Municipality Must Technically Delimit the Spring Before Restricting Land UseMunicipalidad debe delimitar técnicamente la naciente antes de restringir el uso del suelo

Municipal appeal in improper hierarchy Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A. v/ Municipalidad de Vázquez de Coronado Contencioso Administrative Tribunal, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Email ...01 _______________________________________________________________________ No. 10-2015 CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION, ANNEX A OF THE II JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at nine hours twenty minutes on the twenty-second of January of two thousand fifteen. - Appeal (Recurso de apelación) filed by Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., legal identification number No. CED20026, represented by its unlimited general agent, Mr. Nombre104424, identification number No. CED80786, against resolution No. 017-13 at 3:00 p.m. on September 12, 2013, issued by the Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado.

Drafted by Judge Solano Ulloa, WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):

I.- PROVEN FACTS. The following relevant facts for this process are duly accredited: 1) The Department of Urban Management and Construction Control (Departamento de Gestión Urbana y Control Constructivo) of the Municipalidad de Vázquez de Coronado issued land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) No. 102-2013 dated February 11, 2013, for the property owned by Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., corresponding to cadastral map No. 762362-88, in which it was indicated that the use requested for construction is in accordance with the Plan Regulador, as the property is located in a High-Density Residential Zone. However, the following was ordered:

"You are informed that in this particular case the property has 75% of its territory within the protection zone of the Patalillo spring (naciente), so that within this space no land use (uso de suelo) is permitted except water protection as established by Art. 31 of the Ley de Aguas No. 276. The above is communicated according to Environmental criterion SA-253-017-013 of February 8, 2013 issued by Gilbert Benítez, Environmental Management Technician." (folios 148 to 151) 2) On February 19, 2013, the company filed an appeal against the aforementioned land-use certificate, with the vertical appeal being rejected by the Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado, in resolution No. 0017-13 at 3:00 p.m. on September 12, 2013, in application of the limitations contained in the Ley Forestal, articles 33 and 34, which are supported by Votos of the Sala Constitucional (folios 120 to 126).

II.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The appellant challenges the decision of the Alcalde, alleging defects of absolute nullity, based on the following arguments: It considers that the Ley Forestal only establishes the impossibility of cutting trees in order to fulfill the objective set forth in article 1, which is to conserve and protect forests and natural resources, and does not prevent construction developments that respect such condition, especially because the land is located in the High-Density Residential Zone according to the Plan Regulador. It believes the applicable rule is that contained in the Reglamento Nacional para Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, article III.7.1, which provides for a construction-free strip with a minimum width of 10 meters on the sides of the channel, considering that the law must be correctly applied, which is the regulation of constructions. It considers that the Municipalidad has not undertaken the task of determining whether the spring is permanent or intermittent, since if it is intermittent, the protection of article 33 mentioned should not apply. It considers that its criterion has been supported by the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación, official communication OSJ-415-03 and by the Procuraduría General de la República, in Dictamen OJ-064-2202. It adds that in Voto 16031-2006 of the Sala Constitucional, in application of the precautionary principle, a precautionary measure prohibiting construction was ordered because there was a doubt regarding the effects of a construction on a spring or stream, a scenario that does not apply to the appellant. It considers that we are not in the presence, either, of a water supply source, so numeral 16 of the Ley de Agua Potable is also not applicable. Finally, it maintains that the criterion expressed by the Alcalde, in considering the one-hundred-meter radius of the springs untouchable, is an expropriatory limitation that must be compensated, and therefore requests that if the prohibition on carrying out constructions is maintained, the compensation procedure be initiated to set the fair price.

III.- On the merits. On municipal urban planning competence and environmental protection. Article 50 of the Constitution establishes environmental protection in a dual aspect, as a fundamental right and as a public function, in which the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. The Municipalidades form part of the organization of the Costa Rican State, as their nature as decentralized entities by reason of territory also entails responsibilities regarding environmental protection (in this regard, see the judgment of the Sala Constitucional number 2001-05737, of fourteen hours forty-one minutes on June twenty-seventh, two thousand one). This implies that the municipalidades are responsible for protecting all those assets that converge in the environment, whether all the natural resources necessary for human existence, or scenic beauties. This work includes, par excellence, the oversight of every urban planning process, as these tend to convert a portion of land into a settlement, which is a complex process of environmental alteration with great effect on natural and artificial ecosystems, since most of these types of works compact the land and cover a significant portion of the surface with an impermeable layer, which can affect aquifer reserves, increase runoff, alter natural drainages and increase the flow of rivers and other water courses, in addition to eliminating the original landscape. Land-use planning (ordenamiento territorial) incorporates the use and sustainable development of renewable and non-renewable resources located in the different areas of the country, as well as respect for the cultural, historical, and social characteristics of the human populations involved, aspiring to achieve a balance between human settlements and their environmental conditions. That is why everything concerning the approval of urban planning regulation, as well as the granting of subdivision (fraccionamiento) and construction permits, has been conferred to the Municipalidades, as those responsible for the administration of local interests and services, as provided in article 169 of the Political Constitution (see also, Código Municipal, article 13 subsection o), the Ley de Planificación Urbana, Ley de Construcciones, and the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). Articles 15 and 19 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana recognize the competence that each municipalidad has to plan urban development within the limits of its territory, pursuant to the regulations and regulatory plans they issue for that purpose. That is why the granting of any construction permit is conditional on the project in question being in accordance with the applicable urban planning regulations; which entails a prior enabling control or "permit," accompanied by supervisory activity in the execution of the authorized activity, so that it is carried out in accordance with the license or permit granted and the environmental regulations governing the activity. This is why the construction process cannot be divorced from the environment in which it takes place, and this has been developed by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment No. 000507-F-04 where it stated:

"the notion of property is fully and perfectly amalgamated with the constitutional right to the environment, which with equal intensity and hierarchy, the constitutional body proclaims in its precept 50. Therefore, it is not difficult to infer urban planning regulation as an intermediary between property and environment, because ultimately, it is the gray, regulatory, and edificatory reverse of the latter matter. Environment and urban planning are thus constituted as areas of Law that, due to their limiting role, delineate the precise contour of the property right, that is, its essential content.

Precisely, public order, urban planning, and environmental regulations impose the submission of the administered parties, as these integrate the content of the property right, insofar as they establish the authorized or legitimate scope of its exercise, by containing some of the limitations authorized by article 45 of the Constitution, under the understanding that there is no dispossession of private property nor deprivation of the primary attribute of ownership, therefore, they give no room for any compensation, nor for an expropriation proceeding, as the appellant intends.

IV.- Regarding the specific case, the municipalidad has indicated in the issued land-use certificate that the property owned by the appellant company, with map No. SJ-762362-88, has the limitations of articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal, due to 75% of its surface being covered by the protection radius of a spring. Certainly, the current Ley Forestal, number 7575 of February 13, 1996, establishes the figure of protection areas in its article 33:

“Article 33.- Protection areas. The following are declared protection areas:

• a)The areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes permanentes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally...” And article 34 of the Ley Forestal adds:

“Article 34.- Prohibition on logging in protected areas The cutting or elimination of trees in the protection areas described in the previous article is prohibited, except in projects declared by the Executive Branch as of national convenience. The alignments that must be processed in relation to these areas, shall be carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo.” The appellant develops two grievances regarding the protection radius of springs; the first, in the sense that the limitation only prevents the owner from logging trees; the second, that said limitation only affects lands with forest aptitude or destined for environmental conservation. Neither of the two grievances is receivable by this Chamber. The affectation contained in numeral 33 of the Ley Forestal is of general scope, because it is due to the necessary conservation of the one-hundred-meter radius of every spring in order to conserve the water sources that come from the subsoil, which depend on the physical factors (soil texture and its components, namely, roots, sand, silt, and clay), chemical and biotic factors of the land, whose alteration by man, can converge in the degradation of soils and the increase of desert areas. Said limitation implicitly restricts the exercise of those other ownership faculties that may degrade the natural state of the springs, which includes, as is obvious, the restriction on the right to build on the land. Therefore, said norms are imposed over any regulation contained in local or national regulations.

