Rejection of veto and appeal regarding Villas de Jesús urbanization subdivision projectRechazo de veto y apelación sobre proyecto fraccionamiento urbanístico Villas de Jesús

No. 03-2012 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at twelve hours thirty minutes on the eighteenth of January, two thousand thirteen.

This Tribunal hears, as an improper hierarch, the appeal filed by Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., legal identification number CED77839, represented by its absolute general attorney-in-fact without limitation of amount, Mr. Nombre103588, of legal age, single, merchant, identification number CED77840 (folio 531); against the resolution adopted by the Municipal Council of Atenas in Ordinary Session No. 48, held on December sixth, two thousand ten. It also hears the Veto filed by the Mayor of Atenas, Mr. Wilberth Marín Aguilar Gatgens, against that same resolution.

Judge Solano Ulloa writes, and:

CONSIDERING:

I.- Relevant Background.- For a proper resolution of this matter, the following facts are considered important: 1) The company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. has processed a series of procedures before the Municipality of Atenas in order to obtain approval for a 48-lot subdivision (fraccionamiento), called "Villas de Jesús Atenas", located on the property in the Province of Alajuela with real estate folio registration number Placa16754 (uncontroverted fact); 2) In mid-2007, the Cadastre office of the Municipality of Atenas approved the segregation of lots located on the aforementioned property of the appellant company, identified under numbers A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 and Placa17548 (uncontroverted fact); 3) In a resolution of the Municipal Council taken in Ordinary Session No. 185 of September 29, 2008, the recommendation of the Legal Advisor contained in the report dated September 29, 2008, was approved, in which he responded to the request for a construction permit for the treatment plant, in the sense that "Villas de Jesús Atenas" is an urban development project, which requires compliance with the requirements stipulated by the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), among them, the transfer of public use areas. He referred to the fact that any procedure submitted by the interested company, including plan approvals and construction permits, must be considered within the comprehensive proposal of said project, which must be submitted to the Municipal Council. It was additionally ordered to request the company to submit the complete preliminary project to the Municipality, for the knowledge and decision of the Council, in order to verify compliance with the technical and regulatory requirements, and to decide whether it is approved or denied, subject to a prior report and recommendation from the Municipal Engineering Department, so that until then, the request for the construction permit for the treatment plant would not be resolved (folios 428 to 435); 4) Having submitted a series of documents aimed at the approval of the project and a construction permit for a black water treatment plant, the developing company filed a positive silence (silencio positivo) procedure before the Municipal Council on February 13, 2009 (folios 236 to 242); 5) The Mayor's Office (Alcaldía Municipal), by official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February 17, 2009, accepted the positive silence procedure (folios 251 and 252); 6) The Municipal Council of Atenas in the resolution adopted in Ordinary Session No. 220, held on March sixteenth, two thousand nine, rejected said procedure for non-compliance with requirements and for the inadmissibility of positive silence in environmental matters. In said resolution, it did not endorse the silence that had been granted by the Mayor's Office through official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February 17, 2009, and ordered to request a report on the project and compliance with all requirements from the municipal engineer, the intervention of the Urban Planning Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo) of the INVU, and urged the Administration not to grant the approval of any cadastral plan until the required reports were available, which had to be known and resolved by the Municipal Council (folios 284 and 285); 7) Having challenged the previous resolution, this Tribunal of improper hierarchy resolved in Vote No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 hours on June 17, 2010, to confirm it on the merits and to consider the administrative route exhausted (folios 644 to 670); 8) In a resolution definitively approved by the Municipal Council, in Ordinary Session No. 26 held on August 23, 2010, it was resolved: "As a precautionary measure, until the opinion requested from IFAM is available to resolve the case of the Villas de Jesús Project, the granting of any permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action aimed at its attainment is suspended." (folio 711); 9) The special Commission formed for the study of the "Villas de Jesús" project sent a report to the Municipal Council, dated November 22, 2010, in which, having assessed the events that occurred, it recommended:

"a) Not to approve the "Villas de Jesús" project given that it is a subdivision (fraccionamiento) project for urban development purposes and not a simple subdivision, which has not complied with all the requirements of the Urban Planning Law and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), and must have the examination and approval of the Urban Planning Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (dictámenes C-052-2006, C-243-2008 and C-181-2010 of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic).

• b)In the event that the project is resubmitted to the Council, it must comply with the aforementioned requirements, in addition to an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) that considers the criteria of the AyA and SENARA regarding the environmental fragility of the area where the project is located (Quebrada Barro Micro-watershed), and these documents must be submitted to SETENA.
• c)To reiterate in all its aspects the provisions of the resolutions taken by the Municipal Council on the project starting from the issuance of judgment No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 hours on June 17, 2010, namely:

a. That given that the project lacks municipal approval, the granting of any permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action aimed at its attainment is suspended.

b. That the Administration refrain from granting any right to the developing entity in relation to its project, given that it does not have Council approval.

c. That the investigation continue in order to determine the administrative and other responsibilities of the municipal officials involved, ordering the Municipal Audit Office to render the respective report.

d. That the annulment of the approvals and permits granted be ordered, following the procedures and requirements of law, given their illegality." (folios 801 to 808) 10) The previous recommendation was considered by the Municipal Council of Atenas, adopted in Ordinary Session No. 48, held on December sixth, two thousand ten, in which it ordered: "To accept the opinion provided by the Commission that studied the Villa Jesús case, excluding point d; which refers to: Ordering the annulment of the approvals and permits granted, following the procedures and requirements of law, given their illegality. Passed with 4 votes in favor and one against by councilor Víctor González" (folios 811 to 814); 11) In a brief dated December 20, 2010, Mr. Wilberth Martín Aguilar Gatgens, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, filed a formal veto against the aforementioned resolution, which was rejected in the ordinary session of the municipal body, No. 53 held on December 29, 2010 (veto at folio 823, resolution at folio 843); 12) The representative of the company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. filed a formal appeal against the same resolution, which was submitted on December 21, 2010 (folios 829 to 842); 13) The developer Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. filed a formal plenary proceeding in the jurisdictional venue, processed under case file number 09-001089-1027-CA, in which it raised as part of its claims, the following: it requested:

"Main Claim: "2) That the validity and legal effectiveness be declared and ratified of the approvals granted by the Municipality of Atenas to plan numbers A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 and A-1020301-2005, since they face a public street, with frontages and areas larger than those indicated by the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations and have all public services. These conditions were accredited by the Municipal Engineer Mr. Marcelo López León. ... 3) That the validity and legal effectiveness of the construction permits granted by the Municipality of Atenas to my represented party be ratified, by virtue of complying with the technical, legal, and regulatory requirements and conditions required by the legal system and because there are opinions from the competent officials (Municipal Engineer and Topographer) accrediting that all requirements are met. ... 3.1) Construction Permit No. 030-2009 dated February 24, 2009, to carry out the infrastructure works required for said subdivision, namely: 'wastewater treatment plant, improvements to the public road, ballasting, curb and gutter, sidewalks, stormwater drainage, and potable water'. 3.2) Construction permit number 110-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling, on lot L-29 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. 3.3) Construction permit number 111-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling, on lot L-30 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. The foregoing, by virtue that all the works authorized in the permits were executed with the consent of the Mayor's Office and the Municipal Engineering Department of Atenas. 4) The Municipality of Atenas be ordered to refrain from executing formal and material acts that disregard the subjective right that assists the plaintiff, in relation to the recognition of the permits and licenses granted, which is requested to be ratified in claims 2 and 3, appendices 1, 2 and 3." (judgment added to the case file, known by both parties, visible from folio 911) 14) Said proceeding was resolved by the Fourth Section of this same Tribunal, in which the claims of the plaintiff were discussed in an oral and public trial, which concluded with Vote No. 031-2012 at eleven hours and thirty minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, which in its operative part indicated the following:

"THEREFORE:

The objection sine actione agit is rejected, the lack of interest and right is declared ex officio on all the main declaratory claims not expressly granted. The claim is partially granted, ordering under the protection of article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code a period of three months from the finality of the judgment for the defendant to execute the act of acceptance or, failing that, to initiate the revocation or annulment procedures for the Villa Jesús de Atenas project. The lack of right is also declared ex officio on the main indemnity claims in all that is not expressly granted, the Municipality of Atenas is ordered to pay the plaintiff the damages corresponding to the stoppage of the construction works it had authorized, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase. The lack of right on the subsidiary claims is declared. On the economic amount recognized, the right to indexation and civil interest is recognized starting from the finality of the enforcement resolution that eventually sets them. Costs are charged to the defendant Municipality." (judgment added to the case file, known by both parties, visible from folio 911) II.- GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.- The Mayor of Atenas has been maintaining that the subdivision (fraccionamiento) cannot be classified as a subdivision for urban development purposes, but rather as a simple subdivision, since all the lots are located facing a public street, considering that the legal advisor's opinion is contrary to what the Urban Planning Director of the INVU argued in official letter PU-C-D-575-2007 of August 2007, which stipulated that this is its nature and it is governed by the provisions of Article II.1.2 and following of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones).

III.- GROUNDS FOR THE APPEAL AGGRIEVANCE. After summarizing the events that occurred, the appellant company maintains that the resolution it challenges has defects in its reasoning (motivación), insofar as it merely accepts the commission's opinion but does not even provide the specific reasons for which that decision is taken, much less is any indication made of which rules are applied to the specific case on the basis of which the suspension of the granting of any "permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action" aimed at the continuation of the project is decreed, considering that the municipality had already granted a series of rights through a large number of administrative acts. It adds that the act did not comply with article 245 of the General Law of Public Administration, since it was not informed which remedies were applicable or the period for filing them. It also states that there has been a violation of the Principle of Legitimate Expectations (Principio de Confianza Legítima), since the actions of the municipality have been confusing, permits (subjective rights) are granted and their development and execution are allowed, and then the decision is changed on repeated occasions; hence it believes the project is valid and effective. It adds that, since the approvals and the three construction permits are valid and effective, the Administration should not hinder their effectiveness, in application of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), so that if it wishes to annul them, it must proceed according to the legal mechanisms established for that purpose. It considers that in the challenged resolution, the intention is to render ineffective those administrative acts that granted it subjective rights.

IV.- Regarding the grounds for the Veto. Regarding the nature of the "Villas de Jesús" project, this was already resolved in resolution No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 hours on June 17, 2010, of this improper hierarchy. On that occasion, this improper hierarchy ruled as follows:

"VII.- Regarding the nature of the Villas de Jesús de Atenas Project. Within the present case, the legal nature of the Villas de Jesús Project must be clarified, since both the Municipal Engineer and the Company Veintitrés Doce Trece S.A. have classified it as a 'simple subdivision' (fraccionamiento simple), according to the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations. As can be deduced from the documents provided to the Municipality, in accordance with the conclusions of Engineer Bayardo Noguera Paz incorporated within the document called 'Technical Analysis of Documents for Permits', the project, even though it has been called a simple subdivision, is actually an entire urban development project whose purpose is to provide a housing solution on 48 lots, within a terrain lacking all services. It can be seen from the various actions carried out that the Company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. has been processing, one by one, all those permits necessary to build an urbanization (urbanización) and provide it with basic services. Both the company and the Municipal Engineer justified that it was a simple subdivision, solely based on the fact that the property is surrounded by public roads and all lots would face a public street. On this particular point, it must be indicated that even though the property is surrounded by public roads, it is evident from the same permit granted by the Mayor that the property subject to segregation lacks essential services, and what was authorized was the construction of the wastewater treatment plant, improvements to the public road, ballasting, curb and gutter, sidewalks, stormwater drainage, and potable water, which is far from being a simple subdivision in the terms set forth above. What emerges is that the developer's actions are outside the law, as it intends to build an urbanization but without fully complying with all the necessary requirements for that purpose, which include, among others, the submission of the preliminary project and compliance with all legal requirements, as was made known in the technical report of Engineer Bayardo Noguera, where serious deficiencies were evidenced that must be addressed by the developer and which were transcribed in Proven Fact 26 of this resolution. The foregoing means that the challenged resolution of the Municipal Council, aware of the existing technical reports, correctly applied the body of legality, insofar as it adhered to the unequivocal rules of science and technique (article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration), by which the Administration is obliged to ensure that its actions do not contradict the theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, so that what is resolved by the municipality regarding any construction permit must conform to the results emanating from the technical studies required for the specific case. It must be warned that there is not even evidence of studies reflecting the real supply capacity of the existing well for forty-eight houses, which was authorized by MINAET exclusively for domestic use, nor the management system of the treatment plant, among other serious deficiencies. From this it follows that no grievance expressed by the company to the contrary is acceptable." Since, then, on that occasion the administrative route was considered exhausted, this implies that the discussion on the nature of the project was already concluded in this venue, and therefore it cannot be retaken by this improper hierarch, and the Mayor of Atenas must abide by what was resolved on that occasion. For this reason, the Veto must be rejected.

V.- Regarding the absence of remedies opposable to the challenged act. The appellant party requests the annulment of the act for failure to indicate the ordinary opposable remedies. In this regard, it is sufficient to indicate that section 136 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes such a requirement for the act of communication of the final act, so its absence only flaws the notification act. However, this defect, as provided in numeral 223 of that same Law, only applies when the right of the administered party to appeal is barred, which is not the case here, since the party has effectively exercised the ordinary remedies, from which it is clear there is no defenselessness. For this reason, the grievance cannot be upheld by this Chamber.

VI.- Regarding the alleged lack of grounds for the administrative act. Prior to the analysis of this grievance, this Chamber must warn that a declaration of nullity is meaningless if the act, although null, has fulfilled its purpose or objective. Nullity, then, is subordinated not to the simple violation of the form of the act, but to the relationship between the defect and the purpose of the act, thus enshrining the principle of purpose or instrumentality of forms, more commonly called the 'principle of preservation of acts' (principio de conservación de los actos). Not every irregularity of an act determines its nullity, rather the legal system assesses the deviation from the procedural model in various degrees, admitting that, despite being imperfect, the act is valid if it achieved its purpose or the party accepted the nullity, or the procedure or action has been corrected. The purpose of each act is deduced implicitly, from which it can be concluded that there is no nullity of the act if there has been no defenselessness and the right to defense of the injured party has not been violated (article 223 of the General Law of Public Administration), so it is necessary that the attributed fault be serious, significant, or has caused an irreparable harm, which correlates correspondingly with the accusation made by the aggrieved party of the violated formality and the defenselessness produced by the null act. Otherwise, it would be to fall into excessive solemnity and empty formalism. From the integral reading of said opinion, it is appreciated that the Commission prepared a summary of the factual framework of this case, including the pre-existing technical reports for that purpose and taking up what was provided in the resolution of this same improper hierarchy, No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 hours on June 17, 2010. All these elements had been fully known by the appellant party, since the discussion regarding the nature of the project had been a topic that for years had been elucidated within the local government and was even raised by the same appellant to judicial courts in the proceeding decided by the Fourth Section of this Tribunal in judgment No. 031-2012 at eleven hours and thirty minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve. From this point of view, this Tribunal considers it necessary to indicate that the defect of lack of reasoning would have the force to annul the administrative act, insofar as the administered party did not know the reasons for which the administration has made its decision. However, it is clear that from the resolution taken by the Municipal Council of Atenas in Ordinary Session No. 220, held on March 16, 2009, the municipal body had rejected the positive silence due to lack of requirements, ordering its compliance and the rendering of a report on the project by the municipal engineer, as well as the intervention of the Urban Planning Directorate of the INVU, urging the Administration not to grant approval for any cadastral plan until the required reports were available, which had to be known and resolved by the Municipal Council. That resolution was confirmed by this same improper hierarchy, in the sense that the project could not be understood as a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), and the company must comply with the requirements of an urbanization (urbanización) as provided by the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones). Therefore, the grievance alleging the omission in the duty to state reasons (deber de motivación) aimed at annulling the resolution appealed is not acceptable, since it cannot be accepted that the appellant party is unaware of the specific reasons for which the decision to disapprove the project was taken, from which, as a logical consequence and without the need for stating specific norms, derives the suspension of the granting of any "permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action" aimed at the continuation of the project. This grievance is even less acceptable, since the challenged resolution practically takes up what had previously been indicated to the party, in the sense that the project corresponds to an urban subdivision (fraccionamiento urbanístico) and not to a simple subdivision.

