Nullity of expropriation acts for transmission line easementNulidad de actos expropiatorios de servidumbre por línea de transmisión

**Nº 13 - 2016-II** **Nº 13 - 2016-II** **SECTION II. CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL.-** Goicoechea, at eight o'clock on the twenty-sixth of February of two thousand sixteen.

Appeal in an ordinary proceeding brought by Nombre72179, of legal age, married once, attorney, bearer of identity card CED48746, resident of Curridabat, in his capacity as special attorney-in-fact of the company called Cuatro Amigos S.A., and of Mr. Nombre81076, of legal age, married, businessman, resident of Rancho Redondo, bearer of identity card CED31489, against the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, represented by Adriana Jiménez Calderón, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San Francisco de Dos Ríos, bearer of identity card CED30270, in her capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the defendant Institute.

**WHEREAS:** 1- That, with the amount in controversy in this matter definitively set as UNESTIMABLE, based on the facts it sets forth and the legal citations adduced, the complaint seeks the following in a judgment: "A) Nullity due to illegality of the acts: That, because they are not in accordance with the Law and because they are vitiated by nullity, the absolute nullity of the following acts be declared: 1. The two presumptive or implicit acts that we do not know and that supposedly must have been issued by the ICE Board of Directors declaring the public interest of the lands owned by the plaintiffs and affected by the actions of the ICE, and that implicitly or explicitly ordered the expropriation of the easements (servidumbres) on the properties owned by the plaintiffs, including all substantial or procedural acts in the procedure followed by the ICE for the determination of the public interest of the plaintiffs' lands, and also encompassing the very absence of said procedure. 2. The administrative act implicit in the decision to initiate respective expropriation proceedings for easement rights over the plaintiffs' properties in judicial venue. 3. Official letter 108.03977.2004-DCPJ 073 signed by Licda. Julieta Bejarano, Director of the Institutional Legal Directorate, dated February 4, 2004. 4. The agreement adopted by the ICE Board of Directors in session 578 of January 20, 2004, in which it resolved to "reject the claim" of Don Nombre81076 and Cuatro Amigos S.A. and "consequently deem the administrative remedy exhausted." 5. Official letter 108.000490.2004-DCPJ/018 dated January 13, 2004, signed by Lic. Giovanni Bonilla Goldoni, Chief of the ICE Consulting and Judicial Processes Division. 6. The notification acts carried out on November 26, 2003, when official letters 107.52247.2003 and 107.52248.2003, dated November 14, 2003, both signed by Lic. Carlos Alberto Quesada Fernández, Chief of the Notarial Area - ICE Legal Directorate, were delivered to Mr. Nombre72026, legal representative of Cuatro Amigos S.A., and to Mr. Nombre81076, respectively. 7. All substantial procedural acts in the procedure followed by the ICE for the determination of the appraisal and subsequent expropriation of the referenced easements (servidumbres). 8. Appraisal No. 707-2002 dated September 2002, signed by Ing. Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo, in which it purports to establish the compensation corresponding to the cost of the easement right and the damages caused by the passage of the aforementioned high-voltage transmission line to property number 423399-000 of the San José Registry Section, owned by Nombre81076, in the sum of ¢2,280,264.70. 9. Appraisal No. 743-2002 dated November 2002, in which Ing. Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo purports to establish the compensation corresponding to the cost of the easement right and the damages caused by the passage of the aforementioned high-voltage transmission line to property number 168956-000 of the San José Registry Section, owned by Cuatro Amigos S.A., in the sum of ¢13,030,459.15. 10. Any internal or external act, procedural preparatory, decisional, and/or execution act, prior or subsequent to those listed, that is directly or indirectly related to the expropriation and appraisal of the referenced easements (servidumbres), insofar as they are instrumental in the violation of the rights of my represented party and are contrary to law. 11. The explicit or implicit administrative acts by which the ICE determined that the current project route is the ideal one. 12. The explicit or implicit administrative acts and the material actions by which the ICE has executed a good part of the project works before obtaining environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental). 13. The explicit or implicit administrative acts and the material actions by which the ICE executed the construction of the tower located on the right-of-way of the Durazno road. B) Compensation for damages caused by legal and illegal acts: That the civil liability incurred by the ICE and/or its officials or experts for the commission of illegal acts and for negligence in recognizing the nullities be declared in the abstract. In the event that there is liability for legal acts of the administration, it is also requested that this be declared and included in the Institution's civil liability. In any case, the damages shall be liquidated in due course during the execution of the judgment, but from now on, the declaration of the amount is requested along with the recognition that this is a value obligation that must be indexed so that it is not eroded by inflation. C) Recognition and restoration of rights: That the individualized legal situation be recognized and the necessary measures be adopted for its restoration. D) Order to pay costs: That the ICE be ordered to pay both sets of costs for this action and for all the defenses undertaken by the plaintiffs in both judicial and administrative venues." (folios 129 to 132 of the judicial file) 2- In a resolution at ten hours and six minutes on September 7, two thousand five, the complaint was deemed properly filed and a copy was transferred to the defendant Institution. (folio 133 of the judicial file) 3- That the representative of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of standing, and the generic defense of sine actione agit. (folios 142 to 160 of the judicial file) 4- Judge Cynthia Sandoval Bonilla, in judgment Nº 1378 - 2015 at fourteen hours on July 31, two thousand fifteen, resolved: "The defense of lack of standing is rejected. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and consequently, this complaint is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the defeated plaintiffs." 5- The special judicial attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff, in his stated capacity, appealed, and the appeal was admitted, by virtue of which this Court hears the matter on appeal.

6- The representatives of the defendant appeared during the summons period, requesting that the challenged resolution be confirmed, indicating that it does not contradict the applied legal system and is fully in accordance with the law.

7- The appeal has been given the due process, and no defects or omissions capable of producing nullity of the proceedings or defenselessness to the parties are observed. This resolution is issued after deliberation within the time margin that the work of this Office allows.

Drafted by Judge Hernández Hernández; and **WHEREAS:** **I.-** Regarding the list of proven facts, this Court decides to adopt them because they faithfully reflect what has been proven in the case file.

**II.-** GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT. 1.- The appellant points out that the Trial Judge denies the claims brought by my represented parties, adducing a general declaration of public interest for all those real estate properties that are subject to expropriation by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, according to the first article of its special expropriation law. We do not dispute this assertion and we agree. But the declaration made by the law, although necessary, is not sufficient to concretize an expropriation. It is clear that the general declaration of public interest only establishes the relationship between the ICE's activity and the real estate properties whose expropriation might be necessary or convenient for said activity. Indeed, the ICE, as the Expropriating Administration, must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to certain real estate properties, and it is that concrete determination that must be declared specifically and in detail to individualize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party.

2.- The Trial Judge errs by accepting the absence of a concretization act in the ICE's expropriation process and by not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. It is clear that the general declaration of public interest only establishes the relationship between the ICE's activity and the real estate properties whose expropriation might be necessary or convenient for said activity, and that, to exercise the expropriatory power, an individualization act is necessary in which a particular and concrete real estate property (my represented party's property) is identified to serve a particular and concrete purpose (the passage of a transmission line). That act of concrete determination is the fatal absence accused in this challenge as a fundamental defect of the administrative expropriation process, and which clearly was never produced with the proper formality so that the administered party could exercise the defense of his interests. Where the Trial Judge errs is in saying that what the law says is sufficient, and that the implicit concretization act does not need to be formally communicated or judicially reviewed, and in fact refuses to declare the evident and manifest absolute nullity of the expropriation due to the absence of the formal communication of this act of concretizing the public interest in a specific real estate property.

3.- The Trial Judge errs by accepting that said absence violates the administered party's right of defense. Indeed, the ICE, as the Expropriating Administration, must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to certain real estate properties, and it is that concrete determination that must be declared specifically and in detail to individualize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party. In the case before us, the ICE carried out said concretization only implicitly and never formalized it in a concrete act that should have been substantiated with proper reasoning and with the requirements of law to be able to offer the administered party the opportunity to challenge the act for defects in its essential elements. Without a formal communication of the concrete act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose in a specific real estate property, the Administered party is left without a way to attack the lack of grounds for the act in their specific case and causes defenselessness to the party. That act of concrete determination is the absence accused in this challenge, and which clearly was never produced with the proper formality so that the administered party could exercise the defense of his interests.

4.- The Trial Judge errs by accepting that, because the act is implicit, it is not reviewable either by the administered party or by the Judicial Branch. The position ascribed to by the Trial Judge is therefore fundamentally erroneous, since by accepting as valid an implicit determination act under these conditions, he is in fact accepting that the specific determination act carried out by the ICE in each expropriation is de facto impossible to challenge and impossible to judicially review. By accepting as valid an implicit act, the Trial Judge is in fact declaring that said act is not subject to any possibility of judicial review and is artificially creating a non-reviewable administrative act, creating a sphere of impunity of power in an exercise of the expropriatory power of eminent domain, which is the most dangerous power the Administration has. Certainly, the expropriatory power, with the sole exception of the ius puniendi, is undoubtedly the power with the most potential to threaten the rights of the administered party, and therefore one of the functions that the Judicial Branch must review with the greatest zeal. By doing so, he is not only rendering nugatory the right of my represented party to demand the formal communication of the concretization act and also rendering nugatory the right of my represented party to demand the review of the legality of said act, but he is also accepting that the implicit act not be reviewed or challenged in administrative venue and in judicial venue. Certainly, the possibility of requesting and obtaining the review of an administrative act in administrative venue is a fundamental right of the administered party, but the possibility of challenging and JUDICIALLY reviewing an administrative act is one of the most important intra-organ controls of the Rule of Law in a Constitutional Democracy. It is undoubtedly a fundamental function of the Judicial Branch in our legal and political system that the conformity of the administrative act with the law can be reviewed, that is, reviewing the legality of the administrative act is a fundamental constitutional right for the effective functioning of the Rule of Law. Therefore, the Trial Judge's position is incomprehensible and inexcusable in endorsing an interpretation in which he is in fact voluntarily failing to exercise his duty to review the legality of the implicit administrative act of concretizing the public interest in the specific real estate property of my represented party. The Trial Judge therefore fails fundamentally by denying the judicial review of the implicit administrative act and violates the principle that EVERY administrative act must be subject to judicial review, that is, he betrays what in our environment is called the FIGHT AGAINST THE IMMUNITIES OF POWER.

5.- The Trial Judge errs in considering that the act is legal. Contrary to the interpretation given by the trial court judge, the declaration of public interest only becomes one of the elements of the administrative act, which is not valid if defects are not observed in the integrating elements that allow concluding its legitimacy and suitability -article 128 and following of the Ley General de la Administración Pública-. As doctrine and jurisprudence have recognized, administrative power is subject to a purpose, and this purpose in the expropriatory activity of the public administration is the achievement of the public interest, which can be represented in the case under study as universal and suitable access to electric energy. I repeat, there is no discussion on this. But if we ask ourselves, how do we achieve this purpose? A range of possibilities opens up, legitimate and illegitimate, through which the administration, in this case the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, decides to affect one property or another. It is here that the grounds and content of the administrative act must be analyzed, which this representation has claimed as non-existent throughout this process. The Trial Judge errs by not seeing that the ICE has hidden from the Administered party and the Court any source of information that would allow verification of whether the grounds for the expropriation act in fact exist, whether the content is proportional to the grounds, and whether the content in fact fulfills the purpose desired by the legal system. Of course, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated. It would be ideal to have the inputs within the administrative file that could enrich the discussion on the nullity of the elements of the administrative act; however, this is not possible for the simple reason that they do not exist. The public administration's duty to issue a valid administrative act -which can be reviewed by the administered party, upon whom an extraordinary burden is being imposed as an exception to the principle of inviolability of private property enshrined in Article 45 of our Magna Carta-, has been overlooked, thus grounding the claim of my represented parties.

6.- Guaranteeing the legitimacy of the elements of the act works in a double direction. Both for the administered party who wishes to verify the suitability of his property for the purpose required by the State; as well as so that the State itself can perform a controlling review of the funds used for this purpose. In light of the foregoing, the following questions arise: Are there other properties whose layout makes the transmission line less costly? Are there other properties with better topography for the passage of lines that were omitted? Did the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad pay more for expropriating these lands when it could have passed through others? Among the most serious violations accused by the plaintiffs, and which the Trial Judge has omitted to consider, counts the fact that the expropriated party was never given, and to date has not been given, access to the entirety of the administrative files that truly make up the decision-making process on the final choice and location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the complaint that the ICE has indeed impeded the administered party's access to the files documenting the decisions that ultimately become the very basis of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso). Time and again, it was explained to the Court that the ICE has consistently and constantly hidden all information about the grounds and reasons for determining the transmission line route, which is, in essence, what explains how and why my represented party's real estate property is necessary for the passage of the line and is therefore the core of the problem of the concretization of the public interest in the specific real estate property. Herein lies the violation incurred by the ICE and which the Trial Judge does not want to see: the ICE hides the entire decision-making process on the line route under a cloak of pseudo-technicality and intends that no one review it. It takes this exercise to the extreme of violating the administrative expropriation process and never formally and substantively communicates the determination of said concretization in the specific case precisely so that the administered party cannot know or discuss the grounds for its decision (that is, cannot examine the elements of the act -grounds, content, and purpose-). What the ICE seeks with this is to reduce the opportunities for opposition by the administered party, thereby violating the fundamental rights of the administered party to challenge administrative acts in administrative and judicial venues, and it clearly incurs in a deviation of power by serving a purpose other than that desired by the legal system. Incredibly, the Trial Judge lends himself to this charade and allows it, making the judicial authority a co-author in the murder of the fundamental guarantees of the Rule of Law.

7.- In the same line of logical argumentation outlined so far, we find Article 1 of Law 6313, repeatedly cited by the Trial Judge. This article states: "Real estate properties, whether complete properties, portions, legitimate patrimonial rights or interests, which due to their location are necessary, in the judgment of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, are declared of public utility..." (highlighting is not from the original). It is evident, according to the elements of judgment within the case file, that the necessity of the location of the plaintiffs' land for the expropriation subject to this process was not determined. In this sense, the Trial Judge errs, considering the legality review of the act satisfied by merely verifying the purpose, forgetting about the content and the grounds. No information exists, or at least my represented parties were never given access to it, nor was it brought into this process as part of the administrative file, regarding the suitability and necessity of my represented parties' lands with respect to their location. It must never be forgotten that public function, especially when affecting the rights of the administered party and spending public funds, must be transparent, auditable, and evaluable!

8.- Even though, in the consideration of this representation, there are elements of conviction that allow the appealed judgment to be revoked and, in its place, the claims of my represented parties to be upheld, should the Trial Judge's substantive thesis be maintained, costs must be waived in accordance with Article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, given that the good faith with which the plaintiffs have litigated is evident. On the contrary, the ICE's position, in wanting to exempt its act of concretizing the public interest from any possibility of administrative or judicial challenge, is what is indefensible, and therefore, the defendant party must be ordered to pay costs.

**III.-** The appeal must be dismissed. The grievances mostly show a subjective and repetitive content of the arguments adduced in the filed action, even expressed in the opposition to the judgments in the expropriation proceedings, in order to thereby repeatedly support the opposition to the trial judge's position on this occasion. What is being challenged, why it is being challenged, what evidence was ignored for the valuation, what the judge's error is, what norms were violated, how the judge violated the legal framework, etc., is the fundamental intellectual exercise that the appellant must carry out, not just showing the antithesis of the position as a fallacy of begging the question to undermine the trial court's criterion; counter-argumentation is insufficient. The judgment is attacked for its ruling or for the omission regarding its basis, and not through the reiteration adduced in the process. Obviously, these reproaches must be externalized (by the content of the material expression as well as by the normative content) beyond the legal technical position of the appellant, which will serve, in the case of the appeal, so that the appellate body can resolve with full competence and with the exclusive limit to what was challenged. That is, what the judge said and where and in what his error lay, is the mandatory consequent of the enunciation of the breach of the violated norms and the relationship of the evidentiary means that prove the claimed norm. The appeal must fall within the scope established by numeral 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Notwithstanding and despite this manner of arguing, this Court permits itself to make the following considerations to refute the appeal. As the central theme and core in discussion in this appeal refers to the nullity of the executed expropriatory administrative act, due to the absence of an underlying instrumented public interest embodied in a concrete act duly communicated, as well as for its unsuitability for the expropriatory purpose, and the opposition to the trial judge's thesis regarding the unchallengeability of the implicit act concerning the expropriatory act, this Court deems it pertinent, prudent, and necessary to locate and highlight several points on which the Sala Primera de la Corte (Ruling No. 166 at sixteen hours twenty minutes on December 18, nineteen ninety-two) and other resolutions have delved deeply into the expropriatory power, and on which there is no difference whatsoever for the specific case, in order to thus unravel the controversy and reject the filed appeal. Let us begin by pointing out that: "(...) II.- To achieve its purposes, the State... may employ voluntary means (e.g., administrative contracting) or coercive means (e.g., the tax system), expropriation being a faithful expression of the latter... The purposes of the coercive route must not be spurious nor an instrument to supplement State inefficiency, to profit, or to speculate... III.-... E) It is the theory of the State's purposes that satisfactorily explains the justification of the institute under examination; according to that theoretical approach, which has a pragmatic foundation, the State uses a series of instruments, among which the expropriatory power figures, for the achievement of its socio-economic purposes and, above all, the common good... IV.- The expropriatory institute is justified because the right of property is not absolute. On the contrary, besides being a subjective right, it must satisfy collective needs and public interests. Expropriation does not alter the general property regime; it is consubstantial with it because when a sacrifice is imposed on a private individual for a public interest, this must be minimized through compensation with an equivalent economic value. The burden of extinguishing the property does not fall on the expropriated party; the compensation is borne by all the administered parties, through the tax system, as it is taken from public funds. V.- ... expropriation is any forced or coercive acquisition of the right of private property, or of one of its attributes, over a good or right, by a public entity, based on a power granted by law... VI.- Expropriation fulfills a dual role: as an inalienable power of the State, and as a guarantee for the administered party against the suppression of his right of property suffered in his patrimony. Expropriation constitutes a singular and concrete sacrifice, and as such discriminatory, therefore, in application of the principle of equality before public burdens (Articles 18 and 33 of the Political Constitution), it requires restoration or compensatory compensation... X.- The Civil Code contains a specific norm. Article 293 provides: 'The owner may be obliged to alienate his property for the fulfillment of contracted obligations or for reason of public utility. The cases in which expropriation for reasons of public utility is permitted, and the manner of carrying it out, shall be regulated by special law'... XIII.-... it is an act of public law in all its stages... In summary, expropriation in all its stages and elements is a homogeneous institute of public law because the compensation arises before the exercise of a State power to ensure equality before public burdens... XV.- Only the legally proven public interest justifies the deprivation of property. That is, not all State requirements demand an expropriation, therefore, for its proceeding, a cause is required (legally proven public interest), which stands as a clear limit to the arbitrary exercise of the expropriatory power... The ultimate purpose of expropriation is not the ablation of the right of property but the ultimate public interest destination given to the good (it always implies a material or legal transformation of the expropriated good), therefore it must be considered as a means and not an end in itself; it is an instrument for achieving a purpose, it cannot lack a cause... XVI.-... the broadest expression is that of public interest, as this covers both public necessity and social interests, being equivalent to the needs of the community that require satisfaction (needs that the State or a public entity seeks to satisfy for itself or for the community). Every need must be satisfied, and precisely from that arises the interest. Interest is the relationship between an individual or collective need and the instruments to satisfy it, which generate a utility. Public interest must be understood as the future destiny of the expropriated object, that is, the allocation to a concrete public interest purpose. The State may expropriate only for reason of 'legally proven public interest' ... XXX. - Expropriation is accomplished through a general procedure, however, the legislator has gradually conceived specific procedures, depending on the interests pursued; it can be divided into two phases: a) the administrative phase, of concurrence, amicable agreement, amicable transfer, or extrajudicial, and b) the judicial phase. A triangle will be present, composed of the expropriatory power of the State, the right to equitable economic compensation in favor of the dispossessed owner, and the judicial guarantee of executing the expropriation in accordance with the legal system... XXXIII. - If concurrence is not achieved, the expropriating party must resort to the jurisdictional route. In this venue, the parties are expropriating party and expropriated party. In this proceeding, the expropriated party may basically question the amount of the compensation. The law authorizes the expropriating party to obtain possession of the good once the compensation amount established in due course by the administrative body is deposited. This proceeding has two essential characteristics: 1) it is summary, meaning its processing must be carried out with celerity and has short deadlines, and, 2) it is urgent, because the expropriating party may dispose of the good if it first deposits the provisional compensation, whose final amount is established subsequently.

The competent judge is that of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (except in the case of agrarian expropriations, where the judge of that branch shall be competent), as it involves a public-law institution and a real action exercised by the State. When there are disputed facts, the trial must be opened to evidence regarding the value of the expropriated assets. The expropriation procedure has a universal character in that all issues affecting or concerning the purpose or consequences of that institution must be raised and resolved within it (transfer of the asset, compensation (indemnización), legitimacy of the taking, individualization of the asset, etc.). The judgment shall determine the corresponding amount of compensation (indemnización). Thus, the expropriation power must be exercised through a formal procedure, and prior to its initiation, there must be a legally verified public interest. The procedure serves to achieve its objective: the patrimonial deprivation of the expropriated party...."(intentionally highlighted in bold) IV.- Continuation... This Court is very clear that the purposes of the challenged coactive administrative channel, through the underlying administrative act, cannot and must not be spurious or non-existent, nor an instrument to supplement state inefficiency, to profit, or to speculate; much less to empty the content of the property right without any reason or with a distorted reason; hence, the substantiation of the expropriation power is one of means, not an end, all for the achievement of the socio-economic mandates of the State and, above all, the common good, relativizing the property right by holding it as not absolute, to satisfy collective needs and public interests identifiable with the general interest. It is taken into account that when a sacrifice is imposed on a private party for a public or general interest, it must be minimized through its compensation with an equivalent economic value, which, upon being challenged, questioned, or rejected as proposed at the administrative stage, refers the dispute to the summary expropriation channel for the determination of a fair price regarding the specific values and attributes of the affected asset. It is a truism to note that the core issue concerns an improvement of the compensation (indemnización) set in the challenged expropriations. The judicial case management system SIGDJ and the pages of judicial file 318-388 indicate that the expropriation proceedings 04-000319-0163-CA and 04-000125-01653-CA, the first brought against Cuatro Amigos S.A., was resolved by Ruling of this Section No. 257-2010, accepting the appeal of the expropriated party and granting the sum of 32,411,051 colones, and the second brought against Nombre81076 (), the decision of the lower court (a quo) was confirmed by Ruling No. 451-2011 of Section I, maintaining the amount granted at 8,304,817 colones; that is, such proceedings fully complied with the necessary formal and material requirements allowing the expropriation to materialize for the specific case, including not only the individualization of the assets but also the underlying public interest. It should be added that the judicial proceedings confirmed the prior administrative action in this regard, and the expropriated party's opposition at that stage redirected the action towards the legally established judicial procedural route through which the easements (servidumbres) of interest were implemented. The justifications for establishing the easements (servidumbres) for the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line corridor were published in La Gaceta No. 46 of March 5, 2004, and No. 30 of February 12, 2004, respectively. The expropriation rationale materialized here.

In Ruling of Section I, No. 451-2011 at sixteen hours ten minutes of October thirteen, two thousand eleven, within file 04-125-0163-CA, the Court stated: "IV. OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY IN EXPROPRIATION MATTERS: Indeed, having analyzed the file in light of the grievances, the consistency of which invokes absolute nullity due to the absence of requirements inherent to expropriation, it must be noted that this line of grievances must be rejected in its entirety, since the correct perspective from which they must be viewed relates only to the procedural periphery that the specialty of the legal rite imposes on the object of the functional competence that this Chamber holds regarding an expropriation, that is, the fulfillment of the requirements that are required for it—the expropriation—, it is insisted, because it is a special proceeding. The best procedural doctrine views nullity not only from the perspective of a grotesque defenselessness in the proceeding, but for a better understanding, refers to the study of the constituent elements of an act or set of procedural acts filled with formal character (procedural requirements) and material character (substantive requirements). Viewed through this lens, expropriation matters, both under its special law on the matter (7495) and the very special law on expropriations and constitution of easements (servidumbres) of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (6313), require the presence of several fundamental requirements that this Body does observe from the study of the file, namely: a) declaration of public interest; b) duly motivated expropriatory act; c) notification to the interested party; d) publication in the Official Gazette. Once these requirements are verified, the functional jurisdictional competence attending this type of proceeding follows, which leads to the fixing of a fair price for the expropriation. Equally clear must be the scope of the words ‘duly motivated expropriatory act,’ since on this point the Court, in a special expropriation proceeding as has been stated, must only verify the presence of the motivation element as justification, at least succinct, of the requirements of the administrative act, but this does not imply that from this, one can examine the technical merits of the act's content as a material element, since analyzing the merits of the motivation of the expropriatory act in detail constitutes a substantive issue of merit for a declaratory proceeding, which is characterized by being a general, broad, sufficient, and appropriate procedural instrument to address technical arguments that are not stricto sensu related to setting a fair price that translates the expropriated object into a monetary economic amount with as much precision as possible, as the object of substantive procedural substantiation in the correct aspect that the procedural specialty of expropriation as such must definitively rule upon. Therefore, this Chamber is barred by legal mandate from addressing other issues than those set forth in the doctrine of Articles 10 of Law 6313 and 30 of Law 7495. It is not true, as the appellant alleges, that the declaration of public interest ‘has been conspicuously absent throughout the administrative and judicial proceeding,’ and it must be noted that the Court must review not only this but also the other procedural requirements that have led to such an advanced stage at which the file stands, within the enumeration previously alluded to. Accepted for analysis as the administrative file and the judicial file itself were, they provide a clear vision to this Chamber of all the requirements listed above; thus, between the judicial file and the administrative file incorporated into the record by certification and paginated within the main file, all the requirements inherent to expropriation are perfectly visible at pages 4 to 15, and then, for greater detail and indubitability, the following pages clearly clarify, in light of the grievances, the non-absence of the necessary elements to have initiated and concluded this special proceeding in the first instance: pages 4 to 15 show the administrative appraisal and the publication in the Official Gazette; page 442 contains official note DAL066-2004 of February 26, 2004, and pages 443 to 446 contain official notes 108.03977.2004 DCPJ073 of February 4, 2004, and 0012-3474-2004 CD-047-2004 of January 23, 2004, adopting the criterion of the plaintiff's Institutional Legal Directorate to provide all institutional information concerning the declaration of public interest regarding the passage of the electric power transmission line over the appellant's property. In the same order of study, the administrative appraisal referenced above is found, now as part of the incorporated administrative file, from pages 457 to 484; the invoice for the publication service at page 468, the publication in the Official Gazette at page 465 (repeated at page 466), the notification of the administrative appraisal to the plaintiff at page 471, which was carried out via official note 107.52248.2003 of November 14, 2003, addressed to the plaintiff, whose receipt stamp reads November 26, 2003, at 3:25 p.m. as the time of receipt. The aforementioned official note is clear as to the legal status of plaintiff-owner-expropriation and the procedural implications it entails for the owner. The administrative appraisal is repeated from page 474 to page 481. In the subsequent pages admitted for better resolution (487 to 522), technical analyses of the overall project on which the expropriation under decision here relies are found." The legally verified public interest justified the limitation of those properties for the intended purpose. An interest that was evidenced as verified through the forging of the San Miguel - El Este - Río Macho high-voltage electric power interconnection project, this conduct being, due to its raison d'être and its pursued objectives, the motive and the motivation by implicit conduct that thus justified the expropriation processes from the administrative stage to the jurisdictional stage, making the pursued purpose clearly identifiable: a supply of electric power in response to demand for this service, which results in a positive impact on the standard of living of the citizens. An example of this expropriation intention as a product of this necessary expansion was the expropriated stretches for the constitution of the new SIEPAC electric transmission line, which interconnects the six Central American countries. This network, spanning 1,800 kilometers, strengthens the exchange of electric power among the six countries of the region, ensuring continuity of electricity supply and favoring more competitive prices; therefore, it was no less justified for this case and the affected easements (servidumbres), the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line project, which required approximately 47 kilometers of transmission and the construction of approximately 60 towers, the objective being to link high-voltage (230 KV) electricity transmission systems via an overhead high-voltage line, making it necessary to acquire easements (servidumbres) along the entire line. (see Resolution No. 2338-2004-SETENA at pages 86 to 90 of the judicial file). It must be noted, due to the results of human logic and common sense, that transmission lines are necessary for having interconnected and integrated electrical systems, which guarantee users of the network stability and reliability in electrical service thanks to redundancy in sources and transmission lines. An energy projection model endorsed even by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) through Ruling 02806-98, where the importance of transmission lines and the responsibility of ICE to provide electric power to the national economy and consequently to citizens is recognized.

