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Res. 00071-2018 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 10/08/2018
OutcomeResultado
The claim is dismissed and the revocation of the family farm allotment for unjustified abandonment is upheld, given that the plaintiff failed to comply with the obligations of agricultural exploitation and construction of a dwelling, and INDER respected due process.Se declara sin lugar la demanda y se confirma la revocación de la adjudicación de la granja familiar por abandono injustificado, al constatarse que el actor no cumplió con las obligaciones de explotación agraria ni construcción de vivienda, y que el INDER respetó el debido proceso.
SummaryResumen
The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section IV, dismisses the claim of a family farm allottee who challenged the INDER’s revocation of his plot for unjustified abandonment. The ruling reaffirms that family farms allotted by INDER are subject to a special property regime, distinct from ordinary private property, driven by the social function of land under Article 50 of the Constitution and the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825. The beneficiary must personally farm the land and build a dwelling, on pain of losing the right. The court finds that although the claimant held the farm since 1999, he never lived there nor cultivated it effectively, and that INDER conducted multiple inspections and warnings, respecting due process, before revoking the allotment. The court holds that the administrative revocation had sufficient grounds and complied with the law.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección IV, rechaza la demanda de un adjudicatario de granja familiar del INDER (antes IDA) que impugnaba la revocación de su parcela por abandono injustificado. La sentencia reitera que las granjas familiares adjudicadas por el INDER están sometidas a un régimen especial de propiedad, distinto al derecho común, orientado por la función social de la tierra según el artículo 50 constitucional y la Ley de Tierras y Colonización N° 2825. El beneficiario debe explotar personalmente el fundo mediante actividad agraria y construir su vivienda, so pena de perder el derecho. El tribunal constata que el actor, pese a tener la granja desde 1999, nunca habitó ni cultivó de manera efectiva el inmueble, y que el INDER realizó múltiples inspecciones y amonestaciones, respetando el debido proceso, antes de revocar la adjudicación. Se concluye que el acto administrativo de revocación tuvo motivo suficiente y se ajustó a derecho.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In light of all the foregoing, it is easily inferred that the beneficiary may not transfer ownership of the plot, or encumber it, lease it, or subdivide it without the Institute's authorization, except when fifteen years have elapsed since the acquisition of the plot and all obligations to said body have been settled, by virtue of which private contracts entered into by the allottee with third parties do not bind the entity. Thus, once the sale of the plots is agreed upon, the Institute shall issue in favor of the occupant a provisional title of possession stating their rights and obligations, so that if the occupant has cultivated the minimum required and fulfilled all other obligations to satisfaction, they shall be entitled to receive the title of ownership (article 65 ibid.). The penalty for any breach of the duties imposed on beneficiaries is set forth in the immediately preceding article: “Article 66.- Non-compliance with the obligations imposed on the occupant of a plot shall cause, in the Institute's judgment, the loss of the right to it. In the event that a resolution to that effect is issued, requiring four affirmative votes of the Board of Directors, the plot shall revert to the Institute with all its equipment, and the Institute shall recognize to the plot-holder the value of the necessary or useful improvements made from their own resources.”En mérito de todo lo expuesto, se colige sin dificultad que el beneficiario no podrá traspasar el dominio de su predio, ni gravarlo, arrendarlo, subdividirlo sin autorización del Instituto, excepto que hayan transcurrido quince años desde la adquisición de la parcela y de que todas las obligaciones con dicho organismo estuvieren canceladas, en mérito de lo cual los contratos privados celebrados por el adjudicatario con terceros, no vincula a la entidad. Así las cosas, una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expedirá a favor del ocupante un título de posesión provisional en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones, de modo que si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado y cumplido a satisfacción las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue el título de propiedad (artículo 65 ibíd.). La sanción para los eventuales incumplimientos de los deberes señalados a los beneficiarios está prevista en el ordinal inmediato anterior: “Artículo 66.- El incumplimiento de las obligaciones impuestas al ocupante de una parcela, causará, a juicio del Instituto, la pérdida del derecho sobre la misma. En el caso de dictarse una resolución en tal sentido, que requerirá cuatro votos conformes de la Junta Directiva, la parcela volverá al dominio del Instituto con toda su dotación, reconociéndole éste al parcelero el valor de las mejoras necesarias o útiles que hubiere hecho de su peculio.”
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Este tipo de propiedad está sometida a un régimen especial, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a actividades contrarias a su fin social o que no se explote económicamente, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización."
"This type of property is subject to a special regime, safeguarded and protected in an intensified manner, with the purpose of dedicating it to the goal entrusted by law, thus preventing the land from being used for activities contrary to its social purpose or not being economically exploited, which would entail its denaturalization."
Considerando VI
"Este tipo de propiedad está sometida a un régimen especial, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a actividades contrarias a su fin social o que no se explote económicamente, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización."
Considerando VI
"El incumplimiento de las obligaciones impuestas al ocupante de una parcela, causará, a juicio del Instituto, la pérdida del derecho sobre la misma."
"Non-compliance with the obligations imposed on the occupant of a plot shall cause, in the Institute's judgment, the loss of the right to it."
Artículo 66 Ley 2825, citado en Considerando V
"El incumplimiento de las obligaciones impuestas al ocupante de una parcela, causará, a juicio del Instituto, la pérdida del derecho sobre la misma."
Artículo 66 Ley 2825, citado en Considerando V
"De esta forma, en el fondo lo que está alegando el actor, desde la técnica del derecho administrativo es que el acto administrativo de revocación emitido por el INDER carece del elemento motivo."
"Thus, in essence what the plaintiff is arguing, from the standpoint of administrative law technique, is that the administrative act of revocation issued by INDER lacks the element of cause."
Considerando VI
"De esta forma, en el fondo lo que está alegando el actor, desde la técnica del derecho administrativo es que el acto administrativo de revocación emitido por el INDER carece del elemento motivo."
Considerando VI
"Así las cosas, esta Cámara concluye que el motivo del acto, existió, y fue tomado en cuenta de manera correcta a la hora de dictar el acto final dentro del proceso de revocación de la granja adjudicada, conforme lo exige el artículo 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y el régimen jurídico especial que norma este tipo de relaciones jurídicas."
"Thus, this Chamber concludes that the cause of the act existed and was correctly taken into account when issuing the final act within the process of revoking the allotted farm, as required by Article 133 of the General Public Administration Law and the special legal regime governing this type of legal relationships."
Considerando VI
"Así las cosas, esta Cámara concluye que el motivo del acto, existió, y fue tomado en cuenta de manera correcta a la hora de dictar el acto final dentro del proceso de revocación de la granja adjudicada, conforme lo exige el artículo 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y el régimen jurídico especial que norma este tipo de relaciones jurídicas."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section IV Date of Resolution: August 10, 2018, at 4:00 p.m.
Case File: 14-000050-0689-AG Type of Matter: Ordinary proceeding Judgments from the same case file Content of Interest:
Type of Content: Majority Vote Branch of Law: Administrative Law Topic: Administrative procedure Subtopics:
Revocation process for breach of obligations contracted with family farms granted by INDER. General principles and content of due process.
Topic: Instituto de Desarrollo Rural Subtopics:
Considerations regarding the nature, regulations, and limitations of granted family farms.
Topic: Land Allocation Subtopics:
Considerations regarding the nature, regulations, and limitations of family farms granted by INDER. Revocation process for breach of obligations contracted with the parcels.
Topic: Limitations on Property Subtopics:
Considerations regarding family farms granted by INDER.
"V. REGARDING THE REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO FAMILY FARMS ALLOCATED BY INDER: Before addressing the present matter, we note that the plaintiff basically indicated that, on the allocated farm, he erected fences, maintained it, cultivated it, and that at the time his allocation was revoked, he was about to build his dwelling on it. For this reason, he maintained that INDER's actions in revoking his allocation were unjust and arbitrary. As we have established, the IDA Board of Directors, on July 14, 1999, allocated a family farm in the Asentamiento San Jerónimo I to the plaintiff under the conditions and requirements imposed by the regulations, namely, to exploit the land through agricultural activity and to build his dwelling on it. It is clear that, due to the legal nature of the property, destined by law to fulfill a social function and granted to beneficiaries for these purposes under a special subjugation relationship distinct from that of other private property, the allottee is subject to a series of requirements to consolidate the right of ownership over the property.
Thus, regarding the legal nature of the parcels and family farms granted by INDER and the applicable regulations, as well as their limitations, this Section stated in its vote No. 032-2013, of two thirty p.m. on April twenty-third, two thousand thirteen, which, due to its relevance to the resolution of this case, is cited in full: '...IV. REGARDING THE APPLICABLE LEGAL REGIME: The Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, provides that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario has the purpose of linking the citizen to a healthy regime of land possession, ensuring that the allocation of this resource promotes a gradual increase in productivity, advocating for a fair distribution of its product and the improvement of their socioeconomic condition, thereby making them a conscious participant in the nation's development, thus achieving a just distribution of wealth and avoiding indirect forms of land exploitation (articles one ibid.).
Indeed, the regulation is nothing more than the direct development of Article 50 of the Constitution, where the State intervenes in the means of production in order to generate a healthy distribution of wealth in favor of the groups with the greatest social need. By virtue of such purposes, the right of every person to denounce or report the existence of land whose exploitation does not fulfill the social function of property is encouraged. This last concept, although discarded by the Constituent Assembly of nineteen forty-nine, was adopted by the ordinary legislator, doctrine, and jurisprudence to establish that land has a public interest as the means from which, directly or indirectly, the goods and services necessary for the existence of the human species are produced, such that its exploitation within an ecologically balanced environment is a priority in society. Even more so when it allows for the generation of rural parcels for low-income individuals.
It is a special and exceptional system to the right of property enshrined in the first paragraph of the constitutional provision, protecting the weaker party in the relationship, namely the farmer, who often has the interest and puts in the effort but lacks the land. In merit of such purposes, the State originally declared itself the owner of all land lacking an owner for distribution, and later, with the closure of the agrarian frontier, the former ITCO became the IDA, where the Board of Directors of said entity has the power to promote parceling plans, order the acquisition of private property to fulfill its economic-social purposes, to make landowners out of the farmers to whom it allocates a parcel, and to approve the allocation of lands for the granting of the respective titles. As can be observed, to make land parceling policies effective (Articles 49 et seq. ibid.), the entity offers very favorable conditions to the acquirers, with comfortable payment systems and low installments and interest, to promote the social function of property (Articles 58 to 61 ibid.).
Initially, it was considered that all national rural territory could have this orientation, an assertion progressively nuanced based on respect for environmental norms and the public domain that prevails in those matters. This led the institution to become more technical and establish which lands had an agrarian vocation, so they would be truly usable, and which spaces of the national rural territory had, from a legal and technical standpoint, another vocation. Always advocating that the beneficiaries of these distribution plans are persons who dedicate the property to their own sustenance and that of their family, who have technical capacity and experience in agricultural work, and must commit to working the parcel personally and with their descendants up to the second degree of consanguinity (Article 62 ibid.). Likewise, no more than one parcel will be allocated to each beneficiary, and its size will be proportional to the family members (Article 64 ibid.).