VII.- On the merits. The grievances related to the merits of the matter, specifically regarding the intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) and the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), were already duly addressed in the jurisdictional venue, when the Fourth Section of this Tribunal ordered, in judgment No. 031-2012 at eleven hours and thirty minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, the following:

"X.- ON THE MAIN DECLARATORY CLAIMS: Before entering into the specific claim, the Tribunal must warn that the intended articulation does not present a format with full clarity insofar as acknowledgments and declaratory judgments of right are consistently mixed; however, its analysis will be attempted in the most understandable manner possible, always having the principle of effective judicial protection (principio de tutela judicial efectiva) as a guide. A) Leaving aside the first main claim, consisting of declaring the proceeding granted, as it is not a claim in itself but rather understandable from the others, the first request (numbered as two) of the plaintiff company requires that the twenty-eight plans approved at the time by the municipality be revalidated, by virtue of corresponding to a mere subdivision. The term revalidate is understood by the Tribunal as that scenario where an administrative act is issued, it is later annulled, and consequently the granting of legal effectiveness again is requested. In the pertinent case, the plans that are visible in proven fact number fourteen have never been annulled and consequently cannot be revalidated, despite this, under the protection of article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the Chamber understands that what is sought is the nullity of any formal or material act that harms the favorable administrative action in consideration. It is also pertinent to clarify that the plaintiff party implicitly maintains the upholding of said constitutive acts by virtue of corresponding to simple subdivisions, which as has been indicated is incorrect, as they are part of an urbanization. Thus, it is not possible to assert in the terms that the plaintiff company requires that the project is a mere subdivision, when from the relationship of proven facts, the limitations in public services were clearly indicated, which were assumed by the developer as necessary requirements for its project, such that the existence of public streets and limited public services are not sufficient to grant what was requested. In any case, we are inclined to find meaning in the claim in the terms indicated, not because they are mere subdivisions (fraccionamientos), but because any harm to an act favorable to the administered party is a violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), such that only through legally established administrative procedures is it possible to destroy the legal effectiveness of those acts, procedures for which, in the specific case, there is no evidence whatsoever of having been carried out. Having compared all the actions against those acts, the only moment where it is possible to locate an attempt to detract from the effect of those acts is located in proven fact sixty-one by the improper hierarch, where it comes to indicate that said acts must be considered non-existent. A first aspect that must be pointed out is that the act under appeal was the minutes of session two hundred twenty, of March sixteenth, two thousand nine of the corresponding Municipal Council, referring to the refusal to endorse the positive silence granted by the municipality, which is why this jurisdictional body understands that it corresponds to an Obiter dictum, that is, a tangential analysis carried out by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal without it being the core part of its analysis, as that was not the reason for the appeal. This Section of the Tribunal thus understands that the act favorable to the administered party had already been granted previously, as can be located in the list of proven facts under number thirty-eight, corresponding to official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February seventeenth, two thousand nine. Such that once the act in consideration was granted, it becomes irrelevant whether or not it is endorsed by the Municipal Council and even if this position is shared or disagreed with by the improper hierarch, to the extent that the act had already been generated. It is worth warning in this regard of the non-existence of elements of conviction on which bad faith of the plaintiff company could be thought, especially when the municipal officials were in the conviction of dealing with a mere subdivision (fraccionamiento), a position even shared by the officials of the Institute of Housing and Urbanism." Assessment of the administrative officials, while respectable, is not shared by this Tribunal insofar as they failed to understand that what the regulation sought was the mere connection to a pre-existing public services network, which in this case was not so. Despite the error in the application of the regulations, the truth is the existence of an act favorable to the interests of the administered party, which is impossible to ignore. Thus, what was held by the improper hierarch under the protection of Article 173 of the Political Constitution, besides not being a strictly jurisdictional act that generates res judicata before this judicial body, is also not the central basis of his reasoning. All without prejudice that subsequently, the Municipal Council itself clarifies its agreement, alluding that it should not be understood as an act contrary to the interests of the plaintiff company in this proceeding, but rather a mere position of the collegiate body; a clear example of the foregoing is that, based on this second agreement, the suspension of the project that had been generated is lifted. Thus, at the time the improper hierarch heard the administrative appeal, there was a manifest lack of interest, since the administrative hierarch had reversed his own acts in application of the principle of self-tutelage. This again leads us to the conclusion of the non-existence of acts intended to diminish the legal effects of the approved plans (visados) granted. It is necessary to recall on this point that the approved plans (visados) as such are acts whose effects are captured on the plan itself, empowering the interested party to be able to segregate the land through the corresponding public deed at the moment it deems convenient, as stated; thus, any disturbance should be directed toward communications with the National Registry, the office where the act would take effect, which in this case have not occurred. The plaintiff thus speculates on the existence of future impacts, which have not occurred and which cannot be known insofar as it is not possible to know what new activities or positions the public entity will adopt regarding the specific case. The other impacts generated by the municipality (impacts on the progress of the work or non-reception of the project) are mere material actions and do not attack the approved plan (visado) granted for the twenty-eight plans. Therefore, a real and concrete impact on said claim that would allow it to be declared is not occurring, disposing the lack of current interest. All without prejudice that declaring the validity of said acts is accepting their conformity with the legal system, when as already indicated they do not present such attributes insofar as they should have been considered within an urban development project (proyecto urbanístico) and not as a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple). B) The following claim is oriented toward the declaration of validity and effectiveness regarding three construction permits granted to the plaintiff, corresponding to numbers 030-2009 for a wastewater treatment plant, improvements on public roads, gravel base (encascotado), curb and channel (cordón y caño), sidewalks, stormwater drainage, and potable water; 110-2009 for a single-family dwelling; and construction permit 111-2009 for the building of a single-family dwelling. The first of the construction permits was granted by the Mayor as narrated in proven fact thirty-eight, while the basis of the construction permits were granted as established in proven fact forty-six. Although said works were at one time paralyzed, their construction was subsequently permitted. A sample of the foregoing is as in proven fact number forty-eight, the Municipal Council of Atenas on April sixth, two thousand nine, clarifies its actions, to indicate that they are not annulling or revoking the first. Within the arguments of the parties made during the oral trial, as well as from the list of proven facts, it is not possible to detect any administrative action that prevents the realization of these works at this moment, those that could have occurred at the time; although the Chamber understands that given the existence of previous actions, there may be a fear in the plaintiff that other situations could arise, given works already concluded or without a current restriction, these are mere speculations that have no legal protection. It is fitting to return to what was pointed out regarding the obligation of control and surveillance of urban development activities in a canton by the decentralized public entity, but these functions must be developed under the protection of legality, which includes that stoppages or suspensions of works must occur in cases of non-compliance with the granted permit or regarding impacts generated when developing the project not originally contemplated. They could never correspond to untimely, unfounded actions, or those with illicit motivations. Returning to the specific case, the Tribunal again finds a lack of interest insofar as we are faced with construction permits that exhausted their effects at the moment the work is concluded, lacking all relevance to analyze their validity and effectiveness, especially when this is not being questioned. Again, the lack of right must also be declared, to the extent that, as has been indicated, said acts should have been considered within an urban development project (proyecto urbanístico) and not as a mere segregation, which would prevent declaring that they were issued with legal support." Following this, the aforementioned Tribunal states:

"D) The fifth claim concerns the ratification of the approval of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, requesting that compliance with all legal requirements be declared. Seen as ratification, as had been indicated, it presupposes the existence of a prior act which is annulled or revoked, which in the case does not materialize, however, the Chamber understands the request as one of annulment of all acts that are contrary to those ordered with favorable action to the interests of the plaintiff company. In those terms, initially there is a manifest lack of right regarding said claim, to the extent that it is impossible to recognize compliance with all the requirements of the project under consideration when it is not possible to verify that situation in the case of a residential development (urbanización), as is the case that occupies us, which as is known presents more complex requirements due to the nature of the work to be carried out, where various state agencies act; therefore, it is not possible to grant the deduced claim. Moreover, as has been reasoned, we are in the presence of an act favorable to the interests of the plaintiff which has not been revoked or annulled, protected consequently by the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, so that regarding the acts of obstruction of the project, as already indicated, the oversight duties of construction projects, insofar as they conform to what is permitted by an administrative act, is a connatural obligation of the municipal regime; to the extent that the enabling act is not for any activity but for one in particular. Even when subject to what is permitted, the generation of unconsidered impacts is possible (in environmental matters, by way of example) that would make the stoppage of a construction activity lawful. What is indeed illegal is the stoppage of a work adjusted to what is permitted and without generating unconsidered impacts (especially environmental ones), which everything indicates was what occurred in the case at hand. In any case, we will return to this topic when considering the requested liabilities. In the sub júdice it is possible to verify how there are no acts tending to annul the acceptance of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, but rather non-formal actions, consisting of the stoppage of the project in its timely opportunity and in the absence of execution of the activities proper to the reception of the project; the first lacking interest at this moment and the second, in which its execution is omitted. Everything seems to indicate that this last situation is based on the lack of clarity of the municipal government about the concrete impacts that could arise, promoted by pressure from the neighbors. The acceptance of the project presents three direct effects: the first of them regarding the acceptance of the communal areas under Article 40 of the Urban Development Law (Ley de Urbanismo) (which includes the treatment tank), secondly, what corresponds to the acceptance of improvements in public infrastructure and services, and what corresponds to the approval of the plans pending approval within the project. We are facing an antinomy of norms, in the understanding that accepting the project in the current terms would be an anti-juridical act, but at the same time denying effectiveness to an act without the fulfillment of legal requirements is also so. Thus, the Chamber chooses, under Article 122 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), to grant the respondent Municipality a period of three calendar months from the finality of this resolution for the respondent to execute the ordered act or, failing that, to initiate the revocation or annulment procedures, as corresponds, based on the legally established procedures. In the understanding that the legal uncertainty presented by the respondent cease definitively in one sense or another, before contradictory conducts of the corporate public entity where on one hand it authorizes or permits and on the other denies the execution of the ordered acts. In this regard, the copious list of proven facts demonstrates a chain of procedures, some reiterative and others isolated, without establishing a concrete resolution regarding the matter; especially in the case of the Municipal Council, fully breaching its obligations. It must be clear that it is one thing for the act to present discretionary elements and quite another to be able to keep the administered party without resolving its procedures indefinitely. It is also possible to verify how the supreme collegiate body makes statements disapproving of the project, but does not adopt any concrete act in this regard, which manifestly generates an unsustainable state of legal uncertainty. By granting said term, this claim is resolved, as well as the one numbered as 5.1 which corresponds to the reception of lands and works by the respondent, the one indicated as 5.2 which refers to the approval of the missing plans, and what pertains to the annulment of acts contrary to that which was favorable to the administered party. Regarding this last one, we must also indicate the lack of interest insofar as the non-existence of any current act with a real impact on the project under consideration." From the foregoing reading, several important conclusions are drawn, necessary for the purpose of retaking them to provide a solution to the appeal now being heard. The grievances tending to discuss the intangibility of one's own acts that defend the thesis of the effectiveness of the approved plans (visados de planos) and construction permits already granted, have already been analyzed in the jurisdictional venue, with the respective authority considering that there is no current interest, as the former have taken full effect and the latter are capable of being executed, until their nullity is declared. And indeed, the only way to annul the permits and approvals granted is through legally established procedures, either in application of Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), or with a declaration of harmfulness (declaratoria de lesividad) and the respective filing of the administrative litigation process, which to date has not occurred. Likewise, in that same judgment, the Tribunal assessed the different positions that have been arising within the municipal government regarding this project, an issue that goes hand in hand with the grievance referring to the disrespect of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), given the uncertainty in which the appellant company considers itself to be. On this particular point, the Tribunal chose to grant a prudential term "for the respondent to execute the ordered act or, failing that, to initiate the revocation or annulment procedures," so this Office considers that, as the company has also brought this reason for challenge to the jurisdictional venue, the exhaustion of the administrative path is more than overcome, in application of Article 120.4 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code. It must be warned in this respect, that the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, in light of Constitutional postulate 173, establishes the mandatory exhaustion of the administrative path before this improper hierarchy, prior to resorting to judicial instances; notwithstanding this, if the administered party goes before the courts of justice without fulfilling this requirement, and the process reaches its conclusion, as has occurred in this case, it must be understood that the conflict is submitted to the knowledge of a higher instance than this improper hierarchy, with this Section not having to make a pronouncement as this stage has been surpassed. To do otherwise would be to reopen the discussion on the same topic and, worse still, to disregard the force of formal and material res judicata that must fall upon the judicial process, thereby generating great legal uncertainty for all participants in this cause. Therefore, given that the substantive grievances of the appeal deal with transgressions already analyzed in the jurisdictional venue, the parties must abide by what is decided in that process, even though the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice's resolution of the filed cassation appeal is pending. Consequently, under these circumstances, given also that the grievances due to formal defects have been rejected, nothing remains but to conclude that the appeal must be rejected, as is indeed declared.

POR TANTO

Both the Veto and the filed appeal are rejected.