It follows that the public necessity prior to the expropriation exercise was recognized through the material instrumentation given by the inherent exercise of the discretion that accompanies the interested Public Administration, by sustaining, as part of ICE's ordinary activity and therefore constituting its public interest, the formation of an electric power transmission corridor for high-voltage supply, the project consideration and the corridor route being evidenced by the Environmental Impact Study found in the administrative file containing 332 pages, which begins in the town of San Miguel in Santo Domingo de Heredia, heading northeast to tower 11.1, then turns east, passing through the town of Paracito and then through San Pedro de Coronado, where after tower 33, it heads south to tower 38, from there it goes southeast to tower 40, thus crossing the canton of Coronado and entering that of Goicoechea; then the line again takes a southward direction crossing Goicoechea, San Rafael de Montes de Oca, and enters La Unión at tower 49, from there it changes direction to the southwest, passing near the town of Concepción to arrive at the East substation, opposite the road to Tres Ríos. The second stretch starts from the aforementioned substation, crossing the hamlets of San Juan and crosses the Florencio del Castillo highway at the toll booth, continuing southward to cross the protective zone of the Cerros de la Carpintera, touches the easternmost extreme of the Patarrá district of Desamparados, and crosses the canton of El Guarco near the towns of Tobosi and Tejar up to tower 49; from that point it heads southeast crossing the canton of El Guarco and arriving again at the canton of Cartago towards the community of Muñeco and Navarro, where at tower 21 it again changes direction south-southeast and enters the canton of Paraíso up to the Río Macho substation (pages 0034-0035-0036 of the environmental study file), with the real estate of the plaintiffs being intersected in part and in proportion by the width of the easement (servidumbre).

This is the precise and concrete requirement, within its typical competencies and justified, for which ICE demanded and exercised the consequent expropriation power and to which the private and particular interest must yield. The route and the selection of the path, as well as the real estate domains necessary for the formation of this corridor, are merely material acts consequent to the public interest determined in the operational and technical judgment of the entity's ordinary activity, as already mentioned. It is therefore mandatory for anyone opposing this essential public activity, seeking its annulability, to prove its unsuitability as an institutional project in service of the community, or the sterility or foolishness of the chosen corridor, that is, the legal/technical challenge to that corridor and its purpose specifically, in order to disprove that public interest and demonstrate a merely administrative interest, in which case the explicit control of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction would operate, an aspect that does not constitute the crux of this particular matter, as the public interest indicated has been sustained without any discrediting, it being the plaintiff's burden of proof to disprove the project for the chosen route.

In accordance with what has been stated, this jurisdiction has consistently been of uniform criterion regarding the expropriation route for constituting forced easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE, as well as the applicable special regulatory framework, flatly rejecting the ordinary procedure of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) that the appellant suggests, more so in the understanding of the existence of its Article 367.2.a), which excludes expropriations from that procedural rite. In this regard, by way of illustration of this consolidated stance, we have: “IV.- Legal regime applicable to ICE's expropriation power and constitution of easements (servidumbres). By virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to present a brief review of the rules governing ICE's activity of imposing electrical line easements (servidumbres). The very dynamics of the actions undertaken by ICE to exercise its service competencies in electricity and telecommunications constitute the legitimizing basis for the assignment of a public power enabling it to expropriate the assets required to satisfy that public interest it is called to satisfy. But it also justifies the imposition of easements (servidumbres) on the properties necessary for carrying out its activities. In that vein, Law No. 6313 of January 4, 1979 (Gaceta No. 14 of January 19, 1979), the Law on Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Constitution of Easements of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, -reformed by Law No. 8660 of July 29, 2008 (Scope No. 31 to Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008)-, is precisely that special norm regulating the expropriation dynamics of that public entity, as well as the procedure and rules concerning the imposition of easements (servidumbres). This legal source declares of public utility the immovable property, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests that ICE requires for the fulfillment of its legal duties (Articles 1 and 2). That norm sets the procedure ICE must follow in expropriation matters, a topic not relevant to the case. Suffice it to say that according to Article 22 of the same law, said provisions are applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. This implies that the appraisal or valuation specified in the rules of Articles 2 to 7 and concordant ones must be carried out before ordering the constitution of the easement (servidumbre), such that the compensation (indemnización) parameter for the imposition of such an administrative real right is included within that reference." (see Judgment: 00146 File: 11-007391-1027-CA, Date: 12/12/2013 Time: 10:50:00 a.m. Issued by: Contentious-Administrative Court, Section VI, and Judgment: 00050 File: 11-001886-1027-CA, Date: 03/16/2012 Time: 07:40:00 a.m. Issued by: Contentious-Administrative Court, Section VI) Likewise, in this same vein, it was established: "V.1- Regarding ICE's Expropriation Power and its regulations. The activity of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute in matters of expropriation is contained in the Law on Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Easements (servidumbres), number 6313 of January 4, 1979, which declares the works to be undertaken by ICE and its companies of public utility, in fulfilling the assigned legal duties; this describes the procedure to which the institution is subject to exercise its power of imperium regarding the imposition of expropriations and easements (servidumbres) necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes granted to it by law. In this legal instrument, the procedure the Institution must follow is described in order to guarantee the fundamental right protected by Article 45 of the Public Constitution. The first step established is the valuation of the property, as well as all those movable or immovable rights to be affected, limiting Article 3 to real permanent damages causally linked to the expropriation; thereafter, once the technical valuation expertise is approved and the expropriation agreement is issued (Article 7), the appraisal shall be communicated to the owner, lessee, or tenant so that within the following eight days they may express their will either to sell and accept the price set for the asset or indicate their disagreement. Under the first scenario, they shall appear to execute the corresponding deed, and under the second, the institution shall resort to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court so that the Judge may set the fair price (justiprecio) (Article 11). At the jurisdictional stage, the proceeding for appraisal proceedings for expropriation will be processed, and the expropriated party will be granted five days to appoint an expert to assess the damages caused (Article 13). If necessary, a third expert may be appointed, and a resolution will be issued setting the amount of compensation (indemnización), which shall not exceed that estimated in the valuation expert reports (Article 17); this resolution may be appealed to the superior court if both or either party disagrees (Article 21). The same procedure is applicable for the constitution of easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, as well as for the fulfillment of any other purpose entrusted to the institution (Article 22)." (see Judgment: 00022 File: 12-001001-1027-CA, Date: 03/20/2013, Time: 04:00:00 p.m. Issued by: Contentious-Administrative Court, Section IV) Reviewing this stance of the Court, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Ruling 966, in file 00-000008-0163-CA at 2:10 a.m. on December 15, 2005, determined: "In this regard, it must be noted that the Public Administration in general –central and decentralized– must adapt its conduct to the legality block, enshrined in Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the LGAP. In this sense, the Political Constitution, in canon 45, establishes the principle of inviolability of private property, except for legally verified public interest and prior compensation (indemnización) in accordance with the law. Likewise, Law number 6313 of January 4, 1979, Law on Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Easements (servidumbres) of ICE, Article one, provides: ‘Immovable property, whether entire estates, portions, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests, which, due to their location, are necessary, in the judgment of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, for the fulfillment of its purposes, are hereby declared of public utility. This immovable property may be expropriated in accordance with this law, whomever its owner may be.’ For its part, Article 22 ibidem prescribes: ‘The provisions of this law are applicable to the constitution of forced easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, as well as for the direct or indirect fulfillment of any other purpose entrusted to ICE.’ From both provisions, it is clearly inferred that, for ICE to constitute forced easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, in case of opposition by the owner of the affected property, it must necessarily follow the expropriation procedure set forth in said regulations. Obviously, if the owner of the property agrees, such a procedure is unnecessary." And in a ruling by that same Chamber (Judgment: 00448 in file: 10-000617-1027-CA at nine o'clock on April 10, 2013, it added: "IX.- Expropriation is a legal act of a special nature governed by public law. So much so that it arises from the expropriation decree, which necessarily and unilaterally identifies the immovable property that responds to an interest –in this case, of ICE– in obtaining it to satisfy a public need. This constitutional tool –expropriation power– was designed by the legislator under a dual scheme. An administrative one, where the preparatory acts are generated, among them, the communication of the land appraisal to the owner, which, to expedite the process, if accepted, would allow taking possession more quickly and thus destine it for public utility. And another at the jurisdictional level, which arises, in principle, when the owner of the immovable property does not accept the offered price, limiting the proceeding to its determination. From this perspective, without a doubt, both hypotheses arise from the exercise of a public power. The expropriation authority granted to ICE for the fulfillment of its purposes derives from Law 6313 itself, Articles 2, 22, and 23; Law 7495, Articles 13 and 14, as well as the Law on Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, Law 8660, canon 79 (legal aspects extensively assessed by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling no. 2011-5271 at 15 hours 16 minutes of April 27, 2011). In this understanding, Article 22 of Law 6313 stands out, which establishes that these regulations are applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. Canon 11 ibidem is what establishes the specific procedure that this Institution must follow for purposes of expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres), including those for laying electrical lines. Thus, Article 2 of that legal text declares the works that ICE and its companies undertake in fulfilling the legal duties entrusted to them by the legal system to be of public utility. Up to this point, it is clear that ICE is authorized by special law to impose electrical line easements (servidumbres), which by their nature are of public utility –legally declared– and that the constitution procedure is defined by Law 6313 itself. Now then, once ICE's needs to undertake its projects are defined, the corresponding land appraisal follows, which must be communicated to the owners before signing the agreement or decreeing the expropriation for the relevant purposes. This latter activity will occur when there is no agreement or the interested parties do not respond to the expropriating entity's call. At this point, it must be highlighted that this is carried out with the proper communication of the appraisal. The expropriation must be agreed upon by the Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo). The agreement will be published in the Official Gazette. Finally, the Administration must resort to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court to request the fixing of the final appraisal. In general terms, this is the procedure for expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres) that the legislator entrusted to the Institute and its companies. Of interest for the grievance, it can be concluded that, according to Law 6313, it is through the communication of the appraisal that the property owner learns of the matter and can challenge the ablative agreement (Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 11). This last communication is what the legal system requires and must be carried out personally on the expropriated party or the property owner affected by the easement (servidumbre) (Article 8 Law 6313 and 25 Law 7495)." From the body of proven facts established by the lower court (a quo), it is inferred, as relevant to this case, that the Institute deemed it necessary, on account of the repeatedly mentioned work, to impose an easement (servidumbre) right over properties no. 168956-000 and 423388-000, both of the Partido of San José and owned by the plaintiffs, respectively. To this end, in 2002, the Appraisals Area of the ICE's Sub-Management of Administrative Management issued appraisals nos. 743-2002 and 707-2002 for those immovable properties. Subsequently, through Board of Directors agreements 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, respectively, and published in Gaceta No. 46 of March 5, 2004, and Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2004, the pertinent public interest was implemented. For this Chamber, it is evident that long before the expropriation agreements existed, the plaintiffs were aware of the expropriation process that ICE had initiated. That communication carries the effects of informing and notifying the owner not only of the existence of the forced easement (servidumbre) imposition proceedings but also of the price or amount assessed for compensation (indemnización). Therefore, from that date, the period for them to respond to the Institute's call or express their opposition began, as historically occurred. By virtue of the foregoing, it was foreseeable that the Board, in Sessions Nos. 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, based on Article 45 of the Political Constitution and Laws 6313 and 7495, would decide to decree the necessary easement (servidumbre) to fulfill the public interest, both referring to the appraisals previously communicated to the landowners with the specific reference to the immovable properties, as seen in the files of the expropriation proceedings. It is also evident that the Institute previously informed the representative of the plaintiff company about the existence of the “expropriation proceedings for the constitution of easement (servidumbre).” The law does not require this appraisal to be approved by the Board; its formal existence and compliance with the legal system is sufficient. Therefore, it is reiterated, the “expropriation agreement” was adopted with the prior existence of the appraisals. The appellant does not identify or does not wish to accept the nature of the special expropriation procedure with which ICE was equipped, nor does it exhibit the claimed nullities; much less does this Court observe them. The original idea of the legislator was to facilitate an agile and efficient procedure for the Institute and its companies for the purposes of expropriations and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres). These proceedings are governed by the special stipulations of Law 6313 and, supplementarily, by those of the Expropriation Law (Article 2 Law 6313).

Based on the analysis, the actions prior to the expropriation agreement (including the appraisal (avalúo)) are valid and effective, given that ICE’s summons conforms to the provisions of canon 11 of Ley 6313, through an act issued by competent officials, duly communicated (according to the parameters of Article 25 of Ley 7495, applicable supplementarily by mandate of canon 2 of Ley 6313) and approved by the Council in the indicated sessions.

In addition to the foregoing, it must be emphasized that Ley 6313 declares of public utility the real estate, be they complete farms, portions, rights or legitimate patrimonial interests, that due to their location are necessary (in the opinion of the Institute) for the fulfillment of its purposes (precept 1 ibidem). This is one of the main differences in relation to the procedure of Ley 7495, where a "Declaration of public interest" is established as a prerequisite for expropriation, since for expropriation, a reasoned act is indispensable, through which the property to be expropriated is declared of public interest. Even that declaration of public interest in Ley 7495 must be notified to the interested party or their legal representative and published in the Diario Oficial (numeral 18 Ley 7495), as occurred in the case of file 04-000125-0163-CA. A necessary clarification is that due to the ipso jure declaration that operates in Ley 6313, this action is not necessary in the expropriations and easements (servidumbres) carried out by ICE under this format (04-000319-0163-CA). Regarding the agreement, the Law under comment does not require that it be notified personally to the administered party; its publication in the Diario Oficial according to article 11 ibidem is sufficient. In this understanding, the publication of the agreement was carried out in the indicated Gazettes, with which the legal requirement was fully met. Both actions (appraisal (avalúo) and agreement) comply with the legal requirements to produce the desired effects.

This Court does not accept for itself the claims of the appellant and rejects the positions adduced when they state: that ICE as the Expropriating Administration must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to certain real estate, and it is that concrete determination that must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party, or likewise, the one that similarly states: the A QUO errs in accepting the absence of an act of concretization in ICE's expropriation process and in not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. Neither is it acceptable when it states: The A QUO errs in accepting that said absence violates the administered party's right of defense. Without a formal communication of the concrete act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose in a specific property, the Administered party is left without a way to challenge the lack of grounds for the act in their specific case and creates defenselessness for the party. It is here that the grounds and the content of the administrative act must be analyzed, which has been claimed as non-existent by this representation throughout this process. The A QUO errs in not seeing that ICE has hidden from the Administered party and the Court any source of information that allows verifying whether the grounds for the expropriation act actually exist, whether the content is proportional to the grounds, and whether the content actually fulfills the purpose desired by the legal system. Clearly, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated, and finally, the assertion of the a quo's error regarding the fact that the A Quo has omitted considering that the expropriated party was never and to date has not been given access to the entirety of the administrative files that truly make up the decision-making process on the final choice and location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the lawsuit that ICE has indeed prevented the administered party's access to the files in which the decisions are documented that end up being the very foundation of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso).

V.- Cont... In the case of ICE, the declaration of general utility was agreed generically by the legislator itself; and it is known that the procedure begins with the practice of the expert appraisal (avalúo pericial), which is then notified to the expropriated party, and if the latter does not accept it, it is appropriate to decree expropriation, thus concluding said phase. So the possibility of knowing and challenging the ablative agreement and the underlying public interest is implicit in the communication of the appraisal (avalúo), according to the design of the law itself. If the party does not accept the appraisal (avalúo), it must be discussed in the special expropriation proceeding, and if in addition to reviewing the administrative appraisal (avalúo) that set the compensation, it wishes to discuss the exercise of the expropriatory power, it must do so in a plenary action, proving the nullity of said administrative acts and the impropriety or non-existence of the general interest. As a corollary of the foregoing, it must be made clear, then, that the appraisal (avalúo) was the act through which the Institute communicated to the property owner its intention and justification to constitute an administrative easement (servidumbre administrativa) (power line), as well as the compensation offered. From the formal delivery of this document, according to the applicable legal text, what proceeded was expropriation by means of the Council's agreement, which for its validity complied with the regulated requirements demanded. For these reasons, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is likewise no injury to administrative due process, since the procedure for the imposition of the easement (servidumbre) carried out by the Institute complies with the regulations created for that purpose.

VI.- Cont.... Administrative burdens such as expropriated easements (servidumbres) constitute a real public right constituted by a state entity over another's real estate, for the purpose of serving public use. The imposition of these administrative limitations clearly implies their own limits: 1) the restriction must be adequately proportional to the administrative need that must be satisfied by it; proportionality is given in relation to the need to be satisfied, it is not a fixed measure but varies according to the case. 2) it must have some type of plausible justification, it must truly respond to an administrative need but directed towards an inseparable and indispensable public purpose. 3) it is required that it not alter, disintegrate, or dismember the property. In any of these cases, it will be appropriate to establish an easement (servidumbre) or carry out expropriation, but the mere non-compensated restriction will not be valid. 4) it must be valid in its form, competence, object, and will. Due to the dynamism of organic administrative activity, administrative easements (servidumbres administrativas) can be constituted directly by law (N°6313 for ICE), or authorized by law but established by the authorized administration in a concrete administrative act, precisely, expressed by the expropriatory agreement (in the administrative venue or passed to the judicial route), in which case, as has been stated and as stated by the a quo, the act became implicit, not through a mandatory administrative resolution, produced as a result of an adversarial administrative procedure or opposition as suggested by the appellant for the application of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), more precisely, articles 308 and following, due to the specialty and prevalence of the regulatory expropriatory rite that covers ICE over the general expropriation law and, of course, over the LGAP, regarding the aspects of constitution and validity of real impositions, due to express prohibition (367.2.a- LGAP). Of course, the judge can and has the functional competence to control whether the acts that execute or instrument the expropriation have conformed or not to the regulated acts that the law regulates or has authorized, as the case may be, so only on this point, this Court differs from the thinking of the a quo, insofar as it creates an isolated, immune, and unchallengeable niche over implicit acts, but this does not alter the determined solution, given the lack of substantial demonstration of the non-existence or unsuitability of the chosen layout and its necessity for the high-voltage overhead line corridor, ergo, of the internal nullity of the conceived route, this in the socio-economic and legal aspects, as it is a burden of proof on the interested party. The public interest must be understood as the primary destination of the expropriated object in the future, which allows that, by technical norm and even by additional executive decree, the purpose of the coercive exercise imposed is made operational by opportunity and convenience (articles 16, and 154 of the LGAP), with the implantation of the respective easements (servidumbres) and cadastres for the material utility of the separated asset. Although the Political Constitution in its Article 45 establishes that property is inviolable, and that no one may be deprived of theirs except for a legally proven public interest, that has already been accredited in the declaration indicated and published in the referenced Gazettes, so what was declared or ordered was not imprecise, equivocal, negligent, or remiss in the mandatory identification of the property or its intrinsic necessity. The ultimate goal of expropriation is not the ablation of the property right but the subsequent public interest destination given to the asset (it always implies a material or legal transformation of the expropriated asset), as has been indicated, therefore it must be considered as a means and not an end in itself, it is an instrument for the achievement of a purpose, it cannot lack a cause, and this cause is fully identified jointly with the respective real estate, so there is no uncertainty, legal or real insecurity that undermines the affected property right and the subsequent definition of the fair price. By way of synthesis, it must be concluded that this Court does not consider that the alleged defects are of such magnitude as referred to by the appellant and that they provide sufficient grounds to affirm the existence of nullities capable of being classified as absolute, nor is it considered that there is an absence of an essential element in the formal and material conduct deployed by ICE due to substantial non-conformity with the legal system. Both the public interest and the individualization of the asset are duly identified, sufficient elements for the validity of the declaration of public interest subject to challenge and the imposition of the established easement (servidumbre), consequently the grievances set forth in Considering II find no remedy or acceptance in this instance.

VII.- Regarding costs.- The attorney for the plaintiffs appeals the award of costs, indicating that they have had sufficient elements and reasons to litigate, and therefore requests to be exempted from paying costs. In matters of regulating personal and procedural costs, numerals 221 to 224 of the Civil Procedure Code must be observed (applied supplementarily in the absence of regulation in the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, according to the provisions of numeral 103 thereof), as well as articles 98 and 99 of the aforementioned Law. In this sense, as it is mandatory for the adjudicator to pronounce on them in the judgment (ordinal 59 section 2 of the Procedural Law and 221 of the cited Code), two possibilities must be taken into account in its issuance, 1) to resolve without special award of costs, 2) or with special award imposing their payment on one of the parties. In the first hypothesis, it will be resolved without special award of costs in application of the doctrine that informs numeral 222 in fine, each party must pay those they have incurred and both parties share those that are common. The reasons for which a ruling is issued in this manner is due to the occurrence of some exoneration ground, such as reciprocal defeat, that the losing party litigated in good faith, if the complaint or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, when part of the fundamental petitions of the complaint or counterclaim are upheld in the ruling, if important defenses invoked by the losing party are admitted, upon the Administration's acquiescence to the plaintiff's claims (unless the complaint substantially reproduces what was requested in the denied administrative claim, and that denial founded the action), when due to the nature of the debated issues there was sufficient reason to litigate, if the judgment was rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party plausibly did not know and for that reason the party's opposition was justified, and finally if the winning party incurred in plus petitio, that is, that the difference between what was claimed and what was obtained in the judgment was 15% or more. From what has been processed in this file and the manner in which this matter was resolved, no possible exemption applies. This is noted, as said award of costs does not imply a qualification of recklessness or bad faith. Therefore, no legal breach occurs if the losing party is ordered to pay costs, and the lower court body merely applied the norm in the terms provided by it, thus it does not incur the indicated error, imposing the rejection of this present ground of appeal.

POR TANTO

The challenged resolution is confirmed in what has been the object of the appeal.

Ronaldo Hernández Hernández Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos Eduardo González Segura ACTOR: CUATRO AMIGOS S.A and another DEMANDED: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD **2.-** The A QUO errs in accepting the absence of a concretization act in ICE's expropriation process and in not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. It is clear that the general declaration of public interest establishes only the relationship between ICE's activity and the real estate whose expropriation might be necessary or convenient for said activity and that, to exercise the expropriation power, an individualization act is necessary in which a particular and specific real property (my represented party's farm) is identified to serve a particular and specific purpose (the passage of a transmission line). That act of concrete determination is the fatal absence alleged in this challenge as a fundamental defect in the administrative expropriation process, and which clearly was never produced with the due formality so that the administered party could exercise the defense of their interests. Where the A QUO errs is in saying that what the law says is sufficient, and that the implicit concretization act does not need to be formally communicated nor judicially reviewed, and in fact refuses to declare the evident and manifest absolute nullity of the expropriation due to the absence of formal communication of this act of concretization of public interest in a specific property.

**3.-** The A QUO errs in accepting that said absence violates the administered party's right of defense. Indeed, ICE as the Expropriating Administration must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to certain real estate, and it is that concrete determination which must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of imperium to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party. In the case before us, ICE carried out said concretization only implicitly and never formalized it in a concrete act that should have been substantiated with due justification and with the legal requirements in order to offer the administered party the opportunity to challenge the act for defects in its essential elements. Without formal communication of the concrete act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose in a specific property, the Administered Party is left without a way to attack the lack of motive for the act in their specific case and creates defenselessness for the party. That act of concrete determination is the absence alleged in this challenge, and which clearly was never produced with the due formality so that the administered party could exercise the defense of their interests.

