how long this may be, with much more reason does the employer have that same impossibility with respect to their workers who, in addition to fulfilling their duty to vote, serve as members of a Vote Receiving Board (Junta Receptora de Votos), precisely facilitating the exercise of that right-duty for their fellow citizens. This collaboration that the employer provides for their employee can be considered a form of service to the Fatherland, pursuant to what is established in Article 18 of the Political Constitution. In any case, as we have already indicated, should a conflict exist between the private interest of the employer in having their worker perform the tasks of their employment to receive the corresponding salary, and the public interest in having them instead perform the duties of a member of a Vote Receiving Board (Junta Receptora de Votos) and thereby facilitate and guarantee the functioning of the electoral apparatus on the day of popular elections, we could not place said private economic interest of the employer before the much-mentioned public interest. The solidarity of the employer, before being with their collaborator, must be with the Fatherland and its system, which allow and facilitate not only developing their activity within the productive means of the country, but furthermore guarantee and protect that practice under conditions of equality, respect, and legal certainty, without which their actions would be threatened by insecurity. The foregoing is sufficient cause for the employer, regardless of the sector involved, to cooperate with the State in the electoral process by encouraging their workers to participate as members of a Vote Receiving Board (Junta Receptora de Votos), with a full guarantee that their salary will not be reduced for the time they serve as such. Especially since popular election events at the national level occur occasionally, practically every four years. Therefore, From the integration of the cited constitutional and legal provisions, this Tribunal interprets exclusively and bindingly that the content of Article 69 subsection j) of the Labor Code contemplates, among others, the obligation of employers to pay the respective salary, without any reduction, to their workers who serve as members of a Vote Receiving Board (Junta Receptora de Votos) on the day of a popular election.
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