Omission of restitution in conviction for protected area invasionOmisión de restitución en condena por invasión de área de protección

*120000360359PE* **Expediente:** 12-000036-0359-PE **Contra:** [Nombre1] **Delito:** Invasión de Área de Protección **Ofendido:** Los Recursos Naturales **Res:** 2019-031 **Exp:** 12-000036-0359-PE **TRIBUNAL DE APELACION DE SENTENCIA PENAL DE CARTAGO. SECCIÓN SEGUNDA.** At fourteen hours and thirty-six minutes on the thirty-first of January of the year two thousand nineteen.- **Appeal** filed in the present case against **[Nombre1]** , an adult, born on the thirtieth of September of nineteen hundred sixty-seven, with identity card number CED1- - , for the crime of **Invasión de Área de Protección**, to the detriment of **Los Recursos Naturales**. Judges Xiomara Gutiérrez Cruz, as well as Marco Mairena Navarro and Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez, participate in the decision of the appeal. Licensed attorney Margot Avellán Ruíz appeared in the appeal in her capacity as Procuradora Penal.

**Resultando:** **1.** That by oral judgment No. 177-2018, at seven hours and thirty minutes on the thirty-first of August of the year two thousand eighteen, the Tribunal Penal de Cartago, Sede Turrialba, resolved: *"**POR TANTO:** In accordance with the foregoing, Article 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política, 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1, 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 to 15, 184 and following, 373 to 375 of the Código Procesal Penal, 1, 4, 11, 30, 31, 45, 50, 59, 60, 62, 71, 73 and 74 of the Código Penal, 58 subsection a) in relation to 33 of the Ley Forestal, this Tribunal Penal resolves: To accept the Procedimiento Especial Abreviado and declare* **[Nombre1]** *, the responsible author of a crime of* **INVASIÓN DE ÁREA PROTECCIÓN** *, committed to the detriment of* **LOS RECURSOS NATURALES** *, and in that capacity, the penalty of* **TWO MONTHS OF PRISON** *is imposed, a penalty that must be served in the place and manner determined by prison regulations, after crediting any pretrial detention suffered for these facts, if any.* *As he qualifies for it, the convicted person* **[Nombre1]** *is granted the* **BENEFIT OF CONDITIONAL EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS** *. If during said period the convicted person* **[Nombre1]** *commits a new intentional crime punishable by more than six months of imprisonment, the benefit granted here will be revoked, and he must effectively serve the prison sentence imposed here in the place and manner determined by the respective penitentiary regulations then in force, without further liabilities.* *The cessation of any precautionary measure that, by reason of this case, has been ordered against the convicted person* **[Nombre1]** *is ordered.* *Once the judgment is final, in accordance with Law Number 6106, Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso and its regulations, the destruction of any seized property that is not susceptible to return or donation is ordered. Once the judgment is final, it shall be registered in the Registro Judicial, and certified copies shall be sent to the Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena and the Instituto Nacional de Criminología for their respective duties. The costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the State. As the present judgment has been delivered orally, the parties are hereby notified in this act, and the digital medium containing the entirety of the judgment is made available to them. Juan Carlos Carrillo Mora. Trial Judge. Tribunal Penal de Cartago, Sede Turrialba"* **2.** That against the preceding ruling, licensed attorney Margot Avellán Ruíz filed the appeal.

**3.** That after conducting the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 466 of the Código Procesal Penal, amended by Law 8837 published on the ninth of December two thousand eleven (Creation of the Appeal of the Judgment), the Tribunal considered the questions raised in the appeal.

**4.** That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.

Judge of Appeal, Xiomara Gutiérrez Cruz, reports.