All of this undoubtedly establishes a special property regime, protected and safeguarded in an aggravated manner, to allocate it to the purpose entrusted by law, thus preventing the land from being dedicated to purposes contrary to its social function, which would imply its denaturalization. The legal nature of this type of assets was for a long time a subject of intense discussion, because while they were normally classified as public domain assets, if they indeed possessed this nature, transfer to private individuals would be impossible; on the contrary, if they were taken as fiscal assets, they could be acquired through the means of common law, diverting the public purpose they held. Jurisprudence and doctrine resolved the conflict under the category of temporary or transitory public domain assets, such that the asset has the public domain condition during the time it is in the hands of the administration, preventing it from leaving the public domain through common means within the general State patrimony.
However, once the legal requirements are met, the public nature disappears, the asset is released from public domain, becoming a fiscal asset and consequently transferable in accordance with the special legal norm for the matter (in this regard, see Constitutional Chamber vote 2008-18434). Thus, once the allocation of the parcels by sale is agreed upon, the Institute will issue a 'provisional possession title' to the occupant, setting forth their rights and obligations. So, if the occupant has cultivated the minimum specified and fully complied with the other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted the ownership title (Article 65 ibid.). In consideration of all that has been stated, it can be concluded without difficulty that the beneficiary may not transfer domain of their property, nor encumber it, lease it, or subdivide it without authorization from the Institute, except that fifteen years have elapsed since the acquisition of the parcel and all obligations with said agency have been paid, by virtue of which private contracts entered into by the allottee with third parties do not bind the entity.
In this sense, it was provided that even after such period, if the alienation of the parcel produces excessive concentration or subdivision of the property, the Institute may acquire them on a priority basis (Article 67 ibid.). In addition to the foregoing, it is appropriate to indicate, regarding this differentiated property regime and based on the provisions of Article 67 ibid., that the fifteen-year period begins to run from the acquisition, that is, from the granting of the ownership title (sale) and not from the occupation or administrative allocation. In this regard, for a correct interpretation of the aforementioned provision, it is inferred that the parcel is acquired upon its registration in the name of the beneficiary by virtue of the alienation carried out by the entity in their favor. This is so because it is from that date that the imposed limitations are registered and begin to run, it being stipulated that the sale under the stated terms is subject to the conditions and limitations of Law 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, since, under the terms of Article 65 cited above, prior to acquisition, what exists is a provisional possession title not subject to the limitations, because these are imposed once the land is transferred to the name of the parcel holder, before which they would have no reason for being, as one cannot limit that which one does not dispose of.
An exception remains, which we will consider later. According to the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, No. 2825, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) is called upon to parcel its lands to achieve, among other purposes, a better distribution of land for colonization purposes, giving preference to those areas and lands where nuclei of squatters exist and which are considered suitable for its objectives. Interested persons seeking to become beneficiaries must submit the corresponding application so that it can be analyzed whether they qualify as such (Article 55). Once the allocation of the parcels by sale is agreed upon, the Institute issues a 'provisional possession title' in favor of the occupant, setting forth their rights and obligations. Later, if the occupant has cultivated the minimum specified by the Institute and fully complied with all the other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted an ownership title (Article 65).
The penalty for eventual breaches of the duties assigned to the beneficiaries is provided for in the immediately preceding article: 'Article 66.- Breach of the obligations imposed on the occupant of a parcel shall cause, at the discretion of the Institute, the loss of the right to it. In the event that a resolution to this effect is issued, which shall require four concurring votes from the Board of Directors, the parcel shall revert to the domain of the Institute with all its endowment, the value of the necessary or useful improvements made by the parcel holder at their own expense being recognized by the Institute.' The logical basis of the provision rests on the aforementioned social function of land; although, as can be seen, the legislator exercised due prudence to guarantee the right for the works performed in good faith by the subsequently revoked allottee, under the principle of prohibition of unjust enrichment...'.
Pursuant to the cited judgment, within the framework of the social function of property, the Costa Rican legislator, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Magna Carta, enacted the 'Ley de Tierras y Colonización', number 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, to provide land to low-income farmers, but under a special and exceptional property regime different from the right of property enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. The beneficiary of the system must commit to working the parcel personally and with their descendants up to the second degree of consanguinity (Article 62 ibid.), with the obligation of the allottee to dedicate the property to the purposes for which it was intended by INDER, and not by the beneficiary. Failure by the beneficiary to use it for the intended purposes would denaturalize the property and thus breach their obligations, which would give rise to INDER initiating proceedings for the revocation of allocation and annulment of title against them, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 66 and 177 of Law No. 2825.
Taking into consideration this special legal nature of the real estate allocated by INDER and the obligations to which the beneficiary commits, the Chamber will now address the case under analysis. VI.- ON THE MERITS: In a very summarized manner, the plaintiff's argument consists of the claim that the revocation of the allocation of the family farm by INDER was unjust and arbitrary because he never abandoned the farm. That he fenced it, cultivated it, maintained it, and that at the time of revocation, he was about to benefit from the housing voucher to proceed to build his dwelling on the land. Thus, in substance, what the plaintiff is arguing, from the perspective of administrative law technique, is that the administrative act of revocation issued by INDER lacks the element of grounds. Later, he alleged that he was never notified of the allocation revocation process. In this way, the plaintiff raises both substantive and procedural challenges to what was performed.
For its part, INDER's representation was emphatic in stating that the property allocated to the plaintiff constitutes, by its nature, a property destined to fulfill the social and economic function of ownership. Hence, the plaintiff's obligation was to directly exploit the family farm and build his dwelling on it. But the plaintiff, after nearly 13 years since the property was allocated to him, never built his dwelling on it, and after repeated inspections, it was verified that the farm was abandoned. Consequently, the plaintiff did not fulfill his legal obligations, and therefore INDER was obliged to initiate the farm recovery process. Thus, according to the facts that have been established, the plaintiff must take into account what was indicated in the preceding recital regarding the legal nature of the properties allocated by INDER. Furthermore, it is an undisputed fact that the Board of Directors of IDA, now INDER, agreed in its Session No. 50-99 held on July 14, 1999, Article XXXIX, to allocate to the plaintiff the family farm No. 28 located in the Asentamiento San Jerónimo I, under the principles and obligations set forth in Law No. 2825 and the Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93.
In this way, this type of property is subject to a special regime, protected and safeguarded in an aggravated manner, to allocate it to the purpose entrusted by law, thus preventing the land from being dedicated to activities contrary to its social function or from not being economically exploited, which would imply its denaturalization. The plaintiff must also take into consideration that the real estate granted or allocated by INDER is regulated by a legal regime different from that of private property, as provided in Law No. 2825 and the aforementioned Regulation. Thus, the allottee of the property finds themselves, with respect to the obligations imposed by INDER, in a special subjugation relationship, and to consolidate their right of property, they must comply, for the period stipulated by law, with each and every one of the obligations imposed by INDER regarding the parcel or Farm at the time of its allocation.
Failure to do so would expose the beneficiary of this type of real estate to the initiation of revocation of allocation proceedings against them, a means by which INDER recovers the allocated lands whose beneficiaries do not dedicate them to the purposes given by INDER or who fail to comply with the obligations to which they committed in the act of allocation. In this regard, Article 68(4) of Law No. 2825 stated: '...4) That the Institute must, in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the Chapter on Tribunales de Tierras, revoke or extinguish the allocation for the following reasons: ...b) For the unjustified abandonment of the parcel or of the family....With the exception of case b) and prior to the revocation or extinction of the right, a warning must be issued that has not been heeded by the allottee...' For its part, the Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93, in its Article 34, indicates that the status of allottee may be revoked when the beneficiary incurs any of the grounds provided for in the aforementioned Article 68 of Law No. 2825, and Article 43 of the Regulation governs matters related to the construction of the dwelling and requires that the allottees of family farms shall have a period of 6 months from the notification of the allocation of the property to begin construction of the dwelling, and they have one year to complete it.
According to the cited regulations, it is clear that two conditions are required of the allottee: 1) Direct agricultural exploitation by the beneficiary. 2) The construction of the dwelling in cases of family farms. Then, if the beneficiary does not comply with such requirements, INDER must recover the allocated land once due process has been exhausted. Under this regulatory framework, we will proceed to analyze what was performed by INDER in order to determine whether the issued act conformed or not to said legal system, according to the defects alleged by the plaintiff:
of Aguas Zarcas de San Carlos, what is indicated is that on that date he was processing a housing voucher (bono de la vivienda), without being able to determine the result of that process, so he did not prove that it had been given to him for the purpose of building on farm No. 28. Then, from the witness's statement, it is established that the plaintiff has lived for approximately 60 years in front of the Hospital of Los Chiles, and never on the parcel, despite it having been awarded to him since the year 1999. On the other hand, from the documentary evidence provided, it is established that Messrs. Nelson Villalobos Villalobos and Fernando Palacios Reyes, officials of INDER, conducted a total of 4 inspections of the farm, confirming that it was in a state of abandonment—which must be interpreted as meaning that the property was not being given the use imposed by law, that is—without it being economically exploited at least for subsistence and the dwelling was never built, commitments to which the plaintiff was obligated and of which he had already been warned on repeated occasions.
Thus, this Chamber concludes that the grounds for the act existed and were correctly taken into account when issuing the final act within the revocation process of the awarded farm, as required by Article 133 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and the special legal regime that governs this type of legal relationship, so the plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that the proceedings were arbitrary or unjust for not having abandoned the farm. 2) THE REVOCATION PROCEDURE: Regarding the procedure followed, the plaintiff alleged: a) That it was never proven that the resolution of 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012 (Order to Open Proceedings and Notify Charges - Auto de apertura y traslado de cargos), issued by Mr. Wiston Estrada E., was notified to his wife. b) That the fax number indicated for receiving notifications was never provided by him for those purposes.
In relation to the guarantee of due process in ablative procedures, this same Tribunal, in Ruling No. 171-2015-VI, clearly and precisely explained its importance and guiding principles as set forth in the following excerpt: "(...) IV.- General Overview of the Administrative Procedure. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it serves as a framework of reference that allows the administered party to compare public conduct, in order to establish a control to ensure that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It therefore seeks to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against (sic) public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the proper functioning of the public function.
As indicated by Article 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as grounds for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Public Administration Law. Hence, Article 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal order. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and adversarial proceedings, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which those established in Articles 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law can be seen). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that in these cases (sic), the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere.
The same normative framework provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, deeming invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum requirements. This is derived from Article 223 of the referenced Law, in that it states that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this Jurisdiction by Article 49 of the Magna Carta involves a comparison to ensure that the Administration, in the course of these procedures, satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in essence, the due process that must be insurmountable in that proceeding has been protected. The Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal already had the opportunity to refer to the common characteristics that make up the content of the legal due process that must prevail in the dynamics of administrative procedures.
