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Res. 00306-2020 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón · Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón · 21/04/2020
OutcomeResultado
The court partially granted the appeals, vacated the entire sentence and specified criminal and civil rulings for retrial, set aside the order directed to the Municipality of Alajuela, corrected two attorney-fee awards, and left the remainder undisturbed.El Tribunal acogió parcialmente las apelaciones, anuló la totalidad de la pena y determinados extremos penales y civiles para juicio de reenvío, revocó la orden dirigida a la Municipalidad de Alajuela, corrigió dos honorarios profesionales y mantuvo incólume lo demás.
SummaryResumen
The Criminal Judgment Appeals Court decided several challenges to the criminal and civil judgment involving the Bella Vista Project. It rejected some defense claims but vacated the criminal and civil judgments concerning one victim and ordered a retrial; it also vacated, on its own motion, the conviction relating to another injured person. The court granted the Public Prosecutor’s challenge to the reasoning supporting the sentence, vacated the entire punishment imposed, and remanded that issue for fresh adjudication. It also set aside the order requiring the Municipality of Alajuela to conduct administrative proceedings concerning the project, partially accepting the defense challenge. On civil matters, it ordered several damages claims to be heard again and corrected the attorney-fee awards for the Office of Civil Defense of Victims under the decree in force when the claims were filed. All portions of the original judgment not vacated or reversed remained intact. The court further stated that any referral of records for criminal investigation must identify and substantiate the event to be investigated.El Tribunal de Apelación resolvió varios recursos contra la sentencia penal y civil relacionada con el Proyecto Bella Vista. Rechazó algunos agravios de la defensa, pero anuló la condena penal y civil respecto de una ofendida y ordenó un juicio de reenvío; además, anuló de oficio la condena correspondiente a otra persona perjudicada. Acogió el recurso del Ministerio Público por defectos en la fundamentación de la sanción, anuló toda la pena impuesta y remitió ese extremo para una nueva sustanciación. También revocó la orden dirigida a la Municipalidad de Alajuela para ejecutar procedimientos administrativos sobre el proyecto, al estimar parcialmente el reclamo defensivo. En materia civil, ordenó conocer nuevamente varias demandas, corrigió el cálculo de honorarios de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima conforme al decreto vigente cuando se presentaron las acciones y mantuvo incólumes los extremos que no fueron anulados o revocados. Asimismo, indicó que cualquier testimonio de piezas debía fundamentar el hecho que se pretendiera investigar.
Key excerptExtracto clave
2) Regarding the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The sole ground of challenge raised by the prosecution is granted. Consequently, the entire sentence imposed on defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo is vacated, and a retrial is ordered for fresh adjudication of that issue. 3) Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of Civil Defense of Victims. The first and second grounds of the appeal filed by the Office of Civil Defense of Victims are granted. (i) The judgment is partially vacated insofar as it denied the civil action brought by civil claimants [Name73] and [Name18]. Consequently, a retrial is ordered so that those civil claims brought against defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo may be heard again. 4) On the court’s own motion. This Criminal Judgment Appeals Court, on its own motion, vacates the conviction entered against defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo in connection with the acts charged to the detriment of [Name29]. The case file shall be remitted to the court of origin for fresh adjudication of the acts affecting [Name29]. The portions of the original judgment not vacated by this decision or reversed on appeal remain undisturbed.2) Del recurso interpuesto por el Ministerio Público. Se declara con lugar el único motivo de impugnación interpuesto por la Fiscalía. En consecuencia, se anula la totalidad de pena impuesta al encartado Evelio Murillo Murillo, y se ordena el juicio de reenvío para la sustanciación de ese extremo. 3) Del recurso interpuesto por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. Se declaran con lugar los motivos primero y segundo del recurso interpuesto por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. (i) Se anula parcialmente el fallo, en lo concerniente a la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil incoada por los actores civiles [Nombre73] y [Nombre18] . En consecuencia, se ordena el juicio de reenvío para que se conozca nuevamente sobre dichas demandas civiles incoadas contra el imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo. 4) De oficio. Este Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, de oficio anula la condena recaída contra el imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo, con ocasión de los hechos acusados en perjuicio de [Nombre29] . Se ordena remitir los autos ante el Tribunal de origen para una nueva sustanciación de los hechos acaecidos en perjuicio de [Nombre29] . En los aspectos no anulados en este fallo, o revocados en alzada, el fallo de instancia permanece incólume.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En otro orden de ideas, en los aspectos no anulados en este fallo, o revocados en alzada, la sentencia de instancia permanece incólume."
"In all other respects not vacated by this decision or reversed on appeal, the trial judgment remains undisturbed."
Considerando XI
"En otro orden de ideas, en los aspectos no anulados en este fallo, o revocados en alzada, la sentencia de instancia permanece incólume."
Considerando XI
"Por ello, y con ocasión del juicio de reenvío que se ordena en este fallo, deberá el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela, en caso de estimarlo necesario, fundamentar ese extremo."
"Therefore, in the retrial ordered by this decision, the Alajuela Trial Court must provide reasons for that issue if it considers the measure necessary."
Considerando XI
"Por ello, y con ocasión del juicio de reenvío que se ordena en este fallo, deberá el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela, en caso de estimarlo necesario, fundamentar ese extremo."
Considerando XI
"De este recuento, se tiene que para el 23 de marzo de 2015, ocasión en la que se interpuso la acción civil resarcitoria de los actores [Nombre23] y [Nombre46] , el decreto ejecutivo que estaba vigente era el número 36562-JP y es esta normativa la que debe ser utilizada para hacer el cálculo de los honorarios."
"It follows that on March 23, 2015, when claimants [Name23] and [Name46] filed their civil damages actions, Executive Decree No. 36562-JP was in force and is therefore the regulation that must be used to calculate the attorney fees."
Considerando sobre honorarios profesionales
"De este recuento, se tiene que para el 23 de marzo de 2015, ocasión en la que se interpuso la acción civil resarcitoria de los actores [Nombre23] y [Nombre46] , el decreto ejecutivo que estaba vigente era el número 36562-JP y es esta normativa la que debe ser utilizada para hacer el cálculo de los honorarios."
Considerando sobre honorarios profesionales
"Se revoca parcialmente el falló y se deja sin efecto, la orden que se giró a la Municipalidad de Alajuela."
"The judgment is partially reversed, and the order issued to the Municipality of Alajuela is set aside."
Por tanto, apartado 1(ii)
"Se revoca parcialmente el falló y se deja sin efecto, la orden que se giró a la Municipalidad de Alajuela."
Por tanto, apartado 1(ii)
Full documentDocumento completo
JUDICIAL BRANCH COURT OF APPEAL OF JUDGMENTS OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN Tel: 2456-9069 [...]@ Fax: 24569029 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Decision No.: 2020-00306 COURT OF APPEAL OF JUDGMENTS OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, FIRST SECTION. San Ramón, at fourteen hours and twenty-five minutes on the twenty-first of April, two thousand twenty.
APPEAL OF JUDGMENT filed in these proceedings against EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO, Costa Rican, identity document number CED1, for the offense of [Nombre2] AGAINST A MINOR AND AN ADULT, to the detriment of [Nombre3] AND OTHERS. Judges Adriana Escalante Moncada, Ana Lucrecia Hernández Chavarría, and José Alberto Rojas Chacón participated in deciding the appeal. Licenciado Adrián Rojas Rodríguez appeared in the appeal of judgment in his capacity as attorney for the Victim’s Civil Defense Office, and licenciados Jorge Enrique Gonzalo Villalobos and Luis Diego Salazar Gonzalo appeared as privately retained defense counsel for the accused, Evelio Murillo Murillo. The representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, licenciada Edith Morera Rodríguez, also appeared.
WHEREAS:
As personal costs (costas personales), the civil defendant shall pay to the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima the sum of ONE MILLION SIXTY THOUSAND COLONES NET (1,060.000.00), in its capacity as counsel for the Civil Action (Acción Civil).
Appellate Judge Escalante Moncada delivers the opinion; and,
CONSIDERING:
I.Defense counsel Jorge Enrique González Villalobos and Luis Diego Salazar filed an appeal against judgment number 980-2018, issued by the Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela. Attorney Adrián Rojas Rodríguez, in his capacity as counsel for the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Victima, also appealed, as did prosecutor Edith Morera on behalf of the Ministerio Público.
II.For the proper resolution of the various appeals filed, they shall be addressed in the following order. First, the claims raised by defense counsel concerning the criminal liability (responsabilidad penal) of defendant Evelio Murillo shall be addressed. Next, the challenge filed by the Ministerio Público, which objects to the grounds stated for the sentence (fundamentación de la pena), shall be resolved. Thereafter, the claims raised by defense counsel concerning the civil judgment (condena civil) shall be heard. Finally, the challenge filed by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima shall be heard.
SECTION I. APPEALS FILED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO.
III.Appeal by defense counsel against the criminal conviction. By judgment 980-2018, the Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela found defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo criminally responsible as the perpetrator of several offenses of [Nombre2] and, in that capacity, imposed a total sentence of three years’ imprisonment, as readjusted through application of the rules governing real concurrence of offenses (concurso material de delitos). Because of that conviction, defense counsel challenge the lower court’s judgment and raise several grounds for appeal (motivos de apelación), which, for proper resolution, are organized and numbered as follows. First ground. In this claim, the appellants raise several objections, summarized as follows: (i) They challenge the assessment of the evidence (valoración de la prueba), because the lower court’s panel of judges found the victims credible. They state that the Tribunal de Juicio did not conduct a rigorous analysis of each witness, but merely repeated what each witness stated during the trial stage (fase plenaria), thereby violating the rules of sound judicial reasoning (sana crítica).
They explain that, when analyzing the statements of [Nombre19], [Nombre57] and [Nombre20], [Nombre45], [Nombre27], [Nombre28], Leader [Nombre30], [Nombre34], [Nombre35], [Nombre18], [Nombre37], [Nombre40], [Nombre41] and [Nombre42], the panel of judges used the same refrain to validate these witnesses, stating that they testified clearly, simply, and coherently, without displaying any intention to lie or harm the accused. They contend that this type of reasoning is insufficient because it does not explain why the witnesses were found credible. In support of their position, they cite decision number 43-2018 of this appellate Chamber and assert that the parameters established in that decision for assessing testimonial evidence were not applied by the Tribunal de Juicio. They state that the judgment merely describes the judges’ impressions of each witness, without setting forth the reasons why they found them credible.
They argue that these accounts conflict with the contracts signed by each injured party and with the attorneys’ testimony, but that the trial judges did not assess those contradictions. (ii) They state that one of the matters challenged during the adversarial proceedings (contradictorio) was the alleged promise made by the defendant to offer the victims an urban development project, a fact charged by the Ministerio Público and found proven by the Tribunal de Juicio. They say that one disputed issue concerned water and electricity services. They assert that the defendant informed the victims that they would have to obtain water from the water connection serving the parent property (finca madre) and that, with respect to electricity service, each of them would have to arrange it with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. They criticize the conclusion that, although the injured parties are socially and academically disadvantaged and have limited ability to express themselves, those circumstances cannot constitute sufficient grounds for finding them credible, since such persons can also be untruthful.
They further assert that defendant Evelio Murillo did not offer the victims an urban development project, but rather that each of them was responsible for carrying out their own construction. They state that another essential issue concerned building permits (permisos de construcción). On this point, each witness stated that the defendant told them they could build and that other people had done so without the corresponding permits. They criticize the lower court judges’ acceptance of this version without any objection, which they contend violates the rules of human understanding (reglas del entendimiento humano). In support of this claim, the appellants transcribe excerpts from the testimony of each injured party and then assert that the witnesses’ accounts share a common factor: they stated that, when they purchased the lot, there were no basic services such as electricity, water, or roads, or any of the other infrastructure required for an urban development project.
They argue that the injured parties knew there was no water or electricity and that no housing development was being offered, and that they accepted the sale of the lot under those conditions. They criticize the fact that, despite the victims’ accounts, the Court concluded that the defendant offered them an urban development project in connection with the sale of the lots. They state that the error in the judgment consists of finding the fact charged by the Ministerio Público proven and asserting that the defendant offered the victims an urban development project even though the property had no roads, sidewalks, water service, or electricity service, all of which form part of the infrastructure for this type of project. They state that the Tribunal de Juicio failed to assess these matters and instead blindly believed each victim. They argue that, if the defendant offered them an urban development project but it did not exist when they arrived at the site, then why did they purchase the lot?
They state that the answer is simple: because of the favorable payment terms and the opportunity to avoid compliance with building-permit requirements, among other reasons, but not because of the alleged scheme (ardid) that the adjudicating body found proven, consisting of the offer of an urban development project. (iii) They explain that one of the issues discussed during the trial stage was the price of the lots because, according to the indictment (acusación), part of the scheme carried out by the defendant consisted of offering lots at below-market prices and with low monthly installments, circumstances that the lower Chamber found proven. They state that, in the defense’s view, this reasoning lacks evidentiary support because the market price was not established. They explain that the Court itself acknowledges that there is no evidence on that point, such as expert reports (peritajes) or notarial records (actas notariales), but that, to establish it, the court a quo referred to the favorable payment terms, which bear no relation to the element that allegedly formed part of the scheme described in the indictment.
(iv) They assert that there was no economic loss (perjuicio económico) in this case because, upon purchasing the lot, each injured party became a co-owner and, therefore, suffered no pecuniary loss (perjuicio patrimonial). In support of this point, they cite Sala Tercera decision number 580-1996, which establishes the principle of offsetting gain against loss (principio de compensación del lucro con el daño). They note that, in this case, each injured party became the owner of an interest in [Dirección2] in the province of Alajuela. They explain that contracts have the force of law between the parties and that each injured party therefore owns an interest that may be specifically located by a civil judge according to the amount paid and the area purchased by each of them, as well as the location each person selected for construction; they therefore consider that no unlawful economic loss occurred.
They state that, in this case, there was a perfected sale (compraventa perfecta), regardless of the name given to the contract, and that title was therefore transferred, to the point that the injured parties mortgaged their lots even though those contracts were not executed by public deed (escritura pública). They say that, in this case, the mortgages are void because they were not executed by public deeds and that, if the victims owed money to the defendant, the debt would have to be collected in ordinary civil proceedings (juicio ordinario). Likewise, if the victims require the accused to provide them with a public deed, they may apply to the civil judge for the compelled execution (firma forzosa) of that document. (v) They explain that, beginning at folio 4753 of the judgment, the Court analyzes the contracts signed by each injured party and concludes that a perfected sale, rather than an option to purchase (opción de venta), existed between the victims and Tecrem S.A, and that the aggrieved parties were therefore sold an interest in [Dirección3].
The appellants maintain that the judgment is contradictory because, on the one hand, it states that each injured party acquired an interest in that property but, on the other, it categorically states that the victims would never obtain ownership of the lot they purchased. They consider these two premises mutually exclusive and incapable of coexisting, and therefore contend that the judgment is contradictory. They state that the Court’s assertion is untrue because, in this case, some people hold public deeds to their lots, including [Nombre58], who testified about that circumstance during the trial stage. They state that another error in the judgment concerns the injured parties who never contracted directly with the defendant. They explain that several injured parties negotiated not with the defendant but with third parties and that, by the time the contracts were executed, those persons had already formed the intention to acquire the lot; consequently, there was no deception (engaño) by the defendants.
They therefore consider that judgments of acquittal (sentencias absolutorias) should have been entered in the cases of victims [Nombre44], [Nombre3], [Nombre25], [Nombre32], [Nombre33], [Nombre36] and [Nombre39]. The appellants then recount the testimony of each of these victims, who, according to their theory, admitted that they negotiated for the lot with a third party and merely signed the corresponding contract with the accused so that they could continue paying the monthly installments on the lot. They state that, in this case, judgments of acquittal were entered with respect to other victims who also negotiated with third parties and that acquittals should therefore have been entered on these other counts as well because there was no deception by the defendant. They add that the cases involving Ms. [Nombre33] and Ms. [Nombre39] were conflated in the judgment of conviction (sentencia condenatoria), because the testimony of one witness was used to support the conviction relating to the other victim’s case, as confirmed by reviewing folios 4821, 4822, 4851 and 4551.
In the second ground, they allege failure to observe the in dubio pro reo principle. They argue that the Tribunal de Juicio rejected the accused’s statement and instead found the injured parties credible when they asserted that defendant Evelio Murillo had promised them an urban development project. They object that the defense evidence (prueba de descargo) was analyzed only cursorily, including the attorneys’ testimony regarding the contracts they endorsed, as well as the testimony of other persons who live in the area and are the registered owners of an interest derived from the property at issue in this litigation. They explain that the Tribunal de Juicio did not compare Evelio Murillo’s account with certain contracts whose eighth clause provides: “Eighth: TECREM S.A is not responsible for grading and paving public roads or for supplying water or electricity service. TECREM S.A undertakes only to grade the roads with a tractor” (verbatim copy of the argument).
They state that, although the Tribunal de Juicio found attorneys Hazel Víquez Alvarado and Doris Céspedes Elizondo not credible (folios 4709 et seq.), those individuals explained that they read and explained the document to each injured party who signed a contract and that, although they did not ask whether those persons could read or write, those persons likewise did not state that they were unable to do so. They say that these attorneys’ statements absolve defendant Evelio Murillo of liability because the attorneys explained the property’s actual circumstances to the injured parties. They object to the Tribunal de Juicio’s decision to discredit the accounts given by witnesses [Nombre59], [Nombre60], and [Nombre61] on the ground that those persons’ cases differed from those of the other injured parties. It was further stated that those persons testified only about their own contracts and the transactions they entered into with the defendant, without referring to the cases of the other injured parties.
