Appeal of Conviction for Illegal Cocobolo Wood Transport ConfirmedApelación de condena por movilización ilegal de madera de Cocobolo, confirmada

*140007230396PE* **VOTO 36-2019** **TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL.** Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, at ten hours thirty minutes of January thirtieth, two thousand nineteen.

**Appeal** filed in the present case number **14-000723-396-PE,** brought against **[Nombre1]** , identity card number CED1, born December 05, 1988, son of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] , for the crime of **VIOLATION OF THE LEY FORESTAL** to the detriment of **LOS RECURSO NATURALES**. The judges Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas, Adolfo Raynold Quirós, and Gustavo Gillen Bermúdez participate in the decision on the appeal. Licenciado Francisco López Carmona, public defender of the accused, the accused [Nombre1] , Licenciada Kattia Soto Hernández, representing the Ministerio Público, and Licenciado Clarencio Bolaños Barth, representing the Procuraduría General de la República, appeared at this venue.

**RESULTANDO** **1.-** By judgment no. 553-17 of fifteen hours fifty minutes on October thirtieth, two thousand seventeen, the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia venue, resolved: "**POR TANTO:** Pursuant to Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política; Articles 1, 30, 45, 50, 71, 103 subsection 3) and 110 of the Código Penal; Articles 27, 31, 33, 34, 58 and 56 in relation to Article 63 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal; Article 38 of Decreto Ejecutivo 39078-JP of the Arancel de Cobro de Honorarios; Articles 1 to 6, 11 to 13, 180 to 184, 265, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 and 367 of the Código Procesal Penal; **[Nombre1]** is declared the responsible perpetrator of the crime of **ILLEGAL MOVILIZACIÓN DE MADERA** to the detriment of **LOS RECURSOS NATURALES** and in that capacity is sentenced to a term of **ONE MONTH OF IMPRISONMENT**. A penalty that must be served in the corresponding penitentiary center, after crediting the pre-trial detention that may have been suffered. The convicted [Nombre1] is granted the benefit of sentence execution (beneficio de ejecución de la pena) for a period of three years. Ordered is the confiscation (comiso) in favor of the State (Administración Forestal del Estado) of the Mitsubishi brand truck-type vehicle, plate [Placa1] ; as well as the quantity of thirty-three logs of the Cocobolo species. The accused [Nombre1] is ordered to pay the costs of the querella in favor of the State, which is set at the sum of four hundred forty thousand colones. The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought against the civil defendant [Nombre1] is not admitted, and the State is exempted from paying costs for this action. The expenses of the proceedings are the responsibility of the State. Once the ruling becomes final, register it in the Registro Judicial and notify the Instituto Nacional de Criminología and the Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena for their respective duties. NOTIFÍQUESE. **The complete reading of the judgment is scheduled for November 6, 2017, at 13:00 hours**[Nombre4].- **JUEZ DE JUICIO.** **2.-** Against the preceding pronouncement, Licenciado Francisco López Carmona and the accused [Nombre1] filed an appeal.

**3.-** Having completed the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Código Procesal Penal, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

