Infrastructure demolition in Wildlife Refuge irregularity due to defects and State liabilityDemolición de infraestructura en Refugio de Vida Silvestre irregularidad por vicios y responsabilidad estatal

Knowledge proceeding CED115485 Plaintiff/ Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA and Nombre148432 Defendant/ The State and Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación No. 33- 2014 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, EIGHTH SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GOICOECHEA, at ten o'clock in the morning on the twenty-eighth of April of the year two thousand fourteen.- Knowledge proceeding filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, legal identification number CED115486, represented by Nombre75056, bearer of identity card number CED27349, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact, and Nombre148432, bearer of residence card CED115487, against the STATE, represented by Nombre79839, in his capacity as Deputy Procurator, and the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, which appeared through Nombre148433, bearer of identity card number CED89816, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact.

WHEREAS

1.- The object of this proceeding, established in the preliminary hearing, is to seek a declaration that: "1) That the demolition carried out of the Hotel Las Palmas on 26 July 2011 was irregular due to defects in the acts; 2) That based on the foregoing, the Costa Rican State is liable for the illegitimate demolition of Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) That the State be ordered to pay material damages corresponding to the value of the Hotel built from the time the concession was granted until the annulled use permit was issued; 4) That the State be ordered to pay moral damages suffered by Mrs. Nombre148432, which is estimated at the sum of fifty million colones; 5) That the State be ordered to pay the damages that its illegitimate action caused to the company I represent and to Mrs. Nombre148432; 6) That the Costa Rican State be ordered to pay both costs." (preliminary hearing record and complaint brief).- 2.- The State's representation opposed the complaint, requesting it be dismissed. It alleged in its defense the unresolved exceptions of res judicata (cosa juzgada), lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) and lack of right (falta de derecho), with costs awarded against the plaintiff, as well as corresponding interest. Regarding the exceptions of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and act not subject to challenge, they were rejected by the Judge of the preliminary hearing in oral judgment No. 772-2013 issued at the preliminary hearing at 13:15 on 18 April 1013 [sic] (preliminary hearing record and response to the complaint).- 3.- The SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN (SINAC) was declared in default (folio 130 judicial file) 4.- In the adversarial phase, the testimonial statements of Nombre148432 and Nombre148434 were received (oral trial video).- 5.- In the proceedings, the requirements of law were met and no defects susceptible of causing nullity or defenselessness of the parties are observed. 6.- After deliberation, UNANIMOUSLY, this judgment is issued and notified, within the period provided by Article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- -Drafted by Dr. Nombre145617-

WHEREAS:

I- PROVEN FACTS: The following factual framework has evidentiary support: 1) The Municipalidad de Talamanca, through the inspection report dated 25 January 1989, halted the construction in the terrestrial maritime zone of Punta Uva being carried out by Nombre66716 without authorization (Folio 03 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 2) In ordinary session No. 157 of the Concejo Municipal de Talamanca, held on 7 June 1989, the agreement was taken to approve the construction permit in the name of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, according to attached plans (Folio 26 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 3) The Municipalidad de Talamanca, through the inspection report dated 13 September 1989, warned COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA regarding the already built construction, without payment of the construction tax, owing the sum of ¢133,244.35 (Folio 32 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 4) The company COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA paid the Municipalidad de Talamanca the sum of ¢133,244.35, on 18 December 1989, for the concept of construction tax (Folios 35 to 36 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 5) The Management of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, through official letter No. DST-264-023 of 9 February 1990, approved the lodging rates presented by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, applicable to rooms 1-2-3-4 located in Cahuita, Punta Uva, Limón (Folios 39 to 40 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 6) The Municipal Executive of the Municipalidad de Talamanca and COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, at 14:00 on 21 February 1990, based on Law No. 6043, entered into a concession contract in the terrestrial maritime zone whereby the territorial corporation granted said company a plot located in Punta Uva, Sixaola District, Talamanca Canton, Limón Province, for a term of 20 years, with an area of 4 hectares and 681.60 square meters, cadastral plan No. L-841259-89 of 8 November 1989, for tourism use, according to the use permit granted by the Concejo Municipal de Talamanca, agreement n-0.c.n 4757 of 19 April 1989 (Folios 41 to 43 and 70 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 7) In official letter No. PRO-260-90 of 12 March 1990, the Projects Department of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo resolved the request made by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA regarding the beach hotel, approving the preliminary design phase to continue with the preparation of construction plans, the approval of the Oficina Centralizadora de Permisos para la Construcción, and the definitive permit from the respective Municipalidad, warning that "because it is located within the boundaries of the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, prior to processing construction plans, approval must be obtained from the institution on which said refuge depends, that is, from the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas" (Folios 44 to 45 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 8) On 16 July 1991, COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA paid the sum of ¢45,539.75 for construction tax for APART. TYPE III buildings, for an area of 144 square meters (Folios 56 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitted in preliminary hearing); 9) In resolution No. 351-90-MIRENEM, at 9:13 on 17 June 1990, the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas and the Dirección de Vida Silvestre granted COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA a use permit for an area located in Punta Uva, Sixaola District, Talamanca Canton, Limón Province, with an extent of 4 hectares and 681.60 square meters, which lies within 150 meters of the terrestrial maritime zone of the Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo created by D.E. 206 of 29 October 1985 (Folios 42 to 45 of file identified No. 2, admitted in preliminary hearing); 10) By judgment No. 2254-09 at 09:30 on 13 October 2009, Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolved: "THEREFORE.- In accordance with Article 50 of the Constitución Política and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and by its very nature as a supervisory body, the Contraloría General de la República has active standing (legitimación activa) to demand from SINAC and MINAET the forced execution of the final and favorable administrative act issued by the latter since 1993, number Nombre148435 of 5-3-93, by which the revocation of use permit number 351-90 to Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA was resolved, the validity of which was confirmed by the resolution of the cassation appeal, issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, number 285-F-04 at 11:30 on 28-4-04, duly notified to all parties that intervened in said process and which translates into the eviction of all occupants of the zone on the 4 ha 681.66 m2 plot, according to the cadastral plan Placa29675. The forced execution of said administrative act is ordered, I repeat No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, for which the proposal presented by SINAC for its realization is admitted, specifically between the 3rd and 6th of November upcoming. (...) Once the eviction is carried out, the responsible organs must proceed to return things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that encroaches on the protected zone and is finally recovered, for which SINAC's report must include the respective proposal and timeline.", a decision of the Enforcement Judge that was confirmed by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 at 14:45 on 25 March 2010 (Folios 001 to 004 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in preliminary hearing); 11) By resolution at 9:00 on 9 June 2011, Enforcement Judge Cristina Víquez Cerdas, of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolved: "Final the judgment number 2254-09 at nine forty-six on the thirteenth of October two thousand nine, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca Monge, in which the forced execution of administrative act No. Nombre148435 was ordered, and which translates into the eviction of all occupants of the zone from the plot of 4 hectares 681.66 square meters, according to cadastral plan L841259-89, proceed to its execution under the same terms and conditions established therein. For carrying out the forced execution of said administrative act, the dates of 19 to 22 July 2011 are set" (Folios 005 to 006 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in preliminary hearing); 12) The eviction and demolition of the works began on 26 July and concluded with an operational closure on 1 August, both of the year 2011, an event at which Mrs. Nombre148432 was present, who had to vacate and abandon the facilities of the Hotel Las Palmas (Folios 272 to 289 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in preliminary hearing and statement of Nombre148432, rendered in oral trial); 13) The Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 at 14:30 on 29 March 2012, heard the project called demolition Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, presented by the Executive Director of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, and taking into account that as of 15 December 2011 the infrastructure of Hotel Las Palmas was 80% destroyed, all existing works had to be demolished, leaving the land clean, resolving to approve the Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental, and the project for the demolition and final disposal of the disabled Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, in compliance with resolution No. Nombre148435 of 5 March 1993, ratified by judgment No. 2254-2009 of 13 October 2009 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, granting environmental feasibility (license) (Folios 371 to 380 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in preliminary hearing); 14) The Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment No. 285-F-04 at 11:30 on 28 April 2004, dismissed the cassation appeal filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda No. 286-2003 at 10:50 on 23 July 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, to instead admit the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) regarding this point; also regarding the acquittal of costs, to instead order the plaintiff to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.", in reference to the judgment of the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda No. 178-2002, at 7:30 on 26 February 2002, which had originally ordered: "As complementary evidence for better provision, the notarized certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a brief received on 12 May 1999 are admitted (folios 615 to 681).- The exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) is admitted regarding the items identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; in all other respects, the exception of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay to COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, damages.- The compensation shall comprise all those constructions carried out according to the construction plans presented and approved by the competent administrative authorities, which are prior to the date of filing and notification of this complaint; works undertaken and constructions erected outside the area of the granted permit are excluded, as well as those subsequent to the related date, all of which will be determined in the execution phase of this judgment. With expert assistance. There is no award of personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, in order that the judgment declare: "a-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, at eight fifteen on the fifth of March nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, at nine o'clock on the seventeenth of June nineteen ninety, is unconstitutionally and illegally canceled. B-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, at eight fifteen on the eighteenth of July nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed. LIKEWISE, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs caused, both in the administrative venue and in the judicial venue.- 2-) Pay the totality of damages that may be caused to my represented party, in the event of an eventual closure and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas." (Evident and notorious fact, not controverted by the parties and so admitted in oral trial); 15) The Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment No. 32311-F-S1-2011 at 09:50 on 31 March 2011, dismissed the cassation appeal filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda No. 2220-2010 at 09:47 on 10 June 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the proceeding processed in file No. 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of administrative resolution No. DM-1784-2009 of 05 October 2009 issued by MINAET, through which the eviction and demolition of Hotel Las Palmas was ordered (Evident and notorious fact, not controverted by the parties and so admitted in oral trial) II.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: 1) That there exists any formal or material, normal or abnormal administrative conduct, whose individualized effects were directed against the plaintiff Nombre148432, by reason of any pre-existing link with the co-defendants, or even in its absence, and that caused damage or injury in a causal nexus; 2) That the constructions whose demolition was carried out and claimed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA were located outside the terrestrial maritime zone comprised in the Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo created by D.E. 206 of 29 October 1985; 3) That the demolition ordered in the judicial venue and executed by the state police power exceeded the authorization issued by the respective Judge, or incurred in abnormal action.

III.- EXCEPTIONS. LACK OF ACTIVE AD CAUSAM STANDING (FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM ACTIVA). PLAINTIFF Nombre148432: The Tribunal considers it relevant to resolve the exception of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) concerning the plaintiff, a natural person, since this aspect allows clarifying the fate of the compensatory claim (moral damages (daño moral)), together with the rest of the claims also brought by her. In this order of things, we must indicate that the administrative action, according to the list of proven facts, originating from the granting of the use concession of the terrestrial maritime zone (by the Municipalidad de Talamanca and subsequently by the competent Ministry), up to the issuance of the judicial judgment that ordered the execution of a final administrative act, did not direct its effects to, nor involve in any way, the plaintiff in her personal capacity. In fact, there is no manifestation of will that reaches her individually and specifically, in that sense. Therefore, the argument regarding "the irregularity of the demolition of Hotel Las Palmas due to defects in the acts", and any claim surrounding that complaint, does not bind the plaintiff, but only the company that suffered the consequence of the event. For purposes of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), it is true that the plaintiff was evicted from the said Hotel, as she herself recounted in her statement, when the judicial order was executed, but this occurred because she was an occupant, and not because there existed a decision to expel Mrs. Nombre148432 specifically, but rather that any individual who was in those facilities had to leave. Furthermore, it is not proven that the plaintiff suffered direct and personal injury, derived from the eviction ordered by a judicial decision, which could be deemed as the result of abnormal conduct, a hypothesis in which the respective liability could be demanded. Much less could the claimed damages be compensated, if it is viewed as derived from normal conduct, in this case by the Poder Judicial, which was the entity that ordered the eviction, in exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, since it is not possible to attribute that responsibility to the State-Judge, nor to the State for the normal action of the auxiliary organs of the jurisdictional function, as this option is not contemplated in the law, in the manner mandated by Constitutional precepts 9, 41, 154 and 166. Furthermore, the regime provided in articles 190 et seq. LGAP becomes inapplicable, since these regulate the strict liability of the State derived from the exercise of the administrative function, it being unthinkable to apply that regime to the jurisdictional function, for obvious reasons related to the division of functions derived from the Magna Carta, and also because the Constitution expressly refers to the law as the only source for imposing or regulating the liability of the Poder Judicial, and therefore that of the State, derived from the exercise of the jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between parties, as mandated by the Fundamental Norm. Consequently, there is an evident lack of active ad causam standing (falta de legitimación ad causan activa), which prevents the plaintiff from claiming "defects related to the demolition of Hotel Las Palmas", nor moral damages (daño moral) whose cause was not proven to exist, based on an injury derived from abnormal functioning; it being absolutely improper to grant it under the thesis of the normal functioning of the State-Judge or of the State for the action of the auxiliary organs of the jurisdictional function, and much less by applying the regulation of the LGAP which only applies to strict liability for administrative function. In summary, the decision of the Enforcement Judge, by ordering the eviction agreed in a final act issued by a ministerial body, does not transmute that order into a kind of administrative action, nor can it be understood that the Administration acted "on its own behalf", but rather it simply limited itself to fulfilling what was entrusted by the judicial authority (notwithstanding the sui generis nature of this curious process for the execution of a final administrative act unfavorable to the administered party versus the principle of autotutela), so the imputation of responsibility would fall on the Poder Judicial, to which (in the person of the State) it does not correspond to indemnify in an objective manner for its normal functioning (of a jurisdictional nature or of those auxiliary to that activity), nor for the abnormal functioning of its officials when exercising the constitutional mandate that justifies its existence, unless ordinary law so provides (as is the case for criminal proceedings), as it concerns an area of responsibility not authorized by ordinary legislation (a safeguard reserve: see also the judgment of this Section of the Tribunal, No. 011-2014 at 11 o'clock on 6 February of the year two thousand fourteen and oral judgment No. 23-2013 at 8:15 on 1 April 2013).

IV.- EXCEPTIONS. PLAINTIFF COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA: To resolve the exceptions raised, in direct reference to the claims of the company COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, analyzing the issue according to the order of the requests, it is necessary to frame the context of the dispute in its real dimension, and thus not lose sight of whether the present matter involves any particularity that had not previously been resolved in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. It is undeniably observable that the approach of the plaintiff company is somewhat complex for its correct understanding, since it essentially claims "1) That the demolition carried out of the Hotel Las Palmas on 26 July 2011 was irregular due to defects in the acts; 2) That based on the foregoing, the Costa Rican State is liable for the illegitimate demolition of Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) That the State be ordered to pay material damages corresponding to the value of the Hotel built from the time the concession was granted until the annulled use permit was issued". This manner of requesting a pronouncement —ours— which would produce the effect of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) regarding those issues, faces the following difficulties: a) It seeks an express judicial manifestation indicating that the demolition was irregular "due to defects in the acts", without individualizing which acts are referred to; b) The responsibility of the State is demanded for an illegitimate demolition, without specifying whether it is that of the State-Judge (referring to the jurisdictional procedural activity), that of the auxiliary organs of the function (understood as non-jurisdictional procedural activity, which, as a side note, must never be confused with the exercise of the exceptional administrative function of the Poder Judicial in areas such as administrative contracting, public employment, etc.), nor does the complaint clarify whether it claims the strict liability of the State (Poder Ejecutivo) for the exercise of the administrative function (arts. 190 et seq. LGAP); c) It requests compensation for the demolition of works that existed before the granting of the use permit issued by the competent Ministry, arguing that prior to the intervention of the centralized Poder Ejecutivo, there existed a terrestrial maritime zone concession issued by the Municipalidad de Talamanca, and that upon executing the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization" —subsequently revoked—, those works erected under the protection of the Municipal concession, and that occurred prior to the use permit of the indicated Ministry, could not be demolished. In its defect —it claims— it was the State's obligation to indemnify the value of those constructions, basing this on the fact that the municipal concession was in force. On these aspects we will rule immediately. MATERIAL RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA MATERIAL).- For the purpose of resolving the first claim, we see that the lack of clarity on the part of the plaintiff regarding the defects in the acts, and which of them are questioned, obliges the Tribunal to return to a general consideration. While in the oral trial the plaintiffs stated that it concerns those acts issued after the Enforcement Judge of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo ordered the demolition, as a consequence of the execution of a final administrative act, and that for this purpose they exemplified the "late" administrative act issued by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, by resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 at 14:30 on 29 March 2012, the truth is that we cannot forget that the claim set forth in the complaint does not discriminate, so we must inevitably refer to all elements that bear upon the State's action in demolishing the referred work. We begin by indicating that in the sub litem, the defects of the administrative acts whose legal validity was recognized in an ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be attacked. In this sense, we cannot revisit the issues that were resolved by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment No. 285-F-04 at 11:30 on 28 April 2004, upon dismissing the cassation appeal filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda No. 286-2003 at 10:50 on 23 July 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, to instead admit the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) regarding this point; also regarding the acquittal of costs, to instead order the plaintiff to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.", in reference to the judgment of the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda No. 178-2002, at 7:30 on 26 February 2002, which had originally ordered: "As complementary evidence for better provision, the notarized certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a brief received on 12 May 1999 are admitted (folios 615 to 681).- The exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) is admitted regarding the items identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; in all other respects, the exception of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay to COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, damages.- The compensation shall comprise all those constructions carried out according to the construction plans presented and approved by the competent administrative authorities, which are prior to the date of filing and notification of this complaint; works undertaken and constructions erected outside the area of the granted permit are excluded, as well as those subsequent to the related date, all of which will be determined in the execution phase of this judgment. With expert assistance. There is no award of personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, in order that the judgment declare: "a-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, at eight fifteen on the fifth of March nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, at nine o'clock on the seventeenth of June nineteen ninety, is unconstitutionally and illegally canceled. B-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, at eight fifteen on the eighteenth of July nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed. LIKEWISE, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs caused, both in the administrative venue and in the judicial venue.- 2-) Pay the totality of damages that may be caused to my represented party, in the event of an eventual closure and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas." Thus, there exists material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) regarding the validity of resolution No.