They argue that, had the defense evidence been properly weighed, this testimony would indeed have been relevant because it contradicts the complainants’ version of events; moreover, these statements support the defense theory, since the purchasers were informed of the actual situation of the property. To support this objection, the appellants transcribe excerpts from the statements of the defense witnesses. In the third ground of appeal (identified in the appeal as the first ground on the merits), the appellants claim that the substantive law was improperly applied. They criticize the Trial Court for finding that the prosecution brought by the Public Prosecutor’s Office had been proven. They state that, in each case resulting in a conviction, the Trial Court failed to consider the “principle of offsetting profit against damage” (verbatim copy from folio 4944), because they believe that when each injured party entered into the contract, whether oral or written, they completed a sale and became co-owners of right 001 in property recorded under real-property folio 096824-001 in the province of Alajuela.
They state that the offense of [Nombre2] requires financial loss, but that in this case there was no impairment of assets, since the agreement made each injured party a co-owner; therefore, the objective elements of the statutory definition of fraud (estafa), such as deceit, error, disposition of assets, and loss, were not established. They assert that, in this case, each of the lots sold can be located through the appropriate proceedings before the civil judge. Likewise, they argue that the mortgages granted by the injured parties in favor of the defendant are null and void because they were not executed by public instrument (escritura pública); accordingly, if the injured parties owed money to the defendant, he would have to bring an ordinary civil action (juicio ordinario). Furthermore, if the injured parties require a public instrument and the defendant does not execute it, they may seek specific performance (ejecución forzosa) before the competent civil judge.
They state that “the means of correcting the problem arising from contracts that were erroneously characterized but whose contents are truthful is a matter for another jurisdiction or for the parties’ consent.” (Verbatim copy from folio 4946). They state that, in Considerando V, entitled civil consequences, the lower court ordered the contracts annulled. They assert that the harm to the injured parties will materialize if that decision becomes final, since the victims will be left without any real property right in their assets and will have no evidence with which to claim co-ownership. They add that, during closing arguments, the absence of the element of financial loss was raised, but despite that argument, the panel of lower-court judges chose to find a breach of contract (incumplimiento contractual). They state that although the defense advanced the breach-of-contract theory during closing arguments, the judgment did not address the relief requested by the defense on that occasion.
They explain that, in the case of a breach of contract, the agreement is not performed because of causes or circumstances arising after the contract is entered into. By contrast, in the case of fraud, the defining characteristic is that, from the outset of the negotiations, the accused person had no intention of performing as agreed in the contract. They state that even if the Trial Court’s position—that the defendant offered the injured parties a residential development—were accepted, the fact remains that each of these persons acquired a lot and built a home, and therefore no loss can be said to have occurred. Moreover, because the judgment ordered the Municipalidad de Alajuela to intervene, that circumstance would negate the commission of the offense of fraud. They point out that Article 35 of Ley de Planificación Urbana número 4240 del 1 de noviembre de 1968 permits the parties to seek rescission and civil damages in civil court; they therefore contend that these proceedings should have been heard in that other forum rather than in criminal court.
In the fourth ground of appeal (identified in the appeal as the second ground on the merits), they maintain that, during closing arguments, it was asserted that their client had acted under a mistake of law (error de prohibición), because he acted on the advice of several legal professionals who drafted and endorsed the contracts. They state that the Trial Court expressed no opinion concerning that defense theory. They add that, in the judgment, the Trial Court acknowledged the defendant Evelio Murillo’s limited education, but nevertheless found him criminally liable because of his intelligence and aptitude for business. They explain that, in this case, the defendant Evelio Murillo was advised by an attorney and therefore could not be expected to know the procedure and requirements for the segregation of lots (segregación de lotes), such as a cadastral plan (plano catastrado) and the corresponding municipal approvals (visados municipales).
They state that the defendant’s intention was to sell lots through undivided ownership interests and that it was the professionals’ duty to advise the parties who retained their services. They emphasize that the defendant testified that he conducted the negotiations in good faith and that, at the time, he had no knowledge whatsoever concerning the sale of land. To support this claim, the appellants transcribe part of the accused’s testimony, concluding that their client acted on the advice of attorneys, that the accused had no knowledge of this type of transaction, and that it was the legal professional’s duty to warn him about the circumstances inherent in transactions of this kind. They state that, in exercising his right to present a personal defense (defensa material), the defendant testified that he had always intended to sell lots through undivided ownership interests so that persons without access to bank credit or housing subsidies could build a home. They conclude by stating that, in this case, the offense of fraud was not established and that application of Article 35 of the Criminal Code should be considered.
That said, having established this other point, with regard to the proven facts, the Trial Chamber also found it established that the offer made by the accused was fraudulent because, on the property in question, it was not feasible to subdivide (segregar) the lots sold to the injured parties, since the areas comprising each unit were smaller than permitted under the zoning plan (plan regulador) of the Municipalidad de Alajuela for the area where property CED3 is located. This was established through expert report 1540-ING-2013, as well as official communication MA-PPCCI-817-2013, issued by the Municipalidad de Alajuela. These documents explain that the zoning plan for that sector permits only lots larger than six hundred square meters, as well as ten houses per hectare of land. This point was also established through the testimony of Roy Delgado Alpízar, an engineer with the Municipalidad de Alajuela, who explained the zoning plan applicable in that area and the dimensions that the lots must have.
Based on this evidence, the lower court established the scheme (ardid) employed by the defendant, which consisted of offering lots for the construction of homes and representing that, upon completion of the payment plan, the injured parties would have a subdivided lot duly registered with the Registro Nacional. As correctly explained in the challenged judgment, the defendant used this scheme to attract a large number of buyers who, influenced by the ease of payment offered under the financing plan, agreed to purchase a lot in that project. Another argument raised by defense counsel is that the defendant did not offer the victims water and electricity services and that, for this reason, the offense of fraud (estafa) could not be deemed established. On this point, it must be noted that defense counsel attempt to dissect the scheme carried out by the defendant, which was not limited to offering lots suitable for building homes.
More importantly, the essential deception consisted of leading the victims to believe that, once the payment plan had been completed, the lot they were purchasing would be subdivided and registered in each victim’s name with the Registro Nacional. As stated above, this scheme is apparent from the injured parties’ testimony, as well as from the contract itself that the accused signed with the various victims, which specifies that they were being sold a lot and that, upon completion of the payment plan, the company would execute the corresponding deed. This was fictitious because those parcels could not be subdivided due to the limitations imposed by the zoning plan issued by the Municipalidad de Alajuela, under which only lots measuring six hundred square meters or more may be subdivided. In addition, the issue concerning the accused’s offer of public electricity and water services was addressed generally by the injured parties during the plenary stage (fase plenaria).
In this regard, the injured parties who purchased the first lots stated that the defendant told them that water would be supplied from an existing water connection (paja de agua) on the parent property (finca madre). To that end, the people who came to live on the property had to organize themselves, and potable water service was supplied according to a schedule for each of the areas comprising the housing project. In this respect, see the testimony of [Nombre64] , [Nombre59] and [Nombre34] (see summary of evidence at pages 4644, 4678, 4616, respectively), among others. The testimonial evidence even shows that the accused subsequently constructed a water well to provide that service to the people living there, which demonstrates the truthfulness of the victims’ accounts that the defendant told them the project would have water and electricity services. It should be specified here that, upon reviewing the testimonial evidence, this Court of Appeal counted a total of fourteen injured parties who stated that the defendant offered them water and electricity services.
In addition, three other victims stated that the person on trial told them that the place would be like a residential development (urbanización), meaning that it would have those public services; in this regard, see the testimony of [Nombre3] , [Nombre27] and [Nombre32] . Likewise, a consistent feature of the affected persons’ testimony was that the defendant told them that, upon completion of the payment plan, they would receive a deed granting them ownership of the land. Furthermore, the existence of a housing project was supported by the photographs in the case file showing the existence of the homes and the current conditions of the settlement, together with the on-site inspection conducted by the lower court. This review of the body of evidence and the reasoning set forth by the court below (a quo) allows this Court of Appeal to conclude that the lower court’s judgment properly supports the finding that the defendant offered each victim not only the sale of a lot, but also a project that would have water and electricity services, while concealing from them the legal status of the land and the impossibility of subdividing the lots sold.
Based on the foregoing, this Court of Criminal Appeals has no doubt that the evidence gathered during the plenary stage clearly demonstrates the scheme carried out by the defendant and that, contrary to the defense’s contention, this case does not involve a mere breach of contract, but rather deception duly perpetrated by the defendant. Although he knew that he had not obtained the corresponding land-development authorizations and permits (autorizaciones y permisos urbanísticos) from the state agencies and the municipal government of Alajuela, he proceeded to publicly offer lots for sale so that people could build their homes, knowing that the land he was offering ultimately could neither be subdivided nor registered with the Registro Nacional because he lacked the permits and authorizations required for every land-development project (proyecto urbanístico). It must likewise be emphasized that another proven fact was that, although the defendant offered the victims ownership of a lot, the contracts reflected a different and deceptive legal arrangement: they stated that what he was selling them was an interest in the property in question.
This issue will be discussed further below. At this point, it is necessary to state that all the objective and subjective elements of the criminal offense of fraud are present in this case, since it was established that the accused carried out a scheme through which he induced the injured parties into error, causing them to make a detrimental disposition of assets (disposición patrimonial), with the resulting unlawful financial benefit to the accused. Consequently, for the reasons stated, this argument must be rejected. Argument (i) of the first ground. On this point, defense counsel state that the Trial Court did not examine each statement but instead generically found the victims credible, using formulaic phrases such as that their testimony was clear and consistent. The claim is without merit. In this regard, an analysis of the judgment shows that the defense is incorrect. In support of the conviction, the panel of judges examined the victims’ statements, which are detailed from page 4725 through 4834 (except for the testimony of [Nombre33] , which will be examined when addressing argument number (v) of the first ground), as well as the testimony of several witnesses.
In each case, it assessed not only the consistency of those accounts but also compared them against the documentary evidence, and it was through that combined assessment that the Trial Court reached its conclusion regarding the truthfulness and reliability of that testimony. Thus, in the case of the injured party [Nombre19] , the Trial Court weighed both his testimony at trial and what he had stated when filing the complaint. That account was likewise supported by other documentary evidence, such as the contract the injured party signed with the defendant Evelio Murillo and the receipts submitted by the victim in the proceedings, which document the disposition of assets he made. In the case of the injured parties [Nombre57] and [Nombre20] , both surnamed [Nombre20] , the Trial Court found them credible based both on the consistency between their testimony and on its assessment of the documentary evidence, namely, the contract that the aggrieved parties signed with the accused and the receipts documenting the victims’ delivery of money to the defendant Murillo Murillo.
In the case of the injured party [Nombre44] , the Trial Chamber’s finding that her testimony was credible and reliable was likewise based on the consistency between what she testified to at trial and what she had stated when filing the complaint, as well as on the support her testimony found in the contract she entered into with the defendant and the bank-deposit documents recording the injured party’s transfer of money to the accused Evelio Murillo. Using this same method of evaluating the evidence, which consisted of comparing each injured party’s testimony against the statements in the complaint and the documentation relating to the contract and payment records, the Court examined the testimony of [Nombre45] , [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] , [Nombre65] , [Nombre24] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre26] , [Nombre54] , Leader [Nombre30] , [Nombre31] , [Nombre32] , [Nombre34] , [Nombre35] , [Nombre37] , [Nombre38] and [Nombre40] .
In these cases, the reliability of the injured parties’ accounts rested not only on the versions they provided; their accounts were also corroborated by the documentary evidence, consisting of money receipts, bank-deposit slips, and the contracts each of them signed with the person on trial. The court’s reasoned analysis (análisis intelectivo) further shows that, with respect to the offenses committed against [Nombre42] , [Nombre46] , [Nombre39] , [Nombre43] , [Nombre41] , [Nombre36] and [Nombre33] , the Court took into consideration that, although these victims did not sign a contract with the defendant for the sale of the lot in question, their accounts were supported by the existence of an oral agreement corroborated by the money receipts and bank deposits that each injured party submitted as evidence in the case file and that were detailed in the reasoned analysis of the evidence. Likewise, with respect to the victim [Nombre25] , the Court found her credible not only because of the consistency of her account, but also because [Nombre66] testified during the plenary stage and consistently described the offer made by the defendant and the disposition of assets made by the injured party [Nombre25] .
Moreover, that testimony was supported by the money receipts and bank deposits submitted by the victims, which establish the disposition of assets. A similar situation arose in the reasoned analysis conducted in the case of [Nombre28] , regarding whom the Trial Court also explained that, although that person did not have a written contract, an oral transaction did exist and was demonstrated by the proof of payment submitted by the victim when filing the complaint. It was further supported by the complaint filed by the injured party [Nombre67] , who, on that occasion, reported the details of the defendant’s offer to sell a lot.
Additionally, it must be taken into consideration that there is another factor that served as a criterion for establishing the reliability of those accounts: when those statements are assessed jointly, the injured parties (ofendidos) are consistent with one another in stating that the defendant offered them lots for sale that would have basic water and electricity services and that, ultimately, each injured party would own his or her land. In summary, it is concluded that the appellant’s assertion that the Trial Court did not assess in detail the statements of the various victims is incorrect. For the foregoing reasons, this claim must be denied. Argument (iii) of the first ground of appeal. In this challenge, defense counsel assert that it was not proven that the lots sold had a value below market value. The ground is denied. In this regard, defense counsel once again attempt to dissect the scheme (ardid) carried out by the defendant, stating that it was not proven that the sale price of the lots was markedly lower than market value.
On this point, although the Trial Court found this matter proven based on the accounts given by each injured party, insofar as they detailed the price agreed upon for the sale of the lot—an amount that was even recorded in each of the contracts signed by the victims or in the receipts for payment—the fact remains that, under the principle of freedom of evidence (principio de libertad probatoria), the Trial Court was entitled to assess the information provided by the victims and, based on those data, determine that the amount was below market value. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to the injured parties’ accounts, the price of a lot ranged from six to eighteen million colones, depending on the size of each parcel, and there is no objective parameter by which a fixed amount per square meter could be determined; rather, in every case, the price was set by the accused. Therefore, given the variability of the prices, the Trial Court correctly concluded, based on the maxims of experience (máximas de la experiencia), that the offered price was below that prevailing in the real-estate development market.
Additionally, even if the finding that the lots sold were priced below the real-estate market were removed from the judgment, that circumstance would in no way undermine the scheme carried out by the defendant. That scheme went beyond offering lots at an attractive price and with an affordable financing plan—factual circumstances that also formed part of the deception carried out by the accused. Rather, as stated above, the essential scheme consisted of publicly offering lots for sale in a real-estate development project, with full knowledge that the necessary national and municipal permits for a project of that magnitude had not been obtained and that, consequently, the lots could not be subdivided (segregados) in favor of each injured party. Arguments (iv) and (v) of the first ground. In these two arguments, defense counsel state that there was no financial loss because the injured parties own an interest and, by virtue of that status, could not have suffered financial loss.
As to this challenge, the claim is denied. Here, defense counsel attempt to invoke matters unrelated to the facts adjudicated, because, as extensively explained in the lower-court judgment, the lot that the defendant sold to each injured party cannot be subdivided and therefore cannot be recorded in the Registro Nacional, since each lot measures less than six hundred meters, which precludes its subdivision and registration in the Registro Nacional. This is compounded by the fact that the lot-sale project was undertaken without complying with all the requirements imposed by the legislation governing urban-development matters, which constitutes another impediment to the victims eventually owning land registered in their names. The impossibility of subdividing and registering those parcels demonstrates the financial harm caused to each injured party, regardless of whether the victims currently hold a possessory interest (derecho de posesión) in that real property.
Here, defense counsel refer to the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno (principio de compensación del lucro), which was discussed by the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in decision number 580-1996. Under that principle, in offenses of [Nombre2], there must be a loss resulting from a disposition of assets (disposición patrimonial), and therefore a reduction in the victim’s assets must be established; if, as a direct consequence of the act of disposition, the victim’s assets remain unchanged or increase, the offense of [Nombre2] is not established because no loss existed, due to the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno. This defense theory is inadmissible because, as correctly explained in the challenged judgment, each injured party made a disposition of assets, reflected in the monthly payments agreed upon with the defendant for the purchase of a lot that, from a legal standpoint, cannot be registered as an independent property.
Accordingly, the cited principle of compensatio lucri cum damno does not apply to this case. Likewise, in the appeal, defense counsel insist that the victims own an interest in the property belonging to Tecrem and that, consequently, there is no financial loss and the offense of fraud (estafa) is therefore not established. This theory is inadmissible because it rests on a distorted view of the proven facts: the victims were not offered an unlocated undivided interest (derecho indiviso no localizado) in real property. Instead, through deception, the accused offered to sell them a lot of which they would acquire ownership after making the various monthly payments, and they would then receive the corresponding deed. Both the Trial Court and this Court of Appeal are satisfied that the manner in which the contracts were drafted formed part of the deception, since those documents were used solely to give an appearance of legality to an unlawful situation. This issue will be revisited and discussed more fully when the second ground of appeal is resolved.
Returning to the argument that the injured parties own an interest and that the victims therefore suffered no financial loss, it must be emphasized that this issue warrants particular attention for the following reason. According to defense counsel, no financial loss whatsoever occurred in these proceedings because, under the contracts signed by the accused and the injured parties, the latter own an interest. This argument is fallacious for the following reason. During the proceedings, it was established that Tecrem S.A owns an interest in property number CED5, which is identified by number CED6. In other words, Tecrem owns an interest in the aforementioned parcel and is not the sole owner of the entire property. This type of legal situation is governed by article 270 of the Código Civil, which provides that when a thing simultaneously belongs to two or more persons, the owners jointly exercise all the rights of a sole owner in proportion to each person’s share of the commonly owned property.
