Dismissal on lapse grounds of claim against project halt for environmental non-complianceCaducidad de demanda contra paralización de proyecto por incumplimiento de condiciones ambientales

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. Sección Quinta, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ ORDINARY PROCEEDING PLAINTIFF: CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A. AND VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A.

DEFENDANT: EL ESTADO PROCURATOR: ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS Nº18- 2016-V TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN QUINTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección144 . Goicoechea, at eight hours thirty minutes on the nineteenth of February, two thousand sixteen.- Proceeding brought by CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A., represented by its General Attorneys-in-Fact without limit of sum, Mr. Nombre114167, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San Rafael de Escazú, identity card number CED24626 and Mrs. Nombre114168, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San Rafael de Alajuela, identity card number CED90273, and VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A., represented by its General Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum, Mr. Nombre114169, who is of legal age, married, identity card number CED90274; against EL ESTADO, represented by the Procuradora, ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS, of legal age, attorney, divorced, resident of San José, identity card number CED566. Also intervening are Messrs. FEDERICO SOSTO LÓPEZ, identity card number CED27064; and JUAN CARLOS HERNÁNDEZ JIMÉNEZ, identity card number CED13713, both of legal age, attorneys and acting as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff party.

RESULTANDO

I.- By writ filed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, on the tenth of August of the year two thousand twelve, the plaintiff party requests: "1. That the resolutions of the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental N° 1782-2011-SETENA, of 11:35 hours on the 21st day of July 2011, and N° 1948-2011-SETENA, of 13:00 hours on the 17th day of August 2011, be declared non-conforming with the legal system and annulled.

2.- That the State be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to our represented parties, and interest on those sums, from the moment the challenged illegitimate action was notified.

3. The condemnation must be made in the abstract for the stipulated reasons and consequences, its liquidation being reserved for the sentence execution stage, pursuant to the provisions of article 153 of the CPCA.

4. That the State be ordered to pay both costs, personal and procedural." (folios 706 to 732). During the preliminary hearing that took place on the eighth of May of the year two thousand thirteen, the claim identified with No. 1 was modified in the following terms: "That the non-conformity and nullity be declared, so that the right of the plaintiff companies to execute the works of the Project Urbanización La Campiña is recognized, and that the State's responsibility be declared for the illegitimate suspension of all productive activity in the project area ordered in resolution 1782-2011-SETENA of 11:35 hours on the 21st day of July 2011, and in relation to resolution N°1948-2011-SETENA of 13:00 hours on the 17th day of August 2011, the nullity and non-conformity requested relates to the lifting of the Precautionary Measure (Medida Cautelar), which is the content of the second considerando of that resolution." (folios 831 to 833).- II.- In a resolution at thirteen hours and forty-seven minutes on the tenth of October of the year two thousand twelve, the Tribunal admitted the claim, which was answered via a writ filed on the fourteenth of January of the year two thousand thirteen. (folios 733, 734 and 771 to 796).- III.- The preliminary hearing took place between thirteen hours thirty-five minutes and fifteen hours forty-eight minutes, on the eighth of May of the year two thousand thirteen (folios 831 to 833).- IV.- In a memorial filed on the thirteenth of May of the year two thousand thirteen, by the plaintiff's representative, she requested the rejection of the new evidence offered by the State's representative during the preliminary hearing. She further argued that the offering of that evidence demonstrates that the administrative case file (expediente administrativo) was managed in a disorderly manner, and that it was not provided complete, despite certifications to that effect issued by the Administration (folios 834 to 842).

V.- In a resolution at nine hours on the seventeenth of July of the year two thousand thirteen, Section V (Sección V) of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, returned the case file (expediente) to the procedural stage, for the purpose of completing the administrative case file (folios 855 and 856).

VI.- In a resolution at eleven hours and twelve minutes on the twenty-third of April of the year two thousand twelve, the Judge of the procedural stage, Mr. Alcevit Godínez Prado, deemed the administrative case file (expediente administrativo) "completed", and the matter was again assigned to Section V (Sección V) on the twenty-ninth of May of the year two thousand fourteen (folios 953 and 955).

VII.- In a resolution at fourteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on the twenty-fifth of June of the year two thousand fourteen, the fifth of January of the year two thousand fifteen was set as the date for conducting the oral trial (folios 957 and 958).- VIII.- In a writ filed before the Tribunal on the seventh day of November of the year two thousand fourteen, the plaintiff party's representative requested the Tribunal to modify the date set for holding the trial hearing, given that one of the witnesses, residing outside the national territory, could not appear on the appointed day and time (folios 960 and 961).

IX.- In a resolution at eight hours and fifty-seven minutes on the eighth of December of the year two thousand fourteen, the Judge, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, set aside the scheduling order (folio 962).- X.- In a resolution at fourteen hours and fourteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of March of the year two thousand fifteen, a new date was set for holding the trial hearing (folio 963).- XI.- The oral and public trial hearing was held on the first of February of the year two thousand sixteen (folios 966 to 968).- XII.- The procedures have followed the prescriptions of law, and no defects capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed. This judgment is issued within the fifteen-business-day period established in numeral 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for complex matters, following rigorous deliberation and unanimously. Judge Álvarez Molina and Judge Campos Hidalgo concur with their votes. The Reporting Judge Sánchez Navarro drafts the opinion.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS): Of importance for resolving this matter, the following proven facts are established: 1).- That the company Corporación Jayalía Sociedad Anónima is the owner of the properties registered in the Property Registry under numbers 139432-000, with an area of 41,745.12 square meters; 148913-000, with an area of 75,210.10 square meters; 153702-000, with an area of 24,294.45 square meters; and Placa21089, with an area of 2,883.92 square meters; located in Dirección14007, of the first canton Cartago, province of Cartago. From two of these properties, two lots were segregated, merged, and transferred, which were registered in the name of Fundación para la Vivienda Rural Costa Rica Canadá, in its capacity as trustee (certifications visible at folios 13 to 25 of the judicial case file); 2).- That on the first of March of two thousand eight, Corporación Jayalía S.A and Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica (VIPROHAB), entered into a business collaboration agreement for the development of a residential project located on the properties described in the immediately preceding fact, which would be known as "La Campiña" (agreement visible at folios 27 to 35 of the judicial case file and testimony of the witness Nombre114170); 3).- That in Ordinary Session N°0135-2008, communicated to the plaintiff through resolution N° 2548, at ten hours forty minutes on the third of September of two thousand eight, the Plenary Commission (Comisión Plenaria) of SETENA, granted "ENVIRONMENTAL VIABILITY (VIABILIDAD AMBIENTAL) to the project, opening the stage of Environmental Management (Gestión Ambiental) and with the understanding of complying with the fundamental Environmental Commitment Clause (Cláusula de Compromiso Ambiental), indicated in the preceding Considerando Tercero." In that agreement, it was provided in clauses three and seven, section 2, the following: "THIRD: Based on the environmental characteristics of the AP and its interaction with the activities the project will carry out, the frequency for submitting environmental oversight reports (informes regenciales) to SETENA is established, for periods of every two months during the construction phase and one consolidated report upon finishing the construction stage (Memorándum DT-026-2008 of 26-5-2008). The environmental oversight reports (informes regenciales) must be submitted within a maximum period of 10 days after the end of the period they cover. When activities begin, the period for the first environmental oversight report (informe de regencia ambiental) begins. For the preparation of these reports, according to the format established by this Secretaría, it will be the responsibility of the environmental supervisor (regente ambiental) to carry out the necessary number of visits, depending on the characteristics of the project. Based on these reports and the monitoring program, SETENA may adjust the amount of the guarantee and issue mandatory compliance measures to keep the project, work, or activity within a margin of controlled environmental impact. The responsible party and the owner must provide support to the labors of SETENA during inspections it carries out." (...) SEVENTH: (...) 2) Prior to the start of each of the 9 stages (one month before the start of each stage), submit to this Secretaría: A Projected Environmental Management Plan Chart (Cuadro Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental) for the construction and operational stage. In this way, each of the environmental impact factors analyzed in the environmental management chart must be informed in detail in the environmental oversight reports (informes de regencia ambiental), according to the progress of the works or tasks being carried out in situ." (resolution from SETENA and agreement of the Plenary Commission visible at folios 130 to 137 of volume I of the administrative case file and 124 to 133 of the judicial case file); 4).- That SETENA, in resolution at eleven hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of July of the year two thousand eleven, N°1782-2011-SETENA, (notified to the project representative that same day); ordered the suspension of constructive activities at the "La Campiña" project and granted a period of twenty business days for the developer to carry out the following actions: submit the socioeconomic study; submit the Projected Environmental Management Plan Chart (Cuadro Pronóstico de Gestión Ambiental) for the first stage; as well as to submit a pluvial hydrological and surface runoff analysis for the entire project area (see copy of the referenced resolution at folios 318 to 323 and 339 of volume II of the administrative case file) 5).- That in a memorial filed before SETENA on the twenty-eighth of July of the year two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A., filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA, referenced in the immediately preceding fact. (see copy of the motion filed and the memorial requesting the implementation of mitigation measures at folios 564 to 612 and 613 to 615 of volume III of the administrative case file); 6).- That in a writ filed before SETENA on the tenth of August of two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A., withdrew (desistieron) the motions for revocation and appeal (recursos de revocatoria y apelación). The foregoing on the grounds that they considered they had complied with the requirements of the challenged resolution (folios 733 to 742 of volume III of the administrative case file). 7).- That in resolution N°1948-2011-SETENA, at thirteen hours on the seventeenth of August of two thousand eleven, SETENA ordered the lifting of the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) (folios 769 to 774 of volume III of the administrative case file).- II.- PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS (ALEGATOS DEL ACTOR): In essence, the plaintiff party's representative presents the following arguments as the basis for their claim: 1. Illegality of resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA. They argue that the referenced resolution is an absolutely null act, with defects in form, motive, content, and purpose. They also indicate that no procedure was carried out to verify the true reality of the facts. 2. The challenged conduct is a final act disguised as a precautionary measure (medida cautelar): Resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA lacks the characteristic elements of a precautionary measure (medida cautelar), namely: instrumentality, provisionality, and accessory nature. They point out that there was no situation to secure, nor was there a principal procedure, since SETENA had not initiated any investigation and had no indications that the execution of the project represented a situation of environmental risk. The measure had no preventive objective. 3. It is false that the Projected Environmental Management Plan Chart (Cuadro pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental) was not submitted by their represented party: They allege that SETENA authorized the plaintiff to commence works, the development of which was supervised from the beginning through inspections carried out by officials, as well as through reports made by the Environmental Supervisor (Regente Ambiental). They point out that if SETENA presumed any non-compliance, it should have made the corresponding warning. 4. State responsibility derived from the damages and losses caused by the suspension of works: The challenged resolution is absolutely null and produced harmful effects in the plaintiff's legal sphere, which generates liability on the part of the Administration in terms of numerals 190 and 191 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. They state that the damages occurred during the suspension of works and say that these were negatively impacted. Furthermore, it implied a longer stay on the worksite, an increase in the cost of labor and machinery, a cost for the restart of the construction process, operational, design, and management expenses. The contractor companies had to carry out mass layoffs and corresponding settlements. Likewise, they state that damages were produced due to budget adjustment, travel, project management, staff training, negative publicity. They note that they also suffered losses for lost profits, financial losses, profit for the period, and sales to third parties. On the other hand, in relation to the defense of expiration (caducidad) raised by the State's representative, the plaintiff party's representative argued that the act of lifting the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) took place on the seventeenth of August of the year two thousand eleven, and the claim was filed before the Tribunal on the sixteenth of August of the year two thousand twelve, which, according to what they stated, places the action within the legal deadline.

