Environmental Judgment Annulled for Untimely Issuance in Hydrocarbons Decree CaseAnulación de sentencia ambiental por dictado fuera de plazo procesal en caso de decreto de hidrocarburos

**110039071027CA** **EXP.** Telf423 **RES. 000028-F-S1-2016** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine forty-five on the twenty-eighth of January two thousand sixteen.

A proceeding of cognizance established by Nombre3762, divorced, biologist, resident of Heredia; against the STATE, represented by its attorney Grettel Rodríguez Fernández, single. The company Mallon Oil Company, Costa Rica Branch, appears as a passive coadjuvant, represented by its unlimited general agent, Pedro Oller Taylor, married. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, attorneys and residents of San José.

**WHEREAS** 1.- Based on the facts he set forth and the legal provisions he cited, the plaintiff established a proceeding of cognizance, so that in judgment it be declared: "I. This contentious-administrative action is granted II. That Executive Decree # 26750-MINAET of February 27, 1998, is null and ineffective. III. In the event that the state representation opposes this action, I request that it be ordered to pay both costs of this action." 2.- The state representation answered negatively and raised the defenses of expiration, res judicata, lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of joinder of necessary passive litis consortium, the latter being resolved interlocutorily. Likewise, on folio 131 it waived the conciliation proceeding.

3.- The preliminary hearing was held at 8:37 a.m. on January 11, 2013, at which time all parties took the floor, a procedural moment when the preliminary defense of res judicata was resolved.

4.- The oral and public trial was held on May 20, 2013, with the participation of all parties.

5.- The Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, composed of Judges Juan Luis Giusti Soto, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Sergio Mena García; in judgment no. 058-2013-V at 8:10 a.m. on June 12, 2013, resolved: "The exceptions of Lack of Current Interest and Lack of Right are rejected. The lawsuit filed by Nombre3762 against the State is declared Granted, and consequently, the absolute nullity of Decree 26750-MINAE of February 27, 1998 (Regulations for conducting environmental impact studies for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation contracts) published in Official Gazette No. 53 of March 17, 1998, is declared. This declaration has declaratory effects and is retroactive to February 27, 1998, respecting rights acquired in good faith from its entry into force until the finality of this resolution. Furthermore, this judgment is dimensioned in the sense that the second article and the entire Title X of the Regulations to the Hydrocarbons Law, articles 266 to 283 (Executive Decree No. 24735 published in La Gaceta No. 230 of December 4, 1995) recover their original validity, which shall occur once this judgment becomes final. The State is ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding." 6.- The defendant and the passive coadjuvant file a cassation appeal, expressly indicating the reasons on which they rely to refute the Court's thesis.

7.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings. Substitute Judge Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar participates in the decision of this matter.

Judge Rivas Loáiciga drafts.

**WHEREAS** **I.-** Mr. Nombre3762 sued the State and requested the declaration of nullity and ineffectiveness of Executive Decree No. 26750-MINAE of February 27, 1998 (hereinafter Decree No. 26750), considering that the then President of the Republic José María Figueres Olsen and Minister René Castro Salazar issued it *contra legem* and with deviation of power, repealing Title X of the Regulations to the Hydrocarbons Law No. DE-24735 of September 29, 1995 (hereinafter the Regulations), which regulated the conduct of Environmental Impact Assessments (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. He indicated that article 266 of the repealed Regulations established the contractor's obligation to have an EIA prior to the signing of the adjudicatory act, which had to be updated periodically. He alleged that, in the challenged decree, the EIA was divided into two phases in accordance with the progress of activities, the first stage being prospecting and the second intensive exploration. That the approval of Phase I of the EIA would be an indispensable and sufficient requirement for the adjudicatory act to become final. He stated that the first phase does not involve high-impact activity, so developers provide as an EIA only preliminary descriptions of the exploratory activities to be carried out in that stage, without delving into the environmental impacts that the oil project will produce as a whole, nor the procedures for their mitigation during execution or the recovery actions. The plaintiff mentioned in his brief that the "two latest" cases processed based on that regulation, namely those of MKJ Xplotation Inc. and Mallon Oil, presented a marine seismic reflection geophysical study in the first case, and Mallon Oil presented a document called: "Project for the compilation and analysis of information for Phase I of oil prospecting in the northern Huetar and Atlantic Huetar region of Costa Rica", which, he considered, is a simple desk-based activity to analyze existing regional scientific information. He alleged that none of the documents comprise the environmental assessment of the oil activity proper, and with this, in application of the challenged decree, both companies maintain that the State was obligated to allow the execution of the concession contract in the case of the MKJ company and to sign a concession contract with Mallon Oil. He argues that officials Figueres and Castro used their legitimate powers to carry out a discretionary administrative act supposedly for a public purpose (the protection of the environment), but with evident deviation of power, thereby weakening and disapplying the State's environmental controls in the private interest of the oil companies, these being able to demand the signing of concession contracts without the correlative obligation of having the necessary prior approval of the integral and complete EIA. The plaintiff states that the challenged regulation causes a very serious environmental risk to the country, violating the public interest, since oil activity is historically linked to serious accidents that cause irreversible ecological damage. With the challenged decree, he said, the environmental controls on oil activity in Costa Rica were deregulated or made more flexible, which is contrary to articles 2, 31 subsection f) and 41 of the Hydrocarbons Law; 50 of the Political Constitution; 14 subsection 1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity; 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment and the preventative and precautionary environmental principles; regulations that require the submission and approval of the EIA prior to the start of activities that cause environmental impact (impacto ambiental). He indicated that the Constitutional Chamber had already ruled before the promulgation of Decree No. 26750 in judgment no. 6240-93 when hearing the optional consultation on the Hydrocarbons Law bill, a position that was reiterated by the same Chamber in judgment no. 1221-2002 subsequent to the challenged decree, when it established the partial unconstitutionality of article 41 of the Hydrocarbons Law. In cases of oil exploration and exploitation, the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated its position on the mandatory nature of the EIA in judgment no. 205-2010 related to the Mallon Oil company case. On the other hand, he indicates that, after the challenged decree, the Biodiversity Law was approved, in which its precept 94 indicates that the environmental impact assessment (evaluación del impacto ambiental) must be carried out in its entirety even if the project is scheduled to be carried out in stages, which in the plaintiff's view leaves no doubt as to the mandatory nature of the EIA, implying a tacit repeal due to supervening illegality. He expressed that, starting in the 1990s, environmental responsibility ethics emerged strongly, leading to the reception of contents from the Rio Declaration, with the country ratifying the Convention on Biological Diversity and other important international legal instruments; furthermore, canon 50 of the Political Constitution was reformed, introducing the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, giving rise to environmental constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence and the internal promulgation of legislation such as the Organic Law of the Environment and the Biodiversity Law. On the other hand, he stated that the company MJK, known as Harken, using the challenged regulation, managed to sign the concession contract for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Costa Rica on August 12, 1999, corresponding to oil tender 1-97, with Nombre3763 having approved for this only the marine seismic reflection geophysical study over 507 km of surface used in the first prospecting phase, whereby only an environmental guarantee of $7,995 was requested from the company, which does not correspond to the real and potential risk of the oil exploration and exploitation it intends to carry out. He expressed that the geophysical study is a simple academic activity to describe an exploratory procedure, which he considers is not sufficient to sign and make final a concession contract covering an area of 5633 km2, without an EIA existing. He also indicated that the contract with the Harken company was suspended due to the moratorium of former president Nombre3762 and because Nombre3763 eventually rejected the EIA submitted after the signing of the contract, which caused that company to accuse the State of breach of contract, claiming compensation of $57,000,000, which reaffirms the Constitutional Chamber's warning since 1993. He continues indicating that, by Resolution No. R-105-MINAE published in Official Gazette No. 73 of April 13, 2000, oil concession No. 2 was awarded to the company Mallon Oil for the exploration and exploitation of blocks 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the 27 blocks into which the country was divided, a contract whose signing has not yet been possible due to various administrative and judicial remedies from civil society and the developer. He argued that the Mallon Oil company has not submitted an EIA, and what Nombre3763 reviewed and approved in its case, under the terms of the challenged decree, was a document describing a desk-based activity, about which the Director of Hydrocarbons warned Nombre3763 that they do not constitute field methods such as those provided for in article 1 of Decree No. 26750. Nevertheless, he expressed, the company is pressing through political and legal means to force the government of Costa Rica to sign the concession contract. Finally, he considered that these two cases are the practical result of the application of the challenged decree. The State answered negatively to the lawsuit and interposed the defenses of lack of: joinder of necessary passive litis consortium, current interest, and right, as well as expiration and res judicata. The Court rejected the exceptions of lack of current interest and lack of right. It declared the lawsuit granted and consequently declared the absolute nullity of Decree No. 26750. It established that the declaration had declaratory and retroactive effects to February 27, 1998, respecting rights acquired in good faith from its entry into force until the finality of this resolution. Furthermore, it dimensioned the judgment in the sense that the second precept and the entire Title X of the Regulations to the Hydrocarbons Law, articles 266 to 283 (Executive Decree No. 24735 published in La Gaceta No. 230 of December 4, 1995) recover their original validity, which shall occur once the judgment becomes final. It also ordered the State to pay both costs of the proceeding. Disagreeing with the resolution, the State and the passive coadjuvant filed a cassation appeal. Given the manner in which it will be resolved, only the procedural grievance set forth below will be heard, omitting a ruling on the remaining grievances and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant Mallon Oil Company Costa Rica Branch S.A., which adheres to what is stated in the State's appeal.