Indeed, in ruling No. 1151-2009 of seven thirty on June nineteenth, two thousand nine, the following was indicated on the matter: '1) Material or Substantial Principles of the Disciplinary Procedure: These principles are the following: a) Principle of Legality: comprises both the principle of legal reservation regarding administrative faults and sanctions, and the principle of typicality, which consists of the norm imposing an obligation or prohibition (conduct) on a subject (active) and classifying the breach of that conduct as reprehensible (sanction), aspects that must have been established by law prior to the processing of the administrative procedure (see Articles 39 of the Political Constitution and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights); b) Principle of Proportionality (necessary adequacy between the infraction and the sanction): this principle is understood as the congruence or adequacy of the measures adopted to the characteristics of the situation that motivates them and the ends pursued by them, demanding (sic) the choice of the least serious, onerous, and restrictive to individual freedom among those that are suitable; c) Principle of "non bis in idem": no one can be tried twice for the same facts (see Articles 42 of the Political Constitution and 8.4 of the American Convention on Human Rights). 2) Formal or Procedural Principles of the Sanctioning Procedure: These are classified as follows: a) Right to a Hearing and Defense: this principle consists of the right of every individual subjected to a sanctioning administrative procedure to be heard by the directing body of the administrative procedure; to contribute to the process any evidence deemed appropriate to support their defense; to challenge the arguments and evidence for the prosecution; to be advised by a legal professional; to be notified of all procedural actions; to have access to the administrative file; to challenge appealable acts or resolutions (see Articles 39 of the Political Constitution, 8.1, 8.2.c., 8.2.d., 8.2.f. of the American Convention on Human Rights, 308 and 211.3 of the General Public Administration Law, and rulings of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 1990-00015 and 1992-001739); b) Principle of Notice and Imputation: the formulation of charges or the notification of charges is the initiating act of the procedure, through which the subject is informed by means of a timely, precise, clear, and detailed account of the facts and their legal consequences (see Articles 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.2.b of the American Convention on Human Rights, 249 of the General Public Administration Law, and ruling of the Constitutional Chamber number 1999-00632); c) Principle of Impartiality: this is a (sic) principle referring to the fact that the directing bodies of the sanctioning administrative procedure are obligated to act with the greatest objectivity and impartiality, respecting the right of defense of the parties involved (Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights), this principle is possible through the system of excuses and recusals established in the General Public Administration Law and, in a supplementary manner, in the Civil Procedure Code; d) Right of the Interested Party to Appeal the Decision Issued by the Administration: this is the right of challenge available to the administered party to appeal the final act, as well as all those procedural acts with their own effect that may affect the right of defense (see Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights).
Having explained some of the most relevant principles that must be followed in any sanctioning disciplinary administrative procedure, they will be applied to the specific case to determine whether or not there are violations of due process that cause the invalidity of the final act challenged in this matter.' Under this protective and legality-guaranteeing framework, the analysis of the specific objections raised by the plaintiff in his complaint regarding the procedure proceeds, as well as the appropriateness or not of the claims deduced. It is clarified that the legality control verified by this Tribunal is limited to the arguments and objections formulated by the parties in the complaint, answer, and conclusions. In the present case, it has been accredited that as a result of the 4 inspections of farm No. 28 conducted by Messrs. Nelson Villalobos Villalobos and Fernando Palacios Reyes, both officials of INDER, the plaintiff was warned to correct that situation, for which a reasonable period was granted, since the first inspection was carried out in the year 2007; however, by January 2, 2012, the plaintiff had not remedied his omission (planting the land and building the house), so the revocation process was initiated by resolution of 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012.
This resolution was notified to the plaintiff at his home on August 31, 2012, and received by his wife, Mrs. Miriam Mendoza Cantillano, and Mr. Wiston Estrada E. recorded this, and Mr. Fernando Palacios Reyes signed as a witness to that action, both officials of INDER. In said resolution, the plaintiff was summoned to appear on September 13, 2012, for an oral and private hearing (See folio 40 of the administrative file) and the plaintiff indeed appeared at said hearing (See folios 41 and 42 of the administrative file), so the document came to his knowledge, meaning he was notified. Thus, this Tribunal does not identify any defect regarding the notification of the resolution of 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012. Regarding the notified means, he accused that fax number 24711061 was not provided by him. On this matter, we have that the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on June 6, 2013, by which the awarding of the farm was revoked, was notified to fax No. 24711061, because in the hearing record appearing on folios 41 and 42 of the administrative file, the plaintiff expressly requested this, a situation that was not discredited.
As a corollary of all that has been stated, the rejection of the complaint in all its aspects must be declared, as well as the claims for damages, as is hereby done." ... See more Citations of Legislation and Doctrine Related Judgments Sign Document CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL Telephone 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email ...01 Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A FILE:
\t PROCEEDING:
\t Cognizance PLAINTIFF:
\t Name31960 DEFENDANT:
\t The Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, INDER).
No. 071-2018-IV.
CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL. FOURTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Address01 , Building Anexo A, at four o'clock in the afternoon on August tenth, two thousand eighteen.
Cognizance Proceeding filed by Mr. Name31960 , who is of legal age, married, resident of Los Chiles, in front of the Hospital, ID number .... represented by Attorney Juan Carlos Quirós Larios, bar card CED87912 against The Institute of Agrarian Development, hereinafter INDER, represented by Attorney Karina Castro Leitón, bar card CED22215.
WHEREAS:
Drafted by Judge Salas Leitón;
CONSIDERING:
During the Oral and Public Trial, the plaintiff's representation offered as evidence for better decision-making a copy of resolution No. 37-2007-CF of 8:35 a.m. on May 29, 2007, from the Arenal Conservation Area, Huetar Norte, Los Chiles Operational Center, of Minaet, by which the plaintiff's request for timber harvesting was approved. Regarding the admission of evidence for better decision-making, it must be noted that such a situation is contemplated in Article 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is applicable in a supplementary manner in this Jurisdiction, according to the provisions of Article 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. Now, regarding the discretionary admission of evidence for better decision-making, it is the reiterated criterion of the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that its rejection does not produce defenselessness for the parties.
Among other judgments, the relevant part of Ruling No. 547-F-2002 of 4:00 p.m. on July 12, 2002, is transcribed, in which that Chamber indicated: "(…) IV.- Multiple precedents of this Chamber, referring to evidence for better decision-making, have indicated that this is the judge's evidence, and not that of the parties. Consequently, the decision to collect it is discretionary for the jurisdictional body, and it can be dispensed with without the need for any resolution. Ergo, the omission of a pronouncement regarding it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been exceeded, in which the parties must demonstrate the facts constitutive of their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof and once that stage is precluded, it will be the exclusive power of the judge to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation must be added to the record.
Consult, among many others, the following resolutions; 59 of 3:20 p.m. on May 31, 1996, 23 of 2:20 p.m. on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 a.m. on May 28, 1993, and 83 of 2:40 p.m. on December 22, 1993. (…)". In the specific case, the Tribunal considers that the evidence offered is inadmissible because it is a document issued since May 29, 2007, which was known to the plaintiff since July 25 of that month and year, the date on which it was notified to him, so that as of the date of filing the complaint, that is, May 23, 2014, the plaintiff could well have offered said document as one more element of his evidentiary array. Furthermore, given the terms in which this judgment is issued, it is deemed unnecessary in the opinion of this Chamber.
The plaintiff's representation indicated, in summary:
The following are considered as such:
The plaintiff fails to prove: 1) That he had fulfilled the requirements under which family farm No. 28 of the Asentamiento San Jerónimo I was awarded to him, namely, building the family dwelling and exploiting the plot (fundo) through agrarian activity. (No evidence to that effect was located). 2) That the plaintiff had not indicated fax No. 24711061 as the means for receiving notifications. (No evidence to that effect was located). 3) That the resolution issued at 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012, was not notified by Messrs. Wiston Estrada E. and Fernando Palacios Reyes to Mrs. Nombre111243. (No evidence to that effect was located).
Before addressing the present matter, we note that the plaintiff basically stated that he had put up fences on the awarded farm, maintained it, cultivated it, and that at the time his award was revoked he was about to build his dwelling on it. For this reason, he maintained that INDER’s action in revoking the award was unfair and arbitrary. As we have held as proven, the Board of Directors of the IDA, since July 14, 1999, awarded the plaintiff a family farm in the Dirección13235 under the conditions and requirements imposed by the regulations, namely, exploiting the plot through agrarian activity and building his dwelling on it. It is clear that, due to the legal nature of the property, designated by law to fulfill a social function, and for those purposes granted to beneficiaries under a special subjection relationship (condición de sujeción especial), distinct from that of the rest of private property, the awardee is subject to a series of requirements in order to consolidate the ownership right over it.
Thus, regarding the legal nature of the plots and family farms granted by INDER and the applicable regulations, as well as their limitations, this Section stated in its opinion No. 032-2013, issued at two-thirty in the afternoon on April twenty-third, two thousand thirteen, and which, due to its relevance for the resolution of the present case, is quoted at length: “...IV. ON THE APPLICABLE LEGAL REGIME: The Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, provides that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario has the purpose of linking the citizen to a healthy land possession regime, ensuring that the allocation of this resource promotes the gradual increase of productivity, advocating for a fair distribution of its product and the elevation of their socioeconomic condition, in order to thereby make them a conscious participant in the nation’s development, thus achieving a fair distribution of wealth and avoiding indirect forms of land exploitation (article one ibid.).
Indeed, the regulation is nothing more than the direct implementation of Article fifty of the Constitution, by which the State intervenes in the means of production in order to generate a healthy distribution of wealth in favor of the groups with the greatest social need. By virtue of such purposes, the right of every person to denounce or inform of the existence of land whose exploitation does not fulfill the social function of property is incentivized. This latter concept, although it was discarded by the Constituent Assembly of nineteen forty-nine, was taken up by the ordinary legislator, doctrine, and jurisprudence to establish that land presents a public interest in being the means from which, directly or indirectly, the goods and services necessary for the existence of the human species are produced, such that its exploitation within an ecologically balanced environment is a priority in society.
Even more so when it allows for the creation of rural parcels for low-income persons. It is a special and exceptional system to the right of property enshrined in the first paragraph of the constitutional provision, in protection of the weaker party in the relationship, namely the farmer, who often has the interest and puts in the effort but lacks land. In merit of such tasks, originally the State declared itself the owner of all ownerless land in order to distribute it, and subsequently, with the closure of the agrarian frontier, the former ITCO became the IDA, where the Board of Directors of said entity has the power to promote parcelization plans, order the acquisition of private property in order to fulfill its socioeconomic purposes, to make landholders (propietarios) of the campesinos to whom it awards a plot, and to approve the award of plots for the issuance of the respective titles.
As can be observed, in order to make effective the land parcelization policies (article 49 et seq. ibid.), the entity offers very favorable conditions to the acquirers, with easy payment systems and low installments and interest, for the purpose of promoting the social function of property (articles 58 to 61 ibid.). Initially it was considered that the entire national rural territory could present that orientation, this assertion being progressively nuanced based on respect for environmental norms and the public domain that prevails in such matters. This led the institution to become more technical and establish which lands had an agrarian vocation, so that they were truly usable, and which areas of the national rural territory had a different vocation from the legal and technical standpoint. It is always advocated that the beneficiaries of these distribution plans be persons who dedicate the property to their own sustenance and that of their family, who have technical capacity and experience in agrarian work, and who must commit to working the plot personally and with their descendants up to the second degree of consanguinity (article 62 ibid.).
Likewise, no more than one plot shall be awarded to each beneficiary, and its size shall be in proportion to the family members (article 64 ibid.). All of this undoubtedly establishes a special property regime, protected and safeguarded in an aggravated manner, for the purpose of assigning it to the function mandated by law, thus preventing the land from being dedicated to purposes contrary to its social purpose, which would imply its denaturalization. The legal nature of this type of property was for a long time a topic of arduous discussion, since although it was normally classified as public domain property, if it had this nature, its transfer to private individuals would be impossible; whereas, on the contrary, if it were taken as fiscal property, it could be acquired through the ordinary means of common law, diverting the public purpose it presented. Jurisprudence and doctrine resolved the conflict under the category of temporary or transitory public domain property, such that the property has the public domain condition during the time it is in the hands of the administration, which prevents it from leaving the public domain through common means, within the general patrimony of the State, but once the legal requirements are met, the public nature disappears, the property is released (desafecta), to become a fiscal property and consequently transferrable pursuant to the special legal provision on the matter (in this regard, see opinion 2008-18434 of the Constitutional Chamber).