Evelyn Solano Ulloa Marianella Alvarez Molina Claudia Bolaños Salazar 11-002368-1027-CA Improper Hierarchy Appeal Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. vrs Municipality of Atenas 26 held on August 23, 2010, it was agreed: <span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">"As a precautionary measure, until the opinion requested from IFAM to resolve the case of the Villas de Jesús Project is available, the granting of any permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action aimed at its achievement is suspended.</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">" (folio 711); </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">9)</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> The special Commission formed to study the "Villas de Jesús" project submitted a report to the Municipal Council, dated November 22, 2010, in which, having assessed the events that occurred, it recommended:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">"a) Not to approve the "Villas de Jesús" project given that it is a subdivision (fraccionamiento) project for urban development purposes (con fines urbanísticos) and not a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), which has not met all the requirements of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), and must have the examination and approval of the Urban Planning Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (opinions C-052-2006, C-243-2008, and C-181-2010 of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic).</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">b) In the event the project is resubmitted to the Council, it must meet the aforementioned requirements, in addition to an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) that considers the criteria of AyA and SENARA regarding the environmental fragility of the area where the project is located (Quebrada Barro Micro-watershed), and these documents must be submitted to SETENA.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">c) To reiterate in all its terms the provisions of the agreements adopted by the Municipal Council regarding the project following the issuance of judgment No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010, namely:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">a. That given that the project lacks municipal approval, the granting of any permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action aimed at its achievement is suspended.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">b. That the Administration refrain from granting any right to the developer entity in relation to its project, given that it does not have Council approval.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">c. That the investigation continue for the purpose of determining the administrative and any other kind of responsibilities of the municipal officials involved, ordering the Municipal Audit Office to render the respective report.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">d. That the annulment of the approvals and permits granted be ordered, following the procedures and legal requirements, given their illegality."</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">(folios 801 to 808)</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">10) </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">The previous recommendation was known to the </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">Municipal Council of Atenas, adopted in Ordinary Session No. 48, held on December 6, 2010</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">, in which it ordered: </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">"To accept the opinion provided by the Commission that studied the Villa Jesús case, excluding point d, which refers to: That the annulment of the approvals and permits granted be ordered, following the procedures and legal requirements, given their illegality. Approved with 4 votes in favor and one against by council member Víctor González</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">" (folios 811 to 814); </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">11)</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> In a submission dated December 20, 2010, Mr. Wilberth Martín Aguilar Gatgens, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, filed a formal veto against the cited agreement, which was rejected in the ordinary session of the municipal body, No. 53 held on December 29, 2010 (veto at folio 823, agreement at folio 843);</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold"> 12)</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> The representative of the company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. filed a formal appeal against the same agreement, which he presented on December 21, 2010 (folios 829 to 842); </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">13)</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> The developer Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. initiated a formal declaratory judgment proceeding in the jurisdictional venue, processed under case file number 09-001089-1027-CA, in which it asserted, as part of its claims, the following: it requested:</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic; color:#010101">" </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Main Claim:</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic"> "2) That the validity and legal effectiveness of the approvals granted by the Municipality of Atenas to the plans numbered A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005, and A-1020301-2005 be declared and ratified, as they front on a public street, with frontages and areas larger than those indicated by the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, and have all public services. These conditions were attested to by the Municipal Engineer Marcelo López León. ... 3) That the validity and legal effectiveness of the construction permits (permisos de construcción) granted by the Municipality of Atenas to my represented party be ratified, by virtue of having met the requirements and technical, legal, and regulatory conditions demanded by the legal system and because there exist opinions from the competent officials (Municipal Engineer and Surveyor) attesting that all requirements are met. ... 3.1) Construction Permit No. 030-2009 dated February 24, 2009, to carry out the infrastructure works required for said subdivision, namely: "wastewater treatment plant, improvements to public road, ballast layer, curb and gutter, sidewalks, stormwater assessment, and potable water". 3.2) Construction permit number 110-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling on lot L-29 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. 3.3) Construction permit number 111-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling on lot L-30 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. The foregoing, by virtue of the fact that all works authorized in the permits were executed with the approval of the Municipal Mayor's Office and the Municipal Engineering Department of Atenas. 4) The Municipality of Atenas be ordered to refrain from executing formal and material acts that disregard the subjective right that assists the plaintiff, in relation to the recognition of the permits and licenses granted, which it is requested to ratify in claims 2 and 3, appendices 1, 2, and 3.</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> (judgment added to the case file, known to both parties, visible from folio 911)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:7.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">14)</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">Said proceeding was resolved by the Fourth Section of this same Tribunal, in which the plaintiff's claims were discussed in oral and public hearing, which concluded with </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Voto N° 031-2012 </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; color:#010101">of </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; color:#010101"> eleven thirty hours on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, whose operative part stated the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:7.05pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"POR TANTO:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The expression sine actione agit is dismissed; the lack of interest and right is declared ex officio on all main declaratory claims not expressly granted. The lawsuit is partially upheld, with the defendant being ordered, under the protection of Article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), a period of three months from the finality of the judgment to execute the act of acceptance (recepción) or, failing that, to initiate the revocation or annulment proceedings for the Villa Jesús de Atenas project. The lack of right is also declared ex officio on the main indemnification claims in all that is not expressly granted; the Municipality of Atenas is condemned to pay the plaintiff the damages corresponding to the paralysis of the construction works it had authorized, which shall be liquidated in the execution of judgment. The lack of right is declared on the subsidiary claims. On the recognized economic amount, the right to indexation and civil interest is recognized from the finality of the enforcement resolution that eventually sets them. Costs are borne by the defendant Municipality."</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">(judgment added to the case file, known to both parties, visible from folio 911)</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">II.- GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.-</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> The Mayor of Atenas has been arguing that the subdivision cannot be categorized as a subdivision for urban development purposes (fraccionamiento con fines urbanísticos), but rather as a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), since all lots front on a public street, considering that the legal advisor's criterion is contrary to what the Urban Planning Director of INVU stated in official communication PU-C-D-575-2007 of August 2007, which determined that this is its nature and is governed by the provisions of Article II.1.2 and following of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">III.- GROUNDS OF GRIEVANCE OF THE APPEAL.</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> After summarizing the events that occurred, the appealing company argues that the agreement it is challenging has defects in its reasoning, insofar as it merely accepts the commission's opinion without even giving the specific reasons for taking that decision, much less is there any indication of which rules are applied to the specific case based on which the suspension of the granting of any "</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">permit, approval, authorization, or any administrative action</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'">" tending towards the continuation of the project is decreed, considering that the municipality had already granted a series of rights through a large number of administrative acts. It adds that the act did not comply with Article 245 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), since it was not informed which remedies were available nor the time limit to file them. It also states that there has been a violation of the Principle of Legitimate Expectations (Principio de Confianza Legítima), as the municipality's actions have been confusing, permits (subjective rights) are granted and allowed to be developed and executed, and then the decision is repeatedly changed; hence it considers that the project is valid and effective. It adds that since the approvals and the three construction permits are valid and effective, the Administration must not hinder their effectiveness, in application of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios), so if it wishes to annul them, it must proceed according to the legal mechanisms established for that purpose. It considers that the challenged agreement seeks to render without effect those administrative acts that granted it subjective rights.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold"> On the grounds for the Veto.</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'"> Regarding the nature of the "Villas de Jesús" project, this was already resolved in resolution No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010, from this improper hierarchy. On that occasion, this improper hierarchy pronounced itself as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">" </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">VII.- Regarding the nature of the Villas de Jesús de Atenas Project. </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">Within this case, the legal nature of the Villas de Jesús Project must be clarified, since both the Municipal Engineer and the company Veintitrés Doce Trece S.A. have classified it as a "simple subdivision" (fraccionamiento simple), in accordance with the Reglamento para el Control Nacional del Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Century Gothic'; font-style:italic">As can be deduced from the documents provided to the Municipality, in accordance with the conclusions of Engineer Bayardo Noguera Paz incorporated within the document called "Technical Analysis of Documents for Permits," the project, even though it has been called a simple subdivision, is actually an entire urban development project aimed at providing a housing solution on 48 lots, within a piece of land lacking all services. It can be observed from the various actions carried out that the company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A.

has been processing, one by one, all those permits necessary to build a housing development (urbanización) and provide it with basic services. Both the company and the Municipal Engineer justified that it was a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), solely because the property is surrounded by public roads and all the lots would front onto a public street. In this regard, it must be noted that even though the property is surrounded by public roads, it is evident from the very permit granted by the Mayor that the property subject to segregation lacks essential services, and what was authorized was the construction of a wastewater treatment plant, improvements to the public road, gravel surfacing (encascotado), curb and gutter (cordón y caño), sidewalks, stormwater drainage (evacuación de pluviales), and potable water, which is far from being a simple subdivision in the terms set forth above. What is apparent is that the developer's actions fall outside the law, as it seeks to build a housing development but without fully complying with all the necessary requirements for that purpose, which include, among others, the submission of the preliminary project (anteproyecto) and compliance with all legal requirements, as made known by the technical report of Engineer Bayardo Noguera, which evidenced serious deficiencies that must be addressed by the developer and that were transcribed in Proven Fact 26 of this decision. The foregoing means that the agreement of the appealed Municipal Council, aware of the existing technical reports, correctly applied the legal framework, insofar as it adhered to the univocal rules of science and technique (Article 16 of the General Public Administration Law), which obligate the Administration to ensure that its actions do not contradict the theoretical knowledge acquired from the various methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, so that what is resolved by the municipality regarding any construction permit must be in accordance with the results emanating from the technical studies required for the specific case.

It should be noted that not even studies reflecting the real supply capacity of the existing well for forty-eight houses are observed, which was authorized by MINAET exclusively for domestic use, nor is there any management system for the treatment plant, among other serious deficiencies. From this it follows that no grievance expressed by the company to the contrary is admissible." Thus, since on that occasion the administrative channel was exhausted, this implies that the discussion regarding the nature of the project was already exhausted in this venue, and therefore cannot be taken up again by this improper hierarchical superior, and the Mayor of Atenas must abide by what was resolved on that occasion. For this reason, the Veto must be rejected.

V.- Regarding the absence of appealable remedies against the appealed act. The appellant requests that the act be annulled due to the lack of indication of the ordinary appealable remedies. In this regard, it suffices to indicate that Article 136 of the General Public Administration Law provides such a requirement for the communication of the final act, so its absence vitiates only the notification act. However, this defect, as provided by Article 223 of that same Law, only applies when the administered party's right to appeal is barred, which is not the case here, since the party has effectively exercised the ordinary remedies, from which it follows that there is no defenselessness. For this reason, the grievance cannot be upheld by this Chamber.

VI.- Regarding the alleged lack of reasoning of the administrative act. Prior to the analysis of this grievance, this Chamber must note that a declaration of nullity is meaningless if the act, although null, has fulfilled its purpose or objective. Nullity, then, is subordinate not to the simple violation of the act's form, but to the relationship between the defect and the act's purpose, thereby enshrining the principle of the purpose or instrumentality of forms, more commonly called the "principle of preservation of acts." Not every irregularity in an act determines its nullity; rather, the legal system evaluates the deviation from the procedural model in varying degrees, admitting that, despite being imperfect, the act is valid if it achieved its purpose or if the party acquiesced to the nullity or if the procedure or action has been corrected. The purpose of each act is deduced implicitly, from which it can be concluded that there is no nullity of the act if there has been no defenselessness and the right of defense of the aggrieved party has not been violated (Article 223 of the General Public Administration Law), so it is necessary that the attributed flaw be serious, significant, or that an irreparable harm has been caused, which corresponds correlatively with the accusation made by the aggrieved party of the violated formality and the defenselessness produced by the null act. To hold otherwise would be to fall into excessive solemnity and empty formalism. From a comprehensive reading of said opinion, it is observed that the Commission prepared a summary of the factual background of this case, including the pre-existing technical reports to that effect and retaking what was ordered in the resolution of this same improper hierarchical body, No. 2300-2010 of 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010. All these elements had been fully known to the appellant, since the discussion regarding the nature of the project had been an issue that for years had been elucidated within the local government and was even brought by the appellant herself to the judicial courts in the proceeding decided by Section Four of this Court in judgment No. 031-2012 of eleven thirty in the morning on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve. From this point of view, this Court considers it necessary to indicate that the defect of lack of reasoning would have the force to annul the administrative act, insofar as the administered party did not know the reasons why the administration made its decision. However, it is clear that from the agreement made by the Municipal Council of Atenas in Ordinary Session No. 220, held on March 16, 2009, the council had rejected the positive silence due to the lack of requirements, ordering their fulfillment and the rendering of a report on the project by the municipal engineer, as well as the intervention of the Urban Planning Directorate of INVU, urging the Administration not to grant approval of any cadastral plan until the required reports were available, which had to be known and resolved by the Municipal Council. That agreement was confirmed by this same improper hierarchical body, in the sense that the project could not be understood as a simple subdivision, and the company had to comply with the requirements of a housing development as provided by the Urban Planning Law and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Housing Developments. Therefore, the grievance alleging the omission of the duty to provide reasoning aimed at annulling the appealed agreement is not admissible, since it cannot be accepted that the appellant is unaware of the specific reasons why the decision to disapprove the project was taken, from which follows, as a logical consequence and without the need to state specific norms, the suspension of the granting of any "permit, approval, authorization or any administrative action" that tends toward the continuation of the project. Even less admissible is this grievance, since the appealed agreement practically retakes what had previously been indicated to the party, in the sense that the project corresponds to an urban subdivision and not a simple subdivision.

VII.- On the merits. The grievances related to the merits of the matter, specifically regarding the intangibility of own acts and the transgression of the principle of legitimate expectation, were already addressed in a timely manner in the judicial venue, when Section Four of this Court ordered, in judgment No. 031-2012 of eleven thirty in the morning on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, the following:

"X.- ON THE PRINCIPAL DECLARATORY CLAIMS: Prior to addressing the specific claim, the Court must note that the intended articulation does not present a format with complete clarity, as recognitions and declaratory judgments of right are consistently mixed; however, its analysis will be undertaken in the most comprehensible manner possible, always guided by the principle of effective judicial protection. A) Setting aside the first principal claim, consisting of the declaration finding for the plaintiff in the proceeding, as it is not a claim in itself but rather a comprehensible part of the others, the first request (numbered as two) of the plaintiff company requires that the twenty-eight plans approved in their time by the municipality be revalidated, by virtue of corresponding to a mere subdivision. The term revalidate is understood by the Court as that scenario where an administrative act is issued, is subsequently annulled, and consequently the granting of juridical efficacy is requested again. In the case at hand, the plans that are visible in proven fact fourteen have never been annulled and consequently cannot be revalidated; despite this, under Article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, the Chamber understands that what is sought is the nullity of any formal or material act that harms the favorable administrative action in consideration. It is also pertinent to clarify that the plaintiff implicitly maintains the preservation of those constitutive acts by virtue of corresponding to simple subdivisions, which, as has been indicated, is incorrect, since they are part of a housing development. Thus, it is not possible to assure, in the terms the plaintiff company requires, that the project is a mere subdivision, when from the list of proven facts the limitations in public services were clearly indicated, which were assumed by the developer as necessary requirements for its project, so that the existence of public streets and limited public services are not sufficient to grant what is requested. In any case, we are inclined to find meaning in the claim in the terms indicated, not because they are mere subdivisions, but because any harm to an act favorable to the administered party is a violation of the principle of intangibility of own acts, such that only through legally established administrative procedures is it possible to destroy the juridical efficacy of those acts, procedures for which, in the case at hand, there is no evidence whatsoever of having been carried out. Comparing all the actions regarding those acts, the only moment where it is possible to locate an attempt to diminish the effect of those acts is found in proven fact sixty-one by the improper hierarchical superior, where he goes so far as to state that said acts must be considered non-existent. A first aspect that must be pointed out is that the act before which the appeal was heard was the minutes of session two hundred twenty, of March sixteenth, two thousand nine, of the corresponding Municipal Council, referring to the denial of endorsement of the positive silence granted by the municipality, which is why this jurisdictional body understands that it corresponds to an Obiter dictum, that is, a tangential analysis carried out by Section Three of the Contentious Administrative Court without it being the core part of its analysis since that was not the reason for the appeal. This Section of the Court thus understands that the act favorable to the administered party had already been granted previously, as can be located in the list of proven facts under number thirty-eight, corresponding to official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February seventeenth, two thousand nine. So that once the act in consideration was granted, it becomes irrelevant whether or not it is endorsed by the Municipal Council and even whether this position is shared or disagreed with by the improper hierarchical superior, to the extent that the act had already been generated. It is worth noting in this regard the absence of elements of conviction upon which one could suspect bad faith on the part of the plaintiff company, especially when the municipal officials were convinced that it was a mere subdivision, a position even shared by officials of the Institute of Housing and Urbanism. An assessment by the administrative officials that, while respectable, is not shared by this Court insofar as they failed to understand that what the norm sought was the mere connection to a pre-existing public services network, which in this case was not so. Despite the error in the application of the norms, the truth is the existence of the act favorable to the interests of the administered party, which cannot be ignored. Thus, what was held by the improper hierarchical superior under Article one hundred seventy-three of the Political Constitution, besides not being a jurisdictional act properly speaking that generates res judicata before this judicial body, is also not the central basis of its reasoning. All without prejudice to the fact that subsequently, it is the Municipal Council itself that clarifies its agreement, alluding that it should not be understood as an act contrary to the interests of the plaintiff company in this proceeding, but rather a mere position of the collegial body; a clear sign of this is that after this second agreement, the suspension of the project that had been generated is lifted. Thus, by the time the improper hierarchical superior heard the administrative appeal, there was a manifest lack of interest, as the administrative hierarchical superior had reversed its own acts in application of the principle of self-tutelage. Which again leads us to the conclusion of the non-existence of acts that seek to remove juridical effects from the approvals granted. It is necessary to recall on this point that the approvals as such are acts whose effects are reflected in the plan itself, empowering the interested party to segregate the land by means of the corresponding public deed at the time it deems appropriate as stated, so any disturbance thereof should be directed toward communications with the National Registry, the office where the act would take effect, which in this case have not occurred. The plaintiff thus speculates about the existence of future impacts, which have not occurred and which could not be known insofar as it is not possible to know what new activities or positions the public entity will adopt regarding the specific case.

