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Res. 00021-2016 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste · Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste · 2016
OutcomeResultado
The appeal was denied on all grounds and the conviction for illegal forest harvesting was upheld.La apelación fue rechazada en todos sus extremos y la condena por aprovechamiento forestal ilegal quedó confirmada.
SummaryResumen
The Guanacaste Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court upheld a three-month suspended prison sentence imposed on a farm caretaker for violating the Forestry Law by illegally harvesting timber in a protected zone. The accused was caught by MINAET officials while sawing and planing mahogany logs—an endangered species—cut from a stump located one meter from a stream bank, a protected area under Article 33(b) of the Forestry Law. The defense argued that the charges were invalid, lacked judicial impartiality, contained erroneous evidentiary analysis, and that the conduct was atypical because the accused merely "cobaleaba" (squared and planed) found wood. The appeals court reviewed the four grounds of appeal and held that the trial court's judgment was consistent, the evidence was properly assessed, and the acts of sawing, planing, and storing the wood into uniform boards constituted illegal harvesting under Article 3(a) of the Forestry Law. The court emphasized that the criminal provision does not require economic profit; it is sufficient if the action generates or could generate any advantage, benefit, utility, or gain, as demonstrated by leaving the wood ready for future use.El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste confirmó la condena de tres meses de prisión con ejecución condicional de la pena impuesta a un cuidador de finca por el delito de infracción a la Ley Forestal, en la modalidad de aprovechamiento ilegal de árboles maderables en zona de protección. El acusado fue sorprendido por funcionarios del MINAET mientras aserraba y cepillaba trozas de caoba —especie en peligro de extinción— provenientes de un tocón localizado a un metro de la orilla de una quebrada, área protegida conforme al artículo 33 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal. La defensa alegó nulidad de la acusación, violación al principio de juez natural, indebida valoración probatoria y atipicidad de la conducta al sostener que únicamente se "cobaleaba" la madera hallada para guardarla. El tribunal de apelación analizó los cuatro motivos del recurso y determinó que la sentencia de primera instancia fue congruente, que la prueba fue valorada correctamente y que los actos de aserrar, cepillar y almacenar las trozas en tablas uniformes configuraban por sí solos el aprovechamiento ilegal, conforme al artículo 3 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal. Destacó que el tipo penal no exige ánimo de lucro económico, sino que basta con que la acción genere o pueda generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia, como ocurrió al dejar la madera lista para su uso posterior.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The final grievance questioned the concept of "harvesting," arguing that the accused merely "cobaleaba" (squared and planed) the logs, meaning he cut, sawed, and planed them into symmetrical boards for later use. This conduct—sawing and planing the wood into uniform boards suitable for construction and storing them for future use—clearly indicates the objective of harvesting, as the purpose is achieved when the material can "generate any advantage, benefit, utility or gain." In this regard, Article 3(a) of the Forestry Law explicitly defines harvesting as: "For the purposes of this law, the following is considered: (a) Timber harvesting: The action of cutting down or removing standing timber trees or using felled trees, carried out on private land not covered by Article 1 of this law, that generates or could generate any advantage, benefit, utility or gain for the person carrying it out or for whom that person represents." In the same vein, this Court, though differently composed, has ruled on the scope of forest material harvesting, stating: "The sanctioned conduct is the harvesting of forest resources. This harvesting consists of the 'action of cutting down or removing standing timber trees or using felled trees... that generates or could generate any advantage, benefit, utility or gain...' (Article 3(a) of the Forestry Law). It is understood that economic gain is not required, given the various possibilities contemplated: 'As stated before, in criminal provisions regarding forest harvesting, there need not necessarily be a profit motive, understood as the intention or actual obtaining of any economically translatable benefit; on the contrary, the definition of timber harvesting in Article 3(a) of the Forestry Law expands the possibility that a crime is committed simply if the active subject, or the person represented, obtains any advantage, benefit, utility or gain. These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general. Many other advantages can result from harvesting; for example, the advantage of removing an obstruction that blocked the landscape or view, clearing the land for subsequent planting or construction, reducing forest density so that the land no longer qualifies as forest in order to obtain a clearcutting permit, among others' (González [Name], Manual de Delitos Ambientales, Judicial School, 2007, p. 267)." (Vote 175-10 of July 30, 2010; see similarly Vote 57-12 of February 10, 2012). Following this line of reasoning, the lower court noted: "This action of cobaleo, of taking a log, producing the planks, aligning them with a chainsaw and then smoothing them with a plane, was solely for the purpose of harvesting, a harvest that in no way implies selling the wood or demonstrating profit, even though its economic value was set at over fifty thousand colones; rather, it constitutes harvesting a wood resource for later use. It is illogical to take mahogany logs, produce planks, align those planks to a standardized measurement, and make them well-designed boards, and then claim they were not for harvesting but simply to store them in the hallway. Even analyzing the documentary evidence (...) all were the same length, width and thickness, ready to be used in construction or sold." (Folio 83). The judgment's conclusion is consistent with sound reason, as the form the accused gave the logs—into well-structured boards—fulfilled the objective of later use, in accordance with principles of logic and experience.Ahora bien, como último agravio, se cuestionó el concepto de "aprovechamiento", pues se indicó que lo que realizó el imputado fue "cobaliar", es decir, cortar, aserrar las trozas y cepillarlas para lograr tablas simétricas y almacenarlas para decidir que hacer con ellas con posterioridad. Esta conducta del acusado, de aserrar y cepillar la madera, cortarla en tablas uniformes aptas para ser utilizadas en cualquier construcción y almacenarlas para ser usadas con posterioridad, es un indicador claro del objetivo de aprovechamiento, pues se logra ese propósito cuando el material puede "generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia". Al respecto, el artículo 3 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal define concreta y claramente lo que es el aprovechamiento señalando: "Para los efectos de esta ley, se considera: a) Aprovechamiento maderable: Acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos, realizada en terrenos privados, no incluida en el artículo 1 de esta ley, que genere o pueda generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia para la persona que la realiza o para quien esta representa." En ese sentido, este Tribunal con integración parcialmente diferente se ha pronunciado respecto del alcance del aprovechamiento en material forestal indicando: "La conducta sancionada es el aprovechamiento del recurso forestal. Este aprovechamiento consiste en la "Acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos....que genere o pueda generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia..." (artículo 3. a) de la Ley Forestal). Se ha entendido que no se requiere ventaja económica, en vista de las varias posibilidades que se contemplan: "Como se dijo antes, en los tipos penales de aprovechamiento forestal, no debe existir necesariamente el ánimo de lucro, entendido como la intención o la obtención actual de algún tipo de beneficio que sea traducible en términos económicos, sino que, por el contrario, la definición de aprovechamiento maderable en el artículo 3, inciso a) de la LF, amplía la posibilidad de que se configure el delito, con solo que el sujeto activo, o su representada, obtengan algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia. Estos elementos no necesariamente implican la comercialización de la madera o el aspecto económico en general. Pueden existir otras muchas ventajas, como resultado de un aprovechamiento; por ejemplo, la ventaja de la eliminación de un estorbo que tapaba el paisaje o la vista, la limpieza del terreno para una posterior plantación o construcción, la disminución de la densidad boscosa para lograr que el terreno no califique como bosque, para obtener así el permiso de tala rasa, entre otros" (González [Nombre22] , Manual de Delitos Ambientales, Escuela Judicial, 2007, página 267)." (Voto 175-10 de 9.30 horas de 30 de julio de 2010; en ese mismo sentido ver también el voto 57-12 de 10:15 horas de 10 de febrero de 2012). Siguiendo esta línea de pensamiento el juzgador señaló que: "Esa acción de cobaleo, de tomar una troza, sacar los tablones, alinearlos con motosierra y posteriormente afinarlos con cepillo es con la única intención de su aprovechamiento, aprovechamiento que en ningún momento implica la venta de esa madera o la demostración de un lucro, aunque se estableció su valor económico en más de cincuenta mil colones, sino en un aprovechamiento como recurso de madera, para ser utilizadas con posterioridad. No es lógico tomar trozas de madera de caoba, sacar [tablones], alinear esos [tablones] hasta darle una medida estándar a cada uno y que queden [tablas] bien diseñadas y pensar que no son para el aprovechamiento, sino simplemente para acomodarlas en el corredor. Incluso al analizar la prueba documental (...) todas tenían el mismo largo, el mismo ancho y el mismo grueso, listas para ser utilizadas en construcción o vendidas." (Folio 83). La conclusión a la que llega la sentencia, es congruente con las reglas de la sana crítica, pues finalmente la forma que el encartado dio a las trozas, en tablas bien estructuradas, cumplían con el objetivo de ser utilizadas posteriormente, de acuerdo a los principios de la lógica y la experiencia.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Esta conducta del acusado, de aserrar y cepillar la madera, cortarla en tablas uniformes aptas para ser utilizadas en cualquier construcción y almacenarlas para ser usadas con posterioridad, es un indicador claro del objetivo de aprovechamiento, pues se logra ese propósito cuando el material puede "generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia"."
"This conduct of the accused—sawing and planing the wood, cutting it into uniform boards suitable for any construction and storing them for later use—is a clear indicator of the objective of harvesting, as that purpose is achieved when the material can 'generate any advantage, benefit, utility or gain.'"
Considerando I
"Esta conducta del acusado, de aserrar y cepillar la madera, cortarla en tablas uniformes aptas para ser utilizadas en cualquier construcción y almacenarlas para ser usadas con posterioridad, es un indicador claro del objetivo de aprovechamiento, pues se logra ese propósito cuando el material puede "generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia"."
Considerando I
"Se ha entendido que no se requiere ventaja económica, en vista de las varias posibilidades que se contemplan (...). Estos elementos no necesariamente implican la comercialización de la madera o el aspecto económico en general."
"It is understood that an economic advantage is not required, given the various possibilities contemplated (...). These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general."
Considerando I (citando jurisprudencia anterior)
"Se ha entendido que no se requiere ventaja económica, en vista de las varias posibilidades que se contemplan (...). Estos elementos no necesariamente implican la comercialización de la madera o el aspecto económico en general."
Considerando I (citando jurisprudencia anterior)
"No es lógico tomar trozas de madera de caoba, sacar tablones, alinear esos tablones hasta darle una medida estándar a cada uno y que queden tablas bien diseñadas y pensar que no son para el aprovechamiento, sino simplemente para acomodarlas en el corredor."
"It is illogical to take mahogany logs, produce planks, align those planks to a standardized measurement, and make them well-designed boards, and then claim they were not for harvesting but simply to store them in the hallway."
Considerando I
"No es lógico tomar trozas de madera de caoba, sacar tablones, alinear esos tablones hasta darle una medida estándar a cada uno y que queden tablas bien diseñadas y pensar que no son para el aprovechamiento, sino simplemente para acomodarlas en el corredor."
Considerando I
Full documentDocumento completo
***130003510396PE*** ***130003510396PE*** **VOTO 21 - 16** **TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL DE GUANACASTE.** Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz seat. At fifteen hundred hours on the fourth of February, two thousand sixteen.
Appeal (Recurso de apelación) filed in the present case number 13-000351-0356-pe against **[Nombre1]** , identity document number 502000017, born on March 29, 1962, son of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3], for the crime of **INFRACCIÓN A LEY FORESTAL**, to the detriment of **LOS RECURSOS NATURALES**. Participating in the decision of the appeal are judges Cynthia Dumani Stradtmann, [Nombre4] Lucila Monge Pizarro and judge Rodrigo Obando Santamaría. Attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the accused, appeared at this venue.
