Appeal of conviction for usurpation and invasion of protected area confirmedApelación de condena por usurpación e invasión de área protegida confirmada

Res: 2014-038 Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal de Cartago, Sección Segunda. At eleven hours and twenty-five minutes on the twenty-ninth of January, two thousand fourteen.

Appeal of criminal judgment filed in this case against [[Nombre1] ], [...], for the crime of Usurpation and Invasion of Protection Areas, to the detriment of [[Nombre2] ] and Natural Resources. The judges [Nombre3] . , [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] participate in the decision. Attorneys [Nombre6], in the capacity of public defender, and [Nombre7], representative of the Procuraduría General de La República, appeared on appeal.

Considering:

1. That by Judgment Number 59-2013 of fifteen hours on the sixteenth of April, two thousand thirteen, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Zona Sur, Sede Osa, resolved: "POR TANTO: In accordance with the foregoing Articles 35, 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política; 11 of the Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos; 8 subsection 2 of the Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos; 14 of the Pacto Internacional Sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos; 1, 22, 30, 31, 45, 50, 59 to 62, 71, 76, 103 subsection 2), 225 subsection 1) and 2) of the Código Penal; 122 subsection 3), 124 and 126, of the Código Penal of 1941 still in force in relation to 1045 of the Código Civil; numerals 16 in relation to 42, of Decreto number 36562-JP which in its numeral 114 derogates all decrees currently in force 32683-J of 2005, 34442-J of 2008; numeral 58 subsection of Ley Forestal number 7575 in relation to the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente in its numerals 32, 40, 41 and 45; 1 to 13, 16, 82, 142 to 145, 182 to 184, 265 to 267, 326, 328, 330, 333, 335 to 337, 341, 343, 349 to 352, 355 to 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366 and 367 of the Código Procesal Penal, it is declared that [Nombre [Nombre8]], is the PERPETRATOR AND SOLE RESPONSIBLE PARTY FOR ONE CRIME OF USURPATION AND ONE CRIME OF INVASION OF PROTECTION AREAS, prosecuted to the detriment of NATURAL RESOURCES and in that sense he is sentenced to SIX MONTHS OF PRISON for the first crime and THREE MONTHS OF PRISON for the second crime, which by application of the rules of material concurrence total NINE MONTHS OF PRISON, a sentence to be served in the places and forms determined by the respective prison regulations after crediting the pre-trial detention served. For meeting the requirements of numerals 59 and following of the CP, the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence is granted for a period of THREE YEARS counted from the finality of this judgment; if he commits a new intentional crime with a sentence exceeding six months, this benefit shall be revoked and he must serve this sentence along with that imposed for the new crime. [Nombre [Nombre8]] is acquitted of all punishment and responsibility for the crime of EXPLOITATION OF FOREST PRODUCTS, to the detriment of NATURAL RESOURCES. Costs in the criminal process are borne by the State. Once this judgment is final, issue the respective communications to the Instituto Nacional de Criminología, the Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena and the Registro Judicial. The civil compensatory claim brought by the Procuraduría General de la República on behalf of the STATE is accepted, and [[Nombre1] ] is ordered to pay for the Environmental Damage caused the sum of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE COLONES AND EIGHTY-SEVEN CÉNTIMOS (3.249,545,87); likewise, he is ordered to pay legal-rate interest on the environmental damage caused from the year two thousand eleven until payment is fulfilled, in accordance with numeral 1163 of the Código Civil. He is also ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, which are set in the amount of SIX HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE COLONES AND SEVENTEEN CÉNTIMOS. Notify by reading. [Nombre9] " (sic)

2. That against the previous pronouncement, attorney [Nombre6] filed the appeal.

3. That having carried out the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 466 of the Código Procesal Penal, amended by Ley 8837 published on the ninth of December, two thousand eleven (Creation of the Appeal of the Judgment), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.

Judge [Nombre10] drafts, and;

Considering:

I.Attorney [Nombre6], in his capacity as Public Defender of the accused [[Nombre1] ], files an appeal against judgment number 59-2013, a decision handed down at fifteen hours on the sixteenth of April, two thousand thirteen, by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Zona Sur, Sede Osa, which resolves to declare the defendant the responsible perpetrator of one crime of Usurpation and one crime of Invasion of Protection Areas in material concurrence, imposing a sentence of nine months in prison. This appeal was filed in a timely manner, in compliance with the requirements necessary for the challenge to enable adequate and correct understanding of the grievances raised by the appellant, for the comprehensive review of the contested judgment, as established by numeral 8.2 h of the Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos. II. In his first ground of appeal, he claims a lack of reasoning regarding the analysis and assessment of evidence. The appellant indicates that, regarding the crime of usurpation, the Court from the outset inclined towards believing the victim and her sole witness, and establishing that the accused and the defense witnesses are complacent and incoherent. He argues that the victim failed to demonstrate that she exercised notorious and continuous possession of the real property. The appellant indicates that his client has stated that he has been on that land since the year nineteen ninety-two and clearly explains that there was a boundary constituted by a ditch or channel that was later filled in by the rice farmers or those who cleared the melina to plant rice, and that this is where the original limit was established, that for such purposes there still exists a thick melina stump with wire embedded in it as evidence of where the fence ran, an aspect that could be observed on the day of the inspection and which the Judge made no mention of. That the boundary issue was confirmed by the defense witnesses [[Nombre11] ] and [[Nombre12] ] who were emphatic in stating that the ditch was filled in. The challenger asserts that the reiteration ad nauseam that the victim is the owner and that the forensic engineering report places the accused invading the duly registered property is not sufficient to convict a person for usurpation, because this does not tell us who was the person who actually exercised possession over the course of years, given that the defense witnesses are in agreement in saying that the accused exercised possession from the ditch that existed where the melina stump is located towards the wetland area, from nineteen ninety-two onwards. The appellant asserts that the judge states she does not believe the accused that he has possessed that property since nineteen ninety-two, because the victim provided a copy of an alleged lease contract from the year two thousand, the legitimacy of which cannot be verified, since it is a contract purportedly between the now deceased Mr. [[Nombre13] ] and the accused, who has never acknowledged it. He requests that the appeal be granted, the ineffectiveness of the judgment be ordered, and a remand be ordered for a new proceeding. The ground must be dismissed. This Chamber has undertaken the task of meticulously analyzing the grievance raised by the appellant and concludes that his arguments are unfounded. Indeed, the challenger argues that the Trial Judge inclined towards giving full probative value to what was stated by the victim in the adversarial proceedings, and detracting value from the defense evidence. It is necessary to mention on this issue that the Criminal Court, in its judgment, in accordance with the principles guiding a correct assessment of the evidence properly incorporated in the oral trial, in its function of reconstructing the formal truth of the facts, may, based on the rules of sound human understanding, choose to attribute greater value to one piece of evidence over another, but it must inevitably provide reasons, justification, and reasoning for that decision. In the case at hand, this task of the Judge of attributing total solidity to what was stated by the victim is fully reasoned according to a comprehensive analysis of the evidence. Thus, to prove the facts of usurpation and invasion of protection areas by the accused, it was clearly reasoned why it is concluded that the aggrieved party and her family have and maintain possession of the usurped real property for many years, approximately since nineteen eighty-five, and why the material defense's claim of the existence of an alleged boundary is unfounded, intended to create confusion and harbor hope of some right over the victim's property. It is clear, according to the reasoning of the judgment, that the property has always belonged to the victim's family. Initially, it was established that the usurped property was acquired in nineteen eighty-five by [[Nombre13] ], husband of the victim here, [[Nombre2] ], and that the accused entered that property in the year two thousand, so much so that a lease contract was signed between [[Nombre13] ] and the defendant here, specifically leasing the sector known as La Isla, which is part of the Térraba Sierpe wetland; the accused thus taking advantage of the fact that the aggrieved party was usually not on said property, and using clandestinity, dispossessed her of almost three hectares of duly registered land on the side bordering the La Isla zone, altering the boundaries of that property. Moreover, it was also proven through the evidence in the judgment that: "In addition, the criminalistic analysis report so determined, concluding from the inspection carried out at the site that the accused was indeed invading an area of the registered property in the name of the victim, evidence that was compelling in reflecting the invasion and dispossession by the accused of almost more than three hectares of land owned by [[Nombre2] ]; this was further supported by the inspection carried out at the site in the company of the forensic engineer, who confirmed the area invaded by the accused [[Nombre1] ] within the victim's land and the alteration of boundaries, moving the [Placa1] and erecting a fence of almost one kilometer, which when the forensic engineering inspection was carried out, the fence was found raised, as stated by the Minaet officials; when they conducted the inspection, they observed a fence of over one kilometer, as did Officer [[Nombre14] ] of the OIJ of Osa, who documented in the report submitted of his inspection of the site that a recently erected fence was indeed observed..." (see folios 281-282). Hence, the Defense's arguments are unfounded when it states, without support or probative solidity, among other things, that the Judge did not consider evidentiary elements that could have considered the existence long ago of a boundary. With this argument, what the appellant seeks to create is a potential confusion about a completely nonexistent boundary, when the truth is that the accused never had the right to remain on that property, initially owned by [[Nombre13] ] and now by the victim [[Nombre2] ], much less to invade a state protection area over which he cannot claim any act of possession as it is a public domain asset. It is clear, contrary to what the appellant claims, that the defense witnesses cannot validly affirm that the accused exercised any act of possession of that property; that could be a mere perception, however, with the analysis of all other testimonial, documentary, and expert evidence in the judgment, it could be verified that there is no such exercise of possessory acts from which the accused could harbor any real right. Based on the foregoing, the ground of appeal must be dismissed. III. In his second ground of appeal, he claims a lack of reasoning to demonstrate the accused's intent regarding the invasion of the protection area of the Humedal Nacional Térraba-Sierpe. The appellant indicates that his client is an elderly person who has been in possession of a portion of that land for many years and has never received visits from MINAET officials. That this land is not properly delimited or demarcated to the point that on the day of the inspection it was evident in some parts of the terrain that one could not tell if a protection area was being invaded. The appellant asserts that wetlands must be declared by decree, contrary to what MINAET officials state that the wetland must be protected even when it is not part of the respective decree. In the appellant's opinion, there is no intellectual analysis on the part of the Judge showing that the accused was fully aware he was committing a crime in that area, and that despite such knowledge he had the will to perpetrate it. He requests that the ground of appeal be granted and, as the conduct is atypical, the defendant be acquitted of all punishment and responsibility. The ground must be dismissed. The defense seeks to allege an absence of intent on the part of the accused; however, from the legal reasoning of the referenced judgment, the Judge provides a clear analysis, which this Chamber shares, of why the accused's conduct is intentional, as the facts reveal his knowledge and will to violate the proven criminal types. Thus, the mentioned judgment states: "The acts carried out by the defendant were unquestionably intentional. He devoted his full will to usurping part of the victim's property and thus invading the Terraba-Sierpe wetland located within that same property, altering the ecosystem; he devoted his full will to assume as his own both the area he wanted to dispossess from the victim and the protection area of the Terraba-Sierpe national wetland; and therewith, his conduct fits the criminal types proposed by the Ministerio Público and the State Representative as Private Prosecutor. In the invasion carried out, he maintained his attitude of dispossession of part of the victim's property and still currently, even though he is no longer within the property, he maintains that part of this property belongs to him, and likewise maintains his attitude of invasion of the protection area belonging to the Terraba-Sierpe wetland, state patrimony, which he claims is his property. He knew exactly that he was acting illegitimately. In this sense, the conducts are typical of the crimes of usurpation and invasion of protected areas. We are speaking of a person who, using clandestinity, threats, and intimidation, dispossesses the victim and her family of part of a property from the legitimate exercise of a right over the parcel they hold, and invades the protection area of the Terraba-Sierpe wetland; while it is true he entered without authorization, he subsequently entered into a contract with the victim's husband, yet he has never wanted to abandon the area and has remained there, where he has altered the ecosystem, intervened in the area by planting pasture and turning it into pastureland for cattle." (see folios 311-312 of the judgment) Based on the foregoing reasoning, this Chamber entirely dismisses the thesis put forward by the defense that the intent of the accused in the crimes committed has not been established and demonstrated. Nor is the defense correct in its assertion that the referenced property is not properly delimited or demarcated. This statement is not true because, among other things, the Forensic Report of the Sección de Ingeniería Forense number 207-ING-2012, visible at folios 158 to 160, is clear in its conclusions in stating: "According to the topographic survey conducted by personnel of this Section, and the cadastral plan being the document that identifies and describes the property in geometric and literal form, the analyzed plans were used as support to determine that the accused is occupying an area of 3 ha 1750 m2 of the property in the district of Puntarenas [Valor [Nombre8]], which is represented by plan [Valor [Nombre15]], whose owner is the victim, (See green colored area in Figure N 1 )." The defense also seeks to argue the ignorance the accused may or may not have had as to whether that invaded property was a wetland, a point on which there is no dispute. Certainly, what is important for the purposes of the criminal offense is that it is a protected area, as has been proven through the body of evidence provided and incorporated into the debate, and which likewise verifies that the accused, without any justification, invaded that protected area of approximately twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, planting pasture in the place without having the respective permits. Hence, the arguments are not receivable; therefore, the appropriate course in law is to dismiss this ground. IV. In his third ground of appeal, he claims a lack of reasoning regarding the civil judgment against the defendant. The appellant states that the assessment of the environmental damage was merely a lifeless document added to the case file, and that it was not subject to any analysis by the Procuraduría, which is why in the conclusions the defense argued that since no analysis of the alleged environmental damages and their quantification was provided, the civil compensation claim should have been dismissed, as merely reading the report setting forth the economic valuation of the damages was insufficient. He adds that the Court accepts the report setting forth the economic valuation of the environmental damages, when at most it should have considered a small area, where they supposedly found the accused with a machete in hand cutting vegetation, an area that does not even total half a hectare, and this analysis was certainly not conducted in any way by the Judge. Thus, the defendant is civilly liable for damages that could not be proven against him, and from which, quite to the contrary, he was acquitted, such as the cutting of cork oak trees. He requests that the ground of appeal be granted, and a remand be ordered for a new proceeding to correctly dimension the value of the alleged damages. The ground must be dismissed. The defense's argument is unfounded; having analyzed the appealed judgment on the issue of the civil compensation claim (see reasoning in folios 315 to 320), according to the appellant's arguments, it can be verified that a probationary analysis of the defendant's civil liability was conducted; and considering that the judgment constitutes a self-contained logical legal structure, the Judge analyzed the issue, determined the environmental impact, and areas of impact of the property invaded by the accused and civil defendant were verified, which were converted into pastureland, in an area of twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, based on the initial Informe of Minaet number 267-2011 found at folios 1 to 15, from the photographs also included in said report (see folios 11 to 13), also from the Informe de Valoración Económica de los Daños Ambientales from folios 53 to 86 prepared by engineer [Nombre [Nombre16]], who addressed the issue in his testimony during the adversarial proceedings, all aspects that lead to establishing the civil liability of the defendant. The defense's argument seeks to minimize the damage caused and the consequent liability of the accused and civil defendant, indicating that at most what should have been considered was a small area where they found the accused with a machete in hand cutting vegetation; however, this is unfounded, as it was proven from the intentional action of the accused that environmental impact occurred in a wetland area protected even by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. In short, the reasoning of the judgment on this issue established the causal link between the illicit action of the defendant and the damage caused to the property he invaded. Therefore, the ground cannot succeed. Based on the foregoing, the appropriate course in law is to dismiss the appeal against the judgment filed by attorney [Nombre6], Public Defender of the accused, and consequently the appealed judgment is confirmed.