089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, issued at eight hours fifteen minutes on March fifth, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, at nine hours on June seventeenth, nineteen ninety, was revoked, nor can we review the provisions of resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, issued at eight hours fifteen minutes on July eighteenth, nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM was confirmed. The same must be said regarding the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 32311-F-S1-2011 of 09:50 hours on March 31, 2011, in which it dismissed the cassation appeal filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court No. 2220-2010 of 09:47 hours on June 10, 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the proceeding processed in file No. 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of administrative resolution No. DM-1784-2009 of October 5, 2009, issued by MINAET, which ordered the eviction and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas and for which it requested a declaration of its non-conformity with the legal system, and that the decision be set aside. In sum, regarding the indicated administrative acts No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, No. DM-1784-2009, there is substantive res judicata (cosa juzgada material), and it is not appropriate to air in the current trial whether they contain defects, unless said judgments are annulled by virtue of an extraordinary review appeal, which annuls the effect that characterizes them (arts. 619 et seq. CPC).

V.- ACTS NOT SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE. In judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, ordered —in essence— the forced execution of the firm administrative act number 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, a decision of said Judge that was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010, and which translates —the indicated Judge assessed— into the eviction of all occupants from the area on the 4 ha 681.66 m² property, according to the cadastral map Placa29675. Once the eviction was completed, the responsible bodies were to return things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that intrudes into the protected area. Following this decision, the infrastructure was evicted and demolished, and now it is not through a declaratory proceeding that the "irregularity of the demolition due to defects in the acts" can be declared, since, being a judicial action, this is not the proper avenue (Constitutional precept 49, Articles 1 and 2 CPCA), for it is not an administrative conduct, but a judicial resolution. Nor —as we have said— is an abnormal action by the Judicial Branch in the exercise of its judicial function being ventilated here, and even less can "the existence of a defect" be recognized, applying the thesis of normal functioning, because they are incompatible, and in any event, under that latter hypothesis, no liability is generated for the State-as-Judge (judicial procedural activity), for its auxiliary bodies in the exercise of that function (non-judicial procedural activity), nor even the personal liability of the judge, for the broad legal reasons we have already outlined previously (see also the judgment of this Section of the Tribunal, No. 011-2014 of 11:00 hours on February 6, two thousand fourteen, and the oral judgment No. 23-2013 of 8:15 hours on April 1, 2013). While article 92 subsection 7) of the CPCA allows the Trial Court to reexamine this defense (as with res judicata (cosa juzgada), as was indeed done), even though it may have been dismissed by the Processing Judge (oral judgment No. 772-2013 issued at the preliminary hearing at 13:15 hours on April 18, 2013), the truth is that it proved necessary to do so in order to settle any doubt given the imprecision of the claim. Subsequently, regarding what was expressed during the oral trial by the plaintiffs, who stated that their challenge refers to the defect in the administrative act issued one year late by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012, in reviewing the project called "demolition Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA," submitted by the Executive Director of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, and according to which it was resolved to approve the Environmental Management Forecast-Plan (Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the project for the demolition and final disposal of the decommissioned Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, in compliance with resolution No. Nombre148435 of March 5, 1993, ratified by judgment No. 2254-2009 of October 13, 2009, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, granting environmental viability (license), it suffices to reiterate what is indicated in judgment No. 00032311-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber, already cited, in its considerando VI: "(...) This judgment became final after both the cassation appeal filed by the plaintiffs herein was dismissed, through judgment no. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14 hours 45 minutes on March 25, and the motion for addition and clarification was dismissed in order number 1564 of 9 hours 50 minutes on December 23, both of the year 2010. It is that judicial decision which will ultimately be executed —articles 155, 156, 173 and 174 of the CPCA—, not the challenged administrative act, which, it is insisted, represents the commencement of the administrative execution of resolution 89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, but is not carried out in practice. The enforcement judgment is what prevails. That is, the Public Administration (in this case MINAET and SINAC) will execute the aforementioned administrative resolution —89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM— in accordance with the terms indicated by the judicial authority, not according to official letter DM-1784-2009. In this sense, everything carried out by the Public Administration prior to judgment 2254-2009, including the challenged act, must be considered mere background. Ergo, nothing will be achieved by processing this proceeding if, ultimately, the contested act will not be executed." Therefore, the administrative act issued by Nombre3456, one year late —as the plaintiffs claim—, is irrelevant to cause a defect in what interests them, that is, the demolition of the claimed work, since it constitutes background or complementary provisions (even subsequent, to conclude the remaining field work), which do not supersede the judicial decision finally executed, apart from the fact that this administrative action regulates environmental details related to the demolition, regarding which no legal link exists between that decision and the claims outlined by the plaintiffs in this trial. For the reasons stated, it is an act (in this case, an administrative one) not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación), as it has no effect of its own, nor does the issuance of an administrative act capable of causing a definitive state (causar estado), to the detriment of the subjective rights or the own and current interests of the plaintiffs, depend upon it, being limited to the authorization of a plan related to the destruction of the remaining infrastructure. In this manner, through the exceptions of res judicata (cosa juzgada) as well as acts not subject to challenge (actos no susceptibles de impugnación), it is impossible to pronounce on "the defects in the acts" that —according to the interested parties— render the demolition of the infrastructure irregular, as per the thesis of the claim. Consequently, the demolition is not irregular (understood as synonymous with illegal), and the first claim is dismissed.

VI.- LACK OF ACTIVE LEGITIMATION AD CAUSAM. In reference to the second claim, having dismissed —by definition— the liability of the State-as-Judge and its auxiliary bodies for normal functioning of the judicial function, as explained ut supra, the objective liability of the Administration (Executive Branch) for normal or abnormal functioning, under the terms of arts. 190 et seq. of the LGAP, is also unadmissible and dismissed, because its officials, when demolishing the aforementioned infrastructure, limited themselves to complying with a firm judicial decision. Then, only the liability of the State for abnormal functioning of its officials in the exercise of judicial activity remains to be reviewed, which has been extensively commented on above, to understand that the Constitution refers to ordinary law to establish the cases in which such objective imputation is possible (precept 166 of the Magna Carta: "Regarding that which is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number and the term of the courts, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their acts, and the manner of demanding liability from them"). From this, we can affirm that there is a scope of exclusion of objective state liability —referring to the Judicial Branch in the exercise of the judicial function—, with the exception of criminal matters (where the liability of the State-as-Judge applies, by provision of law, arts. 271 and 419 CPP), the general rule being subjective liability (that of the Judge) and the prior existence of a fault (arts. 85 et seq. CPC). In this context, the demolition ordered by the Enforcement Judge and confirmed by the First Chamber renders the judicial action legitimate, therefore, it excludes subjective liability as no fault exists, and objective liability is improper because it is inapplicable, both in normal and abnormal functioning (fault), as set forth. This means that no cause exists to sue the State demanding objective liability, not only because of the legal obstacle concerning the Judicial Branch in the exercise of the judicial function, but also because, for purposes of subjective liability, it has not been demonstrated that a fault —personally— attributable to the judges has been previously declared (that of the Tribunal and those of the First Chamber), who, moreover, were not sued in that capacity in the current proceeding, so the object of the sub litem was never to prove that individual liability, nor would this be the proper avenue, being in the presence of final judgments with the authority of substantive res judicata (cosa juzgada material), not annulled through an extraordinary review appeal. Neither can it be established that the demolition was illegitimate, this time at the hands of the Executive Branch officials who carried out that action, for they acted compelled by a judicial decision and as members of the forces representing the police power (generic concept) to which the Judge must resort to enforce their resolutions (Constitutional precept 153). From the perspective of the exception analyzed, in its active modality, no administrative conduct exists that is separate from the judicial decision (as long as it remains within the canons of normal functioning), and therefore, the cause to sue the State understood as the Executive Branch (Public Administration), for the purposes of the liability regime provided for in articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP, is impertinent, because it does not apply in the face of judicial activity regarding the enforcement of a Judge's sentence, since the mandate that the police power fulfilled in the sub júdice was jurisdictional in nature and not an administrative action of its own volition. This implies that the party cannot base their petition on that ground (a law that regulates administrative conduct, but not judicial) in the absence of a link between the alleged fact and the legal norm. It is not a lack of right, but the absolute lack of a connection between the relevant conduct and the regulatory justification that supports liability. We have already said, of course, that if the Administration's action exceeds the parameters or limits of the judicial decision, it may generate the objective liability provided for in that law, at the expense of the State (Executive Branch), but this is not the case, as such a thing has not been ventilated, alleged, or demonstrated.

VII.- RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA). Finally, the compensation claimed in the third and fifth claims does not depend on "the irregularity in the execution of the demolition, due to the defects" claimed and already resolved. Its context is very specific and seeks a substantive pronouncement, insofar as the plaintiff company has endeavored to justify that the works existing before the granting of the use permit issued by the competent Ministry could not be demolished, affirming that prior to it, there was a maritime-terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, and that when the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization" —subsequently revoked— was executed, those works erected under the protection of the Municipal concession could not be destroyed, because they were built prior to the use permit of the indicated Ministry. For this reason, it claims the State's obligation to compensate the value of those constructions, basing itself for this —repeatedly and as the sole legal element— on the fact that the municipal concession was in force when it erected those structures. The Tribunal understands the viewpoint of its proponent; however, it disagrees with the usefulness of the distinction it has sought to assert, since said difference is irrelevant because there are jurisprudential precedents that apply to the specific case. Precisely on this point, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 hours on April 28, 2004, dismissed the cassation appeal filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court No. 286-2003 of 10:50 hours on July 23, 2003, which ordered: “The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages and losses consisting of the constructions carried out, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the absolution of costs, instead ordering the plaintiff to pay the procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.”, leaving absolute clarity that any compensatory claim related to damages and losses consisting of the constructions was denied. For the current Tribunal that now hears this matter, that pronouncement prevents issuing a new one that implies —without a doubt— reviewing that which has already been resolved with finality, especially taking into account that the distinction the plaintiff party wishes to have recognized (the time span between the municipal authorization and the ministerial one) lacks importance because that type of infrastructure could not be erected based on the concession contract signed by the Municipal Executive, as it involves land within an area declared protected, with the effects of law, given that the establishment of a Wildlife Refuge implied stripping the respective Municipality of its character as the granting Administration, which, under other circumstances, would have issued a valid and effective concession had the exception provided for in Article 73 of Law No. 6043 (LZMT) not applied. It would be different if it had been demonstrated that the execution of the firm administrative act ordered by a Judge of the Republic entailed the demolition of constructions that were not affected by the judicial decision to which we have referred; or failing that, if the proceeding were directed at reviewing the eventual liability of the Municipal Administration for granting the plaintiff company the use of land, on which it erected a structure legitimately trusting that, by virtue of that public action, a subjective right existed in its favor. But the foregoing has not been ventilated in that manner, for it was not demonstrated that any of the demolished works were outside the area belonging to the Refuge of interest, nor has the objective liability of the Administration that granted a maritime-terrestrial zone concession been claimed, despite it being a protection area that excluded municipal jurisdiction by law (art. 73 LZMT). Thus, the claim sub examine is a reiteration of the compensation that was already denied in its opportunity, and the fact that an attempt was made to allege the legal premise as a novel argument, claiming the value of the infrastructure erected during the period that elapsed between the granting of the municipal concession for the use of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the Ministerial use permit that was subsequently revoked, the truth is that the factual basis and the jurisprudential precedent of the specific case have not changed; they are the same constructions carried out in an area declared a Wildlife Refuge prior to the date on which the local Municipality granted the interested company "the use permit," and nothing new is contributed by the arguments we now hear, for there is no change whatsoever regarding that definitive fact. Let us recall that Constitutional precept 129 provides that acts and agreements contrary to prohibitive laws shall be null, if those same laws do not provide otherwise, and Article 73 of the LZMT is of a prohibitive nature, since it expressly states that "This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation." In this context, it is understood that the pronouncement contained in the judgments indicated previously covers the compensation issue relating to all the demolished constructions, regardless of "the validity" of the maritime-terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, for the basis of the judicial decision —which has the authority of substantive res judicata (cosa juzgada material)— expressly stated that the plaintiff company lacked a protectable compensatory right, having incurred in the violation of Articles 13 LZMT and 195 LGAP, which prevents us from entering to review that decision again, in the manner intended by the plaintiff company.

VIII.- CONCLUSION AND COSTS. For what has been extensively set forth, the exception of lack of active legitimation ad causam is upheld with respect to the plaintiff Nombre148432, declaring the claim inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth claims. The exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is upheld concerning COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the declaration of defects in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, No. DM-1784-2009. The exception of acts not subject to challenge (actos no susceptibles de impugnación) is upheld, with respect to judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, as well as the resolution of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010; this last exception also encompassing the procedural administrative act issued by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012. The res judicata (cosa juzgada) also extends to the compensation claimed by the plaintiff company; consequently, the inadmissibility of the first, third, and fifth claims, insofar as they concern the legal entity, is declared. The exception of lack of active legitimation ad causam is upheld, regarding the second claim. A ruling on the undecided exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right is omitted as unnecessary. As there is no merit for exoneration, both costs are borne by the co-defendants, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the time of their assessment in the enforcement of judgment until their effective payment.

POR TANTO

The exception of lack of active legitimation ad causam is upheld with respect to the plaintiff Nombre148432, declaring the claim inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth claims. The exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is upheld concerning COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the declaration of defects in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. Placa29676 MIRENEM, No. DM-1784-2009. The exception of acts not subject to challenge (actos no susceptibles de impugnación) is upheld, with respect to judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, as well as the resolution of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010; this last exception also encompassing the procedural administrative act issued by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012. The res judicata (cosa juzgada) also extends to the compensation claimed by the plaintiff company; consequently, the inadmissibility of the first, third, and fifth claims, which involve the legal entity, is declared. Regarding said company, the exception of lack of active legitimation ad causam, linked to the second claim, is also upheld. A ruling on the exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right is omitted as unnecessary. As there is no merit for exoneration, both costs are borne by the plaintiffs, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the time of their assessment in the enforcement of judgment until their effective payment.

NOTIFY.- Nombre145617 Nombre18366 Rosa Cortés Morales 3 Knowledge proceeding CED115485 Plaintiff/ Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA and Nombre148432 Defendant/ The State and Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación Nº 33- 2014 CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, EIGHTH SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GOICOECHEA, at ten in the morning of the twenty-eighth of April of the year two thousand fourteen.- Knowledge proceeding filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, legal identification number CED115486, represented by Nombre75056 , holder of identity card number CED27349, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact, and Nombre148432 , holder of residence card CED115487, against the STATE, represented by Nombre79839 , in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General, and the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, which appeared through Nombre148433 , holder of identity card number CED89816, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact.

RESULTANDO

1.- The object of this proceeding, established in the preliminary hearing, is to seek a declaration that: "1) The demolition carried out of the Hotel Las Palmas on July 26, 2011, was irregular due to defects in the acts; 2) That, based on the foregoing, the Costa Rican State is responsible for the illegitimate demolition of Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) That the State be ordered to pay material damages corresponding to the value of the Hotel built from the time the concession was granted until the annulled use permit was issued; 4) That the State be ordered to pay moral damages suffered by Mrs. Nombre148432, which is estimated at the sum of fifty million colones; 5) That the State be ordered to pay the losses that its illegitimate action caused to the company I represent and to Mrs. Nombre148432; 6) That the Costa Rican State be ordered to pay both sets of costs." (preliminary hearing record and statement of claim).- 2.- The representation of the State opposed the claim, requesting it be dismissed, and raised in its defense the unresolved exceptions of res judicata, lack of current interest, lack of standing to sue, and lack of right, with costs awarded against the plaintiff, as well as the corresponding interest. Regarding the exceptions of res judicata and act not subject to challenge, they were rejected by the Judge of the preliminary hearing in oral judgment No. 772-2013 rendered during the preliminary hearing at 1:15 p.m. on April 18, 2013 (preliminary hearing record and answer to the claim).- 3.- The SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN (SINAC) was declared in default (folio 130 of the judicial file).

4.- In the adversarial phase, the testimonial statement of Nombre148432 and Nombre148434 was received (video of the oral trial).- 5.- The procedures complied with legal requirements, and no defects susceptible of causing nullity or defenselessness of the parties are observed.