**Cassation appeal on procedural grounds** **II.-** Sole grievance: In the opinion of the appellant, the judgment suffers from a defect of absolute nullity, given that it was issued and notified outside the deadline established by article 111 of the CPCA. Indeed, it says, the oral and public trial was held and concluded on May 20, 2013, a date when the matter was declared of complex processing, indicating to the parties that the judgment would be issued in writing and notified within a period of 15 business days. According to the completion date of the oral and public trial and taking into account the elapsed business days, the judgment should have been notified at the latest on June 10, 2013. However, it was not issued until June 12 and notified until June 13, both in 2013, as stated in the certification of the notification record. It follows from the foregoing that it was issued and notified outside the period established in article 111 of the CPCA, a rule that is accused of being breached by its evident non-observance (lack of application). It explains, it should be noted that Recital 7 of the judgment justifies the delay on the grounds that Reporting Judge Juan Luis Guisti Soto, "... according to agreement of Article XXV of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, Session No. 54-13 of May 14, two thousand thirteen, had leave to attend as a trainer on Fridays, May 31 and June 7, both in the year 2013. The foregoing, for the purposes of understanding the deadline for issuing judgment to be automatically extended." It must be warned, it indicates, that the judgment contains an error, since session no. 54-13 was not held on May 14 as indicated, but was held until May 23, 2013, that is, after the oral and public trial had already taken place (see printout of agreements number 25 of sessions no. 54-13 and no. 49-13 of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, taken from the Judiciary's website). Consequently, it considers that the justification contained in recital 7 of the ruling is unacceptable, as it violates article 111 of the CPCA mentioned above, as well as article 138 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC), applicable to the specific case by reason of the mandate established in article 220 of the CPCA, since days other than those expressly indicated in the mentioned procedural legislation are considered "non-business days." As is clear from the foregoing, article 138 clearly establishes what should be considered a non-business day, and the article at no point indicates that days on which judicial officials are on leave from their duties can be considered a non-business day. It considers that this interpretation is reinforced by analyzing the content of Article XXV of minutes no. 54-13 of eight o'clock on May 23, 2013, which authorizes the Judge's participation in training activities, but with the caveat that he must attend to and give priority to any matter that, due to the high duties he performs, he must address; it copies an excerpt from the minutes that establishes the foregoing. It follows from the transcription, it says, that the leave granted to participate in the training activity was conditioned on giving priority to any work activity requiring the Judge's presence, so in its view, it is impossible to consider that the days on which the judge was on leave are non-business days under the terms established in article 138 of the CPC. Along these same lines, it is considered that the challenged judgment violates the provisions of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (hereinafter the RAOSJCACH) regarding the manner in which deliberations must be conducted and the deadline for issuing judgment. In fact, it argues, note that in accordance with what that legal body establishes, the Trial Court must resolve each of the incidents that arise in the case file once the oral and public trial hearing has been scheduled. In defense of its thesis, it copies the provisions of article 72 of the RAOSJCACH. It reproaches that the present case was scheduled for trial since March 2013, meaning that at the time leave was requested to participate in the Judicial School training activity on May 14, 2013, the Fifth Section should have foreseen how the reporting judge's participation would affect the final issuance and notification of the judgment in this trial, adopting the pertinent measures so as not to affect the public service. Especially when the RAOSJCACH establishes the grounds upon which the deliberation in a specific matter may be considered suspended, and the existence of leaves with pay does not constitute one of them, under the terms established in article 81 of that regulatory body. Following this same line of thought, it indicates that the previously cited rule establishes that the operative part of the judgment should have been issued within 2 business days, and the full text should have been communicated within the fifteen business days following the conclusion of the oral and public trial, pursuant to the provisions of precepts 79 and 83 of this same legal body. It considers that, according to those rules, it is clear that in the present case all deadlines established in applicable legislation were breached, both for issuing the judgment and for notifying it, and it is unacceptable to consider that the deadline for issuing and notifying the judgment was suspended because one of the Court members was on leave to participate as a teacher in Judicial School training activities. The jurisprudence of the First Chamber, it warns, has been clear and forceful in establishing the nullity of judgments issued in contravention of the deadlines established in the repeatedly cited article 111 of the CPCA, in that sense rulings no. 1527-F-51-2012 at 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. In the same vein, resolutions 1058-A-S1-2012 at 12:00 p.m. on August 24, 2012, 1068-A-S1-2D12 at 12:50 p.m. on August 24, 2012, among others. Therefore, it concludes, the judgment was issued in flagrant violation of articles 111, 137 subsection g, and 220 of the CPCA, and article 138 of the CPC, due to lack of application to the specific case. Likewise, it says, the ruling violates articles 72, 73 subsection 10, 79, 81, and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, due to erroneous interpretation, and therefore requests that it be annulled for having been issued and notified outside the deadline established for that purpose, and that a new oral and public trial be ordered before a different section of the Court, under the terms established in article 111 of the CPCA. Alternatively, it requests that, if it is considered that the deadline for issuing and notifying the judgment must be considered effectively "suspended" due to the existence of the leave with pay for training activities at the Judicial School, it asks the Chamber to consider the following arguments. As warned at the beginning of the complaint, the oral and public trial took place on May 20, 2013, so even considering that the deadline for issuing and notifying the judgment was suspended for two more days, it is clear that the resolution was notified outside the established deadline for issuing judgment, since it should have been issued on the second day of deliberation and notified to the parties no later than May 12, 2013. For this reason, it states, even under this assumption, the resolution was notified in contravention of the provisions of articles 111 and 137 subsection g of the CPCA and 81 and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, so even under this assumption the judgment must be annulled and the remand of the case file ordered so that a new oral and public trial is held before a different section of the Court, under the terms established in article 111 of the CPCA.

**III.-** On this matter, this Chamber has expressed: "By virtue of the principles of immediacy and celerity, numeral 111 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (hereinafter CPCA) establishes that, once the hearing is concluded, the Court must deliberate and issue the judgment immediately, foreseeing the possibility of exempting this obligation in those cases classified as complex, in which case, the judgment must be notified within a maximum period of 15 business days, calculated from the conclusion of the hearing. As indicated, the rule responds to the principle of immediacy – this being the normative value intended to be protected in the precept under discussion – and ensures that the judges, when issuing the ruling, retain in their memory, with the greatest clarity, the evidentiary elements produced during the trial, and thus prevent the passage of time from eroding the comprehensive assessment they can make of them. In line with the above, articles 82.1 and 79.4 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction provide that the deliberation may extend up to two days, in which case, the operative part must be communicated to the participants with a laconic exposition of its grounds, and the full text of the judgment within the already mentioned term of 15 days. Both the legal rule and the regulatory ones to which reference has been made establish a parameter based on which it can be presumed that there has been a breach of the oft-cited principle of immediacy. This is, of course, a legal presumption set for control purposes, without it being possible to infer from what has been indicated that judges cannot retain the details of the proceeding for a more extended period. It is simply the establishment of a tolerance limit by the legislator, or what is the same, a normative convention. Therefore, its non-observance was sanctioned with nullity. Precisely, on this topic it has been indicated: "Provision 111.2 of the cited legal body, in accordance with precept 137 subsection g, sanctions with nullity the failure to comply with the deadline for deliberating and issuing the judgment, and orders the trial to be repeated before another Court panel, except for irreproducible evidentiary acts. The foregoing obeys the principle of immediacy itself, and seeks to ensure that the least amount of time elapses between the evidentiary proceedings and the judgment, guaranteeing that the judges have the evidence in mind with the greatest possible clarity, and therefore, can carry out the corresponding assessment exercise, without forgetting relevant aspects thereof" (judgment no. 1096-F-S1-2011 at 9:45 a.m. on September 8, 2011)". No. 1527 at 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. In the case at hand, the oral and public trial, according to the hearing recording and the respective minute, took place on May 20, 2013, an act where the matter was declared complex and the parties were informed that the judgment would be made known to them in writing. Regarding the notification of the judgment to the State, it is verified on folio 573 of the judicial case file that this was carried out on June 13, 2013, as the appellant argues. Consequently, it is observed that from the date when the oral trial concluded – May 20 – and the notification of the judgment on June 13, more than 15 business days elapsed, which is the deadline provided in the cited provision, which expired on June 10, which is why it is mandatory to uphold the grievance formulated. The Court justifies its issuance outside the deadline on the fact that the reporting judge attended a training activity at the Judicial School on May 31 and June 7, both in 2013. It is essential to reproduce article 81 of the RAOSJCACH because it regulates the hypotheses that interrupt (actually suspend) the deadline for issuing and communicating the judgment: "1) The deliberation shall be carried out without interruption, unless reasons of force majeure or illness of any of the judges concur. Once the cause has disappeared, the Court shall reconvene for the deliberation and issuance of the judgment, after notifying the parties. 2) Likewise, the reopening of the debate contemplated in numeral 110 of the CPCA and 73.15 of this Regulation shall be cause for interruption of the deliberation and decision stage." Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of said article, the deliberation and decision can only be suspended (since when the reason for its stoppage ceases, its counting continues from the point where it had stopped, i.e., its computation does not begin again) due to force majeure, illness of any of the judges (incapacity), or when the debate is reopened. In the sub lite case, it is clear that the last two causes were not the reason invoked to justify the delay, so it would only remain to verify if there was a force majeure reason that prevented issuing the ruling within the period provided by the legal system. In the opinion of this Deciding Body, in this instance, the cited exemption is not configured, given that the reporting judge's participation in the course was known in advance (a foreseeable event), meaning that the issuance of the ruling outside the deadline could have been avoided by taking the necessary measures so that the judgment was issued on time. The foregoing, because that deadline is peremptory and, as this Chamber has ordered, said period should not be violated for the purpose of safeguarding the principle of immediacy. And, to ensure that the judges preserve in their memory the convincing elements, as well as everything that occurred in the oral and public trial, so that they can carry out a correct assessment, retaining the relevant aspects thereof.

**IV.-** By virtue of the foregoing, by majority it is deemed that the appropriate course is to uphold the appeal filed, omit a ruling regarding the remaining objections and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant party, as well as to annul the challenged judgment. Pursuant to numeral 111.2 of the CPCA, the oral trial must be repeated before a Court with a different panel, which is why this matter must be sent to the corresponding processing judge for the purpose of scheduling a new hearing.

**THEREFORE** By majority, the appeal is declared granted. The challenged judgment is annulled. A new oral and public trial is ordered, before a different Court. Let this matter be sent to the corresponding processing judge to schedule a new hearing. Notify the Executive Directorate of this judgment for the appropriate purposes.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar** **Dissenting vote of Judge Escoto Fernández and Judge Molinari Vílchez** The undersigned members respect but depart from the criterion held by the majority of this Chamber by virtue of the following. Pursuant to the second paragraph of precept 137 of the CPCA, the grounds for cassation appeal for procedural reasons may only be alleged by the party who has been harmed by the non-observance of the procedural rule. Furthermore, it shall be necessary to have petitioned the jurisdictional body for the rectification of the defect, in cases where possible. Subsection g) of the cited mandate provides for the admissibility of the appeal when there is non-observance of the rules provided for deliberation, the deadline for issuing the judgment, or the drafting of the ruling in its essential elements. Such provision is a consequence of a proceeding influenced by the system based on orality, where it is necessary to respect the principle of immediacy, with the fundamental purpose that what occurred in the oral and public trial be preserved in the memory of the Judges. However, it should not be interpreted as an absolute safeguard of forms, since it is oriented towards protecting the constitutional guarantees of hearing, defense, and contradiction, which delegitimizes the declaration of nullity for nullity's sake, as it is odious matter that must be interpreted restrictively and is only admissible when it causes defenselessness to the appellant. Under the assumption of ground g), this requirement is maintained; the appellant party must explain the defenselessness, which consists of pointing out the affectation generated by the fact that the judgment was issued outside the deadline established in canon 111 of the CPCA.

It should be added that procedural rules are instrumental to substantive law, and along that line of thought they must be understood as means to realize the constitutional right to prompt and complete justice, to obtain a judgment within a reasonable time. They cannot, therefore, be interpreted with such rigidity, abandoning that instrumentality, turning them into ultimate ends and an obstacle to the decision that the parties seeking justice demand, since, it is reiterated, it implies taking a process back to stages already overcome (holding a new hearing and issuing a judgment), affecting not only the party seeking justice, but also the administration of justice and the proper management of public resources. Furthermore, it would contradict the principle of conservation of procedural acts. For these reasons, the second paragraph of Article 137 establishes lack of defense (indefensión) as the prerequisite for the admissibility of procedural complaints. In the present matter, the State's representation does not explain how the three-day delay incurred by the Tribunal harmed it, which indicates the informality of the complaint. Communication to the Executive Directorate is also not shared, since that would imply a sanction without basis in what is stated here and without regard to due process. In addition to the foregoing and for greater abundance of reasons, in this case the presiding judge enjoyed a vacation day, as stated by the appellant. Based on canons 220 of the CPCA and 138 of the Civil Procedure Code, applied supplementarily, where this latter rule establishes as non-working days, in what is of interest: “ [...] Sundays, holidays, vacation days, days that are legally declared days off for judicial offices.” (the underlining does not belong to the original); such that the vacation day granted to the presiding judge is also a non-working day. Consequently, the challenged ruling was issued within the legal deadline. In this regard, the dissenting vote found in the resolution at 8 hours 54 minutes on June 4, 2015, which corresponds to number 633-A, of this Chamber, may also be consulted.

Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vílchez Nombre3667 according to the agreement of Article XXV of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, Session No. 54-13 of May 14, two thousand thirteen, he had permission to attend as a trainer on Fridays May 31 and June 7, both of the year 2013. The foregoing, for purposes of automatically considering the deadline to issue judgment extended. It must be noted, he indicates, the judgment contains an error, because session no. 54-13 was not held on May 14 as indicated, but rather was held on May 23, 2013, that is, after the oral and public trial had already been conducted (see printout of agreements number 25 of sessions no. 54-13 and no. 49-13 of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, taken from the Judicial Branch website). Consequently, he believes, the justification contained in resultando 7 of the ruling is not acceptable, because Article 111 of the CPCA cited above is violated, as well as Article 138 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC) applicable to the specific case by reason of the mandate established in Article 220 of the CPCA, since days different from those expressly indicated in the indicated procedural legislation are considered as "non-business days" ("días inhábiles"). As is clear from the foregoing, Article 138 clearly establishes what must be considered a non-business day, and the article at no time indicates that those days on which judicial officials are on leave to be absent from their duties can be considered as a non-business day. He believes this interpretation is reinforced by analyzing the content of Article XXV of minute no. 54-13 of eight o'clock on May 23, 2013, which authorizes the participation of the Judge in training activities, but with the caveat that he must attend to and give priority to any matter that, due to the high duties he performs, he must attend to; he copies an excerpt from the minute establishing what is indicated. It is clear from the transcription, he says, that the leave granted to participate in the training activity was conditional on giving priority to any work activity that required the Judge's presence, so in his view, it is impossible to consider that the days on which the judge was on leave are non-business days under the terms established in Article 138 of the CPC. Along these same lines, it is considered that the appealed judgment violates the provisions of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (hereinafter the RAOSJCACH) regarding the manner in which deliberations must be conducted and the deadline to issue judgment. Indeed, he argues, note that in accordance with what that legal body establishes, the Trial Court must resolve each of the incidents that arise in the case file once the oral and public trial hearing has been scheduled. In defense of his thesis, he copies the provisions of Article 72 of the RAOSJCACH. He reproaches that the present case was scheduled for trial since the month of March 2013, that is, at the time when leave was requested to participate in the Judicial Branch training activity on May 14, 2013, the Fifth Section should have foreseen how the participation of the presiding judge would affect the issuance and final notification of the judgment in this trial, adopting the pertinent measures so as not to affect the public service. Especially since the RAOSJCACH establishes the grounds on which the deliberation in a specific matter may be considered suspended, and the existence of paid leave does not constitute one of them, under the terms established in Article 81 of that regulatory body. Along this same line of thought, he indicates, the previously cited rule establishes that the operative part of the judgment had to be issued within a period of 2 business days, and the complete text had to be communicated within the fifteen business days following the conclusion of the oral and public trial, in accordance with the provisions of precepts 79 and 83 of this same legal body. He believes, according to said rules, it is clear that in the present case all the deadlines established in the applicable legislation were breached, both for issuing the judgment and for notifying it, and it is not acceptable to consider that the deadline to issue and notify the judgment was suspended because one of the members of the Court was on leave to participate as an instructor in Judicial Branch training activities. The jurisprudence of the First Chamber, he warns, has been clear and emphatic in establishing the nullity of judgments issued in contravention of the deadlines established in Article 111 of the CPCA repeatedly cited; in that sense, rulings no. 1527-F-51-2012 of 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. In the same sense, resolutions 1058-A-S1-2012 of 12:00 p.m. on August 24, 2012, 1068-A-S1-2D12 of 12:50 p.m. on August 24, 2012, among others. For the foregoing reasons, he concludes, the judgment was issued in flagrant violation of Articles 111, 137 subsection g, and 220 of the CPCA and Article 138 of the CPC, due to lack of application to the specific case. Likewise, he says, the ruling violates Articles 72, 73 subsection 10, 79, 81 and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, due to erroneous interpretation, for which reason he requests it be annulled for having been issued and notified outside the established deadline and orders a new oral and public trial before a different section of the Court, under the terms established in Article 111 of the CPCA. In the alternative, he requests, if it is considered that the deadline to issue and notify the judgment should indeed be considered "suspended" due to the existence of paid leave for training activities in the Judicial Branch, he requests the Chamber to consider the following arguments. As stated at the beginning of the charge, the oral and private trial took place on May 20, 2013, so even considering that the deadline to issue and notify the judgment was suspended for two more days, it is clear that the resolution was notified outside the deadline established for issuing judgment, because it should have been issued on the second day of deliberation and notified to the parties no later than May 12, 2013. For this reason, he states, even under this assumption, the resolution was notified in contravention of the provisions of Articles 111 and 137 subsection g of the CPCA and 81 and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, so even under this assumption the judgment must be annulled and the case file must be remanded for a new oral and public trial before a different section of the Court, under the terms established in Article 111 of the CPCA.

**III.-** Regarding this matter, this Chamber has expressed: *"Under the principles of immediacy and celerity, numeral 111 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter CPCA) establishes that, once the hearing is concluded, the Court must deliberate and issue the judgment immediately, foreseeing the possibility of exempting this obligation in those cases classified as complex, in which case, the judgment must be notified within a maximum period of 15 business days, calculated from the conclusion of the hearing. As indicated, the rule responds to the principle of immediacy –this being the normative value intended to be protected in the precept under discussion– and seeks to ensure that the judges, when issuing the ruling, retain in their memory, with the greatest clarity, the evidentiary elements presented during the trial, and thus prevent the passage of time from eroding the comprehensive assessment they may make of them. In line with the above, Articles 82.1 and 79.4 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction provide that the deliberation may be extended for up to two days, in which case, the operative part must be communicated to the participants with a laconic exposition of its grounds, and the complete text of the judgment within the already referenced term of 15 days. Both the legal norm and the regulatory ones to which reference has been made establish a parameter based on which it can be presumed that there has been a breach of the repeatedly cited principle of immediacy. It is, of course, a legal presumption fixed for purposes of control, without it being possible to infer from what is indicated that judges cannot retain the details of the process for a longer period. It is simply the establishment of a tolerance limit by the legislator, or what is the same, a normative conventionalism. Therefore, its non-observance was sanctioned with nullity. Precisely, on this topic it has been indicated: 'Provision 111.2 of the legal body cited, in accordance with precept 137 subsection g, sanctions with nullity the non-compliance with the deadline to deliberate and issue the judgment, and orders the trial repeated before another composition of the Tribunal, except for irreproducible evidentiary acts. The foregoing is due to the principle of immediacy itself, and seeks to ensure that the least amount of time elapses between the evidentiary proceedings and the judgment, guaranteeing that the judges have the evidence present with the greatest possible clarity, and therefore, can carry out the corresponding assessment exercise, without forgetting relevant aspects of those.' (ruling no. 1096-F-S1- 2011 of 9:45 a.m. on September 8, 2011)"*. No. 1527 of 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. In the instant case, the oral and public trial, in view of the recording of the hearing and the respective minute, took place on May 20, 2013, an act where the matter was declared complex and the parties were informed that the judgment would be made known to them in writing. Regarding the notification of the judgment to the State, it is verified at folio 573 of the judicial case file that this was carried out on June 13, 2013, as the appellant argues. Consequently, it is observed that from the date when the oral trial concluded—May 20—and the notification of the judgment on June 13, more than 15 business days elapsed, which is the deadline provided in the cited provision, which expired on June 10, for which reason it is mandatory to uphold the grievance formulated. The Court justifies its issuance outside the deadline on the fact that the presiding judge attended a training activity at the Judicial Branch on May 31 and June 7, both of 2013. It is essential to reproduce Article 81 of the RAOSJCACH because it is where the hypotheses are regulated that interrupt (actually suspend) the deadline for issuing and communicating the judgment: *"**1)** The deliberation shall be carried out without interruption, unless there are reasons of force majeure or illness of one of the judges. Once the cause has disappeared, the Court will reconvene for the deliberation and issuance of the judgment, prior communication to the parties. **2)** Likewise, the reopening of the debate contemplated in numeral 110 of the CPCA and 73.15 of this Regulation shall be a cause for interruption of the deliberation and decision stage."* Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of said article, the deliberation and decision may only be suspended (since when the reason for its stoppage ceases, its count continues from the point where it stopped, meaning its computation does not start anew) for reasons of force majeure, illness of one of the judges (incapacity), or when the debate is reopened. In the case at hand, it is clear the last two causes were not the reason invoked to justify the delay, so it only remains to verify if there was a force majeure reason that prevented issuing the ruling within the period provided in the legal system. In the opinion of this Deciding Body, in the instant case, the cited exemption does not exist, given that the participation of the presiding judge in the course was known beforehand (a foreseeable event), so the issuance of the ruling outside the deadline could have been avoided by taking the necessary measures to ensure the judgment was issued on time. The foregoing, because that deadline is peremptory and as this Chamber has ordered, said period must not be violated with the purpose of safeguarding the principle of immediacy. And, to ensure that the judges preserve in their memory the elements of conviction, as well as everything that occurred in the oral and public trial so they can carry out a correct assessment, maintaining the relevant aspects thereof.

**IV.-** By virtue of the foregoing, by majority vote it is considered appropriate to uphold the appeal filed, to omit ruling on the remaining objections and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant party, as well as to annul the appealed judgment. In accordance with numeral 111.2 of the CPCA, the oral trial must be repeated before a Court with a different composition, for which reason this matter must be referred to the corresponding processing judge for the purpose of scheduling a new hearing.