A co-owner (condueño) may not, however, dispose of a specific portion of the thing unless that portion has first been awarded to that co-owner in the corresponding partition. This statutory provision is significant in these proceedings because the Law prevents the owner of an interest in an asset from selling or disposing of a specific portion without first completing the corresponding process for the partition and location of that interest (división y localización de su derecho). It may therefore be concluded that defense counsel’s contention that the defendant legitimately and in good faith transferred an interest in the property to the victims is fallacious, because, from a legal standpoint, the accused was not entitled to sell specific portions of that real property. Furthermore, the fact that the contracts stated that what was being sold was an interest in the aforementioned property reveals even more clearly the scheme carried out by the accused, since he told the various injured parties at all times that he was selling each of them an individually identified parcel; instead, this document was used to create the appearance that the transaction was legitimate and consistent with the legal system.
Likewise, each injured party explained that, when entering into the transaction with the accused, they were offered ownership of an independent lot, and that is what they understood they were acquiring: namely, a property consisting of land that they would own after making the various payments and for which they would receive the corresponding public deed (escritura pública).
It must also be stated that defense counsel’s assertion that no financial loss exists because the individuals may appear before a civil judge to pursue the procedure for locating an undivided interest (localización de un derecho indiviso) is fallacious. This argument is invalid because, for a person to pursue the proceeding described in the Ley sobre localización de derechos indivisos number 2755, the claimant must have an interest in a property registered in the Registro Nacional. That circumstance is absent here because none of the injured parties has an interest in the aforementioned property registered in the Registro Nacional. Furthermore, the private contract signed by the parties does not satisfy the requirements established by our legislation for registration in the Registro Nacional as an independent property, in addition to the fact that the document forms part of the fraud devised by the accused to give that fraudulent transaction an appearance of legality.
Along the same lines, the affected parties likewise could not bring a civil action to enforce the obligations agreed upon in the contract, because civil law is governed by the principle that every obligation must have a lawful cause (causa lícita). In this regard, article 631 of the Código Civil provides that an obligation whose subject matter is a thing or act that is physically or legally impossible is ineffective. This article further provides that obligations arising from acts contrary to law are also ineffective. In this case, it has been demonstrated that what the accused agreed to provide to the injured parties under the contract is contrary to the legal system, not only because he was legally unable to subdivide an unlocated undivided interest (article 270 and 1101 of the Código Civil), but also because it has been demonstrated that the accused offered a large number of lots for sale without having obtained the required national and municipal permits and that, given the dimensions of the various parcels, they cannot be subdivided as independent properties. The appellants’ assertion that the victims may apply to the civil courts to obtain the corresponding deed is therefore incorrect. For the foregoing reasons, this challenge is denied.
In argument (v) of the first ground, defense counsel raise two additional claims. First, they state that, in the cases of the injured parties [Nombre44] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre25] , [Nombre32] , [Nombre33] , [Nombre36] and [Nombre39] , an acquittal should have been entered because those individuals did not negotiate directly with the defendant Evelio Murillo, but instead agreed upon the sale with a third party. They also contend that there is an error in the statement of reasons (fundamentación) concerning the facts related to [Nombre39] and [Nombre33] , because those individuals’ statements were conflated. This claim is granted in part, on the terms set forth below.
With respect to the victims (ofendidas) [Nombre44], [Nombre3], [Nombre25], [Nombre32], [Nombre33], and [Nombre36], the appellants begin from a biased analysis of the evidence and the court’s reasoned assessment (fundamentación intelectiva). An analysis of the judgment shows that it explains that, although the victim [Nombre44] initially negotiated the acquisition of her lot with Ms. Leonora Hernández, the fact is that she was referred to speak with the defendant (imputado), Evelio Murillo, before whom she was required to formalize the sale of that lot. Thus, the victim entered into negotiations with the accused (acusado), Murillo Murillo, during which he offered that land to her for sale, concealing the property’s true situation from her and, instead, telling her that once she completed the payment plan, she would obtain title to that lot. In other words, as in the remaining cases, the accused induced the victim into error so that she would make a financial decision detrimental to herself.
In the case of the victims [Nombre3], [Nombre25], and [Nombre32], the reasoned assessment and summary of evidence (sumario de prueba) show that they negotiated the sale of the lot in question directly with the defendant, and therefore the defense’s argument lacks merit. As for the victim [Nombre36], the appellants are likewise incorrect because, although she acquired a lot for which another person had paid the first monthly installment, as clearly explained in her account (see summary of evidence beginning on the reverse of folio 4599), she subsequently negotiated the purchase of that lot directly with the defendant and paid him the monthly installments for the sale of that land. This brief reference to what each of these victims recounted demonstrates that the appellants’ argument is unfounded. The appellants are correct, however, regarding the reasoned assessment used in the case of the victim [Nombre33].
In this regard, the record shows that, during the plenary phase (fase plenaria), on 4 de setiembre de 2018, Ms. Lidia María Jurado Mendoza testified, as shown by audiovisual recording CED7. Subsequently, on 05 de setiembre de 2018, the victim [Nombre33] testified, as reflected in audiovisual recording number CED8. A review of the trial records (actas de debate) at folios 4249 and 4250 shows that they erroneously stated that the victim [Nombre33] testified on 4 de setiembre and that the victim [Nombre39] did so on 05 de setiembre. Although the audiovisual recordings containing both victims’ testimony are available, the summary of evidence omitted any summary of Ms. [Nombre33]’s testimony. This is so because the summary of evidence for [Nombre39] appears at folio 4538 and is repeated at folio 4544. In addition, this Chamber reviewed both audiovisual recordings and notes that the summary appearing in the summary of evidence at folios 4538 and 4544 does not correspond to [Nombre33]’s testimony, but rather to that of the victim [Nombre39].
This error in the summary of evidence led the Panel of Judges (Colegio de Jueces) to use [Nombre39]’s testimony as the basis for the conviction (condenatoria) entered in the case of the victim [Nombre33], as reflected beginning at folio 4787. It must be clarified here that the reasoned assessment corresponding to the case of the victim [Nombre39], appearing at folios 4815 through 4819, is correct, because it weighed her trial testimony, and the documents examined correspond to the receipts for the payments she made. It follows from the foregoing that the appropriate course is to vacate the conviction entered against the defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo in the case of the victim [Nombre33] and order a retrial (juicio de reenvío) for new proceedings.
The second ground. Having examined the appellants’ claims, the Court concludes that they are without merit for the following reasons. In this section, defense counsel return to the argument that the defendant did not offer the victims a housing development, an issue already addressed by this Chamber when considering the second argument raised under the first ground; the parties are therefore referred to what was stated there. It is also alleged that neither the defense theory nor the defense evidence (prueba de descargo) was assessed. An examination of the ruling, however, shows that it weighed both the defendant’s statement and the accounts given by attorneys Hazel Víquez Alvarado and Doris Céspedes, and no errors are apparent in that analysis that would invalidate the assessment made by the trial court (Tribunal de instancia). In this regard, it is sufficient to examine recital IV (considerando IV) of the challenged ruling, entitled “analysis of the defense evidence” (see beginning at folio 4834), to conclude that both the defense theory and the evidence offered by the defense were indeed analyzed, and no errors are apparent that would invalidate either the assessment of that evidence or the conclusions reached by the trial-level Chamber.
As the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) correctly stated, the defendant’s statement was limited to recounting what he had agreed upon with each victim and the difficulties he encountered with each of them; however, that statement was not sufficiently persuasive to rebut the conclusion that, in this case, the defendant employed a fraudulent scheme (ardid) when selling the lots in question to the victims. As for the testimony of the aforementioned attorneys, the Court finds that the Trial Court gave it less credibility because they distanced themselves from any potential professional liability, stating that they had merely authenticated the signatures on those contracts, whose terms had been established by the accused, and that their sole function was to express those terms in legal language. Nevertheless, as the ruling correctly explains, those attorneys had extensive experience in notarial and registry matters and therefore should have known that the document’s contents were contrary to the legal system.
In addition, both professionals stated that they were unfamiliar with the procedures required to subdivide (segregar) a lot, an assertion inconsistent with the rules of experience (reglas de la experiencia), because the witnesses hold law degrees and are also notaries; accordingly, their stated lack of knowledge of those procedures revealed a deferential attitude toward the accused and his defense theory. This Court of Appeal of the Judgment (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia) finds valid the reasoning used by the court below (a quo) to discount that defense evidence. Indeed, a review of both attorneys’ testimony shows that they avoided any form of professional responsibility they might bear for participating in those negotiations. Furthermore, the witnesses evidently attempted to evade their duties as notaries, particularly their duty to provide objective advice to the parties to a legal transaction (negocio jurídico).
That did not occur here because, as the victims stated, they did not understand the contents of the document and, instead, believed that because a legal professional had participated, the agreement complied with the legal system. It should also be noted that, from the beginning of its reasoned assessment, the Trial Court explained why that contract was invalid and determined that the document had instead been used to conceal the deception carried out by the defendant. On this point, it should be emphasized that the trial ruling established that the victims had limited financial resources and little formal education and that the defendant took advantage of those circumstances to carry out his fraudulent scheme. The Trial Court’s decision to discount the defense evidence therefore accords with the rules of sound judicial reasoning (reglas de la sana crítica). Regarding the other defense evidence, the trial-level Chamber also weighed the testimony of [Nombre59], [Nombre60], and [Nombre68].
As correctly stated in the trial ruling, the private negotiations these individuals conducted with the accused do not diminish the unlawfulness of the acts the defendant committed against the victims, which were amply established by the evidence introduced in the adversarial proceedings (contradictorio). Likewise, after reviewing that testimony, this Court of Appeal finds that these individuals’ accounts do not disprove the occurrence of the events; on the contrary, they also attested to the existence of the housing project and to the defendant’s sale of lots on that property. Finally, regarding [Nombre61]’s testimony, the trial court correctly found that this account instead demonstrated the defendant’s involvement, since he was the person who gave orders to improve the existing roads and construct the water well as a means of alleviating the lack of potable water affecting the people who lived in that community. Consequently, because the defense evidence was duly assessed, this ground must be denied.
The third ground. In this section, the appellant reiterates that the conduct does not satisfy the statutory elements of the offense (tipicidad) under the principle of offsetting profit against harm (principio de compensación del lucro con el daño). He also reiterates that the victims may resort to the civil courts to demand delivery of the deed pursuant to the contracts executed by the parties or to seek compensation for losses and damages, as provided by the Ley de Planificación Urbana. He further reiterates that the conduct is not criminally actionable (atipicidad), maintaining that this case involved a breach of contract (incumplimiento contractual) and that the facts should therefore have been adjudicated in that other jurisdiction. These arguments were already addressed by this Chamber when it ruled on the first ground of appeal, and the appellant is therefore referred to the reasons stated there. Under this third ground, the appellants raise additional objections, which will be resolved according to the subject matter at issue.
Nullity of the contracts. Another issue challenged by the appellant under this third ground concerns the Trial Court’s declaration, in recital V (considerando V), that the contracts were null and void. He argues that, as a result of this decision, the victims will be left without any real property right (derecho real) among their assets and will have no evidence with which to bring a claim for co-ownership (copropiedad). The claim is denied. The first point to note is that the appellants proceed from a mistaken premise, because they regard the contract entered into between the victims and Tecrem S.A as valid. That position is erroneous because, as extensively explained in the challenged ruling, both the written and oral agreements entered into by the victims and the accused were fraudulent, since they formed part of the deception employed by the defendant to obtain an unlawful financial benefit.
The contract therefore cannot be regarded as valid between the parties. In addition, the ruling sets forth both the factual and legal grounds supporting the Trial Court’s decision to declare those contracts null and void. In this regard, as the trial-level Panel of Judges correctly explains, the declaration of nullity (declaratoria de nulidad) of those agreements is based on the rules established in Articles 37 and 41 of the Constitución Política, as well as Article 103 of the Código Penal, which governs the civil consequences of the criminal offense (consecuencias civiles del hecho punible).
Regarding the scope of this latter legal provision, the Criminal Chamber of Cassation (Sala de Casación Penal) has stated as follows: “Based on a systematic analysis of the legislation described above, it is clear why restitution of the object of the punishable act (hecho punible) must be ordered whenever possible, even if it has not been requested by a person with standing through a civil action (acción civil). In this regard, this Chamber has previously stated: ‘This is expressly provided for in Articles 103 of the Criminal Code and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in circumstances different from the items that may be awarded as a result of a claim for damages (gestión resarcitoria). Accordingly, restoring matters to their status ex ante (that is, their status before the offense) is a consequence mandated by law that seeks to reverse the effects of the judicial declaration and undo the consequences of the unlawful conduct.
Because these purposes are matters of public interest, the legal provision does not make compliance contingent upon bringing a civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria).’ (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment number 133 -2013 at 17:00 hours on February 14, 2013). Additionally, for further explanation and legal support, Article 837 of the Civil Code, which constitutes supplementary legislation (normativa de aplicación supletoria) in this matter, provides: ARTICLE 837.- Absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) may be asserted by anyone with an interest therein and, when apparent from the record, must be declared ex officio (de oficio), even if the parties do not assert it; and it cannot be cured by the parties’ confirmation or ratification, or by the passage of a period shorter than that required for ordinary prescription (prescripción ordinaria).” Regarding the scope of this provision, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: VIII.-Concerning the alleged violations of the substantive provisions (normas de fondo), this Chamber, in consideration of the grievances raised by the appellant and in application of Article 837 of the Civil Code, which is alleged to have been violated, makes the following observations.
A legal act (acto jurídico) is null when it is found that its elements have departed from the essential requirements established by the Legal System (Ordenamiento Jurídico), which are indispensable to its legal formation. Thus, the difference between how the legal act was carried out and the manner prescribed by that Legal System gives rise to the need to deny it any consequences definitively; to that end, all its effects are eliminated and reversed so that, once it has been extinguished, it is as though it had never occurred. Such invalidity may be characterized as structural and radical. Structural because it stems from an irregularity in the formation of the act. Radical because it arises ipso iure, that is, regardless of whether any action is brought by those interested in having it declared. Consequently, an act tainted by absolute nullity may be set aside at the request of any interested person or even ex officio when the judge identifies it.
The basis for the latter is that, because the act is null, it is barred by operation of law (de pleno derecho) and erga omnes from producing any type of legal consequence, thereby constituting a defect that necessarily requires extinction and concerns the entire legal system; accordingly, the judge is required to declare it, whether or not the parties to the litigation or a third party request it. Under Costa Rican legislation, provision 837 of the Civil Code establishes: “Absolute nullity may be asserted by anyone with an interest therein and, when apparent from the record, must be declared ex officio, even if the parties do not assert it; and it cannot be cured by the parties’ confirmation or ratification, or by the passage of a period shorter than that required for ordinary prescription” (emphasis not in the original). This provision plainly reflects the legislature’s intention to establish that, given the necessary elimination of wholly null acts, invalidity must be declared whenever it is indisputable, based, of course, on the essential prerequisite that the affected parties duly participate and that the nullity be established in the record.
This consistent doctrinal position, clearly reflected in Costa Rica’s positive Legal System, dovetails precisely with the longstanding precedent of this Chamber of Cassation, which, when addressing the background and proper interpretation of Article 837 of the Civil Code, stated as follows in its judgment at 10 hours 40 minutes on December 24, 1947: “II.— This mandate originates in the following concepts of Aubry et Rou ([Nombre69]), whose work French Civil Law was the principal source of information for the Commission that drafted our Code: ‘An act that lacks the factual elements presupposed by its nature or purpose, without which it is logically impossible to conceive of its existence, must be regarded not only as null but as never having been performed. The same applies to an act that was not accompanied by the conditions and formalities indispensable to its existence under the letter and spirit of positive law.
The ineffectiveness of such acts is independent of any judicial declaration. It cannot be cured either by confirmation or by prescription. Every judge is responsible for recognizing it, even ex officio,’ (work cited, volume I, page 180, fifth edition, 1897). According to Aubry et Rou ([Nombre69]) himself, the French Civil Code contains no article declaring, as a general rule, the nullity of acts performed contrary to these provisions—page 181—nor did that author specify the circumstances of a proceeding in which such ex officio intervention by the courts would be advisable. In addition to other modifications that it introduced to those provisions—such as encompassing all of them under the designation of nullity—the aforementioned Drafting Commission remedied the omission by requiring two fundamental conditions for an ex officio declaration: that the absolute nullity be apparent from the record, meaning that it be manifestly certain—which implies that nullities subject to doubt must always be litigated—and that the parties to the litigation include the same parties who participated in the null act or contract, or a person who demonstrates an interest in the nullity, since the law uses the term ‘parties,’ in relation to absolute nullity, in the dual sense of parties to the proceeding—when it states ‘even if the parties do not assert it’—and parties to the null act or contract, in the phrase ‘and it cannot be cured by the parties’ confirmation or ratification’; likewise, without the possibility for those parties, or the person interested in the nullity, to pursue the legal remedies available against the decision—which prevents this issue from being raised directly or arising spontaneously before this Court [that is, it must arise in a proceeding in which the affected parties are necessarily present]—there would be no explanation for the law’s reference to nullity declared by a final judgment (sentencia firme); and lastly, without the participation of the parties to the null act or contract, it would be incomprehensible for the law to grant them the guarantee of being restored to the position in which they would have been had the null act or contract never existed, Articles 837 and 844 of the Civil Code.” (The clarification is not in the original).
It follows from the quoted passage that, based on an analysis of the reasons given by the Drafting Commission of the national Civil Code, every judge, regardless of the level of court, is required to declare an act null when its nullity emerges from an examination of the record and is absolute. At the same time, that mandate also overrides the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo), insofar as invalidity may be declared without having been expressly requested, provided that the parties who carried out and are affected by the act are present, or that the party interested in obtaining a ruling to that effect is present. In summary, legal scholarship, legislation, and case law agree that, where nullity is absolute and evident, it may be declared even ex officio in the absence of a request by a party, giving precedence to the need to eliminate the legal consequences of an act contrary to the Legal System over the principle of party disposition, provided that those affected by the defective act to be declared null are parties to the litigation (lite) and have the opportunity to exercise their right of defense.” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment number 549-2007 at 8:45 hours on August 03, 2007.
