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Res. 01588-2017 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · 12/07/2017
OutcomeResultado
The Court continued the suspension of the home’s demolition, conditioned on the principal action being filed within fifteen days.El Tribunal mantuvo suspendida la demolición de la vivienda y condicionó la medida cautelar a la presentación de la demanda principal dentro de quince días.
SummaryResumen
The Contentious-Administrative Court granted a pre-suit interim measure and continued suspending the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation’s order to demolish a dwelling allegedly located within the right-of-way of National Route 163. Without prejudging the legality of the occupation or deciding whether the property actually encroached upon public-domain land, the Court found a prima facie case and concluded that demolition could inflict serious and irreparable harm on the thirteen people living in the home, including minors and persons living in poverty. In balancing the competing interests, it noted that the Administration had not shown that the suspension would seriously harm the public interest or interfere with roadworks. The protection was conditional upon the applicant filing the principal action within fifteen days after notification. Failure to do so would result in termination of the interim measure and potential liability for the damages caused.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo acogió una medida cautelar ante causam y mantuvo suspendida la orden del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes de demoler una vivienda presuntamente ubicada dentro del derecho de vía de la Ruta Nacional 163. Sin prejuzgar sobre la legalidad de la ocupación ni resolver si el inmueble efectivamente invade un bien de dominio público, estimó que la futura demanda presentaba apariencia de buen derecho y que la demolición podía causar un daño grave e irreparable a las trece personas que habitaban la casa, entre ellas menores de edad y personas en condición de pobreza. Al ponderar los intereses, observó que la Administración no demostró que la suspensión afectara gravemente el interés público o impidiera obras viales. La protección quedó condicionada a que la promovente presentara la demanda principal dentro de los quince días siguientes a la notificación; de lo contrario, la medida sería levantada y podrían imponérsele daños y perjuicios.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In view of the foregoing, the claimant must be afforded effective protection, irrespective for now of what may ultimately be decided on the merits in the principal proceeding. With the first two requirements established, the decision turns on balancing the interests at stake and the effect upon the public interest. Accordingly, after considering the parties’ positions as a whole, this Court concludes that the private interest must prevail over the public interests or those of interested third parties. The requirement under examination is therefore deemed satisfied. The effects and enforcement of the demolition ordered through Resolution IVD-II24-2014 of October 24, 2014, shall remain suspended. Ms. Nombre3223 is advised that, under Article 26, second paragraph, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, if she has not filed the principal action, she must do so under this same case number (16-007716-1027-CA) within fifteen days counted from the day following notice of this ruling. Failure to do so will result in the lifting of the interim measure ordered here and an award against her for the damages caused, to be assessed through judgment-enforcement proceedings.Dicho lo anterior, se considera que se le debe de dar una tutela efectiva a la parte actora, independientemente por ahora de lo que por el fondo se resolverá en el proceso de conocimiento. Teniendo acreditados los dos primeros presupuestos, la decisión recae sobre la ponderación de los intereses en juego y la afectación al interés público. Así las cosas, al analizar en conjunto las posiciones de las partes, es la conclusión de este juzgador que ha de prevalecer el interés particular, frente a los intereses públicos o de terceros interesados. Téngase por cumplido el elemento analizado. Se ordena el mantener suspendido los efectos y ejecución de la demolición dispuesta por medio de la resolución IVD-II24-2014 del 24 de Octubre del 2014. Tome en consideración la señora Nombre3223 , que según las reglas del artículo 26 párrafo segundo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, si no ha presentado la demanda principal deberá presentarla en el plazo de 15 días, contados a partir del día siguiente de la notificación de esta resolución, y bajo este mismo número (16-007716-1027-CA), bajo el apercibimiento de que en caso de omisión la medida cautelar aquí decretada será levantada y se le condenará al pago de los daños y perjuicios causados los cuales se liquidarán por el trámite de ejecución de sentencia.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La justicia cautelar responde a la necesidad de garantizar el principio constitucional de una justicia pronta y cumplida, al conservar las condiciones reales indispensables para la emisión y ejecución de la sentencia."
"Interim judicial protection responds to the need to guarantee the constitutional principle of prompt and effective justice by preserving the factual conditions essential for issuing and enforcing the judgment."
