Use of Municipal Right-of-Way and Long-Established Gravel Access RoadUso de derecho de vía municipal y camino de lastre de vieja data

*110031951027CA* RES. 000029-F-S1-2016 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten o'clock on the twenty-eighth of January, two thousand sixteen.

Ordinary proceeding established by Nombre3611 SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by Nombre3612, of unknown civil status; against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO, represented by its mayor Rolando Alberto Rodríguez Brenes, single, and SANITARIOS HERMANOS Nombre3613 SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by Nombre3614, businessman. Also appearing as special judicial representatives are, for the plaintiff, attorney Julio Fonseca Pion; for the Municipality, attorney Julio Cesar Monge Gutiérrez; and, for the co-defendant company, attorney Cindy Blanco González. The individuals are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, and residents of Cartago.

RESULTANDO

1. - Based on the facts set forth and the legal provisions cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding so that the judgment declares: *"1.- That the co-defendant company has no right to carry out any construction whatsoever on any strip of the cantonal public domain (dominio cantonal); 2.- That the co-defendant company has no right to drive vehicles over the strips designated as green zone and future sidewalks; 3.- That all the ballast (lastre) placed on the strips designated as green zone and future sidewalks must be removed, with the respective costs borne by the co-defendant company, as well as any compensation for the environmental damage it may have caused, which shall be determined in the enforcement phase; 4.- That the Municipalidad de Cartago must require the co-defendant company to observe the identical alignment (alineamiento) that it has required of my represented party; namely - To respect a width of eleven meters and fifty centimeters for the green zone, measured from the center of the public street; and - To respect a width of two meters for the future sidewalk, measured from the end of the green zone. 5.- That the co-defendant company placed ballast on part of the private property of my represented party, which must be completely removed, with the respective costs borne by Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima; 6.- That damages and losses have been caused to my represented party due to the invasion that occurred on part of its private property, the amount of which shall be determined in the enforcement of the judgment. 6.- (sic) That the liability to indemnify my represented party for the damages and losses suffered is joint and several between the two co-defendant parties; 7.- That both co-defendant parties must also jointly and severally pay both sets of litigation costs (costas) of this proceeding."* In a document visible on folio 21, the plaintiff withdrew from the two claims identified with the number six (folios 8, 19, and 21).

2.- The representative of the Municipality opposed the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of standing to sue and be sued (*falta de legitimación activa y pasiva*), current interest, prescription, expiry (caducidad), and lack of right.

3.- The co-defendant company answered according to its document on folios 99 through 112 and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of standing to sue and be sued.

4.- The preliminary hearing was held at 14 hours 15 minutes on the twentieth of November, two thousand twelve. At that time, the parties addressed the court.

5.- The oral and public trial was held on July 1, 2013, with the participation of all parties.

6.- The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Quinta, composed of judges Ileana Sánchez Navarro, Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, and Juan Luis Giusti Soto, in judgment no. 2013-75-V at 8 hours 15 minutes on July 24, 2013, ordered: "The defenses of prescription, expiry, and lack of interest raised by the defendant Municipality are rejected, as are the exceptions of lack of standing to sue and be sued raised by the co-defendants. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and the lawsuit by Nombre3611 against Nombre3613 and the MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO is dismissed in all its aspects. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the plaintiff." 7.- The plaintiff filed a cassation appeal, expressly stating the grounds on which it relies to refute the Tribunal's thesis.

8.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed. Substitute Magistrate Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar participates in the decision of this matter.

Authored by Magistrate Escoto Fernández

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Nombre3611 S.A. sued, in the administrative contentious jurisdiction, the Municipalidad de Cartago (hereinafter, Municipality) and Empresa Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A. (hereinafter, the Company or the Society). It stated that its represented party is the owner of the property registered under real estate folio number of the Partido de Cartago, 178063-000, described in cadastral plan C-0604544-2000. It stated that the Society is the owner of a property in the same location, real estate folio 037191-000, cadastral plan C-0692354-2001. It noted that these properties are adjoining and border on the north with the green zone (zona verde) of the public road right-of-way (derecho de vía); a public road known as "Camino de Avance." It pointed out that the co-defendant Nombre3613 built a ballast road as access to its property. It asserted that no construction permit was issued by the local government for the Company to place ballast in that location. It argued that the territorial entity issued an alignment in favor of its represented party, establishing a green zone of 11 meters and 50 centimeters from the center of the public street, respecting a width of two meters for the sidewalk. It indicated that, when building the road, the Society invaded part of that area, the sidewalk, and its land. It requested that the judgment declare: a) the Company has no right to carry out constructions on the cantonal public domain, b) it may not drive vehicles in the area, c) the removal of the placed ballast and compensation for environmental damage, d) the identical alignment imposed on its represented party. The co-defendants responded negatively to the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of standing to sue and be sued, lack of right, current interest, prescription, and expiry. The Tribunal upheld the defense of lack of right and dismissed the lawsuit in all its aspects. It ordered the plaintiff to pay costs. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff filed a cassation appeal.

II.- Before examining the charges, it is noted that the appellant divides their second substantive challenge into different sections, of which only those designated by the appellant as a), b), and d) will be analyzed in this ruling. Likewise, the three points concern evidentiary aspects; therefore, this Chamber will proceed to summarize them jointly so that the decision is comprehensible.

III.- From a synthesis of the claims, this Chamber determines that they revolve around a single axis: the violation of numeral 19 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos (hereinafter LGCP), in the opinion of the dissatisfied party, due to an improper evaluation and disregard (preterición) of evidence. From a summary of the first point—section a) of the appeal—it alleges the violation of articles 82.4 of the CPCA, and 330 and 368 of the CPC. It argues that the appealed judgment omitted to give due weight to the photographs inserted in facts 4 and 5 of the precautionary measure brief and mentions that this evidence clearly shows the placement of ballast. It indicates that "the photographs whose evaluation is missed in the appealed judgment" illustrate what happened. It argues that the resolution it "seeks to overturn on cassation" was based exclusively on the documents contained in the file of the ordinary proceeding, disregarding those included in the precautionary measure proceeding. As a second aspect—section b) of the appeal—it criticizes that the Tribunal did not evaluate the judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales), specifically the one conducted by the Processing Judge, evidence on which "there is no analysis or comment in the appealed judgment." In its last objection—section d) of the appeal—it points out that there is abundant counter-evidence that detracts from the weight of the witnesses' statements. It criticizes that Mr. Nombre3615 (road inspector) and Nombre3616 Nombre3617 failed to answer when the Municipalidad de Cartago last ballasted the road, or whether it authorized it.

IV.- Regarding the disregard and evaluation of evidence, this Chamber, in ruling 1535-F-S1-2013 at 9:40 a.m. on November 14, 2013, noted that it occurs: "[…] when the judges fail to consider, totally or partially, the evidence submitted to the proceedings. This implies a disregard for the value that the law grants to it, and as such, constitutes an error of law. It follows from the foregoing that ignoring an evidentiary element, duly submitted and having an impact on the dispute, will constitute such an error. This is because an inaccurate representation of the factual picture of what occurred and was debated in the process can be observed, with the consequent violation that this implies for the substantive law applied to the specific case." (Judgment no. 771-F-S1-2011 at 13 hours 30 minutes on June 30, 2011). It also pointed out: "…Canon 82, subsection 4) of the CPCA establishes that all evidence shall be evaluated according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). This is a concept widely developed by this Chamber, and it consists of evaluating it according to the rules of logic and experience, without disregarding the specific value assigned to certain types of evidence, such as public documents unless they are declared false (resolution no. 126-F-S1-2009 at 15 hours 40 minutes on February 5, 2009) […] without forgetting the different 'evaluation' regimes, such as that of full and absolute freedom in valuation (in conscience); under the criteria of sound judgment, or also, under predetermined or legally prescribed formulas for all or some of the evidentiary elements. In this regard, section 4 of Article 82 proclaims: 'all evidence shall be evaluated according to the rules of sound judgment.' This provision takes a stance in favor of evidentiary evaluation under the criteria of sound judgment, subjecting the weighing of such evidence to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime established by the same law for public documents and confession evidence. (Resolution no. 287-F-S1-2009 at 10 hours 45 minutes on March 19, 2009).

V.- The Tribunal ruled that it was necessary to clarify whether the aforementioned entrance was indeed built by the defendant company, its nature, and whether the conduct of both the Municipality and the Company conformed to the legal system. It clarified that, as evidenced by the judicial inspection conducted, as well as the documentary and testimonial evidence gathered, the plaintiff's and co-defendant's properties are located in the province of Cartago. It noted: "[…] according to the official letters signed by the Municipal Inspector, visible on folios 5, 6, 7, 11, and 15 of the administrative file, it is clear that the access in question is within the public road right-of-way, in an area between the roadway and the alignment decreed by the Municipality, from which the private properties begin." It emphasized that this is a public domain asset, with special attributes of public ownership (demanialidad), therefore inalienable, that is, not subject to appropriation by private individuals. However, indicated that decision-making body, this characteristic does not prevent individuals from using these assets; on the contrary, they are intended for public use. What is impossible, it noted, is to establish an easement (servidumbre) or a right of occupation or possession over them in favor of a specific person under the terms of private law, but according to the provisions of Article 5 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), it is possible to build accesses on the public road, precisely to facilitate private individuals' entry to their properties. It determined: "[…] thus, the fact that the area considered part of the public road right-of-way serves to access not only the defendant company's property but also the plaintiff's, is not contrary to the special principles governing public domain assets." It specified that from the evidence submitted to the proceedings, the Tribunal could only conclude that the disputed access has existed for more than 25 years, and all the witnesses who appeared at the oral trial hearing, including the municipal inspector, were unanimous in stating that the access was of old date. It mentioned that an expert report conducted by Nombre3618 was in the record; however, the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo did not have the opportunity to question that expert about their report, and it cannot be clearly determined whether there was an invasion of the plaintiff company's property.

VI.- Given that the objections concern evidentiary elements, they will be analyzed as a whole. In turn, for the purpose of performing a correct legal interpretation, it is appropriate to state the provisions of numeral 19 LGCP, which has been extensively cited by the appellant because they claim it was violated. In that sense, the cited article, in relevant part, orders: "…No constructions or buildings of any type may be made in front of existing or projected highways without prior authorization from the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, nor in front of neighborhood roads (caminos vecinales) and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality (the underlining is not part of the original). The Municipalities shall coordinate alignments in front of neighborhood roads with the Ministry, which shall establish the policy most convenient to the public interest. On restricted-access or unidirectional highways, adjoining landowners may only access the highway in the sectors previously designated for that purpose or through marginal roads approved by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes." The plaintiff focuses this litigation on the assertion that the Company built a ballast road on a municipal public domain asset, using it privately and generating environmental damage by removing living species. In summary, it criticizes before this instance that the photographs provided in the precautionary measure file—folios 2 and 3—were improperly evaluated. It argues that the Judge did not evaluate the judicial inspections. In turn, it questions what was stated by witnesses Nombre3615 and Nombre3617. First, the matter concerning the photographs must be clarified. In that order of argument, the appellant is not correct, as the challenged decision refers to the documentary evidence submitted to the proceedings—including the photographs—and this collegiate body finds that in the judgment, it was studied as a whole. Observe that the Judges relied on different means of proof, such as official letters signed by the municipal inspector visible on folios 5, 6, 7, 14, and 15 of the administrative file, certification on folios 23 and 26 of the precautionary measure, judicial inspection, and images visible on folios 57, 59 of the main file and 4 of the precautionary measure file, as well as the cartographic sheet on folio 68 of the judicial file. Furthermore, the appellant does not emphasize how the placement of ballast by the Company—an unproven fact—could have changed the course of the judgment, when the crux of this matter revolved around whether the latter built or did not build the road that is the subject of the litigation. Add to the above that the plaintiff objects to the evaluation performed by the Judge but offers no criterion that would undermine the ruling. Thus, this Chamber observes no errors with the evidence analyzed that would lead to an inaccurate representation of the factual picture. In general, it is not sufficient to state that that jurisdictional body incorrectly evaluated certain evidence or omitted it; rather, the appellant must convincingly demonstrate whether there was any modification of the facts framed by the judgment and, from that point, indicate how the substantive norm was violated. On the other hand, in the *sub júdice*, the Tribunal—contrary to the plaintiff's thesis—stated: "…upon conducting the judicial inspection, it could be observed that the boundaries of both properties coincided, and in the absence of any other evidence, the plaintiff again fails to prove its claim with technical evidence […] it has not been possible to demonstrate an appropriation or improper use by the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima of the public road right-of-way at issue in this matter." Note that although the judgment did not specify which of the two judicial inspections it referred to, there is no doubt that this evidence was considered and mentioned in the judgment based on weighing criteria such as rational sound judgment, logic, and experience. And this objection does not lead to a useful cassation. Moreover, it is this Chamber's criterion that such evidence refuted the alleged construction of the road by the Society and was complemented by the testimony of Nombre3616 Nombre3615, who declared: (see audio and video recording, 14 hours 24 minutes): "[…] Mr. Nombre3619, when did you first become aware of the site referred to in this process? Nombre3616: I have known about it, more or less, for approximately 25 years." This fact was taken into consideration by the Tribunal and deserves equal credibility from this decision-making body, since listening to the recording of the Oral and Public Trial reveals spontaneity, transparency, and clarity in the examination. In turn, he added (audio and video recording, 14 hours 25 minutes): "[…] Could you tell me if the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A. built any road at the site referred to in this process? Nombre3616: In the time that I have known it, that land has always been like that with that entrance; later, I don't know how long ago, they made the other entrance further down, but when I began there with the municipality, that was the entrance that was there, through that place." For his part, Nombre3616 Nombre3617 stated in substance (audio and video, 15 hours 23 minutes): "[…] How long has that access existed? Witness: […] that access is more than 50 years old. He stated (audio and video, 15 hours 26 minutes): "[…] How can you be certain of something that occurred before you arrived in that neighborhood, in that area? Witness: By virtue of the fact that when purchasing that property, it was my father's desire to farm, and two neighbors who are on that route, Mr. Nombre3620 and Mr. Nombre3621, one is located just above and the other is up past the bridge that is there, those were the ones who helped us with the loan of water tank trucks for planting and who lent us the oxen and horses to plow and make the furrows, so my father and I had to be in constant visits to them, and they gave us advice, because we are from the capital, we are not farmers […] so it was very usual, very common to be traveling that path of the road." In summary, this decision-making body shares the grounds of the judgment, according to which there was no improper appropriation of a public domain asset by the Company. Nor was the plaintiff able to prove environmental damage to the green zones or invasion of its property. Quite the contrary, the judgment is conclusive in indicating that the access contemplated in cartographic sheet number 3445-IV-11 Tres Ríos, together with the witnesses and the Municipal Inspector, attested that the access was of old date. In this line of reasoning, the provisions in numeral 19 LGCP could not have been violated, as no constructions or buildings were observed on assets under the Municipality's control. As a corollary to the foregoing, the appellant's arguments regarding the evidence do not have the power to break the challenged judgment. Accordingly, it is not possible to assert that the evidentiary means were improperly evaluated, much less disregarded, and for this Chamber, it is irrefutable that the judicial inspections, testimonies, documents, and expert reports were considered by the Judges in the appealed judgment in their correct dimension and integrity.

VII.- Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed, with the litigation costs to be borne by the party that pursued it (Article 150, subsection 3) CPCA).

POR TANTO

The appeal is declared without merit. The litigation costs are to be borne by the appellant company.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vilchez Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar Nombre3622 6.- (sic) That the responsibility to compensate my client for the damages and losses she has suffered is joint and several between the two co-defendants; 7.- That the two co-defendants, also jointly and severally, must pay both cost awards of this proceeding." In the brief visible on folio 21, the plaintiff withdrew from the two sections of claims identified with number six (folios 8, 19, and 21).

2.- The representative of the Municipalidad opposed the claim and filed the defenses of lack of active and passive standing, lack of current interest, statute of limitations (prescripción), lapse (caducidad), and lack of right.

3.- The co-defendant company answered in accordance with its brief on folios 99 to 112 and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active and passive standing.

4.- The preliminary hearing was held at 2:15 p.m. on November 20, 2012. An opportunity in which the parties presented their arguments.

5.- The oral and public trial was held on July 1, 2013, with the participation of all the parties.

6.- The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Fifth Section, composed of Judges Ileana Sánchez Navarro, Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, and Juan Luis Giusti Soto, in judgment no. 2013-75-V at 8:15 a.m. on July 24, 2013, ordered: "The defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lapse (caducidad), and lack of interest raised by the defendant Municipalidad are rejected, as well as the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing filed by the co-defendants. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and the claim of Nombre3611 against Nombre3613 and the MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both cost awards are to be borne by the plaintiff." 7.- The plaintiff files an appeal in cassation, expressly stating the reasons on which she relies to refute the Tribunal's thesis.

8.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed. The substitute judge Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar participates in the decision of this matter.

Judge Escoto Fernández writes

CONSIDERING

Nombre2805.- Nombre3611 S.A. sued in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the Municipalidad de Cartago (hereinafter Municipalidad) and the Empresa Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A. (hereinafter the Company or the Corporation). She stated that her client is the owner of the property with real folio registration number of the Cartago District, 178063-000, described in cadastral map C-0604544-2000. Nombre193, the Corporation is the owner of a property in the same location, real folio registration number 037191-000, cadastral map C-0692354-2001. Nombre361, these properties are adjacent and border to the north with the green zone of the right-of-way; a public road known as "Camino de Avance." She noted that the co-defendant Nombre3613 built a gravel road as access to its property. She stated that no construction permit was issued by the local government for the Company to place gravel in that location. She argued that the territorial entity issued an alignment (alineamiento) in favor of her client, in which it established a green zone of 11 meters and 50 centimeters from the center of the public street, respecting a width of two meters for the sidewalk. She indicated that the Corporation, when building the road, invaded part of that area, the sidewalk, and her land. She requests that the judgment declare: a) the Company has no right to carry out constructions on the cantonal public domain, b) it cannot drive vehicles in the zone, c) to eliminate the gravel placed and compensate for the environmental damage, d) an identical alignment to the one imposed on her client. The co-defendants answered the claim negatively and raised the defenses of lack of active standing, passive standing, right, current interest, statute of limitations (prescripción), and lapse (caducidad). The Tribunal upheld the defense of lack of right and rejected the claim in its entirety. It ordered the plaintiff to pay legal costs (costas). The plaintiff disagrees and comes to cassation.

II.- Prior to the study of the charges, it is noted that the appellant divides her second substantive challenge into different sections, of which only those designated by the appellant as a), b), and d) will be analyzed in this resolution. Likewise, the three points concern evidentiary matters, for which reason this Chamber will proceed to summarize them jointly so that the judgment is comprehensible.

III.- From a summary of the complaints, this Chamber determines that they revolve around a single axis, which is the violation of numeral 19 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos (LGCP), according to the petitioner's view, by committing an improper valuation and pretermission of evidence. From a summary of the first point—section a) of the appeal—she alleges that ordinal numbers 82.4 of the CPCA, 330 and 368 of the CPC were violated. She argues that the appealed judgment failed to give the corresponding value to the photographs that were inserted in facts 4 and 5 of the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) brief, and mentions that this evidence clearly showed the placement of gravel. She indicates that "the photographs whose valuation is missed in the appealed judgment" illustrate what happened. She argues that the resolution "sought to be quashed" was based exclusively on the documents that appear in the file of the main proceeding, overlooking those included in the precautionary proceeding. As the second aspect—section b) of the appeal—she criticizes that the Tribunal did not value the judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales), specifically the one carried out by the Judge in charge of the proceedings, evidence about which "there is no analysis or comment in the appealed judgment." In her last disagreement—section d) of the appeal—she points out that there is abundant counter-evidence that reduces the value of the witnesses' statements. She reproaches that Mr. Nombre3615 (road inspector) and Nombre3616 Nombre3617 failed to answer when the Municipalidad de Cartago last placed gravel on the road, and also, whether it authorized it.

IV.- Regarding the pretermission and valuation of evidence, this Chamber, in judgment 1535-F-S1-2013 at 9:40 a.m. on November 14, 2013, stated that what occurs is: "[…] when the judges fail to consider, totally or partially, the evidence provided to the case file. This implies disregarding the value that the law grants it, and as such, constitutes an error of law. From the foregoing, it follows that disregarding an evidentiary element, duly provided and with an impact on the lite, will configure that error. This is because an inaccurate representation of the factual picture of what happened and was debated in the process may be appreciated, with the immediate breach that this implies for the substantive law applied to the specific case." (Judgment no. 771-F-S1-2011 at 1:30 p.m. on June 30, 2011). Likewise, it pointed out: "…Canon 82, subsection 4) of the CPCA, establishes that all evidence will be assessed in accordance with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). This is a concept widely developed by this Chamber, and consists of its valuation according to the rules of logic and experience, without disregarding the specific value assigned to certain types of evidence, such as public documents, unless they are declared false (resolution no. 126-F-S1-2009 at 3:40 p.m. on February 5, 2009) […] without forgetting the different regimes of "valuation," such as that of full and absolute freedom in the assessment (in conscience); under criteria of sound criticism, or also, under predetermined or appraised formulas by the legal system itself, for all or some of the evidentiary elements. In this line, subsection 4 of article 82 proclaims: 'all evidence will be assessed in accordance with the rules of sound criticism.' This provision opts for evidentiary valuation under criteria of sound criticism, subjecting the weighting of the evidence to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime that the same law establishes for public documents and confessional evidence." (Resolution no. 287-F-S1-2009 at 10:45 a.m. on March 19, 2009).

V.- The Tribunal resolved that it was appropriate to determine whether indeed the referred entrance was built by the defendant company, its nature, and whether the conduct of the Municipalidad and the Company conforms to the legal system. It clarified, as was proved by the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted, as well as the documentary and testimonial evidence gathered, that the plaintiff's and co-defendant's properties are located in the province of Cartago. It noted, "[…] according to the official letters signed by the Municipal Inspector, visible on folios 5, 6, 7, 11, and 15 of the administrative file, it is clear that the access in question is located within the right-of-way, in an area between the roadway and the alignment (alineamiento) decreed by the Municipalidad, from which the private estates begin." It pointed out that it is a public domain asset, with special attributes of domaniality (demanialidad), therefore inalienable, that is, not susceptible to appropriation by private parties. However, that deciding body indicated, this characteristic does not prevent people from being able to use those assets; on the contrary, they are intended for public use. What is impossible, it indicated, is to establish an easement (servidumbre) or a right of occupation or possession over them in favor of a specific person under the terms of private law, but according to the provisions of article 5 of the Ley de Construcciones, it is possible to build accesses on the public road, precisely to facilitate the entry of private parties to their properties. It determined, "[…] thus, the fact that the zone considered part of the right-of-way serves to enter not only the defendant company's property but also the plaintiff's, is not contrary to the special principles that govern public domain assets." It specified that from the evidence provided to the case file, the Tribunal had no choice but to conclude that the questioned access has existed for more than 25 years, and all the witnesses who appeared at the oral trial hearing, and even the municipal inspector, were unanimous in affirming that the access was of old date. It mentioned that an expert opinion conducted by Nombre3618 is on record; however, the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo did not have the opportunity to consult that expert about his report, and the existence of an invasion of the plaintiff company's property cannot be clearly extracted.

VI.- Given that the challenges consist of evidentiary elements, they will be analyzed as a whole. In turn, in order to carry out a correct legal interpretation, it is appropriate to set forth the provisions of numeral 19 of the LGCP, which has been widely cited by the appellant because she claims it was violated. In that sense, the cited ordinal, in pertinent part, orders: "…Constructions or edificaciones of any type may not be made in front of existing or planned highways without the prior authorization of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, nor in front of local roads (caminos vecinales) and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipalidad (the underlining is not part of the original). The Municipalities shall coordinate the alineamientos in front of local roads with the Ministry, which will be the entity that establishes the policy most convenient for the public interest. On restricted-access or unidirectional highways, the adjoining owners may only access the highway in sectors previously designated for that purpose or through marginal roads approved by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes." The plaintiff focuses this litigation on the fact that the Company built a gravel road on a municipal public domain asset, using it privately and generating environmental damage by removing live species. In summary, she criticizes before this instance that the photographs provided in the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) file—folios 2 and 3—were improperly assessed. Nombre1508, that the Judge did not value the judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales). She also questions the statements made by witnesses Nombre3615 and Nombre3617. First, the matter related to the photographs must be clarified. In that order of arguments, the appellant is not correct, because the challenged decision refers to the documentary evidence provided to the case file—including the photographs—and, this collegiate body appreciates that in the judgment, it was studied as a whole. Note that the Judges relied on different means of proof, such as official letters signed by the municipal inspector visible on folios 5, 6, 7, 14, and 15 of the administrative file, certification on folios 23 and 26 of the precautionary measure, judicial inspection, and images visible on folios 57, 59 of the main file and 4 of the precautionary file, as well as the cartographic sheet on folio 68 of the judicial file. Furthermore, the appellant does not emphasize how the placement of gravel by the Company—an unproven fact—could have changed the course of the judgment, when the core of this matter revolved around whether or not the latter built the road that is the subject of the litigation. Add to this that the plaintiff objects to the valuation carried out by the Judge but does not offer any criterion that disproves what was decided. Thus, this Chamber does not observe errors in the analyzed evidence that lead to an inaccurate representation of the factual picture. In general, it is not enough to state that that jurisdictional body incorrectly assessed certain evidence or omitted it; rather, the appellant must demonstrably set forth whether there was any modification of the facts framed by the judgment and, from there, point out how the substantive norm was violated. On the other hand, in the case under review, the Tribunal—contrary to the plaintiff's thesis—stated: "…upon conducting the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial), it could be observed that the boundaries of both properties coincided, and there being no more evidence than that, since, again, the plaintiff omits to prove her claim with technical evidence […] it has not been possible to demonstrate an appropriation or improper use by the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima of the right-of-way that is the object of this matter." Note that although the judgment did not specify which of the two judicial inspections it was referring to, there is no doubt that this evidence was considered and mentioned in the judgment based on weighting criteria such as rational sound criticism (sana crítica), logic, and experience. And such a challenge does not lead to a useful cassation. Moreover, it is this Chamber's criterion that said evidence disproved the alleged construction of the road by the Corporation and was complemented by the testimony of Nombre3616 Nombre3615, who testified: (see audio and video recording 2:24 p.m.): "[…] Mr. Nombre3619, when did you become aware of the site referred to in this process? Nombre3616: I have known it for more or less, approximately, about 25 years." A fact taken into consideration by the Tribunal and merits equal credibility from this deciding body, since listening to the recording of the Oral and Public Trial reveals spontaneity, transparency, and clarity in the questioning. In turn, he noted (audio and video recording 2:25 p.m.): "[…] Could you tell me if the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A. built any road at the site referred to in this process? Nombre3616: In the time that I have known it, that land has always been like that with that entrance, later, I don't know how long ago, they made the other entrance further down, but when I started there with the municipality, that was the entrance that was there, for that place." For his part, Nombre3616 Nombre3617 stated, in substance (audio and video 3:23 p.m.): "[…] How long has that access existed? Witness: […] that access has been there for more than 50 years." Nombre193 (audio and video 3:26 p.m.): "[…] How can you be certain about something that happened before you came to that neighborhood, to that area? Witness: Due to the fact that when buying that property, it was my father's wish to farm, and two neighbors who are on that route, Mr. Nombre3620 and Mr. Nombre3621, one is at the top side and the other is towards the top of the bridge that is there, those were the ones who helped us with the loan of spray tanks for planting and who lent us the oxen and horses to plow and make the furrows, so my father and I had to make constant visits to them and they gave us advice, because we are from the capital, we are not farmers […] so it was very common to travel that stretch of the road." In summary, this deciding body shares the foundations of the judgment, according to which there was no improper appropriation of a public domain asset by the Company. Nor could the plaintiff prove the environmental damage to the green zones or the invasion of her property. Quite the contrary, the judgment is conclusive in pointing out the access shown on cartographic sheet number 3445-IV-11 Tres Ríos, together with the witnesses and the Municipal Inspector, which proved that the access was of old date. In this order of reasons, what is ordered in numeral 19 of the LGCP could not be violated, as no constructions or edificaciones were observed on assets under the control of the Municipalidad. As a corollary to the foregoing, the appellant's arguments regarding the evidence do not have the capacity to break the challenged judgment.

Thus, it cannot be asserted that the evidentiary means were improperly assessed, much less overlooked, and for this Chamber it is irrefutable that the judicial inspections, testimonies, documentary evidence, and expert reports were considered by the Judges in the contested judgment in their correct dimension and in full.

**VII.-** Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by the party that filed it (150(3) CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The appeal is denied. Costs are to be borne by the appellant company.

Nombre3622 126-F-S1-2009 of 15 hours 40 minutes on February 5, 2009) […] without forgetting the different regimes of "assessment", such as that of full and absolute freedom in valuation (in conscience); under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), or also, under predetermined or fixed formulas by the legal system itself, for all, or some of the evidentiary elements. In this line, subsection 4 of article 82 proclaims: "all evidence shall be assessed according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica)." This provision opts for evidentiary valuation under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), subjecting the weighing of the evidence to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime established by the same law for public documents and confessional evidence. (Resolution no. 287-F-S1-2009 of 10 hours 45 minutes on March 19, 2009).

**V.-** The Court resolved, it is necessary to elucidate whether the access way in question was indeed built by the defendant company, its nature, and whether the conduct of the Municipality and the Company conform to the legal system. It clarified, as was accredited by the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted, as well as the documentary and testimonial evidence gathered, that the plaintiff's and the co-defendant's farms are located in the province of Cartago. It noted, “[…] according to the official letters signed by the Municipal Inspector, visible at folios 5, 6, 7, 11, and 15 of the administrative file, it is clear that the access in question is located within the road right-of-way (derecho de vía), in an area comprised between the roadway and the building line (alineamiento) decreed by the Municipality, from which private properties begin.” It pointed out, this is a public domain asset, with special attributes of public ownership (demanialidad), therefore inalienable, that is, not susceptible to appropriation by private individuals. However, that decision-making body indicated, this characteristic does not prevent people from making use of those assets; on the contrary, they are intended for public use. What is impossible, it stated, is to establish an easement (servidumbre) or a right of occupation or possession in favor of a specific person under private law terms regarding them, but according to the provisions of article 5 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), it is indeed possible to build access ways on public roads, precisely to facilitate the entry of private individuals to their properties. It determined, “[…] thus, the fact that the area considered part of the road right-of-way (derecho de vía) serves to enter not only the defendant company's property, but also the plaintiff's, is not contrary to the special principles governing public domain assets.” It specified, from the evidence adduced to the case file, the Court has no choice but to conclude that the questioned access has existed for more than 25 years, and all the witnesses who appeared at the oral trial hearing, and even the municipal inspector, were unanimous in affirming that the access was of very old date. It mentioned, an expert report carried out by Nombre3618 is on record; however, the Contentious Administrative Court did not have the opportunity to consult said expert about his report, and the existence of an invasion of the plaintiff company's property cannot be clearly extracted.

**VI.-** Given that the objections consist of evidentiary elements, they will be analyzed as a whole. In turn, in order to carry out a correct legal interpretation, it is pertinent to set forth what is stipulated in numeral 19 LGCP, which has been widely cited by the appellant because she claims it was violated. In that sense, the cited ordinance, in what is of interest, orders: "…No constructions or buildings of any type may be built in front of existing or planned roads without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), nor in front of local roads (caminos vecinales) and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality (the underline is not part of the original). The Municipalities shall coordinate building lines (alineamientos) in front of local roads (caminos vecinales) with the Ministry, which will be the one to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest. On restricted or one-way access highways, neighboring property owners may only have access to the highway in sectors previously designated for that purpose or by means of frontage roads (caminos marginales) approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT)." The plaintiff focuses this litigation on the fact that the Company built a ballast road on a municipal public domain asset, using it privately and generating environmental damage by removing living species. In summary, she reproaches before this instance that the photographs provided to the precautionary measure dossier –folios 2 and 3– were unduly assessed. Nombre1508, the Judge did not value the judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales). In turn, she questions the testimony of witnesses Nombre3615 and Nombre3617. First, the matter regarding the photographs must be clarified. In that order of arguments, the appellant is not correct, because the challenged decision alludes to the documentary evidence adduced to the case file –including the photographs– and, this collegiate body observes in the ruling, it was studied as a whole. See, the Judges relied on different means of proof, such as official letters signed by the municipal inspector visible at folios 5, 6, 7, 14, and 15 of the administrative file, certification at folios 23 and 26 of the precautionary measure, judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) and images visible at folios 57, 59 of the main file and 4 of the precautionary measure file, as well as the cartographic sheet at folio 68 of the judicial file. Furthermore, the appellant does not emphasize how the placement of ballast by the Company –a fact not proven– could have changed the course of the judgment, when the crux of this matter revolved around whether the latter built or did not build the road that is the subject of the litigation. Added to the above, the plaintiff objects to the assessment carried out by the Judge, but does not offer any criterion that disproves what was decided. Thus, this Chamber does not observe errors with the analyzed evidence that would entail an inexact representation of the factual picture. In general, it is not enough to state that that jurisdictional body incorrectly assessed certain evidence or omitted it; rather, the appellant must convincingly expose whether there was any modification of the facts that frame the judgment and, from there, indicate how the substantive norm was violated. On the other hand, in the sub judice, the Court –contrary to the plaintiff's thesis– stated: “…when carrying out the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial), it could be observed that the boundaries of both properties coincided, and there being no more evidence than that, because, again, the plaintiff omits accrediting his claim with technical evidence […] it has not been possible to demonstrate an appropriation or undue use by the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima, of the road right-of-way (derecho de vía) that is the subject of this matter.” Note that, although the ruling did not specify which of the two judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales) it referred to, there is no doubt that this evidence was considered and mentioned in the judgment based on weighting criteria such as rational sound judgment (sana crítica), logic, and experience. And such a reproach does not lead to a useful cassation appeal. Even more, it is the criterion of this Chamber, that said evidence disproved the alleged construction of the road by the Company and was complemented by the thesis of Nombre3616 Nombre3615 who declared: (see audio and video recording 14 hours 24 minutes): “[…] Don Nombre3619, when did you first learn of the site referred to in this proceeding? Nombre3616: I have known about that, more or less, approximately for some 25 years.” A fact taken into consideration by the Court and deserves equal credibility on the part of this decision-making body, since, upon listening to the recording of the Oral and Public Trial, it extracts spontaneity, transparency, and clarity in the questioning. In turn, he noted (audio and video recording 14 hours 25 minutes): “[…] Could you tell me if the company Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A, at the site referred to in this proceeding, built any road? Nombre3616: In the time that I have known it, that land has always been like that with that entrance, later, I don't know how long ago, they made the other entrance further down, but when I started there with the municipality, that was the entrance that was there, through that place.” For his part, Nombre3616 Nombre3617 stated in substance (audio and video 15 hours 23 minutes): “[…] How long has that access existed? Witness: […] that access is more than 50 years old.” Nombre193 (audio and video 15 hours 26 minutes): “[…] How do you know about something that occurred before you arrived in that neighborhood, in that area? Witness: Because of the fact that upon buying that property, it was a wish of my father, to want to farm, and two neighbors who are on that route, Mr. Nombre3620 and Mr. Nombre3621, one is on the upper side and the other is up from the bridge, that is there, those were the ones who helped us with the loan of tanks, for planting and who lent us oxen and horses to plow and make the furrows, so, my father and I had to be in constant visits to them and they gave us advice, because we are from the capital (capitalinos), we are not farmers […] so it was very usual, very common to be traveling that path of the road.” In summary, this decision-making body shares the foundations of the judgment, according to which, there was no undue appropriation of a public domain asset by the Company. Nor was the plaintiff able to prove environmental damage to green areas or the invasion of her property. Quite the contrary, the ruling is compelling in pointing out the access shown on cartographic sheet number 3445-IV-11 Tres Ríos, added to the witnesses and Municipal Inspector, which accredited that the access was of very old date. In this order of reasons, what is ordered in numeral 19 LGCP could not have been breached, as no constructions or buildings were observed on assets under the control of the Municipality. As a corollary of the above outlined, the appellant's arguments regarding the evidence do not have the virtue of breaking the challenged ruling. In this manner, it is not feasible to affirm that the evidentiary elements were unduly assessed, much less omitted, and for this Chamber it is irrefutable that the judicial inspections (reconocimientos judiciales), testimonies, documentary evidence, and expert reports were considered by the Judges in the challenged ruling in their correct dimension and integrity.

**VII.-** Consequently, the appeal must be rejected, with costs to be borne by the party who filed it (150 subsection 3) CPCA).

**POR TANTO** This appeal is declared without merit. Costs are to be borne by the appellant company.

| | --- | | **Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** | | |

| | | **William Molinari Vilchez** | **Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar** | Nombre3622

*110031951027CA* RES. 000029-F-S1-2016 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas del veintiocho de enero de dos mil dieciséis.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido por Nombre3611 SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por Nombre3612, de calidades ignoradas; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO, representada por su alcalde Rolando Alberto Rodríguez Brenes, soltero y SANITARIOS HERMANOS Nombre3613 SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por Nombre3614, empresario. Figuran además, como apoderados especiales judiciales, de la actora, el licenciado Julio Fonseca Pion; de la Municipalidad, el licenciado Julio Cesar Monge Gutiérrez; y, de la sociedad co-demandada, la licenciada Cindy Blanco González. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de Cartago.

RESULTANDO

1. - Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, la parte actora estableció proceso de conocimiento a fin de en sentencia se declare: "1.- Que la empresa codemandada no tiene derecho a realizar construcción alguna sobre cualquier franja del dominio cantonal; 2.- Que la empresa codemandada no tiene derecho a transitar con vehículos sobre las franjas destinadas a zona verde y a futuras aceras; 3.- Que debe eliminarse todo el lastre que se colocó sobre las franjas destinadas a zona verde y a futuras aceras, corriendo los gastos respectivos a cargo de la empresa codemandada, así como toda indemnización por el daño ambiental que haya podido causar, lo cual se determinará en fase de ejecución; 4.- Que la Municipalidad de Cartago debe exigir a la empresa codemandada, idéntico alineamiento del que ha exigido a mi representada; sea - Respetar un ancho para la zona verde, de once metros con cincuenta centímetros contados a partir del centro de la calle pública; y - Respetar un ancho para futura acera, de dos metros, contados a partir del final de la zona verde. 5.- Que la empresa codemandada colocó lastre sobre parte de la propiedad privada de mi representada, debiendo eliminarlo por completo, corriendo con los gastos respectivos a cargo de sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima; 6.- Que se han causado daños y perjuicios a mi representada, por la invasión que se dio de parte de su propiedad privada, cuya cuantía se determinará en ejecución de sentencia. 6.- (sic) Que la responsabilidad de indemnizar a mi representada por los daños y perjuicios que ha sufrido, es solidaria entre las dos partes codemandadas; 7.- Que las dos partes codemandadas, también de manera solidaria deben pagar ambas costas de este proceso." En escrito visible a folio 21, la parte actora desistió de los dos apartados de pretensiones identificadas con el número seis (folios 8, 19 y 21).

2.- El representante de la Municipalidad se opuso a la demanda y formuló las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, de interés actual, prescripción, caducidad y la de falta de derecho.

3.- La sociedad co-demandada contestó conforme a su escrito de folios 99 al 112 y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación activa y pasiva.

4.- La audiencia preliminar se celebró a 14 horas 15 minutos del veinte de noviembre de dos mil doce. Oportunidad en que las partes hicieron uso de la palabra.

5.- El juicio oral y público se celebró el 1° de julio de 2013, con participación de todos las partes.

6.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Quinta, integrada por los jueces, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas y Juan Luis Giusti Soto, en sentencia no. 2013-75-V de las 8 horas 15 minutos del 24 de julio de 2013, dispuso: “Se rechazan las defensas de prescripción, caducidad y falta de interés planteadas por la Municipalidad accionada, así como las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva interpuestas por los codemandados. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho y se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos, la demanda de Nombre3611 contra Nombre3613 y la MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO. Son ambas costas a cargo de la demandante.” 7.- La accionante formula recurso de casación indicando expresamente las razones en que se apoya para refutar la tesis del Tribunal.

8.- En los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de ley. Intervienen en la decisión de este asunto el magistrado suplente Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar.

Redacta la magistrada Escoto Fernández

CONSIDERANDO

Nombre2805.- Nombre3611 S.A demandó en sede contenciosa administrativa a la Municipalidad de Cartago (en lo sucesivo Municipalidad) y a la Empresa Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A (en lo que sigue la Empresa o la Sociedad). Dijo, su representada es propietaria de la finca matrícula de folio real del Partido de Cartago, 178063-000, descrita en el plano catastrado C-0604544-2000. Nombre193, la Sociedad es dueña de una finca en el mismo sitio, folio real 037191-000, plano catastrado C-0692354-2001. Nombre361, estos inmuebles son colindantes y lindan al norte con la zona verde del derecho de vía; camino público conocido como “Camino de Avance ”. Apuntó, la codemandada Nombre3613 construyó un camino de lastre como acceso a su finca. Manifestó, no existió permiso de construcción extendido por el gobierno local para que la Empresa colocara lastre en ese lugar. Arguyó, el ente territorial extendió alineamiento a favor de su representada, donde estableció una zona verde de 11 metros con 50 centímetros desde el centro de la calle pública, respetando un ancho de dos metros para acera. Indicó, la Sociedad al construir el camino invadió parte de dicha área, acera y su terreno. Solicita en sentencia se declare: a) la Empresa no tiene derecho a realizar construcciones sobre el dominio público cantonal, b) no puede transitar vehículos en la zona, c) eliminar el lastre colocado e indemnizar el daño ambiental, d) idéntico alineamiento del impuesto a su representada. Las coaccionadas contestaron negativamente la demanda, interpusieron las defensas de falta de legitimación activa, pasiva, derecho, interés actual, prescripción, caducidad. El Tribunal acogió la de derecho y rechazó la demanda en todos sus extremos. Condenó en costas a la accionante. Inconforme la parte actora acude a casación.

II.- Previo al estudio de los cargos, se advierte, el casacionista divide su segundo reproche de fondo en distintos apartados, de los cuales, solamente serán analizados en esta resolución los denominados por la recurrente como a), b) y d) . Asimismo, los tres puntos versan sobre aspectos probatorios, por lo cual, esta Sala procederá a resumirlos de manera conjunta de forma que el fallo resulte comprensible.

III.- De una síntesis de los reclamos esta Sala determina que gravitan en un eje único, cual es, la vulneración del numeral 19 Ley General de Caminos Públicos (en lo que sigue LGCP), según criterio del inconforme al cometerse una indebida valoración y preterición de prueba. De un sumario del primer punto –apartado a) del recurso-, alega quebrantados los ordinales 82.4 CPCA, 330 y 368 del CPC. Aduce, el fallo recurrido omitió brindar el valor correspondiente a las fotografías que se insertaron en los hechos 4 y 5 del escrito de medida cautelar y menciona, estas pruebas desprenden con claridad la colocación de lastre. Indica, “las fotografías cuya valoración se echa de menos en el fallo recurrido” ilustran lo acontecido. Arguye, la resolución que “ pide casar” se basó exclusivamente en los documentos que constan en el expediente del proceso de conocimiento, soslayando, aquellos comprendidos en la gestión cautelar. Como segundo aspecto –apartado b) del recurso-, recrimina, el Tribunal no valoró los reconocimientos judiciales, específicamente el realizado por el Juez Tramitador, probanza sobre la que “no hay ningún análisis ni comentario en la sentencia recurrida ”. En su última inconformidad –apartado d) del recurso-, apunta, existe abundante contraprueba que resta valor a las manifestaciones de los testigos. Reprocha, el señor Nombre3615 (inspector de caminos) y el Nombre3616 Nombre3617, fueron omisos en responder cuándo la Municipalidad de Cartago lastréo por última vez el camino, también, si ésta lo autorizó.

IV.- Sobre la preterición y valoración de prueba esta Sala en fallo 1535-F-S1-2013 de las 9 horas 40 minutos del 14 de noviembre de 2013 Nombre361 que ocurre: “[…] cuando los jueces dejan de considerar, total o parcialmente, las probanzas aportadas a los autos. Ello implica el desconocimiento del valor que la ley les otorga, y como tal, constituye un error de derecho. De lo anterior se colige que, desconocer un elemento demostrativo, aportado en forma debida y con incidencia en la lite, configurará ese yerro. Esto, por cuanto puede apreciarse una representación inexacta del cuadro fáctico de lo sucedido y debatido en el proceso, con el mediato quebranto que ello implica sobre el derecho sustantivo aplicado al caso concreto.” (Sentencia no. 771-F-S1-2011 de las 13 horas 30 minutos del 30 de junio de 2011)”. Asimismo apuntó: “…El canon 82, inciso 4) del CPCA, establece que todas las pruebas serán apreciadas, de conformidad con las reglas de la sana crítica. Este es un concepto ampliamente desarrollado por esta Sala, y consiste en su valoración de acuerdo a las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia, sin desconocer el valor específico asignado a cierto tipo de prueba, como los documentos públicos salvo que sean declarados falsos (resolución no. 126-F-S1-2009 de las 15 horas 40 minutos del 5 de febrero de 2009) […] sin olvidar los distintos regímenes de “apreciación”, como el de plena y absoluta libertad en la valoración (en conciencia); bajo criterios de la sana crítica, o también, bajo fórmulas predeterminadas o tasadas por el propio ordenamiento jurídico, en todo, o algunos de los elementos probatorios. En esta línea, el apartado 4 del artículo 82 pregona: “todas las pruebas serán apreciadas conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica”. Esta disposición toma partido por la valoración probatoria bajo criterios de la sana crítica, sujetando la ponderación de aquéllas, a las reglas de la ciencia, la lógica, la psicología y la experiencia. No obstante, su interpretación debe ser cuidadosa y con gran apego al sistema jurídico total y más amplio al que pertenece. En ese sentido, importa aclarar que con ello no se desecha, deroga o destruye el régimen prevalente que establece la misma ley para los documentos públicos y la prueba confesional. (Resolución no. 287-F-S1-2009 de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 19 de marzo de 2009).

V.- El Tribunal resolvió, corresponde dilucidar si efectivamente la entrada referida fue construida por la empresa accionada, su naturaleza, y si la conducta de la Municipalidad como de la Empresa son conformes al ordenamiento jurídico. Aclaró, tal como se acreditó del reconocimiento judicial practicado, así como las pruebas documental y testimonial recabadas, la finca de la actora y de la codemandada, se localizan en la provincia de Cartago. Acotó, “[…] de acuerdo con los oficios suscritos por el Inspector Municipal, visibles a folios 5, 6, 7, 11 y 15 del expediente administrativo, es claro que el acceso en cuestión se encuentra dentro del derecho de vía, en un área comprendida entre la calzada y el alineamiento decretado por la Municipalidad, a partir del cual empiezan los fundos privados”. Puntualizó, se trata de un bien de dominio público, con atributos especiales de la demanialidad, por ello inalienable, es decir, no susceptible de apropiación por los particulares. No obstante, indicó aquel órgano decisor, esta característica no impide que las personas puedan hacer uso de esos bienes, por el contrario, se encuentran destinados a un uso público. Lo que resulta imposible, señaló, es establecer respecto de ellos una servidumbre o un derecho de ocupación o de posesión a favor de una persona determinada en los términos del derecho privado, pero de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley de Construcciones, sí es posible construir accesos en la vía pública, precisamente para facilitar el ingreso de los particulares a sus propiedades. Determinó, “[…] así, el hecho de que la zona considerada como parte del derecho de vía sirva para ingresar, no solo a la propiedad de la empresa accionada, sino también a la del demandante no resulta contrario a los principios especiales que rigen los bienes de dominio público”. Precisó, de la prueba allegada a los autos, no queda más al Tribunal que concluir, el acceso cuestionado tiene más de 25 años de existir y todos los testigos que comparecieron a la audiencia de juicio oral e incluso el inspector municipal, fueron contestes en afirmar que el acceso era de vieja data. Mencionó, consta peritaje realizado por Nombre3618, sin embargo, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo no tuvo oportunidad de consultar a dicho experto sobre su informe y no se puede extraer con claridad la existencia de una invasión en la propiedad de la sociedad actora.

VI.- En vista de que los reproches consisten en elementos probatorios, serán analizados en su conjunto. A su vez, con el fin de efectuar una correcta interpretación jurídica, es procedente exponer lo dispuesto en el numeral 19 LGCP, el cual ha sido ampliamente citado por la recurrente porque lo reclama vulnerado. En ese sentido, el ordinal de cita en lo de interés ordena: “…No podrán hacerse construcciones o edificaciones de ningún tipo frente a las carreteras existentes o en proyecto sin la previa autorización del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, ni al frente de los caminos vecinales y calles sin la aprobación escrita de la Municipalidad correspondiente (el subrayado no forma parte del original). Las Municipalidades coordinarán los alineamientos frente a los caminos vecinales con el Ministerio quien será el que establezca la política más conveniente al interés público. En las carreteras de acceso restringido o unidireccional, los colindantes solo podrán tener acceso a la carretera en los sectores previamente señalados para ese fin o mediante caminos marginales aprobados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes”. La demandante concentra este litigio en que la Empresa construyó un camino de lastre en un bien de dominio público municipal, utilizándolo privativamente y generando un daño ambiental al remover especies vivas. En resumen, recrimina ante esta instancia, las fotografías aportadas al legajo de medida cautelar –folios 2 y 3- fueron indebidamente apreciadas. Nombre1508, el Juez no valoró los reconocimientos judiciales. A su vez, cuestiona lo indicado por los testigos Nombre3615 y Nombre3617. En primer término debe aclararse lo relativo a las fotografías. En ese orden de argumentos, no lleva razón el recurrente, pues la decisión impugnada hace alusión a la prueba documental aportada a los autos –incluyendo las fotografías- y, este órgano colegiado aprecia en el fallo, fue estudiada en su conjunto. Véase, los Juzgadores se apoyaron en distintos medios de prueba, tales como, oficios suscritos por el inspector municipal visibles a folios 5, 6, 7, 14 y 15 del expediente administrativo, certificación de folios 23 y 26 de la medida cautelar, reconocimiento judicial e imágenes visibles a folios 57, 59 del principal y 4 del cautelar , así como la hoja cartográfica a folio 68 del judicial. Además, la casacionista no acentúa, cómo la colocación de lastre por parte de la Empresa –hecho no probado- pudo cambiar el curso de la sentencia, cuando el quid de este asunto gravitaba en si esta última construyó o no el camino objeto del litigio. Añádase a lo anterior, la demandante objeta la valoración realizada por el Juzgador, mas no ofrece criterio alguno que desvirtúe lo resuelto. Así, no observa esta Sala errores con la prueba analizada que conlleven una representación inexacta del cuadro fáctico. En general, no basta con manifestar que aquel órgano jurisdiccional haya apreciado incorrectamente determinadas probanzas o las haya omitido, mas bien, el casacionista debe exponer fehacientemente, si existió modificación alguna de los hechos que enmarca la sentencia y, a partir de ahí, señalar en qué se violentó la norma sustantiva. Por otro lado, en el subjúdice el Tribunal –contrario a la tesis del accionante- expresó: “…al realizar el reconocimiento judicial pudo observarse que los límites de ambas propiedades coincidían, y no existiendo más prueba que esa, pues, de nuevo, omite el demandante acreditar con prueba técnica su dicho […] no se ha logrado demostrar una apropiación o uso indebido por parte de la empresa Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 Sociedad Anónima, del derecho de vía objeto de este asunto”. Nótese, aunque el fallo no especificó a cuál de los dos reconocimientos judiciales se refería, no queda duda que esta prueba fue considerada y mencionada en la sentencia con base en criterios de ponderación como la sana crítica racional, la lógica y la experiencia. Y tal reproche no conduce a una casación útil. Más aún, es criterio de esta Sala, dicha prueba desvirtuó la supuesta construcción del camino por parte de la Sociedad y se complementó con la tesis del Nombre3616 Nombre3615 quien declaró: (véase grabación de audio y video 14 horas 24 minutos): “[…] ¿Don Nombre3619 cuándo conoce usted el sitio al que se refiere este proceso? Nombre3616: Yo eso lo conozco, mas o menos, aproximadamente unos 25 años”. Hecho tomado en consideración por el Tribunal y merece igual credibilidad por parte de este órgano decisor, ya que, al escuchar la grabación del Juicio Oral y Público desprende espontaneidad, transparencia y claridad en el interrogatorio. A su vez, acotó (grabación audio y video 14 horas 25 minutos): “[…] ¿Usted podría decirme si la empresa Sanitarios Hermanos Nombre3613 S.A en el sitio al que se refiere este proceso construyó algún camino? Nombre3616: En el tiempo que yo he conocido, ese terreno siempre ha estado así con esa entrada, después, no sé qué tiempo hará, hicieron la otra entrada más para abajo, pero cuando yo iniciaba ahí con la municipalidad, ésa era la entrada que había por ahí, por ese lugar”. Por su cuenta, el Nombre3616 Nombre3617 expresó en lo sustancial (audio y video 15 horas 23 minutos): “ […] ¿Cuánto tiempo de existencia tiene ese acceso? Testigo: […] ese acceso tiene más de 50 años. Nombre193 (audio y video 15 horas 26 minutos): “[…] ¿Cómo le consta a usted algo que ocurrió antes de que usted llegara a ese vecindario, a esa zona? Testigo: Por el hecho de que al comprar esa propiedad, fue un deseo de mi padre, de querer cultivar y dos vecinos que están sobre esa ruta, el señor Nombre3620 y don Nombre3621, que uno está al lado arriba y el otro está hacia arriba del puente, que está ahí, esos eran los que nos ayudaban con el préstamo de tanquetas, para el sembrado y los que nos prestaban los bueyes y los caballos para arar y hacer los surcos, entonces, mi padre y yo teníamos que estar en constantes visitas a ellos y que nos dieron asesoramiento, porque nosotros somos capitalinos, no somos agricultores […] entonces era muy usual, muy común estar transitando esa trayectoria del camino”. En suma , este órgano decisor comparte los fundamentos de la sentencia, conforme los cuales, no hubo una indebida apropiación de un bien de dominio público por parte de la Empresa. Tampoco, pudo probar el demandante el daño ambiental a las zonas verdes o la invasión a su propiedad. Todo lo contrario, el fallo es contundente al señalar el acceso contemplado en la hoja cartográfica número 3445-IV-11 Tres Ríos, sumado a los testigos e Inspector Municipal, los cuales acreditaron que el acceso era de vieja data. En este orden de razones, no pudo quebrantarse lo ordenado en el numeral 19 LGCP, al no apreciarse construcciones o edificaciones en bienes bajo control de la Municipalidad. Corolario de lo antes esbozado, los alegatos de la casacionista sobre la prueba, no tienen la virtud de quebrar el fallo impugnado. De esta manera, no es dable afirmar que los medios probatorios fueron indebidamente apreciados, mucho menos preteridos y para esta Cámara es irrefutable que los reconocimientos judiciales, testimonios, documentales y peritajes; fueron considerados por los Juzgadores en el fallo impugnado en su correcta dimensión e integridad.

VII.- Consecuentemente, deberá rechazarse el recurso con las costas a cargo de la parte que lo promovió (150 inciso 3) CPCA).

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso. Son las costas a cargo de la sociedad recurrente.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández William Molinari Vilchez Jorge Isaac Solano Aguilar Nombre3622