Por Tanto:

The appeal against the judgment filed by attorney [Nombre6], Public Defender of the accused, is dismissed, and consequently the appealed judgment is confirmed. Notify.

[Nombre3] .

[Nombre4] [Nombre5] Judges of the Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal CED1 /: [ ] /: and [Nombre [Nombre15]] D/: Usurpation and another kcalderon Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Telephones: [Telf1] or [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: [...]

He is likewise sentenced to the payment of personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), which are set in the amount of SIX HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE COLONES AND SEVENTEEN CÉNTIMOS. Notify by reading. [Nombre9] " (sic)

2. That against the preceding ruling, attorney [Nombre6] filed an appeal (recurso de apelación).

3. That after the respective deliberation was verified in accordance with the provisions of Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), amended by Law 8837 published on December 9, 2011 (Creation of the Appeal Against the Judgment), the Court considered the questions formulated in the appeal.

4. That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.

Judge [Nombre10] writes, and;

Considering:

I.Attorney [Nombre6], in his capacity as Public Defender of the accused [Nombre1], files an appeal against judgment number 59-2013, ruling of 3:00 p.m. on April 16, 2013, of the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Osa Venue, which decides to declare the defendant, responsible perpetrator of a crime of Usurpation and a crime of Invasion of Protected Areas in material concurrence, imposing a sentence of nine months of imprisonment. Said appeal was filed in a timely manner, in compliance with the requirements necessary for the challenge to enable the adequate and correct understanding of the grievances raised by the appellant, for the integral examination of the appealed judgment, as established by Article 8.2 h of the American Convention on Human Rights. II. In their first ground of appeal, a lack of reasoning in the analysis and valuation of evidence is claimed. The appellant indicates that in the crime of usurpation, the Court from the beginning inclined to believe the victim and her sole witness, and to establish that the accused and the defense witnesses are complacent and incoherent. He argues that the victim failed to demonstrate that she exercised possession in a notorious and continuous manner over the real property. The appellant indicates that his client has pointed out that he has been on that land since 1992 and clearly states that there was a boundary marker formed by a ditch or channel that the rice growers later filled in, and that is where the original limit was established, and for such purposes there is still a thick melina stump with embedded wire as proof of where the fence ran, an aspect that could be observed on the day of the inspection and to which the Judge made no reference. That the issue of the boundary marker was confirmed by the defense witnesses [Nombre11] and [Nombre12], who were emphatic in stating that the ditch was filled in. The challenger asserts that the reiteration ad nauseam that the victim is the owner and that the forensic engineering report places the accused invading the duly registered estate is not sufficient to convict a person of usurpation, because it does not tell us who was the person who effectively exercised possession over the years, given that the defense witnesses concur in saying that the accused exercised possession from the ditch that existed where the melina stump is located towards the wetland area, since 1992. The appellant asserts that the judge points out that she does not believe the defendant that he possessed that property since 1992, because the victim submitted a copy of a supposed lease contract from the year two thousand whose legitimacy cannot be verified, since it is a contract supposedly between Mr. [Nombre13], now deceased, and the accused, who has never recognized it. He requests that the appeal be granted, the judgment be declared ineffective, and that a remand for a new proceeding be ordered. The ground must be declared without merit. This Chamber has undertaken the task of meticulously analyzing the grievance raised by the appellant and concludes that he is not correct in his allegations. Indeed, the challenger argues that the Trial Judge inclined to give full probative value to the victim's statements in the adversarial proceeding and to reduce the value of the defense evidence. It is necessary to mention on this topic that the Criminal Court in its judgment, in accordance with the principles that guide a correct valuation of the elements of evidence duly incorporated in the oral trial, in its function of reconstructing the formal truth of the facts, may, based on the rules of correct human understanding, choose to attribute greater value to one item of evidence over another; however, it must inevitably motivate, justify, and reason that decision. In the case at hand, that task by the Judge of attributing total solidity to the victim's statements is completely motivated according to an integral analysis of the evidence. Thus, to prove the facts of usurpation and invasion of protected areas by the accused, it was clearly reasoned why it is concluded that the injured party and her family have and maintain possession of the usurped real property for many years, approximately since 1985, and why the material defense is incorrect in affirming the existence of a supposed boundary marker to try to create confusion and shelter the hope of some right over the victim's real property. It is clear, according to the judgment's reasoning, that the property has always belonged to the victim's family. Initially, it can be established that the usurped farm was acquired in 1985 by [Nombre13], husband of the victim here, [Nombre2], and that the accused entered that property in the year two thousand, so much so that a lease contract was signed between [Nombre13] and the defendant here, specifically leasing the sector known as La Isla, which is part of the Térraba Sierpe wetland, the defendant then taking advantage of the fact that the victim was usually not on said property, and, using clandestinity, dispossesses her of almost three hectares of duly registered land on the side bordering the La Isla zone, altering the limits of that property. Moreover, it was also proven according to the evidence in the judgment that: "Added to this, it was determined by the criminalistic analysis report which determined from the inspection carried out at the site, that the accused was effectively invading an area of the property registered in the name of the victim, evidence that was decisive in reflecting the invasion and dispossession by the accused of almost more than three hectares of land owned by [Nombre2], this was further supported by the inspection carried out at the site in the company of the forensic engineer, who ratifies the zone invaded by the accused [Nombre1] within the victim's land and the alteration of the boundaries, running the [Placa1] and erecting a fence of almost one kilometer, which when the forensic engineering inspection was carried out, the fence was found lifted and thus the officials of Minaet stated it, when they carry out the inspection they observe a fence of more than one kilometer, just like the officer [Nombre14] of the OIJ of Osa, who records in the report rendered of the inspection he performs of the site that a recently erected fence was effectively observed...." (see folios 281-282). Hence, the Defense is incorrect when it affirms, without support or evidentiary solidity, among other things, that the Judge did not consider evidentiary elements with which the prior existence of a boundary marker could have been considered. With this argument, what the appellant intends to create is an eventual confusion about an entirely non-existent boundary marker, when the truth is that the accused never had the right to remain on that property, initially owned by [Nombre13] and now by the victim [Nombre2], much less to invade a state-protected area over which he cannot claim any act of possession because it is a public domain asset. It is clear, contrary to what the appellant affirms, that the defense witnesses cannot validly affirm that the accused exercises any act of possession over that farm; that could be a mere perception, however, with the analysis of all the other testimonial, documentary, and expert evidence in the judgment, it could be verified that there is no such exercise of possessory acts from which the accused can shelter any real right. For the foregoing reasons, the ground of appeal must be declared without merit. III. In their second ground of appeal, a lack of reasoning to demonstrate the accused's intent regarding the invasion of a protected area of the Térraba-Sierpe National Wetland is