Thus, once the award of the plots by sale is agreed, the Institute shall issue in favor of the occupant a provisional possession title stating their rights and obligations, such that if the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated and satisfactorily fulfilled all other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted the ownership title (article 65 ibid.). In merit of all the foregoing, it follows without difficulty that the beneficiary may not transfer ownership of their parcel, nor encumber it, lease it, or subdivide it without authorization from the Institute, unless fifteen years have elapsed since the acquisition of the plot and all obligations with said agency have been settled, in merit of which private contracts entered into by the awardee with third parties do not bind the entity. In this sense, it was provided that even after such period, if the alienation of the plot produces concentration or excessive subdivision of property, the Institute may acquire them on a priority basis (article 67 ibid.).
In addition to the above, it is appropriate to indicate regarding this differentiated property regime, and based on the provisions of article 67 ibid., that the fifteen-year period begins to run from the acquisition, that is, from the granting of the ownership title (purchase-sale) and not from the occupation or administrative award. In this regard, for a correct interpretation of the aforementioned provision, it follows that the plot is acquired from its registry inscription in their name by virtue of the alienation carried out by the entity in their favor. This is so because it is as of said date that the imposed limitations are established by registration and begin to run, it being provided that the sale under the stated terms is subject to the conditions and limitations of Law 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, since under the terms of article sixty-five cited, before acquisition what one has is a provisional possession title not subject to the limitations, because these are imposed once the plot is transferred in the name of the parcelero, prior to which they would have no reason to exist, given that one cannot limit that which one does not dispose of.
This leaves an exception, which we shall consider later. According to the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, No. 2825, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) is called upon to carry out the parcelization of its lands to achieve, among other purposes, a better distribution of land, for colonization purposes, giving preference to those zones and lands where there are nuclei of precaristas (squatters) and which are considered suitable for its objectives. Individuals interested in becoming beneficiaries must submit the corresponding application, so that it can be analyzed whether they qualify as such (article 55). Once the award of the plots by sale is agreed, the Institute issues in favor of the occupant a “provisional possession title” stating their rights and obligations. Subsequently, if the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and satisfactorily fulfilled all other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted the ownership title (article 65).
The sanction for eventual breaches of the duties indicated to the beneficiaries is provided in the immediately preceding article: “Article 66.- Non-compliance with the obligations imposed on the occupant of a plot shall cause, in the judgment of the Institute, the loss of the right over the same. In the event of issuing a resolution to that effect, which shall require four concurring votes of the Board of Directors, the plot shall return to the ownership of the Institute with all its endowment, the Institute recognizing to the parcelero the value of necessary or useful improvements made from their own funds.” The logical foundation of the provision is based on the aforementioned social function of land; even though, as can be observed, the legislator exercised due prudence to guarantee the right to works of good faith carried out by the subsequently revoked awardee, under the principle of the prohibition of unjust enrichment...".
Pursuant to the cited judgment; within the framework of the social function of property, the Costa Rican legislator, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution, enacted the "Ley de Tierras y Colonización", number 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, for the purpose of providing lands to low-income campesinos, but under a special and exceptional property regime to the right of property enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. The beneficiary of the system must commit to working the plot personally and with their descendants up to the second degree of consanguinity (article 62 ibid.), with the obligation of the awardee to dedicate the property to the purposes designated for it by INDER, and not by the beneficiary, since if the beneficiary does not use it for the intended purposes, they would be denaturalizing the property and thereby breaching their obligations, which would give cause for INDER to initiate proceedings against them for revocation of the award and annulment of the title, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 66 and 177 of Law No. 2825.
Taking into consideration this special legal nature of the real properties awarded by INDER and the obligations to which the beneficiary commits, the Chamber shall now proceed to rule on the case under analysis.
In very summarized form, the plaintiff’s argument is that the revocation of the award of the family farm by INDER was unfair and arbitrary because he never abandoned the farm. That he fenced it, cultivated it, maintained it, and that at the time of the revocation, he was about to be benefited with the housing voucher (bono de la vivienda) to proceed with building his dwelling on the plot. Thus, in essence, what the plaintiff is alleging, from the technique of administrative law, is that the administrative act of revocation issued by INDER lacks the grounds (motivo) element. Then, he claimed that the procedure for revocation of the award was never notified to him. Thus, the plaintiff makes both substantive and procedural objections to the actions taken. For its part, INDER’s representation was emphatic in pointing out that the property awarded to the plaintiff constitutes, by its nature, a property destined for the fulfillment of the social and economic function of property.
Hence, the plaintiff’s obligation was to directly exploit the family farm and build his dwelling on it. But that the plaintiff, after almost 13 years since the property was awarded to him, never built his dwelling on it, and after repeated inspections it was verified that the farm was abandoned, such that the plaintiff did not fulfill his legal obligations, and therefore INDER was compelled to initiate the process of recovering the farm. Thus, according to the facts that have been held as proven, the plaintiff must take into account what was indicated in the preceding recital, regarding the legal nature of properties awarded by INDER. Moreover, it is an uncontroverted fact that the Board of Directors of the IDA, now INDER, agreed at its session No. 50-99 held on July 14, 1999, article XXXIX, to award the plaintiff family farm No. 28 located in Dirección13235 under the principles and obligations set forth in Law No. 2825 and the Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93.
Thus, this type of property is subject to a special regime, protected and safeguarded in an aggravated manner, for the purpose of assigning it to the function mandated by law, thereby preventing the land from being dedicated to activities contrary to its social purpose or from not being economically exploited, which would imply its denaturalization. The plaintiff must also take into consideration that the properties granted or awarded by INDER are regulated by a legal regime different from that of private property, according to the provisions of Law No. 2825 and the aforementioned Regulation. Thus, the awardee of the property finds themselves, with respect to the obligations imposed by INDER, in a special subjection relationship, and in order to consolidate their ownership right, they must comply, for the period set by law, with each and every one of the obligations imposed by INDER regarding the plot or farm at the time of its award.
And if they fail to do so, the beneficiary of this type of property was exposed to the initiation of revocation of award proceedings against them, a mechanism by which INDER recovers awarded lands whose beneficiaries do not dedicate them to the purposes given by INDER or do not fulfill the obligations they committed to in the award act. In this sense, article 68) of Law No. 2825 indicated: "...4) That the Institute shall, in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the Chapter on Land Tribunals, revoke or extinguish the award for the following reasons: ...b) Unjustified abandonment of the plot or of the family....With the exception of case b) and prior to the revocation or extinction of the right, a warning must be issued that has not been heeded by the awardee...". In turn, the Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93 in its article 34) indicates that the status of awardee may be revoked when the beneficiary incurs any of the causes provided in the cited article 68 of Law No. 2825, and article 43 of the Regulation regulates matters relating to the construction of the dwelling and requires that persons awarded family farms shall have a period of 6 months from the notification of the award of the plot to begin construction of the dwelling and have one year to complete it.
Pursuant to the cited regulations, it is clear that two conditions are required of the awardee: 1) Direct agrarian exploitation by the beneficiary. 2) Construction of the dwelling in the case of family farms. Then, if the beneficiary fails to fulfill such requirements, INDER must recover the awarded plot, once due process has been exhausted. Under this regulatory framework, we shall proceed to analyze the actions taken by INDER for the purpose of determining whether the act issued conformed or not to said legal order, in accordance with the defects alleged by the plaintiff:
Thus, this Court is clear that the plaintiff's domicile has always been, up to the present day, in front of the Los Chiles Hospital, and that the plaintiff, despite having been awarded the farm in 1999, never built on it or designated it as his dwelling, that being a need he already had satisfied. Furthermore, although Ms. Nombre111243 stated that some fruit trees had been planted, that activity, as a sustained agricultural activity or economic exploitation, was not demonstrated. Nor was it demonstrated by the plaintiff that he had cleared or fenced the property. And while the plaintiff submitted a note dated September 11, 2012, signed by Mr. Luis Alberto Barquero Quirós, Housing Officer of Coopeande R.L. in Aguas Zarcas de San Carlos, what it indicates is that at that date he was processing a housing voucher, without it being possible to determine the outcome of that process, so he did not prove that it had been granted to him for the purpose of building on farm No. 28.
Furthermore, from the witness's statement, it is established that the plaintiff has lived for approximately 60 years in front of the Los Chiles Hospital and never on the parcel, despite it having been awarded to him in 1999. On the other hand, from the documentary evidence provided, it is established that Messrs. Nelson Villalobos Villalobos and Fernando Palacios Reyes, officials of INDER, conducted a total of 4 inspections of the farm, confirming that it was in a state of abandonment—which must be interpreted as meaning that the property was not being put to the use imposed by law, that is—without it being economically exploited, at least for subsistence, and the dwelling was never built, commitments to which the plaintiff was obligated and of which he had already been warned on repeated occasions. Such being the case, this Chamber concludes that the grounds for the act existed and were correctly taken into account when issuing the final act within the revocation process of the awarded farm, as required by Article 133 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and the special legal regime governing this type of legal relationship, so the plaintiff is therefore incorrect in asserting that the actions taken were arbitrary or unjust because he had not abandoned the farm. 2) REGARDING THE REVOCATION PROCEDURE: As to the procedure followed, the plaintiff alleged: a) That it was never proven that the resolution issued at 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012 (Order to initiate proceedings and notify charges) by Mr.
Wiston Estrada E. was notified to his wife. b) That the fax number indicated for receiving notifications was never provided by him for such purposes. In relation to the guarantee of due process in abrogative proceedings, this same Court, in Ruling No. 171-2015-VI, clearly and precisely explained its importance and guiding principles, as set forth in the following excerpt: "(...) IV.—General Overview of the Administrative Procedure. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow in reaching a given decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it serves as a frame of reference allowing the individual to compare public conduct, in order to establish a control ensuring that its actions have been carried out in accordance with the rules governing that conduct.
It therefore seeks to serve as a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against the public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the proper functioning of public service. As indicated in canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as grounds for the final act. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the individual the full exercise of the right to defense and adversarial proceedings, in order to arrive at establishing the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law, can be seen).
This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that in those cases, the final decision may impose a punitive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same body of law provides for the substantial nature of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum requirements. This follows from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, in that it states that the omission of substantial formalities shall cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Court has previously indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this Jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta involves a verification that the Administration, in the course of these procedures, satisfies the minimum guarantees established by applicable regulations, and that, at its core, the due process that must be inviolable in that conduct has been protected.