V.- The appellant considers said regulations inapplicable, so that, failing that, the construction regulation contained in the Reglamento Nacional para el Control de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, article III.3.7.1, be applied. The assumption provided for in this norm is not the one being addressed in this case, as that regulatory provision refers to the existence of properties crossed by rivers or streams, or that are adjacent to them. In a similar matter, the same concerns were already analyzed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 199 at 3:30 p.m. on February 4, 2010, with criteria that this Chamber fully shares, where it stated:

“II…As a second ground, it considers violated, by erroneous interpretation, ordinals 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal, which, it states, must be analyzed jointly, as well as their improper application, therefore violating numeral III.3.7.6 of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones…V.-…due to the relevance of the topic, it is important to refer to the protection regime for springs, which provides for different scenarios, which have in common, the establishment of an area around them on which the respective protection falls. The legal system provides two scenarios; an affectation of that strip to public domain (ordinals 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización and 31 of the Ley de Aguas), or, maintaining the property as private property but protected (articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal). Regardless of the nature of the land in question (which is not under discussion in this process), even in the scenario of lesser protection, that is, in the case of a protected area on private property, it cannot be ignored that a series of limitations on property arise from this legal classification. In addition to the explicit one referred to in numeral 34 of the cited normative body, which consists of a prohibition on cutting trees, the truth is that the establishment of a protection area around the spring implicitly restricts the exercise of those ownership faculties that may affect, directly or indirectly, a permanent spring. To affirm the contrary could lead to the contradiction of allowing the erection of a building that destroys said natural resource on the condition that no tree is cut, or as in the present case, that no trees are planted. In this sense, what is provided in numeral 10 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública must be taken into account, which establishes that the administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the public purpose sought. In environmental matters, in addition to what is prescribed in constitutional ordinal 50 and which was the subject of analysis in Whereas III, it must be taken into account that the State is compelled to ensure the protection of the environment, seeking healthy and ecologically balanced development. This constitutional-level obligation has been developed in various legal-level norms, such as the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the Ley de Biodiversidad, among others. By virtue of the foregoing, although the challenged precautionary measure must be annulled, both the plaintiff party and the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, as well as any other competent institution, are under the legal obligation to prevent any action that could negatively affect the spring.” As can be seen from the transcribed text, there is no possibility of imposing the application of numeral III.3.7.1 of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones above numerals 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal, which would be openly illegal.

VI.- The Municipalidad has accepted, in the Second Whereas (Considerando Segundo) of the challenged resolution No. 017-13, that it has not yet been determined if the spring is permanent or intermittent. On this point, it must be noted that our legislation provides protection for intermittent springs, not in numeral 33 of the Ley Forestal, but in article 149 of the Ley de Aguas which states:

“It is prohibited to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located less than sixty meters from the springs that arise on hills, or less than fifty meters from those that arise on flat lands.” (Emphasis added).

In this sense, there are uniform precedents, issued both by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in voto 858-F-S1-2012, at 9:20 a.m. on July 20, 2012, and by the Sala Constitucional, in voto number 2010-8315 at 8:45 a.m. on May 7, 2010, where the sixty-meter protection radius for some intermittent springs was recognized, in application of the cited numeral. To this effect, the First Chamber ruled in the cited voto:

"III.- Numeral 149 of the Ley de Aguas is found within the Ninth Chapter of said law, called “Measures Concerning the Conservation of Trees to Prevent the Diminution of Waters,” which as its name indicates, seeks, with the precepts contained therein, that the state authorities ensure “(…) the strict compliance with legal provisions regarding the conservation of trees, especially those on the banks of rivers and those found at water sources” (canon 145 ibidem), in order to prevent the diminution of waters. In that sense, the referred numeral reads: “It is prohibited to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located less than sixty meters from the springs that arise on hills, or less than fifty meters from those that arise on flat lands.” As observed, the norm does not distinguish between permanent and intermittent springs, so it is not appropriate to make such differentiation when applying it. It is a typical limitation of public interest (article 45 of the Political Constitution), which like others provided for in various normative bodies of the legal system, has evolved the concept of limits to private property, for the sake of a real and effective protection of the constitutional guarantee (article 50 of our Political Constitution) of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Nor does the precept distinguish between public domain waters and private domain waters. The norm refers to waters only, that is, to water resources in general, so the citation of articles 1 to 4 of Law No. 276 is not pertinent to the case. Hence, this Chamber does not consider that the Tribunal had violated the canon whose erroneous interpretation and application is challenged, by establishing that legal protection does exist for intermittent springs." From the foregoing, it is clear that the radius of intermittent springs, as part of the water resources (aquifer mantles), is also protected by our environmental order; however, the distance provided for this purpose is notably smaller. Therefore, it is essential that each spring has been duly classified by the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación, to determine if it is permanent or intermittent and, in the latter case, its location must be clear, in order to define the coverage distance of its protection area. Certainly, the grievance claiming the absence of a determination of this data is absolutely receivable, which reveals an important technical-legal deficiency in the challenged act, since until there is absolute clarity on the exact location of the spring and the length of its protection radius, whether one hundred linear meters if permanent, sixty or fifty meters if intermittent, depending on the location on a hill or on a plain, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation provided by the legal system, if there are mechanisms to resolve this absence. Until this is clarified with certainty by the local government, making the rigorous consultations with the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación of MINAET, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation in the way it has been done, as it could be generating a direct, illegitimate, and unjust harm to the property of the appellant company, preventing it from the enjoyment of areas that it could eventually use for construction purposes. These considerations are necessary to conclude that, due to the manner in which the local government has resolved, there are defects in reasoning (vicios de motivo) due to a lack of technical basis and content in the resolution of the Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado, No. 017-2013, which is contrary to what is provided in articles 16 subsection 1) and 136 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Said circumstance warrants declaring the absolute nullity of the appealed act, which entails the partial nullity of land-use certificate No. 102-2013, regarding the content that has been reviewed in this resolution and that was confirmed on that occasion. The ayuntamiento must then make the appropriate inquiries before the competent administrative bodies, to subsequently define with exactness, whether there is a coverage margin for the protection area of the spring that affects the property owned by the appellant. For the foregoing reasons, the filed appeal is upheld, and the case file must be returned to the local government, so that it may re-evaluate the application for the land-use certificate, with exact and accurate technical criteria, as indicated in this resolution.

VII.- Finally, it must be pointed out that the resolution brought on appeal makes no reference whatsoever to numeral 16 of the Ley de Agua Potable, which is why no ruling is made regarding the grievance that refers to said norm. Similarly, the compensation claims are not addressable in this instance, as this Tribunal is a reviewer of objective legality, for which, if it deems appropriate, it may proceed to the ordinary knowledge process in the jurisdictional venue, if it still considers that it has been subjected to a hollowing out of its property right.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The appeal filed is upheld and consequently, resolution No. 017-13 at 3:00 p.m. on September 12, 2013, issued by the Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado is annulled, and by connection, land-use certificate No. 102-2013 issued on February 11, 2013, is partially annulled, solely regarding the limitation imposed on 75% of the appellant's property, cadastral map No. SJ-762362-88. The case file is returned to the respondent Municipalidad, so that it may promote before the corresponding administrative bodies, the delimitation of the area covered by the protection zone of the Patalillo spring. Based on that, it may rule again regarding the limitation that may eventually fall on the indicated property, with the identification of the exact coverage area that affects it, in the terms indicated in this resolution.

Evelyn Solano Ulloa Jorge Leiva Poveda Francisco José Torres Chaves Contencioso Administrative and Civil Hacienda Tribunal, Third Section.

Resolution No. 10-2015 at 9:20 a.m. on January 22, 2015.

2 of 13 c/ Municipality of Vázquez de Coronado Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Email ...01 _______________________________________________________________________ No. 10-2015 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION, ANNEX A OF THE II JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at nine hours twenty minutes on the twenty-second of January, two thousand fifteen.- Appeal filed by Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., legal identification number No. CED20026, represented by its general agent without sum limit, Mr. Nombre104424, identity card No. CED80786, against resolution No. 017-13 of 15:00 hours on September 12, 2013, issued by the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado.

Drafted by Judge Solano Ulloa,

CONSIDERING:

Io.- PROVEN FACTS. The following facts, which are relevant to this process, are deemed duly accredited: 1) The Department of Urban Management and Construction Control of the Municipality of Vázquez de Coronado issued land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) No. 102-2013 dated February 11, 2013, for the property owned by Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., corresponding to cadastral map No. 762362-88, in which it was indicated that the requested use for construction conforms to the Regulatory Plan, as the property is located in a High-Density Residential Zone. However, the following was ordered:

"It is communicated to you that in this particular case, the property has 75% of its territory within the protection zone of the Patalillo spring (naciente), therefore no land use can occur within this space except water protection according to Art. 31 of the Water Law No. 276. The above is communicated according to Environmental Criterion SA-253-017-013 of February 8, 2013, issued by Gilbert Benítez, Environmental Management Technician." (folios 148 to 151) 2) On February 19, 2013, the company filed an appeal against the aforementioned land-use certificate, resulting in the internal appeal being rejected by the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado, in resolution No. 0017-13 of 15:00 hours on September 12, 2013, in application of the limitations contained in the Ley Forestal, articles 33 and 34, which are supported by Votes of the Constitutional Chamber (folios 120 to 126).

