Invading public-domain watercourses requires knowledge of that statusInvadir cauces de dominio público requiere conocer esa calidad

1 *100066950345PE* Case file: 10-006695-345-PE Against: [[Name1] ] Offense: Invasion of a public domain protection zone, destruction of flora in a public domain protection zone, one offense of illegal extraction in a public domain protection zone. Victim: Natural Resources Res: 2017-474 Appeals Court of Criminal Sentencing of Cartago, first section. At eleven hours and thirty-three minutes, on the fourteenth of September, two thousand and seventeen.

Appeal filed in the present case against [[Name1] ]; [...], for the offenses of Invasion of a public domain protection zone, destruction of flora in a public domain protection zone, and one offense of illegal extraction in a public domain protection zone, to the detriment of Natural Resources. Participating in the decision on the appeal are judges Giovanni Mena Artavia, [Name2] [Name3] [Name4] and judge Ivette Carranza Cambronero. Appearing in the appeal were attorneys [Name5], in their capacity as Coordinator of the Environmental Criminal Deputy Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry, and [Name6], Appeals Prosecutor of the Public Ministry.

Considering:

1. That through judgment number 968-2016 at eleven hours and thirty minutes on the twentieth of September, two thousand and sixteen, the Criminal Trial Court of Cartago resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 30 and 45 of the Criminal Code, 1, 5, 6, 9, 40, 142, 180 to 184, 200, 265 to 267, 324, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 and 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 33 subsection b, 34 and 58 subsection a of the Forestry Law 7575, 90 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, Article 1 and 141 of the Mining Code in relation to Article 2 of the Regulations of said Code, Article 1 of the Water Law 276, the Court acquits [Name [Name7]] of all penalty and liability for the offenses of Invasion of a public domain protection zone, destruction of flora in a public domain protection zone and one offense of illegal extraction in a public domain protection zone that were being attributed to him to the detriment of Natural Resources. Any precautionary measure that has been ordered as a consequence of this criminal case is lifted. The atypical precautionary measures requested by the accusers are rejected. Likewise, the civil action for damages filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic against the accused [Name [Name7]] is declared without merit. The costs of the criminal proceedings are to be borne by the State and regarding the filing of the civil action and the complaint, it is resolved without special condemnation in costs as it is considered that there was plausible reason to litigate. Once the judgment becomes final, the return of all assets that have been seized as a consequence of this process is ordered to whoever proves their legitimate ownership over them. Notify.- Msc. [Name8], Trial Judge." 2. That against the preceding ruling, attorneys [Name5] and [Name6] filed the appeal.

3. That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, amended by Law 8837 published on the ninth of December, two thousand and eleven (Creation of the Sentence Appeal Remedy), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.

Judge [Name9] writes this opinion; and

Considering:

I.- On the eleventh of January, two thousand and seventeen, an oral hearing was held in this matter. Participating in the same were judges [Name10] and Giovanni Mena Artavia, who sign this ruling; as well as judge Gustavo Chan Mora, who no longer works in this court. In the diligence in question, no evidence was presented and the Public Ministry merely summarized the content of its written appeal.

II.- Attorneys [Name5], coordinating prosecutor of the Environmental Criminal Deputy Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry, and [Name11], appeals prosecutor of the Public Ministry, appeal judgment 968-16 of the Criminal Trial Court of Cartago, at eleven hours thirty minutes on the twentieth of September, two thousand and sixteen. The first ground of appeal is entitled "Disagreement with the assessment of evidence due to pretermission of essential evidence and incorrect appreciation of the elements brought to the adversarial process." The appellants point out that the court did not consider, according to the rules of rational sound judgment, the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted at trial by the Public Ministry. Particularly, they miss the intellectual analysis of the testimonies of [Name12] and [Name13] and official letter ACLAP-GASP-133, the seizure and confiscation record 001-003, the photographic sequence of the machinery used in the events, official letter ACLAP-GASP-143, official letter ACLAP-GASP-070, the report amplifying the complaint, the map of the geographical area where the defendant's farm is located, official letter SG-DEA-662-2012-SETENA, reports DGM-CHRHN-40-2011 and DGM/RNM-517-2011, official letter DGM-RNM-C-32-2012, official letter DL-OF-0012-2012, official letter DGM-RNM.C-41-2012, official letter ACLAP.PNTMM-162-11, official letter 0-C-1541 and the copy of report DPM-INF-1065-2011. They consider it incorrect to believe the statements of [Name14], [Name15] and [Name16], without noticing their contradictions with the mentioned documentary evidence and with the testimonies of [Name17], [Name18] and [Name19]. The appellants indicate that the record signed by [Name20] himself accounts for the seizure of the machinery operated by [Name21] and [Name22], which was being operated within the protection area of the Kirí River. The photographs illustrate the mechanization carried out up to the edge of the Kirí River channel, which indicates an invasion of the protection area, which the accused directed. The criminal offense makes no difference regarding the type of vegetation. The court does not indicate why it accepts the version of expert witness (perito) [Name23] and dismisses expert witnesses (peritos) [Name24] and [Name25]. Regarding the offense of destruction of vegetation in the protection area of the Kirí River, the judgment discredits what was indicated by [Name17] and [Name18], who even recalled destroyed vegetative species, violating the principle of freedom of evidence. Regarding the illegal exploitation of minerals, the court did not analyze the invoices provided by the accused, with which a quantity of one thousand five hundred cubic meters of material placed on the roads could not be justified, nor was the expert opinion of [Name26] analyzed, who pointed out a coincidence between the material from the Río Grande de Orosi and that placed on the roads built by the accused; the testimony and documentary support of [Name13] was also not analyzed, who referred to the extraction site and tracks of machinery in the hole left after carrying out the exploitation. For the purposes of the offenses related to the Forestry Law and the Wildlife Conservation Law, it is important to determine whether they are quebradas, rivers, or arroyos, beyond the technical concept of "public domain watercourse (cauce de dominio público)." The judgment concludes that there is doubt as to whether the watercourses are public domain and therefore dismisses the offense. The court agrees with the criterion issued by expert witness [Name27], that the watercourses are generated by permanent springs (nacientes permanentes), not accepting other definitions or alternatives such as those in subsections 9 and 10 of Article 1 of the Water Law. The judgment diminishes the opinions of the Water Directorate DA-1596-2011 and DA-2229-2011 for lacking a methodology. Regarding that, there was pretermission of the testimonies of the agricultural engineers from the MINAE Water Directorate [Name24] and [Name28], who had no doubt that they were public domain watercourses. The judgment diminishes the result of the follow-up inspection by the Water Directorate officials that confirmed that the watercourses are originated by permanent springs. The testimonies of [Name12], [Name13], [Name29], [Name16] and [Name30], the official letters DA-1596-2011, DA-2229-2011, CED1- -, CED2-- -, report visits to the site at different times and account for the existence of water in the unnamed watercourses under discussion. Against that evidence, the trial court (a quo) leans towards doubt, based on the study by expert witness [Name27]. The report of said expert, however, presents methodological shortcomings, since she only sought to sow doubt about the condition of the watercourses. That expert's report starts from four weak variables: 1) the morphometry of the watercourse, 2) the nature of the spring (naciente) that gives them origin, 3) the graphic mention on the cartographic sheet, 4) the dragging and deposition of lithic material. Regarding morphometry, it was not taken into account that the events charged are from the years two thousand ten and two thousand eleven. Consequently, it cannot be affirmed that the watercourses are not public domain because they are in a straight line, if the opinion is based on a site visit in two thousand fifteen and Google Earth photographs from two thousand thirteen. Regarding the second point, which affirms that only those watercourses produced by a permanent spring (naciente permanente) are public domain watercourses, it must be indicated that: 1) the expert did not visit the origins of the water bodies, but rather doubted what was originating them; 2) the criterion conflicts with Article 1 of the Water Law, which establishes as public domain watercourses those originated by other types of sources. Furthermore, Messrs. [Name31] and [Name32], in a follow-up inspection in July of two thousand sixteen, located the springs that originate those quebradas. The third variable assumes that watercourses must be on the cartography to be public domain, but the sheets used by the expert are from several decades ago (1990), and were drawn at very small scales (1:50000), that is, at five thousand meters of height, so they do not capture details of the small watercourse. The fourth variable conflicts with the finding of lithic material at the site, which is recorded in photographs. Regarding the violation of the Mining Law, witness [Name26] affirmed that the material came from the Río Grande de Orosi and that in administrative proceedings the accused did not prove the origin of the material. Witnesses [Name12] and [Name13] stated that the material had been extracted from that river, since they observed machinery tracks at the site of extraction and stockpiling of mineral material. Even [Name16] said that the material used came from the quebradas located on the farm. The statement of the accused was also not assessed. The invoices admitted at trial do not allow demonstrating that the accused purchased one thousand five hundred cubic meters of material. They do not even correspond to places near the site of the events, it not being reasonable that the accused brought the material from Turrialba and Heredia. Without merit. The appellants point out that the seizure record signed by [Name14] allows establishing the existence of the seizure of machinery operated by [Name33] and [Name34], when it was being operated within the protection area of the Kirí River. In reality, the referred document, which is attached at folio 9, indicates the existence of the seizure, but not the precise place where the machinery was located. What is true is that, at least some of the photographs in the case file, illustrate the work carried out by the machinery, apparently up to the edge of the Kirí River channel (see folio 15). However, the judgment under review discredited those photographs pointing out: "[Name14] referred regarding the first inspection that was done with [Name17], on the Kirí dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of criteria between him and Mr. [Name35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area and that that day no movement of material that he could evidence was seen. Photograph number 1 from the first inspection which the interested parties emphasized is important and must be assessed and (sic) but in relation to the entire photographic sequence incorporated since it relates to photos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and it is where the white backhoe is seen near the margins of the Kirí River, there are witnesses who say it was on the margins invading, as well as the tractor, so much so that as the prosecutor's representative said, that backhoe is noticed entering the Kirí River channel. If the Court assesses these photos in isolation, that is the impression that emerges, but even being photographs, they must be assessed harmoniously with the rest of the photos and in particular, because the accused and his defense indicated that those photos were views from one point on the farm, but that there is another photo that shows the back of that vegetation that is seen, where at that time there was a small hillock where this machine was parked, that is, the photo taken from another angle which is the back side of what is seen in the previous ones and proves that behind it is not the Kirí River that is found. This photo that is in the sequence and that the defense and the accused pointed out is number 78 where in the foreground we see that that back side relates to the site of the first photos and seen all as a joint panorama it confirms that it cannot be concluded that what was seen in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 was the backhoe entering the channel, but rather turning on the small hillock described by Mr. [Name [Name7]] (judgment uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 23, 2016, pp. 127 and 128). This court contrasted such photographs, reaching the conclusion that, indeed, they sustain a doubt about the proximity between the white backhoe and the Kirí River, in which it is alleged the invasion was taking place. On one hand, number 1, visible at folio 15, shows a perspective in which said machine is seen close to the river, although it is taken from afar. However, photograph number 78, which appears on the DVD attached to the file, presents an image from the reverse point of view, making it seem that the proximity between the machinery and the river is not so clear. The doubt on this matter increases when considering that between prosecution witnesses [Name14] and [Name12] there was a discrepancy about whether or not the machinery was within the protection area. In this regard, the court indicated: "[Name14] referred regarding the first inspection that was done with [Name17], on the Kiri dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of criteria between him and Mr. [Name35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area and that that day no movement of material that he could evidence was seen" (judgment, p. 127). The foregoing is extremely important for two reasons: i) because the location of said machinery is intended to be taken as an indicator of the invasion, a matter that is controversial; and ii) because the controversy arises between two officials who participated in the inspection in which the machinery was detected. The very existence of the vegetation on the river margin was also the subject of controversy, since the evidence was not clear on this. As the trial court (a quo) noted, while [Name12] and [Name13] mentioned the presence of shrubby vegetation with a height of two and a half to three meters, this was contradicted by other witnesses such as [Name16], [Name15] and [Name31] (judgment, pp. 125 and 126), without it being perceived in any of them a reason to be untruthful. Such contradictions should reasonably lead to sustaining a state of doubt, regarding the alleged invasion of the Kirí River. In another vein, the court adequately justified its affirmation that the public domain condition of the unnamed watercourses on the defendant's farm was "a very controversial topic even within the expert branch" (judgment, p. 119). The appellants focus their attention on the fact that the trial court (a quo) leaned towards the version of expert witness (perito) [Name23] over that of [Name24] and [Name25]; however, the essential thing is not whether such watercourses hold one nature or another, but rather whether the divergence is so complex that the experts themselves were not able to resolve it easily. Naturally, this is decisive to know if a layperson such as the accused could be required to have certain knowledge on this issue, which ultimately affects the subjective elements of the offense. The judging magistrate questioned whether the accused [[Name1] ] could have acted with intent (dolosamente), given the ignorance of one of the objective elements of the offense, which is the public domain nature of the invaded watercourse (cauce) (judgment, p. 119). Especially when expert witness (perito) [Name36] pointed out that, in the absence of expertise, one had to resort to the cartographic sheet to determine if a water body is public domain, when the one used at trial did not show those of interest (judgment, p. 121). Thus, the question of whether in reality the watercourses are public domain or not is not the fundamental thing, but rather whether the accused could have been unaware of that nature. It is not relevant, consequently, to determine whether the trial court (a quo) gave greater or lesser merit to the opinions of the Water Directorate DA-1596-2011 and DA-2229-2011 for lacking a methodology, or to the testimonies of the agricultural engineers from the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy [Name24] and [Name28]. They could be right in that the unnamed watercourses are public domain. The follow-up inspection carried out by them in the year two thousand sixteen may have shed light on the point, since previously none of the experts had sought the springs (nacientes) of the water sources. However, none of that detracts from the merit court's reason for questioning the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the offense. On the other hand, the issue of the invoices in the illegal exploitation of minerals was also duly addressed by the trial court. The trial court (a quo) did not affirm that the invoices provided proved the purchase of all the material spread on the roads; what it indicated was that "for some of those material purchases, [the accused] provided some invoices numbers 3723, 4148, 3955, 3952, 3836 and according to which they correspond to companies that have a concession in watercourses (cauces) of the Reventazón River but with offices in Heredia, Siquirres and others in Atirro, invoices that, by the way, maintain dates contemporaneous with the crimes accused" (judgment, p. 113). The version of [Name26] was also analyzed. In this regard, the trial court (a quo) pointed out: "the witness [Name37] already analyzed, a geologist from Geology and Mines indicated that from the inspection she carried out she determined that it was an agricultural-type farm with a dairy that had an internal road network and that they were recently ballasted (lastreados) and that she also toured that network and the materials came from the fluvial network of the Río Grande de Orosi area which were placed quite recently at that time and that to extract that material, a permit was required. However, when questioned during the trial, the same indicated: 'I did not compare the materials on the road and the river, it cannot be determined absolutely that they are from the same site since the materials upstream and downstream are similar in the immediacy...I called the material lastre which is a layer of materials that overlies the soil to make a road suitable for movement of people or vehicles and they always come from the subsoil and when I say it is obtained from the river it is because they are disgregated rocks that may be from the river which facilitates it having sand and small stones, but also from a quarry or hill which is different whose fragments are rounded, but both from the subsoil.' Here then, in light of these statements, it became necessary to return to the oral presentation of the hydrogeologist expert witness (perito) [Name38] when regarding this point she stated that through field analysis, it cannot be established if the material from a river is the same as that which is at a site, but rather for that there are studies that are carried out on all the stones such as petrography, geochemistry, sections of rock wear to compare them to see if they are the same and they result not only in the name of the rock species but also its chemical composition. In light of the questioning on the point during the trial, even the witness [Name13] indicated that they did not excavate the roads to see what material was at the extraction site" (judgment, pp. 130 and 131, bold from the original). In summary, the court came to conclude, validly, that from the statement of the expert witness (perito) [Name39] it could not be affirmed with certainty that the material used on the roads came from the rivers that run through the property. The testimony of [Name13], its documentary support, and the reference he made to the machinery tracks were equally considered. Regarding the testimony of said person, the court pointed out: "He asserted that in photos 21 and 22 of folio 40, the site of extraction of pluvial material on the farm of Mr. [Name [Name7]] is observed because there are heavy machinery tracks, however the existence of machinery on the farm of Mr. [Name [Name7]] was not a disputed fact precisely because its use was mentioned for excavating the channels, cleaning the swampy area and it cannot constitute a determining and sole element to define an extraction site, especially seeing that in the photographs only that mentioned track is barely observed and nothing else, a situation that by itself could constitute an indication but which by itself is not sufficient unless it is corroborated with more evidentiary elements and that is not sufficient for this Chamber to define with certainty the alleged extraction site. Regarding this last point, it should not be overlooked that Ms. [Name37] who was the one who championed this issue of mineral extraction at trial, asserted that when she inspected the site, there was no evidence of recent extraction" (judgment, p. 131). As can be seen, there was no such certainty that the material came from the river, as the appellants affirm. It must also be emphasized that what witness [Name16] indicated was that the material was brought from Cartago, as the court pointed out (judgment, p. 130); it was witness [Name15] who affirmed that from cleaning the channels, material was extracted that remained on the roads, but clarified that it was mud (judgment, p. 130). In another vein, the challengers affirm that, beyond the concept of "public domain watercourses (cauces de dominio público)," what matters to determine, in relation to the offenses referred to in the Forestry Law and the Wildlife Conservation Law, is whether what was invaded were quebradas, rivers, or arroyos. This, in relation to the unnamed water bodies. The appellants overlook, however, that the accusation itself adheres to said concept for the attribution of conduct to the defendant, when it makes references such as: "7 public domain watercourses" (fact 3), "six public domain watercourses" (fact 4), "one of the public domain watercourses" (fact 6) and "to build within the watercourses and the protection areas on both margins of the 7 public domain watercourses" (fact 8). For that reason, the establishment of said condition regarding the watercourses was indeed important. The application of subsections IX and X of Article 1 of the Water Law is also sought. In this regard, the norm indicates that waters of public domain are "IX.- Subterranean waters whose extraction is not done by means of wells; and / X.- Rainwater that flows through barrancos or ramblas whose watercourses (cauces) are public domain." When presenting that argument, the challengers overlook three important things: 1) the discussion at trial revolved around the nature of the watercourses in relation to subsection IV of the Water Law, which also defines as such "Those from rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, arroyos or manantiales from the point where the first permanent waters spring to their mouth in the sea or lakes, lagunas or esteros." Therefore, the technical criteria revolved around the controversy of whether it was possible to identify the place where the water bodies sprang forth. 2) In relation to subsection IX of the cited article, it was not proven that they were subterranean waters that surfaced naturally. 3) Regarding subsection X, it was also not established that they were waters flowing through barrancos and ramblas whose watercourses were public domain. Hence the impropriety of applying the regulations in the manner suggested by the claimants.