III.- DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS (ALEGATOS DEL DEMANDADO): The State's representative makes the following allegations against the claim: 1. The measure to suspend works is lawful: She states that the environmental viability license (licencia de viabilidad ambiental) was subject to compliance with a series of conditions and requirements that were not met by the developer. She considers that the breach of these requirements "by itself entails a threat and/or damage to the environment, sufficient to proceed to issue precautionary measures (medidas cautelares)" (folio 777 judicial case file). She states that the plaintiff was aware of the obligations arising from the resolution in which environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) was granted, and that they were also warned on repeated occasions, in which they were urged to comply with the submission of the environmental oversight report (informe de regencia ambiental). She indicates that the warnings were complied with untimely, and the submission of the Projected Environmental Management Plan Chart (Cuadro Pronóstico Plan de Gestión) was omitted. She alleges that it was precisely the plaintiff's non-compliance that gave rise to Technical Report ASA-1221-2011 of the eighteenth of July of the year two thousand eleven, which served as the basis for the resolution challenged here, which, she says, has a series of competencies and powers to implement precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) like the one ordered in this case. 2.- Express acknowledgment by the plaintiff that it had not complied with the requirements demanded in resolution 1782-2011-SETENA: She states that the plaintiff filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the referenced resolution, and that subsequently, in a memorial of the ninth of August of the year two thousand eleven, they withdrew (desistió) these articulation procedures. This, according to her, is conclusive proof that they had failed to comply with their obligations. 3. The damages and losses claimed were not duly accredited: She points out that suitable evidentiary elements were not provided to demonstrate the monetary repercussions the plaintiff claims to have suffered. 4. Expiration (Caducidad) of the claim: She further alleges expiration (caducidad), on the basis that the claim was not notified to her until the fifth of November of the year two thousand twelve, the one-year period established in article 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo having already amply elapsed.

IV.- ON THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD): Precisely because of the effects produced by a declaration of expiration (caducidad), in relation to the Tribunal's powers to hear the merits of the allegations raised in the matter under examination, it is appropriate to first resolve the defense of expiration (caducidad) raised by the State's representative. When answering the claim, the State prosecutor raises the defense of expiration (caducidad), based on article 39.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and states that the claim was notified to her on the fifth of November of the year two thousand twelve, exceeding, according to her assertion, the one-year period established in the referenced numeral. In relation to this defense, the Tribunal considers that the defendant is correct in maintaining that the claim has expired, however, not for the reasons she states. It is true that the claim was notified on the fifth of November of the year two thousand twelve, but the referenced article does not establish notification of the transfer to the counterparty as one of the parameters for calculating the period. The correct reading of said numeral is in the sense that the parameter is the filing of the claim, so that in order to verify whether or not expiration (caducidad) has occurred, the examination that must be carried out is to verify the time elapsed between the date the challenged act was issued and the filing of the claim, a period that cannot exceed one year. In this sense, the first paragraph of the rule provides: "The maximum period to initiate the proceeding shall be one year (...)" (the bold and underline are supplied). It must be clarified that, despite what has been said regarding the erroneous argument made by the state attorney regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad), the truth is that it is incumbent upon this decision-making Body to ex officio review the verification of the maxim related to the filing of the claim within the legal deadline, which is done next. In order to conduct the examination of expiration (caducidad), the following important facts must be kept in mind: In the claim, two acts were challenged, one of which, resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA, was issued and notified to the plaintiff on the twenty-first of July of the year two thousand eleven. The other resolution under attack is 1948-2011-SETENA, issued on the seventeenth of August of the year two thousand eleven. Furthermore, it is on the record that the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) through a memorial filed before SETENA on the twenty-eighth of July of the year two thousand eleven, however, it is also accredited that they withdrew (desistieron) that articulation procedure in a writ filed before that same body, on the tenth of August of the year two thousand eleven (folios 733 to 742 of Volume III of the administrative case file). This action by the plaintiff party, by which it withdraws (desiste) the remedies filed, causes the act issued in resolution N°1782-2011-2011, of the twenty-first of July of the year two thousand eleven, to become final (firmeza), from which it follows that, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the period for initiating the claim must be counted from the day following its notification. This occurred on the same day the resolution issued by SETENA was dictated—the twenty-first of July of the year two thousand eleven—therefore, the period must be counted starting from the twenty-second of July of the year two thousand eleven, meaning that necessarily, the expiration of the period for filing the claim occurred on the twenty-second of July of the following year—two thousand twelve. Now then, having said the foregoing, and taking into account that the claim was filed before the Tribunal on the sixteenth of August of the year two thousand twelve, there is no choice but to declare its expiration (caducidad), as it is evident that it was filed after the deadline within which its interposition can be considered timely, in accordance with the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) provided in the legal system. It is necessary to indicate that, even if the Tribunal were to calculate the period from the moment when the plaintiff's representatives withdrew (desistieron) the remedies filed against the challenged act, which is not procedurally correct, not only because expiration (caducidad) cannot be interrupted, but also because the Law is clear in indicating that the period must be counted from the day following notification of the challenged act, the solution to the examination of expiration (caducidad) would be identical, since the withdrawal (desistimiento) occurred on the tenth of August, and the claim was initiated six days later. Besides the above, it is opportune to indicate that on the occasion of the withdrawal (desistimiento), resolution N°1948-2011-SETENA, issued on the seventeenth of August, cannot be considered as the final act of the proceedings initiated through resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA, being rather a consequence of the plaintiff's submission of the documentation that had been requested of it. More simply, when the plaintiff party withdrew (desistió) the motion, the act dictated in resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA acquired finality (firmeza). This being the case, the claim should have been filed before judicial authority within a one-year period counted from the twenty-second of July of the year two thousand eleven, which did not occur, as it was filed on the sixteenth of August of the year two thousand twelve. Consequently, the Tribunal considers that the claim was filed untimely with regard to said resolution. Regarding resolution N°1948-2011-SETENA, the plaintiff party only challenges its considerando II, insofar as it orders the lifting of the measure, and for considering that the nullity of the resolution that ordered the precautionary measure (cautelar) entails the nullity of the one establishing its lifting. Thus, given that this claim cannot survive without the one related to the examination of nullity regarding resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA, an exercise that is not possible to carry out by virtue of the expiration (caducidad) now declared, the link between the examinations of both resolutions, established by the plaintiff themselves, compels that the inadmissibility of the claim seeking the declaration of nullity of resolution N°1945-2011-SETENA must be declared, as it is unstateable, given that the determination of legality or not of said act depends, as stated by the plaintiff's representative during the preliminary hearing and oral trial, on the nullity of resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA, the challenge of which, by the plaintiff, was untimely. Due to the manner in which it is resolved, a ruling on the merits is omitted.- V.- COSTS: Pursuant to article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, costs shall be borne by the losing party, and given that in this case none of the scenarios contemplated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the referenced numeral apply, the plaintiff party is ordered to pay both costs of this action.