To the same effect, judgments of that Chamber of Cassation number 331-2019). Returning to the case under review and applying these judicial precedents, it is clear that the Trial Court was authorized to declare ex officio the nullity of a contract used as an instrument to commit a criminal offense. The appellant is therefore incorrect in this claim, and it must accordingly be dismissed. Regarding the order issued by the Trial Court to the Municipalidad de Alajuela. In this third ground, the appellant contends that the trial judgment’s direction that the Municipalidad de Alajuela intervene to resolve the victims’ housing situation would negate the commission of the offense of Fraud (Estafa). The claim is granted, with effects different from those requested by defense counsel. To address this claim, it is necessary to transcribe the Trial Court’s ruling on the matter: “INTERVENTION BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT.- our substantive law provides that the law does not protect abuse of rights (abuso del derecho) or the antisocial exercise thereof, and that any act or contract that, because of its author’s intent or its purpose, manifestly exceeds the normal limits on the exercise of a right and causes harm to third parties shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures to prevent its continuation.
As the representatives of the Municipalidad de Alajuela have stated, much of what ‘Bella Vista’ is today has resulted from the inaction of the local government itself; consequently, what is now occurring in the aforementioned project must be resolved. It is by virtue of this, and in view of every state entity’s legal duty to enforce the legal system as such or to align its guiding policies with the solutions provided by the legislation itself, that this authority orders the MUNICIPALIDAD DE ALAJUELA, through [Nombre48], to undertake the administrative proceedings (procedimientos administrativos) necessary for matters concerning the ‘Proyecto Bella Vista’ to attain the effects required by our legal system. For this purpose, it is granted a period of THREE MONTHS, counted from the date this proceeding becomes final, with notice that, if it fails to do so, certified records will be forwarded regarding the offense of disobedience to authority (desobediencia a la autoridad); for the pertinent purposes of this ruling, personal service is ordered upon the person holding the position of representative of the local government once this judgment becomes final.” (verbatim copy from the reverse of folio 4841).
Upon analysis, the first point that must be made is that this decision is confusing and imprecise because it issues an order to the Municipalidad de Alajuela without specifying what actions that local government must carry out within the three-month period; it merely states that the municipal corporation must “undertake the administrative proceedings necessary for matters concerning the ‘Proyecto Bella Vista’ to attain the effects required by our legal system.” Additionally, the record demonstrates that the subdivision (fraccionamiento) of property number 096824-001 in the province of Alajuela was carried out in disregard of urban-planning regulations, particularly the provisions contained in the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), number 4240, as amended. The provisions of the regulatory plan (plan regulador) governing that canton were also violated with respect to the minimum size required for each parcel to be severed (segregar).
Therefore, it is unclear what the Trial Court intended by issuing this order to the municipal corporation, a body that did not even appear as a party to these proceedings. Finally, it must be noted that, although the Trial Court’s order is erroneous, that decision has no bearing whatsoever on the statutory elements of the offense (tipicidad) or the unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) of the conduct of the defendant (encartado), Evelio Murillo, matters that have already been addressed at length in this judgment. Consequently, the judgment is partially reversed, and the order issued to the Municipalidad de Alajuela is vacated. Regarding the fourth ground. In this claim, the appellants argue that there was a mistake of law (error de prohibición), asserting that the defendant was unaware that his conduct was unlawful, particularly because he had been advised by attorneys. They further contend that the accused (imputado), who has little formal education, could not be expected to know the procedures and requirements for the severance of lots.
The claim is denied. As explained in the trial judgment and in this judgment, it was established in this case that the involvement of legal professionals and the preparation of the contracts formed part of the scheme employed by the accused to give an appearance of legality to the actions he undertook in order to obtain an unlawful financial benefit. Furthermore, a mistake of law is analyzed at the stage of culpability (culpabilidad), and under Article 35 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), a person is not culpable when, due to an unavoidable mistake (error invencible), that person believes that the act committed is not subject to punishment. If the mistake was not unavoidable, the penalty prescribed for the act may be reduced in accordance with Article 79. In this regard, the provision establishes that a mistake excludes punishability (punibilidad) when it was unavoidable, that is, when the perpetrator could not have avoided it.
In this case, the accused alleges that, because he was advised by attorneys, the mistake was unavoidable; this is incorrect for the following reasons. Whether the mistake was unavoidable must be assessed in the context in which it occurred, and here the accused has openly acknowledged that he offered for sale lots on the property in which he held an interest and that he intended to grant individuals an interest in that property, while claiming that he was under no obligation to know the applicable procedures governing the severance of land. Although individuals are not required to know the entire body of existing law, the evidence must establish that the alleged lack of knowledge was unavoidable. In this case, the Trial Court stated the following in its judgment on this issue: “There are no grounds of justification (causas de justificación) or exculpatory grounds (exculpantes) to analyze.
Although the defendant’s counsel floated the theory that there was, as an element relating to unlawfulness, a ground of justification such as mistake, the fact is that counsel merely advanced it as a general proposition without undertaking to establish the theoretical and factual elements supporting it, thereby making it impossible for this Court to conduct an analysis in that regard. By virtue of the foregoing attributed to the defendant, upon being found guilty, the penalty shall be as stated in the recital that follows” (verbatim copy from the reverse side of folio 4854). Although the Trial Court did not examine in depth whether a mistake of law had occurred, such an examination was unnecessary in this case for the following reasons. The judgment validly established that the attorneys became involved so that people would believe that the project being developed complied with the legal system; in other words, their involvement formed part of the scheme employed by the defendant.
The person on trial (justiciable) therefore cannot rely on the excuse that the attorneys he retained did not advise him correctly. It must be recalled here that the person on trial is being prosecuted for carrying out a housing development entirely outside the urban-planning and municipal regulatory framework; that is, this was not merely the omission of a single procedure or requirement, but rather the failure to comply with a series of requirements and obtain governmental authorizations that must be issued by institutions such as the Dirección de Catastro del Registro Nacional, the Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo, the Ministerio de Ambiente, the Ministerio de Salud, the Secretaría Técnica Ambiental, and the Municipalidad de Alajuela. Moreover, the information that the accused claims not to have known was available through the Departamento de Ingeniería de la Municipalidad de Alajuela, which anyone may approach to request such information. The defense attorneys’ argument is therefore unfounded. Consequently, the claim is denied.
VI.Appeal by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (recurso del Ministerio Público). Attorney Edith Morera Rodríguez, in the sole ground of appeal, challenges the statement of reasons for the sentence (fundamentación de la pena). She states that, in this case, the Public Prosecutor’s Office requested a sentence of one year’s imprisonment for each offense of minor [Nombre2], as well as a sentence of three years’ imprisonment for each offense of major [Nombre2]. She maintains that, although she presented reasoned closing arguments supporting the prosecuting authority’s request for punishment, the Trial Court, without further justification, imposed very lenient sentences despite the seriousness of the acts. She explains that the Prosecutor’s Office stated that, in each of the thirty fraud offenses, the defendant took advantage of the victims, specifically their personal, social, and economic circumstances, because they were persons of limited financial means and low educational attainment, as well as persons who lacked access to the national financial system because of both their economic position and their immigration status, and that 90% of the victims are Nicaraguan nationals.
She states that neither those personal circumstances of the victims nor the seriousness of the consequences that the acts committed by the defendant had on the victims’ lives were taken into consideration. She asserts that the defendant, using his business acumen, took advantage of the victims’ vulnerability and the trust placed in him and entered into negotiations with the victims for the acquisition of land on which they could build a house and own a home. She reiterates that, in this matter, the magnitude of the harm caused must be assessed as extending beyond property loss to include psychological harm, because the victims live with the uncertainty of not knowing whether they will ever own even a parcel of land. Regarding the offender’s subsequent conduct, she criticizes the Trial Court for failing to consider that, even 5 years after the act was committed, the defendant had taken no action aimed at repairing the harm caused to the victims.
In this regard, she states that the defendant has not even seen fit to guarantee basic electricity and water services to the occupants of those homes, since water is currently supplied through a well, and it is unknown whether that water is potable. She states that the Trial Court relied on an argument based on compassion to justify the sentence, referring to the fact that the defendant was 59 years old and had little formal education. She explains that this argument is contradictory because the Trial Chamber also found it proven that the accused had extensive commercial knowledge and business acumen by virtue of the company he operated. She considers that the sentence imposed is not proportional to the economic, social, and psychological harm suffered by each affected person. She explains that the Trial Court imposed a sentence of one year’s imprisonment for the major fraud offenses, which resulted, under the rules governing material concurrence of offenses (concurso material), in a final sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment; this allowed the defendant to be granted the benefit of a conditionally suspended sentence (beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena).
She states that the judgment does not make it possible to understand the criteria used to impose the sentences in each case. She requests that only the sentence imposed on the defendant be vacated, that the other rulings in the first-instance judgment remain in force, and that a remand trial (juicio de reenvío) be ordered solely with respect to that issue. Appeal granted. Upon examination of the judgment, the appellant is found to be correct because the sentence imposed lacks an adequate statement of reasons. In this regard, the Trial Chamber stated the following in determining the sentence: “VIII. Applicable sentence: Specifically, in consideration of the objective and subjective elements and the manner, time, and place, as provided in section 71 of the Criminal Code, the following circumstances are taken into account in determining the length of the sentence to be imposed. The defendant is fifty-nine years old and has very little formal education, since it became known from the preliminary examination and during the adversarial proceedings themselves that he completed only the third grade of school; despite this, however, he is intelligent and astute, with a good eye for business.
From his own statements, we know that he transported iron to panamá in his trucks, owns the company TECREM, and, as he also stated, had a great many trucks that transport materials to Guatemala for smelting. His businesses and assets do not end there, since, according to the information obtained at trial, he owns several apartment complexes, describes himself as a merchant with an average monthly income of two million colones, and says that he ‘gets into’ any business, whether the sale of a car or motorcycle or even the purchase of a property measuring more than nineteen thousand square meters. He stated that he purchased a house, which his daughter used and enjoyed for several years, and that afterward he simply lost it; but his economic situation does not end there. To purchase the property where he developed the informal housing project called ‘Bella Vista,’ he invested in purchasing right zero zero six; subsequently, on that same property, he invested at least ninety million colones in a well and two hundred million colones in a road.
In addition, as [Nombre70] stated, Murillo Murillo has another project similar to Bella Vista in San Rafael de Alajuela. Furthermore, at least forty-six persons have been involved in this matter as potential victims, each of whom suffered emotional and financial harm. The defendant did not cease his unlawful activity in the Bella Vista project; rather, he drilled and operated a well more than one hundred meters deep using the most rudimentary methods, without the record establishing the feasibility, purity, or quality of the water he distributes in the ‘Bella Vista’ housing development, water that supplies more than one hundred and fifty homes in the area and that he commercially exploits, since he charges for it without any concession or permit. This was apparent from the documents that the Prosecutor’s Office introduced as evidence to assist the court in reaching its decision. The victims trusted him and paid substantial sums with the idea of attaining or fulfilling a dream: building their own homes.
The defendant took advantage of the fact that the victims had limited financial means and little formal education and had been unable to understand what they had acquired; Murillo Murillo abused these persons’ trust and caused them property loss. He abused the law because he used a legal instrument, namely contracts, as a means within his plan. The contracts were executed in the city of Alajuela, in the offices of various attorneys, thereby giving the offer an appearance of feasibility and legality. At a particular point in time, Mr. Murillo Murillo was in a position to conform his conduct to the legal system; nevertheless, he decided to depart from the law and defraud the victims. All these proven acts are in material concurrence with one another, constitute independent actions, and, pursuant to article 76 of the Criminal Code, the appropriate course is to impose the sentence corresponding to each offense, provided that the aggregate does not exceed three times the highest sentence” (verbatim copy of pages 4855 and 4856).
Based on this reasoning, the Court imposed a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment for each offense of minor [Nombre2] committed against twenty-seven persons. This reasoning for determining the sentence is insufficient because the objective circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense were not weighed, such as the manner in which the scheme was carried out. Nor were the magnitude of the harm caused or the victims’ personal circumstances analyzed, insofar as those circumstances contributed to the execution of the criminal activity. In this regard, both in the section containing the court’s inferential reasoning (fundamentación intelectiva) and in the section addressing legal classification (calificación jurídica), the Trial Court refers to the various acts carried out by the accused, such as publicly offering the lots, showing the land to the victims, devising a financing plan that did not require proof of financial capacity in order to make it attractive to interested persons, and preparing a document entitled “reciprocal purchase-and-sale option agreement,” in order to give the victims a false sense of security that the sale of the lot complied with the law, while also creating in each of them the false expectation that, once the payment plan was completed, they would own a parcel of land.
These circumstances, which were proven in the judgment, were not considered in weighing the sentence, since they were not even mentioned; consequently, it is unknown to what extent these factual circumstances were assessed in the statement of reasons for the sentence. In addition, this Court of Appeal notes that, according to the statement of proven facts, the amounts of property transferred by each victim to the defendant varied, and the reasons given for imposing the sentence do not reveal what criteria were considered in imposing a uniform sentence of eight months’ imprisonment when some victims suffered greater financial loss than others. For example, in the case of the injured party [Nombre3], a loss of 770.000 colones was proven, while in the case of the victim [Nombre21], the financial fraud amounted to 2.430.000. In this regard, the uniform imposition of eight months’ imprisonment for each proven offense of minor [Nombre2] demonstrates that no examination was conducted in which each case and the individual harm caused to each victim were analyzed separately.
It is also noted that, for purposes of imposing the sentence, the Court likewise failed to weigh the fact that, in some cases, the victims did not construct any building on the land, whereas other victims, because of the scheme carried out by the accused in telling them that construction was permitted, made investments to build a home. Nevertheless, these additional circumstances are likewise not reflected in the statement of reasons for the sentence. A similar situation arises with the convictions for the offenses of major [Nombre2], for which a uniform sentence of one year’s imprisonment was imposed without separately analyzing each case in order to weigh the financial harm that the defendant individually caused to each of those persons. Because of the deficiencies in the judgment, the judgment must be partially vacated with respect to the statement of reasons for the sentence. Consequently, the entirety of the sentence imposed on the accused Evelio Murillo Murillo is vacated, and a remand trial is ordered for adjudication of that issue.
VII.In reviewing the claims raised by the defense against the criminal conviction, this Appellate Chamber (Cámara de Apelación) notes the existence of a particular error which, although not specifically alleged by the party, contains a defect that this Appellate Court shall address sua sponte (de oficio). As stated in the operative part of the judgment (parte dispositiva), the defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo was convicted of a total of 27 offenses of minor [Nombre2], including the case involving the victim [Nombre29], and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for these acts. However, the evidentiary summary (sumario de prueba) on folio 4560 contains a summary of that person’s testimony during the adversarial proceedings (contradictorio). Nevertheless, upon review of the judgment’s reasoned assessment of the evidence (fundamentación intelectiva), it is apparent that the Trial Chamber (Cámara de Juicio) failed to conduct a reasoned analysis of the alleged acts involving this victim.
Indeed, the reasoned assessment was conducted on a case-by-case basis and covered all the other victims, but not the matters concerning the victim [Nombre29]. Consequently, there is no analysis of the evidence relating to this victim, and the sentence of eight months’ imprisonment imposed for these acts is therefore unsupported. Accordingly, the judgment is partially vacated, solely with respect to the alleged acts involving the case of the victim [Nombre29], and a retrial on remand (juicio de reenvío) is ordered for the adjudication of those acts.
SECTION II — CIVIL LIABILITY
Background. Before addressing the civil claims raised by counsel for the accused against the civil judgment entered against defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo and the company Tecrem S.A, as well as the arguments submitted by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, it is necessary to review the background of these proceedings, since the judgment now being challenged resulted from a retrial (juicio de reenvío). In this regard, by judgment number 154-2016 at 15:00 hours on March 16, 2016, the Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela ruled as follows with respect to the civil portion of the case: “REGARDING THE CIVIL DAMAGES ACTION (ACCIÓN CIVIL RESARCITORIA): The Civil Damages Action filed by civil plaintiffs [Nombre20] , [Nombre44] , [Nombre45] , [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] , [Nombre23] , [Nombre46] , [Nombre24] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre26] , [Nombre27] , [Nombre67] , [Nombre28] , [Nombre32] , [Nombre34] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre17] , [Nombre47] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre71] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] , against civil defendant EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO and third-party civil defendant TECREM S.A. is granted, and they are ordered to pay the following items jointly and severally:
For moral damages (daño moral), the sum of six million colones (6,000.000.00). For personal legal costs (costas personales), the civil defendant (demandado civil) shall pay Lic. Segismundo Araya Zúñiga the sum of two million one hundred seventy-eight thousand colones (2.178.000), for his representation in the Criminal Complaint and Civil Action (Querella y Acción Civil).
IX.The appeal filed by defense counsel against the civil judgment. In the appeal, defense counsel title one of the grounds “civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria),” which, for purposes of this judgment, is numbered as the fifth ground. In this section, defense counsel challenge the civil judgment entered against their client, Evelio Murillo, as well as against the company Tecrem S.A, and assert the following arguments. They state that the judgment against their client and the corporation was based on the Trial Court’s finding that the offense of fraud had been established, an unlawful act that, in their view, did not occur, according to the claims raised in the preceding grounds. They state that, in the civil actions brought by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, the basis of liability underlying those claims was the commission of a criminal offense, and that no claim was made for breach of contract or any other civil wrong.
They state that, because the relief sought on appeal is the acquittal of their client from all punishment and liability, the claims must be dismissed on appeal, since the civil actions are ancillary to the criminal action and, in the absence of an offense, the civil judgment against their clients cannot stand. They then express their opposition to and rejection of each item of damages awarded in the civil judgment. They criticize the unliquidated award (condena en abstracto) requiring payment of the amount corresponding to the structures built by the civil plaintiffs. They state that this award is arbitrary, since a person may not build without the respective permits issued by the Municipalidad de Alajuela, yet the civil plaintiffs built without this fundamental requirement and without the civil defendants having undertaken, either directly or contractually, to obtain those permits. Likewise, they challenge the exemption from payment of costs granted to the civil plaintiffs who withdrew their claims.