Considerando II
"La justicia cautelar responde a la necesidad de garantizar el principio constitucional de una justicia pronta y cumplida, al conservar las condiciones reales indispensables para la emisión y ejecución de la sentencia."
Considerando II
"Las lesiones acusadas al menos deben ser comprobadas a través del principio racional de prueba por lo que no basta con aducir el daño en los términos dichos, sino que habrá de acreditarse las circunstancias para ser considerado un daño y que el mismo sea grave."
"The alleged injuries must at least be established through a rational evidentiary basis; merely asserting harm in those terms is insufficient, because the circumstances showing that it constitutes harm and that it is serious must be proven."
Considerando III
"Las lesiones acusadas al menos deben ser comprobadas a través del principio racional de prueba por lo que no basta con aducir el daño en los términos dichos, sino que habrá de acreditarse las circunstancias para ser considerado un daño y que el mismo sea grave."
Considerando III
"Se tiene total claridad que el derecho de vía forma parte de los bienes del Estado, y por consiguientes entran en lo conocido como dominio público, y como tales son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables y que se encuentran fuera del comercio; por lo que no podrán ser ocupados ni apropiados sin autorización de la administración correspondiente."
"It is entirely clear that the right-of-way forms part of State property and therefore falls within the public domain; as such, it is inalienable, not subject to acquisitive prescription, immune from attachment, and outside commerce, and thus may not be occupied or appropriated without authorization from the competent administration."
Considerando V
"Se tiene total claridad que el derecho de vía forma parte de los bienes del Estado, y por consiguientes entran en lo conocido como dominio público, y como tales son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables y que se encuentran fuera del comercio; por lo que no podrán ser ocupados ni apropiados sin autorización de la administración correspondiente."
Considerando V
"Dicho lo anterior y hasta tanto no sea dirimido el conflicto en sede jurisdiccional la balanza en esta oportunidad se inclina por tener por cumplido este requisito."
"In view of the foregoing, and until the dispute is resolved judicially, the balance at this stage favors finding that this requirement has been satisfied."
Considerando V
"Dicho lo anterior y hasta tanto no sea dirimido el conflicto en sede jurisdiccional la balanza en esta oportunidad se inclina por tener por cumplido este requisito."
Considerando V
Full documentDocumento completo
TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Main line 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A (Former Motorola building) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CASE FILE: 16-007716-1027-CA PROCEEDING: PRE-FILING INTERIM MEASURE (MEDIDA CAUTELAR ANTE CAUSAM) PETITIONER: Nombre3223 RESPONDENT: THE STATE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ N°1588-2017-T TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, Dirección144, Goicoechea, at sixteen hundred hours on doce de Julio del año dos mil diecisiete.- Petition for a pre-filing interim measure, filed by Ms. Nombre3223, who is of legal age, married, a homemaker, a resident of Jicaral de Puntarenas, holder of identity card number CED2493 - -, against THE STATE, represented in this matter by Licenciada Berta Eugenia Marín González, a resident of Guadalupe, married, holder of identity card number CED2494 - -, in her capacity as Procuradora A.- RESULTS
CONSIDERATIONS
Furthermore, we cannot overlook the fact that the jurisdiction of this Court, derived both from the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution and from the provisions of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), makes it possible to exercise plenary review of the legality of administrative action, which entails declaring legally noncompliant any formal or material conduct that is contrary to the body of applicable law (bloque de legalidad). The likelihood of success on the merits (apariencia de buen derecho) is, in itself, an assessment of probabilities made by the Judge regarding the eventual outcome of the proceedings; since we are considering an interim measure (medida cautelar), and even more so one such as the present measure, which is sought before the commencement of the proceedings (ante causam), it is premature to determine whether or not it should be granted, because the arguments and evidence on which the proceedings on the merits will be based could differ from those before us today.