**POR TANTO** By majority vote, the appeal is declared with merit. The appealed judgment is annulled. A new oral and public trial is ordered, before a different Court. Refer this matter to the corresponding processing judge to schedule a new hearing. Make this judgment known to the Executive Directorate for pertinent purposes.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar** **Dissenting Vote of Judge Escoto Fernández and Judge Molinari Vílchez** We, the undersigned members, respect but depart from the opinion held by the majority of this Chamber by virtue of the following. In accordance with the second paragraph of precept 137 of the CPCA, the grounds for a cassation appeal for procedural reasons may only be alleged by the party harmed by the non-observance of the procedural norm. Furthermore, it will be necessary to have requested, before the jurisdictional body, the rectification of the defect, in cases where possible. Subsection g) of the cited mandate provides for the admissibility of the appeal when there is non-observance of the rules provided for the deliberation, deadline for issuing judgment, or drafting of the ruling in its essential elements. Such provision is a consequence of a process influenced by the system based on orality, where it is necessary to respect the principle of immediacy, with the fundamental purpose that what occurred in the oral and public trial is preserved in the memory of the Judges. However, it should not be interpreted as an absolute safeguarding of forms, since it is oriented towards protecting the constitutional guarantees of hearing, defense, and contradiction, which delegitimizes the declaration of nullity for nullity's sake, as it is odious matter that must be interpreted restrictively and is only admissible when it causes defenselessness to the appellant. In the case of ground g), this requirement is maintained; the appellant must explain the defenselessness, which consists of indicating the harm caused by the fact that the judgment was issued outside the deadline established in canon 111 of the CPCA. It should be added, procedural rules are instrumental to substantive law, and along that line of thought they must be understood as means to realize the constitutional right to prompt and complete justice, to obtain a judgment within a reasonable time. They cannot, therefore, be interpreted with such rigidity, abandoning that instrumentality, turning them into ultimate ends and an obstacle to the decision that the parties demand, since, it is reiterated, it implies rolling back a process to overcome stages (holding a new debate and issuing judgment), with harm not only to the party seeking justice, but to the administration of justice and the proper management of public resources. Furthermore, it would be contradictory to the principle of preservation of procedural acts. For these reasons, the second paragraph of Article 137 establishes defenselessness as the prerequisite for the admissibility of procedural charges. In the present matter, the State representation does not explain how it was harmed by the three-day delay incurred by the Court, which indicates the informality of the charge. Nor is the communication to the Executive Directorate shared, since that would imply a sanction without basis in what is said here and without attending to due process. In addition to the foregoing and for greater abundance of reasons; in this case, the presiding judge enjoyed a vacation day, according to what the appellant stated. Based on canons 220 of the CPCA and 138 of the Civil Procedure Code, applied supplementarily, where in this latter norm it is established, as relevant, as non-business days: *"[...] Sundays, holidays, vacation days, days that are legally declared as days off for judicial offices."* (the underlining does not belong to the original); so the vacation day granted to the presiding judge is also non-business. Consequently, the questioned ruling was issued within the legal deadline.

One may also consult, in this regard, the dissenting vote found in the decision issued at 8:54 a.m. on June 4, 2015, corresponding to case number 633-A of this Chamber.

Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vílchez Nombre3667 "II.- Sole ground: In the opinion of the appellant, the judgment suffers from an absolute nullity defect, since it was issued and served outside the time limit established by Article 111 of the CPCA. In effect, it states, the oral and public hearing was held and concluded on May 20, 2013, the date on which the matter was declared to be of complex processing, with the parties being advised that the judgment would be issued in writing and served within a period of 15 business days. According to the date of conclusion of the oral and public hearing and taking into account the business days elapsed, the judgment should have been served no later than June 10, 2013. However, it was not issued until June 12 and not served until June 13, both in 2013, as stated in the certification of the notice of service. It follows from the foregoing that it was issued and served outside the time limit established in Article 111 of the CPCA, a provision which is alleged to have been violated due to its evident non-observance (failure to apply). It explains, it should be noted, in Recital 7 of the judgment, the delay is justified by the fact that Judge Rapporteur Juan Luis Guisti Soto, "... according to the agreement of Article XXV of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, Session No. 54-13 of May 14, two thousand thirteen, had leave to attend as an instructor on Fridays, May 31 and June 7, both in the year 2013. The foregoing, for the purposes of automatically extending the time limit to issue judgment." It must be warned, it indicates, the judgment contains an error, since Session No. 54-13 was not held on May 14 as stated, but was not held until May 23, 2013, that is, after the oral and public hearing had already taken place (see printout of agreements number 25 of Sessions No. 54-13 and No. 49-13 of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, taken from the Judicial Branch website). Consequently, it considers, the justification contained in recital 7 of the decision is not acceptable, since it violates Article 111 of the aforementioned CPCA, as well as Article 138 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC) applicable to the specific case by virtue of the mandate established in Article 220 of the CPCA, because days other than those expressly indicated in the cited procedural legislation are considered as "non-business days". As follows from the foregoing, Article 138 clearly establishes what should be considered a non-business day, it being the case that the article at no time indicates that those days on which judicial officials are on leave to be absent from their duties may be considered as non-business days. It considers, this interpretation is reinforced by analyzing the content of Article XXV of Minutes No. 54-13 at eight o'clock on May 23, 2013, which authorizes the Judge's participation in the training activities, but with the proviso that he must attend to and give priority to any matter that, due to the high duties he performs, he must address; it copies an excerpt from the minutes which establishes the foregoing. It follows from the transcript, it states, that the leave granted to participate in the training activity was conditioned on giving priority to any work-related activity requiring the Judge's presence, and therefore, in its opinion, it is impossible to consider that the days on which the judge was on leave are non-business days within the meaning of Article 138 of the CPC. In this same vein, it is considered that the challenged judgment violates the provisions of the Autonomous Regulations for the Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (hereinafter the RAOSJCACH) regarding the manner in which deliberations and the time limit for issuing judgment must be carried out. In effect, it argues, note that in accordance with what this legal body establishes, the Trial Court must resolve each of the incidents that arise in the case file once the oral and public trial hearing has been scheduled. In defense of its thesis, it copies the provisions of Article 72 of the RAOSJCACH. It reproaches, the present case was scheduled for trial since the month of March 2013, that is, at the time the leave was requested to participate in the Judicial School training activity on May 14, 2013, the Fifth Section should have foreseen how the participation of the Judge Rapporteur would affect the final issuance and service of the judgment in this trial, adopting the pertinent measures so as not to affect the public service. Especially when the RAOSJCACH establishes the grounds upon which the deliberation in a given matter may be considered suspended, and the existence of leaves with pay does not constitute one of them, pursuant to the provisions of Article 81 of that regulatory body. Following this same line of thought, it indicates, the previously cited provision establishes that the operative part of the judgment must have been issued within a period of 2 business days, and the full text must have been communicated within the fifteen business days following the conclusion of the oral and public hearing, in accordance with the provisions of Precepts 79 and 83 of this same legal body. It considers, according to said provisions, it is clear that in the present case all the time limits established in the applicable legislation were breached, both for issuing the judgment and for serving it, it being unacceptable to consider that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment was suspended because one of the members of the Court was on leave to participate as a teacher in training activities of the Judicial School. The jurisprudence of the First Chamber, it warns, has been clear and conclusive in establishing the nullity of judgments issued in contravention of the time limits established in Article 111 of the repeatedly cited CPCA, in that sense decisions No. 1527-F-51-2012 of 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. Likewise, decisions 1058-A-S1-2012 of 12:00 p.m. on August 24, 2012, 1068-A-S1-2D12 of 12:50 p.m. on August 24, 2012, among others. For the foregoing reasons, it concludes, the judgment was issued in flagrant violation of Articles 111, 137 subsection g, and 220 of the CPCA and Article 138 of the CPC, due to failure to apply them to the specific case. Likewise, it states, the decision violates Articles 72, 73 subsection 10, 79, 81, and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, due to erroneous interpretation, and therefore it requests that it be annulled for having been issued and served outside the established time limit and that a new oral and public trial be ordered before a different section of the Court, pursuant to the provisions of Article 111 of the CPCA. Alternatively, it requests, if it is considered that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment should indeed be deemed "suspended" by the existence of the leave with pay for training activities at the Judicial School, it requests this Chamber to consider the following arguments. As was warned at the beginning of the charge, the oral and private trial was held on May 20, 2013, so even considering that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment was suspended for two more days, it is clear that the decision was served outside the established time limit for issuing judgment, since it should have been issued on the second day of deliberation and served on the parties no later than May 12, 2013. For this reason, it explains, even under this scenario, the decision was served in contravention of the provisions established in Articles 111 and 137 subsection g of the CPCA and 81 and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, and therefore, even under this assumption, the judgment must be annulled and the return of the case file ordered so that a new oral and public trial is held before a different section of the Court, pursuant to the provisions of Article 111 of the CPCA.

III.- Regarding this matter, this Chamber has stated: "Pursuant to the principles of immediacy and celerity, numeral 111 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter CPCA) establishes that, once the hearing has concluded, the Court must deliberate and issue the judgment immediately, foreseeing the possibility of excepting this obligation in those cases qualified as complex, in which case, the judgment must be served within a maximum period of 15 business days, calculated from the conclusion of the hearing. As indicated, the provision responds to the principle of immediacy –this being the normative value intended to be protected in the precept under discussion– and seeks to ensure that the adjudicators, when delivering the decision, retain in their memory, with the greatest clarity, the evidentiary elements presented during the trial, thus avoiding the passage of time from eroding the integral assessment they may make of them. In line with the foregoing, Articles 82.1 and 79.4 of the Autonomous Regulations for the Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction provide that the deliberation may extend for up to two days, in which case, the operative part of the decision must be communicated to the participants with a brief description of its grounds, and the full text of the judgment communicated within the already-referenced term of 15 days. Both the legal provision and the regulatory provisions referred to establish a parameter from which it can be presumed that a violation of the many-times-cited principle of immediacy has occurred. This is, of course, a legal presumption established for control purposes, without it being possible to infer from what has been stated that judges cannot retain the details of the proceeding for a longer period. It is simply the establishment of a tolerance limit by the legislator, or in other words, a normative convention. For this reason, its non-observance was sanctioned with nullity. Precisely on this subject, it has been stated: 'Provision 111.2 of the cited legal body, in conjunction with Precept 137 subsection g, sanctions with nullity the non-compliance with the time limit to deliberate and issue judgment, and orders the trial to be repeated before another composition of the Court, except for irreproducible evidentiary acts. The foregoing responds to the very principle of immediacy, and seeks to ensure that the shortest time elapses between the evidentiary proceedings and the judgment, guaranteeing that the adjudicators retain the evidence with the greatest possible clarity, and therefore, can carry out the corresponding assessment exercise, without forgetting relevant aspects thereof' (judgment No. 1096-F-S1-2011 of 9:45 a.m. on September 8, 2011)." No. 1527 of 8:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. In the instant case, the oral and public trial, based on a review of the hearing recording and the respective minutes, was held on May 20, 2013, an act at which the matter was declared complex and the parties were informed that the judgment would be made known to them in writing. Regarding the service of notice of the judgment on the State, it is verified at page 573 of the judicial file that this took place on June 13, 2013, as alleged by the appellant. Consequently, it is observed, from the date the oral trial concluded –May 20– and the service of notice of the judgment on June 13, more than 15 business days elapsed, which is the time limit set forth in the cited provision, which expired on June 10, for which reason it is mandatory to uphold the grievance filed.

The Court justifies its late ruling on the fact that the presiding judge attended a training activity at the Judicial School (Escuela Judicial) on May 31 and June 7, both in 2013. It is essential to reproduce Article 81 of the RAOSJCACH because it is where the hypotheses that interrupt (in reality, suspend) the deadline for the issuance and notification of the judgment are regulated: *“**1)** The deliberation shall be carried out without interruption, unless there are reasons of force majeure or illness of one of the judges. Once the cause has disappeared, the Court shall reconvene for deliberation and issuance of the judgment, after prior notification to the parties. **2)** Likewise, the reopening of the debate contemplated in numeral 110 of the CPCA and 73.15 of this Regulation shall be a cause for interruption of the deliberation and decision phase.”* Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of said article, the deliberation and decision can only be suspended (since when the reason for its paralysis ceases, the counting continues from the point where it had stopped, that is, its computation does not start anew) due to reasons of force majeure, illness of one of the judges (incapacity), or when the debate is reopened. In the sub lite case, it is clear that the latter two causes were not the reason given to justify the delay, so it would only remain to verify if there was a reason of force majeure that prevented the issuance of the ruling within the period provided in the legal system. In the opinion of this deciding Body (Órgano decisor), in this instance, the cited exculpatory circumstance does not apply, given that the presiding judge's participation in the course was known in advance (a foreseeable fact), so the issuance of the ruling outside the deadline could have been avoided by taking the necessary measures so that the judgment was issued on time. The foregoing, since that deadline is peremptory and, as this Chamber has ruled, said period must not be breached for the purpose of safeguarding the principle of immediacy (principio de inmediación). And, in this way, ensure that the judges preserve in their memory the elements of conviction, as well as everything that occurred in the oral and public trial, so that they can carry out a correct assessment, maintaining the relevant aspects thereof.