In this regard, they state that the judgment says costs were not imposed because the litigation was conducted in good faith. They state that this is the sole reasoning used to support the exemption from costs, without explaining what that good faith consisted of. They state that Article 384 of the Código Procesal Penal is clear that an express withdrawal results in an award of costs. They note that, during the trial, none of the civil plaintiffs who withdrew their claims agreed with the accused that they would be exempted from payment of that item; they therefore request that, on appeal, the civil plaintiffs who withdrew their claims be ordered to pay costs, namely [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre50] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre72] , Stanley Méndez González, Maritza Silva Catín, Jorge Luis Cerdas Campos, Donald Vargas and Shirley Mora Solano. They add that the judgment declared the contracts null and void, and therefore request that, if the substantive or procedural grounds are sustained on appeal, the declared invalidity of those contracts should be vacated, since the criminal conviction was the basis for that nullity.
They explain that, upon those contracts being declared null and void, the injured parties will be the victims, whose assets will be diminished. They request that the judgment be vacated and a new trial ordered, or that the claims be decided on the merits and their client acquitted of all punishment and liability because the conduct does not constitute an offense. Under this ground, the appellants raise various claims, which will be addressed according to their respective subject matter. The civil judgment. On this point. The first matter that must be noted is that, in the appeal, defense counsel make arguments referring both to the civil liability of the accused, Evelio Murillo Murillo, and to that of the company Tecrem S.A. However, as explained in recital VIII (considerando VIII) of this judgment, the civil liability of the company Tecrem S.A was established upon issuance of voto 2017-142, subject to the qualifications previously explained, and those matters therefore may not now be relitigated.
Furthermore, in the remand trial (juicio de reenvío) that gave rise to the judgment now being challenged, the Tribunal de Alajuela ruled on the civil liability of the company Tecrem S.A with respect to those matters that had been ordered by this Tribunal de Apelación in voto 2017-142; defense counsel’s claim will therefore be addressed within that scope of jurisdiction. This ground is partially sustained on the terms set forth below. In presenting their argument, defense counsel proceed from the mistaken premise that their client bears no criminal liability. This is incorrect because, as analyzed in the preceding recitals, the criminal liability of the accused, Evelio Murillo Murillo, was duly established, except in the cases of the victims [Nombre33] and [Nombre29] . That factual framework supports the civil judgment entered against the defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo on the various claims brought by the civil plaintiffs, except in the case of plaintiff [Nombre33] , which will be analyzed below.
In addition, as stated in the lower-court judgment, the civil judgment entered against Evelio Murillo Murillo is based on Articles 41 of the Constitución Política, 103 of the Código Penal and 1045 of the Código Civil. Thus, not only has the subjective basis for attributing liability (criterio de imputación subjetiva) to defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo been duly established, but that liability also has an adequate intellectual and legal basis, and no errors are apparent that would invalidate the determination of civil liability. With respect to the civil liability of the company Tecrem S.A, they are correct only as regards the civil judgment on the claim brought by [Nombre33] . As this Cámara de Apelación already analyzed when deciding the fifth argument raised under the first ground of appeal (recital V), the intellectual assessment of the events occurring to the detriment of [Nombre33] is erroneous.
Accordingly, the reasoning set forth in that section also applies to the basis for the civil judgment entered against defendant Evelio Murillo Murillo in connection with that event. In this regard, and as detailed in recital VIII of this judgment, the remand trial that resulted in the judgment now under review was also required to address the civil liability of the company Tecrem S.A in the case of civil plaintiff [Nombre33] . For the reasons previously explained, the civil judgment entered against the company Tecrem S.A on the civil action brought by [Nombre33] must also be vacated because the factual framework found to have been established in relation to this victim lacks an adequate intellectual basis. Consequently, a remand trial is ordered for reconsideration of the civil claim brought by plaintiff [Nombre33] against the accused Evelio Murillo Murillo and the company Tecrem S.A. The items awarded in the judgment to the civil plaintiffs.
As to the civil judgment entered for the various items awarded to the victims, the appellants merely express disagreement with their determination but provide no objective grounds invalidating the arguments given by the Trial Chamber in assessing those items. In this regard, as to pecuniary damages (daño material), the Trial Court weighed the various documents submitted by the victims, which proved the delivery of money for the purchase of the lot. In addition, in determining non-pecuniary damages (daño moral), the suffering and anguish experienced by each victim were taken into account, given their expectation that they would own a parcel of land. Nevertheless, as extensively discussed in the lower-court judgment, there is a legal impossibility preventing those persons from becoming the registered owners of those properties. Finally, as to the unliquidated items awarded, that decision is valid because, although it was established in those cases that some victims had built homes on the land, the amount of the resulting economic loss could not be established using objective parameters, since no evidence was available that would permit the specific amount of that loss to be quantified.
The Trial Court’s decision was therefore valid, and those amounts must accordingly be determined during the judgment-enforcement phase (fase de ejecución de sentencia). Likewise, it should be noted that, with respect to the company Tecrem S.A, the remand trial that resulted in the judgment now being challenged (judgment number 980-2018) encompassed the amounts awarded to victim [Nombre21] for pecuniary damages. The appellants make general arguments against the various items without identifying any specific prejudice that would warrant vacating the lower court’s ruling on this civil award. In this regard, it should be noted that the Trial Court awarded two million five hundred twenty thousand colones in pecuniary damages, corresponding to the amount paid by the victim. As to the value of the structures, this item was awarded on an unliquidated basis, and two million colones was awarded for non-pecuniary damages.
This Chamber finds that the specifically determined amounts for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages are supported by the evidence, and there is therefore no basis for invalidating them. Exemption from costs. In this section, the appellants challenge the exemption from payment of costs granted to civil plaintiffs [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre50] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre72] , [Nombre47] , [Nombre52] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre73] and [Nombre18] , even though those persons withdrew their claims. The argument is denied. The appellants proceed from the mistaken premise that a group of persons withdrew their claims. To the contrary, a review of the judgment shows that the Trial Court stated the following regarding this issue: “As to the private prosecutions (querellas), this authority has found that, over time, they have acted in this matter with procedural loyalty and, in this particular case, with evident procedural good faith, so much so that they have stated that their primary interest was satisfied by the judgment, the civil portion of which is final, a judgment that ordered the third-party civilly liable corporation TECREM S.A., which is owned by the accused, to pay damages; they do not wish to proceed any further because such a lengthy proceeding, in which several judgments have been vacated, has even become detrimental to their mental health.
Accordingly, this full court finds that they should not be ordered to pay costs; likewise, the costs of the proceedings in this respect shall be borne by the State.” (verbatim copy from folio 4851). It follows from the foregoing that, in the case of these civil plaintiffs—except as will be decided below with respect to [Nombre73] and [Nombre18] by virtue of the appeal filed by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima—what occurred was that they deemed their civil claims satisfied by virtue of the civil judgment entered in the prior trial against the company Tecrem S.A. As the Trial Court correctly stated, this demonstrates procedural good faith, and it was therefore valid to exempt them from payment of costs arising from the claim filed against Evelio Murillo Murillo. Accordingly, this argument must be rejected. Nullity of the contracts.
This argument had also been raised by the appellants in connection with the grounds asserted against the criminal conviction entered against the accused, Evelio Murillo Murillo, and was resolved by this Court of Appeal in Considerando V of this judgment; accordingly, the appellants are referred to the discussion therein.
X.Appeal filed by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. In his first ground, attorney Adrián Rojas Rodríguez objects to the dismissal of the civil actions (acciones civiles) brought by the plaintiffs [Nombre73] and [Nombre18]. He challenges the reasoning of the judgment, arguing that the testimony of these persons was not properly assessed. Although they stated that they initially negotiated the lot with a third party, the transaction was ultimately concluded with the accused, who signed the contracts for the sale of the lot and to whom the funds relating to that transaction were transferred. He also contends that, without further explanation, the Tribunal de Juicio credited the accused’s account, even though the documentary and testimonial evidence supported the civil plaintiffs’ position. In both cases, he requests that the judgment be vacated and that a retrial be ordered. The claim is granted.
Upon review of the reasoning of the judgment concerning the case of [Nombre73], appearing on the front of folios 4847 to 4849, it is apparent that the Trial Chamber based its analysis primarily on the accused’s statement, without assessing that account together with the remaining evidence. It should be noted here that the judgment on the merits contains an error in its descriptive statement of the evidence, because it omitted a summary of the testimony given by the injured party [Nombre73] during the plenary phase (fase plenaria). In this regard, the reverse of folio 4258 shows that [Nombre73] appeared before the Tribunal de Juicio on 12 de setiembre de 2018, during the afternoon hearing, and gave testimony, but the Tribunal de Juicio omitted that testimony from the judgment’s summary of the evidence. Moreover, the brief reference in the evidentiary analysis to the testimony given by the injured party [Nombre73] is insufficient, because it does not reflect an examination of the information this person provided during the plenary phase.
In this regard, this Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia played the audiovisual file containing this person’s testimony (recording CED9) and notes that [Nombre73] provided a detailed explanation of how the sale of that lot was conducted and of the involvement of the defendant Evelio Murillo. He also referred to the documents supporting his case, evidentiary material that the Tribunal de Juicio did not assess in the challenged judgment. Regarding the case of the injured party [Nombre18], the judgment lacks reasoning concerning the civil liability of the accused Evelio Murillo Murillo. In the lower-court judgment, the Tribunal de Juicio devoted recital VI (considerando VI) of the judgment (cf. folio 4842 et seq.) to stating the grounds for acquittal of the crime of [Nombre2] with which that person had been charged. That decision was not challenged by the Ministerio Público, which prevents its review on appeal by this Appeals Chamber.
That reasoning sets forth grounds supporting the existence of doubt regarding the commission of that offense. Nevertheless, the judgment provides no relevant grounds supporting the dismissal of the civil action that the victim brought against the accused Evelio Murillo. It must be recalled here that the case law of the Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia and the Sala Tercera has consistently established that, even where an acquittal is entered concerning the defendant’s criminal liability, the court deciding the merits must rule on any potential civil liability. In this case, recital IX of the challenged judgment states only the following: “The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the injured parties and civil plaintiffs [Nombre4], [Nombre49], [Nombre6], [Nombre7], [Nombre50], [Nombre9], [Nombre10], [Nombre11], [Nombre12], [Nombre13], [Nombre67] and [Nombre47], [Nombre52], [Nombre15], [Nombre17], [Nombre18] against the accused and civil defendant EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO is dismissed; in this regard, because the proceedings are deemed to have been conducted in procedural good faith, he is exempted from payment of the costs of the civil action” (cf. folio 4857).
A review of this excerpt shows that no explanation was provided as to why those civil actions were dismissed. In this case, the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima challenged only the rulings concerning civil plaintiffs [Nombre73]—whose case has already been addressed—and [Nombre18]. Accordingly, pursuant to the party-presentation principle (principio dispositivo) governing civil matters, this Appeals Chamber is empowered to rule only on the cases that were challenged. Having clarified this point, and returning to the analysis of the case of Ms. [Nombre18], it must be noted that the standards of attribution (criterios de imputación) in civil matters differ from those used in criminal matters. In this case, although the Tribunal ruled out the commission of fraud, an intentional offense, the lower-court judges erred by failing to assess the other standards of attribution established in Article 1045 of the Código Civil, as well as the provisions of Articles 182, 187 and 189 of the Código de Comercio, which establish the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of representatives of a legal entity when their acts or decisions cause harm.
On this point, the record shows that, in the case of the injured party [Nombre18], she signed a contract with Tecrem S.A for the sale of a lot, and that document was signed by the accused in his capacity as the company’s legal representative (see folios 3460 to 3468). Furthermore, pursuant to that contract, the injured party delivered money to the accused as part of the financing plan for that lot. Likewise, the civil plaintiff described the expenses she incurred in building a house on that lot. This information, however, was not assessed by the lower-court Chamber, with the result that the judgment lacks adequate evidentiary and legal reasoning. Consequently, the first ground of appeal is granted. The judgment is partially vacated insofar as it dismissed the civil actions brought by civil plaintiffs [Nombre73] and [Nombre18]. A retrial is therefore ordered so that those issues may be heard anew.
In the second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges an improper application of substantive law. He asserts that the determination of the fees payable to the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima in connection with the civil actions brought by [Nombre46] and [Nombre23] was erroneous. In summary, he states that the award of legal fees (costas personales) was incorrect because fee decree number 36562-JP, which was in force when the civil action was filed on 23 de marzo de 2015, was not applied. He requests that the judgment be reversed and that payment of the amount of fees requested by that office be ordered. The claim is granted. The lower-court judgment stated the following, insofar as relevant to the resolution of the claim presented: “…9) [Nombre46], for pecuniary damage (daño material) consisting of the amounts paid to the accused for lot 62, the sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND COLONES (1,215.000.00).
Payment is likewise ordered for the pecuniary damage relating to construction of the dwelling, which damage is awarded without specification of amount. For non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), the sum of TWO MILLION COLONES (2,000.000.00). As legal fees, the civil defendant shall pay the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima the sum of SIX HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND COLONES (640.000.00) in its capacity as counsel for the Civil Action.” It further stated: “12) [Nombre23], for pecuniary damage consisting of the amounts paid to the accused for lot 21, the sum of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND COLONES (2,610.000.00). For non-pecuniary damage, the sum of TWO MILLION COLONES (2,000.000.00). As legal fees, the civil defendant shall pay the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima the sum of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND COLONES (522.000.00) in its capacity as counsel for the Civil Action.” (cf. operative part of judgment 980-2018).
A review of the judgment shows that civil plaintiffs [Nombre18] and [Nombre23], through the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, filed their respective civil claims. At that time, fee decree number 36562-JP, published in the official gazette La Gaceta on 18 de mayo de 2011, was in force and remained so until 13 de agosto de 2015, when executive decree number 39078 was published in the official gazette La Gaceta, repealing executive decree number 36562. It follows from this chronology that on 23 de marzo de 2015, when the civil action for damages of plaintiffs [Nombre23] and [Nombre46] was filed, the executive decree in force was number 36562-JP, and that is the legislation that must be used to calculate the fees. Article 42 of decree 36562-JP states: “Civil Action: Fees for a civil action for damages are separate from those payable for conducting the criminal case. Counsel for the civil plaintiff shall charge fees for this action in accordance with the general fee schedule, unless otherwise agreed in writing.” Article 16 of that decree, in turn, governs the general fee schedule and states, insofar as relevant: Article 16.—General fee schedule: Ordinary, abbreviated, arbitral, possessory-injunction, or summary proceedings in civil, public-finance civil, commercial, agrarian, administrative-litigation, or tax matters, whose monetary value can be determined, shall accrue the following minimum percentages: a.Up to fifteen million colones, twenty percent (20%).
Returning to the case of each civil plaintiff, the total award for [Nombre46] was three million two hundred fifteen thousand colones (3.215.000). Accordingly, under the cited provisions of that decree, twenty percent of that amount must be awarded as attorney’s professional fees, which, after performing the corresponding arithmetic calculation, amounts to six hundred forty-three thousand colones (643.000). As the appellant correctly points out, the judgment awarded six hundred forty thousand colones (640.000) in the case of Ms. [Nombre18]. Because that calculation was erroneous, the appropriate course is to reverse the judgment on that issue and directly apply the substantive rule. A similar situation arises in the case of the injured party [Nombre74], because the total civil award amounted to four million six hundred ten thousand colones (4.610.000). Accordingly, under the cited provisions of that decree, twenty percent of the award must be granted as attorney’s professional fees, which, after performing the corresponding arithmetic calculation, amounts to nine hundred twenty-two thousand colones (922.000).
The judgment, however, awarded five hundred twenty-two thousand colones. Because that calculation was erroneous, the appropriate course is to reverse the judgment on that issue and directly apply the substantive rule. Consequently, the judgment is partially reversed concerning the determination of fees for the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, as follows. Attorney’s fees arising from the civil judgment entered against Evelio Murillo Murillo in the civil action for damages brought by [Nombre18] are set at six hundred forty-three thousand colones (643.000).
For attorney’s fees arising from the civil judgment entered against Evelio Murillo Murillo in connection with the civil action brought by [Nombre23], the amount is set at nine hundred twenty-two thousand colones (922.000).
XI.Regarding the certified copies of the record (testimonio de piezas) ordered by the Trial Court to be sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and another matter. An examination of the challenged judgment shows that, in recital X (considerando X), appearing at folio 4894, the Trial Court ordered that certified copies of the record be sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, but without indicating which alleged event should be investigated. Therefore, in connection with the remand trial (juicio de reenvío) ordered in this judgment, the Alajuela Trial Court shall, if it deems it necessary, state the grounds for that determination. In all other respects not vacated in this judgment or reversed on appeal, the trial judgment remains undisturbed.
POR TANTO:
Adriana Escalante Moncada Ana Lucrecia Hernández Chavarría José Alberto Rojas Chacón Judges of the Court of Appeals Expediente Nº 13-000452-0305-PE Against: Evelio Murillo Murillo Offense: [Nombre2] To the detriment of: [Nombre9] and others [Nombre75]
PODER JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN Tel: 2456-9069 [...]@ Fax: 24569029 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Res: 2020-00306 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SECCIÓN PRIMERA. San Ramón, a las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del veintiuno de abril de dos mil veinte.
RECURSO DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO, costarricense, documento de identidad número CED1, por el delito de [Nombre2] MENOR Y MAYOR en perjuicio de [Nombre3] Y OTROS. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces Adriana Escalante Moncada, Ana Lucrecia Hernández Chavarría y José Alberto Rojas Chacón. Se apersonan en apelación de sentencia, el licenciado Adrián Rojas Rodríguez, en calidad de Abogado de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima y los licenciados Jorge Enrique Gonzalo Villalobos y Luis Diego Salazar Gonzalo, en calidad de defensores particulares del imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo. Asimismo, la representante del Ministerio Público, la licenciada Edith Morera Rodríguez.