The Sixth Section of the Administrative Contentious Court has already had the opportunity to refer to the common characteristics that comprise the content of due process of law that must prevail in the dynamics of administrative procedures. Indeed, in ruling No. 1151-2009 at seven thirty a.m. on June nineteenth, two thousand nine, it was stated on the subject: '1) Material or substantial principles of disciplinary procedure: These principles are as follows: a) Principle of Legality: encompasses both the principle of legal reserve regarding administrative offenses and sanctions and the principle of specificity, which means that the rule must impose on an (active) subject the obligation or prohibition (conduct) and classify the breach of that conduct as reprehensible (sanction), aspects that must have been established by law prior to the initiation of the administrative procedure (see Articles 39 of the Political Constitution and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights); b) Principle of Proportionality (necessary suitability between the offense and the sanction): this principle is understood as the congruence or adequacy of the measures adopted to the characteristics of the situation that motivates them and the ends pursued by them, requiring the choice of the least severe, burdensome, and restrictive of individual liberty among the suitable ones; c) Principle of "non bis in idem": no one may be tried twice for the same facts (see Articles 42 of the Political Constitution and 8.4 of the American Convention on Human Rights). 2) Formal or procedural principles of the sanctioning procedure: These are classified as follows: a) Right to a hearing and defense: this principle consists of the right of every individual subject to an administrative sanctioning procedure to be heard by the directing body of the administrative procedure; to provide to the proceeding all evidence deemed appropriate to support their defense; to challenge the arguments and evidence of the charges; to be advised by a legal professional; to be notified of all procedural actions; to have access to the administrative file; to challenge acts or resolutions subject to appeal (see Articles 39 of the Political Constitution, 8.1, 8.2.c., 8.2.d., 8.2.f. of the American Convention on Human Rights, 308 and 211.3 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and rulings of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 1990-00015 and 1992-001739); b) Principle of Intimation and Imputation: the formulation of charges or the notification of charges is the initiating act of the procedure, through which the subject is made aware, by way of a timely, precise, clear, and detailed account of the facts and their legal consequences (see Articles 41 of the Political Constitution, 8.2.b of the American Convention on Human Rights, 249 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and ruling of the Constitutional Chamber number 1999-00632); c) Principle of Impartiality: this is a principle referring to the fact that the directing bodies of the administrative sanctioning procedure are obligated to act with the greatest objectivity and impartiality, respecting the right to defense of the parties involved (Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights); this principle is made possible by the system of disqualifications and recusals established in the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and, subsidiarily, in the Civil Procedure Code; d) Right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued by the Administration: this is the right to challenge that assists the individual in appealing the final act, as well as all those procedural acts with independent effect that may affect the right to defense (see Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights).
Once some of the most relevant principles that must be followed in any administrative disciplinary sanctioning procedure have been explained, these will be applied to the specific case to determine whether or not there are violations of due process that cause the invalidity of the final act challenged in this matter.' Under this framework of guarantees and protection of legality, we proceed to analyze the specific objections raised by the plaintiff in his claim regarding the procedure, as well as the appropriateness or not of the claims brought. It is clarified that the legality control verified by this Court is limited to the arguments and objections formulated by the parties in the claim, defense, and conclusions. In the present case, it has been proven that as a result of the 4 inspections of farm No. 28 conducted by Messrs. Nelson Villalobos Villalobos and Fernando Palacios Reyes, both officials of INDER, the plaintiff was warned to correct this situation, for which he was granted a reasonable period, since the first inspection was carried out in 2007; however, as of January 2, 2012, the plaintiff had not remedied his omission (to plant the property and build the house), so the revocation process was initiated by resolution at 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012.
This resolution was notified to the plaintiff at his dwelling on August 31, 2012, and received by his wife, Ms. Nombre111243, and Mr. Wiston Estrada E. recorded this, and Mr. Fernando Palacios Reyes, both officials of INDER, signed as a witness to said action. In said resolution, the plaintiff was summoned to appear on September 13, 2012, for the oral and private hearing (See folio 40 of the administrative file) and the plaintiff did indeed attend said hearing (See folios 41 and 42 of the administrative file), so the document came to his knowledge and was therefore notified. Thus, this Court finds no defect regarding the notification of the resolution of 10:30 a.m. on April 16, 2012. As for the notified means, he alleged that the fax number 24711061 was not provided by him. In this regard, we note that the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on June 6, 2013, by which the award of the farm was revoked, was notified to fax No. 24711061 because the plaintiff expressly requested it in the hearing record found at folios 41 and 42 of the administrative file, a circumstance that was not discredited. As a corollary to all the foregoing, the claim must be dismissed in all its aspects, as well as the claims for damages, as is hereby ordered.
The representation of INDER raised in its defense the defenses of lack of current interest and lack of right. The defense of lack of current interest must be dismissed, since the plaintiff filed contentious proceedings against INDER, seeking a declaration of nullity of official communication OSR-636-2012 of October 9, 2012, by which the award of the granted family farm was revoked, for the property to be restored and re-registered in the Public Registry in his name, plus payment for objective and subjective moral damages and losses, plus lost profits, without there being, prior to the determination that this Court has made, any circumstance that would permit affirming that the dispute raised has been resolved in any manner beforehand, and/or that, should the claim succeed, no change in the plaintiff's legal situation could be generated. It is clear that what was resolved by INDER constitutes an administrative act that affected the plaintiff's alleged rights, for which reason he sought the nullity of the aforementioned official communication and therefore remains expectant—current interest—of a resolution to his petitions.
The foregoing undoubtedly gives him the right to request that his judicial action be resolved judicially, so a loss of current interest has not occurred, and such defense must be dismissed. Regarding the defense of lack of right, returning to what was stated by our First Chamber, it is necessary to refer to the demonstration of the facts, as a fundamental part thereof, because from what is determined in that section, it can be inferred whether or not the legal basis for what is sought exists. Current legislation establishes that one of the defenses that can be raised in judicial proceedings is Lack of Right (Article 298 of the Civil Procedure Code) and regarding this defense, the doctrine tells us: "...Speaking of lack of right is like speaking of lack of a legal norm, so the correct term would then be lack of material prerequisites or lack of elements in the material claim—not procedural, since we all possess that one; despite the terminological imprecision, lack of right seems then to refer to what Italian doctrine calls 'conditions of the action' or requirements of the claim, which are known to include the constitutive requirements, to make it understood that without them, the right of action is not exercised properly and that they must, consequently, be considered as the necessary and sufficient elements to determine, concretely, the birth of the right to the claim.
Such requirements of the claim, which must concur for it to be considered approvable—which seeks a favorable resolution—are, according to the doctrine, three: (a) a certain specific legal fact, that is, a certain relationship between a fact and a norm; (b) standing; (c) procedural interest. Therefore, lack of right would be represented by the nonexistence of the material prerequisites for each specific case...". Since no right amenable to protection in favor of the plaintiff has been proven, the appropriate course is to uphold the defense of lack of right and dismiss the claim.
Article 193 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, a ruling that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to numeral 119.2 ibidem, so the plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding in favor of INDER.
THEREFORE:
The evidence offered for a better resolution is rejected. The defense of lack of current interest is dismissed. The defense of lack of right is upheld and, consequently, the claim filed by Mr. Nombre31960 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario is declared without merit. The plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding, which shall be calculated in the judgment enforcement phase upon request by INDER. LET IT BE NOTIFIED. José Iván Salas Leitón, Nombre60833, Nombre5250.
JOSE IVAN SALAS LEITON, TRIAL JUDGE Nombre60833, TRIAL JUDGE Nombre5250, TRIAL JUDGE Classification prepared by CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL of the Judicial Branch. Reproduction and/or distribution for a fee is prohibited.
It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 03-26-2026 05:53:17.
Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV Sentencias del mismo expediente Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Administrativo Tema: Procedimiento administrativo Subtemas:
Proceso de revocación por incumplimiento de las obligaciones contraidas con las granjas familiares otorgadas por el INDER. Generalidades y contenido del debido proceso.
Tema: Instituto de Desarrollo Rural Subtemas:
Consideraciones con respecto a la naturaleza, normativa y limitaciones de las granjas familiares otorgadas.
Tema: Adjudicación de tierras Subtemas:
Consideraciones con respecto a la naturaleza, normativa y limitaciones de las granjas familiares otorgadas por el Inder. Proceso de revocación por incumplimiento de las obligaciones contraidas con las parcelas.
Tema: Limitaciones a la propiedad Subtemas:
Consideraciones con respecto a las granjas familiares otorgadas por el INDER.
"V. DE LA NORMATIVA APLICABLE A LAS GRANJAS FAMILIARES ADJUDICADAS POR EL INDER: De previo a referirnos sobre el presente asunto, tenemos que el actor básicamente indicó que, en la granja adjudicada levantó cercas, le dio mantenimiento, la cultivó y que al momento en que se le revocó su adjudicación estaba pronto a construir su vivienda en ella. Por ello sostuvo que lo actuado por el INDER al revocarle la adjudicación, resultó injusto y arbitrario. Tal y como hemos tenido por acreditado la Junta Directiva del IDA desde el día 14 de julio de 1999, le adjudicó al actor una granja familiar en el Asentamiento San Jerónimo I bajo las condiciones y exigencias que le impuso la normativa, a saber, explotar el fundo mediante actividad agraria y construir en ella su vivienda. Es claro que, por la naturaleza jurídica del inmueble, destinado por ley al cumplimiento de una función social, y para esos fines se otorga a los beneficiados, bajo una condición de sujeción especial, distinta que al resto de la propiedad privada, y el adjudicatario se sujeta a una serie de exigencias para consolidar el derecho de propiedad sobre la misma.
Así, en cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica de las parcelas y granjas familiares otorgadas por el INDER y la normativa aplicable, así como sus limitaciones; esta Sección manifestó en su voto No. 032-2013, de las catorce horas con treinta minutos del veintitrés de abril de dos mil trece, y que por su incidencia para resolución del presente caso, se cita en extenso: "...IV. SOBRE EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO APLICABLE: Dispone la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario tiene por objeto vincular al ciudadano a un régimen sano de posesión de la tierra, velando por que la asignación de este recurso promueva el aumento gradual de la productividad, propugnando por una justa distribución de su producto y la elevación de su condición socioeconómica, para de esa forma hacerlo partícipe consciente del desarrollo de la nación, logrando así una justa distribución de la riqueza y evitando las formas indirectas de explotación de la tierra (ordinal primero ibíd.).
En efecto la norma no es más que el desarrollo directo del artículo cincuenta constitucional, donde El Estado interviene en los medios de producción a fin de generar una sana distribución de la riqueza en favor de los grupos de mayor necesidad social. En virtud de tales fines, es que se incentiva el derecho de toda persona de denunciar o informar la existencia de tierra en cuya explotación no se cumple con la función social de la propiedad. Este último concepto si bien fue descartado de la Asamblea Constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, fue recogido por el legislador ordinario, la doctrina y la jurisprudencia para fijar que la tierra presenta un interés público de ser el medio a partir del cual de manera directa o indirecta se producen los bienes y servicios necesarios para la existencia de la especie humana, de suerte que su explotación dentro de un ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado es una prioridad en la sociedad.
Más aún cuando permite generar las parcelas rurales para personas de bajos recursos. Es un sistema especial y excepcional al derecho de propiedad consagrado en el párrafo primero de la norma constitucional, en protección de la parte débil de la relación a saber el agricultor, quien muchas veces tiene el interés y pone su esfuerzo pero carece de la tierra. En mérito de tales cometidos, originalmente el Estado se declaró propietario de toda la tierra carente de dueño para distribuirla, y de manera ulterior, con el cierre de la barrera agraria el antiguo ITCO paso a ser el IDA, donde la Junta Directiva de dicha entidad tiene la facultad de promover planes de parcelación, disponer la adquisición de propiedad particular a fin de cumplir con sus fines económico-sociales, de constituir en propietarios a los campesinos a quienes les adjudica una parcela y de aprobar la adjudicación de fundos para el otorgamiento de los títulos respectivos.
Como puede observarse en aras de hacer efectiva las políticas de parcelación de tierras (numeral 49 y siguientes ibíd.) la entidad ofrece condiciones muy favorables a los adquirentes, con cómodos sistemas de pago y bajas cuotas e intereses, con el objeto de promover la función social de la propiedad (numerales 58 a 61 ibíd.). Inicialmente se consideró que todo el territorio nacional rural podía presentar esa orientación, siendo progresivamente matizada esa aseveración a partir del respeto a normas ambientales y del demanio público que impera en esas materias. Eso llevó a la institución a tecnificarse más y establecer cuales terrenos presentaban una vocación agraria, de forma tal que fuera verdaderamente aprovechable y que espacios del territorio nacional rural presentaban desde el plano jurídico y técnico otra vocación. Siempre propugnándose que los beneficiarios de estos planes de distribución recaigan sobre personas que destinen el inmueble para la propia manutención y de su familia, que tengan capacidad técnica y experiencia en trabajos agrarios, debiendo comprometerse a trabajar la parcela personalmente y con sus descendientes hasta el segundo grado de consanguinidad (ordinal 62 ibíd.).
De igual forma, no se adjudicará más de una parcela a cada beneficiario y su extensión irá en proporción a los miembros de la familia (artículo 64 ibíd.). Todo ello sin duda establece un régimen especial de propiedad, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a fines contrarios a su fin social, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización. La naturaleza jurídica de este tipo de bienes fue durante mucho tiempo un tema de ardua discusión, pues si bien normalmente se les calificaba como bienes demaniales, si presentaban esta naturaleza resultaría imposible la transmisión hacia los particulares; mientras que por el contrario si se tomaban como bienes fiscales, podrían ser adquiridos por los medios propios del derecho común, desviándose el fin público que presentaban. La jurisprudencia y la doctrina resolvieron el conflicto bajo la categoría de bienes demaniales temporales o transitorios, de suerte que el bien presenta la condición dominical durante el tiempo que está en manos de la administración, lo que impide salir del dominio público por los medios comunes, dentro del patrimonio general del Estado, pero cumplidos los requisitos legales, la naturaleza pública desaparece, se desafecta el bien, para pasar a ser bien fiscal y consecuentemente transmisible conforme la norma legal especial para la materia (al respecto es posible ver el voto 2008-18434 de la Sala Constitucional).
Así las cosas, una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expedirá a favor del ocupante un título de posesión provisional en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones, de modo que si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado y cumplido a satisfacción las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue el título de propiedad (artículo 65 ibíd.). En mérito de todo lo expuesto, se colige sin dificultad que el beneficiario no podrá traspasar el dominio de su predio, ni gravarlo, arrendarlo, subdividirlo sin autorización del Instituto, excepto que hayan transcurrido quince años desde la adquisición de la parcela y de que todas las obligaciones con dicho organismo estuvieren canceladas, en mérito de lo cual los contratos privados celebrados por el adjudicatario con terceros, no vincula a la entidad. En ese sentido se dispuso que incluso transcurrido tal plazo, si la enajenación de la parcela produce la concentración o subdivisión excesiva de la propiedad, el Instituto podrá adquirirlas en forma prioritaria (numeral 67 ibíd.).
Aunado a lo anterior, es dable indicar en torno a este régimen diferenciado de propiedad, y con base en lo estipulado en el artículo 67 ibíd., que el plazo de los quince años comienza a correr a partir de la adquisición, es decir del otorgamiento del título de propiedad (compraventa) y no de la ocupación o de la adjudicación administrativa. En torno a ello, para una correcta interpretación de la norma supra citada, se colige que se adquiere la parcela desde la inscripción registral a su nombre en virtud de la enajenación que realizara la entidad en su favor. Ello es así, porque es a partir de dicha data que registralmente se establecen y comienzan a correr las limitaciones impuestas, disponiéndose que la venta en los términos expuestos queda sujeta a las condiciones y limitaciones de la Ley 2825 de catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, toda vez que en los términos del ordinal sesenta y cinco citado, antes de la adquisición lo que se tiene es un título de posesión provisional no sujeto a las limitaciones, porque éstas se imponen una vez traspasado a nombre del parcelero el fundo, antes de ello no tendrían razón de ser, debido a que no se puede limitar aquello de lo cual no se dispone.
Quedando a salvo una excepción, que consideraremos más adelante. De acuerdo con la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, N° 2825, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) está llamado a efectuar la parcelación de sus tierras para lograr, entre otros fines, una mejor distribución de la tierra, con propósitos de colonización, dando preferencia a aquellas zonas y tierras en donde existan núcleos de poseedores en precario y que se consideren aptas para sus objetivos. Las personas interesadas en convertirse en beneficiarias deben presentar la solicitud correspondiente, a fin de que se analice si califican como tales (artículo 55). Una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expide a favor del ocupante un “título de posesión provisional” en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones. Luego, si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado por el Instituto y cumplido a satisfacción todas las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue título de propiedad (artículo 65).
La sanción para los eventuales incumplimientos de los deberes señalados a los beneficiarios está prevista en el ordinal inmediato anterior: “Artículo 66.- El incumplimiento de las obligaciones impuestas al ocupante de una parcela, causará, a juicio del Instituto, la pérdida del derecho sobre la misma. En el caso de dictarse una resolución en tal sentido, que requerirá cuatro votos conformes de la Junta Directiva, la parcela volverá al dominio del Instituto con toda su dotación, reconociéndole éste al parcelero el valor de las mejoras necesarias o útiles que hubiere hecho de su peculio.” El fundamento lógico de la norma se sustenta en la ya señalada función social de la tierra; aun cuando cómo se puede ver el legislador presentó la debida prudencia de garantizar el derecho de las obras de buena fe realizadas por el adjudicatario ulteriormente revocado, bajo el principio de la prohibición del enriquecimiento sin justa causa...".
Conforme a la citada sentencia; en el marco de la función social de la propiedad, el legislador costarricense, de acuerdo a lo que dispone el artículo 50 de la Carta Magna, emitió la "Ley de Tierras y Colonización", número 2825 del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, con el fin de dotar de tierras a campesinos de escasos recursos, pero bajo un régimen de propiedad especial y excepcional al derecho de propiedad consagrado en el párrafo primero del artículo 45 constitucional, debiendo el beneficiado del sistema, comprometerse a trabajar la parcela personalmente y con sus descendientes hasta el segundo grado de consanguinidad (ordinal 62 ibíd), con la obligación del adjudicatario de dedicar el inmueble a los fines que le fueron destinados por el INDER, y no por el beneficiario, ya que de no utilizarla el beneficiario para los fines destinados, estaría desnaturalizando el bien y por ende incumpliendo sus obligaciones, lo que daría pie a que el INDER inicie en su contra, las diligencias de revocatoria de adjudicación y nulidad de título, conforme a lo que disponen los artículos 66 y 177 de la Ley No. 2825.
Tomando en consideración esta especial naturaleza jurídica de los bienes inmuebles adjudicados por el INDER y de las obligaciones a las cuales se compromete el beneficiario, de seguido procederá la Cámara a manifestarse sobre el caso bajo análisis. VI.- SOBRE EL FONDO: De forma muy resumida, el alegato del actor consiste en que la revocación de la adjudicación de la granja familiar hecha por el INDER resultó injusta y arbitraria porque nunca hizo abandono de la granja. Que él la cercó, cultivó, le dio mantenimiento y que al momento de la revocación, estaba por verse beneficiado con el bono de la vivienda para proceder a construir su vivienda en el fundo. De esta forma, en el fondo lo que está alegando el actor, desde la técnica del derecho administrativo es que el acto administrativo de revocación emitido por el INDER carece del elemento motivo. Luego, acusó que nunca se le notificó el proceso de revocatoria de la adjudicación.
De esta forma el actor hace con respecto a la actuado cuestionamiento de fondo y de forma. Por su parte, la representación del INDER fue enfática en señalar que el inmueble adjudicado al actor, constituye por su naturaleza un bien destinado al cumplimiento de la función social y económica de la propiedad. De ahí que la obligación del actor era explotar directamente la granja familiar y construir en ella su vivienda. Pero que el actor, luego de casi 13 años de haberle adjudicado el inmueble nunca construyó en ella su vivienda, y luego de reiteradas inspecciones se constató que la granja estaba abandonada, de forma que el actor no cumplió con sus obligaciones legales y por ende el INDER se vio obligado a iniciar el proceso de recuperación de la granja. Así las cosas, de acuerdo a los hechos que se han tenido por acreditados, el actor debe tomar en cuenta lo señalado en el considerando anterior, en cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica de las propiedades adjudicadas por el INDER.
Además, es un hecho no controvertido que, la Junta Directiva del IDA hoy INDER acordó en su sesión No. 50-99 celebrada el día 14 de julio de 1999, artículo XXXIX; adjudicar al actor la granja familiar No. 28 ubicada en el Asentamiento San Jerónimo I bajo los principios y obligaciones que señala la Ley No. 2825 y el Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93. De esta forma, este tipo de propiedad está sometida a un régimen especial, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a actividades contrarias a su fin social o que no se explote económicamente, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización. También debe tomar en consideración el actor, que los inmuebles otorgados o adjudicados por el INDER, están regulados por un régimen jurídico diferente al de la propiedad privada, según lo dispuesto en la Ley No. 2825 y el Reglamento antes citado.
De manera que, el adjudicatario del bien, se encuentra con respecto a las obligaciones impuestas por el INDER en una relación de sujeción especial y para que pueda consolidar su derecho de propiedad, debe cumplir por el plazo que diga la ley, con todas y cada una de las obligaciones que le impuso el INDER con respecto a la parcela o Granja al momento de su adjudicación, y de no hacerlo, el beneficiario de este tipo de inmuebles se exponía a que se iniciara en su contra, las diligencias de revocatoria de adjudicación, forma por la cual el INDER recupera las tierras adjudicadas, pero cuyos beneficiarios no destinan a los fines dados por el INDER o que no cumple con las obligaciones a las que se comprometió en el acto de adjudicación. En este sentido el artículo 68) de la Ley No. 2825 indicó: "...4) Que el Instituto deberá, de conformidad con el procedimiento estipulado en el Capítulo de Tribunales de Tierras, revocar o extinguir la adjudicación por los siguientes motivos: ...b) Por el abandono injustificado de la parcela o de la familia....Con excepción del caso b) y antes de la revocatoria o extinción del derecho, debe proceder una amonestación que no haya sido atendida por el adjudicatario...".
Por su parte el Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93 en su artículo 34) indica que la calidad de adjudicatario puede ser revocada cuando el beneficiario incurre en alguna de las causales previstas en el citado artículo 68 de la Ley No. 2825 y el artículo 43 del Reglamento regula lo referido a la construcción de la vivienda y exige a las personas adjudicatarias de granjas familiares, tendrán un plazo de 6 meses a partir de la notificación de la adjudicación del predio, para que inicien la construcción de la vivienda y tienen un año para concluirla. Conforme a la normativa citada, es claro que se requiere del adjudicatario dos condiciones: 1) La explotación agraria directa por parte del beneficiario. 2) La construcción de la vivienda en los casos de las granjas familiares. Luego, en caso de que el beneficiario no cumpla con tales exigencias, el INDER debe recuperar el fundo adjudicado, una vez agotado el debido proceso. Bajo este cuadro normativo procederemos a analizar lo actuado por el INDER a efectos de determinar si el acto dictado se ajustó o no a dicho ordenamiento conforme a los vicios acusados por el actor:
Nombre31960 El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (INDER).
No. 071-2018-IV.
TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección01 , Edificio Anexo A, a las dieciséis horas del diez de agosto de dos mil dieciocho.
Proceso de Conocimiento interpuesto por el señor Nombre31960 , quien es mayor, casado, vecino de Los Chiles, frente al Hospital, cédula .... representado por el Licenciado Juan Carlos Quirós Larios, carné CED87912 contra El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en adelante INDER, representado por la Licenciada Karina Castro Leitón, carné CED22215.
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Juez Salas Leitón;
CONSIDERANDO:
Durante el Juicio Oral y Público la representación del actor, ofreció como prueba para mejor resolver copia de la resolución No. 37-2007-CF de las 08:35 horas del 29 de mayo de 2007, del Área de Conservación Arenal, Huetar Norte, Centro Operativo de Los Chiles, del Minaet, mediante la cual se le aprobó al actor la solicitud de aprovechamiento maderable. En cuanto a la admisión de la prueba para mejor resolver, se debe indicar que tal situación se contempla en el artículo 331 del Código Procesal Civil, el cual resulta de aplicación supletoria en esta Jurisdicción, de acuerdo a lo que dispone el artículo 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Ahora, respecto a la admisión facultativa de la prueba para mejor resolver, es criterio reiterado de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que su rechazo no produce la indefensión de las partes. Entre otras sentencias, se transcribe en lo que interesa el Voto N° 547-F-2002 de las 16 horas del 12 de julio de 2002, en el cual esa Sala indicó: “(…) IV.- Múltiples precedentes de esta Sala, refiriéndose a la prueba para mejor resolver, han señalado que esta es prueba del juez, y no de las partes.
En consecuencia, la decisión de recabarla es facultativa del órgano jurisdiccional, y puede prescindirse de ella sin necesidad de resolución alguna. Ergo, la omisión de pronunciamiento a su respecto, precisamente porque ha sido rebasada la etapa probatoria, en la cual deben las partes demostrar los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, según lo imponen las normas sobre la carga de la prueba y precluida aquella etapa, será facultad exclusiva del juzgador, determinar si deben allegarse a los autos nuevas probanzas necesarias para la correcta decisión del litigio. Pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras las siguientes resoluciones; 59 de las 15:20 horas del 31 de mayo de 1996, 23 de las 14:20 horas del 4 de marzo de 1992, 34 de las 10:45 horas del 28 de mayo de 1993 y 83 de las 14:40 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1993. (…)”. En el caso concreto, el Tribunal estima que la prueba ofrecida resulta inadmisible en razón de que se trata de un documento emitido desde el 29 de mayo de 2007, que estuvo en conocimiento del actor desde el 25 de julio de ese mes y año, fecha en la que le fue notificada, de manera que a la fecha de interposición de la demanda sea, el 23 de mayo de 2014, bien pudo el actor ofrecer dicho documento como un elemento mas a su elenco probatorio. Por lo demás y dados los términos en que se dicta la presente sentencia, la misma resulta innecesaria en criterio de esta Cámara.
La representación de la parte actora indicó a modo de síntesis:
Como tales se tienen los siguientes:
No logra acreditar el actor: 1) Que hubiese cumplido con las exigencias bajo las cuales se le adjudicó la granja familiar No. 28 del Asentamiento San Jerónimo I, a saber, construir la vivienda familiar y explotar el fundo mediante actividad agraria. (No se ubica prueba en tal sentido). 2) Que el actor no hubiese señalado el fax No.24711061 como medio para atender notificaciones. (No se ubica prueba en tal sentido). 3) Que la resolución de las 10:30 horas del 16 de abril de 2012 no haya sido notificada por los señores Wiston Estrada E. y Fernando Palacios Reyes a la señora Nombre111243 . (No se ubica prueba en tal sentido).
De previo a referirnos sobre el presente asunto, tenemos que el actor básicamente indicó que, en la granja adjudicada levantó cercas, le dio mantenimiento, la cultivó y que al momento en que se le revocó su adjudicación estaba pronto a construir su vivienda en ella. Por ello sostuvo que lo actuado por el INDER al revocarle la adjudicación, resultó injusto y arbitrario. Tal y como hemos tenido por acreditado la Junta Directiva del IDA desde el día 14 de julio de 1999, le adjudicó al actor una granja familiar en el Dirección13235 bajo las condiciones y exigencias que le impuso la normativa, a saber, explotar el fundo mediante actividad agraria y construir en ella su vivienda. Es claro que, por la naturaleza jurídica del inmueble, destinado por ley al cumplimiento de una función social, y para esos fines se otorga a los beneficiados, bajo una condición de sujeción especial, distinta que al resto de la propiedad privada, y el adjudicatario se sujeta a una serie de exigencias para consolidar el derecho de propiedad sobre la misma.
Así, en cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica de las parcelas y granjas familiares otorgadas por el INDER y la normativa aplicable, así como sus limitaciones; esta Sección manifestó en su voto No. 032-2013, de las catorce horas con treinta minutos del veintitrés de abril de dos mil trece, y que por su incidencia para resolución del presente caso, se cita en extenso: "...IV. SOBRE EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO APLICABLE: Dispone la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario tiene por objeto vincular al ciudadano a un régimen sano de posesión de la tierra, velando por que la asignación de este recurso promueva el aumento gradual de la productividad, propugnando por una justa distribución de su producto y la elevación de su condición socioeconómica, para de esa forma hacerlo partícipe consciente del desarrollo de la nación, logrando así una justa distribución de la riqueza y evitando las formas indirectas de explotación de la tierra (ordinal primero ibíd.).
En efecto la norma no es más que el desarrollo directo del artículo cincuenta constitucional, donde El Estado interviene en los medios de producción a fin de generar una sana distribución de la riqueza en favor de los grupos de mayor necesidad social. En virtud de tales fines, es que se incentiva el derecho de toda persona de denunciar o informar la existencia de tierra en cuya explotación no se cumple con la función social de la propiedad. Este último concepto si bien fue descartado de la Asamblea Constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, fue recogido por el legislador ordinario, la doctrina y la jurisprudencia para fijar que la tierra presenta un interés público de ser el medio a partir del cual de manera directa o indirecta se producen los bienes y servicios necesarios para la existencia de la especie humana, de suerte que su explotación dentro de un ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado es una prioridad en la sociedad.
Más aún cuando permite generar las parcelas rurales para personas de bajos recursos. Es un sistema especial y excepcional al derecho de propiedad consagrado en el párrafo primero de la norma constitucional, en protección de la parte débil de la relación a saber el agricultor, quien muchas veces tiene el interés y pone su esfuerzo pero carece de la tierra. En mérito de tales cometidos, originalmente el Estado se declaró propietario de toda la tierra carente de dueño para distribuirla, y de manera ulterior, con el cierre de la barrera agraria el antiguo ITCO paso a ser el IDA, donde la Junta Directiva de dicha entidad tiene la facultad de promover planes de parcelación, disponer la adquisición de propiedad particular a fin de cumplir con sus fines económico-sociales, de constituir en propietarios a los campesinos a quienes les adjudica una parcela y de aprobar la adjudicación de fundos para el otorgamiento de los títulos respectivos.
Como puede observarse en aras de hacer efectiva las políticas de parcelación de tierras (numeral 49 y siguientes ibíd.) la entidad ofrece condiciones muy favorables a los adquirentes, con cómodos sistemas de pago y bajas cuotas e intereses, con el objeto de promover la función social de la propiedad (numerales 58 a 61 ibíd.). Inicialmente se consideró que todo el territorio nacional rural podía presentar esa orientación, siendo progresivamente matizada esa aseveración a partir del respeto a normas ambientales y del demanio público que impera en esas materias. Eso llevó a la institución a tecnificarse más y establecer cuales terrenos presentaban una vocación agraria, de forma tal que fuera verdaderamente aprovechable y que espacios del territorio nacional rural presentaban desde el plano jurídico y técnico otra vocación. Siempre propugnándose que los beneficiarios de estos planes de distribución recaigan sobre personas que destinen el inmueble para la propia manutención y de su familia, que tengan capacidad técnica y experiencia en trabajos agrarios, debiendo comprometerse a trabajar la parcela personalmente y con sus descendientes hasta el segundo grado de consanguinidad (ordinal 62 ibíd.).
De igual forma, no se adjudicará más de una parcela a cada beneficiario y su extensión irá en proporción a los miembros de la familia (artículo 64 ibíd.). Todo ello sin duda establece un régimen especial de propiedad, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a fines contrarios a su fin social, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización. La naturaleza jurídica de este tipo de bienes fue durante mucho tiempo un tema de ardua discusión, pues si bien normalmente se les calificaba como bienes demaniales, si presentaban esta naturaleza resultaría imposible la transmisión hacia los particulares; mientras que por el contrario si se tomaban como bienes fiscales, podrían ser adquiridos por los medios propios del derecho común, desviándose el fin público que presentaban. La jurisprudencia y la doctrina resolvieron el conflicto bajo la categoría de bienes demaniales temporales o transitorios, de suerte que el bien presenta la condición dominical durante el tiempo que está en manos de la administración, lo que impide salir del dominio público por los medios comunes, dentro del patrimonio general del Estado, pero cumplidos los requisitos legales, la naturaleza pública desaparece, se desafecta el bien, para pasar a ser bien fiscal y consecuentemente transmisible conforme la norma legal especial para la materia (al respecto es posible ver el voto 2008-18434 de la Sala Constitucional).
Así las cosas, una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expedirá a favor del ocupante un título de posesión provisional en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones, de modo que si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado y cumplido a satisfacción las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue el título de propiedad (artículo 65 ibíd.). En mérito de todo lo expuesto, se colige sin dificultad que el beneficiario no podrá traspasar el dominio de su predio, ni gravarlo, arrendarlo, subdividirlo sin autorización del Instituto, excepto que hayan transcurrido quince años desde la adquisición de la parcela y de que todas las obligaciones con dicho organismo estuvieren canceladas, en mérito de lo cual los contratos privados celebrados por el adjudicatario con terceros, no vincula a la entidad. En ese sentido se dispuso que incluso transcurrido tal plazo, si la enajenación de la parcela produce la concentración o subdivisión excesiva de la propiedad, el Instituto podrá adquirirlas en forma prioritaria (numeral 67 ibíd.).
Aunado a lo anterior, es dable indicar en torno a este régimen diferenciado de propiedad, y con base en lo estipulado en el artículo 67 ibíd., que el plazo de los quince años comienza a correr a partir de la adquisición, es decir del otorgamiento del título de propiedad (compraventa) y no de la ocupación o de la adjudicación administrativa. En torno a ello, para una correcta interpretación de la norma supra citada, se colige que se adquiere la parcela desde la inscripción registral a su nombre en virtud de la enajenación que realizara la entidad en su favor. Ello es así, porque es a partir de dicha data que registralmente se establecen y comienzan a correr las limitaciones impuestas, disponiéndose que la venta en los términos expuestos queda sujeta a las condiciones y limitaciones de la Ley 2825 de catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, toda vez que en los términos del ordinal sesenta y cinco citado, antes de la adquisición lo que se tiene es un título de posesión provisional no sujeto a las limitaciones, porque éstas se imponen una vez traspasado a nombre del parcelero el fundo, antes de ello no tendrían razón de ser, debido a que no se puede limitar aquello de lo cual no se dispone.