**4.-** The A QUO errs in accepting that, because the act is implicit, it is not reviewable either by the administered party or by the Judiciary. The position ascribed by the A QUO is therefore fundamentally erroneous, since by accepting an implicit act of determination under these conditions as valid, they are in fact accepting that the specific determination act carried out by ICE in each expropriation is in fact impossible to challenge and impossible to judicially review. By accepting an implicit act as valid, the A QUO Judge is in fact declaring that said act is not subject to any possibility of judicial review and is artificially creating a non-reviewable administrative act; they are creating a realm of impunity of power in an exercise of the expropriation power of imperium, which is the most dangerous one the Administration has. Certainly, the expropriation power, with the sole exception of the ius puniendi, is undoubtedly the power with the most potential to threaten the administered party's rights and therefore one of the functions that the Judiciary must review most zealously. By doing so, they are not only rendering nugatory my represented party's right to demand formal communication of the concretization act, and they are also rendering nugatory my represented party's right to demand review of the legality of said act, but they are also accepting that the implicit act not be reviewed or challenged in administrative or judicial venues. Certainly, the possibility of requesting and obtaining review of an administrative act in an administrative venue is a fundamental right of the administered party, but the possibility of JUDICIALLY challenging and reviewing an administrative act is one of the most important intra-organ controls of the Rule of Law of the Constitutional Democracy. It is undoubtedly a fundamental function of the Judicial Branch in our legal and political system that the conformity of the administrative act with the law can be reviewed, that is, reviewing the legality of the administrative act is a fundamental constitutional right for the effective functioning of the Rule of Law. Therefore, the A QUO's position in supporting an interpretation in which they are in fact voluntarily failing to exercise their duty to review the legality of the implicit administrative act of concretization of public interest in my represented party's specific property is incomprehensible and inexcusable. The A QUO therefore fundamentally fails by denying judicial review of the implicit administrative act and violates the principle that ALL administrative acts must be subject to judicial review, that is, betrays what in our context is called the FIGHT AGAINST IMMUNITIES OF POWER.

**5.-** The A QUO errs in considering that the act is legal. Contrary to the interpretation given by the lower court judge, the declaration of public interest constitutes only one of the elements of the administrative act, which is not valid if defects are not observed in the constituent elements that allow for concluding its legitimacy and suitability—Article 128 and following of the General Law of Public Administration. As doctrine and jurisprudence have recognized, administrative power is subject to a ***purpose***, and this purpose in the public administration's expropriation activity is the achievement of public interest, which can be represented in the case under study as universal and suitable access to electric energy. I repeat, there is no discussion on this. But if we ask ourselves, how do we achieve this purpose?, a range of possibilities opens up, legitimate and illegitimate, through which the administration, in this case the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, decides to affect one parcel of land or another. It is here where the ***motive*** and the ***content*** of the administrative act must be analyzed, which has been claimed as non-existent by this representation throughout this process. The A QUO errs by not seeing that ICE has hidden from the Administered Party and the Court any source of information that would allow verifying if the motive for the expropriation act actually exists, if the content is proportionate to the motive, and if the content actually fulfills the purpose intended by the legal system. Of course, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated. It would be ideal to have the inputs within the administrative record that could enrich the discussion on the nullity of the elements of the administrative act; however, this is not possible for the **simple reason that they do not exist.** The public administration's duty to issue a valid administrative act—which can be reviewed by the administered party, upon whom an extraordinary burden is being imposed as an exception to the principle of inviolability of private property enshrined in Article 45 of our Magna Carta—has been overlooked, thus grounding my represented parties' claim.

**6.-** Guaranteeing the legitimacy of the act's elements works in a double direction. Both for the administered party who wishes to verify the suitability of their property for the purpose required by the State; as well as for the State itself to perform a controlling review of the funds used for this purpose. Given the above, the following questions arise: Are there other farms whose layout makes the transmission line less onerous? Are there other farms with better topography for the passage of lines that were omitted? Did the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad overpay for expropriating these lands when it could have gone through others? Among the most serious violations alleged by the plaintiffs, **and which the A Quo has omitted to consider,** is the fact that the expropriated party was never given, and to date has not been given, access to the entirety of the administrative records that actually constitute the decision-making process on the final choice and location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the lawsuit that ICE has indeed impeded the administered party's access to the records in which the decisions that ultimately become the very foundation of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this easement of passage are documented. It was explained to the Court time and again that ICE has consistently and constantly hidden all information about the motives and reasons for determining the transmission line route, which is, in essence, what explains how and why my represented party's property is necessary for the passage of the line and therefore is the core of the problem of concretizing the public interest in the specific property. Herein lies the violation incurred by ICE that the A QUO Judge does not want to see: ICE hides the entire decision-making process on the line route under a cloak of pseudo-technicality and intends that no one review it. It takes this exercise to the extreme of violating the administrative expropriation process and never formally and substantively communicates the determination of said concretization in the specific case, precisely so that the administered party cannot know or discuss the foundations of its decision (that is, cannot examine the elements of the act—motive, content, and purpose). What ICE seeks by this is to reduce the opportunities for opposition by the administered party, and by doing so it violates the administered party's fundamental rights to challenge administrative acts in administrative and judicial venues and clearly incurs in misuse of power by serving a purpose other than that intended by the legal system. Incredibly, the A QUO lends itself to this game and allows it, making the judicial authority a co-author in the murder of the fundamental guarantees of the Rule of Law.

**7.-** Along the same logical argumentative line outlined so far, we find Article 1 of Law 6313, repeatedly cited by the A Quo. Said ordinal states: "The real estate, whether complete farms, portions, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests, which by their **location are necessary,** in the judgment of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad... are declared of public utility..." (highlighting is not from the original). It is evident, according to the elements of judgment within the record, that the necessity of the plaintiffs' land location for the expropriation subject to this process was not determined. In this regard, the A Quo errs, considering the legality review of the act satisfied by merely verifying the purpose, forgetting the content and the motive. There is no information, or at least my represented parties were never given access to it, nor was it brought into this process as part of the administrative record, about the suitability and necessity of my represented parties' lands regarding their location. It must never be forgotten that public function, especially when it involves affecting the administered party's rights and spending public funds, must be transparent, auditable, and evaluable!

**8.-** Even though, in the consideration of this representation, there are elements of conviction that allow revoking the appealed judgment, and instead upholding my represented parties' claims, should the A Quo's substantive thesis be maintained, costs must be waived in accordance with Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the foregoing because the good faith with which the plaintiffs have litigated is clear. On the contrary, ICE's position in seeking to exonerate its act of concretizing public interest from any possibility of administrative or judicial challenge is what is indefensible, and therefore, the defendant party must be ordered to pay costs.

**III.- The appeal must be dismissed.** The grievances show mostly subjective and repetitive content of the arguments adduced in the filed action, even expressed in the opposition to the judgments in the expropriation processes, to thereby repeatedly support the opposition to the *a quo*'s stance on this occasion. What is being challenged, why is it being challenged, what evidence was omitted from the assessment, what is the judge's error, what norms were disrupted, how did it violate the legal framework, etc., *is the fundamental intellectual exercise that the appellant must perform, not merely showing the antithesis of the position as a begging-the-question fallacy to unnerve the lower court's criterion; counter-argumentation is insufficient. The judgment is attacked for its pronouncement or for the omission regarding its foundation, and not through the reiteration adduced in the process.* Obviously, those reproaches must be externalized (both by the content of the material expression and by the normative content) beyond the appellant's legal technical position, which will serve, in the case of the appeal, so that the appellate body can resolve with full competence and with the exclusive limit of what was challenged. That is, what the judge said and where and in what their error lay is the mandatory consequence of stating the breach of the violated norms and the relationship of the evidentiary means that accredit the claimed norm. The appeal must fall within the scope established by numeral 574 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Notwithstanding and despite this manner of arguing, this Tribunal allows itself the following considerations to refute the appeal. As the central topic and core under discussion in this appeal refers to the nullity of the executed expropriation administrative act, due to the absence of an substantiated underlying public interest and in a concrete act duly communicated, as well as its unsuitability for the expropriation purpose, and the opposition to the *a quo*'s thesis regarding the unchallengeability of the implicit act regarding the expropriation act, this Tribunal deems it pertinent, prudent, and necessary to locate and highlight several points on which the First Chamber of the Court (Voto Nº 166 of sixteen hours twenty minutes of December eighteenth, nineteen ninety-two) and other rulings have delved into regarding the expropriation power and about which there is no difference for the specific case, in order to unravel the controversy and reject the filed appeal. Let us begin by pointing out that: *"(...) **II.-** To achieve its purposes, the State... may employ voluntary means (e.g., administrative contracting) or coercive means (e.g., the tax system), expropriation being a faithful expression of the latter... **The purposes of the coercive means must not be spurious nor an instrument to supplement state inefficiency, profit, or speculation...** **III.-**...E) It is the theory of the purposes of the State that satisfactorily explains the justification for the institute under examination; according to that theoretical approach, which has a pragmatic foundation, **the State uses a series of instruments, among which the expropriation power figures, for the achievement of its socio-economic purposes and, above all, the common good...** **IV.-** The expropriation institute is justified because **the right to property is not absolute.** On the contrary, besides being a subjective right, **it must satisfy collective needs and public interests.** Expropriation does not alter the general regime of property; it is consubstantial with it because **when a sacrifice is imposed on the private party for a public interest, it must be minimized through its compensation** with an equivalent economic value. The burden of extinguishing ownership does not fall on the expropriated party; the compensation is borne by all administered parties, through the tax system, by being taken from public funds. **V.-**... **expropriation is any forced or coercive acquisition of the private property right, or any of its attributes, over a good or right, by a public entity, based on a power granted by law...** **VI.-** Expropriation fulfills a dual role: as an inalienable power of the State, and as a guarantee for the administered party against the suppression of their ownership right harmed in their patrimony. Expropriation constitutes a singular and concrete sacrifice, and as such discriminatory; therefore, in application of the principle of equality before public burdens (Articles 18 and 33 of the Political Constitution), it demands a restorative or compensatory indemnity... **X.-** The Civil Code contains a specific norm. Article 293 provides: "The owner may be obligated to alienate their property for the fulfillment of contracted obligations or **by reason of public utility. The cases in which expropriation for reasons of public utility is permitted, and the manner of carrying it out, shall be regulated by special law"**... **XIII.-**...**it is an act of public law in all its stages...** In sum, expropriation in all its stages and elements is a homogeneous institute of public law because **the indemnity arises from the exercise of a power of the State to ensure equality before public burdens...** **XV.-** **Only legally verified public interest justifies the deprivation of property. That is, not all State requirements demand an expropriation, therefore, for its proceeding, a cause (legally verified public interest) is required, which stands as a clear limit to the arbitrary exercise of the expropriation power...** The ultimate purpose of expropriation is not the ablation of the property right but the ulterior public interest destination given to the good (it always implies a material or juridical transformation of the expropriated good); therefore, it must be reputed as a means and not an end in itself; it is an instrument for the achievement of a purpose; it cannot lack a cause... **XVI.-**... **the broadest expression is that of public interest, because it covers both public necessity and social interests, being equivalent to the needs of the collectivity that require satisfaction (needs that the State or a public entity seeks to satisfy for itself or for the collectivity). Every need must be satisfied, and precisely therefrom arises the interest. Interest is the relationship between an individual or collective need and the instruments to satisfy it, which generate a utility. Public interest must be understood as the future destination of the expropriated object, that is, its allocation to a concrete public interest purpose. The State may expropriate solely by reason of "legally verified public interest"...** **XXX.** **- Expropriation is carried out through a general procedure,** however, the legislator has gradually conceived specific procedures, depending on the interests pursued; it can be divided into two phases: a) the administrative phase, of settlement, amicable agreement, friendly cession, or extrajudicial phase, and b) the judicial phase. A triangle will be present, composed of the State's expropriation power, the right to equitable economic compensation in favor of the dispossessed owner, and the judicial guarantee of executing the expropriation in accordance with the legal system.... **XXXIII.** **-** *If settlement is not achieved, the expropriating party must resort to the jurisdictional route. In this venue, the expropriating party and the expropriated party are the parties. In this trial, the expropriated party may fundamentally question the amount of the compensation. The law empowers the expropriating party to obtain possession of the good once the amount of compensation set in its opportunity by the administrative body is deposited. This trial has two essential characteristics; 1) it is summary, meaning its processing must be done with celerity and has short timeframes, and, 2) it is urgent, because the expropriating party may dispose of the good if it first deposits the provisional compensation, whose definitive amount is established later. The competent judge is that of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (except when it involves agrarian expropriations, where the specialized jurisdiction is competent), as it is an institution of public law, as it is a real action exercised by the State.* ***When there are controversial facts, the trial must be opened to evidence, regarding the value of the expropriated goods.*** *The expropriation procedure has a universal character in that all questions that affect or interest the purpose or consequences of that institute (transfer of the good, compensation, legitimacy of the allocation, individualization of the good, etc.) must be raised and resolved within it. The judgment will set the corresponding amount of compensation. Then, the expropriation power must be exercised through a formal procedure; prior to its initiation, there must be a legally verified public interest. The procedure serves to achieve its objective: the patrimonial deprivation of the expropriated party...."* **(boldface intentionally highlighted)** **IV.- Continuation...** This Tribunal is very clear that the purposes of the challenged coercive administrative route, through the underlying administrative act, cannot and must not be spurious or non-existent, nor an instrument to supplement state inefficiency, for profit or speculation; much less to empty the content of the right to property without any reason or with a distorted reason; hence, the substantiation of the expropriation power is a matter of means, not an end, all for the achievement of socio-economic tasks of the State and, above all, the common good, relativizing the right to property by holding it as not absolute, to satisfy collective needs and public interests identifiable with the general interest.

It is taken into account that when a public or general interest imposes a sacrifice on a private party, it must be minimized by compensating it with an equivalent economic value, which, when challenged, questioned, or rejected as proposed in the administrative venue, refers the dispute to the summary expropriation proceeding for the determination of the just price based on the own values and virtues of the affected property. It is a truism to point out that the core issue is an improvement of the indemnity set in the questioned expropriations. The Judicial Case Management System (SIGDJ) and the folios of judicial case file 318-388 report that the expropriation proceedings 04-000319-0163-CA and 04-000125-01653-CA, the first brought against Cuatro Amigos S.A., was resolved by Vote of this Section No. 257-2010, upholding the expropriated party's appeal and granting the sum of ¢32,411,051 colones, and the second brought against Nombre81076 (), confirmed the ruling of the a quo, through Vote No. 451-2011 of Section I, maintaining the amount granted at ¢8,304,817 colones; that is, these proceedings fully met the necessary formal and material requirements that allowed them to materialize the expropriation for the specific case, including not only the individualization of the properties but also the underlying public interest. It should be added that the judicial proceedings confirmed the prior administrative management in this regard, and the opposition of the expropriated party at that time redirected the management toward the legally established procedural route through which the easements (servidumbres) of interest were implemented. The justifications for establishing the easements (servidumbres) for the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line corridor were published in La Gaceta No. 46 of March 5, 2004, and No. 30 of February 12, 2004, respectively. The reason for expropriation materialized here.

In vote of Section I, No. 451-2011 of sixteen hours ten minutes of October thirteenth, two thousand eleven, within case file 04-125-0163-CA, the Court stated: " IV. ON ABSOLUTE NULLITY IN EXPROPRIATION MATTERS: Indeed, upon analyzing the case file in light of the grievances whose consistency invokes the presence of absolute nullity due to absence of requirements inherent to expropriation, it must be noted that this tendency of the grievances must be rejected in its entirety, since the correct perspective from which they must be viewed appears only from the procedural periphery imposed by the specialty of the legal ritus on the very object of the functional competence vested in this Chamber regarding an expropriation, that is, the fulfillment of the requirements demanded for it—the expropriation—it is insisted, because it is a special proceeding. The best procedural doctrine not only views nullity from the perspective of a grotesque defenselessness in the proceeding, but, to better understand it, refers to the study of the constituent elements of an act or set of procedural acts that are imbued with formal contexture (procedural requirements) and material contexture (substantive requirements). Viewed under this lens, expropriation matters, both in its special law on the subject (7495) and the very special law on expropriations and constitution of easements (servidumbres) of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (6313), require the presence of several fundamental requirements that this Body does observe from the study of the case file, namely: a) declaration of public interest; b) duly motivated expropriation act; c) notification to the interested party; d) publication in the Official Gazette. Once these requirements are verified, the functional competence determination of the jurisdiction that handles this type of proceeding follows, which results in the setting of a just price for the expropriation. Equally clear must be the understanding of the scope of the words "duly motivated expropriation act," since at this point the Court, in an expropriation proceeding—special—as has been said, must only verify the presence of the motivation element as a justification, at least succinct, of the requirements of the administrative act, but this does not imply that, based on this, one may enter into the study of the technical substance of the content of the act as a material element, since analyzing in detail the substance of the motivation of the expropriation act constitutes a substantive merit issue for a plenary proceeding, which is characterized by constituting a general, broad, sufficient, and appropriate procedural instrument to address technical arguments that are not strictu sensu related to the setting of the price and that it be just and that it yield, with the greatest possible precision in the conversion of the expropriated object into a monetary economic amount, as the object of substantive procedural consideration, in the correct aspect that the procedural specialty of expropriation as such must definitively adjudicate. Therefore, this Chamber is impeded by legal imperative from addressing issues other than those set forth in the doctrine of articles 10 of Law 6313 and 30 of Law 7495. It is not true, as the appellant alleges, that the declaration of public interest "has been conspicuously absent throughout the administrative and judicial proceeding," and it must be noted that the Court must not only review this but also the other procedural requirements that have led to the advanced stage at which the case file finds itself, within the enumeration previously alluded to. Accepted for analysis, as the administrative case file and the judicial case file itself were, they provide a clear view to this Chamber of all the requirements previously enumerated; thus, between the judicial case file and the administrative case file incorporated into the record by certification and foliated within the mentioned principal file, all the requirements inherent to expropriation are perfectly visible at folios 4 to 15, and later, for further clarification and indubitability, they are clearly explanatory, in light of the grievances, in the following folios that reflect the non-absence of the necessary elements to have initiated and concluded this special proceeding in first instance: folios 4 to 15 show the administrative appraisal and the publication in the Official Gazette; folio 442 contains official letter DAL066-2004 of February 26, 2004, and at folios 443 through 446, official letters 108.03977.2004 DCPJ073 of February 4, 2004, and 0012-3474-2004 CD-047-2004 of January 23, 2004, accepting the criterion of the plaintiff's Institutional Legal Directorate to provide all institutional information regarding the declaration of public interest in the passage of the electric power transmission line over the appellant's property. In the same order of study, the administrative appraisal previously referenced is found, only now as part of the incorporated administrative case file, as stated, at folios 457 to 484; the invoice for the publication service at folio 468, the publication in the Official Gazette at folio 465 (repeated at folio 466), the notification of the administrative appraisal to the plaintiff at folio 471, which was carried out through official letter 107.52248.2003 of November 14, 2003, addressed to the plaintiff, in which the acknowledgment of receipt shows November 26, 2003, at 3:25 a.m. as its reception. The aforementioned official letter is clear regarding the plaintiff-owner-expropriation legal status and the procedural derivation that this implies for the owner's effects. The administrative appraisal is repeated from folio 474 to folio 481. In the subsequent folios admitted for better adjudication (487 to 522), technical analyses of the generality of the project on which the expropriation under decision here falls are found." The legally proven public interest justified the limitation of those properties for the pursued end. An interest that was evidenced as proven through the forging of the San Miguel - El Este - Río Macho high-voltage electric power interconnection project, this conduct being, by its raison d'être and its pursued objectives, the motive and the motivation by implicit conduct that thus justified the expropriation proceedings from the administrative venue to the jurisdictional one, with the pursued end being clearly identifiable: a supply of electric power in response to the demand for this service, which results in a positive impact on the standard of living of citizens. An example of this expropriation intent as a product of this necessary expansion turned out to be the segments expropriated for the constitution of the new SIEPAC electric transmission line, which interconnects the six countries of Central America. This network, of 1,800 kilometers, strengthens the exchange of electric power among the six countries of the region, which ensures the continuity of the electricity supply and favors more competitive prices; therefore, no less justified was, for this case and the affected easements (servidumbres), the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line project, which entailed approximately 47 kilometers of transmission and the construction of approximately 60 towers, the objective being the linking of the high-voltage (230 KV) electricity transmission systems through a high-voltage overhead line, making it necessary for this purpose to acquire easements (servidumbres) along the entire line. (see Resolution No. 2338-2004-SETENA at folios 86 to 90 of the judicial case file). It is necessary to point out, as a result of human logic and common sense, that transmission lines are necessary to have interconnected and integrated electrical systems, which are what guarantee network users stability and reliability in electric service thanks to redundancy in sources and transmission lines. An energy projection model even endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber through vote 02806-98, which recognized the importance of transmission lines and the responsibility that ICE has to provide electric power to the national economy and consequently to the citizen.

There follows that the public necessity prior to the expropriation exercise was recognized through the material implementation given by the inherent exercise of the discretion that accompanies the interested Public Administration, by supporting, as part of ICE's ordinary activity, and therefore constituting the public interest thereof, the formation of an electric power transmission corridor for high-voltage supply, with the consideration of the project and the route of the corridor being evidenced through the Environmental Impact Study appearing in the administrative case file containing 332 folios. This corridor begins in the town of San Miguel in Santo Domingo de Heredia, heading northwest to tower 11.1, then turns east, passing through the town of Paracito and then through San Pedro de Coronado, where later, starting from tower 33, it heads south to tower 38; from there, it goes southeast to tower 40, thus crossing the canton of Coronado and entering that of Goicoechea; then the line again takes a southern orientation, crossing Goicoechea, San Rafael de Montes de Oca, and enters La Unión at tower 49; from there, it changes direction toward the southwest, passing near the town of Concepción to reach the El Este substation, in front of the highway to Tres Ríos. The second segment starts from the aforementioned substation, crossing the hamlets in San Juan and crosses the Florencio del Castillo highway at the height of the toll booth, continues southbound to cross the protective zone of the Cerros de la Carpintera, touches the easternmost point of the district of Patarrá de Desamparados, and crosses the canton of El Guarco near the towns of Tobosi and Tejar up to tower 49; from that point, it heads southeast, crossing the canton of El Guarco and arriving again in the canton of Cartago toward the community of Muñeco and Navarro, where at tower 21 it again changes direction toward the south-southeast and enters the canton of Paraíso up to the Río Macho substation (folios 0034-0035-0036 env. environmental study), with the real estate properties of the plaintiffs being partially and proportionally intercepted by the width of the easement (servidumbre).

This is the precise and specific requirement, within its typical and justified competences, for which ICE demanded and exercised the consequent expropriation power and to which the particular and private interest must submit. The trajectory and the choice of the route as well as of the real estate domains necessary for the formation of this corridor are merely material acts consequent to the public interest determined in the operational and technical judgment of the entity's ordinary activity, of which mention has already been made. It is therefore mandatory for one who opposes such essential public activity, seeking its annullability, to prove its unsuitability as an institutional project serving the community, or the sterility or stupidity of the chosen corridor; that is, the legal/technical questioning of that corridor and its purpose itself, in order to detract from that public interest and demonstrate a properly administrative interest, in which case the explicit control of the administrative contentious jurisdiction would operate, an aspect that does not constitute the crux of the matter in particular, since the indicated public interest is supported without any discredit whatsoever, the burden of proof being on the plaintiff to detract from the project by the chosen route.

In line with what has been indicated, this jurisdiction has been consistent and of uniform criterion regarding the expropriation route to constitute forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE, as well as the special applicable regulatory framework, flatly rejecting the ordinary procedure of the General Law of Public Administration that the appellant suggests, especially given the existence of its article 367.2.a) which excludes expropriations from that procedural rite. In this regard, as an illustration of this consolidated position, we have: " IV.- Legal regime applicable to ICE's expropriation power and constitution of easements. By virtue of what is alleged, it is necessary to present a brief review of the rules governing the activity of imposing an electrical line easement (servidumbre de tendido eléctrico) in favor of ICE. The very dynamic of the actions undertaken by ICE for the exercise of its service-providing competences in electricity and telecommunications constitutes the legitimizing basis for the assignment of a public power that enables it to expropriate the property required for the satisfaction of that public interest it is called to satisfy. But, in addition, it justifies the imposition of easements (servidumbres) on the properties that are necessary for the performance of its activities. In that line, Law No. 6313 of January 4, 1979 (Gaceta No. 14 of January 19, 1979), the Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Constitution of Easements of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, -amended by Law No. 8660 of July 29, 2008 (Alcance No. 31 to Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008)-, is precisely that special rule that regulates the expropriation dynamics of that public entity, as well as the procedure and rules pertaining to the imposition of easements (servidumbres). This legal source declares of public utility the real estate properties, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests that ICE requires for the fulfillment of its legal duties (articles 1 and 2). This rule sets the procedure that ICE must follow in expropriation matters, an issue that is not relevant in the case at hand. It suffices for these purposes to point out that according to article 22 ejusdem, these provisions are applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. This implies that the appraisal or valuation specified in rules 2 through 7 and concordant must be carried out prior to ordering the constitution of the easement (servidumbre), in such a way that the indemnity parameter for the imposition of such an administrative real right is included within that referent." (see Judgment: 00146 Case File: 11-007391-1027-CA, Date: 12/12/2013 Time: 10:50:00 a.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Court, Section VI, and Judgment: 00050 Case File: 11-001886-1027-CA, Date: 03/16/2012 Time: 07:40:00 a.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Court, Section VI) Likewise, in this same sense, it was established: " V.1- On the Expropriation Power of ICE and its regulations. The activity of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute in expropriation matters is contained in the Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Easements, number 6313 of January 4, 1979, in which the works to be executed by ICE and its companies are declared of public utility, in fulfillment of the legal powers entrusted, which describes the procedure to which the institution is subject to exercise its power of imperium regarding the imposition of expropriations and easements (servidumbres) necessary for the fulfillment of the ends granted to it by law. In that legal instrument, the procedure that the Institution must follow is described in order to guarantee the fundamental right protected by article 45 of the Political Constitution. The first step established is the valuation of the property as well as all those movable or immovable rights that shall be affected, article 3 limiting them to real damages of a permanent nature that have a causal link with the expropriation; next, upon approval of the technical valuation expert report and the issuance of the expropriation agreement (article 7), the appraisal shall be made known to the owner, tenant, or lessee so that within the following eight days they may express their willingness either to sell and accept the price set for the property, or indicate their disagreement; in the first case, they shall appear for the execution of the corresponding deed, and in the second, the institution shall resort to the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Court so that the Judge sets the just price (article 11). In the jurisdictional venue, the appraisal proceedings for expropriation shall be processed and the expropriated party granted five days to designate the expert who will assess the damages and losses caused (article 13); if necessary, a third expert may be appointed, and a resolution shall be issued fixing the time of the indemnity, which shall not exceed that estimated in the appraisal expert reports (article 17), a resolution that may be appealed before the superior in case of disagreement of both or either of the parties (article 21). The same procedure is applicable for the constitution of easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, as well as for the fulfillment of any other end entrusted to the institution (article 22)." (see Judgment: 00022 Case File: 12-001001-1027-CA, Date: 03/20/2013, Time: 04:00:00 p.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Court, Section IV) Reviewing this position of the Court, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote 966, in case file 00-000008-0163-CA of 2:10 a.m. on December 15, 2005, determined: "In this regard, it is necessary to note that the Public Administration in general—central and decentralized—must adapt its conduct to the block of legality, enshrined in articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the LGAP. In this sense, the Political Constitution, in canon 45, establishes the principle of inviolability of private property, except for legally proven public interest, and upon prior indemnity according to law. Likewise, Law number 6313 of January 4, 1979, the Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations, and Easements of ICE, first article, provides: "Declared of public utility are the real estate properties, whether complete farms, portions, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests, which by their location are necessary, in the judgment of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, for the fulfillment of its ends. These real estate properties may be expropriated in accordance with this law, whosoever their owner may be." For its part, article 22 ibidem prescribes: "The provisions of this law are applicable to the constitution of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines," as for the direct or indirect fulfillment of any other end entrusted to ICE. From both provisions, it is clearly inferred that, for ICE to be able to constitute forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, in case of opposition of the owner of the affected property, it must necessarily follow the expropriation procedure set forth in said regulations. Obviously, if the owner of the property agrees, such procedure is unnecessary." And in a vote of that same Chamber (Judgment: 00448 in case file: 10-000617-1027-CA of nine o'clock on April 10, 2013), it added: "IX.- Expropriation is a legal act of a special nature governed by public law. So much so that it arises from the expropriation decree that necessarily identifies unilaterally the real estate property that responds to an interest—in this case of ICE—in obtaining it to satisfy a public need. This constitutional tool—expropriation power—was designed by the legislator under a dual scheme. One administrative, where preparatory acts are generated, among them, the communication of the land appraisal to the owner, which, in order to accelerate the process, if accepted, would allow entry into possession more quickly and thus allocate it to public utility. And another in the jurisdictional venue, which arises, in principle, when the owner of the property does not accept the offered price, the proceeding being limited to its determination. From this perspective, without a doubt, both hypotheses arise from the exercise of a public power. The expropriation power granted to ICE for the fulfillment of its ends derives from Law 6313 itself, articles 2, 22, and 23; Law 7495, articles 13 and 14, as well as the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, Law 8660, canon 79 (legal aspects broadly assessed by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling no. 2011-5271 of 3:16 p.m. on April 27, 2011). In this understanding, article 22 of Law 6313 stands out, which establishes that said regulation is applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. Canon 11 ibidem is what establishes the specific procedure that this Institution must follow for the purposes of expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres), among them, those for the laying of electrical lines. Thus, article 2 of that legal text declares of public utility the works that ICE and its companies undertake in fulfillment of the legal powers that the legal system has entrusted to them. Up to this point, it is clear that ICE is empowered by special law to impose easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical lines, which by their very nature are of public utility—legally declared—and that the constitution procedure is defined by Law 6313 itself. Now, once ICE's needs to undertake its projects are defined, what follows is the appraisal of the corresponding lands, which must be communicated to the owners prior to signing the agreement or decreeing the expropriation for the corresponding purposes. This last activity shall occur when there is no agreement or the interested parties do not respond to the expropriating entity's summons. At this point, it must be emphasized that this is carried out with the proper communication of the appraisal. The expropriation must be agreed upon by the Board of Directors. The agreement shall be published in the Official Gazette. Finally, the Administration must resort to the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Court to request the setting of the definitive appraisal. In general terms, this is the procedure for expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres) that the legislator entrusted to the Institute and its companies.