1 6.- After deliberation, UNANIMOUSLY, this judgment is rendered and notified, within the period established by Article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- -Drafted by Dr. Nombre145617 -

CONSIDERANDO:

I- PROVEN FACTS: The following factual framework has evidentiary support: 1) The Municipality of Talamanca, through an inspection report dated January 25, 1989, halted the construction in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) of Punta Uva, being carried out by Nombre66716 without authorization (Folio 03 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 2) In ordinary session No. 157 of the Municipal Council of Talamanca, held on June 7, 1989, the agreement was adopted to approve the construction permit in the name of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, according to attached plans (Folio 26 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 3) The Municipality of Talamanca, through an inspection report dated September 13, 1989, gave notice to COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA regarding the construction already erected, without payment of the construction tax, owing the sum of ¢133,244.35 (Folio 32 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 4) The company COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA paid the Municipality of Talamanca the sum of ¢133,244.35, on December 18, 1989, for the concept of construction tax (Folios 35 to 36 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 5) The Management of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, through official letter No. DST-264-023 of February 9, 1990, approved the lodging rates submitted by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, applicable to rooms 1-2-3-4 located in Cahuita, Punta Uva, Limón (Folios 39 to 40 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 6) The Municipal Executive of the Municipality of Talamanca and COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, at 2:00 p.m. on February 21, 1990, based on Law No. 6043, entered into a concession contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) whereby the territorial corporation granted said company a parcel located in Punta Uva, Sixaola District, Canton of Talamanca, Province of Limón, for a term of 20 years, with an area of 4 hectares and 681.60 square meters, cadastral plan No. L-841259-89 of November 8, 1989, for tourist use, according to the use permit granted by the Municipal Council of Talamanca, agreement n-0.c.n 4757 of April 19, 1989 (Folios 41 to 43 and 70 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 7) In official letter No. PRO-260-90 of March 12, 1990, the Projects Department of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo resolved the request filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the beach hotel, approving the preliminary project phase to continue with the preparation of construction plans, the approval of the Centralizing Office for Construction Permits, and the final permit from the respective Municipality, warning that "because it is located within the boundaries of the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, before processing construction plans, the approval of the institution on which said refuge depends must be obtained, that is, the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas" (Folios 44 to 45 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 8) On July 16, 1991, COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA paid the sum of ¢45,539.75 for the concept of construction tax for APART. TYPE III buildings, for an area of 144 square meters (Folios 56 of file identified No. 1 certified by the Municipality of Talamanca, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 9) In resolution No. 351-90-MIRENEM, at 9:13 a.m. on June 17, 1990, the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas and the Wildlife Directorate granted COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA a use permit for an area located in Punta Uva, Sixaola District, Canton of Talamanca, Province of Limón, with a capacity of 4 hectares and 681.60 square meters, which is located within the 150 meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) of the Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo created by D.E. 206 of October 29, 1985 (Folios 42 to 45 of file identified No. 2, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 10) Through judgment No. 2254-09 at 9:30 a.m. on October 13, 2009, Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Court, resolved: "POR TANTO.- In accordance with Article 50 of the Constitución Política and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and by its very nature as a supervisory entity, the Contraloría General de la República has standing to demand from SINAC and MINAET the forced execution of the final and favorable administrative act issued by the latter since 1993, number Nombre148435 of 3-5-93, whereby the revocation of use permit number 351-90 to Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA was resolved, the validity of which was confirmed by the cassation appeal resolution, issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, number 285-F-04 at 11:30 a.m. on 4-28-04, duly notified to all parties that participated in said proceeding and which translates into the eviction of all occupants of the zone on the land of 4 hectares 681.66 m2, according to cadastral plan Placa29675. The forced execution of said administrative act, I repeat No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, is ordered, for which the proposal submitted by SINAC for its execution is admitted, specifically between the 3rd and 6th of next November. (...) Once the eviction is carried out, the responsible bodies must proceed to return things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that breaks into the protected and finally recovered zone, for which the SINAC report must include the respective proposal and chronogram.", a decision of the Enforcement Judge that was confirmed by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 at 2:45 p.m. on March 25, 2010 (Folios 001 to 004 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 11) Through the resolution at 9:00 a.m. on June 9, 2011, Enforcement Judge Cristina Víquez Cerdas, of the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Court, resolved: "The judgment number 2254-09 at nine forty-six hours on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca Monge, ordering the forced execution of administrative act No. Nombre148435, and which translates into the eviction of all occupants of the zone on the land of 4 hectares 681.66 square meters, according to cadastral plan L841259-89, having become final, proceed to its execution under the same terms and conditions established therein.

For the carrying out of the forced execution of said administrative act, the dates of July 19 to 22, 2011 are set" (Folios 005 to 006 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 12) The eviction and demolition of the works began on July 26 and concluded with an operational close on August 1, both in 2011, an event at which Mrs. Nombre148432 was present, who had to vacate and abandon the facilities of the Hotel Las Palmas (Folios 272 to 289 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in the preliminary hearing and the statement of Nombre148432, given in oral trial); 13) The National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 2:30 p.m. on March 29, 2012, took cognizance of the project called demolition of Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, presented by the Executive Director of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC), and taking into account that as of December 15, 2011, the infrastructure of Hotel Las Palmas was 80% destroyed, all existing works had to be demolished, leaving the land clean, therefore resolved to approve the Environmental Management Plan Forecast (Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental), and the project for the demolition and final disposal of the decommissioned Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, in compliance with resolution No. Nombre148435 of March 5, 1993, ratified by judgment No. 2254-2009 of October 13, 2009, of the Administrative Litigation Court, granting environmental feasibility (license) (Folios 371 to 380 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted in the preliminary hearing); 14) The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 a.m. on April 28, 2004, declared without merit the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 286-2003 of 10:50 a.m. on July 23, 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the absolution of costs, and instead the plaintiff is ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects it is confirmed.", in reference to the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 178-2002, of 7:30 a.m. on February 26, 2002, which had originally ordered: "As complementary evidence for better provision, the notarially certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a brief received on May 12, 1999 (folios 615 to 681) are admitted.- The exception of lack of right is admitted, with respect to the points identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; in all other respects, the exception of lack of current interest is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay in favor of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, damages.- The reparation shall include all those constructions carried out in accordance with the construction plans presented and approved by the competent administrative authorities, that are prior to the date of filing and notification of this claim; works undertaken and constructions erected outside the area of the granted permit are excluded, as well as those subsequent to the related date, all of which shall be determined in the execution phase of this ruling. With expert assistance. There is no order regarding personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, so that the judgment would declare: "a-) ABSOLUTELY NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on March five, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, of nine o'clock in the morning on June seventeen, nineteen ninety, is cancelled in an unconstitutional and illegal manner. B-) ABSOLUTELY NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on July eighteen, nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed. LIKEWISE, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs incurred, both in administrative proceedings and in court.- 2-) Pay all damages that may be caused to my represented party, in the event of a potential closure and demolition of Hotel Las Palmas." (An evident and notorious fact, not contested by the parties and so admitted in oral trial); 15) The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 32311-F-S1-2011 of 9:50 a.m. on March 31, 2011, declared without merit the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 2220-2010 of 9:47 a.m. on June 10, 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the process processed in file No. 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of the administrative resolution No. DM-1784-2009 of October 5, 2009, issued by MINAET, through which the eviction and demolition of Hotel Las Palmas was ordered (An evident and notorious fact, not contested by the parties and so admitted in oral trial).

II.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: 1) That there exists any formal or material, normal or abnormal administrative conduct, whose individualized effects were directed against the plaintiff Nombre148432, by reason of any pre-existing link with the co-defendants, or even in its absence, and that caused harm or damage in a causal nexus; 2) That the constructions whose demolition was carried out and which are claimed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, were located outside the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised in the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge created by D.E. 206 of October 29, 1985; 3) That the demolition ordered in court and executed by the state's police power exceeded the authorization issued by the respective Judge, or incurred in abnormal conduct.

III.- EXCEPTIONS. LACK OF ACTIVE LEGITIMATION AD CAUSAM. PLAINTIFF Nombre148432: The Court considers it relevant to resolve the exception of lack of active legitimation, concerning the plaintiff, a natural person, since this aspect allows the fate of the compensatory claim (moral damages) to be elucidated, together with the other claims also filed by her. In this order of things, we must indicate that the administrative action, according to the list of proven facts, from the granting of the use concession of the maritime-terrestrial zone (by the Municipality of Talamanca and subsequently by the competent Ministry), until the issuance of the judicial judgment that agreed to the execution of a firm administrative act, did not direct its effects or involve the plaintiff in any way, in her personal capacity. In fact, there is no expression of will that reaches her individually and specifically, in such sense. Therefore, the argument regarding "the irregularity of the demolition of Hotel Las Palmas due to defects in the acts," and any claim around that complaint, does not bind the plaintiff, but only the company that suffered the consequence of the event. For purposes of subjective moral damages, it is true that the plaintiff was evicted from the aforementioned Hotel, as she herself related in her statement, when the judicial order was executed, but such a thing occurred because she was an occupant, and not because there was a decision to specifically expel Mrs. Nombre148432, but rather any individual who was in those facilities had to leave. Furthermore, it is not proven that the plaintiff suffered direct and personal harm, derived from the eviction ordered by a judicial decision, which could be considered as the result of abnormal conduct, a hypothesis under which the respective liability could be demanded. Much less could the claimed damage be compensated if it is focused on as deriving from normal conduct, in this case of the Judicial Branch, which was the entity that ordered the eviction, in exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, since it is not possible to attribute that responsibility to the State-Judge, nor to the State for the normal performance of the auxiliary bodies of the jurisdictional function, as this option is not contemplated in the law, in the manner that precepts 9, 41, 154 and 166 of the Constitution mandate. Furthermore, the regime provided in articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP becomes inapplicable, because these regulate the objective liability of the State derived from the exercise of the administrative function, it being unthinkable to apply that regime to the jurisdictional function, for obvious reasons related to the division of functions derived from the Magna Carta, and also because the Constitution expressly refers to the law as the sole source for imposing or regulating the liability of the Judicial Branch, therefore of the State, derived from the exercise of the competence to resolve conflicts between parties, as mandated by the Fundamental Norm. Thus, there is an evident lack of active legitimation ad causam, which prevents the plaintiff from claiming "the defects related to the demolition of Hotel Las Palmas", nor moral damages whose cause was not proven to exist, based on an injury derived from abnormal functioning; it being absolutely improper to grant it, under the thesis of normal functioning of the State-Judge or of the State through the action of the auxiliary bodies of the jurisdictional function, and much less attending to the regulation of the LGAP which only applies to objective liability for administrative function. In summary, the decision of the Executing Judge, when ordering the eviction agreed upon in a firm act issued by a ministerial body, does not transmute that order into a sort of administrative action, nor can it be understood that the Administration acted "on its own hand," but rather simply limited itself to complying with what was entrusted by the judicial authority (notwithstanding the sui generis nature of this curious process of execution of a firm and unfavorable administrative act for the administered party versus the principle of autotutela), so that the imputation of liability would fall on the Judicial Branch, to which (on behalf of the State) does not correspond to indemnify objectively for its normal functioning (of a jurisdictional nature or of the auxiliaries of that activity), nor for the abnormal functioning of its officials when exercising the constitutional mandate that justifies its existence, unless ordinary law so provides (as is the case of the criminal process), as it is an area of liability not authorized by ordinary legislation (a safeguard redoubt: see also the judgment of this Section of the Court, No. 011-2014 of 11 o’clock on February 6, two thousand fourteen and oral judgment No. 23-2013 of 8:15 a.m. on April 1, 2013).

IV.- EXCEPTIONS. PLAINTIFF COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA: To resolve the exceptions raised, in direct reference to the claims of the company COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, analyzing the issue according to the order of what was requested, it is necessary to frame the context of the dispute in its real dimension, and thus not lose sight of whether the present matter involves any particularity that had not previously been resolved in the administrative litigation jurisdiction. It is undeniable to observe that the approach of the plaintiff company has a certain complexity for its proper understanding, since it essentially claims "1) That the demolition of Hotel Las Palmas carried out on July 26, 2011, was irregular due to defects in the acts; 2) That as a result of the foregoing, the Costa Rican State is responsible for the illegitimate demolition of Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) That the State be ordered to pay material damages which correspond to the value of the Hotel built from the time the concession was granted until the annulled use permit was issued." This way of requesting a pronouncement from us—which would produce the effect of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), on these issues, faces the following difficulties: a) An express judicial declaration is sought indicating that the demolition was irregular "due to defects in the acts," without specifying which acts are referred to; b) State liability is demanded for an illegitimate demolition, without specifying whether it is that of the State-Judge (referring to the jurisdictional procedural activity), that of the auxiliary bodies of the function (meaning non-jurisdictional procedural activity, which, as a side note, must never be confused with the exercise of the exceptional administrative function of the Judicial Branch in areas such as administrative contracting, public employment, etc.), nor does the claim clarify if it demands the objective liability of the State (Executive Branch) for exercise of the administrative function (arts. 190 et seq. LGAP); c) An indemnity is requested for the demolition of works that existed before the granting of the use permit issued by the competent Ministry, arguing that prior to the intervention of the centralized Executive Branch, there existed a maritime-terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, and that when executing the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization"—later revoked—those works erected under the protection of the Municipal concession, and which occurred prior to the use permit of the indicated Ministry, could not be demolished. In its defect—it claims—it was the State's obligation to indemnify the value of those constructions, based on the fact that the municipal concession was in force. We will resolve these aspects immediately. MATERIAL RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA MATERIAL).- In order to resolve the first claim, we see that the lack of clarity of the plaintiff party regarding the defects in the acts, and which of them are questioned, forces the Court to take up a consideration of a general nature. Although in the oral trial the plaintiffs stated that it concerns those acts issued after the Executing Judge of the Administrative Litigation Court ordered the demolition, as a consequence of the execution of a firm administrative act, and that for that purpose exemplified the "late" administrative act issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 2:30 p.m. on March 29, 2012, the truth is that we cannot forget that the claim set forth in the demand does not discriminate, so we must inevitably refer to all the elements that have an impact on the State's action in demolishing the referred work. We begin by indicating that in the sub litem, the defects of the administrative acts whose legal validity was recognized in an ordinary administrative litigation process cannot be attacked. In this sense, we cannot revisit the issues that were resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 a.m. on April 28, 2004, by declaring without merit the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 286-2003 of 10:50 a.m. on July 23, 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the absolution of costs, and instead the plaintiff is ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects it is confirmed.", in reference to the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 178-2002, of 7:30 a.m. on February 26, 2002, which had originally ordered: "As complementary evidence for better provision, the notarially certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a brief received on May 12, 1999 (folios 615 to 681) are admitted.- The exception of lack of right is admitted, with respect to the points identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; in all other respects, the exception of lack of current interest is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay in favor of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, damages.- The reparation shall include all those constructions carried out in accordance with the construction plans presented and approved by the competent administrative authorities, that are prior to the date of filing and notification of this claim; works undertaken and constructions erected outside the area of the granted permit are excluded, as well as those subsequent to the related date, all of which shall be determined in the execution phase of this ruling. With expert assistance. There is no order regarding personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, so that the judgment would declare: "a-) ABSOLUTELY NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on March five, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, of nine o'clock in the morning on June seventeen, nineteen ninety, is cancelled in an unconstitutional and illegal manner. B-) ABSOLUTELY NULL, and therefore ineffective, resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on July eighteen, nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed. LIKEWISE, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs incurred, both in administrative proceedings and in court.- 2-) Pay all damages that may be caused to my represented party, in the event of a potential closure and demolition of Hotel Las Palmas." In this manner, there is material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) regarding the validity of resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on March five, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, of nine o'clock in the morning on June seventeen, nineteen ninety, was revoked, nor can we review what was ordered by resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, of eight fifteen in the morning on July eighteen, nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM was confirmed. The same must be said regarding what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 32311-F-S1-2011 of 9:50 a.m. on March 31, 2011, in which it declared without merit the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court No. 2220-2010 of 9:47 a.m. on June 10, 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the process processed in file No. 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of the administrative resolution No. DM-1784-2009 of October 5, 2009, issued by MINAET, the same that ordered the eviction and demolition of Hotel Las Palmas and of which it requested that its non-conformity with the legal system be ordered, and what was resolved be left without effect.

In sum, regarding the indicated administrative acts No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009, res judicata (cosa juzgada material) exists, and it is not appropriate to discuss in the current trial whether they contain defects (vicios), unless said judgments are annulled by virtue of an extraordinary motion for review, which would annul the effect that characterizes them (arts. 619 et seq. CPC).