**RESULTANDO**
1.- By judgment No. 169-2015 at fourteen hundred hours on the eighth of May, two thousand fifteen, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia seat, resolved: "POR TANTO: In accordance with Articles 1, 28, 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, Article 8.1 and 8.2 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 1, 30, 31, 45, 50, 51, 59, 60, 62 and 71 of the Penal Code, Articles 1, 3, 58 and 66 of the Ley Forestal, Articles 1, 6, 141, 142, 144, 184, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [Nombre6] is declared the responsible author of the crime of Infringement of the Ley Forestal in the form of use (aprovechamiento) of timber trees in a protection zone, committed to the detriment of Los Recursos Naturales, and in that capacity is imposed the sentence of THREE MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT, a penalty that shall be served at the place and in the manner indicated by the respective penitentiary regulations, upon crediting the pretrial detention suffered. Considering it appropriate, the convicted person is granted the BENEFIT OF CONDITIONAL EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE for a probation period of THREE YEARS, on the understanding that during said period he must not be convicted of a new intentional crime for which a prison sentence exceeding six months is imposed, for in such event, the benefit here granted will be revoked and he must serve the imposed sentence in prison. The costs of the criminal proceeding are the responsibility of the State. Once the judgment is final, register it in the Judicial Registry and send the corresponding testimonials to the Sentence Execution Court (Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena) and the National Institute of Criminology. In accordance with Article 58 of the Ley Forestal and 110 of the Penal Code, the confiscation (comiso) in favor of the State of the Husquarna brand chainsaw, model 460, serial number 075000500, and the timber logs is ordered; the judicial depositary is required to deliver them to the Criminal Court of Guanacaste, Liberia Seat, within five days following the finality of this judgment.- Notify.- Lic. Guillermo Arce Arias Trial Judge". (sic).
2.- Against the preceding pronouncement, attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the accused, filed an appeal (recurso de apelación).
3.- Having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the questions raised in the appeal. In the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed. Drafted by Judge [Nombre7]; and, **CONSIDERANDO** I- In the first ground, the defendant's counsel alleges nullity of the accusation for reporting a false fact, since the defendant was accused of illegal logging within the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal; however, the MINAET officers stated that the defendant was on a private property neighboring the refuge when he was surprised by the authorities; therefore, the Public Prosecutor's Office reported a false fact. He states that although the defendant was not convicted of felling a tree within the Refugio de Vida Silvestre, property of the State, the judgment lacks analysis regarding the lack of proof of the fact accused as having occurred in the protected area. He requests that the absolute nullity of the accusatory pleading, the hearing held, and the verdict be declared, and that a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) be issued in favor of the accused. In the second ground, he alleges violation of the principle of the natural judge for lack of objectivity, improper substantiation of the judgment, and erroneous assessment of the evidence. He alleges that the judge carried out an inadequate analysis of the evidence by only taking excerpts from the statements, failing in the duty of objectivity. In that sense, he indicates that regarding the statement of the accused, [Nombre1], his information was misunderstood, because the timber boards were found and, to store them by virtue of their irregularity, it was necessary to "square them up (cobaliarla)"; and it was not 5 timber logs that were taken but 5 boards. Regarding the witness [Nombre8], in response to a question from the defense aimed at determining the use of the chainsaw, he stated that there was no sawdust when the accused was intercepted; while another witness for the Public Prosecutor's Office said there was, a contradictory situation that the court did not explain. He states that the defendant's son confirmed that the defendant's only action was to "square up (cobaliar)" the boards, which was interpreted by the court as intent for use (aprovechamiento); however, he argues that it was only to arrange them. He stated that the judge set forth contradictory grounds, giving credibility to the two witnesses from the accusing body, who he considered came to lie, specifically [Nombre9] and [Nombre10], and from their accounts contradictions could be distinguished related to the manner and means of entry to the house: witness [Nombre11] says they went part of the way by car and the rest on foot; witness [Nombre12] said they arrived directly by car at the house; witness [Nombre11] indicated that they observed a [Placa1]; witness [Nombre12] mentioned that the drag trail was of timber; witness [Nombre11] affirmed that from the first time they heard the chainsaw they traveled between 500 and 600 meters until they reached the house where the defendant was, taking 10 minutes; witness [Nombre12] said the time was 45 minutes traveling the same distance; witness [Nombre11] said there was no sawdust where the accused was planing the board, and witness [Nombre12] that there was; witness [Nombre11] stated that the stump with the timber logs were in a flat and accessible place, and witness [Nombre12] indicated that the place was steep and not accessible. He states that, as the defense witnesses testified, the sound of the chainsaw that the officers heard corresponds to the moment when the timber was being "squared up (cobaliaba)" at the house on the farm itself by order of the defendant's employer, for the finding and transfer of the timber to the dwelling had occurred several hours earlier. He considers that it has not been proven what the illegal use (aprovechamiento) consisted of. In the third claim, he alleges violation of the rules of sound criticism for error in the appreciation of the evidence, since the judgment indicated that the accused used (aprovechó) a timber tree of the Caoba (Mahogany) species, located in a protection zone, without there being evidence to prove that appreciation by the judge, as it was a finding of timber when the accused was working as caretaker of the private farm that borders the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Junquillal. He states that the defense witnesses indicated that the accused had called the MINAET offices in Pocosol by phone, but they did not answer him. He adds that the accused indicated that he was not the one who was squaring up (cobaliando) but his sons, so there is no illegal conduct by the accused. He claims that it was the officers who presumed that the accused had felled the tree, but they did not see him, nor is there any evidence proving this action. He indicates that the defendant suffers from a spinal hernia, so it was not possible for him to fell and use (aprovechar) the tree, extracting five caoba boards and moving them 200 meters from the site to his house. He points out that there was no timber use (aprovechamiento de madera), because it has not been proven that the accused benefited from the timber felled by "antisocial elements", and the reason it was sawn was solely to arrange it, a situation the judge interpreted as an act of use (aprovechamiento). He states that there has been no illegal use (aprovechamiento) because no type of use or benefit occurred, as it was a finding of illegally felled timber, which was hauled and arranged. In the fourth ground, he alleges improper legal classification, unlawfulness, and culpability. He claims that from none of the evidence produced can it be deduced that the timber was used (aprovechada), but rather that it was "squared up (cobaliada)" to store it, until the property owner decided what was appropriate, which was stated by the defense witnesses, a version that was not discredited by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He considers that the court failed in its duty of objectivity and assessed the evidence erroneously, since the sanctioned conduct is atypical, as "use (aprovechamiento) ultimately supposes an advantage, use or benefit, for consideration or gratuitous, from the action of cutting, eliminating standing timber trees or utilizing fallen trees, which has not occurred in any of these cases ... the timber has not been obtained as a product of any action of cutting, eliminating standing timber trees or utilizing fallen trees, but rather the timber was obtained as a product of a finding from illegal logging by third persons, timber that was already sawn..." (folio 120 front); he stated that the defendant is a worker on the property and is not the registered owner, and his sole participation was hauling it to the farm house and squaring it up (cobaliarla) to be able to store it; thus, no crime existed, facts he considers have not been contradicted, so the use (aprovechamiento) indicated in the judgment is conjecture. He adds that the defendant indicated that it was guácimo wood, as that was what he was planing to use as a support to arrange the caoba wood. He requests that the verdict be declared ineffective, the hearing annulled, and a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) be issued in favor of the accused, returning the chainsaw. In the alternative, he requests that the case be remanded for a new proceeding with the requirement of correcting the accusatory pleading. The grounds are resolved jointly, and the appeal is denied. The judgment established as proven that on December 29, 2012, approximately at 17:30 hours, the defendant [Nombre6], was surprised by MINAET officials when, by using a chainsaw, he illegally used (aprovechó) a tree of the Caoba species (which is in danger of extinction) that was located in the protection zone of a stream, without having the permits from the State Forest Administration, and they proceeded to seize 3 logs and 4 boards of the caoba species from him (folio 5). The defense appeals on four specific grounds: Regarding the first, it considered the existence of a defective activity by having introduced into the accusation that the defendant had felled the caoba tree, as it says that action was not reported. In this regard, in the present matter it has been a non-controversial fact that the MINAET officials, while patrolling the surroundings of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal and following the sound of a chainsaw, found the accused [Nombre13] at the house on a farm adjacent to the Refuge, sawing some logs from a caoba tree, turning them into boards. It was also determined that said logs came from a stump of a tree of the caoba species located at the edge of a stream, since, according to the experience of the MINAET security agent Junior [Nombre14], what was being sawn was not of the guácimo species as the accused initially alleged. In that sense, the witness stated: "... we said we were going to inspect the farm, we followed a vehicle track looking for forest area until we came upon a caoba tree stump, there was a log that had been used (aprovechada) which, in our opinion, coincided in diameter, length, and thickness with what the man was planing at the house, there were three unused logs (...) the tree was in a protection zone because it was in the protection zone one meter from the edge of the stream and it was a prohibited tree because it was in danger of extinction..." (evidence summary folios 73 front and back); therefore, the judgment established as proven that the sawn boards came from the stump of a tree of the caoba species located in the protected area of a stream; which was also admitted by the defendant himself (folios 72 front and back and 83). Additionally, it was proven that the defendant lacked authorization from the respective forest administration to use (aprovechar) forest material, which was also admitted by the accused (the accused arguing that he was sawing another species that does not require that permit). The court explained that, even though the defendant had also been accused of felling the tree, this action described in the accusation had not been proven, but the use (aprovechamiento) of the logs from a caoba tree had been proven, a species that is on the path to extinction, for which its use (aprovechamiento) required authorization from the State Forest Administration (folio 78 back). This situation (where the facts of the accusation were partially proven), does not violate the principle of congruence provided for in Article 365 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor can it be considered a lack of truthfulness by the prosecutor who drafted the accusation, since, according to the complaint on folios 1 to 4, ratified by the MINAET officers at the hearing, the investigation originated upon hearing a chainsaw operating in the vicinity of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal. So the forest rangers undertook the task of locating the site where they were logging, which led them to the neighboring property called "Finca La Bavaria" (folio 5) and to the house where the accused was "squaring up (cobaliando)" (that is, sawing) and planing 3 timber logs and 4 boards, for the purpose of storing them, with the accused indicating that "for the moment it was not planned to use the wood but to wait ..." (folio 72 back). It was not specified whether the stump of the caoba tree was inside or outside the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal, but it was demonstrated that it was at the edge of a stream (approximately one meter distant according to the MINAET report on folio 2), a site which, according to Article 33 subsection b) of the Ley Forestal, is also a protected area (zona protegida) and therefore a permit must be requested for the cutting of trees. Therefore, the first claim is unfounded. The same conclusion is reached regarding the second ground, for it is alleged that it was only timber boards, but the defendant himself, in the account given at trial, indicated that "we took 5 logs" (folio 72 back), which they then proceeded to "square up (cobaliar)" and plane; it was also indicated by the witness [Nombre8], verifying from the documentary evidence that three logs and four timber boards of the Caoba species were seized (report on folios 1 to 4, record on folio 5). The complaint regarding the difference in distance and time between the stream and the house is also not admissible, something that was evidenced at the hearing when the MINAET officials testified. In that sense, the accused confirmed that the forest rangers arrived where he was planing the wood and that they later went to look for the tree stump, which was at the edge of the stream, so the discussion has no significance, for in any case it is an approximate calculation that each of the witnesses gave and not a measurement they made with precision. In relation to the third grievance, the a quo indicated that the use (aprovechamiento) was demonstrated when the wood from the caoba tree was sawn, planed, and stored, and that it was not proven that the defendant felled the tree when it was standing at the edge of the stream, so the discussion about the defendant's spinal ailment that prevented him from felling a tree is sterile, as the use (aprovechamiento) of the timber was proven through the acts subsequent to the felling of the caoba tree, performed by the defendant. Nor is the claim admissible that the defendant was not the one "squaring up (cobaliaba)" the wood from the caoba tree. In that sense, the verdict stated that the two MINAET officers were clear in their account in identifying the defendant as the person who was sawing and planing the timber logs. The court highlighted that the defendant himself had admitted it in his statement, which can be observed in the evidence summary when the accused said "I was cutting a ruler with a handsaw (...)" (folio 72 back). The accused at trial attempted to pin the planing acts on his sons, and make it be believed that when he cut wood it was of another species (guácimo); however, the MINAET representatives indicated that it was the defendant whom they saw performing the planing work on the wood from the caoba tree. Thus, the witness [Nombre15] said: "...we continued on foot until reaching a little house where there was a blue pickup vehicle, next to it was Mr. [Nombre16] (defendant) planing pieces, we identified ourselves as MINAE authorities, asked for permits for the wood and he said that for guácimo wood he did not need a permit, and as it gave us suspicion that it was not guácimo due to the color, we said we were going to inspect the farm, we followed a vehicle track looking for forest area until we came upon a caoba tree stump, there was a log that had been used (aprovechada) which, in our opinion, coincided in diameter, length, and thickness with what the man was planing at the house..." (folio 73 front). The witness [Nombre17] also referred in that sense: "[Nombre18] behaved normally but failed by lying to us, telling us one wood species when in reality it was another; what he insisted on was that it was guácimo (...) We arrived and he was working the wood. [Nombre18] was finishing the wood with a hand planer. Near him there was a child. The cabo species is a type of tree that is under a ban, there are no permits for it (...) If there had been another person sawing or planing the wood, we would have had to note it in the report..." (folio 75 front). For the judge, there was no reason not to believe the forest rangers, as their report and account arises solely from the duty to perform their job. In this line of thought, the report and seizure record (folios 1 to 5) pointed out the defendant as the person who was "planing (manually) some timber into boards of the caoba species (Swietenia marophylla)." No one else was pointed out. Regarding the defendant's actions, the Court stated: "This is also accepted by [Nombre1] and his son, the witness [Nombre19], who declared that they indeed moved the logs and planks from the place where the caoba tree was cut to the house or the place where the house was being built, which is to say, that the caoba tree, in logs and planks, was moved from the place where it was felled to the place where the caretaker's house was being built, and that at that place, [Nombre1] decided to 'square up (cobaliar)' the boards, a word whose meaning, according to what he himself stated at the hearing, consists of aligning the boards or planks with a chainsaw and subsequently with a hand planer to leave them well prepared, as [Nombre20] also indicated in his statement." (folio 83 front). Even though at some point the son participated by planing the boards, he also stated, speaking in the plural, that: "...we were squaring them up (cobaliando) to arrange them and store them..." (folio 76); which allowed the court to establish that there may have been participation by the witness (which was not included in the accusation), but this does not discredit that the main action and the decisions had been made by [Nombre21], who decided to take the logs, "square them up (cobaliarlas)", plane them, and store them (folio 80). Additionally, it is important to add that the defendant indicated that his job was surveillance on the farm. However, the crime of use (aprovechamiento) of the timber was committed by the defendant, and his responsibility is personal, as he himself admitted that the logs were at the edge of the stream and that he took them to saw and plane them at the farm house, a fact recorded in the judgment (folio 79); therefore, the ground is rejected. Now, as a final grievance, the concept of "use (aprovechamiento)" was questioned, for it was indicated that what the defendant did was "square up (cobaliar)", that is, cut, saw the logs, and plane them to achieve symmetrical boards and store them to decide later what to do with them. This conduct of the accused, of sawing and planing the wood, cutting it into uniform boards suitable for use in any construction and storing them for later use, is a clear indicator of the objective of use (aprovechamiento), for that purpose is achieved when the material can "generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain". In this regard, Article 3, subsection a) of the Ley Forestal concretely and clearly defines what use (aprovechamiento) is, stating: "For the purposes of this law, the following shall be considered: a) Timber use (Aprovechamiento maderable): The action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees, or utilization of fallen trees, carried out on private lands, not included in Article 1 of this law, which generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain for the person performing it or for whom that person represents." In that sense, this Court, with partially different integration, has ruled regarding the scope of use (aprovechamiento) in forest material, indicating: "The sanctioned conduct is the use (aprovechamiento) of the forest resource. This use (aprovechamiento) consists of the 'Action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees, or utilization of fallen trees.... that generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain...' (Article 3 a) of the Ley Forestal). It has been understood that economic advantage is not required, in view of the various possibilities contemplated: 'As stated before, in criminal types of forest use (aprovechamiento forestal), there need not necessarily exist profit motive, understood as the intention or actual obtaining of some type of benefit that is translatable into economic terms, but rather, on the contrary, the definition of timber use (aprovechamiento maderable) in Article 3, subsection a) of the LF, broadens the possibility that the crime is configured, merely if the active subject, or the represented party, obtains some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain. These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general. Many other advantages may exist as a result of a use (aprovechamiento); for example, the advantage of eliminating an obstruction that blocked the landscape or view, clearing the land for a later planting or construction, reducing forest density so that the land does not qualify as forest, to thus obtain the clear-cutting permit, among others' (González [Nombre22], Manual de Delitos Ambientales, Judicial School, 2007, page 267)." (Voto 175-10 of 9:30 hours on July 30, 2010; in the same sense, see also Voto 57-12 of 10:15 hours on February 10, 2012). Following this line of thought, the judge pointed out that: "That action of squaring up (cobaleo), of taking a log, extracting the planks, aligning them with a chainsaw and subsequently smoothing them with a hand planer, is with the sole intention of their use (aprovechamiento), [Placa2] which in no moment implies the sale of that wood or the demonstration of a profit, although its economic value was established at more than fifty thousand colones, but rather a use (aprovechamiento) as a timber resource, to be utilized later. It is not logical to take caoba wood logs, extract [Placa3], align those [Placa3] to give each one a standard measurement and so that [Placa4] are well designed, and think they are not for use (aprovechamiento), but simply to arrange them in the corridor. Even when analyzing the documentary evidence (...) they all had the same length, the same width, and the same thickness, ready to be used in construction or sold." (Folio 83). The conclusion reached by the judgment is congruent with the rules of sound criticism, for ultimately the form the defendant gave to the logs, into well-structured boards, fulfilled the objective of being used later, according to the principles of logic and experience. Consequently, the appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the defendant [Nombre1], is denied.
**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the defendant [Nombre1], is denied. NOTIFY.
CYNTHIA DUMANI STRADTMANN [Nombre4] LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO RODRIGO OBANDO SANTAMARÍA APPELLATE JUDGES C/ [Nombre6] OF./ LA LEY FORESTAL D./ CDUMANI Judicial Circuit of Santa Cruz, [Dirección1], Phones: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Email: [...]
RESULTANDO
1.- By judgment no. 169-2015 of fourteen hundred hours on eight May two thousand fifteen, the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia seat, resolved: "POR TANTO: In accordance with articles 1, 28, 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, article 8.1 and 8.2 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, articles 1, 30, 31, 45, 50, 51, 59, 60, 62 and 71 of the Criminal Code, articles 1, 3, 58 and 66 of the Ley Forestal, articles 1, 6, 141, 142, 144, 184, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [Nombre6] is declared the responsible party for the crime of Violation of the Ley Forestal in its modality of harvesting (aprovechamiento) of timber trees in a protection zone, committed to the detriment of Natural Resources, and in such capacity is hereby sentenced to THREE MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT, a penalty to be served in the place and manner indicated by the respective penitentiary regulations, after crediting the preventive detention served. Deeming it appropriate, the convicted person is granted the BENEFIT OF CONDITIONAL EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE for a probation period of THREE YEARS, on the understanding that during said period he must not be convicted of a new intentional crime for which a prison sentence exceeding six months is imposed, as in that event, the benefit granted here will be revoked and he must serve the imposed sentence in prison. The costs of the criminal proceedings are to be borne by the State. Once the judgment is final, let it be registered in the Judicial Register and let the standard certified copies be sent to the Sentence Execution Court and the National Institute of Criminology. In accordance with article 58 of the Ley Forestal and 110 of the Criminal Code, the confiscation (comiso) in favor of the State is ordered of the chainsaw brand Husqvarna model 460, series 075000500, and of the wood logs; warning the judicial depositary to deliver them to the Criminal Court of Guanacaste, Liberia Seat, within five days following the finality of this judgment.- Notifíquese.- Lic. Guillermo Arce Arias Trial Judge" (sic).
2.- Against the preceding ruling, attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the defendant, filed an appeal.
3.- Having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court addressed the issues raised in the appeal. The pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by Judge [Nombre7]; and,
CONSIDERANDO
I- In the first ground, the defendant's counsel alleges nullity of the accusation for reporting a false fact, since the defendant was accused of illegal felling within the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal; however, the MINAET officials stated that the defendant was on a private property neighboring the refuge when he was surprised by the authorities; therefore, the Public Prosecutor's Office reported a false fact. He states that although the defendant was not convicted of felling a tree within the Refugio de Vida Silvestre, property of the State, the judgment lacks analysis regarding the lack of demonstration of the fact alleged to have occurred in the protected area. He requests that the absolute nullity of the accusatory document, the hearing held, and the ruling be declared, and that a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) be issued in favor of the accused. In the second ground, he alleges violation of the principle of natural judge for lack of objectivity, improper reasoning of the judgment, and erroneous assessment of the evidence. He alleges that the judge conducted an inadequate analysis of the evidence by merely taking excerpts from the statements, failing the duty of objectivity. In that sense, he indicates that regarding the statement of the accused [Nombre1], his information was misunderstood, since the wooden boards were found and, to store them due to their irregularity, they had to be "planed" (cobaliarla); and it was not 5 wood logs that were taken but 5 boards. Regarding the witness [Nombre8], in response to a question from the defense aimed at determining the use of the chainsaw, he stated that there was no sawdust when the accused was intercepted; while another witness for the Public Prosecutor's Office said there was, so it is a contradictory situation that the court did not explain. He states that the defendant's son confirmed that the only action of the accused was "planing" (cobaliar) the boards, which was interpreted by the court as an intention of harvesting (aprovechamiento); however, he argues it was solely to arrange them. He stated that the judge set forth contradictory grounds, giving credibility to the two witnesses of the accusing body, whom he considered came to lie, specifically [Nombre9] and [Nombre10], and from their accounts, contradictions could be distinguished related to the form and means of entering the house: witness [Nombre11] says they went part by car and part on foot; witness [Nombre12] said they arrived directly by car to the house; witness [Nombre11] pointed out that they observed a [Placa1]; witness [Nombre12] mentioned that the drag mark was of wood; witness [Nombre11] affirmed that from the first time they heard the chainsaw, they traveled between 500 and 600 meters until they reached the house where the defendant was, taking 10 minutes; witness [Nombre12] said the time was 45 minutes traveling the same distance; witness [Nombre11] said there was no sawdust where the accused was planing the board, and witness [Nombre12] that there was; witness [Nombre11] stated that the stump with the wood logs was in a flat and accessible place, and witness [Nombre12] indicated that the place was steep and not accessible. He states that, according to the defense witnesses, the sound of the chainsaw that the officers heard corresponds to the moment when the wood was being "planed" (cobaliaba) at the house on the farm itself by order of the defendant's employer, since the discovery and transfer of the wood to the dwelling had occurred several hours earlier. He considers that what the illegal harvesting (aprovechamiento) consisted of has not been proven. In the third complaint, he asserts a violation of the rules of sound criticism due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence, since the judgment indicated that the accused harvested (aprovechó) a timber tree of the Mahogany (Caoba) species, located in a protection zone, without there being evidence that accredits that assessment by the judge, since it involved a discovery of wood when the accused was working as caretaker of the private farm that borders the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Junquillal. He states that the defense witnesses indicated that the convicted person had called the MINAET offices in Pocosol by phone, but they did not answer him. He adds that the accused indicated that he was not the one planing (cobaliando) but his sons, so there is no illegal conduct on the part of the accused. He complains that it was the officers who presumed that the accused had felled the tree, but they did not see him, nor is there evidence that accredits this action. He indicates that the defendant suffers from a hernia in the spinal column, so it was not possible for him to fell and harvest the tree, taking out five mahogany boards and moving them 200 meters from the site to his house. He points out that there was no wood harvesting (aprovechamiento), since it has not been proven that the defendant benefited from the wood felled by "antisocials"; furthermore, the reason why it was sawn was solely to accommodate it, a situation that the judge interpreted as an act of harvesting (aprovechamiento). He states that there was no illegal harvesting (aprovechamiento) because no type of use or benefit occurred, as it involved a discovery of illegally felled wood, which was hauled and accommodated. In the fourth ground, he alleges incorrect legal classification, unlawfulness, and culpability. He claims that from none of the evidence adduced can it be inferred that the wood was harvested (aprovechada), but rather that it was "planed" (cobaliada) to store it, until the property owner decided what was appropriate, which was stated by the defense witnesses, a version not discredited by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He considers that the court failed in its duty of objectivity and assessed the evidence mistakenly, since the sanctioned conduct is atypical, given that "harvesting (el aprovechamiento) ultimately supposes an advantage, use, or benefit, whether onerous or gratuitous, from the action of cutting, eliminating standing timber trees, or utilizing fallen trees, which has not occurred in any of these cases... the wood was not obtained as a product of any action of cutting, eliminating standing timber trees, or utilizing fallen trees, but rather the wood was obtained as a result of a discovery from the illegal felling by third parties, wood that was already sawn..." (folio 120 front); he stated that the defendant is a worker on the property and is not the registered owner, and his only participation was hauling it to the farm house and planing it (cobaliarla) to be able to store it, so no crime existed, facts he considers have not been controverted, so the harvesting (aprovechamiento) indicated in the judgment is conjecture. He adds that the defendant indicated it was guácimo wood, since that was what he was planing to use as support to arrange the mahogany wood. He requests that the ruling be declared ineffective, the hearing be annulled, and a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) be issued in favor of the accused, returning the chainsaw. In the alternative, he requests that it be remanded for a new proceeding with the requirement of correcting the accusatory document. The grounds are resolved jointly and the appeal is dismissed. The judgment established as proven that on December 29, 2012, at approximately 5:30 p.m., the defendant [Nombre6] was surprised by MINAET officials when, through the use of a chainsaw, he illegally harvested (aprovechó) a tree of the Mahogany (Caoba) species (which is in danger of extinction) that was located in the protection zone of a stream (quebrada), without having the permits from the State Forestry Administration, for which reason they proceeded to seize 3 logs and 4 boards of the mahogany (Caoba) species (folio 5). The defense appeals on four specific grounds: Regarding the first, he considered the existence of a defective action in having introduced in the accusation that the defendant had felled the mahogany tree, as he says that action was not reported. In this regard, in the present matter, it has been an uncontroverted fact that the MINAET officials, when patrolling the surroundings of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal and following the sound of a chainsaw, found, at the house of a farm adjacent to the Refuge, the accused [Nombre13] sawing some logs from a mahogany tree, turning them into boards. It was also determined that said logs came from a stump of a tree of the mahogany species located on the bank of a stream, since, according to the experience of MINAET security agent Junior [Nombre14], what was being sawn was not of the guácimo species as the accused initially alleged. In that sense, the witness stated: "...we said we were going to inspect the farm, we followed a vehicle track looking for a forest area until we came upon a stump of a mahogany tree, there was a harvested (aprovechada) log that in our judgment matched in diameter, length, and thickness what the man was planing at the house, there were three unharvested (no aprovechadas) logs (...) the tree was in a protection zone because it was in a protection zone one meter from the bank of the stream and it was a protected tree because it was in danger of extinction..." (evidence summary folio 73 front and back), therefore the judgment established as proven that the sawn boards came from the stump of a mahogany tree located in the protected area of a stream; which was also admitted by the defendant himself (folio 72 front and back and 83). Additionally, it was proven that the defendant lacked authorization from the respective forestry administration to harvest forest material, which was also admitted by the accused (the accused arguing that he was sawing another species that does not require such a permit). The court explained that, even though the defendant had also been accused of felling the tree, this action described in the accusation had not been demonstrated, but rather the harvesting (aprovechamiento) of the logs from a mahogany tree, a species that is in danger of extinction, for which reason its harvesting (aprovechamiento) required authorization from the State Forestry Administration (folio 78 back). This situation (that the facts of the accusation were partially proven) does not violate the principle of congruence provided for in article 365 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor can it be considered a falsehood on the part of the prosecutor drafting the accusation, since, according to the complaint on folios 1 to 4, ratified by the MINAET officers in the hearing, the investigation originated upon hearing a chainsaw operating in the vicinity of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal. Therefore, the forest guards undertook the task of locating the site where they were felling, which led them to the neighboring property called "Finca La Bavaria" (folio 5) and to the house where the accused was "planing" (cobaliando) (that is, sawing) and planing 3 wood logs and 4 boards, in order to store them, the accused indicating that "for the moment, it was not thought to use the wood but to wait..." (folio 72 back). It was not specified whether the stump of the mahogany tree was inside or outside the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal, but it was demonstrated that it was on the bank of a stream (approximately one meter away according to the MINAET report on folio 2), a site that, according to article 33 subsection b) of the Ley Forestal, is also a protected zone and therefore permission must be requested for cutting trees. Therefore, the first complaint is without merit. The same conclusion is reached with the second ground, as it is alleged that it only involved wooden boards, but the defendant himself, in the account given at trial, indicated that "we took 5 logs" (folio 72 back), which they then proceeded to "plane" (cobaliar) and plane; witness [Nombre8] also indicated this, and it was verified from the documentary evidence that three logs and four wooden boards of the Mahogany species were seized (report on folios 1 to 4, acta on folio 5). The complaint regarding the difference in distance and time between the stream and the house is also not admissible, which became evident in the hearing when the MINAET officials testified. In that sense, the accused confirmed that the forest guards arrived where he was planing the wood and that they later went to look for the tree stump, which was on the bank of the stream, so the discussion has no relevance whatsoever, as in any case it is an approximate calculation that each of the witnesses gave and not a measurement they made with precision. In relation to the third grievance, the a quo indicated that the harvesting (aprovechamiento) was demonstrated when the wood from the mahogany tree was sawn, planed, and stored, and that it was not proven that the defendant felled the tree when it was standing on the bank of the stream, so the discussion about the defendant's spinal condition that prevented him from felling a tree is sterile, since the harvesting of the wood was proven through the acts subsequent to the felling of the mahogany tree, carried out by the defendant. The complaint that the defendant was not the one "planing" (cobaliaba) the wood from the mahogany tree is also without merit. In that sense, the ruling stated that the two MINAET officers were clear in their account in identifying the defendant as the person who was sawing and planing the wood logs. The court highlighted that the defendant himself had admitted it in his statement, which can be observed in the evidence summary when the accused said "I was cutting a strip with a saw (...)" (folio 72 back). At trial, the accused attempted to blame the planing actions on his sons, and to make it believed that when he cut wood it was of another species (guácimo); however, the MINAET representatives indicated that it was the defendant whom they saw carrying out the planing work on the wood from the mahogany tree. Thus, witness [Nombre15] said: "...we continued on foot until we reached a small house where there was a blue pickup vehicle, next to it was Mr. [Nombre16] (defendant) planing pieces, we identified ourselves as MINAE authorities, we asked for permits for the wood and he said that for guácimo wood he did not need a permit, and since it raised our suspicion that it was not guácimo due to the color, we said we were going to inspect the farm, we followed a vehicle track looking for a forest area until we came upon a stump of a mahogany tree, there was a harvested (aprovechada) log that in our judgment matched in diameter, length, and thickness what the man was planing at the house..." (folio 73 front). Witness [Nombre17] also referred to that sense: "[Nombre18] behaved normally but failed in lying to us by telling us one wood species when in reality it was another, he insisted that it was guácimo (...) We arrived and he was working the wood.
[Nombre18] was giving the wood a finish with a hand plane. There was a child near him. The species mahogany (cabo) is a type of tree that is subject to a logging ban (veda), it does not have permits (...) If there had been another person sawing or planing the wood, we would have to note it in the report..." (folio 75 front). There was no reason for the judge not to believe the forest guards, since their report and account arose solely from the duty to perform their work. In this line of reasoning, the report and seizure record (folios 1 to 5) identified the defendant as the person who was "planing (manually) a piece of wood into boards of the species mahogany (Swietenia marophylla)." No one else was identified.
Regarding the defendant's actions, the Court stated: "This is also accepted by [Nombre1] and his son, the witness [Nombre19], who declared that they indeed transported the logs and planks from the place where the mahogany tree was cut to the house or the place where the house was being built, which means that the mahogany tree, in logs and planks, was transported from the place where it was felled to the place where the caretaker's house was being built and that in that place, [Nombre1] indicates, he decided to 'square up (cobaliar)' the boards, a word whose meaning, according to what he himself stated in the hearing, consists of aligning the boards or planks with a chainsaw and subsequently with a hand plane to leave them well finished, as [Nombre20] also indicated in his declaration." (folio 83 front). Therefore, although at some point the son participated in planing the boards, he also declared, expressing himself in the plural, that: "...we were squaring them up (cobaliando) to arrange and store them..." (folio 76); which allowed the court to establish that there may have been participation by the witness (which was not included in the accusation), but this does not discredit that the main action and the decisions had been taken by [Nombre21], who arranged to take the logs, "square them up (cobaliarlas)", plane them, and store them (folio 80). Additionally, it is important to add that the defendant indicated that his job was surveillance on the property (finca). However, the crime of forest product use (aprovechamiento) was committed by the defendant and his responsibility is personal, since he himself admitted that the logs were at the edge of the stream and that he took them away to saw and plane them at the house on the property (finca), a fact set forth in the judgment (folio 79), for which the ground is rejected.
Now, as a final grievance, the concept of "forest product use (aprovechamiento)" was questioned, since it was indicated that what the defendant did was "square up (cobaliar)", that is, cut, saw the logs, and plane them to achieve symmetrical boards and store them to decide what to do with them later. This conduct of the accused, of sawing and planing the wood, cutting it into uniform boards suitable for use in any construction, and storing them for later use, is a clear indicator of the objective of forest product use (aprovechamiento), as that purpose is achieved when the material can "generate some benefit, advantage, utility, or gain." In this regard, Article 3, subsection a) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) concretely and clearly defines what forest product use (aprovechamiento) is, stating: "For the purposes of this law, it is considered: a) Timber forest product use (Aprovechamiento maderable): The action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees, or utilization of fallen trees, carried out on private lands, not included in Article 1 of this law, which generates or may generate some benefit, advantage, utility, or gain for the person who performs it or for whom this person represents." In that sense, this Court, with a partially different composition, has ruled regarding the scope of forest product use (aprovechamiento) in forest material, indicating: "The sanctioned conduct is the forest product use (aprovechamiento del recurso forestal). This forest product use (aprovechamiento) consists of the 'Action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees, or utilization of fallen trees....which generates or may generate some benefit, advantage, utility, or gain...' (Article 3. a) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal)). It has been understood that economic advantage is not required, in view of the various possibilities contemplated: 'As stated before, in the criminal offenses of forest product use (aprovechamiento forestal), there should not necessarily be a profit motive, understood as the intention or the actual obtaining of some type of benefit that is translatable into economic terms, but rather, on the contrary, the definition of timber forest product use (aprovechamiento maderable) in Article 3, subsection a) of the Forest Law (LF), expands the possibility that the crime is configured, by the mere fact that the active subject, or the person he represents, obtains some benefit, advantage, utility, or gain. These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general. Many other advantages may exist as a result of a forest product use (aprovechamiento); for example, the advantage of eliminating an obstruction that blocked the landscape or the view, the cleaning of the land for a later planting or construction, the reduction of forest cover density (densidad boscosa) so that the land does not qualify as forest, to thus obtain a clearcutting permit, among others' (González [Nombre22], Manual de Delitos Ambientales, Escuela Judicial, 2007, page 267)." (Voto 175-10 of 9:30 a.m. on July 30, 2010; in the same sense, also see Voto 57-12 of 10:15 a.m. on February 10, 2012).
Following this line of thinking, the judge stated that: "That action of squaring up (cobaleo), of taking a log, extracting planks, aligning them with a chainsaw, and subsequently finishing them with a hand plane, is for the sole intention of their forest product use (aprovechamiento), [Placa2] which in no way implies the sale of that wood or the demonstration of profit, although its economic value was established at more than fifty thousand colones, but rather a forest product use (aprovechamiento) as a wood resource, to be used later. It is not logical to take mahogany wood logs, extract [Placa3], align those [Placa3] to give a standard measurement to each one so that they are [Placa4] well-designed, and think that they are not for forest product use (aprovechamiento), but simply to arrange them in the hallway. Even when analyzing the documentary evidence (...) all had the same length, the same width, and the same thickness, ready to be used in construction or sold." (Folio 83). The conclusion reached by the judgment is consistent with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), since ultimately the form the defendant gave to the logs, in well-structured boards, fulfilled the objective of being used later, according to the principles of logic and experience.
Consequently, the appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the defendant [Nombre1], is declared without merit.
**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the defendant [Nombre1], is declared without merit. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.
**CYNTHIA DUMANI STRADTMANN** [Nombre4] LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO RODRIGO OBANDO SANTAMARÍA **JUEZAS Y JUEZ DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA** C/ [Nombre6] OF./ LA LEY FORESTAL D./ CDUMANI Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1], Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Correo electrónico: [...]
The mahogany species is a type of tree that is under a logging ban, there are no permits (...) If there had been another person sawing or planing the wood we would have to note it in the report..." (folio 75 front). There was no reason for the judge not to believe the forest guards, since their report and account arise solely from the duty to fulfill their work. In this line of thought, the report and seizure record (folios 1 to 5) identified the accused as the person who was "planing (manually) a piece of wood into boards of the mahogany species (Swietenia marophylla)." No one else was identified. Regarding the defendant's actions, the Trial Court stated: "This is also accepted by [Name9] and his son the witness [Name10], who testified that they indeed transported the logs and planks from the place where the mahogany tree was cut to the house or the place where the house was being built, which means that the mahogany tree, in logs and planks, was transported from the place where it was felled to the place where the caretaker's house was being built and that at that place, [Name9] indicates, he decided to 'cobaliar' the boards, a word whose meaning, according to what he himself stated in the debate, consists of aligning the boards or planks with a chainsaw and subsequently with a plane to leave them well finished, as [Name11] also indicated in his statement." (folio 83 front). Therefore, although at some point the son participated in planing the boards, he also stated, speaking in the plural that: "...we were 'cobaliando' them to arrange them and store them..." (folio 76); which allowed the court to establish that there could have been participation by the witness (which was not included in the accusation), but this does not discredit that the main action and the decisions had been taken by [Name12], who arranged to take the logs, "cobaliarlas", plane them and store them (folio 80). Additionally, it is important to add that the accused indicated that his job was surveillance on the farm. However, the crime of exploitation (aprovechamiento) of the wood was committed by the accused and his responsibility is personal, since he himself admitted that the logs were at the edge of the ravine and that he took them to saw them and plane them at the farm house, a fact reflected in the judgment (folio 79), so the ground is rejected. Now then, as a final grievance, the concept of "exploitation" (aprovechamiento) was questioned, since it was indicated that what the defendant did was "cobaliar", that is, cut, saw the logs and plane them to achieve symmetrical boards and store them to decide what to do with them later. This conduct by the accused, of sawing and planing the wood, cutting it into uniform boards suitable for use in any construction and storing them for later use, is a clear indicator of the objective of exploitation (aprovechamiento), since that purpose is achieved when the material can "generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility or gain." In this regard, Article 3, subsection a) of the Forest Law concretely and clearly defines what exploitation (aprovechamiento) is, stating: "For the purposes of this law, the following is considered: a) Timber exploitation (Aprovechamiento maderable): The action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees or utilization of fallen trees, carried out on private lands, not included in Article 1 of this law, that generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility or gain for the person who performs it or for whom that person represents." In that sense, this Court with a partially different composition has ruled on the scope of exploitation (aprovechamiento) in forestry material, indicating: "The sanctioned conduct is the exploitation of the forest resource (aprovechamiento del recurso forestal). This exploitation (aprovechamiento) consists of the 'Action of cutting, elimination of standing timber trees or utilization of fallen trees....that generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility or gain...' (Article 3. a) of the Forest Law). It has been understood that no economic advantage is required, in view of the various possibilities contemplated: 'As stated before, in the criminal types of forest exploitation (aprovechamiento forestal), there does not necessarily have to be an intention of profit, understood as the intention or the actual obtaining of some type of benefit that is translatable into economic terms, but rather, on the contrary, the definition of timber exploitation (aprovechamiento maderable) in Article 3, subsection a) of the LF, expands the possibility that the crime is configured, with only the active subject, or the person represented, obtaining some profit, benefit, advantage, utility or gain. These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general. There may be many other advantages, as a result of an exploitation (aprovechamiento); for example, the advantage of eliminating an obstacle that blocked the landscape or the view, cleaning the land for a subsequent planting or construction, the reduction of forest density so that the land does not qualify as forest, in order to obtain a clearcutting permit, among others' (González [Name13], Manual de Delitos Ambientales, Judicial School, 2007, page 267)." (Voto 175-10 of 9:30 a.m. on July 30, 2010; in the same sense see also Voto 57-12 of 10:15 a.m. on February 10, 2012). Following this line of thought, the judge pointed out that: "That action of 'cobaleo', of taking a log, removing the [Placa1], aligning them with a chainsaw and subsequently refining them with a plane, is with the sole intention of their exploitation (aprovechamiento), exploitation (aprovechamiento) that in no way implies the sale of that wood or the demonstration of a profit, although its economic value was established at more than fifty thousand colones, but rather an exploitation (aprovechamiento) as a wood resource, to be used later. It is not logical to take mahogany wood logs, remove [Placa1], align those [Placa1] until giving each one a standard measurement and leaving them as well-designed [Placa2], and think that they are not for exploitation (aprovechamiento), but simply to arrange them in the hallway. Even when analyzing the documentary evidence (...) they all had the same length, the same width and the same thickness, ready to be used in construction or sold." (Folio 83). The conclusion reached by the judgment is consistent with the rules of sound criticism, since finally the form that the accused gave to the logs, into well-structured boards, fulfilled the objective of being used later, according to the principles of logic and experience. Consequently, the appeal filed by attorney [Name14], private defender of the accused [Name9], is declared without merit." He stated that the judge presented contradictory grounds, giving credibility to the two witnesses for the prosecuting entity, whom he considered ended up lying, specifically [Nombre9] and [Nombre10], and from their accounts contradictions could be distinguished related to the form and means of entry to the house: witness [Nombre11] says they went part of the way by car and part on foot, witness [Nombre12] said they arrived directly by car at the house; witness [Nombre11] indicated that they observed a [Placa1], witness [Nombre12] mentioned that the drag mark was made of wood; witness [Nombre11] affirmed that from the first time they heard the chainsaw they traveled between 500 and 600 meters until they reached the house where the accused was, taking 10 minutes; witness [Nombre12] said the time was 45 minutes traveling the same distance; witness [Nombre11] said there was no sawdust where the accused was planing the board and witness [Nombre12] said there was; witness [Nombre11] stated that the stump with the wood logs were in a flat and accessible place, and witness [Nombre12] indicated that the place was rugged and was not accessible. He states that as the defense witnesses said, the sound of the chainsaw that the officers heard corresponds to the moment when the wood was being "squared (cobaliaba)" at the house on the property itself at the direction of the accused's employer, since the discovery and transport of the wood to the dwelling had occurred several hours earlier. He considers that it has not been proven what the illegal use (aprovechamiento) consisted of. In the **third claim** he alleges violation of the rules of sound criticism due to error in the assessment of the evidence, since the judgment indicated that the accused used (aprovechó) a timber-yielding tree of the Caoba (Mahogany) species, located in a protection zone without there being evidence to support that assessment by the judge, since it was a discovery of wood when the accused was working as caretaker of the private property that borders the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Junquillal. He states that the defense witnesses indicated that the convicted person had called the MINAET offices in Pocosol by phone, but they did not answer him. He adds that the accused indicated that he was not the one doing the squaring (cobaliando) but rather his sons, therefore there is no illegal conduct by the accused. He claims that it was the officers who presumed that the accused had felled the tree but they did not see him, nor is there evidence to support this action. He indicates that the accused suffers from a hernia in his spine, so it was not possible for him to fell and use (aprovechar) the tree by cutting five mahogany boards and transport them 200 meters from the site to his house. He points out that there was no wood use (aprovechamiento), since it has not been proven that the accused benefited from the wood felled by "antisociales", in addition the reason it was sawn was solely to accommodate it, a situation that the judge interpreted as an act of use (aprovechamiento). He states that there has been no illegal use (aprovechamiento) since no type of use or benefit occurred, as it was a discovery of illegally felled wood, which was hauled and accommodated. In the **fourth ground** he alleges improper legal classification, unlawfulness, and culpability. He claims that from none of the evidence presented can it be deduced that the wood was used (aprovechada), but rather that it was "squared (cobaliada)" to store it, until the property owner decided what was appropriate, which was stated by the defense witnesses, a version that was not discredited by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He considers that the court failed in its duty of objectivity and assessed the evidence erroneously, since the sanctioned conduct is atypical, given that "*the use (aprovechamiento) ultimately supposes an advantage, use, or onerous or gratuitous benefit from the action of cutting, elimination of standing timber-yielding trees, or utilization of fallen trees, which has not occurred in any of these cases... the wood has not been obtained as a result of any action of cutting, elimination of standing timber-yielding trees, or utilization of fallen trees, but rather the wood was obtained as a result of a discovery from the illegal felling by third persons, wood that was already sawn...*" (folio 120 front); he stated that the accused is a worker on the property, not the registered owner, and the only participation was hauling it to the house on the property and squaring it (cobaliarla) to be able to store it, therefore no crime existed, facts which he considers have not been controverted, so the use (aprovechamiento) indicated in the judgment are conjectures. He adds that the accused indicated that it was wood from a Guácimo tree, as that was what he was planing to use as support to accommodate the mahogany wood. He requests that the ruling be declared ineffective, the hearing be annulled, and a definitive dismissal be issued in favor of the accused, returning the chainsaw. Alternatively, he requests that it be remanded for a new proceeding with the requirement of correction of the accusatory document. **The grounds are resolved jointly and the appeal is dismissed.** The judgment held as proven that on December 29, 2012, at approximately 5:30 p.m., the accused [Nombre6] was surprised by MINAET officials, when, through the use of a chainsaw, he illegally used (aprovechó) a tree of the Caoba (Mahogany) species (which is endangered) that was located in the protection zone of a stream (quebrada), without having the permits from the State Forestry Administration, for which reason they proceeded to seize 3 logs and 4 boards of the mahogany species (folio 5). The defense appeals on four specific grounds: Regarding the first, it considered the existence of a defective activity by having introduced into the accusation that the accused had felled the mahogany tree, since it says that action was not reported. In this regard, in the present matter, it has been an uncontroverted fact that the MINAET officials, when patrolling the surroundings of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal and upon following the sound of a chainsaw, encountered the accused [Nombre13] at the house of a property adjacent to the Refuge, sawing logs from a mahogany tree, turning them into boards. It was also determined that said logs came from a stump of a tree of the mahogany species located on the bank of a stream (quebrada), since according to the experience of the MINAET security agent Junior [Nombre14], what was being sawn was not of the Guácimo species as the accused initially alleged. In that sense, the witness said: "*...we said we were going to inspect the property, we followed a vehicle track looking for forested area until we came upon a stump of a mahogany tree, there was a used (aprovechada) log that in our judgment matched in diameter, length, and thickness what the man was planing at the house, there were three unused logs (...) the tree was in a protection zone because it was in a protection zone one meter from the bank of the stream (quebrada) and it was a forbidden tree because it was endangered...*" (summary of evidence folios 73 front and back), therefore the judgment held as proven that the sawn boards came from the stump of a tree of the mahogany species located in the protected area of a stream (quebrada); which was also admitted by the accused himself (folio 72 front and back and 83). Additionally, it was proven that the accused lacked authorization from the respective forestry administration to use (aprovechar) forestry material, which was also admitted by the accused (the accused arguing that he was sawing another species that does not require that permit). The court explained that, despite the fact that the accused had also been charged with the felling of the tree, this action described in the accusation had not been demonstrated, but the use (aprovechamiento) of the logs from a mahogany tree, a species that is endangered, for which reason its use (aprovechamiento) required authorization from the State Forestry Administration, was demonstrated (folio 78 back). This situation (that the facts of the accusation were partially proven), does not breach the principle of congruence provided for in article 365 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor can it be considered a lack of truth on the part of the prosecutor drafting the accusation, since, according to the complaint on folios 1 to 4, ratified by the MINAET officers at trial, the investigation originated upon hearing a chainsaw operating in the vicinity of the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal. Therefore, the forest guards undertook the task of locating the site where they were felling, which led them to the neighboring property called "Finca La Bavaria" (folio 5) and to the house where the accused was "squaring (cobaliando)" (that is, sawing) and planing 3 wood logs and 4 boards, in order to store them, the accused indicating that "*for the moment the wood was not going to be used but rather to wait...*" (folio 72 back). It was not specified whether the stump of the mahogany tree was inside or outside the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal, but it was demonstrated that it was on the bank of a stream (quebrada) (approximately one meter distance according to the MINAET report on folio 2), a site that according to article 33 subsection b) of the Forestry Law is also a protected zone and therefore permission must be requested for the cutting of trees. Therefore, the first claim is unfounded. The same conclusion is reached with the second ground, since it is alleged that it was only about wood boards, but the accused himself, within the account given at trial, indicated that "*we took away 5 logs*" (folio 72 back), which they then proceeded to "square (cobaliar)" and plane, as also indicated by witness [Nombre8], verifying from the documentary evidence that three logs and four wood boards of the Caoba (Mahogany) species were seized (report on folios 1 to 4, record on folio 5). Nor is the complaint regarding the difference in distance and time between the stream (quebrada) and the house admissible, which was evidenced at trial when the MINAET officials testified. In that sense, the accused confirmed that the forest guards arrived where he was planing the wood and that they later went to look for the tree stump, which was on the bank of the stream (quebrada), therefore the discussion has no significance whatsoever, since in any case it is an approximate calculation that each of the witnesses gave and not a measurement they made with precision. In relation to the third grievance, the *a quo* indicated that the use (aprovechamiento) was demonstrated when the wood from the mahogany tree was sawn, planed, and stored, and that it was not proven that the accused felled the tree when it was standing on the bank of the stream (quebrada), therefore the discussion about the accused's spinal condition that prevented him from felling a tree is moot, since the use (aprovechamiento) of the wood was proven through the acts subsequent to the felling of the mahogany tree, performed by the accused. Nor is the claim that the accused was not the one who was "squaring (cobaliaba)" the wood from the mahogany tree valid. In that sense, the ruling expressed that the two MINAET officers were clear in their account in identifying the accused as the person who was sawing and planing the wood logs. The court highlighted that the accused himself had admitted it in his statement, which can be observed in the summary of evidence when the accused said "*I was cutting a rule with a hand saw (...)*" (folio 72 back). The accused at trial attempted to attribute the acts of planing to his sons, and to make it believed that when he cut wood, it was of another species (Guácimo); however, the MINAET representatives indicated that it was the accused whom they saw performing the work of planing the wood from the mahogany tree. Thus, witness [Nombre15] said: "*...we continued on foot until we reached a small house where there was a blue pickup vehicle, next to it was Mr. [Nombre16] (accused) planing pieces, we identified ourselves as MINAE authorities, we requested wood permits and he said that for guácimo wood he did not need a permit and as we were suspicious that it was not guácimo due to the color, we said we were going to inspect the property, we followed a vehicle track looking for forested area until we came upon a stump of a mahogany tree, there was a used (aprovechada) log that in our judgment matched in diameter, length, and thickness what the man was planing at the house...*" (folio 73 front). Also witness [Nombre17] referred in that sense: "*[Nombre18] behaved normally but he failed in lying to us by telling us one wood species when in reality it was another, what he insisted on was that it was guácimo (...) We arrived and he was working the wood. [Nombre18] was finishing the wood with a plane. Near him there was a child. The cabo species is a type of tree that is prohibited, it has no permits (...) If there had been another person sawing or planing the wood we would have to note it in the report...*" (folio 75 front). There was no reason for the judge not to believe the forest guards, since their report and account arises solely from the duty to perform their job. In this vein, the report and seizure record (folios 1 to 5) pointed to the accused as the person who was "*planing (manually) wood in boards of the caoba species (Swietenia marophylla).*" No one else was indicated. Regarding the accused's actions, the Court stated: "*This is also accepted by [Nombre1] and his son, witness [Nombre19], who declared that they indeed transported the logs and planks from the place where the mahogany tree was cut to the house or the place where the house was being built, which means, that the mahogany tree, in logs and planks, was transported from the place where it was felled to the place where the caretaker's house was being built and that in that place, indicates [Nombre1], he decided to 'square (cobaliar)' the boards, a word whose meaning according to what he testified at trial, consists of aligning the boards or planks with a chainsaw and subsequently with a plane to leave them well prepared, as also indicated [Nombre20] in his statement.*" (folio 83 front). Therefore, although at some point the son participated in planing the boards, he also stated, speaking in the plural that: "*...we were squaring (cobaliando) them to accommodate them and store them...*" (folio 76); which allowed the court to establish that there could have been participation by the witness (which was not included in the accusation), but this does not discredit that the main action and the decisions had been taken by [Nombre21], who decided to take the logs, "square them (cobaliarlas)", plane them, and store them (folio 80). Additionally, it is important to add that the accused indicated that his job was surveillance on the property. However, the crime of wood use (aprovechamiento) was committed by the accused and his responsibility is personal, since he himself admitted that the logs were on the bank of the stream (quebrada) and that he took them to saw and plane them at the house on the property, a fact reflected in the judgment (folio 79), therefore the ground is rejected. Now, as the last grievance, the concept of "use (aprovechamiento)" was questioned, since it was indicated that what the accused performed was "to square (cobaliar)", that is, to cut, saw the logs, and plane them to achieve symmetrical boards and store them to decide what to do with them later. This conduct of the accused, of sawing and planing the wood, cutting it into uniform boards suitable for use in any construction, and storing them for later use, is a clear indicator of the objective of use (aprovechamiento), since that purpose is achieved when the material can "*generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain*". In this regard, article 3 subsection a) of the Forestry Law concretely and clearly defines what use (aprovechamiento) is, stating: "*For the effects of this law, the following is considered: a) Timber use (Aprovechamiento maderable): Action of cutting, elimination of standing timber-yielding trees, or utilization of fallen trees, carried out on private lands, not included in article 1 of this law, that generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain for the person who performs it or for whom this person represents.*" In that sense, this Court with a partially different composition has ruled regarding the scope of use (aprovechamiento) in forestry material, indicating: "*The sanctioned conduct is the use (aprovechamiento) of the forest resource. This use (aprovechamiento) consists of the 'Action of cutting, elimination of standing timber-yielding trees, or utilization of fallen trees.... that generates or may generate some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain...' (article 3. a) of the Forestry Law). It has been understood that economic advantage is not required, in view of the various possibilities contemplated: 'As was said before, in the criminal types of forestry use, there need not necessarily exist profit motive, understood as the intention or the actual obtaining of some type of benefit that is translatable into economic terms, but rather, on the contrary, the definition of timber use in article 3, subsection a) of the FL, broadens the possibility that the crime is configured, with only the active subject, or the person represented, obtaining some profit, benefit, advantage, utility, or gain. These elements do not necessarily imply the commercialization of the wood or the economic aspect in general. There can exist many other advantages, as a result of a use; for example, the advantage of eliminating an obstruction that blocked the landscape or the view, clearing the land for a later planting or construction, the reduction of forest density to cause the land not to qualify as forest, to thus obtain a clearcutting permit, among others' (González [Nombre22], . Manual of Environmental Crimes, Judicial School, 2007, page 267).*" (Voto 175-10 of 9:30 a.m. on July 30, 2010; in that same sense, also see voto 57-12 of 10:15 a.m. on February 10, 2012). Following this line of thought, the judge indicated that: "*That action of squaring (cobaleo), of taking a log, cutting the planks, aligning them with a chainsaw and subsequently refining them with a plane is with the sole intention of their use (aprovechamiento), [Placa2] which in no way implies the sale of that wood or the demonstration of a profit, although its economic value was established at more than fifty thousand colones, but rather in a use as a wood resource, to be used later. It is not logical to take mahogany wood logs, cut [Placa3], align those [Placa3] until giving each one a standard measurement and leaving [Placa4] well designed and to think that they are not for use (aprovechamiento), but simply to accommodate them in the hallway. Even upon analyzing the documentary evidence (...) all had the same length, the same width, and the same thickness, ready to be used in construction or sold.*" (Folio 83). The conclusion reached by the judgment is congruent with the rules of sound criticism, since ultimately the form that the accused gave to the logs, in well-structured boards, fulfilled the objective of being used later, in accordance with the principles of logic and experience.
Consequently, the appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the accused [Nombre1], is declared without merit.
**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by attorney [Nombre5], private defender of the accused [Nombre1], is declared without merit. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.
**CYNTHIA DUMANI STRADTMANN** **[Nombre4] LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO** **RODRIGO OBANDO SANTAMARÍA** **JUDGES OF THE SENTENCE APPEALS COURT** C/ [Nombre6] OF./ LA LEY FORESTAL D./ CDUMANI Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Correo electrónico: [...]
*130003510396PE* *130003510396PE* VOTO 21 - 16 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL DE GUANACASTE. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Santa Cruz. A las quince horas de cuatro de febrero de dos mil dieciséis.
Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la presente causa número 13-000351-0356-pe seguida contra [Nombre1] , documento de identidad número 502000017, nació el 29 de marzo de 1962, hijo de [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] , por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LEY FORESTAL, en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso las juezas Cynthia Dumani Stradtmann, [Nombre4] Lucila Monge Pizarro y el juez Rodrigo Obando Santamaría. Se apersonó en esta sede, el licenciado [Nombre5] , defensor particular del imputado.
RESULTANDO
1.- Mediante sentencia n.°169-2015 de catorce horas de ocho de mayo de dos mil quince, el Tribunal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Liberia, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con los artículos 1, 28, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, artículo 8.1 y 8.2 de la Convención Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos, artículos 1, 30, 31, 45, 50, 51, 59, 60, 62 y 71 del Código Penal, artículos 1, 3, 58 y 66 de La Ley Forestal, artículos 1, 6, 141, 142, 144, 184, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 y 459 del Código Procesal Penal, se declara a [Nombre6] autor responsable del delito de Infracción a la Ley Forestal en su modalidad de aprovechamiento de arboles maderables en zona de protección, cometido en perjuicio de Los Recursos Naturales, y en tal carácter se le impone el tanto de TRES MESES DE PRISIÓN, pena que deberá descontar en el lugar y forma que lo indiquen los respectivos reglamentos penitenciarios, previo abono de la preventiva sufrida. Por considerarlo procedente se le otorga al condenado el BENEFICIO DE EJECUCIÓN CONDICIONAL DE LA PENA por un período de prueba de TRES AÑOS, en el entendido de que durante dicho lapso no deberá resultar condenado por nuevo delito doloso en que se le imponga una pena de prisión superior a seis meses, pues en dicho evento, le será revocado el beneficio aquí concedido y deberá descontar en prisión la pena impuesta. Son los gastos del proceso penal a cargo del Estado. Una vez firme la sentencia inscríbase en el Registro Judicial y envíese los testimonios de estilo para ante el Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y el Instituto Nacional de Criminología. De conformidad con el artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal y 110 del Código Penal se ordena el comiso a favor del Estado de la motosierra marca Husquarna modelo 460, serie 075000500 y de las trozas de madera; previniéndosele al depositario judicial entregarlas a Tribunal Penal de Guanacaste Sede Liberia, dentro de los cinco días siguientes a la firmeza de esta sentencia.- Notifíquese.- Lic. Guillermo Arce Arias Juez de Juicio ". (sic).
2.- Contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre5] , defensor particular del justiciable, interpuso recurso de apelación.
3.- Verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso. En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.
Redacta la jueza [Nombre7] ; y,
CONSIDERANDO
I- En el primer motivo el defensor del encartado alega nulidad de la acusación por denunciar un hecho falso pues se acusó al encartado por una tala ilegal dentro del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal, sin embargo, los oficiales del MINAET se refirieron a que el encartado estaba en una propiedad privada vecina del refugio cuando fue sorprendido por las autoridades; por lo que el Ministerio Público denunció un hecho falso. Expresa que si bien el encartado no fue condenado por talar un árbol dentro del Refugio de Vida Silvestre propiedad del Estado, la sentencia carece de análisis sobre la falta de demostración del hecho que se acusó ocurrido en el área protegida. Solicita se declare la nulidad absoluta de la pieza acusatoria, del debate realizado y del fallo, y que se dicte un sobreseimiento definitivo a favor del imputado. En el segundo motivo alega violación al principio de juez natural por falta de objetividad, indebida fundamentación de la sentencia y errónea valoración de la prueba. Alega que el juzgador realizó un inadecuado análisis de la prueba al solo tomar extractos de las declaraciones, faltando al deber de objetividad. En ese sentido, indica que respecto de la declaración del imputado [Nombre1] se malentendió su información, pues las tablas de madera fueron halladas y para guardarlas en virtud de su irregularidad hubo que "cobaliarla"; y no fueron 5 trozas de madera las que se llevaron sino 5 tablas. Sobre el testigo [Nombre8] , ante una pregunta de la defensa con el fin de determinar el uso de la motosierra, manifestó que no había aserrín cuando fue interceptado el imputado; mientras que otro testigo del Ministerio Público dijo que sí, por lo que es una situación contradictoria, que no explicó el tribunal. Expresa que el hijo del encartado confirmó que la única acción del imputado fue "cobaliar" las tablas, que fue interpretada por el tribunal como intención de aprovechamiento, sin embargo, refiere que era únicamente para acomodarlas. Manifestó que el juzgador expuso fundamentos contradictorios, dándole credibilidad a los dos testigos del ente acusador, quienes consideró llegaron a mentir, propiamente [Nombre9] y [Nombre10] y de sus relatos se pudieron distinguir contradicciones relacionados a la forma y medio de ingreso a la casa, el testigo [Nombre11] dice que fueron una parte en carro y otra a pie, el testigo [Nombre12] dijo que llegaron directamente en carro hasta la casa; el testigo [Nombre11] señaló que observaron una [Placa1] , el testigo [Nombre12] mencionó que la señal de arrastre era de madera; el testigo [Nombre11] afirmó que desde la primera vez que escucharon la motosierra recorrieron entre 500 y 600 metros hasta que llegaron a la casa donde estaba el encartado, durando 10 minutos; el testigo [Nombre12] dijo que el tiempo fue 45 minutos recorriendo la misma distancia; el testigo [Nombre11] dijo que no había aserrín donde estaba el imputado cepillando la tabla y el testigo [Nombre12] que sí había; el testigo [Nombre11] refirió que el tocón con las trozas de madera estaban en un lugar plano y accesible, y el testigo [Nombre12] indicó que el lugar era quebrado y no era accesible. Expresa que conforme lo dijeron los testigos de la defensa, el sonido de la motosierra que escucharon los oficiales corresponde al momento en que se "cobaliaba" la madera en la casa de la propia finca por disposición del patrono del imputado, pues fue varias horas antes que había sucedido el hallazgo y traslado de la madera hasta la vivienda. Considera que no se ha probado en qué consistió el aprovechamiento ilegal. En el tercer reclamo manifiesta violación a las reglas de la sana crítica por error en la apreciación de la prueba, pues la sentencia indicó que el acusado aprovechó un árbol maderable de la especie Caoba, ubicado en zona de protección sin que exista prueba que acredite esa apreciación del juzgador, pues se trató de un hallazgo de madera cuando el imputado se encontraba laborando como cuidador de la finca privada que colinda con el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Junquillal. Expresa que los testigos de la defensa indicaron que el ajusticiado había llamado por teléfono a las oficinas del MINAET de Pocosol, pero no le contestaron. Agrega que el imputado indicó que él no era quien estaba cobaliando sino sus hijos, por lo que no existe una conducta ilegal del acusado. Reclama que fueron los oficiales quienes presumieron que el imputado había talado el árbol pero no lo vieron, ni existe prueba que acredite esta acción. Indica que el encartado padece de una hernia en la columna por lo que no era posible que pudiera talar y aprovechar el árbol sacando cinco tablas de caoba y las trasladara 200 metros del lugar hasta su casa. Señala que no existió aprovechamiento de madera, pues no se ha probado que el imputado se haya beneficiado de la madera talada por "antisociales", además que la razón por la que se aserró fue únicamente para acomodarla, situación que interpretó el juzgador como acto de aprovechamiento. Expresa que no ha existido aprovechamiento ilegal pues no se dio ningún tipo de uso o beneficio ya que se trató de un hallazgo de madera talada ilegalmente, la cual se acarreó y acomodó. En el cuarto motivo alega indebida calificación legal, antijuridicidad y culpabilidad. Reclama que de ninguna de las pruebas evacuadas se extrae que la madera fue aprovechada, sino que la misma fue "cobaliada" para guardarla, hasta que el propietario del inmueble decidiera lo que correspondiera, lo cual fue manifestado por los testigos de la defensa, versión que no fue desacreditada por el Ministerio Público. Considera que el tribunal faltó al deber de objetividad y valoró la prueba en forma equivocada, pues la conducta sancionada es atípíca, ya que " el aprovechamiento supone en definitiva una ventaja, uso o beneficio oneroso o gratuito de la acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos, lo cual no ha sucedido en ninguno de estos casos ...la madera no ha sido obtenida producto de alguna acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos, sino que la madera fue obtenida producto de un hallazgo por la tala ilegal de terceras personas, madera que ya se encontraba aserrada..." (folio 120 frente); expresó que el encartado es trabajador del inmueble no es propietario registral, y la única participación fue acarrearla hasta la casa de la finca y cobaliarla para poder guardarla, por lo que no existió delito, hechos que considera no han sido contravertidos, por lo que el aprovechamiento señalado en la sentencia son conjeturas. Agrega que el encartado indicó que era madera de guácimo, pues era la que se encontraba cepillando para utilizarla de soporte para acomodar la madera de caoba. Solicita se declare ineficaz el fallo, se anule el debate y se dicte sobreseimiento definitivo a favor del imputado, devolviendo la motosierra. Subsidiariamente pide que se reenvíe para una nueva sustanciación con exigencia de corrección de la pieza acusatoria. Se resuelven los motivos en conjunto y se declara sin el recurso. La sentencia tuvo por demostrado que el 29 de diciembre de 2012 aproximadamente a las 17:30 horas el encartado [Nombre6] , fue sorprendido por funcionarios del MINAET, cuando, mediante el uso de una motosierra, aprovechó ilegalmente un árbol de la especie Caoba (la cual está en peligro de extinción) que se ubicaba en la zona de protección de una quebrada, sin contar con los permisos de la Administración Forestal del Estado, por lo que procedieron a decomisarle 3 trozas y 4 tablas de la especie caoba (folio 5). La defensa recurre por cuatro motivos concretos: En cuanto al primero, consideró la existencia de una actividad defectuosa el haber introducido en la acusación que el encartado había talado el árbol de caoba pues dice que esa acción no fue denunciada. Al respecto, en el presente asunto ha sido un hecho no controvertido que los funcionarios del MINAET, cuando patrullaban los alrededores del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal y al seguir el sonido de una motosierra, se encontraron en la casa de una finca colindante con el Refugio, al imputado [Nombre13] aserrando unas trozas de un árbol de caoba, dejándolas en tablas. También se determinó que dichas trozas provenían de un tocón de un árbol de la especie caoba ubicado a la orilla de una quebrada, pues de acuerdo a la experiencia del agente de seguridad del MINAET Junior [Nombre14] , lo que se aserraba no era de la especie guácimo como lo alegó en un primer momento el acusado. En ese sentido, dijo el testigo: "... dijimos que íbamos a hacer inspección de la finca, seguimos un rastro de carro buscando zona de bosque hasta dar con un tocón de árbol de caoba, había una troza aprovechada que según nuestro criterio coincidía en diámetro, largo y grosor con lo que el señor estaba cepillando en la casa, estaban tres trozas no aprovechadas (...) el árbol estaba en zona de protección porque estaba en zona de protección a un metro de la orilla de la quebrada y era un árbol vedado porque estaba en peligro de extinción..." (sumario de prueba folios 73 frente y vuelto), por lo tanto la sentencia tuvo por probado que las tablas aserradas provenían del tocón de un árbol de la especie caoba ubicado en el área protegida de una quebrada; lo cual también fue admitido por el mismo encartado (folio 72 frente y vuelto y 83). Adicionalmente se probó que el encartado carecía de autorización de la administración forestal respectiva para aprovechar material forestal, lo cual también fue admitido por el acusado (argumentando el acusado que aserraba otra especie que no requiere de ese permiso). El tribunal explicó que, a pesar de que se había acusado al encartado también de la tala del árbol, esta acción descrita en la acusación no se había demostrado, pero sí el aprovechamiento de las trozas de un árbol de caoba, especie que está en vías de extinción, por lo cual su aprovechamiento necesitaba autorización de la Administración Forestal del Estado (folio 78 vuelto). Esta situación (de que se probaran parcialmente los hechos de la acusación), no quebranta el principio de congruencia previsto en el artículo 365 del Código Procesal Penal, ni se puede considerar una falta a la verdad del fiscal redactor de la acusación, pues, de acuerdo a la denuncia de folios 1 a 4, ratificados por los oficiales del MINAET en debate, la investigación se originó al escuchar una motosierra funcionando en las inmediaciones del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal. Por lo que los guardas forestales emprendieron la tarea de ubicar el sitio donde estaban talando, lo cual los llevó hasta la propiedad vecina llamada "Finca La Bavaria" (folio 5) y a la casa donde el imputado estaba "cobaliando" (es decir, aserrando) y cepillando 3 trozas de madera y 4 tablas, con el fin de almacenarlas, indicando el acusado que "por el momento no se pensaba utilizar la madera sino esperar ..." (folio 72 vuelto). No se precisó si el tocón del árbol de caoba estaba dentro o fuera del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Bahía Junquillal, empero sí se demostró que estaba a la orilla de una quebrada (aproximadamente un metro de distancia de acuerdo al informe del MINAET de folio 2), sitio que de acuerdo al artículo 33 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal es también zona protegida y por lo tanto debe solicitarse permiso para la corta de árboles. Por lo que el primer reclamo es improcedente. A igual conclusión se llega con el segundo motivo, pues se alega que solo se trató de tablas de madera, pero el mismo encartado, dentro del relato rendido en juicio, indicó que "nos llevamos 5 trozas" (folio 72 vuelto), las cuales luego procedieron a "cobaliar" y cepillar, también lo indicó el testigo [Nombre8] , verificándose de la prueba documental que se decomisaron tres trozas y cuatro tablas de madera de la especie Caoba (informe de folios 1 a 4, acta de folio 5). Tampoco resulta de recibo la queja respecto de la diferencia en distancia y tiempo entre la quebrada y la casa, lo que se evidenció en el debate cuando declararon los funcionarios del MINAET. En ese sentido, el acusado confirmó que los guardas forestales llegaron donde él cepillaba la madera y que luego fueron a buscar el tocón del árbol, el cual estaba en la orilla de la quebrada, por lo que no tiene trascendencia alguna la discusión, pues en todo caso es un cálculo aproximado que cada uno de los testigos dio y no una medida que hayan hecho con precisión. En relación al tercer agravio, el a quo indicó que se demostró el aprovechamiento cuando se aserró, cepilló y almacenó la madera del árbol de caoba y que no se probó que el endilgado talara el árbol cuando este estaba en pie a la orilla de la quebrada, por lo que la discusión sobre el padecimiento en la columna del imputado que lo imposibilitaba para talar un árbol es estéril, pues el aprovechamiento de la madera se probó mediante los actos posteriores a la tala del árbol de caoba, realizados por el imputado. Tampoco es procedente el reclamo de que el encartado no era quien "cobaliaba" la madera proveniente del árbol de caoba. En ese sentido, el fallo expresó que los dos oficiales del MINAET fueron claros en su relato al identificar al encartado como la persona que aserraba y cepillaba las trozas de madera. El tribunal destacó que el mismo encartado lo había admitido en su declaración, lo cual se puede observar en el sumario de prueba cuando el acusado dijo "yo cortaba una regla con serrucho (...)" (folio 72 vuelto). El imputado en el juicio pretendió endilgarle los actos de cepillado a sus hijos, y hacer creer que cuando él cortó madera se trataba de otra especie (guácimo); empero los personeros del MINAET indicaron que fue al encartado a quien vieron realizar las labores de cepillado de la madera del árbol de caoba. Así, el testigo [Nombre15] dijo: "...continuamos a pie hasta llegar a una casita donde había un vehículo pickup azul, a la par de él estaba el señor [Nombre16] (imputado) cepillando piezas, nos identificamos como autoridades de MINAE solicitamos permisos de la madera y dijo que para madera de guácimo no necesitaba permiso y como nos dio sospecha que no era guácimo por el color dijimos que íbamos a hacer inspección de la finca, seguimos un rastro de carro buscando zona de bosque hasta dar con tocón de árbol de caoba, había una troza aprovechada que según nuestro criterio coincidía en el diámetro, largo y grosor con el que el señor estaba cepillando en la casa..." (folio 73 frente). También el testigo [Nombre17] , se refirió en ese sentido: "[Nombre18] se comportó normal pero falló en mentirnos en decirnos una especie de madera cuando en en realidad era otra, él lo que insistía era que se trataba de guácimo (...) Llegamos y él estaba trabajando la madera. [Nombre18] le estaba dando acabado a la madera con un cepillo. Cerca de él había un niño. La especie cabo es un tipo de árbol que está en veda, no tiene permisos (...) Si hubiese habido otra persona aserrando o cepillando la madera tendríamos que anotarlo en el informe..." (folio 75 frente). No existió para el juzgador razón alguna para no creerle a los guardas forestales, pues su informe y relato únicamente surge por el deber de cumplir con su trabajo. En este orden de ideas, el informe y acta de decomiso (folios 1 a 5) señalaron al encartado como la persona que estaba "cepillando (manualmente) una madera en tablas de la especie caoba (Swietenia marophylla)." No se señaló a nadie más. Sobre la actuación del imputado ,refirió el Tribunal :" Esto también es aceptado por [Nombre1] y su hijo el testigo [Nombre19] , quienes declararon que efectivamente ellos trasladaron las trozas y tablones desde el lugar donde fue cortado el árbol de caoba hasta la casa o el lugar donde se estaba construyendo la casa, lo que quiere decir, que el árbol de caoba, en trozas y tablones, fue trasladado desde el lugar donde fue talado hasta el lugar donde se construía la casa de cuido y que en ese lugar, indica [Nombre1] decidió "cobaliar" las tablas, palabra cuyo significado según lo depuso él mismo en debate, consiste en alinear las tablas o tablones con motosierra y posteriormente con cepillo para dejarlas bien alistadas, así lo indicó también [Nombre20] en su declaración." (folio 83 frente). Por lo que si bien, en algún momento el hijo participó cepillando las tablas, también manifestó, expresándose en plural que: "...las estábamos cobaliando para acomodarlas y guardarlas.." (folio 76); lo que permitió al tribunal establecer que pudo haber existido participación del testigo (lo cual no fue incluido en la acusación), pero ello no desacredita que la acción principal y las decisiones habían sido tomadas por [Nombre21] , quien dispuso llevarse las trozas, "cobaliarlas", cepillarlas y guardarlas, (folio 80). Adicionalmente es importante agregar que el encartado indicó que su labor era de vigilancia en la finca. Empero, el delito aprovechamiento de la madera fue cometido por el encartado y su responsabilidad es personal, pues él mismo admitió que las trozas estaban a la orilla de la quebrada y que él se las llevó para aserrarlas y cepillarlas en la casa de la finca, hecho plasmado en la sentencia (folio 79), por lo que el motivo se rechaza. Ahora bien, como último agravio, se cuestionó el concepto de "aprovechamiento", pues se indicó que lo que realizó el imputado fue "cobaliar", es decir, cortar, aserrar las trozas y cepillarlas para lograr tablas simétricas y almacenarlas para decidir que hacer con ellas con posterioridad. Esta conducta del acusado, de aserrar y cepillar la madera, cortarla en tablas uniformes aptas para ser utilizadas en cualquier construcción y almacenarlas para ser usadas con posterioridad, es un indicador claro del objetivo de aprovechamiento, pues se logra ese propósito cuando el material puede "generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia". Al respecto, el artículo 3 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal define concreta y claramente lo que es el aprovechamiento señalando: "Para los efectos de esta ley, se considera: a) Aprovechamiento maderable: Acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos, realizada en terrenos privados, no incluida en el artículo 1 de esta ley, que genere o pueda generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia para la persona que la realiza o para quien esta representa." En ese sentido, este Tribunal con integración parcialmente diferente se ha pronunciado respecto del alcance del aprovechamiento en material forestal indicando: "La conducta sancionada es el aprovechamiento del recurso forestal. Este aprovechamiento consiste en la "Acción de corta, eliminación de árboles maderables en pie o utilización de árboles caídos....que genere o pueda generar algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia..." (artículo 3. a) de la Ley Forestal). Se ha entendido que no se requiere ventaja económica, en vista de las varias posibilidades que se contemplan: "Como se dijo antes, en los tipos penales de aprovechamiento forestal, no debe existir necesariamente el ánimo de lucro, entendido como la intención o la obtención actual de algún tipo de beneficio que sea traducible en términos económicos, sino que, por el contrario, la definición de aprovechamiento maderable en el artículo 3, inciso a) de la LF, amplía la posibilidad de que se configure el delito, con solo que el sujeto activo, o su representada, obtengan algún provecho, beneficio, ventaja, utilidad o ganancia. Estos elementos no necesariamente implican la comercialización de la madera o el aspecto económico en general. Pueden existir otras muchas ventajas, como resultado de un aprovechamiento; por ejemplo, la ventaja de la eliminación de un estorbo que tapaba el paisaje o la vista, la limpieza del terreno para una posterior plantación o construcción, la disminución de la densidad boscosa para lograr que el terreno no califique como bosque, para obtener así el permiso de tala rasa, entre otros" (González [Nombre22] , . Manual de Delitos Ambientales , Escuela Judicial, 2007, página 267)." (Voto 175-10 de 9.30 horas de 30 de julio de 2010; en ese mismo sentido ver también el voto 57-12 de 10:15 horas de 10 de febrero de 2012). Siguiendo esta línea de pensamiento el juzgador señaló que: " Esa acción de cobaleo, de tomar una troza, sacar los tablones, alinearlos con motosierra y posteriormente afinarlos con cepillo es con la única intención de su aprovechamiento, [Placa2] que en ningún momento implica la venta de esa madera o la demostración de un lucro, aunque se estableció su valor económico en más de cincuenta mil colones, sino en un aprovechamiento como recurso de madera, para ser utilizadas con posterioridad. No es lógico tomar trozas de madera de caoba, sacar [Placa3], alinear esos [Placa3] hasta darle una medida estándar a cada uno y que queden [Placa4] bien diseñadas y pensar que no son para el aprovechamiento, sino simplemente para acomodarlas en el corredor. Incluso al analizar la prueba documental (...) todas tenían el mismo largo, el mismo ancho y el mismo grueso, listas para ser utilizadas en construcción o vendidas." (Folio 83). La conclusión a la que llega la sentencia, es congruente con las reglas de la sana crítica, pues finalmente la forma que el encartado dio a las trozas, en tablas bien estructuradas, cumplían con el objetivo de ser utilizadas posteriormente, de acuerdo a los principios de la lógica y la experiencia. Por consiguiente, se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el licenciado [Nombre5] defensor particular del encartado [Nombre1] .
POR TANTO
Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el licenciado [Nombre5] defensor particular del encartado [Nombre1] . NOTIFÍQUESE.
CYNTHIA DUMANI STRADTMANN [Nombre4] LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO RODRIGO OBANDO SANTAMARÍA JUEZAS Y JUEZ DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA C/ [Nombre6] OF./ LA LEY FORESTAL D./ CDUMANI Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Correo electrónico: [...]
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