Of interest to the grievance, it can be concluded that in accordance with Law 6313, it is through the communication of the appraisal (avalúo) that the property owner learns of and can challenge the ablative agreement (ordinals 2, 3, 7, 8, 11). This final communication is what the legal system requires, which must be made personally to the expropriated party or the owner affected by the easement (servidumbre) (article 8 Law 6313 and 25 law 7495)." From the accumulation of proven facts established by the a quo, it is inferred, as relevant to the case, that the Institute deemed it necessary, on the occasion of the oft-cited project, to impose an easement right over properties nos. 168956-000 and 423388-000, both of the Partido de San José and owned by the plaintiffs respectively. To this end, in 2002, the appraisals area of the ICE's Administrative Management Sub-management issued appraisals nos. 743-2002 and 707-2002 for these properties. Subsequently, through Directorial Council agreements 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, respectively, and published in La Gaceta No. 46 of March 5, 2004, and La Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2004, the pertinent public interest was formalized. For this Chamber, it is evident that long before the existence of the expropriation agreements, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the expropriation process that the ICE had initiated. That communication carries the effects of informing and notifying the owner, not only of the existence of the procedures for the forced imposition of an easement (servidumbre), but also of the price or the amount assessed for the compensation. Therefore, from that date, the period began for them to respond to the Institute's call or to state their opposition, just as occurred historically. By virtue of the foregoing, it was foreseeable that the Council, in Sessions Nos. 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, based on article 45 of the Political Constitution and on Law 6313 and 7495, would decide to decree the easement (servidumbre) necessary to fulfill the public interest, both making reference to the appraisals (avalúos) previously communicated to the landowners with the specific reference to the properties, as seen in the expropriation process case files. It follows equally that the Institute proceeded to previously inform the representative of the plaintiff company about the existence of the "expropriation proceedings for the constitution of an easement (servidumbre)." The law does not require this appraisal (avalúo) to be approved by the Council; its formal existence and its accordance with the legal system are sufficient. It is reiterated, then, that the "expropriation agreement" was adopted with the prior existence of the appraisals (avalúos). The appellant does not identify or does not wish to accept the nature of the special expropriation procedure with which the ICE was endowed, nor does it demonstrate the nullities it claims, and still less does this Court observe them. The original idea of the legislator was to facilitate an agile and efficient process for the Institute and its companies, for the purposes of expropriations and the forced imposition of easements (servidumbres). These procedures are governed by the special stipulations of Law 6313 and, supplementally, by those of the Expropriation Law (article 2 Law 6313). According to what has been analyzed, the actions prior to the expropriation agreement (including the appraisal (avalúo)) are valid and effective, given that the ICE's call conforms to the provisions of canon 11 of Law 6313, by means of an act issued by competent officials, duly communicated (according to the parameters of article 25 of Law 7495, applied supplementally by mandate of canon 2 of Law 6313) and approved by the Council in the indicated sessions.

In addition to the above, it must be insisted that Law 6313 declares to be of public utility the immovable property, be they entire farms, portions, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests, which by their location are necessary (in the judgment of the Institute) for the fulfillment of its purposes (precept 1 ibidem). This is one of the main differences in relation to the process of Law 7495, where a "Declaration of public interest" is established as a prerequisite for expropriation, since to expropriate, a reasoned act is indispensable, by means of which the property to be expropriated is declared of public interest. Even that declaration of public interest in Law 7495 must be notified to the interested party or their legal representative and published in the Diario Oficial (numeral 18 Law 7495), just as occurred in the case of case file 04-000125-0163-CA. A necessary clarification is that due to the declaration by full right that operates in Law 6313, this action is not necessary in the expropriations and easements (servidumbres) carried out by the ICE under this format (04-000319-0163-CA). Regarding the agreement, the Law under commentary does not require it to be personally notified to the administered party; its publication in the Diario Oficial is sufficient according to article 11 ibidem. In this understanding, the publication of the agreement was carried out in the indicated Gazettes, whereby the legal requirement was fully met. Both actions (appraisal (avalúo) and agreement) comply with the legal requirements to produce the desired effects.

This Court does not accept the claims of the appellant and rejects the stances argued when it indicates: that the ICE, as the Expropriating Administration, must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to certain immovable property, and it is this concrete determination that must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of imperium to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party, or, the one that equally indicates: the A QUO errs in accepting the absence of a concretization act in the ICE's expropriation process and in not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. Nor is it acceptable when it states: The A QUO errs in accepting that said absence violates the right of defense of the administered party. Without a formal communication of the concrete act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose on a specific property, the Administered party is left without a way to attack the lack of motive of the act in their specific case and causes defenselessness for the party. This is where the motive and the content of the administrative act must be analyzed, which has been claimed as nonexistent by this representation throughout this process. The A QUO errs in not seeing that the ICE has concealed from the Administered party and from the Court any source of information that would allow verification of whether the motive for the expropriation act indeed exists, if the content is proportionate to the motive, and if the content indeed fulfills the purpose intended by the legal system. Clearly, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated, and finally, the assertion of the a quo's error in that the A Quo has omitted to consider the fact that the expropriated party was never given, and to date has not been given, access to the entirety of the administrative files that truly make up the decision-making process regarding the final choice and location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the lawsuit that the ICE has indeed prevented the administered party's access to the files in which the decisions are documented that ultimately become the very foundation of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso).

V.- Cont... In the case of the ICE, the declaration of general utility was generically agreed upon by the legislator himself; and it is known that the procedure begins with the practice of the expert appraisal (avalúo pericial), which is then notified to the expropriated party, and if they do not accept it, it is appropriate to decree the expropriation, thus concluding that phase. So the possibility of knowing and challenging the ablative agreement and the underlying public interest is implicit in the communication of the appraisal (avalúo), according to the design of the law itself. If the party does not accept the appraisal (avalúo), they must dispute it in the special expropriation process, and if, in addition to the review of the administrative appraisal (avalúo administrativo) that assessed the compensation, they wish to dispute the exercise of the expropriation power, they must do so in a plenary proceeding, proving the nullity of said administrative acts and the impropriety or nonexistence of the general interest. As a corollary of the foregoing, it must be made clear, then, that the appraisal (avalúo) was the act through which the Institute communicated to the property owner its intention and justification for constituting an administrative easement (servidumbre administrativa) (power line), as well as the compensation offered. From the formal delivery of this document, according to the applicable regulatory text, what proceeded was expropriation through the Council's agreement, which, for its validity, complied with the mandated requirements. For these reasons, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is also no injury to administrative due process, since the procedure for the imposition of an easement (servidumbre) carried out by the Institute complies with the regulations created for this purpose.

VI.- Cont.... Administrative burdens such as expropriated easements (servidumbres) are a real public right constituted by a state entity over another's property, for the purpose of having it serve public use. The imposition of these administrative limitations clearly supposes its own limits: 1) the restriction must be adequately proportionate to the administrative need that must be satisfied with it; proportionality is given in relation to the need to be satisfied, it is not a fixed measure but varies according to the case. 2) it must have some type of plausible justification, it must truly respond to an administrative need but directed toward an indivisible and indispensable public end. 3) it is required that it does not alter, disintegrate, or dismember the property. In any of these cases, it will be appropriate to establish an easement (servidumbre) or carry out the expropriation, but the mere non-compensated restriction will not be valid. 4) that it be valid in its form, competence, object, and will. Due to the dynamism of organic administrative activity, administrative easements (servidumbres administrativas) can be constituted directly by law (No. 6313 for the ICE), or authorized by law but established by the authorized administration in a concrete administrative act, precisely, expressed by the expropriation agreement (in an administrative venue or later referred to the judicial route) in which case, as has been affirmed and as the a quo stated, the act became implicit, not by a mandatory administrative resolution, produced as a result of a contentious or opposition administrative procedure as suggested by the appellant for the application of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), more precisely, articles 308 and following, this due to the specialty and prevalence of the normative expropriation rite that protects the ICE over the general expropriation law and, of course, over the LGAP, regarding the aspects of constitution and validity of the real impositions, this by express prohibition (367.2.a- LGAP). Of course, the judge can and has the functional competence to control whether the acts that execute or implement the expropriation have been adjusted to the regulated acts that the law regulates or has authorized, as the case may be, so only on this point does this Court differ from the thinking of the a quo, insofar as it creates an isolated niche, immune, and unimpeachable over implicit acts, but that does not alter the determined solution, given the lack of substantial demonstration of the nonexistence or unsuitability of the chosen route and its necessity for the high-voltage overhead line corridor, ergo, of the internal nullity of the route created, this in the socio-economic and legal aspects, as it is a burden of proof of the interested party. The public interest must be understood as the primary destination of the expropriated object in the future, which allows that by technical standard and even by additional executive decree, the purpose of the imposed coercive exercise is operationalized by opportunity and convenience (articles 16 and 154 of the LGAP), with the implantation of the respective and corresponding easements (servidumbres) and cadastral records for the material utility of the property taken. While the Political Constitution in its article 45 establishes that property is inviolable, and that no one can be deprived of theirs except by a legally proven public interest, this is already accredited in the declaration indicated and published in the referenced Gazettes, so that what was declared or ordered was not imprecise, erroneous, negligent, or omitted in the obligatory identification of the property or its intrinsic necessity. The ultimate purpose of expropriation is not the ablation of the property right but the ulterior public interest destination given to the good (it always implies a material or legal transformation of the expropriated good) as has been pointed out, therefore it must be regarded as a means and not an end in itself, it is an instrument for the achievement of an end, it cannot lack a cause, and this is fully identified together with the respective immovable property, so that there is no uncertainty, legal insecurity, real or legal, that undermines the affected property right and the subsequent definition of a fair price. In summary, it must be concluded that this Court does not consider that the alleged defects are of such magnitude as the appellant refers to them, nor that they provide sufficient grounds to affirm the existence of nullities capable of being classified as absolute, nor is the absence of an essential element in the formal and material conduct deployed by the ICE considered for substantial disagreement with the legal order. Both the public interest and the individualization of the good are duly identified, sufficient elements for the validity of the declaration of public interest under challenge and the imposition of the established easement (servidumbre), consequently, the grievances set forth in Considerando II find no remedy or acceptance in this instance.

VII.- Regarding costs.- The representative of the plaintiffs appeals the award of costs, indicating that they have had sufficient elements and motives to litigate, and therefore requests to be exonerated from the payment of costs. In matters of regulation of personal and procedural costs, numerals 221 to 224 of the Civil Procedure Code must be observed (applied supplementally in the absence of regulation in the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, as provided in numeral 103 thereof), as well as articles 98 and 99 of the aforementioned Law. In that sense, as it is mandatory for the judge to rule on them in the judgment (ordinal 59 subsection 2 of the Law of the Rite and 221 of the cited Code), two possibilities must be taken into account in its issuance, 1) that it be resolved without a special award of costs, 2) or with a special award imposing its payment on one of the parties. In the first hypothesis, it will be resolved without a special award in application of the doctrine that informs numeral 222 in fine, with each party paying those they have caused and both jointly paying those that are common. The reasons why a decision is made in this manner are due to the occurrence of some exonerating ground, such as reciprocal defeat, that the defeated party has litigated in good faith, if the claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, if the judgment partially grants fundamental petitions of the complaint or counterclaim, if important defenses invoked by the defeated party are admitted, upon the Administration's acquiescence to the plaintiff's claims (unless the lawsuit substantially reproduces what was requested in the denied administrative claim, and that denial gave rise to the action), when due to the nature of the debated questions there was sufficient motive to litigate, if the judgment is rendered as a result of evidence whose existence the opposing party could plausibly not have known and because of this the party's opposition would have been justified, and finally if the winning party incurred in plus petitio, that is, that the difference between what was claimed and what was obtained in the judgment was 15% or more. From what has been conducted in these proceedings and the way this matter was resolved, no possible exemption operates. This is noted, that said award does not imply a qualification of recklessness or bad faith. Therefore, no legal breach is produced if the defeated party is ordered to pay costs and thus the lower court merely limited itself to applying the rule in the terms it provides, so it does not incur in the pointed error, imposing the rejection of the present ground for appeal.

POR TANTO

The challenged resolution is confirmed in that which has been the subject of appeal.

Ronaldo Hernández Hernández Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos Eduardo González Segura ACTOR: CUATRO AMIGOS S.A y otro DEMANDADO: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD The two presumed or implicit acts that we do not know and that supposedly must have been issued by the ICE Board of Directors declaring the public interest of the lands owned by the plaintiffs and affected by the ICE's actions, and that implicitly or explicitly ordered the expropriation of the easements (servidumbres) over the properties owned by the plaintiffs, including all substantive or procedural acts in the procedure followed by the ICE for the determination of the public interest of the plaintiffs' lands, and also encompassing the very absence of said procedure. **2.** The administrative act implicit in the decision to initiate the respective expropriation proceedings for the right of easement (derecho de servidumbre) over the plaintiffs' properties in the judicial sphere. **3.** Official communication **108.03977.2004-DCPJ 073** signed by Licda. Julieta Bejarano, Director of the Institutional Legal Directorate, dated February 4, 2004. **4.** The agreement reached by the ICE Board of Directors in session 578 of January 20, 2004, in which it is ordered to "reject the claim" of Mr. Nombre81076 and Cuatro Amigos S.A. and "consequently deem the administrative channel exhausted." **5.** Official communication 108.000490.2004-DCPJ/018 dated January 13, 2004, signed by Lic. Giovanni Bonilla Goldoni, Head of the Judicial Consulting and Processes Division of the ICE. **6.** The notification acts carried out on November 26, 2003, when official communications 107.52247.2003 and 107.52248.2003 dated November 14, 2003, both signed by Lic. Carlos Alberto Quesada Fernández, Head of the Notary Area - Legal Directorate of the ICE, were delivered to Mr. Nombre72026, legal representative of Cuatro Amigos S.A., and to Mr. Nombre81076, respectively. **7.** All substantive procedural acts in the procedure followed by the ICE for the determination of the appraisal (avalúo) and subsequent expropriation of the referred easements (servidumbres). **8.** Appraisal (avalúo) No. 707-2002 dated September 2002, signed by Ing. Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo, in which he purports to establish the compensation corresponding to the cost of the right of easement (derecho de servidumbre) and the damages caused by the passage of the aforementioned high-voltage transmission line to property number 423399-000 of the San José Registry, owned by Nombre81076, in the sum of ¢2,280,264.70. **9.** Appraisal (avalúo) No. 743-2002 dated November 2002, in which Ing. Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo purports to establish the compensation corresponding to the cost of the right of easement (derecho de servidumbre) and the damages caused by the passage of the aforementioned high-voltage transmission line to property number 168956-000 of the San José Registry, owned by Cuatro Amigos S.A., in the sum of ¢13,030,459.15. **10.** Any internal or external act, procedural preparatory, decisional, and/or enforcement act prior or subsequent to those listed, that is directly or indirectly related to the expropriation and appraisal (avalúo) of the referred easements (servidumbres) insofar as they are instrumental in the violation of the rights of my represented party and are contrary to law. **11.** The explicit or implicit administrative acts by which the ICE determined that the current project route is the most suitable. **12.** The explicit or implicit administrative acts and the material actions by which the ICE has executed a good part of the project works prior to environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). **13.** The explicit or implicit administrative acts and the material actions by which the ICE executed the construction of the tower located on the right-of-way of the Durazno road. **B) Compensation for damages caused by legal and illegal acts:** That the civil liability incurred by the ICE and/or its officials or experts for the commission of illegal acts and for negligence in the recognition of nullities be declared in the abstract. In the event that there is liability for legal acts of the administration, it is also requested that it be declared and included in the Institution's civil liability. In any case, the damages shall be liquidated in due course during the execution of the judgment, but the declaration of the amount is hereby requested along with the recognition that this is a value obligation that must be indexed so that it is not eroded by inflation. **C) Recognition and restoration of rights:** That the individualized legal situation be recognized and the necessary measures be adopted for its restoration. **D) Order to pay costs:** That the ICE be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action and of all defenses undertaken by the plaintiffs both in the judicial sphere and in the administrative sphere. (folios 129 to 132 of the judicial file) **2**- By resolution at ten hours and six minutes on September 7, two thousand five, the lawsuit was deemed formally filed and a transfer was granted to the defendant Institution. (folio 133 of the judicial file) **3**- The representative of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of standing (legitimación), and the generic defense of *sine actione agit*. (folios 142 to 160 of the judicial file) **4**- Judge Cynthia Sandoval Bonilla, in judgment No. 1378 - 2015 at fourteen hours on July 31, two thousand fifteen, resolved: *"The defense of lack of standing (legitimación) is rejected. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and consequently, this lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the unsuccessful plaintiffs."* **5**- The special judicial attorney of the plaintiff, in his expressed capacity, appealed; the appeal was admitted, and by virtue thereof, this Court hears the case on appeal.

**6**- The representatives of the defendant appeared during the summons period, requesting that the challenged resolution be confirmed, indicating that it does not contradict the applied legal system and is entirely in accordance with the law.

**7**- The appeal has been given due process, and no defects or omissions capable of causing the nullity of the proceedings or defenselessness to the parties are observed. This resolution is issued after deliberation within the time margin permitted by the workload of this Office.

**Drafted by Judge Hernández Hernández; and** **WHEREAS:** **I.-** Regarding the list of proven facts, this Panel considers it appropriate to adopt them as they faithfully reflect what is evident in the case file.

**II.- APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES**. **1.-** The appellant points out that the lower court denies the claims brought by his clients, citing a general declaration of public interest for all those immovable properties that are subject to expropriation by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, according to the first article of its special expropriation law. We do not dispute this assertion and we agree with it. But the declaration made by the law, although necessary, is not sufficient to carry out an expropriation. It is clear that the general declaration of public interest establishes only the relationship between the ICE's activity and the immovable properties whose expropriation might be necessary or convenient for said activity. Indeed, the ICE, as the Expropriating Administration, must establish the specific application of said public interest in relation to certain immovable properties, and it is this specific determination that must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party.

**2.-** The lower court errs in accepting the absence of a concretization act in the ICE's expropriation process and in not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. It is clear that the general declaration of public interest establishes only the relationship between the ICE's activity and the immovable properties whose expropriation might be necessary or convenient for said activity and that, to exercise the expropriation power, an act of individualization is necessary in which a particular and specific immovable property (my client's property) is identified to serve a particular and specific purpose (the passage of a transmission line). That specific determination act is the fatal absence that is alleged in this challenge as a fundamental defect in the administrative expropriation process and which clearly was never carried out with the due formality so that the administered party could defend its interests. Where the lower court errs is in saying that what the law says is sufficient, and that the implicit concretization act does not need to be formally communicated or judicially reviewed, and in fact, it refuses to declare the evident and manifest absolute nullity of the expropriation due to the absence of formal communication of this act of concretization of the public interest in a specific property.

**3.-** The lower court errs in accepting that this absence violates the administered party's right of defense. Indeed, the ICE, as the Expropriating Administration, must establish the specific application of said public interest in relation to certain immovable properties, and it is this specific determination that must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the detriment of a property and a particular administered party. In the case at hand, the ICE carried out this concretization only implicitly and never formalized it in a specific act that should have been substantiated with due reasoning and with the requirements of the law in order to offer the administered party the opportunity to challenge the act for defects in its essential elements. Without formal communication of the specific act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose in a specific property, the Administered Party is left without a way to challenge the lack of grounds for the act in its specific case, causing defenselessness to the party. That specific determination act is the absence alleged in this challenge and which clearly was never carried out with the due formality so that the administered party could defend its interests.

**4.-** The lower court errs in accepting that, because the act is implicit, it is not reviewable by the administered party or by the Judiciary. The position adopted by the lower court is therefore fundamentally flawed, since by accepting as valid an implicit determination act under these circumstances, it is in fact accepting that the specific determination act carried out by the ICE in each expropriation is effectively impossible to challenge and impossible to judicially review. By accepting as valid an implicit act, the lower court Judge is in fact declaring that said act is not subject to any possibility of judicial review and is artificially creating an administrative act that is not reviewable, creating a sphere of impunity for power in an exercise of the expropriation power of eminent domain, which is the most dangerous power held by the Administration. Certainly, the expropriation power, with the sole exception of the *ius puniendi*, is undoubtedly the power with the greatest potential to threaten the rights of the administered party and therefore one of the functions that the Judiciary must review with the greatest zeal. In doing so, it is not only rendering nugatory my client's right to demand the formal communication of the concretization act but also rendering nugatory my client's right to demand the review of the legality of said act, and it is also accepting that the implicit act not be reviewed or challenged in the administrative or judicial sphere. Certainly, the possibility of requesting and obtaining the review of an administrative act in the administrative sphere is a fundamental right of the administered party, but the possibility of challenging and JUDICIALLY reviewing an administrative act is one of the most important intra-organ controls of the Rule of Law of Constitutional Democracy. It is undoubtedly a fundamental function of the Judiciary in our legal and political system that the conformity of the administrative act with the law can be reviewed; that is to say, reviewing the legality of the administrative act is a fundamental constitutional right for the effective functioning of the Rule of Law. Therefore, the position of the lower court in endorsing an interpretation in which it is actually voluntarily failing to exercise its duty to review the legality of the implicit administrative act of concretization of the public interest in my client's specific property is incomprehensible and inexcusable. The lower court therefore fundamentally fails by denying judicial review of the implicit administrative act and violates the principle that EVERY administrative act must be subject to judicial review, i.e., it betrays what in our environment is called the FIGHT AGAINST THE IMMUNITIES OF POWER.

**5.-** The lower court errs in considering that the act is legal. Contrary to the interpretation given by the trial court, the declaration of public interest constitutes only one of the elements of the administrative act, which is not valid if defects are observed in the constituent elements that allow one to conclude its legitimacy and suitability —Article 128 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—. As recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence, the administrative power is subject to a **purpose (fin)**, and this purpose in the expropriation activity of the public administration is the achievement of the public interest, which for the case under study can be represented as universal and suitable access to electrical energy. I repeat, there is no discussion on this. But if we ask ourselves, how do we achieve this purpose?, a range of possibilities opens up, legitimate and illegitimate, through which the administration, in this case the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, decides to affect one property or another. This is where the **motive (motivo)** and the **content (contenido)** of the administrative act must be analyzed, which this representation has claimed as non-existent throughout this process. The lower court errs in not seeing that the ICE has concealed from the Administered Party and the Court any source of information that allows verification of whether the motive for the expropriation act actually exists, whether the content is proportionate to the motive, and whether the content actually fulfills the purpose desired by the legal system. Of course, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated. It would be ideal to have the inputs within the administrative file that could enrich the discussion on the nullity of the elements of the administrative act; however, this is not possible for the **simple reason that they do not exist.** The duty of the public administration to issue a valid administrative act —one that can be reviewed by the administered party, upon whom an extraordinary burden is being imposed as an exception to the principle of inviolability of private property contained in Article 45 of our Magna Carta— has been overlooked, thus grounding my clients' claim.