POR TANTO

The defense of expiration (caducidad) of the claim regarding resolution N°1782-2011-SETENA of the twenty-first of July of the year two thousand eleven is upheld. The claim regarding resolution N°1948-2011-SETENA of the seventeenth of August of the year two thousand eleven is declared unstateable. The claim of Corporación Jayalía S.A and Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica VIPROHAB S.A., against the State is declared inadmissible. Both costs of this action are to be borne by the plaintiff.

Ileana Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo Fifth Section, **II Judicial Circuit of San José, Directorate04** Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Email ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ **ORDINARY PROCEEDING** **PLAINTIFF: CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A. AND VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A.** **DEFENDANT: THE STATE** **PROCURATOR: ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS** **CASE FILE No. 12-004410-1027-CA** **No. 18- 2016-V** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL FINANCIAL TRIBUNAL. FIFTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Directorate144.** Goicoechea, at eight hours and thirty minutes on the nineteenth of February, two thousand sixteen.- Proceeding filed by **CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A.**, represented by its General Attorneys-in-Fact without limit of sum, Mr. Nombre114167 , of legal age, married, lawyer, resident of San Rafael de Escazú, identity card number CED24626 and Mrs. **Nombre114168** , of legal age, married, lawyer, resident of San Rafael de Alajuela, identity card number CED90273, and **VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A.**, represented by its General Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum, Mr. **Nombre114169** , who is of legal age, married, identity card number CED90274; against the STATE, represented by the Procurator, **ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS**, of legal age, lawyer, divorced, resident of San José, identity card number CED566. Also intervening are Mr. FEDERICO SOSTO LÓPEZ, identity card number CED27064; and Mr. JUAN CARLOS HERNÁNDEZ JIMÉNEZ, identity card number CED13713, both of legal age, lawyers, and in their capacity as special judicial attorneys-in-fact for the plaintiff.

**WHEREAS** **I.-** In a brief filed before the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda on the tenth of August, two thousand twelve, the plaintiff requests: *"1. That resolutions of the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental No. 1782-2011-SETENA, of 11:35 hours on the 21st of July, 2011 and No. 1948-2011-SETENA, of 13:00 hours on the 17th of August, 2011 be declared non-conforming with the legal system and annulled.* *2.- That the State be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to our represented parties, and interest on those sums, beginning from the moment the challenged illegitimate action was notified.* *3. The award of damages must be made in the abstract for the stipulated reasons and consequences, with its liquidation left for the judgment enforcement stage, in accordance with Article 153 of the CPCA.* *4. That the State be ordered to pay both types of costs, personal and procedural."* (folios 706 to 732). During the preliminary hearing that took place on the eighth of May, two thousand thirteen, the claim identified as No. 1 was modified in the following terms: "That the non-conformity and nullity be declared, so that the right of the plaintiff companies to execute the works of the Project *Urbanización La Campiña* is recognized, and that the State's liability be declared for the illegitimate stoppage of all productive activity in the project area ordered in resolution 1782-2011-SETENA of 11:35 hours on the 21st of July, 2011, and in relation to resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA of 13:00 hours on the 17th of August, 2011, the nullity and non-conformity requested relates to the lifting of the Precautionary Measure, which is the content of the second whereas clause (considerando) of that resolution." (folios 831 to 833).- **II.-** In a resolution of thirteen hours and forty-seven minutes on the tenth of October, two thousand twelve, the Tribunal admitted the complaint, which was answered in a brief filed on the fourteenth of January, two thousand thirteen. (folios 733, 734 and 771 to 796).- **III.-** The preliminary hearing took place between thirteen hours thirty-five minutes and fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on the eighth of May, two thousand thirteen (folios 831 to 833).- **IV.-** In a submission filed on the thirteenth of May, two thousand thirteen, by the plaintiff's representative, the plaintiff requested the rejection of the new evidence offered by the State's representative during the preliminary hearing. The plaintiff further argued that the offering of this evidence demonstrates that the administrative file was handled in a disorderly manner, and that it was not provided in its entirety, despite certifications to that effect issued by the Administration (folios 834 to 842).

**V.-** In a resolution of nine hours on the seventeenth of July, two thousand thirteen, Section V of the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda returned the file to the procedural stage for the purpose of completing the administrative file (folios 855 and 856).

**VI.-** In a resolution of eleven hours and twelve minutes on the twenty-third of April, two thousand twelve, the Judge in the procedural stage, Mr. Alcevit Godínez Prado, deemed the administrative file *"completed"*, and the matter was again assigned to Section V on the twenty-ninth of May, two thousand fourteen (folios 953 and 955).

**VII.-** In a resolution of fourteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on the twenty-fifth of June, two thousand fourteen, the fifth of January, two thousand fifteen, was set as the date for the oral trial (folios 957 and 958).- **VIII.-** In a brief filed before the Tribunal on the seventh of November, two thousand fourteen, the plaintiff's representative requested the Tribunal to modify the date set for the trial hearing, given that one of the witnesses, residing outside the national territory, would be unable to attend on the set day and time (folios 960 and 961).

**IX.-** In a resolution of eight hours and fifty-seven minutes on the eighth of December, two thousand fourteen, Judge Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, set aside the hearing date (folio 962).- **X.-** In a resolution of fourteen hours and fourteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, two thousand fifteen, a new date was set for the trial hearing (folio 963).- **XI.-** The oral and public trial hearing was held on the first of February, two thousand sixteen (folios 966 to 968).- **XII.-** In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been followed, and no defects capable of invalidating what has been done are observed. This judgment is issued within the fifteen-business-day period established in numeral 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for complex matters, after rigorous deliberation and unanimously. Judge Álvarez Molina and Judge Campos Hidalgo concur with their votes. Judge Rapporteur Sánchez Navarro writes the opinion.