**CONSIDERANDO:** **ÚNICO.** Licensed attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, Procuradora Penal duly appearing in the process, timely and in proper form, challenges judgment Number 177-2018 of the Tribunal Penal de Cartago, Sede Turrialba, delivered at seven hours and thirty minutes on the thirty-first of August of the year two thousand eighteen, in an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado) by which the accused [Nombre1] was sentenced to a penalty of two months of imprisonment for a crime of Invasión de Área de Protección to the detriment of natural resources, and was granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. In the sole ground of her challenge, she alleges a lack of substantiation in the judgment, in violation of Article 142 of the Código Procesal Penal. She bases her reproach on Articles 50 of the Constitución Política, 103 of the Código Penal, 122 and 123 of the Vigent Rules on Civil Liability of the Código Penal of 1941, 140 and 466 of the Código Procesal Penal, 99 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, and 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal. She alleges that the Tribunal issued a conviction as a result of an abbreviated procedure and deemed the commission of the crime of invasion of a protection area by the accused to be proven, despite which it did not rule on the restitution of things to their prior state through the demolition of the invasive works at his charge and cost. She states that there is abundant documentary evidence establishing that the defendant affected the water resource on the property he holds as his own, among which she cites official letters OT-011-12, 101-2012-OT, and 099-2012 from SINAC, AT-2907-2014 and DA-5624-2011 from the Dirección de Aguas of the MINAET, and the expert report DCF-2014-00991-ING, from whose analysis it is unmistakably clear that the accused built, without any permit, a dwelling within the protection zone of a stream, thereby causing environmental damage valued at the sum of one hundred seven thousand eight hundred thirty-seven colones and thirty-two cents. She adds that “[...] the restitution of things to their prior state, in the interest of mitigating the damage and in accordance with the pro natura principle and the protection of the water resource, should have been ordered by the Trial Court, and within that parameter, order the demolition of the invasive work in order to prevent further activities that could aggravate the situation suffered by the environment, seeking the natural regeneration of the affected zone and the direct protection of the affected body of water.” (sic) (folio 126 verso) She argues that if the work remains on the site, the impact on the zone would be perpetuated, and the pernicious effects of the illicit act would continue. To support her petition, she mentions a series of jurisprudential precedents: Judgments 2007-10578 of the Sala Constitucional; 2014-1528 of the Tribunal de Apelación de Cartago; 2009-00058 of the Tribunal de Casación Penal of the Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, Sección Segunda, San Ramón; 2007-964 of the Tribunal de Casación Penal of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José; and 507-2007 of the Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón. She adds that the Tribunal's omission violates due process and renders nugatory the constitutional right of the community to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the purpose of which, in this case, is the protection of the water resource. She requests that the appealed judgment be revoked regarding the omission of the restitution of things to their prior state, and, by the principle of procedural efficiency (celeridad procesal), that such restitution be ordered, directing the accused to demolish the invasive work and not to carry out any activity preventing the regeneration of the affected zone of the unnamed stream or, failing that, that the case be remanded for its proper substantiation. The ground is upheld. This Chamber has heard the appealed oral judgment and considers that the alleged defect occurred, because the substantiation is incomplete since there was no ruling on the restitution sought by the appellant. In accordance with the provisions of Article 142 of the Código Procesal, substantiation is indispensable in every judicial resolution; therefore, every aspect must be duly resolved and reasoned. Consequently, restitution, as a possible consequence of the punishable act that must be decided according to the provisions of Article 361, subsection d) of the Código Procesal Penal, within a process in which the existence of a building has been determined within the protection zone of a stream, on which the sentencing Tribunal is obliged to rule, requires reasoning, whether it is ordered or dismissed. Regarding the necessary ruling, even ex officio, on the matter object of the challenge, there is abundant jurisprudence. For example, the former Tribunal de Casación Penal, in judgment Number 964-2007, resolved: “The matter in question has already been the subject of pronouncements by this Chamber, among others in judgments No. 193-02, of 9:00 hours, of March 8, 2002, and No. 450-03, of 8:48 hours, of May 22, 2003. In the latter ruling, the following was held on the matter: 'Regardless of the principal or accessory penalty that each criminal statute establishes for the criminal conduct, the commission of the crime entails a series of civil consequences, as established by Articles 103 of the Código Penal, 123 and 124 of the Vigent Rules on Civil Liability of the Código Penal of 1941, including the restitution of the material object of the crime. Precisely, one of the scopes of the criminal judgment is to order restitution to the victim in the full exercise of their violated right, which has the nature of a fundamental right due to its regulation in Article 41 of the Constitución Política, which establishes that “Resorting to the laws, everyone shall find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests…” (Judgment 346-98 of 9:30 hrs, April 3, 1998, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), which includes, among other aspects, the restitution of the material object of the crime (Judgment 511-2000 of 9:20 hrs, May 19, 2000, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Article 123 of the Vigent Rules on Civil Liability of the Código Penal of 1941, in its first two paragraphs, establishes that: “The convicted person must restore to the victim, with credit for any deterioration or impairment, the thing that is the object of the punishable act, and if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value according to expert estimation as of the date of the infraction. If such an estimation is not possible because the thing has been destroyed or has disappeared, the judges shall set the respective value, relying on the data in the proceeding. Restitution shall be ordered even when the thing is in the possession of a third party, without prejudice to the rights conferred upon such third party by civil law.”; all of which may be ordered ex officio, as the regulation of Articles 103, 123, and 124 cited above is mandatory, and it does not require that the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) has been formally initiated, as jurisprudence has well established in the sense that “…the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil action for damages, because procedural regulations condition it thus; however, that same condition does not exist when it comes to the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of indemnification in the strict sense.” (Judgment No. 52-F 10:35 hrs. January 31, 1990, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, reiterated in Ruling # 604-F-91, of 9:25 hours of November 7, 1991, and in Judgment 511-2000 of 9:20 hrs of May 19, 2000). The right to the environment, qualified as a third-generation human right, has been recognized in Costa Rica as a fundamental right, as Article 50 of the Constitución Política provides that: “Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment,” and grants individuals and the State the right and duty to guarantee and defend that right on behalf of all inhabitants. Therefore, the commission of the crime makes the community the victim of the act, and from that perspective, it acquires the right to reparation for the damage caused[. . .] From the procedural perspective, Articles 140 and 466 of the Código Procesal Penal obligate the Judge to order the restitution of things to the state prior to the crime, which the contested ruling omits, as the Procuraduría rightly points out in its filing. Therefore, having established in the judgment the authorship of the act by the accused and the injury to the environment by opening a road in the forest down to the river, it is appropriate to order the restitution of the affected area to the state prior to the act, so that the offender does not derive benefit from the illegality committed and to restore the environment altered by his action in favor of the protection of the collective interests.” This Chamber shares these considerations and finds them applicable in this case. The trial judge issued a conviction, within an abbreviated procedure, against the accused [Nombre1], for the crime of Invasión de Área de Protección defined in Article 58, subsection a), in relation to Article 33, subsection b) of the Ley Forestal, having deemed it proven that “On a date between the month of December 2011 and January 4, 2012, in Turrialba, San Juan Norte, [Dirección1], near [Dirección2], the accused [Nombre1], known as [Nombre2], without having the authorization of the State Forest Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado), invaded the protection area of an unnamed stream located in said zone, by constructing the entirety of a dwelling house within the stream's protection area, the invaded area being fifty-two square meters according to a criminalistics report.” (audio-visual file of the judgment, counter 17:58) Among the body of evidence that the deciding Tribunal assessed to determine the existence of the accused facts, the analysis of which begins at counter 19:09 of the oral judgment, in addition to the admission thereof made by the accused due to the type of procedure he underwent, was Official Letter OT-011-12 of January 9, 2011, prepared by members of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), which detailed the existence of the aforementioned building within the fifteen-meter protection area of the stream, as well as Official Letter AT-2907-2014 of the Dirección de Aguas of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, which stipulates that the watercourse affected by the accused, who is the owner of the property and lived on the site, is a natural stream. Likewise, the court assessed the report of the Sección de Ingeniería Forense of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, which determined that the dwelling of the accused [Nombre1] is within the fifteen-meter protection zone, at a distance of 6.6 meters from the high bank of the river and has an area of fifty-two square meters, and Official Letter 101-2012-OT from SINAC, which establishes the lack of permits, both from that institution and from the respective Municipality, for the accused to build his dwelling house on that site. Having deemed the existence of the construction within the stream's protection zone to be undeniably proven, the judge should have decided whether or not to order restitution, even ex officio, as this is one of the matters that must necessarily be ruled upon in the judgment, according to the provisions of Article 361, subsection d), as well as Article 103, subsection 1 of the Código Penal. On this aspect, the Sala Tercera resolved long ago: “[...] Article 103 of the current Código Penal indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the things that are the object of the punishable act, or failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by Article 123 of the Código Penal of 1941, also in mandatory form, by providing that the convicted person must restore the thing that is the object of the punishable act to the victim, and if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value. These provisions must necessarily be related to the procedural regulations, especially the final paragraph of Article 399 of the Código de Procedimientos Penales, in indicating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it in mandatory form. In other words, the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil action for damages, because procedural regulations condition it thus; however, that same condition does not exist when it comes to the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of indemnification in the strict sense.” (Judgment Number 52-F of January 31, 1990) The Chamber has maintained the same criterion, which this Chamber shares, after the 1996 criminal procedural reform: “This being so, by legal provision, and regardless of whether it was requested by the interested parties, it is a legal necessity to restore things to the state prior to the crime. Articles 103 of the Código Penal and 361 of the Código Procesal Penal explicitly provide for this, in a scenario different from the items that can be granted through a claim for damages. Therefore, the restitution of things to their ex ante status (i.e., prior to the crime) is a consequence of law that seeks to roll back the effects of the judicial declaration and undo the consequences of the illegality. These being purposes of public interest, the legal rule does not condition their fulfillment on the exercise of the civil action for damages. In this regard, the jurisprudence of this Chamber developed the matter in ruling 604, of 9:25 on November 7, 1997, in which it held that: ‘…Article 103 of the current Código Penal indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the things that are the object of the punishable act, or failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by Article 123 of the Código Penal of 1941, also in mandatory form, by providing that the convicted person must restore the thing that is the object of the punishable act to the victim, and if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value. These provisions must necessarily be related to the procedural regulations, especially the final paragraph of Article 399 of the Código de Procedimientos Penales, in indicating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it in mandatory form. In other words, the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil action for damages, because procedural regulations condition it thus; however, that same condition does not exist when it comes to the restitution of the material object of the crime.’” (Judgment Number 911-2010) (In the same sense, judgment Number 511-2010). Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant is correct, and that the omission to resolve the restitution sought by the Procuraduría General de la República constitutes a defect in the substantiation of the judgment. However, this Chamber does not consider it appropriate to directly resolve the matter as the appellant petitioned in her brief, because it is indispensable to guarantee the rights to be heard, defense, and a second instance as integral parts of due process. Therefore, the appropriate course is to uphold the claim and partially declare the appealed judgment ineffective, only with respect to the omission to rule on the restitution of things to their prior state. The case is remanded so that the same Trial Court, with a different composition, may rule on the indicated matter, after holding an oral hearing with all the parties, in accordance with the provisions of Article 375 of the Código Procesal Penal. Said hearing is necessary in this case, to guarantee due process, specifically the rights to be heard and to a defense, given that prior to the dictation of the judgment under appeal, the parties had not presented their arguments on this matter.

**POR TANTO** The sole ground of the appeal filed by Procuradora Margot Avellán Ruiz is upheld. The partial ineffectiveness of the challenged judgment is declared, solely insofar as it omitted to rule on the restitution of things to the state prior to the facts, and the case is remanded so that the Trial Court may rule on that matter, after holding an oral hearing. In all other respects, the judgment remains unchanged. NOTIFÍQUESE.