**6.-** Guaranteeing the legitimacy of the elements of the act works both ways. That is, for the administered party who wishes to verify the suitability of their property for the purpose required by the State, as well as for the State itself to carry out a supervisory review of the funds used for this purpose. In light of the foregoing, the following questions arise: Are there other properties whose route layout would make the transmission line less onerous? Are there other properties with better topography for the passage of lines that were omitted? Did the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad pay more to expropriate these lands when it could have passed through others? Among the most serious violations alleged by the plaintiffs, **and which the lower court has omitted to consider**, is the fact that the expropriated party was never given, and to date has not been given, access to the entirety of the administrative files that actually comprise the decision-making process on the final choice and location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the lawsuit that the ICE has effectively prevented the administered party's access to the files in which the decisions are documented that ultimately become the very basis of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this easement of passage (servidumbre de paso). Time and again it was explained to the Court that the ICE has consistently and constantly concealed all information regarding the motives and reasons for the determination of the transmission line route, which is, in essence, what explains how and why my client's property is necessary for the passage of the line and is therefore the core of the problem of the concretization of the public interest in the specific property. Here lies the violation committed by the ICE and which the lower court Judge does not want to see: the ICE conceals the entire decision-making process on the line route under a cloak of pseudo-technicality and intends that no one review it. It takes this exercise to the extreme of violating the administrative process of expropriation and never communicates formally and with substantiation the determination of said concretization in the specific case precisely so that the administered party cannot know or discuss the grounds for its decision (i.e., cannot examine the elements of the act - motive, content, and purpose). What the ICE seeks with this is to reduce the opportunities for opposition from the administered party and thereby violates the fundamental rights of the administered party to challenge administrative acts in the administrative and judicial spheres and clearly incurs a misuse of power (desviación de poder) by serving a purpose other than that desired by the legal system. Incredibly, the lower court lends itself to this game and allows it, making the judicial authority a co-author in the assassination of the fundamental guarantees of the Rule of Law.

**7.-** In the same logical argumentative line outlined so far, we find Article 1 of Law 6313, repeatedly cited by the lower court. This article states: "The following are declared of public utility, the immovable properties, whether entire properties, portions, rights, or legitimate patrimonial interests, which by their **location are necessary**, in the judgment of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad..." (the highlighting is not from the original). It is evident, according to the elements of judgment within the file, that the necessity of the location of the plaintiffs' land for the expropriation that is the subject of this process was not determined. In this sense, the lower court errs in considering the legality review of the act satisfied merely by verifying the purpose, forgetting about the content and the motive. There is no information, or at least my clients were never given access to it, nor was it brought to this process as part of the administrative file, regarding the suitability and necessity of my clients' lands with respect to their location. It must never be forgotten that public function, especially when it involves affecting the rights of the administered party and the expenditure of public funds, must be transparent, verifiable, and assessable!

**8.-** Even though, in this representation's consideration, there are elements of conviction that would allow the appealed judgment to be reversed and instead uphold my clients' claims, should the substantive thesis of the lower court be maintained, costs must be waived in accordance with Article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, given that the good faith with which the plaintiffs have litigated is evident. On the contrary, the ICE's position in seeking to exempt its concretization act of public interest from any possibility of administrative or judicial challenge is what is indefensible, and therefore, the defendant must be ordered to pay costs.

**III.- The appeal must be dismissed.** The grievances mostly show a subjective and repetitive content of the arguments put forward in the action filed, even those expressed in opposition to the judgments in the expropriation proceedings, to thereby repeatedly support opposition to the lower court's (*a quo*) position on this occasion. What is being challenged, why it is being challenged, what evidence was overlooked for assessment, what the judge's error is, what norms were disrupted, how the legal framework was violated, etc., **is the fundamental intellectual exercise that the appellant must carry out, not just show the antithesis of the position as a begging-the-question fallacy to undermine the trial court's criterion; counter-argumentation is insufficient. The judgment is attacked for its pronouncement or for the omission regarding its grounds, and not through the reiteration put forward in the process.** Obviously, these reproaches must be expressed (both by the content of the material expression and by that of the normative content) beyond the legal technical position of the appellant, which will serve, in the case of the appeal, so that the appellate body can resolve with full competence and with the exclusive limit of what is challenged. That is, what the judge said and where and in what their error lay is the necessary prerequisite for the statement of the breach of the violated norms and the relation of the evidentiary means that prove the claimed norm. The appeal must be within the scope established by Article 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Notwithstanding and despite this manner of argumentation, this Court allows itself to make the following considerations to refute the appeal. As the central theme and core of the discussion in this appeal refers to the nullity of the executed expropriatory administrative act, due to the absence of an underlying, formalized public interest in a duly communicated specific act, as well as for its unsuitability for the expropriation purpose, and the opposition to the lower court's (*a quo*) thesis regarding the unchallengeability of the implicit act over the expropriatory act, this Court deems it pertinent, prudent, and necessary to locate and highlight several points on which the First Chamber of the Supreme Court (Vote No. 166 at sixteen hours twenty minutes on December 18, nineteen ninety-two) and other resolutions have elaborated concerning the expropriation power and on which there is no difference whatsoever for the specific case, in order to unravel the controversy and reject the filed appeal.

Let us begin by noting that: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">"(...) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">II.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">To achieve its ends, the State... may employ voluntary means (e.g., administrative contracting) or coercive means (e.g., the tax system), with expropriation being a faithful expression of the latter... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The ends of the coercive pathway must not be spurious nor an instrument to supplement state inefficiency, to profit, or to speculate</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">III.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">...E) It is the theory of the ends of the State that satisfactorily explains the justification of the institution under examination; according to this theoretical approach, which has a pragmatic foundation, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the State uses a series of instruments, among which the expropriatory power figures, to achieve its socio-economic ends and, above all, the common good...</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">IV.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The expropriation institution is justified insofar as </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the right of property is not absolute</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. On the contrary, besides being a subjective right, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">it must satisfy collective needs and public interests.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Expropriation does not alter the general regime of property; it is consubstantial with it because </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">when a sacrifice is imposed on a private individual for a public interest, this must be minimized through compensation</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> with an equivalent economic value. The burden of the extinction of property does not fall on the expropriated party; the compensation is borne by all administered persons, through the tax system, being taken from public funds. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">V.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> ... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">expropriation is any forced or coercive acquisition of the right of private property, or of any of its attributes, over a good or right, by a public entity, based on a power granted by law... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">VI.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Expropriation fulfills a dual role: as an inalienable power of the State, and as a guarantee for the administered person against the suppression of their property right suffered in their patrimony. Expropriation constitutes a singular and concrete sacrifice, and as such discriminatory; therefore, in application of the principle of equality before public burdens (Articles 18 and 33 of the Political Constitution), it requires a restorative or compensatory compensation... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">X.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The Civil Code contains a specific norm. Article 293 provides: "The owner may be compelled to alienate their property for the fulfillment of contracted obligations or </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">by reason of public utility. The cases in which expropriation is permitted for reasons of public utility, and the manner of carrying it out, shall be regulated by special law"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">XIII.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">-...</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">it is an act of public law in all its stages... In sum, expropriation in all its stages and elements is a homogeneous institution of public law because </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the compensation arises upon the exercise of a power of the State to ensure equality before public burdens... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">XV.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Only legally verified public interest justifies the deprivation of property. That is, not all State requirements demand an expropriation, for which its propriety requires a cause (legally verified public interest), which stands as a clear limit to the arbitrary exercise of the expropriatory power... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The ultimate end of expropriation is not the ablation of the property right but the subsequent public interest purpose given to the good (it always implies a material or juridical transformation of the expropriated good), therefore it must be regarded as a means and not an end in itself; it is an instrument for achieving an end, it cannot lack a cause... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">XVI.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">...</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> the broadest expression is that of public interest, since this covers both public necessity and social interests, being equivalent to the needs of the community that require satisfaction (needs that the State or a public entity seeks to satisfy for itself or for the community). </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Every need must be satisfied, and precisely from there is born the interest. Interest is the relationship between an individual or collective need and the instruments to satisfy it, which generate a utility. Public interest must be understood as the future destination of the expropriated object, that is, its allocation (afectación) to a concrete public interest purpose.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The State may expropriate only by reason of "legally verified public interest"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">...</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">XXX.</span><span> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">- Expropriation is accomplished through a general procedure</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, however, the legislator has progressively conceived specific procedures, depending on the interests pursued; it can be divided into two phases: a) the administrative phase, of settlement (avenimiento), amicable agreement, amicable cession, or extrajudicial phase, and b) the judicial phase. A triangle will be present, composed of the expropriatory power of the State, the right to equitable economic compensation in favor of the dispossessed owner, and the judicial guarantee of executing the expropriation in accordance with the legal system.... </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">XXXIII.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">If settlement is not achieved, the expropriator must resort to the jurisdictional pathway. In this venue, the parties are the expropriator and the expropriated. In this proceeding, the expropriated party may basically challenge the amount of compensation. The law empowers the expropriator to obtain possession of the good once the amount of compensation set in due course by the administrative body has been deposited. This proceeding has two essential characteristics; 1) it is summary, meaning its processing must be done with celerity and it has short timeframes, and, 2) it is urgent, because the expropriator may dispose of the good if it previously deposits the provisional compensation, the definitive amount of which is established later. The competent judge is that of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (except when it concerns agrarian expropriations, where the agrarian judge is competent), since it is an institution of public law, being a real action exercised by the State. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">When there are disputed facts, the proceeding must be opened to evidence, on the value of the expropriated goods. The expropriatory procedure has a universal character in that all issues affecting or concerning the purpose or consequences of that institution (transfer of the good, compensation, legitimacy of the allocation, individualization of the good, etc.) must be raised and resolved in it.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. The judgment shall set the corresponding amount of compensation. Thus, the expropriatory power must be exercised through a formal procedure; prior to its commencement, there must be a legally verified public interest. The procedure serves to achieve its objective: the patrimonial deprivation of the expropriated party...."</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(emphasis added intentionally)</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IV.- Continuation...</span><span> </span><span> </span><span> This Tribunal is very clear that the ends of the challenged coercive administrative pathway, through the underlying administrative act,</span><span> </span><span> cannot and must not be spurious or non-existent, nor an instrument to supplement state inefficiency, to profit, or to speculate; much less to empty the property right of content without any reason or with a distorted reason; hence, the substantiation of the expropriatory power is one of means, not as an end, all for the achievement of socio-economic tasks of the State and, above all, the common good, relativizing the property right by considering it as not absolute, to satisfy collective needs and public interests identifiable with the general interest. It is taken into account that when a sacrifice is imposed on a private individual for a public</span><span> </span><span> or general interest, this must be minimized through compensation with an equivalent economic value; the same that, when the one proposed in the administrative venue is challenged, questioned, or rejected, refers the dispute to the summary pathway of expropriation, for the determination of the just price based on the inherent values and virtues that the affected good exhibits. It is a truism to indicate that the core issue at hand corresponds to an improvement of the compensation fixed in the challenged expropriations. The judicial case management system SIGDJ and the folios of judicial case file 318-388 inform that the expropriation proceedings 04-000319-0163-CA and 04-000125-01653-CA, the first pursued against Cuatro Amigos S.A., was resolved by Ruling of this Section No. 257-2010, upholding the appeal of the expropriated party and granting the sum of </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">¢32,411,051</span><span> colones and, the second pursued against Nombre81076 ()</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span>, confirmed the resolution of the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">a quo</span><span>, through Ruling No. 451-2011 of Section I, maintaining the amount granted in the sum of </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">¢8,304,817</span><span> colones; that is, those proceedings fully complied with the necessary requirements, formal and material, by which they were permitted to materialize the expropriation for the specific case, among these, not only the individualization of the goods but also the underlying public interest. It should be added that the judicial proceedings ratified the prior administrative handling thereof and the opposition of the expropriated party at that time redirected the process toward the judicially established procedural route by which the easements (servidumbres) of interest were implemented. The justifications for establishing the easements for the corridor of the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line were published in </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">La Gaceta Nos. 46 of March 5, 2004 and 30 of February 12, 2004</span><span> respectively. The expropriatory reason was materialized here. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>In ruling of Section I, No. 451-2011 of sixteen hours ten minutes of October thirteenth, two thousand eleven, within case file 04-125-0163-CA, the Tribunal stated:</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> "</span><span> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">IV. OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY IN EXPROPRIATION MATTERS: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Indeed, having analyzed the case file, in light of the grievances whose consistency invokes the presence of absolute nullity due to the absence of requirements proper to expropriation, it must be noted that this tendency of the grievances must be rejected in its entirety, since the correct perspective from which they must be viewed appears only from the procedural periphery that the specialty of the legal ritus imposes on the very object of the functional competence that this Chamber holds regarding an expropriation, that is, compliance with the requirements that for it—expropriation—are required, it is insisted, as it involves a special proceeding.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> The best procedural doctrine not only sees nullity from the perspective of a grotesque defenselessness in the proceeding, but for better understanding it refers to the study of the constitutive elements of an act or set of procedural acts that fulfill formal structure (procedural requirements) and material structure (merits requirements).</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Viewed under this lens, the expropriation matter, both in its special law (7495) and the very special law on expropriations and establishment of easements of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (6313), requires the presence of several fundamental requirements that this Body does appreciate from the study of the case file, namely: a) declaration of public interest; b) duly motivated expropriation act; c) notification to the interested party; d) publication in the Official Gazette.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Once these requirements are verified, the functional competence definition of the jurisdiction that handles this type of proceeding follows, which results in the fixing of a just price for the expropriation.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Equally clear must be the scope of the words "duly motivated expropriation act," since on this point the Tribunal, in an expropriation proceeding—special—as has been stated, must only verify the presence of the element of motivation as justification, at least succinctly, of the requirements of the administrative act, but this does not imply that from there, one can enter into the study of the technical merits of the content of the act as a material element, since analyzing in detail the merits of the motivation of the expropriation act constitutes a substantive thematic issue of merit for a plenary proceeding, which is characterized by constituting a general, broad, sufficient, and appropriate procedural instrument to address technical arguments that are not strictu sensu related to the fixing of the price and that it be just and that it provide with the greatest precision possible the conversion of the expropriated object into a pecuniary economic amount, as the object of substantive procedural substantiation, in the correct aspect that the procedural specialty of expropriation as such must finally rule upon.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Thus, this Chamber is precluded by legal imperative from addressing other themes that are not those provided in the doctrine of articles 10 of Law 6313 and 30 of Law 7495.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> It is not certain, as the appellant alleges, that the declaration of public interest "has been conspicuously absent throughout the entire administrative and judicial procedure," and it must be noted that the Tribunal must review not only that, but also the other procedural requirements that have led to the advanced stage in which the case file finds itself, within the enumeration previously mentioned.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Admitted for analysis as it was, the administrative case file and the judicial case file itself provide a clear view to this Chamber regarding all the requirements listed above; thus, between the judicial case file and the administrative one incorporated into the proceedings by certification and foliated within the aforementioned principal file, all the requirements proper to expropriation are perfectly visible at folios 4 to 15 and then, for further elaboration and indubitability, they are clearly explanatory, in light of the grievances, the following folios reflecting the non-absence of the necessary elements to have commenced and concluded this special proceeding at first instance: folios 4 to 15 show the administrative appraisal and the publication in the Official Gazette; folio 442 contains official letter DAL066-2004 of February 26, 2004, and folio 443 and up to 446 the official letters 108.03977.2004 DCPJ073 of February 4, 2004 and 0012-3474-2004 CD-047-2004 of January 23, 2004, where the criterion of the Institutional Legal Directorate of the plaintiff is accepted to provide all institutional information relating to the declaration of public interest in the path of the electric power transmission line over the appellant's property.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> In the same order of study, the administrative appraisal already referenced before is found, only now as part of the incorporated administrative case file, as stated, from folios 457 to 484; the invoice for the publication service at folio 468, the publication in the Official Gazette at folio 465 (repeated at folio 466), the notification of the administrative appraisal to the plaintiff at folio 471, which was carried out through official letter 107.52248.2003 of November 14, 2003, addressed to the plaintiff, in the acknowledgment of receipt of which allows one to read November 26, 2003, at 3:25 a.m. as its reception.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> The aforementioned official letter is clear as to the legal status of plaintiff-owner-expropriation and the procedural derivation this implies for the purposes of the owner.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> The administrative appraisal is repeated from folios 474 to folio 481.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> In the subsequent folios admitted for better resolution (487 to 522) are found technical analyses of the generality of the project, upon which rests the expropriation here under decision."</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The legally verified public interest justified the limitation of those properties for the pursued end</span><span>. An interest that was evidenced as verified through the forging of the high-voltage electric power interconnection project San Miguel - El Este - Río Macho, this conduct being, by its raison d'être and its pursued objectives, the reason and the motivation by </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">implicit conduct</span><span> that thus justified the expropriation proceedings from the administrative venue to the jurisdictional one, the pursued end being clearly identifiable: a supply of electric power in the face of the demand for this service, which results in a positive impact on the standard of living of citizens. An example of this expropriatory intent as a product of this necessary expansion turned out to be the sections expropriated for the establishment of the new SIEPAC electric transmission line, which interconnects the six countries of Central America. This network, of 1,800 kilometers, strengthens the exchange of electric power among the six countries of the region, which ensures the continuity of the electricity supply and favors more competitive prices; no less, then, was justified, for this case and the affected easements, the San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho Transmission Line project, which merited around 47 kilometers of transmission and the construction of around 60 towers, the objective of this being the link between high-voltage (230 KV) electricity transmission systems through a high-voltage aerial line, the acquisition of easements along the entire line being necessary for this. (see Resolution No. 2338-2004-SETENA at folios 86 to 90 of the judicial case file). It is necessary to point out, by the result of human logic and common sense, that transmission lines are necessary to have interconnected and integrated electrical systems, which are what guarantee to network users stability and reliability in the electrical service thanks to redundancy in sources and transmission lines. Energy projection model even endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber through ruling 02806-98, where the importance of transmission lines and the responsibility that ICE has to provide electric power to the national economy and consequently to the citizen is recognized.</span><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>It follows that the public necessity prior to the expropriatory exercise was recognized through the material instrumentation provided by the inherent exercise of the discretion that accompanies the interested Public Administration, by supporting, as part of the ordinary activity of ICE, and therefore constituting the public interest thereof, the formation of an electric power transmission corridor for high-voltage supply, it being through the Environmental Impact Study that is evidenced in the administrative case file containing 332 folios, the consideration of the project</span><span> </span><span> and the route of the corridor, the same that begins in the town of San Miguel in Santo Domingo de Heredia, heading toward the northwest up to tower 11.1, then takes to the east, passing through the town of Paracito and then through San Pedro de Coronado, where later from tower 33, it heads south to tower 38, from there it heads southeast to tower 40, thus crossing the canton of Coronado and entering that of Goicoechea, then the line again takes a southbound orientation crossing Goicoechea, San Rafael de Montes de Oca, and enters La Unión at tower 49, from there it changes course toward the southwest passing near the town of Concepción to reach the Este substation, opposite the road to Tres Ríos. The second section departs from the aforementioned substation crossing the hamlets in San Juan and crosses the Florencio del Castillo highway at the toll station, continues southbound to cross the protective zone of the Cerros de la Carpintera, touches the far eastern end of the district of Patarrá de Desamparados, and crosses the canton of El Guarco near the towns of Tobosi and Tejar up to tower 49; from that point it heads toward the southeast crossing the canton of El Guarco and arriving again at the canton of Cartago toward the community of Muñeco and Navarro, where at tower 21 it again changes course toward the south-southeast and enters the canton of Paraíso up to the Río Macho substation (folios 0034-0035-0036 of the environmental study file), the real properties of the plaintiffs being intercepted in part and in proportion by the width of the easement.</span><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>This is the precise and concrete requirement, within its typical competencies and justified, by which ICE demanded and exercised the consequent expropriatory power and to which the particular and private interest must submit.</span></p> The trajectory and the selection of the route, as well as the real property interests necessary for the formation of this corridor, are merely material acts consequent to the public interest determined in the operative and technical judgment of the ordinary activity of the entity, which has already been mentioned. It is therefore mandatory, for anyone opposing that essential public activity, in seeking its annulment, to prove its unsuitability as an institutional project in service of the community, or else the sterility or folly of the chosen corridor, that is, the legal/technical challenge to that corridor and its purpose itself, in order to detract from that public interest and demonstrate a purely administrative interest, in which case the explicit control of the administrative contentious jurisdiction would operate, an aspect that does not constitute the crux of the matter in this particular case, since the indicated public interest is supported without any discrediting, as it is the plaintiff's burden of proof to detract from the project via the chosen path.

In keeping with what has been indicated, this jurisdiction has been in agreement and of uniform opinion regarding the expropriation route for constituting forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE, as well as the applicable special regulatory framework, flatly rejecting the ordinary procedure of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) suggested by the appellant, especially in the understanding of the existence of its article 367.2.a) which excludes expropriations from that procedural rite. In this regard, by way of illustration of this consolidated position, we have: *“IV.- Legal regime applicable to the expropriation power and constitution of easements of ICE. By virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to present a brief review of the rules that regulate the activity of imposing an electrical line easement in favor of ICE. The very dynamics of the actions undertaken by ICE for the exercise of its service-providing competencies in electricity and telecommunications constitute the legitimizing basis for the allocation of a public power that enables it to expropriate the goods required to satisfy that public interest it is called upon to satisfy. But furthermore, it justifies the imposition of easements (servidumbres) on the lands (predios) necessary for carrying out its activities. In this line, Law No. 6313 of January 4, 1979 (Gazette No. 14 of January 19, 1979) Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations and Constitution of Easements of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, -amended by Law No. 8660 of July 29, 2008 (Scope No. 31 to La Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008)-, is precisely that special norm that regulates the expropriation dynamics of that public entity, as well as the procedure and rules pertaining to the imposition of easements (servidumbres). This legal source declares of public utility the real estate, rights or legitimate patrimonial interests that ICE requires for the fulfillment of its legal tasks (articles 1 and 2). That norm establishes the procedure that ICE must follow in expropriation matters, a topic that is not relevant in the present case. It suffices for these purposes to point out that according to article 22 ejusdem, said provisions are applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. This implies that the appraisal or valuation (tasación o avalúo) specified in the rules from 2 to 7 and concordant ones must be carried out, prior to ordering the constitution of the easement (servidumbre), in such a way that the compensation parameter for the imposition of such an administrative real right is included within that referent.”* (see Judgment: 00146 Case File: 11-007391-1027-CA, Date: 12/12/2013 Time: 10:50:00 a.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Tribunal, Section VI, and Judgment: 00050 Case File: 11-001886-1027-CA, Date: 16/03/2012 Time: 07:40:00 a.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Tribunal, Section VI) Likewise, in this same sense it was established: *"V.1- On the Expropriation Power of ICE and its regulations. The activity of the Instituto Costarricense del Electricidad in matters of expropriations is contained in the Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations and Easements, number 6313 of January 4, 1979, in which the works to be executed by ICE and its companies, in the fulfillment of the entrusted legal attributions, are declared of public utility, which describes the procedure to which the institution is subject to exercise its power of imperium regarding the imposition of expropriations and easements (servidumbres) necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes granted to it by law. In said legal instrument, the procedure that the Institution must comply with is described in order to guarantee the fundamental right protected by article 45 of the Political Constitution. It establishes as a first step the valuation of the property as well as all those movable or immovable rights that shall be affected, limiting article 3 to real damages of a permanent nature that have causation with the expropriation, following which, having approved the technical valuation expertise and issued the expropriation agreement (acuerdo expropiatorio) (article 7), the appraisal (avalúo) shall be made known to the owner, tenant or lessee so that within the following eight days they may express their will either to sell and accept the price fixed for the property, or indicate their disagreement, in the first case they shall appear for the granting of the corresponding deed, and in the second the institution shall resort to the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Court so that the Judge may fix the just price (justiprecio) (article 11). In the jurisdictional venue, the proceedings of appraisal for expropriation shall be processed and five days shall be granted to the expropriated party for the designation of the expert who will assess the damages caused (article 13); if necessary, a third expert may be appointed and a resolution shall be issued fixing the moment of compensation, which shall not be greater than that estimated in the valuation expertises (article 17), a resolution that may be appealed before the superior in case of disagreement of both or any of the parties (article 21). The same procedure is applicable for the constitution of easements (servidumbres) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, as well as for the fulfillment of any other purpose entrusted to the institution (article 22)."* (see Judgment: 00022 Case File: 12-001001-1027-CA, Date: 20/03/2013, Time: 04:00:00 p.m. Issued by: Administrative Contentious Tribunal, Section IV) Reviewing this position of the Tribunal, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote 966, in case file 00-000008-0163-CA at 2:10 hours on December 15, 2005, determined: *"In this regard, it is necessary to note that the Public Administration in general –central and decentralized– must adapt its conduct to the block of legality, enshrined in articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the LGAP. In this sense, the Political Constitution, in canon 45, establishes the principle of the inviolability of private property, except for legally proven public interest, and upon prior compensation according to the law. Likewise, Law number 6313 of January 4, 1979, Law of Acquisitions, Expropriations and Easements of the ICE, first article, provides: 'Real estate, whether complete farms, portions, rights or legitimate patrimonial interests, which due to their location are necessary, in the judgment of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, for the fulfillment of its purposes, are declared of public utility. These real estate properties may be expropriated pursuant to this law, whoever their owner may be.' For its part, article 22 ibidem, prescribes: 'The provisions of this law are applicable to the constitution of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines,' as for the direct or indirect fulfillment of any other purpose entrusted to ICE. From both provisions, it is clearly inferred that, for ICE to be able to constitute forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines, in case of opposition from the owner of the affected property (fundo), it must necessarily follow the expropriation procedure set forth in said regulations. Obviously, if the owner of the property (fundo) agrees, such a procedure is unnecessary."* And in a vote of that same Chamber (Judgment: 00448 in case file: 10-000617-1027-CA at nine hours on April 10, 2013, it added: *"IX.- Expropriation is a legal act of a special nature governed by public law. So much so that it arises from the expropriation decree which, necessarily, unilaterally identifies the property that responds to an interest—in this case of ICE—in obtaining it to satisfy a public need. This constitutional tool—expropriation power—was designed by the legislator under a double scheme. One administrative, where the preparatory acts are generated, among them, the communication of the appraisal (avalúo) of the land to the owner, which, in order to accelerate the process, in case of accepting it, would allow taking possession more quickly and thus destining it for public utility. And another in the jurisdictional venue, which arises, in principle, when the owner of the property does not accept the offered price, limiting the process to its determination. From this perspective, without a doubt, both hypotheses are born from the exercise of a public power. The expropriation power granted to ICE for the fulfillment of its purposes comes from Law 6313 itself, articles 2, 22 and 23; Law 7495, articles 13 and 14, as well as from the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, Law 8660, canon 79 (legal aspects extensively assessed by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling no. 2011-5271 at 15 hours 16 minutes on April 27, 2011). In this understanding, article 22 of Law 6313 stands out, which establishes that said regulation is applicable to the imposition of forced easements (servidumbres forzosas) for the laying of electrical and telecommunications lines by ICE. Canon 11 ibidem is the one that establishes the specific procedure that the Institution must follow for the purposes of expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres), among them, those for the laying of electrical lines. Thus, article 2 of that legal text declares of public utility the works that ICE and its companies undertake in the fulfillment of the legal attributions that the legal system has entrusted to them. Up to this point, it is clear that ICE is authorized by special law to impose electrical line laying easements (servidumbres), which by their very nature are of public utility—legally declared—and that the constitution procedure is defined by Law 6313 itself. Now then, once ICE's needs to undertake its projects are defined, the next step is the appraisal (avalúo) of the corresponding lands, which must be communicated to the owners prior to signing the agreement or decreeing the expropriation for the corresponding purposes. This last activity shall occur when there is no agreement or the interested parties do not respond to the call of the expropriating entity. At this point, it must be emphasized that this is carried out with the proper communication of the appraisal (avalúo). The expropriation must be agreed upon by the Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo). The agreement shall be published in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial). Finally, the Administration must resort to the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Court to request the fixing of the definitive appraisal (avalúo). In general terms, this is the expropriation and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres) procedure that the legislator entrusted to the Institute and its companies. Of interest for the grievance, it can be concluded that according to Law 6313, it is with the communication of the appraisal (avalúo) that the owner of the property learns about it and can challenge the ablative agreement (articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 11). That final communication is what the legal system requires, which must be made personally to the expropriated party or the owner affected by the easement (servidumbre) (article 8 Law 6313 and 25 Law 7495)."* From the accumulation of proven facts established by the a quo, it is inferred, in what is relevant to the case, that the Institute deemed it necessary, on the occasion of the often-cited work, to impose an easement right (derecho de servidumbre) over properties (fincas) no. 168956-000 and 423388-000, both of the Partido de San José and owned by the plaintiffs respectively. For this purpose, in the year 2002, the appraisal area of the Administrative Management Sub-management of ICE issued appraisals (avalúos) no. 743-2002 and 707-2002 for said properties. Subsequently, through Board of Directors agreements 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, respectively, and published in La Gaceta No. 46 of March 5, 2004, and La Gaceta No. 30 of February 12, 2004, the pertinent public interest was instrumented. For this Chamber, it is evident that long before the existence of the expropriation agreements (acuerdos expropiatorios), the plaintiffs had knowledge of the expropriation process that ICE had initiated. That communication entails the effects of informing and notifying the owner, not only of the existence of the forced easement imposition procedures (procedimientos de imposición forzosa de servidumbre), but also of the price or amount assessed for compensation. Therefore, as of that date, the period for them to respond to the Institute's call or manifest their opposition began, as historically occurred. By virtue of the foregoing, it was foreseeable that the Board, in Sessions Nos. 5557 of October 7, 2010, and 5459 of November 12, 2002, based on article 45 of the Political Constitution and on Law 6313 and 7495, would decide to decree the easement (servidumbre) necessary to fulfill the public interest, both making reference to the appraisals (avalúos) previously communicated to the land owners with the singular reference of the properties, as seen in the files of the expropriation processes. It is also evident that the Institute proceeded to previously inform the representative of the plaintiff company about the existence of the "expropriation proceedings for the constitution of an easement (servidumbre)." The law does not require that this appraisal (avalúo) be approved by the Board; its formal existence and its accordance with the legal system suffice. Thus, it is reiterated, the "expropriation agreement (acuerdo expropiatorio)" was adopted with the prior existence of the appraisals (avalúos). The appellant does not identify or does not wish to accept the nature of the special expropriation procedure with which ICE was endowed, nor does he exhibit the nullities he claims, much less does this Tribunal observe them. The legislator's original idea was to facilitate an agile and effective procedure for the Institute and its companies for the purposes of expropriations and forced imposition of easements (servidumbres). Those procedures are governed by the special stipulations of Law 6313 and supplementarily by those of the Expropriation Law (article 2 Law 6313). According to what has been analyzed, the actions prior to the expropriation agreement (acuerdo expropiatorio) (including the appraisal (avalúo)) are valid and effective, given that ICE's call complies with the provisions of canon 11 of Law 6313, through an act issued by competent officials, duly communicated (according to the parameters of article 25 of Law 7495, of supplementary application by mandate of canon 2 of Law 6313) and approved by the Board in the indicated sessions.