V.- ACTS NOT SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE. In judgment N° 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, the Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) ordered—in essence—the forced execution of the final administrative act number 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, a decision of said Judge that was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010, and which translates—as the indicated Judge assessed—into the eviction of all occupants from the area on the land of 4 hectares 681.66 m², according to cadastral map Placa29675. Once the eviction was carried out, the responsible bodies were to restore things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that encroaches upon the protected zone. Based on this decision, the eviction and demolition of the infrastructure took place, and now it is not through an ordinary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) that the "irregularity of the demolition due to defects (vicios) in the acts" can be declared, since this being a jurisdictional action, this is not the proper avenue (precept 49 Constitutional, articles 1 and 2 CPCA), because it is not an administrative conduct, but a jurisdictional resolution. Nor—as we have said—is an abnormal action by the Judicial Branch in the exercise of its jurisdictional function being discussed here, much less can "the existence of a defect (vicio)" be recognized by applying the normal functioning thesis, as they are incompatible, and in any case, under that last hypothesis, no liability of the State-Judge is generated (jurisdictional procedural activity), nor of its auxiliary bodies in the exercise of that function (non-jurisdictional procedural activity), nor even the personal liability of the judge, for the broad legal reasons we have already outlined previously (see also the judgment of this Section of the Court, No. 011-2014 of 11 hours on February 6, two thousand fourteen, and oral judgment No. 23-2013 of 8:15 hours on April 1, 2013). Since numeral 92 subsection 7) CPCA allows the Trial Court to re-examine this defense (as well as res judicata, as was indeed done), even though it had been dismissed by the Processing Judge (oral judgment No. 772-2013 issued at the preliminary hearing of 13:15 hours on April 18, 2013), the truth is that it was necessary to do so to settle any doubt given the imprecision of the claim. Then, regarding what was expressed in oral trial by the plaintiffs, who stated that their questioning refers to the defect (vicio) in the administrative act issued one year late by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012, when reviewing the project called demolition of Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, presented by the Executive Director of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), and according to which it was resolved to approve the Environmental Management Plan Forecast (Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental), and the demolition and final disposal project for the decommissioned Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, in compliance with resolution No. Nombre148435 of March 5, 1993, ratified by judgment No. 2254-2009 of October 13, 2009, of the Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), granting environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental), it suffices to reiterate what judgment No. 00032311-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber, already cited, indicates in its Recital VI: "(...) This judgment became final after both the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the plaintiffs here was declared without merit through judgment no. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14 hours 45 minutes on March 25, and the motion for addition and clarification in order number 1564 of 9 hours 50 minutes on December 23, both of the year 2010. It is that judicial decision that will ultimately be executed—numerals 155, 156, 173, and 174 of the CPCA—not the challenged administrative act, which, it is insisted, represents the start of the administrative execution of resolution 89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, but is not carried out in practice. The enforcement judgment is the one that prevails. That is, the Public Administration (in this case MINAET and SINAC), will execute the aforementioned administrative resolution—89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM—in accordance with the terms indicated by the judicial authority, not according to official letter DM-1784-2009. In this sense, everything done by the Public Administration before judgment 2254-2009, including the challenged act, must be considered as mere background. Ergo, nothing will be achieved by processing this proceeding if, ultimately, the contested act will not be executed." Therefore, the administrative act issued by Nombre3456, one year late—according to the plaintiffs—is irrelevant for causing a defect (vicio) in what concerns them, that is, the demolition of the claimed construction, as it involves background or complementary provisions (even subsequent ones, to conclude the remaining tasks in the field), which do not undermine the jurisdictional decision finally executed, besides the fact that this administrative action regulates environmental details revolving around the demolition, regarding which there is no legal link between that decision and the claims outlined by the plaintiffs in the present trial. For the foregoing reasons, this is an act (in this case administrative) not subject to challenge, as it does not possess its own effect, nor does the issuance of an administrative act capable of establishing status (causar estado) to the detriment of the plaintiffs' subjective rights or their own and current interests depend upon it, being limited to the authorization of a plan related to the destruction of the remaining infrastructure. In this way, through res judicata (cosa juzgada) as well as acts not subject to challenge, it is impossible to pronounce on "the defects (vicios) in the acts" that make—according to the interested parties—the demolition of the infrastructure irregular, following the lawsuit's thesis. Therefore, the demolition is not irregular (understood as a synonym for illegal) and the first claim is dismissed.

VI.- LACK OF ACTIVE LEGITIMACY AD CAUSAM (FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM ACTIVA). In reference to the second claim, liability of the State-Judge and its auxiliary bodies for normal functioning of the jurisdictional function having been dismissed—by definition—as explained above, the objective liability of the Administration (Executive Branch) for normal or abnormal functioning is also unaddressable and dismissed, under the terms of arts. 190 et seq. LGAP, since its officials, when demolishing the mentioned infrastructure, limited themselves to complying with a final judicial decision. Then, all that remains is to review the State's liability for abnormal functioning of its officials in the exercise of jurisdictional activity, which has been amply commented on above, to understand that the Constitution refers to ordinary law to establish the cases in which such objective attribution is possible (precept 166 of the Magna Carta: "Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number and the duration of the courts, as well as their attributions, the principles to which they must adjust their acts and the manner of demanding responsibility from them"). From that, we can affirm that there is a jurisdictional shield (fuero de exclusión) of objective state liability—referring to the Judicial Branch in the exercise of the jurisdictional function—, with the exception of criminal matters (where State-Judge liability does apply, by provision of law, arts. 271 and 419 CPP), the general rule being subjective liability (that of the Judge) and prior existence of a fault (falta) (arts. 85 et seq. CPC). In that context, the demolition ordered by the Enforcement Judge and confirmed by the First Chamber makes the judicial action legitimate, therefore excludes subjective liability as no fault (falta) exists, and objective liability is improper because it is inapplicable, both in normal and abnormal functioning (fault), as stated. This means there is no cause of action (causa para demandar) against the State demanding objective liability, not only due to the legal obstacle concerning the Judicial Branch in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, but also because, for purposes of subjective liability, it has not been demonstrated that a personal fault—attributable to the judges (those of the Court and those of the First Chamber), who were also not sued in that capacity in the current process—has been previously declared, so the object of the sub litem was never to prove that individual liability, nor would this be the proper avenue, being in the presence of final judgments with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada material), not annulled through an extraordinary motion for review. Nor can it be established that the demolition was illegitimate, this time at the hands of the Executive Branch officials who carried out that action, for these acted compelled by a jurisdictional decision and as members of the forces representing police power (generic concept) to which the Judge must resort to execute their resolutions (precept 153 Constitutional). From the perspective of the exception analyzed, in its active modality, there is no administrative conduct that is unrelated to the judicial decision (as long as it remains within the canons of normal functioning), and therefore, the cause of action against the State understood as the Executive Branch (Public Administration), for the effects of the liability regime provided in articles 190 et seq. LGAP, is impertinent, because it does not apply in the face of judicial activity regarding the execution of a Judge's sentence, because the mandate that the police power fulfilled in the sub júdice was of a jurisdictional nature and not an administrative action by its own will. This implies that the party cannot base its petition on that ground (a law that regulates administrative conduct, but not judicial conduct) given the absence of a link between the factual basis and the legal norm. It is not a lack of right (falta de derecho), but the absolute lack of a connection between the relevant conduct and the normative justification that sustains liability. We have already said, of course, that if the Administration's action exceeds the parameters or limits of the judicial decision, it can generate the objective liability provided for in that law, charged to the State (Executive Branch), but this is not the case, as such a thing was not discussed, alleged, or demonstrated.

VII.- RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA). Finally, the compensation claimed in the third claim and the fifth claim does not hinge on "the irregularity in the execution of the demolition, due to the defects (vicios) claimed and already decided. Its context is very specific and seeks a substantive ruling, insofar as the plaintiff company has endeavored to justify that the constructions existing before the granting of the use permit issued by the competent Ministry could not be demolished, affirming that prior to that, there was a maritime-terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, and that when executing the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization"—subsequently revoked—, those constructions erected under the protection of the Municipal concession could not be destroyed, because they were built prior to the indicated Ministry's use permit. For that reason, it claims the State's obligation to compensate the value of those constructions, relying for this—repeatedly and as the sole legal element—on the fact that the municipal concession was in force when carrying out those constructions. The Court understands the point of view of its proponent; however, it disagrees on the usefulness of the distinction sought to be enforced, since that difference is irrelevant because there are jurisprudential precedents that apply to the specific case. Precisely on this point, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 hours on April 28, 2004, declared without merit the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) No. 286-2003 of 10:50 hours on July 23, 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, and in its place, the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) on this point is admitted; also regarding the absolution of costs, and in its place, the plaintiff is ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. The rest is confirmed.", leaving absolute clarity that any compensatory claim related to the damages consisting of the constructions was denied. For the current Court that now hears this matter, that pronouncement prevents issuing a new one that implies—without a doubt—reviewing what has already been decided as final, especially considering that the distinction the plaintiff party wishes to be recognized (the time lapse between the municipal and ministerial authorization) lacks importance since that class of infrastructure could not be erected based on the concession contract signed by the Municipal Executive, as it involved land included in a zone declared protected, with the effects of law, since the constitution of a Wildlife Refuge entailed stripping the respective Municipality of its character as granting Administration, which, under other circumstances, would have issued a valid and effective concession, had the exception provided in article 73 of Law No. 6043 (LZMT) not applied. It would be different if it had been demonstrated that the execution of the final administrative act ordered by a Judge of the Republic entailed the demolition of constructions that were not affected by the judicial decision we have referred to; or failing that, that the process was aimed at reviewing the eventual liability of the Municipal Administration for granting the plaintiff company the use of land, on which it erected a structure legitimately trusting that, based on that public action, a subjective right existed in its favor. But the foregoing has not been discussed in that way, since it was not demonstrated that any of the demolished works were outside the area belonging to the Refuge in question, nor has the objective liability of the Administration been claimed that granted a maritime-terrestrial zone concession, despite it being a protection area that excluded municipal jurisdiction by law (art. 73 LZMT). This being the case, the claim sub exámine is a reiteration of the compensation that was already rejected at the time, and the fact that an attempt was made to allege the legal basis as a novel argument, claiming the value of the infrastructure erected during the period that elapsed between the granting of the municipal concession for use of the maritime-terrestrial zone, and that of the Ministerial use permit that was later revoked, the truth is that the factual basis and the jurisprudential precedent of the specific case have not changed, it involves the same constructions carried out in an area declared a Wildlife Refuge prior to the date on which the Municipality of the place issued "the use permit" to the interested company, and the arguments we now hear contribute nothing new, as there is no change whatsoever regarding that definitive fact. Let us recall that constitutional precept 129 provides that acts and agreements contrary to prohibitive laws shall be null, if the same laws do not provide otherwise, and article 73 LZMT is prohibitive in nature, as it expressly states that "This law does not apply to maritime-terrestrial zones, included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation." In that context, it is understood that the pronouncement contained in the judgments indicated previously covers the compensatory issue related to all demolished constructions, regardless of "the validity" of the maritime-terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, since the basis of the jurisdictional decision—which has the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada material)—expressly stated that the plaintiff company lacked a protectable right to compensation, having incurred in the violation of articles 13 LZMT and 195 LGAP, which prevents us from reviewing that decision again, in the manner the plaintiff company intends.

VIII.- CONCLUSION AND COSTS. For what has been amply set forth, the exception of lack of active legitimacy ad causam (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) is upheld concerning the plaintiff Nombre148432, and the lawsuit is declared inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth claims. The exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is upheld regarding COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, concerning the declaration of defects (vicios) in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009. The exception of acts not subject to challenge is upheld, regarding judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), as well as the resolution of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010; this last exception also covering the procedural administrative act (acto administrativo de trámite) issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012. Res judicata (cosa juzgada) also covers what relates to the compensation claimed by the plaintiff company, and consequently the inadmissibility of the first, third, and fifth claims is declared, as they pertain to the legal entity. The exception of lack of active legitimacy ad causam (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) is upheld, regarding the second claim. No pronouncement is made regarding the unresolved exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right (falta de interés and falta de derecho) as it is unnecessary.

Since there is no merit to exonerate, both sets of costs shall be borne by the co-defendants, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the date it is fixed in the enforcement of judgment stage until its effective payment.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">POR TANTO</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">The exception of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) regarding the plaintiff Nombre148432 is granted, and the claim is declared inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth prayers for relief. The exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is granted concerning COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the declaration of defects in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. Placa29676 MIRENEM,</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold"> N° DM-1784-2009. The exception of acts not subject to challenge is granted, with respect to judgment N° 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, as well as the resolution of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice,</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold"> N° 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010; this last exception also encompassing the preliminary administrative act issued by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, through resolution N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012. Res judicata also covers matters related to the compensation claimed by the plaintiff corporation; consequently, the first, third, and fifth prayers for relief, which involve the legal entity, are declared inadmissible. Regarding said corporation, the exception of lack of active standing, linked to the second prayer for relief, is also granted. As unnecessary, a ruling on the exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right is omitted. Since there is no merit to exonerate, both sets of costs shall be borne by the plaintiffs, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the date it is fixed in the enforcement of judgment stage until its effective payment. NOTIFÍQUESE.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">Nombre145617</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">Nombre18366</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; 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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> 3</span></p> In summary, the decision of the Executing Judge, in ordering the eviction agreed upon in a final act issued by a ministerial body, does not transmute that order into some sort of administrative action, nor can it be understood that the Administration acted "on its own authority"; rather, it simply limited itself to complying with what was entrusted to it by the judicial authority (despite the sui generis nature of this curious process of executing a final and <u>unfavorable</u> administrative act against the administered party versus the principle of self-enforcement), so that <b><u>the imputation of liability would fall on the Judicial Branch, which (on behalf of the State) is not obligated to indemnify in an objective manner for its normal functioning (of a jurisdictional nature or of the auxiliaries of that activity), nor for the abnormal functioning of its officials when exercising the constitutional mandate that justifies its existence, unless ordinary law so provides (as is the case of criminal proceedings), given that it is an area of liability not authorized by ordinary legislation (a safeguard reserve: see also the judgment of this Section of the Tribunal, No.</u></b> <b><u>011-2014 of 11:00 a.m. on February 6, two thousand fourteen, and the oral judgment No. 23-2013 of 8:15 a.m. on April 1, 2013)</u></b>." Once the eviction has been carried out, the responsible bodies must proceed to return things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that encroaches upon the protected and finally recovered zone, for which purpose SINAC’s report must include the respective proposal and schedule.", decision of the Enforcement Judge (Jueza Ejecutora) that was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 of 2:45 p.m. on March 25, 2010 (Folios 001 to 004 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted at the preliminary hearing); 11) By resolution of 9:00 a.m. on June 9, 2011, the Enforcement Judge Cristina Víquez Cerdas, of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) resolved: "The judgment number 2254-09 of nine forty-six hours on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, issued by the Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca Monge, ordering the forced execution of administrative act No. Nombre148435, which translates into the eviction of all occupants of the zone on the land of 4 hectares 681.66 square meters, according to the cadastral map L841259-89, having become final, proceed to its execution under the same terms and conditions established therein. To carry out the forced execution of said administrative act, the dates of July 19 to 22, 2011 are set" (Folios 005 to 006 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted at the preliminary hearing); 12) The eviction and demolition of the works began on July 26 and concluded with an operational closure on August 1, both in the year 2011, an event in which Mrs. Nombre148432 was present, who had to vacate and abandon the facilities of the Hotel Las Palmas (Folios 272 to 289 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted at the preliminary hearing, and testimony of Nombre148432 , given at trial); 13) The National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 2:30 p.m. on March 29, 2012, took cognizance of the project called demolition of Punta Uva SA Tourist Center (Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA), presented by the Executive Director of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), and taking into account that as of December 15, 2011, the infrastructure of the Hotel Las Palmas was 80% destroyed, all existing works had to be demolished, leaving the land clean, for which reason it resolved to approve the Environmental Management Forecast-Plan, and the project for the demolition and final disposal of the disabled Punta Uva SA Tourist Center, in compliance with resolution No. Nombre148435 of March 5, 1993, ratified by judgment No. 2254-2009 of October 13, 2009 of the Administrative Contentious Court, granting the environmental viability (license) (Folios 371 to 380 of the administrative file provided by the State, admitted at the preliminary hearing); 14) The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 a.m. on April 28, 2004, dismissed the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court No. 286-2003 of 10:50 a.m. on July 23, 2003, which ordered: “The judgment on appeal is reversed insofar as it orders the payment of damages consisting of the constructions made to the plaintiff, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the acquittal of costs, to instead order the plaintiff to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.”, in reference to the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court No. 178-2002, of 7:30 a.m. on February 26, 2002, which had originally ordered: "As supplementary evidence to better provide, the notarially certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a writing received on May 12, 1999 (folios 615 to 681) are admitted.- The exception of lack of right is admitted with respect to the extremes identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; as for the rest, the exception of lack of current interest is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay damages to COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA.- The reparation shall include all those constructions made in accordance with the construction plans submitted and approved by the competent administrative authorities, that predate the filing and notification date of this claim; works undertaken and constructions built outside the area of the granted permit, and those subsequent to the related date, are excluded, all of which shall be determined in the execution phase of this judgment. With expert assistance. There is no order for personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, in order that the judgment declare: "a-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, Resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, of eight hours fifteen minutes on the fifth of March, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by Resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, of nine hours on the seventeenth of June, nineteen ninety, is cancelled unconstitutionally and illegally. B-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, Resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, of eight hours fifteen minutes on the eighteenth of July, nineteen ninety-three, by which Resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed. ALSO, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs incurred, both at the administrative and judicial levels.- 2-) Pay the totality of damages that may be caused to my represented party, in the event of a possible closure and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas." (An evident and notorious fact, not controverted by the parties and thus admitted at trial); 15) The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 32311-F-S1-2011 of 09:50 a.m. on March 31, 2011, dismissed the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court No. 2220-2010 of 09:47 a.m. on June 10, 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the proceeding processed in file No. 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of the administrative resolution No. DM-1784-2009 of October 5, 2009 issued by MINAET, through which the eviction and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas was ordered (An evident and notorious fact, not controverted by the parties and thus admitted at trial) II.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: 1) That there existed any formal or material administrative conduct, normal or abnormal, whose individualized effects were directed against the plaintiff Nombre148432 , by reason of some pre-existing link with the co-defendants, or even in its absence, and that caused damage or harm in causal nexus; 2) That the constructions whose demolition was carried out and which COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA claims were located outside the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised within the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo) created by D.E. 206 of October 29, 1985; 3) That the demolition ordered in judicial venue and executed by the state police power exceeded the authorization issued by the respective Judge, or incurred in an abnormal action.

III.- DEFENSES. LACK OF ACTIVE LEGITIMATION AD CAUSAM. PLAINTIFF Nombre148432 : The Court considers it relevant to resolve the defense of lack of active legitimation, as far as the plaintiff, a natural person, is concerned, since this aspect allows us to elucidate the fate of the claim for compensation (moral damage), together with the rest of the claims also demanded by her. In this order of things, we must indicate that the administrative action, according to the list of proven facts, born from the granting of the use concession (concesión de uso) of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) (by the Municipality of Talamanca and subsequently by the competent Ministry), until the issuance of the judicial judgment that ordered the execution of a final administrative act, did not direct its effects nor involve the plaintiff in any way, in her personal capacity. In fact, there is no manifestation of will that reaches her individually and specifically, in that sense. That is why the allegation regarding "the irregularity of the demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas due to vices in the acts", and any claim around that demand, does not bind the plaintiff, but only the corporation that suffered the consequence of the event. For the purposes of subjective moral damage, it is true that the plaintiff was evicted from the aforementioned Hotel, as she herself related in her testimony, when the judicial order was executed, but such thing occurred because she was an occupant, and not because there was a decision to specifically expel Mrs. Nombre148432 , but rather any individual who was in those facilities had to leave. Furthermore, it is not accredited that the plaintiff suffered direct and personal damage, derived from the eviction ordered by a judicial decision, which could be deemed as a result of an abnormal conduct, a hypothesis in which the respective liability could be demanded. Much less could the claimed damage be indemnified, if it is focused as derived from a normal conduct, in this case by the Judicial Branch, which was the one that ordered the eviction, in the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, since it is not possible to attribute that liability to the State-Judge, nor to the State for the normal performance of the auxiliary bodies of the jurisdictional function, as this option is not contemplated in the law, in the manner mandated by Constitutional precepts 9, 41, 154 and 166. Furthermore, the regime provided in articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP (LGAP) becomes inapplicable, since these regulate the objective liability of the State derived from the exercise of the administrative function, it being unthinkable to apply that regime to the jurisdictional function, for obvious reasons related to the division of functions derived from the Magna Carta, and also because the Constitution expressly refers to the law as the only source to impose or regulate the liability of the Judicial Branch, therefore of the State, derived from the exercise of the competence to resolve conflicts between the parties, which the Fundamental Norm mandates. Thus, there exists an evident lack of active legitimation ad causam, which precludes the plaintiff from claiming "the vices related to the demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas", nor any moral damage whose cause was not proven to exist, based on an injury derived from abnormal functioning; it being absolutely improper to grant it, under the theory of the normal functioning of the State-Judge or of the State through the performance of the auxiliary bodies of the jurisdictional function, much less by attending to the regulation of the LGAP which only applies to objective liability for the administrative function. In summary, the decision of the Enforcement Judge, in ordering the eviction agreed upon in a final act issued by a ministerial body, does not transmute that order into a sort of administrative action, nor can it be understood that the Administration acted "on its own hand", but rather it simply limited itself to fulfilling what was entrusted by the judicial authority (notwithstanding the sui generis nature of this curious process of execution of a final and unfavorable administrative act for the administered party versus the principle of autotutela), so that the imputation of liability would fall on the Judicial Branch, to whom (on behalf of the State) it does not correspond to indemnify objectively for its normal functioning (of a jurisdictional nature or of the auxiliaries of that activity), nor for the abnormal functioning of its officials in exercising the constitutional mandate that justifies its existence, unless ordinary law so provides (as is the case of the criminal process), as it is a realm of liability not authorized by ordinary legislation (a safeguard redoubt: see also the judgment of this Section of the Court, No. 011-2014 of 11:00 a.m. on February 6 of the year two thousand fourteen and oral judgment No. 23-2013 of 8:15 a.m. on April 1, 2013).

IV.- DEFENSES. PLAINTIFF COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA: To resolve the defenses opposed, in direct reference to the claims of the company COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, analyzing the issue according to the order of the requests, it is necessary to frame the context of the dispute in its real dimension, and thus not lose sight of whether the present matter involves any particularity that had not previously been resolved in the administrative contentious jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa). It is undeniable to observe that the approach of the plaintiff corporation is somewhat complex for its correct understanding, since it essentially claims "1) That the demolition carried out on the Hotel Las Palmas on July 26, 2011, was irregular due to vices in the acts; 2) That in light of the above, the Costa Rican State is responsible for the illegitimate demolition of Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) That the State be ordered to pay for the material damage which corresponds to the value of the Hotel built from the time the concession was granted until the cancelled use permit was issued". This way of requesting a pronouncement—ours—that would produce the effect of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), regarding those issues, faces the following difficulties: a) An express judicial declaration is sought indicating that the demolition was irregular "due to vices in the acts", without specifying which acts are referred to; b) The State's liability for an illegitimate demolition is demanded, without specifying whether it is that of the State-Judge (referring to jurisdictional procedural activity), that of the auxiliary bodies of the function (meaning non-jurisdictional procedural activity, which, as a side note, should never be confused with the exercise of the exceptional administrative function of the Judicial Branch in areas such as administrative contracting, public employment, etc.), nor does the lawsuit clarify whether it claims the objective liability of the State (Executive Branch) for the exercise of the administrative function (arts. 190 et seq. LGAP); c) An indemnification is requested for the demolition of works that existed before the granting of the use permit extended by the competent Ministry, alleging that prior to the intervention of the centralized Executive Branch, there existed a concession for the maritime-terrestrial zone issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, and that upon executing the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization" - subsequently revoked -, it was not possible to demolish those works built under the protection of the Municipal concession, and which occurred prior to the use permit from the indicated Ministry. Failing that - it claims - the State had an obligation to indemnify the value of those constructions, basing itself on the fact that the municipal concession was in force. We will resolve these aspects immediately. MATERIAL RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA MATERIAL).- For the purpose of resolving the first claim, we see that the plaintiff's lack of clarity regarding the vices in the acts, and which of them are being questioned, obliges the Court to retake a consideration of a general nature. Although at trial the plaintiffs stated that it concerns those acts issued after the Enforcement Judge of the Administrative Contentious Court ordered the demolition, as a consequence of the execution of a final administrative act, and that for this purpose they exemplified the "tardy" administrative act issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 2:30 p.m. on March 29, 2012, the truth is that we cannot forget that the claim set forth in the lawsuit does not discriminate, so we must inevitably refer to all the elements that have an impact on the State's action in demolishing the said work. We begin by indicating that in the sub lite the vices of the administrative acts whose legal validity was recognized in an ordinary administrative contentious process cannot be attacked. In that sense we cannot revisit the issues that were resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 285-F-04 of 11:30 a.m. on April 28, 2004, upon dismissing the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court No. 286-2003 of 10:50 a.m. on July 23, 2003, which ordered: “The judgment on appeal is reversed insofar as it orders the payment of damages consisting of the constructions made to the plaintiff, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the acquittal of costs, to instead order the plaintiff to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.”, in reference to the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court No. 178-2002, of 7:30 a.m. on February 26, 2002, which had originally ordered: "As supplementary evidence to better provide, the notarially certified photocopies presented by the plaintiff in a writing received on May 12, 1999 (folios 615 to 681) are admitted.- The exception of lack of right is admitted with respect to the extremes identified with letters a) and b) of the petition, which are denied; as for the rest, the exception of lack of current interest is rejected.- The STATE is ordered to pay damages to COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA.- The reparation shall include all those constructions made in accordance with the construction plans submitted and approved by the competent administrative authorities, that predate the filing and notification date of this claim; works undertaken and constructions built outside the area of the granted permit, and those subsequent to the related date, are excluded, all of which shall be determined in the execution phase of this judgment. With expert assistance. There is no order for personal and procedural costs.", whose origin was the claim of COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA established in file No. 01-001043-638-CI, the amount of which was set as inestimable, in order that the judgment declare: "a-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, Resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, of eight hours fifteen minutes on the fifth of March, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by Resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, of nine hours on the seventeenth of June, nineteen ninety, is cancelled unconstitutionally and illegally. B-) Absolutely NULL, and therefore ineffective, Resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, of eight hours fifteen minutes on the eighteenth of July, nineteen ninety-three, by which Resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM is confirmed.

LIKEWISE, I request that the State be ordered to: 1-) Pay the personal and procedural costs incurred, both in the administrative venue and in the judicial venue.- 2-) Pay the totality of damages and losses that may be caused to my client, in the event of a potential closure and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas." Thus, there is material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) regarding the validity of resolution No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, issued at eight hours fifteen minutes on March fifth, nineteen ninety-three, by which the use authorization granted by resolution number 351-90MIRENEM, at nine hours on June seventeenth, nineteen ninety, was revoked, nor can we review the provisions of resolution No. 216-93 MIRENEM, issued at eight hours fifteen minutes on July eighteenth, nineteen ninety-three, by which resolution No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM was confirmed. The same must be said regarding the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in judgment N°32311-F-S1-2011 at 09:50 hours on March 31, 2011, in which it declared without merit the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA and others against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) N°2220-2010 at 09:47 hours on June 10, 2010, which ordered the inadmissibility of the proceeding processed under case file (expediente) N° 10-001470-1027-CA, and whose claim was to declare the absolute nullity of administrative resolution N° DM-1784-2009 of October 5, 2009, issued by MINAET, which ordered the eviction and demolition of the Hotel Las Palmas and of which it was requested that its nonconformity with the legal system be declared, and the decision be rendered without effect. In summary, regarding the indicated administrative acts No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009, material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) exists, and it is not appropriate to raise in the current trial whether they contain defects (vicios), unless those judgments are annulled by virtue of an extraordinary review appeal (recurso extraordinario de revisión), which annuls the effect that characterizes them (arts. 619 et seq. CPC).

V.- ACTS NOT SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE (ACTOS NO SUSCEPTIBLES DE IMPUGNACIÓN). In judgment N° 2254-09 at 09:30 hours on October 13, 2009, the Enforcement Judge (Jueza Ejecutora) Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), ordered—in essence—the forced execution of the final administrative act number 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, a decision of said Judge that was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) in resolution 401-F-S1-2010 at 14:45 hours on March 25, 2010, and which translates—as the indicated Judge assessed—to the eviction of all occupants from the zone on the 4 ha 681.66 m2 property, according to the cadastral map Placa29675. Once the eviction was carried out, the responsible bodies were to return things to the state they were in before the revoked use permit was granted, which includes the demolition of any infrastructure that invaded the protected zone. Based on this decision, the infrastructure was evicted and demolished, and now it is not possible, through a plenary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento), to declare the "irregularity of the demolition due to defects in the acts," since, being a jurisdictional action, this is not the proper avenue (Article 49 of the Constitution, articles 1 and 2 CPCA), because it is not an administrative conduct, but rather a jurisdictional resolution. Nor—as we have said—is an abnormal action of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) in the exercise of its jurisdictional function being raised here, and even less can "the existence of a defect" be recognized, applying the thesis of normal functioning, as they are incompatible, and in any case, in that latter hypothesis, no liability is generated on the part of the State-as-Judge (Estado-Juez) (jurisdictional procedural activity), of its auxiliary bodies in the exercise of that function (non-jurisdictional procedural activity), nor even the personal liability of the judge, for the extensive legal reasons that we have already outlined previously (see also the judgment of this Section of the Tribunal, No. 011-2014 at 11 hours on February 6, two thousand fourteen, and oral judgment No. 23-2013 at 8:15 hours on April 1, 2013). While numeral 92 subsection 7) CPCA allows the Trial Tribunal to reexamine this defense (just as with res judicata, as was indeed done), even if it had been dismissed by the Processing Judge (Juez Tramitador) (oral judgment No. 772-2013 given at the preliminary hearing at 13:15 hours on April 18, 2013), the truth is that it was necessary to do so to settle any doubt given the imprecision of the claim. Subsequently, regarding what was expressed in oral trial by the plaintiffs, who stated that their challenge refers to the defect of the administrative act issued one year late by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 at 14:30 hours on March 29, 2012, when reviewing the project called demolition of Punta Uva SA Tourist Center (Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA), submitted by the Executive Director of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), and according to which it was resolved to approve the Environmental Management Prognosis-Plan (Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental), and the demolition and final disposal project for the decommissioned Punta Uva SA Tourist Center, in compliance with resolution N° Nombre148435 of March 5, 1993, ratified by judgment N° 2254-2009 of October 13, 2009, of the Administrative Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), granting environmental feasibility (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental), it is sufficient to reiterate what is indicated in judgment N°00032311-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber, already cited, in its recital (considerando) VI: "(...) This judgment became final after both the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the plaintiffs here was declared without merit through judgment no. 401-F-S1-2010 at 14 hours 45 minutes on March 25, and the motion for addition and clarification (gestión de adición y aclaración) in order number 1564 at 9 hours 50 minutes on December 23, both of the year 2010, were resolved. It is that judicial decision that will ultimately be executed—numerals 155, 156, 173, and 174 CPCA—not the challenged administrative act, which, it is insisted, represents the beginning of the administrative execution of resolution 89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, but is not carried out in practice. The enforcement judgment is what prevails. That is, the Public Administration (in this case MINAET and SINAC), will execute the aforementioned administrative resolution—89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM—in accordance with the terms indicated by the judicial authority, not according to official communication DM-1784-2009. In this sense, everything carried out by the Public Administration before judgment 2254-2009, including the challenged act, must be considered as mere background. Ergo, nothing will be achieved by processing this proceeding if, ultimately, the contested act will not be executed." Therefore, the administrative act issued by Nombre3456, one year late—according to the plaintiffs—is irrelevant to cause a defect in what interests them, that is, the demolition of the claimed work, as it involves background or complementary provisions (even later ones, to conclude the remaining field work), which do not undermine the jurisdictional decision that was finally executed, in addition to the fact that this administrative action regulates environmental details surrounding the demolition, regarding which there is no legal link (vínculo jurídico) between that decision and the claims put forth by the plaintiffs in the present trial. For the reasons stated, it is an act (in this case, administrative) not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación), as it does not possess its own effect, nor does the issuance of an administrative act that could cause state, to the detriment of the subjective rights or the own and current interests of the plaintiffs, depend on it; it is limited to the authorization of a plan related to the destruction of the remaining infrastructure. In this way, by means of res judicata (cosa juzgada) as well as that of acts not subject to challenge (actos no susceptibles de impugnación), it is impossible to make a statement regarding "the defects in the acts" which transform—according to the interested parties—the demolition of the infrastructure into irregular, according to the claim's thesis. Therefore, the demolition is not irregular (understood as synonymous with illegal) and the first claim is discarded.

VI.- LACK OF ACTIVE STANDING TO SUE (FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM ACTIVA). In reference to the second claim, having discarded—by definition—the liability of the State-as-Judge (Estado-Juez) and its auxiliary bodies for normal functioning of the jurisdictional function, as has been explained above, the objective liability of the Administration (Executive Branch) for normal or abnormal functioning, in the terms of arts. 190 et seq. LGAP, is also inapplicable and dismissed, since its officials, when demolishing the mentioned infrastructure, merely complied with a final judicial decision. Therefore, the only thing remaining is to review the liability of the State for abnormal functioning of its officials in the exercise of jurisdictional activity, which has been extensively commented on above, to understand that the Constitution refers to ordinary law to establish the circumstances under which such objective imputation is possible (precept 166 of the Magna Carta: "Regarding what is not provided for by this Constitution, the law shall indicate the jurisdiction, the number and duration of the courts, as well as their powers, the principles to which they must adjust their actions, and the manner of demanding liability from them"). From there we can affirm that there is a forum of exclusion of objective state liability—referring to the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) in the exercise of the jurisdictional function—with the exception of criminal matters (where the liability of the State-as-Judge does apply, by provision of law, arts. 271 and 419 CPP), the general rule being subjective liability (that of the Judge) and prior existence of a fault (falta) (arts. 85 et seq. CPC). In that context, the demolition ordered by the Enforcement Judge and confirmed by the First Chamber makes the judicial action legitimate, therefore, it excludes subjective liability as there is no fault, and objective liability is improper because it is inapplicable, both in normal and abnormal (fault) functioning, as stated. This means that there is no cause to sue the State by demanding objective liability, not only because of the legal obstacle concerning the Judicial Branch in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, but also because for purposes of subjective liability, it has not been demonstrated that a fault—personally—attributable to the judges (those of the Tribunal and those of the First Chamber) has been previously declared, who furthermore were not sued in that capacity in the current proceeding, so the object of the sub litem was never to prove that individual liability, nor would this be the proper avenue, being in the presence of final judgments with the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), not annulled through an extraordinary review appeal (recurso extraordinario de revisión). Nor can it be established that the demolition was illegitimate, this time at the hands of the Executive Branch officials who carried out that action, because they acted compelled by a jurisdictional decision and as members of the forces representing the police power (poder de policía) (generic concept) to which the Judge must resort to execute their resolutions (precept 153 of the Constitution). From the viewpoint of the exception analyzed, in its active modality, there is no administrative conduct separate from the judicial decision (as long as it remains within the canons of normal functioning), and therefore, the cause to sue the State understood as the Executive Branch (Public Administration), for the purposes of the liability regime provided in articles 190 et seq. LGAP, is impertinent, because it does not apply to judicial activity regarding the execution of a Judge's judgment, since the mandate that the police power carried out in the sub júdice was of a jurisdictional nature and not an administrative action of its own volition. This implies that the party cannot base its petition on that foundation (a law that regulates administrative conduct, but not judicial conduct) given the absence of a link between the factual circumstance and the legal norm. It is not a lack of right, but the absolute lack of a connection between the relevant conduct and the normative justification that supports liability. We have already said, of course, that if the Administration's action exceeds the parameters or limits of the judicial decision, it may generate the objective liability provided for in that law, chargeable to the State (Executive Branch), but this is not the case, as such a thing was not raised, alleged, or demonstrated.