The others generated by the municipal council (actions affecting the progress of the work or the non-acceptance of the project) are mere material actions and do not challenge the approval granted to the twenty-eight plans. Therefore, a real and concrete impact on that claim that would allow it to be declared would not be present, and a lack of current legal interest is established. All without prejudice to the fact that declaring the validity of said acts is to accept their conformity with the legal system, when, as already indicated, they lack such attributes insofar as they should have been considered within an urban development project and not as a simple subdivision.

**B)** The next claim seeks the declaration of validity and effectiveness regarding three construction permits granted to the plaintiff, corresponding to numbers 030-2009 for a wastewater treatment plant, public road improvements, graveling (encascotado), curb and gutter (cordón y caño), sidewalks, storm drainage, and potable water; 110-2009 for a single-family dwelling; and construction permit 111-2009 for the building of a single-family dwelling. The first of the construction permits was granted by the Mayor as narrated in proven fact thirty-eight, while the basis of the construction permits were granted as established in proven fact forty-six. Although said works were halted at the time, their construction was subsequently permitted. Evidence of this is seen in proven fact number forty-eight, where the Atenas Municipal Council, on April sixth, two thousand nine, clarifies its actions to indicate that it is not annulling or revoking the first one. From the parties' arguments made during the oral trial, as well as from the list of proven facts, it is not possible to detect any administrative action that currently prevents the execution of these works, though such actions may have existed at one time. The Chamber understands that, given the existence of prior actions, the plaintiff may harbor a fear that further situations might arise; however, regarding works already completed or without a current restriction, these are mere speculations that lack legal protection. It is worth revisiting what was noted regarding the obligation to control and monitor urban development activities in a canton by the decentralized public entity; however, these functions must be carried out under the protection of legality, which includes that work stoppages or suspensions must occur in cases of non-compliance with the granted permit or for impacts generated during the development of the project not originally contemplated. They can never correspond to untimely, unfounded, or illicitly motivated actions. Returning to the specific case, the Court again finds a lack of legal interest in that we are dealing with construction permits that have exhausted their effects at the moment the work is completed, lacking any relevance to analyze their validity and effectiveness, especially since this is not being questioned. Again, a lack of right must also be declared, to the extent that, as has been indicated, said acts should have been understood within an urban development project and not as a mere land division (segregación), which would prevent a declaration that they were issued with legal basis.

" **The cited Court then states:** "**D)** The fifth claim concerns the ratification of the approval of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, requesting a declaration that all legal requirements have been met. Viewed as ratification, as previously indicated, it presupposes the existence of a prior act which is annulled or revoked, a situation that does not materialize in this case; however, the Chamber understands the request as the annulment of all acts that are contrary to those provisions with actions favorable to the interests of the plaintiff company. In these terms, there is initially a manifest lack of right regarding said claim, to the extent that it is impossible to recognize compliance with all project requirements under consideration when it is not possible to verify that situation in the case of a residential development (urbanización), as is the case before us, which, as is known, presents more complex requirements due to the nature of the work to be carried out, where various state entities are involved; so it is not possible to grant the claim as framed. Moreover, as we have been reasoning, we are in the presence of an act favorable to the interests of the claimant which has not been revoked or annulled, protected consequently by the principle of irrevocability of one's own acts, so that, regarding acts obstructing the project, as already indicated, the oversight of construction projects, insofar as they conform to what is permitted by an administrative act, is an obligation inherent to the municipal regime; to the extent that the enabling act is not for just any activity but for a specific one. Even when adhering to what is permitted, it remains possible for unforeseen impacts to arise (in environmental matters, for example) which would make the halting of a construction activity lawful. What is indeed illegal is the halting of a work that conforms to what is permitted and without generating unforeseen impacts (especially environmental ones), which everything indicates is what occurred in the case at hand. In any case, we will revisit this issue when considering the requested liabilities. In the sub judice, it can be verified that there are no acts aimed at annulling the acceptance of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, but rather non-formal actions, consisting of the halting of the project in its time and the lack of execution of activities proper to the acceptance of the project; the former lacking legal interest at this time, and the latter, in which its execution is omitted. Everything seems to indicate that this last situation is based on the municipal council's lack of clarity regarding the concrete impacts that might occur, driven by pressure from neighbors. The acceptance of the project presents three direct effects: the first, regarding the acceptance of communal areas under the protection of Article forty of the Urban Development Law (which includes the treatment tank); second, that corresponding to the acceptance of improvements to public infrastructure and services; and that corresponding to the approval of the remaining unapproved plans within the project. We are facing an antinomy of norms, in the understanding that accepting the project under its current terms would be an unlawful act, but at the same time, denying effectiveness to an act without the fulfillment of legal requirements is also unlawful. Therefore, the Chamber opts, under the protection of Article one hundred twenty-two of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, to grant the defendant Municipality a term of three calendar months from the finality of this resolution, for the defendant to execute the ordered act or, failing that, to initiate revocation or annulment procedures, as appropriate, through legally established procedures. So that the legal uncertainty presented by the defendant definitively ceases, one way or the other, in the face of contradictory conduct by the corporate public entity where, on the one hand, it authorizes or permits, and on the other, denies the execution of the ordered acts. In this regard, the copious list of proven facts demonstrates a chain of proceedings, some repetitive and others isolated, without establishing a concrete resolution on the matter; especially in the case of the Municipal Council, fully failing in its obligations. It must be clear that it is one thing for an act to contain discretionary elements, and quite another for an administered party to be kept indefinitely without resolution of their proceedings. It is also possible to verify how the supreme collegiate body makes statements disapproving the project but adopts no concrete act in this regard, which manifestly generates an unsustainable state of legal uncertainty. By granting this term, this claim is resolved, as well as the one numbered as 5.1, which corresponds to the acceptance of lands and works by the defendant, that indicated as 5.2, which refers to the approval of the remaining unapproved plans, and that concerning the annulment of acts contrary to one that was favorable to the administered party. Regarding this last one, we must also indicate the lack of legal interest given the non-existence of any current act with a real impact on the project under consideration." From the foregoing reading, several important conclusions are drawn, necessary to revisit in order to resolve the appeal under consideration. The grievances aimed at discussing the irrevocability of one's own acts, which defend the thesis of the effectiveness of the plan approvals and construction licenses already granted, have already been analyzed by the jurisdictional authority, where the respective authority deemed that there is no current legal interest, because the former have taken full effect, and the latter are susceptible to execution, until such time as their nullity is declared. And indeed, the only way to annul the granted permits and approvals is through legally established procedures, be it by applying numeral 173 of the General Public Administration Law, or through a declaration of detrimental effect (declaratoria de lesividad) and the corresponding filing of the administrative contentious process, which has not occurred to date. Likewise, in that same judgment, the Court assessed the various positions that have arisen within the municipal council regarding this project, an issue linked to the grievance concerning the breach of the principle of legitimate expectations, given the uncertainty in which the appellant company considers itself to be. On this particular point, the Court opted to grant a reasonable period "for the defendant to execute the ordered act or, failing that, to initiate revocation or annulment procedures," therefore, this Office considers that, as the company has also brought this ground of challenge in the jurisdictional venue, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is more than surpassed, applying numeral 120.4 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code. In this regard, it must be noted that the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, in light of constitutional postulate 173, establishes the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies before this improper hierarchy, prior to going to judicial instances; nonetheless, if the administered party goes before the courts of justice without fulfilling this requirement, and the process reaches its conclusion, as has occurred in this case, it must be understood that the conflict is under the cognizance of an instance superior to this improper hierarchy, and this Section should not make a pronouncement, as this stage has been surpassed. To do otherwise would be to reopen the discussion on the same issue and, worse still, to disregard the force of formal and material res judicata that must be vested in the judicial process, thereby generating great legal uncertainty for all participants in this cause. Therefore, as the substantive grievances of the appeal concern transgressions already analyzed in the jurisdictional venue, the parties must abide by whatever is decided in that process, even though the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has yet to resolve the filed cassation appeal. Hence, under these circumstances, and given that the grievances for formal defects have also been rejected, it remains only to conclude that the appeal must be rejected, as is hereby declared.

**POR TANTO** Both the Veto and the filed appeal are rejected.

**Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **Marianella Alvarez Molina Claudia Bolaños Salazar** 11-002368-1027-CA Appeal of Improper Hierarchy Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. vrs Municipality of Atenas 48, held on the sixth of December, 2010. The Court is also aware of the Veto filed by the Mayor of Atenas, Mr. Wilberth Marín Aguilar Gatgens, against that same agreement.

Drafted by Judge *Solano Ulloa*, and:

**CONSIDERANDO:** **I.- Relevant Background.-** For a correct resolution of this matter, the following facts are of importance: **1)** The company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., has processed before the Municipality of Atenas, a series of steps in order to obtain approval of a 48-lot subdivision, called "Villas de Jesús Atenas," located on the property in the Province of Alajuela with real property registration folio number 16754 (undisputed fact); **2)** In mid-2007, the Cadastre Office of the Municipality of Atenas endorsed the segregation of the lots located on the aforementioned property of the appellant company, identified under numbers A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 and Placa17548 (undisputed fact); **3)** In the Municipal Council agreement adopted in Ordinary Session No. 185 of September 29, 2008, the recommendation of the Legal Advisor contained in the report dated September 29, 2008, was approved, in which it responded to the request for a permit for the construction of the treatment plant, in the sense that "Villas de Jesús Atenas" is an urban development project, which requires compliance with the requirements stipulated by the Urban Planning Law, among them, the transfer of public use areas. It referred to the fact that every step presented by the interested company, including plan endorsements and construction permits, must be considered within the integral proposal of said project, which must be submitted to the Municipal Council. It was additionally ordered to request that the company present to the Municipality, for the knowledge and decision of the Council, the complete preliminary project, in order to verify compliance with the technical and regulatory requirements, and to resolve whether it is approved or denied, following a prior recommendation report from the Municipal Engineering Department, so that until then the request for a construction permit for the treatment plant would not be resolved (folios 428 to 435); **4)** Having submitted the developing company a series of documents aiming at the approval of the project and a construction permit for a wastewater treatment plant, it filed before the Municipal Council, on February 13, 2009, a request for positive silence (silencio positivo) (folios 236 to 242); **5)** The Municipal Mayor's Office, through official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February 17, 2009, granted the request for positive silence (silencio positivo) (folios 251 and 252); **6)** The Municipal Council of Atenas, in the agreement adopted in Ordinary Session No. 220, held on March sixteenth, two thousand nine, rejected said request due to non-compliance with requirements and because positive silence (silencio positivo) was improper in environmental matters. In said agreement, it did not endorse the positive silence (silencio positivo) that the Municipal Mayor's Office had granted through official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February 17, 2009, and ordered that a report on the project and compliance with all requirements be requested from the municipal engineer, as well as the intervention of the Urbanism Directorate of INVU, and urged the Administration not to grant the endorsement of any cadastral plan until the required reports were available, which were to be reviewed and resolved by the Municipal Council (folios 284 and 285); **7)** Having the company challenged the previous agreement, this Tribunal of improper jurisdiction resolved in Ruling No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010, to confirm it on the merits and deem the administrative route exhausted (folios 644 to 670); **8)** In an agreement definitively approved by the Municipal Council, in Ordinary Session No. 26 held on August 23, 2010, it was agreed: *"As a precautionary measure, until the opinion requested from IFAM to resolve the case of the Villas de Jesús Project is available, the granting of any permit, endorsement, authorization or any administrative act tending to its achievement is suspended."* (folio 711); **9)** The special commission formed for the study of the "Villas de Jesús" project sent a report to the Municipal Council, dated November 22, 2010, in which, having assessed the events that occurred, it recommended:

*a) Not to approve the "Villas de Jesús" project given that it is a subdivision (fraccionamiento) with urban development purposes and not a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), which has not complied with all the requirements of the Urban Planning Law and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations, and must have the review and endorsement of the Urbanism Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (opinions C-052-2006, C-243-2008 and C-181-2010 of the Attorney General's Office).* *b) In the event that the project is again presented to the Council, it must meet the previous requirements, and also include an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) that considers the criteria of AyA and SENARA expressed regarding the environmental fragility of the area where the project is located (Quebrada Barro Micro-Watershed), and these documents must be submitted to SETENA.* *c) Reiterate in all its aspects the provisions of the agreements adopted by the Municipal Council regarding the project following the issuance of ruling No. 2300-2010 at 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010, namely:* *a. That given that the project lacks municipal approval, the granting of any permit, endorsement, authorization or any administrative act tending to its achievement is suspended.* *b. That the Administration shall refrain from granting any right to the developing entity in relation to its project, given that it does not have Council approval.* *c. That the investigation continue in order to determine the administrative and any other type of responsibilities of the involved municipal officials, ordering the Municipal Audit Department to render the respective report.* *d. That the annulment of the endorsements and permits granted be ordered, following the procedures and legal requirements, given their illegality.* (folios 801 to 808) **10)** The previous recommendation was reviewed by the **Municipal Council of Atenas, adopted in Ordinary Session No. 48, held on the sixth of December, 2010**, in which it ordered: *"To accept the opinion provided by the Commission that studied the Villa Jesús case, excluding point d; where it refers: That the annulment of the endorsements and permits granted be ordered, following the procedures and legal requirements, given their illegality. Approved with 4 votes in favor and one against by councilmember Víctor González"* (folios 811 to 814); **11)** In a brief dated December 20, 2010, Mr. Wilberth Martín Aguilar Gatgens, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, filed a formal veto against the aforementioned agreement, which was rejected in the ordinary session of the council body, No. 53 held on December 29, 2010 (veto on folio 823, agreement on folio 843); **12)** The representative of the company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., filed a formal appeal against the same agreement, which was presented on December 21, 2010 (folios 829 to 842); **13)** The developer Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., filed a formal action for ordinary proceedings in the jurisdictional venue, processed under case file number 09-001089-1027-CA, in which it raised as part of its claims, the following: it requested:

*" **Main Claim:** "2) That the validity and legal effectiveness of the endorsements granted by the Municipality of Atenas to plans numbers A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 and A-1020301-2005 be declared and ratified, since they are facing a public street, with frontages and areas greater than those indicated by the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, and they have all public services. These conditions were accredited by Municipal Engineer Marcelo López León. ... 3) That the validity and legal effectiveness of the construction permits granted by the Municipality of Atenas to my represented party be ratified, by virtue of complying with the technical, legal and regulatory requirements and conditions demanded by the legal system and because there exist opinions from the competent officials (Municipal Engineer and Surveyor) that certify that all requirements are met. ... 3.1) Construction Permit No. 030-2009 dated February 24, 2009, to carry out the infrastructure works required for said subdivision, namely: "wastewater treatment plant, improvements to public roads, ballast, curb and gutter, sidewalks, storm drainage and potable water evaluation." 3.2) Construction Permit number 110-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling, on lot L-29 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. 3.3) Construction Permit number 111-2009 dated June 22, 2009, this license being for the construction of a single-family dwelling, on lot L-30 of the subdivision approved for my represented party. The foregoing, by virtue of the fact that all works authorized in the permits were executed with the approval of the Municipal Mayor's Office and the Municipal Engineering Department of Atenas. 4) That the Municipality of Atenas be ordered to refrain from executing formal and material acts that disregard the subjective right that assists the plaintiff, in relation to the recognition of the permits and licenses granted, which is requested to be ratified in claims 2 and 3, appendices 1, 2 and 3."* (ruling included in the court records, known to both parties, visible from folio 911 onwards) **14)** Said process was resolved by the Fourth Section of this same Tribunal, in which the claims of the plaintiff were discussed in an oral and public trial, which concluded with **Ruling No. 031-2012** at eleven thirty in the morning of March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, which stated in its operative part the following:

***"POR TANTO:*** *The expression sine actione agit is rejected, the lack of interest and right regarding all main declaratory claims not expressly granted is declared ex officio. The lawsuit is partially granted, and under the protection of article one hundred twenty-two of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, a three-month period from the finality of the judgment is ordered for the defendant to execute the act of acceptance or, failing that, to initiate the revocation or annulment proceedings for the Villa Jesús de Atenas project. The lack of right regarding the main indemnification claims in all that is not expressly granted is also declared ex officio, the Municipality of Atenas is ordered to pay the plaintiff the damages corresponding to the paralysis of the construction works it had authorized, which shall be liquidated in the execution of the judgment. The lack of right regarding the subsidiary claims is declared. On the recognized economic amount, the right to indexation and civil interest is recognized from the finality of the enforcement resolution that determines them.* Costs are borne by the respondent Municipality." (judgment added to the case file, known to both parties, visible from folio 911) **II.- GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.-** The Mayor of Atenas has been maintaining that the subdivision (fraccionamiento) cannot be classified as a subdivision for urban development purposes (fraccionamiento con fines urbanísticos), but rather as a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple), since all the lots are located facing a public street, considering that the legal advisor's opinion is contrary to what the Director of Urbanism of the INVU stated in official letter PU-C-D-575-2007 of August 2007, which provided that this is its nature and it is governed by the provisions of Article II.1.2 and following of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones.