RESULTANDO:
Redacta la Jueza de Apelación de Sentencia Escalante Moncada; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
I.Los defensores Jorge Enrique González Villalobos y Luis Diego Salazar, interpusieron recurso de apelación contra la sentencia número 980-2018, emitida por el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela. También recurrió, el licenciado Adrián Rojas Rodríguez, en su calidad de abogado de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Victima, así como, la fiscal Edith Morera en representación del Ministerio Público.
II.Para una adecuada resolución de los diversos recursos interpuestos, se atenderán en el siguiente orden. Primeramente, se abordarán los reclamos planteados por los defensores vinculados con la responsabilidad penal del enjuiciado Evelio Murillo. De seguido se resolverá la impugnación formulada por el Ministerio Público, en la que se objeta la fundamentación de la pena. Posteriormente, se conocerán los reclamos formulados por los defensores vinculados con la condena civil. Finalmente, se conocerá la impugnación formulada por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima.
SECCIÓN I. DE LOS RECURSOS INTERPUESTOS CON OCASIÓN DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DEL IMPUTADO EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO.
III.Del recurso de apelación de los defensores contra la condena penal. Mediante el fallo 980-2018, el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela declaró al imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo, autor responsable de varios delitos de [Nombre2] y en tal carácter le impuso una pena total de tres años de prisión, así readecuada por aplicación de las reglas del concurso material de delitos. Debido a dicha condenatoria, los defensores impugnan el fallo de instancia e interponen varios motivos de apelación, los cuales para una adecuada resolución se ordenan y enumeran de la siguiente manera. Primer motivo. En este reclamo, los apelantes exponen varios reproches que se sintetizan de la siguiente forma: (i) Se cuestiona la valoración de la prueba, ya que el Colegio de Jueces de instancia, les otorgó credibilidad a las víctimas. Indica que el Tribunal de Juicio no hizo un análisis riguroso de cada uno de los testigos, sino que repite lo que cada deponente declaró en la fase plenaria, vulnerando así las reglas de la sana crítica.
Detallan que el colegio de jueces, al analizar las declaraciones de [Nombre19] , [Nombre57] y [Nombre20] , [Nombre45] , [Nombre27] , [Nombre28] , Leader [Nombre30] , [Nombre34] , [Nombre35] , [Nombre18] , [Nombre37] , [Nombre40] , [Nombre41] y [Nombre42] , utilizó el mismo estribillo para otorgarle validez a estos testigos al afirmar que declararon de forma, clara, sencilla y coherente, sin demostrar ánimo de mentir o dañar al acusado. Indican que este tipo de fundamentación no es suficiente ya que no se explica por qué se les dio credibilidad. Para fundamentar su postura, se cita el voto número 43-2018, de esta Cámara de apelación y afirman que los parámetros establecidos en dicho fallo para valorar la prueba testimonial no fueron aplicados por el Tribunal de Juicio. Refieren que el fallo se conforma con describir lo que a los jueces les parece de cada testigo, pero sin exponer los motivos por los que les otorgaron credibilidad.
Indican que estos relatos se contraponen a los contratos que cada ofendido firmó y a las deposiciones de las abogadas, pero esas contradicciones no fueron valoradas por los jueces de juicio. (ii) Indican que uno de los aspectos que se atacó en el contradictorio, fue la supuesta promesa realizada por el imputado de ofrecer un proyecto urbanístico a las víctimas, hecho que acusó el Ministerio Público, y que tuvo por acreditado el Tribunal de Juicio. Dicen que un punto debatido fue lo referente a los servicios de agua, y electricidad. Afirman que el imputado le informó a las víctimas que debían abastecerse de la paja de agua de la finca madre, y en lo atinente el servicio de luz, cada uno de ellos debía gestionarlo ante el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Fustigan que, si bien los ofendidos son personas con un rezago social, académico, y con escasa facultad de expresión, esas condiciones no pueden constituir una razón suficiente para otorgarles credibilidad, ya que este tipo de personas también pueden faltar a la verdad.
Además, afirman que el imputo Evelio Murillo no les ofreció a las víctimas un proyecto urbanístico, sino que cada uno de ellos era responsable de realizar sus construcciones. Refieren que, otro tema esencial era lo relativo a los permisos de construcción. En este punto cada uno de los testigos refirió que el imputado les indicó que podían construir, y que otras personas lo hicieron sin tener los permisos respectivos. Critica que esta versión fue aceptada sin ninguna objeción por los jueces de instancia, lo cual violenta las reglas del entendimiento humano. Para sustentar este reclamo, los apelantes transcriben extractos de las deposiciones de cada uno de los ofendidos, y luego afirman que hay un factor común en el relato de los deponentes, consiste en que ellos indicaron que al comprar el lote no existían servicios básicos, como electricidad, agua y calles, así como los demás insumos de un proyecto urbanístico.
Alegan que los ofendidos sabían que no había agua y luz, y que no se estaba ofreciendo un proyecto habitacional y en esas condiciones aceptaron la venta del lote. Fustigan que, a pesar de lo relatado por las víctimas, el Tribunal concluyó que el imputado les ofreció un proyecto urbanístico para la venta de los lotes. Indican que el error en la sentencia es tener por demostrado el hecho acusado por el Ministerio Público, y afirmar que el imputado les ofreció un proyecto urbanístico a las víctimas, sin que en esa finca existieran calles, aceras, servicios de agua y luz, que son parte de los insumos de este tipo de proyectos. Indica que el Tribunal de Juicio omitió valorar estos aspectos, y por el contario le creyó ciegamente a cada uno de ellos. Refieren que, si el imputado les ofreció un proyecto urbanístico, pero al llegar al sitio este no existía, entonces por qué compraron el lote. Indica que la respuesta es sencilla, por la facilidad de pagos, así como por la omisión de cumplir con los requisitos de permisos de construcción entre otros, pero no motivados por el supuesto ardid que tuvo por demostrado el cuerpo juzgador, consistente en el ofrecimiento de un proyecto urbanístico.
(iii) Detallan que, uno de los temas discutidos en la fase plenaria, lo fue el precio de los lotes, ya que, según la acusación, parte del ardid desplegado por el imputado fue ofrecer lotes a precios por debajo del mercado y con cuotas mensuales bajas, y estas circunstancias las tuvo por demostradas la Cámara de instancia. Indican que para la defensa este fundamento carece de sustento probatorio, por cuanto no se demostró cuál era el precio de mercado. Explican que el propio tribunal admite que sobre ese extremo no existen elementos de prueba, tales como peritajes o actas notariales, pero para demostrar ese extremo el a quo hizo alusión a las facilidades de pago, lo cual no tiene relación con ese elemento que supuestamente integraba el ardid descrito en la acusación. (iv) Afirman que, en este caso no existe perjuicio económico, ya que cada uno de los ofendidos con la compra del lote, pasó a ser codueño y por ende no hay perjuicio patrimonial.
Para sustentar este punto se cita el voto de la Sala Tercera número 580-1996, que establece el principio de compensación del lucro con el daño. Señalan que en este caso cada uno de los ofendidos pasó a ser dueño de un derecho sobre la [Dirección2] de la provincia de Alajuela. Explican que los contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes, por lo que cada ofendido es propietario de un derecho, el cual puede ser localizado ante un juez civil, según el monto y extensión que pagó cada uno de ellos, así como por la ubicación que cada persona escogió para construir, por lo que estiman que no se dio un perjuicio económico antijurídico. Indican que, en este caso, se dio una compraventa perfecta, con independencia del nombre que se le pusiera al contrato, por lo que hubo traslado del dominio, al punto que los ofendidos hipotecaron sus lotes, a pesar de que esos contratos no se hicieran en escritura pública.
Dicen que, en este caso, las hipotecas devienen en nulas por no haberse otorgado en escrituras públicas, por lo que, si las víctimas le debieran dinero al imputado, esa deuda deberá cobrarse en un juicio ordinario. De igual manera, si las víctimas requieren que el encartado les dé una escritura pública podrán acudir ante el juez civil, para que les otorgue la firma forzosa de ese documento. (v) Detallan que, en la sentencia, a partir del folio 4753, el Tribunal analiza lo relativo a los contratos firmados por cada ofendido, y concluye que entre las víctimas y la empresa Tecrem S.A, se da una compraventa perfecta, y no una opción de venta, por lo que a los agraviados les vendieron un derecho sobre la [Dirección3] . Sostienen los apelantes que la sentencia es contradictoria porque por un lado se afirma que cada ofendido adquirió un derecho sobre la referida finca, pero después se indica de forma categórica que las víctimas no llegarían a tener la propiedad sobre el lote que adquirieron.
Estiman que estas dos premisas son excluyentes entre sí, y no pueden coexistir por lo que el fallo deviene en contradictorio. Refieren que esa afirmación del Tribunal no es cierta, porque en este caso, hay personas que tienen escritura pública de sus lotes, como es el caso de [Nombre58] , quien depuso sobre esa circunstancia en la fase plenaria. Indican que otro error en el fallo, se refiere a los ofendidos que nunca contrataron directamente con el imputado. Detallan, que hay varios ofendidos que no negociaron directamente con el imputado, sino con terceras personas, por lo que, al momento de suscribirse los contratos, estas personas ya traían en su psiquis adquirir el lote, por lo que no existe un engaño por parte de los imputados. Por ello, estiman que en los casos de las víctimas [Nombre44] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre25] , [Nombre32] , [Nombre33] , [Nombre36] y [Nombre39] , se tuvo que dictar una sentencia absolutoria.
De seguido, los apelantes hacen un recuento de lo que declaró cada una de estas víctimas, en las que, según su tesis, admitieron que ellas negociaron el lote con una tercera persona, y que con el acusado solo firmaron el contrato respectivo para seguir pagando las mensualidades del lote. Indica que, en este caso, en relación con otras víctimas que también negociaron con terceras personas se dictó una sentencia absolutoria, por lo que, por estos otros hechos se debió dictar una sentencia absolutoria, por no mediar engaño por parte del imputado. Añaden que en la sentencia condenatoria se entremezclaron los casos referentes a las señoras [Nombre33] , y [Nombre39] , ya que se utiliza el testimonio de una de las testigos para sustentar la condenatoria referente al caso de la otra víctima, lo cual se confirma con revisar los folios 4821, 4822, 4851 y 4551. En el segundo motivo alegan, inobservancia al principio in dubio pro reo.
Arguyen que el Tribunal de Juicio descartó la declaración del encartado, y por el contrario, le dio credibilidad a los ofendidos, quienes afirmaron que el imputado Evelio Murillo, les había prometido un proyecto urbanístico. Objetan que se hizo un análisis lacónico de la prueba de descargo, como lo fueron los testimonios de las abogadas, en relación con los contratos que estas refrendaron, así como de los testimonios de otras personas que son vecinas del lugar, y quienes son propietarias registrales de un derecho proveniente de la finca que genera este litigio. Detallan que, el Tribunal de Juicio no confrontó el relato de Evelio Murillo con algunos contratos en los que en la cláusula octava se indica que: “Octava: La empresa TECREM S.A, no se hace responsable de rastrear y asfaltar las calles públicas, de abastecer de servicio de agua ni de electricidad. “Únicamente TECREM S.A, se compromete a tractoriar las calles” (copia textual del alegato).
Indican que, que a pesar de que el Tribunal de Juicio les restó credibilidad a las abogadas Hazel Víquez Alvarado, y Doris Céspedes Elizondo (folios 4709 y siguientes), lo cierto es que estas personas explicaron que a cada uno de los ofendidos que firmaron los contratos, ellas les leyeron el documento y se los explicaron, y si bien no les preguntaron si sabían leer o escribir, estas personas tampoco manifestaron que no supieran hacerlo. Dicen que las declaraciones de estas letradas liberan de responsabilidad al imputado Evelio Murillo, ya que estas profesionales les explicaron a los ofendidos la situación real del inmueble. Objetan que el Tribunal de Juicio le restara credibilidad a las versiones que dieron las testigos [Nombre59] , [Nombre60] , [Nombre61] , bajo el argumento de que los casos de estas personas eran diferentes a las de los otros ofendidos. Además, se afirmó que estas personas solo declararon acerca de sus contratos y negocios que pactaron con el imputado, sin que hicieran alusión a los casos de los otros ofendidos.
Estiman que, si se hubiera ponderado de forma correcta la prueba de descargo, estos testimonios sí eran relevantes, ya que se contraponen a la versión de las personas denunciantes, además estas declaraciones apoyan la tesis defensiva, ya que los compradores fueron advertidos de la situación real de la finca. Para sustentar este reproche, los apelantes trascriben extractos de las declaraciones de los testigos de descargo. En el tercer motivo (titulado en el recurso como primer motivo por el fondo), los recurrentes reclaman indebida aplicación de la ley sustantiva. Critican que el Tribunal de Juicio tuviera por demostrada la acusación del Ministerio Público. Indican que, en cada uno de los casos, en los que se emitió una condena, el Tribunal de Juicio no ponderó lo relativo al “principio de compensación del lucro con el daño” (copia textual de folio 4944), ya que estiman que cada uno de los ofendidos al formalizar el contrato, fuese este verbal o escrito, perfeccionaron una compraventa, y pasaron a ser copropietarios del derecho 001, de la finca de folio real 096824-001 de la provincia de Alajuela.
Refieren que para la configuración del delito de [Nombre2] se requiere de un perjuicio económico, pero en este caso no se da ninguna afectación patrimonial, ya que el convenio coloca a cada ofendido como codueño, por lo que no se acreditan los elementos objetivos del tipo penal de estafa, tales como, el ardid, error, disposición patrimonial y perjuicio. Afirma que, en este caso, cada uno de los lotes vendidos puede localizarse mediante las diligencias pertinentes ante el juez civil. De igual manera, afirman que las hipotecas otorgadas por los ofendidos en favor del imputado, devienen en nulas por no haberse otorgado en escritura pública, por lo que, si los ofendidos llegaran a adeudarle dinero al imputado, este deberá acudir a un juicio ordinario. Además, si los ofendidos requieren de una escritura pública, y el imputado no la otorga, pueden pedir la ejecución forzosa ante el juez civil competente.
Indica que “la forma de corregir el entuerto de los contratos erróneamente calificados, pero con contenido verdadero, es tema de otra jurisdicción o del consentimiento de las partes.”(Copia textual de folio 4946). Refieren que, el Tribunal de instancia, en el considerando V, denominado consecuencias civiles, ordena la anulación de los contratos. Afirman que el daño a los ofendidos se concretará si dicha decisión queda en firme, ya que las víctimas quedarán sin derecho real alguno en su patrimonio y no tendrán prueba para demandar la copropiedad. Añaden que, en la fase de conclusiones, se alegó la ausencia del elemento referido al perjuicio económico, pero a pesar de dicho alegato, el Colegio de Jueces de instancia, se decantó por declarar un incumplimiento contractual. Indican que si bien, la defensa en conclusiones planteó la tesis del incumplimiento contractual, el fallo no se refirió a la petitoria defensiva que fue propuesta en esa ocasión.
Explican que, en el caso del incumplimiento contractual, el acuerdo no se cumple, por causas o circunstancias que se dan después de la formalización del contrato. En cambio, en el caso de la estafa, lo característico es que, desde el inicio de las negociaciones, la persona acusada no ha tenido la intención de cumplir con lo pactado en el convenio. Indican que aún si se admitiera la postura del Tribunal de Juicio, de que el imputado les ofreció a los ofendidos un proyecto urbanístico, lo cierto es que, cada una de estas personas adquirió un lote y construyeron sus casas, por lo que no puede hablarse de perjuicio. Además, debido a lo ordenado en el fallo, para que la Municipalidad de Alajuela intervenga, esa circunstancia desvirtuaría la comisión de un delito de estafa. Señalan que de conformidad con el artículo 35 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana número 4240 del 1 de noviembre de 1968, le permite a las partes demandar en la vía civil la rescisión y la reparación civil, por lo que estima que era en aquella otra vía y no en la sede penal, en la que se tuvo que ventilar este proceso.
En el cuarto motivo (titulado en el recurso como segundo motivo por el fondo). Sostienen que, en conclusiones, se alegó un error de prohibición por parte de su defendido, debido a que este actuó bajo el asesoramiento de varios profesionales en derecho, quienes redactaron y refrendaron los contratos. Indica que, en relación con esa tesis defensiva, el Tribunal de Juicio no emitió criterio alguno. Añaden que, en la sentencia, el Tribunal de Juicio reconoció la escasa escolaridad que tiene el imputado Evelio Murillo, pero aun así, le atribuyó responsabilidad penal, debido a su inteligencia y aptitud para el comercio. Explican que, en este caso, el imputado Evelio Murillo fue asesorado por una abogada, por lo que no se le podía exigir que conociera el trámite y requisitos para la segregación de lotes, tales como un plano catastrado, y los respectivos visados municipales. Indica que la idea del imputado era vender lotes en derechos, y que era obligación de los profesionales, asesorar a las partes que contratan sus servicios.