**IV.-** By virtue of the foregoing, by majority it is considered that the appropriate course of action will be to uphold the appeal filed, omit a ruling regarding the remaining objections and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant party, as well as to annul the contested judgment. In accordance with numeral 111.2 of the CPCA, the oral trial must be repeated before a Court with a different composition, which is why this matter must be referred to the corresponding processing judge so that a new hearing date is scheduled.” 24735 published in La Gaceta Nº 230 of December 4, 1995) regain their original force, which will take effect once the judgment becomes final. It also ordered the State to pay both sets of costs (ambas costas) of the proceeding. Disagreeing with the decision, the State and the passive coadjuvant (coadyuvante pasivo) filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación). Given the manner in which this will be resolved, only the procedural grievance set forth below will be addressed, omitting any ruling on the remaining grievances and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant Mallon Oil Company Sucursal Costa Rica S.A., which adheres to the arguments presented in the State's appeal. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Cassation Appeal on Procedural Grounds</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">II.- Sole ground: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In the opinion of the appellant, the judgment suffers from a defect of absolute nullity, given that it was issued and served outside the time limit established by Article 111 of the CPCA. Indeed, it states,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> the oral and public hearing (juicio oral y público) was held and concluded on May 20, 2013, the date on which the matter was declared to be of complex processing (tramitación compleja), with the parties being informed that the judgment would be issued in writing and served within a time limit of 15 business days. According to the date the oral and public hearing concluded, and taking into account the business days that elapsed, the judgment should have been served no later than June 10, 2013. However, it was not issued until June 12 and was not served until June 13, both in 2013, as evidenced by the certification of the service record. It follows from the foregoing that it was issued and served outside the time limit established in Article 111 of the CPCA, a rule that is claimed to have been breached by its evident non-observance (lack of application). It states, it should be noted, in Recital (Resultando) 7 of the judgment, the delay is justified on the grounds that the Reporting Judge (Juez Ponente) Juan Luis Guisti Soto, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“... according to the agreement of Article XXV of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), Session N° 54-13 of May 14, two thousand thirteen, had permission to attend as an instructor on Friday, May 31 and Friday, June 7, both in the year 2013. The foregoing, for purposes of automatically understanding the time limit for issuing judgment to be extended</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It must be warned, it indicates, the judgment contains an error, because session no. 54-13 was not held on May 14 as indicated, but was held on May 23, 2013, that is, after the oral and public hearing had already been held (see printout of agreements number 25 of sessions no. 54-13 and no. 49-13 of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, taken from the Judiciary's web page). Consequently, it considers, the justification contained in Recital 7 of the ruling is not acceptable, as it violates the aforementioned Article 111 of the CPCA, as well as Article 138 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil, hereinafter CPC) applicable to the specific case by reason of the mandate established in Article 220 of the CPCA, since days other than those expressly indicated in the indicated procedural legislation are considered as “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">non-business days (días inhábiles)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">”. As is clear from the foregoing, Article 138 clearly establishes what must be considered a non-business day, and the article at no time indicates that days on which judicial officials have permission to be absent from their duties may be considered non-business days. It considers that this interpretation is reinforced by analyzing the content of Article XXV of minute no. 54-13 of eight o'clock on May 23, 2013, which authorizes the Judge's participation in training activities, but with the caveat that he must attend to and give priority to any matter that, due to the high duties he performs, he must attend to; it copies an extract from the minute establishing the foregoing. It follows from the transcription, it says, that the permission granted to participate in the training activity was conditioned on giving priority to any work activity requiring the Judge's presence, and therefore, in its opinion, it is impossible to consider that the days on which the judge was on permission are non-business days under the terms of Article 138 of the CPC. In this same line of thought, it is considered that the challenged judgment violates the provisions of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, hereinafter RAOSJCACH) regarding the manner in which deliberations and the time limit for issuing judgment must be carried out. Indeed, it argues, note that in accordance with what that legal body establishes, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) must resolve each of the incidents that arise in the case file (expediente) once the oral and public hearing has been scheduled. In defense of its thesis, it copies the provisions of Article 72 of the RAOSJCACH. It reproaches that the present case was scheduled for hearing since the month of March 2013, that is, at the time permission was requested to participate in the Judicial School (Escuela Judicial) training activity on May 14, 2013, the Fifth Section (Sección Quinta) should have foreseen how the reporting judge's participation would affect the final issuance and service of this trial's judgment, adopting the pertinent measures so as not to affect the public service. Especially when the RAOSJCACH establishes the grounds for which deliberation in a given matter may be considered suspended, and the existence of paid leave permits</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> does not constitute one of them, under the terms of Article 81 of that regulatory body. Under this same line of thought, it indicates, the previously cited rule establishes that the operative part of the judgment should have been issued within a time limit of 2 business days, and the full text should have been communicated within the fifteen business days following the conclusion of the oral and public hearing, in accordance with precepts 79 and 83 of this same legal body. It considers that, pursuant to said rules, it is clear that in the present case all time limits established in the applicable legislation, both for issuing the judgment and for serving it, were breached, and it is not acceptable to consider that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment was suspended because one of the members of the Court (Tribunal) had permission to participate as a teacher in Judicial School training activities. The case law (jurisprudencia) of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), it warns, has been clear and categorical in establishing the nullity of judgments issued in contravention of the time limits established in Article 111 of the CPCA of repeated citation, in that sense rulings no. 1527-F-51-2012 of 8 hours 30 minutes of November 20, 2012. In the same sense, resolutions 1058-A-S1-2012 of 12 hours of August 24, 2012, 1068-A-S1-2D12 of 12 hours 50 minutes of August 24, 2012, among others. For the reasons stated, it concludes, the judgment was issued in flagrant violation of Articles 111, 137 subsection g), and 220 of the CPCA and Article 138 of the CPC, due to lack of application to the specific case. Likewise, it says, the ruling violates Articles 72, 73 subsection 10, 79, 81, and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, due to erroneous interpretation, and it therefore requests that it be annulled for having been issued and served outside the time limit established therefor, and that a new oral and public hearing be ordered before a different Section of the Court, under the terms of Article 111 of the CPCA. In the alternative, it requests, should it be considered that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment must indeed be considered “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">suspended</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” due to the existence of paid leave permission for training activities at the Judicial School, it requests the Chamber to consider the following arguments. As warned at the beginning of the grievance, the oral and private hearing was held on May 20, 2013, so even considering that the time limit for issuing and serving the judgment was suspended for two more days, it is clear that the resolution was served outside the time limit established for issuing judgment, since it should have been issued on the second day of deliberation and served to the parties no later than May 12, 2013. For this reason, it states, even under this assumption, the resolution was served in contravention of Articles 111 and 137 subsection g) of the CPCA and 81 and 82 of the RAOSJCACH, and therefore even under this assumption the judgment must be annulled and the referral (reenvío) of the case file ordered so that a new oral and public hearing is held before a different Section of the Court, under the terms of Article 111 of the CPCA. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">III.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> On this matter, this Chamber has stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“Pursuant to the principles of immediacy (inmediación) and celerity, numeral 111 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter CPCA) establishes that, once the hearing has concluded, the Court must deliberate and issue the judgment immediately, foreseeing the possibility of exempting this obligation in those cases classified as complex, in which case, the judgment must be served within a maximum time limit of 15 business days, calculated from the conclusion of the hearing. As indicated, the rule responds to the principle of immediacy – this being the normative value intended to be protected in the precept under discussion – and seeks to ensure that the judges, when issuing the ruling, retain in their memory, with the greatest clarity, the evidentiary elements presented during the trial, and thus prevent the passage of time from eroding the comprehensive assessment that they can make of them. In line with the foregoing, Articles 82.1 and 79.4 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction provide that deliberation may be extended for up to two days, in which case, the operative part must be communicated to the participants with a laconic exposition of its grounds, and the full text of the judgment within the already referenced term of 15 days. Both the legal rule and the regulatory ones referred to establish a parameter based on which it can be presumed that a breach of the oft-cited principle of immediacy has occurred. It is, of course, a legal presumption established for control purposes, without it being possible to infer from the foregoing that judges cannot retain the details of the proceeding for a longer period. It is simply the establishment of a tolerance limit by the legislator, or what is the same, a normative convention. Therefore, its non-observance was sanctioned with nullity. Precisely on this subject, it has been indicated: “Provision 111.2 of the cited legal body, in concordance with precept 137 subsection g), sanctions with nullity the non-compliance with the time limit for deliberating and issuing the judgment, and orders the trial to be repeated before a different composition of the Court, except for irreproducible evidentiary acts. The foregoing obeys the principle of immediacy itself, and seeks to ensure that between the evidentiary proceedings and the judgment, the least time elapses, guaranteeing that the judges have the evidence present with the greatest possible clarity, and therefore, can carry out the corresponding assessment exercise, without forgetting relevant aspects thereof” (ruling no. 1096-F-S1-2011 of 9 hours 45 minutes of September 8, 2011)”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. No. 1527 of 8 hours 30 minutes of November 20, 2012. In the specific case, the oral and public hearing, in view of the recording of the hearing and the respective minute, was held on May 20, 2013, an act where the matter was declared complex and the parties were informed that the judgment would be made known to them in writing. Regarding the service of the judgment on the State, it is verified at folio 573 of the judicial case file, that this was carried out on June 13, 2013</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> as claimed by the appellant. Consequently, it is observed that from the date the oral hearing concluded – May 20 – and the service of the judgment on June 13, more than 15 business days elapsed, which is the time limit foreseen in the cited provision, which expired on June 10, for which reason it is mandatory to uphold the grievance formulated. The Court justifies its late issuance on the fact that the reporting judge attended a training activity at the Judicial School on May 31 and June 7, both in 2013. It is essential to reproduce Article 81 of the RAOSJCACH because it is where the hypotheses that interrupt (in reality suspend) the time limit for the issuance and communication of the judgment are regulated: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">1) </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Deliberation shall be carried out without interruption, unless reasons of force majeure (fuerza mayor) or illness of any of the judges concur.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Once the cause has disappeared, the Court shall be constituted again for deliberation and issuance of the judgment, after communication to the parties. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Likewise, the reopening of the debate contemplated in numeral 110 of the CPCA and 73.15 of this Regulation shall be a cause for interruption of the deliberation and decision stage.” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of said cardinal, deliberation and decision may only be suspended (since when</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">the reason for its stoppage ceases, its count continues from the point where it had stopped, that is, its calculation does not start anew) for reasons of force majeure, illness of any of the judges (incapacity), or when the debate is reopened. In the case at hand, it is clear the last two causes were not the reason given to justify the delay, so it would only remain to verify if there was a reason of force majeure that prevented issuing the ruling within the period provided in the legal system. In the opinion of this Deciding Body, in the specific case, the</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> cited exemption is not configured, given that the reporting judge's participation in the course was known in advance (a foreseeable event), so the late issuance of the ruling could have been avoided by taking the necessary measures so that the judgment was issued on time. The foregoing, since that time limit is peremptory and, as this Chamber has ordered, said period must not be violated for the purpose of safeguarding the principle of immediacy. And, thus, to ensure that the judges preserve in their memory the elements of conviction, as well as everything that occurred in the oral and public hearing, so that they can carry out a correct assessment, maintaining the relevant aspects thereof. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IV.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">By virtue of the foregoing, by majority it is considered that the appropriate course of action will be to grant the appeal filed, omit any ruling regarding the remaining objections and the appeal of the passive coadjuvant party, as well as annul the challenged judgment. In accordance with numeral 111.2 of the CPCA, the oral hearing must be repeated before a Court with a different composition, for which reason this matter must be referred to the corresponding processing judge (juez tramitador) so that a new scheduling is carried out.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><br style=\"page-break-before:always; clear:both\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">THEREFORE (POR TANTO)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">By majority, the appeal is granted. The challenged judgment is annulled. It is ordered that a new oral and public hearing be held, before a different Court. Refer this matter to the corresponding processing judge so that a new scheduling is carried out. Make this judgment known to the Executive Directorate (Dirección Ejecutiva) for what may correspond.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Román Solís Zelaya</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">William Molinari Vílchez</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> Jorge Isaac solano Aguilar</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Dissenting vote (Voto salvado) of Magistrate Escoto Fernández and Magistrate Molinari Vílchez</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The undersigned members respect but diverge from the opinion held by the majority of this Chamber by virtue of the following. In accordance with the second paragraph of precept 137 of the CPCA, the grounds for the cassation appeal on procedural grounds (recurso de casación por razones procesales) may only be alleged by the party that was harmed by the non-observance of the procedural rule. Furthermore, it will be necessary to have sought, before the jurisdictional body, the rectification of the defect, in cases where this is possible. Subsection g) of the cited mandate provides for the admissibility of the appeal when there is non-observance of the rules foreseen for deliberation, the time limit for issuance of judgment, or the drafting of the ruling in its essential elements. Such provision is a consequence of a proceeding influenced by the system based on orality, where it is necessary to respect the principle of immediacy (principio de inmediación), for the fundamental purpose of preserving in the memory of the Judges what occurred in the oral and public hearing. However, it should not be interpreted as an absolute safeguard of forms, since it is oriented towards the protection of the constitutional guarantees of hearing, defense, and contradiction, which delegitimizes the declaration of nullity for nullity's sake, as it is an odious matter that must be interpreted restrictively and is only admissible when it causes defenselessness (indefensión) to the appellant. Under the assumption of ground g), this requirement remains; the appellant must explain the defenselessness, which consists of pointing out the impact caused by the fact that the judgment was issued outside the time limit established in canon 111 of the CPCA. It should be added, procedural rules are instrumental to substantive law, and in that line of thought they must be understood as means to realize the constitutional right to prompt and complete justice, to obtain a judgment within a reasonable time. They cannot then</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> be interpreted with such rigidity, in abandonment of that instrumentality, turning them into ultimate ends and an obstacle to the decision that the litigants demand, since, it is reiterated, it implies taking a proceeding back to overcome stages (holding a new debate and issuing a judgment), affecting not only the litigant, but also the administration of justice and the proper management of public resources. Furthermore, it would be contradictory to the principle of conservation of procedural acts. For these reasons, the second paragraph of Article 137 establishes defenselessness as the prerequisite for the admissibility of procedural grounds. In the present matter, the State representation does not explain in what way it was harmed by the three-day delay incurred by the Court, which speaks to the informality of the ground. Nor is the communication to the Executive Directorate shared, since this would imply a sanction without support in what is stated here and without attending to due process.</span></p> In addition to the foregoing and by way of further reasoning; in this case the reporting judge enjoyed a day of vacations, as asserted by the appellant. Based on canons 220 of the CPCA and 138 of the Civil Procedure Code, applied suppletorily, where the latter provision establishes as non-working days (días inhábiles) of relevance: “[...] Sundays, holidays, vacation days, days that are legally declared as court holidays for judicial offices.” (the underlining does not belong to the original); so that the day of vacation granted to the reporting judge is also a non-working day. Consequently, the challenged ruling was issued within the legal time limit. One may also consult in this regard the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) found in the resolution of 8 hours 54 minutes of June 4, 2015, corresponding to number 633-A, of this Chamber.

Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vílchez Nombre3667

20130004000878-1183229-1.rtf *110039071027CA* RES. 000028-F-S1-2016 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de enero de dos mil dieciséis.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido por Nombre3762, divorciado, biólogo, vecino de de Heredia; contra el ESTADO, representado por su procuradora Grettel Rodríguez Fernández, soltera. Interviene como coadyuvante pasivo, la empresa Mallon Oil Company, Sucursal Costa Rica, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Pedro Oller Taylor, casado. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y, con las salvedades hechas, abogados y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales citó, el actor estableció proceso de conocimiento, a fin de que en sentencia se declare: "I. Con lugar la presente acción contenciosa-administrativa II. Que el Decreto Ejecutivo # 26750-MINAET de 27 de febrero de 1998, es nulo e ineficaz. III. En caso de que la representación estatal se oponga a la presente acción, solicito condenarla al pago de ambas costas de esta acción." 2.- La representación estatal contestó negativamente y opuso las defensas de caducidad, cosa juzgada, falta de derecho, de interés actual y la de falta de integración de litis consorcio pasiva necesaria, siendo resuelta esta última interlocutoriamente. Asimismo, a folio 131 renunció al proceso conciliatorio.

3.- La audiencia preliminar se efectuó a las 8 horas 37 minutos del 11 de enero de 2013, oportunidad en que todas las partes hicieron uso de la palabra y momento procesal en que se resolvió la defensa previa de cosa juzgada.

4.- El juicio oral y público se celebró el 20 de mayo de 2013, con participación de todos las partes.

5.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, integrado por los Jueces Juan Luis Giusti Soto, Ileana Sánchez Navarro y Sergio Mena García; en sentencia no. 058-2013-V de las 8 horas 10 minutos del 12 de junio de 2013, resolvió: “Se rechazan las excepciones de Falta de Interés actual y la Falta de derecho. Se declara Con Lugar la demanda incoada por Nombre3762 contra el Estado y en consecuencia se declara la nulidad absoluta del Decreto 26750-MINAE de 27 de febrero de 1998 (Reglamento para la realización de estudios de impacto ambiental para los contratos de exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos) publicado en el Diario Oficial Nº 53 de 17 de marzo de 1998. Esta declaratoria tiene efectos declarativos y es retroactiva al 27 de febrero de 1998, debiéndose respetar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe desde su entrada en vigencia y hasta la firmeza de esta resolución. Además, se dimensiona esta sentencia en el sentido de que el artículo segundo y todo el Titulo X del Reglamento a la Ley de Hidrocarburos, artículos 266 al 283 (Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 24735 publicado en La Gaceta Nº 230 de 4 de diciembre de 1995) recobran su vigencia original, lo cual se dará a partir de que esta sentencia quede firme. Se condena en ambas costas del proceso al Estado.” 6.- El accionado y coadyuvante pasivo formulan recurso de casación indicando expresamente las razones en que se apoyan para refutar la tesis del Tribunal.

7.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley. Interviene en la decisión de este asunto el magistrado suplente Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar.