In addition to the above, it must be insisted that Law 6313 declares of public utility the real estate, whether complete farms, portions, rights or legitimate patrimonial interests, which by their location are necessary (in the Institute's judgment) for the fulfillment of its purposes (article 1 ibidem). That is one of the main differences in relation to the procedure of Law 7495, where a "Declaration of public interest" is established as a prior requirement for expropriation, since to expropriate, a reasoned act through which the property to be expropriated is declared of public interest is indispensable. Even that declaration of public interest in Law 7495 must be notified to the interested party or their legal representative and published in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial) (article 18 Law 7495), just as happened in the case of file 04-000125-0163-CA. Due clarification is that, due to the declaration by operation of law (declaratoria de pleno derecho) that operates in Law 6313, this action is not necessary in the expropriations and easements (servidumbres) carried out by ICE under this format (04-000319-0163-CA). Regarding the agreement (acuerdo), the Law in question does not require that it be notified personally to the administered party; its publication in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial) according to article 11 ibidem suffices. In this understanding, the publication of the agreement was carried out in the indicated Gazettes, with which the legal requirement was fully complied with. Both actions (appraisal (avalúo) and agreement (acuerdo)) meet the legal requirements to produce the desired effects.

This Tribunal does not accept for itself the claims of the appellant and rejects the positions adduced when he states: that ICE as the Expropriating Administration must establish the concrete application of said public interest in relation to specific real estate properties, and it is that specific determination that must be declared in a specific and detailed manner to individualize the exercise of the power of imperium to the detriment of a property and a specific administered party, or likewise, when he states: the A QUO errs in accepting the absence of a concretization act in ICE's expropriation process and in not recognizing it as a formal and essential element of the expropriation process. Nor is it acceptable when he states: The A QUO errs in accepting that said absence violates the right of defense of the administered party. Without a formal communication of the concrete act that individualizes the public interest for a specific purpose on a specific property, the Administered party is left without a way to attack the lack of grounds for the act in their specific case and causes defenselessness of the party. It is here where the grounds (motivo) and the content (contenido) of the administrative act must be analyzed, which has been claimed as non-existent by this representation throughout this process. The A QUO errs in not seeing that ICE has hidden from the Administered party and the Court any source of information that would allow verification of whether the grounds for the expropriation act in effect exist, whether the content is proportional to the grounds, and whether the content in effect fulfills the purpose intended by the legal system. Clearly, none of these elements can be examined in an implicit act that has not been formally communicated, and finally, the assertion of the error of the a quo in that the A Quo has omitted to consider, counts the fact that the expropriated party was never given, and to date has not been given, access to the entirety of the administrative files that truly constitute the decision-making process on the choice and final location of the route of the aforementioned transmission line. It is a fundamental fact of the lawsuit that ICE has indeed prevented the administered party's access to the files in which the decisions are documented that end up being the very foundation of the declaration of public interest necessary for the expropriation of this easement of passage (servidumbre de paso).

V.- Cont... In the case of ICE, the general declaration of utility was generically agreed upon by the legislator himself; and it is known that the procedure begins with the execution of the expert appraisal (avalúo pericial), which is then notified to the expropriated party, and if they do not accept it, it proceeds to decree the expropriation, thus concluding said phase. Thus, the possibility of knowing and challenging the ablative agreement and the underlying public interest is implicit in the communication of the appraisal (avalúo), according to the design of the law itself. If the party does not accept the appraisal (avalúo), they must dispute it in the special expropriation process, and if, in addition to the review of the administrative appraisal (avalúo) that assessed the compensation, they wish to dispute the exercise of the expropriation power, they must do so via a plenary proceeding, proving the nullity of said administrative acts and the impropriety or non-existence of the general interest. As a corollary of the foregoing, it must be made clear then that the appraisal (avalúo) was the act through which the Institute communicated to the owner of the properties its intention and justification for constituting an administrative easement (servidumbre administrativa) (electrical line laying), as well as the compensation offered. As of the formal delivery of this document, according to the applicable normative text, expropriation was to proceed through the Board's agreement, which for its validity complied with the regulated requirements demanded. For these reasons, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is also no injury to administrative due process, since the easement imposition procedure (procedimiento de imposición de servidumbre) carried out by the Institute complies with the regulations created for that purpose.

VI.- Cont.... Administrative burdens such as expropriated easements (servidumbres) constitute a real public right constituted by a state entity over a foreign property, with the purpose of having it serve public use. The imposition of these administrative limitations clearly presupposes its own limits: 1) the restriction must be adequately proportional to the administrative need that must be satisfied with it; proportionality is given in relation to the need to be satisfied, it is not a fixed measure but varies according to the case. 2) it must have some type of plausible justification, it must truly respond to an administrative need but directed towards an indivisible and indispensable public purpose. 3) it is required that it does not alter, disintegrate, or dismember the property. In any of these cases, it will be appropriate to establish an easement (servidumbre) or carry out the expropriation, but the mere non-compensated restriction will not be valid. 4) that it is valid in its form, competence, object, and will. Due to the dynamism of organic administrative activity, administrative easements (servidumbres administrativas) may be constituted directly by law (No. 6313 for ICE), or authorized by law but established by the authorized administration in a specific administrative act, precisely, expressed by the expropriation agreement (acuerdo expropiatorio) (in administrative venue or else passed to the judicial route), in which case, as has been affirmed and as the a quo stated, the act became implicit, not through a preceptive administrative resolution, produced as a result of a controversial administrative procedure or opposition procedure like the one suggested by the appellant for the application of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), more precisely, articles 308 et seq., this due to the speciality and prevalence of the normative expropriation rite that protects ICE over the general expropriation law and, of course, over the LGAP, on the aspects of constitution and validity of real impositions, this by express prohibition (367.2.a- LGAP). Of course, the judge can and has the functional competence to control whether the acts that execute or implement the expropriation have adjusted or not to the regulated acts that the law regulates or has authorized, as the case may be, so it is only on this topic that this Tribunal differs from the thinking of the a quo, insofar as it creates an isolated niche, immune and unchallengeable regarding implicit acts, but that does not alter the determined solution, given the lack of substantial demonstration of the non-existence or unsuitability of the chosen layout and its need for the high-voltage overhead line corridor, ergo, of the internal nullity of the path generated, this in the socio-economic and legal aspects, as it is a burden of proof of the interested party. The public interest must be understood as the primary destination of the expropriated object in the future, which allows that by technical norm and even by additional executive decree, the purpose of the imposed coercive exercise is operationalized by opportunity and convenience (articles 16 and 154 of the LGAP), with the implementation of the easements (servidumbres) and respective and corresponding cadastres for the material utility of the separated property. Although the Political Constitution in its article 45 establishes that property is inviolable, and that no one may be deprived of theirs except for a legally proven public interest, that is already accredited in the indicated declaration and published in the referenced Gazettes, so that what was declared or ordered was not imprecise, equivocal, negligent, or remiss in the obligatory identification of the property nor in its intrinsic necessity. The ultimate purpose of expropriation is not the ablation of the property right but the subsequent public interest destination given to the property (it always implies a material or legal transformation of the expropriated property) as has been pointed out, therefore it must be considered as a means and not an end in itself, it is an instrument for achieving an end, it cannot lack a cause and this is fully identified jointly with the respective real estate property, so there is no uncertainty, legal or real insecurity that diminishes the affected property right and the subsequent definition of the fair price. By way of summary, it must be concluded that this Tribunal does not consider that the alleged defects are of such magnitude as the appellant refers to and that give sufficient reasons to affirm the existence of nullities capable of being categorized as absolute, nor is the absence of an essential element estimated in the formal and material conduct deployed by ICE due to substantial non-conformity with the legal system.

Both the public interest and the individualization of the property are duly identified, sufficient elements for the validity of the declaration of public interest under challenge and the imposition of the established easement (servidumbre), consequently the grievances set forth in Considerando II find no remedy or acceptance in this instance.

**VII.- Regarding costs.-** The representative of the plaintiffs appeals the award of costs, noting that they have had sufficient elements and grounds to litigate, and therefore requests to be exempted from the payment of costs. In matters of regulating personal and procedural costs, numerals 221 to 224 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) must be observed (applied in a supplementary manner in the absence of regulation in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), as provided in numeral 103 thereof), as well as articles 98 and 99 of the aforementioned Law. In this regard, as it is mandatory for the judge to rule on them in the judgment (ordinal 59 subsection 2 of the procedural Law and 221 of the cited Code), two possibilities must be considered when issuing the ruling, **1)** that it is resolved without a special award of costs, **2)** or with a special award imposing their payment on one of the parties.

In the first hypothesis, it shall be resolved without a special award of costs in application of the doctrine informing numeral 222 in fine, with each party paying those it has incurred and both sharing those that are common. The reasons for deciding in this manner are that some exonerating cause occurs, such as reciprocal defeat, that the losing party has litigated in good faith, if the claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, if part of the fundamental petitions of the claim or counterclaim are granted in the decision, if important defenses invoked by the losing party are admitted, in the event of the Administration acquiescing to the plaintiff's claims (unless the claim substantially reproduces what was requested in the denied administrative claim, and that denial founded the action), when due to the nature of the issues debated there was sufficient ground to litigate, if the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was plausibly unknown to the opposing party and for that reason its opposition was justified, and finally if the prevailing party incurred in plus petitio, meaning that the difference between what was claimed and what was obtained in the judgment is 15% or more. From the proceedings in this case file and the manner in which this matter was resolved, no possible exemption applies. It is noted that such an award does not imply a characterization of recklessness or bad faith. Therefore, no legal breach occurs if the losing party is condemned, and thus the lower court body merely applied the rule in the terms it provides, and therefore does not incur the error indicated, imposing the rejection of this ground of appeal.

**POR TANTO** The challenged resolution is confirmed insofar as it has been subject to appeal.

**Ronaldo Hernández Hernández** **Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos** **Eduardo González Segura** **EXPEDIENTE: 04-000252-163-CA.** **ACTOR: CUATRO AMIGOS S.A y otro** **DEMANDADO: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD**

Nº 13 - 2016-II Nº 13 - 2016-II SECCION II. TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA.- Goicoechea, a las ocho horas del veintiséis de febrero de dos mil dieciséis.

Apelación en proceso ordinario promovido por Nombre72179 mayor, casado una vez, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad CED48746 , vecino de Curridabat, en su condición de apoderado especial de la Sociedad denominada Cuatro Amigos S.A, y del señor Nombre81076 , mayor, casado, empresario, vecino de Rancho Redondo, portador de la cédula de identidad CED31489 , contra el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, representado por Adriana Jiménez Calderón, mayor, casada, abogada, vecina de San Francisco de Dos Ríos, portadora de la cédula de identidad CED30270 , en su condición de Apoderada Especial Judicial del Instituto demandado.

RESULTANDO:

1- Que fijada en definitiva la cuantía de este asunto, como INESTIMABLE, con base en los hechos que expone y citas legales aducidas, la demanda es para que en sentencia:" A) Nulidad por ilegalidad de los actos: Que por no ser conformes a Derecho y por estar viciados de nulidad, se declara la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes actos: 1. Los dos actos presuntos o implícitos que no conocemos y que supuestamente debe haber sido dictado por el Consejo Directivo del ICE declarando el interés público de los terrenos propiedad de los actores y afectados por las acciones del ICE, y que implícita o explícitamente ordenaron la expropiación de las servidumbres sobre las fincas propiedad de los demandantes, incluyendo todos los actos sustanciales o de procedimiento en el procedimiento seguido por el ICE para la determinación del interés público de los terrenos de los actores,y abarcando también la ausencia misma de dicho procedimiento. 2. El acto administrativo implícito en la decisión de iniciar sendas diligencias de expropiación de derecho de servidumbre sobre las fincas de los actores en sede judicial. 3. El oficio 108.03977.2004-DCPJ 073 firmado por la Licda Julieta Bejarano Directora de la Dirección Jurídica Institucional de fecha 04 de febrero de 2004. 4. El acuerdo tomado por el Consejo directivo del ICE en sesión 578 de 20 de enero de 2004 en el cual se dispone" rechazar el reclamo" de Don Nombre81076 y Cuatro Amigos S.A y " en consecuencia dar por agotada la vía administrativa." 5.El oficio 108.000490.2004-DCPJ/018 de fecha 13 de enero de 2004 firmado por el Lic Giovanni Bonilla Goldoni, Jefe de la División de Consultoría y Procesos Judiciales del ICE. 6. Los actos de notificación llevados a cabo el 26 de noviembre de 2003 cuando fueron entregados al Sr. Nombre72026 , representante legal de Cuatro Amigos S.A y al Sr. Nombre81076 respectivamente los oficios 107.52247.2003 y 107.52248.2003 de fecha 14 de noviembre de 2003, firmados ambos por el Lic. Carlos Alberto Quesada Fernández, Jefe del Área de Notariado -Dirección Jurídica del ICE. 7. Todos los actos sustanciales del procedimiento en el procedimiento seguido por el ICE para la determinación del avalúo y subsiguiente expropiación de las servidumbres referidas. 8. El avalúo No 707-2002 de fecha setiembre de 2002 firmado por el Ing. Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo en el cual pretende establecer la indemnización correspondiente al costo del derecho de servidumbre y a los daños y perjuicios irrogados por el paso de la referida línea de transmisión de alto voltaje a la finca número 423399-000 del Partido de San José propiedad de Nombre81076 , en la suma de ¢ 2.280.264,70. 9. El avalúo No 743-2002 fechado noviembre de 2002 en el cual el Ing Carlos Alberto Salazar Angulo pretende establecer la indemnización correspondiente al costo del derecho de servidumbre y a los daños y perjuicios irrogados por el paso de la referida línea de transmisión de alto voltaje a la finca número 168956-000 del Partido de San José propiedad de Cuatro Amigos S.A en la suma de ¢ 13.030.459,15 . 10. Todo acto interno o externo, preparatorio procedimental, decisorio y/o de ejecución anteriores o posteriores a los relacionados, que esté relacionado directa o indirectamente con la expropiación y avalúo de las servidumbres referidas en tanto y en cuanto sean instrumentales en la violación de los derechos de mi representada y que sean contrarios a derecho. 11. Los actos administrativos explícitos o implícitos con los que el ICE determinó que la ruta actual del proyecto es la idónea. 12. Los actos administrativos explícitos o implícitos y las actuaciones materiales con los que el ICE ha ejecutado buena parte de las obras del proyecto antes de la viabilidad ambiental. 13. Los actos administrativos explícitos o implícitos y las actuaciones materiales con los que el ICE ejecutó la construcción de la torre localizada sobre el derecho de vía del camino del Durazno. B) Resarcimiento de daños y perjuicios por actos legales e ilegales: Que se declare en abstracto la responsabilidad civil en que ha incurrido el ICE y/o sus funcionarios o peritos por la comisión de actos ilegales y por la negligencia en el reconocimiento de las nulidades. En caso que hubiese responsabilidad por actos legales de la administración, también se solicita se declare y se incluya en la responsabilidad civil de la Institución. En todo caso los daños y perjuicios se liquidarán oportunamente en ejecución de sentencia, pero desde ya se solicita la declaratoria del monto junto con el reconocimiento de que se trata de una obligación de valor que debe ser indexada para que no sea erosionada por la inflación. C) Reconocimiento y restablecimiento de derechos: Que se reconozca la situación jurídica individualizada y se adopten las medidas necesarias para el restablecimiento de la misma. D) Condenatoria en costas: Que se condene al ICE al pago de ambas costas de esta acción y de todas las defensas asumidas por los actores tanto en sede judicial como en sede administrativa.( folios 129 a 132 del expediente judicial) 2- En resolución de las diez horas y seis minutos del siete de Setiembre del año dos mil cinco se tuvo por formalizada la demanda y se confirió traslado a la Institución demandada.( folio 133 del expediente judicial) 3- Que la representante del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad contestó la acción en forma negativa y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación y la genérica de sine actione agit.( folios 142 a 160 del expediente judicial) 4- La Jueza Cynthia Sandoval Bonilla, en sentencia Nº 1378 - 2015 de las catorce horas del treinta y uno de julio de dos mil quince, resolvió: " Se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación. Se acoge la de falta de derecho, y en consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos esta demanda. Son ambas costas a cargo de los actores vencidos." 5- El apoderado especial judicial de la actora, en su expresada calidad apeló, recurso admitido y en virtud del cual, conoce este Tribunal en alzada.

6- Los representantes del demandado se apersonaron durante el emplazamiento solicitando sea confirmada la resolución impugnada, indicando que la misma no contradice el ordenamiento jurídico aplicado y se sujeta en un todo a derecho.

7- A la apelación se le ha dado el trámite debido, y no se observan vicios u omisiones susceptibles de producir nulidad de lo actuado o indefensión a las partes. Se dicta esta resolución, previa deliberación dentro del margen de tiempo que las labores de este Despacho lo permiten.

Redacta el Juez Hernández Hernández ; y

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- En cuanto al elenco de hechos probados estima este Colegio prohijarlos por tener fiel reflejo con lo acreditado en autos.

II.- AGRAVIOS DEL APELANTE. 1.- Señala el apelante que el A Quo deniega las pretensiones incoadas por mis representados, aduciendo una declaratoria general de interés público para todas aquellos bienes inmuebles que sean objeto de expropiación por parte del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, según el artículo primero de su ley especial de expropiaciones. Esta aseveración no la discutimos y estamos de acuerdo. Pero la declaración que hace la ley, aunque es necesaria, no es suficiente para concretar una expropiación. Es claro que la declaratoria general de interés público establece tan solo la relación entre la actividad del ICE y los bienes inmuebles cuya expropiación pudiera ser necesaria o conveniente para dicha actividad. En efecto el ICE como Administración Expropiante, debe establecer la aplicación concreta de dicho interés público con relación a determinados bienes inmuebles, y es dicha determinación en concreto la que debe declararse de manera específica y detallada para individualizar el ejercicio de la potestad de imperio en perjuicio de un inmueble y de un administrado en particular.

2.- Yerra el A QUO en aceptar la ausencia de un acto de concretización en el proceso de expropiación del ICE y al no reconocerlo como un elemento formal y esencial del proceso de expropiación. Es claro que la declaratoria general de interés público establece tan solo la relación entre la actividad del ICE y los bienes inmuebles cuya expropiación pudiera ser necesaria o conveniente para dicha actividad y que, para ejercer la potestad expropiatoria es necesario un acto de individualización en el cual se identifica un bien inmueble particular y concreto (la finca de mi representada) para que sirva a un fin particular y concreto (el paso de una línea de transmisión). Ese acto de determinación concreta es la ausencia fatal que se acusa en esta impugnación como un vicio fundamental del proceso administrativo de expropiación y que a todas luces nunca se produjo con la formalidad debida para que el administrado pudiese ejercer la defensa de sus intereses. Donde yerra el A QUO es al decir que es suficiente con lo que dice la ley, y que el acto de concretización implícito no hace falta que se comunique formalmente ni que sea revisado judicialmente y de hecho se niega a declarar la nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta de la expropiación por ausencia de la comunicación formal de este acto de concretización del interés público en un inmueble específico.

3.- Yerra el A QUO al aceptar que dicha ausencia vulnere el derecho de defensa del administrado. En efecto el ICE como Administración Expropiante, debe establecer la aplicación concreta de dicho interés público con relación a determinados bienes inmuebles, y es dicha determinación en concreto la que debe declararse de manera específica y detallada para individualizar el ejercicio de la potestad de imperio en perjuicio de un inmueble y de un administrado en particular. En el caso que nos ocupa, el ICE llevó a cabo dicha concretización de manera tan solo implícita y nunca lo formalizó en un acto concreto que debió sustanciar con la debida motivación y con los requisitos de ley para poder ofrecer al administrado la oportunidad de poder impugnar el acto por vicios en sus elementos esenciales. Sin una comunicación formal del acto concreto que individualiza el interés público para un fin específico en un inmueble específico, el Administrado se queda sin manera de atacar la falta de motivo del acto en su caso específico y origina indefensión de la parte. Ese acto de determinación concreta es la ausencia que se acusa en esta impugnación y que a todas luces nunca se produjo con la formalidad debida para que el administrado pudiese ejercer la defensa de sus intereses.