II.- OBJECT OF THE APPEAL. The appellant challenges the decision of the Mayor, alleging defects of absolute nullity, based on the following arguments: He considers that the Ley Forestal only establishes the impossibility of cutting trees in order to fulfill the objective set forth in article 1, which is to conserve and protect forests and natural resources, and does not prevent construction developments that respect such condition, especially because the land is located in the High-Density Residential Zone according to the Regulatory Plan. He estimates that the applicable norm is that contained in the National Regulations for Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento Nacional para Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), article III.7.1, which provides for a strip without constructions with a minimum width of 10 meters on the sides of the channel, estimating that the law must be correctly applied to him, which is the regulation of constructions. He considers that the Municipality has not undertaken the task of determining whether the spring is permanent or intermittent, since if it proves intermittent, the protection of the aforementioned article 33 should not be applied to him. He considers that his criterion has been supported by the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación), official letter OSJ-415-03 and by the Attorney General's Office, in Opinion OJ-064-2202. He adds that in Vote 16031-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber, in application of the precautionary principle, a precautionary measure of prohibition of construction was ordered due to the existence of doubt regarding the effects of a construction on a spring or creek, a supposition that is not that of the appellant. He considers that we are not in the presence, either, of a water supply source, so that numeral 16 of the Drinking Water Law is also inapplicable to him. Finally, he maintains that the criterion expressed by the Mayor, in estimating the one-hundred-meter radius of the springs as untouchable, is an expropriatory limitation that must be compensated to him, so he requests that if the prohibition on carrying out constructions is maintained, the compensation procedure be initiated so that the just price is fixed.

III.- On the merits. On municipal urban planning competence and environmental protection. Article 50 of the Constitution establishes the protection of the environment in a dual aspect, as a fundamental right and as a public function, in which the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. The Municipalities constitute part of the organization of the Costa Rican State, since from their nature as decentralized entities by reason of territory derive responsibilities also regarding environmental protection (in this regard, see the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber number 2001-05737, of fourteen hours forty-one minutes on June twenty-seventh, two thousand one). This implies that the municipalities are responsible for protecting all those goods that converge in the environment, whether all the natural resources necessary for human existence, to scenic beauties. This task includes, par excellence, the surveillance of every urban development process, since these tend to convert a portion of land into a populated area, which is a complex process of environmental alteration with great effect on natural and artificial ecosystems, since the majority of this type of work compacts the terrains and covers an important part of the surface with an impermeable layer, thereby potentially affecting aquifer reserves, increasing runoff, altering natural drainage and increasing the flow of rivers and other watercourses, in addition to eliminating the original landscape. Land-use planning incorporates the use and sustainable development of renewable and non-renewable resources located in the different zones of the country, as well as respect for the cultural, historical, and social characteristics of the human populations involved, aspiring to achieve a balance between human settlements and their environmental conditions. That is why everything concerning the approval of urban planning regulation, as well as the granting of subdivision (fraccionamiento) and construction permits, has been conferred upon the Municipalities, as those responsible for the administration of local interests and services, as provided in article 169 of the Political Constitution (see also, Código Municipal, article 13 subsection o), the Urban Planning Law, Construction Law and the Organic Law of the Environment). Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law recognize the competence that each municipality has to plan urban development within the limits of its territory, in accordance with the regulations and regulatory plans they issue for that purpose. That is why the granting of any construction permit is conditioned on the project in question being in conformity with the applicable urban planning ordinance; which supposes a prior enabling control or "permit", accompanied by the oversight activity in the execution of the authorized activity, so that it is carried out in accordance with the license or permit granted and the environmental regulations governing the activity. This is why the construction process cannot be divorced from the environment in which it develops, and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has developed this in ruling No. 000507-F-04 in which it stated:

"The notion of property amalgamates fully and perfectly with the constitutional right to the environment, which with equal intensity and hierarchy, the constitutional body proclaims in its precept 50. Therefore, it is not difficult to infer urban planning regulation as an intermediary between property and environment, as it is, ultimately, the gray, ordinating, and constructive reverse side of this latter matter. Environment and urbanism thus become areas of Law that, by their limiting role, delimit the precise contour of the right of property, that is, its essential content." Precisely, public order, urban planning, and environmental regulations impose the subjection of the administered, as these integrate the content of the right of property, insofar as they establish the authorized or legitimate scope of its exercise, containing some of the limitations authorized by constitutional article 45, under the understanding that there is no dispossession of private property nor deprivation of the primary attribute of ownership, therefore, they do not give rise to any compensation, nor to expropriation proceedings, as the appealing party intends.

IV.- Regarding the specific case, the municipality has indicated in the land-use certificate issued that the property owned by the appellant company, with map No. SJ-762362-88, has the limitations of articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal, due to 75% of its surface being covered by the protection radius of a spring. Certainly, the current Ley Forestal, number 7575 of February 13, 1996, establishes the figure of protection areas in its article 33:

"Article 33.- Protection areas. The following are declared protection areas:

• a)The areas bordering permanent springs, defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally..." And article 34 of the Ley Forestal adds:

"Article 34.- Prohibition on cutting in protected areas. The cutting or elimination of trees in the protection areas described in the previous article is prohibited, except in projects declared by the Executive Branch as of national convenience.

The alignments that must be processed in relation to these areas shall be carried out by the National Housing and Urbanism Institute (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo).” The appellant develops two grievances regarding the protection radius of the springs (nacientes); the first, in the sense that the limitation only prevents the owner from cutting down trees; the second, that said limitation only affects lands with forest aptitude or destined for environmental conservation. Neither of the two grievances is admissible by this Chamber. The encumbrance contained in numeral 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) is of general scope, since it obeys the necessary conservation of the hundred-meter radius around every spring (naciente) in order to conserve the water sources that come from the subsoil, which depend on the physical factors (soil texture and its components, namely, roots, sand, silt, and clay), chemical factors, and biotic factors of the land, whose alteration by man can converge in the degradation of soils and the increase of desert areas. Said limitation implicitly includes the restriction on the exercise of those other property rights that may degrade the natural state of the springs (nacientes), which includes, as is obvious, the restriction on the right to build on the land. For this reason, said norms are imposed over and above any regulation contained in local or national regulations.

**V.-** The appellant considers said regulation inapplicable, so that, in its stead, the constructive regulation contained in the National Regulation for the Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations, article III.3.7.1, be applied to it. The assumption foreseen in this norm is not the one being addressed in this case, because that regulatory provision refers to the existence of properties crossed by rivers or streams (quebradas), or that border on them. In a similar matter, the same concerns were already analyzed by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 199 of 15:30 hours on February 4, 2010, with criteria that this Chamber shares in its entirety, where it indicated:

*“II…As a second ground, it considers violated, by erroneous interpretation, the ordinals 33 and 34 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), which, it refers, must be analyzed in conjunction, as well as their improper application, by which numeral III.3.7.6 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations is contravened…V.-…due to the relevance of the topic, it is important to refer to the protection regime of the springs (nacientes), which provides for different assumptions, which have in common the establishment of an area around these on which the respective protection falls. The legal system provides two assumptions; an encumbrance of that strip to the public domain (ordinals 7 of the Land and Colonization Law and 31 of the Water Law), or, maintaining the property as private property but protected (articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal)). Regardless of the nature of the land in question (which is not under discussion in the present process), even in the assumption of lesser protection, that is, in the case of a protected area in private property, it cannot be overlooked that the consequences that from this legal qualification arise are a series of limitations on the property. In addition to the explicit one referred to in numeral 34 of the cited normative body, and which consists of a prohibition on cutting trees, the truth is that the establishment of a protection area around the spring (naciente) carries with it an implicit restriction on the exercise of those property rights that may affect, directly or indirectly, a permanent spring (naciente). Asserting the contrary could lead to the contradiction of allowing a building to be erected that destroys said natural resource on the condition that no tree is cut down, or as in the present case, that there are no trees planted. In this sense, the provisions of numeral 10 of the General Law of Public Administration must be taken into account, which establishes that the administrative norm must be interpreted in the way that best guarantees the public purpose pursued. In environmental matters, in addition to what is precepted in constitutional ordinal 50 and which was the subject of analysis in Considering III, it must be taken into account that the State is compelled to ensure the protection of the environment, procuring healthy and ecologically balanced development. This constitutional obligation has been developed in various norms of legal rank, such as, for example, the Organic Law of the Environment, the Biodiversity Law, among others. By virtue of the foregoing, although the challenged precautionary measure must be annulled, both the plaintiff and the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, as well as any other competent institution, are under the legal obligation to prevent any action that may negatively affect the spring (naciente).”* As can be seen from the transcribed text, there is no possibility of imposing the application of numeral III.3.7.1 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations over and above numerals 33 and 34 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), which would be openly illegal.

**VI.-** The Municipality has accepted, in the Second Considering of the challenged resolution No. 017-13, that it has not yet been determined whether the spring (naciente) is permanent or intermittent. On this particular, it must be noted that our legislation provides protection for intermittent springs (nacientes), not in numeral 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), but in article 149 of the Water Law which states:

*“It is forbidden to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located at less than sixty meters from the springs (manantiales) that originate in the hills, or at less than fifty meters from those that originate on flat lands”* (Emphasis added).

In this sense, there are uniform precedents, issued both by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote 858-F-S1-2012, of 9:20 hours on July 20, 2012, and by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote number 2010-8315 of 8:45 hours on May 7, 2010, where the radius of sixty meters of protection for some intermittent springs (nacientes) was recognized, in application of the cited numeral. To this effect, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) provided in the cited vote:

*“III.-* *Numeral 149 of the Water Law is found within the Ninth Chapter of said law, named ‘Measures Concerning the Conservation of Trees to Prevent the Diminution of Waters,’ which, as its name indicates, seeks with the precepts contained therein, that the state authorities ensure ‘(…) the strict compliance with the legal provisions concerning the conservation of trees, especially those on the banks of rivers and those found at the water sources (nacimientos de aguas)’ (canon 145 ibidem), in order to prevent the diminution of waters. In that sense, the referred numeral reads: ‘It is forbidden to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located at less than sixty meters from the springs (manantiales) that originate in the hills, or less than fifty meters from those that originate on flat lands.’ As observed, the norm does not distinguish between permanent and intermittent springs (manantiales), so it would not be appropriate to make such a differentiation when applying it. It is a typical limitation of public interest (article 45 of the Political Constitution), which, like others foreseen in various normative bodies of the legal system, has evolved the concept of limits to private property, for the sake of real and effective protection of the constitutional guarantee (article 50 of our Political Constitution) of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Nor does the precept distinguish between public domain waters and private domain waters. The norm refers to waters only, that is, to water resources in general, so the citation of articles 1 to 4 of Law No. 276 is not pertinent to the case. Hence, this Chamber does not consider that the Court had violated the canon whose erroneous interpretation and application is alleged, by establishing that there is indeed legal protection for intermittent springs (nacientes).”* From the foregoing, it is clear that the radius of intermittent springs (nacientes), as part of the water resource (aquifers), is also protected by our environmental legal system; however, the distance foreseen for this purpose is notably less. For this reason, it is essential that each spring (naciente) has been duly classified by the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación), to determine if it is permanent or intermittent and, in the latter case, its location must be clearly established, in order to define the coverage distance of its protection area. Certainly, the grievance that claims the absence of determination of this data is absolutely admissible, which reveals a significant technical-legal deficiency of the challenged act, since until there is absolute clarity regarding the exact location of the spring (naciente) and the length of its protection radius, whether one hundred linear meters if it is permanent, sixty or fifty meters if it is intermittent, depending on its location on a hill or on flat land, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation provided by the legal system, if there are mechanisms to remedy this absence. Until this is clarified with certainty by the local government, making the necessary consultations with the National System of Conservation Areas of MINAET, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation in the manner in which it has been done, because a direct, illegitimate, and unjust injury could be generated to the appellant company's property, preventing it from enjoying areas that it could eventually utilize for constructive purposes. These considerations are necessary to conclude that, due to the manner in which the local government has resolved, there are defects of motive due to lack of technical foundation and in the content of the resolution of the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado, No. 017-2013, which is contrary to the provisions of articles 16 subsection 1) and 136 of the General Law of Public Administration. Said circumstance merits declaring the absolute nullity of the appealed act, which entails the partial nullity of the land use certificate No. 102-2013, regarding the content that has been reviewed in this resolution and that was confirmed on that occasion. The municipality must then make the necessary consultations before the competent administrative instances, to later define with exactitude if there is a coverage margin of the protection area of the spring (naciente) that affects the property owned by the appellant party. For the reasons stated, the filed appeal is granted, and the records must be returned to the local government, so that it may again address the application for the land use certificate, with exact and accurate technical criteria, as indicated in this resolution.

**VII.-** Finally, it remains to be indicated that the resolution brought on appeal makes no reference whatsoever to numeral 16 of the Drinking Water Law, which is why no pronouncement is made regarding the grievance that alludes to said norm. Likewise, the indemnification claims are not admissible in this instance, as this Court is a reviewer of objective legality, for which, if it sees fit, it may access the ordinary trial process in the jurisdictional venue, if it still considers that it has been subject to a deprivation of its property right.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is granted and consequently, resolution No. 017-13 of 15:00 hours on September 12, 2013, issued by the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado is annulled and, by connection, the land use certificate No. 102-2013 issued on February 11, 2013, is partially annulled, solely regarding the limitation imposed on 75% of the property of the appellant party, cadastral map No. SJ-762362-88. The file is returned to the respondent Municipality, so that it may promote before the corresponding administrative instances the delimitation of the area encompassed by the protection zone of the Patalillo spring (naciente). Based on that, it may resolve again regarding the limitation that may eventually fall on the indicated property, with the identification of the exact coverage area that affects it, in the terms indicated in this resolution.

**Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Francisco José Torres Chaves** ***Contencioso Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Third Section.*** ***Resolution No.*** 10-2015 of 09:20 hours on January 22, 2015.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">2 of 13</span></p></div></body></html>", "links": [], "next_actions": [ "Full document text is in the 'content' field", "Structured metadata in 'metadata' (and 'api_hits' for the raw API response)" ], "api_hits": { "anno": "2015", "claseAsunto": "Appeal", "contenidosInteresOrden": "1", "descriptores": [ "Precautionary measures in administrative proceedings", "Limitations on property", "Waters", "Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment" ], "despacho": "Administrative Litigation Tribunal Section III", "despachoOrden": "15", "enteSistematizador": "CENTRO DE 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width=\"63\" height=\"76\" alt=\"graphic\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:82.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-2.85pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:82.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-2.85pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">II Circuito Judicial de San José, Dirección04</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">Central 2545-00-03</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> Fax 2545-00-33 </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> Correo Electrónico </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; text-decoration:underline; color:#0000ee\">...01</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">_______________________________________________________________________</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; text-indent:19.85pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">No. 10-2015</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">Goicoechea, at nine hours twenty minutes on January twenty-second</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> of two thousand fifteen .- </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">Appeal </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">filed by </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">, corporate ID No. CED20026, represented by its unlimited general agent, Mr. Nombre104424</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">, identification number No. CED80786,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> against </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">resolution No. 017-13 of 15:00 hours on September 12, 2013</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">, issued by the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Drafted by Judge Solano Ulloa,</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">WHEREAS:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">I.- PROVEN FACTS. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">The following facts, which are relevant to this process, are deemed duly proven: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">1) </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">The Department of Urban Management and Construction Control of the Municipality of Vázquez de Coronado issued land-use certificate No. 102-2013 dated February 11, 2013, for the property owned by Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A.,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> corresponding to cadastral map No. 762362-88, in which it was indicated that the requested use for construction conforms to the Regulatory Plan, as the property is located in a High-Density Residential Zone.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> However, the following was ordered:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">\"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\">You are hereby notified that in this particular case, the property has 75% of its territory within the protection zone of the Patalillo spring (naciente), therefore, within this space no land use may be permitted except for hydrological protection</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\"> as established by Art. 31 of the Ley de Aguas No. 276. The foregoing is communicated according to Environmental Opinion SA-253-017-013 of February 8, 2013, issued by Gilbert Benítez, Environmental Management Technician.\"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic\"> (folios 148 to 151)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> On February 19, 2013, the company filed an appeal against the previous land-use certificate, with the vertical appeal being rejected by the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> in resolution No. 0017-13 of 15:00 hours on September 12, 2013, applying the limitations contained in the Ley Forestal, articles 33 and 34, which are supported by Rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Votos de la Sala Constitucional) (folios 120 to 126). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">II.- SUBJECT OF THE APPEAL.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> The appellant challenges the Mayor's decision,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> alleging defects of absolute nullity, based on the following arguments: It considers that the Ley Forestal only establishes the impossibility of cutting trees in order to fulfill the objective set forth in Article 1, which is to conserve and protect forests and natural resources,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> and does not prevent construction developments that respect such condition, especially because the land</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> is located in a High-Density Residential Zone according to the Regulatory Plan.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> It considers that the applicable regulation is contained in the Reglamento Nacional para Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, Article III.7.1, which provides for a strip without constructions with a minimum width of 10 meters on the sides of the stream bed, considering that the law should be correctly applied to it, which is the regulation of constructions.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> It considers that the Municipality has not undertaken the task of determining whether the spring is permanent or intermittent, since if it proves to be intermittent, the protection of the aforementioned Article 33 should not be applied to it.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> It considers that its opinion has been supported by the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), official letter OSJ-415-03, and by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), in Opinion OJ-064-2202.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> It adds that in Ruling 16031-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber, in application of the precautionary principle, a precautionary measure (medida cautelar) prohibiting construction was ordered because there was doubt regarding the effects of construction on a spring or stream, a scenario that is not the appellant's. It also considers that we are not in the presence of a water supply source, so Article 16 of the Ley de Agua Potable is not applicable to it either. Finally,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> it maintains that the criterion expressed by the Mayor, in considering the hundred-meter radius of the springs untouchable, constitutes an expropriatory limitation that must be compensated, and therefore requests that if the prohibition on carrying out constructions is upheld, the indemnification procedure be initiated in order to determine just compensation (justiprecio). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:2.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:2.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">III.- On the merits. Regarding municipal urban planning competence</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\"> and environmental protection. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">Article 50 of the Constitution establishes the protection</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> of the environment in a dual aspect,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> as a fundamental right and as a</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> public function, in which the State must </span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold\">guarantee, defend, and preserve this right</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">. The Municipalities</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> constitute part of the organization of the Costa Rican State,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> since from their nature as</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> decentralized entities by reason of territory derive</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> responsibilities</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> also regarding environmental protection (in this regard, see Constitutional Chamber ruling number 2001-05737, of fourteen hours forty-one minutes on June twenty-seventh, two thousand one).</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> This implies that municipalities are responsible for protecting all those goods</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> that converge in the environment, from all the</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> natural resources necessary for human existence, to scenic beauties. This task includes, par excellence, the oversight</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> of any</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> urban planning process, as these tend to convert a portion of land into a settlement, which is a complex process of environmental alteration</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> having a great effect on natural and artificial ecosystems, given that the majority of this type of works compact the land</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> and cover a significant part of the</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> surface with an</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> impermeable layer, which can end up affecting</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> aquifer reserves, increasing runoff, altering natural drainage, and increasing the flow of rivers and other watercourses,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> in addition to eliminating the original landscape.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> Territorial planning incorporates the use and sustainable development</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> of renewable and non-renewable resources located in the different zones of the country, as well as respect for the cultural,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Century Gothic'\"> historical, and social characteristics of the human populations involved, aspiring to achieve a balance between human settlements and their environmental conditions.</span></p></div></body></html>" It is for this reason that everything concerning the approval of urban planning regulations, as well as the granting of subdivision (fraccionamiento) and construction permits, has been conferred upon the Municipalities, as those responsible for the administration of local interests and services, as provided in Article 169 of the Political Constitution (see also, Municipal Code, Article 13 subsection o), the Urban Planning Law, the Construction Law, and the Organic Law of the Environment). Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law recognize the competence vested in each municipality to plan urban development within the limits of its territory, in accordance with the regulations and regulatory plans they issue for that purpose. It is for this reason that the granting of any construction permit is conditioned upon the project in question being compliant with the applicable urban planning ordinance; this entails a prior enabling control or “permit,” accompanied by the supervisory activity during the execution of the authorized activity, so that it is carried out in accordance with the granted license or permit and the environmental regulations governing the activity. This is why the construction process cannot be divorced from the environment in which it takes place, and so the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has developed this in judgment No. 000507-F-04, in which it stated:

“the notion of property is fully and perfectly amalgamated with the constitutional right to the environment, which, with equal intensity and hierarchy, is proclaimed by the constitutional body in its precept 50. Therefore, it is not difficult to infer urban planning regulation as intermediate between property and environment, since, after all, it is the grey, regulatory, and building-related reverse of the latter subject matter. Environment and urbanism thus constitute areas of Law that, due to their limiting role, delineate the precise contour of the right to property, that is, its essential content.

Precisely, public order, urban planning, and environmental regulations impose the subjection of the governed, as these integrate the content of the right to property, insofar as they establish the authorized or legitimate scope of its exercise, containing some of the limitations authorized by constitutional Article 45, under the understanding that no dispossession of private property nor deprivation of the primary attribute of ownership occurs; therefore, they give rise to no compensation whatsoever, nor to expropriation proceedings, as the appellant party claims.

**IV.-** With respect to the specific case, the municipality has indicated in the issued land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) that the property of the appellant company, with plan No. SJ-762362-88, has the limitations of Articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), on the grounds that 75% of its surface area is covered by the protection radius of a spring (naciente). Certainly, the current Forestry Law, number 7575 of February 13, 1996, establishes the figure of protection areas in its Article 33:

“Article 33.- Protection areas. The following are declared protection areas:

• a)Areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes permanentes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally…” And Article 34 of the Forestry Law adds:

“Article 34.- Prohibition on clearing in protected areas The cutting or elimination of trees in the protection areas described in the previous article is prohibited, except in projects declared by the Executive Branch as being of national convenience. Alignments that must be processed in relation to these areas shall be carried out by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU)”.

The appellant develops two grievances regarding the protection radius of springs (nacientes); the first, in the sense that the limitation only prevents the owner from cutting trees; the second, that said limitation only affects lands with forestry aptitude or destined for environmental conservation. Neither of the two grievances is accepted by this Chamber. The affectation contained in numeral 33 of the Forestry Law is of general scope, as it responds to the necessary conservation of the one-hundred-meter radius of every spring (naciente) in order to conserve the water sources originating from the subsoil, which depend on the physical factors (soil texture and its components, namely, roots, sand, silt, and clay), chemical, and biotic factors of the land, whose alteration by man can converge in the degradation of soils and the increase of desert zones. This limitation implicitly restricts the exercise of those other ownership faculties that may degrade the natural state of the springs (nacientes), which includes, as is obvious, the restriction on the right to build on the land. Therefore, these norms are imposed above any regulation contained in local or national regulations.

**V.-** The appellant considers said regulations inapplicable, so that, in their stead, the construction regulation contained in the National Regulation for the Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations, Article III.3.7.1, be applied. The scenario provided for in this norm is not the one being addressed in this case, because that regulatory provision refers to the existence of properties crossed by rivers or streams (quebradas), or that border them. In a similar matter, the same concerns were already analyzed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 199 of 3:30 p.m. on February 4, 2010, with criteria that this Chamber fully shares, in which it stated:

“II…As a second ground, it considers violated, by erroneous interpretation, ordinals 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law, which, it refers, must be analyzed jointly, as well as their improper application, thereby infringing numeral III.3.7.6 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations…V.-…due to the relevance of the topic, it is important to refer to the protection regime for springs (nacientes), which provides for different scenarios, which have in common the establishment of an area around them upon which the respective protection falls. The legal system provides for two scenarios; an affectation of that strip to the public domain (ordinals 7 of the Land and Colonization Law and 31 of the Water Law), or, maintaining the property as private property but protected (Articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law). Regardless of the nature of the land in question (which is not under discussion in this proceeding), even in the scenario of lesser protection, that is, in the case of a protected area on private property, it cannot be overlooked that the consequences derived from this legal classification include a series of limitations on property. In addition to the explicit one referred to in numeral 34 of the cited normative body, which consists of a prohibition on cutting trees, the truth is that the establishment of a protection area around the spring (naciente) implicitly carries a restriction on the exercise of those ownership powers that may affect, directly or indirectly, a permanent spring (naciente permanente). To assert the contrary could lead to the contradiction of allowing a building to be erected that destroys said natural resource on the condition that no tree is cut, or as in the present case, that there are no trees planted. In this sense, the provisions of numeral 10 of the General Law of Public Administration must be taken into account, which establishes that the administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the public purpose pursued. In environmental matters, in addition to that prescribed in constitutional ordinal 50 and which was the subject of analysis in Considerando III, it must be taken into account that the State is compelled to ensure the protection of the environment, seeking a healthy and ecologically balanced development. This constitutional-rank obligation has been developed in various legal-rank norms, such as, for example, the Organic Law of the Environment, the Biodiversity Law, among others. By virtue of the foregoing, although the challenged precautionary measure must be annulled, both the plaintiff and the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET), as well as any other competent institution, are under the legal obligation to prevent any action that could negatively affect the spring (naciente).” As can be seen from the transcribed text, there is no possibility of imposing the application of numeral III.3.7.1 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations above numerals 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law, which would be openly illegal.

**VI.-** The Municipality has accepted, in the Second Considerando of the appealed resolution No. 017-13, that it has not yet been determined whether the spring (naciente) is permanent or intermittent. On this point, it must be warned that our legislation does provide protection for intermittent springs (nacientes intermitentes), not in numeral 33 of the Forestry Law, but in Article 149 of the Water Law, which states:

“It is forbidden to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located less than sixty meters from the springs that rise in the hills, or less than fifty meters from those that rise on flat lands.” (Emphasis added).

In this regard, there are uniform precedents, issued both by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote 858-F-S1-2012, of 9:20 a.m. on July 20, 2012, and by the Constitutional Chamber, in vote number 2010-8315 of 8:45 a.m. on May 7, 2010, in which the sixty-meter protection radius for some intermittent springs (nacientes intermitentes) was recognized, in application of the cited numeral. To this effect, the First Chamber ruled in the cited vote:

“III.- Numeral 149 of the Water Law is within the Ninth Chapter of said law, called “Measures Regarding the Conservation of Trees to Avoid the Diminution of Waters,” which, as its name indicates, seeks with the precepts contained therein, that state authorities ensure “(…) the strict compliance with legal provisions regarding the conservation of trees, especially those on the banks of rivers and those found at water sources (nacimientos de aguas)” (canon 145 ibidem), in order to avoid the diminution of waters. In that sense, the referred numeral reads: “It is forbidden to destroy, both in national forests and in those of private individuals, the trees located less than sixty meters from springs that rise in the hills, or less than fifty meters from those that rise on flat lands.” As observed, the norm does not distinguish between permanent and intermittent springs, so such differentiation should not be made when applying it. It is a typical limitation of public interest (Article 45 of the Political Constitution), which, like others provided in various normative bodies of the legal system, has evolved the concept of limits on private property, for the sake of real and effective protection of the constitutional guarantee (Article 50 of our Political Constitution) of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Nor does the precept distinguish between public domain waters and private domain waters. The norm refers only to waters, that is, to hydrological resources in general, therefore the citation of Articles 1 to 4 of Law No. 276 is not pertinent to the case. Hence, this Chamber does not consider that the Court has breached the canon whose erroneous interpretation and application is accused, by establishing that legal protection does exist for intermittent springs.” From the foregoing, it is clear that the radius of intermittent springs (nacientes intermitentes), as part of the hydrological resources (aquifers), is also protected by our environmental legal system; however, the distance provided for this purpose is notably smaller. It is therefore essential that each spring (naciente) has been duly classified by the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) to determine whether it is permanent or intermittent and, in the latter case, its location must be clear, in order to define the coverage distance of its protection area. Certainly, the grievance claiming the absence of a determination of this data is absolutely accepted, which reveals a significant technical-legal deficiency in the challenged act, since until there is absolute clarity as to the exact location of the spring (naciente) and the length of its protection radius, whether one hundred linear meters if permanent, sixty or fifty meters if intermittent, depending on its location on a hill or flat land, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation provided by the legal system, if mechanisms exist to resolve this absence. Until this is clarified with certainty by the local government, making the appropriate inquiries to the National System of Conservation Areas of MINAET, it is not possible to impose the maximum limitation in the manner that has been done, because a direct, illegitimate, and unjust harm could be being generated to the property of the appellant company, preventing it from enjoying areas that it could eventually use for construction purposes. These considerations are necessary to conclude that, due to the way the local government has resolved the matter, there are defects of motive (vicios de motivo) for lack of technical basis and in the content of the resolution of the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado, No. 017-2013, which is contrary to the provisions of Articles 16 subsection 1) and 136 of the General Law of Public Administration. This circumstance warrants declaring the absolute nullity of the appealed act, which consequently entails the partial nullity of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso del suelo) No. 102-2013, regarding the content that has been reviewed in this resolution and that was confirmed on that occasion. The local council must then make the appropriate inquiries before the competent administrative authorities, in order to subsequently determine, with exactness, whether there is a margin of coverage of the protection area of the spring (naciente) that affects the property of the appellant party. For the foregoing reasons, the filed appeal is granted, and the case file must be returned to the local government, so that it may address the request for the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) again, with exact and accurate technical criteria, as indicated in this resolution.

**VII.-** Finally, it remains to be indicated that the appealed resolution makes no reference whatsoever to numeral 16 of the Potable Water Law, which is why no ruling is issued regarding the grievance that alludes to said norm. Likewise, claims for compensation are not addressable in this instance, as this Tribunal reviews objective legality, for which, if it deems it appropriate, it may resort to the ordinary cognizance proceeding in the jurisdictional venue, if it still considers that it has been the object of a hollowing out of its right to property.

**POR TANTO** The filed appeal is granted and, consequently, Resolution No. 017-13 of 3:00 p.m. on September 12, 2013, issued by the Mayor of Vázquez de Coronado is annulled and, by connection, the land-use certificate (certificado de uso del suelo) No. 102-2013 issued on February 11, 2013, is partially annulled, solely regarding the limitation imposed on 75% of the property of the appellant party, cadastral plan No. SJ-762362-88. The case file is returned to the respondent Municipality, so that it may promote, before the corresponding administrative authorities, the delimitation of the area encompassed by the protection zone of the Patalillo spring (naciente). Based on this, it may then rule again regarding the limitation that may eventually fall upon the indicated property, with the identification of the exact coverage area that affects it, in the terms indicated in this resolution.

**Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Francisco José Torres Chaves** *Contencioso-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Third Section.* *Resolution No. 10-2015 of 9:20 a.m. on January 22, 2015.*

Apelación municipal en jerarquía impropia Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A. c/ Municipalidad de Vázquez de Coronado Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 _______________________________________________________________________ No. 10-2015 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del veintidós de enero del dos mil quince .- Recurso de apelación interpuesto por Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., cédula jurídica No. CED20026, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, el señor Nombre104424 , cédula de identidad No. CED80786, contra la resolución No. 017-13 de las 15:00 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2013, dictada por el Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado.

Redacta la jueza Solano Ulloa,

CONSIDERANDO:

Io.- HECHOS PROBADOS. Se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes hechos que resultan relevantes para este proceso: 1) El Departamento de Gestión Urbana y Control Constructivo de la Municipalidad de Vázquez de Coronado, emitió el certificado de uso de suelo No. 102-2013 de fecha 11 de febrero del 2013, para la finca propiedad de Flores y Helechos Centroamericanos S.A., que corresponde al plano catastrado No. 762362-88, en el cual se le indicó que el uso solicitado para construcción es conforme al Plan Regulador, por estar localizada la finca en Zona Residencial de Alta Densidad. Sin embargo, se dispuso lo siguiente:

"Se le comunica que en este caso particular la propiedad posee un 75% de su territorio, dentro de la zona de protección de la naciente Patalillo, por lo que dentro de este espacio no puede darse ningún uso de suelo salvo la protección hídrica según lo establece el Art. 31 de la Ley de Aguas No. 276. Lo anterior se le comunica según el criterio Ambiental SA-253-017-013 del 08 de febrero del 2013 emitido por Gilbert Benítez Técnico en Gestión Ambiental." (folios 148 a 151) 2) El 19 de febrero del 2013, la empresa interpuso recurso de apelación en contra del anterior certificado de uso de suelo, resultando rechazado el recurso vertical por el Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado, en resolución No. 0017-13 de las 15:00 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2013, en aplicación de las limitaciones contenidas en la Ley Forestal, artículos 33 y 34, las cuales tienen sustento en Votos de la Sala Constitucional (folios 120 a 126).