Furthermore, we cannot overlook the constitutional principle guaranteeing that any person who considers themselves affected by an administrative action may seek redress before this Court, with access to justice also being recognized as a fundamental right (Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution). Accordingly, at least prima facie, without prejudging the matter and without even determining the likelihood that the claim will succeed, the fact remains that it is sufficiently serious for the requirement under analysis to be deemed established. As regards the risk arising from delay (peligro en la demora), although the entry into force of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure largely resolved the problem of proceedings that lasted years or even decades, today, despite the efforts made, proceedings—although shorter due to the benefits of oral procedure—must pass through various stages and scheduling processes amid fairly congested dockets, as well as other procedural steps that make them last for a shorter and reasonable period, but a period of time nonetheless.
The claimant has stated that she lives in the dwelling that is intended to be demolished with her husband, children, mother, and siblings. The respondent Administration has stated that the claimant’s survey plan served or was used in connection with a possessory-title proceeding (información posesoria), the outcome of which, as noted above, remains unknown as of today; therefore, if it is pending registration, it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant has no other property to which she could relocate with her entire family if her dwelling were demolished, since one of the requirements for applying to register, or registering, real property through a possessory-title proceeding is that it lack title registered or eligible for registration with the Public Registry; for that reason, the claimant would suffer greater harm, which in this case would extend to her family unit, thereby further aggravating the harm.
In the filing submitted by counsel for the State on 29 de agoto del año dos mil dieciséis, it argues with respect to this requirement that the claimant has not demonstrated that enforcement of the challenged decision would cause her serious harm or injury, whether actual or potential. It states that report IVD 883-2013 of 20 de mayo del 2013, issued by the Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, shows that the claimant’s dwelling is located within the right-of-way (derecho de vía) of Route 163, which runs from Jicaral to Dominicas de Puntarenas, according to registered survey plan Placa434°; therefore, a dwelling has been built within a right-of-way without authorization from the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, which empowers the Engineering Directorate’s Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department, under the Public Works Division, to take the measures necessary to apply to the competent authorities in order to pursue the appropriate actions to restore the public-domain property (bien de dominio público) to the State.
It further states that, in view of the foregoing, administrative act IVD-1124-2014 of 24 de octubre del 2014, served on the claimant on 24 de octubre del 2014, granted her fifteen business days to vacate the right-of-way she is encroaching upon, a period that has been extended to the present day; therefore, it is not true that this case involves urgency, because the claimant has had approximately 10 months rather than 15 days to vacate the right-of-way she is encroaching upon, and she has submitted no evidence demonstrating any potential harm, despite bearing the burden of proof; and until the evidence necessary to demonstrate the alleged harm is introduced into the proceedings, it is the State’s position that this requirement has not been met and the interim measure must therefore be denied. As is apparent from the arguments advanced by counsel for the State to contest this element, it has relied on matters going to the merits, such as the construction of a dwelling within the right-of-way, and has defended the position of the Engineering Directorate’s Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department, under the Public Works Division, that the dwelling should be demolished for that reason; these are considered positions that must be examined in the proceedings on the merits.
The second argument relied upon by counsel for the State to contest this element is that the claimant has not submitted the evidence necessary to demonstrate the alleged harm; however, counsel fails to account for the fact that, as stated by that Ministry’s own Department, the property on which the dwelling at issue was built was acquired by the claimant through a possessory-title proceeding and that, in addition, according to the claimant’s statements, she and her relatives live in the dwelling intended for demolition, with the resulting harm that they would have nowhere to go because they do not own another home—a circumstance that counsel for the State did not address. For this Court, each and every one of the claimant’s statements, as well as the evidence she submits, is consistent with what is required and necessary to establish an injury that, in this particular case, could extend beyond the personal sphere to the family sphere, since the claimant states that her family lives in that dwelling.
It should also be noted that in official letter number DVOP-DI-DV-IVD-2016-826 dated 07 de Junio del 2016, addressed to Engineer Oscar Ulloa Rojas of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, Licenciado Vinicio Barboza Ortíz, Head of that Ministry’s Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department, states that the dwelling is “occupied by 13 people,” a circumstance to which he apparently lent credibility by recording it as such, regardless of whether it was based on the claimant’s statement; because if there was no certainty regarding the number of people living in what he describes as a makeshift house, the prudent course would have been to verify it rather than simply record the claimant’s statement. This circumstance merely demonstrates that the harm indeed extends not only to the applicant but also to the group of people who occupy the dwelling. Later in the cited official letter, this time in the words of the Head of the Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department himself, it states that “the shack” is occupied by persons who are vulnerable because of their poverty and that minors are among its occupants.