**CONSIDERING** **I.- PROVEN FACTS:** Of importance for resolving this matter, the following proven facts are established: **1).-** That the company Corporación Jayalía Sociedad Anónima is the owner of the properties registered in the Property Registry under numbers 139432-000, with an area of 41,745.12 square meters; 148913-000, with an area of 75,210.10 square meters; 153702-000, with an area of 24,294.45 square meters; and Placa21089, with an area of 2,883.92 square meters; located in the Dirección14007 , of the first canton of Cartago, province of Cartago. From two of these properties, two lots were segregated, consolidated, and transferred, which were registered in the name of Fundación para la Vivienda Rural Costa Rica Canadá, in its capacity as trustee (certifications visible on folios 13 to 25 of the judicial file); **2).-** That on the first of March, two thousand eight, Corporación Jayalía S.A and Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica (VIPROHAB) entered into a business collaboration agreement for the development of a residential project located on the properties described in the immediately preceding fact, which would be known as "La Campiña" (agreement visible on folios 27 to 35 of the judicial file and testimony of witness Nombre114170 ); **3).-** That in Ordinary Session No. 0135-2008, communicated to the plaintiff via resolution No. 2548, of ten hours forty minutes on the third of September, two thousand eight, the Plenary Commission of SETENA granted *"ENVIRONMENTAL FEASIBILITY to the project, opening the Environmental Management stage and with the understanding of complying with the fundamental Environmental Commitment Clause indicated in the Third Whereas Clause (Considerando) above."*. In that agreement, the following was stipulated in the third and seventh clauses, section 2: *"THIRD: Based on the environmental characteristics of the AP and its interaction with the activities to be carried out by the project, the frequency for submitting environmental supervision reports (informes regenciales) to SETENA is established for periods (sic) of every two months during the construction phase and one consolidated report upon completing the construction stage (Memorandum DT-026-2008 of 26-5-2008). The environmental supervision reports must be submitted within a maximum period of 10 days after the end of the period (sic) they cover. At the start of activities, the period (sic) for the first environmental supervision report begins. For the preparation of these reports, according to the format established by this Secretariat, the environmental supervisor (regente ambiental) shall be responsible for making the necessary number of visits, depending on the characteristics of the project. Based on these reports and the monitoring program, SETENA may adjust the amount of the guarantee and issue mandatory compliance measures to keep the project, work, or activity within a margin of controlled environmental impact. The responsible party and the owner must provide support for the work of SETENA during the inspections it carries out." (...) SEVENTH (sic): (...) 2) Prior to the start of each of the 9 stages (one month before the start of each stage), submit to this Secretariat: A Forecast Chart-Environmental Management Plan (Cuadro Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental) for the construction and operational stage. In this way, each of the environmental impact factors analyzed in the environmental management chart must be reported in detail in the environmental supervision reports, according to the progress of the works or tasks being carried out in situ."* (resolution of SETENA and agreement of the Plenary Commission visible on folios 130 to 137 of volume I of the administrative file and 124 to 133 of the judicial file); **4).-** That SETENA, in resolution of eleven hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of July, two thousand eleven, No. 1782-2011-SETENA, (notified to the project representative that same day); ordered the stoppage of construction activities in the project *"La Campiña"* and granted a period of twenty business days to the developer to carry out the following actions: submit the socioeconomic study; submit the *Environmental Management Forecast Chart* for the first stage; as well as submit a pluvial hydrological and surface runoff analysis for the entire project area (see copy of the referenced resolution on folios 318 to 323 and 339 of volume II of the administrative file). **5).-** That in a submission filed before SETENA on the twenty-eighth of July, two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. filed a motion for revocation with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, referenced in the immediately preceding fact. (see copy of the motion filed and the submission requesting the implementation of mitigation measures on folios 564 to 612 and 613 to 615 of volume III of the administrative file); **6).-** That in a brief filed before SETENA on the tenth of August, two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. withdrew the motions for revocation and appeal. The foregoing because they considered to have complied with the requirements of the challenged resolution (folios 733 to 742 of volume III of the administrative file). **7).-** That in resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, of thirteen hours on the seventeenth of August, two thousand eleven, SETENA ordered the lifting of the precautionary measure (folios 769 to 774 of volume III of the administrative file).- **II.- PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS:** In essence, the representative of the plaintiff submits the following arguments as the basis for its complaint: **1. Illegality of resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA.** Argues that the referenced resolution is an absolutely null act, with defects in form, motive, content, and purpose. Also indicates that no procedure was conducted to verify the actual truth of the facts. **2. The challenged conduct is a final act disguised as a precautionary measure:** Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA lacks the characteristic elements of a precautionary measure, namely: instrumentality, provisionality, and accessory nature. Points out that there was no situation to secure, nor a principal proceeding, since SETENA had not initiated any investigation and had no indication that the execution of the project represented a situation of environmental risk. The measure had no preventive objective. **3. It is false that the Environmental Management Forecast Chart-Plan was not submitted by its represented party:** Alleges that SETENA authorized the plaintiff to start the works, whose development was supervised from the beginning through inspections carried out by officials, as well as through reports made by the Environmental Supervisor. Points out that if SETENA presumed any non-compliance, it should have made the corresponding warning. **4. Liability of the State derived from the damages and losses caused by the stoppage of the works:** The challenged resolution is absolutely null and produced harmful effects in the plaintiff's legal sphere, which generates liability for the Administration in the terms of numerals 190 and 191 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. States that the damages occurred during the stoppage of the works and says that these were negatively impacted. Furthermore, it implied a longer stay on site, an increase in the cost of labor and machinery, a cost for restarting the construction process, operational, design, and management expenses. The contracting companies had to make massive layoffs and corresponding severance payments. Likewise, states that damages occurred due to budget adjustment, travel, project management, personnel training, and negative publicity. Notes that they also suffered losses for lost profits, financial losses, operating profit, and sales to third parties. On the other hand, in relation to the expiration (caducidad) defense raised by the State's representative, the plaintiff's representation argued that the act of lifting the precautionary measure took place on the seventeenth of August, two thousand eleven, and the complaint was filed before the Tribunal on the sixteenth of August, two thousand twelve, which, it stated, places the action within the legal time limit.

**III.- DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS:** The representative of the State submits the following allegations against the complaint: **1. The measure to stop the works is in accordance with the law:** States that the environmental feasibility license was subject to compliance with a series of conditions and requirements that were not met by the developer. Considers that the non-compliance with these requirements *"in and of itself entails a threat and/or damage to the environment, sufficient to proceed to issue precautionary measures"* (folio 777 judicial file). States that the plaintiff knew the obligations deriving from the resolution by which the environmental feasibility was granted, and that it was also warned on repeated occasions, in which it was urged to comply with the submission of the environmental supervision report. Indicates that the warnings were complied with late, and the submission of the Environmental Management Forecast Chart-Plan was omitted. Alleges that it was precisely the plaintiff's non-compliance that gave rise to Technical Report ASA-1221-2011 of the eighteenth of July, two thousand eleven, which served as the basis for the resolution challenged here, which, it states, has a series of competencies and powers to implement precautionary measures like the one ordered in this case. **2.- Express acknowledgment by the plaintiff that it had not met the requirements demanded in resolution 1782-2011-SETENA:** States that the plaintiff filed a motion for revocation with a subsidiary appeal against the referenced resolution, and that subsequently, in a submission of the ninth of August, two thousand eleven, withdrew those procedural motions. This, it asserts, is conclusive proof that it had failed to comply with its obligations. **3. The claimed damages and losses were not properly accredited:** Points out that suitable evidence was not provided to demonstrate the monetary repercussions the plaintiff claims to have had. **4. Expiration of the complaint:** Also alleges expiration, on the basis that the complaint was not notified to it until the fifth of November, two thousand twelve, the one-year period established in Article 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo having already amply elapsed.

**IV.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF EXPIRATION:** Precisely because of the effects produced by a declaration of expiration, in relation to the Tribunal's powers to hear the merits of the allegations raised in the matter under examination, it is appropriate to first resolve the expiration defense raised by the State's representative. In answering the complaint, the State's representative raises the defense of expiration, based on Article 39.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, and states that the complaint was notified to it on the fifth of November, two thousand twelve, exceeding, it asserts, the one-year period established in the referenced numeral. In relation to this defense, the Tribunal considers that the defendant is correct in asserting that the complaint is time-barred; however, not for the reasons it argues. Certainly, the complaint was notified to it on the fifth of November, two thousand twelve, but the referenced article does not establish notification of the procedural transfer to the counterparty as one of the parameters for calculating the time period. The correct reading of said numeral is that the parameter is the filing of the complaint, such that in order to verify whether or not expiration has occurred, the examination that must be carried out is to verify the time elapsed between the date the challenged act was issued and the filing of the complaint, a period that cannot exceed one year. In this sense, the first subsection of the norm provides: *"The maximum period **to file** the proceeding shall be one year (...)"* (bold and underline supplied). It must be clarified that, despite what has been said regarding the erroneous argumentation made by the Procurator regarding the expiration defense, the fact is that it is incumbent upon this decision-making body to review ex officio the verification of the matter related to the filing of the complaint within the legal time limit, which is done forthwith.