II.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El apelante impugna lo resuelto por el Alcalde, acusando vicios de nulidad absoluta, con base en los siguientes argumentos: Considera que la Ley Forestal sólo establece la imposibilidad de cortar árboles en aras de cumplir con el objetivo previsto en el artículo 1, cual es conservar y proteger los bosques y los recursos naturales, y no impide desarrollos constructivos que respeten tal condición, sobre todo porque el terreno se encuentra en la Zona Residencial de Alta Densidad según el Plan Regulador. Estima que la norma aplicable es la contenida en el Reglamento Nacional para Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, artículo III.7.1, que prevé una franja sin construcciones con un ancho mínimo de 10 metros a los lados del lecho, estimando que se le debe aplicar el derecho correctamente, cual es la regulación de construcciones. Considera que la Municipalidad no se ha dado a la tarea de determinar si la naciente es permanente o intermitente, pues si resulta intermitente, no se le debe aplicar la protección del artículo 33 mencionado. Considera que su criterio ha sido sustentado por el Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación, oficio OSJ-415-03 y por la Procuraduría General de la República, en el Dictamen OJ-064-2202. Agrega que en el Voto 16031-2006 de la Sala Constitucional, en aplicación del principio precautorio se dispuso una medida cautelar de prohibición de construcción debido a que existía una duda respecto de los efectos de una construcción sobre una naciente o quebrada, supuesto que no es el del apelante. Considera que no estamos en presencia, tampoco, de una fuente de abastecimiento de agua, por lo que tampoco le resulta aplicable el numeral 16 de la Ley de Agua Potable. Finalmente, sostiene que el criterio expuesto por el Alcalde, al estimar intocable el radio de cien metros de las naciente, es una limitación expropiatoria que debe serle indemnizada, por lo que solicita que en el caso de mantenérsele la prohibición de realizar construcciones, se inicie el procedimiento indemnizatorio a efecto de que se fije el justiprecio.

III.- Sobre el fondo. De la competencia urbanística municipal y la tutela con el medio ambiente. En el artículo 50 constitucional se establece la tutela del medio ambiente en una doble vertiente, como derecho fundamental y como función pública, en el que el Estado debe garantizar, defender y preservar este derecho. Las Municipalidades constituyen parte de la organización del Estado costarricense, pues de su naturaleza de entes descentralizados en razón del territorio derivan responsabilidades también respecto de la tutela del ambiente (al respecto, ver la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional número 2001-05737, de las catorce horas cuarenta y un minutos del veintisiete de junio del dos mil uno). Ello implica que a cargo de las municipalidades debe protegerse todos aquellos bienes que convergen en el medio ambiente, ya sean todos los recursos naturales necesarios para la existencia humana, hasta las bellezas escénicas. Esta labor incluye, por excelencia, la vigilancia de todo proceso urbanístico, pues estos tienden a convertir en un poblado una porción de terreno, lo cual es un proceso complejo de alteración ambiental de gran efecto sobre los ecosistemas naturales y artificiales, ya que la mayoría de este tipo de obras compacta los terrenos y cubre una parte importante de la superficie de una capa impermeabilizante, con lo que se pueden llegar a afectar las reservas de acuíferos, se aumenta la escorrentía, se alteran los desagues naturales y se aumenta el caudal de los ríos y otros cursos del agua, además de eliminar el paisaje original. El ordenamiento territorial incorpora el uso y desarrollo sostenible de los recursos renovables y no renovables ubicados en las distintas zonas del país, así como el respeto a las características culturales, históricas y sociales de las poblaciones humanas involucradas, aspirando a la obtención de un equilibrio entre los asentamientos humanos y sus condiciones ambientales. Es por ello que todo lo concerniente a la aprobación de la regulación urbanística, así como el otorgamiento de los permisos de fraccionamiento y construcción, se le ha conferido a las Municipalidades, como encargadas de la administración de los intereses y servicios locales, conforme lo dispone el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política (ver además, Código Municipal, artículo 13 inciso o), la Ley de Planificación Urbana, Ley de Construcciones y la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). Los artículos 15 y 19 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana reconocen la competencia que dispone cada municipalidad para planificar el desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su territorio, conforme a los reglamentos y planes reguladores que al efecto dicten. Es por ello que el otorgamiento de cualquier permiso de construcción está condicionado a que el proyecto en cuestión resulte conforme con la ordenación urbanística aplicable; lo cual supone un control previo de habilitación o "permiso", acompañado de la actividad de fiscalización en la ejecución de la actividad autorizada, a fin de que se realice conforme a la licencia o permiso concedido y a las regulaciones ambientales que rigen la actividad. A ello obedece que el proceso constructivo no pueda divorciarse del medio en que se desarrolla, y así lo ha desarrollado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en la sentencia N° 000507-F-04 en que indicó:

"la noción de propiedad se amalgama de manera plena y perfecta con el derecho constitucional del medio ambiente, que con igual intensidad y jerarquía, proclama el cuerpo constitucional en su precepto 50. Por ello, no es difícil inferir la regulación urbanística como intermedia entre propiedad y ambiente, pues al fin y al cabo, es el anverso gris, ordenatorio y edificativo de ésta última materia. Ambiente y urbanismo se constituyen así en áreas del Derecho que por su rol limitante, delimitan el contorno preciso del derecho de propiedad, es decir, su contenido esencial.

Precisamente, las regulaciones de orden público, urbanísticas y ambientales imponen el sometimiento de los administrados, pues éstas integran el contenido del derecho de propiedad, en tanto establecen el ámbito autorizado o legítimo de su ejercicio, al contener algunas de las limitaciones autorizadas por el artículo 45 constitucional, bajo el entendido de que no se produce un despojo de la propiedad privada ni la privación del atributo primario del dominio, por ello, no dan cabida a indemnización alguna, ni a trámite expropiatorio, como pretende la parte apelante.

IV.- En lo que se refiere al caso concreto, la municipalidad ha indicado en el certificado de uso de suelo expedido, que la finca propiedad de la sociedad apelante, con plano No. SJ-762362-88, tiene las limitaciones de los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, a razón de estar cubierto, el 75% de su superficie, por el radio de protección de una naciente. Ciertamente, la Ley Forestal vigente, número 7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, establece la figura de las áreas de protección en su artículo 33:

“Artículo 33.- Áreas de protección. Se declaran áreas de protección las siguientes:

• a)Las áreas que bordeen nacientes permanentes, definidas en un radio de cien metros medidos de modo horizontal...” Y el artículo 34 de la Ley Forestal agrega:

“Articulo 34.- Prohibición para talar en áreas protegidas Se prohíbe la corta o eliminación de árboles en las áreas de protección descritas en el artículo anterior, excepto en proyectos declarados por el Poder Ejecutivo como de conveniencia nacional. Los alineamientos que deban tramitarse en relación con estas áreas, serán realizados por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo”.

El apelante desarrolla dos agravios referidos al radio de protección de las nacientes; el primero, en el sentido de que la limitación únicamente impide al propietario la tala de árboles; el segundo, de que dicha limitación afecta únicamente a los terrenos con aptitud forestal o destinados a la conservación ambiental. Ninguno de los dos agravios es de recibo por esta Cámara. La afectación contenida en el numeral 33 de la Ley Forestal es de alcance general, pues obedece a la necesaria conservación del radio de cien metros de toda naciente a razón de conservar las fuentes de agua que provienen del subsuelo, las cuales dependen de los factores físicos (textura del suelo y sus componentes, a saber, raíces, arena, limo y arcilla), químicos y bióticos del terreno, cuya alteración por parte del hombre, puede converger en la degradación de los suelos y el aumento de las zonas desérticas. Dicha limitación tiene implícita la restricción al ejercicio de aquellas otras facultades dominicales que puedan degradar el estado natural de las nacientes, lo cual incluye, como es obvio, la restricción al derecho a edificar sobre el terreno. Por ello, dichas normas se imponen por encima de cualquier regulación contenida en reglamentaciones locales o nacionales.

V.- La recurrente estima inaplicable dicha normativa, para que en su defecto, se le aplique la regulación constructiva contenida en el Reglamento Nacional para el Control de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, artículo III.3. 7.1. El supuesto previsto en esta norma no es el que se está atendiendo en esta causa, pues esa disposición reglamentaria se refiere a la existencia de fincas atravesadas por ríos o quebradas, o bien, que colinden con éstos. En un asunto similar las mismas inquietudes ya fueron analizadas por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 199 de las 15:30 horas del 4 de febrero de 2010, con criterios que este Cámara comparte en su totalidad, en donde indicó:

“II…Como segundo motivo, considera vulnerado, por errónea interpretación, los ordinales 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, los cuales, refiere, deben ser analizados en forma conjunta, así como su aplicación indebida, por lo que se conculca el numeral III.3.7.6 del Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones…V.-…por la relevancia del tema, es importante referirse al régimen de protección de las nacientes, el cual prevé distintos supuestos, los cuales tienen en común, el establecimiento de un área alrededor de estas sobre la cual recae la respectiva tutela. El ordenamiento jurídico dispone dos supuestos; una afectación de esa franja al demanio público (ordinales 7 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización y 31 de la Ley de Aguas), o bien, mantener el inmueble como propiedad privada pero protegida (artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal). Al margen de la naturaleza del terreno en cuestión (que no se encuentra en discusión en el presente proceso), aún en el supuesto de menor protección, es decir, tratándose de un área protegida en propiedad privada, no puede dejarse de lado que las consecuencias que de esta calificación legal se desprenden una serie de limitaciones a la propiedad. Además de la explícita a que hace referencia el numeral 34 del cuerpo normativa citado, y que consiste en una prohibición para cortar árboles, lo cierto es que el establecimiento de un área de protección alrededor de la naciente lleva implícito una restricción al ejercicio de aquellas facultades de dominio que puedan afectar, directa o indirectamente, una naciente permanente. Afirmar lo contrario podría derivar en el contrasentido de que se permita levantar una edificación que destruya dicho recurso natural a condición de que no se tale ningún árbol, o como en el presente caso, que no hayan árboles sembrados. En este sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta lo dispuesto en el numeral 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual establece que la norma administrativa debe interpretarse de la manera que mejor garantice el fin público que se persigue. En materia ambiental, además de lo preceptuado en el ordinal 50 constitucional y que fue objeto de análisis en el considerando III, debe tenerse en cuenta que el Estado se encuentra compelido a velar por la protección del ambiente, procurando un desarrollo sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Esta obligación de rango constitucional ha sido desarrollada en diversas normas de rango legal, como por ejemplo la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, la Ley de Biodiversidad, entre otras. En virtud de lo anterior, si bien la medida cautelar impugnada debe ser anulada, tanto la parte actora como el Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, así como cualquier otra institución competente, se encuentran en la obligación legal de prevenir cualquier acción que pueda incidir en forma negativa sobre la naciente.” Como se aprecia del texto transcrito, no existe posibilidad de imponer la aplicación del numeral III.3.7.1 del Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones por encima de los numerales 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, lo cual sería abiertamente ilegal.

VI.- La Municipalidad ha aceptado, en el Considerando Segundo de la resolución No. 017-13 impugnada, que aún no se ha determinado si la naciente es permanente o intermitente. Sobre este particular, ha de advertirse que nuestra legislación da protección de las nacientes intermitentes, no en el numeral 33 de la Ley Forestal, sino en el artículo 149 de la Ley de Aguas que dice:

“Se prohíbe destruir, tanto en los bosques nacionales como en los de particulares, los árboles situados a menos de sesenta metros de los manantiales que nazcan en los cerros, o a menos de cincuenta metros de los que nazcan en terrenos planos”. (Énfasis añadido).

En este sentido, existen antecedentes uniformes, emitidos tanto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en voto 858-F-S1-2012, de las 9:20 horas del 20 de julio de 2012, como de la Sala Constitucional, en el voto número 2010-8315 de las 8:45 horas del 7 de mayo de 2010, en donde se reconoció el radio de sesenta metros de protección de unas nacientes intermitentes, en aplicación del numeral de cita. Al efecto, dispuso la Sala Primera en el voto de cita:

"III.- El numeral 149 de la Ley de Aguas se encuentra dentro del Capítulo Noveno de dicha ley, denominado “Medidas Referentes a la Conservación de Árboles para Evitar la Disminución de las Aguas”, que como su nombre lo dice, procura con los preceptos contenidos en él, que las autoridades estatales velen por “(…) el estricto cumplimiento de las disposiciones legales referentes a la conservación de los árboles, especialmente los de las orillas de los ríos y los que se encuentren en los nacimientos de aguas” (canon 145 ibídem), con el fin de evitar la disminución de las aguas. En ese sentido, el numeral referido reza: “Se prohíbe destruir, tanto en los bosques nacionales como en los de particulares, los árboles situados a menos de sesenta metros de los manantiales que nazcan en los cerros, o menos de cincuenta metros de los que nazcan en terrenos planos”. Como se observa, la norma no distingue entre manantiales permanentes e intermitentes, por lo que no cabría hacer tal diferenciación a la hora de aplicarla. Se trata de una típica limitación de interés público (artículo 45 de la Constitución Política), que al igual que otras previstas en diversos cuerpos normativos del ordenamiento jurídico, ha evolucionado el concepto de límites a la propiedad privada, en aras de una tutela real y efectiva de la garantía constitucional (artículo 50 de nuestra Constitución Política) de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Tampoco distingue el precepto entre aguas de dominio público y de dominio privado. La norma alude a aguas solamente, sea, al recurso hídrico en general, por lo que la cita de los artículos 1 a 4 de la Ley no. 276 no resulta pertinente al caso. De ahí, que no estima esta Sala que el Tribunal hubiese quebrantado el canon cuya errónea interpretación y aplicación se acusa, al establecer que sí existe amparo legal para las nacientes intermitentes." De lo anterior, resulta claro que el radio de las nacientes intermitentes, como parte del recurso hídrico (mantos acuíferos), también es protegido por nuestro ordenamiento ambiental; empero, la distancia prevista al efecto es notoriamente menor. Por ello es indispensable que cada naciente haya sido debidamente clasificada por el Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación, para determinar si es permanente o intermitente y, en último supuesto, se debe tener clara su localización, a efecto de definir la distancia de cobertura de su área de protección. Ciertamente, el agravio que reclama la ausencia de determinación de este dato es de absoluto recibo, lo cual hace relucir una deficiencia técnica jurídica importante del acto impugnado, puesto que hasta que no exista claridad absoluta de la ubicación exacta de la naciente y la longitud de su radio de protección, ya sea de cien metros lineales si es permanente, sesenta o cincuenta metros si es intermitente, dependiendo de la ubicación en un cerro o en un plano, no es posible imponer la máxima limitación prevista por el ordenamiento, si existen mecanismos para solventar esta ausencia. Hasta tanto ello no sea aclarado con certeza por parte del gobierno local, haciendo las consultas de rigor al Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación del MINAET, no es posible imponer la máxima limitación de la forma en que se ha realizado, pues se podría estar generando una lesión directa, ilegítima e injusta sobre el inmueble de la sociedad apelante, impidiéndole el disfrute sobre áreas de las que eventualmente sí podría aprovechar para efectos constructivos. Estas consideraciones son necesarias para concluir que, por la forma en que ha resuelto el gobierno local, existen vicios de motivo por falta de fundamento técnico y en el contenido en la resolución del Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado, No. 017-2013, lo cual resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en los artículos 16 inciso 1) y 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Dicha circunstancia amerita declarar la nulidad absoluta del acto recurrido, lo cual lleva de la mano la nulidad parcial del certificado de uso del suelo No. 102-2013, respecto del contenido que se ha revisado en esta resolución y que fue confirmado en esa ocasión. Deberá entonces el ayuntamiento, hacer las consultas del caso ante las instancias administrativas competentes, para luego, definir con exactitud, si existe margen de cobertura del área de protección de la naciente, que afecte la finca propiedad de la parte apelante. Por lo expuesto, se declara con lugar el recurso interpuesto, debiéndose devolver los autos al gobierno local, a efecto de que vuelva a atender la solicitud del certificado de uso de suelo, con criterios técnicos exactos y certeros, conforme lo indicado en esta resolución.

VII.- Queda por último indicar, que la resolución venida en alzada no hace referencia alguna la numeral 16 de la Ley de Agua Potable, motivo por el cual se omite pronunciamiento respecto del agravio que alude a dicha norma. De igual forma, las pretensiones indemnizatorias no son atendibles en esta instancia, por ser este Tribunal revisor de la legalidad objetiva, para lo cual, si tiene a bien, puede acceder al proceso ordinario de conocimiento en sede jurisdiccional, si aún considera que ha sido objeto de un vaciamiento de su derecho de propiedad.

POR TANTO

Se declara con lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto y en consecuencia, se anula la resolución No. 017-13 de las 15:00 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2013, dictada por el Alcalde de Vázquez de Coronado y por conexidad, se anula parcialmente el certificado de uso del suelo No. 102-2013 expedido el 11 de febrero del 2013, únicamente respecto de la limitación impuesta sobre el 75% de la propiedad de la parte apelante, plano catastrado No. SJ-762362-88. Se devuelve el expediente a la Municipalidad recurrida, a fin de que promueva ante las instancias administrativas correspondientes, la delimitación del área que abarca la zona de protección de la naciente Patalillo. Con base en ello, podrá volver a resolver respecto de la limitación que eventualmente puede recaer sobre la finca indicada, con la identificación del área de cobertura exacta que le afecta, en los términos indicados en esta resolución.

Evelyn Solano Ulloa Jorge Leiva Poveda Francisco José Torres Chaves Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Tercera.

Resolución No. 10-2015 de las 9:20 horas del 22 de enero del 2015.

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