**4.-** The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Written by Judge **Gillen Bermúdez**; **CONSIDERANDO** **I- Appeal of Licenciado López Carmona, public defender of the accused [Nombre1] .** In the sole ground of challenge, the defense claims disagreement with the weighing of the evidence (valoración de la prueba). It claims non-observance of Article 190 of the Código Procesal Penal, since at the moment of approaching the vehicle driven by the accused, the public force officers and [Nombre5] did not know if the accused was actually mobilizing wood, if it came from a forest area or a plantation, or if he carried or did not carry a certificate of origin (certificado de orígen) or wood transport guide (guía de transporte de madera), for which reason, in their view, the accused could not be asked to show the content of the truck he was driving, which they consider is not remedied by the accused's consent, because, due to the characteristics of the specific case, in their view that consent was vitiated. **The ground is declared WITHOUT MERIT.** The trial court determined the criminal liability of the accused [Nombre1] in the following facts: *" **1.-** On April 28, 2014, at approximately 23:30 hours, the accused [Nombre1] driver and registered owner of the Mitsubishi brand vehicle, plates [Placa2], van type, closed metal box, white color, illegally without carrying the respective documentation (without carrying guía de transporte de madera, nor certificado de orígen de madera), mobilized in that vehicle the quantity of 33 logs of wood of the Cocobolo species, with a value of 1,800,178 colones.* 2.- Illegal transport that the accused [Name1] carried out of Cocobolo wood that was cut from a forest area within a protection area of an intermittent stream where environmental damage was caused, transporting that wood from the locality of El Salto de Liberia to the locality of Montano de Bagaces where the accused [Name1] was intercepted by police officers of the Fuerza Pública and an official of MINAET, on the Inter-American Highway; proceeding to the seizure of both the wood and the vehicle in which it was being transported" (sic)(folio 163). The defense complains that the search of the vehicle driven by the accused was carried out without the police officers knowing that the accused was illegally transporting wood. First, it must be established that the accused [Name1], after being informed of the reasons he was being detained by the police authorities, consented to having the cargo he was transporting verified. This was recounted by the administrative police officers who attended the hearing, without the defendant refuting this statement at the hearing. The defense has indicated that the defendant's consent was vitiated, but has not substantiated this position, nor has it presented any evidence thereof, not even the statement of the defendant [Name1] to this effect, making its assertion mere conjecture without evidentiary support. With the free consent of the defendant, who was proven to be the owner and driver of the vehicle in question, the police action becomes legitimate. Beyond this, as the defense considers that police officers must have proof of the commission of a crime to proceed with a vehicle search pursuant to article 190 of the Código Procesal Penal (Criminal Procedure Code), it is important to clarify that it is incorrect to equate the existence of "proven indication of crime (indicio comprobado de delito)" - as the defense seems to understand it - with the existence of "sufficient grounds (motivos suficientes) to presume that a person is concealing objects related to the crime therein" as required by the aforementioned numeral 190 of the criminal procedural system. This has been indicated by the Sala de Casación Penal (Criminal Cassation Chamber), among others, in Vote 440-2017, in which it stated: "...There is indeed an error regarding the equating of a proven indication (indicio comprobado) with what the legislator expressly ruled for vehicle searches, which is the existence of 'sufficient grounds (motivos suficientes)', as the appeals prosecutor correctly points out in her reproach, because the evidentiary body contains circumstances different from the conclusions granted by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia (Sentence Appeals Court), both regarding the vehicle's detention and the seizure of the drugs. The interpretation made by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia is erroneous, in attempting to extend the need for a 'proven indication of having committed a crime (indicio comprobado de haber cometido delito)', as provided in Article 37 of the Constitución Política (Political Constitution), as an indispensable legitimacy requirement for a vehicle search to proceed, whereas what the legislator provides for this latter diligence is that there be sufficient grounds (motivos suficientes) to presume that a person is concealing objects related to the crime therein, which evidently in this case was the drugs. The foregoing finds support in the reiterated criteria of this Sala de Casación Penal, specifically in resolutions No. 0680-2016, No. 0981-2014, No. 1825-2014 and of the Sala Constitucional (Constitutional Chamber) No. 1831-2011, No. 8467-2007; among others." In this specific case, had a vehicle search been necessary due to a lack of consent from the defendant - which did not occur -, the administrative police had sufficient reasons to carry out such diligence, as they had received a notitia criminis reporting the transport of wood late at night, at 11:30 p.m., outside the hours authorized for such activity, in a closed-box truck, white, and even providing the vehicle's license plates, information that was fully corroborated by the police, all sufficient grounds (motivos suficientes) to presume that said vehicle was concealing objects related to a crime, which further legitimizes the vehicle search conducted.

**II.- Appeal by the accused [Name1]** . In his grounds for challenge, the accused complains of disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. He reproaches the inapplicability of the principle in dubio pro reo, as he considers it was not proven that he knew he needed a certificate of origin or transport guides to transport wood. He points out that he is a transporter and was hired to transport wood, and that the paperwork does not correspond to him but to the owner of the transported wood. He complains that the MINAET official did not continue the investigation to determine who is the owner of the wood he was transporting. He states that at no time did he offer resistance as he was unaware of the illegality of his action. He reproaches that it is affirmed that the wood he was transporting originated from a protection area based solely on the testimony of the MINAET official, which he considers insufficient because a DNA analysis of the trees was necessary to determine if the stumps in the protected area correspond to the logs he was transporting. **The ground is declared WITHOUT MERIT.** The trial court determined that the accused was aware of his obligation to have wood transport guides based on several considerations: that he is a person dedicated to the goods transport business, so he had sufficient experience to know that he needed transport certificates for this type of cargo; that he carried it out late at night - at 11:30 p.m. - when the authorized hours for wood mobilization are from 05:00 to 21:00, the time range in which transport control for this type of goods is verified; that he spent four hours loading the wood onto the truck, seeking the late night for its transfer; his knowledge that he had not processed them with SINAC, so he knew he was not authorized to carry out this type of transport, all indications that, concatenated, determine that the accused effectively knew he was acting contrary to the regulations established for this purpose, in the specific case, without having the authorization required for the mobilization of wood. The fact that the police did not continue the investigation to determine the owner of the transported wood does not exclude the criminal liability of the defendant [Name1], since his conduct was completed at the moment of transporting the wood without the respective permits, regardless of whether or not the person who he claims hired him for said activity was located. Finally, the accused complains that the origin of the wood transported by him was determined through the statement of the witness [Name6]. In this regard, Article 182 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes the principle of freedom of evidence (libertad probatoria) by stating: "The facts and circumstances of interest for the correct solution of the case may be proven by any permitted means of evidence, unless expressly prohibited by law." This principle establishes the freedom to prove any aspect of interest through lawful evidentiary elements, testimonial evidence being one of them. At the hearing, the statement of the witness [Name6] was available, which the trial court assessed, taking into account his condition as a biologist with over twenty-three years of experience as a MINAET official, in addition to confronting this testimony with the photographs on folios 30 to 35 and the statement of the witness [Name7], a forestry engineer from MINAET, all of which strengthened and imbued credibility to his testimony, a conclusion that this Cámara de Apelaciones (Court of Appeals) endorses. Thus, with sufficient evidence, the DNA analysis missed by the defendant was not necessary. The assessment of the evidence is extensive and correct, and it is so declared.

**POR TANTO** The appeals filed by the defense and the accused [Name1] are declared **WITHOUT MERIT**. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.

**GUSTAVO GILLEN BERMÚDEZ** **GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS** **ADOLFO RAYNOLD QUIRÓS** **JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA** C/ [Name1] OF./ LOS RECURSOS NATURALES D./ [Name8] Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Address1], Teléfonos: 2681-4047. Fax: 2680-1072. Correo electrónico: [...]

Appearing at this venue were Francisco López Carmona, public defender of the accused, the accused [Name1], Kattia Soto Hernández, representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and Clarencio Bolaños Barth, representing the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República).