For the purpose of conducting the expiration (caducidad) review, the following material facts must be kept in mind: In the complaint, two acts were challenged, one of which, resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, was issued and notified to the plaintiff on July twenty-first, two thousand eleven. The other resolution under attack is No. 1948-2011-SETENA, issued on August seventeenth, two thousand eleven. Furthermore, the record shows that the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. filed a motion for revocation with subsidiary appeal through a brief submitted to SETENA on July twenty-eighth, two thousand eleven; however, it is also proven that they withdrew that procedural motion in a writing filed before that same body on August tenth, two thousand eleven (folios 733 to 742 of Volume III of the administrative file). This action by the plaintiff, whereby it withdraws the motions filed, causes the act issued in resolution No. 1782-2011-2011, of July twenty-first, two thousand eleven, to become final, from which it follows that, pursuant to the provisions of subsection 1 of Article 39 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, the time limit for filing the complaint must be counted from the day following its notification. This occurred on the same day the resolution issued by SETENA was handed down —July twenty-first, two thousand eleven—, so the time limit shall be counted from July twenty-second, two thousand eleven, and therefore, the expiration of the time limit for filing the complaint necessarily occurred on July twenty-second of the following year —two thousand twelve—. Now, having said that, and taking into account that the complaint was filed before the Court on August sixteenth, two thousand twelve, there is no alternative but to declare its expiration (caducidad), since it is evident that it was filed after the deadline by which its interposition can be considered timely, in accordance with the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) established in the legal system. It must be pointed out that, even if the Court were to compute the time limit from the moment when the plaintiff’s representatives withdrew the motions filed against the challenged act —which is not appropriate, not only because expiration (caducidad) cannot be interrupted, but also because the Law is clear in stating that the time limit must be counted from the day following notification of the challenged act— the result of the expiration review would be identical, given that the withdrawal occurred on August tenth, and the complaint was filed six days later. In addition to the foregoing, it is pertinent to state that as a result of the withdrawal, resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, issued on August seventeenth, cannot be considered the final act of the proceedings initiated by resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, being rather a consequence of the plaintiff’s submission of the documentation that had been required of it. More simply put, when the plaintiff withdrew the motion, the act issued in resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA became final. Thus, the complaint should have been filed before the judicial court within a one-year period counted from July twenty-second, two thousand eleven, which did not occur, since it was filed on August sixteenth, two thousand twelve. Consequently, the Court finds that the complaint was untimely filed with respect to that resolution. Regarding resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, the plaintiff only challenges its finding II (resultando II), insofar as it orders the lifting of the measure, and on the grounds that the nullity of the resolution that imposed the precautionary measure entails the nullity of the one ordering its lifting. Thus, given that this claim cannot survive without the claim regarding the review of nullity of resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, a review which cannot be carried out by virtue of the expiration (caducidad) now declared, the linkage of the review between both resolutions, established by the plaintiff itself, compels a declaration of inadmissibility of the claim seeking a declaration of nullity of resolution No. 1945-2011-SETENA, as it is unviable, since the determination of the legality or otherwise of that act depends, as stated by the plaintiff’s own representative during the preliminary hearing and the oral trial, on the nullity of resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, whose challenge by the plaintiff was untimely. Given the manner in which this matter is resolved, a ruling on the merits is omitted.- **V.- COSTS (COSTAS):** Pursuant to Article 193 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, costs (costas) are borne by the losing party, and given that in this case none of the situations set forth in subsections 1 and 2 of that provision apply, the plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs (costas) of this action.

**POR TANTO** The defense of expiration (caducidad) of the complaint with respect to resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, of July twenty-first, two thousand eleven, is upheld. The complaint with respect to resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, of August seventeenth, two thousand eleven, is declared unviable. The complaint of Corporación Jayalía S.A and Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica VIPROHAB S.A., against the State, is declared inadmissible. Both costs (costas) of this action shall be borne by the plaintiff.

**Ileana Sánchez Navarro** **Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo** In this way, each of the environmental impact factors analyzed in the environmental management table must be reported in detail in the environmental oversight reports (informes de regencia ambiental), according to the progress of the construction works or activities being carried out on site."</span><span> (SETENA resolution and Plenary Commission agreement visible at folios 130 to 137 of volume I of the administrative case file and 124 to 133 of the judicial case file); </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">4).-</span><span> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">That SETENA, in a resolution issued at eleven thirty-five hours on July twenty-first, two thousand eleven, No. 1782-2011-SETENA, (notified to the project representative that same day), ordered the suspension of construction activities </span><span>at the project </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"La Campiña" </span><span>and granted the developer a period of twenty business days to carry out the following actions:</span><span> </span><span> submit the socioeconomic study; submit the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Environmental Management Forecast Table (Cuadro Pronóstico de Gestión Ambiental)</span><span> for the first stage; as well as to submit a pluvial hydrological and surface runoff analysis for the entire project area (see copy of the referenced resolution at folios 318 to 323 and 339 of volume II of the administrative case file) </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">5).-</span><span> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">That in a written submission presented before SETENA on July twenty-eighth of the year two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio)</span><span> against Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, referenced in the immediately preceding fact. (see copy of the motion filed and the written submission requesting the implementation of mitigation measures at folios 564 to 612 and 613 to 615 of volume III of the administrative case file); </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">6).-</span><span> </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">That in a document presented before SETENA on August tenth, two thousand eleven, the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. withdrew the motions for reconsideration and appeal.</span><span> The foregoing because they considered that they had complied with the requirements of the contested resolution (folios 733 to 742 of volume III of the administrative case file). </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">7).-</span><span> </span><span> That in Resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, at thirteen hours on August seventeenth, two thousand eleven, SETENA ordered the lifting of the precautionary measure (folios 769 to 774 of volume III of the administrative case file).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">II.- ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF:</span><span> In essence, the representative of the plaintiff presents the following arguments as the basis for their claim: </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">1. Illegality of Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA.</span><span> They argue that the referenced resolution is an absolutely null act, with defects in form, motive, content, and purpose. They also indicate that no procedure was carried out to verify the actual truth of the facts. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">2. The contested conduct is a final act disguised as a precautionary measure:</span><span> Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA lacks the characteristic elements of a precautionary measure, namely: instrumentality, provisionality, and accessoriality. They point out that there was no situation to secure, nor was there a principal procedure, since SETENA had not initiated any investigation and had no indications that the execution of the project represented a situation of environmental risk. The measure had no preventive objective whatsoever. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">3. It is false that the Environmental Management Forecast Table-Plan was not submitted by their represented party:</span><span> They allege that SETENA authorized the plaintiff to begin the works, the development of which was supervised from the outset through inspections carried out by officials, as well as through reports made by the Environmental Regent (Regente Ambiental). They note that if SETENA presumed any noncompliance, it should have issued the corresponding notice of deficiency (prevención). </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">4. Liability of the State arising from the damages caused by the suspension of works:</span><span> The contested resolution is absolutely null and produced harmful effects on the plaintiff's legal sphere, which generates liability on the part of the Administration under the terms of Articles 190 and 191 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). They state that the damages occurred during the suspension of the works and say that these were negatively impacted. Furthermore, it entailed a longer stay on the project site, an increase in the cost of labor and machinery, a cost for restarting the construction process, operational, design, and management expenses. The contracting companies had to carry out mass dismissals and the corresponding settlements. Likewise, they state that damages were caused by budget adjustments, travel, project management, staff training, and negative publicity. They point out that they also suffered losses due to lost profits, financial losses, operating profit, and sales to third parties. On the other hand, in relation to the defense of expiration (caducidad) raised by the State's legal representative, the plaintiff's representation argued that the act of lifting the precautionary measure took place on August seventeenth, two thousand eleven, and the claim was filed before the Court on August sixteenth, two thousand twelve, which, according to their statement, places the action within the statutory period. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">III.- ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT: </span><span>The representative of the State presents the following arguments against the claim: </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">1. The measure suspending the works is in accordance with the law: </span><span>She says that the environmental viability license was subject to compliance with a series of conditions and requirements that were not fulfilled by the developer. She considers that noncompliance with these requirements </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"in itself entails a threat and/or damage to the environment, sufficient to proceed to issue precautionary measures"</span><span> (folio 777 judicial case file). She states that the plaintiff was aware of the obligations arising from the resolution granting environmental viability, and that it was also given notice of deficiency on repeated occasions, in which it was urged to comply with the submission of the environmental oversight report (informe de regencia ambiental). She indicates that the deficiency notices were complied with late, and the submission of the Environmental Management Forecast Table-Plan was omitted. She alleges that it was precisely the plaintiff's noncompliance that gave rise to Technical Report ASA-1221-2011 of July eighteenth, two thousand eleven, which served as the basis for the resolution contested here, which, she says, has a series of competencies and powers to implement precautionary measures such as the one ordered in this case. 2.- </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Express acknowledgment by the plaintiff that it had not complied with the requirements demanded in Resolution 1782-2011-SETENA:</span><span> </span><span> She states that the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against the referenced resolution, and that subsequently, in a written submission dated August ninth, two thousand eleven, withdrew those pleadings. This, according to her statement, is incontrovertible proof that it had failed to comply with its obligations.</span><span> </span><span> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">3. The claimed damages were not duly accredited:</span><span> She points out that no suitable evidentiary elements were provided to demonstrate the monetary repercussions the plaintiff claims to have had. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">4. Expiration of the claim:</span><span> She also alleges expiration, on the basis that the claim was not notified to her until November fifth, two thousand twelve, by which time the one-year period established in Article 39 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) had already been amply exceeded.</span><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IV.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF EXPIRATION:</span><span> Precisely because of the effects produced by a declaration of expiration, in relation to the Court's powers to hear the merits of the arguments raised in the matter under review, it is appropriate to resolve, in the first place, the defense of expiration raised by the State's representative.</span><span> </span><span> In answering the claim, the State's legal representative raises the defense of expiration, based on Article 39.1 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, and says that the claim was notified to her on November fifth, two thousand twelve, exceeding, according to her statement, the one-year period established in the referenced article. In relation to this defense, the Court considers that the defendant is correct in asserting that the claim is expired, however, not for the reasons she argues. Certainly, the claim was notified to her on November fifth, two thousand twelve, but the referenced article does not establish the notification of the transfer to the opposing party as one of the parameters for computing the period. The correct reading of said article is to the effect that the parameter is the filing of the claim, so that in order to verify whether or not expiration has occurred, the examination to be carried out involves verifying the period elapsed between the date on which the contested act was issued and the filing of the claim, a period which may not exceed one year.</span><span> </span><span> In this regard, the first paragraph of the provision states: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"The maximum period </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">for filing</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> the proceeding shall be one year (...)"</span><span> (emphasis and underlining supplied). It must be clarified that, despite the foregoing, regarding the erroneous argument made by the State attorney concerning the defense of expiration, the truth is that it is incumbent upon this Adjudicatory Body to review ex officio the verification of the maximum period related to the filing of the claim within the statutory period, which is done below. For the purpose of examining the expiration, the following important facts must be kept in mind: Two acts were contested in the claim, one of which, Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, was issued and notified to the plaintiff on July twenty-first, two thousand eleven. The other resolution being challenged is No. 1948-2011-SETENA, issued on August seventeenth, two thousand eleven. Furthermore, the record shows that the representatives of Corporación Jayalía S.A. filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal by means of a written submission presented before SETENA on July twenty-eighth, two thousand eleven; however, it is also accredited that they withdrew said pleading in a document presented before that same body on August tenth, two thousand eleven (folios 733 to 742 of Volume III of the administrative case file). This action by the plaintiff, according to which it withdraws the motions filed, causes the act issued in Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, of July twenty-first, two thousand eleven, to become final, from which it follows that, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 39 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, the period for filing the claim must be counted from the day following its notification. This occurred on the same day the resolution issued by SETENA was rendered —July twenty-first, two thousand eleven—, therefore the period will be counted from July twenty-second, two thousand eleven, so that necessarily, the expiration of the period to file the claim occurred on July twenty-second of the following year —two thousand twelve—. Now, having said the foregoing, and taking into account that the claim was filed before the Court on August sixteenth, two thousand twelve, there is no alternative but to declare its expiration, as it is evident that it was filed after the deadline within which its filing can be considered timely, in accordance with the expiration period provided in the legal system. It is necessary to indicate that, even if the Court were to calculate the period from the moment in which the plaintiff's representatives withdrew the motions filed against the contested act, which is not appropriate, not only because expiration cannot be interrupted, but also because the Law is clear in indicating that the period must be counted from the day following notification of the contested act, the outcome of the expiration examination would be identical, given that the withdrawal occurred on August tenth, and the claim was filed six days later. In addition to the foregoing, it is pertinent to indicate that on the occasion of the withdrawal, Resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, issued on August seventeenth, cannot be considered as the final act of the proceedings initiated through Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, but rather a consequence of the plaintiff's submission of the documentation that had been required of it. More simply, when the plaintiff withdrew the motion, the act issued in Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA became final. Thus, the claim should have been presented to the judicial court within a period of one year counted from July twenty-second, two thousand eleven, which did not occur, as it was filed on August sixteenth of the year two thousand twelve. Consequently, the Court considers that the claim was filed untimely with respect to said resolution. As regards Resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, the plaintiff only contests its recital II, insofar as it orders the lifting of the measure, and on the grounds that the nullity of the resolution that ordered the precautionary measure entails the nullity of the one ordering its lifting. Thus, given that this claim cannot subsist without the one related to the examination of nullity regarding Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, an exercise that it is not possible to carry out by virtue of the expiration now declared, the link between the examination of both resolutions, established by the plaintiff itself, makes it necessary to declare the inadmissibility of the claim seeking the declaration of nullity of Resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, as it is not legally viable, given that the determination of the legality or not of said act depends, as stated by the plaintiff's representative during the preliminary hearing and the oral trial, on the nullity of Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, whose challenge by the plaintiff was untimely. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, a ruling on the merits is omitted.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">V.- COSTS:</span><span> Pursuant to Article 193 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, costs are borne by the losing party, and given that in this case none of the circumstances contemplated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the referenced article apply, the plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs of this action.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">THEREFORE</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>The defense of expiration of the claim with respect to Resolution No. 1782-2011-SETENA, dated July twenty-first, two thousand eleven, is upheld. The claim with respect to Resolution No. 1948-2011-SETENA, dated August seventeenth, two thousand eleven, is declared not legally viable.</span><span> </span><span> The claim of Corporación Jayalía S.A and Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica VIPROHAB S.A. against the State is declared inadmissible. Both costs of this action are borne by the plaintiff.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Ileana Sánchez Navarro</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Marianella Álvarez Molina</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span></p></div></body></html>" } }

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. Sección Quinta, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ PROCESO ORDINARIO ACTOR: CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A. Y VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A.

DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO PROCURADORA: ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS Nº18- 2016-V TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN QUINTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección144 . Goicoechea, a las ocho horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de febrero del dos mil dieciséis.- Proceso planteado por CORPORACIÓN JAYALÍA S.A., representada por su Apoderados Generalísimos sin límite de suma, señor Nombre114167 , mayor de edad, casado, abogado, vecino de San Rafael de Escazú, cédula de identidad número CED24626 y señora Nombre114168 , mayor de edad, casada, abogada, vecina de San Rafael de Alajuela, cédula de identidad número CED90273, y VIVIENDAS Y PROYECTOS HABITACIONALES DE COSTA RICA VIPROHAB S.A., representada por su Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma, señor Nombre114169 , quien es mayor de edad, casado, cédula de identidad número CED90274; contra el ESTADO, representado por la señora Procuradora, ELIZABETH LI QUIRÓS, mayor de edad, abogada, divorciada, vecina de San José, cédula de identidad número CED566. Intervienen además, los señores FEDERICO SOSTO LÓPEZ, cédula de identidad número CED27064; y JUAN CARLOS HERNÁNDEZ JIMÉNEZ, cédula de identidad número CED13713, ambos mayores de edad, abogados y en condición de apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora.

RESULTANDO

I.- Por escrito presentado ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, el diez de agosto del año dos mil doce, la parte actora solicita: "1. Se declare la disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico y se anulen las resoluciones de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental N° 1782-2011-SETENA, de las 11:35 horas del día 21 de julio del 2011 y N° 1948-2011-SETENA, de las 13:00 horas del día 17 de agosto del 2011.

2.- Se condene al Estado al pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a nuestras representadas, y los intereses sobre esas sumas, a partir del momento en que fue notificada la actuación ilegítima impugnada.

3. La condenatoria debe hacerse en abstracto por los motivos y consecuencias estipulados, quedando su liquidación para la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 153 del CPCA.

4. Se condene al Estado al pago de ambas costas, personales y procesales." (folios 706 a 732). Durante la audiencia preliminar que tuvo lugar el ocho de mayo del año dos mil trece, la pretensión identificada con el N°1, fue modificada en los siguientes términos: "Se declare la disconformidad y nulidad, para que se reconozca el derecho de las empresas actoras a ejecutar las obras del Proyecto Urbanización La Campiña y se declare la responsabilidad del Estado por la paralización ilegítima de toda la actividad productiva en el área del proyecto ordenada en la resolución 1782-2011-SETENA de las 11:35 horas del día 21 de julio del 2011 y en relación a la resolución N°1948-2011-SETENA de las 13:00 horas del día 17 de agosto del 2011 la nulidad y la disconformidad que se solicita es en lo relativo al levantamiento de la Medida Cautelar que es el contenido del considerando segundo de esa resolución." (folios 831 a 833).- II.- En resolución de las trece horas y cuarenta y siete minutos del diez de octubre del año dos mil doce, el Tribunal dio curso a la demanda, la cual fue contestada mediante escrito presentado el catorce de enero del dos mil trece. (folios 733, 734 y 771 a 796).- III.- La audiencia preliminar tuvo lugar entre las trece horas treinta y cinco minutos y las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos, del ocho de mayo del año dos mil trece (folios 831 a 833).- IV.- En memorial presentado el trece de mayo del año dos mil trece, por la representación de la actora, ésta solicitó el rechazo de la prueba nueva ofrecida por la personera del Estado durante la audiencia preliminar. Adujo además que el ofrecimiento de esa prueba, demuestra que el expediente administrativo fue manejado de forma desordenada, y que no se aportó completo, a pesar de las certificaciones en ese sentido, emitidas por la Administración (folios 834 a 842).

V.- En resolución de las nueve horas del diecisiete de julio del año dos mil trece, la Sección V del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, devolvió a la etapa de trámite el expediente, con la finalidad de completar el administrativo (folios 855 y 856).

VI.- En resolución de las once horas y doce minutos del veintitrés de abril del año dos mil doce, el Juez de la etapa de trámite, señor Alcevit Godínez Prado, tuvo por "completado" el expediente administrativo, y se turnó nuevamente el asunto a la Sección V el veintinueve de mayo del dos mil catorce (folios 953 y 955).