Redacta el magistrado Rivas Loáiciga

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El señor Nombre3762, demandó al Estado y solicitó la declaratoria de nulidad e ineficiencia del Decreto Ejecutivo no. 26750-MINAE de 27 de febrero de 1998 (en lo sucesivo Decreto no. 26750), al considerar que el Presidente de la República de ese entonces José María Figueres Olsen y el Ministro René Castro Salazar, lo emitieron contra leguem y con desviación de poder, derogando el título X del Reglamento a la Ley de Hidrocarburos no. DE-24735 de 29 de setiembre de 1995 (en adelante el Reglamento), el cual regulaba la realización de Estudios de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) para la exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos. Indicó, el artículo 266 del Reglamento derogado establecía la obligación del contratista de contar con un EIA previo a la firma del acto adjudicatario, el cual debía actualizarse periódicamente. Alegó, en el decreto impugnado, se dividió el EIA en dos fases en concordancia con el avance de las actividades, siendo la primera etapa la de prospección y la segunda la de exploración intensiva. Que la aprobación de la fase I del EIA será requisito indispensable y suficiente para que el acto adjudicatorio quede firme. Manifestó, la primera fase no implica actividad de alto impacto, por lo que los desarrolladores aportan como EIA solo las descripciones preliminares de las actividades exploratorias que se realizarán en esa etapa, sin profundizar en los impactos ambientales que producirá el proyecto petrolero en su conjunto, ni los procedimientos para su mitigación durante la ejecución o las acciones de recuperación. El actor mencionó en su escrito que los "dos últimos" casos tramitados con base en esa normativa sea los de MKJ Xplotation Inc. y Mallon Oil, presentaron un estudio geofísico de reflexión sísmica marina en el primer caso y Mallon Oil presentó un documento denominado: "Proyecto de recopilación y análisis de información para la fase I de prospección petrolera en la región Huetar norte y Huetar atlántico de Costa Rica", lo cual, consideró, es una simple actividad de gabinete para analizar la información científica regional existente. Alegó, ninguno de los documentos comprende la evaluación ambiental de la actividad petrolera propiamente dicha y con ello, en aplicación del decreto impugnado, ambas empresas sostienen que el Estado quedó obligado a permitir la ejecución del contrato de concesión en el caso de la empresa MKJ y de suscribir un contrato de concesión con Mallon Oil. Aduce, los funcionarios Figueres y Castro utilizaron sus competencias legítimas para realizar un acto administrativo discrecional supuestamente con un fin público (la protección del medio ambiente), pero con evidente desviación de poder con ello debilitaron y desaplicaron los controles ambientales del Estado en interés privado de las empresas petroleras, pudiendo exigir estas la firma de contratos de concesión sin la correlativa obligación de contar con la aprobación previa necesaria del EIA integral y completo. Expresa el actor, con la normativa impugnada se ocasiona un gravísimo riesgo ambiental al país, con violación al interés público, ya que la actividad petrolera históricamente está ligada a graves accidentes que provocan daños ecológicos irreversibles. Con el decreto impugnado, dijo, se desregularizó o flexibilizaron los controles ambientales de la actividad petrolera en Costa Rica, lo cual es contrario a los artículos 2, 31 inciso f) y 41 de la Ley de Hidrocarburos; 50 de la Constitución Política; 14 inciso 1 de la Convención sobre Diversidad Biológica; 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y los principios ambientales preventivo y precautorio; normativa que obliga a la presentación y aprobación del EIA de previo al inicio de actividades que causen impacto ambiental. Indicó, la Sala Constitucional ya se había pronunciado antes de la promulgación del Decreto no. 26750 en la sentencia no. 6240-93 al conocer la consulta facultativa sobre el proyecto de la Ley de Hidrocarburos, posición que fue reiterada por la misma Sala en la sentencia no. 1221-2002 con posterioridad al decreto impugnado, cuando estableció la inconstitucionalidad parcial del artículo 41 de la Ley de Hidrocarburos. En casos de exploración y explotación petrolera, la Sala Constitucional ha reiterado su posición sobre la obligatoriedad del EIA en la sentencia no. 205-2010 relacionado al caso de la empresa Mallon Oil. Por otra parte indica, posterior al decreto impugnado, se aprobó la Ley de Biodiversidad en la cual en su precepto 94 se indica que la evaluación del impacto ambiental debe efectuarse en su totalidad aun cuando el proyecto esté programado para realizarse en etapas, lo cual a criterio del actor no deja duda alguna de la obligatoriedad del EIA, lo que implica una derogatoria tácita por ilegalidad sobreviniente. Expresó, a partir de la década de los 90 surgió con fuerza la ética de responsabilidad ambiental, llegándose a recepcionar contenidos de la Declaración de Río, ratificando el país la Convención sobre Diversidad Biológica y otros importantes instrumentos jurídicos internacionales, además se reformó el canon 50 de la Constitución Política introduciendo el derecho fundamental de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, dando pie a la doctrina y jurisprudencia constitucional del ambiente y la promulgación interna de legislación como la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y la Ley de Biodiversidad. Por otra parte, manifestó, a la empresa MJK conocida como Harken, utilizando el reglamento impugnado, logró la firma del contrato de concesión para la exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos en Costa Rica el 12 de agosto de 1999, correspondiente a la licitación petrolera 1-97, siendo que Nombre3763 aprobó para ello sólo el estudio geofísico de reflexión sísmica marina en 507 km de superficie usado en la fase primera de prospección, con lo cual apenas se solicitó a la empresa una garantía ambiental de $7.995, sin que ello corresponda al riesgo real y potencial de la exploración y explotación petrolera que pretende realizar. Expresó, el estudio geofísico es una simple actividad académica para describir un procedimiento exploratorio, lo que considera no es suficiente para suscribir y dejar firme un contrato de concesión que abarca una extensión de 5633 km2, sin que exista un EIA. También indicó, el contrato con la empresa Herken se suspendió debido a la moratoria del expresidente Nombre3762 y que Nombre3763 rechazara eventualmente el EIA presentado en fecha posterior a la suscripción del contrato, lo que provocó que dicha empresa acusare el incumplimiento del Estado, reclamando una indemnización de $57.000.000, lo cual reafirma la advertencia de la Sala Constitucional desde 1993. Sigue indicando, por resolución Nº R-105-MINAE publicada en el diario oficial Nº 73 del 13 de abril de 2000, se adjudicó la concesión petrolera Nº 2 a la compañía Mallon Oil para la exploración y explotación de los bloques 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 y 10 de los 27 bloques en que se dividió el país, contrato del cual aún no ha sido posible su firma debido a diversos recursos administrativos y judiciales de la sociedad civil y del desarrollador. Arguyó, la empresa Mallon Oil no ha presentado un EIA, y lo que Nombre3763 conoció y aprobó en su caso, en los términos del decreto impugnado, fue un documento que describe una actividad de gabinete, sobre la cual el Director de Hidrocarburos advirtió a Nombre3763 que no constituyen métodos de campo tales como lo que prevé el artículo 1 del Decreto no. 26750. No obstante, expresó, la empresa está presionando por lo medios políticos y jurídicos para obligar al gobierno Costa Rica a suscribir el contrato de concesión. Finalmente estimó, esos dos casos son el resultado práctico de la aplicación del decreto impugnado. El Estado contestó negativamente la demanda e interpuso las defensas de falta de: integración de litisconsorcio pasiva necesaria, interés actual y derecho, así como las de caducidad y cosa juzgada. El Tribunal rechazó las excepciones de falta de interés actual y la de derecho. Declaró con lugar la demanda y en consecuencia declaró la nulidad absoluta del Decreto no.26750. Estableció que la declaratoria tenía efectos declarativos y retroactivos al 27 de febrero de 1998, debiéndose respetar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe desde su entrada en vigencia y hasta la firmeza de esta resolución. Además, dimensionó la sentencia en el sentido de que el precepto segundo y todo el Titulo X del Reglamento a la Ley de Hidrocarburos, artículos 266 al 283 (Decreto Ejecutivo no. 24735 publicado en La Gaceta Nº 230 de 4 de diciembre de 1995) recobran su vigencia original, lo cual se dará a partir de que la sentencia quede firme. También condenó en ambas costas del proceso al Estado. Inconforme con lo resuelto, el Estado y el coadyuvante pasivo, presentaron recurso de casación. Dada la forma como se resolverá se conocerá únicamente el agravio procesal que de seguido se expone, omitiéndose pronunciamiento sobre el resto de agravios y el recurso del coadyuvante pasivo Mallon Oil Company Sucursal Costa Rica S.A. que se adhiere a lo expuesto en el recurso del Estado.

Recurso de casación por motivos procesales II.- Único: En criterio de la parte recurrente, la sentencia adolece de un vicio de nulidad absoluta, toda vez que fue dictada y notificada fuera del plazo establecido por el artículo 111 del CPCA. En efecto, dice, el juicio oral y público fue realizado y concluido el 20 de mayo de 2013, fecha cuando se declaró el asunto de tramitación compleja indicándose a las partes que la sentencia seria dictada por escrito y notificada en el plazo de 15 días hábiles. De acuerdo con la fecha de terminación del juicio oral y público y tomándose en cuenta los días hábiles transcurridos, la sentencia debió ser notificada como máximo el 10 de junio de 2013. Sin embargo, no fue emitida sino hasta el 12 de junio y notificada hasta el 13 de junio, ambos de 2013, según consta en la certificación del acta de notificación. Se desprende de lo expuesto, que fue dictada y notificada fuera del plazo establecido en el artículo 111 del CPCA, norma que se acusa quebrantada por su evidente inobservancia (falta de aplicación). Expone, cabe señalar, en el Resultando 7 de la sentencia justifica el retraso en que el Juez Ponente Juan Luis Guisti Soto, “... según acuerdo del Artículo XXV del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, Sesión N° 54-13 de 14 de mayo del dos mil trece, ha contado con permiso para asistir como capacitador los días viernes 31 de mayo y 7 de junio ambos del año 2013. Lo anterior, para efectos de entender automáticamente prorrogado el plazo para dictar sentencia.” Debe advertirse, indica, la sentencia contiene un error, pues la sesión no. 54-13 no fue realizada el 14 de mayo como se indica, sino que fue realizada hasta el 23 de mayo del 2013, es decir, después de que ya fue realizado el juicio oral y público (ver impresión de los acuerdos número 25 de las sesiones no. 54-13 y no. 49-13 del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, tomadas de la página web del Poder Judicial). En consecuencia, estima, la justificación contenida en el resultando 7 del fallo no resulta de recibo, pues se violenta el artículo 111 del CPCA antes señalado, así como el artículo 138 del Código Procesal Civil (en adelante CPC) de aplicación al caso concreto en razón del mandato establecido en el artículo 220 del CPCA, pues se consideran como “días inhábiles” días diferentes a aquellos que expresamente se señalan en la legislación procesal indicada. Tal y como se desprende de lo expuesto, el artículo 138 establece claramente lo que debe considerarse como un día inhábil, siendo que el artículo en ningún momento señala que pueda considerarse como un día inhábil aquellos en los cuales los funcionarios judiciales se encuentren con permiso para ausentarse de sus labores. Estima, esta interpretación se refuerza analizando el contenido del artículo XXV del acta no. 54-13 de las ocho horas del 23 de mayo de 2013, y que autoriza la participación del Señor Juez en las actividades de capacitación, pero con la salvedad de que deberá atender y dar prioridad a cualquier asunto que, por las altas labores que desempeña, deba atender, copia un extracto del acta que establece lo indicado. Se desprende de la trascripción, dice, que el permiso otorgado para participar en la actividad de capacitación, fue condicionado a que se diera prioridad a cualquier actividad laboral que requiriera la presencia del Juez, por lo que en su criterio, es imposible considerar que los días en los cuales el juzgador se encontraba con permiso, sean días inhábiles al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 138 del CPC. Bajo este mismo orden de ideas, se considera que la sentencia impugnada violenta lo dispuesto por el Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda (en adelante el RAOSJCACH) en orden a la forma en que deben realizarse las deliberaciones y el plazo para emitir sentencia. En efecto, arguye, nótese que de conformidad con lo que establece dicho cuerpo legal, el Tribunal de Juicio deberá resolver cada una de las incidencias que se presenten en el expediente una vez que se ha señalado para la audiencia de juicio oral y público. En defensa de su tesis, copia lo dispuesto en el artículo 72 del RAOSJCACH. Reprocha, el presente caso fue citado para juicio desde el mes de marzo del 2013, es decir, al momento en que se solicitó el permiso para participar en la actividad de capacitación de la Escuela Judicial el 14 de mayo del 2013, la Sección Quinta debió prever cómo iba a afectar la participación del juez ponente en la emisión y notificación final de la sentencia de este juicio, adoptando las medidas pertinentes para no afectar el servicio público. Máxime cuando el RAOSJCACH establece las causales por la cuales se podrá considerar suspendida la deliberación en un determinado asunto, siendo que la existencia de permisos con goce de salario no constituye una de ellas, al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 81 de ese cuerpo normativo. Bajo esta misma línea de pensamiento, indica, la norma anteriormente citada establece que la parte dispositiva de la sentencia debió emitirse en el plazo de 2 días hábiles, y el texto completo debió ser comunicado dentro de los quince días hábiles siguientes a la terminación del juicio oral y público, conforme a lo dispuesto en los preceptos 79 y 83 de este mismo cuerpo legal. Estima, conforme a dichas normas, es claro que en el presente caso se incumplieron todos los plazos establecidos en la legislación aplicable, tanto para emitir la sentencia como para notificarla, sin que resulte de recibo el considerar que el plazo para dictar y notificar la sentencia estaban suspendidos porque uno de los integrantes del Tribunal gozaba de un permiso para participar como docente en actividades de capacitación de la Escuela Judicial. La jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera, advierte, ha sido clara y contundente al establecer la nulidad de las sentencias emitidas en contravención con los plazos establecidos en el artículo 111 del CPCA de repetida cita, en ese sentido los fallos no. 1527-F-51-2012 de las 8 horas 30 minutos del 20 de noviembre de 2012. En el mismo sentido, las resoluciones 1058-A-S1-2012 de las 12 horas del 24 de agosto 2012, 1068-A-S1-2D12 de las 12 horas 50 minutos del 24 de agosto de 2012 entre otras. Por lo expuesto, finaliza, la sentencia se dictó en flagrante violación de los artículos 111, 137 inciso g, y 220 del CPCA y del artículo 138 del CPC, por falta de aplicación al caso concreto. Asimismo, dice, el fallo viola los artículos 72, 73 inciso 10, 79, 81 y 82 del RAOSJCACH, por errónea interpretación, por lo que solicita se anule por haber sido dictada y notificada fuera del plazo establecido para ello y se ordene efectuar un nuevo juicio oral y público ante una sección diferente del Tribunal, al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 111 del CPCA. Subsidiariamente, pide, de considerar, que el plazo para dictar y notificar la sentencia debe estimarse efectivamente “suspendido” por la existencia del permiso con goce de salario para actividades de capacitación en la Escuela Judicial, solicita a la Sala considerar los siguientes argumentos. Tal y como se advirtió al inicio del cargo, el juicio oral y privado se efectuó el 20 de mayo del 2013, por lo que aun considerando que el plazo para emitir y notificar la sentencia fue suspendido por dos días más, es claro que la resolución fue notificada fuera del plazo establecido para dictar sentencia, por cuanto debió ser emitida en el segundo día de deliberación y notificada a más tardar a las partes el 12 de mayo del 2013. En razón de ello, expone, aún en este supuesto, la resolución fue notificada en contravención con lo establecido en los artículos 111 y 137 inciso g del CPCA y 81 y 82 del RAOSJCACH, por lo que incluso en este supuesto la sentencia debe ser anulada y ordenarse el reenvío del expediente para que se efectúe un nuevo juicio oral y público ante una sección diferente del Tribunal, al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 111 del CPCA.