4.- Yerra el A QUO al aceptar que, por estar implícito el acto, no es revisable ni por el administrado ni por el Poder Judicial. La posición que adscribe el A QUO se encuentra entonces fundamentalmente errada, ya que al aceptar como bueno un acto implícito de determinación en estas condiciones de hecho está aceptando que el acto de determinación específica que lleva a cabo el ICE en cada expropiación es de hecho imposible de impugnar e imposible de revisar judicialmente. Al aceptar como bueno un acto implícito el Juez A QUO de hecho está declarando que dicho acto no está sujeto a ninguna posibilidad de revisión judicial y está creando artificialmente un acto administrativo no revisable, crea un ámbito de impunidad del poder en un ejercicio de la potestad de imperio expropiatoria, que es la más peligrosa que tiene la Administración. Ciertamente la potestad expropiatoria, con la única excepción del ius puniendi, es sin duda la potestad que más potencial tiene para amenazar los derechos del administrado y por lo tanto una de las funciones que con más celo debe revisar el Poder Judicial. Con ello no solo está haciendo nugatorio el derecho de mi representada de poder exigir la comunicación formal del acto de concretización y también está haciendo nugatorio el derecho de mi representada de poder exigir la revisión de la legalidad de dicho acto, sino que además está aceptando que el acto implícito no sea revisado ni impugnado en sede administrativa y en sede judicial. Ciertamente la posibilidad de solicitar y obtener la revisión de una acto administrativo en sede administrativa es un derecho fundamental del administrado, pero la posibilidad de impugnar y revisar JUDICIALMENTE un acto administrativo es uno de los controles intraórganos más importantes del Estado de Derecho de la Democracia Constitucional. Es sin duda función fundamental del Poder Judicial en nuestro sistema jurídico y político el que se pueda revisar la conformidad del acto administrativo con la ley, es decir, revisar la legalidad del acto administrativo es un derecho constitucional fundamental para el funcionamiento efectivo del Estado de Derecho. Por ello resulta incomprensible e inexcusable la posición del A QUO al respaldar una interpretación en la cual de hecho está voluntariamente dejando de ejercer su deber de revisar la legalidad del acto administrativo implícito de concretización del interés público en el inmueble específico de mi representada. Falla por lo tanto de una manera fundamental el A QUO al denegar la revisión judicial del acto administrativo implícito y viola el principio de que TODO acto administrativo debe estar sujeto a revisión judicial, es decir traiciona lo que en nuestro medio se llama la LUCHA CONTRA LAS INMUNIDADES DEL PODER 5.- Yerra el A QUO en considerar que el acto es legal. Contrario a la interpretación dada por el juzgador de instancia, la declaratoria de interés público deviene únicamente en uno de los elementos del acto administrativo, el cual no es válido si no se aprecian vicios en los elementos integradores que permitan concluir su legitimidad e idoneidad -artículo 128 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-. Según ha reconocido la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, la potestad administrativa está sujeta a un fin , y este fin en la actividad expropiatoria de la administración pública, es la consecución del interés público, pudiendo representarse para el caso bajo estudio en un acceso universal e idóneo a la energía eléctrica. Repito sobre esto no hay discusión. Pero si nos preguntamos ¿cómo logramos este fin?, se abre un abanico de posibilidades, legítimas e ilegítimas, a través de las cuales la administración, en este caso el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, decide afectar a un fundo u otro. Es acá donde se debe analizar el motivo y el contenido del acto administrativo, lo cual ha sido reclamado como inexistente por esta representación a lo largo de este proceso. Yerra el A QUO al no ver que el ICE ha ocultado del Administrado y del Juzgado toda fuente de información que permita verificar si el motivo del acto de expropiación en efecto existe, si el contenido es proporcionado al motivo y si el contenido en efecto cumple con el fin querido por el ordenamiento. Claro ninguno de estos elementos se puede examinar en un acto implícito que no ha sido formalmente comunicado. Sería idóneo tener los insumos dentro del expediente administrativo que pudieran enriquecer la discusión sobre la nulidad de los elementos del acto administrativo, sin embargo esto no es posible por la sencilla razón que no existen. El deber de administración pública de emitir un acto administrativo válido -que pueda ser revisado por el administrado, a quien se le está imponiendo una carga extraordinaria como excepción al principio de inviolabilidad de la propiedad privada inmerso en el artículo 45 de nuestra Carta Magna-, ha sido pasado por alto, fundándose así el reclamo de mis representadas.

6.- Garantizar la legitimidad de los elementos del acto funciona en doble vía. Sea para el administrado que desea verificar la idoneidad de su propiedad para el fin requerido por el Estado; así como que el mismo Estado pueda hacer una revisión contralora de los fondos utilizados para este propósito. Ante lo anterior surgen las siguientes preguntas, ¿Existen otras fincas cuyo trazado haga la línea de transmisión menos onerosa?; ¿Existen otras fincas con mejor topografia para el paso de líneas que se omitieran?; ¿Pagó de más el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por expropiar estos terrenos pudiendo pasar por otros? Entre las violaciones más serias acusadas por los actores, y que ha omitido considerar el A Quo, cuenta el hecho de que nunca se le dio y hasta la fecha no se le ha dado acceso al expropiado a la totalidad de los expedientes administrativos que realmente conforman el proceso de toma de decisiones sobre la elección y localización final de la ruta de la línea de transmisión supradicha. Es un hecho fundamental de la demanda el que el ICE en efecto ha impedido el acceso del administrado a los expedientes en los que se documentan las decisiones que terminan siendo el fundamento mismo de la declaratoria de interés público necesaria para la expropiación de esta servidumbre de paso. Una y otra vez se explicó al Juzgado que el ICE ha ocultado de manera consistente y constante toda información sobre los motivos y razones para la determinación de la ruta de la línea de transmisión, que es, en esencia, lo que explica cómo y por qué el inmueble de mi representada resulta necesario para el paso de la línea y por lo tanto es el centro del problema de la concretización del interés público en el inmueble específico. He aquí la violación en que incurre el ICE y que el Juez A QUO no quiere ver: el ICE oculta todo el proceso de toma de decisiones sobre la ruta de la línea bajo un manto de pseudo-tecnicismo y pretende que nadie lo revise. Lleva este ejercicio al extremo de violentar el proceso administrativo de la expropiación y nunca comunica de manera formal y sustanciada la determinación de dicha concretización en el caso específico precisamente para que el administrado no pueda conocer ni discutir los fundamentos de su decisión (es decir, no pueda examinar los elementos del acto -motivo, contenido y fin-). Lo que busca el ICE con esto es reducir las oportunidades de oposición de parte del administrado y con ello violenta los derechos fundamentales del administrado a la impugnación de los actos administrativos en sede administrativa y judicial e incurre claramente en desviación de poder al servir otro fin que no es el querido por el ordenamiento. Increíblemente el A QUO se presta a este juego y lo permite, haciendo de la autoridad judicial un co-autor en el asesinato de las garantías fundamentales del Estado de Derecho.

7.- En la misma línea lógica argumentativa esbozada hasta el momento, encontramos el artículo 1 de la Ley 6313 reiteradamente citado por el A Quo. Dicho ordinal expresa: "Declarasen de utilidad pública, los bienes inmuebles, sean fincas completas, porciones, derechos o intereses patrimoniales legítimos, que por su ubicación sean necesarios, a juicio del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad..." (el resaltado no es del original). Es evidente según los elementos de juicio dentro del expediente, que no se determinó la necesidad de la ubicación del terreno de los actores para la expropiación objeto de este proceso. En este sentido yerra el A Quo, que consideran satisfecho el examen de legalidad del acto al solo verificar el fin, olvidándose del contenido y del motivo. No existe información, o por lo menos nunca se le dio acceso a mis representados, ni fue traída a este proceso como parte del expediente administrativo, sobre la idoneidad y necesidad de los terrenos de mis representados respecto a su ubicación. ¡Nunca debe olvidarse que la función pública, máxime cuando se trata de afectación a los derechos del administrado y gasto de fondos públicos, debe ser transparente, fiscalizable y evaluable!

8.- Aún cuando, a consideración de esta representación, existen elementos de convicción que permiten revocar la sentencia recurrida, y en su lugar acoger las pretensiones de mis representadas, en caso de mantenerse la tesis de fondo del A Quo, deberá de eximirse de costas de acuerdo al artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil, lo anterior por cuanto queda patente la buena fe con la que han litigado los actores. Por el contrario, la posición del ICE, en querer exonerar a su acto de concretización del interés público de toda posibilidad de impugnación administrativa o judicial es lo que es indefendible y por ello, debe la parte demandada ser condenada en costas.

III.- El recurso de apelación debe desestimarse. Los agravios muestran mayormente un contenido subjetivo y repetitivo de los argumentos aducidos en la acción planteada, incluso vertidas en la oposición de las sentencias en los procesos expropiatorios, para con ello sustentar de manera reiterada la oposición con la postura del a quo en esta oportunidad. Qué se impugna, por qué se impugna, qué pruebas se obviaron para la valoración, cuál es el yerro del juez, qué normas trastocó, cómo violentó el marco jurídico, etc ., es el ejercicio intelectivo fundamental que debe hacer el recurrente, no solo mostrar la antítesis de la posición como falacia de petición de principio para hacer enervar el criterio de instancia, la contra argumentación es insuficiente. Se ataca la sentencia por su pronunciamiento o por la omisión en cuanto a su fundamento, y no a través de la reiteración aducida en el proceso. Obviamente, se deben exteriorizar (por contenido de la expresión material como por la del contenido normativo) esos reproches más allá de la posición técnica jurídica del apelante, los cuales servirán, en el caso del recurso de apelación, para que el órgano de alzada pueda resolver con plena competencia y con exclusivo límite a lo impugnado. Esto es, qué dijo el juzgador y en dónde y en qué radicó su yerro, es el consecuente preceptivo de la enunciación del quebranto de las normas conculcadas y la relación de los medios probatorios que acrediten la norma reclamada. El recurso debe encontrarse dentro de los alcances que establece el numeral 574 del Código Procesal Civil.

No obstante y a pesar de esta manera de argumentar, este Tribunal se permite hacer las siguientes consideraciones para desvirtuar el recurso. Como el tema y núcleo central en discusión en esta alzada, se refiere a la nulidad del acto administrativo expropiatorio ejecutado, por ausencia de un interés público instrumentado subyacente y en un acto concreto debidamente comunicado, como además, por su inidoneidad para el fin expropiatorio y, la oposición a la tesis del a quo en relación a la inimpugnabilidad del acto implícito sobre el acto expropiatorio, este Tribunal, estima pertinente, prudente y necesario ubicar y resaltar varios puntos en lo que la Sala Primera de la Corte (voto Nº 166 de las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del dieciocho de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos) y otras resoluciones han profundizado sobre la potestad expropiatoria y sobre lo cual no hay diferencia alguna para el caso concreto, para así desentrañar la polémica y rechazar el recurso interpuesto. Empecemos señalando que: "(...) II.- Para el logro de sus fines el Estado... puede emplear medios voluntarios (v. gr. la contratación administrativa) o coactivos (v. gr. el sistema impositivo), siendo fiel expresión de estos últimos la expropiación... Los fines de la vía coactiva, no deben ser espurios ni instrumento para suplir la ineficiencia estatal, lucrar o especular... III.-...E) Es la teoría de los fines del Estado la que explica satisfactoriamente la justificación del instituto objeto de examen; conforme ese planteamiento teórico, el cual tiene un fundamento pragmático, el Estado utiliza una serie de instrumentos, entre los cuales figura la potestad expropiatoria, para el logro de sus fines socio‑económicos y, sobre todo, del bien común... IV.- El instituto expropiatorio se justifica por cuanto el derecho de propiedad no es absoluto. Por el contrario, además de ser un derecho subjetivo debe satisfacer necesidades colectivas e intereses públicos. La expropiación no altera el régimen general de la propiedad, es consustancial con él pues cuando por un interés público se impone un sacrificio al privado, éste se debe minimizar mediante su compensación con un valor económico equivalente. La carga de la extinción de la propiedad no recae en el expropiado; la indemnización corre a cargo de todos los administrados, a través del sistema tributario, al ser tomada de los fondos públicos. V.- ... expropiación es toda adquisición forzosa o coactiva del derecho de propiedad privada, o de alguno de sus atributos, sobre un bien o derecho, por parte de un ente público, con fundamento en un poder concedido por la ley... VI.- La expropiación cumple un doble rol: como una potestad irrenunciable del Estado, y como garantía del administrado frente a la supresión de su derecho de propiedad adolecida en su patrimonio. La expropiación constituye un sacrificio singular y concreto, y como tal discriminatorio, por ende en aplicación del principio de la igualdad ante las cargas públicas (Artículos 18 y 33 de la Constitución Política) exige una restauración o compensación indemnizatoria... X.- El Código Civil contiene una norma específica. El artículo 293 dispone: "El propietario puede ser obligado a enajenar su propiedad para el cumplimiento de obligaciones contraídas o por motivo de utilidad pública. Los casos en que es permitida la expropiación por motivos de utilidad pública, y la manera de llevarse a efecto, serán regulados por ley especial"... XIII.-...se trata de un acto de derecho público en todas sus etapas... En suma, la expropiación en todas sus etapas y elementos es un instituto homogéneo de derecho público pues la indemnización nace ante el ejercicio de una potestad del Estado para asegurar la igualdad ante las cargas públicas... XV.- Únicamente el interés público legalmente comprobado justifica la privación de la propiedad. Esto es, no todos los requerimientos del Estado demandan una expropiación, por lo cual para su procedencia se requiere de una causa (interés público legalmente comprobado), la cual se yergue como un claro límite al ejercicio arbitrario de la potestad expropiatoria... El fin último de la expropiación no es la ablación del derecho de propiedad sino el destino de interés público ulterior dado al bien (siempre implica una transformación material o jurídica del bien expropiado), por ello debe reputarse como un medio y no un fin en sí misma, es un instrumento para el logro de un fin, no puede carecer de causa... XVI.-... la expresión más amplia es la de interés público, pues ésta cubre tanto la necesidad pública como los intereses sociales, al ser equivalente a las necesidades de la colectividad que requieren satisfacción (necesidades que el Estado o un ente público busca satisfacer para sí o para la colectividad). Toda necesidad debe ser satisfecha, y precisamente de ahí nace el interés. El interés es la relación entre una necesidad individual o colectiva y los instrumentos para satisfacerla, los cuales generan una utilidad. El interés público debe entenderse como el destino del objeto expropiado en el futuro, es decir, la afectación a un fin de interés público concreto. El Estado puede expropiar sólo por motivo de "interés público legalmente comprobado" ... XXX. - La expropiación se cumple a través de un procedimiento general, no obstante, paulatinamente el legislador ha concebido procedimientos específicos, en función de los intereses perseguidos, puede ser dividido en dos fases: a) la administrativa, de avenimiento, acuerdo amigable, cesión amistosa o extrajudicial, y b) la judicial. Va a estar presente un triángulo integrado por la potestad expropiatoria del Estado, el derecho a la compensación económica equitativa a favor del propietario desposeído, y la garantía judicial de ejecutar la expropiación conforme al ordenamiento jurídico.... XXXIII. - De no lograrse el avenimiento el expropiante debe acudir a la vía jurisdiccional. En esta sede son partes expropiante y expropiado. En este juicio el expropiado podrá cuestionar básicamente el monto de la indemnización. La ley faculta al expropiante a obtener la posesión del bien una vez depositado el monto de la indemnización fijada en su oportunidad por el órgano administrativo. Este juicio tiene dos características esenciales; 1) es sumario, sea su tramitación debe hacerse con celeridad y cuenta con plazos cortos, y, 2) es urgente, porque el expropiante puede disponer del bien si deposita de previo la indemnización provisional, cuyo monto definitivo se establece posteriormente. El juez competente es el de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, (salvo cuando se trata de expropiaciones agrarias que será competente la del ramo), pues se trata de una institución de derecho público, pues se trata de una acción real ejercitada por el Estado. Cuando hay hechos controvertidos el juicio debe abrirse a pruebas, sobre el valor de los bienes expropiados. El procedimiento expropiatorio tiene un carácter universal en cuanto en él deben ser planteadas y resueltas todas las cuestiones que afecten o interesen la finalidad o consecuencias de ese instituto (transmisión del bien, indemnización, legitimidad de la afectación, individualización del bien, etc.) . La sentencia fijará el monto correspondiente de la indemnización. Entonces la potestad expropiatoria es menester ejercitarla mediante un procedimiento formal, de previo a su inicio debe haber un interés público legalmente comprobado. El procedimiento sirve para el logro de su objetivo: la privación patrimonial del expropiado...."(negrita resaltada intencional) IV.- Continuación... Este Tribunal tiene muy en claro que los fines de la vía administrativa coactiva cuestionada, a través del acto administrativo de base, no pueden ni deben ser espurios o inexistentes, ni instrumento para suplir la ineficiencia estatal, lucrar o especular; mucho menos para vaciar de contenido el derecho de propiedad sin razón alguna o razón deformada; de allí que la sustanciación de la potestad expropiatoria, lo es de medios, no como fin, todo ello, para el logro de cometidos socio‑económicos del Estado y, sobre todo, del bien común, relativizando el derecho de propiedad al tenerlo como no absoluto, para satisfacer necesidades colectivas e intereses públicos identificables con el interés general. En cuenta se tiene, que cuando por un interés público o general se impone un sacrificio al privado, éste se debe minimizar mediante su compensación con un valor económico equivalente, mismo que al momento de impugnarse, cuestionarse, o rechazarse el propuesto en la sede administrativa, remite el diferendo a la vía sumaria de la expropiación, para la determinación del precio justo sobre los valores y virtudes propios que expone el bien afectado. Verdad de perogrullo es señalar que el quid de fondo obedece a un mejoramiento de la indemnización fijada en las expropiaciones cuestionadas. El sistema judicial de gestión de expedientes SIGDJ y los folios del expediente judicial 318-388, informa que los procesos expropiatorios 04-000319-0163-CA y 04-000125-01653-CA, el primero seguido en contra de Cuatro Amigos S.A., fue resuelto por Voto de esta Sección N° 257-2010 acogiéndose la apelación del expropiado y otorgándose la suma de ¢32.411.051 colones y, el segundo seguido en contra de Nombre81076 () , se confirmó la resolución del a quo, mediante Voto N° 451-2011 de la Sección I, manteniéndose lo otorgado en la suma de ¢8.304.817 colones, esto es, tales procesos cumplieron a cabalidad con los requisitos necesarios, formales y materiales por los cuales se les permitía materializar la expropiación para el caso concreto, entre estos, no solo la individualización de los bienes sino además el interés público subyacente de base. Cabe agregar, que los procesos judiciales ratificaron la gestión administrativa previa al respecto y la oposición del expropiado en esa oportunidad, redireccionó la gestión hacia la ruta procesal judicial legalmente establecida mediante la cual se instrumentaron las servidumbres que interesaban. Las justificaciones para establecer las servidumbres para el corredor de la Línea de Transmisión San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho, fueron publicadas en La Gaceta N°s 46 del 5 de marzo del 2004 y 30 del 12 de febrero de 2004 respectivamente. Aquí se materializó la razón expropiatoria.

En voto de la Sección I, N°451-2011 de las dieciséis horas diez minutos del trece de octubre de dos mil once, dentro del expediente 04-125-0163-CA el Tribunal señaló: " IV. DE LA NULIDAD ABSOLUTA EN MATERIA EXPROPIATORIA: En efecto, analizado el expediente, a la luz de los agravios cuya consistencia invoca la presencia de nulidad absoluta por ausencia de requisitos propios de la expropiación, debe advertirse que esta tendencia de los agravios debe rechazarse en su totalidad, toda vez que la óptica correcta en que estos deben verse, luce sólo desde el periferia procesal que la especialidad del ritus jurídico le impone al objeto propio de la competencia funcional que a esta Cámara le versa la atención de una expropiación, es decir, el cumplimiento de los requisitos que para ella -la expropiación-, se requiere, se insiste, por entratarse de un proceso especial. La mejor doctrina procesal no sólo ve la nulidad desde la óptica de una indefensión grotesca en el proceso, sino que para mejor entenderla refiere el estudio de los elementos constitutivos de un acto o conjunto de actos procesales que se llenen de contextura formal (requisitos procedimentales) y material (requisitos de fondo). Vistos bajo esta lupa, la materia expropiatoria tanto en su ley especial de la materia (7495) como la especialísima de expropiaciones y constitución de servidumbres del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (6313), obligan a la presencia de varios requisitos fundamentales que este Órgano sí aprecia del estudio del expediente, a saber: a) declaratoria de interés público; b) acto expropiatorio debidamente motivado; c) notificación al interesado; d) publicación en el Diario Oficial. Una vez comprobados estos requisitos sigue la definición competencial funcional de la jurisdicción que atiende este tipo de procesos, la cual deriva en la fijación de un precio justo para la expropiación. Igualmente claras deben entenderse los alcances de las palabras "acto expropiatorio debidamente motivado", ya que en este punto el Tribunal, en proceso de expropiación -especial- como se ha venido diciendo, sólo debe comprobar la presencia del elemento motivación a modo de justificación, al menos sucinta, de los requisitos del acto administrativo, pero ello no implica que a partir de ello, se pueda entrar al estudio del fondo técnico del contenido del acto como elemento material, ya que analizar pormenorizadamente el fondo de la motivación del acto expropiatorio constituye temática sustantiva de mérito para un proceso de conocimiento, que se caracteriza por constituir un instrumento procesal general, amplio, suficiente y apropiado para versar argumentos técnicos que no sean strictu sensu atinentes a la fijación del precio y que este sea justo y que dé con la mayor precisión posible en la conversión del objeto expropiado con un montante económico dinerario, como objeto de sustanciación procesal de fondo, en la vertiente correcta que la especialidad procesal de la expropiación como tal, debe fallar en definitiva. De manera que esta Cámara esta impedida por imperativo legal para atender otros temas que no sean los dispuestos en la doctrina de los ordinales 10 de la Ley 6313 y 30 de la Ley 7495. No es cierto, como lo alega el articulante, que la declaratoria de interés público "se ha encontrado conspicuamente ausente en todo el procedimiento administrativo y judicial" y debe advertirse que no sólo ello debe revisar el Tribunal, sino los otros requisitos procesales que han conducido a la etapa tan avanzada en la que se encuentra el expediente, dentro de la enunciación antes aludida. Aceptado para análisis como lo fue el expediente administrativo y el propio expediente judicial dejan visión clara a esta Cámara sobre todos los requisitos antes enumerados, así, entre el expediente judicial y el administrativo incorporado a autos por certificación y foliado dentro del mencionado principal, todos los requisitos propios de la expropiación están perfectamente visibles a folios 4 a 15 y luego, para mejor abundamiento e indubitabilidad, son claramente aclaratorios, a la luz de los agravios, los siguientes folios que reflejan la no ausencia de los elementos necesarios para haber dado inicio y final en primera instancia a este proceso especial: folios 4 a 15 se ven el avalúo administrativo y la publicación en el Diario Oficial; folios 442 se encuentran oficio DAL066-2004 del 26 de Febrero de 2004 y a folio 443 y hasta el 446 los oficios 108.03977.2004 DCPJ073 del 4 de Febrero de 2004 y 0012-3474-2004 CD-047-2004 del 23 de Enero de 2004, donde se acoge criterio de la Dirección Jurídica Institucional del actor para brindar toda la información institucional relativa a la declaratoria de interés público en el paso de la línea de transmisión de energía eléctrica sobre la propiedad del apelante. En el mismo orden de estudio, se halla el avalúo administrativo ya referenciado antes, sólo que ahora como parte del expediente administrativo incorporado, como se dijo de a folios 457 al 484; la factura por el servicio de la publicación a folio 468, la publicación en el Diario Oficial a folio 465 (repetida a folio 466), la notificación del avalúo administrativo al actor a folio 471, lo que se llevó a cabo mediante el oficio 107.52248.2003 del 14 de noviembre de 2003, dirigido al actor, en cuyo razón de recibido deja leer el 26 de noviembre de 2003 a las 3.25 horas como su recepción. El aludido oficio es claro en cuanto al status jurídico actor-propietario-expropiación y la derivación procedimental que ello implica a efectos del propietario. Se repite el avalúo administrativo de folios 474 a folio 481. En los subsiguientes folios admitidos para mejor resolver (487 a 522) se hallan análisis técnicos de la generalidad del proyecto, en el cual recae la expropiación aquí en decisión." El interés público legalmente comprobado justificó la limitación de esas propiedades para el fin perseguido. Interés que se evidenció comprobado mediante el forjamiento del proyecto de interconexión de energía eléctrica en alta tensión San Miguel - El Este - Río Macho, siendo ésta conducta, por su razón de ser y sus objetivos perseguidos el motivo y la motivación por conducta implícita que así justificó los procesos expropiatorios desde la sede administrativa hasta la jurisdiccional, resultando claramente identificable el fin perseguido, un abastecimiento de energía eléctrica ante la demanda de este servicio, lo que redunda en un impacto positivo sobre el nivel de vida de los ciudadanos. Ejemplo de esta intención expropiatoria como producto de esta expansión necesaria resultó ser los tramos expropiados para la constitución de la nueva línea de transmisión eléctrica SIEPAC, que interconecta a los seis países de América Central. Esta red, de 1,800 kilómetros, robustece el intercambio de energía eléctrica entre los seis países de la región, lo cual asegura la continuidad del suministro de electricidad y favorece precios más competitivos, no menos entonces, resultó justificado, para este caso y las servidumbres afectadas, el proyecto Línea de Transmisión San Miguel-El Este-Río Macho, que ameritó alrededor de 47 kilómetros de transmisión y la construcción de alrededor de 60 torres, siendo el objetivo de ello, el enlace de los sistemas de transmisión de electricidad de alta tensión (230 KV) a través de una línea aérea de alta tensión, resultando necesario para esto la adquisición de servidumbres a lo largo de toda la línea. (ver Resolución N°2338-2004-SETENA a folios 86 a 90 del expediente judicial). Es necesario señalar, por el resultado de las lógicas humanas y el sentido común que las líneas de transmisión son necesarias para tener sistemas eléctricos interconectados e integrados, que son los que garantizan a los usuarios de la red la estabilidad y la confiabilidad en el servicio eléctrico gracias a la redundancia en fuentes y líneas de transmisión. Modelo de proyección energética avalado incluso por la Sala Constitucional mediante voto 02806-98, donde se reconoce la importancia de las líneas de transmisión y la responsabilidad que tiene el ICE de proveer energía eléctrica a la economía nacional y por consiguiente al ciudadano.

Síguese, la necesidad pública previa al ejercicio expropiatorio, se reconoció a través de la instrumentación material dada por el ejercicio inherente de la discrecionalidad que le acompaña a la Administración Pública interesada, al sustentar, como parte de la actividad ordinaria del ICE, y por ende constituyente del interés público de ésta, la formación de un corredor de transmisión de energía eléctrica para el abasto en alta tensión, siendo por el estudio de Impacto Ambiental que se evidencia en el expediente administrativo contentivo de 332 folios, la consideración del proyecto y la ruta del corredor, mismo que inicia en el poblado de San Miguel en Santo Domingo de Heredia, enrumbándose hacia el noroeste hasta la torre 11.1, luego toma al este, pasando por el poblado de Paracito y luego por San Pedro de Coronado, donde luego a partir de la torre 33, se dirige al sur hasta la torre 38, de ahí parte hacia el sureste a la torre 40 cruzando así el cantón de Coronado y entrando al de Goicoechea, luego la línea vuelve a tomar orientación sur atravesando Goicoechea, San Rafael de Montes de Oca y entra a la Unión en la torre 49, de ahí cambia de rumbo hacia el suroeste pasando cerca del poblado de Concepción para llegar a la subestación del Este, frente a carretera a Tres Ríos. El segundo tramo, parte de la subestación de cita atravesando los caseríos en San Juan y cruza la autopista Florencio del Castillo a la altura del peaje, continúa con rumbo sur para cruzar la zona protectora de los cerros de la Carpintera, toca el extremo más al este del distrito de Patarrá de Desamparados y atraviesa el cantón de El Guarco cerca de los poblados de Tobosi y Tejar hasta la torre 49; de ese punto se enrumba hacia el sureste cruzando el cantón de El Guarco y llegando de nuevo al cantón de Cartago hacia la comunidad de Muñeco y navarro, donde en la torre 21 vuelve a cambiar de rumbo hacia el sursureste y entra al cantón de Paraíso hasta la subestación de Río Macho (folios 0034-0035-0036 exp.estudio ambiental), resultando interceptados en parte y en proporción por el ancho de la servidumbre los bienes inmuebles de los actores.