VII.- En resolución de las catorce horas y cincuenta y ocho minutos del veinticinco de junio del año dos mil catorce, fue señalado el cinco de enero del año dos mil quince, como fecha para la realización del juicio oral (folios 957 y 958).- VIII.- En escrito presentado ante el Tribunal el día siete de noviembre del dos mil catorce, el representante de la parte actora solicitó al Tribunal la modificación de la fecha señalada para la celebración de la audiencia de juicio, en vista de que uno de los testigos, residentes fuera del territorio nacional, no podría presentarse el día y hora fijados (folios 960 y 961).

IX.- En resolución de las ocho horas y cincuenta y siete minutos del ocho de diciembre del dos mil catorce, el señor Juez, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, dejó sin efecto el señalamiento (folio 962).- X.- En resolución de las catorce horas y catorce minutos del veintinueve de marzo del dos mil quince, se fijó nueva fecha para la celebración de la audiencia de juicio (folio 963).- XI.- La audiencia de juicio oral y público fue celebrada el primero de febrero del año dos mil dieciséis (folios 966 a 968).- XII.- En los procedimientos se han seguido las prescripciones de ley, y no se observan vicios capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Se dicta esta sentencia dentro del plazo de quince días hábiles establecido en el numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para los asuntos complejos, previa deliberación de rigor y por unanimidad. Concurren con su voto la Jueza Álvarez Molina y el Juez Campos Hidalgo. Redacta la Jueza Ponente Sánchez Navarro.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para resolver este asunto, se establecen los siguientes hechos probados: 1).- Que la empresa Corporación Jayalía Sociedad Anónima es propietaria de las fincas inscritas en el Registro de la Propiedad bajo los números 139432-000, con un área de 41,745.12 metros cuadrados; 148913-000, con un área de 75,210.10 metros cuadrados; 153702-000, con un área de 24,294.45 metros cuadrados; y Placa21089, con un área de 2,883.92 metros cuadrados; situadas en el Dirección14007 , del cantón primero Cartago, provincia de Cartago. De dos de estas fincas fueron segregados, reunidos y traspasados, dos lotes, los cuales fueron inscritos a nombre de Fundación para la Vivienda Rural Costa Rica Canadá, en calidad de fiduciario (certificaciones visibles a folios 13 a 25 del expediente judicial); 2).- Que el primero de marzo del dos mil ocho, Corporación Jayalía S.A y Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica (VIPROHAB), suscribieron un contrato de colaboración empresarial para el desarrollo de un proyecto residencial localizado en las fincas descritas en el hecho inmediato anterior, que se conocería como "La Campiña" (contrato visible a folios 27 a 35 del expediente judicial y declaración del testigo Nombre114170 ); 3).- Que en la Sesión Ordinaria N°0135-2008, comunicada a la actora mediante resolución N° 2548, de las diez horas cuarenta minutos del tres de septiembre del dos mil ocho, la Comisión Plenaria de la SETENA, otorgó la "VIABILIDAD AMBIENTAL al proyecto quedando abierta la etapa de Gestión Ambiental y en el entendido de cumplir con la Cláusula de Compromiso Ambiental fundamental, indicado en el Considerando Tercero anterior.". En ese acuerdo, se dispuso en las cláusulas tercera y sétima, apartado 2, lo siguiente: "TERCERO: Con base en las características ambientales del AP y su interacción con las actividades que realizará el proyecto, se establece la periodicidad de presentación de informes regenciales ante la SETENA, para periodos (sic) de cada dos meses durante la fase constructiva y uno consolidado al finalizar la etapa constructiva (Memorándum DT-026-2008 del 26-5-2008). Los Informes regenciales deberán ser presentados en un plazo máximo de 10 días posteriores a la finalización del periodo (sic) que cubren. En el momento de iniciar actividades se inicia el periodo (sic) del primer informe de regencia ambiental. Para la elaboración de estos informes, de acuerdo al formato establecido por esta Secretaría, será responsabilidad del regente ambiental realizar el número de visitas necesarias, dependiendo de las características del proyecto. Con base en estos informes y al programa de monitoreo, la SETENA podrá ajustar el monto de la garantía y dictar medidas de acata miento obligatorio para mantener el proyecto, obra o actividad dentro de un margen de impacto ambiental controlado. El responsable y el propietario deberán brindar apoyo a las labores de la SETENA, en las inspecciones que esta efectúe."(...) SETIMO (sic): (...) 2) Previo al inicio de cada una de las 9 etapas (un mes antes del inicio de cada etapa) presente a esta Secretaría: Un Cuadro Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental de la etapa constructiva y operativa. De este modo cada uno de los factores de impacto ambiental analizados, en el cuadro de gestión ambiental, deben ser informados en detalle en los informes de regencia ambiental, conforme al avance de las obras o labores que se estén realizando in situ." (resolución de la SETENA y acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria visibles a folios 130 a 137 del tomo I del expediente administrativo y 124 a 133 del expediente judicial); 4).- Que la SETENA, en resolución de las once horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de julio del dos mil once, N°1782-2011-SETENA, (notificada al representante del proyecto ese mismo día); dispuso la paralización de las actividades constructivas en el proyecto "La Campiña" y confirió un plazo de veinte días hábiles al desarrollador para realizar las siguientes acciones: presentar el estudio socioeconómico; presentar el Cuadro Pronóstico de Gestión Ambiental para la primera etapa; así como para presentar una análisis pluvial hidrológico y de escorrentía superficial para todo el área del proyecto (ver copia de la resolución referida a folios 318 a 323 y 339 del tomo II del expediente administrativo) 5).- Que en memorial presentado ante la SETENA el veintiocho de julio del año dos mil once, los representantes de Corporación Jayalía S.A., plantearon recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio en contra de la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, referida en el hecho inmediato anterior. (ver copia del recurso planteado y del memorial solicitando la implementación de medidas de mitigación a folios 564 a 612 y 613 a 615 del tomo III del expediente administrativo); 6).- Que en escrito presentado ante la SETENA el diez de agosto del dos mil once, los representantes de Corporación Jayalía S.A., desistieron de los recursos de revocatoria y apelación. Lo anterior por considerar que había cumplido con los requerimientos de la resolución impugnada (folios 733 a 742del tomo III del expediente administrativo). 7).- Que en resolución N°1948-2011-SETENA, de las trece horas del diecisiete de agosto del dos mil once, la SETENA dispuso el levantamiento de la medida cautelar (folios 769 a 774 del tomo III del expediente administrativo).- II.- ALEGATOS DEL ACTOR: En lo esencial, el representante de la parte actora expone los siguientes argumentos como fundamento de su demanda: 1. Ilegalidad de la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA. Aduce que la referida resolución es un acto absolutamente nulo, con vicios en la forma, motivo, contenido y fin. Indica además, que no se hizo un procedimiento para verificar la verdad real de los hechos. 2. La conducta impugnada es un acto final disfrazado de medida cautelar: La resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA carece de los elementos característicos de la medida cautelar a saber: instrumentalidad, provisionalidad y accesoriedad. Señala que no había ninguna situación que asegurar, ni tampoco un procedimiento principal, puesto que la SETENA no había iniciado ninguna investigación y no tenía indicios en el sentido de que la ejecución del proyecto representaba una situación de riesgo ambiental. La medida no tenía ningún objetivo de naturaleza preventiva. 3. Es falso que el Cuadro pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental no fue presentado por su representada: Alega que la SETENA autorizó a la actora el inicio de las obras, cuyo desarrollo fue fiscalizado desde el inicio a través de las inspecciones realizadas por los funcionarios, así como mediante los informes realizados por el Regente Ambiental. Señala que si la SETENA presumía algún incumplimiento, debió hacer la prevención correspondiente. 4. Responsabilidad del Estado derivada de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por la paralización de las obras: La resolución impugnada es absolutamente nula y produjo efectos perjudiciales en la esfera jurídica de la actora, lo cual genera responsabilidad de la Administración en los términos de los numerales 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Expresa que los daños se produjeron durante la paralización de las obras y dice que éstas fueron impactadas negativamente. Además, implicó una estadía mayor en la obra, un aumento en el costo de mano de obra y maquinaria, un costo por el reinicio del proceso constructivo, gastos operativos, de diseño y de dirección. Las empresas contratistas debieron realizar despidos masivos y las correspondientes liquidaciones. Asimismo, manifiesta que se produjeron daños por ajuste del presupuesto, viajes, dirección del proyecto, entrenamiento del personal, publicidad negativa. Apunta que también sufrieron perjuicios por la utilidades dejadas de percibir, perjuicios financieros, utilidad del ejercicio y ventas a terceros. Por otra parte, en relación con la defensa de caducidad formulada por la personera del Estado, la representación de la parte actora argumentó que el acto de levantamiento de la medida cautelar tuvo lugar el diecisiete de agosto del dos mil once, y la demanda fue presentada ante el Tribunal el dieciséis de agosto del dos mil doce, lo cual, según afirmó, coloca la acción dentro del plazo de ley.