As can be seen, in the section concerning the risk arising from delay, counsel for the State begins its challenge by noting that the claimant asserts that granting the interim measure is extremely urgent because her family—her husband, children, mother, and siblings who live in the dwelling—would suffer potential harm; nevertheless, counsel adds, the assertion that harm exists is not accompanied by suitable evidence effectively demonstrating that serious harm has occurred. For this Court, that position is incorrect for one very simple reason: if this is a family group consisting of 13 people; if, in the words of the Head of the Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department, the structure is a shack or makeshift dwelling; and if those who live there are vulnerable persons, including minors, then demolition in this case, without taking the corresponding steps before that Ministry’s Environmental and Social Management Unit, would be contrary to the determination made by the Head of that Department himself: that the persons concerned are in a state of vulnerability.
In that condition, the harm would be more severe and would consequently warrant protection not only through an interim measure, but also from the institutions involved in this matter. In this case and under these circumstances, what is known as an admission by a party (confesión de parte) must apply, because the Head of the Roadway Inspection and Demolitions Department himself has stated that minors live in the dwelling, that they live in conditions of poverty, and that they require assistance. These statements merely confirm that, because they are persons in a state of vulnerability, the harm is imminent; therefore, since there is an admission to that effect, it relieves the opposing party of the need to prove its assertion (an admission by a party relieves the burden of proof—“a confesión de parte - relevo de prueba”). It is entirely clear that the right-of-way forms part of the State’s property and consequently falls within what is known as the public domain (dominio público), and that such property is inalienable, not subject to acquisitive prescription, immune from attachment, and outside the stream of commerce; therefore, it may not be occupied or appropriated without authorization from the relevant Administration.
However, it must be clear that this is precisely the issue disputed by the claimant, a matter that is fully reviewable in these proceedings; yet the particular circumstances presented and described by Ms. Nombre3223, as well as those of the persons who live with her in the dwelling intended for demolition, require a decision that is not only prompt but effective, so as to afford her at least an opportunity to defend herself against the State’s position. It should now be emphasized that, in this case, counsel for the State’s position is framed from the perspective of the area comprising the right-of-way of Dirección343, which it asserts the claimant is encroaching upon, as well as from its analysis that such property belongs to the public domain and has the corresponding characteristics. Although this is highly relevant to the proceedings on the merits, counsel has neglected its obligation to present evidence.
It objects that the claimant has not submitted evidence, referring to her statement that she lives with her family—her husband, children, mother, and siblings—and arguing that the assertion that harm exists is nevertheless not accompanied by suitable evidence demonstrating that the harm has actually occurred. In this regard, it is important to note that Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), applicable to this matter by express reference under numeral 220 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure, provides with respect to the burden of proof, in its first subsection, that: 1) A person who brings a claim (pretención) (sic), with respect to assertions concerning the facts constituting that person’s right.” However, its second subsection provides that the burden of proof rests upon: “2) A person who opposes a claim, with respect to assertions of facts that preclude, modify, or extinguish the claimant’s right.” (boldface and underlining do not appear in the original).
It is clear that the State’s representative has taken a position regarding this case, but this Court finds that such position and assertions are insufficient to rebut the element or requirement under review—danger in delay (periculum in mora)—and even less sufficient to discredit all the evidence that the plaintiff has diligently undertaken to submit. Although that evidence is directly related to the merits of the matter, it has made it possible to ascertain the conditions in which they live, their state of vulnerability, and the presence of minors at the location; this evidence is therefore fully credible to this Court, as it was not challenged as required (Article 317, subsection 2; see also official communication IVD-510-2015 dated 28/04/2016). In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff must be afforded effective judicial protection (tutela efectiva), irrespective, for the time being, of the ruling ultimately issued on the merits in the plenary proceedings (proceso de conocimiento).