VII.- RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA). Finally, the compensation claimed in the third claim and the fifth claim does not depend on "the irregularity in the execution of the demolition, due to the defects" claimed and already resolved. Its context is very specific and seeks a ruling on the merits, as the plaintiff corporation has striven to justify that the works that existed before the granting of the use permit issued by the competent Ministry could not be demolished, affirming that prior to it there was a maritime terrestrial zone concession (concesión de zona marítimo terrestre) issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, and that when the order to "return things to the state they were in before that Ministerial authorization"—later revoked—was executed, those works erected under the protection of the Municipal concession could not be destroyed, because they were built prior to the use permit from the indicated Ministry. For this reason, it claims the State's obligation to compensate the value of those constructions, basing itself—repeatedly and as the sole legal element—on the fact that the municipal concession was in force when constructing those buildings. The Tribunal understands the proponent's point of view, however, it disagrees on the utility of the distinction it has tried to assert, since that difference is irrelevant because there are jurisprudential precedents that apply to the specific case. Precisely on this point, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), N°285-F-04 at 11:30 hours on April 28, 2004, declared without merit the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA against the judgment of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) N°286-2003 at 10:50 hours on July 23, 2003, which ordered: "The appealed judgment is revoked insofar as it orders payment in favor of the plaintiff for damages consisting of the constructions carried out, and instead the exception of lack of right on this point is admitted; also regarding the acquittal of costs, and instead the plaintiff is ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. In all other respects, it is confirmed.", leaving absolute clarity that any compensatory claim related to damages and losses consisting of the constructions was denied. For the current Tribunal now hearing this matter, that pronouncement prevents issuing a new one that would imply—undoubtedly—reviewing what has already been finally decided, especially considering that the distinction the plaintiff wishes to be recognized (time lapse between the municipal authorization and the ministerial one), lacks importance because that type of infrastructure could not be erected based on the concession contract signed by the Municipal Executive, as it involves a property included in an area declared protected, with the effects of law, given that the constitution of a Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre) implied stripping the respective Municipality of its character as the granting Administration, which, under other circumstances, would have issued a valid and effective concession, had the exception provided in article 73 of Law N° 6043 (LZMT) not applied. It would be different if it had been demonstrated that the execution of the final administrative act ordered by a Judge of the Republic entailed the demolition of constructions that were not affected by the judicial decision we have referred to; or alternatively, that the proceeding was directed at reviewing the possible liability of the Municipal Administration for granting the plaintiff corporation the use of a property, on which it erected a structure legitimately trusting that from that public action, a subjective right existed in its favor. But the foregoing has not been raised in that manner, as it was not demonstrated that any of the demolished works were outside the area belonging to the Refuge of interest, nor was the objective liability of the Administration that granted a maritime terrestrial zone concession claimed, despite it being a protection area that excluded municipal jurisdiction by law (art. 73 LZMT). This being the case, the claim sub exámine is a reiteration of the compensation that was already denied at the time, and the fact that the legal premise was attempted to be alleged as a novel argument, claiming the value of the infrastructure erected during the period that elapsed between the granting of the municipal concession for use of the maritime terrestrial zone, and the Ministerial use permit that was subsequently revoked, the truth is that the factual basis and the jurisprudential precedent of the specific case have not changed; it involves the same constructions carried out in an area declared a Wildlife Refuge prior to the date on which the Municipality of the place issued the "use permit" to the interested corporation, and the arguments we now hear contribute nothing new, since there is no change whatsoever regarding that definitive fact. Let us remember that precept 129 of the Constitution provides that acts and agreements contrary to prohibitory laws shall be null, if the same laws do not provide otherwise, and article 73 LZMT is prohibitory in nature, because it expressly says that "This law does not apply to maritime terrestrial zones, included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation." In that context, it is understood that the pronouncement contained in the judgments indicated previously reaches the indemnification issue relating to all the demolished constructions, regardless of "the validity" of the maritime terrestrial zone concession issued by the Municipality of Talamanca, because the basis of the jurisdictional decision—which has authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material)—expressly stated that the plaintiff corporation lacked a protectable compensatory right, having incurred in the violation of articles 13 LZMT and 195 LGAP, which prevents us from reviewing that decision again, in the manner intended by the plaintiff corporation.

VIII.- CONCLUSION AND COSTS (CONCLUSIÓN Y COSTAS). For what has been extensively set forth, the exception of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) is sustained concerning the plaintiff Nombre148432 , declaring the lawsuit inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth claims. The exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is sustained concerning COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the declaration of defects in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009.

We accept the exception of non-appealable acts (actos no susceptibles de impugnación), with respect to judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on 13 October 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), as well as the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), No. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on 25 March 2010; this latter exception also covering the interlocutory administrative act issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on 29 March 2012. The res judicata (cosa juzgada) also extends to the matter of compensation claimed by the plaintiff company; consequently, the inadmissibility of the first, third, and fifth claims (pretensiones primera, tercera y quinta) is declared, insofar as they concern the legal entity. We accept the exception of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa), regarding the second claim (segunda pretensión). We omit ruling on the unresolved exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right as unnecessary. Since there is no merit for exoneration, both costs are borne by the co-defendants, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the time of its determination in execution of judgment and until its effective payment.

POR TANTO

We accept the exception of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) concerning the plaintiff Nombre148432, declaring the lawsuit inadmissible, particularly the fourth and fifth claims. We accept the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) concerning COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, regarding the declaration of defects in the acts, in reference to administrative resolutions No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. Placa29676 MIRENEM, No. DM-1784-2009. We accept the exception of non-appealable acts (actos no susceptibles de impugnación), with respect to judgment No. 2254-09 of 09:30 hours on 13 October 2009, issued by Enforcement Judge Lorena Montes de Oca, of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), as well as the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), No. 401-F-S1-2010 of 14:45 hours on 25 March 2010; this latter exception also covering the interlocutory administrative act issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), through resolution No. 0942-2012 Nombre3456 of 14:30 hours on 29 March 2012. The res judicata (cosa juzgada) also extends to the matter of compensation claimed by the plaintiff company; consequently, the inadmissibility of the first, third, and fifth claims involving the legal entity is declared. Regarding said company, the exception of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa), linked to the second claim, is also accepted. We omit ruling on the exceptions of lack of interest and lack of right as unnecessary. Since there is no merit for exoneration, both costs are borne by the plaintiffs, who are jointly and severally liable, and must pay the respective interest from the time of its determination in execution of judgment and until its effective payment. NOTIFY.

Nombre145617 Nombre18366 Rosa Cortés Morales 3

Proceso de conocimiento CED115485 Actor/ Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA y Nombre148432 Demandado/ El Estado y Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación Nº 33- 2014 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN OCTAVA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, GOICOECHEA, a las diez de la mañana del veintiocho de abril del año dos mil catorce .- Proceso de conocimiento interpuesto por COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, cédula de persona jurídica CED115486, representada por Nombre75056 , portador de la cédula de identidad número CED27349, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial, y Nombre148432 , portadora de la cédula de residencia CED115487, contra el ESTADO, representado por Nombre79839 , en su condición de Procurador Adjunto, y el SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, quien apersonó a Nombre148433 , portador de la cédula de identidad número CED89816, en su calidad de apoderado especial judicial.

RESULTANDO

1.- El objeto del presente proceso, fijado en audiencia preliminar, es para que se declare: "1) Que el derribo realizado del Hotel Las Palmas en fecha 26 de julio de 2011, fue irregular por vicios en los actos; 2) Que en función de lo anterior, el Estado costarricense es responsable por la demolición ilegítima del Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) Que se condene al Estado al pago del daño material el cual corresponde al valor del Hotel construido desde que se otorgó la concesión y hasta que se emitió el permiso de uso anulado; 4) Que se condene al Estado al pago del daño moral o sufrido por la Sra. Nombre148432. el cual se estima en la suma de cincuenta millones de colones; 5) Que se condene al Estado al pago de los perjuicios que mediante su actuación ilegítima causó a la empresa que represento y a la señora Nombre148432 ; 6) Que se condene en ambas costas al Estado costarricense." (acta de audiencia preliminar y escrito de la demanda).- 2.- La representación del Estado se opuso a la demanda, solicitando se declare sin lugar, alegó en su defensa las excepciones no resueltas de cosa juzgada, falta de interés actual, falta de legitimación activa y la falta de derecho, con condena en costas para la parte actora, así como los intereses respectivos. En cuanto a la excepción de cosa juzgada y acto no susceptible de impugnación, fueron rechazadas por el Juez de la audiencia preliminar en sentencia oral N° 772-2013 dictada en la audiencia preliminar de 13:15 horas de 18 de abril de 1013 (acta de audiencia preliminar y contestación de la demanda).- 3.- El SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN (SINAC) fue declarado rebelde (folio 130 expediente judicial) 4.- En el contradictorio se recibió la declaración testimonial de Nombre148432 y Nombre148434 (video de juicio oral).- 5.- En los procedimientos se cumplieron los requisitos de ley y no se observan vicios susceptibles de producir nulidad o indefensión de las partes. 6.- Previa deliberación, POR UNANIMIDAD , se dicta y se notifica esta sentencia, dentro del plazo dispuesto por el artículo 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- -Redacta el Dr. Nombre145617 -

CONSIDERANDO:

I- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS: Tiene sustento probatorio el siguiente cuadro fáctico: 1) La Municipalidad de Talamanca, mediante el informe de inspección de fecha 25 de enero de 1989, paralizó la construcción en la zona marítimo terrestre de Punta Uva, llevaba a cabo por Nombre66716 , sin autorización (Folio 03 del expediente identificado N°1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 2) En sesión ordinaria N° 157 del Concejo Municipal de Talamanca, celebrada el 7 de junio de 1989, se tomó el acuerdo de aprobar el permiso de construcción a nombre del COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, según planos adjuntos (Folio 26 del expediente identificado N° 1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 3) La Municipalidad de Talamanca, mediante el informe de inspección de fecha 13 de setiembre de 1989, previno al COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA por la construcción ya edificada, sin pago del impuesto de construcciones, debiendo la suma de ¢133.244,35 (Folio 32 del expediente identificado N° 1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 4) La empresa COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA pagó a la Municipalidad de Talamanca la suma de ¢133.244,35, en fecha 18 de diciembre de 1989, por concepto de impuesto de construcción (Folios 35 al 36 del expediente identificado N°1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 5) La Gerencia del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, mediante el oficio N° DST-264-023 de 9 de febrero de 1990, aprobó las tarifas por concepto de alojamiento, presentadas por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, aplicable a las habitaciones 1-2-3-4 que se encontraban en Cahuita, Punta Uva, Limón (Folios 39 al 40 del expediente identificado N°1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 6) El Ejecutivo Municipal de la Municipalidad de Talamanca y el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, a las 14:00 horas del 21 de febrero de 1990, con base en la Ley N° 6043 suscribieron un contrato de concesión en zona marítimo terrestre a partir del cual la corporación territorial le otorgó a dicha sociedad, una parcela ubicada en Punta Uva, Distrito Sixaola, Cantón de Talamanca, Provincia de Limón, por un plazo de 20 años, con un área de 4 hectáreas con 681.60 metros cuadrados, plano catastrado N° L-841259-89 de 8 de noviembre de 1989, para uso turístico, según el permiso de uso otorgado por el Concejo Municipal de Talamanca, acuerdo n-0.c.n 4757 de 19 de abril de 1989 (Folios 41 al 43 y 70 del expediente identificado N° 1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 7) En el oficio N° PRO-260-90 de 12 de marzo de 1990 el Departamento de Proyectos del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo resolvió la solicitud planteada por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, en torno al hotel de playa, aprobando la fase de anteproyecto para continuar con la elaboración de los planos constructivos, el visado de la Oficina Centralizadora de Permisos para la Construcción y el permiso definitivo de la Municipalidad respectiva, haciendo la advertencia de que "por estar ubicado en los límites del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, antes de la tramitación de planos constructivos debe obtenerse el visto bueno de la institución de la que depende dicho refugio, es decir, del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas" (Folios 44 al 45 del expediente identificado N°1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 8) El día 16 de julio del año 1991 el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA pagó la suma de ¢45.539,75 por concepto de impuesto de construcciones para edificios APART. TIPO III, para un área de 144 metros cuadrados (Folios 56 del expediente identificado N°1 certificado por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 9) En la resolución N° 351-90-MIRENEM, de 9:13 horas de 17 de junio de 1990, el Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas y la Dirección de Vida Silvestre, otorgaron al COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA un permiso de uso de un área ubicada en Punta Uva, Distrito Sixaola, Cantón de Talamanca, Provincia de Limón, con una cabida de 4 hectáreas con 681.60 metros cuadrados, que se encuentra dentro de los 150 metros de la zona marítimo terrestre del Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo creado por el D.E. 206 de 29 de octubre de 1985 (Folios 42 al 45 del expediente identificado N° 2, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 10) Mediante la sentencia N° 2254-09 de 09:30 horas de 13 de octubre de 2009, la Jueza Ejecutora Lorena Montes de Oca, del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolvió: "POR TANTO.- De conformidad con el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política y 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y por su propia naturaleza de ente fiscalizador, le asiste legitimación activa a la Contraloría General de la República para exigir del SINAC y el MINAET la ejecución forzosa del acto administrativo firme y favorable emitido por este último desde el año 93, número Nombre148435 de 5-3-93, mediante el cual se resolvió la revocación del permiso de uso número 351-90 a Complejo Turístico Punta Uva SA, cuya validez se confirmó con la resolución del recurso de casación, emitida por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, número 285-F-04 de 11:30 hrs de 28-4-04, debidamente notificada a todas las partes que intervinieron en dicho proceso y que se traduce en el desalojo de todos los ocupantes de la zona en el terreno de 4 hás 681,66 m2, según el plano catastrado Placa29675. Se ordena la ejecución forzosa de dicho acto administrativo, repito N° 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, para lo cual se admite la propuesta presentada por el SINAC para su realización, concretamente entre el 3 y 6 de noviembre próximo entrante. (...) Efectuado el desalojo deberán proceder los órganos responsables a devolver las cosas al estado en que se encontraban antes de concederse el permiso de uso revocado, lo que incluye el derribo de aquella infraestructura que irrumpa en la zona protegida y recuperada finalmente, para lo cual dentro del informe del SINAC deberá incluirse la propuesta y cronograma respectivos.", decisión de la Jueza Ejecutora que fue confirmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en resolución 401-F-S1-2010 de 14:45 horas de 25 de marzo de 2010 (Folios 001 al 004 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Estado, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 11) Mediante la resolución de 9:00 horas de 9 de junio de 2011, la Jueza Ejecutora Cristina Víquez Cerdas, del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolvió: "Firme la sentencia número 2254-09 de las nueve horas cuarenta y seis minutos del trece de octubre de dos mil nueve, emitida por la Jueza Ejecutora Lorena Montes de Oca Monge, en que se ordenó la ejecución forzosa de acto administrativo N° Nombre148435, y que se traduce en el desalojo de todos los ocupantes de la zona en el terreno de 4 hectáreas 681,66 metros cuadrados, según el plano catastrado L841259-89, procédase a su ejecución en los mismos términos y condiciones ahí establecidos. Para la realización de la ejecución forzosa de dicho acto administrativo, se fija del 19 al 22 de julio de 2011" (Folios 005 al 006 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Estado, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 12) El desalojo y la demolición de las obras inició el día 26 de julio y concluyó con un cierre operativo el día 1 de agosto, ambos del año 2011, evento en el cual estuvo presente la señora Nombre148432 , quien debió desocupar y abandonar las instalaciones del Hotel Las Palmas (Folios 272 al 289 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Estado, admitido en audiencia preliminar y declaración de Nombre148432 , rendida en juicio oral); 13) La Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, mediante la resolución N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 de 14:30 horas de 29 de marzo de 2012 conoció del proyecto denominado demolición Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, presentado por la Directora Ejecutiva del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, y tomando en cuenta que al 15 de diciembre de 2011 la infraestructura del Hotel Las Palmas se encontraba destruido en un 80%, se debía demoler todas las obras existentes, dejando el terreno limpio, por lo que resolvió aprobar el Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental, y el proyecto de demolición y disposición final del deshabilitado Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, en acato de la resolución N° Nombre148435 de 5 de marzo de 1993, ratificada por la sentencia N° 2254-2009 de 13 de octubre de 2009 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, otorgando la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental (Folios 371 al 380 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Estado, admitido en audiencia preliminar); 14) La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia N°285-F-04 de 11:30 horas de 28 de abril de 2004, declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA contra la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N°286-2003 de las 10:50 horas del 23 de julio del 2003, que dispuso: “Se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada en cuanto ordena pagar a favor de la accionante daños y perjuicios consistentes en las construcciones realizadas, para en su lugar admitir la excepción de falta de derecho sobre este extremo; también en cuanto a la absolución en costas, para en su lugar condenar al pago de las procesales y personales a la actora. En lo demás se confirma.”, en referencia a la sentencia del Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N° 178-2002, de las 7:30 del 26 de febrero del 2002, que originalmente había dispuesto: "Como prueba complementaria para mejor proveer, se admiten las fotocopias certificadas notarialmente presentadas por parte actora en escrito recibido el 12 de mayo de 1999 (folios 615 a 681).- Se admite la excepción de falta de derecho, respecto de los extremos identificados con las letras a) y b) de la petitoria, los cuales se deniegan; en lo demás, se rechaza la de falta de interés actual.- Se condena al ESTADO, a pagar a favor de COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, daños y perjuicios.- La reparación comprenderá todas aquellas construcciones realizadas conforme a los planos constructivos presentados y aprobados por las autoridades administrativas competentes, que sean anteriores a la fecha de interposición y notificación de esta demanda; se excluyen las obras emprendidas y construcciones levantadas fuera del área del permiso concedido, y las que sean posteriores a la fecha relacionada, todo lo cual se determinará en la fase de ejecución de este fallo. Con auxilio pericial. No hay condena en costas personales y procesales.", cuyo origen era la pretensión del COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA establecida en el expediente N°01-001043-638-CI, cuya cuantía se fijó como inestimable, a fin de que en sentencia se declarara: "a-) Absolutamente NULA, y por ende ineficaz, la resolución No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del cinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se cancela en forma inconstitucional e ilegal, la autorización de uso concedida por resolución número 351-90MIRENEM, de las nueve horas del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa. B-) Absolutamente NULA, y por ende ineficaz, la resolución No. 216-93 MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del dieciocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se confirma la resolución No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM. IGUALMENTE, pido que se condene al Estado a: 1-) Al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas, tanto en sede administrativa, como en la vía judicial.- 2-) Al pago de la totalidad de daños y perjuicios que se llegaren a ocasionar a mi representada, ante un eventual cierre y derribo del Hotel Las Palmas." (Hecho evidente y notorio, no controvertido por las partes y así admitido en juicio oral); 15) La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia N°32311-F-S1-2011 de 09:50 horas de 31 de marzo de 2011, declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA y otros contra la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N°2220-2010 de las 09:47 horas de 10 de junio del 2010, que dispuso la inadmisibilidad del proceso tramitado en el expediente N° 10-001470-1027-CA, y cuya pretensión era declarar la nulidad absoluta de la resolución administrativa N° DM-1784-2009 de 05 de octubre de 2009 dictada por el MINAET, a través del cual se ordenó el desalojo y demolición del Hotel Las Palmas (Hecho evidente y notorio, no controvertido por las partes y así admitido en juicio oral) II.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: 1) Que exista alguna conducta administrativa formal o material, normal o anormal, cuyos efectos individualizados hayan estado dirigidos contra la actora Nombre148432 , en razón de algún vínculo preexistente con los codemandados, o aún en su ausencia, y que causara un daño o perjuicio en nexo causal; 2) Que las construcciones cuya demolición se realizó y que reclama el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, estuvieran ubicadas fuera de la zona marítimo terrestre comprendida en el Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo creado por el D.E. 206 de 29 de octubre de 1985; 3) Que la demolición ordenada en sede judicial y ejecutada por el poder de policía estatal, haya desbordado la autorización emitida por la Jueza respectiva, o incurriera en una actuación anormal.

III.- EXCEPCIONES. FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM ACTIVA. ACTORA Nombre148432 : El Tribunal considera relevante resolver la excepción de falta de legitimación activa, en lo que concierne a la demandante, persona física, por cuanto este aspecto permite dilucidar la suerte de la pretensión resarcitoria (daño moral), en conjunto con el resto de las pretensiones también reclamadas por ella. En este orden de cosas debemos indicar que la actuación administrativa, según el elenco de hechos probados, nacida desde el otorgamiento de la concesión de uso de la zona marítimo terrestre (por parte de la Municipalidad de Talamanca y posteriormente del Ministerio competente), hasta la emisión de la sentencia judicial que acordó la ejecución de un acto administrativo firme, no dirigió sus efectos ni involucró de forma alguna a la accionante, en su condición personal. De hecho, no hay manifestación de voluntad que la alcance en forma individual y específica, en tal sentido. Por eso el alegato en torno "a la irregularidad del derribo del Hotel Las Palmas por vicios en los actos", y cualquier pretensión alrededor de ese reclamo, no vincula a la actora, sino únicamente a la sociedad que sufrió la consecuencia del evento. Para efectos del daño moral subjetivo, cierto es que la actora fue desalojada del referido Hotel, según ella misma relató en su declaración, al ejecutarse la orden judicial, pero tal cosa ocurrió por tratarse de una ocupante, y no porque existiera una decisión de expulsar específicamente a la señora Nombre148432 , sino que debía retirarse a cualquier individuo que estuviera en esas instalaciones. Además no está acreditado que la accionante sufriera un daño directo y personal, derivado del desalojo ordenado por una decisión judicial, el cual pudiera reputarse como resultado de una conducta anormal, hipótesis en la cual podría exigirse la respectiva responsabilidad. Mucho menos podría indemnizarse el daño reclamado, si se enfoca como derivado de una conducta normal, en este caso del Poder Judicial, que fue quien ordenó el desalojo, en ejercicio de sus competencias constitucionales y legales, pues no es posible atribuirle esa responsabilidad al Estado-Juez, ni al Estado por la actuación normal de los órganos auxiliares de la función jurisdiccional, al no estar contemplada esta opción en la ley, en la forma que mandan los preceptos 9, 41, 154 y 166 Constitucionales. Además deviene inaplicable el régimen previsto en los artículos 190 ss LGAP, por cuanto éstos regulan la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado derivada del ejercicio de la función administrativa, siendo impensable aplicar ese régimen a la función jurisdiccional, por obvias razones relacionadas con la división de funciones derivadas de la Carta Magna, y además porque la Constitución remite expresamente a la ley como única fuente para imponer o regular la responsabilidad del Poder Judicial, por ende la del Estado, derivada del ejercicio de la competencia que para solucionar los conflictos entre las partes, que manda la Norma Fundamental. De manera que existe una evidente falta de legitimación ad causan activa, que impide que la actora reclame "los vicios relacionados con el derribo de Hotel Las Palmas", ni tampoco un daño moral cuya causa no se acreditó que existiera, a partir de una lesión derivada de un funcionamiento anormal; siendo absolutamente improcedente concederlo, en la tesis del funcionamiento normal del Estado-Juez o del Estado por la actuación de los órganos auxiliares de la función jurisdiccional, y mucho menos atendiendo la regulación de la LGAP que sólo aplica a la responsabilidad objetiva por función administrativa. En síntesis, la decisión de la Jueza Ejecutora, al disponer el desalojo acordado en un acto firme que emitió un órgano ministerial, no transmuta esa orden en una suerte de actuación administrativa, ni tampoco puede entenderse que la Administración haya actuado "en mano propia", sino que simplemente se limitó a cumplir lo encomendado por la autoridad judicial (no obstante lo sui géneris de este curioso proceso de ejecución de un acto administrativo firme y desfavorable para el administrado versus el principio de autotutela), de manera que la imputación de responsabilidad recaería en el Poder Judicial, a quien (en cabeza del Estado) no le corresponde indemnizar en forma objetiva por su funcionamiento normal (de índole jurisdiccional o de los auxiliares de esa actividad), ni por el funcionamiento anormal de sus funcionarios al ejercer el mandato constitucional que justifica su existencia, a no ser que la ley ordinaria así lo prevea (como sí es el caso del proceso penal), al tratarse de un ámbito de responsabilidad no autorizado por la legislación ordinaria (un reducto de salvaguardia: ver además la sentencia de esta Sección del Tribunal, Nº 011-2014 de las 11 horas del 6 de febrero del año dos mil catorce y la sentencia oral N° 23-2013 de 8:15 horas del 1 de abril del 2013).

IV.- EXCEPCIONES. ACTORA COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA: Para resolver las excepciones opuestas, en referencia directa a las pretensiones de la empresa COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, analizando el tema según el orden de lo pedido, es necesario enmarcar el contexto de la litis en su dimensión real, y así no perder de vista si el presente asunto involucra alguna particularidad que anteriormente no hubiese sido resuelta en la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa. Resulta innegable observar que el planteamiento de la sociedad actora reviste de cierta complejidad para su correcto entendimiento, ya que en esencia reclama "1) Que el derribo realizado del Hotel Las Palmas en fecha 26 de julio de 2011, fue irregular por vicios en los actos; 2) Que en función de lo anterior, el Estado costarricense es responsable por la demolición ilegítima del Hotel Las Palmas SA; 3) Que se condene al Estado al pago del daño material el cual corresponde al valor del Hotel construido desde que se otorgó la concesión y hasta que se emitió el permiso de uso anulado". Esta forma de pedir un pronunciamiento -el nuestro- que produciría el efecto de cosa juzgada material, en torno a esos temas, enfrenta las siguientes dificultades: a) Se busca una manifestación expresa judicial que indique que el derribo fue irregular "por vicios en los actos", sin individualizar a cuales actos se refiere; b) Se exige la responsabilidad del Estado por una demolición ilegítima, sin especificar si es la del Estado-Juez (referida a la actividad procesal jurisdiccional), la de los órganos auxiliares de la función (entiéndase la actividad procesal no jurisdiccional, la que, nota al margen, jamás debe confundirse con el ejercicio de la función administrativa excepcional del Poder Judicial en áreas como la contratación administrativa, empleo público, etc), así como tampoco la demanda aclara si reclama la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado (Poder Ejecutivo) por ejercicio de la función administrativa (arts. 190 ss LGAP); c) Se pide una indemnización por el derribo de obras que existían antes del otorgamiento del permiso de uso extendido por el Ministerio competente, alegando que previo a la intervención del Poder Ejecutivo centralizado, existía una concesión de zona marítimo terrestre expedida por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, y que al ejecutarse la orden de "devolver las cosas al estado que se encontraban antes de esa autorización Ministerial" -luego revocada-, no se podía derribar aquellas obras levantadas al amparo de la concesión Municipal, y que ocurrieron anticipadamente al permiso de uso del Ministerio indicado. En su defecto -reclama- que era obligación del Estado indemnizar el valor de esas construcciones, basándose para ello, en que la concesión municipal estaba vigente. Sobre estos aspectos resolveremos de inmediato. COSA JUZGADA MATERIAL.- A efectos de resolver la primera pretensión, vemos que la poca claridad de la parte actora en cuanto a los vicios en los actos, y cuáles de ellos se cuestionan, obliga al Tribunal a retomar una consideración de carácter general. Si bien en el juicio oral los actores manifestaron que se trata de aquellos actos emitidos luego de que la Jueza Ejecutora del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo ordenó el derribo, como consecuencia de la ejecución de un acto administrativo firme, y que para ese fin ejemplificó el acto administrativo "tardío" que emitió la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, mediante la resolución N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 de 14:30 horas de 29 de marzo de 2012, lo cierto es que no podemos olvidar que la pretensión plasmada en la demanda no discrimina, así que sin remedio debemos referirnos a todos los elementos que tienen incidencia con la actuación del Estado al derribar la referida obra. Empezamos indicando que en el sub litem no se puede atacar los vicios de los actos administrativos cuya validez jurídica fue reconocida en un proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo. En tal sentido no podemos volver sobre los temas que quedaron resueltos por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia N°285-F-04 de 11:30 horas de 28 de abril de 2004, al declarar sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA contra la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N°286-2003 de las 10:50 horas del 23 de julio del 2003, que dispuso: “Se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada en cuanto ordena pagar a favor de la accionante daños y perjuicios consistentes en las construcciones realizadas, para en su lugar admitir la excepción de falta de derecho sobre este extremo; también en cuanto a la absolución en costas, para en su lugar condenar al pago de las procesales y personales a la actora. En lo demás se confirma.”, en referencia a la sentencia del Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N° 178-2002, de las 7:30 del 26 de febrero del 2002, que originalmente había dispuesto: "Como prueba complementaria para mejor proveer, se admiten las fotocopias certificadas notarialmente presentadas por parte actora en escrito recibido el 12 de mayo de 1999 (folios 615 a 681).- Se admite la excepción de falta de derecho, respecto de los extremos identificados con las letras a) y b) de la petitoria, los cuales se deniegan; en lo demás, se rechaza la de falta de interés actual.- Se condena al ESTADO, a pagar a favor de COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, daños y perjuicios.- La reparación comprenderá todas aquellas construcciones realizadas conforme a los planos constructivos presentados y aprobados por las autoridades administrativas competentes, que sean anteriores a la fecha de interposición y notificación de esta demanda; se excluyen las obras emprendidas y construcciones levantadas fuera del área del permiso concedido, y las que sean posteriores a la fecha relacionada, todo lo cual se determinará en la fase de ejecución de este fallo. Con auxilio pericial. No hay condena en costas personales y procesales.", cuyo origen era la pretensión del COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA establecida en el expediente N° 01-001043-638-CI, cuya cuantía se fijó como inestimable, a fin de que en sentencia se declarara: "a-) Absolutamente NULA, y por ende ineficaz, la resolución No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del cinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se cancela en forma inconstitucional e ilegal, la autorización de uso concedida por resolución número 351-90MIRENEM, de las nueve horas del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa. B-) Absolutamente NULA, y por ende ineficaz, la resolución No. 216-93 MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del dieciocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se confirma la resolución No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM. IGUALMENTE, pido que se condene al Estado a: 1-) Al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas, tanto en sede administrativa, como en la vía judicial.- 2-) Al pago de la totalidad de daños y perjuicios que se llegaren a ocasionar a mi representada, ante un eventual cierre y derribo del Hotel Las Palmas." De esta manera existe cosa juzgada material acerca de la validez de la resolución No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del cinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se revocó la autorización de uso concedida por resolución número 351-90MIRENEM, de las nueve horas del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa, así como tampoco podemos revisar lo dispuesto por la resolución No. 216-93 MIRENEM, de las ocho horas quince minutos del dieciocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, mediante la cual se confirmó la resolución No. 089-DGVS-MIRENEM. Lo mismo debe decirse en cuanto a lo resuelto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia N°32311-F-S1-2011 de 09:50 horas de 31 de marzo de 2011, en la cual declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA y otros contra la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N°2220-2010 de las 09:47 horas de 10 de junio del 2010, que dispuso la inadmisibilidad del proceso tramitado en el expediente N° 10-001470-1027-CA, y cuya pretensión era declarar la nulidad absoluta de la resolución administrativa N° DM-1784-2009 de 05 de octubre de 2009 dictada por el MINAET, misma que ordenó el desalojo y demolición del Hotel Las Palmas y de la que pedía se dispusiera su disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico, y se dejara sin efecto lo resuelto. En suma sobre los actos administrativos indicados No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009, existe cosa juzgada material, y no corresponde ventilar en el actual juicio, si contienen vicios, a menos que dichas sentencias sean anuladas en virtud de un recurso extraordinario de revisión, que anule el efecto que las caracteriza (arts. 619 ss CPC).