*TULNA0OCNPW61* XIOMARA GUTIERREZ CRUZ - DECIDING JUDGE *4C43YDQSYE2W61* JAIME ROBLETO GUTIERREZ - DECIDING JUDGE *47U7UB43OJV7Q61* MARCO MAIRENA NAVARRO - DECIDING JUDGE Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355. Correo electrónico: [...]

39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1, 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 to 15, 184 and following, 373 to 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1, 4, 11, 30, 31, 45, 50, 59, 60, 62, 71, 73 and 74 of the Penal Code, 58 subsection a) in relation to 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), this Criminal Court resolves: To accept the Abbreviated Special Procedure and declare [Name1], as the responsible author of the offense of INVASION OF A PROTECTED AREA, committed to the detriment of NATURAL RESOURCES, in that capacity, the penalty of TWO MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT is imposed, a penalty that must be served at the place and in the manner determined by prison regulations, with credit for any pre-trial detention suffered for these facts, if any.

Since he qualifies, the sentenced individual [Name1] is granted the BENEFIT OF CONDITIONAL EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. If during that period the sentenced individual [Name1] commits a new intentional crime punishable by more than six months of imprisonment, the benefit herein granted shall be revoked, and he must effectively serve the imprisonment sentence imposed herein at the place and in the manner determined by the respective penitentiary regulations then in force, without further responsibilities.

The cessation of any precautionary measure that may have been ordered against the sentenced individual [Name1] by reason of this case is ordered.

Once the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Law Number 6106, Law on the distribution of confiscated or forfeited property (Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso) and its regulations, the destruction of any seized property that is not susceptible to return or donation is ordered. Once the judgment becomes final, let it be registered in the Judicial Registry, and let the corresponding testimonies be remitted to the Sentencing Enforcement Court and the National Institute of Criminology for their respective duties. The costs of the proceeding shall be borne by the State. Having delivered this judgment orally, the parties are hereby notified in this act, and the digital medium containing the entire judgment is made available to them. Juan Carlos Carrillo Mora. Trial Judge. Criminal Court of Cartago, Turrialba Office.

2. That against the preceding ruling, the licensed attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz filed the appeal.

3. That upon completing the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reformed by Law 8837 published on December ninth, two thousand eleven (Creation of the Appeal of the Judgment), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. That the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

The appeals judge, Xiomara Gutiérrez Cruz, reports.

WHEREAS:

Sole. The licensed attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, Criminal Prosecutor duly appearing in the process, in a timely manner, challenges judgment Number 177-2018, from the Criminal Court of Cartago, Turrialba Office, delivered at seven hours and thirty minutes on August thirty-first, two thousand eighteen, in an abbreviated procedure, through which the accused [Name1] was sentenced to a penalty of two months of imprisonment for an offense of Invasion of Protected Area to the detriment of natural resources and was granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. In the sole ground of her challenge, she alleges a lack of substantiation (fundamentación) of the judgment, in violation of article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She bases her reproach on articles 50 of the Political Constitution, 103 of the Penal Code, 122 and 123 of the Rules in Force on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code, 140 and 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 99 of the Organic Law of the Environment, and 33 and 58 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal). She alleges that the Court delivered a convicting judgment as a result of an abbreviated procedure and deemed the commission of the offense of invasion of a protected area by the accused to be accredited, despite which it did not rule on the restitution of things to their prior state through the demolition of the invasive works at his expense and cost. She refers to abundant documentary evidence that establishes that the defendant affected the water resource on the property he holds as his own, among which she points to official letters OT-011-12, 101-2012-OT, and 099-2012 from SINAC, AT-2907-2014 and DA-5624-2011 from the Water Directorate of MINAET, and the expert report DCF-2014-00991-ING, from whose analysis it indubitably emerges that the accused built, without any permit, a dwelling within the protection zone of a stream (quebrada), thereby causing environmental damage valued in the amount of one hundred seven thousand eight hundred thirty-seven colones and thirty-two cents. She adds that “[...] the restitution of things to their prior state for the sake of mitigating the damage and in accordance with the pro natura principle and the protection of the water resource, should have been ordered by the Trial Court and, within that parameter, order the demolition of the invasive work to prevent further activities that could aggravate the situation suffered by the environment, seeking the natural regeneration of the affected zone and the direct protection of the affected water body.” (sic) (folio 126 verso) She argues that, if the work remains on the site, the affectation of the zone would be perpetuated and the pernicious effects of the illicit act would continue. To support her petition, she mentions a series of jurisprudential precedents: Judgments 2007-10578 of the Constitutional Chamber; 2014-1528 of the Appeals Court of Cartago; 2009-00058 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Second Section, San Ramón; 2007-964 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José; and 507-2007 of the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón. She adds that the Court's omission violates due process and nullifies the constitutional right of the community to a healthy and balanced environment, the purpose of which, in this case, is the protection of the water resource. She requests that the appealed judgment be revoked regarding the omission concerning the restitution of things to their prior state and, due to the principle of procedural speed, that said restitution be ordered, ordering the accused to demolish the invasive work and not to carry out any activity that impedes the regeneration of the affected zone of the unnamed stream (quebrada sin nombre) or, failing that, that a remand for its proper substantiation be ordered. The ground is declared with merit. This Chamber has heard the oral judgment appealed and finds that the alleged defect did occur, as the substantiation (fundamentación) is incomplete because there was no ruling on the restitution sought by the appellant. In accordance with the provisions of article 142 of the Code of Procedure, substantiation (fundamentación) is indispensable in every judicial decision, so every aspect must be duly resolved and reasoned. Consequently, restitution, as a possible consequence of the punishable act that must be decided according to article 361 subsection d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, within a process in which the existence of a building within the protection area of a stream (quebrada) has been determined, on which the sentencing Court is obliged to rule, requires reasoning, whether it is ordered or dismissed. Regarding the necessary ruling, even ex officio, on the extreme being challenged, there is abundant jurisprudence. For example, the former Criminal Cassation Court, in judgment Number 964-2007, resolved: “This matter has already been the subject of rulings by this Chamber, among others in judgments No. 193-02, of 9:00 hours, on March 8, 2002, and No. 450-03, of 8:48 hours, on May 22, 2003. In the latter ruling, it was decided on the matter: ‘Independently of the primary or accessory penalty that each criminal type establishes for the criminal conduct, the commission of the crime carries a series of civil consequences, as established by articles 103 of the Penal Code, 123 and 124 of the Rules in Force on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code, among them the restitution of the material object of the crime. Precisely, one of the scopes of the criminal judgment is to order restitution to the victim in the full exercise of their injured right, which has the nature of a fundamental right due to its regulation in article 41 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that "Occurring to the laws, everyone shall find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests…" (Judgment 346-98 of 9:30 hrs on 03-04-98, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice), which includes, among other aspects, the restitution of the material object of the crime (Judgment 511-2000 of 9:20 hrs. on 19-5-00 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Article 123 of the Rules in Force on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code, in