III.- Sobre el particular esta Cámara ha expresado: “Al tenor de los principios de inmediación y celeridad, el numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (en lo sucesivo CPCA) establece que, una vez finalizada la audiencia, el Tribunal deberá deliberar y dictar la sentencia en forma inmediata, previendo la posibilidad de exceptuar esta obligación en aquellos casos que se califiquen como complejos, en cuyo caso, la sentencia deberá notificarse dentro del plazo máximo de 15 días hábiles, computados a partir de la finalización de la audiencia. Como se indicó, la norma responde al principio de inmediación –siendo este el valor normativo que se pretende tutelar en el precepto que se comenta- y procura que los juzgadores al dictar el fallo retengan en su memoria, con la mayor claridad, los elementos probatorios evacuados durante el juicio, y de esta forma evitar que paso del tiempo erosione la valoración integral que de ellos puedan realizar. En línea con lo anterior, los artículos 82.1 y 79.4 del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda disponen que la deliberación se podrá extender hasta por dos días, en cuyo caso, se debe comunicar a los intervinientes la parte dispositiva con una exposición lacónica de sus fundamentos, y el texto completo de la sentencia en el ya referido término de 15 días. Tanto la norma legal como las reglamentarias a que se ha hecho referencia establecen un parámetro con base en el cual se puede presumir que ha existido un quebranto del tantas veces citado principio de inmediación. Se trata, claro está, de una presunción legal fijada para efectos de control, sin que de lo indicado pueda colegirse que los jueces no puedan retener los detalles del proceso por un período más extenso. Se trata, simplemente, del establecimiento de un límite de tolerancia por parte del legislador, o lo que es lo mismo, un convencionalismo normativo. Por ello, su inobservancia fue sancionada con la nulidad. Precisamente, sobre este tema se ha indicado: “La disposición 111.2 del cuerpo legal de cita, en concordancia con el precepto 137 inciso g, sanciona con nulidad el incumplimiento del plazo para deliberar y dictar la sentencia, y ordena repetir el juicio ante otra integración del Tribunal, salvo por los actos probatorios irreproductibles. Lo anterior obedece al propio principio de inmediatez, y busca asegurar que entre la evacuación probatoria y la sentencia, trascurra el menor tiempo, garantizando que los juzgadores tengan presente, las probanzas con la mayor claridad posible, y por ende, puedan efectuar el ejercicio valorativo que corresponde, sin olvidar aspectos relevantes de aquéllas” (sentencia no. 1096-F-S1- 2011 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 8 de setiembre de 2011)”. No. 1527 de las 8 horas 30 minutos del 20 de noviembre de 2012. En la especie, el juicio oral y público, con vista en la grabación de la audiencia y la respectiva minuta, se llevó a cabo el 20 de mayo de 2013, acto donde se declaró el asunto como complejo y se comunicó a las partes que la sentencia les sería puesta en conocimiento por escrito. En lo relativo a la notificación de la sentencia al Estado, se constata a folio 573 del expediente judicial, que esta se llevó a cabo el 13 de junio de 2013 como lo aduce la impugnante. Por consiguiente, se aprecia, desde la fecha cuando concluyó el juicio oral, -20 de mayo- y la notificación de la sentencia el 13 de junio, transcurrieron más de 15 días hábiles, que es el plazo previsto en la disposición de cita, que feneció el 10 de junio, motivo por el cual resulta obligatorio acoger el agravio formulado. El Tribunal justifica su dictado fuera de plazo en el hecho de que el juez ponente asistió los días 31 de mayo y 7 de junio ambos de 2013, a una actividad de capacitación en la Escuela Judicial. Es indispensable reproducir el artículo 81 del RAOSJCACH porque es donde se regula las hipótesis que interrumpen (en realidad suspenden) el plazo para el dictado y comunicación de la sentencia: “1) La deliberación se llevará a cabo sin interrupción, salvo que concurran motivos de fuerza mayor o enfermedad de alguno de los jueces. Una vez desaparecida la causa, se constituirá nuevamente el Tribunal para la deliberación y dictado de la sentencia, previa comunicación a las partes. 2) De igual modo, será causa de interrupción de la etapa de deliberación y decisión, la reapertura del debate contemplada en el numeral 110 del CPCA y 73.15 de este Reglamento”. Por ende, de conformidad con lo estipulado en dicho cardinal la deliberación y decisión solo pueden suspenderse (ya que cuando cesa el motivo de su paralización, continúa su conteo desde el punto donde se había detenido, sea su computo no inicia de nuevo) por motivos de fuerza mayor, enfermedad de alguno de los jueces (incapacidad) o cuando se reabra el debate. En el sublite, es claro las últimas dos causas no fueron la razón esgrimida para justificar el atraso, así que solo quedaría por constatar si hubo un motivo de fuerza mayor que impidiera emitir el fallo en el lapso dispuesto en el ordenamiento jurídico. En criterio de este Órgano decisor, en la especie, la eximente de cita no se configura, dado que la participación del juez ponente en el curso era conocida de antemano (hecho previsible), por lo que pudo evitarse el dictado del fallo fuera de plazo, tomando las medidas necesarias a fin de que la sentencia se dictara en tiempo. Lo anterior, ya que ese plazo es perentorio y como lo ha dispuesto esta Sala, dicho lapso no debe vulnerarse con el propósito de resguardar el principio de inmediación. Y, así lograr que los juzgadores preserven en su memoria los elementos de convicción, así como todo lo acaecido en el juicio oral y público de forma que puedan realizar una correcta valoración, manteniendo los aspectos relevantes de aquéllos.

IV.- En virtud de lo anterior, por mayoría se estima, lo procedente será acoger el recurso formulado, omitir pronunciamiento respecto de los restantes reparos y el recurso de la parte coadyuvante pasiva, así como anular la sentencia impugnada. De conformidad con el numeral 111.2 del CPCA, se deberá repetir el juicio oral ante un Tribunal con una integración distinta, razón por la cual se deberá remitir este asunto al juez tramitador que corresponda a efectos de que realice un nuevo señalamiento.

POR TANTO

Por mayoría se declara con lugar el recurso. Se anula la sentencia impugnada. Se ordena realizar un nuevo juicio oral y público, ante un Tribunal distinto. Remítase este asunto al juez tramitador que corresponda para que realice un nuevo señalamiento. Hacer de conocimiento esta sentencia de la Dirección Ejecutiva para lo que corresponda.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vílchez Jorge Isaac solano Aguilar Voto salvado de la magistrada Escoto Fernández y el magistrado Molinari Vílchez Los suscritos integrantes respetamos pero nos apartamos del criterio mantenido por la mayoría de esta Sala en virtud de lo siguiente. De conformidad con el párrafo segundo del precepto 137 del CPCA, las causales del recurso de casación por razones procesales, solo podrán alegarse por la parte a quien haya perjudicado la inobservancia de la norma procesal. Además, será necesario haber gestionado, ante el órgano jurisdiccional la rectificación del vicio, en los casos en que sea posible. El supuesto g) del citado mandato dispone la procedencia del recurso cuando se dé inobservancia de las reglas previstas para la deliberación, plazo de dictado de sentencia o redacción del fallo en sus elementos esenciales. Tal disposición es una consecuencia de un proceso influenciado por el sistema fundado en la oralidad, donde es necesario respetar el principio de inmediación, con el fin fundamental de que lo acaecido en el juicio oral y público se conserve en la memoria de los Juzgadores. Sin embargo, no debe interpretarse como un resguardo absoluto de las formas, ya que está orientado a la protección de las garantías constitucionales de audiencia, defensa, contradicción, lo cual deslegitima la declaratoria de nulidad por la nulidad misma, ya que se trata de materia odiosa que ha de ser interpretada de manera restrictiva y solo es admisible cuando se cause indefensión al recurrente. En el supuesto de la causal g), este requerimiento se mantiene, la parte recurrente debe explicar la indefensión, lo cual consiste en señalar la afectación que le generó el hecho de que la sentencia hubiere sido emitida fuera del plazo establecido en el canon 111 del CPCA. Cabe agregar, las normas procesales son instrumentales al derecho sustantivo, y en esa línea de pensamiento deben entenderse como medios para concretar el derecho constitucional a la justicia pronta y cumplida, a obtener una sentencia en un plazo razonable. No pueden entonces interpretarse con tal rigidez, en abandono de esa instrumentalidad, tornándolas en fines últimos y en obstáculo para la decisión que demandan los justiciables, ya que, se reitera, implica retrotraer un proceso a etapas superadas (celebración de un nuevo debate y dictado de sentencia), con afectación no solo para el justiciable, sino para la administración de justicia y para el adecuado manejo de los recursos públicos. Además, sería contradictorio con el principio de conservación de los actos procesales. Por estas razones es que el párrafo segundo del artículo 137 erige la indefensión como el presupuesto de admisibilidad de los cargos procesales. En el presente asunto, la representación estatal no explica de qué manera le perjudicó la dilación de tres días en que incurrió el Tribunal, lo cual dice la informalidad del cargo. Tampoco se comparte la comunicación a la Dirección Ejecutiva, desde que ello implicará una sanción sin sustento en lo que aquí se dice y sin atender al debido proceso. Aunado a lo anterior y a mayor abundamiento de razones; en este caso el juez ponente disfrutó de un día de vacaciones, según afirmara el recurrente. Con base en los cánones 220 del CPCA y 138 del Código Procesal Civil, aplicado supletoriamente donde en esta última norma se establece en lo de interés como días inhábiles: “[...] los domingos, los días feriados, los días de vacaciones, los días que en forma legal sean declarados de asueto para las oficinas judiciales.” (lo subrayado no pertenece al original); de modo que el día otorgado de vacaciones al juzgador ponente, también es inhábil. En consecuencia el fallo cuestionado se emitió dentro del plazo de ley. Puede consultarse también en este sentido el voto salvado que se encuentra en la resolución de las 8 horas 54 minutos del 4 de junio de 2015, que responde al número 633-A, de esta Sala.

Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vílchez Nombre3667