V.- ACTOS NO SUSCEPTIBLES DE IMPUGNACIÓN. En sentencia N° 2254-09 de 09:30 horas de 13 de octubre de 2009, la Jueza Ejecutora Lorena Montes de Oca, del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda ordenó -en esencia- la ejecución forzosa del acto administrativo firme número 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, decisión de dicha Jueza que fue confirmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en resolución 401-F-S1-2010 de 14:45 horas de 25 de marzo de 2010, y que se traduce -valoró la Jueza indicada- en el desalojo de todos los ocupantes de la zona en el terreno de 4 hás 681,66 m2, según el plano catastrado Placa29675. Efectuado el desalojo deberían los órganos responsables devolver las cosas al estado en que se encontraban antes de concederse el permiso de uso revocado, lo que incluye el derribo de aquella infraestructura que irrumpa en la zona protegida. A partir de esta decisión se desalojó y demolió la infraestructura, y ahora no es por la vía de un proceso de conocimiento como se puede declarar la "irregularidad de la demolición por vicios en los actos", ya que tratándose de una actuación jurisdiccional, ésta no es la vía (precepto 49 Constitucional, artículos 1 y 2 CPCA), pues no se trata de una conducta administrativa, sino de una resolución jurisdiccional. Tampoco -como hemos dicho- se está aquí ventilando una actuación anormal del Poder Judicial en ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, y menos se puede reconocer "la existencia de un vicio", aplicando la tesis del funcionamiento normal, por ser incompatibles, y en todo caso, en esa última hipótesis no se genera responsabilidad del Estado-Juez (actividad procesal jurisdiccional), de sus órganos auxiliares en ejercicio de esa función (actividad procesal no jurisdiccional), y ni siquiera la responsabilidad personal del juzgador, por las amplias razones jurídicas que ya hemos esbozado anteriormente (ver además la sentencia de esta Sección del Tribunal, Nº 011-2014 de las 11 horas del 6 de febrero del año dos mil catorce y la sentencia oral N° 23-2013 de 8:15 horas del 1 de abril del 2013). Siendo que el numeral 92 inciso 7) CPCA permite al Tribunal de juicio reexaminar esta defensa (al igual que la cosa juzgada, como en efecto se hizo), aunque hubiese sido desestimada por el Juez Tramitador (sentencia oral N° 772-2013 dictada en la audiencia preliminar de 13:15 horas de 18 de abril de 1013), lo cierto es que resultó necesario hacerlo para dejar zanjada cualquier duda ante la imprecisión de la pretensión. Luego, en cuanto a lo expresado en juicio oral por los actores, quienes manifestaron que su cuestionamiento se refiere al vicio del acto administrativo dictado un año tarde por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, mediante la resolución N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 de 14:30 horas de 29 de marzo de 2012, al conocer del proyecto denominado demolición Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, presentado por la Directora Ejecutiva del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, y según el cual se resolvió aprobar el Pronóstico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental, y el proyecto de demolición y disposición final del deshabilitado Centro Turístico Punta Uva SA, en acato de la resolución N° Nombre148435 de 5 de marzo de 1993, ratificada por la sentencia N° 2254-2009 de 13 de octubre de 2009 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, otorgando la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental, basta reiterar lo que indica la sentencia N°00032311-F-S1-2011 de la Sala Primera, ya citada, en su considerando VI: "(...) Esta sentencia adquirió firmeza luego de haberse declarado sin lugar tanto el recurso de casación interpuesto por las aquí actoras, mediante sentencia no. 401-F-S1-2010 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 25 de marzo, como la gestión de adición y aclaración en auto número 1564 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 23 de diciembre, ambos del año 2010. Es esa decisión judicial la que en definitiva se ejecutará -numerales 155, 156, 173 y 174 del CPCA-, no el acto administrativo impugnado, el cual, se insiste, representa el inicio de la ejecución administrativa de la resolución 89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, pero no se lleva a la práctica. La sentencia de ejecución es la que prima. Es decir, la Administración Pública (en este caso el MINAET y SINAC), ejecutará la susodicha resolución administrativa -89-93-DGVS-MIRENEM- de conformidad con los términos indicados por la autoridad judicial, no según el oficio DM-1784-2009. En este sentido, todo lo efectuado por la Administración Pública antes de la sentencia 2254-2009, incluido el acto impugnado, debe reputarse como meros antecedentes. Ergo, a nada se llegará con la tramitación de este proceso si, en definitiva, el acto combatido no será ejecutado". Entonces, el acto administrativo emitido por Nombre3456, un año tarde -al decir de los actores-, es irrelevante para causar un vicio en lo que les interesa, es decir, la demolición de la obra reclamada, pues se trata de antecedentes o disposiciones complementarias (incluso posteriores, para concluir las labores faltantes en el campo), que no enervan la decisión jurisdiccional finalmente ejecutada, además de que esa actuación administrativa regula detalles ambientales que giran en torno a la demolición, sobre los cuales no existe un vínculo jurídico entre esa decisión y las pretensiones esbozadas por los accionantes en el presente juicio. Por lo dicho se trata de un acto (en este caso administrativo) no susceptible de impugnación, pues no posee efecto propio y tampoco pende de él, la emisión de un acto administrativo que pueda causar estado, en perjuicio de los derechos subjetivos o los intereses propios y actuales de los demandantes, limitándose a la autorización de un plan que se relaciona con la destrucción de la infraestructura remanente. De esta manera, por la vía de la cosa juzgada así como la de los actos no susceptibles de impugnación, es imposible manifestarse en torno "a los vicios en los actos" que transforman -al decir de los interesados- en irregular el derribo de la infraestructura, según la tesis de la demanda. Por ende, el derribo no es irregular (entendido como sinónimo de ilegal) y queda descartada la primera pretensión.

VI.- FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM ACTIVA. En referencia a la segunda pretensión, quedando descartada -por definición- la responsabilidad del Estado-Juez y de sus órganos auxiliares por funcionamiento normal de la función jurisdiccional, como ha sido explicado ut supra, también resulta inatendible y desechada la responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración (Poder Ejecutivo) por funcionamiento normal o anormal, en los términos de los arts. 190 ss LGAP, por cuanto sus funcionarios, al derribar la infraestructura mencionada, se limitaron a acatar una decisión judicial firme. Entonces sólo queda revisar la responsabilidad del Estado por funcionamiento anormal de sus funcionarios en el ejercicio de la actividad jurisdiccional, misma que ha sido ampliamente comentada líneas atrás, para comprender que la Constitución remite a la ley ordinaria a fin de establecer los supuestos en que tal imputación objetiva es posible (precepto 166 de la Carta Magna: "En cuanto a lo que no esté previsto por esta Constitución, la ley señalará la jurisdicción, el número y la duración de los tribunales, así como sus atribuciones, los principios a los cuales deben ajustar sus actos y la manera de exigirles responsabilidad"). De allí que podemos afirmar que hay un fuero de exclusión de responsabilidad estatal de carácter objetivo -referido al Poder Judicial en ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional-, con la salvedad de la materia penal (en donde sí aplica la responsabilidad del Estado-Juez, por disposición de ley, arts. 271 y 419 CPP), siendo la regla general la responsabilidad de carácter subjetiva (la del Juez) y previa existencia de una falta (arts. 85 y ss CPC). En ese contexto la demolición ordenada por la Jueza Ejecutora y confirmada por la Sala Primera, torna en legítima la actuación judicial, por ende, excluye la responsabilidad subjetiva al no existir una falta, y es improcedente la objetiva por inaplicable, tanto en funcionamiento normal como el anormal (falta), según lo expuesto. Ello hace que no exista una causa para demandar al Estado exigiendo una responsabilidad objetiva, no sólo por el obstáculo jurídico en lo que se refiere al Poder Judicial en ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, sino porque para efectos de responsabilidad subjetiva, no se ha demostrado que previamente esté declarado que existe un falta -en lo personal- atribuible a los jueces (la del Tribunal y los de la Sala Primera), quienes además no fueron demandados en esa condición en el actual proceso, por lo que el objeto del sub litem nunca fue acreditar esa responsabilidad individual, ni tampoco sería ésta la vía, estando en presencia de sentencias firmes con autoridad de cosa juzgada material, no anuladas mediante un recurso extraordinario de revisión. Tampoco se puede establecer que la demolición fue ilegítima, esta vez en manos de los funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo que materializaron esa acción, pues éstos actuaron compelidos por una decisión jurisdiccional y como integrantes de las fuerzas que representan el poder de policía (concepto genérico) al cual debe acudir el Juez para ejecutar sus resoluciones (precepto 153 Constitucional). Desde el punto de vista de la excepción analizada, en su modalidad activa, no existe una conducta administrativa que sea ajena a la decisión judicial (mientras se mantenga en los cánones de funcionamiento normal), y por ende, la causa para demandar al Estado entendido como Poder Ejecutivo (Administración Pública), a los efectos del régimen de responsabilidad previsto en los artículos 190 ss LGAP, es impertinente, porque no aplica frente a la actividad judicial en lo que se refiere a la ejecución de la sentencia de una Jueza, porque el mandato que en el sub júdice cumplió el poder de policía fue de índole jurisdiccional y no una actuación administrativa por voluntad propia. Esto implica que la parte no puede fundar su petición sobre esa base (una ley que regula la conducta administrativa, más no la judicial) ante la ausencia de un vínculo entre el supuesto de hecho y la norma jurídica. No es una falta de derecho, sino la carencia absoluta de un ligamen entre la conducta relevante y la justificación normativa que sustenta la responsabilidad. Ya hemos dicho, por supuesto, que si la actuación de la Administración desborda los parámetros o límites de la decisión judicial, puede generar la responsabilidad objetiva prevista en esa ley, a cargo del Estado (Poder Ejecutivo), pero éste no es el caso, al no ventilarse, alegarse o demostrarse tal cosa.

VII.- COSA JUZGADA. Finalmente la indemnización que se reclama en la tercera pretensión y la quinta pretensión no pende de "la irregularidad en la ejecución de la demolición, a causa de los vicios" reclamados y ya resueltos. Su contexto es muy específico y busca un pronunciamiento de fondo, en tanto la sociedad actora se ha esforzado por justificar que no se podían derribar las obras que existían antes del otorgamiento del permiso de uso extendido por el Ministerio competente, afirmando que previo a ello existía una concesión de zona marítimo terrestre expedida por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, y que al ejecutarse la orden de "devolver las cosas al estado que se encontraban antes de esa autorización Ministerial" -luego revocada-, no se podía destruir aquellas obras levantadas al amparo de la concesión Municipal, porque se erigieron anticipadamente al permiso de uso del Ministerio indicado. Por esa razón reclama la obligación del Estado de indemnizar el valor de esas construcciones, basándose para ello -reiteradamente y como único elemento jurídico- en que la concesión municipal estaba vigente al realizar aquellas edificaciones. El Tribunal entiende el punto de vista de su proponente, sin embargo discrepa en la utilidad de la distinción que ha procurado hacer valer, ya que dicha diferencia es irrelevante porque existen antecedentes jurisprudenciales que aplican al caso en concreto. Precisamente sobre este punto la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N°285-F-04 de 11:30 horas de 28 de abril de 2004, declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA contra la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda N°286-2003 de las 10:50 horas del 23 de julio del 2003, que dispuso: “Se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada en cuanto ordena pagar a favor de la accionante daños y perjuicios consistentes en las construcciones realizadas, para en su lugar admitir la excepción de falta de derecho sobre este extremo; también en cuanto a la absolución en costas, para en su lugar condenar al pago de las procesales y personales a la actora. En lo demás se confirma.”, dejando absoluta claridad de que cualquier reclamo resarcitorio relacionado con los daños y perjuicios consistentes en las construcciones, quedaba denegado. Para el actual Tribunal que ahora conoce de este asunto, ese pronunciamiento impide verter uno nuevo que implique -sin duda alguna- revisar lo ya resuelto en firme, sobre todo teniendo en cuenta que la distinción que la parte actora desea que se reconozca (lapso temporal entre la autorización municipal y la ministerial), carece de importancia por cuanto esa clase de infraestructura no podía erigirse con base en el contrato de concesión suscrito por el Ejecutivo Municipal, al tratarse de un terreno comprendido en una zona declarada protegida, con los efectos de ley, siendo que la constitución de un Refugio de Vida Silvestre implicó despojar a la respectiva Municipalidad, de su carácter de Administración concedente, la que, en otras circunstancias, hubiese expedido una concesión válida y eficaz, de no haber aplicado la excepción prevista en el artículo 73 de la Ley N° 6043 (LZMT). Distinto sería que se hubiese demostrado que la ejecución del acto administrativo firme ordenada por un Juez de la República, conllevara el derribo de construcciones que no se encontraban afectados por la decisión judicial a que nos hemos referido; o en su defecto, que el proceso se dirigiera a revisar la eventual responsabilidad de la Administración Municipal al concederle a la sociedad actora el uso de un terreno, en el cual levantó una estructura confiando en forma legítima que a partir de aquella actuación pública, existía un derecho subjetivo a su favor. Pero lo anterior no ha sido ventilado de esa forma, pues no se demostró que alguna de las obras demolidas estuvieran fuera del área que pertenece al Refugio de interés, ni tampoco se ha reclamado la responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración que otorgó una concesión de zona marítimo terrestre, a pesar de tratarse de un área de protección que excluía ley la competencia municipal (art. 73 LZMT). Así las cosas, la pretensión sub exámine es una reiteración de la indemnización que ya fue rechazada en su oportunidad, y el hecho de que se intentó alegar el supuesto jurídico como un planteamiento novedoso, reclamando el valor de la infraestructura levantada durante el lapso que medió entre el otorgamiento de la concesión municipal de uso de la zona marítimo terrestre, y la del permiso de uso Ministerial que posteriormente fue revocado, lo cierto es que la base fáctica y el antecedente jurisprudencial del caso específico no ha variado, se trata de las mismas construcciones realizadas en un área declarada Refugio de Vida Silvestre con antelación a la fecha en la Municipalidad del lugar le extendiera a la sociedad interesada "el permiso de uso", y nada nuevo aporta los alegatos que ahora conocemos, pues no existe cambio alguno en torno a ese hecho definitivo. Recordemos que el precepto 129 Constitucional dispone que los actos y convenios contra leyes prohibitivas serán nulas, si las mismas leyes no disponen otra cosa, y el artículo 73 LZMT es de carácter prohibitivo, pues expresamente dice que "La presente ley no se aplica a las zonas marítimo terrestres, incluidas en los parques nacionales y reservas equivalentes, las cuales se regirán por la legislación respectiva". En ese contexto se entiende que el pronunciamiento contenido en las sentencias señaladas con anterioridad, alcanza el tema indemnizatorio relativo a todas las construcciones demolidas, independientemente de "la vigencia" de la concesión de zona marítimo terrestre expedida por la Municipalidad de Talamanca, pues el fundamento de la decisión jurisdiccional -que tiene autoridad de cosa juzgada material-, expresamente señaló que la sociedad actora carecía de un derecho resarcitorio amparable, por haber incurrido en la infracción de los artículos 13 LZMT y 195 LGAP, lo que impide que entremos a revisar nuevamente aquella decisión, en la forma como lo pretende la sociedad actora.

VIII.- CONCLUSIÓN Y COSTAS. Por lo que ha sido ampliamente expuesto, se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa en lo que concierne a la actora Nombre148432 , declarándose inadmisible la demanda, particularmente las pretensiones cuarta y quinta. Se acoge la excepción de cosa juzgada en lo que atañe a COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, en torno a la declaración de vicios en los actos, en referencia a las resoluciones administrativas No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. 216-93 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009. Se acoge la excepción de actos no susceptibles de impugnación, respecto de la sentencia N° 2254-09 de 09:30 horas de 13 de octubre de 2009, dictada por la Jueza Ejecutora Lorena Montes de Oca, del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, así como la resolución de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N° 401-F-S1-2010 de 14:45 horas de 25 de marzo de 2010; abarcando ésta última excepción también al acto administrativo de trámite emitido por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, mediante la resolución N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 de 14:30 horas de 29 de marzo de 2012. La cosa juzgada también alcanza lo relacionado a la indemnización reclamada por la sociedad actora, en consecuencia se declara la inadmisibilidad de las pretensiones primera, tercera y quinta, en lo que atañe a la persona jurídica. Se acoge la excepción de falta la falta de legitimación ad causam activa , en cuanto a la segunda pretensión. Se omite pronunciamiento respecto de las excepciones no resultas de falta de interés y falta de derecho por innecesario. Al no existir mérito para exonerar, ambas costas quedan a cargo los codemandados, quienes responden en forma solidaria, debiendo pagar los intereses respectivos a partir de su fijación en ejecución de sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago.

POR TANTO

Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa en lo que concierne a la actora Nombre148432 , declarándose inadmisible la demanda, particularmente las pretensiones cuarta y quinta. Se acoge la excepción de cosa juzgada en lo que atañe a COMPLEJO TURÍSTICO PUNTA UVA SA, en torno a la declaración de vicios en los actos, en referencia a las resoluciones administrativas No. 089-93-DGVS-MIRENEM, No. Placa29676 MIRENEM, N° DM-1784-2009. Se acoge la excepción de actos no susceptibles de impugnación, respecto de la sentencia N° 2254-09 de 09:30 horas de 13 de octubre de 2009, dictada por la Jueza Ejecutora Lorena Montes de Oca, del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, así como la resolución de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N° 401-F-S1-2010 de 14:45 horas de 25 de marzo de 2010; abarcando ésta última excepción también al acto administrativo de trámite emitido por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, mediante la resolución N° 0942-2012 Nombre3456 de 14:30 horas de 29 de marzo de 2012. La cosa juzgada también alcanza lo relacionado a la indemnización reclamada por la sociedad actora, en consecuencia se declara la inadmisibilidad de las pretensiones primera, tercera y quinta, que involucran a la persona jurídica. Respecto de dicha sociedad también se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, vinculada con la segunda pretensión. Por innecesario se omite pronunciamiento respecto de las excepciones de falta de interés y falta de derecho. Al no existir mérito para exonerar, ambas costas quedan a cargo de los actores, quienes responden en forma solidaria, debiendo pagar los intereses respectivos a partir de su fijación en ejecución de sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Nombre145617 Nombre18366 Rosa Cortés Morales 3