**III.- GROUNDS OF GRIEVANCE OF THE APPEAL.-** After summarizing the events that occurred, the appellant company maintains that the agreement it is challenging has defects in its statement of reasons (motivación), insofar as it merely accepts the committee's report but does not even provide the specific reasons for which that decision is taken, much less does it indicate which norms apply to the specific case on the basis of which the suspension of the granting of all "permits, endorsements (visado), authorizations, or any administrative action" tending toward the continuation of the project is decreed, considering that the municipality had already granted a series of rights through a large number of administrative acts. It adds that the act did not comply with Article 245 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, since it was not informed which remedies were available or the time limit for filing them. It also states that there has been a violation of the Principle of Legitimate Expectations (Principio de Confianza Legítima), since the municipality's actions have been confusing, permits (subjective rights) are granted and allowed to be developed and executed, and then the decision is changed on repeated occasions; hence it considers the project to be valid and effective. It adds that, since the endorsements and the three construction permits are valid and effective, the Administration must not hinder their effectiveness, in application of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), so that if it wishes to annul them, it must proceed in accordance with the legal mechanisms established for that purpose. It considers that the challenged agreement seeks to render without effect those administrative acts that granted it subjective rights.

**IV.- Regarding the grounds of the Veto.** Regarding the nature of the "Villas de Jesús" project, this was already resolved in Resolution No. 2300-2010 of 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010, from this improper hierarchical level (jerarquía impropia). On that occasion, this improper hierarchical level ruled as follows:

" **VII.- Regarding the nature of the Villas de Jesús de Atenas Project.** Within this case, the legal nature of the Villas de Jesús Project must be clarified, since both the Municipal Engineer and the company Veintitrés Doce Trece S.A. have classified it as a 'simple subdivision' (fraccionamiento simple), in accordance with the Reglamento para el Control Nacional del Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. As can be inferred from the documents submitted to the Municipality, in accordance with the conclusions of Engineer Bayardo Noguera Paz incorporated within the document called 'Technical Analysis of Documents for Permits,' the project, even though it has been called a simple subdivision, is actually an entire urban development project whose purpose is to provide a housing solution on 48 lots, within a piece of land lacking all services. It can be observed from the various actions carried out that the company Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. has been processing, one by one, all those permits necessary to build a residential development (urbanización) and provide it with basic services. Both the company and the Municipal Engineer justified that it was a simple subdivision solely because the property (finca) is surrounded by public roads and all the lots would face a public street. On this particular point, it must be noted that even though the property is surrounded by public roads, the same permit granted by the Mayor makes it evident that the property subject to segregation (segregación) lacks essential services, and what was authorized was the construction of the wastewater treatment plant, improvements to the public road, surface treatment with gravel (encascotado), curb and gutter (cordón y caño), sidewalks (aceras), stormwater drainage (evacuación de pluviales), and potable water, which is far from being a simple subdivision in the terms set forth above. What can be inferred is that the developer's actions are outside the law, as it intends to build a residential development but without fully complying with all the requirements necessary for that purpose, which include, among others, the presentation of the preliminary project (anteproyecto) and compliance with all legal requirements, as set forth in the technical report of Engineer Bayardo Noguera, which revealed serious deficiencies that must be addressed by the developer and which were transcribed in Proven Fact 26 of this resolution. The foregoing means that the challenged agreement of the Municipal Council, being aware of the existing technical reports, made a correct application of the legal framework (bloque de legalidad), insofar as it adhered to the **unequivocal rules of science and technique (** Article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which require the Administration to ensure that its actions do not contradict the **theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique**, so that what is resolved by the municipality regarding any construction permit must conform to the results emanating from the technical studies required for the specific case. It must be noted that studies are not even observed reflecting the actual supply capacity of the existing well for forty-eight houses, which was authorized by the MINAET exclusively for domestic use, nor the management system for the treatment plant, among other serious deficiencies. From this, it follows that no grievance expressed by the company to the contrary can be accepted." Since, then, the administrative channel was exhausted on that occasion, this implies that the discussion regarding the nature of the project has already been exhausted in this channel, so it cannot be taken up again by this improper hierarchical authority (jerarca impropio), and the Mayor of Atenas must abide by what was resolved on that occasion. For this reason, the Veto must be rejected.

**V.- Regarding the absence of remedies applicable to the challenged act.** The appellant party requests that the act be annulled due to the failure to indicate the ordinary applicable remedies. In this regard, it suffices to indicate that Article 136 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides for such a requirement for the communication act (acto de comunicación) of the final act, so that its absence only vitiates the notification act. However, this defect, in accordance with the provisions of Article 223 of that same Law, only proceeds when the administered party's right to appeal is barred, which is not the present case, since the party has effectively exercised its ordinary remedies, from which it follows that there is no defenselessness (indefensión). For this reason, the grievance cannot be upheld by this Chamber.

**VI.- Regarding the alleged lack of a statement of reasons for the administrative act.** Prior to the analysis of this grievance, this Chamber must warn that a declaration of nullity is meaningless if the act, although null, has fulfilled its purpose or objective. Nullity, then, is subordinated not to the simple violation of the form of the act, but to the relationship between the defect and the purpose of the act, thereby enshrining the principle of purpose or instrumentality of forms, more commonly called the "principle of preservation of acts." Not every irregularity of an act determines its nullity; rather, the legal system assesses the departure from the procedural model in varying degrees, admitting that, despite being imperfect, the act is valid if it achieved its purpose or the party acquiesced to the nullity or the proceeding or action has been corrected. The purpose of each act is deduced implicitly, from which it can be concluded that there is no nullity of the act if there has been no defenselessness and the affected party's right of defense has not been violated (Article 223 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), so it is necessary that the attributed fault be serious, significant, or that an irreparable harm has been caused, which corresponds correlatively with the aggrieved party's claim of the violated formality and the defenselessness produced by the null act. To hold otherwise would be to incur in excessive solemnity and empty formalism. From a comprehensive reading of said report, it is observed that the Committee prepared a summary of the factual background of this case, including the pre-existing technical reports for this purpose and taking up the provisions of the resolution of this same improper hierarchical level, No. 2300-2010 of 10:00 a.m. on June 17, 2010. All of these elements had been fully known to the appellant party, since the discussion regarding the nature of the project had been a topic that was being elucidated within the local government for years and was even raised by the same appellant before judicial courts in the proceeding decided by Section Four of this Court in judgment No. 031-2012 of eleven thirty in the morning of March twenty-second, two thousand twelve. From this perspective, this Court considers it necessary to indicate that the defect of lack of a statement of reasons would have the force to annul the administrative act, insofar as the administered party was unaware of the reasons for which the administration has made its decision. However, it is clear that since the agreement taken by the Municipal Council of Atenas in Ordinary Session No. 220, held on March 16, 2009, the municipal body had rejected the positive silence (silencio positivo) given the lack of requirements, ordering compliance and the rendering of a report on the project by the municipal engineer, as well as the intervention of the Dirección de Urbanismo of the INVU, urging the Administration not to grant the endorsement of any cadastral plan until the required reports were available, which were to be known and resolved by the Municipal Council. That agreement was confirmed by this same improper hierarchical level, in the sense that the project could not be understood as a simple subdivision, and the company must comply with the requirements of a residential development in accordance with the provisions of the Ley de Planificación Urbana and the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Therefore, the grievance alleging the omission of the duty to state reasons aimed at annulling the agreement under appeal cannot be accepted, since it cannot be accepted that the appellant party is unaware of the specific reasons for which the decision to disapprove the project was taken, from which follows, as a logical consequence and without the need to state specific norms, the suspension of the granting of all "permits, endorsements, authorizations, or any administrative action" that tends toward the continuation of the project.

Even less is this grievance acceptable, given that the challenged agreement practically takes up what was previously indicated to the party, in the sense that the project corresponds to an urban subdivision (fraccionamiento urbanístico) and not a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple).

**VII.- On the merits.** The grievances related to the merits of the matter, specifically regarding the intangibility of one's own acts and the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations, were already addressed in a timely manner in a judicial venue, when Section Four of this Court ordered, in judgment No. 031-2012 of eleven thirty hours on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, the following:

*"X.- ON THE PRINCIPAL DECLARATORY CLAIMS: Before addressing the specific claim, the Court must warn that the intended articulation does not present a format with complete clarity, as it consistently mixes claims for recognition and declaratory judgments of law; however, its analysis will be pursued in the most comprehensible manner possible, always guided by the principle of effective judicial protection. A) Leaving aside the first principal claim, consisting of a declaration that the proceeding has merit, as it is not a claim in itself but rather an understandable consequence of the others, the first request (numbered as two) by the plaintiff company requires that the twenty-eight plans approved in their time by the Town Council be revalidated, by virtue of corresponding to a mere subdivision (fraccionamiento). The term revalidate is understood by the Court as that scenario where an administrative act is issued, subsequently annulled, and consequently, the granting of legal efficacy is requested again. Regarding the case at hand, the plans that are visible in proven fact number fourteen have never been annulled and consequently cannot be revalidated. Despite this, under Article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the Chamber understands that what is sought is the annulment of any formal or material act that injures the favorable administrative action under consideration. It is also pertinent to clarify that the plaintiff implicitly maintains the preservation of those constitutive acts by virtue of corresponding to simple subdivisions (fraccionamientos simples), which, as has been indicated, is incorrect, as they are part of a development (urbanización). Thus, it is not possible to assure, in the terms the plaintiff company requires, that the project is a mere subdivision (fraccionamiento), when from the statement of proven facts it was clearly indicated the limitations in public services which were assumed by the developer as necessary requirements for his project, such that the existence of public roads and limited public services are not sufficient to grant what was requested. In any case, we are inclined to find meaning in the claim in the terms indicated, not because they are mere subdivisions (fraccionamientos), but because any injury to an act favorable to the administered party is a violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, such that only through legally established administrative procedures is it possible to destroy the legal efficacy of those acts, procedures for which, facing the specific case, there is no proof whatsoever of having occurred. Having compared all the actions concerning those acts, the only moment where an attempt to diminish the effect of those acts can be located is in proven fact sixty-one by the improper superior (jerarca impropio), where he goes so far as to state that said acts must be considered non-existent. A first aspect that must be pointed out is that the act against which the appeal was known was the minutes of session two hundred twenty, of March sixteenth, two thousand nine, of the corresponding Municipal Council, concerning the denial of endorsement to the positive silence granted by the Town Council, which is why this jurisdictional body understands that it corresponds to an Obiter dictum, that is, a tangential analysis carried out by Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court without it being the core part of its analysis, as that was not the reason for the appeal. This Section of the Court thus understands that the act favorable to the administered party had already been granted previously, as can be located in the list of proven facts under number thirty-eight, corresponding to official letter MAT-WA-14-09 of February seventeenth, two thousand nine. So, once the act under consideration had been granted, it becomes irrelevant whether or not it is endorsed by the Municipal Council and even whether this position is shared or disagreed with by the improper superior (jerarca impropio), insofar as the act had already been generated. It is worth warning on this point of the absence of elements of conviction upon which one could suspect bad faith on the part of the plaintiff company, especially when the municipal officials were convinced it was a mere subdivision (fraccionamiento), a position even shared by the officials of the Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo. An assessment by the administrative officials that, while respectable, is not shared by this Court in that they failed to understand that what was sought by the regulation was the mere connection to a pre-existing public service network, which in the case was not so. Despite the error in the application of the rules, the truth is the existence of the act favorable to the interests of the administered party, impossible to ignore. So, what was held by the improper superior (jerarca impropio) under number one hundred seventy-three of the Political Constitution, besides not being a judicial act properly speaking that generates res judicata before this judicial body, is also not the central basis of its reasoning. All without prejudice that subsequently, it is the Municipal Council itself that clarifies its agreement, alluding that it should not be understood as an act contrary to the interests of the plaintiff company in this process, but rather a mere position of the collegiate body; a clear example of what was said is that from this second agreement onward, the suspension of the project that had been generated is lifted. Thus, at the time the improper superior (jerarca impropio) heard the administrative appeal, there was a manifest lack of interest, as the administrative superior had reverted his own acts in application of the principle of self-review. Which again leads us to the conclusion of the non-existence of acts that attempt to diminish the legal effects of the granted approvals. It is necessary to remember on this point that the approvals as such are acts whose effects are recorded on the plan itself, empowering the interested party to segregate the land through the corresponding public deed at the time they see fit, according to what was said, so any disturbance should be directed towards communications with the Registro Nacional, the office where the act would take effect, which in the case have not occurred. The plaintiff thus speculates about the existence of future impacts, which have not occurred and which could not be known, as it is not possible to know what new activities or positions the public entity will adopt concerning the specific case. The others generated by the Town Council (impacts on work progress or non-acceptance of the project) are mere material actions and do not attack the approval granted to the twenty-eight plans. So, a real and concrete impact on that claim that would allow it to be declared would not be occurring, finding a lack of current interest. All without prejudice that declaring the validity of those acts is to accept their conformity with the legal system, when, as already indicated, they do not present such attributes in that they should have been considered within a development project and not as a simple subdivision (fraccionamiento simple). B) The next claim is oriented towards the declaration of validity and efficacy regarding three construction permits granted to the plaintiff, corresponding to numbers 030-2009 for a residual water treatment plant, improvements to public roads, stone packing, curb and gutter, sidewalks, stormwater evacuation, and potable water; 110-2009 for a single-family dwelling; and construction permit 111-2009 for the building of a single-family dwelling. The first of the construction permits was granted by the Mayor as narrated in proven fact thirty-eight, while the other construction permits were granted as established in proven fact forty-six. Although these works were at one time halted, their construction was subsequently permitted. Proof of what was said is that, as in proven fact number forty-eight, the Municipal Council of Atenas on April sixth, two thousand nine, clarifies its actions, to indicate that they are not annulling or revoking the first one. From the arguments of the parties made during the oral trial, as well as from the list of proven facts, it is not possible to detect any administrative action that impedes the execution of these works at this time, which might have occurred at the time; although the Chamber understands that given the existence of prior actions, it is possible that the plaintiff has a fear that other situations might occur, regarding works already completed or without a current restriction, these are mere speculations that do not have legal protection. It is appropriate to retake what was indicated regarding the obligation of control and surveillance of development activities in a canton by the decentralized public entity, but those functions must be carried out under the protection of legality, which includes that work stoppages or suspensions must occur in cases of non-compliance with the granted permit or due to impacts generated when developing the project not originally contemplated. They could never correspond to untimely, unfounded actions, or those with illicit motivations. Returning to the specific case, once again the Court finds a lack of interest in that we are facing construction permits that exhausted their effects the moment the work is completed, lacking all relevance to analyze their validity and efficacy, especially when this is not being questioned. Once again, a lack of right must also be declared, to the extent that, as has been indicated, those acts should have been known within a development project and not as a mere segregation, which would prevent declaring that they were issued with legal support."* **Subsequently, the aforementioned Court states:** *"D) The fifth claim concerns the ratification of the approval of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, requesting a declaration of compliance with all legal requirements. Seen as ratification, as had been indicated, it presupposes the existence of a prior act which is annulled or revoked, which in the present case is not consolidated; however, the Chamber understands the request as one for the annulment of all acts that are contrary to those ordered with action favorable to the interests of the plaintiff company. In the terms stated, initially there is a manifest lack of right regarding this claim, to the extent that it is impossible to recognize compliance with all the requirements of the project under consideration when it is not possible to verify that situation in the case of a development (urbanización), which is the case before us, which, as is known, presents more complex requirements due to the nature of the work to be carried out, where various state agencies are involved; therefore, it is not possible to grant the claimed request. However, as has been reasoned, we are in the presence of an act favorable to the interests of the plaintiff which has been neither revoked nor annulled, consequently protected by the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, so that, regarding acts obstructing the project, as already indicated, the oversight work of construction projects, insofar as they conform to what is permitted by the administrative act, is an obligation inherent to the municipal regime; to the extent that the enabling act is not for any activity but for a specific one. Even when subjecting itself to what is permitted, it is possible that unforeseen impacts may arise (in environmental matters, for example) which would make the halting of construction activity lawful. What is illegal is the halting of a work conforming to what is permitted and without generating unforeseen impacts (especially environmental ones), which everything indicates is what occurred in the present case. In any event, we will return to this topic when considering the requested liabilities. In the sub judice, it is possible to verify that there are no acts aimed at annulling the acceptance of the Villa Jesús de Atenas project, but rather non-formal actions, consisting of the halting of the project at the time and the absence of execution of the activities proper to the acceptance (recepción) of the project; the first lacking interest at this moment, and the second, in which its execution is omitted. Everything seems to indicate that this last situation is based on the Town Council's lack of clarity about the specific impacts that could arise, promoted by pressure from the neighbors. The acceptance of the project has three direct effects: the first, regarding the acceptance of the communal areas under Article forty of the Ley de Urbanismo (which includes the treatment tank); secondly, the corresponding acceptance of improvements in public infrastructure and services; and that corresponding to the approval of the remaining plans yet to be approved within the project. We are faced with an antinomy of norms, in the understanding that accepting the project under the current terms would be an unlawful act, but at the same time, denying efficacy to an act without complying with the legal requirements is also unlawful. Therefore, under Article one hundred twenty-two of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the Chamber opts to grant the defendant Municipality a period of three calendar months from the finality of this ruling for the defendant to execute the ordered act, or failing that, to initiate the procedures for revocation or annulment, as appropriate, based on the legally established procedures. In the understanding that the legal uncertainty presented by the defendant ceases definitively one way or another, given the contradictory conduct of the corporate public entity where on one hand it authorizes or permits and on the other it denies the execution of the ordered acts. In this regard, the copious list of proven facts demonstrates a chain of procedures, some reiterative and others isolated, without establishing a concrete resolution on the issue; especially in the case of the Municipal Council, fully breaching its obligations. It must be clear that it is one thing for the act to have discretionary elements and quite another for the administered party to be kept without resolving its procedures indefinitely. It is also possible to verify how the supreme collegiate body makes statements disapproving of the project, but does not adopt any concrete act in this regard, which manifestly generates an unsustainable state of legal uncertainty. By granting this period, this claim is resolved, as well as that numbered as 5.1 which corresponds to the acceptance (recepción) of lands and works by the defendant, that indicated as 5.2 which refers to the approval of the missing plans, and that pertaining to the annulment of acts contrary to that which was favorable to the administered party. Regarding this last one, we must also indicate the lack of interest, given the non-existence of any current act with a real impact on the project under consideration."* From the foregoing reading, several important conclusions are drawn, necessary for the purpose of retaking them to resolve the appeal now under consideration. The grievances intended to discuss the intangibility of one's own acts that defend the thesis of the efficacy of the plan approvals and construction licenses already granted have already been analyzed in a judicial venue, with the respective authority deeming that there is no current interest, because the former have had full effects and the latter are capable of being executed, as long as their nullity has not been declared. And indeed, the only way to annul the granted permits and approvals is through the legally provided procedures, whether in application of number 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, or with a declaration of detriment and the respective filing of the contentious-administrative process, which to date has not occurred. Likewise, in that same judgment, the Court assessed the different positions that within the Town Council have been presented regarding this project, a topic that goes hand in hand with the grievance referring to the disrespect for the principle of legitimate expectations, given the uncertainty the appellant company considers it is in. On this point, the Court opted to grant a prudential period *"for the defendant to execute the ordered act or, failing that, to initiate the procedures for revocation or annulment"*, for which reason this Office considers that, having also taken this ground of challenge to a judicial venue, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is more than satisfied, in application of number 120.4 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. It should be noted in this regard that the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, in light of constitutional postulate 173, establishes the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies before this improper hierarchy (jerarquía impropia) prior to resorting to judicial instances; notwithstanding this, if the administered party goes before the courts of justice without fulfilling this requirement, and the process reaches its conclusion, as has occurred in this case, it must be understood that the conflict is submitted to the knowledge of a higher instance than this improper hierarchy (jerarquía impropia), and this Section should not make a pronouncement as this stage has been surpassed. To do otherwise would be to reopen the discussion on the same topic and, worse yet, to disregard the force of formal and material res judicata that must fall upon the judicial process, thereby generating great legal uncertainty for all participants in this cause. Therefore, since the substantive grievances of the appeal pertain to violations already analyzed in a judicial venue, the parties must abide by what is ordered in that process, even though the appeal for cassation filed is pending resolution by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Therefore, under these circumstances, and given that the grievances based on procedural defects have also been rejected, there is no choice but to conclude that the appeal must be rejected, as is hereby declared.

POR TANTO

Both the Veto and the appeal filed are rejected.

Evelyn Solano Ulloa Marianella Alvarez Molina Claudia Bolaños Salazar 11-002368-1027-CA Improper Hierarchical Appeal (Apelación de Jerarquía Impropia) Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. vs. Municipality of Atenas (Municipalidad de Atenas)

N° 03-2012 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA. II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las doce horas treinta minutos del dieciocho de enero del dos mil trece.

Conoce este Tribunal, como jerarca impropio, del recurso de apelación interpuesto por Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., cédula jurídica CED77839, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, el señor Nombre103588 , mayor, soltero, comerciante, cédula CED77840 (folio 531); contra el acuerdo adoptado por el Concejo Municipal de Atenas en la Sesión Ordinaria No. 48, celebrada el seis de diciembre del 2010. Se conoce también, del Veto que interpuesto por el Alcalde de Atenas, señor Wilberth Marín Aguilar Gatgens, en contra de ese mismo acuerdo.

Redacta la Juez Solano Ulloa, y:

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Antecedentes de relevancia.- Para una correcta resolución del presente asunto, se tienen de importancia los siguientes hechos: 1) La empresa Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., ha tramitado ante la Municipalidad de Atenas, una serie de gestiones a efecto de obtener la aprobación de un fraccionamiento de 48 lotes, denominado "Villas de Jesús Atenas", ubicado en el inmueble de la Provincia de Alajuela con matrícula de folio real Placa16754 (hecho no controvertido); 2) A mediados del año 2007, la oficina de Catastro de la Municipalidad de Atenas visó para segregar los lotes ubicados en la citada finca de la sociedad apelante, identificados bajo los números A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 y Placa17548 (hecho no controvertido); 3) En acuerdo del Concejo Municipal tomado en la Sesión ordinaria No. 185 del 29 de setiembre del 2008, se aprobó la recomendación del Asesor Legal contenida en el informe de fecha 29 de setiembre del 2008, en el cual dio respuesta a la solicitud de permiso para la construcción de la planta de tratamiento, en el sentido que "Villas de Jesús Atenas" es un proyecto urbanístico, el cual demanda el cumplimiento de los requisitos que estipula la Ley de Planificación Urbana, entre ellos, la cesión de áreas de uso público. Se refirió a que toda gestión presentada por la sociedad interesada, incluyendo visado de planos y permisos de construcción, debe ser conocida dentro de la propuesta integral de dicho proyecto, el cual debe ser sometido al Concejo Municipal. Se ordenó adicionalmente solicitar a la sociedad que presentara a la Municipalidad, para conocimiento y decisión del Concejo, el anteproyecto completo, con el fin de verificar el cumplimiento de los requerimientos técnicos y normativos, y resolver si es aprobado o denegado, previo informe recomendación del Departamento de Ingeniería Municipal, de manera que hasta entonces no se resolvería la solicitud de permiso de construcción de la planta de tratamiento (folios 428 a 435); 4) Habiendo presentado la empresa desarrolladora una serie de documentos tendientes a la aprobación del proyecto y de un permiso de construcción para una planta de tratamiento de aguas negras, interpuso ante el Concejo Municipal, el 13 de febrero del 2009, una gestión de silencio positivo (folios 236 a 242); 5) La Alcaldía Municipal, mediante oficio MAT-WA-14-09 del 17 de febrero del 2009, acogió la gestión de silencio positivo (folios 251 y 252); 6) El Concejo Municipal de Atenas en el acuerdo adoptado en la Sesión Ordinaria No. 220, celebrada el dieciséis de marzo del dos mil nueve, rechazó dicha gestión por incumplimiento de requisitos y por improcedencia del silencio positivo en materia ambiental. En dicho acuerdo no avaló el silencio que había concedido la Alcaldía Municipal mediante oficio MAT-WA-14-09 del 17 de febrero del 2009, y ordenó solicitar al ingeniero municipal un informe del proyecto y el cumplimiento de todos los requisitos, la intervención de la Dirección de Urbanismo del INVU e instó a la Administración para que no concediera el visado de ningún plano catastrado hasta tanto no se contara con los informes requeridos, los cuales debían ser conocidos y resueltos por el Concejo Municipal (folios 284 y 285); 7) Habiendo impugnado la sociedad el anterior acuerdo, este Tribunal de jerarquía impropia resolvió en Voto No. 2300-2010 de las 10:00 horas del 17 de junio del 2010, confirmarlo por el fondo y dar por agotada la vía administrativa (folios 644 a 670); 8) En acuerdo aprobado definitivamente por el Concejo Municipal, en la sesión Ordinaria No. 26 celebrada el 23 de agosto del 2010, se acordó: "Como medida cautelar, hasta tanto no se cuente en el dictamen solicitado al IFAM para resolver el caso del Proyecto Villas de Jesús, se suspenda el otorgamiento de cualquier permiso, visado, autorización o cualquier actuación administrativa tendiente a su consecución." (folio 711); 9) La Comisión especial conformada para el estudio del proyecto "Villas de Jesús" remitió un informe al Concejo Municipal, de fecha 22 de noviembre del 2010, en el que, habiendo valorado los hechos ocurridos, recomendó:

"a) No aprobar el proyecto "Villas de Jesús" dado que se trata de un proyecto de fraccionamiento con fines urbanísticos y no de un fraccionamiento simple, el cual no ha cumplido con todos los requerimientos de la Ley de Planificación Urbana y el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, debiendo contar con el examen y visado de la Dirección de Urbanismo del instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (dictámenes C-052-2006, C-243-2008 y C-181-2010 de la Procuraduría General de la República).

• b)En caso de que el proyecto sea nuevamente presentado al Concejo, el mismo debe contar con los anteriores requerimientos, además, en un estudio de impacto ambiental que considere los criterios del AyA y del SENARA vertidos sobre la fragilidad ambiental que presenta la zona donde se ubica el proyecto (Microcuenca Quebrada Barro), debiendo remitirse estos documentos al SETENA.
• c)Reiterar en todos sus extremos las disposiciones de los acuerdos tomados por el Concejo Municipal sobre el proyecto a partir del dictado de la sentencia No. 2300-2010 de las 10:00 horas del 17 de junio del 2010, a saber:

a. Que dado que el proyecto carece de aprobación municipal, está suspendido el otorgamiento de todo permiso, visado, autorización o cualquier actuación administrativa tendiente a su consecución.

b. Que la Administración se abstenga de otorgar derecho alguno a la entidad desarrolladora en relación con su proyecto, dado que no cuenta con aprobación del Concejo.

c. Que se continúe con la investigación a efecto de determinar las responsabilidades administrativas y de cualquier otra índole de los funcionarios municipales involucrados, ordenándose a la Auditoría Municipal la rendición del respectivo informe.

d. Que se ordene la anulación de los visados y permisos otorgados, siguiendo los procedimientos y requisitos de ley, dada su ilegalidad." (folios 801 a 808) 10) La anterior recomendación fue conocida por el Concejo Municipal de Atenas adoptado en la Sesión Ordinaria No. 48, celebrada el seis de diciembre del 2010, en el que dispuso: "Acoger el dictamen que proporcionó la Comisión que estudió el caso Villa Jesús, excluyendo el punto d; donde hace referencia: Que se ordene la anulación de los visados y permisos otorgados, siguiendo los procedimientos y requisitos de ley, dada su ilegalidad. Quedado con 4 votos a favor y uno en contra por parte del regidor Víctor González" (folios 811 a 814); 11) En memorial de fecha 20 de diciembre del 2010, el señor Wilberth Martín Aguilar Gatgens, en su condición de Alcalde Municipal, en contra del citado acuerdo interpuso formal veto, el cual fue rechazado en la sesión ordinaria del cuerpo edil, No. 53 celebrada el 29 de diciembre del 2010 ( veto a folio 823, acuerdo a folio 843); 12) El representante de la sociedad Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., planteó formal recurso de apelación en contra del mismo acuerdo, el cual presentó el 21 de diciembre del 2010 (folios 829 a 842); 13) La desarrolladora Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A., planteó formal p roceso de conocimiento en sede jurisdiccional, diligenciado bajo número de expediente 09-001089-1027-CA, en el cual planteó como parte de sus pretensiones, las siguientes: pidió:

" Pretensión Principal: "2) Que se declare y ratifique la validez y eficacia jurídica de visados otorgados por la Municipalidad de Atenas a los planos números A-1020358-2005, A-1020360-2005, A-1020362-2005, A-1020319-2005, A-1020326-2005, A-1020364-2005, A-1020323-2005, A-1020330-2005, A-1020331-2005, A-1020329-2005, A-1020321-2005, A-1020351-2005, A-1020349-2005, A-1020348-2005, A-1020347-2005, A-1020346-2005, A-1020344-2005, A-1020311-2005, A-1020310-2005, A-1020306-2005, A-1020305-2005, A-1020304-2005, A-1020302-2005 y A-1020301-2005, ya que están frente a calle pública, con frentes y áreas mayores a los que indica el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones y cuenta todos los servicios públicos. Estas condiciones las acreditó el Ing. Municipal Marcelo López León. ... 3) Que se ratifique la validez y eficacia jurídica de los permisos de construcción que otorgó la Municipalidad de Atenas a mi representada, en virtud de cumplir con los requisitos y condiciones técnicas, jurídicas y reglamentarias exigidas por el ordenamiento jurídico y por existir dictámenes de los funciones competentes (Ingeniero y Topógrafo Municipales) que acreditan que se cumple con todas las exigencias. ... 3.1) Permiso de Construcción No. 030-2009 de fecha 24 de febrero de 2009, para realizar las obras de infraestructura requeridas para dicho fraccionamiento, a saber: "planta de tratamiento de aguas residuales, mejoras en vía pública, encascotada, cordón y caño, aceras, evaluación de pluviales y agua potables". 3.2) Permiso de construcción número 110-2009 de fecha 22 de junio del año 2009, siendo esta licencia para la construcción de una vivienda unifamiliar, en el lote L-29 de fraccionamiento aprobado a mi representada. 3.3) Permiso de construcción número 111-2009 de fecha 22 de junio del año 2009, siendo esta licencia para la construcción de una vivienda unifamiliar, en el lote L-30 de fraccionamiento aprobado a mi representada. Lo anterior, en virtud de que todas las obras autorizadas en los permisos, se ejecutaron con la venía de la Alcaldía Municipal y del Departamento de Ingeniería Municipal de Atenas. 4) Se le ordene a la Municipalidad de Atenas abstenerse de ejecutar actos formales y materiales que desconozcan el derecho subjetivo que le asiste a la actora, en relación con el reconocimiento de los permisos y licencias concedidas, que se solicita ratificar en las pretensiones 2 y 3, apéndices 1, 2 y 3." (sentencia agregada a los autos, de conocimiento de ambas partes, visible a partir de folio 911) 14) Dicho proceso fue resuelto por la Sección Cuarta de este mismo Tribunal, en el cual se discutieron las pretensiones de la parte accionante en juicio oral y pùblico, que concluyó con el Voto N° 031-2012 de las once horas y treinta minutos del veintidós de marzo de dos mil doce, que en su parte dispositiva indicó lo siguiente:

"POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la expresión sine actione agit, se declara de oficio la falta de interés y derecho sobre todas las pretensiones principales de declarativas no expresamente concedidas. Se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda, disponiéndose al amparo del artículo ciento veintidós del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo el plazo de tres meses a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia para que la demandada ejecute el acto de recepción o en su defecto inicie los trámites de revocación o anulación del proyecto Villa Jesús de Atenas. Se declara también de oficio la falta de derecho sobre las pretensiones principales indemnizatorias en todo aquello no expresamente concedido, se condena a la Municipalidad de Atenas a cancelar a la actora los daños correspondientes a la paralización de las obras de construcción que había autorizado, los que se deberán liquidar en ejecución de sentencia. Se declara la falta de derecho sobre las pretensiones subsidiarias. Sobre el rubro económico reconocido se reconoce el derecho a indexación e intereses civiles a partir de la firmeza de la resolución de ejecución que los llegare a fijar. Corren las costas a cargo de la Municipalidad demandada." (sentencia agregada a los autos, de conocimiento de ambas partes, visible a partir de folio 911) II.- MOTIVOS DEL VETO.- El Alcalde de Atenas viene sosteniendo que el fraccionamiento no puede ser catalogado como un fraccionamiento con fines urbanísticos, sino como un fraccionamiento simple, pues todos los lotes se ubican frente a calle pública, estimado que el criterio del asesor legal es contrario a lo que esgrimió el Director de Urbanismo del INVU en el oficio PU-C-D-575-2007 de agosto del 2007, que dispuso que esa es su naturaleza y se rige por lo dispuesto en el Artículo II.1.2 y siguientes del Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones.

III.- MOTIVOS DE AGRAVIO DE LA APELACIÓN. Luego de hacer un resumen de los hechos acaecidos, la sociedad apelante sostiene que el acuerdo que viene impugnando tiene vicios en su motivación, en el tanto solamente acoge el dictamen de la comisión pero ni siquiera se dan los motivos concretos por los cuales se toma esa decisión, y mucho menos se hace indicación de cuáles son las normas que se aplican al caso concreto con base en los cuales se decreta la suspensión del otorgamiento de todo "permiso, visado, autorización o cualquier actuación administrativa " que tienda a la continuación del proyecto, estimando que la municipalidad ya había otorgado una serie de derechos mediante gran cantidad de actos administrativos. Agrega que el acto no cumplió con el artículo 245 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, puesto que no se le indicó cuáles eran los recursos que procedían ni el plazo para interponerlos. Manifiesta también que ha habido una violación al Principio de Confianza Legítima, pues las actuaciones de la municipalidad han sido confusas, se otorgan permisos (derechos subjetivos) y se permite que los mismos se desarrollen y ejecuten, y luego se cambia de decisión en reiteradas ocasiones; de allí que estima, el proyecto es válido y eficaz. Agrega que siendo los visados y los tres permisos constructivos válidos y eficaces, no debe la Administración obstaculizar su eficacia, en aplicación del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, por lo que si desea anularlos, deberá proceder conforme los mecanismos legales instaurados al efecto. Estima que en el acuerdo impugnado, se pretende dejar sin efectos esos actos administrativos que le otorgaron derechos subjetivos.

IV.- Sobre los motivos del Veto. Respecto de la naturaleza del proyecto "Villas de Jesús", ya desde la resolución No. 2300-2010 de las 10:00 horas del 17 de junio del 2010, de esta jerarquía impropia, se resolvió al respecto. En esa ocasión, esta jerarquía impropia se pronunció de la siguiente manera:

" VII.- Respecto de la naturaleza del Proyecto Villas de Jesús de Atenas. Dentro de la presente causa, debe aclararse naturaleza jurídica del Proyecto Villas de Jesús, pues tanto el Ingeniero Municipal como la Sociedad Veintitrés Doce Trece S.A. lo han clasificado como un "fraccionamiento simple", conforme al Reglamento para el Control Nacional del Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Según se desprende de los documentos aportados a la Municipalidad, de conformidad con las conclusiones del Ingeniero Bayardo Noguera Paz incorporadas dentro del documento denominado "Análisis Técnico de Documentos para Permisos" el proyecto, aún cuando ha sido denominado un fraccionamiento simple, en realidad es todo un proyecto urbanístico que tiene como fin brindar solución habitacional en 48 lotes, dentro de un terreno carente de todos los servicios. Se aprecia de las diversas actuaciones realizadas que la Sociedad Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. ha venido gestionando uno por uno, todos aquellos permisos necesarios para levantar una urbanización y dotarla de los servicios básicos. Tanto la sociedad como el Ingeniero Municipal justificaron que se trataba de un fraccionamiento simple, únicamente por el hecho de que la finca se encuentra rodeada de vías públicas y todos los lotes darían frente a calle pública. Sobre este particular, debe indicarse que aún cuando la finca se encuentra rodeada de vías públicas, se pone en evidencia del mismo permiso conferido por el Alcalde, que la finca objeto de segregación carece de los servicio esenciales, y lo autorizado fue la construcción de la planta de tratamiento de aguas residuales, mejoras en la vía pública, encascotado, cordón y caño, aceras, evacuación de pluviales y agua potable, lo cual dista mucho de ser un simple fraccionamiento en los términos supra expuestos. Lo que se desprende es que las actuaciones del desarrollador se encuentran al margen de la ley, pues pretende levantar una urbanización pero sin dar cabal cumplimiento de todos los requisitos necesarios para tal efecto, que incluyen, entre otros, la presentación del anteproyecto y cumplimiento de todos los requisitos de ley, conforme lo puso en conocimiento el informe técnico del Ingeniero Bayardo Noguera, en donde se evidenciaron serias deficiencias que deben ser atendidas por el desarrollador y que se transcribieron en el Hecho Probado 26 de esta resolución. Lo anterior quiere decir que el acuerdo del Concejo Municipal impugnado, conociendo de los informes técnicos existentes, hizo correcta aplicación del bloque de legalidad, en el tanto se sujetó a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica (artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), con lo cuales se impone a la Administración a que su actuación no venga a contrariar el conocimiento teórico adquirido de las distintas metodologías y disciplinas de la ciencia y la técnica, de manera que lo resuelto por la municipalidad respecto de cualquier permiso de construcción, debe estar conforme a los resultados que emanen de los estudios técnicos exigidos para el caso en concreto. Debe advertirse que ni siquiera se aprecian estudios que reflejen la capacidad real de abastecimiento del pozo existente para cuarenta y ocho casas, el cual fue autorizado por el MINAET exclusivamente para uso doméstico, así como tampoco el sistema de manejo de la planta de tratamiento, entre otras graves deficiencias. De ello se desprende que no resulta de recibo ningún agravio expresado por la sociedad en sentido contrario." Siendo, entonces, que en esa ocasión se dio por agotada la vía administrativa, ello implica que la discusión sobre la naturaleza del proyecto ya se agotó en esta vía, por lo que no puede ser retomada nuevamente por este jerarca impropio, debiendo atenerse el Alcalde de Atenas, a lo resuelto en esa ocasión. Por tal motivo, el Veto debe ser rechazado.

V.- Sobre la ausencia de recursos oponibles al acto impugnado. La parte apelante pide se anule el acto por falta de indicación de los recursos ordinarios oponibles. Al respecto, basta indicar que el ordinal 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispone tal requisito para el acto de comunicación del acto final, por lo que su ausencia vicia únicamente el acto de notificación. Sin embargo, este vicio, conforme lo dispone el numeral 223 de esa misma Ley, únicamente procede cuando queda vedado el derecho del administrado de recurrir, caso que no es el presente, toda vez que la parte ha hecho ejercicio efectivo de los recursos ordinarios, de donde se desprende que no hay indefensión. Por tal motivo, el agravio no puede ser acogido por esta Cámara.

VI.- Sobre la falta de fundamentación del acto administrativo acusada. De previo al análisis de este agravio, debe advertir esta Cámara que la declaración de nulidad carece de sentido si el acto, aunque nulo, ha cumplido su objeto o finalidad. La nulidad, entonces, queda subordinada no a la simple violación de la forma del acto, sino a la relación entre el vicio y la finalidad del acto, con lo cual se consagra el principio de finalidad o instrumentalidad de las formas, más comúnmente denominado "principio de conservación de los actos". No toda irregularidad de un acto determina su nulidad, sino que el ordenamiento valora en diversos grados la separación del modelo procesal, admitiéndose que, pese a imperfecto, el acto es válido si alcanzó su finalidad o la parte se conformó con la nulidad o se haya corregido el trámite o la actuación. La finalidad de cada acto se deduce en forma implícita, de donde se puede concluir que no hay nulidad del acto si no ha habido indefensión y no se ha violado el derecho de defensa del perjudicado (artículo 223 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), por lo que es necesario que la falta atribuida sea grave, trascendente o se haya causado un gravamen irreparable, lo que se corresponde correlativamente, con la acusación que hace el agraviado de la formalidad violada y la indefensión producida con el acto nulo. Caso contrario, sería incurrir en una excesiva solemnidad y en un formalismo vacío. De la lectura integral de dicho dictamen, se aprecia que la Comisión elaboró un resumen del cuadro fáctico de esta causa, incluyendo los informes técnicos preexistentes al efecto y retomando lo dispuesto en la resolución de esta misma jerarquía impropia, No. 2300-2010 de las 10:00 horas del 17 de junio del 2010. Todos estos elementos habían sido de total conocimiento de la parte recurrente, puesto que la discusión respecto de la naturaleza del proyecto venía siendo un tema que desde hace años se dilucidaba en el seno del gobierno local e, inclusive, fue elevada por el mismo apelante a estrados judiciales en el proceso fallado por la Sección Cuarta de este Tribunal en la sentencia N° 031-2012 de las once horas y treinta minutos del veintidós de marzo de dos mil doce. Desde este punto de vista, este Tribunal considera necesario indicar que el vicio de falta de fundamentación tendría la fuerza de anular el acto administrativo, en el tanto el administrado no conociere los motivos por los cuales la administración ha tomado su decisión. Sin embargo, es claro que desde el acuerdo tomado por el Concejo Municipal de Atenas en la Sesión Ordinaria No. 220, celebrada el 16 de marzo del 2009, el cuerpo edil había rechazado el silencio positivo ante la falta de requisitos, ordenando su cumplimiento y la rendición de un informe del proyecto por parte del ingeniero municipal, así como la intervención de la Dirección de Urbanismo del INVU, instando a la Administración para que no concediera el visado de ningún plano catastrado hasta tanto no se contara con los informes requeridos, los cuales debían ser conocidos y resueltos por el Concejo Municipal. Ese acuerdo fue confirmado por esta misma jerarquía impropia, en el sentido de que el proyecto no podía ser entendido como un fraccionamiento simple, debiendo la empresa cumplir con los requisitos de una urbanización conforme lo dispone la Ley de Planificación Urbana y el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Por ende, el agravio que acusa la omisión en el deber de motivación tendiente a anular el acuerdo venido en alzada, no es de recibo, toda vez que no se puede aceptar que la parte apelante desconozca los motivos concretos por los cuales se tomó la decisión de desaprobación del proyecto, de la cual deviene, como consecuencia lógica y sin necesidad de enunciación de normas específicas, la suspensión del otorgamiento de todo "permiso, visado, autorización o cualquier actuación administrativa" que tienda a la continuación del proyecto. Menos aún es de recibo este agravio, puesto que con el acuerdo impugnado, prácticamente se retoma lo que otrora se le había indicado a la parte, en el sentido de que el proyecto responde a un fraccionamiento urbanístico y no a un fraccionamiento simple.