its first two paragraphs, establishes that: "The convicted person must restitute to the victim the thing that is the object of the punishable act, with allowance for all deterioration or impairment, and if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value according to expert estimation referred to the date of the infraction. If such estimation is not possible because the thing has been destroyed or disappeared, the judges shall fix the respective value, relying on the data from the trial. Restitution shall be ordered even when the thing is in the possession of a third party, without prejudice to the rights that civil law confers upon the latter."; all of which can be ordered ex officio because the regulation of articles 103, 123, and 124 cited above is imperative, and does not require that the civil indemnifying action has been filed, as jurisprudence has well established in the sense that “... the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil indemnifying action (acción civil resarcitoria), because the procedural rules condition it so; however, that same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of indemnification in the strict sense." (Judgment No. 52-F 10:35 hrs. January 31, 1990 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, reiterated in Voto # 604-F-91, of 9:25 hours on November 7, 1991, and in Judgment 511-2000 of 9:20 hrs on 19-5-2000). The right to the environment, qualified as a third-generation human right, has been recognized in Costa Rica as a fundamental right, as article 50 of the Political Constitution provides that: "Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment." and grants individuals and the State the right and duty to guarantee and defend that right on behalf of all inhabitants, so that the commission of the crime converts the community into the victim or injured party of the act, and from that perspective acquires the right to reparation for the damage caused[...] From the procedural perspective, articles 140 and 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure oblige the Judge to order restitution of things to the state prior to the crime, which the appealed ruling omits, as the Prosecutor's Office rightly points out in its motion, therefore, since the judgment establishes the authorship of the act by the accused and the injury to the environment by the opening of a road in the forest to the river, it is appropriate to order the restitution of the affected area to its prior state, so that the offender does not derive benefit from the illegality committed and the environment altered by his action is restored for the protection of the community's interests.” This Chamber shares these considerations and finds them applicable in this case. The judge a quo delivered a convicting judgment, within an abbreviated procedure, against the accused [Name1], for the crime of Invasion of Protected Area typified in article 58 subsection a) in relation to article 33 subsection b) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), having deemed it proven that: “On a date between December 2011 and January 4, 2012, in Turrialba, San Juan Norte, [Address1], on [Address2], the accused [Name1], known as [Name2], without authorization from the State Forest Administration, invaded the protection area of a stream (quebrada sin nombre) located in said zone, by building the entirety of a dwelling house within the protection area of the stream (quebrada), the invaded area being fifty-two square meters according to the criminalistics report.” (audiovisual file of the judgment, counter 17:58) Among the body of evidence that the deciding Court evaluated to determine the existence of the accused facts, the analysis of which is located starting at counter 19:09 of the oral judgment, besides the admission of them made by the defendant due to the type of procedure he submitted to, was Official Letter OT-011-12 of January 9, 2011, prepared by members of the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), in which the existence of the aforementioned building within the fifteen-meter protection area of the stream (quebrada) was detailed, as well as official letter AT-2907-2014 from the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in which it is stipulated that the watercourse affected by the accused, who is the owner of the property and lived on the site, is a natural stream (quebrada). Likewise, the a quo evaluated the report from the Forensic Engineering Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency, through which it was determined that the dwelling of the accused [Name1] is within fifteen meters of the protection zone, at a distance of 6.6 meters from the high bank of the river and has an area of fifty-two square meters, and official letter 101-2012-OT from SINAC, which establishes the lack of permits, both from that institution and from the respective Municipality, for the accused to build his dwelling house on that site. Having deemed the indubitable existence of the construction within the stream (quebrada) protection zone proven, the judge should have decided whether or not it was appropriate to order restitution, even ex officio, since it is one of the necessary aspects for the judgment to pronounce on by provision of the cited article 361 subsection d), as well as article 103 subsection 1 of the Penal Code. On this aspect, the Third Chamber has resolved, long since, “[...] article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the things that are the object of the punishable act or, failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code, also imperatively, by providing that the convicted person must restitute to the victim the thing that is the object of the punishable act and, if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value. These provisions must necessarily be related to the procedural rules, especially to the final paragraph of article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in stating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other words, the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil indemnifying action (acción civil resarcitoria), because the procedural rules condition it so; however, that same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of indemnification in the strict sense." (Judgment Number 52-F of January 31, 1990) The Chamber has maintained the same criterion, which this Chamber shares, after the criminal procedural reform of 1996: "Thus, by legal provision, and regardless of whether or not it was requested by the interested parties, it is a legal duty to restitute things to their state prior to the crime. This is explicitly provided for in articles 103 of the Penal Code and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a different scenario from the items that can be granted due to an indemnifying action. Therefore, the restitution of things to their ex ante status (that is, prior to the crime), is a legal consequence that seeks to retroact the effects of the judicial declaration and undo the consequences of the illegality. Being these purposes of public interest, the legal rule does not condition its compliance on the filing of a civil indemnifying action. In this regard, this Chamber's jurisprudence developed the matter in ruling 604, of 9:25 on November 7, 1997, in which it ordered that: ‘…article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the things that are the object of the punishable act or, failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code, also imperatively, by providing that the convicted person must restitute to the victim the thing that is the object of the punishable act and, if unable to do so, shall be obliged to pay its value. These provisions must necessarily be related to the procedural rules, especially to the final paragraph of article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in stating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other words, the claim for damages arising from the crime must be made through the civil indemnifying action (acción civil resarcitoria), because the procedural rules condition it so; however, that same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime.’” (Judgment Number 911-2010) (In the same sense, judgment Number 511-2010) Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant is right and that the omission to resolve on the restitution sought by the Attorney General's Office constitutes a defect in the substantiation (fundamentación) of the ruling. However, this Chamber does not consider it appropriate to resolve the matter directly as requested by the challenger in her brief, since it is indispensable to guarantee the rights to hearing, defense, and double instance as integrals of due process. Therefore, the appropriate course is to accept the claim and partially declare the appealed ruling ineffective, only with respect to the omission to rule on the restitution of things to their prior state. A remand is ordered so that the same Trial Court, with a different composition, resolves on the indicated extreme, after holding an oral hearing with all parties, in accordance with the provisions of article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Said hearing is necessary in this case, for the purpose of guaranteeing due process, specifically the rights to hearing and defense, given that, prior to the issuance of the judgment being appealed, the parties had not raised their arguments on this issue.