Destacan que el imputado declaró que las negociaciones las hizo de buena fe y que para esa época él no tenía ningún conocimiento en cuanto a la temática de vender terrenos. Para apoyar este reclamo, los apelantes transcriben parte de la declaración del acusado, para concluir que su defendido actuó bajo la asesoría de abogados, y que el conocimiento del encausado en este tipo de negociones era nulo, y que era deber del profesional en derecho advertir de las situaciones propias de este tipo de negocios. Refieren que el imputado en el ejercicio de su defensa material declaró que él siempre tuvo en mente vender lotes en derechos, para que personas sin acceso a crédito bancario, o bonos de la vivienda, pudiesen construir una casa. Concluyen indicando que, en este caso, no se configura el delito de estafa, y se valore la aplicación de lo regulado en el artículo 35 del Código Penal
VI.Del recurso del Ministerio Público. La licenciada Edith Morera Rodríguez, en el único motivo de apelación objeta la fundamentación de la pena. Indica que en este caso el Ministerio Público solicito la sanción de un año de cárcel por cada delito de [Nombre2] menor, así como la pena de tres años de prisión por cada delito de [Nombre2] mayor. Sostiene que a pesar de que realizó conclusiones motivadas y sustentando así la pretensión punitiva del órgano acusador, el Tribunal de juicio, sin mayor sustentación impuso penas muy leves a pesar de la gravedad de los hechos. Detalla que la Fiscalía explicó que, en cada uno de los treinta delitos de estafa, el imputado se aprovechó de los ofendidos específicamente de sus condiciones personales sociales y económicas ya que eran personas con escasos recursos económicos con baja escolaridad, así como personas que carecían de acceso al sistema financiero nacional, tanto por su posición económica como por su estatus migratorio, y que el 90% de los ofendidos son personas de nacionalidad nicaragüense.
Indica que no se tomó en consideración esas condiciones personales de las víctimas ni la gravedad de las consecuencias que los hechos ejecutados por el imputado tuvieron en la vida de los ofendidos. Alude a que el imputado utilizando la astucia que tiene para sus negocios se aprovechó de la vulnerabilidad de las víctimas y de la confianza que se depositó en él y entró en negociaciones con las víctimas, para la adquisición de un terreno, en el cual estas personas podrían construir una casa y tener una vivienda propia. Reitera que, en este asunto, se debe de dimensionar la magnitud del daño causado que va más allá del patrimonial, sino también, el psicológico, ya que las víctimas viven en la incertidumbre de no saber si llegarán a tener tan siquiera un terreno propio. En cuanto a la conducta posterior del agente, fustiga que el Tribunal de juicio no analizo qué aún 5 años después de cometido el hecho, el imputado no has realizado ningún acto tendiente a reparar el perjuicio ocasionado a las víctimas.
En este sentido indica que el justiciable no se ha dignado en garantizar a los ocupantes de esas viviendas los servicios básicos de luz y agua, ya que en la actualidad el agua es suministrada a través de un pozo del cual se desconoce si dicho líquido es potable. Refiere que el Tribunal de juicio optó por un argumento de conmiseración, para motivar la sanción, al referir que el imputado es una persona de 59 años y que tenía escasa escolaridad. Detalla que este argumentó se convierte en contradictorio, porque la Cámara de Juicio también tuvo por demostrado que el acusado era una persona con conocimientos amplios en materia comercial y que tenía una agilidad para los negocios, en virtud de la empresa que él manejaba. Considera que la pena impuesta no es proporcional con el daño que se le causó a las víctimas, tanto en lo económico como social, psicológico que sufrió cada persona afectada. Explica que el Tribunal de juicio impuso una pena de un año de prisión por las estafas mayores lo que conllevó a que por las reglas del concurso material, la penalidad final se fijará en 3 años de prisión, esto permitió que al justiciable se le otorgará el beneficio ejecución condicional de la pena.
Indica que la sentencia no permite comprender cuáles fueron los parámetros que se utilizaron para imponer las sanciones en cada uno de los casos. Solicita se anule únicamente la pena impuesta al imputado manteniéndose los demás extremos del fallo de instancia y que se disponga el juicio debe envío en cuanto a este extremo únicamente. Con lugar el recurso. Examinado el fallo, se desprende que le asiste razón a la parte recurrente, debido a que la pena impuesta no contiene una adecuada fundamentación. Al respecto, la Cámara de Juicio, para establecer la sanción indicó lo siguiente: “VIII. Sanción aplicable: Precisamente en consideración a los elementos objetivos, subjetivos, de modo, tiempo y lugar, tal y como lo prevé el numeral 71 del Código Penal para fijar el monto de la pena a imponer se toma en consideración las siguientes circunstancias. El imputado es una persona de cincuenta y nueve años, de muy escasa escolaridad, dado que desde la indagatoria y en el propio contradictorio se supo que llegó hasta tercer grado de la Escuela, pero pese a ello, es una persona inteligente y zagas, con buen ojo para los negocios, de sus propias palabras sabemos que transportaba hierro hacia panamá con sus camiones, es dueña de la empresa TECREM, según lo dijo también tenía a su haber muchísimos camiones, que transporta materiales para ser fundidos hacia Guatemala, sus negocios y bienes no se quedan ahí, dado que con la información obtenida en el debate, tiene varios complejos de apartamentos, dice ser comerciante, con un salario promedio de dos millones de colones al mes y que le “entra” a cualquier negocio, la venta de un carro, de una moto e incluso la compra de una propiedad de más de diecinueve mil metros cuadrados, indicó que compró una casa, la cual usufructuó su hija por varios años y que luego nada más la pierde; pero es que aquí no se queda la situación de carácter económico, tenemos que para la compra de la finca donde él desarrolló el proyecto habitacional informal llamado “Bella Vista”, invirtió comprando el derecho cero cero seis; luego, sobre la misma finca, invirtió en ella al menos noventa millones de colones en un pozo y doscientos millones de colones en una carretera, además que como lo dijo [Nombre70] , Murillo Murillo tiene otro proyecto parecido a Bella Vista en San Rafael de Alajuela.
Por otro lado, en este asunto se han visto involucrados al menos cuarenta y seis personas como posibles ofendidas, cada uno con una afectación emocional y económica. El imputado no ha detenido su actividad ilícita en el proyecto Bella Vista, sino que perforó y explotó un pozo de más de cien metros de profundidad, con los más rudimentarios métodos, sin que se determine en autos la viabilidad, pureza y calidad del agua que distribuye en el proyecto urbanístico “Bella Vista” , agua que abastece a más de ciento cincuenta casas del lugar, y que explota, dado que cobra por la misma, sin que medie para ello una concesión o permiso, ello se observó de los documentos que la fiscalía trajo como prueba para mejor resolver. Los ofendidos confiaban y pagaron sumas importantes con la idea de obtener o cumplir un sueño, construir su casa, se valió el imputado de que los ofendidos son de escasos recursos económicos y escasa escolaridad, que no han logrado, introspectar que fue lo que adquirieron; Murillo Murillo abusó de la confianza de estas personas y los perjudicó patrimonialmente, abuso del derecho pues utilizó un instrumento jurídico como es el contratos, pues fue un medio en su plan, los contratos se celebraban en la ciudad de Alajuela, en oficinas de varios abogados, mostrando con ello una supuesta viabilidad y legalidad del ofrecimiento realizado.
El señor Murillo Murillo pudo en un momento determinado se encontraba en condiciones de adecuar su conducta al ordenamiento jurídico, sin embargo, decide apartarse de las leyes y estafar a las víctimas. Todos estos hechos acreditados concurren materialmente entre sí, son acciones independientes y de acuerdo con el artículo 76 del código penal lo procedente es aplicar la pena correspondiente a cada delito siempre que la sumatoria no exceda el triple de la mayor” (copia textual de folios 4855 y 4856). A partir de esta fundamentación, el Tribunal le impone la pena de ocho meses de prisión por cada delito de [Nombre2] menor, cometido en perjuicio de veintisiete personas. Esta argumentación para la fijación de la pena resulta insuficiente, porque no se ponderó las condiciones objetivas que mediaron en la ejecución del delito, como por ejemplo la forma de ejecución del ardid. Tampoco se analizó la magnitud del daño causado, ni las condiciones personales de las víctimas, en el tanto estas incidieron en la ejecución de la actividad delictiva.
En este sentido, se tiene que en el apartado de la fundamentación intelectiva, así como el en acápite de la calificación jurídica, el Tribunal de Juicio, hace alusión a los diversos actos que ejecutó el encartado, tales como ofrecer los lotes públicamente, mostrar el terreno a las víctimas, elaborar un plan de financiamiento económico que no requería de la acreditación de requisitos relativos a la capacidad financiera, para hacerlo atractivo a los interesados, así como confeccionar un documento denominado “contrato recíproco de opción de compra venta”, para darle a las víctimas una falsa seguridad de que la venta del lote era conforme a derecho, además de crear en cada una de ellas, la falsa expectativa de que una vez finalizado el plan de pagos, serían dueñas de un terreno. Estas condiciones que quedaron demostradas en el fallo, no se apreciaron para efectos de la ponderación de la pena, ya que ni siquiera se hace alusión a ellas, por lo que se desconoce en qué medida estas condiciones fácticas fueron valoradas para la fundamentación de la sanción.
Adicionalmente, advierte este Tribunal de Apelación que, conforme con el cuadro de hechos probados, se tiene que son diversos los montos patrimoniales que cada una de las víctimas dispuso en favor del imputado, siendo que de la fundamentación que se hace para la imposición de la pena, no se comprende cuáles parámetros se consideraron para imponer una sanción de ocho meses de prisión de forma generalizada, si hay ofendidos cuyo perjuicio económico fue mayor al de otros. Por ejemplo, en el caso de la agraviada [Nombre3] , se demostró un perjuicio de 770.000 colones, y para el caso del ofendido [Nombre21] , la defraudación económica ascendió a la suma de 2.430.000. En este sentido, la imposición generalizada de ocho meses de prisión por cada uno de los delitos de [Nombre2] menor que se tuvo por acreditado, lo que evidencia es que no se hizo un examen en el que se analizara de forma particular cada uno de los casos, así como el perjuicio individual que se causó a cada ofendido.
Asimismo, se advierte, que tampoco se ponderó para efectos de la imposición de la pena, que, en algunos casos, los ofendidos no construyeron edificación alguna en el terreno, pero en el caso de otras víctimas, quienes debido al ardid desplegado por el encartado de indicarles que se podía construir, hicieron inversiones para edificar una vivienda. No obstante, estas otras circunstancias tampoco se reflejan en la fundamentación de la sanción. Una situación similar ocurre, para el caso de las condenas emitidas por los delitos de [Nombre2] mayor, en los cuales de forma generalizada se impuso una pena de un año de prisión, sin que se analizara de forma individual cada caso, a fin de ponderar el daño económico que, de forma individual, el imputado le causó a cada una de esas personas. Por las falencias que contiene el fallo, se impone anular parcialmente la sentencia, en lo que respecta a la fundamentación de la pena. En consecuencia, se anula la totalidad de pena impuesta al encartado Evelio Murillo Murillo, y se ordena el juicio de reenvío para la sustanciación de ese extremo.
VII.Esta Cámara de Apelación, con ocasión de la revisión de los reclamos planteados por la defensa contra la condena penal, advierte de la existencia de un error particular, el cual, si bien no fue alegado en concreto por la parte, por el vicio que contiene, este Tribunal de Apelación procede a pronunciarse de oficio sobre este. Según consta en la parte dispositiva de la sentencia, al imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo, se le condenó por un total de 27 delitos de [Nombre2] menor, entre los que se incluyó el caso del ofendido [Nombre29] , y por estos hechos se impuso una condena de ocho meses de prisión. Ahora bien, en el sumario de prueba a folio 4560, se observa el resumen de lo que dicha persona declaró en el contradictorio. No obstante, al revisarse la fundamentación intelectiva del fallo, se tiene que la Cámara de Juicio omitió efectuar un análisis intelectivo en relación con los hechos acusados y relacionados con esta víctima.
En efecto, la fundamentación intelectiva se desarrolló caso por caso, y abarcó al resto de los ofendidos, no así lo que corresponde con el ofendido [Nombre29] , por lo que no existe un análisis de la prueba relativa a esta víctima, por lo que la pena impuesta de ocho meses de prisión por estos hechos, deviene en infundada. En consecuencia, se anula parcialmente la sentencia, únicamente en lo que respecta a los hechos acusados y relacionados con el caso del ofendido [Nombre29] , por lo que se ordena el juicio de reenvío para la sustanciación de esos hechos.
SECCIÓN II DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL
Antecedentes. De previo a conocer de los reclamos civiles planteados por los defensores del encartado contra la condena civil emitida para el imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo y la empresa Tecrem S.A, así como los alegatos formulados por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, es necesario repasar los antecedentes de este proceso, toda vez que la sentencia que ahora se impugna proviene de un juicio de reenvío. En este orden de ideas se tiene que, mediante sentencia número 154-2016 de las 15:00 horas del 16 de marzo de 2016, el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela, en lo que respecta a la parte civil dispuso: “SOBRE LA ACCIÓN CIVIL RESARCITORIA: Se declara con lugar la Acción Civil Resarcitoria interpuesta por los actores civiles [Nombre20] , [Nombre44] , [Nombre45] , [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] , [Nombre23] , [Nombre46] , [Nombre24] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre26] , [Nombre27] , [Nombre67] , [Nombre28] , [Nombre32] , [Nombre34] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre17] , [Nombre47] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre71] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] , contra el demandado civil EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO y el tercero civil demandado TECREM S.A., a quienes se condena a pagar los siguientes rubros en forma solidaria:
IX.Del recurso interpuesto por los defensores contra la condena civil. En el recurso, los defensores, titulan uno de los motivos como “acción civil resarcitoria”, el cual para efectos de este fallo se numera como quinto motivo. En este apartado los defensores objetan la condenatoria civil que recayó contra su representado Evelio Murillo, así como contra la empresa Tecrem S.A, para lo cual arguyen los siguientes alegatos. Indica que la condena contra su representado y contra la sociedad anónima, se sustentó en que el Tribunal tuvo por establecido el delito de estafa, ilicitud que en su criterio no se configuró, según los reclamos que se expusieron en los anteriores motivos. Indica que, en las acciones civiles incoadas por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, el criterio de responsabilidad que fundó esas demandas lo fue por la comisión de un hecho delictivo, y que no se reclamó el incumplimiento contractual, u otro ilícito de carácter civil.
Indica que en virtud de que la pretensión formulada en el recurso es que se absuelva a su defendido de toda pena y responsabilidad, se tendrá que declarar en alzada, sin lugar las demandas, toda vez que las acciones civiles, son subsidiarias a la acción penal, y al no existir delito, no puede sostenerse la condenatoria civil de sus representados. De seguido expresan su oposición y rechazo a cada una de las partidas que se otorgó en la condena civil. Fustigan que se condenara en abstracto al pago del monto correspondiente a las construcciones realizadas por estos. Indica que esta condena es arbitraria, ya que una persona no puede construir sin los permisos respectivos expedidos por la Municipalidad de Alajuela, pero aun así los actores civiles construyeron sin ese requisito fundamental, y sin que los demandados civiles, se hayan comprometido de forma directa o en el contrato a obtener esos permisos.
De igual manera, objetan la exoneración del pago de costas a los actores civiles que desistieron de sus demandas. Al respecto, indican que el fallo dice que no se da la condena en costas por cuanto existió buena fe en el litigio. Indica que ese es el único razonamiento utilizado para fundamentar la exoneración en costas, sin explicarse en qué consistió esa buena fe. Indica que el artículo 384 del Código Procesal Penal es claro, que el desistimiento expreso trae como consecuencia la condena en costas. Refieren que durante el juicio, ninguno de los actores civiles que desistió de su demanda convino con el imputado que se les eximiera del pago de ese rubro, por lo que solicita se condene el alzada, a los actores civiles que desistieron de sus demandas al pago de las costas, a saber, [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre50] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre72] , Stanley Méndez González, Maritza Silva Catín, Jorge Luis Cerdas Campos, Donald Vargas y Shirley Mora Solano.
Añaden que en sentencia se declaró la nulidad de los contratos, por lo que solicita que si en alzada, se resuelven con lugar los motivos de fondo o forma, se debería anular la ineficacia decretada de dichos contratos, ya que el sustento de esa nulidad fue la condena penal. Explican que, al declararse la nulidad de dichos contratos, los perjudicados serán los ofendidos, quienes verán disminuido su patrimonio. Solicitan se anule la sentencia y se ordene un nuevo juicio, o se resuelva por el fondo los reclamos y se absuelva a su defendido de toda pena y responsabilidad al ser la conducta atípica. En este motivo los apelantes, invocas reclamos diversos, los cuales se atenderán según el tema del que se trate. De la condena civil. Sobre este punto. Lo primero que hay que indicar es que, en el recurso, los defensores hacen alegatos aludiendo tanto a la responsabilidad civil del encartado Evelio Murillo Murillo, como para la empresa Tecrem S.A. No obstante, como se explicó en el considerando VIII de este fallo, la responsabilidad civil para la empresa Tecrem S.A, quedó fijada desde la emisión del voto 2017-142, con las salvedades antes explicadas, por lo que ahora, no se puede venir a discutir esos aspectos nuevamente.
Además, en el juicio de reenvío que da origen a la sentencia que ahora se impugna, el Tribunal de Alajuela, se pronunció en lo que respecta a la responsabilidad civil de la empresa Tecrem S.A, en aquellos aspectos que habían sido dispuestos por este Tribunal de Apelación en el voto 2017-142, por lo que el reclamo de los defensores se atenderá dentro de ese marco de competencia. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el motivo en los términos que se dirán. Los defensores al formular su planteamiento parten de una premisa equivocada al estimar que a su representado no le asiste responsabilidad penal, lo cual es equivocado, porque conforme se analizó en los considerados precedentes la responsabilidad penal del encausado Evelio Murillo Murillo, quedó debidamente acredita, con la salvedad de los casos de los ofendidos [Nombre33] y [Nombre29] . Ese cuadro fáctico, es el que da sustento a la condena civil que recayó contra el demandado Evelio Murillo Murillo por las diversas demandas incoadas por los actores civiles, con excepción del caso de la actora [Nombre33] , el cual será analizado más adelante.