Quedando a salvo una excepción, que consideraremos más adelante. De acuerdo con la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, N° 2825, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) está llamado a efectuar la parcelación de sus tierras para lograr, entre otros fines, una mejor distribución de la tierra, con propósitos de colonización, dando preferencia a aquellas zonas y tierras en donde existan núcleos de poseedores en precario y que se consideren aptas para sus objetivos. Las personas interesadas en convertirse en beneficiarias deben presentar la solicitud correspondiente, a fin de que se analice si califican como tales (artículo 55). Una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expide a favor del ocupante un “título de posesión provisional” en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones. Luego, si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado por el Instituto y cumplido a satisfacción todas las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue título de propiedad (artículo 65).
La sanción para los eventuales incumplimientos de los deberes señalados a los beneficiarios está prevista en el ordinal inmediato anterior: “Artículo 66.- El incumplimiento de las obligaciones impuestas al ocupante de una parcela, causará, a juicio del Instituto, la pérdida del derecho sobre la misma. En el caso de dictarse una resolución en tal sentido, que requerirá cuatro votos conformes de la Junta Directiva, la parcela volverá al dominio del Instituto con toda su dotación, reconociéndole éste al parcelero el valor de las mejoras necesarias o útiles que hubiere hecho de su peculio.” El fundamento lógico de la norma se sustenta en la ya señalada función social de la tierra; aun cuando cómo se puede ver el legislador presentó la debida prudencia de garantizar el derecho de las obras de buena fe realizadas por el adjudicatario ulteriormente revocado, bajo el principio de la prohibición del enriquecimiento sin justa causa...".
Conforme a la citada sentencia; en el marco de la función social de la propiedad, el legislador costarricense, de acuerdo a lo que dispone el artículo 50 de la Carta Magna, emitió la "Ley de Tierras y Colonización", número 2825 del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, con el fin de dotar de tierras a campesinos de escasos recursos, pero bajo un régimen de propiedad especial y excepcional al derecho de propiedad consagrado en el párrafo primero del artículo 45 constitucional, debiendo el beneficiado del sistema, comprometerse a trabajar la parcela personalmente y con sus descendientes hasta el segundo grado de consanguinidad (ordinal 62 ibíd), con la obligación del adjudicatario de dedicar el inmueble a los fines que le fueron destinados por el INDER, y no por el beneficiario, ya que de no utilizarla el beneficiario para los fines destinados, estaría desnaturalizando el bien y por ende incumpliendo sus obligaciones, lo que daría pie a que el INDER inicie en su contra, las diligencias de revocatoria de adjudicación y nulidad de título, conforme a lo que disponen los artículos 66 y 177 de la Ley No. 2825.
Tomando en consideración esta especial naturaleza jurídica de los bienes inmuebles adjudicados por el INDER y de las obligaciones a las cuales se compromete el beneficiario, de seguido procederá la Cámara a manifestarse sobre el caso bajo análisis.
De forma muy resumida, el alegato del actor consiste en que la revocación de la adjudicación de la granja familiar hecha por el INDER resultó injusta y arbitraria porque nunca hizo abandono de la granja. Que él la cercó, cultivó, le dio mantenimiento y que al momento de la revocación, estaba por verse beneficiado con el bono de la vivienda para proceder a construir su vivienda en el fundo. De esta forma, en el fondo lo que está alegando el actor, desde la técnica del derecho administrativo es que el acto administrativo de revocación emitido por el INDER carece del elemento motivo. Luego, acusó que nunca se le notificó el proceso de revocatoria de la adjudicación. De esta forma el actor hace con respecto a la actuado cuestionamiento de fondo y de forma. Por su parte, la representación del INDER fue enfática en señalar que el inmueble adjudicado al actor, constituye por su naturaleza un bien destinado al cumplimiento de la función social y económica de la propiedad.
De ahí que la obligación del actor era explotar directamente la granja familiar y construir en ella su vivienda. Pero que el actor, luego de casi 13 años de haberle adjudicado el inmueble nunca construyó en ella su vivienda, y luego de reiteradas inspecciones se constató que la granja estaba abandonada, de forma que el actor no cumplió con sus obligaciones legales y por ende el INDER se vio obligado a iniciar el proceso de recuperación de la granja. Así las cosas, de acuerdo a los hechos que se han tenido por acreditados, el actor debe tomar en cuenta lo señalado en el considerando anterior, en cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica de las propiedades adjudicadas por el INDER. Además, es un hecho no controvertido que, la Junta Directiva del IDA hoy INDER acordó en su sesión No. 50-99 celebrada el día 14 de julio de 1999, artículo XXXIX; adjudicar al actor la granja familiar No. 28 ubicada en el Dirección13235 bajo los principios y obligaciones que señala la Ley No. 2825 y el Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93.
De esta forma, este tipo de propiedad está sometida a un régimen especial, tutelado y protegido en forma agravada, con el objeto de destinarla al fin encomendado por ley, evitando así que la tierra sea dedicada a actividades contrarias a su fin social o que no se explote económicamente, lo cual implicaría su desnaturalización. También debe tomar en consideración el actor, que los inmuebles otorgados o adjudicados por el INDER, están regulados por un régimen jurídico diferente al de la propiedad privada, según lo dispuesto en la Ley No. 2825 y el Reglamento antes citado. De manera que, el adjudicatario del bien, se encuentra con respecto a las obligaciones impuestas por el INDER en una relación de sujeción especial y para que pueda consolidar su derecho de propiedad, debe cumplir por el plazo que diga la ley, con todas y cada una de las obligaciones que le impuso el INDER con respecto a la parcela o Granja al momento de su adjudicación, y de no hacerlo, el beneficiario de este tipo de inmuebles se exponía a que se iniciara en su contra, las diligencias de revocatoria de adjudicación, forma por la cual el INDER recupera las tierras adjudicadas, pero cuyos beneficiarios no destinan a los fines dados por el INDER o que no cumple con las obligaciones a las que se comprometió en el acto de adjudicación.
En este sentido el artículo 68) de la Ley No. 2825 indicó: "...4) Que el Instituto deberá, de conformidad con el procedimiento estipulado en el Capítulo de Tribunales de Tierras, revocar o extinguir la adjudicación por los siguientes motivos: ...b) Por el abandono injustificado de la parcela o de la familia....Con excepción del caso b) y antes de la revocatoria o extinción del derecho, debe proceder una amonestación que no haya sido atendida por el adjudicatario...". Por su parte el Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios No. 88-93 en su artículo 34) indica que la calidad de adjudicatario puede ser revocada cuando el beneficiario incurre en alguna de las causales previstas en el citado artículo 68 de la Ley No. 2825 y el artículo 43 del Reglamento regula lo referido a la construcción de la vivienda y exige a las personas adjudicatarias de granjas familiares, tendrán un plazo de 6 meses a partir de la notificación de la adjudicación del predio, para que inicien la construcción de la vivienda y tienen un año para concluirla.
Conforme a la normativa citada, es claro que se requiere del adjudicatario dos condiciones: 1) La explotación agraria directa por parte del beneficiario. 2) La construcción de la vivienda en los casos de las granjas familiares. Luego, en caso de que el beneficiario no cumpla con tales exigencias, el INDER debe recuperar el fundo adjudicado, una vez agotado el debido proceso. Bajo este cuadro normativo procederemos a analizar lo actuado por el INDER a efectos de determinar si el acto dictado se ajustó o no a dicho ordenamiento conforme a los vicios acusados por el actor:
La representación del INDER opuso en su defensa las excepciones de falta de interés de actual y falta de derecho. La excepción de falta de interés actual, debe rechazarse toda vez que el actor presentó proceso contencioso contra el INDER, solicitando la declaratoria de nulidad del oficio OSR-636-2012 del 09 de octubre de 2012, mediante el cual se revocó la adjudicación de la granja familiar otorgada, se le restituya la propiedad y se vuelva a inscribir en el Registro Público a su nombre, mas el pago por daño moral objetivo y subjetivo y los perjuicios, mas lucro cesante, sin que previo a la determinación de lo propio que ha hecho este Tribunal, exista circunstancia alguna que permita afirmar que el conflicto planteado haya sido resuelto con anterioridad de alguna forma, y/o, que de llevar éxito la demanda, ninguna mutación de la situación jurídica del actor pudiese ser generada. Es claro que lo resuelto por el INDER constituye un acto administrativo que afectó supuestos derechos del actor, por lo que pidió la nulidad del supracitado oficio y por ende continua expectante -interés actual- de una resolución a sus pedimentos.
Lo anterior, sin duda alguna le da derecho a requerir se le resuelva judicialmente su gestión judicial por lo que no ha operado una pérdida de interés actual y por ende debe rechazarse dicha excepción. Con respecto a la excepción de falta de derecho, retomando lo dicho por nuestra Sala Primera, es menester remitirse a la demostración de los hechos, como parte fundamental de ello, porque de lo que en ese acápite se determina, se podrá desprender si existen o no las bases legales para lo pretendido. Establece la legislación vigente que una de las excepciones oponibles en los procesos judiciales es la Falta de Derecho (artículo 298 del Código Procesal Civil) y sobre esa excepción la doctrina nos indica: "...Hablar de falta de derecho es como hablar de falta de norma jurídica, por lo que lo correcto sería hablar entonces de falta de presupuestos materiales o falta de elementos en la pretensión material -no procesal pues ésta todos la poseemos, a pesar de la imprecisión terminológica falta de derecho parece entonces referirse a las denominadas por la doctrina italiana como condiciones de la "acción" o requisitos de la pretensión y que se sabe comprende los requisitos constitutivos, para hacer comprender que sin ellos el derecho de acción no se ejerce adecuadamente y que los mismos debe, por consiguiente, ser considerados como los extremos necesarios y suficientes para determinar en concreto, el nacimiento del derecho a la pretensión.
Tales requisitos de la pretensión, que deben concurrir, para que pueda considerarse estimatoria la misma, la cual busca la resolución favorable, son, según la doctrina, tres: (a) un cierto hecho específico jurídico, o sea, una cierta relación entre un hecho y una norma; (b) la legitimación, (c) el interés procesal. Entonces la falta de derecho estaría representada por la inexistencia de los presupuestos materiales para cada caso concreto...". No habiéndose acreditado derecho amparable a favor de la actora, lo procedente es acoger la excepción de falta de derecho y rechazar la demanda.
El artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece que las costas procesales y personales se imponen al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor del numeral 119.2 ibídem, por lo que se condena al actor al pago de ambas costas de este proceso, a favor del INDER.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver. Se rechaza la excepción de falta de interés actual. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y en consecuencia, se declara sin lugar la demanda interpuesta por el señor Nombre31960 contra El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Se condena al actor al pago de ambas costas de este proceso, las cuales se calcularán en fase de ejecución de sentencia a pedido del INDER. NOTIFÍQUESE. José Iván Salas Leitón, Nombre60833 , Nombre5250 .
Nombre60833 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Nombre5250 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Clasificación elaborada por CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.
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