With the first two prerequisites established, the decision turns on balancing the interests at stake and the impact on the public interest. To determine this third element, this judge conducts a preliminary review of matters such as the reasons for the demolition, as well as the evidence submitted in the proceedings. Regarding the reasons underlying the demolition, this judge considers that, although these are matters that may be assessed by an administrative authority—in this case, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes—and although the situation might even be deemed an encroachment upon the road right-of-way (derecho de vía), this authority does not find that it would seriously impair the public interest. As the plaintiff has stated, and as is evident from official communication number DRCH-47-2016-0125 dated 17 de Febrero del 2016, there apparently was no intention as of that date to recover the right-of-way allegedly encroached upon by the plaintiff; rather, the work was directed toward constructing drainage ditches, shoulders, and the roadway surface.
As of today, when this order is issued, it bears noting that the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) filed by Ms. Nombre3223 on once de Agosto del año dos mil dieciséis was granted by this Court on an extremely provisional basis (provisionalísima) as of diecisiete de Agosto del año pasado, ordering the immediate stay of the effects of the administrative act under which the home of the plaintiff herein was to be demolished. Accordingly, since that date Ms. Nombre3223 has resided in her home with the other members of her family unit; a simple calculation thus shows that she has remained in her home pursuant to a judicial order for almost eleven months. Throughout that time, the administrative authority apparently has not carried out any work on the surface of that road involving the property of the plaintiff herein, and consequently the public works project has not experienced any setback.
At least, that is what may be presumed given the absence of a single item of evidence establishing otherwise and warranting a change to the prior decision granting relief on an extremely provisional basis (Articles 29.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 317, subsection 2, of the Código Procesal Civil, which applies supplementarily pursuant to Article 220 of the Code governing this subject matter). In light of the foregoing, and until the dispute is resolved judicially, the balance in this instance weighs in favor of finding that this requirement has been satisfied. Accordingly, upon considering the parties’ positions as a whole, this judge concludes that the private interest must prevail over the public interests or those of interested third parties. The element under review is deemed satisfied.
THEREFORE
It is ordered that the effects and enforcement of the demolition ordered by Resolution IVD-II24-2014 of 24 de Octubre del 2014 remain stayed. Ms. Nombre3223 is advised that, pursuant to the rules of Article 26, second paragraph, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, if she has not filed the principal action, she must do so within 15 days from the day following notification of this ruling, under this same case number (16-007716-1027-CA), with the warning that, should she fail to do so, the preliminary injunction ordered herein will be lifted and she will be ordered to pay the damages caused, which shall be determined through judgment-enforcement proceedings. In view of the particular nature of this type of application, this matter is decided without a specific award of costs. LET NOTICE BE SERVED.- *TQWFQ43NUBYQ61* RODRIGO HUERTAS DURÁN - DECIDING JUDGE
TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A (Antiguo edificio Motorola) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PROCESO: MEDIDA CAUTELAR ANTE CAUSAM PROMOVENTE: Nombre3223 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ N°1588-2017-T TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, Dirección144 , Goicoechea, al ser las dieciséis horas del día doce de Julio del año dos mil diecisiete.- Solicitud de medida cautelar ante causam, interpuesta por la señora Nombre3223 quien es mayor de edad, casada, ama de casa, vecina de Jicaral de Puntarenas, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED2493 - - en contra del ESTADO representado en este asunto por la Licenciada Berta Eugenia Marín González, vecina de Guadalupe, casada, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED2494 - - en su condición de Procuradora A.-
RESULTANDO
CONSIDERANDO
POR TANTO
Se ordena el mantener suspendido los efectos y ejecución de la demolición dispuesta por medio de la resolución IVD-II24-2014 del 24 de Octubre del 2014. Tome en consideración la señora Nombre3223 , que según las reglas del artículo 26 párrafo segundo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, si no ha presentado la demanda principal deberá presentarla en el plazo de 15 días, contados a partir del día siguiente de la notificación de esta resolución, y bajo este mismo número (16-007716-1027-CA), bajo el apercibimiento de que en caso de omisión la medida cautelar aquí decretada será levantada y se le condenará al pago de los daños y perjuicios causados los cuales se liquidarán por el trámite de ejecución de sentencia. Por las particularidades propias de este tipo de gestiones se falla este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas. NOTIFÍQUESE.- *TQWFQ43NUBYQ61* RODRIGO HUERTAS DURÁN - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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