Adicionalmente, la condena civil que se emitió contra Evelio Murillo Murillo, conforme se expresa en el fallo de instancia, tiene sustento en los numerales 41 de la Constitución Política, 103 del Código Penal y 1045 del Código Civil, por lo que el criterio de imputación subjetiva para el demandado Evelio Murillo Murillo, no solo se encuentra debidamente demostrado, sino que esa responsabilidad tiene un adecuado sustento tanto intelectivo como jurídico, sin que se adviertan errores que invaliden la determinación de dicha responsabilidad civil. En lo que respecta a la responsabilidad civil de la empresa Tecrem S.A, únicamente les asiste razón en lo relativo a la condena civil para la demanda incoada por [Nombre33] . Como ya se analizó por parte de esta Cámara de Apelación al resolver en quinto alegato invocado en el primer motivo de apelación (considerando V), es erróneo el análisis intelectivo en relación con los hechos acontecidos en perjuicio de [Nombre33] , por lo que los razonamientos vertidos en ese acápite son aplicables también al sustento de la condena civil que por ese evento recayó contra el demandado Evelio Murillo Murillo.
En este orden de ideas, y como se detalló en el considerando VIII de este fallo, en el juicio de reenvío que originó la sentencia que ahora se analiza, se debía conocer también la responsabilidad civil de la empresa Tecrem S.A, para el caso de la actora civil [Nombre33] , y por lo antes explicado, lo procedente es anular también la condena civil que recayó contra la empresa Tecrem S.A, por la acción civil incoada por [Nombre33] , por carecer de una adecuada fundamentación intelectiva el cuadro fáctico que se tuvo por demostrado en relación con esta víctima. En consecuencia, se ordena un juicio de reenvío para que se conozca nuevamente de la demanda civil incoada por la actora [Nombre33] contra el imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo y contra la empresa Tecrem S.A. De las partidas otorgadas en sentencia en favor de los actores civiles. En cuanto a la condena civil que se emitió en la sentencia, por las diversas partidas otorgadas a las víctimas, los apelantes simplemente manifiestan su inconformidad con dicha fijación, pero no ofrecen criterios objetivos que invaliden los argumentos dados por la Cámara de Juicio, para la estimación de dichos rubros.
En este sentido, en cuanto al daño material, el Tribunal ponderó los diversos documentos que fueron aportados por las víctimas, en los que se acreditaba la entrega del dinero por la compra del lote. Adicionalmente, para la fijación del daño moral, se tomó en consideración el sufrimiento y angustia que vivió cada ofendido, debido a la expectativa que tenían de que serían dueños de un terreno, sin embargo, y conforme se desarrolla ampliamente en el fallo de instancia, existe una imposibilidad jurídica para que esas personas lleguen a ser dueñas registrales de esos fundos. Finalmente, en cuanto a las partidas otorgadas en abstracto, dicha decisión es válida, porque en esos casos, si bien se acreditó que algunas víctimas habían construido viviendas en dichos terrenos, lo que no se pudo establecer a partir de parámetros objetivos, fue el monto de dicho perjuicio económico, ya que no fue posible contar con elementos de prueba que permitieran cuantificar de forma concreta el monto de dicho perjuicio, por lo que lo actuado por el Tribunal de Juicio, es válido, y por ello esos rubros deben ser fijados en la fase de ejecución de sentencia.
De igual manera, hay que mencionar que en lo atinente a la empresa Tecrem S.A, el juicio de reenvío que originó el fallo que ahora se impugna (sentencia número 980-2018), abarcaba lo relativo a los montos otorgados por daño material al ofendido [Nombre21] , y los apelantes, formulan alegatos genéricos contra las diversas partidas, sin que se concrete un agravio específico que amerite anular lo dispuesto en sentencia de instancia para esta condena civil. Al respecto, nótese que el Tribunal de Juicio otorgó por daño material la suma de dos millones quinientos veinte mil colones, correspondientes al monto del dinero pagado por el ofendido. En lo relativo al valor de las construcciones, este rubro se concedió en abstracto, y por daño moral se le otorgó la suma de dos millones de colones. Esta Cámara estima que los montos fijados de forma concreta, por daño material y moral, encuentran sustento en las pruebas, por lo que no existe motivo para invalidarlos.
De la exoneración en costas. En este apartado, los apelantes objetan que se liberó del pago de las costas a los actores civiles [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre50] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre72] , [Nombre47] , [Nombre52] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre73] y [Nombre18] , a pesar de que estas personas desistieron de sus demandas. Sin lugar el alegato. Los recurrentes parten de una premisa equivocada al indicar que un grupo de personas desistió de sus demandas. Por el contrario, revisado el fallo, se tiene que el Tribunal de Juicio en relación con este tópico indicó: “ En cuanto a las querellas, ha considerado esta autoridad que han actuado en este asunto a través del tiempo con lealtad procesal y en este caso particular con evidente buena fe procesal, tanto es así que han manifestado que si interés primordial fue satisfecho mediante la sentencia que en su parte civil se encuentra firme, sentencia que condenó a la sociedad tercera civilmente responsable TECREM S.A. misma que quien ostenta es el imputado, siendo que no desean ir mas haya dado que un proceso tan largo en el cual se han anulado varias sentencias, ya les resulta hasta perjudicial a su salud mental, con ellos cree este tribunal en pleno que no deben ser condenados en costas, igual las costas del proceso en este sentido corren a cargo del Estado.” (copia textual de folio 4851).
De lo anterior se desprende que, en el caso de estos actores civiles, con excepción de lo que más adelante se resolverá para [Nombre73] y [Nombre18] -en virtud del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima-, lo que aconteció es que se dieron por satisfechos en sus pretensiones civiles, en virtud de la condena civil que recayó en el anterior juicio contra la empresa Tecrem S.A. Como bien lo indicó el Tribunal de Juicio, ello demuestra buena fe procesal, y de ahí que era válido eximirlos del pago de costas, con ocasión de la demanda interpuesta contra Evelio Murillo Murillo, por lo que dicho alegato debe ser desestimado. De la nulidad de los contratos. Este alegato también había sido expresado por los apelantes, con ocasión de los motivos interpuestos contra la condena penal que recayó contra el imputado Evelio Murillo Murillo, y este fue resuelto por esta Cámara de Apelación en el considerando V de este fallo, por lo que se remite a los apelantes a lo allí expresado.
X.Del recurso interpuesto por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. En su primer motivo, el abogado Adrián Rojas Rodríguez objeta que se declaró sin lugar las acciones civiles interpuestas por los actores [Nombre73] y [Nombre18] . Combate la fundamentación del fallo, al estimar que no se valoró de forma correcta los testimonios de estas personas, quienes si bien relataron que en un principio negociaron el lote con una tercera persona, al final la negociación se concretó con el imputado, quien fue la persona que firmó los contratos para la venta del lote, y es a quien se le giraron los dineros correspondientes a dicho negocio. También alude que el Tribunal de Juicio, sin mayor explicación le dio credibilidad al dicho del encausado, a pesar de que la prueba documental y testimonial apoyaban la tesis de los actores civiles. Para ambos casos, solicita se anule el fallo, y se ordene el juicio de reenvío.
Con lugar el reclamo. Revisada la fundamentación del fallo en relación con el caso de [Nombre73] , la cual rola de folio 4847 al 4849 frente, se tiene que, la Cámara de Juicio sustentó su análisis principalmente en la declaración del imputado, sin entrar a analizar de forma conjunta ese relato, con el resto de las probanzas. En este punto hay que indicar que la sentencia de mérito contiene un error en la fundamentación descriptiva de la prueba, por cuanto se omitió el resumen de lo que el ofendido [Nombre73] declaró durante la fase plenaria. En este sentido consta a folio 4258 vuelto, que [Nombre73] compareció el 12 de setiembre de 2018, en la audiencia de la tarde, ante el Tribunal de Juicio y rindió su deposición, pero el Tribunal de Juicio omitió incluir dicha deposición en el sumario de prueba del fallo. Además, la breve referencia que se hace en el análisis intelectivo de lo depuesto por el ofendido [Nombre73] , es insuficiente, ya que no se evidencia un examen de la información que esta persona relató en la fase plenaria.
En este sentido, este Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, reprodujo el archivo audiovisual que contiene la deposición que esta persona (registro CED9), y advierte que [Nombre73] , dio una amplia explicación de cómo se llevó a cabo la venta de dicho lote y la intervención del encartado Evelio Murillo, además hizo referencia a los documentos que sustentaban su caso, material probatorio que no fue analizado por el Tribunal de Juicio en el fallo impugnado. En relación con el caso de la ofendida [Nombre18] , la sentencia carece de una fundamentación en lo atinente a la responsabilidad civil del encausado Evelio Murillo Murillo. En el fallo de instancia, el Tribunal de Juicio dedicó el considerando VI del fallo (cfr. folio 4842 en adelante), para fundamentar la absolutoria por el delito de [Nombre2] que se le venía atribuyendo a dicha persona, decisión que no fue impugnada por el Ministerio Público, situación que impide su revisión en alzada por parte de esta Cámara de Apelación.
En esa argumentación se expresan razones para fundamentar la existencia de una duda en lo referente a la comisión de aquella delincuencia. No obstante, en el fallo no se expresan razones atinentes para sustentar la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil que dicha víctima interpuso contra el acusado Evelio Murillo. Aquí hay que recordar que es amplia la jurisprudencia de los Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia y de la Sala Tercera, en la que se ha establecido que, aunque se dicte una absolutoria en lo atinente a la responsabilidad penal del enjuiciado, el Tribunal de mérito debe resolver lo atinente a la eventual responsabilidad civil. En este caso, en el considerando IX del fallo impuganado, únicamente se indica lo siguiente: “Se declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por los ofendidos-actores civiles [Nombre4] , [Nombre49] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre50] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] , [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] , [Nombre67] y [Nombre47] , [Nombre52] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre17] , [Nombre18] en contra del imputado demandado civil EVELIO MURILLO MURILLO, en ese sentido y por considerar que se ha litigado con buena fe procesal se le exime del pago de las costas de la acción civil” (cfr. folio 4857).
De la revisión de este extracto, se desprende que no se explicó por qué se declaró sin lugar esas acciones civiles. En este caso, la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, solo impugnó lo relativo a los actores civiles [Nombre73] -caso que ya fue analizado- y [Nombre18] , por lo que al tener de lo dispuesto por el principio dispositivo que rige la materia civil, esta Cámara de Apelación, se encuentra facultada, únicamente para resolver lo relativo a los casos sobre los que se presentó impugnación. Aclarado este aspecto, y retomando el análisis del caso de la señora [Nombre18] , es menester indicar que, en materia civil, los criterios de imputación son diversos a los utilizados en materia penal. En este caso, aunque el Tribunal descartó la comisión de un delito de estafa, delincuencia que es dolosa, el error de los jueces de instancia consistió en omitir valorar los otros criterios de imputación que establece el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, así como lo establecido en los artículos 182, 187 y 189 del Código de Comercio, que establecen la responsabilidad solidaria de los representantes de la persona jurídica cuando, con sus actuaciones o decisiones, causan un daño.
Sobre este punto, se advierte que, para el caso de la ofendida [Nombre18] , consta que esta firmó un contrato con la empresa Tecrem S.A, para la venta de un lote, y dicho documento fue suscrito por el imputado, en calidad de representante legal de dicha compañía (ver folio 3460 a 3468). Además, en virtud de dicho contrato, la ofendida le entregó dinero al acusado, como parte del plan de financiamiento de dicho lote. De igual manera, la actora civil relata, los gastos en los que incurrió para construir una casa en dicho lote. Sin embargo, esta información no fue analizada por la Cámara de instancia, lo que conlleva a que el fallo carezca de una adecuada fundamentación intelectiva y jurídica. En consecuencia, se declara con lugar el primer motivo de impugnación. Se anula parcialmente el fallo, en lo concerniente a la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil incoada por los actores civiles [Nombre73] y [Nombre18] .
En consecuencia, se ordena el juicio de reenvío para que se conozca nuevamente sobre dichos extremos. En el segundo motivo de impugnación, el apelante reclama, una indebida aplicación de la ley sustantiva. Refiere que es errónea la fijación de los honorarios que le corresponden a la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, en virtud de las acciones civiles ejercidas por [Nombre46] y [Nombre23] . En síntesis, indica que la fijación de las costas personales es equivocada, por cuanto no se utilizó el decreto de honorarios número 36562-JP, que era el que estaba vigente para el momento de la interposición de la acción civil, la cual se presentó el 23 de marzo de 2015. Solicita se revoque el fallo, y se condene al pago del monto de honorarios que fue peticionado por dicha oficina. Con lugar el reclamo. En el fallo de instancia y para lo que interesa par la resolución del reclamo planteado se indicó lo siguiente: “…9) [Nombre46] , por concepto de daño material consistente en las sumas pagadas al imputado por el lote 62, la suma de UN MILLON DOSCIENTOS QUINCE MIL COLONES (1,215.000.00).
Se condena asimismo al pago del daño material relativo a la construcción de la vivienda, daño que se reconoce en abstracto. Por concepto de daño moral la suma de DOS MILLONES DE COLONES (2,000.000.00). Por concepto de costas personales deberá el demandado civil cancelar a favor de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, la suma de SEISCIENTOS CUARENTA MIL COLONES (640.000.00) en su condición de abogada de la Acción Civil.” Además se estableció: “12) [Nombre23] , por concepto de daño material consistente en las sumas pagadas al imputado por el lote 21, la suma de DOS MILLONES SEISCIENTOS DIEZ MIL COLONES (2,610.000.00). Por concepto de daño moral la suma de DOS MILLONES DE COLONES (2,000.000.00). Por concepto de costas personales deberá el demandado civil cancelar a favor de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, la suma de QUINIENTOS VEINTIDOS MIL COLONES (522.000.00) en su condición de abogada de la Acción Civil.” (cfr. parte dispositiva del fallo 980-2018).
De la revisión del fallo, se tiene que los actores civiles [Nombre18] y [Nombre23] , por medio de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima interpusieron sus respectivas demandas civiles. Para ese momento, estaba vigente el decreto de horarios número 36562-JP, publicado en el diario oficial La Gaceta el 18 de mayo de 2011, y el cual estuvo vigente hasta el 13 de agosto de 2015, por la publicación en el periódico oficial La Gaceta del decreto ejecutivo número 39078, normativa que derogó el decreto ejecutivo número 36562. De este recuento, se tiene que para el 23 de marzo de 2015, ocasión en la que se interpuso la acción civil resarcitoria de los actores [Nombre23] y [Nombre46] , el decreto ejecutivo que estaba vigente era el número 36562-JP y es esta normativa la que debe ser utilizada para hacer el cálculo de los honorarios. Ahora bien, el artículo 42 del decreto 36562-JP, indica lo siguiente: “Acción Civil: Los honorarios por la acción civil resarcitoria son independientes de los que correspondan al trámite de la causa penal.
El Abogado (a) del actor civil cobrará honorarios por esta acción de acuerdo con la tarifa general, salvo pacto escrito en contrario”. Por su parte, en el artículo 16 de dicho decreto se regula la tarifa general, la cual en lo que interesa indica: Artículo 16.-Tarifa general: Los procesos ordinarios, abreviados, arbitrales, interdictales o sumarios, en materia civil, civil de hacienda, comercial, agraria, contencioso administrativa o tributaria, cuyo contenido económico sea determinable, devengará los siguientes porcentajes mínimos: a.Hasta quince millones de colones, veinte por ciento (20%). Retomando el caso de cada actor civil, se tiene que para [Nombre46] , el total de la condena fue por el monto de tres millones doscientos quince mil colones (3.215.000), por lo que según las normas referidas del citado decreto, por concepto de honorarios profesionales de abogado, se debe conceder el veinte por ciento de ese monto, cálculo que una vez realizada la operación aritmética correspondiente da un monto de seiscientos cuarenta y tres mil colones (643.000).
Como bien lo indica en apelante, en sentencia, para el caso de la señora [Nombre18] , el monto otorgado fue de seiscientos cuarenta mil colones (640.000). Por lo que al existir un error en dicho cálculo, lo procedente es revocar el fallo en ese extremo y aplicar de forma directa la norma sustantiva. Una situación simular, ocurre para el caso del ofendido [Nombre74] , ya que el monto total de la condenatoria civil ascendió a la suma de cuatro millones seiscientos diez mil colones (4.610.000), por lo que, según las normas referidas del citado decreto, por concepto de honorarios profesionales de abogado, se debe conceder el veinte por ciento de la condenatoria, cálculo que una vez realizada la operación aritmética correspondiente da un monto de novecientos veintidós mil colones (922.000). Sin embargo, en sentencia se concedió el monto de quinientos veintidós mil colones. Por lo que, al existir un error en dicho cálculo, lo procedente es revocar el fallo en ese extremo y aplicar de forma directa la norma sustantiva.
En consecuencia, se revoca parcialmente el fallo, en lo concerniente a la fijación por concepto de honorarios para la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, en el siguiente orden. Por honorarios de abogados por la condena civil recaída contra Evelio Murillo Murillo, por la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta por [Nombre18] , se fija la suma de seiscientos cuarenta y tres mil colones (643.000). Por honorarios de abogado por la condena civil recaída contra Evelio Murillo Murillo, por la acción civil interpuesta por [Nombre23] se fija la suma de novecientos veintidós mil colones (922.000).
XI.Del testimonio de piezas ordenado por el Tribunal de instancia ante el Ministerio Público y otro. De un examen del fallo impugnado, se desprende que, en el considerando X visible a folio 4894, el Tribunal de instancia, dispuso ordenar un testimonio de piezas ante el Ministerio Público, pero sin indicar sobre que evento presuntamente se debería realizar la investigación. Por ello, y con ocasión del juicio de reenvío que se ordena en este fallo, deberá el Tribunal de Juicio de Alajuela, en caso de estimarlo necesario, fundamentar ese extremo. En otro orden de ideas, en los aspectos no anulados en este fallo, o revocados en alzada, la sentencia de instancia permanece incólume.
POR TANTO:
Adriana Escalante Moncada Ana Lucrecia Hernández Chavarría José Alberto Rojas Chacón Jueces de Apelación de Sentencia Expediente Nº 13-000452-0305-PE Contra: Evelio Murillo Murillo Delito: [Nombre2] En perjuicio de: [Nombre9] y otros [Nombre75]
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