claimed. The appellant indicates that his client is an older adult, who has been in possession of a portion of that land for a great many years, and who has never received visits from MINAET officials. That this land is not properly delimited or demarcated, to the point that on the day of the inspection it could be verified in some parts of the land that it is not possible to know if a protected area is being invaded. The appellant affirms that wetlands must be declared by decree, contrary to what the MINAET officials indicate that the wetland must be protected even if it does not form part of the respective decree. In the appellant's opinion, there is no intellectual analysis by the Judge that the accused had full knowledge that he was committing a crime in that area, and that despite said knowledge he had the will to perpetrate it. He requests that the ground of appeal be granted and, because the conduct is atypical, the defendant be acquitted of all penalty and liability. The ground must be declared without merit. The defense attempts to allege an absence of intent on the part of the accused; however, from the legal reasoning of the referenced judgment, the Judge makes a clear analysis, which this Chamber shares, of why the accused's conduct is intentional (dolosa), insofar as the facts reveal his knowledge and will to violate the proven criminal offenses. Thus, it is stated in the mentioned judgment: "The acts carried out by the accused had the unobjectionably intentional characteristic. He exerted all his will to usurp part of the victim's real property and thus invade the Térraba-Sierpe wetland located within the same property of the victim, altering the ecosystem; he exerted all his will to assume it as his own, both the area he wished to dispossess the victim of, and the protected area of the Térraba-Sierpe national wetland; and with this, his conduct fits the criminal offenses proposed by the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Representative of the State as Plaintiff. In the invasion carried out, he maintained his attitude of dispossession of part of the victim's estate and even currently, despite no longer being within the property, he maintains that part of that property belongs to him, and in the same way he maintains his attitude of invasion of the protected area belonging to the Térraba-Sierpe wetland, state heritage, and which he states is his property. He knew exactly that he was acting illegitimately. In this sense, the conducts are typical of the crimes of usurpation and invasion of a protected area. We are talking about a person who, using clandestinity, threats, and intimidation, dispossesses part of the property of the victim and her family, from the legitimate exercise of a right over the parcel they have, and invades the protected area of the Térraba-Sierpe wetland; while it is true he entered without authorization, he later makes a contract with the victim's husband, but nevertheless he has never wanted to abandon the zone and has remained there, where he has altered the ecosystem, intervened in the zone by planting pasture and turning it into pastureland for cattle." (see folios 311-312 of the judgment) From the foregoing reasoning, this Chamber entirely dismisses the thesis put forward by the defense that the intent of the accused in the crimes committed has not been grounded and demonstrated. Nor is the defense correct in its assertion that the referenced property is not properly delimited or demarcated. This affirmation is not true because, among other things, the Criminalistic Report of the Forensic Engineering Section number 207-ING-2012, visible at folios 158 to 160, is clear in its conclusions in stating: "According to the topographic survey carried out by personnel of this Section, and with the cadastral map being the document that identifies and describes the property in geometric and literal form, the analyzed maps were taken as support to determine that the accused is occupying an area of 3 ha 1750 m of the farm in the Puntarenas district [Value [Nombre8]], which is represented by map [Value [Nombre15]], whose owner is the victim, (See green colored area in Figure N 1)." The defense also intends to argue the lack of knowledge the accused may or may not have had as to whether that invaded property was a wetland, about which there is no dispute whatsoever. Certainly, what is important for the purposes of the criminal offense is that it involves a protected area, as has been proven through the accumulation of evidence submitted and incorporated into the debate, and which also, as they verify, the accused without any justification invaded that protected area of approximately twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, planting pasture in the place without having the respective permits. Hence, the allegations are not admissible, and therefore what is procedurally correct is to declare this ground without merit. IV. In their third ground of appeal, a lack of reasoning regarding the civil judgment against the defendant is claimed. The appellant states that the valuation of environmental damage was nothing more than a soulless document added to the case file, and that it was not subject to any analysis by the Attorney General's Office, which is why in his conclusions the defense pointed out that since no analysis was given of the alleged environmental damages and their quantification, the civil action for damages should have been declared without merit, so it was not enough to read the report establishing the economic valuation of the damages. He adds that the Court accepts the report establishing the economic valuation of the environmental damages, when at most what should have been considered is a small area, where the accused was supposedly found with a machete in hand cutting vegetation, which does not even amount to half a hectare, and that analysis was, of course, not carried out in any way by the Judge. So the defendant is civilly sentenced for damages that could not be proven against him, and on the contrary, he was acquitted of the cutting of cork oak trees. He requests that the ground of appeal be granted, and that a remand for a new proceeding be ordered to properly size the value of the alleged damages. The ground must be declared without merit. The defense is not correct in its allegation. Having analyzed the appealed judgment in the matter of the civil action for damages (see reasoning from folios 315 to 320), according to the appellant's arguments, it can be verified that a probative analysis of the defendant's civil liability was carried out, and considering that the judgment constitutes a logical legal structure that must be self-sufficient, the Judge analyzed the issue, determined the impact on the environment, verified areas of impact on the property invaded by the accused and civil defendant that were converted into pastureland, in an area of twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, based on the Initial Minaet Report number 267-2011 appearing at folios 1 to 15, the photographs also appearing in the referenced report (see folios 11 to 13), also the Economic Valuation Report of Environmental Damages from folios 53 to 86 carried out by engineer [Nombre [Nombre16]], who referred to the issue in his statement in the adversarial proceeding, all aspects that lead to establishing the civil liability of the defendant. The defense, in its argument, attempts to minimize the damage caused and the consequent liability of the accused and civil defendant, indicating that at most what should have been considered was a small area where the accused was found with a machete in hand cutting vegetation; however, it is incorrect, since it was possible to demonstrate or prove, based on the intentional action of the accused, that impact on the environment in a wetland zone that is protected, including by the Organic Law of the Environment. In short, it was possible to establish in the reasoning of the judgment on this topic the causal link between the illicit action of the defendant and the damage produced on the property that was invaded by him. Therefore, the ground cannot prosper. For the foregoing reasons, what is procedurally correct is to declare the appeal against the judgment, filed by attorney [Nombre6], Public Defender of the accused, without merit; consequently, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

Therefore:

The appeal against the judgment, filed by attorney [Nombre6], Public Defender of the accused, is declared without merit; consequently, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

**Let it be notified.** **[Nombre3] .** **[Nombre4]** **[Nombre5]** **Judges of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court** CED1 /: [ ] /: and [Nombre [Nombre15]] D/: Usurpation and other ***kcalderon*** Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of Cartago. Phones: [Telf1] or [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: [...]