III.- ALEGATOS DEL DEMANDADO: La representante del Estado expresa los siguientes alegatos contra la demanda: 1. La medida de paralización de las obras se encuentra ajustada a derecho: Dice que la licencia de viabilidad ambiental estaba sujeta al cumplimiento de una serie de condiciones y requisitos que no fueron cumplidos por la desarrolladora. Considera que el incumplimiento de esos requisitos "conlleva por sí sola una amenaza y/o un daño al ambiente, suficiente para proceder a dictar medidas cautelares" (folio 777 exp.judicial). Manifiesta que la actora conocía las obligaciones derivadas de la resolución en la cual se le otorgó la viabilidad ambiental, y que además fue prevenida en repetidas oportunidades, en las cuales se le instó a cumplir con la presentación del informe de regencia ambiental. Indica que las prevenciones fueron cumplidas de forma extemporánea, y fue omitida la presentación del Cuadro Pronóstico Plan de Gestión. Alega que fue precisamente el incumplimiento de la actora lo que da lugar al Informe Técnico ASA-1221-2011 de dieciocho de julio del dos mil once, que sirvió como fundamento de la resolución aquí impugnada, la cual, dice, tiene una serie de competencias y facultades pala implementar medidas cautelares como la ordenada en este caso. 2.- Reconocimiento expreso por parte de la actora, de que no había cumplido con los requisitos exigidos en la resolución 1782-2011-SETENA: Manifiesta que la actora planteó recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución referida, y que posteriormente, en memorial de nueve de agosto del dos mil once, desistió de esas articulaciones. Ello, según afirma, es una prueba contundente de que había incumplido con sus obligaciones. 3. Los daños y perjuicios reclamados no fueron debidamente acreditados: Señala que no fueron aportados elementos de prueba idóneos que demuestren las repercusiones monetarias que dice haber tenido la actora. 4. Caducidad de la demanda: Alega además la caducidad, sobre la base de que la demanda le fue notificada hasta el cinco de noviembre del dos mil doce, habiendo transcurrido ya, de forma sobrada el plazo de un año establecido en el artículo 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

IV.- SOBRE LA DEFENSA DE CADUCIDAD ALEGADA: Precisamente por los efectos que produce la declaratoria de caducidad, en relación con las potestades del Tribunal en orden a conocer por el fondo los alegatos planteados en el asunto bajo examen, corresponde en primer término, resolver la defensa de caducidad formulada por la representante del Estado. Al contestar la demanda, la personera estatal aduce la defensa de caducidad, con fundamento en el artículo 39.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y dice que la demanda le fue notificada el cinco de noviembre del dos mil doce, sobrepasando, según afirma, el plazo de un año establecido en el referido numeral. En relación con esta defensa, el Tribunal considera que lleva razón la accionada, en cuanto sostiene que la demanda está caduca, sin embargo, no por las razones que aduce. Ciertamente la demanda le fue notificada el cinco de noviembre del dos mil doce, pero el artículo de referencia, no establece la notificación del traslado a la contraparte como uno de los parámetros para computar el plazo. La lectura correcta de dicho numeral es en el sentido de que el parámetro es la presentación de la demanda, de modo que a efecto de comprobar si ha operado o no la caducidad, el examen que corresponde realizar es en la línea de verificar el plazo transcurrido entre la fecha del dictado del acto impugnado y la presentación de la demanda, plazo que no puede resultar superior a un año. En este sentido el inciso primero de la norma dispone: "El plazo máximo para incoar el proceso será de un año (...)" (la negrita y el subrayado es suplido). Debe aclararse que, a pesar de lo dicho, respecto a la errada argumentación que hace la señora procuradora respecto de la defensa de caducidad, lo cierto es que compete a este Órgano decisor revisar de forma oficiosa la verificación de la máxima relacionada con la presentación de la demanda dentro del plazo de ley, lo cual se hace de seguido. Con la finalidad de hacer el examen de caducidad deben tenerse presentes los siguientes hechos de importancia: En la demanda fueron impugnados dos actos, uno de los cuales, la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, fue emitida y notificada a la actora el veintiuno de julio del dos mil once. La otra resolución que se ataca, es la 1948-2011-SETENA, emitida el diecisiete de agosto del dos mil once. Además, consta en autos que los representantes de Corporación Jayalía S.A., plantearon recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio mediante memorial presentado ante la SETENA el veintiocho de julio del dos mil once, sin embargo, también está acreditado que desistieron de dicha articulación en escrito presentado ante ese mismo órgano, el diez de agosto del dos mil once (folios 733 a 742 del Tomo III del expediente administrativo). Esta actuación de la parte actora, conforme a la cual desiste de los recursos planteados, provoca la firmeza del acto dictado en la resolución N°1782-2011-2011, de veintiuno de julio del dos mil once, de lo cual se sigue que, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el inciso 1° del artículo 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el plazo para incoar la demanda debe contarse a partir del día siguiente de su notificación. Esto ocurrió el mismo día en el cual fue dictada la resolución emitida por el SETENA -el veintiuno de julio del dos mil once-, luego el plazo habrá de contarse a partir del veintidós de julio del dos mil once, por lo que necesariamente, la expiración del plazo para plantear la demanda acaeció el veintidós de julio del año siguiente -dos mil doce-. Ahora bien, dicho lo anterior, y tomando en cuenta que la demanda fue presentada ente el Tribunal el dieciséis de agosto del dos mil doce, no queda más que declarar su caducidad, pues resulta evidente que ésta fue planteada con posterioridad a la fecha límite dentro de la cual su interposición puede considerarse oportuna, de conformidad con el plazo de caducidad dispuesto en el ordenamiento. Es preciso indicar que, aún y cuando el Tribunal compute el plazo a partir del momento en el cual los personeros de la actora desistieron de los recursos planteados contra el acto impugnado, lo cual no es procedente, no solamente porque la caducidad no puede ser interrumpida, sino además porque la Ley es clara en indicar que el plazo debe contarse a partir del día siguiente de la notificación del acto impugnado, la solución al examen de caducidad resultaría idéntico, toda vez que el desistimiento ocurrió el diez de agosto, y la demanda fue incoada seis días después. Además de lo anterior, es oportuno indicar que con ocasión del desistimiento, la resolución N°1948-2011-SETENA, emitida el diecisiete de agosto, no puede considerarse como el acto final de las actuaciones iniciadas mediante la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, siendo más bien una consecuencia de la presentación por parte de la actora de la documentación que le había sido prevenida. Más sencillo, cuando la parte actora desistió del recurso, el acto dictado en la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, adquirió firmeza. Así las cosas, la demanda debió presentarse a estrados judiciales en el plazo de un año contado a partir del veintidós de julio del del dos mil once, lo cual no ocurrió, pues ésta fue planteada el dieciséis de agosto del año dos mil doce. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que la demanda fue presentada de forma extemporánea respecto de dicha resolución. En lo que atañe a la resolución N°1948-2011-SETENA, la parte actora únicamente impugna su resultando II, en cuanto ordena el levantamiento de la medida, y por considerar que la nulidad de la resolución que dispuso la cautelar conlleva la nulidad de la que establece su levantamiento. Así, siendo que ésta pretensión no puede subsistir sin la relacionada con el examen de nulidad respecto de la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, ejercicio que no es posible llevar a cabo en virtud de la caducidad que ahora se declara, la vinculación del examen entre ambas resoluciones, establecida por el propio actor, impone que deba declararse la inadmisibilidad de la pretensión que reclama la declaratoria de nulidad de la resolución N°1945-2011-SETENA, pues resulta improponible, dado que la determinación de legalidad o no de dicho acto, pende, según lo manifestó el propio representante de la actora durante la audiencia preliminar y el juicio oral, de la nulidad de la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, cuya impugnación, por parte del actor, fue extemporánea. Por la forma en que se resuelve se omite pronunciamiento sobre el fondo.- V.- COSTAS: A tenor del artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas corresponden al vencido, y dado que en este caso no operan ninguno de los supuestos contemplados en el los inciso 1 y 2 del referido numeral, se condena a la parte actora al pago de ambas costas de esta acción.

POR TANTO

Se acoge la defensa de caducidad de la demanda respecto de la resolución N°1782-2011-SETENA, de veintiuno de julio del dos mil once. Se declara improponible la demanda respecto de la resolución N°1948-2011-SETENA, de diecisiete de agosto del dos mil once. Se declara inadmisible la demanda de Corporación Jayalía S.A y Viviendas y Proyectos Habitacionales de Costa Rica VIPROHAB S.A., contra el Estado. Son ambas costas de esta acción a cargo de la actora.

Ileana Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo