Lifting a contracting prohibition due to family ties does not require simultaneous satisfaction of all three subsections of Art. 23 LCALevantamiento de prohibición de contratar por vínculo familiar no exige cumplir los tres incisos del Art. 23 LCA simultáneamente

1 PROCESS OF COGNIZANCE PLAINTIFF: MANEJO INTEGRAL TÉCNO AMBIENTE S.A.

DEFENDANT: CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA AND ANOTHER.

No.033-2016-VII CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, SEVENTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. GOICOECHEA, AT ELEVEN HOURS AND FIFTY MINUTES ON THE THIRTY-FIRST OF MARCH OF TWO THOUSAND SIXTEEN.

Process of cognizance declared a pure matter of law, filed by MANEJO INTEGRAL TECNO AMBIENTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, a company with legal entity identification number CED116299, represented by its unlimited general attorney-in-fact Nombre127888, chemical engineer, with identity card CED116300, resident of Heredia, against the Contraloría General de la República, represented by Nombre4038, attorney, with identity card number CED116301, resident of San José, and against the State, represented by the Deputy Procurator Georgina Cháves Olarte, attorney, with identity card number CED116302, resident of San José. All are of legal age.

WHEREAS

1. With the present matter, the plaintiff seeks that the judgment declare that the plaintiff company “(…) has the right to have the prohibition on contracting with the Municipalidad de Alajuela lifted, given that the company began its commercial activity well before one year prior to my husband (…) having been appointed on January 20, 2010, to the position of Head of the Sub-process of Environmental Services. // (…) the resolutions LEV-PROH No. 06-2013, of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No. 08-2013, of April 24, 2014, and R-DC-072-2013, of June 7, 2013, must be revoked or modified regarding this right, for being contrary to subsections a and b of Article 23 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa.” (see folios 28 to 34 and 81 to 82 of the record, as well as the digital recording of the preliminary hearing held).

2. Once the mandatory transfer was granted, the State’s representation answered the action negatively, invoking the defenses of lack of right, lack of standing, and lack of current interest. For its part, the representation of the Contraloría General de la República answered the complaint negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. (see folios 47 to 57 and 58 to 72 of the record).

3. The preliminary hearing established in ordinal 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was held at 2:00 p.m. on July 30, 2015, during which the Processing Judge declared this matter a pure matter of law and granted the parties present a period to submit conclusions (see folios 81 to 82 of the record, as well as the digital recording of the preliminary hearing held).

4. This judgment is issued within the period permitted by the office's workload, following the mandatory deliberations and by unanimous decision of the Court, without any procedural defects susceptible of invalidating the proceedings being perceived.

Drafted by Judge Quesada Vargas; and,

WHEREAS

I.PROVEN FACTS. Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed duly accredited, finding support in the elements of conviction cited in their support: 1. That Mrs. Nombre127888 has been the unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima since October 18, 2007 (see folios 01 to 05 of the record). 2. That Mrs. Nombre127888 is the spouse of Mr. Nombre127889, who has served as Head of the Environmental Services Sub-process of the Municipalidad de Alajuela since January 20, 2010 (fact not disputed by the parties). 3. That the Contraloría General de la República, through resolution No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 at 9:00 a.m. on March 19, 2013, denied the request for lifting of prohibition for the plaintiff company from contracting with the Municipalidad de Alajuela, by virtue of not having accredited the exercise of the commercial activity giving rise to the lifting request, at least one year before the appointment of the public official affected by the prohibition, in this case, the husband of Mrs. Nombre127888 (see folios 07 to 16 of the record). 4. That subsequently, through resolution No. LEV-PROH No. 08-2013 at 9:00 a.m. on April 24, 2013, the Administrative Procurement Division of the Contraloría General de la República re-examined the matter, again denying the lifting request filed by the plaintiff here (see folios 17 to 21 of the record). 5. That against the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was rejected as untimely and because the plaintiff did not refute the substantive reasons that led to the maintenance of the prohibition, through resolution No. R-DC-072-2013 at 8:00 a.m. on June 7, 2013, issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Contraloría General de la República (see folios 23 to 27 of the record).

II.UNPROVEN FACTS. Lacking evidence in the record to accredit them, the following are considered as such: 1. That the plaintiff company had performed service provision work such as the transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste or sanitary landfill for the Municipalidad de Alajuela, at least during the one-year period prior to the appointment of the spouse of its unlimited general attorney-in-fact, Mr. Nombre127889, as Head of the Environmental Services Sub-process on January 20, 2010 (there is no proof thereof in the record).

III.ON THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS. The plaintiff argues, in support of its action and in summary, that its represented company is the owner of a sanitary landfill in Miramar de Montes de Oro, which it has operated since 2011; for its construction, it was necessary to obtain environmental feasibility from SETENA, which was granted to them through official communication No. 2972-2009-SETENA of December 18, 2009. On October 18 and December 5, 2007, the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A. granted Nombre127888 unlimited general powers of attorney to represent said company. On April 15, 2012, Mrs. Nombre127888 married Nombre127889, who is an official of the Municipalidad de Alajuela in charge of the Environmental Services Sub-process of the Municipalidad de Alajuela. Said official was appointed to the position on January 20, 2010. That Mrs. Nombre127888 requested before the Contraloría General de la República (hereinafter CGR) the lifting of the prohibition of Article 22, subsection a) of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa to contract with the Municipalidad de Alajuela, a request that was denied for the plaintiff company, on the grounds that Article 23 of the same legal body was not complied with, since it was not accredited that the company operated commercially one year before the official assumed office. It cites the Article 23 to which it refers and points out that the rule takes into account three scenarios, but to resolve its petition, only subsection a) was taken into account. It indicates that what should be understood by exercised commercial activity must be defined, since the CGR considers that this implies an invoiced exercise of the commercial activity, but from the moment a company is incorporated and registered in the Mercantile Registry, all its acts are commercial acts. It maintains that since its represented company began its operations as a legally constituted company, it has carried out acts of commerce, all of them directed at its operational activity, which is the provision of services as a sanitary landfill. It states that the problem is that this operation could not be legally carried out until SETENA granted the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), and then the construction plans had to be approved, and only after their approval could the construction of the landfill begin, which was inaugurated in August 2011. It maintains that when the administrative procedures began was in August 2006, and that at that date, she did not even know her husband. That the invoices issued and submitted by its represented company before the CGR are dated August 22, 2011, and September 10, 2011, and the CGR considered that it was from that moment that there was commercial activity, a criterion it deems biased and restrictive. It believes the spirit of the prohibition is that no one takes advantage of a family relationship to obtain undue benefits when contracting with the administration. That when its represented company decided to invest money in the activity of final solid waste disposal, Mrs. Nombre127888 was not thinking about Nombre127889 or their marriage, events that are supervening and for which a company that tries to do things correctly and provides a public service of national importance, in its view, should not be penalized. It states that subsection b) of Article 23 broadly benefits it, since its representation dates from October and December 2007, much more than one year before her husband assumed the position indicated above; therefore, it considers it has the right to have the prohibition lifted. For its part, the representation of the CGR states, in summary: it cites subsections d), h), i) of Article 22 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and numeral 23 of the same law, pointing out that the prohibition indicated in subsections h) and i) may be lifted when it is demonstrated: a) that the commercial activity (actividad comercial) deployed has been exercised for at least one year before the appointment of the public official that originates the prohibition, b) in the case of directors or representatives of a legal entity, when they demonstrate that they have held the position for at least one year before the appointment of the official that originates the prohibition, c) when at least six months have elapsed since the shareholding of the relative has been ceded or transferred, or since they resigned from the position or representative post. It cites Article 22 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, which it transcribes. It indicates the purpose of the prohibition regime and its criteria in this regard. Additionally, decision No. 2011-005272 of the Sala Constitucional. It provides an account of what occurred at the administrative stage and indicates that it was not demonstrated that the plaintiff company has habitually engaged in the activity of transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste prior to the minimum period of one year before the prohibition arose, so it was not possible to grant its lifting, as required by Article 23 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. It considers the interpretation given by the plaintiff regarding the exercise of the commercial activity (actividad comercial) to be erroneous, cites Article 22 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, and states that the activity referred to is the same activity or function potentially subject to an administrative procurement, and the applicant must accredit that it has actually and effectively exercised the commercial activity (actividad comercial) for which it requests the lifting, meaning the company must demonstrate that it has been engaged in providing the services for which it would participate as a bidder before the Municipalidad de Alajuela, namely, the transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste. It maintains that obtaining permits, authorizations, and other requirements are preparatory acts for the exercise of the commercial activity (actividad comercial). That the CGR analyzes the specific commercial activity (actividad comercial) by which services would be provided to that administration, as indicated in the lifting request, and not a general commercial activity (actividad comercial), an activity which, in the case of the plaintiff, is the transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste. Before obtaining the respective permits, the company could not exercise the activity for which it requested the lifting of the prohibition. It cites a series of communications issued by it in this same sense. It states that the matter involves analyzing a specific commercial activity (actividad comercial), since it will be with respect to this that a relationship may arise between the public official in question and the person interested in lifting the prohibition, and the position held by Nombre127889 is directly related to the activity detailed by the plaintiff company. That company also did not demonstrate that it developed the activity at least one year before the appointment of Nombre127889 to his position with the Municipalidad de Alajuela. Regarding the application of subsection b) of Article 23 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, it maintains that Mrs. Nombre127888 has indeed been the representative of the company since 2007 and that Mr. Nombre127889's appointment occurred on January 20, 2010, but the impediment cannot be lifted because the non-compliance with subsection a) of Article 23 of the law persists, which is provided for the case of the company, not the representative, and in the case of the plaintiff company, the prohibition applies for two reasons: the commercial activity (actividad comercial) to which the company is dedicated and the prohibition that applies to its legal representative. It considers that even if the prohibition is lifted for its legal representative under subsection b) of Article 23, the prohibition remains for the company by reason of the commercial activity (actividad comercial) it performs, which it indicates was contemplated in communication No. LEV-PROH. 08-2013 of April 24, 2013. It points out that the resolution that rejected the appeal did so not only because it was untimely, but also because it did not discredit the considerations that supported the denial of the lifting of the prohibition, and that the company did not provide additional documentation in support of its appeal. It concludes by indicating that the challenged acts are lawful, valid, and effective, and therefore requests that the complaint be dismissed. The State's representation argued in defense of its positions, and in summary: that the plaintiff requested the lifting of the prohibition on contracting with the public administration according to subsections a) and b) of Article 23 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. That the plaintiff's allegations are unfounded because the challenged acts comply with the legal framework relating to administrative procurement. Articles 22 and 22 bis of that law indicate in which scenarios natural and legal persons are prohibited from participating in procurement procedures with the public administration, while Article 23 establishes in which cases the prohibition derived from subsections h) and i) of Article 22 bis may be lifted. It cites these articles literally and also Article 22 of the respective Regulation, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411. It indicates that the prohibition regime aims to guarantee the impartiality and probity of public officials to prevent collusion and influence peddling. It cites decision No. 2011-5272 of the Sala Constitucional. It states that the plaintiff is barred from contracting with the Municipalidad de Alajuela due to the marital bond existing between Mrs. Nombre127888 and Mr. Nombre127889, as Coordinator of Environmental Services of that Municipality, according to Article 22 bis, subsection i) of Law No. 7494. For the prohibition to be lifted, the company had to demonstrate that the habitual commercial activity (actividad comercial) was performed at least 1 year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 to his position in the Municipality on January 20, 2010, and Mrs. Nombre127888 had to demonstrate that she held the position of attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff for at least one year before her husband's appointment. However, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the activity of collection, treatment, transport, and final disposal of solid waste was carried out one year prior to the appointment of Nombre127889; on the contrary, the administrative procedure revealed that the operational and habitual commercial activity (actividad comercial) was carried out after said appointment, that is, starting in 2011. In the administrative procedure, the plaintiff only provided, as proof of the activity it carries out, invoices dated August 11, 2011, and September 10, 2011, and a certified copy of resolution No. 2972-2009-SETENA. It considers unfounded the argument that from the incorporation of a company and its registration, it performs acts of commerce, since many companies are created and registered with the Registro Nacional and have never performed the commercial activity (actividad comercial) for which they were created. The plaintiff did not accredit that the effective and concrete commercial activity (actividad comercial) was performed one year prior to January 20, 2010; hence, the CGR's actions are lawful. Furthermore, it considers that the CGR applied Article 23 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa integrally, but despite compliance with subsection b) of said Article 23, in this specific case, non-compliance with subsection a) and with Article 22 of Decreto Ejecutivo Placa30040, which refers to the concrete and habitual activity for which the lifting of the prohibition is requested, persists. In this regard, it cites what was indicated by the CGR in the challenged communications, which it states are lawful, and requests that the complaint be dismissed.

IV.ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. As correctly pointed out by the co-defendants in this process and as determined by the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia (judgment No. 5272 at 3:17 p.m. on April 27, 2011), the prohibition regime regulated in Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa aims to guarantee the moral solvency of the persons who contract with the public administrations, thereby seeking to prevent administrative corruption, avoiding collusion and influence peddling that certain public officials, who hold a position of power or influence in the administrative organization and have ties with the natural or legal person intending to contract with the public entity, could directly or indirectly generate. The prohibition regime established in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa constitutes a general guarantee of transparency in the procurement process and of the principles of equality and free competition contained in Articles 33 of the Constitución Política and 5 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. The prohibition regime regulated by the Ley de Contratación Administrativa pursues the objectives of preventing the institutional position of the public official from allowing them to obtain personal gain, favor their relatives, or entities in which they have some participation, and of maintaining the impartiality and the duty of probity that must characterize the conduct of those exercising public functions, preventing certain offerors from being placed in a favorable situation by virtue of the family tie with an official who can directly or indirectly influence administrative contractual procedures. Since the prohibition regime constitutes a legal limitation on the fundamental rights to commerce, business, and contracting, its interpretation must be restrictive, and the limitations must necessarily be reserved to law. From the moment of the public official's appointment to a position whose kinship relationship gives rise to the prohibition, the factual prerequisite established by law to prevent the natural or legal persons covered by the prohibition from contracting with the State and its Institutions arises. The legislator provided a legal waiver so that in certain circumstances, even when this prohibition exists, the controlling body could enable the natural or legal persons covered by the impediment to contract. As maintained by the Contraloría General de la República, which this Court endorses, the appointment to each of the positions indicated in subsection a) of Article 22 bis of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa is configured as a new generating event, such that with each appointment of an official, an express petition from the company or person affected by the prohibition is required so that the controlling body, in the exercise of its constitutional oversight powers, grants the lifting of the prohibition. Thus, the waiver is granted for a specific position, so that if the official is appointed to a new position, a generating event arises again, and the procedure for lifting the waiver must be carried out. Under no circumstance can it be understood that the procedure for lifting a prohibition constitutes a mere formality and that the Contraloría General de la República simply declares that the prohibition does not exist, since the controlling body must, in a reasoned manner, grant the waiver that, by legislative decision, enables contractors covered by the prohibition regime to submit their bids and be awarded contracts in public tenders, such that until the controlling body grants such authorization, there is a diminution of these offerors' capacities to contract with the State and its entities. Even though it might seem logical that if the prerequisites that gave rise to the lifting of the prohibition remain, upon the official's first appointment to a public position subject to the prohibition (since the blood relationship does not change), the truth is that when determining the legal provision contained in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the prohibition that prevents a series of officials from participating as offerors, directly or indirectly, can only be set aside if the natural or legal person affected by the legal impediment carries out the procedure to lift that prohibition each time the official covered by the prohibition takes on a new public position from among those listed in said provision, which, in this Court's opinion, is consistent with the principles of transparency and equality. In this regard, it must be considered that the request for lifting a prohibition is granted at the request of a party and not ex officio, and both the interested party’s request and the approval by the controlling body must be duly substantiated regarding compliance with the prerequisites established in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa to exempt companies or natural persons affected by a cause for prohibition from contracting with the Public Administration. As will be stated, the provisions contained in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa related to the penalty for the prohibition regime do not provide for any sanction regarding non-compliance with the prohibitions contained in Article 22 bis, so there exists a legislative omission that prevents the application to the plaintiff company of the disqualification sanction imposed on it for non-compliance with the prohibitions. In effect, Article 22 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa establishes, in a general manner, the scope of application of the prohibition regime, but it is Article 22 bis that typifies its scope, indicating the persons who are directly or indirectly barred from participating as direct or indirect offerors in administrative procurement procedures. Thus, subsection a) indicates that members of the Asamblea Legislativa, among other positions, are prohibited from participating as offerors directly or indirectly. For its part, subsection h) indicates that the spouse, partner, or companion in a common-law marriage of the officials covered by the prohibition, as well as their relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree inclusive, are unable to participate in administrative procurement procedures. Subsection i) of the cited provision indicates the legal entities in which the spouse, partner, companion, or relatives indicated in the previous subsection hold more than 25% of the share capital, or hold a position of direction or representation. Now, having comprehensively analyzed the documentation in the record as well as the arguments presented by the opposing parties in this litigation, this Chamber deems it appropriate to address each of the grievances raised by the plaintiff. In the first place, it must be stated that the plaintiff is not correct in its considerations when it believes that its represented company has exercised commercial activity (actividad comercial) for at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 as head of the Solid Waste Management Sub-process of the Municipalidad de Alajuela, and it even asserts that it has done so since the moment of its incorporation and registration in the Mercantile Registry of the Registro Nacional. As the representation of the co-defendants here correctly pointed out, in cases such as the one at hand, as a requirement to proceed with the lifting of the legal prohibition, the party interested in such a procedure must duly accredit before the controlling body that it exercised, prior to the appointment of the public official that causes it to incur the prohibition, the commercial activity (actividad comercial) for which it requests the controlling authorization. In this regard, it is not just any commercial activity (actividad comercial) that serves as support to request the lifting of the prohibition contained in numeral 22 of Law No. 7494, but rather, under the rules of logic, reasonableness, and proportionality that must govern the application of the current legal order, it must be the very same commercial activity (actividad comercial) intended to be exercised with the public administration after the lifting and for which said waiver is requested. In accordance with what is indicated by Article 22 of the regulation to Law No. 7494, it cannot be validly considered that any type of activity deployed by a private legal subject is sufficient cause to obtain the lifting of the prohibition, contrary to what the plaintiff considered, and it is under no supposition viable to consider that just any activity a corporation, in this case, carries out can be considered as corresponding to the exercise of the particular and specific activity for which the removal of the legal impediment is needed; therefore, it makes no sense to assert that any mercantile activity is sufficient for the defendant administration to lift the restriction that is imposed by law. It must be, it is reiterated, the specific and concrete commercial activity (actividad comercial) for which the legal impediment exists that must have been exercised by the interested party at least 1 year before the appointment of the official in relation to whom the impediment arose; thus, proving it is the specific responsibility of the party alleging it, in application of the legal aphorism that literally states: "he who affirms, proves." Therefore, it fell upon the applicant to accredit reliably before the respective administration that it meets the conditions required by law for the lifting of the prohibition, and it must demonstrate the truthfulness of such affirmation by providing suitable and accurate evidentiary material. In the case at hand, the plaintiff company failed to demonstrate, before the Contraloría General de la República, that it satisfied said legal condition, and the only effective proof it provided in this regard is not useful for such purposes, since it demonstrates that the company has indeed exercised the activity for which it is barred from contracting with the Municipalidad de Alajuela, but it has exercised it since 2011, that is, after Mrs. Nombre127888's husband assumed the position giving rise to the contractual restriction that the plaintiff has sought to eliminate. For this reason, as the representation of the CGR correctly pointed out, the necessary legal prerequisite to obtain the lifting of the prohibition, based on subsection a) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, is not met in this instance. Likewise, in relation to the prerequisite for the lifting provided for in the same article, but in its subsection b), it must be pointed out that the plaintiff is indeed correct in its assessment, since it has been effectively demonstrated in the record that Mrs. Nombre127888 has occupied a position from which she exercises representation of the plaintiff company for more than five years prior to her husband's appointment as the official in charge of solid waste matters in the Alajuela municipality, and in that regard, concerning the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A., the prohibition provided for in the aforementioned numeral 22 must be lifted.

It is indeed not entirely pleasant for this Court to rule in the manner it does, but this is what proceeds according to law, ruling solely in application of the cited legal norm. And it cannot be resolved in another way, since the articles that regulate this matter, both at the legal and regulatory level, in no way expressly state that the interested party must simultaneously comply with the three conditions set forth in Article 23 of the cited law to proceed with the lifting of the prohibition. In that regard, there is no legal basis to accept the position raised in the case file by the co-defendants, which states that it is not viable to lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company, because although Mrs. Nombre127888 meets the condition of subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, however, she failed to prove that the company she represents exercised the commercial activity for which the lifting is required, at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 in the municipality, a position that would only be admissible if the current regulations expressly stated that the three conditions of Article 23 must be satisfied at the same time to proceed with the lifting, an aspect which is not the case. Both the representation of the CGR and that of the State have argued that although Mrs. Nombre127888 complies with subsection b of numeral 23, the inability to demonstrate that the company she represents engages in the activity of transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste, at least one year before the appointment of her spouse to the municipal position in question, which occurred in January 2010, still weighs upon her. In their view, the restriction should therefore not be lifted. However, adopting such a legal position would violate the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) that governs the matter before us, based on which the administration may only carry out those actions for which it is previously authorized by the current legal order, and in this case, adopting the position that the three conditions of Article 23 must be met simultaneously to access the lifting was not the spirit that the legislator embodied in said legal numeral. Accepting that position as valid would be contrary to the pro homine and pro libertatis principles, which are mandatory to observe and protect in our legal system, the same principles that must guide and delimit the scope of application of legal norms by the legal operator. In that regard, it is appropriate to proceed with lifting the disqualification of the plaintiff company, to offer its services and eventually contract with the Municipality of Alajuela for the activity of transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste. Consequently, and solely with respect to the compliance by the plaintiff's representative with the condition set forth in subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), Resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all emanating from the Comptroller General of the Republic, are partially annulled.

V.ON THE PLEADED EXCEPTIONS. The co-defendants requested that the filed claim be declared without merit in all its aspects, invoking the exceptions of lack of right, lack of standing, and lack of interest. On the lack of standing invoked by the State. The arguments made by the state representative regarding a lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) so that the State appears as a defendant in this trial. Indeed, as the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly held, among others in vote No. 681-F-S1-2010 at eight hours fifteen minutes on June ninth, two thousand ten, in matters submitted for its consideration, the Judge is obliged to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or substantive conditions of every procedural relationship, namely: right, standing, and interest. These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, and therefore must be observed throughout the entire process. Standing (legitimación) constitutes a condition of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make a judgment on the merits that resolves them possible; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural condition, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest regarding the legal-material relationship being discussed on the merits of the process. Standing in the cause refers to the substantial relationship purportedly existing between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law designates to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantial legal relationship object of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff, the person who according to the law can formulate the claims of the complaint, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. According to the legitimized subject or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing. The former corresponds to the plaintiff and to individuals who subsequently intervene to defend their cause; the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to discuss and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment; if the judge becomes aware of its lack, they must declare it ex officio. Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific process, which can be active or passive, depending on the conditions established by law for such purpose regarding the procedural claim. Standing is the "legal consideration, in respect of the process, of persons who find themselves in a determined relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, so that the substantive claim may be examined, that said persons appear as such parties in the process." (Nombre71665. Theory of the Process, Argentina, 1990). In the specific case, the object of the process is directed at the annulment of actions taken by the Comptroller General of the Republic that rejected the request made by the plaintiff to be exempted from the prohibition regime contained in Articles 22 and 22 bis of Law No. 7494, Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), in force. Given that the process reveals no questioning by the plaintiff regarding any conduct attributable to it, since the State has no relationship with the object of this process, nor has any claim been formulated against it, this Court must accept the exception of lack of standing invoked by the state representation. On the exception of lack of current interest: In the specific case, this Court considers that sufficient and current interest has existed to bring action, since the conducts submitted for the evaluation of this chamber had not previously been the object of a process by any jurisdiction, there thus being an evident interest for the plaintiff party in their respective elucidation to determine jurisdictionally the legal viability of an eventual possibility for the plaintiff company to materialize its commercial relations with the Municipality of Alajuela, where the spouse of the legal representative of the plaintiff herein works. Consequently, the interposed exception is rejected. On the exception of lack of right: Given what was stated in the preceding recitals (considerandos), the exception of lack of right invoked by the Comptroller General of the Republic must be partially accepted, declaring the filed claim partially granted, as is hereby ordered.

VI.On the Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the specific case, this Court considers that there is no reason whatsoever to vary the general rule applicable to the matter, and to that extent, both costs of the process are borne by the losing party.

POR TANTO

The exception of lack of active standing with respect to the State is accepted. The exception of lack of right invoked by the Comptroller General of the Republic is partially accepted, and consequently, the filed claim is declared partially granted, understood as denied in what is not expressly granted, as follows: The prohibition weighing upon the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima is lifted, to contract the services of Transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste with the Municipality of Alajuela by virtue of subsection b) of Article 23 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in force. The administrative resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, are partially annulled, only insofar as they did not lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company contracting with the cited municipality, in accordance with what is indicated by subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Both costs of the process are borne by the Comptroller General of the Republic. Notify.- Sandra M. Quesada Vargas.

Nombre22563. Nombre15709.

It estimates that lifting the prohibition under subsection b) of Article 23 for its legal representative is appropriate, but the prohibition remains for the company due to the commercial activity it carries out, which it indicates was contemplated in official letter No. LEV-PROH.08-2013 of April 24, 2013. It points out that the resolution rejecting the appeal did so not only for being untimely but also for failing to discredit the considerations that supported the denial of the lifting of the prohibition, given that the company did not provide additional documentation in support of its appellate action. It concludes by indicating that the challenged acts are in accordance with the law, valid, and effective, and therefore requests that the claim be dismissed. The State representation argued in defense of its positions, and by way of summary: that the plaintiff requested the lifting of the prohibition on contracting with the public administration under subsections a) and b) of Article 23 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). That the plaintiff's allegations are unfounded because the challenged acts comply with the legal framework relating to administrative contracting. Articles 22 and 22 bis of that law indicate in which circumstances natural and legal persons are prohibited from participating in contracting procedures with the public administration, while Article 23 establishes in which cases the prohibition arising from subsections h) and i) of Article 22 bis may be lifted. It quotes these articles verbatim and also Article 22 of the respective Regulation, Executive Decree No. 33411. It points out that the prohibition regime aims to guarantee the impartiality and probity of public officials to prevent collusion and influence peddling. It cites Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruling No. 2011-5272. It affirms that the plaintiff is barred from contracting with the Municipality of Alajuela (Municipalidad de Alajuela) due to the marital relationship that exists between Mrs. Nombre127888 and Mr. Nombre127889 as Coordinator of Environmental Services of that Municipality, under Article 22 bis, subsection i) of Law No. 7494. For the prohibition to be lifted, the company had to demonstrate that the habitual commercial activity was carried out at least 1 year before Mr. Nombre127889's appointment to his position in the Municipality on January 20, 2010, and Mrs. Nombre127888 had to demonstrate that she held the position of legal representative of the plaintiff for at least one year before her husband's appointment. However, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the activity of collection, treatment, transportation, and final disposal of solid waste was carried out one year prior to the appointment of Nombre127889; on the contrary, it was recorded in the administrative proceeding that the operative and habitual commercial activity was carried out after the aforementioned appointment, that is, starting in 2011. In the administrative proceeding, the plaintiff only provided as proof of the activity it carries out, invoices dated August 11, 2011, and September 10, 2011, and a certified copy of resolution No. 2972-2009-SETENA. It considers unfounded the argument that from the incorporation of a company, and its registration, it carries out acts of commerce, since many companies are created and registered with the National Registry (Registro Nacional) and have never carried out the commercial activity for which they were created. The plaintiff did not prove that the effective and concrete commercial activity was carried out one year prior to January 20, 2010, hence the action of the CGR is in accordance with the law. Furthermore, it considers that the CGR applied Article 23 of the Administrative Contracting Law in an integral manner, but despite compliance with subsection b) of said Article 23, in the specific case, non-compliance with subsection a) and with Article 22 of Executive Decree Placa30040, which refers to the specific and habitual activity for which the lifting of the prohibition is requested, persists. It cites in this regard what was indicated by the CGR in the challenged official letters, which it affirms are in accordance with the law, and requests that the claim be dismissed.

**IV. ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.** As correctly pointed out by the co-defendants in this process and as determined by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (judgment No. 5272 of 3:17 p.m. on April 27, 2011), the prohibition regime regulated in Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Administrative Contracting Law has the purpose of guaranteeing the moral solvency of the persons contracting with public administrations, thereby seeking to prevent administrative corruption, avoiding collusions and influence peddling that, directly or indirectly, could be generated by certain public officials who have a position of power or influence in the administrative organization and have links with the natural or legal person seeking to contract with the public entity. The prohibition regime set forth in the Administrative Contracting Law constitutes a general guarantee of transparency in the contracting process and of the principles of equality and free competition contained in Articles 33 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 5 of the Administrative Contracting Law. The prohibition regime regulated by the Administrative Contracting Law pursues the objectives of preventing the institutional position of the public official from allowing them to obtain personal gain, favor their relatives, or favor entities in which they have some participation, and of maintaining the impartiality and the duty of probity that must characterize the conduct of those exercising public functions, preventing certain bidders from being placed in a favorable situation by virtue of a family relationship with an official who can directly or indirectly influence administrative contractual procedures. Since the prohibition regime constitutes a legal limitation of the fundamental rights to commerce, enterprise, and contracting, its interpretation must be restrictive, and the limitations must necessarily be reserved to the law. From the moment of the appointment to the public position of the official whose kinship relationship gives rise to the prohibition, the **factual prerequisite** (presupuesto de hecho) established by the law to prevent the covered natural or legal persons from contracting with the State and its Institutions arises. The legislator provided for a **legal dispensation** (dispensa legal) so that in certain circumstances, even when that prohibition exists, the controlling body may enable the natural or legal persons covered by the impediment to contract. As the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has maintained, which this Tribunal endorses, the appointment to each of the positions indicated in subsection a) of Article 22 bis of the Administrative Contracting Law is configured as a new generating event, such that each appointment of an official requires an express action by the company or person affected by the prohibition so that the controlling body, in the exercise of its constitutional oversight powers, grants the lifting of the prohibition. Thus, the dispensation is granted for a specific position, so that if the official is appointed to a new position, a generating event arises again, and the procedure for lifting the dispensation must be carried out. Under no circumstances can it be understood that the procedure for lifting the prohibition constitutes a **mere formality** (mero formalismo) and that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic simply declares that the prohibition does not exist, since the controlling body must, in a reasoned manner, grant the dispensation that, by the legislator's decision, enables contractors covered by the prohibition regime to submit their bids and be awarded in public tenders. Therefore, until the controlling body provides such enablement, there is a reduction in the capacities of these bidders to contract with the State and its entities. Even though it might seem logical that if the prerequisites that gave rise to the lifting of the prohibition are maintained upon the official's first appointment to a public position subject to the prohibition (since the blood relationship does not change), the truth is that, as determined by the legal provision contained in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Administrative Contracting Law, the prohibition that prevents a series of officials from participating as bidders, whether directly or indirectly, can only be set aside if the natural or legal person affected by the legal impediment carries out the procedure for lifting that prohibition each time the official covered by the prohibition assumes a new public position among those listed in the cited provision. This, in the opinion of this Tribunal, is in accordance with the principles of transparency and equality. In this regard, it must be considered that the request for lifting the prohibition is granted at the request of a party and not ex officio, and both the interested party's request and the approval by the controlling body must be duly substantiated regarding the fulfillment of the prerequisites established in the Administrative Contracting Law to dispense companies or natural persons affected by a ground for prohibition from contracting with the Public Administration. As will be discussed, the provisions contained in the Administrative Contracting Law related to the penalty under the prohibition regime do not provide any penalty for non-compliance with the prohibitions contained in Article 22 bis. Therefore, there is a legislative omission that prevents the application to the plaintiff company of the disqualification penalty imposed on it for non-compliance with the prohibitions. Indeed, Article 22 of the Administrative Contracting Law generally establishes the scope of application of the prohibition regime, but it is Article 22 bis that defines its scope, indicating the persons who are directly or indirectly prevented from participating as direct or indirect bidders in administrative contracting procedures. Thus, subsection a) indicates that, among other positions, the deputies of the Legislative Assembly are prohibited from participating as bidders directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, subsection h) indicates that the spouse, partner, or companion in a common-law marriage of the officials covered by the prohibition, as well as their relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree inclusive, will be unable to participate in administrative contracting procedures. Subsection i) of the cited provision indicates the legal persons in which the spouse, partner, companion, or relatives indicated in the preceding subsection are holders of more than 25% of the share capital, or hold a management or representation position. Now, having comprehensively analyzed the documentation contained in the case file as well as the arguments presented by the opposing parties in this litigation, this Chamber considers it appropriate to address each of the grievances set forth by the plaintiff. Firstly, it must be stated that the plaintiff is not correct in its considerations when it estimates that its represented party has been carrying out commercial activity for at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 as head of the Solid Waste Management Sub-process of the Municipality of Alajuela, and even affirms that it has done so since the moment of its incorporation and registration in the Commercial Registry of the National Registry. As correctly pointed out by the representation of the co-defendants here, in cases such as the one at hand, as a ground for proceeding with the lifting of the legal prohibition, the party interested in such action must duly prove before the controlling body that it has exercised, prior to the appointment of the official causing the prohibition, the commercial activity for which it requests the controlling authorization. In that regard, it is not just any commercial activity that serves as support for requesting the lifting of the prohibition contained in numeral 22 of Law No. 7494, but rather, under the rules of logic, reasonableness, and proportionality that must govern the application of the current legal system, it must be the same commercial activity that is intended to be carried out with the public administration from the lifting onward and for which said dispensation is requested. Under the terms of Article 22 of the regulation to Law No. 7494, it cannot be validly considered that any type of activity carried out by a subject of private law is sufficient cause to obtain the lifting of the prohibition, contrary to what was considered by the plaintiff. It is not viable under any circumstances to consider that any activity carried out, in this case by a corporation (sociedad anónima), can be taken as corresponding to the exercise of the specific and particular activity for which the removal of the legal impediment is needed; therefore, it makes no sense to claim that any commercial activity is sufficient for the defendant administration to lift the restriction imposed by law. It must be, it is reiterated, the specific and concrete commercial activity for which the legal impediment exists, which must have been carried out by the interested party, at least 1 year before the appointment of the official in relation to whom the impediment arose. Therefore, proving this is the specific responsibility of the party alleging it, in application of the legal maxim that literally states: "he who affirms, proves." Consequently, it was incumbent upon the applicant to prove convincingly before the respective administration that it meets the conditions required by the legal system for the lifting of the prohibition, which it must demonstrate by providing suitable and accurate evidentiary material to prove the truthfulness of such affirmation. In the case at hand, the plaintiff company failed to demonstrate, before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, that it satisfied said legal condition, and the sole effective evidence it provided in this regard is not useful for such purposes, because it demonstrates that the company has indeed exercised the activity for which it is prohibited from contracting with the Municipality of Alajuela, but it has exercised it since 2011, that is, after Mrs. Nombre127888's husband assumed the position that gives rise to the contractual restriction that the plaintiff has sought to eliminate. For this reason, as the CGR's representation correctly pointed out, the legal prerequisite necessary to grant the lifting of the prohibition under subsection a) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494 is not met in this case. Likewise, in relation to the prerequisite for the lifting provided in the same article, but in its subsection b), it must be stated that the plaintiff party is indeed correct in its assessment, since it has been effectively demonstrated in the case file that Mrs. Nombre127888 has held a position from which she exercises the representation of the plaintiff company for more than five years prior to the appointment of her husband as the official in charge of solid waste matters in the Alajuela municipality. Therefore, in this regard, concerning the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A., the prohibition provided in the aforementioned numeral 22 must be lifted. It is indeed not entirely pleasing for this Tribunal to resolve in the manner it does, but this is what proceeds according to the law, resolving solely in application of the cited legal norm. And it cannot be resolved otherwise, since the articles regulating this matter, both at the legal and regulatory level, in no way expressly state that the interested party must simultaneously fulfill the three prerequisites provided in Article 23 of the cited law to proceed with the lifting of the prohibition. In this regard, there is no legal basis to accept the position put forward in the case file by the co-defendants, which affirms that it is not viable to lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company because, although Mrs. Nombre127888 meets the prerequisite of subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, she nonetheless failed to prove that the company she represents carried out the commercial activity for which the lifting is required at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 in the municipality. Such a position would only be admissible if the current regulations expressly stated that the three prerequisites of Article 23 must be satisfied at the same time to proceed with the lifting, which is not the case. Both the representation of the CGR and that of the State have argued that even if Mrs. Nombre127888 complies with subsection b) of numeral 23, the fact that her represented company could not prove that it carries out the activity of transportation, treatment, and disposal of solid waste at least one year before her husband's appointment to the aforementioned municipal position, which occurred in January 2010, continues to weigh against it. In their view, the restriction should therefore not be lifted. However, adopting this legal position would violate the principle of legality that governs the matter at hand, according to which the administration can only carry out those actions for which it is previously authorized by the current legal system. In this case, adopting the position that the three prerequisites of Article 23 must be met simultaneously to grant the lifting was not the spirit that the legislator embodied in said legal numeral. Accepting this position as valid would be contrary to the pro homine and pro libertatis principles that are of mandatory observance and protection in our legal system, the same principles that must guide and delimit the scope of application of legal norms by the legal operator. In this regard, proceeding to lift the disqualification of the plaintiff company to offer its services and potentially contract with the Municipality of Alajuela for the activity of transportation, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste is the proper course. Consequently, and solely regarding the fulfillment by the plaintiff's representative of the condition provided in subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Contracting Law, resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No. 08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, are partially annulled.

**V. ON THE OPPOSED DEFENSES.** The co-defendants requested that the filed claim be dismissed in its entirety, invoking the defenses of lack of right, lack of standing, and lack of interest. **On the lack of standing invoked by the State.** The arguments put forth by the State representative regarding a lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) so that the State figures as a defendant in this trial. Indeed, as has been repeatedly held by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others in ruling No. 681-F-S1-2010 of eight hours and fifteen minutes on June ninth, two thousand ten, in matters submitted to its knowledge, the Judge is obliged to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or material prerequisites of every procedural relationship, namely: right, standing, and interest. These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, and therefore must be observed throughout the entire process. Standing constitutes a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the lawsuit and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest regarding the legal-material relationship discussed in the merits of the process. Standing in the cause refers to the substantial relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in dispute. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the declaration of the substantial legal relationship that is the object of the lawsuit; and the plaintiff is the person who, according to the law, may formulate the claims of the lawsuit, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or corresponds to another. According to the subject with standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active standing and passive standing; the former corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who subsequently intervene to defend their cause, the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment; if the judge notices its lack, they must declare it ex officio. Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific process; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for such purpose regarding the procedural claim. Standing is the "legal consideration, regarding the process, of the persons who are in a certain relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, so that the claim on the merits can be examined, that said persons figure as such parties in the process." (Nombre71665. *Theory of Process* (Teoría del Proceso) Argentina 1990). In the present case, the object of the process is directed at the nullity of actions by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which rejected the request made by the plaintiff to be exempted from the prohibition regime contained in Articles 22 and 22 bis of Law No. 7494, current Administrative Contracting Law. Given that the process does not reveal any challenge by the plaintiff regarding any conduct attributable to the State, since the State has no relationship with the object of this process, and no claim has been formulated against it, this Tribunal must uphold the defense of lack of standing invoked by the State representation. **On the defense of lack of current interest:** In this case, this Tribunal considers that there has been sufficient and current interest to bring action, given that the conduct submitted to the assessment of this Chamber had not previously been the object of a process by a jurisdiction. Therefore, there was a clear interest for the plaintiff party in its respective elucidation to jurisdictionally determine the legal viability of a potential possibility for the plaintiff company to materialize its commercial relations with the Municipality of Alajuela, where the spouse of the legal representative of the plaintiff here works. The raised defense is, consequently, rejected. **On the defense of lack of right:** By reason of what was stated in the preceding considerations, the defense of lack of right invoked by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic must be partially upheld, declaring the filed claim partially granted, as indeed is ordered.

**VI. On the costs.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the present case, this Tribunal considers that there is no reason whatsoever to vary the general rule applicable to the matter, and therefore, both costs of the process are borne by the losing party.

**POR TANTO** The defense of lack of active standing with respect to the State is upheld. The defense of lack of right invoked by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic is partially upheld, and consequently, the filed claim is partially granted, it being understood as denied in what is not expressly granted, as follows: The prohibition weighing on the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima from contracting for the services of Transportation, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste with the Municipality of Alajuela by virtue of subsection b) of Article 23 of the current Administrative Contracting Law is lifted. The administrative resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No. 08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, are partially annulled, solely insofar as they did not lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company from contracting with the cited municipality, in accordance with what is indicated by subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Contracting Law. Both costs of the process are borne by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.

**IV. ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.** As the co-defendants in this proceeding correctly point out and as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has determined (judgment No. 5272 of 3:17 p.m. on April 27, 2011), the prohibition regime regulated in Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), is intended to guarantee the moral solvency of persons contracting with public administrations, thereby seeking to prevent administrative corruption, avoiding collusion and influence trafficking that, directly or indirectly, could be generated by certain public officials who hold a position of power or influence in the administrative organization and have ties to the natural or legal person seeking to contract with the public entity. The prohibition regime set forth in the Public Procurement Law constitutes a general guarantee of transparency in the procurement process and of the principles of equality and free competition contained in Articles 33 of the Political Constitution and 5 of the Public Procurement Law. The prohibition regime regulated by the Public Procurement Law pursues as objectives to prevent the institutional position of the public official from allowing them to obtain personal gain, favor their relatives, or favor entities where they have some participation, and to maintain the impartiality and the duty of probity that must characterize the conduct of those who exercise public functions, preventing certain offerors from being placed in a situation of favor by virtue of a family connection with an official who may directly or indirectly influence administrative contractual procedures. As the prohibition regime constitutes a legal limitation on the fundamental rights to commerce, enterprise, and contracting, its interpretation must be restrictive and the limitations must necessarily be reserved to the law. From the moment of the appointment of the official (a) whose kinship relationship gives rise to the prohibition, the **factual prerequisite (presupuesto de hecho)** established by law arises to prevent the natural or legal persons covered by the prohibition from contracting with the State and its Institutions. The legislator provided **a legal waiver (dispensa legal)** so that in certain circumstances, even when such prohibition exists, the controlling body can enable the natural or legal persons covered by the impediment to contract. As the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) has held, which this Tribunal endorses, each appointment to one of the positions listed in subsection a) of Article 22 bis of the Public Procurement Law is configured as a new generating event, such that with each appointment of an official (a), an express request is required from the company or person affected by the prohibition so that the controlling body, in the exercise of its constitutional oversight powers, grants the lifting of the prohibition. Thus, the waiver is granted for a specific position, meaning that if the official is appointed to a new position, a new generating event occurs, and the procedure for lifting the waiver must be carried out. Under no circumstances can it be understood that the procedure for lifting the prohibition constitutes **a mere formality (mero formalismo)** and that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic simply declares that the prohibition does not exist, since the controlling body, in a reasoned manner, must grant the waiver that, by the legislator’s decision, enables contractors covered by the prohibition regime to submit their bids and be awarded contracts in public tenders, such that until the controlling body provides such authorization, there is a diminution in the capacities of these offerors to contract with the State and its entities. Even though it might seem logical that when the conditions that gave rise to the lifting of the prohibition remain unchanged upon the official’s first appointment to a public office subject to the prohibition (since the consanguinity relationship does not change), the truth is that when the legal provision contained in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Public Procurement Law determines the prohibition that causes a series of officials to be disqualified from participating as offerors, whether directly or indirectly, this can only be set aside if the natural or legal person affected by the legal impediment carries out the procedure for lifting that prohibition each time the official (a) covered by the prohibition takes up a new public office from among those listed in the cited provision, which, in this Tribunal’s opinion, is consistent with the principles of transparency and equality. To this effect, it must be considered that the request for lifting the prohibition is granted at the request of a party and not ex officio, and both the request of the interested party and the approval by the controlling body must be duly substantiated regarding compliance with the prerequisites established in the Public Procurement Law for dispensing the companies or natural persons subject to a cause of prohibition from contracting with the Public Administration. As will be discussed, the provisions contained in the Public Procurement Law related to the sanction for the prohibition regime do not provide for any sanction regarding non-compliance with the prohibitions contained in Article 22 bis, meaning there is a legislative omission that prevents the application to the plaintiff corporation of the debarment sanction that was imposed on it for non-compliance with the prohibitions. Indeed, Article 22 of the Public Procurement Law generally establishes the scope of application of the prohibition regime, but it is Article 22 bis that defines its scope, indicating the persons who, directly or indirectly, are disqualified from participating as direct or indirect offerors in administrative procurement procedures. Thus, subsection a) indicates that, among other positions, members of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) shall be prohibited from participating as offerors directly or indirectly. For its part, subsection h) states that the spouse, the companion in a common-law marriage, of the officials covered by the prohibition, as well as their relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree inclusive, shall be unable to participate in administrative procurement procedures. Subsection i) of the cited provision indicates that legal persons in which the spouse, companion, or relatives indicated in the preceding subsection are holders of more than 25% of the share capital, or hold a management or representation position. Now, having comprehensively analyzed the documentation in the case file as well as the arguments presented by the opposing parties in this litigation, this Chamber deems it appropriate to address each of the grievances raised by the plaintiff. First, it must be stated that the plaintiff is incorrect in its considerations when it estimates that its represented company has been engaged in commercial activity since at least one year prior to the appointment of Mr. Sandoval as head of the Solid Waste Management Sub-process of the Municipality (Municipalidad) of Alajuela, and even asserts that it has been so since its incorporation and registration with the Mercantile Registry of the National Registry. As accurately stated by the representation of the co-defendants here, in cases such as the one before us, as a cause for proceeding with the lifting of the legal prohibition, the party interested in such a request must duly demonstrate to the controlling body that it has engaged in the commercial activity for which it requests the comptroller’s authorization prior to the appointment of the official that causes it to incur the prohibition. In that regard, it is not just any commercial activity that serves as a basis for requesting the lifting of the prohibition contained in Article 22 of Law No. 7494, but rather, under the rules of logic, reasonableness, and proportionality that must govern the application of the current legal system, it must be the same commercial activity intended to be exercised with the public administration after the lifting and for which such waiver is requested. In light of what is indicated by Article 22 of the Regulation to Law No. 7494, it cannot be validly considered that any type of activity carried out by a subject of private law is sufficient cause to access the lifting of the prohibition, contrary to what was considered by the plaintiff; it is not viable under any assumption to consider that any activity carried out, in this case by a corporation, can be taken as corresponding to the exercise of the specific, particular activity for which the removal of the legal impediment is needed. Therefore, there is no sense in asserting that any commercial activity is sufficient for the defendant administration to lift the restriction imposed by law. It must be, it is reiterated, the specific and concrete commercial activity for which the legal impediment exists that must have been engaged in by the interested subject for at least 1 year prior to the appointment of the official in relation to whom the impediment arose; thus, proving this is the specific responsibility of the subject alleging it, in application of the legal aphorism that reads: "he who affirms, proves." Consequently, it was incumbent upon the applicant to credibly demonstrate, before the respective administration, that it met the conditions required by the legal system for the lifting of the prohibition, which it must prove by providing suitable and accurate evidentiary material demonstrating the veracity of such affirmation. In the case at hand, the plaintiff company failed to demonstrate, before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, that it satisfied this legal condition, and the only effective evidence it provided in this regard is not useful for such purposes, because it shows that the company has indeed engaged in the activity for which it is impeded from contracting with the Municipality of Alajuela, but has done so since 2011, that is, after the spouse of Ms. Alejandra took up the position that gives rise to the contractual restriction that the plaintiff sought to eliminate. For this reason, as the representation of the CGR correctly pointed out, the necessary legal prerequisite for accessing the lifting of the prohibition, based on subsection a) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, is not met in this case. Likewise, in relation to the prerequisite for the lifting provided for in the same article, but in its subsection b), it must be noted that the plaintiff is indeed correct in its assessment, since it has indeed been demonstrated in the case file that Ms. Alejandra Alfaro Araya holds a position from which she exercises the representation of the plaintiff company, with more than five years of seniority prior to the appointment of her spouse as the official in charge of solid waste matters in the Alajuela municipality. To that extent, in relation to the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A., the prohibition provided for in the aforementioned Article 22 must be lifted. It is indeed not entirely pleasant for this Tribunal to decide in the manner it does, but this is what is appropriate under the law, deciding solely in application of the cited legal rule. And it cannot be decided otherwise, given that the articles regulating this matter, both at the legal and regulatory level, in no way expressly state that the interested party must simultaneously comply with the three prerequisites set forth in Article 23 of the cited law to proceed with the lifting of the prohibition. To that extent, there is no legal basis to accept the position put forth in the case file by the co-defendants, which asserts that it is not viable to lift the prohibition for the plaintiff company because, although Ms. Alfaro meets the prerequisite of subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No.

7494, she nevertheless did not manage to prove that the company she represents engaged in the commercial activity for which the lifting is required, at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Giovanni Sandoval in the municipality, a position that would only be admissible if the current regulations expressly stated that the three conditions of Article 23 must be satisfied simultaneously in order to proceed with the lifting, which is not the case. Both the representation of the CGR and that of the State have argued that even if Mrs. Alejandra complies with subsection b of numeral 23, the fact that her represented party has not been able to demonstrate that it engages in the activity of transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste, at least one year before her husband's appointment to the aforementioned municipal position, which occurred in January 2010, still weighs against her; in their opinion, the restriction should therefore not be lifted. However, adopting this legal position would violate the principle of legality that governs the matter at hand, according to which the administration may only carry out those actions for which it is previously authorized by the current legal system, and in this case, adopting the position that the three conditions of Article 23 must be met simultaneously to access the lifting was not the spirit that the legislator embodied in said legal numeral. Accepting said position as valid would be contrary to the principles pro homine and pro libertatis, which are of mandatory observance and protection in our legal system, the same principles that must guide and delimit the scope of application of legal norms by the legal operator. In this instance, it is appropriate to proceed to lift the prohibition of the plaintiff company, to offer its services and eventually contract with the Municipality of Alajuela for the activity of transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste. Consequently, and solely with respect to the compliance by the plaintiff's representative with the condition set forth in subsection b) of Article 23 of Law No. 7494, the Law of Public Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No. 08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) are partially annulled [...]." The regime of prohibitions set forth in the Administrative Contracting Law constitutes a general guarantee of transparency in the contracting process and of the principles of equality and free competition contained in articles 33 of the Political Constitution and 5 of the Administrative Contracting Law. The regime of prohibitions regulated by the Administrative Contracting Law pursues the objectives of preventing the institutional position of a public official from allowing him to obtain personal gain, favor his relatives, or favor entities in which he has some participation, and maintaining impartiality and the duty of probity that must characterize the conduct of those who exercise public functions, preventing certain bidders from being placed in a situation of favor by virtue of a family relationship with an official who may directly or indirectly influence administrative contractual procedures. Since the regime of prohibitions constitutes a legal limitation on the fundamental rights to commerce, enterprise, and contracting, its interpretation must be restrictive and the limitations must necessarily be reserved to the law. From the moment of the appointment to the public office of the official whose kinship relationship gives rise to the existence of the prohibition, the factual premise (presupuesto de hecho) established by law arises to prevent natural or legal persons covered by the prohibition from contracting with the State and its Institutions. The legislator provided a legal dispensation (dispensa legal) so that, in certain circumstances, even when that prohibition exists, the controlling body may authorize the natural or legal persons covered by the impediment to contract. As sustained by the General Comptroller of the Republic, which this Court endorses, the appointment to each of the positions indicated in subsection a) of article 22 bis of the Administrative Contracting Law constitutes a new triggering event (hecho generador), such that upon each appointment of an official, an express petition is required from the company or person affected by the prohibition so that the controlling body, in the exercise of its constitutional oversight powers, may grant the lifting of the prohibition. Thus, the dispensation is granted for a specific position, so that in the event the official is appointed to a new position, a new triggering event arises and the proceeding for lifting the dispensation must be carried out. Under no assumption can it be understood that the proceeding for lifting the prohibition constitutes a mere formality (mero formalismo) and that the General Comptroller of the Republic simply declares that the prohibition does not exist, since the controlling body must, with a reasoned decision, grant the dispensation that, by decision of the legislator, enables contractors covered by the regime of prohibitions to submit their bids and be awarded contracts in public tenders, such that until the controlling body provides such authorization, there is a diminution of the capacities of these bidders to contract with the State and its entities. Even though it might seem logical that, if the premises that gave rise to the lifting of the prohibition remain unchanged upon the official's first appointment to a public office subject to the prohibition (since the consanguinity relationship does not change), the fact is that upon determining the legal provision contained in article 22 bis subsection a) of the Administrative Contracting Law, the prohibition that causes a series of officials to be barred from participating as bidders, whether directly or indirectly, can only be set aside if the natural or legal person affected by the legal impediment carries out the proceeding to lift that prohibition each time the official covered by the prohibition assumes a new public office among those listed in the cited provision, which in the opinion of this Court is consistent with the principles of transparency and equality. In this regard, it must be considered that the request for lifting the prohibition is granted upon petition of a party and not ex officio, and both the interested party's request and the approval by the controlling body must be duly substantiated with respect to compliance with the premises established in the Administrative Contracting Law, in order to exempt (dispensar) the companies or natural persons affected by a cause for prohibition from contracting with the Public Administration. As will be stated, the provisions contained in the Administrative Contracting Law related to the sanction for the regime of prohibitions do not provide any sanction regarding non-compliance with the prohibitions contained in article 22 bis, and therefore there is a legislative omission that prevents the application to the plaintiff company of the disqualification sanction that was imposed on it for non-compliance with the prohibitions. Indeed, article 22 of the Administrative Contracting Law establishes in a general manner the scope of application of the regime of prohibitions, but it is article 22 bis that defines its scope, indicating the persons who are directly or indirectly barred from participating as direct or indirect bidders in administrative contracting procedures. Thus, subsection a) indicates that, among other positions, deputies of the Legislative Assembly shall be prohibited from participating as bidders directly or indirectly. For its part, subsection h) indicates that the spouse, partner in a common-law marriage, of the officials covered by the prohibition, as well as their relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to and including the third degree, shall be unable to participate in administrative contracting procedures. Subsection i) of the cited provision indicates legal persons in which the spouse, partner, or relatives indicated in the preceding subsection hold more than 25% of the share capital, or hold any management or representative position. Now, having comprehensively analyzed the documentation on record as well as the arguments set forth by the opposing parties in this dispute, this Chamber deems it appropriate to address each of the grievances raised by the plaintiff. In the first place, it must be stated that the plaintiff's considerations are incorrect when she estimates that her represented company has exercised commercial activity since at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 as head of the Solid Waste Management Sub-Process of the Municipality of Alajuela, and she even affirms that it has been since the moment of its incorporation and registration before the Commercial Registry of the National Registry. As correctly pointed out by the representatives of the co-defendants herein, in cases such as the one at hand, as grounds for proceeding with the lifting of the legal prohibition, the party interested in such action must duly demonstrate before the controlling body that it has exercised, prior to the appointment of the official that causes the prohibition, the commercial activity for which it seeks the comptroller's authorization. In that regard, it is not any commercial activity that serves as the basis for seeking the lifting of the prohibition contained in article 22 of Law No. 7494, but rather, under the rules of logic, reasonableness, and proportionality that must govern the application of the current legal system, it must be the same commercial activity that is intended to be carried out with the public administration upon the lifting and for which such dispensation is requested. In accordance with what is indicated by article 22 of the Regulation to Law No. 7494, it cannot validly be considered that any type of activity carried out by a private law subject is sufficient grounds to access the lifting of the prohibition, contrary to what was considered by the plaintiff, and it is not viable under any assumption to consider that any activity carried out, in this case by a corporation, can be considered as corresponding to the exercise of the specific and particular activity for which the removal of the legal impediment is needed; therefore, it is completely senseless to affirm that any commercial activity is sufficient for the defendant administration to lift the restriction imposed by law. It must be, we reiterate, the specific and concrete commercial activity for which the legal impediment exists that must have been exercised by the interested party for at least 1 year before the appointment of the official in relation to whom the impediment arose, and its substantiation is therefore the specific responsibility of the party alleging it, in application of the legal aphorism that literally states: "he who affirms, must prove." Therefore, it was incumbent upon the applicant to demonstrate reliably before the respective administration that she meets the conditions required by the legal system for the lifting of the prohibition, which she must prove by providing suitable and accurate evidentiary material demonstrating the veracity of such affirmation. In the case at hand, the plaintiff company failed to demonstrate, before the General Comptroller of the Republic, that it satisfied said legal condition, and the only effective proof it provided in that regard is not useful for such purposes, since it demonstrates that the company has indeed exercised the activity for which it is barred from contracting with the Municipality of Alajuela, but it has exercised it since the year 2011, that is, after Mrs. Nombre127888's husband assumed the position that gives rise to the contractual restriction that the plaintiff has sought to eliminate. For that reason, as correctly pointed out by the representative of the CGR, the necessary legal premise to access the lifting of the prohibition has not been met in the specific case, based on subsection a) of article 23 of Law No. 7494. Likewise, in relation to the premise for the lifting provided for in the same article, but in its subsection b), it must be noted that the plaintiff is indeed correct in her assessment, since it has been effectively demonstrated on record that Mrs. Nombre127888 occupies a position from which she exercises representation of the plaintiff company, with more than five years prior to the appointment of her husband as the official in charge of solid waste matters in the Alajuela municipality, and in that regard, in relation to the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A., the prohibition provided for in the aforementioned article 22 must be lifted. Indeed, it is not entirely pleasant for this Court to resolve in the manner it does, but this is what proceeds in accordance with the law, resolving solely in application of the cited legal norm. And it cannot be resolved in any other way, since the articles that regulate this matter, both at the legal and regulatory level, in no way expressly state that the interested party must simultaneously comply with all three premises provided for in article 23 of the cited law, in order to proceed with the lifting of the prohibition. In that regard, there is no legal basis to accept the position taken in the record by the co-defendants, which affirms that it is not viable to lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company, because although Mrs. Nombre127888 meets the premise of subsection b) of article 23 of Law No. 7494, she nonetheless failed to prove that the company she represents exercised the commercial activity for which the lifting is required for at least one year before the appointment of Mr. Nombre127889 in the municipality, a position that would only be admissible if the current regulations expressly stated that the three premises of article 23 must be satisfied simultaneously in order to proceed with the lifting, which is not the case. Both the representative of the CGR and that of the State have argued that even though Mrs. Nombre127888 complies with subsection b of article 23, her represented company is still burdened by not having been able to demonstrate that it has exercised the activity of transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste for at least one year before her husband's appointment to the aforementioned municipal position, which occurred in the month of January 2010, and therefore, in their opinion, the restriction should not be lifted; however, adopting such a legal position would violate the principle of legality that governs the matter at hand, according to which the administration can only carry out those actions for which it is previously authorized by the current legal system, and in this case, assuming the position that the three premises of article 23 must be met simultaneously in order to access the lifting was not the spirit that the legislator enshrined in said legal article. Accepting that position as valid would be contrary to the pro hómine and pro libertatis principles that must be observed and safeguarded in our legal system, the same principles that must guide and delimit the scope of application of legal norms by the legal operator. In that regard, it is proper to proceed to lift the disqualification of the plaintiff company to offer its services and eventually contract with the Municipality of Alajuela for the activity of transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste. Consequently, and solely with respect to the plaintiff's representative's compliance with the condition provided for in subsection b) of article 23 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Contracting Law, the resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the General Comptroller of the Republic, are partially annulled.

**V. REGARDING THE OPPOSED EXCEPTIONS.** The co-defendants requested that the filed complaint be declared without merit in all its aspects, invoking the exceptions of lack of right, lack of standing, and lack of interest. **Regarding the lack of standing invoked by the State.** The arguments put forth by the State representative regarding a lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) so that the State is a defendant in this proceeding. Indeed, as the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly held, among others in ruling No. 681-F-S1-2010 of eight hours fifteen minutes on the ninth of June of two thousand ten, in matters submitted to its knowledge, the Judge is obligated to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or substantive premises of every procedural relationship, namely: right, standing, and interest. These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, and must therefore be observed throughout the entire process. Standing constitutes a premise of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural premise, as it does not refer to the procedure or to the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantive interest in relation to the legal-material relationship being discussed on the merits of the process. Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in dispute. The defendant must be the person to whom the law corresponds to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the object of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff must be the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims in the complaint, even if the substantive right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. Depending on the party with standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing; the former corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who subsequently intervene to defend their case, and the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantive impediment; if the judge perceives the lack thereof, they must so declare ex officio. Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party to a specific proceeding; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for that purpose regarding the procedural claim. Standing is the "legal consideration, with respect to the process, of persons who find themselves in a specific relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, in order for the claim on the merits to be examined, that said persons appear as such parties in the process." (Nombre71665 . *Teoría del Proceso* Argentina 1990). In the specific case, the object of the process is directed at the annulment of actions taken by the General Comptroller of the Republic that rejected the request formulated by the plaintiff for relief from the regime of prohibitions contained in articles 22 and 22 bis of Law No. 7494, the current Administrative Contracting Law. Given that the process shows no challenge by the plaintiff with respect to any conduct attributable to the State, since the State has no relationship with the object of this process, nor has any claim been formulated against it, this Court must accept the exception of lack of standing invoked by the State representative. **Regarding the exception of lack of current interest:** In the specific case, this Court considers that there has been sufficient and current interest to bring action, given that the conducts subjected to this Chamber's assessment had not been previously the object of a proceeding by this jurisdiction, and therefore there is an evident interest for the plaintiff in their respective elucidation in order to determine, jurisdictionally, the legal viability of a potential possibility for the plaintiff company to realize its commercial relations with the Municipality of Alajuela, where the spouse of the legal representative of the plaintiff herein works. The exception raised is therefore rejected. **Regarding the exception of lack of right:** By reason of what has been stated in the preceding recitals, the exception of lack of right invoked by the General Comptroller of the Republic must be partially accepted, and the complaint filed is partially granted, as hereby ordered.

**VI. Regarding costs.** In accordance with article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The waiver of this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or else, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence the existence of which was unknown to the opposing party. In the specific case, this Court considers that there is no reason whatsoever to vary the general rule applicable to the matter, and in that regard, both costs of the proceeding are borne by the losing party.

**POR TANTO** The exception of lack of active standing with respect to the State is accepted. The exception of lack of right invoked by the General Comptroller of the Republic is partially accepted, and consequently, the complaint filed is partially granted, it being understood as denied where not expressly granted, as follows: The prohibition that weighs upon the company Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima from contracting for the services of Transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid waste with the Municipality of Alajuela is lifted by virtue of subsection b) of article 23 of the current Administrative Contracting Law. The administrative resolutions No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 of March 19, 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 of April 24, 2013, and R-DC-072-2013 of June 7, 2013, all issued by the General Comptroller of the Republic, are partially annulled, solely insofar as they did not lift the prohibition on the plaintiff company from contracting with the cited municipality, in accordance with what is indicated by subsection b) of article 23 of Law No. 7494 Administrative Contracting Law. Both costs of the proceeding are borne by the General Comptroller of the Republic. **Let it be notified.-** **Sandra M. Quesada Vargas.** **Nombre22563 . Nombre15709 .**

1 1 PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: MANEJO INTEGRAL TÉCNO AMBIENTE S.A.

DEMANDADO: CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA Y OTRO.

No.033-2016-VII TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SÉTIMA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. GOICOECHEA, A LAS ONCE HORAS CON CINCUENTA MINUTOS DEL TREINTA Y UNO DE MARZO DEL DOS MIL DIECISÉIS.

Proceso de conocimiento declarado de puro derecho interpuesto por MANEJO INTEGRAL TECNO AMBIENTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, empresa con cédula de persona jurídica número CED116299, representada por su apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma Nombre127888 , ingeniera química, con cédula de identidad CED116300 vecina de Heredia, contra la Contraloría General de la República, representada por Nombre4038 , abogada, con cédula de identidad número CED116301 vecina de San José y contra el Estado, representado por la procuradora adjunta Georgina Cháves Olarte, abogada, con cédula de identidad número CED116302, vecina San José. Todos son mayores.

RESULTANDO

1. Con el presente asunto, la parte actora pretende que en sentencia se declare, que la empresa actora “(…) tiene derecho a que se le levante la prohibición de contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, dado que la empresa inició su actividad comercial mucho antes de un año antes de que mi esposo (…) hubiera sido nombrado el 20 de enero del 2010, en el puesto de Encargado del Sub proceso de Servicios Ambientales. // (…) deberán revocarse o modificarse en cuanto a este derecho las resoluciones LEV-PROH No. 06-2013, del 19 de marzo del 2013, la LEV-PROH No 08-2013, del día 24 de abril del 2014 y la R-DC-072-2013, del día 7 de junio del 2013, por ser contrarias a los incisos a y b del artículo 23 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa”. (ver folios 28 a 34 y 81 a 82 de los autos, así como la grabación en soporte digital de la audiencia preliminar realizada).

2. Conferido el traslado de rigor, la representación estatal contestó en forma negativa la acción invocando las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación y falta de interés actual. Por su parte, la representación de la Contraloría General de la República contestó negativamente la demanda e interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho. (ver folios 47 a 57 y 58 a 72 de los autos).

3. Que la audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, fue celebrada a las 14:00 horas del 30 de julio del 2015, en ella el Juez Tramitador declaró este asunto de puro derecho y concedió a las partes presentes plazo para rendir conclusiones (ver folios 81 a 82 de los autos así como grabación en soporte digital de la audiencia preliminar realizada).

4. Se dicta esta sentencia dentro del plazo que permiten las labores del despacho, previas las deliberaciones de rigor y por criterio unánime del Tribunal, sin que se perciba en los procedimientos causales susceptibles de invalidar lo actuado.

Redacta la Juez Quesada Vargas; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.HECHOS PROBADOS. De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene como debidamente acreditados los siguientes, por encontrar sustento en los elementos de convicción que en su apoyo se citan: 1. Que la señora Nombre127888 es apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma de la empresa de esta plaza Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima desde el día 18 de octubre del 2007 (ver folios 01 a 05 de los autos). 2. Que la señora Nombre127888 es cónyuge del señor Nombre127889 , quien funge como Encargado del Subproceso de Servicios Ambientales de la Municipalidad de Alajuela desde el día 20 de enero del 2010 (hecho no controvertido por las partes). 3. Que la Contraloría General de la República, mediante la resolución No. LEV-PROH No.06-2013 de las 09:00 horas del 19 de marzo del 2013, denegó la solicitud de levantamiento de prohibición para la empresa actora, de contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, en virtud de no haber acreditado el ejercicio de la actividad comercial que da origen a la solicitud de levantamiento, al menos un año antes de la designación del funcionario afecto por la prohibición, en este caso, el esposo de la señora Nombre127888 (ver folios 07 a 16 de los autos). 4. Que posteriormente, mediante resolución No. LEV-PROH No.08-2013 de las 09:00 horas del 24 de abril del 2013, la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República, volvió a revisar el asunto, denegando nuevamente la solicitud de levantamiento formulada por la aquí actora (ver folios 17 a 21 de los autos). 5. Que en contra de lo resuelto, la actora interpuso recurso de apelación, el cual fue rechazado por extemporáneo y por no haber desvirtuado la accionante las razones sustantivas que llevaron al mantenimiento de la prohibición, mediante resolución No. R-DC-072-2013 de las 08:00 horas del 07 de junio del 2013, dictada por el Despacho de la Contralora de la Contraloría General de la República (ver folios 23 a 27 de los autos).

II.HECHOS NO PROBADOS. Por no existir pruebas en autos que lo acredite se tiene como tales los siguientes: 1. Que la empresa actora hubiera realizado labores de prestación de servicios como el transporte, tratamiento y disposición final de desechos sólidos o de relleno sanitario para la Municipalidad de Alajuela, al menos durante el plazo de un año, anterior a q ue el cónyuge de su apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma, señor Nombre127889 , fuera nombrado como Encargado del Subproceso de Servicios Ambientales el día 20 de enero del 2010 (no hay prueba al respecto en autos).

III.SOBRE LOS ARGUMENTOS DE LAS PARTES. Argumenta la parte actora, en sustento de su acción y a manera de síntesis, que su representada es propietaria de un relleno sanitario en Miramar de Montes de Oro, el cual opera desde el año 2011; para su construcción fue necesario el obtener la viabilidad ambiental por la SETENA, la cual les fue otorgada mediante el oficio No. 2972-2009-SETENA del 18 de diciembre del 2009. Para las fechas 18 de octubre y 5 de diciembre del 2007, la empresa Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A. le confirió a Nombre127888 poderes generalísimos para representar a dicha empresa. El 15 de abril del 2012 la señora Nombre127888 contrajo matrimonio con Nombre127889 , quien es funcionario de la Municipalidad de Alajuela encargado del Subproceso de Servicios Ambientales de la Municipalidad de Alajuela. Dicho funcionario fue designado en el cargo el día 20 de enero del 2010. Que la señora Nombre127888 solicitó ante la Contraloría General de la República (en adelante CGR) el levantamiento de la prohibición del artículo 22 inciso a) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa para contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, solicitud que fue denegada para la empresa actora, por estimarse que no se cumplía con el artículo 23 del mismo cuerpo legal, por cuanto no se acreditó que la empresa operara comercialmente un año antes de que el funcionario asumiera el cargo. Cita el artículo 23 al que refiere y señala que la norma tome en cuenta tres supuestos pero para resolver su gestión sólo tomó en cuenta el inciso a). Señala que debe definirse qué se debe entender por actividad comercial se ha ejercido, pues la CGR estima que ello supone un ejercicio facturado de la actividad comercial, pero desde que una empresa se constituye y queda inscrita en el Registro Mercantil, todos sus actos son actos comerciales. Sostiene que desde que su representada inició su gestión como empresa legalmente constituida ha desplegado actos de comercio y todos ellos dirigidos a su actividad operativa, que es la prestación de servicios como relleno sanitario. Afirma que el problema es que esa operación no se podía realizar legalmente hasta que la SETENA diera la viabilidad ambiental, y luego había que aprobar los planos constructivos, y hasta después de las aprobaciones de los mismos, se podía empezar la construcción del relleno, el cual se inauguró hasta agosto del 2011. Sostiene que cuando empezaron los trámites administrativos fue en agosto del 2006, y que para esa fecha ni siquiera conocía a su esposo. Que las facturas emitidas y aportadas por su representada ante la CGR son de fecha 22 de agosto del 2011 y 10 de setiembre del 2011, considerando la CGR que es a partir de ese momento en que hubo actividad comercial, criterio que estima sesgado y restrictivo. Estima que el espíritu de la prohibición es que nadie se aproveche de una relación familiar para obtener beneficios indebidos a la hora de contratar con la administración. Que cuando su representada decidió invertir dinero en la actividad de disposición final de desechos sólidos, la señora Nombre127888 no pensaba en Nombre127889 ni en su matrimonio, hechos que son sobrevinientes y por los cuales no se puede castigar a una empresa que trata de hacer bien las cosas y prestando un servicio pública de importancia nacional, según estima. Afirma que el inciso b) del artículo 23 le beneficia ampliamente, pues su representación data de octubre y diciembre del 2007, mucho más de un año antes de que su esposo asumiera el cargo indicado supra, por ello, considera que tiene derecho a que se le levante la prohibición. Por su parte, la representación de la CGR, señala, a manera de síntesis: cita los incisos d), h), i) del artículo 22 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y el numeral 23 de la misma ley, señalando que la prohibición indicada en los incisos h) e i) podrá ser levantada cuando se demuestre: a) que la actividad comercial desplegada ha sido ejercida por lo menos un año antes del nombramiento del funcionario que origina la prohibición, b) en el caso de directivos o representantes de una persona jurídica, cuando demuestren que ocupan el puesto por lo menos un año antes del nombramiento del funcionario que origina la prohibición, c) cuando hayan transcurrido al menos seis meses desde que la participación social del pariente ha sido cedida o traspasada, o desde que renunció al puesto o cargo de representación. Cita el artículo 22 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, el cual transcribe. Señala la finalidad del régimen de prohibición y sus criterios al respecto. Además, el voto No. 2011-005272 de la Sala Constitucional. Realiza un recuento de lo acontecido en sede administrativa e indica que no se demostró que la empresa actora se ha dedicado de forma habitual a la actividad de transporte, tratamiento y disposición de desechos sólidos con antelación al plazo mínimo de un año antes del surgimiento de la prohibición, por lo que no era posible otorgar su levantamiento, tal y como lo exige el artículo 23 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Considera errónea la interpretación dada por la actora sobre el ejercicio de la actividad comercial, cita el artículo 22 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y manifiesta que la actividad a la que se hace referencia es la misma actividad o función potencialmente objeto de una contratación administrativa, debiendo el solicitante acreditar que ha ejercido en forma real y efectiva la actividad comercial sobre la cual solicita el levantamiento, es decir, que la empresa debe demostrar que se ha dedicado a prestar los servicios por lo que participaría como oferente ante la Municipalidad de Alajuela, a saber, el transporte, tratamiento y disposición de desechos sólidos. Sostiene que la obtención de los permisos autorizaciones y demás requisitos, son actos preparatorios para el ejercicio de la actividad comercial. Que la CGR analiza la actividad comercial concreta por la que se estaría prestando servicios a aquélla administración, según lo indique la solicitud de levantamiento, y no una actividad comercial general, actividad que para el caso de la actora es el transporte, tratamiento y disposición de desechos sólidos. Antes de la obtención de los permisos respectivos, la empresa no podía ejercer la actividad para la cual solicitó el levantamiento de la prohibición. Cita una serie de oficios por ella emitidos en este mismo sentido. Afirma que se trata de analizar una actividad comercial específica pues será respecto de ésta que puede generarse una relación entre el funcionario público en cuestión y la persona interesada en el levantamiento de la prohibición y el puesto que desempeña Nombre127889 está directamente relacionado con la actividad detallada por la empresa actora. Tampoco demostró esa empresa que desarrollara la actividad al menos un año antes del nombramiento de Nombre127889 en su cargo ante la Municipalidad de Alajuela. Sobre la aplicación del inciso b) del artículo 23 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, sostiene que efectivamente la señora Nombre127888 es representante de la empresa desde el año 2007 y que el nombramiento del señor Nombre127889 se dio el 20 de enero del 2010, pero no puede levantarse el impedimento pues se mantiene el incumplimiento del inciso a) del artículo 23 de la ley, que está previsto para el supuesto de la empresa no del representante, siendo que en el caso de la empresa actora se aplica la prohibición por dos razones: la actividad comercial a la que se dedica la empresa y la prohibición que se aplica a su representante legal. Estima que si procede levantar la prohibición por el inciso b) del artículo 23 a su representante legal, se mantiene la prohibición para la empresa en razón de la actividad comercial que realiza, lo cual indica se contempló en el oficio No.LEV-PROH.08-2013 del 24 de abril del 2013. Señala que la resolución que rechazó el recurso de apelación no sólo lo hizo por extemporáneo, sino por no haber desacreditado las consideraciones que sustentaron la denegatoria del levantamiento de la prohibición, siendo que la empresa no aportó documentación adicional en sustento de su gestión recursiva. Concluye indicando que los actos impugnados son apegados a derecho, válidos y eficaces, y solicita por ello se declare sin lugar la demanda. La representación estatal adujo en defensa de sus posiciones, y a manera de síntesis: que la actora solicitó se levantara la prohibición para contratar con la administración pública según los incisos a) y b) del artículo 23 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Que son improcedentes los alegatos de la actora por estar los actos impugnados apegados al ordenamiento jurídico relativo a la contratación administrativa. Los artículos 22 y 22 bis de esa ley señalan en cuáles supuestos las personas físicas y jurídicas tienen la prohibición de participar en los procedimientos de contratación con la administración pública, mientras que el artículo 23 establece en qué casos puede levantarse la prohibición derivada de los incisos h) e i) del artículo 22 bis. Cita estos artículos en su literalidad y además el artículo 22 del Reglamento respectivo, decreto ejecutivo No.33411. Señala que el régimen de prohibiciones pretende garantizar la imparcialidad y probidad de los funcionarios públicos para evitar colusiones y tráfico de influencias. Cita el voto No. 2011-5272 de la Sala Constitucional. Afirma que la actora está inhibida de contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela por el vínculo marital que existe entre la señora Nombre127888 y el señor Nombre127889 como Coordinador de Servicios Ambientales de esa Municipalidad, según el artículo 22 bis inciso i) de la ley No. 7494. Para que se levantara la prohibición, la empresa debía demostrar que la actividad comercial habitual se ejecutaba al menos 1 año antes del nombramiento del señor Nombre127889 en su cargo en la Municipalidad el 20 de enero del 2010, y la señora Nombre127888 debía demostrar que ocupaba el puesto de apoderada de la actora por lo menos un año antes del nombramiento de su esposo. No obstante, la actora no demostró que la actividad de recolección, tratamiento, transporte y disposición final de desechos sólidos se realizara con un año de antelación al nombramiento de Nombre127889, por el contrario, quedó plasmado en el procedimiento administrativo que la actividad comercial operativa y habitual se realiza con posterioridad al mencionado nombramiento, es decir, a partir del 2011. Al procedimiento administrativo la actora sólo aportó como prueba de la actividad que realiza, facturas del 11 de agosto del 2011 y del 10 de setiembre del 2011 y una copia certificada de la resolución No.2972-2009-SETENA. Considera improcedente el argumento de que a partir de la constitución de una empresa, y de que ésta es inscrita registralmente, realiza actos de comercio, pues muchas empresas son creadas e inscritas ante el Registro Nacional y nunca han realizado la actividad comercial para la cual fueron creadas. La actora no acreditó que la actividad comercial efectiva y concreta se realizara con un año de anterioridad al 20 de enero del 2010, de allí que la actuación de la CGR se ajusta a derecho. Además, considera que la CGR aplicó de forma integral el artículo 23 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa pero pese al cumplimiento del inciso b) del artículo 23 indicado, en el caso concreto se mantiene el incumplimiento del inciso a) y del artículo 22 del decreto ejecutivo Placa30040 que se refiere a la actividad concreta y habitual para la cual solicita el levantamiento de la prohibición. Cita al respecto lo indicado por la CGR en los oficios impugnados, que afirma son conformes a derecho y solicita se declare sin lugar la demanda.

IV.SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO. Conforme bien lo señalan los codemandados en este proceso y lo ha determinado la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (sentencia No.5272 de las 15:17 horas del 27 de abril del 2011), el régimen de prohibiciones regulado en los artículos 22 y 22 bis de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, tiene como finalidad garantizar la solvencia moral de las personas que contraten con las administraciones públicas, con lo cual pretenden evitar la corrupción administrativa, evitando las colusiones y el tráfico de influencias que de manera directa o indirecta, podrían generar ciertos funcionarios públicos que tienen posición de poder o de influencia en la organización administrativa y cuentan con vínculos con la persona física o jurídica que pretende contratar con el ente público. El régimen de prohibiciones dispuesto en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, constituye una garantía general de transparencia en el proceso de contratación y de los principios de igualdad y libre concurrencia contenidos en los artículos 33 de la Constitución Política y 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. El régimen de prohibiciones regulado por la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, persigue como objetivos evitar que la posición institucional del funcionario público le permita obtener un provecho personal, favorecer a sus familiares o bien, a entidades donde tenga alguna participación y mantener la imparcialidad y el deber de probidad que debe caracterizar la conducta de quiénes ejercen la función pública, evitando que ciertos oferentes puedan ser colocados en una situación de favor, en virtud del vínculo familiar con un funcionario que pueda influenciar directa o indirectamente los procedimientos contractuales administrativos. Al constituir el régimen de prohibiciones una limitación legal de los derechos fundamentales al comercio, la empresa y contratación, su interpretación debe ser restrictiva y las limitaciones deben estar necesariamente reservadas a la ley. Desde el momento de la designación en el cargo público del funcionario (a) cuya relación de parentesco origina la existencia de la prohibición, surge el presupuesto de hecho establecido por la ley para impedir a las personas físicas o jurídicas cubiertas con la prohibición el contratar con el Estado y sus Instituciones. El legislador previó una dispensa legal a efecto de que en determinadas circunstancias, aún cuando exista esa prohibición, el órgano contralor habilite a las personas físicas o jurídicas cubiertas por el impedimento para contratar. Conforme lo ha sostenido la Contraloría General de la República, lo cual avala éste Tribunal, la designación en cada uno de los cargos que se señala en el inciso a) del artículo 22 bis de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, se configura como un hecho generador nuevo, de tal manera que en cada designación de un funcionario (a) se requiere de una gestión expresa de la empresa o persona afectada por la prohibición a efecto de que el órgano contralor, en el ejercicio de sus competencias constitucionales de fiscalización, otorgue el levantamiento de la prohibición. Así, la dispensa es otorgada para un cargo específico, de modo que en caso de que el funcionario sea designado en un nuevo cargo, se vuelve a generar un hecho generador y debe realizarse el trámite de levantamiento de la dispensa. Bajo ningún supuesto puede entenderse que el trámite del levantamiento de prohibición constituye un mero formalismo y que la Contraloría General de la República simplemente declara que no existe la prohibición, ya que el órgano contralor de manera motivada debe otorgar la dispensa que por decisión del legislador habilita a los contratistas cubiertos por el régimen de prohibición, para presentar sus ofertas y ser adjudicados en concursos públicos, de modo que hasta tanto el órgano contralor no brinde tal habilitación, existe una disminución de las capacidades de estos oferentes para contratar con el Estado y sus entidades. Aún y cuando pudiera resultar lógico que al mantenerse los presupuestos que originaron el levantamiento de la prohibición, ante la primera designación del funcionario en un cargo público afecto a la prohibición (pues la relación de consanguinidad no cambia), es lo cierto que al determinar la disposición legal contenida en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la prohibición que genera que una serie de funcionarios se encuentren inhibidos de participar como oferentes, sea de manera directa o indirecta, sólo puede dejarse de lado si la persona física o jurídica afectada por el impedimento legal, realiza el trámite de levantamiento de esa prohibición, cada vez que el funcionario (a) cubierto por la prohibición asume un nuevo cargo público de los enumerados en la citada disposición, lo que en criterio de éste Tribunal resulta acorde con los principios de transparencia e igualdad. Al efecto debe considerarse que la solicitud de levantamiento de prohibición se otorga a petición de parte y no de oficio, siendo que tanto la solicitud del interesado, como la aprobación por parte del órgano contralor deben estar debidamente fundamentados, en cuanto al cumplimiento de los presupuestos establecidos en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, para dispensar a las empresas o personas físicas afectas por una causal de prohibición, para contratar con la Administración Pública. Conforme se dirá, las disposiciones contenidas en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa relacionadas con la sanción al régimen de prohibiciones, no prevén sanción alguna respecto del incumplimiento de las prohibiciones contenidas en el artículo 22 bis, por lo que existe una omisión legislativa que impide la aplicación a la sociedad actora de la sanción de inhabilitación que le fue impuesta por incumplimiento de las prohibiciones. En efecto, el artículo 22 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa establece de manera general el ámbito de aplicación del régimen de prohibiciones, pero es el artículo 22 bis, el que tipifica sus alcances, señalando las personas que en forma directa o indirecta se encuentran impedidas de participar como oferentes directos o indirectos en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. Así en el inciso a) se indica tendrán prohibido participar como oferentes en forma directa o indirecta, entre otros cargos, los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa. Por su parte el inciso h) señala que tendrán imposibilidad de participar en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa el cónyuge, el compañero o la compañera en unión de hecho, de los funcionarios cubiertos por la prohibición, así como sus parientes por consanguinidad o afinidad hasta el tercer grado inclusive. El inciso i) de la disposición citada señala que las personas jurídicas en las cuáles el cónyuge, el compañero, la compañera o los parientes indicados en el inciso anterior, sean titulares de más de un 25% del capital social, o ejerzan algún puesto de dirección o representación. Ahora bien, una vez analizada integralmente la documentación constante en autos así como los argumentos expuestos por las partes enfrentadas dentro de esta litis, estima conveniente esta Cámara abordar cada uno de los agravios expuestos por la parte actora. En primer término, debe indicarse que no lleva razón en sus consideraciones la accionante al estimar que su representada ejerce actividad comercial desde al menos un año antes del nombramiento del señor Nombre127889 como encargado del Subproceso de Manejo de Desechos Sólidos de la Municipalidad de Alajuela, e inclusive afirma que desde el momento de su constitución e inscripción ante el Registro Mercantil del Registro Nacional. Tal y como lo señalaran con absoluto acierto la representación de los aquí codemandados, en casos como el que nos ocupa, como causal para proceder al levantamiento de la prohibición de ley, debe la parte interesada en tal gestión, acreditar debidamente ante al órgano contralor, que ha ejercido con anterioridad al nombramiento del funcionario que le hace incurrir en la prohibición, la actividad comercial para la cual solicita la autorización contralora. En ese tanto, no se trata de cualquiera actividad comercial la que sirve de sustento para gestionar el levantamiento de la prohibición contenida en el numeral 22 de la ley No. 7494, sino que al amparo de las reglas de la lógica, la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad que debe regir la aplicación del ordenamiento jurídico vigente, debe tratarse de la misma actividad comercial que se pretende ejercer para con la administración pública a partir del levantamiento y para la cual se solicita dicha dispensa. Al tenor de lo indicado por el artículo 22 del reglamento a la ley No. 7494, no puede estimarse, válidamente, que sea cualquier tipo de actividad desplegada por un sujeto de derecho privado la causal suficiente para acceder al levantamiento de la prohibición, contrariamente a lo considerado por la actora, no siendo viable bajo ningún supuesto considerar que cualquier actividad que despliegue, en este caso una sociedad anónima, puede tenerse como una correspondiente al ejercicio de la actividad particular y puntual para la cual se necesita la remoción del impedimento legal; por ello, carece de todo sentido afirmar cualquier actividad mercantil resulta suficiente para que la administración demandada levante la restricción que por ley se impone. Deberá ser, se reitera, la actividad comercial puntual y concreta para la cual existe el impedimento legal, la que deberá de haberse ejercido por el sujeto interesado, al menos 1 año antes del nombramiento del funcionario en relación con el cual surgió el impedimento, siendo por ello su acreditación, del resorte específico del sujeto que la alega, en aplicación del aforismo jurídico que a la letra reza: "quien afirma, prueba". Por ello, correspondía a la solicitante, acreditar de manera fehaciente ante la administración respectiva, que cumple con las condiciones exigidas por el ordenamiento, para el levantamiento de la prohibición, lo cual deberá demostrar mediante la aportación del material probatorio idóneo y certero, la veracidad de tal afirmación. En el caso que nos ocupa, la empresa actora no logró demostrar, ante la Contraloría General de la República, que satisfacía dicha condición legal, y la única probanza efectiva que al respecto aportó, no resulta útil para tales efectos, pues demuestra que la empresa sí ha ejercido la actividad para la cual se encuentra impedida de contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, pero la ha ejercido desde el año 2011, es decir, con posterioridad a que el esposo de doña Nombre127888 asumiera el cargo que da pie a la restricción contractual que ha pretendido eliminar la accionante. Por dicha razón, como bien lo señalara la representación de la CGR, no se cumple en la especie con el presupuesto jurídico necesario para acceder al levantamiento de la prohibición, con base en el inciso a) del artículo 23 de la ley No. 7494. Así mismo, en relación con el presupuesto para el levantamiento previsto en el mismo artículo, pero en su inciso b), debe señalarse que efectivamente sí lleva razón en su apreciación la parte actora, pues efectivamente ha quedado demostrado en autos, que la señora Nombre127888 ocupa un puesto desde el cual ejerce la representación de la empresa accionante, con más de un lustro de anterioridad a la designación de su esposo como funcionario encargado de la materia de desechos sólidos en el municipio alajuelense, y en ese tanto, en relación con la empresa Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente S.A. debe de levantarse la prohibición prevista en el numeral 22 antes citado. Efectivamente no resulta del todo grato para este Tribunal resolver de la forma en que lo hace, pero es esto lo que procede conforme a derecho, resolviéndose únicamente en aplicación de la norma legal citada. Y es que no puede resolverse de otra forma, toda vez que los artículos que regulan esta materia, tanto a nivel legal como reglamentario, de ninguna manera aducen expresamente que deberá cumplirse al unísono por parte del interesado, con los tres presupuestos que prevé el artículo 23 de la ley citada, para proceder con el levantamiento de la prohibición. En ese tanto, carece de sustento jurídico acoger la posición planteada en autos por los codemandados, la cual afirma que no resulta viable levantar la prohibición a la empresa actora, pues aunque la señora Nombre127888 cumple con el presupuesto del inciso b) del artículo 23 de la ley No. 7494, sin embargo no logró acreditar que la empresa que representa ejerciera la actividad comercial para la cual se requiere el levantamiento, al menos desde un año antes del nombramiento del señor Nombre127889 en el municipio, posición que sólo resultaría admisible, si la normativa vigente señalara de manera expresa, que debe satisfacerse con los tres presupuestos del artículo 23, al mismo tiempo, para proceder al levantamiento, aspecto que no es tal. Tanto la representación de la CGR como la del Estado, han aducido que aunque cumpla doña Nombre127888 con el inciso b del numeral 23, sin embargo sigue pesando sobre su representada el no haber podido demostrar que ejerce la actividad de transporte, tratamiento y disposición de desechos sólidos, al menos un año antes del nombramiento de su esposo en el puesto municipal de marras, acaecido en el mes de enero del año 2010, en su criterio, por ello no debe de levantarse la restricción, sien embargo, asumir dicha posición jurídica vulneraría el principio de legaldiad que rige en la materia que nos ocupa, a partir del cual la administración sólo puede realizar aquellas actuaciones para las cuales se encuentra de previo autorizada por el ordenamiento vigente, y en este caso, asumir la posición de que debe cumplirse al mismo tiempo con los tres presupuestos del artículo 23 para acceder al levantamiento, no fue el espíritu que el legislador plasmó en dicho numeral legal. Asumir como válida dicha posición, resultaría contrario a los principios pro hómine y pro libertatis que resultan de obligatorio acatamiento y resguardo en nuestro sistema de derecho, mismos principios que deben orientar y delimitar el ámbito de aplicación de las normas jurídicas por parte del operador jurídico. En ese tanto, es lo procedente proceder a levantar la inhabilitación de la empresa actora, para ofrecer sus servicios y eventualmente contratar con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, la actividad de transporte, tratamiento y disposición final de desechos sólidos. Consecuentemente, y únicamente en lo que corresponde al cumplimiento por parte de la representante de la actora, del supuesto previsto en el inciso b) del artículo 23 de la ley No. 7494, Ley de Contratación Administrativa, se anula parcialmente las resoluciones No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 del 19 de marzo del 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 del 24 de abril del 2013 y R-DC-072-2013 del 07 de junio del 2013, todas emanadas de la Contraloría General de la República.

V.SOBRE LA EXCEPCIONES OPUESTAS. Los codemandados solicitaron se declare sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta, invocando las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación y falta de interés. Sobre la falta de legitimación invocada por el Estado. Los argumentos esgrimidos por la representante estatal respecto de una falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva a efecto de que el Estado figure como demandado en este juicio. En efecto, conforme lo ha sostenido de manera reiterada la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, entre otras en el voto Nº 681-F-S1-2010 de las ocho horas quince minutos del nueve de junio de dos mil diez, en los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento, el Juez está obligado a analizar, incluso de oficio, los presupuestos sustanciales o de fondo de toda relación procesal, a saber: derecho, legitimación e interés. Se trata de condiciones necesarias para el dictado de una sentencia de fondo, por lo que deben observarse durante todo el proceso. La legitimación constituye un presupuesto de la pretensión formulada en la demanda y de la oposición hecha por el demandado, para hacer posible la sentencia de fondo que las resuelve; consecuentemente la legitimación en la causa no constituye un presupuesto procesal, en tanto no se refiere al procedimiento o al válido ejercicio de la acción, antes bien se refiere a la relación sustancial que debe existir entre actor y demandado y al interés sustancial en cuanto a la relación jurídico-material que se discute en el fondo del proceso. La legitimación en la causa se refiere a la relación sustancial que se pretende existente entre las partes del proceso y el interés sustancial en litigio. El demandado debe ser la persona a quien le corresponde por la ley oponerse a la pretensión del actor o frente a la cual la ley permite que se declare la relación jurídica sustancial objeto de la demanda; y el actor la persona que a tenor de la ley puede formular las pretensiones de la demanda, aunque el derecho sustancial pretendido no exista o le corresponda a otro. De acuerdo al sujeto legitimado o a su posición en la relación procesal se puede distinguir entre legitimación activa y pasiva, la primera le corresponde al actor y a las personas que con posterioridad intervengan para defender su causa, la segunda le pertenece al demandado y a quienes intervengan para discutir y oponerse a la pretensión del actor. La ausencia de legitimación en la causa constituye un impedimento sustancial, si el juzgador se percata de la falta de la misma, así debe declararlo de oficio. En consecuencia, la legitimación es la aptitud para ser parte de un proceso concreto, puede ser activa o pasiva, lo cual dependerá de las condiciones que para tal efecto establezca la ley en cuanto la pretensión procesal. La legitimación es la "consideración legal, respecto del proceso, a las personas que se hallan en una determinada relación con el objeto del litigio y en virtud de la cual se exige, para que la pretensión de fondo pueda ser examinada, que dichas personas figuren como tales partes en el proceso.” (Nombre71665 . Teoría del Proceso Argentina 1990). En la especie, el objeto del proceso está dirigido a la nulidad de actuaciones propias de la Contraloría General de la República que rechazó la solicitud formulada por la actora para que se le excepcionase del régimen de prohibiciones contenido en los artículos 22 y 22 bis de la ley No. 7494 Ley de Contratación Administrativa vigente. Siendo que en el proceso no se evidencia ningún cuestionamiento de la parte actora respecto de alguna conducta que le sea atribuible, toda vez que el Estado no tiene ninguna relación con el objeto de este proceso, ni se ha formulado pretensión alguna en su contra, debe este Tribunal acoger la excepción de falta de legitimación invocada por la representación estatal. Sobre la excepción de falta de interés actual: En la especie, considera este Tribunal que ha existido interés suficiente y actual para accionar, toda vez que las conductas sometidas a la valoración de esta cámara, no habían sido anteriormente objeto de proceso por parte de jurisdicción, existiendo por ende un evidente interés para la parte accionante, de su respectiva dilucidación a efecto de determinar jurisdiccionalmente, la viabilidad jurídica de una eventual posibilidad para la empresa actora, de concretizar sus relaciones comerciales con la Municipalidad de Alajuela, donde labora el cónyuge de la representante legal de la aquí accionante. Se rechaza, en consecuencia, la excepción interpuesta. Sobre la excepción de falta de derecho: En razón de lo señalado en los considerandos precedentes, se debe acoger parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho invocada por la Contraloría General de la República, declarándose parcialmente con lugar la demanda intentada, como en efecto se dispone.

VI.Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el mero hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo resulta viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, considera éste Tribunal que no existe motivo alguno para variar la regla general aplicable a la materia, y en ese tanto, son ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la parte perdidosa.

POR TANTO

Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación activa con respecto al Estado. Se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho invocada por la Contraloría General de la República y en consecuencia se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda intentada, entendiéndose denegada en lo no expresamente concedido, así: Se levanta la prohibición que pesa sobre la empresa Manejo Integral Tecno Ambiente Sociedad Anónima, para contratar los servicios de Transporte, tratamiento y disposición final de desechos sólidos con la Municipalidad de Alajuela en virtud del inciso b) del artículo 23 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa vigente. Se anula parcialmente las resoluciones administrativas No. LEV-PROH No. 06-2013 del 19 de marzo del 2013, LEV-PROH No.08-2013 del 24 de abril del 2013 y R-DC-072-2013 del 07 de junio del 2013, todas emitidas por la Contraloría General de la República, únicamente en cuanto no levantaron la prohibición de contratar la empresa actora con el citado municipio, de conformidad con lo indicado por el inciso b) del artículo 23 de la ley No. 7494 Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Son ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la Contraloría General de la República. Notifíquese.- Sandra M. Quesada Vargas.

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