III.- The second claim is for disagreement with the legal reasoning, incorrect application of numerals 33 and 58 subsection a) of the Forestry Law; 141 of the Mining Code and 90 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. The appellant points out that for the demonstration of intent (dolo) to invade and destroy vegetation it is not necessary to prove that the accused had knowledge regarding whether the water bodies were public domain watercourses, it being enough that he knew he was facing a quebrada, river or arroyo. For the classification of the offense of invasion and affecting protection areas, the destruction of certain vegetative species is not necessary. On the other hand, the restoration of things to their previous state was not ordered, despite at least one criminal wrong having been demonstrated. Without merit. Article 33 of the Forestry Law, as relevant here, states: "The following are declared protection areas: / (...) b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, quebradas or arroyos, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is steep." Evidently, it is fundamental to establish the factual elements of the crime to determine if the water body claimed to be usurped is a river, a quebrada or an arroyo. To this end, one must turn to the Water Law, which in turn indicates that rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, as well as arroyos or manantiales are public domain waters. The same law speaks of private domain waters, within which it does not place rivers, quebradas and arroyos and of which it expressly states that they belong to the landowner. That being so, what sense would there be in protecting the banks of these private water bodies if the owner himself can dispose of them as he wishes? The obvious conclusion is that the protection contemplated in numeral 33 subsection b) of the Forestry Law, must be understood as related to the public domain waters of subsection IV of Article 1 of the Water Law. Consequently, if the objective elements of the crime refer to public domain waters, the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime will require awareness that one is invading or destroying vegetation on the bank of such water bodies and not others. Therefore, contrary to what the challengers affirm, it was indeed essential to demonstrate that specific knowledge, so that a doubt regarding it could affect the classification of the conduct. Regarding the nature of the species that can be the object of the offense of invasion, it is an issue that the trial court (a quo) must resolve when ruling on the conduct that must be judged in the remanded proceeding (reenvío), as provided in the preceding consideration. In the same way, it must make a pronouncement regarding the request for restoration of things to their previous state only with respect to the point pending judgment, if that becomes the subject of discussion in the new trial that is ordered, but not with respect to those aspects in which the ruling is being confirmed. The reason for this last point is that, as the merit court pointed out, the existence of that type of damage in such conditions that they should be reversed was not proven. Hence the rejection of the reproach.

IV.- In their third complaint, the challengers allege a "violation of due (sic) for illegal rejection of evidence." Due to the course the trial took, the parties asked the court for an ocular inspection of the scene of the events, since a controversy arose as to whether the sources subject of the litigation were different from what the prosecuting entity identified during the investigation. The court, without greater justification, rejected the request, even though in its judgment it showed doubt as to whether they were the same watercourses or if they were public domain. It also rejected the admission of the hydrogeological expert witness (perito) [Name23]. The defense offered said expert as evidence for better resolution and the Public Ministry objected. The judge accepted her, but she was interviewed without the documentary support, as the expert report was rejected. At the end of the closing arguments, the judge accepted the expert report.