VII.- Sobre el fondo. Los agravios relacionados con el fondo del asunto, específicamente en lo que se refiere a la intangibilidad de los actos propios y la transgresión al principio de confianza legítima, ya fueron atendidos oportunamente en sede jurisdiccional, cuando la Sección Cuarta de este Tribunal dispuso, en sentencia N° 031-2012 de las las once horas y treinta minutos del veintidós de marzo de dos mil doce, lo siguiente:

"X.- SOBRE LAS PRETENSIONES PRINCIPALES DECLARATIVAS: Previo a entrar en la pretensión en concreto, debe advertir el Tribunal que la articulación pretendida no presenta un formato con plena claridad en cuanto se mezclan consistentemente reconocimiento y juicios declarativos de derecho; empero se procurará su análisis de la manera más comprensible posible, siempre teniendo como norte el principio de tutela judicial efectiva. A) Dejando de lado la primera pretensión principal, consistente en la declaratoria con lugar del proceso, en cuanto no es una pretensión en sí misma, sino una comprensible de las demás, la primera solicitud (numerada como dos) de la sociedad actora requiere que se revaliden los veintiocho planos visados en su oportunidad por el ayuntamiento, en virtud de corresponder a un mero fraccionamiento. El término revalidar es entiendo por el Tribunal como aquel supuesto donde se emite un acto administrativo, posteriormente es anulado, y consecuentemente se solicita el otorgamiento de la eficacia jurídica nuevamente. En lo que al caso corresponde, los planos que resultan ser visibles a hecho probado número catorce nunca han sido anulados y consecuentemente no pueden ser revalidados, pese a esto, al amparo del artículo ciento veintidós del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo entiende la Cámara que lo pretendido es la nulidad de cualquier acto formal o material que lesione la actuación administrativa favorable en consideración. También es pertinente aclarar que la parte actora sostiene de manera implícita la manutención de dichos actos constitutivos en virtud de corresponder a fraccionamientos simples, lo que como se viene indicando es incorrecto, pues son parte de una urbanización. Así no es posible asegurar en los términos que la sociedad actora requiere de que el proyecto es un mero fraccionamiento, cuando de la relación de hechos probados quedó claramente indicado las limitaciones en servicios públicos los cuales fueron asumidos por el urbanizador como requisitos necesarios para su proyecto, de suerte que la existencia de calles públicas y servicios públicos limitados no resultan ser suficientes para otorgar lo pedido. En todo caso, nos inclinamos a encontrar sentido a la pretensión en los términos indicados, no por ser meros fraccionamientos, sino por que cualquier lesión a un acto favorable al administrado es una vulneración al principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, de suerte que solo mediante los procedimientos administrativos legalmente establecidos es posible destruir la eficacia jurídica de esos actos, procedimientos que frente al caso en concreto no existe prueba alguna de haberse dado. Cotejado la totalidad de las actuaciones frente a esos actos, el único momento donde es posible ubicar un intento para restarle efecto a esos actos se ubica en el hecho probado sesenta y uno por parte del jerarca impropio, donde llega a señalar que dichos actos deben tenerse por inexistentes. Un primer aspecto que debe señalarse es que el acto frente al cual se conocía el recurso de apelación era el acta de la sesión doscientos veinte, del dieciséis de marzo de dos mil nueve del Concejo Municipal correspondiente, referente a la negativa del aval al silencio positivo otorgado por el ayuntamiento, motivo por el cual este órgano jurisdiccional entiende que corresponde a un Obiter dictum, es decir un análisis tangencial realizado por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo sin que fuera la parte medular de su análisis pues no era ese el motivo del recurso. Entiende así esta Sección del Tribunal como el acto favorable al administrado ya estaba otorgado con anterioridad según es posible ubicar en el elenco de hechos probados bajo el número treinta y ocho, correspondiente al oficio MAT-WA-14-09 del diecisiete de febrero de dos mil nueve. De suerte que una vez otorgado el acto en consideración, resulta irrelevante si es o no avalado por el Concejo Municipal e incluso si esta posición es compartida o discrepada por el jerarca impropio, en la medida en la cual el acto ya estaba generado. Cabe advertir sobre el particular la inexistencia de elementos de convicción sobre los cuales pudiera pensarse una mala fe de la sociedad actora, máxime cuando los funcionarios municipales estaban en la convicción de tratarse de un mero fraccionamiento, posición incluso compartida por los funcionarios del Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo. Valoración de los funcionarios administrativos aún cuando respetable no compartida por este Tribunal en cuanto no lograron comprender que lo buscado con la norma era la mera unión a una red de servicios públicos preexistentes, lo que en el caso no era así. Pese al error en la aplicación de las normas lo cierto es la existencia del acto favorable a los intereses del administrado, de imposible desconocimiento. De manera que lo sostenido por el jerarca impropio al amparo del numeral ciento setenta y tres de la Constitución Política, además de no ser un acto jurisdiccional propiamente dicho que genere cosa juzgada frente a esta órgano judicial, tampoco es la base central de su razonamiento. Todo sin perjuicio que de manera posterior, es el mismo Concejo Municipal quien aclara su acuerdo, haciendo alusión que no debía entenderse un acto contrario a los intereses de la sociedad actora en este proceso, sino una mera posición del órgano colegiado; muestra claro de lo dicho es que a partir de este segundo acuerdo se levanta la suspensión del proyecto que se había generado. Así al momento que el jerarca impropio conoció del recurso de apelación administrativo había una manifiesta falta de interés, al haber revertido el jerarca administrativo en aplicación del principio de auto tutela sus mismos actos. Lo que nuevamente nos lleva a la conclusión de la inexistencia de actos que pretendan restarle efectos jurídicos a los visados otorgados. Es preciso recordar sobre el particular que los visados como tal son actos cuyos efectos quedan plasmados en el mismo plano, facultando al interesado a poder segregar el terreno mediante la correspondiente escritura pública en el momento que lo tenga a bien según lo dicho, así su perturbación debería ir encaminada hacia comunicaciones con el Registro Nacional, dependencia donde surtiría efectos el acto, los que en el caso no se han dado. La parte accionante especula así sobre la existencia de afectaciones futuras, las cuales no se han dado y que no podrían conocerse en cuanto no es posible saber que nuevas actividades o posiciones va a adoptar el ente público frente al caso en concreto. Las otras generadas por el ayuntamiento (afectaciones al avance de la obra ó no recepción del proyecto) son meras actuaciones materiales y no atacan el visado otorgado a los veintiocho planos. De manera que no se estaría presentando una afectación real y concreta sobre dicha pretensión que permita ser declarada, disponiéndose la falta de interés actual. Todo sin perjuicio que declarar la validez de dichos actos es aceptar su conformidad con el ordenamiento, como cuando ya se indicó no presentan tales atributos en cuanto debieron ser consideradas dentro de un proyecto urbanístico y no como fraccionamiento simple. B) La siguiente pretensión se orienta a la declaración de validez y eficacia en cuanto a tres permisos de construcción otorgados a la actora, correspondientes a los números 030-2009 para una planta de tratamiento de aguas residuales, mejoras en vía pública, encascotado, cordón y caño, aceras, evacuación de pluviales y agua potable; 110-2009 para una vivienda unifamiliar y permiso de construcción 111-2009 para la edificación de una vivienda unifamiliar. El primero de los permisos de construcción fue otorgado por el Señor Alcalde según se narra en hecho probado treinta y ocho, mientras que la base de los permisos de construcción fueron otorgados según se establece ha hecho probado cuarenta y seis. Si bien, dichas obras en su momento fueron paralizadas, posteriormente se permitió su construcción. Muestra de lo dicho es como a hecho probado numero cuarenta y ocho, el Concejo Municipal de Atenas el seis de abril de dos mil nueve, aclara sus actuaciones, para indicar que no se están anulando o revocando el primero. Dentro de las argumentaciones de las partes realizadas en el juicio oral, así como del elenco de hechos probados no es posible detectar actuación administrativa alguna que impida la realización de estas obras en este momento, las que en su momento si pudieran haberse dado; sí bien comprende la Cámara que ante la existencia de actuaciones anteriores es posible la existencia de un temor en la actora que puedan presentarse otras situaciones, ante obras ya concluidas o sin restricción vigente, se trata de meras especulaciones que no presentan abrigo jurídico. Conviene retomar lo señalado en cuanto la obligación del control y vigilancia de las actividades urbanísticas en un cantón a cargo del ente público descentralizado, pero dichas funciones deben ser desarrolladas al amparo de la legalidad, lo que incluye que las paralizaciones o suspensiones de obras deben darse en supuestos de incumplimiento del permiso otorgado o sobre afectaciones generadas a la hora de desarrollar el proyecto no contempladas originalmente. Nunca podrían corresponder a acciones intempestivas, infundadas, o con motivaciones ilícitas. Volviendo al caso en concreto, de nuevo ubica el Tribunal una carencia de interés en cuanto estamos frente a permisos de construcción que agotaron sus efectos en el momento que la obra se encuentra concluida, careciendo de toda relevancia analizar su validez y eficacia, máxime cuanto esta no esta siendo cuestionada. Nuevamente hay que declarar también la falta de derecho, en la medida que como se ha indicado debieron ser conocidos dichos actos dentro de un proyecto urbanístico y no como mera segregación, lo que impediría declarar que fueron emitidos con sustento legal. " De seguido, manifiesta el citado Tribunal:

"D) La quinta pretensión versa sobre la ratificación de la aprobación del proyecto Villa Jesús de atenas, requiriendo se declare el cumplimiento de la totalidad de los requisitos legales. Visto como ratificación, como se había indicado presupone la existencia de un acto previo el cual es anulado o revocado lo que en la especie no se consolida, empero la Cámara entiende la solicitud como de anulación de todos los actos que resultan contrarios a aquellos dispuestos con actuación favorable a los intereses de la sociedad actora. En los términos dichos, inicialmente existe una carencia manifiesta de derecho en cuanto a dicha pretensión, en la medida que resulta imposible reconocer el cumplimiento de todos los requisitos del proyecto en consideración cuando no es posible constatar esa situación en el caso de una urbanización, como es el caso que nos ocupa, que como es conocida presenta requerimientos más complejos en razón de la obra a realizar, donde actúan diversas dependencias estatales; de manera que no resulta posible acceder a la pretensión deducida. Más como se ha venido razonando estamos en presencia de un acto favorable a los intereses de la accionante el cual no sino revocado o anulado, protegido en consecuencia por el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, de manera que en cuanto a los actos de obstrucción del proyecto, como ya se indicó, las labores de fiscalización de los proyectos constructivos, en cuanto se ajusten a aquello permitido por acto administrativo es una obligación connatural al régimen municipal; en la medida que el acto habilitatorio no es para cualquier actividad sino para una en concreto. Incluso, aún supeditándose a lo permitido, resulta posible la generación de afectaciones no consideradas (en temas ambientales a manera de ejemplo) que harían lícito la paralización de una actividad constructiva. Lo que sí resulta ilegal es la paralización de una obra ajustada a lo permitido y sin generarse afectaciones (especialmente ambientales) no consideradas, que todo indica fue lo ocurrido en lo que a la especie corresponde. En todo caso, retomaremos este tema a la hora de considerar las responsabilidades solicitadas. En la sub júdice es posible verificar como no existen actos tendientes a anular la aceptación del proyecto Villa Jesús de Atenas, sino actuaciones no formales, consistentes en la paralización del proyecto en su oportunidad y en la ausencia de ejecución de las actividades propias a la recepción del proyecto; la primera carente de interés a este momento y la segunda, en la cual se omite su ejecución. Todo parece indicar que esta última situación tiene sustento en la falta de claridad del ayuntamiento sobre las afectaciones concretas que podrían presentarse, promovidas por la presión de los vecinos. La aceptación del proyecto presenta tres efectos directos, el primero de ellos en cuanto a la aceptación de las áreas comunales al amparo del artículo cuarenta de la Ley de Urbanismo (lo que incluye el tanque de tratamiento), en segundo lugar lo correspondiente a la aceptación de las mejoras en infraestructura pública y servicios y lo correspondiente al visado de los planos faltantes de visar dentro del proyecto. Estamos frente a una antinomia de las normas, en el entendido que aceptar el proyecto en los términos actuales resultaría un acto antijurídico, pero al mismo tiempo negar eficacia a un acto sin el cumplimiento de los requisitos legales, también lo es. De manera que la Cámara opta al amparo del artículo ciento veintidós del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo por otorgar a la Municipalidad demandada un plazo de tres meses calendario a partir de la firmeza de la presente resolución para que la demandada ejecute el acto dispuesto o en su defecto inicie los procedimientos de revocación o anulación, según corresponda a partir de los procedimientos legalmente establecidos. En el entendido que la inseguridad jurídica presentada por la demandada cese de manera definitiva en uno u otro sentido, ante conductas contrapuestas del ente público corporativo donde por un lado autoriza o permite y por el otro niega la ejecución de los actos dispuestos. Al respecto el copioso listado de hechos probados demuestra una cadena de gestiones, algunas reiterativas y otras aisladas, sin establecer una resolución en concreta frente al tema; en especial en el caso del Concejo Municipal, incumpliendo plenamente sus obligaciones. Debe queda claro que una cosa es que el acto presente elementos discrecionales y otra muy diferente que pueda mantenerse al administrado sin resolver sus gestiones de manear indefinida. Es también posible constatar como el órgano colegiado supremo hace manifestaciones desaprobando el proyecto, pero no adopta ningún acto concreto al respecto, lo que manifiestamente genera un estado de inseguridad jurídica insostenible. Al otorgar dicho plazo, se resuelve dicha pretensión, así como la numerada como 5.1 que corresponde a la recepción de terrenos y obras por la demandada, la señalada como 5.2 que refiere al visado de los planos faltantes y lo atinente a la anulación de actos contrarios a aquel que fuera favorable a la administrada. Sobre esta última si debemos indicar la carencia también de interés en cuanto la inexistencia de algún acto vigente con afectación real sobre el proyecto en consideración." De la lectura anterior se extraen varias conclusiones de importancia, necesarias a efecto de retomarlas para dar solución al recurso de alzada que ahora se conoce. Los agravios tendientes a discutir sobre la intangibilidad de los actos propios que defienden la tesis de la eficacia de los visados de planos y licencias constructivas ya conferidos, ya han sido analizados en sede jurisdiccional, estimando la autoridad respectiva que no existe interés actual, por cuanto los primeros han surtido plenos efectos y los segundos son susceptibles de ejecutarse, hasta tanto no se declare su nulidad. Y es que en efecto, la única manera de anular los permisos y visados concedidos, es mediante los procedimientos legalmente previstos, ya sea en aplicación del numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, o con una declaratoria de lesividad y la respectiva interposición del proceso contencioso administrativo, cosa que a la fecha no se ha dado. Asimismo, en esa misma sentencia el Tribunal apreció las distintas posiciones que dentro del ayuntamiento se han venido presentando respecto de este proyecto, tema que va de la mano con el agravio referido al irrespeto al principio de confianza legítima, dada la incertidumbre en que la sociedad recurrente considera que está. Sobre este particular, el Tribunal optó por conferir un plazo prudencial "para que la demandada ejecute el acto dispuesto o en su defecto inicie los procedimientos de revocación o anulación", por lo que este Despacho considera que habiendo llevado la sociedad este motivo de impugnación también a sede jurisdiccional, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa se encuentra más que superado, en aplicación de numeral 120.4 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Debe advertirse al respecto, que el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, a la luz del postulado 173 constitucional, establece el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa ante esta jerarquía impropia, de previo a acudir a instancias judiciales; no obstante ello, si el administrado acude ante los tribunales de justicia sin cumplimiento de este requisito, y el proceso llega a término, como ha ocurrido en este caso, se debe entender que el conflicto se encuentra sometido a conocimiento de una instancia superior a esta jerarquía impropia, no debiendo hacer pronunciamiento esta Sección al haberse superado esta etapa. Caso contrario sería abrir nuevamente la discusión sobre el mismo tema y, peor aún, desconocer la fuerza de la cosa juzgada formal y material que ha de recaer en el proceso judicial, generando con ello una gran inseguridad jurídica a todos los partícipes de esta causa. Por lo tanto, siendo que los agravios de fondo del recurso versan sobre transgresiones ya analizadas en sede jurisdiccional, las partes deberán atenerse a lo que se disponga en dicho proceso, aún y cuando está pendiente que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resuelva el recurso de casación interpuesto. Por ende, ante estas circunstancias, siendo también que han sido rechazados los agravios por vicios formales, no queda más que concluir que la apelación debe ser rechazada, como en efecto se declara.

POR TANTO

Se rechazan tanto el Veto como la apelación interpuestos.

Evelyn Solano Ulloa Marianella Alvarez Molina Claudia Bolaños Salazar 11-002368-1027-CA Apelación de Jerarquía Impropia Veintitrés Trece Doce S.A. vrs Municipalidad de Atenas