Este es, el requerimiento preciso y concreto, dentro de sus competencias típicas y justificado por el cual el ICE demandó y ejercitó la potestad expropiatoria consecuente y sobre el cual debe someterse el interés particular y privado. La trayectoria y la escogencia de la vía como de los dominios inmobiliarios necesarios para la formación de este corredor, son tan solo actos materiales consecuentes del interés público determinado en el juicio operativo y técnico de la actividad ordinaria del ente y del cual ya se hizo mención. Resulta entonces preceptivo, para aquel que se contrapone a dicha actividad pública esencial, en búsqueda de su anulabilidad, la acreditación de su inidoneidad como proyecto institucional al servicio de la colectividad, o bien la esterilidad o estolidez del corredor escogido, esto es, el cuestionamiento jurídico / técnico de ese corredor y su finalidad propiamente, ello para desvirtuar ese interés público y evidenciar un interés propiamente administrativo, en cuyo caso operaría el control explícito del contencioso administrativo, aspecto que no constituye el quid del asunto en lo particular, al sustentarse el interés público señalado sin desacreditación alguna, siendo como es, el deber de probar del actor para desvirtuar el proyecto por la vía escogida.

A tono con lo que se ha señalado, esta jurisdicción ha sido conteste y de criterio uniforme en cuanto a la vía expropiatoria para constituir las servidumbres forzosas para el tendido de líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones por parte del ICE, como igualmente el marco normativo de aplicación especial, rechazándose de plano el procedimiento ordinario de la Ley General de la Administración Pública que sugiere el apelante, más en el entendido de la existencia de su numeral 367.2.a) que excluye las expropiaciones de ese ritual procesal. Al respecto, a modo de ilustración de esta postura consolidada, se tiene: “ IV.- Régimen jurídico aplicable a la potestad expropiatoria y constitución de servidumbres del ICE. En virtud de lo alegado, se hace necesario presentar un breve repaso de las reglas que regulan la actividad de imposición de servidumbre de tendido eléctrico a favor del ICE. La dinámica misma de las acciones que emprende el ICE para el ejercicio de sus competencias prestacionales en el servicio de electricidad y telecomunicaciones, constituyen la base legitimante para la asignación de una potestad pública que le posibilita para expropiar los bienes requeridos para la satisfacción de ese interés público que se encuentra llamado a satisfacer. Pero además, justifica la imposición de servidumbres en los predios que sean necesarios para la realización de sus actividades. En esa línea, la Ley No. 6313 del 04 de enero de 1979 (Gaceta No. 14 del 19 de enero de 1979) Ley de Adquisiciones, Expropiaciones y Constitución de Servidumbres del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, -reformada por la Ley No. 8660 del 29 de julio del 2008 (Alcance No. 31 aLa Gaceta No. 156 del 13 de agosto del 2008)-, es precisamente esa norma especial que regula la dinámica expropiatoria de ese ente público, así como el procedimiento y reglas atinentes a la imposición de servidumbres. Esta fuente legal declara de utilidad pública los bienes inmuebles, derechos o intereses patrimoniales legítimos que requiera el ICE para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos legales (numerales 1 y 2). Esa norma fija el procedimiento que ha de seguir el ICE en menesteres expropiatorios, tema que no es relevante en la especie. Basta para los efectos señalar que acorde al precepto 22 ejusdem, dichas disposiciones son aplicables a la imposición de servidumbres forzosas para el tendido de líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones por parte del ICE. Ello supone que debe realizarse la tasación o avalúo que se encuentre especificado en las reglas del 2 al 7 y concordantes, de previo a disponer la constitución de la servidumbre, de manera tal que se incluya dentro de ese referente el parámetro indemnizatorio por la imposición de tal derecho real administrativo". (ver Sentencia: 00146 Expediente: 11-007391-1027-CA, Fecha: 12/12/2013 Hora: 10:50:00 a.m. Emitido por: Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, y Sentencia: 00050 Expediente: 11-001886-1027-CA, Fecha: 16/03/2012 Hora: 07:40:00 a.m. Emitido por: Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI) Igualmente en este mismo sentido se estableció: "V.1- Sobre la Potestad Expropiatoria del ICE y su normativa. La actividad del Instituto Costarricense del Electricidad en materia de expropiaciones se encuentra contenida en la Ley de Adquisiciones, Expropiaciones y Servidumbres, número 6313 del 4 de enero de 1979, en la que se declara de utilidad pública las obras por ejecutar por el ICE y sus empresas, en el cumplimiento de las atribuciones legales encomendadas, misma en la que se describe el procedimiento al cual se encuentra sujeta la institución para ejercer su potestad de imperio respecto a la imposición de expropiaciones y servidumbres necesarias para el cumplimiento de los fines que por ley se le han otorgado. En dicho instrumento legal, se describe el procedimiento que la Institución debe acatar a fin de garantizar el derecho fundamental que tutela el numeral 45 de la Constitución Pública. Se establece como primer paso la valoración de la propiedad así como todos aquellos derechos muebles o inmuebles que habrán de ser afectados, limitándolos el numeral 3 a los daños reales con carácter de permanencia que tengan causalidad con la expropiación, acto seguido aprobada la pericia técnica de valuación y dictado el acuerdo expropiatorio (artículo 7,) el avalúo se pondrá en conocimiento del propietario, inquilino o arrendatario para que dentro de los ocho días siguientes manifiesten su voluntad bien sea de vender y aceptar el precio fijado por el bien, o indiquen su inconformidad, en el primer presupuesto comparecerán al otorgamiento de la escritura correspondiente, y en el segundo la institución recurrirá al Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda a fin de que el Juez fije el justiprecio (artículo 11). En sede jurisdiccional, se le dará curso a la gestión de diligencias de avalúo por expropiación y se concederán cinco días al expropiado para la designación del perito que valorará los daños y perjuicios causados (numeral 13) de ser necesario podría nombrarse un tercer perito y se procederá a dictar resolución fijando el momento de la indemnización la que no será mayor que la estimada en las pericias valuadoras (artículo 17), resolución que podrá ser recurrida ante el superior en caso de inconformidad de ambas o cualquiera de las partes (numeral 21) Igual procedimiento resulta aplicable para la constitución de servidumbres para el tendido de las líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones, como para el cumplimiento de cualquier otro fin encomendado a la institución (numeral 22)". (ver Sentencia: 00022 Expediente: 12-001001-1027-CA, Fecha:20/03/2013, Hora: 04:00:00 p.m. Emitido por: Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección IV) Reseñando esta postura del Tribunal, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en voto 966, en expediente 00-000008-0163-CA de las 2:10 horas del 15 de diciembre de 2005 determinó: "Al respecto, precisa anotar que la Administración Pública en general –central y descentralizada- debe adecuar su proceder al bloque de legalidad, consagrado en los numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la LGAP. En este sentido, la Constitución Política, en el canon 45, establece el principio de la inviolabilidad de la propiedad privada, salvo por interés público legalmente comprobado, y previa indemnización conforme a la ley. Asimismo, la Ley número 6313 del 4 de enero de 1979, Ley de Adquisiciones, Expropiaciones y Servidumbres del ICE, ordinal primero, dispone: “Decláranse de utilidad pública, los bienes inmuebles,sean fincas completas, porciones, derechos o intereses patrimoniales legítimos, que por su ubicación sean necesarios, a juicio del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, para el cumplimiento de sus fines. Estos bienes inmuebles podrán ser expropiados conforme a esta ley, quien quiera sea su dueño. ” Por su parte, el numeral 22 ibídem, preceptúa: “Las disposiciones de esta ley son aplicables a la constitución de servidumbres forzosas para el tendido de las líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones, "como para el cumplimiento directo o indirecto de cualquier otro fin encomendado al ICE. De ambas disposiciones, se colige con claridad que, para que el ICE pueda constituir servidumbres forzosas para el tendido de líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones, en caso de oposición del propietario del fundo afectado, debe, necesariamente, seguir el procedimiento expropiatorio dispuesto en dicha normativa. Obviamente, si el dueño del fundo se muestra conforme, resulta innecesario tal proceder" Y en voto de esa misma Cámara (Sentencia: 00448 en expediente: 10-000617-1027-CA de nueve horas del 10 de abril de 2013, agregó: "IX.- La expropiación, es un acto jurídico de naturaleza especial regido por el derecho público. Tanto es así que surge a partir del decreto expropiatorio que, necesariamente, identifica de manera unilateral el inmueble que responde a un interés -en este caso del ICE-, en obtenerlo para satisfacer una necesidad pública. Esta herramienta de carácter constitucional -potestad de expropiación-, fue diseñada por el legislador bajo un doble esquema. Uno administrativo, donde se generan los actos preparatorios, entre ellos, la comunicación del avalúo del terreno al propietario, que con el fin de acelerar el proceso, en caso de aceptarlo, permitiría la entrada en posesión con mayor celeridad y así destinarlo a la utilidad pública. Y otro en sede jurisdiccional, que surge, en principio, cuando el dueño del inmueble no acepta el precio ofrecido, limitándose el proceso a su determinación. Desde este plano, sin duda, ambas hipótesis nacen a partir del ejercicio de una potestad pública. La facultad expropiatoria concedida al ICE para el cumplimiento de sus fines, deviene de la propia Ley 6313, artículos 2, 22 y 23; Ley 7495, ordinales 13 y 14, así como de la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones, Ley 8660, canon 79 (aspectos jurídicos valorados ampliamente por la Sala Constitucional en el fallo no. 2011-5271 de las 15 horas 16 minutos del 27 de abril de 2011). En este entendido, sobresale el precepto 22 de la Ley 6313, el cual establece que esa normativa es aplicable a la imposición de servidumbres forzosas para el tendido de líneas eléctricas y de telecomunicaciones por parte del ICE. El canon 11 ibídem, es el que establece el procedimiento concreto que debe seguir esa Institución para los efectos de expropiación e imposición forzosa de servidumbres, entre ellas, las de tendido de líneas eléctricas. Así, el ordinal 2 de ese texto legal declara de utilidad pública las obras que el ICE y sus empresas emprendan en el cumplimiento de las atribuciones legales que el ordenamiento jurídico les ha encomendado. Hasta aquí queda claro que el ICE está facultado por ley especial para imponer servidumbres de tendido de línea eléctricas, las cuales por su propia naturaleza son de utilidad pública -legalmente declarada- y que el procedimiento de constitución lo define la propia Ley 6313. Ahora bien, una vez definidas las necesidades del ICE para emprender sus proyectos, lo que procede es el avalúo de los terrenos correspondientes, el cual debe ser comunicado a los propietarios de previo a firmar el convenio o a decretar la expropiación para los fines correspondientes. Esta última actividad se dará cuando no exista convenio o los interesados no acudan al llamado del ente expropiante. En este punto, debe resaltarse que este se realiza con la debida comunicación del avalúo. La expropiación tiene que ser acordada por el Consejo Directivo. El acuerdo será publicado en el Diario Oficial. Finalmente, la Administración deberá recurrir al Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda para solicitar la fijación del avalúo definitivo. En términos generales, ese es el trámite de expropiación e imposición forzosa de servidumbres, que el legislador encomendó al Instituto y sus empresas. De interés para el agravio, se puede concluir que de acuerdo a la Ley 6313, es con la comunicación del avalúo que el dueño de la propiedad se entera y puede impugnar el acuerdo ablativo (ordinales 2, 3, 7, 8, 11). Esa última comunicación, es la que exige el ordenamiento jurídico, la cual debe ser realizada personalmente al expropiado o propietario afectado con la servidumbre (artículo 8 Ley 6313 y 25 ley 7495)." Del cúmulo de hechos probados establecidos por el a quo, se infiere, en lo que al caso interesa, que el Instituto estimó necesario, con motivo de la obra de tanta cita, la imposición de un derecho de servidumbre, sobre las fincas n°s 168956-000 y 423388-000 ambas del Partido de San José y propiedad de la actores respectivamente. Para tal fin, en el año 2002, el área de avalúos de la Subgerencia de Gestión Administrativa del ICE emitió los avalúos nos. 743-2002 y 707-2002 para tales inmuebles. Posteriormente, mediante acuerdos del Consejo Directivo 5557 de 7 de octubre de 2010 y 5459 de 12 de noviembre de 2002 respectivamente y publicados en la Gaceta N° 46 del 5 de marzo del 2004 y Gaceta N°30 del 12 de febrero de 2004, quedó instrumentado el interés público pertinente. Para esta Cámara, es evidente que mucho antes de la existencia de los acuerdos expropiatorios, los actores tuvieron conocimiento del proceso de expropiación que había iniciado el ICE. Esa comunicación conlleva los efectos de informar y enterar al propietario, no solo de la existencia de los procedimientos de imposición forzosa de servidumbre, sino también del precio o el monto tasado por la indemnización. Por ende a partir de esa fecha, iniciaba el plazo para que ellos acudieran al llamado del Instituto o manifestara su oposición, tal y como ocurrió históricamente. En virtud de lo anterior, era previsible que el Consejo, en las sesiones Nos. 5557 de 7 de octubre de 2010 y 5459 de 12 de noviembre de 2002, con base en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política y en la Ley 6313 y 7495, decidiera decretar la servidumbre necesaria para cumplimentar el interés público, ambos, haciendo referencia a los avalúos previamente comunicados a los propietarios de los terrenos con la referencia singular de los inmuebles, según se aprecian en los expedientes de los procesos expropiatorios. Se desprende igualmente, que el Instituto procedió a informar previamente al representante de la empresa actora, sobre la existencia de las “diligencias de expropiación para constitución de servidumbre”. La ley no exige que este avalúo se encuentre aprobado por el Consejo, basta su existencia formal y que se encuentre acorde con el ordenamiento jurídico. Entonces, se reitera, el “acuerdo expropiatorio” se adoptó con la existencia previa de los avalúos. El apelante no identifica o no desea aceptar la naturaleza del procedimiento expropiatorio especial con el que fue dotado el ICE, ni tampoco exhibe las nulidades que reclama, menos que menos, este Tribunal las observa. La idea original del legislador fue la de facilitar un trámite ágil y eficaz al Instituto y sus empresas, para los efectos de expropiaciones e imposición forzosa de servidumbres. Esos procedimientos se rigen por las estipulaciones especiales de la Ley 6313 y supletoriamente por los de la Ley de Expropiación (artículo 2 Ley 6313). Según lo analizado, las actuaciones previas al acuerdo expropiatorio (incluido el avalúo) son válidas y eficaces, dado que el llamado del ICE se ajusta a lo dispuesto en el canon 11 de la Ley 6313, mediante un acto emitido por funcionarios competentes, debidamente comunicado (según los parámetros del artículo 25 de la Ley de 7495, de aplicación supletoria por mandato del canon 2 de la Ley 6313) y aprobado por el Consejo en las sesiones indicadas.

Aunado a lo anterior, hay que insistir que la Ley 6313 declara de utilidad pública los bienes inmuebles, sean fincas completas, porciones, derechos o intereses patrimoniales legítimos, que por su ubicación sean necesarios, (a juicio del Instituto), para el cumplimiento de sus fines (precepto 1 ibídem). Esa es una de las principales diferencias en relación con el trámite de la Ley 7495, en donde se establece como un requisito previo de expropiación una “Declaratoria de interés público”, ya que para expropiar, es indispensable un acto motivado, mediante el cual, el bien por expropiar se declare de interés público. Incluso esa declaratoria de interés público en la Ley 7495, ha de notificarse al interesado o a su representante legal y publicarse en el Diario Oficial (numeral 18 Ley 7495) tal y como sucedió para el caso del expediente 04-000125-0163-CA. Aclaración debida, es que debido a la declaratoria de pleno derecho que opera en la Ley 6313, esta actuación no es necesaria en las expropiaciones y servidumbres que realice el ICE bajo este formato (04-000319-0163-CA). En cuanto al acuerdo, la Ley en comentario no requiere que deba ser notificado personalmente al administrado, basta con su publicación en el Diario Oficial según el artículo 11 ibídem. En este entendido, la publicación del acuerdo se realizó en las Gacetas señaladas con lo cual el requisito legal se cumplió a cabalidad. Ambas actuaciones (avalúo y acuerdo) cumplen con las exigencias legales para que surtan los efectos deseados.

Este Tribunal no acoge para sí los reclamos del apelante y rechaza las posturas aducidas cuando señala: que el ICE como Administración Expropiante, debe establecer la aplicación concreta de dicho interés público con relación a determinados bienes inmuebles, y es dicha determinación en concreto la que debe declararse de manera específica y detallada para individualizar el ejercicio de la potestad de imperio en perjuicio de un inmueble y de un administrado en particular, o bien, la que igualmente señala: yerra el A QUO en aceptar la ausencia de un acto de concretización en el proceso de expropiación del ICE y al no reconocerlo como un elemento formal y esencial del proceso de expropiación. Como tampoco es de aceptación cuando manifiesta: Yerra el A QUO al aceptar que dicha ausencia vulnere el derecho de defensa del administrado. Sin una comunicación formal del acto concreto que individualiza el interés público para un fin específico en un inmueble específico, el Administrado se queda sin manera de atacar la falta de motivo del acto en su caso específico y origina indefensión de la parte. Es acá donde se debe analizar el motivo y el contenido del acto administrativo, lo cual ha sido reclamado como inexistente por esta representación a lo largo de este proceso. Yerra el A QUO al no ver que el ICE ha ocultado del Administrado y del Juzgado toda fuente de información que permita verificar si el motivo del acto de expropiación en efecto existe, si el contenido es proporcionado al motivo y si el contenido en efecto cumple con el fin querido por el ordenamiento. Claro ninguno de estos elementos se puede examinar en un acto implícito que no ha sido formalmente comunicado y finalmente, la aseveración del yerro del a quo en cuanto a que ha omitido considerar el A Quo, cuenta el hecho de que nunca se le dio y hasta la fecha no se le ha dado acceso al expropiado a la totalidad de los expedientes administrativos que realmente conforman el proceso de toma de decisiones sobre la elección y localización final de la ruta de la línea de transmisión supradicha. Es un hecho fundamental de la demanda el que el ICE en efecto ha impedido el acceso del administrado a los expedientes en los que se documentan las decisiones que terminan siendo el fundamento mismo de la declaratoria de interés público necesaria para la expropiación de esta servidumbre de paso.

V.- Cont... En el caso del ICE, la declaratoria de utilidad general fue acordada genéricamente por el propio legislador; y es sabido que el procedimiento se inicia con la práctica del avalúo pericial, el que luego se notifica al expropiado, y si este no lo acepta, procede decretar la expropiación, concluyendo así dicha fase. De modo que la posibilidad de conocer e impugnar el acuerdo ablativo y el interés público subyacente, está implícito en la comunicación del avalúo, según el diseño de la propia ley. Si la parte no acepta el avalúo, deberá discutirlo en el proceso especial de expropiación, y si además de la revisión del avalúo administrativo que tazó la indemnización desea discutir el ejercicio de la potestad expropiatoria, deberá hacerlo en vía plenaria, acreditando la nulidad de dichos actos administrativos y de la improcedencia o inexistencia del interés general. Corolario de lo anterior, se debe dejar claro entonces, que el avalúo fue el acto a través del cual, el Instituto comunicó al propietario de los inmuebles, su intención y justificación de constituir una servidumbre administrativa (tendido eléctrico), así como la indemnización ofrecida. A partir de la entrega formal de este documento, según el texto normativo aplicable, lo que procedía era la expropiación mediante el acuerdo del Consejo, el cual para su validez, cumplió con los requisitos reglados exigidos. Por estas razones, en criterio de esta Cámara, tampoco se presenta la lesión al debido proceso administrativo, ya que el procedimiento de imposición de servidumbre realizado por el Instituto cumple con la normativa creada al efecto.

VI.- Cont.... Las cargas administrativas como las servidumbres expropiadas, vienen a ser un derecho público real constituido por una entidad estatal sobre un inmueble ajeno, con el objeto de que éste sirva al uso público. La imposición de estas limitaciones administrativas supone claramente sus propios límites: 1) la restricción debe ser adecuadamente proporcional a la necesidad administrativa que con ella se debe satisfacer; la proporcionalidad está dada en relación a la necesidad que se va a satisfacer, no es una medida fija sino que varía según el caso. 2) debe tener algún tipo de justificación plausible, debe responder realmente a una necesidad administrativa pero direccionado a un fin público inescindible e imprescindible. 3) se exige que no altere, desintegre o desmiembre la propiedad. En cualquiera de estos casos corresponderá establecer una servidumbre o hacer la expropiación, pero no será válida la mera restricción no indemnizada. 4) que sea válida en su forma, competencia, objeto y voluntad. Por el dinamismo de la actividad administrativa orgánica, las servidumbres administrativas pueden ser constituidas directamente por ley (N°6313 para el ICE), o autorizadas por la ley pero establecidas por la administración autorizada en un acto administrativo concreto, precisamente, expresadas por el acuerdo expropiatorio (en sede administrativa o bien pasado a la vía judicial) en cuyo caso como se ha afirmado y así lo expuso el a quo, el acto devino implícito, no mediante resolución administrativa preceptiva, producida como resultado de un procedimiento administrativo controvertido o de oposición como el sugerido por el apelante para la aplicación de la Ley General de Administración Pública (LGAP), más preciso, artículos 308 y siguientes, ello por la especialidad y prevalencia del rito expropiatorio normativo que cobija al ICE sobre la ley general expropiatorio y claro está, sobre la LGAP, sobre los aspectos de constitución y validez de las imposiciones reales, esto por prohibición expresa (367.2.a- LGAP). Desde luego, el juez puede y tiene la competencia funcional para controlar si los actos que ejecutan o instrumentan la expropiación se han ajustado o no a los actos reglados que la ley regula o ha autorizado, según sea el caso, por lo que solo en este tema, este Tribunal difiere del pensamiento del a quo, en cuanto crea un nicho aislado, inmune e inimpugnable sobre los actos implícitos, mas ello no altera la solución determinada, ante la falta de demostración sustancial de la inexistencia o inidoneidad del trazo escogido y su necesidad del corredor de líneas aéreas de alta tensión, ergo, de la nulidad interna de la vía gestada, esto en las aristas socio económicas y jurídicas al ser una carga probatoria de la parte interesada. El interés público debe entenderse como el destino primario del objeto expropiado en el futuro, lo que permite que por norma técnica y hasta por decreto ejecutivo adicional, se operativice por oportunidad y conveniencia, la finalidad del ejercicio coactivo impuesto (artículos 16, y 154 de la LGAP), con la implantación de las servidumbres y catastros respectivos y correspondientes para la utilidad material del bien apartado. Si bien, la Constitución Política en su artículo 45 establece que la propiedad es inviolable, y que nadie podrá ser privado de la suya sino es por un interés público legalmente comprobado, ese ya está acreditado en la declaratoria indicada y publicada en las Gacetas de referencia, de manera que lo declarado o dispuesto no fue impreciso, equívoco, negligente y omiso en la identificación obligada del inmueble ni su necesidad intrínseca. El fin último de la expropiación, no es la ablación del derecho de propiedad sino el destino de interés público ulterior dado al bien (siempre implica una transformación material o jurídica del bien expropiado) como se ha venido señalando, por ello debe reputarse como un medio y no un fin en sí misma, es un instrumento para el logro de un fin, no puede carecer de causa y ésta se encuentra plenamente identificada conjuntamente con el bien inmueble respectivo, de manera que no hay incerteza, inseguridad jurídica, real o jurídica que menoscabe el derecho de propiedad afectado y la definición posterior del precio justo. A manera de síntesis, se debe concluir que este Tribunal no estima que los vicios acusados sean de tal magnitud como los refiere el apelante y que den motivos suficientes para afirmar la existencia de nulidades susceptibles de ser catalogadas como absolutas, ni se estima la ausencia de un elemento esencial en la conducta formal y material desplegada por el ICE por disconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento. Tanto el interés público como la individualización del bien se encuentran debidamente identificados, elementos suficientes para la validez de la declaratoria de interés público objeto de impugnación y la imposición de la servidumbre establecida, consecuentemente los agravios expuestos en el Considerando II no encuentren reparo ni aceptación en esta instancia.

VII.- En cuanto a las costas.- Apela el apoderado de los actores la condenatoria en costas señalando que ha tenido suficientes elementos y motivos para litigar, por lo que solicita se le exonere del pago de las costas. En materia de regulación de las costas personales y procesales deben observarse los numerales 221 al 224 del Código Procesal Civil (aplicados en forma supletoria ante omisión de regulación en la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, según lo dispuesto en el numeral 103 de la misma), así como los artículos 98 y 99 de la Ley supra. En ese sentido, al ser obligatorio para el juzgador pronunciarse sobre las mismas en sentencia (ordinal 59 inciso 2 de la Ley de rito y 221 del Código citado), debe tomar en cuenta dos posibilidades en su dictado, 1) que se resuelva sin especial condenatoria, 2) o con especial condena imponiendo su pago a alguna de las partes. En la primera hipótesis, se resolverá sin especial condenatoria en aplicación de la doctrina que informa el numeral 222 in fine, debiendo cada parte pagar las que hubiere causado y entre ambas las que fueren comunes. Las razones por las cuales se falla de dicha forma, se debe a que acaece alguna causal exonerativa, como lo son el vencimiento recíproco, que el vencido haya litigado de buena fe, si la demanda o contrademanda comprenden pretensiones exageradas, al acogerse en el fallo parte de las peticiones fundamentales de la demanda o reconvención, si se admiten defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido, ante allanamiento de la Administración a las pretensiones del demandante (salvo que la demanda reproduzca sustancialmente lo pedido en la reclamación administrativa denegada, y esa denegación fundare la acción), cuando por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas hubo motivo suficiente para litigar, si la sentencia se dictare en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia verosímilmente no haya conocido la contraria y por causa de ello se hubiere justificado la oposición de la parte y finalmente si la parte vencedora incurrió en plus petitio, es decir que la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en sentencia fuere de un 15% o más. De lo procedimentado en estos autos y de la manera en que resolvió este asunto, no opera ninguna eximente posible. Esto se advierte, que dicha condenatoria no implica una calificación de temeridad o mala fe. Por ello, no se produce quebranto legal si se condena al vencido y así el órgano de instancia se limitó a actuar la norma en los términos por ella previstos, por lo que no incurre en el yerro apuntado, imponiéndose el rechazo del presente motivo de apelación.

POR TANTO

Se confirma la resolución impugnada en lo que ha sido objeto de recurso.

Ronaldo Hernández Hernández Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos Eduardo González Segura ACTOR: CUATRO AMIGOS S.A y otro DEMANDADO: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD