Reversal of acquittal for erroneous suspect witness classification in invasion and illegal logging caseAnulación de absolutoria por errónea calificación de testigos sospechosos en causa de invasión y tala

Res: 2015-024 **Court of Criminal Sentence Appeals of Cartago, first section.** At fifteen hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-second of January of two thousand fifteen.

**Criminal sentence appeal** filed in the present case against **[Nombre1]** , of legal age, married, resident of Cajón de Pérez Zeledón, born on the fifteenth of March of nineteen eighty-five, with identity card number CED1 , for the crime of **Invasion of a Protection Area and Illegal Logging**, to the detriment of **Natural Resources**. Participating in the decision on the appeal are judges [Nombre2] , Rosibel López Madrigal and Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez. Appearing on appeal is Attorney [Nombre3] . representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office.

**Whereas:**

**1.** That by judgment No. 801-2013 (sic) at seven hours thirty minutes on the twenty-third of October of two thousand fourteen, the Trial Court of the southern zone, Pérez Zeledón venue, resolved: "**THEREFORE**: In accordance with the foregoing, articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 8 subsections 1 and 2, 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 142, 265, 266, 267, 360 to 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 1, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 45 of the Criminal Code, 58 of the Forestry Law, article 122 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability. It is resolved: to acquit the defendant [Nombre4] of all penalty and responsibility for the crimes of Invasion of a protection area and illegal logging to the detriment of Natural Resources. By reason of the foregoing, the lifting of any precautionary measure weighing against the accused, concerning the present case, is ordered. The costs of the proceedings are to be borne by the State. This matter is resolved without a special order of costs. The **CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AND THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC ARE DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT.** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is exempted from the payment of costs for the filing of the civil action, as a plausible reason to litigate exists. The restitution to its previous state and reparation of the damage caused on the land where the environmental damage occurred is ordered, to be carried out by SINAC. [Nombre5] Judge of the Court of Pérez Zeledón ." (sic)

**2.** That against the foregoing ruling, Attorney [Nombre3] . filed the appeal.

**3.** That upon conducting the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Law 8837 published on the ninth of December of two thousand eleven (Creation of the Criminal Sentence Appeal), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

**4.** That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge **[Nombre6] ,** and; **Considering:** **I-** The appeal meets the admissibility requirements defined in articles 459, 460, and 461 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the grounds thereof are addressed.

**II-** In **the sole ground of the appeal,** the Assistant Prosecutor of Pérez Zeledón, [Nombre7] , alleges an erroneous application of procedural law by considering the label of suspect witnesses applicable without the imperative of a proven indication of the commission of the criminally relevant act. He argues that he offered [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] , both with the last name [Nombre10] , as witnesses, based on the preliminary inquiry report issued by the Judicial Investigation Agency number 510-DRPZ-14, who were essential given that they knew the defendant and are the registered owners of the property on which the reservoir-type body of water, the subject of this accusation for repeated invasions of the protection area, is located. He adds that, furthermore, the witnesses had agreed on an option-to-purchase contract with the accused by the date of the events. He contends that the Court, without any formal resolution, classified the cited witnesses as suspect witnesses, erroneously applying the law by considering that said minor police report was a sufficient indication that they might have committed a crime. He alludes that, for this reason, witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] , both [Nombre10] , abstained from testifying, causing a grievance to the Public Prosecutor's Office, as the accused was acquitted due to the lack of receipt of that evidence. **The claim is upheld.** This Chamber considers that, indeed, as claimed by the Prosecutor, the Court erroneously granted the right of abstention from testifying to witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] , both [Nombre10] , by considering them to be suspect witnesses. Our criminal procedural system regulates the figure of the "suspect witness" very briefly in article 204, first paragraph, where it states: "*The witness shall not be obligated to testify about facts that could incur criminal liability for them*." This is the sole reference the Code of Criminal Procedure makes regarding this particular figure. Legal doctrine defines the "suspect witness" as: "*the person upon whom some minimal possibility of participation in the crime falls; however, their participation is not yet sufficient to attribute any responsibility to them and to have them as a defendant in the proceeding, by virtue of the fact that the indications against them are very weak*" (CAMPOS [Nombre11] and [Nombre12] . *The probative value of incriminating statements made by co-defendants in criminal proceedings.* San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas. 2007. pp 185). It is also defined as: "*that person who, in a given criminal proceeding, is relieved, redundantly, from taking an oath, since there exists a certain degree of suspicion about them, based on a duly substantiated reason (not mere doubt or intuition) sufficient to attribute some criminal liability in the punishable act under investigation, yet that suspicion, at least in some cases, is not sufficiently strong to bring a formal accusation against them*" (BLANCO [Nombre13] . *Duties and Rights of the Suspect Witness in the Costa Rican Criminal Procedural System*. Thesis for the degree of Licenciada in Law. UCR. 1997 cited by [Nombre14] and [Nombre12] . Op cit pp 186). In the specific case, witnesses [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], both [Nombre10] , were offered as evidence by the Public Prosecutor's Office and admitted by the Court. Nonetheless, the presiding judge considered that based on what was stated in Police Report number 510-DRPZ-14 dated October 8, 2014, in which the witness [Nombre15] made a statement to officers of the Judicial Investigation Agency, this converted both her and her brother into suspect witnesses. Precisely, what was recorded in the cited Report, as recounted by Mrs. [Nombre15] , was that: "*her intention has been to sell the lot and that about three years ago they tried to do business with a man named [Nombre16] and another named [Nombre17], That these gave them some money as a down payment and agreed to give them several monthly installments, but 'since this individual caused damage in a lagoon, neighbors reported him and he had told them that he would not be able to do anything there because MINAET would not let him continue doing what was planned, that is how they failed to close the deal and the lot still belongs to them' (sic)\".* No degree of duly substantiated suspicion, not even slight, can be inferred from this statement from which it could be concluded that these witnesses might have engaged in any criminal act. What Mrs. [Nombre15] stated was that they sold the property to the defendant and another individual named [Nombre18] who made several payments, and that later, since the defendant caused damage in the lagoon, the neighbors reported him, and he then told them he could not continue with what was planned because Minaet would not allow him to, which is why they failed to close the deal. The Presiding Judge interpreted that, eventually, because the witnesses were the registered owners of the property where the invasion of the protected zone occurred, and because a sales agreement with the accused existed, the testimony of these witnesses could eventually give rise to some type of liability, if not criminal. The interpretation made by the Trial Court is erroneous, given that nothing in the cited Police Report whatsoever yields any type of element that would lead one to presume that Mrs. [Nombre15] or witness [Nombre9] , by having sold or negotiated the property with the defendant, participated in the crime attributed by the Public Prosecutor's Office in this case. As indicated, it is not a simple intuition or presumption held by the Presiding Judge that can grant a person the status of "suspect witness," but rather a suspicion based on some probative element, which is something that does not emerge from the police report cited by the Judge. It is even less acceptable to base the status of "suspect witness" on an alleged non-criminal liability or consequence for the witness, as the Court referred to when resolving the objection due to defective procedural activity filed against that decision by the Attorney General. Article 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clear that a witness is not obligated to testify about facts that could incur criminal liability for them. Therefore, by the Court having treated the witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] , both [Nombre10] , as "suspect witnesses," and thus having advised them of their right to abstain from testifying and to retain a defense attorney, which resulted in both witnesses choosing not to testify, the exercise of the criminal action by the Public Prosecutor's Office was limited, given that it was relevant evidence, duly admitted by the Trial Court, on which the prosecuting authority was going to base its accusation. Accordingly, an absolute defect has occurred under numeral 178 subsection c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the claim is upheld, and the judgment is partially annulled regarding the acquittal decreed in favor of the defendant [Nombre19] . A remand for a new proceeding on that aspect is ordered. In all other respects, the ruling remains unaltered, that is, regarding the declaration that the civil action has no merit and the restitution of the land to its natural state, as these aspects were not appealed.

**Therefore:** The criminal sentence appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is declared with merit. The appealed judgment is partially annulled regarding the acquittal rendered in favor of the defendant [Nombre19] . Remand for a new trial on that aspect is ordered. In all other respects, the ruling remains unaltered, that is, regarding the declaration that the civil action has no merit and the restitution of the land to its natural state. LET IT BE NOTIFIED.

[Nombre2] Rosibel López Madrigal Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez Judge and Judges of the Court of Criminal Sentence Appeals C/: [Nombre1] Of/: Natural Resources D/: Invasion of a Protection Area and another JORTIZS Court of Criminal Sentence Appeals of Cartago. Telephones: [Telf1] or [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: [...]

3 Therefore, because the Trial Court treated the deponents [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], both [Nombre10], as "suspect witnesses" (testigos sospechosos), and therefore warned them of their right to abstain from testifying (abstención de declarar) and to have defense counsel, which resulted in both deponents choosing not to testify, the exercise of criminal prosecution (acción penal) by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) was limited, given that this was relevant evidence, duly admitted by the Trial Court, upon which the prosecuting body was going to base its accusation. Due to the foregoing, an absolute defect (vicio de carácter absoluto) has occurred according to subsection c) of Article 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and therefore the claim is upheld, and the judgment is partially annulled with respect to the acquittal decreed in favor of the accused [Nombre19]. A remand (reenvío) is ordered for a new proceeding on that aspect. In all other respects, the ruling remains unscathed, that is, regarding the dismissal of the civil action (acción civil) and the restitution of the land to its natural state, as those aspects were not appealed.

**Therefore (Por tanto):** The appeal of the judgment (recurso de apelación de sentencia) filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is granted. The appealed judgment is partially annulled regarding the acquittal issued in favor of the accused [Nombre19]. A remand (reenvío) for a new trial is ordered on that aspect. In all other respects, the ruling remains unscathed, that is, regarding the dismissal of the civil action (acción civil) and the restitution of the land to its natural state. NOTIFY.

[Nombre2] Rosibel López Madrigal Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez **Judge and Judges of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal)** C/: [Nombre1] Of/: Los Recursos Naturales D/: Invasión a una Área de Protección y otro JORTIZS Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...] 3 That in the proceedings the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.

Drawn up by Judge **[Nombre6]** , and; **Considering:** **I-** The appeal meets the admissibility requirements defined in articles 459, 460 and 461 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and therefore its grounds will be examined.

**II-** In **his sole ground of appeal,** the Assistant Prosecutor of Pérez Zeledón, [Nombre7] , argues erroneous application of procedural law in deeming the label of suspicious witnesses appropriate without the imperative of a proven indication of commission of the criminally relevant act. He argues that he offered as witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], both bearing the surname [Nombre10], based on the minor diligence report issued by the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) number 510-DRPZ-14, who were essential given that they knew the accused, are the registered owners of the property on which the reservoir-type body of water that is the subject of this accusation is located due to the repeated invasions of the protection area. He adds that, furthermore, the witnesses had agreed, on the date of the events, to a purchase-sale option contract with the accused. He contends that the Court, without any resolution, classified the aforementioned deponents as suspicious witnesses, erroneously applying the law, by considering that this minor police report was a sufficient indication that they might have committed a crime. He alludes that, by reason of this, the witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], both [Nombre10], abstained from testifying, causing harm to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) since the accused was acquitted due to the lack of reception of that evidence. **The claim is upheld.** This Chamber finds that, indeed, as the Prosecutor alleges, the Court erroneously granted the right of abstention from testifying to the witnesses [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], both [Nombre10], by considering them to be suspicious witnesses. Our criminal procedural system regulates the figure of the "suspicious witness" very briefly in the first paragraph of article 204, which states: "*The witness shall not be obliged to testify regarding facts that may incur criminal liability for him*." This is the only reference made by the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding this particular figure. Legal doctrine defines the "suspicious witness" as: " *the subject upon whom there falls some minimal possibility of participation in the crime; however, his participation is not yet sufficient to attribute any liability to him and to regard him as an accused in the proceeding, by virtue of the indications against him being very weak* " (CAMPOS [Nombre11] and [Nombre12]. The Probative Value of Incriminating Statements by Co-Defendants in Criminal Proceedings (El valor probatorio de las declaraciones incriminatorias de coimputados en el proceso penal). San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas. 2007. pp 185). It is also defined as: " *that person who, in a given criminal proceeding, is relieved, redundantly speaking, of taking an oath, because there exists a certain degree of suspicion regarding him, based on a duly founded motive (not mere doubt or intuition) as to attribute some criminal liability to him in the punishable act under investigation, however that suspicion, at least in some cases, is not sufficiently great as to file a formal accusation against him* " (BLANCO [Nombre13] . Duties and Rights of the Suspicious Witness in the Costa Rican Criminal Procedural System (Deberes y Derechos del Testigo Sospechoso en el Ordenamiento Procesal Penal Costarricense). Thesis for the degree of Licenciada en Derecho. UCR. 1997 cited by [Nombre14] and [Nombre12]. Op cit pp 186). In the specific case, the witnesses [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], both [Nombre10], were offered as evidence for better resolution by the Public Prosecutor's Office and admitted by the Court. Notwithstanding this, the judging magistrate considered that, based on what was set forth in Police Report number 510-DRPZ-14 dated October 8, 2014, in which the deponent [Nombre15] made a statement to the officers of the Judicial Investigation Organization, this converted both her and her brother into suspicious witnesses. Precisely, what was recorded in the cited Report as related by Mrs. [Nombre15] was that: " *her intention has been to sell the lot and that about three years ago they tried to do business with a man named [Nombre16] and another named [Nombre17]. That these gave them an amount of money as a deposit and agreed to make several monthly payments, but "since this subject caused damage in a lagoon, neighbors reported him and he had told them that he was not going to be able to do anything there because MINAET would not let him continue what was planned, that is how they were unable to complete the deal and the lot still belongs to them" (sic)* ." No duly founded degree of suspicion, not even a slight one, from which it might be inferred that these witnesses could have committed any criminal act, emerges from this statement. What Mrs. [Nombre15] stated is that they sold the property to the accused and another subject named [Nombre18]; this person made several payments to them, and that later, as the accused caused damage in the lagoon, the neighbors reported him and he then told them he could not continue with what was planned because Minaet would not let him, and therefore they were unable to complete the deal. The judging magistrate interpreted that, eventually, because the deponents were the registered owners of the property where the invasion of the protected zone occurred, and there having been a sale agreement with the accused, the testimony of these witnesses could eventually generate liability for them, if not criminal, of some other type. The interpretation made by the Court is erroneous, given that the cited Police Report in no way reveals any type of element that would lead one to presume that Mrs. [Nombre15] or the witness [Nombre9], by having sold or negotiated the property with the accused, participated in the crime attributed by the Public Prosecutor's Office in this case. As indicated, it is not a simple intuition or presumption held by the judging magistrate that can grant the status of "suspicious witness" to a person, but rather a suspicion founded on some evidentiary element, which does not emerge from the police report cited by the Judge. Even less acceptable is to base the status of "suspicious witness" on a presumed non-criminal liability or consequence for the deponent, as the Court referred to when resolving the objection for defective procedural activity filed against that decision by the Prosecutor. Article 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clear that the witness is not obliged to testify regarding facts that may incur criminal liability for him. Therefore, by the Court having treated the deponents [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], both [Nombre10], as "suspicious witnesses," and consequently having advised them of their right to abstain from testifying and to have a defense attorney, which caused both deponents to decide not to testify, the exercise of the criminal action by the Public Prosecutor's Office was limited, given that it was relevant evidence, duly admitted by the Trial Court, on which the prosecutorial body was going to base its accusation. Due to the foregoing, an absolute defect has been produced according to numeral 178 subsection c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the claim is upheld, the judgment is partially annulled with respect to the acquittal decreed in favor of the accused [Nombre19]. A remand for a new proceeding on that aspect is ordered. In all other respects, the ruling remains unchanged, that is, regarding the declaration without merit of the civil action and the restitution of the land to its natural state, as those aspects were not appealed.

**Therefore:** The appeal against the judgment filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is upheld. The contested judgment is partially annulled regarding the acquittal dictated in favor of the accused [Nombre19]. A remand for a new trial on that aspect is ordered. In all other respects, the ruling remains unchanged, that is, regarding the declaration without merit of the civil action and the restitution of the land to its natural state. NOTIFY.

**[Nombre2]** Rosibel López Madrigal Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez **Judge and Judges of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal)** C/: [Nombre1] Of/: Natural Resources (Los Recursos Naturales) D/: Invasion of a Protection Area and other (Invasión a una Área de Protección y otro) JORTIZS Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Telephone numbers: [Telf1] or [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: [...] 3

Res: 2015-024 Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal de Cartago, sección primera. A las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintidós de enero de dos mil quince.

Recurso de apelación de sentencia penal interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1] , mayor, casado, vecino de Cajón de Pérez Zeledón, nacido el quince de marzo de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, con cédula de identidad número CED1 , por el delito de Invasion a una Área de Protección y Tala Ilegal, en perjuicio de Los Recursos Naturales. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces [Nombre2] , Rosibel López Madrigal y Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez. Se apersonó en apelación, el licenciado [Nombre3] . representante del Ministerio Público.

Resultando:

1. Que mediante sentencia No. 801-2013 (sic) de las siete horas treinta minutos del veintitrés de octubre de dos mil catorce, el Tribunal de Juicio de la zona sur sede Pérez Zeledón, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39, 41 de la Constitución Política, 8 inciso1 y 2, 9 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 142, 265, 266, 267, 360 a 366 del Código Procesal Penal; 1, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 45 delCódigo Penal, 58 de la Ley Forestal, artículo 122 de las Reglas Vigentes sobre Responsabilidad Civil. Se resuelve:absolver de toda pena y responsabilidad al imputado [Nombre4] por los delitos de Invasión en un área de protección y tala ilegal en perjuicio de los Recursos Naturales. En razón de lo anterior se ordena el levantamientode cualquier medida cautelar que pese en contra del acusado, referente a la presente causa. Son los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoriaen costas. Se declara SIN LUGAR LA ACCION CIVIL RESARCITORIAY LA QUERELLA PRESENTADA POR LA PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA. Se exime del pago de costas por la interposición de la acción civil a la Procuraduría General de la República por existir razón plausible para litigar. Se ordena la restitución a su estado anterior y reparación del daño causado en el terreno donde se produjo el daño ambiental, por parte del SINAC. [Nombre5] Jueza del Tribunal de Pérez Zeledón ." (sic)

2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre3] . interpuso el recurso de apelación.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 466 del Código Procesal Penal, reformado por Ley 8837 publicada el nueve de diciembre de dos mil once (Creación de Recurso de Apelación de la Sentencia), el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4 . Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez [Nombre6] , y;

Considerando:

I- El recurso de apelación reúne los requisitos de admisibilidad definidos en los artículos 459, 460 y 461 del Código Procesal Penal, por lo que se entra a conocer de sus motivos.

II- En su único motivo del recurso, el Fiscal Auxiliar de Pérez Zeledón, [Nombre7] , aduce errónea aplicación de la ley adjetiva al estimar procedente el epíteto de testigos sospechosos sin el imperativo de indicio comprobado de comisión del hecho penalmente relevante. Arguye que ofreció como testigos a [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , ambos de apellido [Nombre10] , sustentándose en el informe de diligencia menor emitido por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial número 510-DRPZ-14, quienes eran esenciales dado que conocían al imputado, son los propietarios registrales de la finca en la cual se ubica el cuerpo de agua tipo embalse objeto de esta acusación por las reiteradas invasiones del área de protección. Agrega que además los testigos habían convenido para la fecha de los hechos en un contrato de opción de compra venta con el acusado. Esgrime que el Tribunal sin resolución alguna calificó de testigos sospechosos a los citados deponentes, aplicando erróneamente el derecho, al considerar que ese informe menor de la Policía, era indicio suficiente de que podrían haber cometido delito. Alude, que en razón de ello, los testigos [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , ambos [Nombre10] , se abstuvieron de declarar, generando un agravio para el Ministerio Público al ser absuelto el acusado por la falta de recepción de esa prueba. Con lugar el reclamo. Esta Cámara estima que efectivamente conforme lo alega el señor Fiscal, el Tribunal otorgó erróneamente el derecho de abstención de declarar a los testigos [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , ambos [Nombre10] , al estimar que estos eran testigos sospechosos. Nuestro ordenamiento procesal penal regula la figura del "testigo sospechoso" de forma muy somera en el artículo 204 párrafo primero en donde indica: "El testigo no estará en la obligación de declarar sobre hechos que puedan depararle responsabilidad penal". Esta es la única referencia que hace el Código Procesal Penal acerca de esta particular figura. La doctrina define al "testigo sospechoso" como: "al sujeto sobre quien recae alguna posibilidad mínima de participación en el delito; sin embargo, su participación aún no es suficiente para atribuirle responsabilidad alguna y tenerlo como imputado en el proceso, en virtud de que los indicios en su contra son muy débiles" (CAMPOS [Nombre11] y [Nombre12] . El valor probatorio de las declaraciones incriminatorias de coimputados en el proceso penal. San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas. 2007. pp 185). También se define como: "aquella persona que en determinado proceso penal, se le releva, valga la redundancia, de prestar juramento, pues sobre él existe cierto grado de sospecha, basado en un motivo debidamente fundado (no mera duda o intuición) como para atribuirle alguna responsabilidad penal en el hecho punible que se investiga, sin embargo esa sospecha, al menos en algunos casos, no es lo suficientemente grande como para realizar una acusación formal en su contra" (BLANCO [Nombre13] . Deberes y Derechos del Testigo Sospechoso en el Ordenamiento Procesal Penal Costarricense. Tesis para optar al grado de Licenciada en Derecho. UCR. 1997 citado por [Nombre14] y [Nombre12] . Op cit pp 186). En el caso concreto, los testigos [Nombre9] y [Nombre8], ambos [Nombre10] , fueron ofrecidos como prueba para mejor resolver por el Ministerio Público y admitidos por el Tribunal. No obstante ello, la juzgadora consideró que con base en lo expuesto en el Informe Policial número 510-DRPZ-14 de fecha 8 de octubre de 2014, en el cual la deponente [Nombre15] hizo una manifestación a los oficiales del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, eso la convertía tanto a ella como a su hermano, en testigos sospechosos. Precisamente, lo consignado por el Informe citado como relatado por Doña [Nombre15] fue que: "su intención a sido vender el lote y que hace como unos tres años trataron de hacer un negocio con un señor de nombre [Nombre16] y otro de nombre [Nombre17], Que estos les dieron como señal de trato un dinero y quedaron en darles varias mensualidades, pero "como este sujeto hizo un daño en una laguna, vecinos lo denunciaron y este les había comentado que no iba a poder realizar nada ahi porque,el MINAET no lo dejaba seguir haciendo lo planeado es así como no lograron realizar el trato y el lote aún les pertenece" (sic)". De esta manifestación no se desprende ningún grado de sospecha debidamente fundado, ni siquiera leve, del cual pueda desprenderse que estos testigos pudieron haber incurrido en algún hecho delictivo. Lo que manifestó la señora [Nombre15] es que ellos vendieron la finca al imputado y otro sujeto de nombre [Nombre18] este les hizo varios pagos, y que luego como el imputado realizó un daño en la laguna, los vecinos lo denunciaron y entonces les dijo que no podía seguir con lo planeado porque el Minaet no lo dejaba, por lo que no lograron entonces hacer el trato. La Juzgadora interpretó que eventualmente por ser los deponentes dueños registrales de la propiedad en donde se generó la invasión a la zona protectora, y haber existido un convenio de venta con el acusado, la declaración de estos testigos podía generarles eventualmente una responsabilidad sino penal, de algún otro tipo. La interpretación que hizo el Tribunal es errónea, dado que del Informe Policial citado en modo alguno se desprende ningún tipo de elemento que haga presumir que la señora [Nombre15] o el testigo [Nombre9] por haber vendido o negociado la propiedad con el encartado hayan participado del delito atribuido por el Ministerio Público en esta causa. Tal y como se indicó, no es una simple intuición o presunción que tenga la Juzgadora la que puede otorgar la calidad de "testigo sospechoso" a una persona, sino una sospecha fundada en algún elemento probatorio, lo cual no se desprende del informe policial que cita la señora Jueza. Mucho menos es de recibo, fundamentar la calidad de "testigo sospechoso" en una presunta responsabilidad o consecuencia no penal para el deponente, como refirió el Tribunal al resolver la protesta por actividad procesal defectuosa interpuesta contra esa decisión por el señor Procurador. El artículo 204 del Código Procesal Penal es claro en que no está en la obligación de declarar el testigo, sobre hechos que le puedan deparar responsabilidad penal. Por ende, al haber tratado el Tribunal a los deponentes [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , ambos [Nombre10] , como "testigos sospechosos", y por ende haberles advertido de su derecho de abstención de declarar y de contar con un abogado defensor, lo cual hizo que los dos deponentes dispusieran no declarar, se limitó el ejercicio de la acción penal por parte del Ministerio Público, dado que era prueba relevante, debidamente admitida por el Tribunal de Juicio, en la que el órgano Fiscal iba a sustentar su acusación. Por lo anterior, se ha producido un vicio de carácter absoluto según el numeral 178 inciso c) del Código Procesal Penal, por lo que se acoge el reclamo, se anula la sentencia parcialmente en lo que respecta a la absolutoria decretada a favor del imputado [Nombre19] . Se ordena el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación en ese aspecto. En lo demás se mantiene incólume el fallo, sea en lo que atañe a la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil y la restitución del terreno a su estado natural por no haber sido recurridos dichos aspectos.

Por tanto:

Se declara con lugar el recurso de apelación de sentencia interpuesto por el Ministerio Público. Se anula parcialmente la sentencia impugnada en cuanto a la absolutoria dictada a favor del imputado [Nombre19] . Se ordena el reenvío a nuevo juicio en ese aspecto. En lo demás se mantiene incólume el fallo, sea en lo que atañe a la declaratoria sin lugar de la acción civil y la restitución del terreno a su estado natural. NOTIFÍQUESE.

[Nombre2] Rosibel López Madrigal Jaime Robleto Gutiérrez Jueza y Jueces del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal C/: [Nombre1] Of/: Los Recursos Naturales D/: Invasión a una Área de Protección y otro JORTIZS Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...]

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