Ideal concurrence does not apply between invasion of protected area and usurpation of public domainConcurso ideal no aplica entre invasión de área protegida y usurpación de dominio público

**Resolution: 2019-0036** **Case File: 07-000750-0647-PE(01)** **CRIMINAL SENTENCE APPEALS COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José.** Goicoechea, at ten fifty-five hours, on the seventeenth of January of two thousand nineteen.- **APPEAL** filed in the present case against **[Name1]** , of legal age, Costa Rican, identity card number CED1, born in Nicaragua, on June 16, 1962, single, resident of San José, Tibás, **[Address1]** , **[Address2]** , for the crime of **USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ANOTHER**, to the detriment of **NATURAL RESOURCES**. Judges Giovanni Mena Artavia, Raúl Madrigal Lizano, and Alfredo Araya Vega participate in the decision on the appeal. Appearing before this court are licensed attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, private defense counsel for the accused; licensed attorney Mari Tere Vargas Molina, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Assistant Agrarian Environmental Prosecutor's Office of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José; and licensed attorney Randall Alban Aguirre Mena, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

**WHEREAS:**

**I.-** That by judgment number 478-2018, at eight thirty hours on the twenty-eighth of August of two thousand eighteen, the Trial Court of the Second Circuit of San José, resolved: **"THEREFORE:** Pursuant to Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, Articles 1, 4, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 30, 45, 50, 227 of the Criminal Code, Articles 1, 3 to 6, 11 to 13, 31, 32, 33, 142, 265, 324 et seq., 341 et seq., 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 58 subsection b) of the Ley Forestal, and Article 90 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, **IT IS RESOLVED:** I) **[Name1]** is declared the **PERPETRATOR RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE CRIME OF INVASION OF A PROTECTED AREA AND ONE CRIME OF USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN GOODS,** to the detriment of **NATURAL RESOURCES,** and she is sentenced to **ONE YEAR OF IMPRISONMENT FOR EACH CRIME, FOR A TOTAL OF TWO YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT,** a sentence she must serve, after credit for any pre-trial detention served, if any, at the location and in the manner established by the respective penitentiary regulations. As the accused meets the requirements established in Articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code, **THE BENEFIT OF CONDITIONAL EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE IS GRANTED** for a period of **THREE YEARS,** under the following conditions: 1) the sentenced person must, within four months, demolish all constructions located within the protection area of Quebrada La Cangreja, as established in the forensic expert reports, as well as take charge of removing all debris from the constructions in said zone; 2) the sentenced person must, within two years, reforest the protection zone of Quebrada La Cangreja that was invaded, under the supervision of SINAC; 3) throughout the entire period of the benefit, she must not commit a new intentional crime punishable by more than six months; otherwise, this benefit shall be revoked, and she must serve the imposed sentence effectively. Should the accused fail to comply with points one and two of the benefit, it shall be revoked, and she must serve the sentence in prison; additionally, the Municipality of Tibás must take charge of the demolition, cleaning, and reforestation of the affected zone. II) **[Name1]** is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for **ONE CRIME OF DESTRUCTION OF VEGETATION** to the detriment of **NATURAL RESOURCES,** due to the statute of limitations of the criminal action. Once the judgment is final, the corresponding communications shall be sent to the Judicial Archive, the National Institute of Criminology, and the Sentence Enforcement Court for corresponding purposes. The costs of the process for the exercise of the criminal action by the Public Prosecutor's Office are borne by the State. **THE COMPLETE SENTENCE IS NOTIFIED BY READING.** (File 07-750-647-PE) Erika Calvo Navas, Trial Judge, Trial Court of Goicoechea." (sic).

**II.-** That against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, private defense counsel for the accused, filed an appeal.

**III.-** That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

**IV.-** That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge of Criminal Sentence Appeals Mena Artavia writes; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.-** Licensed attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defense counsel for the accused [Name1], file an appeal against judgment number 478-2018 of the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at eight thirty hours on the twenty-eighth of August of two thousand eighteen. They identify their first ground for appeal as a violation of due process and the rules of sound critical judgment, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellectual reasoning in the judgment and an erroneous assessment of the body of evidence; and a violation of the rules of sound critical judgment due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. They rely on Articles 8, 10, and 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; and 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c) and d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They argue that the judgment is contradictory regarding the perpetration of the accused acts. The analysis of the evidence is limited to repeating the witnesses' depositions, without considering how much they benefit their client or the contradictions they show with the rest of the evidence. The judge overlooked the dubious and contradictory versions, whereas the accused was consistent and credible, indicating that her husband led the construction acts and she only obeyed, being forced by him. [Name2] said it was the accused's husband who gave the orders. The judge did not describe the accused's participation in such acts. Witness [Name3] said he did not know who or when built the houses; [Name4] and [Name2] spoke in plural, and the latter said he did not know who built the dwellings. The judge conjectured that after the death of the accused's husband, she continued constructing, which the witnesses did not report. It is not indicated in which of the buildings the accused lives, despite the expert evidence concluding that not all of them were in the protected area. Therefore, they request that the ground be upheld, that the accused be acquitted, or, alternatively, that the judgment be revoked and a retrial be ordered. Ground dismissed. The challengers' assertion that the judgment is contradictory in determining the perpetration of the acts was not substantiated, and is therefore merely a subjective disagreement with the outcome of the judgment. It is pointed out that the part of the depositions that benefited the accused was left unconsidered, without stating specifically what the omissions consisted of; and contradictions in the evidence are invoked without being specified. It is indicated that the accused was credible in saying that her husband led the construction acts, while she obeyed. This was not contradicted in the judgment; rather, the trial court implicitly accepts it as true. However, it is also noted that: i) thereby the accused acknowledged her participation in the crimes for which she was convicted, and ii) there was no evidence indicating that said participation was forced. The judgment states: "The accused alludes that her former partner, who has since passed away, was the person who directed the constructions, that he was the one who led everything, and that she obviously had to help him, a situation that demonstrates that the accused herself recognizes that it was they who carried out the constructions, which, although ordered and directed by her former partner, the truth is that she acknowledges her participation in the constructions, without indicating that there was any type of threat, coercion, intimidation, violence, or aggression that diminished her will; therefore, it is completely demonstrated that, despite another person directing the construction works, she agreed to them, was an active part in the erection of the buildings, as well as in the provision of the materials to build both her house and the rooms and the enclosure they made for the animals, as well as the bridge to facilitate the crossing of people over the river, this bridge being for their exclusive use" (judgment uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 4, 2018, image 22). It is clear that the leadership exercised by one person in a criminal enterprise does not exclude the liability of the co-participants, provided their participation remains voluntary, as was the case here. The accused did not indicate, nor can it be presumed, that her will had been coerced by her husband in any way. Furthermore, the participation of the accused [Name1] was duly accredited, it being clear that it was participation in a family enterprise, as stated by witnesses [Name4] and [Name2], without it being reasonable, given the magnitude of the work (which includes multiple shanties and even a bridge), to detail what each of the four family members did. Moreover, the assertion that construction continued after the death of the accused's spouse was not a conjecture by the judge, but was stated by witness [Name4] (judgment, image 8). Finally, the sanction for the crime of invasion of a protected area did not depend on establishing in which of the constructions the accused lived—although the witnesses living in the area were categorical in locating her domicile there—. The important thing was that it could be established that she participated in their construction. Hence the dismissal of the ground.- **II.-** The second claim is identified as a violation of due process and the rules of sound critical judgment, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellectual reasoning in the judgment and an erroneous assessment of the body of evidence; violation of the rules of sound critical judgment, due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. The challengers rely on Articles 8, 10, 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c and d, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They argue that the defense's thesis was based on the starting point of the measurement, and this aspect was not analyzed by the judge. Witness [Name3] said that the land did have an incline, but did not specify how much, and pointed out that measurements vary greatly depending on the water point of the river. None of the expert reports referred to the starting point of the measurement. Therefore, they request that the ground be upheld and their client be acquitted; alternatively, that the judgment be revoked and a retrial be ordered. Ground dismissed. The challengers raise as a contentious issue the point from which the measurement of the protected zone was made. Article 33 of the Ley Forestal states that a protection area shall be understood as: "...b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the land is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the land is sloped." Since the bank is the "Margin and shore of the sea or river" (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, retrieved from http://dle.rae.es/?id=WRvSDST), it is clear that the measurement must be made, as witness [Name3] indicated, from "the maximum fill point of the stream" (judgment, image 6). With these parameters, the witness could perceive the constructions between three and five meters from the protection area, an appreciation that was technically corroborated by the expansion of criminalistic analysis 07-000750-647-PE (uploaded to the virtual desktop on April 3, 2012), which clearly shows that the majority of the constructions that the accused helped build are within the protected zone. The lack of specification of the land's incline is also questioned, but this would have been relevant only if said zone had been expanded due to its sloped nature, which was not done in this case. As the recently cited report indicates, the constructions were within the ten meters of the protected zone. Hence the dismissal of the claim.- **III.-** As a third ground for challenge, disagreement with the reasoning for the sentence is alleged. The dispositions of Articles 1, 142, 143, 184, 459, and 466 to 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are claimed to have been violated, in relation to 175 and 363 of the same legal body; 71 of the Criminal Code; as well as 121 and 123 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. The appellants point out that the court did not assess the accused's personal circumstances, such as her age, health status, and family unit. There is uncertainty about the high sentence, about the reasons for punishing for two crimes instead of one, and even, knowing of its prescription. The sentence is increased for profiting from the buildings, of which there is no evidence. The way in which the conditional execution was granted is also burdensome, making compliance impossible. It was not proven that all the constructions belonged to their client. Reforestation is imposed, without indicating what reforestation acts the accused must perform; in addition, there is no evidence that she deforested. In summary, it was not reasoned why the court deviated from the minimum sentences, dubious evidentiary elements were used to aggravate the sanction, and it was not explained why punishment was imposed for two crimes and not one, violating the rules of ideal concurrence. Therefore, they request that the ground be partially upheld, the sentence be annulled, and a retrial be ordered for a new determination, should the judgment be upheld. Partially upheld. Firstly, the unjustified assertion by the appellants that there could be a single crime or an ideal concurrence must be rejected. The accused participated in the construction of a series of housing units in the protected zone of Quebrada La Cangreja. She also made, together with other relatives, a bridge that allowed them to cross the river to reach those constructions. Regarding this structure, the documentary evidence points out: "the pedestrian bridge has a structurally defective condition in its anchorages, it is affected by the water erosion process, which gives it a weak condition, in poor condition and without preventive or corrective maintenance" (report DGU 278-2011, uploaded to the virtual desktop on October 25, 2011, image 2). The public domain goods upon which the crimes were committed are distinct (the river and its bank), the actions perpetrated were carried out at different times, and there is no legal link between them. Furthermore, neither did the invasion of the protected area determine the usurpation of the stream, nor vice versa. Therefore, we are facing two distinct crimes and not one, besides the fact that no unity of action is observed between them that would allow affirming the existence of an ideal concurrence. On the other hand, the judgment elements for the valuation of the punishment, whose omission the challengers complain of, do not have the capacity to affect what was decided by the court. The accused's age is invoked as a positive factor, without explaining why a fifty-six-year-old person deserves different treatment from any other human being facing a sentence; a certain health status is alleged, for which no indicator within the evidence produced at trial is pointed out; the family group is mentioned, without explaining why its particularities would merit special consideration. However, despite the defects in the challengers' approach, it is observed that the justification for the imposed sentence is partially unsatisfactory. The judge justified her decision to deviate from the minimum end of the sanctions, in both cases, as follows: "The judge considers that the Prosecutor's request is adequate, deviating from the minimum sentence since the accused not only built constructions on a protection area but also profited from said buildings, as it was proven that she rented the rooms she built in said area, which warrants increasing the reproach, since at the expense of natural resources, invading protection areas, she had economic income, coupled with the fact that she built a bridge over a stream, to which she placed a padlock to prevent the passage of people unconnected to her interests, thereby usurping public domain goods, and it was used precisely by the people who rented the rooms that the accused built. It is also considered that the imposed sentence is consistent with the acts that have been proven; a sentence greater than the one imposed could lose its purpose, in accordance with its resocializing aims" (judgment, image 27). Certainly, the fact that the accused (along with her family group) not only built her own dwelling but also other buildings and profited from them for a considerable time, can be considered sufficient to deviate from the minimum end of the crime of invasion of a protected area, imposing the sanction of one year in prison, as was done. Contrary to what the challengers assert, there is evidence of this lucrative activity, as witness [Name2] clearly referred to the point, indicating that after the bridge's construction, about seven shanties were made for rent, one of which was even rented by a former coworker of his from the company "Plywood" (judgment, image 17). However, that argument cannot also be used to justify the increase in sentence for the crime of usurpation of public domain, whose commission had nothing to do with such buildings. On the other hand, the fact that a bridge was built over the stream cannot be taken as an element to increase the punishment, since that was precisely the manner in which the usurpation was constituted. Nor does this court comprehend the relevance of considering that a padlock was placed on the bridge. Finally, there is the fact that the usurpation of public domain provides for an alternative sanction of fine-days, regarding which there was no statement whatsoever by the trial court. Consequently, the sentence for the crime of usurpation of public domain must be annulled. Regarding the imposition of conditions for granting the benefit of conditional execution, the lower court provided no justification whatsoever. Although Article 61 of the Criminal Code allows the conditional granting of the benefit, the truth is that the imposed requirements must be duly justified to demonstrate their reasonableness and proportionality. This was not done in this case, which prevents ruling out that, as the challengers assert, impossible-to-fulfill conditions were imposed. Thus, without denying the benefit already granted, by reason of the principle of non-reform in prejudice (Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), what is appropriate is to annul the judgment inasmuch as it imposed conditions for its enjoyment, ordering a retrial so that the lower court may rule, in a reasoned manner, on them; that is, to assess whether such conditions should subsist or not. It is clear that said benefit could end up being inapplicable to the crime of usurpation of public domain if, in the retrial hearing, a sentence other than imprisonment is imposed. This, as said sentence has also been annulled. In such case, the benefit would only subsist regarding the crime of invasion of a protected area.- **THEREFORE:** The third ground of the appeal filed by the defense of [Name1] is partially upheld. The sentence with which the crime of usurpation of public domain was punished is annulled. Likewise, the conditions imposed on the accused for the granting of the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence are annulled. A retrial is ordered for a new substantiation on both points. In all other respects, the appeal is dismissed. NOTIFY.- Giovanni Mena Artavia Raúl Madrigal Lizano Alfredo Araya Vega Judges of Criminal Sentence Appeals Case File: 07-000750-0647-PE(01) Accused: [Name1] Victim: Natural resources Crime: Usurpation of public domain and another DDURANC File: 07-000750-0647-PE(01) - VOTE 2019-0036 - page: 1

II) **[Nombre1]** is acquitted of all punishment and liability for a crime of destruction of vegetation to the detriment of natural resources, due to the statute of limitations for the criminal action. Once the judgment is final, the corresponding communications shall be sent to the Judicial Archive, the National Institute of Criminology, and the Sentence Enforcement Court for whatever may correspond. The costs of the process for the exercise of the criminal action by the Public Prosecutor's Office shall be borne by the State. THE ENTIRE SENTENCE IS NOTIFIED BY READING. (Exp. 07-750-647-PE) Erika Calvo Navas, Trial Judge, Criminal Trial Court of Goicoechea." (sic).

**II.-** Against the preceding ruling, attorney Johanna Meneses Ramírez and attorney Hazel Víquez Alvarado, private defenders of the accused, filed an appeal.

**III.-** Having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the questions raised in the appeal.

**IV.-** The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Judge *Mena Artavia*; and, **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.-** Attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defenders of the accused [Nombre1], file an appeal against sentence number 478-2018 of the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, issued at eight thirty hours on August twenty-eighth, two thousand eighteen. Their **first ground** of appeal is identified as a violation of due process and the rules of sound rational criticism, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellective reasoning in the sentence and an erroneous assessment of the evidentiary record; and violation of the rules of sound criticism due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. They rely on Articles 8, 10, and 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; and 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c) and d), of the Criminal Procedure Code. They argue that the ruling is contradictory regarding the authorship of the charged acts. The analysis of the evidence is limited to repeating the statements of the witnesses, without considering how much they benefit their client or the contradictions they show with the rest of the evidence. The judge overlooked the dubious and contradictory versions, whereas the accused was consistent and credible, stating that her husband led the construction acts and she only obeyed, being forced by him. [Nombre2] stated that it was the defendant's husband who gave the orders. The judge did not describe the participation of the accused in such acts. Witness [Nombre3] said he did not know who or when built the houses; [Nombre4] and [Nombre2] spoke in the plural, and the latter said he did not know who built the dwellings. The judge conjectured that after the death of the accused's husband, she continued carrying out constructions, which the witnesses did not report. It is not indicated in which of the buildings the accused lives, even though the expert evidence concluded that not all of them were in the protected area. Therefore, they request that the ground be upheld, the accused be acquitted, or, subsidiarily, the sentence be revoked and a retrial be ordered. **Rejected.** The appellants' assertion that the ruling is contradictory in determining the authorship of the facts was not substantiated, so it does not go beyond a subjective discrepancy regarding the outcome of the sentence. They point out that the part of the statements that benefited the accused was not considered, without saying exactly what the omissions consisted of; and they invoke contradictions in the evidence that are not specified. They indicate that the accused was credible in saying that her husband led the construction acts, while she obeyed. This was not contradicted in the ruling; rather, the trial court implicitly accepts it. However, it is also noted that: **i)** by doing so, the accused acknowledged her participation in the crimes for which she was convicted and **ii)** there was no evidence indicating that such participation was forced. The sentence states: *"The accused alludes to her former partner, who has since died, being the person who directed the constructions, that he was the one who led everything, and that she obviously had to help him, a situation that demonstrates that the accused herself recognizes that it was they who carried out the buildings, which although ordered and directed by her former partner, the truth of the matter is that she recognizes her participation in the constructions, without indicating any threat, coercion, intimidation, violence, or aggression that diminished her will, therefore it is completely demonstrated that, even though another person directed the construction works, she agreed to them, she was an active part in the erection of the buildings, as well as in the provision of materials to build both her house and the rooms and the enclosure they made for the animals, as well as the bridge to facilitate the crossing of people over the river, this bridge being for their exclusive use"* (sentence uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 4, 2018, image 22). It is clear that the leadership exercised by one person in a criminal enterprise does not exclude the liability of the co-participants, as long as their participation remains voluntary, as occurred in this case. The accused did not state, nor can it be presumed, that her will was constrained by her husband in any way. Furthermore, the participation of the defendant [Nombre1] was duly credited, it being clear that it involved participation in a family enterprise, as stated by witnesses [Nombre4] and [Nombre2], without it being reasonable, dealing with a work of that magnitude (which includes multiple structures and even a bridge), to detail what each of the four family members did. Moreover, the assertion that construction continued after the death of the accused's husband was not a conjecture of the judge, but was indicated by witness [Nombre4] (sentence, image 8). Finally, the penalty for the crime of invasion of a protected area did not depend on establishing in which of the constructions the accused lived—although the witnesses living in the area were categorical in locating her domicile there—. The important thing was that it could be established that she participated in their construction. Hence the rejection of the ground.- **II.-** The **second claim** is identified as a violation of due process and the rules of sound criticism, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellective reasoning in the sentence and an erroneous assessment of the evidentiary record; violation of the rules of sound criticism, due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. The appellants rely on Articles 8, 10, 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c and d, of the Criminal Procedure Code. They argue that the defense's thesis was based on the starting point of measurement and this aspect was not analyzed by the judge. Witness [Nombre3] said that the land did have an incline, but did not specify how much, and pointed out that measurements vary greatly depending on the river's water level point. None of the expert reports referred to the starting point of measurement. Therefore, they request that the ground be upheld, their client be acquitted; subsidiarily, the sentence be revoked and a retrial be ordered. **Rejected.** The appellants raise as a contentious issue the point from which the measurement of the protected zone was made. Article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) indicates that an area of protection should be understood as: *"...b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, along the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the land is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the land is steep"*. The bank being the "Margin and shore of the sea or river" (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, retrieved from http://dle.rae.es/?id=WRvSDST), it is clear that the measurement must be made, as witness [Nombre3] indicated, from *"the maximum filling level of the creek"* (sentence, image 6). With those parameters, the witness was able to perceive the constructions between three and five meters from the protection area, an appreciation that was technically corroborated through the expansion of criminalistic analysis 07-000750-647-PE (uploaded to the virtual desktop on April 3, 2012), which clearly shows that the majority of the constructions that the accused helped to build are within the protected zone. The lack of specification of the land's incline is also questioned, but this would have been relevant only if said zone had been extended due to its steep character, which was not done in this case. As the recently cited report indicates, the constructions were within ten meters of the protected zone. Hence the rejection of the claim.- **III.-** As a **third ground** of challenge, disagreement with the reasoning for the sentence is alleged. The provisions of Articles 1, 142, 143, 184, 459, and 466 to 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code are claimed to be breached, in relation to 175 and 363 of the same regulatory body; 71 of the Penal Code; as well as 121 and 123 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. The appellants point out that the court did not assess the personal conditions of the accused, such as her age, state of health, and family nucleus. There is uncertainty about the high penalty, about the reasons for punishing for two crimes instead of one, and even, knowing about their statute of limitations. The penalty is increased for profiting from the buildings, for which there is no evidence. Also burdensome is the way in which the conditional execution was granted, making compliance impossible. It was not proven that all the constructions belonged to their client. Reforestation is imposed, without indicating what reforestation acts the accused must carry out; in addition to there being no proof that she deforested. In summary, it was not substantiated why the court departed from the minimum penalties, dubious evidence was used to aggravate the sanction, and it was not explained why punishment was imposed for two crimes and not one, violating the rules of ideal concurrence. Therefore, they request that the ground be upheld, the penalty be annulled, and a retrial be ordered for a new determination, should the conviction be upheld. **Partially upheld.** Firstly, the unjustified assertion by the appellants must be rejected that it could be a single crime or an ideal concurrence. The accused participated in the construction of a series of housing units in the protected zone of the Quebrada La Cangreja. Furthermore, she made, together with other family members, a bridge that allowed her to cross the river to reach those constructions. Regarding this structure, the documentary evidence states: *"the pedestrian bridge has a structurally defective condition in its anchorages, it is affected by the water erosion process, which gives it a weak condition, in poor state and without preventive or corrective maintenance"* (report DGU 278-2011, uploaded to the virtual desktop on October 25, 2011, image 2). The public domain assets upon which the crimes were committed are distinct (the river and its bank), the perpetrated actions were carried out at different times, and there is no legal link between them. Additionally, neither the invasion of the protected area determined the usurpation of the creek, nor vice versa. Therefore, we are facing two distinct crimes and not one, besides the fact that there is no observable unity of action between them that would allow affirming the existence of an ideal concurrence. Additionally, the judgment elements for the assessment of the punishment, whose omission is claimed by the appellants, do not have the virtue of affecting the court's decision. The accused's age is invoked as a positive factor, without explaining why a fifty-six-year-old person deserves treatment different from any other human being facing a penalty; a certain state of health is alleged, regarding which no indicator within the evidence evacuted at trial is pointed out; the family group is mentioned, without explaining why its particularities would warrant special consideration. However, despite the defects in the appellants' motion, it is observed that the justification for the imposed penalty is partially unsatisfactory. The judge justified her decision to depart from the lower end of the sanctions, in both cases, in the following way: *"The judge considers that the Prosecution's request is appropriate, departing from the minimum penalty since the accused not only proceeded to build buildings on a protection area, but also profited from said buildings, as it was proven that she rented out the rooms she built in that area, which warrants increasing the reproach, since at the expense (sic) of natural resources, invading protection areas, she had economic income, coupled with the fact that she built a bridge over a creek, on which she placed a padlock to prevent the passage of people not related to her interests, thus usurping public domain assets, and it was used precisely by the people who rented the rooms that the accused built. It is also considered that the imposed penalty is commensurate with the facts that have been proven; a penalty higher than the one imposed could lose its purpose, in accordance with its resocializing aims"* (sentence, image 27). Certainly, the fact that the defendant (together with her family group) not only built her own dwelling but also other buildings and profited from them for quite some time, can be considered sufficient to depart from the lower end of the crime of invasion of a protected area, imposing a penalty of one year in prison, as was done. Contrary to what the appellants state, there is evidence of that lucrative activity, since witness [Nombre2] referred to the point clearly, stating that after the bridge was built, about seven structures were made for rent, one of which was even rented by a former colleague of his from the company "Plywood" (sentence, image 17). However, that argument cannot also be used to justify the increase in penalty for the crime of usurpation of public domain, whose commission had nothing to do with such buildings. Furthermore, the construction of a bridge over the creek cannot be taken as an element to increase the punishment, since that was precisely the way in which the usurpation was configured. Nor does this court come to understand the relevance of considering that a padlock was placed on the bridge. Finally, there is the fact that the usurpation of public domain provides for an alternative penalty of fine-days, regarding which there was no statement whatsoever by the trial court. Consequently, the penalty for the crime of usurpation of public domain must be annulled. Regarding the imposition of conditions for granting the benefit of conditional execution, the *a quo* did not provide any justification. Although Article 61 of the Penal Code allows the conditional granting of the benefit, the truth is that the imposed requirements must be duly justified, to demonstrate their reasonableness and proportionality. This was not done in this case, which makes it impossible to rule out that, as the appellants state, conditions of impossible fulfillment were imposed. Thus, without denying the benefit already granted, by reason of the principle of non-reform in detriment (Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the appropriate course is to annul the ruling insofar as it imposed conditions for its enjoyment, ordering a retrial so that the *a quo* may rule, in a justified manner, on them; that is, to assess whether or not such conditions should subsist. It is clear that said benefit could end up being inapplicable to the crime of usurpation of public domain if, in the retrial proceeding, a penalty other than imprisonment were imposed. This, since said penalty has also been annulled. In such case, the benefit would only subsist regarding the crime of invasion of a protected area.- **POR TANTO:** The third ground of the appeal filed by the defense of [Nombre1] is partially upheld. The penalty imposed for the crime of usurpation of public domain is annulled. Likewise, the conditions imposed on the accused for granting the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence are annulled. A retrial is ordered for a new substantiation on both points. In all other respects, the appeal is rejected.

NOTIFÍQUESE.- *Giovanni Mena Artavia* *Raúl Madrigal Lizano* *Alfredo Araya Vega* *Judges of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court* Imputado: \[Name1\] Ofendido: Los recursos naturales Delito: Usurpación de dominio público y otro DDURANC 07-750-647-PE) Erika Calvo Navas, Trial Judge, Goicoechea Criminal Trial Court.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">" (sic)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">II.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">That against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, private defense counsel for the accused, filed an appeal.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">III.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">IV.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The Criminal Sentence Appeals Judge </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Mena Artavia</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> writes; and,</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">CONSIDERING:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">I.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Licensed attorneys Johanna Meneses Ramírez and Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defense counsel for the defendant [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, file an appeal against judgment number 478-2018 of the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, issued at eight hours thirty minutes on August twenty-eighth, two thousand eighteen. They identify their </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">first ground </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">of appeal as the violation of due process and the rules of sound rational criticism, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellective reasoning in the judgment and an erroneous assessment of the body of evidence; and violation of the rules of sound criticism due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. They rely on articles 8, 10, and 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; and 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c) and d), of the Criminal Procedure Code. They argue that the ruling is contradictory regarding the authorship of the accused acts. The analysis of the evidence is limited to repeating the testimonies of the witnesses, without considering how much they benefit their client or the contradictions they show with the rest of the evidence. The judge overlooked the dubious and contradictory versions, whereas the defendant was consistent and credible, stating that her husband led the construction acts and she only obeyed, being forced by him. [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">said that it was the defendant's husband who gave the orders. The judge did not describe the defendant's participation in such acts. Witness [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">said he did not know who built the houses or when; [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">spoke in the plural, and the latter said he did not know who built the dwellings. The judge conjectured that after the defendant's husband died, she continued carrying out construction, which the witnesses did not report. It is not indicated in which of the buildings the defendant resides, despite the expert evidence concluding that not all of them were in the protected area. Therefore, they request that the ground be granted, the defendant be acquitted, or, alternatively, the judgment be revoked and a retrial be ordered. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Without merit. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The appellants' assertion that the ruling is contradictory in determining the authorship of the acts was not substantiated, and therefore it amounts to nothing more than a subjective disagreement with the outcome of the judgment. They point out that the part of the testimonies that benefited the accused was left unconsidered, without stating what the omissions consisted of, concretely; and they invoke contradictions in the evidence that are not specified. They indicate that the accused was credible in saying that her husband led the construction acts, while she obeyed. This was not contradicted in the ruling; rather, the trial court implicitly accepts it as true. Nevertheless, it is also noted that: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">i)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> by that, the accused acknowledged her participation in the crimes for which she was convicted and </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">ii)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> there was no evidence whatsoever indicating that such participation was forced. The judgment states: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"The defendant alludes that her ex-partner, who is now deceased, was the person who directed the constructions, that he was the one who led everything, and that she obviously had to help him, a situation that demonstrates that the defendant herself recognizes that it was they who carried out the buildings which, although ordered and directed by her ex-partner, the truth of the matter is that she acknowledges her participation in the constructions, without indicating that there was any type of threat, coercion, intimidation, violence, or aggression that diminished her will, therefore it is completely demonstrated that, despite another person having directed the construction works, she agreed to them, was an active part in the erection of the buildings, as well as in the provision of materials to build both her house and the rooms and the enclosure they made for the animals, as well as the bridge to facilitate the crossing of people over the river, this bridge being for their exclusive use" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(judgment uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 4, 2018, image 22). It is clear that the leadership exercised by one person in a criminal enterprise does not exclude the liability of the co-participants, provided their participation remains voluntary, as was the case here. The defendant did not indicate, nor can it be presumed, that her will had been constrained by her husband in any way. Furthermore, the participation of the defendant [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">was duly accredited, it being clear that it involved participation in a family enterprise, as witnesses [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">indicated, without it being reasonable, in the case of a work of such magnitude (which includes multiple shacks and even a bridge), to detail what each of the four family members did. Additionally, the statement that construction continued after the death of the accused's husband was not a conjecture by the judge, but was indicated by witness [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(judgment, image 8). Finally, the penalty for the crime of invasion of a protected area did not depend on establishing in which of the constructions the accused resided—although the witnesses who lived in the area were categorical in locating her domicile there—. The important thing was that it could be established that she participated in its construction. Hence the rejection of the ground.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">II.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">second claim </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">is identified as the violation of due process and the rules of sound rational criticism, specifically the principle of logic and derivation, due to a lack of analytical and intellective reasoning in the judgment and an erroneous assessment of the body of evidence; violation of the rules of sound criticism, due to an erroneous assessment of the evidence. The appellants base their argument on articles 8, 10, 11.1 of the Declaration of Human Rights; 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, subsections c and d, of the Criminal Procedure Code. They argue that the defense's theory was based on the starting point of the measurement and this aspect was not analyzed by the judge. Witness [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">said that the terrain did have an incline, but did not specify how much and pointed out that the measurements vary greatly depending on the point of the river water. None of the expert reports referred to the starting point of the measurement. Therefore, they request that the ground be granted, their client be acquitted; alternatively, the judgment be revoked and a retrial be ordered. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Not granted. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The appellants raise as a contentious issue the point from which the measurement of the protected area was made. Article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) states that an area of protection must be understood as: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"...b) A strip of fifteen meters in a rural zone and ten meters in an urban zone, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the terrain is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is broken"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. The bank being the "Margin and edge of the sea or river" (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, retrieved from http://dle.rae.es/?id=WRvSDST), it is clear that the measurement must be made, as witness [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">indicated, from </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"the maximum filling level of the stream" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(judgment, image 6). With these parameters, the witness was able to perceive the constructions as being between three and five meters from the area of protection, an appreciation that was technically corroborated by the criminalistics analysis expansion 07-000750-647-PE (uploaded to the virtual desktop on April 3, 2012), which clearly shows that the majority of the constructions the accused helped to build are within the protected zone. The lack of specification regarding the terrain's incline is also questioned, but this would have been relevant if said zone had been expanded due to the broken nature of the terrain, which was not done in this case. As the aforementioned report indicates, the constructions were within ten meters of the protected zone. Hence the rejection of the claim.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">III.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">As a </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">third ground </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">of challenge, disagreement with the reasoning for the sentence is alleged. They claim that the provisions of articles 1, 142, 143, 184, 459, and 466 to 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in relation to 175 and 363 of the same normative body, have been violated; also, 71 of the Penal Code; as well as 121 and 123 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. The appellants point out that the court did not assess the defendant's personal conditions, such as her age, health status, and family nucleus. There is uncertainty about the high sentence, about the reasons for punishing for two crimes instead of one, and even, knowing of its prescription. The sentence is increased for profiting from the buildings, of which there is no proof. The way in which the conditional execution of the sentence was granted is also burdensome, making compliance impossible. It was not proven that all the constructions belonged to their client. Reforestation is imposed, without indicating which reforestation acts the accused must perform; in addition to the fact that there is no proof that she deforested. In summary, no reasoning was provided as to why the court departed from the minimum penalties, dubious evidentiary elements were used to aggravate the sanction, and it was not explained why punishment was imposed for two crimes and not one, violating the rules of the ideal concurrence of offenses. Therefore, they request that the ground be granted, the penalty be annulled, and a retrial be ordered for a new determination, in the event the judgment is upheld. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Partially granted. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Firstly, the assertion, not justified by the appellants, that it could be a single crime or an ideal concurrence of offenses must be rejected. The defendant participated in the construction of a series of housing units in the protected area of the La Cangreja Stream. She also</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">built, together with other family members, a bridge that allowed her to cross the river to reach those constructions. Regarding this structure, the documentary evidence states: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"the pedestrian bridge has a structurally defective condition in its anchors, is affected by the water erosion process, which gives it a flimsy condition, in poor condition and without preventive or corrective maintenance" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(report DGU 278-2011, uploaded to the virtual desktop on October 25, 2011, image 2). The public domain assets upon which the crimes were committed are different (the river and its bank), the actions perpetrated were carried out at different times, and there is no legal link between them. Furthermore, the invasion of the protected area neither determined the usurpation of the stream, nor vice versa. Therefore, we are dealing with two different crimes and not one, besides which no unity of action is observed between them that would allow affirming the existence of an ideal concurrence of offenses. On the other hand, the elements of judgment for the assessment of the punishment, whose omission the appellants claim, do not have the virtue of affecting what was decided by the court. The accused's age is invoked as a positive factor, without explaining why a fifty-six-year-old person deserves a different treatment than any other human being facing a penalty; a certain health status is alleged, about which no indicator within the evidence presented at trial is pointed out; the family group is mentioned, without explaining why its particularities would merit special consideration. However, despite the defects in the appellants' formulation, it is indeed observed that the justification for the imposed sentence is partially unsatisfactory. The judge justified her decision to depart from the lower end of the sanctions, in both cases, in the following manner: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"The judge considers the Fiscal request to be adequate, departing from the minimum penalty since the defendant not only proceeded to build buildings on a protection area, but she profited from said buildings, as it was proven that she rented the rooms she built in that area, which warrants increasing the reproach, since at the expense (sic) of natural resources, invading protection areas, she had economic income, coupled with the fact that she built a bridge over a stream, to which she placed a padlock to prevent the passage of people unrelated to her interests, thus usurping public domain assets, and it was used precisely by the people who rented the rooms that the defendant built. It is also considered that the penalty imposed is consistent with the facts that have been proven, a penalty greater than the one imposed could lose its purpose, in accordance with its resocializing aims" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(judgment, image 27). Certainly, the fact that the defendant (together with her family group) not only built her dwelling but also other buildings and that she profited from them for quite some time, can be considered sufficient to depart from the lower end for the crime of invasion of a protected area, imposing the sanction of one year in prison, as was done. Contrary to what the appellants state, there is indeed proof of that lucrative activity, as witness [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">clearly referred to the point, indicating that after the construction of the bridge, about seven huts were built for rent, one of which was even rented by a former colleague of his from the company "Plywood" (judgment, image 17). However, this argument cannot also be used to justify the increase in the penalty for the crime of usurpation of public domain, whose commission had nothing to do with such buildings. On the other hand, the fact that a bridge was built over the stream cannot be taken as an element to increase the punishment, since that was precisely the way in which the usurpation was configured. Nor does this court manage to understand the relevance of considering that a padlock was placed on the bridge. Finally, there is the fact that the usurpation of public domain provides for an alternative sanction of fine-days, regarding which there was no statement whatsoever by the trial court. Consequently, the penalty for the crime of usurpation of public domain must be annulled. Regarding the imposition of conditions for granting the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">a quo </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">provided no justification. While Article 61 of the Penal Code allows for the conditional granting of the benefit, the truth is that the requirements imposed must be duly justified, to demonstrate their reasonableness and proportionality. This was not done in this case, which makes it impossible to rule out that, as the appellants state, conditions impossible to fulfill were imposed. Thus, without denying the benefit already granted, based on the principle of no reform to the detriment (Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code), what is appropriate is to annul the ruling insofar as it imposed conditions for its enjoyment, ordering a retrial so that the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">a quo </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">may rule, with justification, on them; that is, to assess whether or not such conditions should subsist. It is clear that said benefit could end up being inapplicable to the crime of usurpation of public domain if, in the retrial hearing, a penalty other than imprisonment is imposed. This, since said penalty has also been annulled. In such case, the benefit would only subsist regarding the crime of invasion of a protected area.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">THEREFORE:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The third ground of the appeal filed by the defense of [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">is partially granted. The penalty with which the crime of usurpation of public domain was punished is annulled. Likewise, the conditions imposed on the defendant for granting the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence are annulled. A retrial is ordered for new substantiation on both points. In all other respects, the appeal is without merit.</span></p> NOTIFY.- Giovanni Mena Artavia Raúl Madrigal Lizano Alfredo Araya Vega Judges of Appeal for Criminal Sentences Accused: [Name1] Victim: Natural resources Crime: Usurpation of public domain and another DDURANC