**WHEREAS (RESULTANDO)** **1.-** By judgment no. 553-17 of fifteen hours fifty minutes on October thirty, two thousand seventeen, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia venue, resolved: "**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** In accordance with articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; articles 1, 30, 45, 50, 71, 103 subsection 3) and 110 of the Penal Code; articles 27, 31, 33, 34, 58 and 56 in relation to section 63 subsection a) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal); article 38 of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 39078-JP on the Fee Schedule; articles 1 to 6, 11 to 13, 180 to 184, 265, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; **[Name1]** is declared to be the responsible perpetrator of the crime of **ILLEGAL TRANSPORT OF TIMBER (MOVILIZACIÓN ILEGAL DE MADERA)** to the detriment of **NATURAL RESOURCES (LOS RECURSOS NATURALES)** and in such capacity is sentenced to a term of **ONE MONTH OF IMPRISONMENT (UN MES DE PRISIÓN)**. A sentence that must be served in the corresponding penitentiary center, with prior credit for any pretrial detention suffered. The convicted person [Name1] is granted the benefit of execution of the sentence for a period of three years. Confiscation (comiso) in favor of the State (Administración Forestal del Estado) is ordered of the Mitsubishi truck-type vehicle, license plate [LicensePlate1]; as well as the thirty-three logs of the Cocobolo species. The accused [Name1] is condemned to pay the costs of the complaint in favor of the State, which is fixed at the sum of four hundred forty thousand colones. The civil action for damages brought against the civil defendant [Name1] is not accepted, and the State is exonerated from paying the costs of this action. The expenses of the proceedings are borne by the State. Once the judgment is final, register it in the Judicial Registry and notify the National Institute of Criminology and the Sentence Enforcement Court for their respective actions. NOTIFY. **The full reading of the judgment is scheduled for November 06, 2017, at 13:00 hours** [Name4].- TRIAL JUDGE." **2.-** Against the previous pronouncement, Francisco López Carmona and the accused [Name1] filed an appeal.

**3.-** Having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

**4.-** The pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge **Gillen Bermúdez**; **WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO)** **I- Appeal by Mr. López Carmona, public defender of the accused [Name1].** In the sole ground for challenge, the defense claims disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. It claims non-observance of article 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because at the time of approaching the vehicle driven by the defendant, the public force officers and [Name5] did not know whether the accused was actually transporting timber, whether it came from a forest area or a plantation, or whether or not he carried a certificate of origin or timber transport guide, so in its view, the defendant could not be asked to show the contents of the truck he was driving, which it considers is not remedied by the accused's consent, because due to the characteristics of the specific case, in its view that consent was vitiated. **The ground is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR).** The Trial Court determined the criminal liability of the accused [Name1] based on the following facts: *"**1.-** On April 28, 2014, at approximately 23:30 hours, the accused [Name1], driver and registered owner of the Mitsubishi vehicle license plates [LicensePlate2], van type, closed metal box, white color, illegally without carrying the respective documentation (without carrying a timber transport guide, nor a certificate of origin for the timber), transported in that vehicle the quantity of 33 logs of timber of the Cocobolo species, with a value of 1,800,178 colones. **2.-** Illegal transport that the accused [Name1] carried out of timber of the Cocobolo species that was felled from a forest area within a protection area of an intermittent stream where environmental damage was caused, transporting that timber from the town of El Salto de Liberia to the town of Montano de Bagaces where the accused [Name1] was intercepted by police officers of the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) and an official of MINAET, on the Inter-American Highway; proceeding to the seizure both of the timber and the vehicle in which it was transported"* (sic)(folio 163). The defense claims that the vehicle driven by the accused was searched without the police agents knowing that the accused was illicitly transporting timber. Firstly, it must be established that the accused [Name1], after being informed of the reasons why he was being required by the police authorities, consented to the verification of the load he was transporting. This was recounted by the administrative police officers who attended the debate, without the defendant refuting such statement in the debate. The defense has pointed out that the defendant's consent was vitiated, but has not substantiated this position, nor has it presented any evidence thereof, not even the statement of the defendant [Name1] in this regard, making its assertion mere conjecture without evidentiary support. Having the free consent of the defendant, who was shown to be the owner and driver of the vehicle in question, the police action becomes legitimate. Beyond this, when the defense considers that police officers must have proof of the commission of a crime to proceed with the search (registro) of vehicles in accordance with article 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is important to clarify that it is incorrect to equate the existence of *"proven indication of a crime"* – as the defense seems to understand it – with the existence of *"sufficient grounds to presume that a person is hiding objects related to the crime in it"* as required by the aforementioned numeral 190 of the criminal procedural system. This has been pointed out by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), among others in ruling (Voto) 440-2017 in which it stated: *"...Indeed, there is an error regarding the equating of a proven indication with what the legislator expressly ruled for vehicle searches, which is the existence of **“sufficient grounds”**, as the appeals prosecutor rightly points out in her reproach, because from the body of evidence different circumstances arise from the conclusions given by the Sentence Appeals Court, both regarding the stopping of the vehicle and the seizure of the drug. The interpretation made by the Sentence Appeals Court is erroneous, in attempting to extend the need for a “proven indication of having committed a crime”, as provided in article 37 of the Political Constitution, as an indispensable legitimacy requirement for a vehicle search to proceed, whereas what the legislator provides for this latter measure is that there be **sufficient grounds** to presume that a person is hiding objects related to the crime in it, which evidently in this case was the drug. The foregoing is supported by the reiterated criteria of this Criminal Cassation Chamber, specifically in resolutions No. 0680-2016, No. 0981-2014, No. 1825-2014 and of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1831-2011, No. 8467-2007; among others.”* In the specific case, had the vehicle search been necessary because the defendant's consent was not available – which did not happen –, the administrative police had sufficient reasons to carry out such measure, as they had received a *notitia criminis* reporting the transport of timber late at night, 23:30 hours, outside the authorized hours for such activity, in a white closed-box truck, even providing the license plates of the motor vehicle, information that was fully corroborated by the police, all sufficient grounds to presume that objects related to a crime were being hidden in said vehicle, which further legitimizes the vehicle search carried out.