The parties requested that the expert be heard again to interview her regarding her expert report, which was denied to the detriment of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), by accepting an expert report without the possibility of questioning the person who prepared it. The rejection was atypical, because when the request was made, the judge suspended the recording to ask the party if they could bring her in the afternoon or the next day. Since this was not possible, the recording continued and the request was rejected, making it clear that, more than questioning reasons of necessity and relevance, merely temporal and convenience aspects were assessed. The Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) was left at a disadvantage by not being allowed to question the expert who prepared it on essential matters of the document. It was based on that document that the court settled its doubt. For all of the foregoing, they request that the appeal be granted, the judgment be annulled, and the case be remanded to the court. Not granted. The ground must be rejected for lack of grievance. The appellants complain that an inspection of the sources was not ordered to determine their nature as public domain watercourses (cauces de dominio público). However, as already stated in the second recital (considerando), determining that nature was not what was essential in this case, but rather whether the confusion that became evident even among experts allowed excluding the defendant's criminal intent (dolo), due to lack of the cognitive element of the subjective type. Furthermore, the appellants do not indicate how that inspection could be more effective in elucidating the divergence raised than the assessment of the statements made by the experts in the field who appeared at trial, set forth their positions before the parties, having carried out their respective inspections with technical knowledge. Furthermore, the appellants complain about the denial of the reception of the hydrogeological expert [Nombre23] on a second occasion, after her expert report was incorporated as evidence. However, that expert report was not even considered in the intellectual reasoning. In addition to the above, the appellants do not indicate how not having been able to hear the expert again after the formal incorporation of the document affected the position of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público); that is, what new proposals or questioning could have been raised from that moment on that could not have been brought up on the first occasion that the expert testified. Finally, what was taken as the basis for the judgment was what the expert said at trial, at which time she was questioned by all parties. Therefore, the rejection of the claim.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is dismissed. Let it be notified.

*CED3* CED3 GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA - DECIDING JUDGE (JUEZ/A DECISOR/A) *CED4* CED4 [Placa1] [Placa2] [Nombre4] - DECIDING JUDGE (JUEZ/A DECISOR/A) *CED5* CED5 CED6 CED7 CED8 - DECIDING JUDGE (JUEZ/A DECISOR/A) Judicial Circuit of Cartago Telephones: [Telf1] or [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: tapelacionpe-[...]-Judicial.go.cr They do not even correspond to places near the site of the events, and it is not reasonable that the accused would have brought the material from Turrialba and Heredia. **Without merit.** The appellants point out that the seizure record signed by [Nombre14] allows for establishing the existence of the seizure of machinery operated by [Nombre33] and [Nombre34], when it was being used within the protection area (área de protección) of the Kirí River. In reality, the referenced document, which is attached at folio 9, indicates the existence of the seizure, but not the precise location where the machinery was found. What is true is that at least some of the photographs in the case file illustrate the work performed by the machinery, apparently up to the edge of the Kirí River channel (see folio 15). However, the judgment under review refuted those photographs by stating: *"[Nombre14] stated regarding the first inspection conducted with [Nombre17], on the Kirí dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of opinions between him and Mr. [Nombre35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area, and that on that day no movement of material was observed that he could attest to. Photograph number 1 from the first inspection, which the interested parties emphasized, is important and must be evaluated and (sic) but in relation to the entire photographic sequence incorporated, since it relates to photos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and it is where the white backhoe is seen near the banks of the Kirí River; there are witnesses who say it was on the banks, encroaching, as well as the tractor, such that, as the prosecutorial inspector stated, that backhoe is seen entering the channel of the Kirí River. If the Court evaluates these photos in isolation, that is the impression derived, but even being photographs, they must be evaluated in harmony with the rest of the photos, and in particular, because the accused and his defense indicated that those photos were views from one point of the farm, but that there is another photo that shows the back side of that vegetation seen, where at that time there was a small hill on which this machine was parked; that is, the photo taken from another angle, which is the back part of what is seen in the previous ones, proves that behind it is not the Kirí River. This photo found in the sequence and which the defense and the accused pointed out is number 78, where, in the foreground, we see that that back part is related to the site of the first photos, and viewed all together as a panoramic, it confirms that one cannot conclude that what was seen in photos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 was the backhoe entering the channel, but rather turning on the little hill that Mr. [Nombre [Nombre7]] describes"* (judgment uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 23, 2016, pp. 127 and 128). This court contrasted said photographs, reaching the conclusion that, indeed, they support a doubt about the proximity between the white backhoe and the Kirí River, where the invasion (invasión) was allegedly occurring. On one hand, number 1, visible at folio 15, shows a perspective in which said machine appears close to the river, although it is taken from afar. However, photograph number 78, contained in the DVD attached to the case file, presents an image from the reverse point of view, making it appear that the proximity between the machinery and the river is not so clear. The doubt on this matter increases when considering that among the prosecution witnesses [Nombre14] and [Nombre12], there was a discrepancy about whether or not the machinery was within the protection area. In this regard, the court indicated: *"[Nombre14] stated regarding the first inspection conducted with [Nombre17], on the Kiri dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of opinions between him and Mr. [Nombre35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area, and that on that day no movement of material was observed that he could attest to"* (judgment, p. 127). The foregoing is extremely important for two reasons: **i)** because the aim is to take the location of said machinery as an indicator of the invasion (invasión), a matter that is controversial; and **ii)** because the controversy arises between two officials who participated in the inspection where the machinery was detected. The very existence of vegetation at the river margin was also subject to controversy, since the evidence was not clear on this point. As the *a quo* noted, while [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] mentioned the presence of shrubby vegetation with a height of two and a half to three meters, this was contradicted by other witnesses such as [Nombre16], [Nombre15], and [Nombre31] (judgment, pp. 125 and 126), without any reason to doubt their truthfulness being apparent in any of them. Such contradictions should lead, reasonably, to sustaining a state of doubt, as far as the alleged invasion (invasión) of the Kirí River is concerned. In another vein, the court adequately justified its statement that the condition of public domain (dominio público) of the unnamed channels (cauces) on the defendant's property was *"a very controversial subject even within the expert branch"* (judgment, p. 119). The appellants focus their attention on the fact that the *a quo* leaned towards the version of the expert [Nombre23] over that of [Nombre24] and [Nombre25]; however, what is essential is not whether such channels (cauces) hold one nature or another, but whether the divergence is so complex that the experts themselves were not able to easily resolve it. Naturally, this is determinant to know whether a layperson like the accused could be required to have certain knowledge on such a matter, which ultimately affects the subjective elements of the crime (tipo subjetivo del delito). The judge questioned whether the accused [[Nombre1]] could have acted willfully (dolosamente), given the ignorance of one of the objective elements of the crime (tipo), namely the public domain (dominio público) character of the invaded channel (cauce) (judgment, p. 119). Especially when the expert [Nombre36] pointed out that, in the absence of an expert report, one had to resort to the cartographic sheet to determine if a body of water is of public domain (dominio público), when those of interest did not appear on the one used at trial (judgment, p. 121). Thus, the question of whether in reality the channels (cauces) are of public domain (dominio público) or not is not fundamental, but rather whether the accused could have been ignorant of that nature. Consequently, it is not relevant to determine whether the *a quo* gave greater or lesser merit to the opinions of the Water Directorate (Dirección de Aguas) DA-1596-2011 and DA-2229-2011 for lacking a methodology, or to the testimonies of the agricultural engineers from the Water Directorate (Dirección de Aguas) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) [Nombre24] and [Nombre28]. They might be right that the unnamed channels (cauces) are of public domain (dominio público). The follow-up inspection carried out by them in the year two thousand sixteen may have shed light on the point, since previously none of the experts had sought the springs (nacientes) of the water sources. However, none of this deprives the trial court of reason in casting doubt on the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime (tipo subjetivo). Furthermore, the topic of the invoices in the illegal exploitation of minerals was also duly addressed by the trial court. The *a quo* did not state that the invoices submitted proved the purchase of all the material spread on the roads; what it indicated was that *"for some of those material purchases, [the accused] provided some invoices, numbers 3723, 4148, 3955, 3952, 3836, and according to which they correspond to companies that have concessions in channels of the Reventazón River but with offices in Heredia, Siquirres, and others in Atirro, invoices which furthermore have dates contemporaneous to the accused criminal acts"* (judgment, p. 113). The version of [Nombre26] was also analyzed. In this regard, the a quo stated: *"the witness [Nombre37], already analyzed, a geologist from Geology and Mines, indicated that from the inspection she carried out, she determined it was an agricultural-type farm with a dairy that had an internal road network that had been recently graveled (lastreados), and that she also toured that network and the materials came from the fluvial network of the area of the Grande de Orosi River, which were placed quite recently at that time, and that to extract that material, a permit was required. However, when questioned in the debate, she indicated:* **"I did not compare the materials in the road and the river; it cannot be absolutely determined that they are from the same site since the materials upstream and downstream are similar in the immediacy... I called the material lastre, which is a layer of materials overlying the soil to make a road suitable for movement of people or vehicles, and they always come from the subsoil, and when I say it is obtained from the river, it is because they are disaggregated rocks that can be from the river that facilitates it, which have sand and small pebbles, but also from a quarry or hill, which is different, whose fragments are rounded, but both from the subsoil."** *Here then, given these statements, it became necessary to revisit the oral exposition of the hydrogeology expert [Nombre38] when, in what is pertinent to this point, she stated that through field analysis, one cannot establish if the material from a river is the same as that which is at a site, but rather that for this there are studies performed on all the pebbles, such as petrography, geochemistry, and rock wear sections, to compare them to see if they are the same, and they yield not only the name of the rock type but also its chemical composition. Faced with questions on the point during the debate, even the witness [Nombre13] indicated that they did not excavate the roads to see what material was at the extraction site"* (judgment, pp. 130 and 131, bold in original). In synthesis, the court reached the valid conclusion that from the statement of the expert [Nombre39], it could not be affirmed with certainty that the material used on the roads came from the rivers that flow through the property. The testimony of [Nombre13] was also considered, along with his documentary support and the reference he made to the machinery tracks. Regarding this person's testimony, the court pointed out: *"He asserted that in photos 21 and 22 of folio 40, the extraction site of pluvial material is observed on the farm of Mr. [Nombre [Nombre7]] because there are tracks from heavy machinery; however, the existence of machinery on the farm of Mr. [Nombre [Nombre7]] was not a controversial fact precisely because its use was discussed for digging the canals, cleaning the swampy area, and it cannot constitute a determining and unique element to define an extraction site, especially since, looking at the photos, one only partially observes the track mentioned and nothing more, a situation which by itself could constitute an indication but which by itself is not sufficient unless corroborated with more evidentiary elements, and this is not sufficient for this Chamber to define with certainty the supposed extraction site. Regarding this last point, it must not be overlooked that Ms. [Nombre37], who was the one who surveyed this issue of mineral extraction at the trial, asserted that when she inspected the site, there was no evidence of recent extraction"* (judgment, p. 131). As can be seen, there was not such certainty that the material came from the river, as the appellants claim. It must also be emphasized that what the witness [Nombre16] indicated was that the material was brought from Cartago, as the court noted (judgment, p. 130); it was the witness [Nombre15] who stated that material extracted from cleaning the canals was left on the roads, but he clarified that it was mud (judgment, p. 130). In another vein, the challengers assert that, beyond the concept of "public domain channels (cauces de dominio público)," what matters to determine, in relation to the crimes referenced in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) and the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), is whether what was invaded were streams (quebradas), rivers, or brooks (arroyos). This is in relation to the unnamed water bodies. The appellants overlook, however, that the accusation itself adheres to said concept for the attribution of conduct to the defendant, when it makes references such as: *"7 public domain channels (cauces de dominio público)"* (fact 3), *"six public domain channels (cauces de dominio público)"* (fact 4), *"one of the public domain channels (cauces de dominio público)"* (fact 6), and *"build within the channels and the protection areas (áreas de protección) on both banks of the 7 public domain channels (cauces de dominio público)"* (fact 8). For this reason, the establishment of said condition regarding the channels (cauces) was indeed important. The application of sections IX and X of Article 1 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas) is also sought. In this regard, the law states that waters of public domain (dominio público) are *"IX.- Subterranean waters whose surfacing is not done by means of wells; and / X.- Pluvial waters that flow through ravines or watercourses whose channels (cauces) are of public domain (dominio público)."* In setting forth that argument, the challengers overlook three important things: **1)** the discussion in the debate centered on the nature of the channels (cauces) in relation to section IV of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), which also defines as such *"Those of the rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, brooks (arroyos) or springs (manantiales) from the point where the first permanent waters flow to their mouth in the sea or lakes, lagoons, or estuaries."* Therefore, the technical criteria revolved around the controversy of whether it was possible to identify the place where the water bodies sprang forth. **2)** In relation to section IX of the cited article, it was not proven that they were subterranean waters that surfaced naturally. **3)** Regarding section X, it was also not established that they were waters flowing through ravines and watercourses whose channels (cauces) were of public domain (dominio público). Hence, the inadmissibility of applying the regulation in the manner suggested by the claimants.

**III.-** The **second claim** is for disagreement with the legal grounds, incorrect application of articles 33 and 58 subsection a) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal); 141 of the Mining Code (Código de Minería) and 90 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre). The appellant points out that to demonstrate the intent (dolo) to invade and destroy vegetation, it is not necessary to prove that the accused had knowledge regarding whether the water bodies were public domain channels (cauces de dominio público); it is enough that he knew he was facing a stream (quebrada), river, or brook (arroyo). For the classification of the crime of invasion (invasión) and affecting protection areas (áreas de protección), the destruction of certain vegetative species is not necessary. Furthermore, the restitution of things to their previous state was not ordered, despite at least one criminal offense having been proven. **Without merit.** Article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), as far as it interests us here, states: *"The following are declared protection areas (áreas de protección): / (...) b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams (quebradas) or brooks (arroyos), if the land is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the land is broken."* Evidently, it is fundamental to establish the criminal classification (tipicidad) to determine if the body of water claimed to be usurped is a river, a stream (quebrada), or a brook (arroyo). For this purpose, one must turn to the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), which in turn indicates that rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, as well as brooks (arroyos) or springs (manantiales), are waters of public domain (dominio público). The same law speaks of waters of private domain (dominio privado), within which it does not place rivers, streams (quebradas), and brooks (arroyos), and which it expressly states belong to the landowner. This being so, what sense would there be in protecting the banks of these private water bodies if the owner can dispose of them as they wish? The obvious conclusion is that the protection contemplated in section b) of article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) must be understood as related to the waters of public domain (dominio público) of section IV of Article 1 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas). Consequently, if the objective elements of the crime (tipo objetivo) refer to waters of public domain (dominio público), the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime (tipo subjetivo) will require awareness that one is invading or destroying vegetation on the banks of such water bodies and not others. Therefore, contrary to what the challengers assert, it was indeed essential to prove that specific knowledge, such that a doubt in this regard could affect the criminal classification (tipicidad) of the conduct. Regarding the nature of the species that can be the object of the invasion crime (delito de invasión), this is a matter that the *a quo* must resolve when ruling on the conducts to be judged in the remand, as ordered in the previous recital. Likewise, it must issue a ruling regarding the request for restitution of things to their previous state only in relation to the point pending judgment, if this becomes a subject of discussion in the new debate that is ordered, but not in relation to those aspects where the verdict is being confirmed. The reason for this last point is that, as the trial court indicated, the existence of that type of damage under conditions that must be reversed was not proven. Hence, the rejection of the reproach.

**IV.-** In their **third objection**, the challengers allege a *"violation of due process (sic) due to illegal rejection of evidence."* Due to the direction the trial took, the parties requested a visual inspection (inspección ocular) of the site of the events from the court, because a controversy arose as to whether the sources subject to the litigation were different from what the prosecuting entity identified during the investigation. The court, without substantial grounds, rejected the request, even though the judgment expressed doubt as to whether they were the same channels (cauces) or whether they were of public domain (dominio público). It also rejected the reception of the hydrogeology expert [Nombre23]. The defense offered said expert as evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), and the Public Prosecutor's Office opposed. The judge accepted it, but she was interviewed without the documentary support, because the expert report was rejected. At the verge of the conclusions, the judge accepted the expert report. The parties asked to receive the expert again to interview her regarding the expert report, which was rejected to the detriment of the Public Prosecutor's Office, by accepting an expert report without the possibility of questioning the person who prepared it. The rejection was atypical, because when the request was made, the judge suspended the recording to ask the party if they could bring her in the afternoon or the following day. Since it was not possible, the recording continued and the request was rejected, making it clear that rather than questioning reasons of necessity and relevance, merely temporal and convenience aspects were evaluated. The Public Prosecutor's Office was left at a disadvantage by not being allowed to question the expert who prepared the document on essential matters. It was on the basis of this document that the court bolstered its doubt. For all these reasons, they request that the appeal be granted, the judgment be annulled, and a remand to the trial court be ordered. **Dismissed.** The claim must be rejected due to lack of harm. The challengers complain that an inspection of the sources was not ordered to determine their nature as public domain channels (cauces de dominio público). However, as already stated in the second recital, the determination of that nature was not what was essential in this case, but rather whether the confusion that was evident even among experts allowed for excluding the intent (dolo) of the accused, due to the lack of the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime (tipo subjetivo). On the other hand, the appellants do not indicate in what manner that inspection could be more effective in clarifying the divergence raised than the evaluation of the testimony of the experts in the matter who appeared at trial, presented their positions before the parties, having each conducted their respective inspections with technical knowledge. Furthermore, the appellants complain about the rejection of the reception of the hydrogeology expert [Nombre23] on a second occasion, after her expert report was incorporated as evidence.

Nonetheless, that expert report was not even considered in the intellectual reasoning. In addition to the foregoing, the appellants do not indicate how not having been able to hear the expert again after the formal incorporation of the document affected the Public Prosecutor's Office's position; that is, what new arguments or questions could have been raised from that moment on that could not have been brought up on the first occasion when the expert testified. Finally, what was taken as the basis of the judgment was what the expert said at trial, at which time she was questioned by all the parties. Therefore, the claim is rejected.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is declared without merit. Notify.

Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: tapelacionpe-[...]-Judicial.go.cr That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Nombre9], and;

Considering:

I.- On January eleventh, two thousand seventeen, an oral hearing was held in this matter. We the judges [Nombre10] and Giovanni Mena Artavia participated in it, who sign this ruling; as well as Judge Gustavo Chan Mora, who no longer works in this court. In the proceeding in question no evidence was produced and the Public Prosecutor's Office merely summarized the content of its written appeal.

II.- Attorneys [Nombre5], coordinating prosecutor of the Adjunta Penal Ambiental Prosecutor's Office of the Public Prosecutor's Office; and [Nombre11], appeals prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, appeal judgment 968-16 of the Criminal Court of Cartago, of eleven hours thirty minutes on September twentieth, two thousand sixteen. The first ground of appeal is titled "Disagreement with the assessment of evidence due to pretermission of essential evidence and incorrect appreciation of the elements brought to the adversarial proceeding." The appellants indicate that the court did not consider, in accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, the testimonial and documentary evidence incorporated into the debate by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Particularly, they miss the intellectual analysis of the testimonies of [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] and official letter ACLAP-GASP-133, the seizure and confiscation record 001-003, the photographic sequence of the machinery used in the acts, official letter ACLAP-GASP-143, official letter ACLAP-GASP-070, the complaint amplification report, the map of the geographical area in which the defendant's property is located, official letter SG-DEA-662-2012-SETENA, reports DGM-CHRHN-40-2011 and DGM/RNM-517-2011, official letter DGM-RNM-C-32-2012, official letter DL-OF-0012-2012, official letter DGM-RNM.C-41-2012, official letter ACLAP.PNTMM-162-11, official letter 0-C-1541 and the copy of report DPM-INF-1065-2011. They consider it incorrect to believe the statements of [Nombre14], [Nombre15] and [Nombre16], without noting their contradictions with the aforementioned documentary evidence and with the testimonies of [Nombre17], [Nombre18] and [Nombre19]. The appellants indicate that the record signed by [Nombre20] himself accounts for the seizure of the machinery operated by [Nombre21] and [Nombre22], which was being operated within the protection area of the Kirí River. The photographs illustrate the mechanization carried out up to the edge of the Kirí River channel, which indicates an invasion of the protection area, which the accused directed. The criminal offense makes no distinction regarding the type of vegetation. The court does not indicate why it accepts the version of the expert [Nombre23] and discards the experts [Nombre24] and [Nombre25]. Regarding the crime of destruction of vegetation in the protection area of the Kirí River, the judgment discredits what was indicated by [Nombre17] and [Nombre18], who even recalled destroyed plant species, violating the principle of freedom of evidence. Regarding the illegal exploitation of minerals, the court did not analyze the invoices provided by the accused, with which a quantity of one thousand five hundred cubic meters of material placed on the roads could not be justified, nor was the expert version of [Nombre26] analyzed, who indicated a coincidence between the material from the Río Grande de Orosi and that placed on the roads built by the accused; nor is the testimony and documentary support of [Nombre13] analyzed, who refers to the extraction site and machinery tracks in the hole left when carrying out the exploitation. For the purposes of crimes related to the Forest Law and the Wildlife Conservation Law, it is important to determine whether they are streams, rivers, or brooks, beyond the technical concept of "public domain channel". The judgment concludes that there is doubt as to whether the channels are public domain and therefore dismisses the crime. The court agrees with the criterion issued by the expert [Nombre27], that the channels are generated by permanent springs, not accepting other definitions or alternatives such as those in subsections 9 and 10 of article 1 of the Water Law. The judgment diminishes the opinions of the Water Directorate DA-1596-2011 and DA-2229-2011 for lacking a methodology. Regarding this, there was pretermission of the testimonies of the agricultural engineers of the MINAE Water Directorate [Nombre24] and [Nombre28], who had no doubt that they were public domain channels. The judgment diminishes the result of the follow-up inspection by the Water Directorate officials that confirmed that the channels originate from permanent springs. The testimonies of [Nombre12], [Nombre13], [Nombre29], [Nombre16] and [Nombre30], official letters DA-1596-2011, DA-2229-2011, CED1--, CED2--, report site visits at different times and account for the existence of water in the unnamed channels under discussion. Against that evidence, the a quo leans toward doubt, based on the study of the expert [Nombre27]. That expert's report, however, presents methodological flaws, since it only sought to sow doubt about the condition of the channels. That expert's report is based on four weak variables: 1) the morphometry of the channel, 2) the character of the spring that gives rise to them, 3) the graphic mention on the cartographic sheet, 4) the dragging and deposition of lithic material. Regarding morphometry, it was not taken into account that the acts charged are from the years two thousand ten and two thousand eleven. Consequently, it cannot be affirmed that the channels are not public domain because they are in a straight line, if the opinion is based on a site visit in two thousand fifteen and Google Earth photographs from two thousand thirteen. Regarding the second point, which affirms that only channels produced by a permanent spring are public domain, it must be indicated that: 1) the expert did not visit the origins of the water bodies, but rather doubted what originated them; 2) the criterion clashes with article 1 of the Water Law, which establishes as public domain channels those originated by other types of sources. Furthermore, Messrs. [Nombre31] and [Nombre32], in a follow-up inspection in July two thousand sixteen, located the springs that originate those streams. The third variable assumes that channels must be on the cartography to be public domain, but the sheets used by the expert are from several decades ago (1990), and were drawn at very small scales (1:50000), that is, at five thousand meters in height, so they do not capture details of the small channel. The fourth variable clashes with the finding of lithic material at the site, which is evident in photographs. Regarding the violation of the Mining Law, the witness [Nombre26] affirmed that the material came from the Río Grande de Orosi and that in the administrative channel the accused did not demonstrate the origin of the material. The witnesses [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] stated that the material had been extracted from that river, since they observed the machinery tracks at the extraction and stockpiling site of mineral material. Even [Nombre16] said that the material used came from the streams located on the property. Nor was the statement of the accused assessed. The invoices provided to the debate do not allow proof that the accused bought one thousand five hundred cubic meters of material. They do not even correspond to places close to the site of the acts, it being unreasonable that the accused brought the material from Turrialba and Heredia. Without merit. The appellants point out that the seizure record signed by [Nombre14] allows establishing the existence of the seizure of machinery operated by [Nombre33] and [Nombre34], when it was being operated within the protection area of the Kirí River. In reality, the referenced document, which is added at folio 9, indicates the existence of the seizure, but not the precise place where the machinery was found. What is true is that, at least some of the photographs that appear in the file illustrate the work carried out by the machinery, apparently up to the edge of the Kirí River channel (see folio 15). However, the judgment under examination refuted those photographs stating: "[Nombre14] referred regarding the first inspection carried out with [Nombre17], on the Kirí dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of criteria between him and Mr. [Nombre35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area and that no movement of material that he evidenced was seen that day. Photograph number 1 of the first inspection on which the interested parties placed emphasis is important and must be assessed and (sic) but in relation to the entire photographic sequence incorporated since it relates to photos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and it is where the white backhoe loader is seen near the margins of the Kirí River, there are witnesses who say it was on the margins invading, as well as the tractor, so much so that as the prosecutorial supervisor said, that backhoe loader is noted entering the Kirí River channel. If the Court assesses these photos in isolation, that is the impression that emerges, but even being photographs, they must be assessed harmoniously with the rest of the photos and in particular, because the accused and his defense indicated that those photos were views from one point of the property, but that there is another photo that shows the back part of that vegetation seen, where at that time there was a small hill on which this machine was parked, that is, the photo taken from another angle which is the back part of what is seen in the previous ones and proves that behind it is not the Kirí River that is found. This photo that is in the sequence and that the defense and the accused pointed out is number 78 where in the foreground we see that that back part is related to the site of the first photos and seen all as a joint panoramic verifies that it cannot be concluded that what was seen in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 was the backhoe loader entering the channel, but rather turning on the small hill described by Mr. [[Nombre7]] (judgment uploaded to the virtual desktop on September 23, 2016, pp. 127 and 128). This court contrasted such photographs, reaching the conclusion that, indeed, they allow sustaining a doubt about the proximity between the white backhoe loader and the Kirí River, in which the invasion was allegedly taking place. On one hand, number 1, visible at folio 15, shows a perspective in which said machine appears close to the river, although that one is taken from afar. However, photograph number 78, which appears on the DVD attached to the file, presents an image from the reverse point of view, making it appear that the proximity between the machinery and the river is not so clear. The doubt on the matter increases when considering that among the prosecution witnesses [Nombre14] and [Nombre12] there was a discrepancy as to whether the machinery was or was not within the protection area. In this regard, the court indicated: "[Nombre14] referred regarding the first inspection carried out with [Nombre17], on the Kiri dike, that the machinery that was at the site was not within the protection area and that there was even a clash of criteria between him and Mr. [Nombre35] regarding whether the machinery was within the protection area and that no movement of material that he evidenced was seen that day" (judgment, p. 127). The foregoing is extremely important for two reasons: i) because it is intended to take the location of said machinery as an indicator of the invasion, an issue that turns out to be controversial; and ii) because the controversy arises between two officials who participated in the inspection in which the machinery was detected. The very existence of vegetation at the river margin was also the subject of controversy, since the evidence was not clear in this regard. As the a quo noted, while [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] mentioned the presence of shrubby vegetation with a height of two and a half to three meters, such a thing was contradicted by other witnesses such as [Nombre16], [Nombre15] and [Nombre31] (judgment, pp. 125 and 126), without any reason being apparent in any of them to fail the truth. Such contradictions should lead, reasonably, to sustain a state of doubt, as it refers to the alleged invasion of the Kirí River. In another order of things, the court adequately justified its affirmation that the public domain condition of the unnamed channels on the defendant's property was "a very controversial issue even in the expert branch" (judgment, p. 119). The appellants focus their attention on the fact that the a quo leaned toward the version of the expert [Nombre23] over that of [Nombre24] and [Nombre25]; however, what is essential is not whether such channels have one nature or another, but whether the divergence is so complex that the same experts were not able to easily resolve it. Naturally, that is decisive in knowing whether a layperson like the accused could be required to have certain knowledge of such an issue, which finally affects the subjective element of the crime. The judge questioned whether the accused [[Nombre1]] could have acted willfully (dolosamente), given the ignorance of one of the objective elements of the offense, such as the public domain character of the invaded channel (judgment, p. 119). Especially when the expert [Nombre36] indicated that, in the absence of expertise, one had to resort to the cartographic sheet to determine if a body of water is public domain, when those of interest did not appear on the one used in trial (judgment, p. 121). Thus, the question of whether in reality the channels are public domain or not is not the fundamental thing, but rather whether the accused could be unaware of said nature. It is not relevant, consequently, to determine whether the a quo granted greater or lesser merit to the opinions of the Water Directorate DA-1596-2011 and DA-2229-2011 for lacking a methodology, or to the testimonies of the agricultural engineers of the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy [Nombre24] and [Nombre28]. They could be right in that the unnamed channels are public domain. The follow-up inspection carried out by them in the year two thousand sixteen may have shed light on the point, since previously none of the experts had sought the springs of the water sources. However, none of this detracts from the trial court's reasoning in calling into question the cognitive element of the subjective type of the offense. On the other hand, the issue of the invoices in the illegal exploitation of minerals was also duly addressed by the trial court. The a quo did not affirm that the invoices provided proved the purchase of all the material spread on the roads; what it indicated was that "from some of those purchases of material, [the accused] provided some invoices numbers 3723, 4148, 3955, 3952, 3836 and according to which they correspond to companies that have a concession in channels of the Reventazón River but with offices in Heredia, Siquirres and others in Atirro, invoices that, by the way, maintain dates contemporary to the criminal acts charged" (judgment, p. 113). The version of [Nombre26] was also analyzed. In this regard, the a quo indicated: "the witness [Nombre37] already analyzed, geologist from Geología y Minas indicated that from the inspection she carried out she determined that it was an agricultural-type property with a dairy that had an internal network of roads and that they had been recently ballasted and that she also toured that network and the materials came from the fluvial network of the Río Grande de Orosi area which were placed quite recently at that time and that to extract that material, a permit was required. However, when questioned in the debate, she indicated: 'I did not compare the materials on the road and the river, it cannot be determined absolutely that they are from the same site since the materials upstream and downstream are similar in the immediacy... I called the material ballast (lastre) which is a layer of materials that overlies the soil to make a road suitable for movement of people or vehicles and they always come from the subsoil and when I say it is obtained from the river it is because they are disaggregated rocks that can be from the river which facilitates it that have sand and small pebbles, but also from a quarry or hill which is different whose fragments are rounded, but both from the subsoil.' Here then, given these statements, it became necessary to return to the oral presentation of the hydrogeologist expert [Nombre38] when in what is pertinent to this point she stated that by field analysis, it cannot be established if the material from a river is the same as that at a site, but rather for that there are studies that are carried out of all the pebbles such as petrography, geochemistry, rock wear sections to compare them to see if they are the same and they result not only in the name of the rock species but with its chemical composition. Given the questioning in the debate on the point, even the witness [Nombre13] indicated that they did not excavate the roads to see what material was at the extraction site" (judgment, pp. 130 and 131, bold from the original).

In summary, the court validly concluded that, based on the statement of the expert witness [Name39], it could not be affirmed with certainty that the material used on the roads came from the rivers that run through the property. The testimony of [Name13] was also considered, along with its documentary support and the reference she made to the machinery tracks. Regarding the testimony of that person, the court stated: *"She asserted that in photos 21 and 22 at folio 40, the site of pluvial material extraction can be observed on the farm of [Name7], because there are heavy machinery tracks; however, the existence of machinery on the farm of [Name7] was not a disputed fact precisely because its use was discussed for excavating the canals and cleaning the marshy area, and this cannot constitute a sole and determining element to define an extraction site, especially since, looking at the photographs, that track mentioned is only barely visible and nothing more, a situation which by itself could constitute an indication but which by itself is not sufficient unless it is corroborated with more evidentiary elements, and that is not sufficient for this Chamber to define with certainty the alleged extraction site. Regarding this last point, it should not be overlooked that [Name37], who championed this issue of mineral extraction at trial, asserted that when she inspected the site, there was no evidence of recent extraction"* (judgment, p. 131). As can be seen, there was no such certainty that the material came from the river, as the appellants claim. It must also be emphasized that what witness [Name16] indicated was that the material was brought from Cartago, as the court noted (judgment, p. 130); it was witness [Name15] who stated that from the cleaning of the canals, material was extracted that remained on the roads, but he clarified that it was mud (judgment, p. 130). In another matter, the challengers affirm that, beyond the concept of "public domain watercourses (cauces de dominio público)," what matters to determine, in relation to the offenses referred to in the Ley Forestal and the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, is whether what was encroached upon were streams (quebradas), rivers (ríos), or brooks (arroyos). This, in relation to the unnamed water bodies. The appellants overlook, however, that the accusation itself adheres to that concept for attributing conduct to the defendant, when it makes references such as: *"7 public domain watercourses"* (fact 3), *"six public domain watercourses"* (fact 4), *"one of the public domain watercourses"* (fact 6), and *"build within the watercourses and the protection areas on both banks of the 7 public domain watercourses"* (fact 8). For that reason, establishing that condition regarding the watercourses was indeed important. The application of subsections IX and X of Article 1 of the Ley de Aguas is also sought. In this regard, the law provides that the following are public domain waters: *"IX.- Subterranean waters whose outcropping (alumbramiento) is not achieved by means of wells; and / X.- Pluvial waters that flow through ravines (barrancos) or dry watercourses (ramblas) whose channels are of public domain."* In setting forth that argument, the challengers overlook three important things: **1)** the discussion at trial centered on the nature of the watercourses in relation to subsection IV of the Ley de Aguas, which also defines as such: *"Those of rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, brooks or springs (manantiales) from the point where the first permanent waters spring forth until their outlet into the sea or lakes, lagoons, or estuaries."* Therefore, the technical criteria were directed toward the controversy of whether it was possible to identify the place where the water bodies sprang forth. **2)** Regarding subsection IX of the cited article, it was not proven that the waters in question were subterranean waters that outcropped naturally. **3)** Regarding subsection X, it was also not established that the waters were those flowing through ravines and dry watercourses whose channels were of public domain. Hence the inadmissibility of applying the regulations in the manner suggested by the claimants.

**III.-** The **second claim** is for disagreement with the legal reasoning, incorrect application of sections 33 and 58 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal; 141 of the Código de Minería, and 90 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. The appellant points out that to prove the criminal intent (dolo) of invading and destroying vegetation, it is not necessary to prove that the accused had knowledge regarding whether the water bodies were public domain watercourses, it being sufficient that he knew he was facing a stream, river, or brook. For the classification of the crime of invasion and damage to protection areas, the destruction of certain vegetative species is not necessary. Furthermore, the restoration of things to their prior state was not ordered, despite at least one criminal wrong having been proven. **Without merit.** Article 33 of the Ley Forestal, as far as is relevant here, states: *"The following are declared protection areas: / (...) b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or brooks, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is broken."* Evidently, to establish the classification of the crime, it is fundamental to determine if the water body claimed to have been usurped is a river, a stream, or a brook. For this purpose, one must turn to the Ley de Aguas, which in turn states that rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, as well as brooks or springs, are public domain waters. The same law speaks of private domain waters, among which it does not place rivers, streams, and brooks, and of which it expressly states they belong to the owner of the land. This being so, what sense would there be in protecting the banks of these private water bodies if the owner can dispose of the bodies themselves in any way he wishes? The obvious conclusion is that the protection contemplated in section 33 subsection b) of the Ley Forestal must be understood in connection with the public domain waters of subsection IV of Article 1 of the Ley de Aguas. Consequently, if the objective elements of the crime (tipo objetivo) refer to public domain waters, the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime (tipo subjetivo) will require awareness that one is invading or destroying vegetation on the banks of such water bodies and not others. Therefore, contrary to what the challengers affirm, it was essential to prove that specific knowledge, so that a doubt in this regard could affect the classification of the conduct. The nature of the species that can be the object of the crime of invasion is a matter that the lower court (a quo) must resolve when ruling on the conducts to be judged in the remand, as was ordered in the preceding recital. In the same way, it must issue a ruling regarding the request for restoration of things to their prior state only with respect to the point pending judgment, if that becomes a subject of discussion in the new hearing that is ordered, but not in relation to those aspects where the verdict is being confirmed. The reason for this last point is that, as the trial court indicated, the existence of that type of damages under conditions such that they should be reversed was not proven. Hence the rejection of the complaint.

**IV.-** In their **third objection,** the challengers allege a *"violation of due process (sic) due to illegal rejection of evidence."* Due to the course the trial took, the parties asked the court for an on-site inspection (inspección ocular) of the scene of the events, since controversy arose as to whether the water sources (fuentes) subject to the litigation were different from what the prosecutorial body identified during the investigation. The court, without greater reasoning, rejected the request, even though in its judgment it showed doubt as to whether they were the same watercourses or whether they were of public domain. It also rejected the acceptance of the hydrogeological expert witness [Name23]. The defense offered said expert as evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) and the Public Prosecutor's Office objected. The judge accepted her, but she was interviewed without the documentary support, since the expert report (peritaje) was rejected. On the verge of the closing arguments, the judge accepted the expert report. The parties requested that the expert be heard again to interview her regarding the expert report, which was rejected to the detriment of the Public Prosecutor's Office, by accepting an expert report without the possibility of questioning the person who prepared it. The rejection was atypical, because when the request was made, the judge suspended the recording to ask the party if she could bring her in the afternoon or the next day. As it was not possible, the recording continued, and the request was rejected, making it clear that rather than questioning reasons of necessity and pertinence, merely temporal and convenience aspects were assessed. The Public Prosecutor's Office was at a disadvantage for not being allowed to question the expert who prepared the document on essential matters. It was on the basis of that document that the court anchored its doubt. For all of these reasons, they request that the appeal be granted, the judgment annulled, and a remand to the trial court be ordered. **Denied.** The ground must be rejected for lack of grievance. The challengers complain that an inspection of the water sources was not ordered to determine their nature as public domain watercourses. Nevertheless, as already stated in the second recital, determining that nature was not what was essential in this case, but rather whether the confusion that became evident, even among expert witnesses, allowed for the exclusion of the defendant's criminal intent, due to the lack of the cognitive element of the subjective elements of the crime. Furthermore, the appellants do not indicate in what way that inspection could be more effective for elucidating the divergence raised than the assessment of the statements of the experts in the field who appeared at trial, set forth their positions before the parties, having themselves conducted their respective inspections with technical knowledge. On the other hand, the appellants complain about the rejection of hearing the hydrogeological expert witness [Name23] on a second occasion, after her expert report was admitted as evidence. However, that expert report was not even considered in the intellectual reasoning. In addition to the above, the challengers do not indicate in what way the inability to hear the expert again after the formal admission of the document affected the position of the Public Prosecutor's Office; that is, what new arguments or questions could have been raised from that moment, which could not have been brought up at the first opportunity when the expert testified. Finally, what was taken as the basis for the judgment was what the expert said at trial, a moment in which she was questioned by all the parties. Therefore, the rejection of the claim.

**POR TANTO:** The appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is declared without merit. Let it be notified.

Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: tapelacionpe-[...]-Judicial.go.cr

1 *100066950345PE* Contra: [[Nombre1] ] Delito: Invasión de zona de protección de dominio público, destrucción de flora en zona de protección de dominio público, un delito de extracción ilegal en zona de protección de dominio público.

Ofendido: Recursos Naturales Res: 2017-474 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, sección primera. A las once horas con treinta y tres minutos, de catorce se setiembre de dos mil diecisiete.

Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [[Nombre1] ]; [...], por los delitos de Invasión de zona de protección de dominio público, destrucción de flora en zona de protección de dominio público y un delito de extracción ilegal e zona de protección de dominio público, en perjuicio de los Recursos Naturales. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso los jueces Giovanni Mena Artavia, [Nombre2] [Nombre3] [Nombre4] y la jueza Ivette Carranza Cambronero. Se apersonaron en apelación los licenciados [Nombre5] . en calidad de Coordinar de la Fiscalía Adjunta Penal Ambiental del Ministerio Público y [Nombre6] , Fiscal de Impugnaciones del Ministerio Público.

Resultando:

1. Que mediante sentencia número 968-2016 de las once horas con treinta minutos del veinte de setiembre de dos mil dieciséis, el Tribunal Penal de Cartago, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 1, 30 y 45 del Código Penal, 1, 5, 6, 9, 40, 142, 180 a 184, 200, 265 a 267, 324, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 y 366 del Código Procesal Penal, artículos 33 inciso b, 34 y 58 inciso a de la Ley Forestal 7575, 90 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, artículo 1 y 141 del Código de Minería en relación con el artículo 2 del Reglamento de dicho Código, artículo 1 de la Ley de Aguas 276, el Tribunal absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre [Nombre7]] por los delitos de Invasión de zona de protección de dominio público, destrucción de flora en zona de protección de dominio público y un delito de extracción ilegal en zona de protección de dominio público que se le venían atribuyendo en perjuicio de los Recursos Naturales. Se levanta cualquier medida cautelar que se haya dictado a consecuencia de esta causa penal. Se rechazan las las medidas cautelares atípicas solicitadas por los acusadores. Asimismo, se declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por la Procuraduría General de la República contra el acusado [Nombre [Nombre7]]. Son las costas del proceso penal a cargo del Estado y por concepto de la interposición de la acción civil y la querella, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas por estimarse que existió razón plausible para litigar. Firme la sentencia, se ordena la devolución de todos los bienes que hayan sido decomisados a consecuencia de este proceso y a quien demuestre su legítima titularidad sobre los mismos. Notifíquese.- Msc. [Nombre8] , Jueza de Juicio." 2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, los licenciados [Nombre5] . y [Nombre6] interpusieron el recurso de apelación.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 466 del Código Procesal Penal, reformado por Ley 8837 publicada el nueve de diciembre de dos mil once (Creación de Recurso de Apelación de la Sentencia), el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4 . Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez [Nombre9] , y;

Considerando:

I.- El once de enero del dos mil diecisiete se realizó vista oral en el presente asunto. En la misma participamos los jueces [Nombre10] y Giovanni Mena Artavia, quienes suscribimos este fallo; así como el juez Gustavo Chan Mora, quien ya no labora en este tribunal. En la diligencia en cuestión no se evacuó prueba y el Ministerio Público únicamente sintetizó el contenido de su recurso escrito.

II.- Los licenciados [Nombre5] . , fiscal coordinador de la Fiscalía Adjunta Penal Ambiental del Ministerio Público; y [Nombre11] , fiscal de impugnaciones del Ministerio Público, apelan la sentencia 968-16 del Tribunal Penal de Cartago, de las once horas treinta minutos del veinte de setiembre del dos mil dieciséis. El primer motivo de apelación es titulado "Inconformidad con la valoración de prueba por preterición de prueba esencial e incorrecta apreciación de los elementos traídos al contradictorio". Señalan los recurrentes que el tribunal no consideró, conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, la prueba testimonial y documental incorporada al debate por el Ministerio Público. Particularmente, echan de menos el análisis intelectivo de los testimonios de [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] y el oficio ACLAP-GASP-133, el acta de decomiso y secuestro 001-003, la secuencia fotográfica de la maquinaria utilizada en los hechos, el oficio ACLAP-GASP-143, el oficio ACLAP-GASP-070, el informe de ampliación de denuncia, el plano de la zona geográfica en que se encuentra la finca del encartado, el oficio SG-DEA-662-2012-SETENA, los informes DGM-CHRHN-40-2011 y DGM/RNM-517-2011, el oficio DGM-RNM-C-32-2012, el oficio DL-OF-0012-2012, el oficio DGM-RNM.C-41-2012, el oficio ACLAP.PNTMM-162-11, el oficio 0-C-1541 y la copia del informe DPM-INF-1065-2011. Consideran incorrecto que se crea en las declaraciones de [Nombre14] , [Nombre15] y [Nombre16] , sin reparar en sus contradicciones con la prueba documental mencionada y con los testimonios de [Nombre17] , [Nombre18] y [Nombre19] . Indican los recurrentes que el acta firmada por el propio [Nombre20] da cuenta del decomiso de la maquinaria conducida por [Nombre21] y [Nombre22] , que era manipulada dentro del área de protección del río Kirí. Las fotografías ilustran de la mecanización realizada hasta el borde del cauce del río Kirí, lo que señala una invasión del área de protección, la que dirigió el imputado. El tipo penal no hace diferencia en cuanto al tipo de vegetación. No indica el tribunal por qué acepta la versión de la perito [Nombre23] y descarta a los peritos [Nombre24] y [Nombre25] . En cuanto al delito de destrucción de vegetación en el área de protección del Río Kirí, la sentencia desacredita lo indicado por [Nombre17] y [Nombre18] , quien incluso recordó especies vegetativas destruidas, vulnerando el principio de libertad probatoria. En cuanto a la explotación ilegal de mineral, el tribunal no analizó las facturas aportadas por el imputado, con las que no se podría justificar una cantidad de mil quinientos metros cúbicos de material colocado en los caminos, ni se analizó la versión pericial de [Nombre26] , quien señaló coincidencia entre el material del Río Grande de Orosi y el colocado en los caminos construidos por el imputado; tampoco se analiza el testimonio y respaldo documental de [Nombre13] , quien alude al sitio de extracción y huellas de maquinaria en el hueco que se dejó al ejecutar la explotación. Para los efectos de los delitos relacionados con la Ley Forestal y la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, interesa determinar si se trata de quebradas, ríos o arroyos, más allá del concepto técnico de "cauce de dominio público". La sentencia concluye que hay duda de si los cauces son de dominio público y por ello descarta el delito. El tribunal coincide con el criterio que emite la perito [Nombre27] , de que los causes son generados por nacientes permanentes, no aceptando otras definiciones o alternativas como las de los incisos 9 y 10 del artículo 1 de la Ley de Aguas. La sentencia demerita los dictámenes de la Dirección de Aguas DA-1596-2011 y DA-2229-2011 por no contar con una metodología. Respecto a ello hubo preterición de los testimonios de los ingenieros agrícolas de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE [Nombre24] y [Nombre28] , quienes no tuvieron duda de que se tratara de cauces de dominio público. La sentencia demerita el resultado de la inspección de seguimiento de los funcionarios de la Dirección de Aguas que confirmó que los cauces son originados por nacientes permanentes. Los testimonios de [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] , [Nombre29] , [Nombre16] y [Nombre30] , los oficios DA-1596-2011, DA-2229-2011, CED1- -, CED2-- -, reportan vistas al sitio en distintas épocas y dan cuenta de la existencia de agua en los cauces sin nombre que se discuten. Contra esa prueba, el a quo se inclina por la duda, con base en el estudio de la perito [Nombre27] . El informe de tal experta, sin embargo, presenta falencias metodológicas, ya que únicamente procuró sembrar duda sobre la condición de los cauces. El informe de esa perito parte de cuatro variables endebles: 1) la morfometría del cauce, 2) el carácter de la naciente que les da origen, 3) la mención gráfica en la hoja cartográfica, 4) el arrastre y depositación del material lítico. En cuanto a la morfometría, no se tomó en cuenta que los hechos acusados son de los años dos mil diez y dos mil once. Consecuentemente, no se puede afirmar que los cauces no son de dominio público por estar en línea recta, si la opinión se basa en visita al sitio en el dos mil quince y fotografías de Google Earth del dos mil trece. En cuanto al segundo punto, que afirma que solo son cauces de dominio público aquellos producidos por una naciente permanente, debe indicarse que: 1) la perito no visitó los orígenes de los cuerpos de agua, sino que dudó sobre lo que los originaba; 2) el criterio choca con el artículo 1 de la Ley de Aguas, que establece como cauces de dominio público los originados por otros tipos de fuentes. Además, los señores [Nombre31] y [Nombre32] , en inspección de seguimiento de julio del dos mil dieciséis, localizaron las nacientes que originan esas quebradas. La tercera variable parte de que los cauces deben estar en la cartografía para ser de dominio público, pero las hojas utilizadas por la perito son de hace varias décadas (1990), y fueron levantadas a escalas muy pequeñas (1:50000), es decir, a cinco mil metros de altura, por lo que no recoge detalles del pequeño cauce. La cuarta variable choca con el hallazgo de material lítico en el sitio, lo que consta en fotografías. En cuanto a la infracción a la Ley de Minería, la testigo [Nombre26] afirmó que el material provenía del Río Grande de Orosi y que en vía administrativa el imputado no demostró la procedencia del material. Los testigos [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] manifestaron que el material había sido extraído de ese río, ya que observaron la huella de maquinaria en el sitio de extracción y acopio de material mineral. Incluso [Nombre16] dijo que el material utilizado provenía de las quebradas ubicadas en la finca. Tampoco se valoró el dicho del imputado. Las facturas aportadas al debate no permiten demostrar que el imputado haya comprado mil quinientos metros cúbicos de material. Ni siquiera corresponden a lugares cercanos al sitio de los hechos, no siendo razonable que el imputado trajera el material desde Turrialba y Heredia. Sin lugar. Los apelantes señalan que el acta de decomiso firmada por [Nombre14] , permite establecer la existencia del decomiso de maquinaria conducida por [Nombre33] y [Nombre34] , cuando era manipulada dentro del área de protección del río Kirí. En realidad, el referido documento, que corre agregado a folio 9, señala la existencia del decomiso, más no el lugar preciso en que la maquinaria fue hallada. Lo que sí es cierto es que, al menos algunas de las fotografías que obran en el expediente, ilustran el trabajo realizado por la maquinaria, aparentemente hasta el borde del cauce del río Kirí (véase el folio 15). Sin embargo, la sentencia bajo examen desvirtuó esas fotografías señalando: "[Nombre14] refirió respecto de la primera inspección que se hizo con [Nombre17] , sobre el dique del Kirí, que la maquinaria que se encontraba en el sitio no estaba dentro del área de protección y que incluso hubo choque de criterios entre él con don [Nombre35] respecto que la maquinaria estaba dentro del área de protección y que ese día no se vio movimiento de material que él evidenciara. La fotografía número 1 de la primera inspección en la que hicieron énfasis las partes interesadas es importante y debe valorarse e (sic) pero en relación a toda la secuencia fotográfica incorporada ya que se relaciona con la foto 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 y 6 y es donde se ve la retroexcavadora blanca cerca de los márgenes del río Kirí, hay testigos que dicen que estaba en los márgenes invadiendo, así como el tractor, tanto que como dijo el visor fiscal, esa retroexcavadora se nota metiéndose al cauce del río Kirí. Si el Tribunal valora de manera aislada estas fotos, esa es la impresión que se desprende, pero aun siendo fotografías, deben valorarse de manera armoniosa con el resto de las fotos y en particular, porque el acusado y su defensa indicaron que esas fotos eran vistas desde un punto de la finca, pero que hay otra foto que muestra la parte de atrás de esa vegetación que se ve, donde para ese entonces había una lomita en la que se parqueaba ésta máquina, es decir la foto tomada desde otro ángulo que es la parte de atrás de lo que se ve en las anteriores y comprueban que detrás no es el río Kirí el que se encuentra. Esta foto que se encuentra en la secuencia y que la defensa y el imputado señalaron es la número 78 donde en primer término vemos que esa parte de atrás guarda relación con el sitio de las primeras fotos y visto todo como una panorámica conjunta constata que no se puede concluir que lo que se veía en la 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, y 6 era la retroexcavadora metiéndose al cauce, sino dando vuelta en la lomita que describe el señor [Nombre [Nombre7]] (sentencia subida al escritorio virtual el 23 de setiembre del 2016, pp. 127 y 128). Este tribunal contrastó tales fotografías, llegando a la conclusión de que, efectivamente, permiten sustentar una duda sobre la cercanía entre la retroexcavadora blanca y el río Kirí, en el que se acusa se estaba dando la invasión. Por un lado, la número 1, visible a folio 15, muestra una perspectiva en que dicha máquina se aprecia cercana al río, aunque aquella es tomada de lejos. Sin embargo, la fotografía número 78, que consta en el DVD adjunto al expediente, presenta una imagen desde el punto de vista inverso, haciendo ver que la cercanía entre la maquinaria y el río no es tan clara. La duda sobre el particular se acrecienta cuando se considera que entre los testigos de cargo [Nombre14] y [Nombre12] hubo discrepancia sobre si la maquinaria estaba o no dentro del área de protección. Al respectó indicó el tribunal: "[Nombre14] refirió respecto de la primera inspección que se hizo con [Nombre17] , sobre el dique del Kiri, que la maquinaria que se encontraba en el sitio no estaba dentro del área de protección y que incluso hubo choque de criterios entre él con don [Nombre35] respecto que la maquinaria estaba dentro del área de protección y que ese día no se vio movimiento de material que él evidenciara" (sentencia, p. 127). Lo anterior es sumamente importante por dos razones: i) porque se pretende tomar la ubicación de dicha maquinaria como indicador de la invasión, tema que resulta controvertido; y ii) porque la controversia se presenta entre dos funcionarios que participaron en la inspección en que la maquinaria fue detectada. La existencia misma de la vegetación al margen del río también fue objeto de controversia, ya que la prueba no fue clara en cuanto a ello. Como lo hizo notar el a quo, mientras [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] hicieron mención a la presencia de vegetación arbustiva con una altura de dos metros y medio a tres metros, tal cosa fue contradicha por otros testigos como [Nombre16] , [Nombre15] y [Nombre31] (sentencia, pp. 125 y 126), sin que se apreciara en ninguno de ellos razón para faltar a la verdad. Tales contradicciones debían conducir, razonablemente, a sostener un estado de duda, en cuanto se refiere a la presunta invasión del río Kirí. En otro orden de cosas, el tribunal justificó adecuadamente su afirmación de que la condición de dominio público de los cauces innominados de la finca del justiciable era "un tema muy controvertido hasta en la rama pericial" (sentencia, p. 119). Los recurrentes centran su atención en el hecho de que el a quo se inclinó por la versión de la perito [Nombre23] sobre la de [Nombre24] y [Nombre25] ; sin embargo, lo esencial no es si tales cauces ostentan una u otra naturaleza, sino si la divergencia es tan compleja que los mismos expertos no fueron capaces de despejarla fácilmente. Naturalmente, ello es determinante para saber si se podía exigir a un lego como el imputado un conocimiento cierto sobre tal cuestión, lo que finalmente incide en el tipo subjetivo del delito. La juzgadora puso en duda que el imputado [[Nombre1] ] hubiera podido actuar dolosamente, ante el desconocimiento de uno de los elementos objetivos del tipo, como lo es el carácter de dominio público del cauce invadido (sentencia, p. 119). Máxime cuando el perito [Nombre36] señaló que, a falta de experticia se debía acudir a la hoja cartográfica para determinar si un cuerpo de agua es de dominio público, cuando en la que se utilizó en juicio no aparecían aquellos de interés (sentencia, p. 121). Así, la cuestión de si en realidad, los cauces son o no de dominio público, no es lo fundamental, sino si el imputado podía ignorar dicha naturaleza. No es relevante, en consecuencia, determinar si el a quo otorgó mayor o menor mérito a los dictámenes de la Dirección de Aguas DA-1596-2011 y DA-2229-2011 por no contar con una metodología, o a los testimonios de los ingenieros agrícolas de la Dirección de Aguas del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía [Nombre24] y [Nombre28] . Ellos podrían tener razón en cuanto a que los cauces innominados son de dominio público. La inspección de seguimiento realizada por ellos en el año dos mil dieciséis, puede haber arrojado luz sobre el punto, ya que anteriormente ninguno de los expertos había buscado las nacientes de las fuentes de agua. Sin embargo, nada de ello quita razón al tribunal de mérito al poner en duda el elemento cognitivo del tipo subjetivo. Por otro lado, el tema de las facturas en la explotación ilegal de mineral también fue debidamente abordado por el tribunal de juicio. El a quo no afirmó que las facturas aportadas acreditaran la compra de todo el material esparcido en los caminos; lo que indicó fue que "de algunas de esas compras de material, aportó [el imputado] algunas facturas las números 3723, 4148, 3955, 3952, 3836 y según las cuales corresponden a empresas que tienen concesión en cauces de del río Reventazón pero con oficinas en Heredia, Siquirres y otras en Atirro, facturas que de por demás, mantienen fechas contemporáneas a las delincuencias acusadas" (sentencia, p. 113). La versión de [Nombre26] también fue analizada. Al respecto, el a quo señaló: "la testigo [Nombre37] ya analizada, geóloga de Geología y Minas indicó que de la inspección que realizó determinó que se trataba de una finca tipo agrícola con una lechería que tenía red de caminos internos y que fueron recientemente lastreados y que además hizo un recorrido por esa red y los materiales provenían de la red fluvial de la zona del río Grande de Orosi los cuales fueron colocados bastante reciente para ese momento y que para extraer ese material, se requería de permiso. Sin embargo al ser interrogada en el debate, la misma indicó: "No compare los materiales en el camino y el río, no se puede determinar de manera absoluta que sean del mismo sitio ya que los materiales aguas arriba y abajo son similares en la inmediatez...Yo llamé al material lastre que es una capa de materiales que sobreyace sobre el suelo para hacer un camino apto para movimiento de personas o vehículos y provienen siempre del subsuelo y cuando digo que se consigue del río es porque son rocas disgregadas que pueden ser del río que lo facilita que tienen arena y cantos pequeños, pero que también de una cantera o cerro que es diferente cuyos fragmentos son redondeados, pero ambos del subsuelo." Aquí entonces, ante estas declaraciones, se hizo necesario retomar la exposición oral de la perito hidrogeóloga [Nombre38] cuando en lo que es atinente a este punto manifestó que por análisis de campo, no se puede establecer si el material de un río es igual al que esta en un sitio, sino que para ello hay estudios que se realizan de todos los cantos como la petrografía, geoquímica, secciones de desgaste de la roca para compararlos a ver si son iguales y ellos dan como resultado no sólo el nombre de la especie de roca sino con su composición química. Ante los cuestionamientos en el debate sobre el punto, incluso el testigo [Nombre13] indicó que no excavaron los caminos para ver que material estaba en el sitio de extracción" (sentencia, pp. 130 y 131, negrita del original). En síntesis, el tribunal llegó a concluir, válidamente, que a partir de la declaración de la perito [Nombre39] no se podía afirmar con certeza que el material utilizado en los caminos proviniera de los ríos que discurren por la propiedad. Igualmente fue considerado el testimonio de [Nombre13] , su respaldo documental y la referencia que hizo a las huellas de maquinaria. Sobre el testimonio de dicha persona, el tribunal señaló: "Aseveró que en las fotos 21 y 22 de folio 40 se observa en la finca de don [Nombre [Nombre7]], el sitio de extracción de material pluvial porque hay huellas de maquinaria pesada, sin embargo la existencia de maquinaria en la finca de don [Nombre [Nombre7]] no fue un hecho controvertido precisamente porque se habló de su utilización para recavar los canales, limpiar la zona suamposa y no puede constituirse un elemento determinante y único para definir un sitio de extracción, máxime que viendo las fotografías sólo se medio observa esa huella de que se habla y nada más, situación que por si sola podría constituir un indicio pero que por si solo no es suficiente salvo que se acuerpe con más elementos probatorios y ello no es suficiente para esta Cámara para definir con seguridad el supuesto sitio de extracción. en (sic) cuanto a esto último, no debe obviarse que doña [Nombre37] que fue la que campeó este tema de la extracción de minerales en el juicio, aseveró que cuando inspeccionó el sitio, no había evidencia de extracción reciente" (sentencia, p. 131). Como se aprecia, no hubo tal certeza de que el material proviniera del río, como afirman los apelantes. También debe recalcarse que lo que indicó el testigo [Nombre16] fue que el material era traído de Cartago, como señaló el tribunal (sentencia, p. 130); fue el testigo [Nombre15] quien afirmó que de la limpieza de los canales se extraía material que quedaba en los caminos, pero aclaró que se trataba de barro (sentencia, p. 130). En otro orden de cosas, los impugnantes afirman que, más allá del concepto de "cauces de dominio público", lo que interesa determinar, con relación a los delitos referidos en la Ley Forestal y en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, es si lo invadido fueron quebradas, ríos o arroyos. Ello, en relación con los cuerpos de agua innominados. Los apelantes dejan de lado, sin embargo, que la acusación misma se atiene a dicho concepto para la atribución de conductas al justiciable, cuando hace referencias como: "7 cauces de dominio público" (hecho 3), "seis cauces de dominio público" (hecho 4), "uno de los cauces de dominio público" (hecho 6) y "construir dentro de los cauces y las áreas de protección a ambos márgenes de los 7 cauces de dominio público" (hecho 8). Por tal razón, el establecimiento de dicha condición en cuanto a los cauces sí era importante. También se pretende la aplicación de los incisos IX y X del artículo 1 de la Ley de Aguas. Al respecto, la norma señala que son aguas de dominio público "IX.- Las subterráneas cuyo alumbramiento no se haga por medio de pozos; y / X.- Las aguas pluviales que discurran por barrancos o ramblas cuyos cauces sean de dominio público". Al exponer ese argumento, los impugnantes dejan de lado tres cosas importantes: 1) la discusión en el debate versó sobre la naturaleza de los cauces en relación con el inciso IV de la Ley de Aguas, que también define como tales "Las de los ríos y sus afluentes directos o indirectos, arroyos o manantiales desde el punto en que broten las primeras aguas permanentes hasta su desembocadura en el mar o lagos, lagunas o esteros". Por ello, los criterios técnicos discurrieron por la polémica de si era posible identificar el lugar en que brotaban los cuerpos de agua. 2) Con relación al inciso IX del artículo citado, no se acreditó que se tratara de aguas subterráneas que alumbraran naturalmente. 3) Respecto al inciso X, tampoco se estableció que se tratara de aguas que discurrieran por barrancos y ramblas cuyos cauces fueran de dominio público. De ahí la improcedencia de aplicar la normativa en la forma que sugieren los reclamantes.

III.- El segundo reclamo es por inconformidad con la fundamentación jurídica, incorrecta aplicación de los numerales 33 y 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal; 141 del Código de Minería y 90 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Señala el apelante que para la demostración del dolo de invadir y destruir vegetación no es necesario demostrar que el imputado tenía conocimiento respecto a si los cuerpos de agua eran cauces de dominio público, bastando que supiera que estaba frente a una quebrada, río o arroyo. Para la tipicidad del delito de invasión y afectación de áreas de protección, no es necesaria la destrucción de ciertas especies vegetativas. Por otro lado, no se ordenó la restitución de las cosas a su estado anterior, a pesar de haberse demostrado al menos un injusto penal. Sin lugar. El artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, en cuanto aquí interesa, señala: "Se declaran áreas de protección las siguientes: / (...) b) Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado". Evidentemente, es fundamental para establecer la tipicidad determinar si el cuerpo de agua que se afirma usurpado es un río, una quebrada o un arroyo. Para tal efecto, debe acudirse a la Ley de Aguas, que señala a su vez que los ríos y sus afluentes directos o indirectos, así como los arroyos o manantiales son aguas de dominio público. La misma ley habla de aguas de dominio privado, dentro de las cuales no ubica a los ríos, quebradas y arroyos y de las que señala expresamente que pertenecen al dueño del terreno. Siendo así, ¿qué sentido tendría proteger las riberas de estos cuerpos de agua privados si de ellos mismos puede disponer el dueño en la forma que quiera? La conclusión obvia es que la protección contemplada en el numeral 33 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal, debe entenderse relacionada con las aguas de dominio público del inciso IV del artículo 1 de la Ley de Aguas. Consecuentemente, si el tipo objetivo se refiere a las aguas de dominio público, el elemento cognitivo del tipo subjetivo requerirá la conciencia de que se invade o destruye la vegetación en la ribera de tales cuerpos de agua y no otros. Por ello, contrario a lo que afirman los impugnantes, sí era esencial demostrar ese conocimiento específico, de manera que una duda al respecto podía incidir en la tipicidad de la conducta. Sobre la naturaleza de las especies que pueden ser objeto del delito de invasión, es un tema que deberá resolver el a quo al pronunciarse sobre las conductas que deben ser juzgadas en el reenvío, según se dispuso en el considerando anterior. De la misma forma, deberá hacer pronunciamiento respecto a la solicitud de restitución de las cosas a su estado anterior únicamente en cuanto al punto pendiente de juzgamiento, si ello llega a ser objeto de discusión en el nuevo debate que se disponga, más no con relación a aquellos aspectos en los que se está confirmando el fallo. La razón de esto último es que, como lo señaló el tribunal de mérito, no se acreditó la existencia de ese tipo de daños en condiciones tales que debieran revertirse. De ahí el rechazo del reproche.

IV.- En su tercer reparo, alegan los impugnantes una "violación al debido (sic) por rechazo ilegal de prueba". Por el rumbo que tomó el juicio, las partes pidieron al tribunal la inspección ocular del sitio de los hechos, ya que surgió controversia de si las fuentes objeto de la litis eran diferentes a lo que el ente fiscal identificó durante la investigación. El tribunal, sin mayor fundamento, rechazó la gestión, pese a que en sentencia mostró duda de si se trataba de los mismos cauces o si eran de dominio público. También rechazó la recepción de la perito hidrogeológica [Nombre23] . La defensa ofreció como prueba para mejor resolver a dicha perito y el Ministerio Público se opuso. La jueza la aceptó, pero fue entrevistada sin el soporte documental, pues el peritaje fue rechazado. Al filo de las conclusiones, la jueza aceptó el peritaje. Las partes pidieron se volviera a recibir a la perito para entrevistarla respecto al peritaje, lo que fue rechazado en perjuicio del Ministerio Público, al aceptar un peritaje sin posibilidad de cuestionar a quien lo elaboró. El rechazo fue atípico, pues cuando se hizo la petición la jueza suspendió la grabación para preguntarle a la parte si podía traerla en horas de la tarde o al día siguiente. Como no era posible, continuó la grabación y se rechazó la gestión, dejando claro que más que cuestionar razones de necesidad y pertinencia, se valoraron simplemente aspectos temporales y de comodidad. El Ministerio Público quedó en desventaja por no permitírsele interrogar sobre cuestiones esenciales del documento al perito que lo confeccionó. Fue con base en ese documento que el tribunal afincó su duda. Por todo ello solicitan se declare con lugar el recurso, se anule la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío al tribunal. No ha lugar. El motivo ha de rechazarse por falta de agravio. Los impugnantes se quejan de que no se dispusiera una inspección de las fuentes, para determinar su naturaleza como cauces de dominio público. No obstante, como ya se dijo en el considerando segundo, la determinación de esa naturaleza no era lo esencial en esta causa, sino si la confusión que se hizo evidente aún entre peritos permitía excluir el dolo del encartado, por falta del elemento cognitivo del tipo subjetivo. Por otro lado, no indican los apelantes de qué manera esa inspección podría ser más eficaz para dilucidar la divergencia planteada, que la valoración del dicho de los expertos en la materia que se presentaron a juicio, plantearon sus posiciones ante las partes, habiendo hecho ellos sus respectivas inspecciones con conocimiento técnico. Por otro lado, los apelantes reclaman el rechazo de la recepción de la perito hidrogeológica [Nombre23] en una segunda ocasión, después de que su peritaje fue incorporado como prueba. No obstante, ese peritaje ni siquiera fue considerado en la fundamentación intelectiva. Además de lo anterior, los impugnantes no indican de qué forma el no haber podido escuchar nuevamente a la perito después de la incorporación formal del documento afectó la posición del Ministerio Público; es decir, qué planteamientos o cuestionamientos nuevos se pudieron haber realizado desde ese momento, que no se pudieron sacar a colación en la primera oportunidad que la experta depuso. Finalmente, lo que se tomó como fundamento de la sentencia fue lo que la perito dijo en juicio, momento en el cual fue interrogada por todas las partes. Por ello el rechazo del reclamo.

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación formulado por el Ministerio Público. Notifíquese.

*CED3* CED3 GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *CED4* CED4 [Placa1] [Placa2] [Nombre4] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *CED5* CED5 CED6 CED7 CED8 - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: tapelacionpe-[...]-Judicial.go.cr