Resolución: 2019-0036 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, al ser las diez horas cincuenta y cinco minutos, del diecisiete de enero de dos mil diecinueve.- RECURSO DE APELACIÓN interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1] , mayor, costarricense, cédula de identidad número CED1, nacida en Nicaragua, el 16 de junio de 1962, soltera, vecina de San José, Tibás, [Dirección1] , de [Dirección2] , , ; por el delito de USURPACIÓN DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO Y OTRO, en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso las los jueces Giovanni Mena Artavia, Raúl Madrigal Lizano y Alfredo Araya Vega. Se apersonaron en esta sede la licenciada Johanna Meneses Ramírez y la licenciada Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defensoras particulares de la encartada; la licenciada Mari Tere Vargas Molina, representante del Ministerio Público, Fiscalía Adjunta Agrario Ambiental del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José y el licenciado Randall Alban Aguirre Mena, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República.

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante sentencia número 478-2018, de las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintiocho de agosto de dos mil dieciocho, el Tribunal Penal del Segundo Circuito de San José, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, artículos 1, 4, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 30, 45, 50, 227 del Código Penal, artículos 1, 3 al 6, 11 a 13, 31, 32, 33, 142, 265, 324 y siguientes, 341 y siguientes, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal, artículo 58 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal, y artículo 90 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, SE RESUELVE: I) Se declara a [Nombre1] AUTORA RESPONSABLE DE UN DELITO DE INVASIÓN DE ÁREA PROTEGIDA Y UN DELITO DE USURPACIÓN DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO, en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES, y se le impone la pena de UN AÑO DE PRISIÓN POR CADA DELITO, PARA UN TOTAL DE DOS AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, pena que deberá descontar, previo abono de la preventiva cumplida, en caso de que exista, en el lugar y forma que establezcan los respectivos reglamentos penitenciarios. Por reunir la imputada con los requisitos establecidos en los artículos 59 y 60 del Código Penal, SE LE OTORGA EL BENEFICIO DE LA EJECUCIÓN CONDICIONAL DE LA PENA por el plazo de TRES AÑOS, bajo las siguientes condiciones: 1) deberá la sentenciada en el plazo de cuatro meses demoler todas aquellas construcciones que se encuentren dentro del área de protección de la Quebrada La Cangreja, según se establece en las pericias forenses, así como encargarse de retirar todo residuo de las construcciones de dicha zona; 2) deberá la sentenciada en el plazo de dos años, reforestar la zona de protección de la quebrada La Cangreja que fue invadida, bajo la supervisión del SINAC; 3) durante todo el periodo del beneficio, no deberá cometer nuevo delito doloso con pena superior a seis meses, caso contrario, se le revocará el presente beneficio debiendo cumplir la pena impuesta de forma efectiva. En caso de que la imputada incumpla con los puntos uno y dos del beneficio, se le revocará el mismo y deberá cumplir la pena en prisión, además, deberá la Municipalidad de Tibás encargarse de la demolición, limpieza y reforestación de la zona afectada. II) Se absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre1] DE UN DELITO DE DESTRUCCIÓN DE VEGETACIÓN en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES, por prescripción de la acción penal. Firme el fallo remítanse los comunicados correspondientes al Archivo Judicial, al Instituto Nacional de Criminología, al Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena para lo que corresponda. Son los gastos del proceso por el ejercicio de la acción penal del Ministerio Público a cargo del Estado. MEDIANTE LECTURA SE NOTIFICA LA SENTENCIA INTEGRAL. (Exp. 07-750-647-PE) Erika Calvo Navas, Jueza de Juicio, Tribunal Penal de Juicio de Goicoechea." (sic).

II.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, la licenciada Johanna Meneses Ramírez y la licenciada Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defensoras particulares de la encartada, interpusieron recurso de apelación.

III.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso de apelación.

IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el juezde Apelación de Sentencia Penal Mena Artavia; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Las licenciadas Johanna Meneses Ramírez y Hazel Víquez Alvarado, defensoras de la imputada [Nombre1] , interponen recurso de apelación contra la sentencia número 478-2018 del Tribunal Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, de las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintiocho de agosto del dos mil dieciocho. Su primer motivo de apelación lo identifican como la violación al debido proceso y las reglas de la sana crítica racional, concretamente el principio de la lógica y la derivación, al existir falta de fundamentación analítica e intelectiva de la sentencia y una errónea valoración del acervo probatorio; y violación a las reglas de la sana crítica al existir una errónea valoración de la prueba. Se amparan en los artículos 8, 10 y 11.1 de la Declaración de los Derechos Humanos; y 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, incisos c) y d), del Código Procesal Penal. Sostienen que el fallo es contradictorio en cuanto a la autoría de los hechos acusados. El análisis de la prueba se limita a repetir las deposiciones de los testigos, sin considerar cuánto benefician a su patrocinada o las contradicciones que muestran con el resto de la prueba. La jueza pasó por alto las versiones dudosas y contradictorias, en tanto que la imputada fue congruente y creíble, al indicar que su esposo encabezó los actos de la construcción y ella solo obedecía, viéndose forzada por éste. [Nombre2] dijo que era el marido de la justiciable el que daba las órdenes. La juzgadora no describió la participación de la imputada en tales actos. El testigo [Nombre3] dijo no conocer quién o cuándo construyó las casas; [Nombre4] y [Nombre2] hablaron en plural, y el último dijo que desconocía quién construyó las viviendas. La juzgadora conjeturó que después de muerto el esposo de la imputada, ésta continuó realizando construcciones, lo que no refirieron los testigos. No se indica en cuál de las edificaciones habita la imputada, a pesar de que la prueba pericial concluyó que no todas ellas estaban en el área protegida. Por ello piden se declare con lugar el motivo, se absuelva a la imputada o, subsidiariamente, se revoque la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío. Sin lugar. La afirmación de las impugnantes de que el fallo es contradictorio en la determinación de la autoría de los hechos no fue fundamentada, por lo que no pasa de ser una discrepancia subjetiva respecto al resultado de la sentencia. Se señala que se dejó de considerar la parte de las deposiciones que beneficiaban a la encartada, sin decir en qué radicaron, concretamente, las omisiones; y se invocan contradicciones en la prueba que no se precisan. Se indica que la encartada fue creíble al decir que su esposo encabezó los actos de construcción, en tanto que ella obedecía. Ello no fue contradicho en el fallo; más bien, implícitamente el tribunal de mérito lo da por cierto. No obstante, también se hace ver que: i) con ello la encartada reconoció su participación en los delitos por los que se le condenó y ii) no hubo prueba alguna que señalara que esa participación fuera forzada. Indica la sentencia: "Alude la imputada que su ex pareja, quien ya falleció, fue la persona que dirigía las construcciones, que él era el que encabezaba todo, y que ella obviamente tenía que ayudarlo, situación que demuestra que la misma imputada reconoce que fueron ellos quienes realizaron las edificaciones que si bien fueron ordenadas, dirigidas por su ex pareja, lo cierto del caso es que ella reconoce su participación en las construcciones, sin indicar que hubo algún tipo de amenaza, coacción, intimidación, violencia, agresión, que hicieran mermar su voluntad, por lo tanto queda completamente demostrado que, a pesar de que fue otra persona quien dirigió las obras de construcción, ella estuvo de acuerdo en las mismas, fue parte activa en el levantamiento de las edificaciones, así como en la provisión de los materiales para poder construir tanto su casa como los cuartos y el encierro que hicieron para los animales, así como el puente para poder facilitar el cruce de las personas por encima del río, siendo este puente de uso exclusivo de ellos" (sentencia subida al escritorio virtual el 4 de setiembre del 2018, imagen 22). Es claro que el liderazgo que ejerza una persona en una empresa delictiva no excluye la responsabilidad de los copartícipes, siempre que su participación siga siendo voluntaria, como la que se dio en este caso. La imputada no indicó, ni puede presumirse, que su voluntad hubiera estado coartada por su marido de alguna forma. Por otro lado, la participación de la justiciable [Nombre1] fue debidamente acreditada, teniéndose claro que se trató de la participación en una empresa familiar, como lo señalaron los testigos [Nombre4] y [Nombre2] , sin que sea razonable, tratándose de una obra de tal magnitud (que incluye múltiples ranchos y hasta un puente), que se detalle qué hizo cada uno de los cuatro miembros de la familia. Además, la afirmación de que se siguió construyendo después de la muerte del esposo de la encartada no fue una conjetura de la jueza, sino que lo indicó el testigo [Nombre4] (sentencia, imagen 8). Finalmente, la sanción por el delito de invasión de área protegida no dependía de que se estableciera en cuál de las construcciones habitó la encartada —aunque los testigos que vivían en la zona fueron categóricos en ubicar su domicilio ahí—. Lo importante fue que se pudo establecer que participó en su construcción. De ahí el rechazo del motivo.- II.- El segundo reclamo es identificado como la violación al debido proceso y a las reglas de la sana crítica, concretamente al principio de la lógica y la derivación, al existir falta de fundamentación analítica e intelectiva de la sentencia y una errónea valoración del acervo probatorio; violación a las reglas de la sana crítica, por una errónea valoración de la prueba. Se apoyan las impugnantes en los artículos 8, 10, 11.1 de la Declaración de los Derechos Humanos; 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 142, 363, incisos c y d, del Código Procesal Penal. Sostienen que la tesis de la defensa se basó en el punto de partida de la medición y éste aspecto no fue analizado por la juzgadora. El testigo [Nombre3] dijo que el terreno sí tenía inclinación, pero no especificó cuanta y señaló que las medidas varían mucho según el punto del agua del río. Ninguno de los peritajes se refirió al punto de inicio de la medición. Por ello piden se declare con lugar el motivo, se absuelva a su patrocinada; subsidiariamente se revoque la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío. No ha lugar. Las impugnantes plantean como cuestión polémica el punto a partir del cual se hizo la medición de la zona protegida. El artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal señala que debe entenderse por área de protección: "...b) Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado". Siendo la ribera el "Margen y orilla del mar o río" (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, recuperado desde http://dle.rae.es/?id=WRvSDST), resulta claro que la medición debe hacerse, como indicó el testigo [Nombre3] , desde "el máximo de llenado de la quebrada" (sentencia, imagen 6). Con esos parámetros, el testigo pudo percibir las construcciones entre tres y cinco metros del área de protección, apreciación que fue corroborada técnicamente mediante la ampliación de análisis criminalístico 07-000750-647-PE (subido al escritorio virtual el 3 de abril del 2012), que muestra claramente que la mayoría de las construcciones que ayudó a realizar la encartada se encuentran dentro de la zona protegida. También se cuestiona la falta de especificación de la inclinación del terreno, pero ello habría sido relevante si se hubiera ampliado dicha zona por el carácter quebrado del mismo, lo que no se hizo en este caso. Como indica el informe recién citado, las construcciones estaban dentro de los diez metros de la zona protegida. De ahí el rechazo del reclamo.- III.- Como tercer motivo de impugnación, se alega inconformidad con la fundamentación de la pena. Se alegan quebrantadas las disposiciones de los artículos 1, 142, 143, 184, 459 y 466 a 468 del Código Procesal Penal, en relación con el 175 y el 363 del mismo cuerpo normativo; 71 del Código Penal; así como 121 y 123 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Señalan las apelantes que el tribunal no valoró las condiciones personales de la imputada, como su edad, estado de salud y núcleo familiar. Hay incerteza sobre la alta pena, sobre las razones de castigar por dos delitos en vez de uno, e incluso, a sabiendas de su prescripción. Se sube la pena por lucrar con las edificaciones, de lo cual no hay prueba. También es gravosa la forma en que se concedió la ejecución condicional, haciendo imposible el cumplimiento. No se demostró que todas las construcciones fueran de su representada. Se impone reforestar, sin indicar cuáles actos de reforestación debe realizar la encartada; además de que no hay prueba de que deforestara. En síntesis, no se fundamentó por qué el tribunal se separó de las penas mínimas, se utilizaron elementos de prueba dudosos para agravar la sanción y no se explicó por qué se impuso el castigo por dos delitos y no uno, violentando las reglas del concurso ideal. Por ello piden se declare con lugar el motivo, se anule la pena y se ordene el reenvío para nueva fijación, en caso de que se mantenga la sentencia. Parcialmente con lugar. En primer lugar, debe rechazarse la afirmación, no justificada por las apelantes, de que podría estarse ante un solo delito o ante un concurso ideal. La imputada participó en la construcción de una serie de unidades habitacionales en zona protegida de la Quebrada La Cangreja. Además hizo, junto con otros familiares, un puente que le permitió atravesar el río para llegar a aquellas construcciones. Sobre esta estructura, señala la prueba documental: "el puente peatonal tiene una condición estructural defectuosa en sus anclajes, está afectado por el proceso de erosión de las aguas, lo que le da una condición endeble, en mal estado y sin mantenimiento preventivo o correctivo" (informe DGU 278-2011, subido al escritorio virtual el 25 de octubre del 2011, imagen 2). Los bienes de dominio público sobre los que recayeron los delitos son distintos (el río y su ribera), las acciones perpetradas se realizaron en momentos diferentes y no existe, desde el punto de vista jurídico, un vínculo entre ellas. Por otro lado, ni la invasión del área protegida determinó la usurpación de la quebrada, ni viceversa. Por ello estamos ante dos delitos distintos y no uno, amén de que entre ellos no se aprecia una unidad de acción que permita afirmar la existencia de un concurso ideal. Por otro lado, los elementos de juicio para la valoración del castigo, cuya omisión reclaman las impugnantes, no tienen la virtud de afectar lo decidido por el tribunal. Se invoca la edad de la encartada como factor positivo, sin explicar por qué una persona de cincuenta y seis años merece un tratamiento distinto al de cualquier otro ser humano enfrentado a una pena; se alega cierto estado de salud, sobre el cual no se señala indicador alguno dentro de la prueba evacuada en juicio; se menciona el grupo familiar, sin explicar por qué sus particularidades ameritarían una consideración especial. No obstante, a pesar de los defectos del planteamiento de las impugnantes, sí se aprecia que la justificación de la pena impuesta es parcialmente insatisfactoria. La jueza justificó su decisión de separarse del extremo menor de las sanciones, en ambos casos, de la siguiente forma: "Estima la juzgadora que la petición Fiscal es adecuada, apartándose de la pena mínima puesto que no solamente procedió la imputada a construir edificaciones sobre un área de protección, sino que lucró con dichas edificaciones, pues se tuvo por demostrado que ella alquilaba los cuartos que construyó en dicha área, lo que amerita aumentar el reproche, puesto que a costas (sic) de recursos naturales, invadiendo áreas de protección, tenía ingresos económicos, aunado al hecho de que construyó un puente sobre una quebrada, mismo que le colocó un candado para impedir el paso de personas ajenas a sus intereses, usurpando así bienes de dominio público, y era usado precisamente por las personas que alquilaban los cuartos que la imputada construyó. Se considera también que la pena impuesta es acorde con los hechos que se han tenido por demostrados, una pena mayor a la impuesta podría perder su finalidad, de acuerdo con los fines resocializadores de la misma" (sentencia, imagen 27). Ciertamente, el hecho de que la justiciable (junto con su grupo familiar) no solo construyera su habitación sino además otras edificaciones y que lucrara con ellas por bastante tiempo, puede considerarse suficiente para separarse del extremo menor del delito de invasión de área protegida, imponiendo la sanción de un año de cárcel, como se hizo. Contrario a lo que afirman las impugnantes, sí existe prueba de esa actividad lucrativa, ya que el testigo [Nombre2] se refirió al punto claramente, al indicar que después de la realización del puente se hicieron unos siete ranchos para alquilar, uno de los cuales incluso fue arrendado por un ex compañero suyo de la empresa "Plywood" (sentencia, imagen 17). No obstante, ese argumento no puede utilizarse también para justificar el aumento de pena por el delito de usurpación de dominio público, cuya comisión no tuvo nada que ver con tales edificaciones. Por otro lado, no puede tomarse como elemento para aumentar el castigo el que se hubiera construido un puente sobre la quebrada, ya que precisamente esa fue la forma en que se configuró la usurpación. Tampoco llega a comprender este tribunal la relevancia de considerar que se hubiera puesto un candado en el puente. Finalmente está el hecho de que la usurpación de dominio público tiene prevista una sanción alternativa de días multa, respecto a la cual no hubo manifestación alguna por parte del tribunal de mérito. En consecuencia, la pena por el delito de usurpación de dominio público debe anularse. En cuanto a la imposición de condiciones para el otorgamiento del beneficio de ejecución condicional, el a quo no aportó justificación alguna. Si bien el artículo 61 del Código Penal permite el otorgamiento condicionado del beneficio, lo cierto es que los requisitos impuestos deben ser debidamente justificados, para demostrar su razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Ello no se hizo en este caso, lo que impide descartar que, como afirman las impugnantes, se hayan impuesto condiciones de imposible cumplimiento. Así, sin denegar el beneficio ya otorgado, en razón del principio de no reforma en perjuicio (artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal), lo que corresponde es anular el fallo en cuanto impuso condiciones para su disfrute, ordenando el reenvío para que el a quo se pronuncie, en forma justificada, sobre ellas; es decir, para que valore si deben subsistir o no tales condiciones. Es claro que dicho beneficio podría terminar siendo inaplicable al delito de usurpación de dominio público si en el juicio de reenvío se impusiera una pena distinta a la prisión. Ello, en tanto se ha anulado también dicha pena. En tal caso, solo subsistiría el beneficio respecto al delito de invasión de área protegida.-

POR TANTO:

Se declara parcialmente con lugar el tercer motivo del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la defensa de [Nombre1] . Se anula la pena con que se castigó el delito de usurpación de dominio público. Asimismo, se anulan las condiciones impuestas a la imputada para el otorgamiento del beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena. Se ordena el reenvío para nueva sustanciación sobre ambos puntos. En lo demás, sin lugar el recurso. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Giovanni Mena Artavia Raúl Madrigal Lizano Alfredo Araya Vega Jueces de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Imputado: [Nombre1] Ofendido: Los recursos naturales Delito: Usurpación de dominio público y otro DDURANC