**II.- Appeal of the accused [Name1].** In his ground for challenge, the accused claims disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. He reproaches the inapplicability of the principle *in dubio pro reo*, as he considers it was not proven that he knew he needed to have a certificate of origin or transport guides to carry out the timber transport. He points out that he is a transporter and was hired to transport timber, and that the paperwork does not correspond to him but to the owner of the transported timber. He claims that the MINAET official did not continue the investigation to determine who is the owner of the timber he was transporting. He states that at no time did he put up resistance because he was unaware of the illegality of his action. He reproaches the affirmation that the timber he transported originates from a protection area based solely on the testimony of the MINAET official, which he considers insufficient because a DNA analysis of the trees was necessary to determine if the stumps from the protected area correspond to the logs he was transporting. **The ground is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR).** The Trial Court determined that the accused knew of his obligation to have timber transport guides based on several considerations: that he is a person dedicated to the goods transport business and therefore had sufficient experience to know that he needed transport certificates for this type of cargo; that he carried it out late at night – 23:30 hours – the authorized hours for timber mobilization being from 05:00 to 21:00 hours, the time range in which transport control for this type of goods is verified; that he took four hours loading the timber onto the truck, seeking the late night hours for its transfer; his knowledge that he had not applied to SINAC and therefore knew he was not authorized to carry out this type of transport, all indications which, taken together, determine that the accused indeed knew he was acting contrary to the regulations established for this purpose, in this specific case, without having the required authorization for timber mobilization. The fact that the police did not continue the investigation to determine the owner of the transported timber does not exclude the criminal liability of the defendant [Name1], as his conduct was completed at the moment of transporting the timber without the respective permits, regardless of whether the person who he claims hired him for said activity was located or not. Finally, the accused claims that the origin of the timber he transported was determined by the statement of witness [Name6]. In this regard, article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the principle of freedom of evidence (libertad probatoria) by stating: *"The facts and circumstances of interest for the correct solution of the case may be proved by any permitted means of evidence, except express legal prohibition."* This principle establishes the freedom to prove any aspect of interest through lawful means of evidence, one of them being testimonial evidence. The statement of witness [Name6] was available in the debate, which the sentencing Court duly weighed (justipreció), taking into account his condition as a biologist with over twenty-three years of experience as a MINAET official, in addition to comparing this testimony with the photographs on folios 30 to 35 and the statement of witness [Name7], a forestry engineer from MINAET, all of which strengthened and lent credibility to his testimony, a conclusion that this Appeals Chamber (Cámara de Apelaciones) endorses. Thus, having sufficient evidence, the DNA analysis missed by the defendant was not necessary. The assessment of the evidence is extensive and correct, and it is so declared.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** The appeals filed by the defense and the accused [Name1] are declared **WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR)**. **NOTIFY**.

**GUSTAVO GILLEN BERMÚDEZ** **GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS** **ADOLFO RAYNOLD QUIRÓS** **SENTENCE APPEALS JUDGES** C/ [Name1] OF./ LOS RECURSOS NATURALES D./ [Name8] Judicial Circuit of Santa Cruz, [Address1], Telephones: 2681-4047. Fax: 2680-1072. Email: [...]

*140007230396PE* VOTO 36-2019 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, a las diez horas treinta minutos de treinta de enero de dos mil diecinueve.

Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la presente causa número 14-000723-396-PE, seguida contra [Nombre1] , cédula de identidad número CED1, nació el 05 de diciembre de 1988, hijo de [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] , por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LEY FORESTAL en perjuicio de LOS RECURSO NATURALES. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso los jueces Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas, Adolfo Raynold Quirós y Gustavo Gillen Bermúdez. Se apersonó en esta sede, el licenciado Francisco López Carmona, defensor público del imputado, el imputado [Nombre1] , la licenciada Kattia Soto Hernández, en representación del Ministerio Público y el licenciado Clarencio Bolaños Barth, en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

RESULTANDO

1.- Mediante sentencia n.° 553-17 de quince horas cincuenta minutos del treinta de octubre de dos mil diecisiete, el Tribunal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Liberia, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; artículos 1, 30, 45, 50, 71, 103 inciso 3) y 110 del Código Penal; artículos 27, 31, 33, 34, 58 y 56 en relación con el ordinal 63 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal; artículo 38 del Decreto Ejecutivo 39078-JP del Arancel de Cobro de Honorarios; artículos 1 a 6, 11 a 13, 180 a 184, 265, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal; se declara a [Nombre1] , autor responsable del delito de MOVILIZACIÓN ILEGAL DE MADERA en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES y en tal carácter se le condena al tanto de UN MES DE PRISIÓN. Pena que deberá descontar en el centro penitenciario correspondiente, previo abono de la preventiva que hubiera sufrido. Se le concede al condenado [Nombre1] el beneficio de ejecución de la pena por el plazo de tres años. Se ordena el comiso en favor del Estado (Administración Forestal del Estado) del vehículo tipo camión marca Mitsubischi, placa [Placa1] ; así como de la cantidad de treinta y tres trozas de la especie Cocobolo . Se le condena al imputado [Nombre1] al pago de las costas de la querella en favor del Estado, la cual se fija en la suma de cuatrocientos cuarenta mil colones. No se acoge la acción civil resarcitoria promovida contra el demandado civil [Nombre1] , y se exonera al Estado al pago de costas de esta acción. Son los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado. Firme el fallo inscríbase el mismo en el Registro Judicial y comuníquese al Instituto Nacional de Criminología y al Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena para lo de su cargo. NOTIFÍQUESE. La lectura integral de la sentencia se señala para el día 06 de noviembre del 2017, a las 13:00 horas[Nombre4].- JUEZ DE JUICIO.

2.- Contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado Francisco López Carmona y el imputado [Nombre1] , interpusieron recurso de apelación.

3.- Verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el juez Gillen Bermúdez;

CONSIDERANDO

I- Recurso del licenciado López Carmona defensor público del imputado [Nombre1] . En el único motivo de impugnación, la defensa reclama inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba. Reclama la inobservancia del artículo 190 del Código Procesal Penal, pues al momento de abordar el vehículo conducido por el encartado, los oficiales de la fuerza pública y [Nombre5] desconocían si el imputado efectivamente movilizaba madera, si provenía de un área de bosque o de una plantanción o si portaba o no certificado de orígen o guía de transporte de madera, por lo que en su parecer no se le podía pedir al encartado que mostrara el contenido del camión que conducía, lo que considera no se subsana con el consentimiento del imputado, pues por las características del caso concreto, en su parecer ese consentimiento estuvo viciado. El motivo se declara SIN LUGAR. El Tribunal de juicio determinó la responsabilidad penal del imputado [Nombre1] en los siguientes hechos: " 1.- El día 28 de abril de 2014, al ser aproximadamente las 23:30 horas, el imputado [Nombre1] conductor y propietario registral del vehículo marca Mitsubishi placas [Placa2], tipo furgón, cajón de metal cerrado, color blanco, ilegalmente sin portar la documentación respectiva (sin portar guía de transporte de madera, ni certificado de orígen de madera), movilizó en ese vehículo la cantidad de 33 trozas de madera de la especie Cocobolo, con un valor de 1.800.178 colones. 2.- Transporte ilegal que el imputado [Nombre1] realizó de una madera de la especie Cocobolo que fue talada de un área de bosque dentro de un área de protección de un a quebrada intermitente donde se ocasionó un daño ambiental, transportando esa madera desde la localidad de El Salto de Liberia hasta la localidad de Montano de Bagaces donde fue interceptado el imputado [Nombre1] por parte de oficiales de policía de Fuerza Pública y funcionario del MINAET, sobre carretera interamericana; procediéndose al decomiso tanto de la madera como del vehículo en que era transportada" (sic)(folio 163). La defensa reclama que se realizara el registro de vehículo conducido por el imputado, sin que los agentes policiales tuvieran conocimiento de que el imputado transportara madera de forma ilícita. En primer lugar se debe establecer que el imputado [Nombre1] luego de ser informado de las razones por las que era requerido por las autoridades de policía consintió en que fuera verificada la carga que transportaba. Así lo relataron los oficiales de la policía administrativa que asistieron a debate, sin que el encartado refutara tal afirmación en el debate. La defensa ha señalado que el consentimiento del encartado estaba viciado, pero no ha fundamentado esta posición, ni ha presentado prueba alguna de ello, ni siquiera la declaración del encartado [Nombre1] en tal sentido, resultando su afirmación en conjeturas sin sustento probatorio. Contando con el consentimiento libre del encartado quien se demostró es el propietario y conductor del vehículo en cuestión, la actuación policial deviene en legítima. Mas allá de esto, al considerar la defensa que los efectivos policiales deben contar con prueba de la comisión de delito para proceder al registro de vehículos conforme el artículo 190 del Código Procesal Penal, es importante aclarar que es incorrecto equiparar la existencia de "indicio comprobado de delito" - como parece entenderlo la defensa- con la existencia de "motivos suficientes para presumir que una persona oculta en él objetos relacionados con el delito" como lo requiere el citado numeral 190 del ordenamiento procesal penal. Así lo ha señalado la Sala de Casación Penal entre otros en el voto 440-2017 en el que indicó: "...Efectivamente existe un yerro en cuanto a la equiparación de un indicio comprobado, con lo que expresamente dictaminó el legislador para el registro de vehículos, que es la existencia de “motivos suficientes”, como bien lo apunta la fiscal de impugnaciones en su reproche, porque del elenco probatorio se derivan circunstancias diferentes a las conclusiones otorgadas por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, tanto sobre la detención del vehículo, como respecto a la incautación de la droga. La interpretación que realiza el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia es errada, al pretender extender la necesidad de un “indicio comprobado de haber cometido delito”, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 37 de la Constitución Política, como requisito indispensable de legitimación para que proceda el registro de vehículos, mientras que, lo que el legislador dispone para esta última diligencia, que haya motivos suficientes para presumir que una persona oculta en él objetos relacionados con el delito, lo que evidentemente en este caso era la droga. Lo anterior, encuentra sustento en los criterios reiterados de esta Sala de Casación Penal, concretamente en las resoluciones N°0680-2016, N°0981-2014, N°1825-2014 y de la Sala Constitucional N°1831-2011, N°8467-2007; entre otras.” En el caso concreto, de haber sido necesario el registro del vehículo por no contar con el consentimiento del encartado -lo cual no sucedió-, la policía administrativa contaba con razones suficientes para realizar tal diligencia, pues había recibido una notitia criminis en la que se informaba del transporte de madera a altas horas de la noche, 23:30 horas, fuera del horario autorizado para tal actividad, en un camión de cajón cerrado, color blanco e incluso aportando las placas del automotor, información que fue corroborada en su totalidad por la policía, todos motivos suficientes para presumir que en dicho automotor se ocultaban objetos relacionados con un delito, lo que legitima aún más el registro vehicular realizado.

II.- Recurso de apelación del imputado [Nombre1] . En su motivo de impugnación, el imputado reclama inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba. Reprocha la inaplicabilidad del principio indubio pro reo, pues considera no se demostró que tuviera conocimiento que para realizar el transporte de madera necesitara contar con certificado de origen o guías de transporte. Señala que es transportista y se le contrató para transportar madera, sin que la tramitología le corresponda sino al dueño de la madera transportada. Reclama que el oficial del MINAET no continuara la investigación para determinar quien es el propietario de la madera que él transportaba. Refiere que en ningún momento opuso resistencia pues desconocía la ilegalidad de su actuación. Reprocha que se afirme que la madera que transportaba tiene origen en un área de protección solamente con el testimonio del oficial del MINAET, lo que considera insuficiente pues era necesario un análisis de ADN de los árboles para determinar sin los tocones del área protegida corresponden a las trozas que transportaba. El motivo se declara SIN LUGAR. El Tribunal de juicio determinó que el imputado tenía conocimiento de su obligación de contar con las guías de transporte de madera debido a varias consideraciones: que se trata de una persona dedicada al negocio del transporte de bienes por lo que tenía la experiencia suficiente para conocer que necesitaba certificados de transporte para este tipo de carga; que lo realizó a altas horas de la noche -23:30 horas- siendo las autorizadas para la movilización de madera de las 05:00 a las 21:00 horas rango temporal en que se verifica en control de transporte de este tipo de bienes; que tardó cuatro horas cargando la madera al camión buscando lo avanzado de la noche para su traslado; su conocimiento de que no había gestionado ante el SINAC por lo que sabía que no estaba autorizado para realizar este tipo de transporte, todos indicios que concatenados determina que efectivamente el imputado conocía que actuaba contrario a la normativa establecida al efecto, en el caso concreto, sin contar con la autorización requerida para la movilización de madera. El que la policía no continuara la investigación para determinar el propietario de la madera transportada, no excluye la responsabilidad penal del encartado [Nombre1] , pues su conducta se completó al momento de transportar la madera sin los permisos respectivos, independientemente de que se localizara o no a quien dice lo contrató para dicha actividad. Finalmente, el imputado reclama que se haya determinado el origen de la madera por él transportada, mediante la declaración del testigo [Nombre6] . A este respecto el artículo 182 del Código Procesal Penal establece el principio de libertad probatoria al señalar: "Podrán probarse los hechos y las circunstancias de interés para la solución correcta del caso, por cualquier medio de prueba permitido, salvo prohibición expresa de ley". Este principio establece la libertad de probar cualquier aspecto de interés mediante elementos de prueba lícitos, siendo uno de ellos la prueba testimonial. En debate se contó con la declaración del testigo [Nombre6] , la que justipreció el Tribunal de sentencia, tomando en cuando su condición de biólogo con mas de veintitrés años de experiencia como oficial de MINAET, además de confrontar este testimonio con la fotografías de folios 30 a 35 y la declaración del testigo [Nombre7] ingeniero forestal del MINAET, todo lo cual fortaleció revistiendo de credibilidad su testimonio, conclusión que prohíja esta Cámara de Apelaciones. Así, contando con prueba suficiente no resultó necesario el análisis de ADN extrañado por el encartado. La valoración de la prueba es extensa y correcta y así se declara.

POR TANTO

Se declaran SIN LUGAR los recursos de apelación interpuestos por la defensa y el imputado [Nombre1] . NOTIFÍQUESE.

GUSTAVO GILLEN BERMÚDEZ GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS ADOLFO RAYNOLD QUIRÓS JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA C/ [Nombre1] OF./ LOS RECURSOS NATURALES D./ [Nombre8] Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: 2681-4047. Fax: 2680-1072. Correo electrónico: [...]