Thus, in order to substantiate the facts of usurpation and invasion of protected areas by the accused, the judgment clearly explained why it concluded that the injured party and her family have and maintain possession of the usurped property for many years, approximately since nineteen eighty-five, and why the defense’s material argument asserting the existence of a supposed boundary is incorrect, in an attempt to create confusion and harbor hope of some right over the injured party's property. It is clear, according to the reasoning of the judgment, that the property has always belonged to the victim's family. Initially, it is established that the usurped property was acquired in nineteen eighty-five by [[Nombre13]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>], husband of the injured party herein [[Nombre2]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>], and that the defendant entered that property in the year two thousand, so much so that a lease agreement was signed between [[Nombre13]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>] and the accused herein, specifically leasing the sector known as La Isla which is part of the humedal Térraba Sierpe, the accused then taking advantage of the fact that the aggrieved party was not usually on said property, and using clandestinity, dispossessed her of almost three hectares of duly registered land on the side adjoining the La Isla zone, altering the boundaries of that property. Moreover, it was also proven, according to the evidence in the judgment, that: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"Additionally, this was determined by the criminalistic analysis expert opinion, which determined from the inspection carried out at the site that the accused was indeed invading an area of the property registered in the name of the injured party, evidence that was conclusive in reflecting the invasion and dispossession by the accused of almost more than three hectares of land owned by [[Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">]; this was further supported by the inspection carried out at the site in the company of the forensic engineer, who ratified the area invaded by the defendant [[Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">] within the injured party's land and the alteration of the boundaries, running the [Placa1] and erecting a fence of almost one kilometer, which when the forensic engineering inspection was carried out, the fence was found torn down, and the MINAET officials so reported; when they carried out the inspection, they observed a fence of more than one kilometer, as did officer [[Nombre14]</span><span style=\"font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">] of the OIJ of Osa, who set forth in the report of the inspection of the site that a recently erected fence was indeed observed....\" </span><span>(see folios 281-282). Hence, the Defense is incorrect when it asserts, without support or evidentiary solidity, among other things, that the Judge did not consider evidentiary elements that could have been used to consider the existence of a boundary from some time ago. With this argument, the appellant merely seeks to create potential confusion about an entirely non-existent boundary, when the truth is that the defendant never had any right to remain on that property, initially owned by [[Nombre13]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>] and now by the injured party [[Nombre2]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>], much less to invade a state-protected area over which he cannot claim any act of possession because it is a public domain asset (bien demanial). It is clear, contrary to what the appellant asserts, that the defense witnesses cannot validly affirm that the defendant exercises any act of possession over that farm; that might be a mere perception; however, with the analysis of all the other testimonial, documentary, and expert evidence in the judgment, it was possible to verify that there is no such exercise of possessory acts from which the accused might harbor any real right. Therefore, the ground of appeal must be dismissed. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">III. In his second ground of appeal, </span><span>a lack of reasoning is claimed to demonstrate the intent of the defendant regarding the invasion of the protected area of the Humedal Nacional Térraba-Sierpe. The appellant indicates that his client is an elderly person, who has been in tenure of a portion of that land for a great many years, who has never received visits from MINAET officials. That this land is not duly delimited or demarcated, to the point that on the day of the inspection it could be confirmed in some parts of the land that it is not</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> possible</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> to know if a protected area is being invaded. The appellant affirms that humedales must be declared by decree, contrary to what MINAET officials indicate, that the humedal must be protected even if it is not part of the respective decree. In the appellant's opinion, there is no intellectual analysis by the Judge that the defendant had full knowledge that he was committing a crime in that area, and that despite such knowledge, he had the will to perpetrate it. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Requests </span><span>that the ground of appeal be granted and, as the conduct is atypical, the accused be acquitted of all punishment and liability. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">The ground must be dismissed. </span><span>The defense seeks to argue an absence of intent on the part of the defendant; however, from the legal reasoning of the referenced judgment, the Judge makes a clear analysis, which this Chamber shares, of why the defendant's conduct is intentional, insofar as the facts demonstrate his knowledge and will to violate the proven criminal offenses. Thus, the mentioned judgment states: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"The acts executed by the accused were unquestionably intentional in nature. He deployed his entire will to usurp part of the injured party's property and thereby invade the humedal Terraba-Sierpe located within the same property of the injured party, altering the ecosystem; he deployed his entire will to assume as his own both the area he wished to dispossess from the injured party, and the protected area of the humedal nacional Terraba-Sierpe; and with this, his conduct fits within the criminal offenses proposed by the</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> Public Prosecutor's Office and State Representative as Complainant. In the invasion carried out, he maintained his attitude of dispossession of part of the injured party's property and even now, although he is no longer within the property, he maintains that part of that property belongs to him, and similarly maintains his attitude of invasion of the protected area belonging to the humedal Terraba-Sierpe, State patrimony, and which he states is his property. He knew exactly that he was acting illegitimately. In this sense, the conduct is typical of the crimes of usurpation and invasion of a protected area. We are speaking of a person who, using clandestinity, threats, and intimidation, dispossesses a part of the property of the injured party and her family from the legitimate exercise of a right over their parcel, and invades the protected area of the humedal terraba-sierpe; while it is true he entered without authorization, subsequently entering into a contract with the injured party's husband, yet he has never wanted to abandon the area and has remained there, where he has altered the ecosystem, intervened in the area by planting pasture and turning it into a cattle pasture.\" </span><span>(see folios 311-312 of the judgment). Based on the foregoing reasoning, this Chamber completely dismisses the thesis put forth by the defense that the intent of the defendant in the crimes committed has not been established and demonstrated. Nor is the defense correct in its assertion that the referenced property is not duly delimited or demarcated. This statement is not true because, among others, the Criminalistic Expert Opinion of the Forensic Engineering Section number 207-ING-2012, visible at folios 158 to 160, is clear in its conclusions in indicating: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"According to the topographic survey carried out by personnel of this Section, and the cadastral map being the document that identifies and describes the property in geometric and literal form,</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> the analyzed maps were taken as support to determine that the defendant is occupying an area of 3 ha 1750 m, of the estate located in the Puntarenas district [Value [Nombre8]], which is represented by the map [Value [Nombre15]], whose owner is the injured party, (See green-colored area in Figure N 1).\" </span><span>The defense also attempts to argue the possible lack of knowledge by the defendant as to whether that invaded property was a humedal, about which there is no discussion. Certainly, what is important for the purposes of the criminal offense is that it is a protected area, as has been proven through the wealth of evidence provided and incorporated into the debate, and as also verified by the same, that the defendant without any justification invaded that protected area of approximately twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, planting pasture in the place without the respective permits. Hence, the arguments are not admissible, and therefore the appropriate legal course is to dismiss this ground. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IV. In his third</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> ground of appeal, </span><span>a lack of reasoning is claimed regarding the civil judgment against the defendant. The appellant states that the environmental damage valuation was nothing more than a soulless document added to the file, and that it was not subject to any analysis by the Attorney General's Office; therefore, in the conclusions, the defense pointed out that since no analysis of the alleged environmental damages and their quantification was given, the civil compensation claim should be dismissed, as it was not enough to simply read the report establishing the economic valuation of the damages. He adds that the Court accepted the report establishing the economic valuation of the environmental damages, when at most what it should have considered is a small area, where they allegedly found the defendant with a machete in hand cutting vegetation, which does not even amount to half a hectare, and that analysis, of course, was not carried out in any way by the Judge. Therefore, the accused is sentenced civilly for damages that could not be proven against him, and for which he was, quite the contrary, acquitted, such as the cutting of cork oak trees (alcornoque). </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Requests </span><span>that the ground of appeal be granted, and a remand be ordered for a new proceeding to correctly dimension the value of the alleged damages.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">The ground must be dismissed. </span><span>The defense is incorrect in its argument; having analyzed the appealed judgment on the subject of the civil compensation claim (see reasoning at folios 315 to 320), according to the appellant’s arguments, it can be verified that a probative analysis of the civil liability of the accused was carried out, and considering that the judgment constitutes a logical legal structure that must be self-sufficient, the Judge analyzed the issue, determined the impact on the environment, verified the affected areas of the property invaded by the defendant and civil respondent that were converted into pastures, in an area of twenty-eight thousand nine hundred fifty square meters, based on the Initial Report of Minaet number 267-2011 appearing at folios 1 to 15, the photographs also appearing in the referenced report (see folios 11 to 13), also the Economic Valuation of Environmental Damages Report at folios 53 to 86 prepared by engineer [Name [Nombre16]], who referred to the issue in his statement during the adversarial proceedings; all aspects leading to the establishment of the civil liability of the accused. The defense attempts in its argument to minimize the damage caused and the consequent liability of the defendant and civil respondent, indicating that at most what should have been considered was a small area where they found the defendant with machete in hand cutting vegetation; however, it is incorrect, since it was demonstrated or proven, based on the intentional act of the defendant, that impact on the environment in a humedal zone that is protected, including by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Ultimately, the reasoning of the judgment on this issue established the causal link between the illicit action of the accused and the damage produced on the property that was invaded by him. Therefore, the ground cannot prosper. In view of the foregoing, the proper course of law is to dismiss the appeal of the judgment filed by attorney [Nombre6]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>, Public Defender of the defendant, and consequently the appealed judgment is affirmed.</span> **Por Tanto:** Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de sentencia, planteado por el licenciado [Nombre6] </span><span>, Defensor Público del imputado, consecuentemente se confirma la sentencia recurrida. **Notify.** **[Nombre3] .** </span> **[Nombre4]** <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> ** [Nombre5]** </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span> **Judges of the Penal Sentence Appeals Court** CED1 /: [ ] /: </span><span> and [Name [Nombre15]] D/: Usurpación y otro **_kcalderon _ </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span> </span><span>Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...]</span>