THEREFORE

The sole ground of the appeal filed by Prosecutor Margot Avellán Ruiz is accepted. The partial ineffectiveness of the challenged judgment is declared, solely inasmuch as it omitted to resolve on the restitution of things to their state prior to the acts, and a remand is ordered so that the Trial Court rules on that extreme, after holding an oral hearing. In all other respects, the ruling remains unaltered.

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vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:19.5pt"><span style="font-size:10pt">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:19.5pt"><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span></p><div style="margin-bottom:1pt; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; clear:both"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">EXP: 12-000036-0359-PE</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355. Correo electrónico: [...]</span></p></div></body></html>" .] From a procedural perspective, articles 140 and 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure obligate the Judge to order the restoration of things to the state prior to the crime, an omission in the appealed judgment as the Procuraduría correctly points out in its submission, so that once the authorship of the act by the accused and the injury to the environment from the opening of a path in the forest down to the river are established in the sentence, it is appropriate to order the restoration of the affected area to the state prior to the act, so that the offender does not derive benefit from the committed illegality and to restore the environment altered by his action in favor of protecting the interests of the community." </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">This Chamber shares these considerations and finds them applicable in this case.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> The judge </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">a quo </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">issued a conviction, within an abbreviated procedure, against the accused [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">, for the crime of Invasion of a Protected Area defined in article 58, subsection a) in relation to article 33, subsection b) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), having accepted as proven that</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">“On a date between the month of December 2011 and January 4,</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> 2012, in Turrialba, San Juan Norte, 200 meters south of the EBAIS, at Lambert horizontal coordinates 207915 vertical 568538, the accused [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">, known as [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">, without having the authorization of the State Forestry Administration, invaded the protection area of an unnamed spring (quebrada) located in said zone, by constructing the entirety of a dwelling house within the protection area of the spring, the area invaded being fifty-two square meters according to the criminalistic expert opinion.”</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">(audiovisual file of the sentence, counter 17:58) Among the body of evidence evaluated by the deciding Court to determine the existence of the accused acts, whose analysis is located starting at counter 19:09 of the oral sentence, in addition to the admission thereof made by the accused due to the type of procedure to which he submitted, was Official Communication OT-011-12 of January 9, 2011, prepared by members of the National System of Conservation Areas</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> (SINAC), in which the existence of the aforementioned building within the fifteen-meter protection area of the spring was detailed, as well as official communication AT-2907-2014 from the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in which it is stipulated that the watercourse affected by the accused, who is the owner of the property and inhabited the site, is a natural spring.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Likewise, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">a quo</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> evaluated the expert opinion of the Forensic Engineering Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency, through which it was determined that the dwelling of the accused [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">is within the fifteen meters of the protection zone, at a distance of 6.6 meters from the high bank of the river and has an area of fifty-two square meters, and the official communication 101-2012-OT from SINAC, which establishes the lack of permits, both from that institution and from the respective Municipality, for the accused to construct his dwelling house on that site.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Having demonstrated the undoubted existence of the construction within the protection zone of the spring, the judge had to decide whether or not to order the restoration, even ex officio, since it is one of the necessary pronouncement points of the sentence by provision of the cited article 361, subsection d), as well as article 103, subsection 1 of the Penal Code. On this aspect, the Third Chamber has resolved, of long standing, </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">“[...]</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restoration of the things that are the object of the punishable act or, failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code also in imperative form, providing that the convicted person must restore to the offended party the thing that is the object of the punishable act, and if unable, will be obliged to satisfy its value. These provisions must necessarily relate to procedural regulations, especially with the final paragraph of article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedures, by indicating that the restoration of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other terms, the claim for damages and losses arising from the crime must be made through the </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">compensatory</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> civil action, because that is how procedural regulations condition it; however, this same condition does not exist when dealing with the restoration of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restoration does not constitute a form of compensation in a strict sense.” (Judgment Number 52-F of 31 January 1990)</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">The Chamber has maintained the same criterion, which this Chamber shares, after the 1996 criminal procedural reform</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">“This being so, by legal provision, and independently of whether or not it was requested by the interested parties, it is a mandate of law to restore things to the state prior to the crime. Articles 103 of the Penal Code and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly so provide, in a different context than the items that may be granted due to compensatory action. Therefore, the restoration of things to their ex ante status (that is, prior to the crime), is a consequence of law that seeks to roll back the effects of the judicial declaration and undo the consequences of the illegality. These purposes being of public interest, the legal norm does not condition its fulfillment on the exercise of the compensatory civil action. In this regard, the jurisprudence of this Chamber developed the issue in ruling 604, of 9:25 on November 7, 1997, in which it provided that: ‘…article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restoration of the things that are the object of the punishable act or, failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code also in imperative form, providing that the convicted person must restore to the offended party the thing that is the object of the punishable act, and if unable, will be obliged to satisfy its value. These provisions must necessarily relate to procedural regulations, especially with the final paragraph of article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedures, by indicating that the restoration of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other terms, the claim for damages and losses arising from the crime must be made through the compensatory civil action, because that is how procedural regulations condition it; however, this same condition does not exist when dealing with the restoration of the material object of the crime.’” </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">(Judgment Number 911-2010) (In the same sense, judgment Number 511-2010) Based on all of the above, it is clear that the appellant is correct and that the omission to resolve the restoration sought by the Procuraduría General de la República constitutes a defect in the reasoning of the judgment. However, this Chamber does not consider it appropriate to directly resolve the issue as the appellant petitioned in her writ, since it is essential to guarantee the rights to hearing, defense, and double instance as integrants of due process. Therefore, it is appropriate to uphold the claim and declare the appealed judgment partially ineffective, only regarding the omission to rule on the restoration of things to their prior state. The case is remanded so that the same Trial Court, with a different composition, resolves the indicated point, prior to holding an oral hearing with all parties, in accordance with the provisions of article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Said hearing is necessary in this case, for the purposes of guaranteeing due process, specifically the rights to hearing and defense, given that, prior to the issuance of the judgment that is the object of the appeal, the parties did not present their arguments on this issue."</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span> In accordance with the provisions of Article 142 of the Procedural Code, a statement of reasons (fundamentación) is indispensable in every judicial ruling, such that each aspect must be duly resolved and reasoned. Consequently, restitution (restitución), as a possible consequence of the punishable act that must be decided pursuant to Article 361(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, within a proceeding in which the existence of a building within the protection area (área de protección) of a stream (quebrada) has been determined, and upon which the sentencing court is obligated to rule, requires reasoning, whether it is ordered or dismissed. Regarding the necessary ruling, even sua sponte (de oficio), on the point that is the subject of the challenge, there is abundant case law. For example, the former Court of Criminal Cassation (Tribunal de Casación Penal), in ruling Number 964-2007, held: “The matter in question has already been the subject of rulings by this Chamber, among others rulings No. 193-02 of 9:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002, and No. 450-03 of 8:48 a.m. on May 22, 2003. In the latter ruling, it was decided on this point: ‘Independently of the principal or accessory penalty established by each criminal statute for the criminal conduct, the commission of the crime entails a series of civil consequences, as established by Articles 103 of the Penal Code, 123, and 124 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code, among them the restitution of the material object of the crime. Precisely, one of the effects of the criminal judgment is to order restitution to the aggrieved party for the full exercise of their injured right, which has the nature of a fundamental right by its regulation in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that “Resorting to the laws, everyone shall find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests…” (Ruling 346-98 of 9:30 a.m. on April 3, 1998, Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice), which includes, among other aspects, the restitution of the material object of the crime (Ruling 511-2000 of 9:20 a.m. on May 19, 2000, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Article 123 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code, in its first two paragraphs, establishes: “The convicted person must return to the aggrieved party, with an allowance for any deterioration or impairment, the object of the punishable act, and if unable to do so, shall be obligated to satisfy its value according to an expert appraisal as of the date of the violation. If such an appraisal is not possible because the object has been destroyed or has disappeared, the judges shall set the respective value, based on the data in the trial. Restitution shall be ordered even if the object is in the possession of a third party, without prejudice to the rights conferred upon the latter by civil law.”; all of which may be ordered sua sponte because the regulation of the aforementioned Articles 103, 123, and 124 is imperative, and it does not require that a compensatory civil action (acción civil resarcitoria) has been filed, as case law has well established in the sense that “… a claim for damages and losses arising from the crime must be made through the compensatory civil action, because procedural law so conditions it; however, this same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of compensation (indemnización) in the strict sense.” (Ruling No. 52-F 10:35 a.m. January 31, 1990, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, reiterated in Voto # 604-F-91, of 9:25 a.m. on November 7, 1991, and in Ruling 511-2000 of 9:20 a.m. on May 19, 2000). The right to the environment, described as a third-generation human right, has been recognized in Costa Rica as a fundamental right, since Article 50 of the Political Constitution provides that: “Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado),” and grants individuals and the State the right and the duty to guarantee and defend that right on behalf of all inhabitants, so that the commission of the crime converts the community into victims or aggrieved parties by the act, and from that perspective acquires the right to the reparation of the damage caused[. . .] From a procedural perspective, Article 140 and 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure obligate the Judge to order the restitution of things to the state prior to the crime, which the appealed judgment omits, as the Procuraduría (Procuraduría) rightly points out in its action; therefore, since the judgment establishes the authorship of the act by the defendant and the injury to the environment by the opening of a road in the forest to the river, it is appropriate to order the restitution of the affected area to the state prior to the act, so that the offender does not derive benefit from the illegality committed and succeeds in restoring the environment altered by their action in favor of the protection of the community’s interests.” This Chamber shares these considerations and finds them applicable in this case.

The trial judge (juez a quo) issued a conviction judgment, within an abbreviated proceeding (procedimiento abreviado), against the defendant [Name1], for the crime of Invasion of a Protection Area (Invasión de Área de Protección), typified in Article 58(a) in relation to Article 33(b) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), having found accredited that “On a date between December 2011 and January 4, 2012, in Turrialba, San Juan Norte, [Address1], on [Address2], the defendant [Name1], known as [Name2], without having the authorization of the State Forestry Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado), invaded the protection area of an unnamed stream located in said zone, by constructing the entirety of a dwelling house within the protection area of the stream, the area invaded being fifty-two square meters according to the criminalistic expert report (dictamen criminalístico).” (audiovisual file of the judgment, counter 17:58) Among the body of evidence that the deciding court assessed to determine the existence of the accused facts, the analysis of which is located starting at counter 19:09 of the oral judgment, in addition to the admission of them made by the accused given the type of proceeding to which he submitted, was Official Note (Oficio) OT-011-12 of January 9, 2011, prepared by members of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC), in which the existence of the cited building within the fifteen-meter protection area of the stream was detailed, as well as Official Note AT-2907-2014 from the Water Directorate (Dirección de Aguas) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), in which it is stipulated that the watercourse affected by the defendant, who is the owner of the property and lived on the site, is a natural stream.

Likewise, the trial judge assessed the expert report of the Forensic Engineering Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), through which it was determined that the dwelling of the defendant [Name1] is within the fifteen meters of the protection area, at a distance of 6.6 meters from the top edge of the river and has an area of fifty-two square meters, and the Official Note 101-2012-OT from SINAC, which establishes the lack of permits, both from that institution and from the respective Municipality, for the defendant to build his dwelling house on that site.

Having demonstrated the indubitable existence of the construction within the stream’s protection area, the judge should have resolved whether or not to order restitution (restitución), even sua sponte, as this is one of the necessary points for the judgment’s ruling under the provisions of the cited Article 361(d), as well as Article 103(1) of the Penal Code. On this aspect, the Third Chamber resolved, of long standing: “[...] Article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the objects of the punishable act, or failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by Article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code, also in an imperative form, by providing that the convicted person must return the object of the punishable act to the aggrieved party, and if unable to do so, shall be obligated to satisfy its value. These provisions must necessarily relate to procedural law, especially with the final paragraph of Article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by indicating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other words, a claim for damages and losses arising from the crime must be made through the compensatory civil action, because procedural law so conditions it; however, this same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime. This is so, as this same Chamber has previously interpreted, because restitution does not constitute a form of compensation in the strict sense.” (Ruling Number 52-F of January 31, 1990) The Chamber has maintained the same criterion, which this Chamber shares, after the criminal procedural reform of 1996: “This being so, by legal provision, and independently of whether or not it has been requested by the interested parties, it is a requirement of law to restore things to the state prior to the crime. Articles 103 of the Penal Code and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly provide this, in a scenario different from the items that can be granted by reason of the compensatory action. Therefore, the restitution of things to their ex ante status (that is, prior to the crime), is a consequence of law that seeks to roll back the effects of the judicial declaration and undo the consequences of the illegality. Being these purposes of public interest, the legal norm does not condition its compliance on the exercise of the compensatory civil action. In this regard, the case law of this Chamber developed the subject in ruling 604, of 9:25 a.m. on November 7, 1997, in which it provided that: ‘… Article 103 of the current Penal Code indicates that one of the civil consequences of every crime is the restitution of the objects of the punishable act, or failing that, the payment of the respective value; an aspect reiterated by Article 123 of the 1941 Penal Code, also in an imperative form, by providing that the convicted person must return the object of the punishable act to the aggrieved party, and if unable to do so, shall be obligated to satisfy its value. These provisions must necessarily relate to procedural law, especially with the final paragraph of Article 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by indicating that the restitution of the material object of the crime may be ordered even if the civil action has not been filed, although it does not order it imperatively. In other words, a claim for damages and losses arising from the crime must be made through the compensatory civil action, because procedural law so conditions it; however, this same condition does not exist when it concerns the restitution of the material object of the crime.’” (Ruling Number 911-2010) (To the same effect, ruling Number 511-2010) From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant is correct and that the omission to resolve on the restitution sought by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) constitutes a defect in the statement of reasons for the judgment. However, this Chamber does not consider it appropriate to resolve the issue directly as the challenger requested in her writ, because it is essential to guarantee the rights to be heard (audiencia), defense, and double instance (doble instancia) as integral elements of due process (debido proceso). Consequently, the appropriate course is to uphold the claim and partially nullify (declarar parcialmente ineficaz) the judgment under appeal, only with respect to the omission to rule on the restitution of things to their prior state. Remand (reenvío) is ordered so that the same Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio), with a different composition, resolves on the indicated point, after conducting an oral hearing (audiencia oral) with all the parties, in accordance with the provisions of Article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Said hearing is necessary in this case, for the purpose of guaranteeing due process, specifically the rights to be heard and to a defense, given that, prior to the issuance of the judgment subject to appeal, the parties have not presented their arguments on this issue.

**POR TANTO** The sole ground of the appeal filed by Attorney General Margot Avellán Ruiz is upheld. The partial nullity (ineficacia parcial) of the challenged judgment is declared, solely insofar as it omitted to resolve on the restitution of things to the state prior to the facts, and remand (reenvío) is ordered so that the Trial Court rules on that point, after conducting an oral hearing. In all other respects, the judgment remains unaltered. **NOTIFÍQUESE.** Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355. Correo electrónico: [...]

Firmar Documento *120000360359PE* Contra: [Nombre1] Delito: Invasión de Área de Protección Ofendido: Los Recursos Naturales Res: 2019-031 TRIBUNAL DE APELACION DE SENTENCIA PENAL DE CARTAGO. SECCIÓN SEGUNDA. A las catorce horas treinta y seis minutos del treinta y uno de enero del año dos mil diecinueve.- Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1] , mayor, nacido el treinta de septiembre de mil novecientos sesenta y siete, con cédula de identidad número CED1- - , por el delito de Invasión de Área de Protección, en perjuicio de Los Recursos Naturales. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso la jueza Xiomara Gutiérrez Cruz, así como, los jueces Marco Mairena Navarro y Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez. Se apersonó en apelación la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz en su condición de Procuradora Penal.

Resultando:

1. Que mediante sentencia oral N° 177-2018 de las siete horas treinta minutos del treinta y uno de agosto del año dos mil dieciocho, el Tribunal Penal de Cartago,Sede Turrialba, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, art. 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 11 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 1,8 de la Convención Americana de los Derechos Humanos, 1 a 15, 184 y siguientes, 373 a 375 del Código Procesal Penal, 1,4,11,30,31,45,50,59,60,62,71,73 y 74 del Código Penal, 58 inciso a) en relación con el 33 de la Ley Forestal, este Tribunal Penal resuelve: Acoger el Procedimiento Especial Abreviado y declarar a [Nombre1] , autor responsable de un delito de INVASIÓN DE ÁREA PROTECCIÓN, cometido en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES, en dicho carácter se le impone la pena de DOS MESES DE PRISIÓN, pena que deberá descontar en el lugar y forma que determinen los reglamentos carcelarios, previo bono de la preventiva sufrida por estos hechos si la hubiere .

Por calificar para ello, se le concede al sentenciado [Nombre1] el BENEFICIO DE EJECUCIÓN CONDICIONAL DE LA PENA POR EL PLAZO DE TRES AÑOS, si durante dicho plazo el sentenciado [Nombre1] comete nuevo delito doloso sancionado con pena superior a seis meses de prisión, se le revocará el beneficio aquí concebido y deberá descontar efectivamente la pena de prisión aquí impuesta en el lugar y forma que determinen los respectivos reglamentos penitenciarios entonces vigentes y sin ulteriores responsabilidades.

Se ordena el cese de cualquier medida cautelar que en razón de la presente causa se haya dispuesto en contra del sentenciado [Nombre1] .

Firme la sentencia, de conformidad con la Ley Número 6106, Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso y su reglamento, se ordena la destrucción de cualquier bien que se halla decomisado y que no sea susceptible de devolución o donación.Una vez firme la sentencia inscríbase en el Registro Judicial, remítanse los testimonios al Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y el Instituto Nacional de Criminología para lo de sus cargos.Son los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado.Al haberse dictado la presente sentencia de manera oral quedan en este acto notificadas las partes y queda a disposición de ellas el medio digital en el cual consta la totalidad de la sentencia.Juan Carlos Carrillo Mora.Juez de Juicio. Tribunal Penal de Cartago, Sede Turrialba" 2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz interpuso el recurso de apelación.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 466 del Código Procesal Penal, reformado por Ley 8837 publicada el nueve de diciembre de dos mil once (Creación de Recurso de Apelación de la Sentencia), el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4. Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Informa la jueza de apelación, Xiomara Gutiérrez Cruz.

CONSIDERANDO:

ÚNICO. La Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, Procuradora Penal debidamente apersonada al proceso, en tiempo y forma, impugna la sentencia Número 177-2018, del Tribunal Penal de Cartago, Sede Turrialba, dictada a las siete horas con treinta minutos del treinta y uno de agosto del año dos mil dieciocho, en procedimiento abreviado mediante el que se condenó al encartado [Nombre1] a la pena de dos meses de prisión por un delito de Invasión de Área de Protección en perjuicio de los recursos naturales y se le otorgó el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena. En el único motivo de su impugnación alega falta de fundamentación de la sentencia, en violación del artículo 142 del Código Procesal Penal. Fundamenta su reproche en los artículos 50 de la Constitución Política, 103 del Código Penal, 122 y 123 de las Reglas Vigentes sobre Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941, 140 y 466 del Código Procesal Penal, 99 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y 33 y 58 de la Ley Forestal. Alega que el Tribunal dictó sentencia condenatoria como consecuencia de un procedimiento abreviado y tuvo por acreditada la comisión del delito de invasión de área de protección por parte del imputado, a pesar de lo cual no se pronunció sobre la restitución de cosas al estado anterior mediante la demolición de las obras invasoras a cargo y costo de este. Refiere que hay abundante prueba documental que permite establecer que el encausado afectó el recurso hídrico en la propiedad que detenta como suya, entre la que señala los oficios OT-011-12, 101-2012-OT y 099-2012 del SINAC, AT-2907-2014 y DA-5624-2011 de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAET y el dictamen pericial DCF-2014-00991-ING, de cuyo análisis se desprende indubitablemente que el imputado construyó, sin contar con permiso alguno, una vivienda dentro de la zona de protección de una quebrada, con lo que ocasionó un daño ambiental valorado en la suma de ciento siete mil ochocientos treinta y siete colones con treinta y dos céntimos. Agrega que “[...] la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior en aras de la mitigación del daño y en concordancia con el principio pro natura y la protección del recurso hídrico, debió dictarse por parte del Tribunal de Juicio y dentro de ese parámetro, ordenar la demolición de la obra invasora a fin de impedir de que se realicen más actividades que podrían agravar la situación sufrida por el ambiente, procurando la regeneración natural de la zona afectada y la protección directa del cuerpo de agua afectado.” (sic) (folio 126 vuelto) Aduce que, de permanecer la obra en el sitio, se perpetuaría la afectación de la zona y se daría continuidad a los efectos perniciosos del ilícito. Para sustentar su petición menciona una serie de precedentes jurisprudenciales: Sentencias 2007-10578 de la Sala Constitucional; 2014-1528 del Tribunal de Apelación de Cartago; 2009-00058 del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, Sección Segunda, San Ramón; 2007-964 del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José; y 507-2007 del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón. Añade que la omisión del Tribunal violenta el debido proceso y hace nugatorio el derecho constitucional a un ambiente sano y equilibrado por parte de la colectividad, cuyo fin, en este caso, es la protección del recurso hídrico. Solicita se revoque la sentencia recurrida en cuanto a la omisión sobre la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior y, por el principio de celeridad procesal, se disponga dicha restitución, ordenando al imputado demoler la obra invasora y no realizar actividad alguna que impida la regeneración de la zona afectada de la quebrada sin nombre o, en su defecto, se ordene el reenvío para su debida sustanciación. El motivo se declara con lugar. Esta Cámara ha escuchado la sentencia oral recurrida y considera que el vicio alegado se produjo, pues la fundamentación es incompleta porque no hubo pronunciamiento sobre la restitución que pretende la recurrente. De conformidad con lo establecido por el artículo 142 del Código Procesal, la fundamentación es indispensable en toda resolución judicial, por lo que cada aspecto debe encontrarse debidamente resuelto y motivado. En consecuencia, la restitución, como posible consecuencia del hecho punible que debe decidirse según lo dispuesto por el artículo 361 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal, dentro de un proceso en el que se ha determinado la existencia de una edificación dentro del área de protección de una quebrada, sobre la cual el Tribunal sentenciador está obligado a pronunciarse, requiere motivación, sea que se disponga o se descarte. Sobre el necesario pronunciamiento, incluso de oficio, en cuanto al extremo objeto de impugnación, hay abundante jurisprudencia. Por ejemplo, el antiguo Tribunal de Casación Penal, en la sentencia Número 964-2007 resolvió “El tema en cuestión ya ha sido objeto de pronunciamientos por esta Cámara, entre otros en las sentencias No. 193-02, de las 9:00 horas, del 8 de marzo del 2002 y No. 450-03, de las 8:48 horas, del 22 de mayo del 2003. En el último fallo se dispuso sobre el particular: " Independientemente de la pena principal o accesoria que establece cada tipo penal para la conducta delictiva, la comisión del delito conlleva una serie de consecuencias civiles, tal como lo establecen los artículos 103 del Código Penal, 123 y 124 de las Reglas Vigentes sobre Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941, entre ellas la restitución del objeto material del delito. Precisamente, uno de los alcances de la sentencia penal es ordenar la restitución al ofendido en el ejercicio pleno de su derecho lesionado, que tiene la naturaleza de un derecho fundamental por su regulación en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política que establece que "Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales…" (Sentencia 346-98 de 9:30 hrs del 03-04-98 Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), lo cual comprende entre otros aspectos la restitución del objeto material del delito (Sentencia 511-2000 de las 9:20 hrs. del 19-5-00 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). El artículo 123 de las Reglas Vigentes Sobre Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941, en sus dos primeros párrafos establece que: " Deberá el condenado restituir al ofendido, con abono de todo deterioro o menoscabo, la cosa objeto del hecho punible, y si no pudiere hacerlo, estará obligado a satisfacer su valor conforme a estimación pericial referida a la fecha de la infracción. Si tal estimación no fuese posible hacerla por haber sido destruida o haber desaparecido la cosa, los jueces fijarán el valor respectivo, ateniéndose a los datos del juicio. La restitución se ordenará aun cuando la cosa se hallare en poder de un tercero, dejando a salvo los derechos que la ley civil confiere a este."; todo lo cual puede ordenarse de oficio por ser imperativa la regulación del artículo 103, 123 y 124 antes citados, y no requiere que se haya instaurado la acción civil resarcitoria , como bien lo ha establecido la jurisprudencia en el sentido que “... el reclamo de los daños y perjuicios provenientes del delito debe hacerse por medio de la acción civil resarcitoria , porque así lo condiciona la normativa procesal; sin embargo esa misma condición no existe cuando se trata de la restitución del objeto material del delito. Ello es así, conforme lo ha interpretado anteriormente esta misma Sala, porque la restitución no constituye una forma de indemnización en sentido estricto." (Sentencia Nº 52-F 10:35 hrs. 31 enero 1990 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, reiterado en Voto # 604-F-91, de 9:25 horas del 7 de noviembre de 1.991 y en Sentencia 511-2000 de 9:20 hrs del 19-5-2000). El derecho al medio ambiente, calificado como un derecho humano de la tercera generación, ha sido reconocido en Costa Rica como un derecho fundamental, pues el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política cuando dispone que: "Toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado ." y le otorga a los particulares y al Estado el derecho y el deber de garantizar y defender ese derecho en nombre de todos los habitantes, por lo que la comisión del delito convierte a la colectividad en víctima u ofendida con el hecho y desde esa perspectiva adquiere el derecho a la reparación del daño causado[. . .] Desde la perspectiva procesal, el artículo 140 y 466 del Código Procesal Penal obligan al Juez a disponer la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior al delito, lo cual omite el fallo recurrido como bien lo apunta la Procuraduría en su gestión, por lo que establecido en la sentencia la autoría del hecho por parte del imputado y la lesión al medio ambiente por la apertura de un camino en el bosque hasta el río, es procedente ordenar la restitución del área afectada al estado anterior al hecho, a fin de que el infractor no derive provecho de la ilicitud realizada y se logre restaurar el medio ambiente alterado con su acción en pro de la tutela de los intereses de la colectividad.” Esta Cámara comparte esas consideraciones y las encuentra aplicables en este caso. El juez a quo dictó sentencia condenatoria, dentro de un procedimiento abreviado, contra el imputado [Nombre1] , por el delito de Invasión de Área de Protección tipificado en el artículo 58 inciso a) en relación con el artículo 33 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal, al tener por acreditado que “En fecha comprendida entre el mes de diciembre del 2011 y el 4 de enero del 2012, en Turrialba, San Juan Norte, [Dirección1] , sobre las [Dirección2] , el imputado [Nombre1] , conocido como [Nombre2] , sin contar con la autorización de la Administración Forestal del Estado, invadió el área de protección de una quebrada sin nombre localizada en dicha zona, al construir dentro del área de protección de la quebrada la totalidad de una casa de habitación, siendo el área invadida cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados según dictamen criminalístico.” (archivo audiovisual de la sentencia, contador 17:58) Entre el acervo probatorio que valoró el Tribunal decisor para determinar la existencia de los hechos acusados, cuyo análisis se ubica a partir del contador 19:09 de la sentencia oral, además de la admisión que de ellos hizo el encartado por el tipo de procedimiento a que se sometió, estuvo el Oficio OT-011-12 del 9 de enero del 2011 elaborado por miembros del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), en el que se detalló la existencia de la citada edificación dentro del área de protección de quince metros de la quebrada, así como el oficio AT-2907-2014 de la Dirección de Aguas del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en el que se estipula que el cauce afectado por el imputado, quien es propietario del inmueble y habitaba en el sitio, es una quebrada natural. Asimismo, el a quo valoró el dictamen de la Sección de Ingeniería Forense del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, mediante el que se determinó que la vivienda del imputado [Nombre1] está dentro de los quince metros de la zona de protección, a una distancia de 6,6 metros del borde alto del río y tiene un área de cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados y el oficio 101-2012-OT del SINAC, que establece la falta de permisos, tanto de esa institución como de la Municipalidad respectiva, para que el imputado construyera su casa de habitación en ese sitio. Al tener por demostrada la existencia indubitable de la construcción dentro de la zona de protección de la quebrada, el juzgador debió resolver si correspondía o no ordenar la restitución, aún de oficio, pues se trata de uno de los extremos de pronunciamiento necesario de la sentencia por disposición del citado artículo 361 inciso d), así como del artículo 103 inciso 1 del Código Penal. Sobre este aspecto la Sala Tercera ha resuelto, de vieja data “[...] el artículo 103 del Código Penal vigente señala que una de las consecuencias civiles de todo delito es la restitución de las cosas objeto del hecho punible o en su defecto el pago del respectivo valor; aspecto que reitera el artículo 123 del Código Penal de 1941 también en forma imperativa, al disponer que el condenado deberá restituir al ofendido la cosa objeto del hecho punible y si no pudiere hacerlo, estará obligado a satisfacer su valor. Estas disposiciones deben necesariamente relacionarse con la normativa procesal, en especial con el párrafo final del artículo 399 del Código de Procedimientos Penales, al señalar que la restitución del objeto material del delito podrá disponerse aunque la acción civil no se hubiere formulado, aunque no lo ordena en forma imperativa. En otros términos, el reclamo de los daños y perjuicios provenientes del delito debe hacerse por medio de la acción civil resarcitoria, porque así lo condiciona la normativa procesal; sin embargo esa misma condición no existe cuando se trata de la restitución del objeto material del delito. Ello es así, conforme lo ha interpretado anteriormente esta misma Sala, porque la restitución no constituye una forma de indemnización en sentido estricto." (Sentencia Número 52-F del 31 enero 1990) La Sala ha mantenido el mismo criterio, que esta Cámara comparte, luego de la reforma procesal penal de 1996 "Siendo así, por disposición legal, y con independencia de que haya sido o no solicitado por los interesados, es menester de ley restituir las cosas al estado previo al delito. Así lo dispone de manera explícita los artículos 103 del Código Penal y 361 del Código Procesal Penal, en un supuesto diferente de las partidas que se pueden conceder a causa de la gestión resarcitoria. Por ende, la restitución de las cosas a su status ex ante (o sea, anterior al delito), es una consecuencia de ley que procura retrotraer los efectos de la declaratoria judicial y deshacer las consecuencias de la ilicitud. Siendo esos propósitos de interés público, la norma legal no condiciona su cumplimiento al ejercicio de la acción civil resarcitoria. Al respecto, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala desarrolló el tema en el fallo 604, de las 9:25 del 7 de noviembre de 1997, en el que dispuso que: “…el artículo 103 del Código Penal vigente señala que una de las consecuencias civiles de todo delito es la restitución de las cosas objeto del hecho punible o en su defecto el pago del respetivo valor; aspecto que reitera el artículo 123 del Código Penal de 1941 también en forma imperativa, al disponer que el condenado deberá restituir al ofendido la cosa objeto del hecho punible y si no pudiere hacerlo, estará obligado a satisfacer su valor. Estas disposiciones deben necesariamente relacionarse con la normativa procesal, en especial con el párrafo final del artículo 399 del Código de Procedimientos Penales, al señalar que la restitución del objeto material del delito podrá disponerse aunque la acción civil no se hubiere formulado, aunque no lo ordena en forma imperativa. En otros términos, el reclamo de los daños y perjuicios provenientes del delito debe hacerse por medio de la acción civil resarcitoria, porque así lo condiciona la normativa procesal; sin embargo esa misma condición no existe cuando se trata de la restitución del objeto material del delito.” (Sentencia Número 911-2010) (En el mismo sentido, sentencia Número 511-2010) A partir de todo lo expuesto, es claro que lleva razón la recurrente y que la omisión de resolver sobre la restitución que pretende la Procuraduría General de la República constituye un vicio en la fundamentación del fallo. Sin embargo, esta Cámara no considera procedente resolver en forma directa el tema como lo peticionó la impugnante en su libelo, pues resulta indispensable garantizar los derechos de audiencia, defensa y doble instancia como integrantes del debido proceso. De manera que lo procedente es acoger el reclamo y declarar parcialmente ineficaz el fallo venido en alzada, solo en lo que respecta a la omisión de pronunciarse sobre la restitución de cosas al estado anterior. Se ordena el reenvío para que el mismo Tribunal de Juicio, con distinta integración, resuelva sobre el extremo indicado, previa realización de audiencia oral con todas las partes, de conformidad con lo establecido por el artículo 375 del Código Procesal Penal. Dicha vista resulta necesaria en este caso, a efectos de garantizar el debido proceso, específicamente los derechos de audiencia y de defensa, dado que, previo al dictado de la sentencia objeto de recurso, las partes no han planteado sus alegatos sobre este tema.

POR TANTO

Se acoge el único motivo del recurso interpuesto por la Procuradora Margot Avellán Ruiz. Se declara la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia impugnada, únicamente en cuanto omitió resolver sobre la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior a los hechos, y se ordena el reenvío para que el Tribunal de Juicio se pronuncie sobre ese extremo, previa realización de audiencia oral. En lo demás, el fallo permanece incólume. NOTIFÍQUESE.

*TULNA0OCNPW61* XIOMARA GUTIERREZ CRUZ - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *4C43YDQSYE2W61* JAIME ROBLETO GUTIERREZ - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *47U7UB43OJV7Q61* MARCO MAIRENA NAVARRO - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355. Correo electrónico: [...]