Res: 2014-038 Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal de Cartago, Sección Segunda. A las once horas veinticinco minutos del veintinueve de enero de dos mil catorce.

Recurso de apelación de sentencia penal interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [[Nombre1] ], [...], por el delito de Usurpación e Invación de Áreas de Protección, en perjuicio de [[Nombre2] ] y Los Recursos Naturales. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los [Nombre3] . , [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] . Se apersonaron en apelación, los licenciados [Nombre6] en calidad de defensor público y [Nombre7] representante de La Procuraduría General de La República.

Resultando:

1. Que mediante sentencia Número 59-2013de las quince horas del dieciséis de abril de dos mil trece, el Tribunal de Juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur, Sede Osa, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad de con lo expuesto Artículos 35, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 11 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos; 8 inciso 2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos; 14 del Pacto Internacional Sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos; 1, 22, 30, 31, 45, 50, 59 a 62, 71, 76, 103 inciso 2), 225 inciso 1) y 2) del Código Penal; 122 inciso 3), 124 y 126, del Código Penal de 1941 aún vigente en relación con el 1045 del Código Civil; numerales 16 en relación al 42, del Decreto número 36562-JP el cual en su numeral 114 viene a derogar todos los decretos vigentes en este momento 32683-J del 2005, 34442-J del 2008; numeral 58 inciso de la Ley Forestal número 7575 en relación con la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente en sus numerales 32, 40, 41 y 45; 1 a 13, 16, 82, 142 a 145, 182 a 184, 265 a 267, 326, 328, 330, 333, 335 a 337, 341, 343, 349 a 352, 355 a 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal, se declara a [Nombre [Nombre8]], AUTOR Y ÚNICO RESPONSABLE DE UN DELITO DE USURPACION Y UN DELITO DE INVASION DE AREAS DE PROTECCION, que se le siguió en perjuicio de LOS RECURSO NATURALES y en tal sentido se le impone el tanto de SEIS MESES DE PRISION por el primer delito y TRES MESES DE PRISION por el segundo delito, que en aplicación de las reglas del concurso material suman NUEVE MESES DE PRISION, pena que deberá cumplir en los sitios y formas que determinen los respectivos reglamentos carcelarios previo abono de la preventiva sufrida. Por reunir los requisitos de los numerales 59 y siguientes del CP se le otorga el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena por un plazo de TRES AÑOS constados a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia, en caso de cometer nuevo delito doloso con pena superior a los seis meses, le será revocado y deberá descontar esta pena junto con la que le imponga por el nuevo delito. Se Absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre [Nombre8]], por el delito de APROVECHAMIENTO DE PRODUCTOS FORESTALES, en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES. Son las costas a cargo del Estado en lo que se refiere al proceso penal. Una vez firme esta sentencia expídanse las comunicaciones respectivas ante el Instituto Nacional de Criminología, el Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y el Registro Judicial. Se acoge la pretensión civil resarcitoria ejercida por la Procuraduría General de la República en representación del ESTADO, y se condena a [[Nombre1] ] a pagar por el Daño Ambiental ocasionado la suma de TRES MILLONES DOSCIENTOS CUARENTA Y NUEVE MIL QUINIENTOS CUARENTA Y CINCO COLONES CON OCHENTA Y SIETE CENTIMOS (3.249,545,87), asimismo se le condena al pago de los intereses de tipo legal en cuanto al daño ambiental causado a partir del año dos mil once hasta el cumplimiento del pago, de conformidad con el numeral 1163 del Código Civil. Se le condena igualmente al pago de las costas personales y procesales, que se fijan en un monto de SEISCIENTOS CUARENTA Y NUEVE MIL NOVECIENTOS NUEVE COLONES CON DIECISIETE CENTIMOS. Notifíquese por lectura. [Nombre9] " (sic)

2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre6] interpuso el recurso de apelación.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 466 del Código Procesal Penal, reformado por Ley 8837 publicada el nueve de diciembre de dos mil once (Creación de Recurso de Apelación de la Sentencia), el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4 . Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez [Nombre10] , y;

Considerando:

I.El licenciado [Nombre6] , en su condición de Defensor Público del imputado [[Nombre1] ], interpone recurso de apelación contra la sentencia número 59-2013, resolución de las quince horas del dieciséis de abril del dos mil trece, del Tribunal Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur, Sede Osa, que resuelve declarar al encartado, autor responsable de un delito de Usurpación y un delito de Invasión de Áreas de Protección en concurso material, imponiéndole la pena de nueve meses de prisión. Dicho recurso se presentó en tiempo, con apego a los presupuestos que se requieren para que la impugnación posibilite el adecuado y correcto conocimiento de los agravios planteados por el recurrente, en orden al examen integral de la sentencia impugnada, tal y como lo establece el numeral 8.2 h de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos. II. En su primer motivo de apelación, se reclama una falta de fundamentación en cuanto al análisis y valoración de prueba. Indica el recurrente, que en el delito de usurpación desde un inicio el Tribunal se inclina por creerle a la ofendida y su testigo único, y establecer que el imputado y los testigos de descargo son complacientes e incoherentes. Argumenta que la ofendida no logró demostrar que ella ejerciera la posesión de manera notoria y continúa sobre el bien inmueble. Indica el apelante que su representado ha señalado que él está en ese terreno desde el año mil novecientos noventa y dos y expone claramente que existía un lindero que lo constituía un zanjo o canal que luego los arroceros o los que arrazaron la melina para sembrar arroz lo rellenaron, y ahí es donde se establecía el límite original, que para tales efectos aún existe un tocón de melina grueso que tiene el alambre tragado como muestra de que ahí iba la cerca, aspecto este que se pudo observar el día de la inspección y que la Jueza de ello no hizo alusión. Que el tema del lindero fue confirmado por los testigos de descargo [[Nombre11] ] y [[Nombre12] ] quiénes fueron enfáticos en manifestar que el zanjo lo aterraron. Afirma el impugnante, que la reiteración hasta la saciedad de que la ofendida es propietaria y que el dictamen de ingeniería forense señala al imputado invadiendo el fundo debidamente inscrito, no es suficiente para condenar a un sujeto por usurpación, pues eso no nos señala quién fue la persona que efectivamente ejerció la posesión en el transcurrir de los años, siendo que los testigos de descargo son contestes en decir que el imputado ejercía la posesión desde el zanjo que existía donde se encuentra el tocón de melina hacia la parte del humedal, ello desde mil novecientos noventa y dos. Afirma el apelante que la juzgadora señala que no le cree al encartado de que posea ese inmueble desde mil novecientos noventa y dos, porque la ofendida aportó copia de un supuesto contrato de arrendamiento del año dos mil cuya legitimada no es posible constatar, pues se trata de un contrato supuestamente entre el señor [[Nombre13] ] ya fallecido y el imputado quién nunca lo ha reconocido. Solicita se declare con lugar el recurso de apelación, se ordene la ineficacia la sentencia, se ordene el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación. El motivo debe declararse sin lugar. Esta Cámara se ha dado a la tarea de analizar minuciosamente el agravio planteado por el recurrente y concluye que no lleva razón en sus alegatos. En efecto, argumenta el impugnante que la Jueza de Juicio se inclinó por darle todo valor probatorio a lo manifestado por la ofendida en el contradictorio, y restarle valor a la prueba de descargo. Es necesario mencionar en este tema, que el Tribunal Penal en su sentencia, conforme a los principios que orientan una correcta valoración de los elementos de prueba incorporados debidamente en el juicio oral, en su función de reconstruir la verdad formal de los hechos, puede a partir de las reglas del correcto entendimiento humano, decantarse por atribuirle mayor valor a una probanza frente a otra, no obstante debe ineludiblemente motivar, justificar, y razonar esa decisión. En el caso que nos ocupa, esa labor de la Jueza de atribuirle total solidez a lo manifestado por la ofendida, se encuentra del todo motivada conforme un análisis integral de las probanzas. Es así, que para acreditar los hechos de usurpación e invasión de áreas de protección por parte del sindicado, se motivó claramente el por qué se concluye que la perjudicada y su familia tienen y mantienen la posesión del bien inmueble usurpado desde hace muchos años, aproximadamente desde mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, y el por qué no lleva razón la defensa material en afirmar la existencia de un supuesto lindero, para tratar de crear confusión y abrigar la esperanza de algún derecho sobre el bien inmueble de la ofendida. Se tiene claro conforme la motivación de la sentencia, que la propiedad siempre ha pertenecido a la familia de la víctima. Inicialmente se logra establecer que la finca usurpada fue adquirida desde mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, por parte de [[Nombre13] ], esposo de la aquí ofendida [[Nombre2] ], y que el imputado en el año dos mil ingresa a esa propiedad, tan es así que se firma un contrato de arrendamiento entre [[Nombre13] ] y el aquí encartado, concretamente arrendando el sector conocido como La Isla que es parte del humedal Térraba Sierpe, aprovechándose entonces el encausado que usualmente la agraviada no se encontraba en dicha propiedad, y valiéndose de la clandestinidad la despoja de casi tres hectáreas de terreno debidamente escriturado y del lado de la colindancia con la zona de La Isla, alterando los límites de esa propiedad. Por lo demás también se acreditó conforme a las probanzas en la sentencia que: "Aunado a ello así lo determinó el dictamen de análisis criminalístico el cual determinó de la inspección que se realizó en el sitio, que efectivamente el acusado estaba invadiendo área de la propiedad escriturada a nombre de la ofendida, prueba que fue contundente en reflejar la invasión y el despoje del acusado de casi más de tres hectáreas de terreno propiedad de [[Nombre2] ], esto se vino a sustentar aún más con la inspección que se realizó al sitio en compañía del ingeniero forense, quien ratifica la zona invadida por el imputado [[Nombre1] ] dentro del terreno de la ofendida y la alteración de los linderos, corriendo la [Placa1] y montando una de casi un kilómetro, la cual cuando se realiza la inspección de ingeniería forense se encuentra levantada la cerca y así lo refieren los funcionarios del Minaet, cuando realizan la inspección observan una cerca de más de un kilómetro, al igual que el oficial [[Nombre14] ] del OIJ de Osa, que plasma en el informe rendido de la inspección que realiza del sitio que efectivamente se observaba una cerca levantada recientemente...." (ver folios 281-282). De ahí que no lleva razón la Defensa cuando afirma, sin respaldo ni solidez probatoria, entre otros, que la Jueza no consideró elementos probatorios con los cuales se pudo haber considerado la existencia tiempo atrás de un lindero. Con esta argumentación, lo que pretende crear el recurrente es una eventual confusión acerca de un lindero del todo inexistente, cuando es lo cierto que el imputado nunca a tenido derecho de permanecer en ese inmueble, propiedad inicialmente de [[Nombre13] ] y ahora de la ofendida [[Nombre2] ], mucho menos invadir un área de protección estatal de la cual no puede alegar ningún acto de posesión por ser un bien demanial. Es claro, contrario a lo que afirma el apelante, que los testigos de descargo no pueden afirmar válidamente que el imputado ejerza algún acto de posesión de esa finca, esa podría ser una mera percepción, no obstante con el análisis de todas las demás probanzas testimoniales, documentales y periciales en la sentencia, se pudo verificar que no hay tal ejercicio de actos posesorios de los cuales el sindicado pueda abrigar algún derecho real. En razón a lo anterior el motivo de apelación debe declararse sin lugar. III. En su segundo motivo de apelación, se reclama una falta de fundamentación para demostrar el dolo del imputado respecto de la invasión de área de protección del Humedal Nacional Térraba-Sierpe. Indica el apelante que su defendido es persona adulta mayor, que tiene gran cantidad de años de estar en tenencia de una porción de ese terreno, que nunca ha recibido visitas de parte de funcionarios del MINAET. Que este terreno no se encuentra debidamente delimitado o demarcado a tal punto que el día de la inspección se pudo constatar en algunas partes del terreno que no se puede conocer si se está invadiendo un área de protección. Afirma el recurrente que los humedales deben de ser declarados mediante decreto, contrario a lo que indican los funcionarios del MINAET de que el humedal debe ser protegido aún cuando no forme parte del decreto respectivo. En criterio del apelante, no existe de parte de la Juzgadora un análisis intelectivo de que el imputado tenía pleno conocimiento de que estuviese cometiendo un delito en esa área, y que pese a dicho conocimiento tuviese la voluntad de perpetrarlo. Solicita se declare con lugar el motivo de apelación y por ser atípica la conducta se absuelva de toda pena y responsabilidad al encartado. El motivo debe declararse sin lugar. Pretende la defensa alegar una ausencia de dolo por parte del imputado, no obstante de la fundamentación jurídica de la referida sentencia, la Juzgadora hace un análisis claro, que esta Cámara comparte, del por qué la conducta del imputado resulta dolosa, en tanto de los hechos se desprende su conocimiento y voluntad de vulnerar los tipos penales acreditados. Así se indica en la mencionada sentencia: "Los actos ejecutados por el procesado tuvieron la característica inobjetablemente dolosa. Dispuso de toda su voluntad para usurpar parte del inmueble de la ofendida y así invadir el humedal Terraba-Sierpe que se ubica dentro de la misma propiedad de la ofendida alterando el ecosistema; dispuso de toda su voluntad para asumirlo como suyo tanto el área que quería despojar a la ofendida, como del área de protección del humedal nacional Terraba-Sierpe; y con ello, encuadra su conducta en los tipos penales propuestos por el Ministerio Público y Representante del Estado como Querellante. En la invasión realizada, mantuvo su actitud de despojo de parte del fundo de la ofendida y aún en la actualidad pese a que ya no se encuentra dentro de la propiedad, mantiene que parte de esa propiedad le pertenece, y de igual forma mantiene su actitud de invasión del área de protección que es perteneciente al humedal Terraba-Sierpe, patrimonio del Estado y que manifiesta que es de su propiedad. Conocía exactamente que actuaba ilegítimamente. En este sentido, las conductas son típicas de los delitos de usurpación y invasión de área protegida. Estamos hablando de una persona que, con el uso de la clandestinidad, amenazas y la intimidación, despoja de una parte de la propiedad de la ofendida y su familia, del ejercicio legítimo de un derecho sobre la parcela que tienen y la invasión al área de protección del humedal terraba-sierpe, que si bien es cierto el ingresa sin autorización, posteriormente hace un contrato con el esposo de la ofendida, más sin embargo nunca ha querido hacer abandono de la zona y se ha mantenido ahí, donde ha alterado el ecosistema, intervenido la zona sembrando pasto y haciéndolo en potrero para ganado." (ver folios 311-312 de la sentencia) A partir de la fundamentación anterior, esta Cámara descarta en un todo la tesis esgrimida por la defensa de que no se ha logrado fundar y demostrar el dolo del imputado en los delitos cometidos. Tampoco lleva razón la defensa en su aserto de que la propiedad referida no se encuentra debidamente delimitada o demarcada. No es cierta esta afirmación porque entre otros, el Dictamen Criminalístico de la Sección de Ingeniería Forense número 207-ING-2012, visible a folios 158 a 160 es claro en sus conclusiones en indicar: "De acuerdo al levantamiento topográfico realizado por personal de esta Sección, y siendo el plano catastrado el documento que identifica y describe en forma geométrica y literal la propiedad, se tomó como respaldo los planos analizados, para determinar que el imputado está ocupando un área de 3 ha 1750 m, de la finca del partido de Puntarenas [Valor [Nombre8]], la cual está representada por el plano [Valor [Nombre15]], cuyo propietario es la ofendida, (Ver área color verde en la figura N 1 )." También pretende argumentar la defensa el desconocimiento que pudo o no haber tenido el imputado, de si esa propiedad invadida era un humedal, de lo cual no hay discusión alguna. Ciertamente lo importante para los efectos del tipo penal es que se trate de un área protegida, tal y como se tiene por acreditado a través del cúmulo de probanzas aportadas e incorporadas al debate, y que también como lo verifican las mismas, que el imputado sin justificación alguna, invadiera esa área protegida de aproximadamente veintiocho mil novecientos cincuenta metros cuadrados, sembrando pasto en el lugar sin contar con los permisos respectivos. De ahí que los alegatos no son de recibo, por ello lo procedente en derecho es declarar sin lugar este motivo. IV. En su tercer motivo de apelación, se reclama una falta de fundamentación en cuanto a la condena civil del demandado. Manifiesta el recurrente que la valoración del daño ambiental no pasó de ser un documento sin alma agregado al expediente, y que no fue objeto de ningún análisis de parte de la Procuraduría, por ello en las conclusiones la defensa señaló que como no se dió ningún análisis de los supuestos daños ambientales y su cuantificación, la acción civil resarcitoria debía ser declarada sin lugar, no bastaba entonces con leer el informe que establece la valoración económica de los daños. Agrega que el Tribunal acoge el informe que establece la valoración económica de los daños ambientales, cuando a lo sumo lo que debió de considerar es una pequeña área, donde supuestamente encuentran al imputado con un machete en mano cortando vegetación, la cual no suma si siquiera media hectárea, y ese análisis por supuesto no fue realizado de ninguna forma por la Juzgadora. Entonces se condena al encartado en lo civil sobre daños que no se le pudieron comprobar, y que muy por el contrario salió absuelto de los mismos como lo es la corta de árboles de alcornoque. Solicita se declare con lugar el motivo de apelación, se ordene el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación para dimensionar correctamente el valor de los supuestos daños. El motivo debe declararse sin lugar. No lleva razón la defensa en su alegato, analizada que fuera la sentencia recurrida en el tema de la acción civil resarcitoria (ver fundamentación de folios 315 a 320), conforme los argumentos del recurrente, se puede verificar que se realizó un análisis probatorio de la responsabilidad civil del encartado, y ponderando que la sentencia se constituye en una estructura lógica jurídica que se debe bastar a si misma, la Juzgadora analizó el tema, determinó la afectación al ambiente, se verificó zonas de afectación de la propiedad invadida por el imputado y demandado civil que fueron convertidos en potreros, en un área de veintiocho mil novecientos cincuenta metros cuadrados, ello en función del Informe inicial del Minaet número 267-2011 que consta a folios 1 al 15, de las fotografías que constan también en el referido informe (ver folios 11 a 13), también del Informe de Valoración Económica de los Daños Ambientales de folios 53 a 86 realizado por el ingeniero [Nombre [Nombre16]], quién se refirió al tema en su declaración en el contradictorio, aspectos todos ellos que conducen a establecer la responsabilidad civil del encartado. Pretende la defensa en su argumentación, minimizar el daño causado y la consecuente responsabilidad del imputado y demandado civil, indicando que a lo sumo lo que se debió considerar era una pequeña área donde encuentran al imputado con machete en mano cortando vegetación, no obstante no lleva razón, toda vez que se logró demostrar o acreditar a partir de la acción dolosa del imputado, esa afectación al ambiente en una zona de humedal que se encuentra protegida inclusive por la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. En definitiva, se logró establecer en la motivación de la sentencia en este tema, el nexo causal entre la acción ilícita del encartado y el daño que se produce en la propiedad que fue invadida por éste. Por ello el motivo no puede prosperar. En razón a lo anterior, lo procedente en derecho es declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación de sentencia, planteado por el licenciado [Nombre6] , Defensor Público del imputado, consecuentemente se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

Por Tanto:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de sentencia, planteado por el licenciado [Nombre6] , Defensor Público del imputado,consecuentemente se confirma la sentencia recurrida. Notifíquese.

[Nombre3] .

[Nombre4] [Nombre5] Jueces del Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal CED1 /: [ ] /: y [Nombre [Nombre15]] D/: Usurpación y otro kcalderon Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Teléfonos: [Telf1] ó [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...]