State liability for failure to install highway safety barriersResponsabilidad del Estado por omisión de barreras de seguridad vial

*090028671027CA* Res. 001039-F-S1-2013 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eight hours thirty-five minutes on the fourteenth of August two thousand thirteen.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court by Nombre229490, widow, homemaker, resident of Alajuela, in her dual capacity as plaintiff and as mother acting on behalf of the minors, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491; against the COMPAÑÍA NACIONAL DE FUERZA Y LUZ, represented by its general judicial attorney, Guillermo Sánchez Williams, the CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD, represented by its deputy executive director, Carlos Solís Murillo, business administrator, and the ESTADO, represented by the procurator, Luis Diego Flores Zúñiga, qualities and domicile not indicated. The PATRONATO NACIONAL DE LA INFANCIA was held as an intervenor, represented by its executive president, Nombre128173, divorced, psychologist. Appearing as beneficiaries of the damages requested are Nombre229492, homemaker, resident of Cartago, and Nombre229493, divorced, salesperson, resident of Cartago. Also appearing as special judicial attorneys are, for the plaintiff, Nombre23579, marital status not indicated; for the CNFL, Henry López Esquivel, Francisco Cabezas Murillo, Nombre229494, resident of Heredia; for the CONAVI, Nombre105421, divorced, resident of Alajuela, Nombre15051, resident of Heredia; and for the PANI, Nombre229495, marital status not indicated. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, and residents of San José.

RESULTANDO

1.- Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding, so that in judgment it be declared: "1. … the present Ordinary Proceeding is granted in all its terms. 2. That it be declared that the installation of posts that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out along Dirección13198 represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and the absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. 3. That it be declared that the omission in the oversight duties by the Nombre1220 and the Estado regarding the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of Dirección5540 by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, allowed the posts to be installed to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit under the best safety conditions, which they are obliged to guarantee by law. 4. That it be declared that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, the Nombre1220, and the Estado are jointly and severally liable for the damages caused as a consequence of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, and therefore must respond patrimonially, the former for placing posts with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on Dirección13198. The Nombre1220 and the Estado for their omission in their duty to oversee the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo. Specified in the provisional estimation of this claim. Consisting of: - For Damages: 194,610.432 One hundred ninety-four million six hundred ten thousand four hundred thirty-two colones. – For Subjective Moral Damages: 200,000.000 Two hundred million colones. – For Psychological Damages: 50,000.000 Fifty million colones. For a total of: 444,610.432 Four hundred forty-four million six hundred ten thousand four hundred thirty-two colones. 5. That the CONAVI, the Estado, and the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz be ordered to fulfill an obligation to perform, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the lighting posts of Dirección24741 (). 6. That the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz be ordered to fulfill an obligation to perform, consisting of ensuring that lighting posts along any highway must have flexible, breakaway, or frangible bases. In the event that this is not possible and a rigid base consisting of a concrete box must be set, it must install a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the lighting posts. 7. That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this proceeding." 2.- The attorneys of the defendant entities answered negatively. The CNFL raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing, and statute of limitations; the Nombre1220 raised the defenses of statute of limitations and lack of right; for his part, the state representative raised the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of interest, and lack of right.

3.- Mr. Flores Zúñiga expressed the refusal to conciliate, so said procedure was dispensed with.

4.- At 13 hours 30 minutes on May 31, 2010, the preliminary hearing began, at which time the representatives of both parties took the floor.

5.- The Administrative Contentious Court, Fourth Section, composed of Judges Ileana Sánchez Navarro and Lilliana Quesada Corella and Judge Julio Cordero Mora, in judgment no. 346-2011 at 14 hours 50 minutes on September 13, 2011, resolved: "The new facts proposed by the Estado during the preliminary hearing are declared inadmissible. The defense of lack of right raised by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz is upheld, therefore, with respect to said defendant, the claim is declared without merit, making it unnecessary to rule on the remaining defenses it raised. The statute of limitations defense raised by the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad is rejected. The defenses of statute of limitations, lack of interest, lack of passive standing, and lack of active standing raised by the Estado are rejected. The defense of lack of right raised by both the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and the Estado is partially upheld, it being understood as denied in what is not expressly granted to the plaintiff. Consequently, the claim is partially granted, it being understood as denied in what is not expressly conceded. The Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and the Estado are jointly and severally ordered to pay, for material damages, the sum of seventeen million five hundred eighty-eight thousand two hundred eighty-one colones, (sic) with eight céntimos (₵17,588,281.08), in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491, an amount that in execution of judgment must be indexed from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment and must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries of this compensation. The Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and the Estado are jointly and severally ordered to pay to Nombre229490, the sum of twelve million two hundred fifty thousand colones (₵12,250,000.00); to Nombre229491, the sum of fourteen million colones (₵14,000,000.00); to Nombre229491, the sum of fourteen million colones (₵14,000,000.00); to Nombre229493, the sum of three million five hundred thousand colones (₵3,500,000.00); to Nombre229492, the sum of three million five hundred thousand colones (₵3,500,000.00); all of these sums corresponding to subjective moral damages, which shall be indexed in the execution of judgment from the date this ruling becomes final until the date of effective payment. The Consejo Nacional de Vialidad is ordered to build and install, within a period of six months counted from the finality of this judgment, a guardrail on Dirección24742, specifically in the section between Terra Mall (sic) and Pasoca, both in the CARTAGO – San José direction and in the San José – Cartago direction. The Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and the Estado are jointly and severally ordered to pay both sets of costs for this proceeding. As it is deemed that there was sufficient reason to litigate, this judgment is issued without special order as to costs against the plaintiff in relation to the claims directed against the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz. The Estado's request to have certified copies of procedural documents sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office against Nombre229496 is rejected." 6.- The representatives of the Estado and the Nombre1220 filed separate cassation appeals indicating the reasons on which they rely to refute the Court's thesis.

7.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Judge León Feoli writes:

CONSIDERANDO

I.- The special judicial attorney of Mrs. Nombre229490 argued in the claim originating this proceeding that in March 2003, the Technical Road Safety Audit of the National Laboratory of Models and Structural Materials (hereinafter Nombre109293 or the Laboratory) issued the "Technical Road Safety Audit Report for the Florencio del Castillo Highway," which, in point 5.6 called "Presence of Obstacles and other Lateral Hazards," pointed out, as relevant: "Rural and interurban highways must have a completely clear zone of sufficient width on both sides of the roadway. For this clear zone to be of sufficient width and to be safe, there must be wide shoulders, the ditches and side slopes must have a gentle slope, and furthermore, there must be no hazardous obstacle in that zone… some elements that limit the clear zone of the highway are:…. Public service posts…" (the highlighting is from the statement of claim). In that same audit, she noted, the Laboratory indicated that the lighting posts installed by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz (the Compañía, Fuerza y Luz, or CNFL in future references) along the entire route notably improved nighttime visibility. However, she criticized, the study warns that "the posts were not installed with flexible, breakaway, or frangible bases, but rather with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting posts represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and rigid condition." For this reason, she exalted, among the proposed recommendations is: "Design and install a system of protection and prevention against eventual collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting posts." She added, on November 9, 2007, Mr. Nombre229497 died when the vehicle in which he was heading to his work, driven by Nombre229496, collided with the poured concrete base that serves as a support for one of the posts installed on that highway. She indicated that Mrs. Nombre229490, in her capacity as surviving spouse and mother of the minors Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, both Nombre229491, filed probate proceedings, where the parents of the deceased, Mr. Nombre229492 and Mrs. Nombre229493, also appear as presumed heirs. By resolution at 8 hours 12 minutes on October 13, 2008, the Civil Court of Cartago appointed Mrs. Nombre229490 as provisional executor, a position that was accepted on October 23, 2008, through a resolution at 15 hours 3 minutes from the same Office. As a consequence of the death of Mr. Nombre229497, she added, a series of patrimonial damages were caused, as well as subjective moral damages to each of the members of his family, consisting of Mrs. Nombre229490, his two daughters, and his parents. The moral damages, she explained, were due to the anguish, unhappiness, and affliction experienced. She highlighted that due to the event, the deceased's wife and his two daughters show a series of emotional sequelae that even warrant psychological treatment at the Hospital de San Carlos. She indicated that the alleged damages (including moral damages) arose as a direct and immediate consequence "of the illegal, abnormal, and inefficient performance" of the CNFL and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad (the Consejo or Nombre1220 hereinafter), which departed from the recommendations provided by the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (Sieca) for the placement of public service posts in the document called Manual de Diseños Geográficos de las Carreteras Regionales, and because they disregarded the recommendations of the Technical Road Safety Audit report provided by Nombre109293, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions with the bases of the public lighting posts of the roadway. She said that the deceased was the main provider of the family nucleus, and his death generated a radical change in the life of Nombre229490, because she had to change her domicile and seek employment, which was aggravated because she does not have university studies or work experience. This situation, she argued, also affected the parents of the deceased, since they saw how the family of their son and granddaughters had to move from Cartago to San Carlos due to the economic and emotional situation experienced.

II.- Based on the foregoing, she sued Fuerza y Luz, the Conavi, and the Estado and requested that in judgment it be declared: a) The claim is granted. b) The lighting posts installed by the defendant administrations along the Florencio del Castillo highway represent a serious danger in the event of a collision, due to their rigidity, absence of protection, and signage. c) The lack of oversight by the Consejo and the Estado regarding the correct execution of the works developed for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo. d) The joint and several liability of the co-defendants for the damages caused as a consequence "of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient performance." e) The co-defendants be ordered to design and install a system of protection and prevention against collisions at the bases of the lighting posts of the Florencio del Castillo roadway. f) The Compañía must install lighting posts along any highway with flexible, breakaway, or frangible bases, or failing that, that it erect a system of protection and prevention against collisions at the bases of the structures. g) Both sets of costs of the proceeding on a joint and several basis to be borne by the co-defendants. The damages were prudentially estimated as follows: ¢194,610,432.00 for damages, ¢200,000,000.00 for subjective moral damages (¢40,000,000.00 for each family member), and ¢50,000,000.00 for psychological damages (¢10,000,000 per person). The defendants answered negatively. The Consejo raised the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations; the Estado raised those of lack of: passive standing, interest, right, and statute of limitations; for its part, the Compañía raised those of lack of: right and passive standing. The Court upheld the defense of lack of right alleged by Fuerza y Luz, therefore declaring the claim without merit against it. It rejected the statute of limitations defenses raised by the Consejo and the Estado, as well as those of lack of: interest, passive standing, and active standing, alleged by the latter. It partially upheld the defense of lack of right argued by both the Consejo and the Estado, it being understood as denied in what was granted to the plaintiff. Consequently, it partially granted the claim. It jointly and severally ordered the Consejo and the Estado to pay: 1) To the plaintiff and her daughters, for material damages, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08, an amount that must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries and indexed in the execution of judgment phase, from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment. 2) By virtue of the subjective moral damages caused to Nombre229490, the sum of ¢12,250,000.00; to both Nombre229491 and Nombre229491 the amount of ¢14,000,000.00 for each of them; to Nombre229492 and to Nombre229493, the sum of ¢3,500,000.00 for each; amounts that must be indexed in execution of judgment from the date this ruling becomes final until its effective payment. 3) Both sets of costs of the proceeding. Furthermore, it ordered the Consejo to build and install, within a period of six months counted from the finality of the judgment, a guardrail on Dirección13198 (in the section between Dirección3257 and Pasoca), both in the Cartago – San José and San José - Cartago directions. The condemned parties filed a cassation appeal for procedural and substantive violations.

III.- Prior to the analysis of the grievances, it must be noted that to avoid unnecessary reiterations, both appeals will be heard jointly, because the objections of one and the other are related and revolve around the same issues. Only the state representation raises cassation grounds for violation of procedural norms. Not so in the substantive arguments, however, it must also be noted that regarding those of the Estado, this Chamber proceeded to organize and reclassify them, since on several occasions they dealt with identical questions, were scattered, or did not correspond to the indicated grievance.

IV.- The representation of the Estado offers in this instance, as evidence for better resolution, a recent marriage certificate of the plaintiff, a copy of the Reglamento de Invalidez Vejez y Muerte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the official report DAE-580-11 from that institution, web studies from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos and the Universidad de Costa Rica, as well as the testimony of its assistant Nombre160993. The eventuality of incorporating evidence in cassation is expressly regulated by the CPCA in two scenarios: 1.- Documents that the parties may provide during the processing of the appeal "…which they swear not to have known previously, regarding new facts occurring after the judgment under appeal" (canon 145, first paragraph). 2.- That which is permissive for the corresponding instance, be it this Chamber or the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo (cardinal 148, subsection 1 ibid.). In this scenario, its incorporation depends solely and exclusively on the deciding body, as it is a power granted to it for the purpose of clarifying some factual issue it deems relevant or pertinent and which cannot be deduced from the evidentiary record offered. As has been reiterated, it is the judge's evidence and not the parties'; it is the judge who decides its convenience and necessity; and it corresponds to a discretionary assessment, which can be dispensed with without the need for an express resolution. Even omitting a pronouncement does not generate defenselessness, since there is no duty to gather or reject it, such that it is absolutely outside the scope of review in this venue. In this case, it is clear that the documents offered do not comply with the provisions of subsection 1) of precept 145 idem, especially the CCSS document no. DAE-580-11, which is dated September 27, 2011. This is an imperative formal requirement, by virtue of which whoever offers documents during the processing of the cassation appeal must swear not to have known them previously and that they pertain to new facts subsequent to the judgment under appeal. That norm does not discriminate as to the reason why the petitioner did not know of that documentary evidence relating to new events occurring after the challenged ruling. In that case, whether the documents existed before that resolution or were issued or became known afterward, the truth is that the oath is required and, on such premise, must be observed. In the instant case, the proponent omits it, thereby making the offering of the outlined evidence improper. Even in the hypothesis that this mandate were dispensed with, this Chamber deems that there are sufficient elements of conviction to resolve the challenges raised by the two defendants, so the evidence that the appellant manages for better resolution proves to be unnecessary. The majority could have offered it at the appropriate procedural moment, but did not do so; accepting it would mean palliating their own negligence, which is not proper. A separate considering paragraph will be dedicated to this point later as it is the subject of the appeal. For the same reason, in upcoming references, it will be analyzed why the testimony of the assistant Nombre160993 proves to be inconsequential and lacking in interest. Consequently, it is proper to declare the evidence offered for better resolution inadmissible.

Violation of procedural norms V.- In its first proposition, the state representation alleges violation of due process and the right of defense. According to its comment, the Court did not exercise the power conferred upon it by article 50 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) regarding extemporaneous documentary evidence that may be admitted for better resolution, pursuant to numeral 82 subsection 1) of the same regulatory body. In that sense, it points out, official letter no. AGP-362 from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), no. CPCE-JD-746-10, and the publication in La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, were rejected. The reason for the rejection, it alleges, was the time when they were provided; however, it says, it was not assessed that they sought to counter the expert evidence provided in the debate. The judges, it opines, cannot ignore that expert evidence can be challenged after it is known. It points out, this evidence from the mathematical expert was presented at the hearing on July 19, 2011, and the evidence that was rejected was offered at the continuation hearing on the following August 3. It insists, the Court must leave open the possibility of presenting new evidentiary material if circumstances warrant it. Articles 94 subsection 7) and 105 subsection 1) idem, it adds, establish that expert evidence is provided partly in writing and is made known to the litigants, complemented orally during the trial, whereby, it notes, there is an opportunity to request clarifications and additions. In its view, the Court erroneously interpreted the cited norms, by understanding that it is not possible to introduce evidence once the parties have fully learned of the expert opinion. Such a restrictive interpretation, it charges, violates the right of defense and does not contribute to the investigation of the real truth. In this sense, it adds, the expert assured that he was forced to render his report based on a Reglamento approved by the Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas de Costa Rica (CPCE) under penalty of disciplinary sanction. That element, it explains, was not on record, and therefore, the Estado should have been given the opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence. Along these lines, it states, the certification from the CCSS was introduced to rebut the mathematical expertise, since, according to the expert's oral report, the life annuity and the commuted annuity or compensation equally aim to replace income lost by the deceased's dependents. In its view, no defenselessness was caused to the opposing party, because the Court could, pursuant to article 50 subsection 2), grant a three-business-day period for them to refer to the evidence introduced by the Estado. In this way, it argues, the Court infringed that regulation for lack of application and article 100 subsection 1) paragraph e) ibid. Furthermore, it deems precept 94 subsection 7) ibid. violated –in relation to the right of defense–, because the written report of the OIJ expert was not made known to the parties with the required advance notice, but rather one day before the expert's interrogation was conducted. It explains, on the first day of the debate, the report was delivered, and on the next, the testimony was received, at which time, without adequate preparation, they had to conduct the cross-examination. In accordance with the foregoing, it exalts, there was no period to learn of the written report, prepare the cross-examination, and obtain defense evidence. It emphasizes, the purpose of the parties having knowledge of the written expert reports after the preliminary hearing and before the trial –as the norm provides– is so they can exercise their right of defense. That opportunity, it assures, did not exist, having been eliminated by the Court, which, it indicates, constitutes a violation of the right of defense.

VI.- On August 3, 2011, during the third day of trial, the state representative submitted a request for the admission, among other documents, of official letter AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, which states that the plaintiff receives a survivor's pension from the CCSS; the document from the Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas, CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which mentions aspects of the Reglamento on which the expert relied to perform his report; and the publication in La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, regarding a draft bill, in relation to the technical audits of Nombre109293. The Court rejected them outright. The CCSS official letter, because the expert indicated that he had not analyzed the pension factor in his report, and also because that document had been produced after the specialist's testimony. It considered that one aspect is the topic of death compensation and another is that of pension. As for the CPCE official letter, they indicated that it was issued on December 2, 2010, before the expert was extensively questioned on that aspect, so it was not true that prior to the questioning, the Estado was unaware of the existence of the regulation used in the expertise. In relation to the La Gaceta document, the judges established that it is dated June 29, 2010, and the preliminary hearing took place on July 1, 2010, that is, after the publication, so its existence was already known (continuation of the oral and public trial on August 3, 2011, starting at 9 hours 30 minutes). The Estado filed a motion to reverse requesting that the documentation be analyzed in the judgment. The Court denied it. In the specific case, the representative of the Procuraduría says that the documents were presented for the purpose of questioning the expert opinion; however, this Chamber observes that all the documents mentioned by the appellant existed before the expert rendered his testimony on July 19, 2011, therefore their admission was improper, especially since the state representative did not justify why they were not presented earlier. It should be remembered that cardinal 50 of the CPCA establishes that after the claim and the answer, only those documents dated after said briefs and those which it was not possible to provide earlier for causes not attributable to the interested party will be admitted. As the Court rightly indicates, the state representative already knew about the written report of the mathematical actuary when the cross-examination was conducted, so it is not true that he could not challenge it, since he knew beforehand the technical criteria used by the professional. It is on record in the judicial file that the report's transfer was made on November 26, 2010 (folio 616) and the testimony is from July 19, 2011 (folio 676). In addition to the foregoing, it must be pointed out that the admission of this evidence at that stage of the proceeding (after the expert's testimony) would imply not only a disadvantage for the plaintiff, as it would cause defenselessness, but also an unjustified delay in the continuation of the debate that would not only imply unnecessarily suspending the proceeding, but also re-hearing the professional's testimony. The foregoing is accentuated if one considers that the issues the procurator questions had already been raised by the parties, not only during the expert's cross-examination, but also in the claim. In relation to the CCSS official letter, it was a fact known to all that the deceased was an employee, therefore the appropriateness of a survivor's pension was evident. The same happens with the document from the CPCE, which was requested by the Procuraduría from that entity on November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the oral and public trial of July 19, 2011. It was not even a document that arose from the discussions of the debate, but rather one already known to the Estado, yet it did not provide it opportunely during the witness's deposition, the appropriate procedural moment for doing so, as is inferred from the analysis of canon 105 of the CPCA. For its part, the publication in La Gaceta is dated June 29, 2010, so its presentation could have been made even during the preliminary hearing that continued on July 1 of that year and not until August 3, 2011, at the trial, so it also becomes improper. Thus, each of the documents presented is evidence that should have been offered during the preliminary hearing or at least before the expert's cross-examination, and not during the third day of trial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be pointed out that in any case, it is the Trial Court that, in each case, assesses the admission of evidence for better resolution, so its proposal is not sufficient for it to be admitted; even if said evidence is accepted, it will be in the ruling that it is determined whether it is assessed as an evidentiary element, as is inferred from cardinals 50 and 110 of the Code on the matter.

Regarding the evidence ordered for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), this Chamber has stated that: “it is not a matter of correcting the omissions, negligence, or carelessness of the parties regarding the burden of proof incumbent upon them, or of remedying deficiencies in defense techniques, since in this scenario the equality between the litigants would be seriously harmed, and it would compromise the impartiality of the judge. Hence, when ordering it, the guarantee of a defense in trial for each of those involved in the litigation must be respected. Thus, on the contrary, it must be introduced with the sole purpose of clarifying points of uncertainty or doubt that may arise after weighing the elements provided by the litigants…” (ruling no. 000213-F-S1-2008 of 8:20 a.m. on March 25, 2008). In general terms, it is not appropriate to attempt, through the offering of evidence that should have been provided and presented during the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Accommodating this petition would mean that the parties would be able to remedy their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered at the appropriate time and did not. Evidence for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) corresponds to a power granted to the judge, who admits it or not if deemed pertinent; it is not a means to compensate for the parties' deficiencies. Regarding the report from the OIJ expert, the alleged violation does not exist, because rule 94 of the CPCA only provides that the expert report must be made known to all parties, without indicating a deadline in this regard. What is important, according to the precept, is that the expert report be sent to the parties. Likewise, the litigants had sufficient time to question the expert during the debate, including, during the cross-examination, a sequence of photographs that the OIJ itself provided to the State representative was admitted for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver), for the purpose of allowing the expert to supplement her opinion under the terms of cardinal 105 of the CPCA (starting at 3:15 p.m. on July 20, 2011). It is also important to highlight on this last point that the Procurador does not clearly explain how the referral of the expert report harmed him, if from the analysis of the judgment it is deduced that this report was fundamental in proving the excessive speed at which the driver of the wrecked vehicle was traveling, a fundamental aspect in the State's defense. Furthermore, from the beginning the parties knew of the existence of abundant evidence, including the technical evidence, so the incorporation of an expert report ordered at trial on April 25, 2011, should not be considered spontaneous. Likewise, the alleged defenselessness (indefensión) does not exist either, since this report was based mostly on the evidentiary elements already existing in the case file, such as Police Report no. 163-SDURU-07 prepared by the OIJ of La Unión on November 9, 2007 (folios 243 to 247, which are part of the documentary evidence admitted to the State on July 1, 2010, during the preliminary hearing). For all these reasons, this Chamber finds that the defenselessness (indefensión) and violation of the principle of defense alleged by the cassation appellant do not exist, and therefore the objection must be rejected.

VII.- Second. It alleges a violation of the right of defense, due to the infringement of subsections 3) and 4) of ordinal 100 of the CPCA, since in its opinion, the organizational problems of the Judicial Branch cannot be transferred to the contenders in a way that affects the principle of concentration of the oral process. It argues that in 2011, the trial's oral phase proceeded on July 19 and 20, continued on August 3 and 5, and concluded on the 23rd of that month. It contends that the purpose of the principle of unity and concentration is for the parties and the judges to be dedicated to hearing the matter, without distractions, in order to allow them to retain in their memory what occurred. However, it states that due to the prolonged suspensions, the recollection of what happened was diluted, causing an unjust ruling, all of which injured the right of defense and due process.

VIII.- In the present matter, the oral and public trial was held over several days, but this was not due to the Court's negligence, but rather to the number of testimonies, statements, and expert reports that had to be received. In fact, this Chamber verifies that this is a complex process which, in cassation, entails the detailed examination of the different evidentiary elements, with the purpose of guaranteeing a just and equitable ruling. From the analysis of the debate, it is observed that the judges had to make an effort to organize the Court's agenda and thereby avoid unnecessary delays, but always in their determinations, they tried to ensure that the testimonies and expert reports were conducted in a single hearing to avoid affecting the principle of unity and concentration of evidence. An example of the above is observed with the testimony of the witness-expert Nombre229498, which lasted a whole day of hearing, even until 9:00 p.m. on August 3, 2011. With each deponent, the hearings were held without interruptions and over several sessions to avoid infringing the analyzed principles, this under the terms of canon 100 of the CPCA. While the first two days of the debate proceeded normally (July 19 and 20, 2011), it is also true that its continuation, on three occasions, could not be on consecutive days (August 3, 5, and 23 of that same year); however, in the opinion of this Chamber, this is not grounds for nullity of the ruling for two specific reasons. First, because none of these suspension periods between each hearing exceeded the 15 working days mentioned in cardinal 100, subsection 5) ibidem, a condition for declaring the absolute nullity of everything conducted and resolved. Second, because at each hearing, the judges followed the order for receiving evidence previously agreed upon, without cuts or interruptions that would make it impossible to hear it at the respective hearing. This, far from affecting the right of defense, strengthens it, since each of the parties had sufficient time to ask questions of the declarants and to prepare their defense. We reiterate, the principle of unity and concentration of evidence has also not been harmed, since the testimonies were received at the respective and duly convened hearings, without interruptions or vicissitudes that would cast doubt on their veracity and credibility. Likewise, the conclusions stage was carried out within the expected chronological order and in a single act, on August 23, 2011. In addition, there was physical identity of the judges. Whether the ruling is just or not is an aspect that must be challenged through the violations established by the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code in cardinal 138 (cassation for violation of substantive norms) and not through this objection, since it is foreseeable that in this type of matters declared complex, the trial will last several days, which, it is insisted, at no time exceeded the 15 working days established in the Code itself, which at the outset rules out the eventual violation of due process or the injury to procedural norms that is sanctioned with absolute nullity (precept 137, subsections b) and h) ibidem). Finally, it must be added that during the recess and suspension time, the Code of the matter allows not only the judges but also the parties' lawyers to participate or intervene in other trials or hearings (ordinal 101, subsection 3). Given the circumstances, the rejection of the objection proceeds.

IX.- In the third grievance, it maintains that the right of defense was similarly infringed, now by virtue of the interpretation given by the Court to article 109 ibidem, by unreasonably reducing the time for conclusions, harming the State because it could not introduce the complete analysis of the evidence, especially, it adds, that of the mathematical expert, as well as the norms applicable to the case. It highlights that the trial lasted 5 days, that is, 40 hours of receiving evidence, so reducing the conclusions to 1 hour is disproportionate.

X.- In the current contentious administrative process, developed through oral hearings, in addition to the principles of orality, transparency, immediacy, contradiction, objective truth, and concentration, the judge must ensure that the principle of procedural speed (celeridad procesal) is respected. To do this, the judge must moderate the discussion, preventing impertinent and unjustifiably prolonged interventions, rejecting clearly inadmissible or dilatory requests, but always respecting the right of defense of the parties (articles 85, 97, 99 subsection 2), 109 of the CPCA and 57, 62 subsection 10), 73 subsection 14) of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction). In the specific case, considering that there were five intervening parties, this Chamber finds that the one-hour period to deliver conclusions is more than sufficient to achieve that unity of the act, since if that time had been exceeded, the questioned procedural stage could not have concluded that August 23, 2011, which would eventually mean a breach of that principle of unity and concentration, as well as the principle of procedural equity. Now, from the beginning of the trial, the parties were aware that the maximum time to present the conclusions was 40 minutes, extendable if necessary (resolution of July 8, 2011, visible on folios 652 to 653). That determination by the Court was duly communicated with sufficient advance notice so that the litigants could adequately prepare their closing arguments. No surprise, much less defenselessness (indefensión), is observed from that point of view, since the parties had to subject their actions to the rules previously established by the Court. The lawyers, in this understanding, had to prepare their presentations within the time established for it. Even the time originally granted to deliver conclusions was extended up to one hour for all litigants. Now, each of these organizational measures adopted by the judges, including the establishment of a maximum time to deliver closing arguments (precept 109 CPCA), tend, as indicated, to protect the postulates of orality, including the principle of procedural speed (celeridad procesal), as well as to equalize the participation of the parties in this procedural stage, with the purpose that all have equality of arms to express their final criteria, which is why the right of defense would not be violated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State representative omits to clearly and precisely explain how the time limitation referred to affected him, since the conclusions regarding the mathematical expert report were indeed raised. In this sense, during the last part of his intervention, he described the reasons why he opposed the mathematical expert's opinion, so it is not true that he had no time for it, especially when the Court told him, as it did with the plaintiff, not to worry about the time, to “be calm” and to calmly present his ideas (at 5:41 p.m. on August 23, 2011). He was not cut off; on the contrary, the time was extended from 40 minutes to one hour, sufficient time and much longer than what is customary in an oral process, since the number of testimonies and existing evidence was considered. Finally, at the end of the State's intervention, no express request from the Procurador to obtain an extension of the time granted in order to analyze the mathematical expert report is observed; on the contrary, it is insisted, the mathematical report was widely questioned during that time (conclusions hearing starting at 6:00 p.m.). The foregoing leads to the grievance being dismissed as the alleged violation of due process is not present.

XI.- It claims, in the fourth censure, that numeral 95, subsection 1) ibidem was transgressed by considering that there is a diffuse interest (interés difuso) to demand the design and placement of a containment barrier on section no. 4 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, which, it asserts, was not asserted by the plaintiff. In this sense, it alleges that article 10, subsection 1. c) of the CPCA was transgressed by considering the existence of that diffuse interest (interés difuso). Canon 95 cited was also harmed, it states, by considering as material damage (daño material) what was demanded in the lawsuit as consequential damages (perjuicios). In both cases, it concludes, the parties should have been heard, and by not doing so, it generated a defect of nullity.

XII.- The cassation appellant places the grievance under the section on violation of due process and the right of defense, because in its understanding, in the two claimed cases, the Court should have suspended the hearing for five working days if it considered that the claim needed to be adjusted or clarified. In its opinion, the plaintiff never asserted a diffuse interest (interés difuso) in relation to the construction of a protective guardrail on the Dirección13198, so that aspect should have been corrected. Note that in the fifth petition of the lawsuit, she expressly requested that “…CONAVI, the State, and the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz be ordered to fulfill an obligation to act, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the lighting posts…” (folio 26). During the preliminary hearing, no adjustments were made to that claim. For this reason, in the judgment, the Court considered that Nombre1220 “… must carry out its activities in observance of road safety criteria, and one of these being to guarantee the adequate transit of drivers… it must…. comply with the technical recommendation issued by Nombre109293 in relation to section number four of its study, between Pasoca and Terramall, consisting of the placement therein of a railing or containment barrier in the Cartago-San José direction and the San José-Cartago direction…” (Considerando XII starting at 4:36 p.m. of the ruling hearing). According to the transcription, it is clear that the plaintiff did expressly request the placement of a protective barrier on the Dirección13198 (in the accident area where her husband died). Now, when resolving the defense of lack of standing raised by the State, the Court ordered that the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code provides for the action for diffuse interests (intereses difusos) and that in this case, any eventual user of the Dirección13198 had an interest in traveling a road that is as safe as possible, and therefore the plaintiffs did have standing regarding that aspect (during the issuance of the ruling starting at 4:46 p.m.). The claim analyzed did not warrant suspending the hearing as the cassation appellant alleges; on the contrary, it had to be analyzed and qualified in the judgment, given that in the terms expressed in the demand and discussed in the process, it generated no doubt about its content and scope, within the possibilities established in canon 10, subsection 1) of the CPCA. If the State's representation disagreed with that claim, it should have stated so when answering the lawsuit or during the preliminary hearing; however, at those stages, it did not oppose or request the adjustment now sought, which becomes sufficient grounds for the rejection of the grievance under the terms established in canon 137, subsection 2) of the CPCA. Added to the above, it must be indicated that in any case, the State's grievance lacks interest, since that obligation to act, the judges explained: “bears only on Nombre1220 and not on the State because what is ordered here is indeed within the technical functions assigned by law to Conavi, not to the State.” Regarding the other point, it should be noted that in the lawsuit, an amount was clearly requested and itemized as “economic material damage (daño material económico)”, which it also termed “consequential damages (perjuicio) for the death” consisting of the non-perception of her spouse's salary during the period according to his life expectancy (folio 9). Independently of the characterization that the plaintiff gave to this claim, the grievance from the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) is not receivable, for the same reasons established previously, above all because at no time did it timely oppose the characterization that the plaintiff made of her claims, so according to cardinal 137, subsection 2) ibidem, the objection must be rejected. In any case, if the issue was widely discussed, it is for the Court to ultimately characterize the claim, whether as material damage (daño material) or consequential damages (perjuicio). In this manner, the grievance must be rejected, as the violation of due process or the nullity pointed out is not observed.

XIII.- Fifth. It explains that the right of defense was undermined, thereby violating article 111, subsection 1) ibidem, because the notification of the ruling was done orally. It argues that when the complexity of the matter demands the detailed consideration of multiple evidentiary elements, it must be provided in writing. It assures that the period for the parties to appeal in cassation is affected when they must obtain a DVD or CD recording of the judgment, to proceed not to read it but to transcribe it in order to find out what was ordered, reducing the time reported in cardinal 139, subsection 1) ibidem to prepare the defense. In this matter, it maintains, the digital media was not delivered to the State until September 19, 2011, when the reading was on the 13th of the previous month, and therefore it accuses canon 111, subsection 1 of the CPCA of being violated.

XIV.- On this particular point, it must be highlighted that based on the process model adopted by the CPCA, founded on partial orality, as well as different provisions in its articles and in the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, approved by the Corte Plena, a written judgment is not always required. Of interest, canon 57 of the cited Code, located within Chapter I “Norms Applicable to All Processes,” of Title V “Procedural Activity,” expressly establishes: “Every resolution issued at any stage of the process, whether oral or written, must be duly reasoned.” Even if a position is taken that the expression “whether oral or written” refers to resolutions issued in different stages of the process and not specifically to the judgment, it is true that the precept merely describes the form of issuance, without differentiating the type of resolution at issue, indicating; the rationale of the norm, that it “…must be duly reasoned.” The foregoing, based on the logical reasoning that what matters is that they are reasoned. Indeed, note how numeral 111, located in Chapter VII “Oral and Public Trial,” of Title V, does not prescribe in what manner the judgment must be issued, so in the face of that presumed omission, applying that principle follows. For its part, the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction prescribes in numeral 83 “Of the form and content of the judgment,” located in Chapter III “Of the functioning of the Court” of Title II “Specific Provisions”: “1) The judgment shall be issued orally, duly recording it in the corresponding technological media that the Judicial Branch possesses and provides. When strictly necessary, it may be issued in writing.//When it proves essential to transcribe it for its execution, only the necessary aspects shall be recorded. …” (the highlighting is not in the original). In other words, orality is contemplated as a form for the issuance of the judgment. From the analysis of the Code, it emerges that only in five cases did the legislator expressly provide otherwise: a) article 92, subsection 5, which, referring to the defenses of cardinal 66 ibidem that lead to the inadmissibility of the process, literally states: “...in this case, the full text of the ruling must be recorded in writing within five days following the holding of the hearing.” (The underlining is not in the original); b) canon 130, subsection 3), on the effects of a judgment annulling an administrative act of general scope, regarding which, due to the effects it produces, once final, must be “…published in full in the official gazette La Gaceta, …” (The underlining is not in the original); c) numeral 149, subsection 2), regarding the cassation judgment whose drafting is particularly complex, imposes the duty to communicate the “…total content.” of the judgment. The foregoing is also applicable in the case of subsection 3) of that norm; d) precept 153, subsection 3), referring to the cassation appeal in the interest of the Legal Order, which establishes the duty to publish the judgment issued “…in a special section of the official gazette La Gaceta …”; e) ordinal 154 concerning the extraordinary appeal for review. This has been considered by this Chamber in rulings no. 206-2009 of 4:20 p.m. on February 26, 2009, 380-2009 of 9:00 a.m. on April 20 of the same year, and recently in no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 of 9:30 a.m. on March 15, 2012. Furthermore, there is also no violation of due process because oral judgments, according to canon 88 of the CPCA, are deemed notified upon their issuance at the hearing convened for that purpose. In another vein, there is no proof that the digital media of the judgment was not provided to the State representation on the day of the hearing. In any event, even if that is true, it is not observed that this event caused it harm, first, because in application of article 23 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República (Law 6815), the State requested an extension of the period to file the appeal, which was granted by this Chamber (folios 808 and 810 of this file); second, because the appeal was ultimately filed in time and form on October 7, 2010. In this understanding, the rejection of the appellant's grievance proceeds.

Violation of substantive norms XV.- In the first objection, the State refers to the alleged omission of Nombre1220 and the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It argues that the Court did not assess the existing evidence in the case file according to sound criticism (sana crítica). a) The Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Roads and the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control, published by the Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana in the years 2000 and 2001. For the judges, according to the internal technical provisions, it notes, each country must determine how lighting posts are constructed and where they are located. However, it says, in the contested ruling there is no citation of any Costa Rican technical provision that would allow knowing on which one it relied to determine that the Council violated it when placing the lighting posts. In its place, it outlines, the criterion of engineer Nombre229498 was assumed, as expressed in the Technical Road Safety Audit Report of the Florencio del Castillo highway, prepared by Nombre109293 in 2003. It emphasizes that Mr. Nombre229498 testified that in the country there is no official technical norm indicating how the posts should be placed, so international ones are used. What was ignored, it expresses, is that Mr. Nombre229498 stated that in the report he used both the Traffic Control Manual and the Highway Design Manual, “the AASHTO one and European ones.” It adds, “In fact, from the analysis of this technical evidence, it results that in sections 2.1.23 of the Manual and 7.2.6 of its Annex A, B, and E; as well as sections 4.3.1; 4.8 and 8.2.7 and 8.3.6, a solid and technically acceptable guide is provided on the most desirable solutions (section 1.2 of the cited Design Manual) for the placement of public lighting in our country, which the Court ignored.” In this way, it states, contrary to sound criticism (sana crítica), the Tribunal not only omitted to use the unequivocal criteria accepted at the Central American level but also failed to observe that the only criterion used, that of Engineer Nombre229498, employed them. In this sense, it reinforces its argument with the transcription of the sections it says were ignored. It asserts that from the Central American technical criteria, it follows that to prevent those who leave the road from impacting the support structure of lighting posts on a divided highway with lanes 3.6 meters wide, the desirable lateral clearance towards the roadway would be 1.80 meters and the minimum 0.50 meters. It highlights that Mr. Nombre229498 affirmed that the alluded manuals did not regulate the lateral clearance, but rather international technical criteria, according to which, the posts must be 6 meters from the road. However, this criterion on which the Tribunal relies contradicts documents and depositions from civil engineers. In another section of the appeal, always related to this grievance, it specifies that by not understanding that said manuals form part of the content of the unequivocal rules of science and technique applicable in the country regarding the placement of posts, the Tribunal violated, by lack of application, cardinal 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). In the same vein, it states, the same normative framework was violated by understanding that these rules are found in Mr. Nombre229498's 2003 report. In this sense, it criticizes that ordinals 5 and 6 of the Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias (Law no. 8114) are also transgressed by attributing the character of a technical norm to the Technical Road Safety Audit contained in Mr. Nombre229498's report, as it finds that it limits discretion, when according to those provisions, the competence of Nombre109293 relates to quality, not to road safety. It asserts that despite the judges recognizing that the report from that laboratory is not binding, they give it that effect by accusing its non-compliance as if it were a mandate imposed by the legal order. It also imputes as violated, by improper application, article 128 of the CPCA, by considering the existence of an omission to comply with the recommendation to design and install barriers in “sector 4” of the Dirección5540, given that for the norm to consider inactivity, the existence of a limit or mandate imposed by the legal order is necessary. The report of Engineer Nombre229498, it argues, is neither a mandate nor a limit that imposed obligations on Nombre1220 prior to the accident. It is a technical criterion that the Administration did not adopt and that has been controverted with the forensic and engineering expertise of the CNFL. b) Nombre193, the Forensic Engineering Section of the OIJ, concluded on the point of the location of post no. 106 that the minimum distance for placing the posts is 1.80 meters and the post was located 3.40 meters away, so at the moment of the accident it “was geometrically well situated.” But that opinion, it warns, has also not been duly assessed by the Tribunal, not only to understand the criterion of Engineer Nombre229498 as controverted but also to establish, based on the manuals, that the impacted post was placed according to unequivocal technical criteria. It comments that Mr. Nombre229498 in his deposition attempted to question the criterion of the aforementioned Forensic Engineering Section by maintaining that the lateral clearance without lighting posts from section 7.2.6 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was 3.65 meters because there was no shoulder (espaldón). The foregoing, it alludes, contradicts Mr. Nombre229498's report –folio 22–, according to which, the speed limit set in the area considered the condition of the shoulder (espaldón), given that, according to forensic engineering, there is a shoulder (espaldón). c) It affirms that engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro, in their depositions, indicated that the Central American Manual provides for the placement of lighting posts at a minimum of 0.50 meters from the roadway. It continues, Mr. Guillermo added that the Manual recommends a greater withdrawal distance for the post because the United States statistics indicate that accidents occur at 1.2 meters. In response to questions from the plaintiff, he indicated that in practice, Fuerza y Luz installs the posts 0.50 meters from the road, this being customary. As it notes, the CNFL engineers are professionals of vast experience; however, it says, the Tribunal, according to sound criticism (sana crítica), did not consider that technical criterion which refutes that of Mr. Nombre229498. In this manner, it reiterates, Mr. Nombre229498's criterion, on which the deciding body based its conclusions, was controverted by the expert report from the OIJ, the declarations of the expert, and the engineers of the Company, from which it follows that it is not possible to establish that the placement of the lighting posts on the Florencio del Castillo highway does not maintain the lateral clearance required by science and technique. d) In its view, another aspect that the Tribunal did not assess with sound criticism (sana crítica) was the recommended width for the “median strip (mediana separadora)” on four-lane, regional, urban, or suburban trunk highways, as Mr. Nombre229498 categorized the Florencio del Castillo. According to the Geometric Design Manual, it notes, the measurement is a minimum of 3 meters and a maximum of 4.3 meters. As a result of this, it alleges, the recommended width at the Central American level for the “median or central dividing strip” is consistent with the requirement that the clearances of the lighting posts be at 1.8 meters.

It argues, he submits, that this is a unanimous criterion at the Central American level that the Court disregarded. The foregoing, he explains, is relevant considering that the plaintiff's entire theory of the case rests on the inconsistency of the electrical post installation based on both SIECA manuals, as noted by engineer Nombre229498 in 2003. The Laboratory's recommendation, he refutes, is based on placing containment barriers or a protection system due to the improper placement of the posts. He then partially reproduces the report of Mr. Nombre229498, to later point out that, along those lines, the recommendation for a protection and prevention system is due to the location of the posts. In his view, the criterion of section 2.1.23 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was set aside, contrary to sound criticism, to establish the existence of an omission by Conavi, by not conforming to the individual criterion of Mr. Nombre229498, thereby forgetting that containment barriers themselves constitute a danger. He alleges infringement of canons 1, 3, and 5 of the Law Creating the Roadway Council (Consejo de Vialidad) (Law No. 7798) by imposing on Conavi the design and installation of containment barriers based on the report of Mr. Nombre229498 and without considering the unanimous criteria of science and technique from the Central American Manuals, expert witnesses from CNFL, and forensic expertise. e) The judges, he reproaches, did not consider it a demonstrated fact that the permitted speed in the area is 60 KPH, disregarding, he affirms, the official communications from the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering (Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito) No. DGIT-SV 138-2010 and Placa43125. The recommendation to design and install containment barriers was not assessed based on the OIJ expertise, according to which the death was caused by excessive speed and would have occurred even with barriers. According to the mentioned official communications, which, he criticizes, were not heeded by the Court, the permitted speed in the San José - Cartago direction, in section No. 4, is 40 KPH. This is relevant, he explains, because Mr. Nombre229498 in his oral testimony considered that on roads where the permitted speed was 40 KPH, the installation of barriers was not justified. He continues, the report of Mr. Nombre229498 should not have been assessed as a conclusive unanimous technical criterion. In the same vein, he protests, the testimony of the expert witness Nombre229500 was not appreciated under the rules of sound criticism, when he indicated that the environment, vehicle, and driver factors are the three elements that must be connected for a traffic incident to be avoided or minimized. However, he alleges, for the Court, Nombre1220 did not adjust its activity to rule 16 of the LGAP, according to which, in no case may acts contrary to the unanimous rules of science or technique be issued. In his view, that provision was misapplied, by believing that these rules depend on the subjective criterion of engineer Nombre229498. He reiterates the true cause of the accident was excessive speed, but the judges did not adequately assess the technical evidence, based in turn on traffic police reports and OIJ reports that attended the event. As stated in the expertise, if the post had not been placed in that location, he relates, the dynamics of the vehicle's trajectory would have resulted in the possibility of more deaths, given that it was heading out of control toward the oncoming lane. Following the line of argument, he also reproaches the disregarding of the Cosevi documents from folios 474 to 480, according to which the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling had several infractions for five collisions, as well as the evidence from that same body dated August 3, 2011, which established that in that year, he had 3 speeding violations of 90 KPH at the location.

XVI.- Related to the foregoing grievances, Nombre1220 for its part, accuses violation of substantive norms due to the improper application of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. According to its commentary, the Court established that both the Geometric Design Manual for Traffic Devices and the Geometric Design Manual for Regional Roads are not binding on the Costa Rican State. The foregoing, it says, was justified by indicating that both instruments point out "suggestions" aimed at harmonizing criteria for road design construction. In the same vein, it adds, it stated that the recommendations issued by the Laboratory through the "Road Safety Audit Report for the Florencio del Castillo Highway," pursuant to numerals 5 and 6 of Law No. 8114, are also not binding nor of mandatory compliance for Conavi. It asserts that the Administration is not obligated to comply with the indications made by both SIECA and Nombre109293, because in them, what is issued are only recommendations and desirable suggestions, which each country, according to its internal provisions and technical criteria, must evaluate to opt for their application. What is intended, it adds, is for the recommendations to be combined with the internal criteria of each country. In accordance with the principle of legality, established in canon 11 of the LGAP, it states that since these instruments (the manuals and the report) are not part of the legal system, the Administration is not obligated to comply with their recommendations. It articulates that they cannot be condemned to obey a recommendation – however valid it may be – if this does not constitute a norm of the internal legal order. It argues that Nombre1220 has in any case complied with many of the recommendations of the manuals, considering that their application contributes to the improvement of the country's road infrastructure. Its actions, it notes, are in accordance with the unanimous rules of science and technique. However, it explains, it is not possible to condemn the non-application of the cited canon 16 to solutions that are not of a mandatory nature. It emphasizes that it is necessary to understand that the Administration's actions must be in accordance with the rules of science and technique, but applied to a duly authorized act. It exalts that by considering that the Council did have to comply with Nombre109293's recommendations in application of the mentioned rule 16, the principle of equality enshrined in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution was also violated, since Article 16 was not applied in the same way to the actions carried out by CNFL. It highlights that, contrary to what the Court noted, Nombre1220 did comply with what is established in the cited canon 16, as there is sufficient technical justification regarding the place where the public lighting posts were placed. It states that from the testimonial evidence it is clear that an engineer from the Council decided the location of the posts in the place where they are found due to a "stormwater drainage system" that passes through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall. It notes that the OIJ expert established that the posts were correctly situated as provided in chapter 7.2.6 on Position of Signs of the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control of SIECA. Therefore, it says, the cited canon 16 was not infringed, as there exists, it accentuates, expert evidence that determined that the posts were technically well located, even complying with the SIECA manuals.

XVII.- In this first approach, the disregard (preterición) of several means of evidence is alleged. In general terms, the State representative alleges, the judges omitted analyzing the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control, as well as the Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Roads, published by the Secretariat for Central American Integration (Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana) in the years 2000 and 2001. He says that these manuals should have been analyzed, especially since Engineer Nombre229498 used them to prepare his report. Regarding the application of these international instruments, the Court established the following: "…it must be stated from the outset, that the Central American Manuals invoked by the plaintiff (i.e., the Central American Manual of Geometric Design for Regional Roads and the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control), although it is true they are issued by the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, they are not binding on the Costa Rican State. This is because from the beginning, both manuals indicate that what they offer are suggestions aimed at harmonizing construction and design criteria for roads and traffic control signs… there is no binding effect whatsoever for the State of Costa Rica regarding the provisions of the referenced manual, nor for that pertaining to traffic control signs… it cannot be forgotten that the standards under discussion do not bind the countries; therefore, it is each of them, in accordance with their internal technical provisions, that will determine how public lighting posts are constructed and where they are located…" (pronouncement of the judgment starting at 15 hours 25 minutes). Upon analyzing the referenced documents, the Court is correct when it establishes that at least these Central American norms are not binding on the Costa Rican State. Thus, the Central American Manual of Environmental Norms for the Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Roads contains a set of recommendations specifically referring to the need for uniform norms for road construction in Central America. Following the philosophy of the Manual itself, these norms "should not become a straitjacket nor generate conflicts in their application by the countries, but rather should offer a solid and technically acceptable guide on the most desirable solutions for the geometric design of regional roads" (chapter I, point 1.2 on the Justification of a Manual of Norms for the Geometric Design of Regional Roads). All these design patterns were devised to be used by the designer to propose the best technical solution applicable to each road project, having in view future traffic projections, the physical difficulties to be overcome, usual maintenance practices, and the availability of resources for the execution of the proposed works. But in themselves, they constitute more of an ideal or model to follow than a mandatory compliance imperative. Even the Manual itself under analysis states that its objective is not for the proposals to serve as a "recipe book for immediate application," but rather as a reference, so each specific case must be evaluated. Here it is necessary to remember that the standards under study arose due to the lack of national and regional research in Central America on the particular requirements and local characteristics applicable to the geometric design of roads, so the Sectoral Council of Ministers of Transport of Central America (COMITRAN) undertook the task of unifying criteria based on the deliberate selection of the most recognized international practices, such as those of the "American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials" (AASHTO), the Transportation Research Board (TRB), and the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE), technical inputs from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) or from the European Union itself. But it also establishes that none of its standards should substitute the good judgment and explicit criteria of the road designer, which must be expressly supported in each case. In this way, its provisions constitute simple recommendations for the countries of the region on the subject of road safety. On the other hand, the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control arose due to the age of the regulations that were in force until the year 2000, which were already over 40 years old. The Central American Road Signs Manual, as the original annex to the Central American Agreement on Uniform Road Signs, was approved in 1958 and officially adopted by each country at a later date, so given the changes experienced in the region during recent times, those regulations on road signage became incomplete and outdated. But these rules are also mere recommendations that seek to improve road safety on Central American roads; reduce unnecessary delays caused by traffic congestion; and provide timely and complete guidance to road users in a uniform manner in any of the countries of the region (chapter 1, point 1.2. Objectives of the Manual). The foregoing is explained by the simple reason that the local legislation of each country has its own traffic circulation laws and regulations and the respective fine regime for infractions, therefore, for the application of that Manual, those driving rules, control devices, and other authorizations or restrictions established in the legal framework of each country must be considered first. Thus, the analyzed document is very clear in chapter I of general provisions, point 1.4 on legal aspects, section 1.4.1 of the general legal framework and placement authority, in that "…what is prescribed in this Manual is applicable to the extent that it does not contradict the traffic rules in force in any of the countries of the Central American region...". According to what has been stated so far, it can be concluded that indeed, the manuals cited by the appellant in cassation are not strictly applicable for Costa Rica. They can be applied, but those in charge of their implementation must justify and demonstrate that they are the best criterion, especially when there are multiple international recommendations and techniques for road construction and the installation of signs and other highway devices. As things stand, any grievance from the State's representation and from Nombre1220 aimed at analyzing the norms of both manuals is not admissible. Furthermore, it must be added that during the debate and closing arguments, all the co-defendants insisted as their main defense on this issue that the norms of the manuals were not applicable in Costa Rica, so they cannot now pretend that they be used to justify Nombre1220's action (during the closing arguments stage, Fuerza y Luz at 15:17, Nombre1220 at 16:34, and the State at 17:00 on August 23, 2011). The State even expressly ruled out the application of the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control by stating that it was not of interest for the present case. But regardless of the foregoing, it is insisted, the judges leaned towards its non-application as a norm of mandatory compliance since its precepts are only suggestions for the States, so in one way or another, those defenses of the defendant parties on the subject had been addressed. From that perspective, the co-defendants requested the non-application of the international instruments, and the Court so recognized, therefore the analysis of its articles lacked interest. Likewise, most of the expert witnesses stated that at the time of installing the luminaries, they were unaware of the existence of the manuals, which ruled out that this was the technical criterion used. Another reason why one should not enter into the analysis of the rules it seeks, at least regarding the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), is that the order to install a safety barrier in section four of the highway only affects the Council, not the State. Where there is joint and several liability between both is in the payment of material and moral damages, but that is a point that will be analyzed in another section. For the reasons stated, the allegation regarding disregard of the manuals is improper. Consequently, the arguments regarding the report of the OIJ expert (from both appellants), the testimonies of engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro regarding the location of the posts, and any proposition about the recommended width for the median (mediana separadora) on four-lane, regional, urban, or suburban arterial highways are also incomprehensible; since for this, the appellants based themselves on norms from the Central American Manual for the Design of Roads, which as explained, is not applicable in the present matter.

XVIII.- In relation to the construction of safety barriers and the speed limits that the State representation says were not analyzed by the Court (according to official communications DGIT-SV 138-2010 and DGIT-SV-284-2010), this Chamber concludes that the State lacks interest in this aspect, since it is not seen how the Court's order affects it, if the obligation to build the guardrails (barandas) falls exclusively on Conavi, which will have to face it with its budget according to what numerals 3 and 4 of its Law of Creation (Law No. 7798) provide. In any case, regarding the alleged contradiction of engineer Nombre229498 concerning the fact that in a 40 KPH zone there should be no protection barriers, it must be said that strangely, at folio 530 of the expediente, in the questioned official communication, there is a photograph (not challenged) of the right sector of the road in the San José - Cartago direction near Terramall, in which a protection barrier with a restricted speed sign of 40 KPH is observed on the edge of the road (calzada), so the engineer's statement would not be an obstacle for Nombre1220 to build the questioned barrier. The indicated disregard of evidence is also not present, since, as will be seen later, the OIJ evidence on the speed at which the vehicle was driven, as well as that certified by the reports for speeding that the driver Nombre229496 had, was indeed taken into consideration by the Court, but to determine the degree of fault (culpa) that Nombre1220 and the State had. The foregoing in no way influences the obligation that now weighs on Nombre1220 to build a barrier in the area, because the speed at which Nombre229496 was driving was not a road aspect or factor that had to be taken into consideration by the judges when imposing the order. This is because the need for a containment barrier does not arise solely from a specific incident, but also from a technical report from a recognized Laboratory in the country. Although it is true that the duty materializes with the plaintiff's claim, it must be remembered that the recommendation existed since the year 2003, after Nombre109293 conducted a risk study or audit of the Dirección13198. One thing is the liability for the consequences of the accident where the Court did have to assess the vehicle's speed, and something very different is the duty that arises from an omission by the Administration, especially since there was a technical opinion stating the danger of the posts with rigid bases on the edge of the Florencio del Castillo highway in section four Pasoca - Terramall. They are two different issues that are duly analyzed by the Court; one is the Council's omission and the other is the degree of fault of the Administration, which was in a certain way mitigated due to the excessive speed at which the wrecked vehicle was traveling.

XIX.- Now then, the conviction for the material and moral damage caused to the deceased's family, the appellants must understand, is not made solely for the placement of the posts, but mainly for the failure to apply the recommendations given by Nombre109293 in March 2003 in the "Technical Audit Report on Road Safety, Florencio del Castillo Highway," since section four of that road (between Pasoca and Terramall) presented an urgent level of attention due to the risk generated by the obstacles present on it, specifically the public lighting posts with rigid bases. An aspect that the expert and author of the report, Mr. Nombre229498, sufficiently referred to during the debate. Although it is true that to date these recommendations are also not of mandatory compliance as deduced from the analysis of Articles 5 and 6 of Law 8114, they do constitute a valid and truthful technical criterion, backed by a laboratory of the University of Costa Rica (exactly an academic research unit attached to the School of Civil Engineering of that university institution). Pursuant to canon 16 of the LGAP for the specific case, they are indeed unanimous rules of technique that in its actions, Nombre1220 should have implemented or at least analyzed, to decide what type of measures would mitigate the risk described therein. Although the report is dated after the placement of the posts, which date back to early 2002, the Council should have in one way or another addressed the recommendations set forth therein, especially since none of them were disproportionate or exaggerated, as it was not established that the structures had to be changed or relocated; the recommended solution was to implement safety mechanisms (protection barriers or retaining walls), which are even observed in other sectors of the road or on other national highways such as the San José – Caldera highway (as analyzed in the debate). This Chamber considers that it is not in vain that Law 8114 establishes in the last paragraph of canon 5 that the Laboratory shall inform, for "whatever corresponds in law," the Legislative Assembly, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) of the final result of the technical audits carried out. By informing the MOPT, the Council was automatically considered notified of the report; therefore, it should have taken the necessary actions to address the warning and not simply archive or ignore the writing, under the pretext that it is not binding. The foregoing becomes relevant if one considers that a road safety issue requiring urgent attention is at stake, because there are obstacles on the road that represent a danger for drivers and passengers, regardless of the speed at which the former travel, since this is an aspect that will always influence issues of liability, but which does not automatically exempt the State from fault, as will be analyzed in the following considerations. Given the foregoing, it must be added that to prepare the report, Mr. Nombre229498 carried out, as he explained at trial, a site study, measurements, and a series of international technical criteria and recommendations were used, mainly those of AASHTO. Nombre1220 has not at any time discredited that study through the implementation of other types of technical and specialized criteria; moreover, to this day that evidence is notably absent from the expediente. The argument that the location of the posts responds to a criterion or "stormwater drainage system" that passes through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall is not sufficient to demonstrate that in its action, rules of technique were followed in the terms of canon 16 of the LGAP. First, because this was rather a circumstance or order that arose in the contracting, for Fuerza y Luz to place the posts closer to the road according to what the Council's engineers determined at that time; this even against the criterion of the Company's specialists. On this point, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229499, head of the Company's Public Lighting Department in 2002, was decisive. He stated that during the contract execution process, there was a supervising engineer from Nombre1220 in charge of defining the way to place the posts; that CNFL was going to locate them in the center, but the Council established that this was not possible because there was a drain there; and that the Company generally complies with MOPT's instructions (statements on August 5, 2011, at 12 hours 30 minutes and 12 hours 42 minutes). It is for this reason that the Court exonerated CNFL from liability by providing that: "The engineers from Fuerza y Luz were clear in maintaining that it was, effectively, a person designated by Nombre1220 to supervise this work, and it was that Conavi official, whose name was not known, who decided where the posts should be located, explaining that they were not erected in the exact center of the median because drains crossed there, a reason that justified building them in a site closer to the edge of the road toward one of the two sides of the center. This being the case and being clear that Fuerza y Luz was not the one that determined, nor could it determine by the agreement, the location of the posts, but rather, it was Nombre1220 that did so, then we derive from this that the Company's conduct has, in this case, no relationship with the causation of the death of Mr. Nombre229501…" (pronouncement of the judgment at 15 hours 30 minutes). Secondly, this Chamber insists, the problem at the time this process was filed does not lie exclusively in the location of the posts, nor the material with which they are built, but in the lack of attention to a problem warned of by the Laboratory since 2003. Since the technical criterion that the Council had to demonstrate is about the convenience or not of installing a protection barrier, which was never demonstrated, the recommendation, and based on it, the technique employed by Nombre109293 continues to be decisive in this regard. Only if there were a convincing report from the Administration would the solutions given by the Laboratory take a back seat, as there would be a better criterion regarding the warned-of problem, an aspect that in any case will be for the Court to assess in each specific case. But so far, the only criterion in this matter is that of the Laboratory, and that report is conclusive in indicating that: "the posts were not installed with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, but with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of lighting posts represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and condition of rigidity" (page 27 of the report). The collision risk on that stretch is imminent and requires urgent attention, which is why Nombre109293 recommends "Designing and installing a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions with the bases of the road lighting posts…" (page 30, chapter 5.6 of the report). Hence the importance, it is inferred from the study, of building containment barriers. For these reasons, the Laboratory's report is vital to substantiate the liability of the State and its body Conavi, for not complying with the analyzed recommendations, which would surely have reduced the fatal consequences at least of this accident in that specific sector of the highway. As things stand, the Court was correct when it indicated that "In the present matter, there was a technical criterion, which is the report of Nombre109293, and there is no other document, submitted at another time, that overrules the report of Nombre109293. That is, we have a technical document prepared by engineers, validated by a specialized laboratory of a university of recognized prestige that also has that specialized laboratory. And that technical criterion has at no time been refuted by anyone. So the only thing available regarding the risk is precisely that audit report. And that audit report specifies that in section four of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the terms already indicated, there is a high risk of collision and a high risk that this collision will result in fatal outcomes. A warning that was made in 2003..." (at 15 hours 34 minutes according to the recording of the judgment pronouncement). That was the technical criterion used by the Court to reach its conclusion, which is in accordance with law and can be classified as the technical rule applicable to the case under examination, since in Costa Rica there is no express legal norm that establishes how lighting posts on national highways should be placed, the type of structures to be used, nor the protection systems they must have. That means the only existing technical criterion is the one that establishes their current location is risky. Furthermore, the study considered, through the criterion of professionals in the subject, the characteristics and behavior of the road, so it leaves no doubt about its impartiality and credibility as unanimous rules of technique. Moreover, the expert was categorical in his testimony that to prepare the report, foreign principles and techniques were used.

He insisted on the implementation of the technical criteria of AASHTO and the European Union, not on the recommendations of the Central American manuals as the State alleges, because the latter, Mr. Nombre229498 assured, are rules that were established for the placement of traffic sign posts, not for lighting posts, which must follow other criteria (at 1:15 p.m., 5:48 p.m., 6:25 p.m.; 6:44 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and 8:45 p.m. on August 3, 2011). While it is true that one could indicate that the international standards used by the Laboratory are also recommendations, it is highlighted that since they are contemplated in the Laboratory’s report, which is also the only criterion regarding the Florencio del Castillo highway, they automatically become a technical criterion for a specific case, which Nombre1220 should have at least analyzed for whatever is legally appropriate. This audit became transcendent due to the occurrence of the accident where Nombre229497 and Nombre229502 died, but it should have been addressed since 2003. Those consequences were expressly warned of by Nombre109293 in the documentation questioned here and which Nombre1220 simply ignored. Thus, the alleged pretermission of evidence is not observed, at least concerning the Council’s omission to address the risks on the road; nor is there a violation of ordinal numbers 16 of the LGAP, 5, 6 of Ley 8114, or 128 of the CPCA, and therefore the appellants’ grievances must be rejected.

XX.- In the second grievance, again for pretermission and improper evaluation of evidence, the State’s representation addresses the items corresponding to damages. It points out, for the Tribunal, that the death of Mr. Nombre229497 implied for Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, the loss of means of subsistence. In its opinion, that loss did not occur and, if it existed, would be only partial based on the pretermitted documentary evidence, which corresponds to certification no. SOA-00272-2010 of January 26, 2010, from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS, or the Institute henceforth) and the aforementioned official communication from the CCSS no. AGP-362 of July 22, 2011. The judges, it states, held as proven facts that the average net monthly salary Mr. Nombre229497 received in the last year of his life was ₡325,154.25; that the co-plaintiffs received an aliquot compensation of ₡2,000,000.00 from the INS; and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ₡206,337.60. But the Tribunal, it adds, did not consider that said income does not undermine the plaintiffs' right to receive additional compensation for Conavi's alleged omission, since the cause of the first is the application of mandatory insurance and the other is because the deceased was contributing to social security. The documents establishing the INS and CCSS payments were improperly evaluated, because, it explains, based on them, it should have been established that the loss of income did not exist to the magnitude that was held as proven to fix the quantum of damages. It notes that all three incomes, whether commuted or lifetime tenure (irreductibles), have the same purpose or objective. It specifies that the income Mr. Nombre229497 distributed during his lifetime among his dependents was replaced in two ways: by the compensation received due to death in a fixed amount, and the other, by a lifetime tenure (irreductible) pension for the widow and a temporary one for the orphans at a percentage of 50% and 30% of the victim's salary. It says the Tribunal should not have confirmed, from the report of the mathematical expert Mr. Nombre37311, the existence of the damages claimed for 75% of the salary Mr. Nombre229497 would have earned in his lifetime, especially considering, as he acknowledged in his oral report, that he made a calculation without considering the existence of the INS compensation and the CCSS pension.

XXI.- On this specific point, the judges resolved the following: “We have already established that in our opinion there is a concurrence of fault between Nombre1220's omission to comply with Nombre109293's technical provisions to make the risk created by the placement of public lighting posts on Dirección13198 acceptable and the reckless and irresponsible driving of Nombre229496 as causes of the death of Nombre229497… despite the indicated concurrence, the liability of Nombre1220 and Nombre229496 is not identical; rather, the latter's is much greater than the former's, to such an extent that for us it constitutes 65% of the total cause of Mr. Nombre229497's death, while Nombre1220 assumes the remaining 35%… the death of Mr. Nombre229497 signified for Mrs. Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491 the loss of ₡50,252,231.67. This amount corresponds to the material damage effectively suffered by the three said plaintiffs… of the indicated figure, Nombre1220 must only be liable to the extent of its responsibility, meaning that of the total amount, Nombre1220 only corresponds to pay 35%. Based on this… the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and the State are jointly and severally ordered to pay, as material damage, the sum of ₡17,588,281.08 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491, an amount that upon sentence enforcement must be indexed from November 7, 2007, until its effective payment date and must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries of this compensation…. the State's allegation regarding the pension received by Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is unavailing. This is because said pension derives from the Disability, Old Age, and Death (Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) regime and its cause is the sole death of a person who was contributing to the indicated regime. That is, the pension is due to the social security system still prevailing in Costa Rica and does not have as its cause the material damage experienced by the deceased's widow and daughters… Finally… the Instituto Nacional de Seguros made a payment in favor of the three said persons, but that payment is for the application of mandatory automobile insurance. Therefore, its cause is also completely different from the compensation that has been established here, which makes it equally irrelevant for the purposes of the right to reparation for material damage…” (Considerando XI from 16:11 of the dictation of the judgment). The State alleges pretermission of the INS certification no. SOA-00272-2010 and the CCSS communication no. Placa43126 where it is recorded, respectively, that the plaintiff received an aliquot compensation of ₡2,000,000.00 from the Institute, and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ₡206,337.60. In reality, remember that the second document was rejected during the debate, so there could be no pretermission; and regarding the first, what is alleged would be an improper evaluation. In the first place, the money the plaintiff and her daughters receive from the CCSS as death and orphan insurance is due to social insurance for the benefit of all workers, as a fundamental principle of the regime of social rights and guarantees, which operates on the basis of mandatory contributions from the State, employers, and workers. This regime is broadly protected in canon 73 of the Political Constitution, 1, 2, 3 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS, and 2 of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance Regulation. Therefore, it responds to a compensatory system different from the one discussed here. The amount granted by the Tribunal corresponds to patrimonial compensation from the Administration for an omissive conduct, which is protected in canon 41 of the Magna Carta and 190 of the LGAP. In this regard, this latter provision establishes: “1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”. This concerns the reparation for the material damage and the damages caused to the family of the deceased, which, until this proceeding, had not been determined under the terms of cardinal 196 ibid. The other compensation system is a right of the insured and their beneficiaries merely for contributing to the CCSS regime. For its part, the mandatory automobile insurance (SOA) is also distinct from the compensation claimed by the plaintiff, since it arises by legal imperative, namely from the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres (Ley 7331, in force at the time of the accident), which vehicle owners must keep current through the payment of a premium set by the Institute. The SOA covers the injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not there is driver liability. This insurance is charged annually and is a requirement to obtain the vehicle's circulation permit (precepts 38, 40, and 48 ibid). This compensation, therefore, is different from the liability regime established in the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which compensates for damages caused to the administered by the legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the State and its organs (objective responsibility). That reparation is not contemplated by the previous regimes, which operate by operation of law upon the occurrence of the event that originated them; the first as a right of workers and their beneficiaries merely for contributing to the system; and the second as insurance for the undeniable risk involved in driving a motor vehicle. This being the case, the judgment did not improperly evaluate the INS certification as the cassation appellant alleges, so the grievance must be rejected.

XXII.- In its third argument, the Procuraduría charges a violation of the constitutional norms or principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality. Regarding the percentage of Conavi’s liability, it states that the Tribunal considered that the Council’s omission did not generate a danger comparable to the daring, lack of skill, and recklessness of driver Nombre229496, thus attributing 65% liability to the latter for his conduct regarding the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It asserts that the administrative omission was overdimensioned to attribute greater liability than corresponding. It is evident, it emphasizes, that the expert report and the oral testimony from the Forensic Engineering Section of the OIJ were not taken into account. It reiterates that the Tribunal did not appreciate that the cause of death was the excessive speed at which Mr. Nombre229496 was driving. It considers that the imprudence, lack of skill, and recklessness of the driver are the exclusive or determining factor, almost 100%, of Mr. Nombre229497's death. The location of the post, it alleges, is not the 35% trigger of Mr. Nombre229497's death as appreciated by the judges. The vehicle had recently passed the technical vehicle inspection, and according to the official traffic report, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229503, and the OIJ report, the road surface was dry, flat, straight, and it was daytime, so the only cause was Mr. Nombre229498's conduct. It refers, according to the testimony of Nombre229500, that what is advised is to consider the stopping, reaction, or braking distance; thus, the maneuver when facing a dead dog was to reduce speed, brake, and swerve; move to the right lane; or have passed with the car centered. However, it criticizes, he maneuvered by invading the green zone without braking. It mentions that Mr. Nombre229496 was driving at a speed of 90 KPH in an area regulated at 60 KPH. For engineer Nombre229498, it states, this limit tries to reduce the consequences of a collision, and even the set speed took into account the condition of the shoulder, stopping sight distance, and pedestrian activity. The forensic expertise, it highlights, referred to several aspects such as: a car at 60 KPH could swerve around the dog, at higher speed it would see a shadow; speed was the cause of the outcome; at the permitted speed there are no deaths or damages; and that all drivers know that in front of Terramall that is the speed. Given the above, it considers unreasonable that the Tribunal exonerated the driver from 35% liability in the death of Mr. Nombre229497 when it should have charged him with, if not total 100% liability, at least greater than 65%, because even with barriers, the death would have occurred. In relation to this, it deems infringed by lack of application the Central American Agreement on Road Circulation, approved by Ley no. Placa43127, articles 3, 3.7, 3.8, and 4, because the Tribunal exonerated Nombre229496 by 35% from his obligation to drive without causing danger or harm to persons and to maintain a rational speed within the indicated limits. Also ordinal 7, second paragraph, of Ley de Tránsito no. 7331, because the person responsible for the damages was Mr. Nombre229496. Beyond the foregoing, it censures as violated by erroneous interpretation precepts 3 of Ley no. 7798 and 12 of the CPCA, by considering that the State must respond civilly with Conavi for the omission attributed to the Council. As well as numerals 199 to 202 and 1046 of the Civil Code for deeming that there is joint and several liability in matters of responsibility between both. It outlines that if the legislator decided to grant legal personality to Conavi, endow it with independent assets, and allow it freedom to contract separately, it is not possible to attribute to the State the omissions of the former within the scope of its competence. It argues that in proven facts 5 through 8, it is established that the Council contracted with CNFL for the placement of lighting on Dirección3536 and that what was agreed included the supervision of road safety aspects. Consequently, it imputes erroneous interpretation of articles 1, 3, and 5 of Ley no. 7798/98 and 12.2 of the CPCA. In its view, the Tribunal confused the subsidiary responsibility that may correspond to the State when a public legal entity lacks sufficient assets to meet its duty, with the scenario of the mentioned norm 12.2, which does not intend to substitute the inquiry into that sufficiency. It adds that having standing to be sued in a proceeding does not mean one must be held liable for the action. In that same line of thought, it says the meaning of cardinals 199 to 202 of Ley no. 6227 was confused, as they are not directed at establishing joint and several liability in extracontractual civil liability between the State person and an organ person. What they foresee, it points out, is the imputation in all cases to the organization on which the servants depend for actions performed in its name and on its behalf, which is not what operates in the other case. It accuses improper application of canon 1046 of the Civil Code because the legal system regulating the Administration's activity is independent from civil law, pursuant to norms 3 and 9 of Ley 6227, violated by lack of application. That norm, it clarifies, regulates the obligation to jointly and severally repair damages for criminal offenses and in cases of participation as perpetrator or accomplice, which does not apply in the present matter. Finally, in addition to what was expressed at the beginning of the objection, by means of a submission presented on October 10, 2011, which corresponds to an amplification of the appeal, it says the Tribunal indirectly violated article 190 of Ley 6227 by attributing civil liability to the State and the Council for a nonexistent technical omission, by not considering the causal link broken by the act of a third party—the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496—and by attributing a 35% degree of responsibility in Mr. Nombre229497's death. It adds that there is no causal link of such gravity with the State conduct, and it is clear that the event has not produced an infringement and damage of the fixed amount. Linked to the previous allegations, Nombre1220 censures the Tribunal’s criterion in holding it, together with the State, 35% responsible for the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It says the Tribunal acknowledges that the cause of the accident was provoked by the act of a third party, namely, the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling. It mentions that it was the lack of skill within reckless driving that caused the fatal outcome. From the body of evidence, it details, it was shown that Nombre229496 disrespected the permitted speed, and it was the excess speed that caused the loss of control of the car and the collision with the post. In the courtroom, it states, Expert Gaudy Vega was asked “if a guardrail—considering the speed the vehicle was carrying—would have prevented the fatal outcome, and her response was no.” In its opinion, it was shown that there is no certainty that even with the guardrail existing, Mr. Nombre229497 would not have died. Therefore, it warns, the one who created the risk was not the Council, but the reckless driving “of an irresponsible driver.” It reinforces its argument with norm 190 of the LGAP. It indicates that for the judges, an exemption from liability is presented, which is the act of a third party. Thus, it argues, there is no reason to want to attribute to Nombre1220 a 35% responsibility for the death of Nombre229497, especially since the Tribunal based its conviction on uncertain situations not verified during the debate. In its understanding, there is no causal link that relates the Council's action to the accident.

XXIII.- The cassation appellants censure a violation of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality regarding the degree of responsibility attributed to them, but in essence, after ordering the arguments, the objection is also for improper evaluation of evidence and direct violation of norms, because in their understanding, the cited evidence is clear in indicating that Nombre229496 is solely responsible for the damages claimed by the plaintiff. This is due to the excess speed at which he was driving the vehicle on the day of the incident. In relation to this point, in the considerations of the ruling, the judges established the following: “The way the vehicle ended up, the description of the event, the absence of braking, and also, this is important, the own admission Nombre229496 made about having several traffic citations, including several for excess speed, reveals to us that he was indeed traveling at very high speed. The zone he was traveling in has a maximum limit of 60 KPH… Now, even if Mr. Nombre229496 tries to deny it, the truth is he was traveling much faster than the permitted speed; the excess speed is evidenced by the impossibility of controlling the vehicle. It is not credible that a vehicle at a maximum speed of 60 KPH would describe the movement as he narrated it… there is not the slightest doubt that those 60 KPH were largely disrespected by Mr. Nombre229496… what happened was a loss of control of the vehicle as a direct consequence of excess speed. But other vehicles had passed by at that moment, that morning, and the dog was there, so the alleged unpredictability effect of not being able to see it is not understood, except due to the excess speed that Mrs. Gaudy [sic] attested to and which, based on the other evidence already mentioned, we consider credible…” (dictation of the judgment at 15 hours 51 minutes). Thus, there is no doubt that the excess speed by Nombre229496 was indeed assessed by the Tribunal, which determined it was a significant cause of the accident that occurred in front of Terramall on that November 9, 2007. That human factor described by expert witness Nombre229500 was considered by the judges, since there was abundant evidence regarding it. In that sense, one has the “Criminalistic Analysis Expert Opinion” rendered by Gaudy Vega of the OIJ, as well as her testimony at trial; the records of excess speed citations for Nombre229496; the testimony of the bus “checker,” Nombre229504, who was at the site on the day of the event; as well as the multiple photographs showing how the motor vehicle ended up after the impact. For these reasons, the judges determined that “…yes, there is an omission by Nombre1220, but the person driving and solely responsible for the driving is Nombre229496. That being so, this Tribunal concludes that there is a concurrence of causes in the production of the fatal result. On one hand, the omission of Nombre1220, on the other hand, the driving of Mr. Nombre229496… The reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496 does not eliminate Nombre1220's omission, but Nombre1220's omission also does not eliminate the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496. Therefore, both must be considered co-responsible in establishing the causal link between what happened, the omission and driving, and the result, the death of Mr. Nombre229497. Now, this concurrence of causes is not equitable, it is not equal for both parties; it is true that there is an omission by Nombre1220 in addressing a risk pointed out by the Universidad de Costa Rica, but the truth of the matter is that, proportionally speaking, it has not been proven here that this is a constant collision zone. There are collisions, there is risk, yes, it is high, it can indeed produce fatal results, but it is also not a danger of such magnitude as to be compared to the daring, the lack of skill, and the recklessness of Nombre229496. What we are saying in other words is that, compensating both factors, both causes, the reckless conduct of Nombre229496 weighs more, considerably more, compared to the omission of Nombre1220…” (dictation of the judgment at 15 hours 58 minutes). Observe that for the Tribunal there exists a concurrence of fault, since on one hand, as analyzed in previous considerandos, there is the omission and neglect by Nombre1220 to comply with the recommendations given by the UCR, and on the other, the reckless and imprudent driving of a third party (Nombre229496). According to the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the representation of the State and the Council is incorrect, since the conduct of Mr. Nombre229496 was indeed extensively analyzed, and moreover, it was not the sole and exclusive cause producing the damage claimed here. On the contrary, it would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, to the rules of logic and experience, to consider that the Council's omission to fulfill its duty of care and maintenance of the roads, to mitigate a risk that a specialized entity warned about since 2003, did not have a causal impact on the death of Mr. Nombre229497. Through its omissive conduct, it is emphasized, the Council did not help to mitigate the damages or consequences of this accident, considering that the rigid-based posts placed in sector four of the highway constitute veritable “shields” or “blades” to the detriment of the vehicles transiting there. In the event of a collision, it was shown, the outcomes would be fatal due to their foundation and anchoring, which makes them “unbreakable.” The judgment does not question the construction methods, perhaps because indeed, there was no clear norm obligating their installation in a certain way, nor was the report advising a substitution of the posts with others having breakaway bases, but the least Nombre1220 could have done when, in March 2003, an express recommendation arose about the risk of the structures, was install safety mechanisms on the road, such as impact barriers or retaining walls. Thus, it is reasonable that liability of the State and Nombre1220 exists, but it is to a lesser degree, since indeed the main cause of the accident was the reckless driving of the driver (act of a third party). This Chamber has already established in previous matters that the existence of an exemption from liability, be it force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party, does not automatically mean that the Administration is completely released from all responsibility regarding the repair of the damage caused (in this regard, see ruling no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8 hours 35 minutes on September 8, 2011). The foregoing is applicable to the case, since not only the imprudence of the driver influenced the death of Mr. Nombre229497, but also the conditions created and tolerated by the Council, given that the omissions in the exercise of its powers, specifically not installing the necessary and sufficient road protection measures, facilitated the vehicle where the accident victims were traveling crashing violently into the structure. Due to the speed of the motor vehicle, perhaps the consequences would have been the same, but that is a fact that cannot be known with exactitude, and which also does not exempt the State and Nombre1220 from their duty of road maintenance. Thus, the graduation of the damage carried out by the Tribunal is also proportional to the proven facts, so it would not be fair and equitable to reduce the percentage of fault of the State and the Council. Their omissive conduct did influence the accident, just as that of driver Nombre229496 did. Thus, there is no pretermission of the indicated evidence, nor violation of the norms of Ley 3148, 7 of Ley 7331, and 190 of the LGAP.

XXIV.- The other topic of the objection, which is the joint and several liability between the State and Conavi, was grounded by the Tribunal as follows: “The instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) granted to Nombre1220 is for administering funds and entering into contracts, it is not for committing damages, it is not for causing damages, so that, when it concerns the fulfillment of its functions, it is perfectly understandable that Nombre1220 can assume its responsibilities on its own, but when it exceeds its functions and falls into the non-functional sphere, it must respond as the organ it is, even though it has maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima), with the entity to which it is attached. In this case, although it is true the attachment is to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas is not an entity, but rather the Central State is, it is clear that the organ of maximum deconcentration of another organ is thus linked under an imputation criterion by normative provision to the entity to which the Ministry belongs, in this case to the Poder Ejecutivo and the Central State… article 12 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo foresees joint participation between the organ with instrumental legal personality and the entity to which it belongs, in this case Nombre1220 and the State, precisely because of the possibility that the conduct of the deconcentrated organ that enjoys instrumental legal personality goes beyond its functions and must respond with another subject, in this case the State… If we had determined here a liability of Nombre1220 solely for non-compliance with its functions, an error in managing its budget, an error in a contract, a mistake of that type, we would have no problem assigning liability exclusively to Nombre1220. But, faced with an administered for a damage like the one proven here, which is entirely unlawful, we cannot exclude the joint and several liability of the State in these circumstances. Joint and several liability that derives from article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública because when facing the administered in harmful events, the Administration is one, even if the specific cause of the damage is Nombre1220…” (final hearing at 16 hours 3 minutes). By express provision of subsection 2) of numeral 12 of the CPCA, when a proceeding is brought against the conduct of an administrative organ that has been granted instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental), it must also be considered a defendant party along with the State or the entity to which it is attached, as applicable. Within this perspective, the rule is that the figure of the “organ-person,” given its particularities, and for purposes of representation, must, in that respect, be assimilated to the participation within the proceeding of a decentralized entity, to the extent that they hold an instrumental legal personality. But this is applicable only insofar as the conduct imputed to it falls within the scope of the deconcentrated competence and regarding which it was granted legal personality. In this sense, what is provided in numeral 12.2 of the CPCA referenced must be understood as a mechanism to prevent, after a proceeding, a determination that the conduct does not fall within the competence exercised by the organ under the coverage of the instrumental personality granted to it, whereupon it becomes indispensable for the State to respond jointly and severally with the organ in its capacity as higher entity. On this point, this Chamber’s provision in vote 1202-A-S1-2009 can be cited, where it was indicated: “The idea underlying the norm is to avoid the administered the problem of defining whether the act (or omissive conduct) of the organ was in the exercise of a competence covered by the instrumental legal personality, or outside of it, meaning, for example, subject to the direction of the hierarch of the entity in whose structure it is inserted. In sum, what is relevant is the existence of an injury to the administered’s legal sphere and the correlative duty to repair. In the victim’s interest, the norm provides for bringing both the organ and the entity to the lite (proceeding), so that the eventual estimatory sentence can be executed against the assets of the one found liable.

If the appearance of both parties were not required, the judgment would be ineffective, since it could not compel someone to indemnify who has not exercised the defense of their own interests in the proceeding. Stated differently, the procedural mandate only orders that both the body with legal personality and the State or entity to which it belongs be brought into the judicial discussion. It then falls to the judge, in accordance with the substantive rules, to determine whether the questioned act, conduct, or indolence was carried out under legal personality or not, thereby establishing whether it is the body that must respond with its own funds, or whether the duty to repair must be attributed to the entity or the State." Law 7798 states that the Council is a "body with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental legal personality and budgetary authority to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to execute the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law…". In this matter, the State itself, through its body Conavi, placed the passengers of the crashed vehicle in a situation of imminent risk of death, a risk that, while materialized by the reckless conduct of the driver Nombre229496, was also caused by the omission of constructing safety barriers on one side of the road. In the same ruling of this Chamber cited in the preceding whereas clause (no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8:35 a.m. on September 8, 2011), this Chamber considered that in cases like the present, the degree of responsibility of the Administration is evident, because the obligation for the maintenance of public roads and the construction of pedestrian bridges corresponds, in this case, to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT, now through its deconcentrated bodies), and by failing to do so, it not only incurs in abnormality and illegality for breaching its substantive legal obligations, but also because it directly attacks and endangers the lives not only of pedestrians but also of drivers and passengers, who, without the existence of the indicated material work, find themselves needing to perform inadvertent maneuvers or, worse still, expose themselves to unnecessary risks such as colliding with an unbreakable obstacle on the road, regardless of speed. In this regard, it must be highlighted that Article 2 of Law 3155, called the "Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT)," provides, as relevant, that: "The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the following purpose: a) To plan, construct, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. To regulate and control the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways and roads. To regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transport on public roads." For its part, precept 4 of Law 7798 establishes: "The objectives of the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) shall be the following: a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs developed by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport…". Article 24 of the same law proclaims: "All public works financed by the National Road Council shall be carried out based on a road and highway construction and maintenance administration system (…) the road safety component must be considered and incorporated before its execution, in accordance with the detail to be provided by regulation and in a coordinated manner between bodies and entities. As part of road safety, precautions must be incorporated for the safe passage of pedestrians, including those at grade and grade-separated, protection for the safe longitudinal transit of pedestrians along the road, bays for public transport stops, bike paths, where applicable, and adequate visibility of the roads, including the elimination of obstacles on them and in their right-of-way and any other measure provided by the Regulation. To safeguard road safety, the urban environment through which the roads pass must be taken into consideration (…) as well as all other elements, technical specifications, norms, and procedures that guarantee the best road safety for pedestrians and drivers…". Based on this explanatory and normative framework, it is that the State and Nombre1220 have a degree of responsibility in this matter, which they must pay jointly and severally in accordance with the provisions of canon 190 of the LGAP, since it is an evident abnormal functioning of the Administration outside the expected conduct of the personified body. Consequently, the reproach regarding the improper application of cardinals 12.2 of the CPCA, 3 of Law 7798, and 199 to 202 of the LGAP must be rejected.

XXV.- In the fourth objection, the State expresses that the expertise of the mathematical actuary expert, Nombre37311, was not assessed according to sound criticism (sana crítica), as the expert stated in his oral testimony that the calculation was based on a regulation in whose drafting he had participated and which had been approved by the College of Economic Sciences, being obligated to apply it to avoid disciplinary sanction, when the truth is that, according to official communication no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, the Regulation on which the expert relied had not even been published, as it was in the process of adjustment and revision for approval. It protests that the expert relied on a Draft Regulation for Actuarial Calculations that is not a rule of the College. Within the legal observations or criticisms it makes of the Regulation, it argues that it was based, according to its Article 3, on the civil liability rules of canon 130 of the 1941 Penal Code, which was repealed by Law no. Placa43128, "without mentioning its modification by Law 4891". Without sound criticism, it affirms, the Trial Court deemed reasonable the expert’s proposition and its Regulation to indemnify 75% of the salary, given the deceased’s condition as the sole source of income for the family nucleus. However, it alleges, for alimony, the salary cannot account for more than 50%, according to precept 172.3 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it mentions, numeral 6 of the Regulation on which the mathematical expert’s report was based, provides for the use of the 2000 mortality rate of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC), without considering that it is the one corresponding to birth. The Trial Court, it comments, took a proven fact a salary without social security contributions, but erred in not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on all salary income according to cardinal 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (Law 4351), for which reason the net amount should have been set at ¢321,019.18 and not at ¢325,154.25. It grounds the fact of not having assessed the expert report according to sound criticism, on the economic dependence not being limited to 18 or 25 years if the daughters were studying, according to the provisions of cardinal 173.5 of the Family Code and 12 of the Regulation for Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance. In the same vein, it indicates, it makes no sense for the Regulation to consider indemnification to economically dependent persons (Article 2) and for the expert not to limit the retirement age by the CCSS of the deceased, in accordance with Article 5 of the Regulation for Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (65 years). The Trial Court, it asserts, did not duly assess the report in this aspect, since it included in the calculation an age of up to 76.2 years which includes the commutation factor of 17.21. For these reasons, in its view, the sentencing body should have stripped all value and effectiveness from the mathematical expert opinion presented in writing and the oral declaration that complemented it. By not doing so, it affirms, it disrespected the rules of sound criticism in its assessment, since had the damages existed, it states, their estimation should have been left to the sentence execution phase with a new expert opinion deserving credibility. The foregoing, it recriminates, represents improper application of rule 196 of the LGAP, since the existence of damages should not have been deemed proven based on the mathematical expert’s report and disregarding the certification from the INS and the Official Communications CPCE-JD-746-10 and CCSS AGP-362 cited, at least not in the established amount. By the end of the brief, it summarizes, lack of application of ordinal 172.3 of the Labor Code, by erroneously interpreting with the mathematical expert opinion rendered that it is possible to indemnify with 75% of the salary, when it is not consistent with the needs during the deceased’s life and that it could not represent a contribution to the household exceeding 50% of said income. Numeral 173.5 of the Family Code for lack of application, by erroneously interpreting with the mathematical expert that the indemnification for the deceased’s minor daughters may consider his income after reaching the age of majority or 25 years if they continue studying. Cardinal 5 of Law 4351 by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on salary income.

XXVI.- As clarified previously, the official communication no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which deals with aspects of the Regulation on which the expert relied to prepare his report, was rejected as evidence for better provision during the public oral trial, because the Trial Court considered that this document, despite being dated December 2, 2010, was not incorporated into the proceedings on July 19, 2011, when the expert was extensively questioned on topics related to his expert opinion, specifically on the Regulation used in the expertise. The judges thus considered that it was not true that the State was unaware of the existence of the regulation used in the report before the questioning. Through the objection, the appellant seeks to incorporate the document back into the proceedings, however, as analyzed in whereas clause VI of this ruling, the evidence had been requested by the Attorney General's Office from the CPCE since November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the public oral trial began on July 19, 2011, so in effect, it was not a document that arose from the debate, but rather was already known to the State. Despite being prepared by that representation prior to the debate, it was not provided beforehand or at least during the testimony of the expert witness, the appropriate procedural moment for it according to cardinal 105 of the CPCA. That is the opportunity to discuss expert reports, not later when the stage has already concluded. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the judges briefly analyzed the State representation's critique of the expertise, on the point that the calculation procedure used has not been adopted by the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences. Regarding that argument, they considered: "…in reality this is not relevant for the present matter, because the assumptions the expert set forth are reasonable regardless of whether they are contemplated or not in a regulation, which is why this Court does not depart from the expertise…". In this regard, it must be indicated that any analysis of the binding nature of the Regulation and the validity of its rules should not have been evaluated, firstly, because there was no duly provided evidence on it; secondly, this would cause defenselessness to the counterpart; thirdly, that was also not the object of the proceeding, because in reality, the Procurador is not only questioning the expert report, but a good part of the rules of the cited instrument. This latter matter must be the object of another proceeding. Now, the expert rendered his report based on the rules and guidelines that were imposed on him by the College. For this Chamber, there is no evidence indicating the contrary, moreover, from the analysis of the report it is inferred that the criteria used were authorized by an internal Commission of the College. As the specialist himself reported during the trial, he did not know if the Board of Directors had approved it, but he did know that they were rules that arose during the year 2008 in a forum held by the CPCE, due to the multiple proposals made by the Judicial Branch, since there was a lack of experts in the field, financial bases were used instead of actuarial ones, among other factors that affected the expert opinions (public oral trial at 11:39 a.m. on July 19, 2011). The criterion used, regardless of whether it is approved or not by the Board of Directors of the College, contains technical bases and formulas that arose within the College; indeed, the expert with 38 years of experience, as he narrated in the debate, taught a course on the subject. These undiscredited facts make the calculation sufficiently valid and credible, so the State's criticisms are not well received. For the purposes of the present matter, the rules of that Regulation for Actuarial Calculations for Authorized Experts of the CPCE constitute, more than a legal instrument, unified technical criteria or foundations for the preparation of mathematical expert reports. Added to the foregoing, they are also mandatory for actuaries (statements by Mr. Nombre37311 during the trial held on July 19, 2011, at 11:46 a.m.). It is a rule that the College demands of the experts, and its non-compliance could generate disciplinary liability for the member. It is worth highlighting that there is no other report, or an express request from the State to perform a new calculation, which makes the legitimacy of the questioned document even greater. As a consequence of all the foregoing, the questioning of the liability rules; the total percentages of the deceased's salary taken for the purpose of indemnification (point 3.d of the report); as well as the rates from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC) used, are aspects that must be dismissed in this proceeding, since they are guidelines regulated by the CPCE itself through its guild, there is no evidence duly provided in the proceeding that proves otherwise, much less technical evidence that indicates the rules used are erroneous. In any event, it is reiterated, the day of the debate, at the time of the expert's questioning, was the appropriate procedural moment to discuss, with valid evidentiary elements, the expert opinion of Mr. Nombre37311. However, the state representation did not present the documentation demonstrating that the percentages, indices, and results of the expert opinion do not correspond with the technical criterion used. This was attempted after that hearing, on August 3, 2011, when it untimely presented documentation it had possessed since the year 2010. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the questioned Regulation could indeed be subject to review in another proceeding, but not in this one where its binding nature was sufficiently demonstrated, not only for the expert but for all the mathematical actuaries affiliated with the College. By reason of the foregoing, all the State's grievances referring to the validity and application of the cited regulations must be rejected.

XXVII.- In another part of its statement of grounds, the Procurador alleges that the Trial Court had as a proven fact a salary without social security contributions, but even so, it comments, the judges erred in not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on all salary income according to cardinal 5 of Law 4351. In the judgment, the judges established the following: "…the first thing that happened with Mr. Nombre229497's salary, is that the quotas he had to contribute for the support of the solidarity social security regime were deducted from it, that is, the amounts he had to contribute… for the disability, old age, and death pension regime or IVM regime; and for the sickness and maternity insurance or SEM, both of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, must be subtracted. After making such subtraction, the net salary corresponding to the deceased is obtained and it is this, that is the net salary, the sum from which the real impact for his widow and daughters can be determined. Well, it happens that in this case, the expert did not discount those social charges from the salary earned by Mr. Nombre229497 when making his calculations, but rather started from the gross sums reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social… the operation yields the sum of ¢353,428.58, which is the sum the expert uses as the starting point for his calculations. It happens that, for the reasons we explained a short while ago, this initial figure from Mr. Nombre37311 is erroneous, because it improperly included as net salary two items that the worker does not receive in cash… which are the quota for the disability, old age, and death regime and the quota for the sickness and maternity insurance. So that is not part of what he materially contributed to the household…" (reading of the judgment at 4:15 p.m.). Up to this point, it can be said that the Trial Court was clear on the point, and even deducted the quotas for the disability, old age, and death pension regime, as well as that for the sickness and maternity insurance. Now, cardinal 5 of Law 4351, on the labor fund, establishes that it will be formed by two types of contributions: "a)… of ½% monthly on the remunerations, whether wages or salaries that the employers, the Powers of the State, and all public institutions must pay; and b)… of 1% monthly on the remunerations, whether wages or salaries that the workers must pay. The employers shall deduct the workers' contribution and must deposit it in the Bank in the manner and within the terms determined by the Regulations of this law". According to this rule, the mandatory savings made by the worker is 1% and not 1.5% since the remaining ½% is made by the employer. The Worker Protection Law, no. 7983, which in one way or another came to complement these savings, also established mechanisms to expand coverage and strengthen the CCSS's Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime as the main system of solidarity in worker protection. In this sense, the Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime (ROP) was created, which is an individual capitalization system, whose contributions will be recorded and controlled through the Centralized Collection System of the CCSS and administered through the operators chosen by the workers. Among the resources with which the ROP is financed are: "…a) The one percent (1%) established in subsection b) of article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by article 8 of that law has elapsed. b) Fifty percent (50%) of the employer's contribution provided in subsection a) of article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by article 8 of that same law has elapsed…" (article 13 Law 7983). In this way, it is clear that Mr. Nombre229497, indeed had to contribute 1% to this system, which should have been considered by the expert when extracting the indemnifiable amounts. The foregoing constitutes an omission on the part of the expert, which the judges also did not assess, meaning the State is correct in its argument. Consequently, the amount corresponding to the material damage awarded by the Trial Court must be modified, so that instead, the 1% that the worker had to contribute to the ROP is taken into consideration. Regardless of whether there is no proof of this contribution and that it was also not alleged at trial, the Procurador is correct in his grievance, since this is a totally different aspect from the application of a regulation by the expert, given that it is a percentage that, by legal imperative, the employer must deduct from employees or officials. However, as the judges correctly establish, this error by the expert can be corrected since there is evidence on folio 607 of the judicial file, which is the CCSS contribution study, and because the expert clearly explained the method to be used to calculate the damages. What must be done is to take each gross monthly salary recorded in the said document and subtract from each one the corresponding IVM, SEM, and ROP contributions, thus obtaining the 12 amounts, one for each month from November 2006 to October 2007 (the last year of Mr. Nombre229497's life). The 12 figures resulting from the operation of subtracting said contributions are added together and divided by the number of months (that is, by 12) and yield a result of ¢321,619.96. The following steps are the same as the expert's. The sum corresponding to the deceased's average salary during the year prior to his death is ¢3,859,439.52. From this amount, the 75% is extracted which corresponds, according to the expert, to the maintenance percentage for his family. That operation results in ¢2,894,579.64. What now follows is to multiply that figure by the so-called commutation factor used by the expert based on the table on folio 611. As the Trial Court correctly analyzes, if those variables on folio 611 are used and applied to a person who at the time of his death was 36 years old, as was the case for Mr. Nombre229497, the commutation factor is 17.1721. This operation yields the result that at the time of his death, that is, on November 7, 2007, the death of Mr. Nombre229497 signified for the claimants a loss of ¢49,706,011.03 and not ¢50,252,231.67 as the Trial Court decided. Of that amount, the cassation appellants must pay the three beneficiaries equitably, 35%, i.e., ¢17,397,103.86. The foregoing is broken down in the following scheme:

PERIOD | SALARY | SEM QUOTA | IVM QUOTA | ROP (1%) | NET --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- 01/11/2006 | 340,313.00 | 18,717.00 | 8,508.00 | 3,403.13 | 309,684.87 01/12/2006 | 329,519.00 | 18,124.00 | 8,238.00 | 3,295.19 | 299,861.81 01/01/2007 | 344,263.00 | 18,934.00 | 8,607.00 | 3,442.63 | 313,279.37 01/02/2007 | 343,960.00 | 18,918.00 | 8,599.00 | 3,439.60 | 313,003.4 01/03/2007 | 343,960.00 | 18,918.00 | 8,599.00 | 3,439.60 | 313,003.4 01/04/2007 | 343,809.00 | 18,909.00 | 8,595.00 | 3,438.09 | 312,866.91 01/05/2007 | 343,960.00 | 18,918.00 | 8,599.00 | 3,439.60 | 313,003.4 01/06/2007 | 343,960.00 | 18,918.00 | 8,599.00 | 3,439.60 | 313,003.4 01/07/2007 | 377,152.00 | 20,743.00 | 9,429.00 | 3,771.52 | 343,208.48 01/08/2007 | 375,943.00 | 20,677.00 | 9,399.00 | 3,759.43 | 342,107.57 01/09/2007 | 377,152.00 | 20,743.00 | 9,429.00 | 3,771.52 | 343,208.48 01/10/2007 | 377,152.00 | 20,743.00 | 9,429.00 | 3,771.52 | 343,208.48 Total | ¢3,859,439.57 | | | | Monthly Average | ¢321,619.96 | | | | 75% Maintenance | ¢2,894,579.64 | | | | Commutation Factor | 17.1721 | | | | Result | ¢49,706,011.03 | | | | 35% Liability | ¢17,397,103.86 | | | | In this way, the judgment must be modified only regarding the total amount corresponding to indemnification for material damage, since its calculation did not consider the worker's contribution of 1% to the Mandatory Pension Fund, which would yield a result of ¢17,397,103.86 and not ¢17,588,281.08 as decided by the Trial Court.

XXVIII.- In the fifth objection, related to the moral damage awarded in the judgment, the State considers that the Trial Court did not assess the circumstances of the case in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and equality, by considering that a subjective moral damage of ¢80,000,000 was caused to the deceased's two daughters, of ¢35,000,000.00 to the widow, and of ¢20,000,000.00 to the parents. It exalts, the amount at which the moral damage was valued, beyond reproaching the alleged unlawful injury caused, artificially elevates the damage with the object that the State and Nombre1220 must cover what they would ordinarily have had to assume if total liability had been pinned on them. It highlights, the circumstances set forth do not reasonably, proportionally, and equitably justify an indemnification of the magnitude established, since it transgressed the limits of judicial discretion. It should have been considered, it indicates, that the living conditions of the plaintiffs were not significantly affected thanks to the CCSS pension they continued to receive. Emotionally, it alludes, the daughters have had the support of their mother and grandparents, for whose affectation there is no direct proof. It adds, three years after the death, the widow remarried, with the minors having a new figure who acts as the paternal one. It details, the activity attributed to the State and Conavi was not directed at causing the claimed damage, for it is a matter, it points out, of the imputation of a neglect based on a technical criterion on road safety. It notes, the awarded compensation is unjust for being excessive, turning what should have been adequate compensation into an irrational benefit, thereby violating, for lack of application, Articles 190 and 196 of the LGAP. Article 190, it assures, because no causal link exists between the state's conduct and what happened; it adds, no damage of the set amount was produced. Article 196, because it requires that the damage be effective and in the granted amount, it adds, it cannot be taken as certain. It qualifies the total sum awarded for moral damage (in the amount of ¢47,500,000.00) as disproportionate, inequitable, and unreasonable; therefore, it affirms, the impugned decision is arbitrary, given that, besides transgressing the principles of law, it incurred in excess of power.

XXIX.- From the preceding whereas clause, it is observed that the appellant is dissatisfied, at first, with the finding of moral damage, and in a second stage, with the amount awarded for subjective moral damage. So the fundamental point of the appeal lies in determining whether the moral damage is appropriate and, if so, whether the sums awarded to each of the claimants for that aspect conform to the evidence in the record, the rules of rational sound criticism, the legal system, and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness adduced. This Chamber, referring to this type of damage, has indicated that it is associated with states of anguish, discouragement, frustration, impotence, insecurity, desperation, anxiety, grief, uneasiness, disillusionment, among others. Its common denominator is suffering or emotional affliction, as it is verified when the sphere of extra-patrimonial interest of the individual is injured (in this regard, see rulings no. 269 of 9:10 a.m. on April 23, 2004, and 845 of 10:05 a.m. on November 23, 2007). As it supposes an unjust disturbance of emotional conditions, it does not require direct proof but can be inferred from human presumptions. In this sense, it has been considered: "Regarding the proof of moral damage, the principle is the following: its existence and severity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through human presumptions inferred from the evidence, since the unlawful generating act makes the moral damage manifest, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa'…" (ruling no. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, cited in decision no. 000096-F-S1-2009 of 4:00 p.m. on January 29, 2009). It is sufficient, on some occasions, that the culpable act is committed for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the trial judges, when it is feasible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. In the same line, it has said: "…The human presumption is a logical judgment by the judge, by virtue of which a fact is considered probable, based on the general maxims of experience, which indicate the normal way things and facts happen…" (ruling no. 878-F-2007 of 8:15 a.m. on December 14, 2007).

XXX.- In this matter, the Trial Court considered the subjective moral damage appropriate, because Nombre229490, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491 both with the surnames Nombre229491, as well as Nombre229493 and Nombre229492, demonstrated an emotional affectation due to the departure of their husband, father, and son, respectively. In this understanding, it ordered: "…we consider that due to the severity and intensity of the damage, the subjective moral affectation of the minors Nombre229491 must be compensated in principle with the indemnification requested by them, that is, the sum of ¢40,000,000.00 for each one of them. On her part, for Mrs. Nombre229490, her subjective moral affectation being a little less intense than that of her daughters, we consider that in principle she corresponds an indemnification of ¢35,000,000.00. However, it must be remembered that the causers of this damage are both Nombre1220 and Nombre229496, and that the former only answers for 35% of the damage, reason for which it is that percentage that Nombre1220 must cover jointly and severally with the State, as already indicated for the subjective moral affectation generated to the three said plaintiffs.

In the case of Mr. Nombre229497's parents, Mr. Nombre229493 and Mrs. Jeanette Agüero Céspedes, this Tribunal considers that only Mrs. Nombre229490 made a slight reference to what the death of their son implied for them, since Mrs. Nombre229490 stated that he is a pensioner and she is a homemaker, making it impossible for them to financially assist their granddaughters. We therefore consider that there was an impact on them, as it is reasonable to consider that they suffered from losing their son, but the evidence available in this proceeding only allows establishing a significantly lesser affliction than that of their former daughter-in-law and granddaughters. Therefore, we consider that in principle, for each of them, compensation of ¢10,000,000 colones is appropriate, for the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) suffered, an amount for which the CONAVI, jointly and severally with the State, is liable for only 35%...” (sentence delivered as of 4:28 p.m.). For this Chamber, regardless of the indications, which in and of themselves are sufficient, due to the death of Mr. Nombre229497, there is additional evidence demonstrating the anguish, suffering, fears, insecurity, and depression experienced by the plaintiffs, as a result of the death of their husband, father, and son. Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughter Nombre229491 declared that the deceased indeed maintained a very good relationship with them and with his parents, Nombre229493 and Nombre229492. Mrs. Nombre229491 extensively narrated the emotional and economic difficulties they experienced, especially since from the age of 18, she cohabited in marriage with Nombre229497 (at the time of his death, she was 31 years old). The death of the minors' father, as can be deduced from her declaration, represented a severe emotional blow for them; they had to radically change their lives, mainly due to the difficult economic situation they went through and because they relocated their domicile (domicilio) from Cartago to San Carlos. Also notable is the change of school that the young Nombre229491 had to undergo. Even at trial, the minor stated that after turning 15, it has been harder to recognize and accept the death of her parent (at 4:28 p.m. on July 19, 2011). She expressed how difficult it has been to see her mother work after the accident, since before the mishap, she was always at home with them. In view of both declarations, the suffering experienced by the youngest of Mrs. Nombre229490's daughters was also demonstrated, as she still asks for her father because she was barely two years old when the death occurred. The parents of the deceased, as inferred from Mrs. Nombre229490's declarations, also suffer, albeit to a lesser extent. However, their condition as older adults cannot be disregarded either. There is a direct relationship between that moral damage (daño moral) caused to the family of Mr. Nombre229497 and the omitted conduct of the State and CONAVI. The foregoing means that the judges, when setting each of those sums for subjective moral damages, based their decision on both human presumptions and the evidence in the case file, which corresponds to the declarations of Mrs. Nombre229490 and Nombre229491. The emotional pain caused by the unexpected loss of a loved one who represented a fundamental pillar within the family nucleus is undeniable, he being an excellent husband, father, and son, especially due to the reckless conduct of a driver and the omission of a State body in addressing the recommendations and warnings of danger existing on the route to Cartago. It is unquestionable that this loss produced an affliction that Mr. Nombre229497's family will have to face with great difficulty for the rest of their lives. The argument that the plaintiff remarried is not admissible, as it is not a cause that discredits the suffering she experienced at the time, and furthermore, this fact is part of the recovery process to which Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters are entitled, who will never recover their father figure. As a consequence of all the foregoing, for this decision-making body, the amount granted is reasonable and proportional due to the moral suffering, emotional impact, insecurity, and sadness that the deceased's family experienced and which is still perceived in the minor daughters. CONAVI and the State are jointly and severally liable for only 35% of those amounts. Taking the amounts corresponding to each one, they are consistent with the pain caused, and are adequate for their sufferings. Thus, the net sums that CONAVI and the Council must pay to Nombre229490 (¢12,250,000), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229493 (¢3,500,000), and to Nombre229492 (¢3,500,000.00) are in accordance with the requirements and parameters of proportionality and reasonableness, as they maintain balance and relationship with the injury inflicted, which is the death of a loved one. These sums are fair, proportionate, rational, and consistent with the legal system, as a compensation mechanism for the damage inflicted on the internal emotional sphere of the direct relatives of Mr. Nombre229497. For the reasons stated, the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed regarding the amount of compensation granted for subjective moral damages must be rejected.

XXXI.- Pursuant to the reasoning and exposition, it is appropriate to reject the appeal of the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad and partially uphold the one filed by the State. Consequently, the judgment of the Tribunal is annulled, insofar as it awarded material damages (daño material) without discounting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution that Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones). In its place, deciding on the merits, the State and CONAVI must jointly and severally pay the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491. In all other respects, the appealed judgment remains intact.

POR TANTO

The evidence for better resolution offered by the State is denied. The appeal filed by the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad is rejected. The State's appeal is partially upheld. The challenged judgment is annulled only insofar as it awarded material damages without discounting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution that Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund. In its place, deciding on the merits, the State and CONAVI must jointly and severally pay for material damages the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491.

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Nombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre165468 **Public service poles**…" (highlighting is from the writ of claim). In that same audit, he noted, the Laboratory indicated that the lighting poles installed by the National Power and Light Company (the Company, Power and Light or CNFL in future references) along the entire road notably improved nighttime visibility. However, he criticized that the study warns that "*the poles were not installed with flexible, breakable or frangible bases, but rather with a rigid base made up of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting poles represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and rigid condition*". For this reason, he emphasized, among the proposed recommendations is: "*Design and install a protection and prevention system for eventual conditions at the bases of the road lighting poles*". He added that on November 9, 2007, Mr. Nombre229497 died when the vehicle in which he was heading to work, driven by Nombre229496, collided with the poured concrete base that serves as support for one of the poles installed on that road. He indicated that Mrs. Nombre229490, in her condition as surviving spouse and mother of the minors Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, both of that surname, initiated probate proceedings, where the deceased's parents, Mr. Nombre229492 and Mrs. Nombre229493, also appear as presumptive heirs. By resolution at 8 hours 12 minutes on October 13, 2008, the Civil Court of Cartago appointed Mrs. Nombre229490 as provisional executor, a position that was accepted on October 23, 2008, through a resolution at 15 hours 3 minutes from that same Office. As a consequence of the death of Mr. Nombre229497, he added, a series of patrimonial damages and losses were caused, as well as subjective moral harm to each member of his family, consisting of Mrs. Nombre229490, his two daughters, and his parents. The moral harm, he explained, was due to the anguish, unhappiness, and affliction experienced. He highlighted that due to the event, the deceased's wife and his two daughters show a series of emotional aftereffects that even warrant psychological treatment at the San Carlos Hospital. He indicated that the alleged damages and losses (including moral harm) arose as a direct and immediate consequence "*of the illegal, abnormal and inefficient conduct*" of the CNFL and the National Road Council (the Council or Nombre1220 hereinafter), which departed from the recommendations provided by the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (Sieca) for the placement of public service poles, in the document called Geographic Design Manual for Regional Roads, and because they disregarded recommendations from the Road Safety Technical Audit report provided by Nombre109293, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system for eventual collisions at the bases of the public lighting poles on the road. He stated that the deceased was the main provider for the family unit and his death generated a radical change in the life of Nombre229490, because she had to change her domicile and look for employment, a situation aggravated because she lacks university studies or work experience. This situation, he argued, also affected the parents of the deceased, since they saw how their son's family and granddaughters had to move from Cartago to San Carlos due to the economic and emotional situation experienced.

**II.-** Based on the foregoing, he sued Power and Light, Conavi, and the State and requested that the judgment declare: a) The claim is granted. b) The lighting poles installed by the defendant administrations along the Florencio del Castillo road represent a serious hazard in case of collision, due to their rigidity, lack of protection, and signage. c) The lack of oversight by the Council and the State in the correct execution of the works developed in the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo. d) The joint and several liability of the co-defendants for the damages and losses caused as a consequence "*of their illicit, abnormal and inefficient conduct*". e) The co-defendants be ordered to design and install a protection and prevention system for collisions at the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio del Castillo road. f) The Company must install lighting poles along any road with a flexible, breakable, or frangible base, or failing that, erect a protection and prevention system for collisions at the bases of the structures. g) Both costs of the process be paid jointly and severally by the co-defendants. He prudentially estimated the damages and losses as follows: ¢194,610,432.00 for losses, ¢200,000,000.00 for subjective moral harm (¢40,000,000.00 for each family member), and ¢50,000,000.00 for psychological harm (¢10,000,000.00 per person). The defendants answered negatively. The Council raised the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations; the State raised lack of: passive standing, interest, right, and statute of limitations; while the Company raised lack of: right and passive standing. The Court upheld the defense of lack of right raised by Power and Light, and therefore dismissed the claim. It rejected the exceptions of statute of limitations raised by the Council and the State, as well as those of lack of: interest, passive standing, and active standing, raised by the latter. It partially upheld the exception of lack of right adduced by both the Council and the State, with it understood as denied for what was granted to the plaintiff. Consequently, it partially granted the claim. It jointly and severally condemned the Council and the State to pay: 1) To the plaintiff and her daughters, for material damage, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08, an amount that must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries and indexed during the judgment enforcement stage, from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment. 2) By virtue of the subjective moral harm caused to Nombre229490, the sum of ¢12,250,000.00; to both Nombre229491 and Nombre229491 the amount of ¢14,000,000.00 for each of them; to Nombre229492 and Nombre229493, the figure of ¢3,500,000.00 for each one; amounts that must be indexed during judgment enforcement from the date the ruling becomes final until its effective payment. 3) Both costs of the process. Furthermore, it condemned the Council to build and install, within six months from the finality of the judgment, a containment barrier at Dirección13198 (in the stretch between Dirección3257 and Pasoca), both in the Cartago – San José and San José – Cartago directions. The condemned parties file a cassation appeal for procedural and substantive breaches.

**III.-** Prior to analyzing the grievances, it must be noted that to avoid unnecessary reiterations, both appeals will be heard jointly, because the objections of one and the other are related and revolve around the same topics. Only the State representation files cassation grounds for violation of procedural rules. This is not the case for the substantive arguments, however, it must also be noted that regarding the State's arguments, this Chamber proceeded to order and reclassify them, since on several occasions they dealt with identical questions, were scattered, or did not correspond to the indicated grievance.

**IV.-** The representation of the State offers in this instance, as evidence for better provision of justice, a recent marriage certificate of the plaintiff, a copy of the Disability, Old Age and Death Regulations of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the official report DAE-580-11 from that institution, web studies from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and the University of Costa Rica, as well as the testimony of its assistant Nombre160993. The eventuality of incorporating evidence in cassation is expressly regulated by the CPCA in two scenarios: 1.- Documents that the parties may provide during the appeal proceeding "*which they swear they did not know of previously, regarding new facts occurring after the appealed judgment*" (canon 145, first section). 2.- Evidence that is optional for the corresponding instance, be it this Chamber or the Administrative Litigation Cassation Court (cardinal 148, subsection 1 ibidem). In this scenario, its incorporation depends solely and exclusively on the decision-making body, as it is a power granted to it for the purpose of clarifying any factual issue it deems relevant or pertinent and that cannot be gathered from the evidentiary body offered. As has been reiterated, it is evidence for the judge and not for the parties; it is the judge who decides its convenience and necessity; and it corresponds to a discretionary assessment, which can be dispensed with without the need for an express ruling. Even omitting a pronouncement does not generate defenselessness, since there is no duty to collect or reject it, such that it is absolutely outside the scope of review in this venue. In this case, it is clear that the documents offered do not comply with the provisions of subsection 1) of precept 145 idem, especially the CCSS document no. DAE-580-11 which is dated September 27, 2011. This is a mandatory formal requirement, by virtue of which, whoever offers documents during the cassation appeal process must swear they did not know of them previously and that they concern new facts occurring after the appealed judgment. This rule does not discriminate the reason why the proponent did not know about that documentary evidence related to novel events that occurred after the contested ruling. In that case, whether the documents existed before that resolution or were issued or learned of later, the fact is that the sworn statement is required and, in such a predicate, must be observed. In this case, the proponent omits it, thereby making the offering of the reviewed evidence inadmissible. Even under the hypothesis that this mandate were dispensed with, this Chamber considers that there are sufficient elements of conviction to resolve the challenges raised by the two defendants, such that the evidence proffered by the appellant for better provision of justice proves to be unnecessary. The majority could have offered it at the opportune procedural moment but did not do so; accepting it would mean mitigating its own negligence, which is not appropriate. A separate recital will be dedicated to this point later as it is the subject of the appeal. For the same reason, in upcoming references, the reason why the testimony of assistant Nombre160993 is irrelevant and lacking in interest will be analyzed. Consequently, it is appropriate to declare the evidence offered for better provision of justice inadmissible.

**Violation of procedural rules** **V.-** In its **first** argument, the State representation alleges a violation of due process and the right of defense. According to its commentary, the Court did not exercise the power conferred by article 50 of the Administrative Litigation Procedural Code (CPCA) regarding extemporaneous documentary evidence that may be admitted for better provision of justice, pursuant to numeral 82 subsection 1) of the same regulatory body. In that sense, it points out that official letter no. AGP-362 from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), no. CPCE-JD-746-10, and the publication from La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, were rejected. The reason for the rejection, it alleges, was the moment when they were provided, however, it was not assessed, it says, that it intended to combat the expert evidence presented at the hearing. The judges, it opines, cannot ignore that the expert report can be contested after it is known. It points out that this evidence from the mathematical expert was presented at the hearing on July 19, 2011, and the evidence that was rejected was offered at the continuation hearing on the following August 3. It insists that the Court must leave open the possibility of presenting new evidentiary material if circumstances warrant it. Articles 94 subsection 7) and 105 subsection 1) ibidem, it adds, establish that expert evidence is provided partly in writing and made known to the litigants, complemented orally during trial, with which, it notes, the opportunity exists to request clarifications and additions. In its opinion, the Court erroneously interpreted the cited rules, understanding that it is not possible to introduce evidence once the parties have fully known the expert report. Such a restrictive interpretation, it charges, violates the right of defense and does not contribute to the investigation of the real truth. In this sense, it adds that the expert assured that he was obliged to render his report based on a Regulation approved by the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences of Costa Rica (CPCE) under penalty of disciplinary sanction. That element, it explains, was not on record and therefore, the State should have been given the opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence. Along these lines, it expresses that the CCSS certification was introduced to rebut the mathematical expert report, since, according to the expert's oral report, the life annuity and the commuted annuity or indemnity equally seek to replace income ceased to be received by the deceased's dependents. In its view, defenselessness was not caused to the opposing party, because the Court could, in accordance with article 50 subsection 2), grant a three-day transfer period for it to refer to the evidence introduced by the State. In this way, it states, it infringed that regulation by lack of application and article 100 subsection 1) paragraph e) ibidem. Furthermore, it considers precept 94 subsection 7) ibidem –in relation to the right of defense– violated, because the written report of the OIJ expert was not made known to the parties with the required advance notice, but rather one day before the cross-examination of the expert took place. It explains that the report was delivered on the first day of the hearing and the statement was received the next day, at which time, without adequate preparation, they had to conduct the cross-examination. In accordance with the foregoing, it emphasizes, there was no period to review the written report, prepare the cross-examination, and obtain defense evidence. It stresses that the purpose of the parties having knowledge of the written expert reports after the preliminary hearing and before trial –as the rule provides– is so that they can exercise their right of defense. That opportunity, it assures, did not exist, being suppressed by the Court, which, it indicates, constitutes a violation of the right of defense.

**VI.-** On August 3, 2011, during the third day of trial, the State representative filed a request for the admission, among other documents, of official letter AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, which states that the plaintiff receives a survivor's pension from the CCSS; that of the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences, CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which mentions aspects of the Regulation on which the expert based his report; and the publication of La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, regarding a bill, in relation to the technical audits of Nombre109293. The Court rejected them outright. The CCSS official letter was rejected because the expert indicated he had not analyzed the pension factor in his report, and also because that document had been produced after the specialist's statement. It considered that the issue of death indemnity is one thing and pension is another. Regarding the CPCE official letter, the judges indicated it was issued on December 2, 2010, before the expert was extensively cross-examined on that aspect, so it was not true that prior to the cross-examination, the State was unaware of the existence of the regulation used in the expert report. In relation to the La Gaceta document, the judges established that it is from June 29, 2010, and the preliminary hearing took place on July first, 2010, that is, after the publication, so knowledge of its existence was already held (continuation of the oral and public trial on August 3, 2011, starting at 9 hours 30 minutes). The State filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the documentation be analyzed in the judgment. The Court denied it. In the specific case, the representative of the Attorney General's Office says that the documents were presented for the purpose of challenging the expert opinion; however, this Chamber observes that all the documents mentioned by the appellant existed before the expert rendered his statement on July 19, 2011, for which reason their admission was improper, especially since the State representative did not justify why they were not presented earlier. It should be recalled that cardinal 50 of the CPCA establishes that after the claim and the answer, only those documents subsequent to those writings and those that it was not possible to provide earlier for a cause not attributable to the interested party shall be admitted. As the Court correctly indicates, the State representative already knew about the written report of the actuarial mathematician when the cross-examination took place, so it is not true that he could not challenge it when he knew beforehand the technical criteria used by the professional. It is recorded in the judicial file that the transfer of the report was made on November 26, 2010 (folio 616) and the statement is from July 19, 2011 (folio 676). In addition to the above, it must be noted that the admission of that evidence at that stage of the process (after the expert's statement) would imply not only a disadvantage for the plaintiff, as it would cause defenselessness, but also an unjustified delay in the continuation of the hearing that would not only imply unnecessarily suspending the process but also having to receive the professional's statement again. This is accentuated if one considers that the topics the State Attorney questions had already been stated by the parties, not only during the cross-examination of the expert, but also in the claim. In relation to the CCSS official letter, it was a fact known to all that the deceased was a salaried employee, so the appropriateness of a survivor's pension was evident. The same occurs with the CPCE document, which was requested by the Attorney General's Office from that entity on November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the oral and public trial of July 19, 2011. It was not even a document that arose from the discussions of the hearing, but rather one that was already known to the State, but which it did not provide opportunely during the deposition of the witness, the appropriate procedural moment for doing so, as inferred from the analysis of canon 105 of the CPCA. Meanwhile, the publication in La Gaceta is dated June 29, 2010, so its presentation could have been made even during the preliminary hearing that continued on July first of that year, and not until August 3, 2011, at trial, so it also becomes improper. In this way, each of the documents presented is evidence that should have been offered during the preliminary hearing or at least before the cross-examination of the expert and not during the third day of trial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be pointed out that in any case, it will be the Court that, in each case, assesses the admission of evidence for better provision of justice, so its mere proposition is not enough for it to be admitted; even if said evidence is accepted, it will be in the ruling that it is determined whether it is valued as an evidentiary element, as inferred from cardinals 50 and 110 of the Code on the matter. Regarding evidence for better provision of justice, this Chamber has stated that: "*It is not a matter of correcting the omissions, negligence, or carelessness of the parties regarding the burden of proof incumbent upon them or of remedying deficiencies in defense techniques, given that in this hypothesis the equality between litigants would be seriously harmed and would compromise the impartiality of the judge. Hence, when ordering it, the guarantee of defense in trial for each of those involved in the litigation must be respected. Thus, on the contrary, it must be introduced for the sole purpose of clarifying points of uncertainty or doubt that may arise after weighing the elements provided by the litigants...*" (judgment no. 000213-F-S1-2008 of 8 hours 20 minutes on March 25, 2008). In general terms, it is not opportune to attempt, through the offering of evidence that should have been provided and practiced in the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Giving room to this petition would mean that the parties are able to remedy their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered in their opportunity and did not. Evidence for better provision of justice corresponds to a power granted to the judge, who admits it or not if deemed pertinent; it is not a means to supply the parties' deficiencies. Regarding the report of the OIJ expert, the alleged violation does not exist, because rule 94 of the CPCA only provides that the expert report must be made known to all parties, without indicating a specific timeframe for this. The important thing, according to the precept, is that the expert report be sent to the parties. Likewise, the litigants had sufficient opportunity to question the expert during the hearing; even during the cross-examination, a sequence of photographs that the OIJ itself provided to the State representative was admitted for better provision of justice, for the purpose of allowing the expert to supplement her opinion under the terms of cardinal 105 of the CPCA (starting at 15:15 hours on July 20, 2011). It is also important to highlight on this last point that the State Attorney does not clearly explain how the transfer of the expert report harmed him, if from the analysis of the judgment it is deduced that this report was fundamental to accrediting the excessive speed at which the driver of the wrecked vehicle was driving, a fundamental aspect of the State's defense. Furthermore, from the beginning, the parties knew of the existence of abundant evidence, including technical evidence, so the incorporation of an expert report ordered in trial on April 25, 2011, should not be considered spontaneous. Also, the alleged defenselessness does not exist, since this report was based mostly on the evidentiary elements that already existed in the file, such as Police Report no. 163-SDURU-07 conducted by the OIJ of La Unión on November 9, 2007 (folios 243 to 247, which is part of the documentary evidence admitted to the State on July first, 2010, during the preliminary hearing). For all these reasons, this Chamber considers that the defenselessness and violation of the principle of defense alleged by the cassation appellant does not exist, for which reason the objection must be rejected.

**VII.-** **Second.** Alleges a violation of the right of defense, for infringement of subsections 3) and 4) of ordinal 100 of the CPCA, since in its opinion, the organizational problems of the Judiciary cannot be transferred to the litigants in a way that affects the principle of concentration of the oral process. It adduces that in 2011, the trial was processed in its oral phase on July 19 and 20, continued on August 3 and 5, and concluded on the 23rd of that month. It argues that the purpose of the principle of unity and concentration is for the parties and the judges to be engaged in the knowledge of the matter, without distractions, in order to allow them to retain what occurred in their memory. However, it states that due to the prolonged suspensions, the recollection of what happened was diluted, causing an unjust judgment, all of which harmed the right of defense and due process.

**VIII.-** In the present matter, the oral and public trial was held over several days, but this was not due to the negligence of the Court, but rather to the number of testimonies, statements, and expert reports that had to be received. In fact, this Chamber verifies that this is a complex process that, in cassation, entails the detailed examination of the different evidentiary elements, with the purpose of guaranteeing a just and equitable ruling. From the analysis of the hearing, it is observed that the judges have had to make an effort to organize the Court's agenda and thereby avoid unnecessary delays, but always in their determinations, they tried to have the testimonies and expert reports practiced in a single hearing to avoid affecting the principle of unity and evidentiary concentration. An example of the foregoing is observed with the testimony of the witness-expert Nombre229498, which lasted a whole day of hearing, even until 21 hours on August 3, 2011.

With each deponent, the hearings were conducted without interruptions and over several sessions to avoid infringing the principles analyzed, this within the terms of canon 100 of the CPCA. While the first two days of the debate proceeded normally (July 19 and 20, 2011), it is also true that its continuation, on three occasions, could not be on consecutive days (August 3, 5, and 23 of that same year); however, in the opinion of this Chamber, this is not grounds for nullity of the judgment for two specific reasons. Firstly, because none of these suspension periods between each hearing exceeded the 15 business days mentioned in cardinal 100 subsection 5) ibid, a condition for declaring the full nullity of all proceedings and rulings. Secondly, because in each hearing, the judges followed the previously agreed order for receiving evidence, without cuts or interruptions that make its comprehension impossible in the respective hearing. This, far from affecting the right of defense, strengthens it, since each of the parties had sufficient time to ask questions of the declarants and to prepare their defense. It is reiterated that nor have the principles of unity and concentration of evidence been harmed, since the testimonies were received in the respective and duly convened hearings, without interruptions or vicissitudes that cast doubt on their veracity and credibility. Likewise, the conclusions stage was developed within the expected chronological order and in a single act, on August 23, 2011. In addition, there was physical identity of the adjudicators. Whether the judgment is fair or not is an aspect that must be challenged through the violations established by the Contentious Procedural Code in cardinal 138 (cassation for violation of substantive norms) and not through this objection, since it is foreseeable that in this type of matters declared complex, the trial lasts several days, which, it is insisted, at no time exceeded the 15 business days established in the Code itself, which from the outset rules out the eventual violation of due process or the injury to procedural norms sanctioned with absolute nullity (precept 137 subsections b) and h) ibid). Finally, it must be added that during the recess and suspension time, the Code on the matter allows not only the judges, but also the parties' attorneys, to participate or intervene in other trials or hearings (ordinal 101 subsection 3). Thus, what proceeds is the rejection of the objection.

**IX.-** In the **third** grievance, it maintains that the right of defense was likewise infringed, now by virtue of the interpretation given by the Tribunal to article 109 ibid, by unreasonably reducing the time for conclusions, prejudicing the State, because it could not introduce the complete analysis of the evidence, especially, it adds, that of the mathematical expert, as well as the norms applicable to the case. It highlights that the trial lasted 5 days, that is, 40 hours of evidence reception, so reducing the conclusions to 1 hour lacks proportion.

**X.-** In the current contentious-administrative process, developed through oral hearings, in addition to the principles of orality, transparency, immediacy, contradiction, real truth, concentration, the judge must ensure that the principle of procedural celerity is respected. To do so, they must moderate the discussion, preventing impertinent and unjustifiably prolonged interventions, rejecting notoriously improper or dilatory requests, but always respecting the right of defense of the parties (articles 85, 97, 99 subsection 2), 109 of the CPCA and 57, 62 subsection 10), 73 subsection 14) of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction). In the specific case, considering that there were five intervening parties, this Chamber considers that the one-hour period to issue conclusions is more than sufficient to achieve that unity of the act, since had that time been exceeded, the questioned procedural stage could not have been concluded on that August 23, 2011, which would eventually signify a breach of that principle of unity and concentration, as well as procedural equity. Now, from the beginning of the trial the parties were aware that the maximum time to present conclusions was 40 minutes, extendable if necessary (resolution of July 8, 2011, visible on folios 652 to 653). That determination by the Tribunal was duly informed with sufficient advance notice so that the litigants could adequately prepare their final arguments. No surprise, much less defenselessness, is observed from that point of view, since the parties had to subject their actions to the rules previously established by the Tribunal. The attorneys, in this understanding, must prepare their presentations within the time established for it. Even the period originally granted to issue conclusions was extended by up to one hour for all litigants. Now, each of these ordering measures adopted by the judges, including the establishment of a maximum time to issue closing arguments (precept 109 CPCA), tends, as indicated, to protect the postulates of orality, including the principle of procedural celerity, as well as to equate the participation of the parties in this procedural stage, with the purpose that all have equality of arms to issue their final criteria, reason for which the right of defense would not be violated. Notwithstanding what has been said, the state representative omits explaining clearly and precisely in what way the time limitation to which it refers affected them, since the conclusions regarding the mathematical expert report were indeed raised. In this sense, during the last part of their intervention, they described the reasons why they opposed the mathematical expert's opinion, therefore it is not true that they had no space for it, especially when the Tribunal indicated to them, just as it did with the plaintiff, not to worry about the time, to "*take your time*" and calmly present their ideas (at 5:41 p.m. on August 23, 2011). They were not cut off; on the contrary, it was extended from 40 minutes to one hour, sufficient time and much more extensive than that customary in an oral process, since the number of testimonies and the existing evidence was taken into account. Finally, nor is an express request from the Procurator observed at the end of the state intervention to obtain an extension of the granted period in order to analyze the mathematical expert report; on the contrary, it is insisted, the mathematical report was indeed extensively questioned during that space (conclusions hearing starting at 6:00 p.m.). The foregoing leads to the objection being dismissed because the violation of due process indicated was not presented.

**XI.-** It claims, in the **fourth** censure, that numeral 95 subsection 1) ibid was transgressed, by considering that there is a diffuse interest to claim the design and placement of a barrier (barrera de contención) on section no. 4 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, which, it asserts, was not adduced by the plaintiff. In this sense, it alleges that article 10 subsection 1. c) of the CPCA was transgressed by considering the existence of that diffuse interest. Canon 95 cited was also injured, it states, by considering as material damage (daño material) what was demanded in the lawsuit as losses (perjuicios). In both cases, it concludes, the parties should have been given a hearing and by not doing so, it generated a vice of nullity.

**XII.-** The cassation appellant places the grievance within the section of violation of due process and the right of defense, because in their understanding, in the two claimed scenarios, the Tribunal had to suspend the hearing for five business days if it considered that the claim had to be adjusted or clarified. In their opinion, the plaintiff never adduced a diffuse interest in relation to the construction of a guardrail in Dirección13198, for which reason that point should have been corrected. Note that in the fifth claim of the lawsuit, they expressly requested that "…*the CONAVI, the State, and the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz be ordered to comply with an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the lighting poles*…" (folio 26). During the preliminary hearing, no adjustments were made to that claim. For this reason, in its judgment, the Tribunal considered that Nombre1220 should "…*develop its activities in observance of road safety criteria and one of these being to guarantee the adequate transit of drivers… must…. comply with the technical recommendation issued by Nombre109293 in relation to section number four of its study, between Pasoca and Terramall, consisting of the placement on the same of a guardrail or barrier (barrera de contención) in the Cartago-to-San José direction and in the San José-to-Cartago direction…*” (Considerando XII starting at 4:36 p.m. of the ruling delivery hearing). According to what is transcribed, it is clear that the plaintiff party did expressly request the placement of a protection barrier on Dirección13198 (in the area of the accident where her husband died). That being so, when resolving the defense of lack of interest raised by the State, the Tribunal ordered that the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code provides for action for diffuse interests and that in this case, there was an interest of any eventual user of Dirección13198 to transit on a road that is as safe as possible, therefore the plaintiffs did have interest regarding that point (during the issuance of the judgment starting at 4:46 p.m.). The analyzed claim did not merit suspending the hearing as the cassation appellant alleges; on the contrary, it had to be analyzed and qualified in the judgment, since in the terms set forth in the lawsuit and discussed in the process, it generated no doubt about its content and scopes, within the possibilities established in canon 10 subsection 1) of the CPCA. If the State's representation disagreed with that claim, they should have so stated when answering the lawsuit or during the preliminary hearing; however, in those stages, they did not oppose or request the adjustment now sought, which becomes a sufficient reason for rejecting the grievance in accordance with the provisions of canon 137 subsection 2) of the CPCA. In addition to the above, it must be indicated that in any case, the State's grievance lacks interest, since that obligation to do, the judges explained: "*rests solely on Nombre1220 and not on the State, for what is ordered here is indeed within the technical functions assigned by law to Conavi, not to the State*.” Regarding the other point, it must be noted that in the lawsuit, it was clearly requested and itemized as "*economic material damage*" (daño material económico), an amount that was simultaneously called "*loss due to death*" (perjuicio por la muerte) consisting of the non-perception of her spouse's salary during the period according to his life expectancy (folio 9). Regardless of the qualification that the plaintiff gave to this claim, the grievance of the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) is not admissible, for the same reasons established previously, above all because at no time did it timely oppose the qualification that the plaintiff made of her claims, so according to cardinal 137 subsection 2) ibid the objection must be rejected. In any case, if the matter was extensively discussed, it is ultimately up to the Tribunal to qualify the claim, be it material damage or a loss. In this way, the grievance must be rejected, since the violation of due process or the nullity indicated is not observed.

**XIII.- Fifth.** It explains that the right of defense was attacked, thereby violating article 111 subsection 1) ibid, because the notification of the judgment was done orally. It alleges that when the complexity of the matter demands the detailed consideration of multiple evidentiary elements, it must be given in writing. It assures that the period for the parties to file a cassation appeal is affected when they must obtain a DVD or CD recording of the judgment, to then proceed not to read it, but to transcribe it in order to find out what was ordered, reducing the time provided by cardinal 139 subsection 1) ibid to prepare the defense. In this matter, it maintains that the digital medium was not delivered to the State until September 19, 2011, when the reading had been on the 13th of that previous month, for which reason it accuses canon 111 subsection 1 of the CPCA of being violated.

**XIV.-** On this point, it must be highlighted that based on the process model adopted by the CPCA, with a line founded on partial orality, as well as on various provisions in its articles and in the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, approved by the Corte Plena, a written judgment does not always have to be issued. Of interest, canon 57 of the cited Code, which is located within chapter I "*Norms applicable to all processes*", of Title V "*Procedural Activity*", expressly establishes: “*Every ruling issued in any of the stages of the process, whether oral or written, must be duly reasoned.*” Even if a position is taken that the expression "*whether oral or written*," refers to rulings issued in different stages of the process and not specifically to the judgment, it is true that the precept limits itself to qualifying the form of the issuance, without differentiating the type of ruling it concerns, when stating; the reason for the norm, that "*…must be duly reasoned*". The foregoing, based on the logical reasoning that what matters is that they are reasoned. Even note how numeral 111, located in chapter VII "*Oral and Public Trial*", of Title V, does not specify how the judgment must be delivered, so given that presumed omission, it is appropriate to apply that principle. For its part, the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction stipulates in numeral 83 "*Of the form and content of the judgment*", located in Chapter III "*Of the functioning of the Tribunal*" of Title II "*Specific provisions*". It establishes “*1) The judgment* *shall be delivered orally*, *duly recording it on the corresponding technological media that the Judiciary possesses and provides. When strictly necessary it may be delivered in written form. //When it is essential to transcribe it for its execution, only the necessary aspects shall be recorded. …*” (the emphasis is not from the original). In other words, orality is contemplated as a form for the issuance of the judgment. From the analysis of the Code, it appears that only in five cases did the legislator expressly provide otherwise: a) article 92, subsection 5, which referring to the defenses in cardinal 66 ibid that lead to the inadmissibility of the process, literally says: "*...in this case, it must record,* *in writing*, *the full text of the judgment, within five days following the holding of the hearing.*” (The underline is not from the original); b) canon 130 subsection 3), on the effects of a judgment annulling an administrative act of general scope, regarding which, due to the effects it produces, once final it must be "*…published* *in full* *in the official newspaper La Gaceta, …*” (The underline is not from the original); c) numeral 149 subsection 2), regarding the cassation judgment whose drafting has particular complexity, imposes the duty to communicate the "*…full content.*" of the judgment. The foregoing is also applicable in the case of subsection 3) of that norm; d) precept 153 subsection 3), referring to the cassation appeal in the interest of the Legal Order, which establishes the duty to publish the judgment issued "*…in a special section of the official newspaper La Gaceta …*”; e) ordinal 154 concerning the extraordinary appeal for review. This has been considered by this Chamber in rulings no. 206-2009 at 4:20 p.m. on February 26, 2009, 380-2009 at 9:00 a.m. on April 20 of the same year, and recently in no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 at 9:30 a.m. on March 15, 2012. Moreover, nor is there a violation of due process because oral judgments, according to canon 88 of the CPCA, are considered notified upon their delivery in the hearing convened for that purpose. In another line of thought, there is no proof that the digital medium of the judgment was not provided on the day of the hearing to the state representation. In any case, even if that is true, it is not observed that this event caused them harm, first, because in application of article 23 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República (Law 6815), the State requested an extension of the period to file the appeal, which was granted by this Chamber (folios 808 and 810 of this file); second, because the appeal was finally filed in a timely and proper manner on October 7, 2010. In this understanding, what proceeds is the rejection of the appellant's grievance.

**Violation of substantive norms** **XV.-** In the **first** objection, the **State** refers to the alleged omission of Nombre1220 and the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It argues that the Tribunal did not assess the existing evidence in the case file according to sound reasoning (sana crítica). **a)** The Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Roads and the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control, published by the Secretariat for Central American Integration in the years 2000 and 2001. For the judges, according to the internal technical provisions, it notes, each country must determine how lighting poles are built and where they are located. However, it says, in the challenged judgment there is no citation of any technical provision of Costa Rica that allows knowing on which one it based itself to determine that the Council violated it when placing the lighting poles. Instead, it reviews, the criterion of engineer Nombre229498 was assumed, as expressed in the Technical Road Safety Audit report of the Florencio del Castillo highway, prepared by Nombre109293 in 2003. It emphasizes that Mr. Nombre229498 declared that in the country there is no official technical norm indicating how poles should be placed, so international ones are used. What was ignored, it states, is that Mr. Nombre229498 expressed that in the report he used both the Traffic Control Manual and the Highway Design Manual, "*the one from AASHTO and European ones.*" It adds, “*In fact, from the analysis of this technical evidence, it turns out that in sections 2.1.23 of the Manual and 7.2.6 of its Annex A, B, and E; and in sections 4.3.1; 4.8 and 8.2.7 and 8.3.6, a* *solid and technically acceptable guide* *is provided on the most desirable solutions (section 1.2 of the cited Design Manual) for the placement of public lighting in our country, which the* *Tribunal ignored* .” In this way, it refers, contrary to sound reasoning, the Tribunal not only omitted using the univocal criteria accepted at the Central American level, but also failed to observe that the only criterion used, that of Engineer Nombre229498, utilized them. In this sense, it reinforces its argument with the transcription of the sections it says were ignored. It asserts that from the Central American technical criteria it follows that, to prevent those who leave the roadway from impacting the support structure of lighting poles on a divided highway with 3.6-meter-wide lanes, the desirable lateral clearance (claro lateral) towards the roadway would be 1.80 meters and the minimum 0.50 meters. It highlights that Mr. Nombre229498 affirmed that the aforementioned manuals did not regulate lateral clearance, but rather international technical criteria, according to which, poles must be 6 meters from the road. However, this criterion on which the Tribunal relies contradicts documents and depositions from civil engineers. In another section of the appeal, still in relation to this grievance, it specifies that by not understanding that the said manuals form part of the content of the univocal rules of science and technique applicable to the country regarding the location of poles, the Tribunal violated cardinal 16 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP) by lack of application. In the same sense, it states, that same norm was violated by understanding that those rules are found in Mr. Nombre229498's report from 2003. In this sense, it criticizes, ordinals 5 and 6 of the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (Law no. 8114) are also transgressed, by attributing to the Technical Road Safety Audit contained in Mr. Nombre229498's report the character of a technical norm, because it considers that it limits discretion, when according to those provisions, Nombre109293's competence relates to quality and not to road safety. It asserts, despite the judges recognizing that the report from that laboratory is not binding, they give it that effect by charging its non-compliance as if it were a mandate imposed by the legal order. It also imputes article 128 of the CPCA as violated by improper application, by estimating the existence of an omission to comply with the recommendation to design and install barriers in "sector 4" of Dirección5540, since for the norm to consider an inactivity, the existence of a limit or mandate imposed by the legal order is necessary. Engineer Nombre229498’s report, it argues, is neither a mandate nor a limit that imposed obligations on Nombre1220 prior to the accident. It is a technical criterion that the Administration did not adopt and that has been controverted by the forensic expertise and CNFL engineering. **b)** Nombre193, the Forensic Engineering Section of the OIJ, concluded regarding the location of pole no. 106 that the minimum distance for placing poles is 1.80 meters and the pole was placed at 3.40 meters, so that at the time of the accident “*it was geometrically well situated*”. But that expert opinion, it warns, has also not been duly assessed by the Tribunal, not only to understand that Engineer Nombre229498’s criterion is controverted, but to establish based on the manuals that the impacted pole was placed according to univocal technical criteria.

Commented that Mr. Nombre229498, in his deposition, sought to question the criterion of the aforementioned Forensic Engineering Section, by maintaining that the lateral clearance without lighting posts under section 7.2.6 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was 3.65 meters, because there was no shoulder. The foregoing, he alludes, contradicts the report of Mr. Nombre229498—folio 22—according to which the speed limit set in the zone took into account the condition of the shoulder, given that, for forensic engineering, there is a shoulder. c) He affirms that engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro, in their depositions, indicated that the Central American Manual provides for the placement of lighting posts at a minimum of 0.50 meters from the roadway. He continues that Mr. Guillermo added that the Manual recommends a greater post setback distance because statistics from the United States indicate that accidents occur at 1.2 meters. In response to questions from the plaintiff, he indicated that, in practice, Fuerza y Luz installs the posts at 0.50 meters from the highway, this being the customary practice. As he points out, the CNFL engineers are professionals of vast experience; however, he says, the Court, in accordance with the rules of sound judgment, did not consider that technical criterion, which rebuts that of Mr. Nombre229498. Thus, he reiterates, the criterion of Mr. Nombre229498 upon which the deciding body based its conclusions was controverted by the expert report of the OIJ, the statements of the expert witness, and the engineers of the Company, from which it is evident that it is not possible to establish that the placement of the lighting posts on the Florencio del Castillo highway fails to maintain the lateral setback required by science and technique. d) In his opinion, another aspect that the Court failed to assess with sound judgment was the recommended width for the “median strip (mediana separadora)” on four-lane highways, regional, urban, or suburban trunk roads, as Mr. Nombre229498 classified the Florencio del Castillo. According to the Geometric Design Manual, he highlights, the measurement is a minimum of 3 meters and a maximum of 4.3 meters. For this reason, he argues, the width recommended at the Central American level for the “median or central dividing strip (mediana o franja separadora central)” is consistent with the requirement that the setbacks for lighting posts be 1.8 meters. It is, he argues, a univocal criterion at the Central American level that the Court disregarded. The foregoing, he explains, is relevant considering that the entire theory of the plaintiff's case rests on the inconsistency of the electrical post installation based on both Sieca manuals, as noted by engineer Nombre229498 in 2003. The Laboratory's recommendation, he refutes, stems from the placement of containment barriers or a protection system by virtue of the improper placement of the posts. He then partially reproduces the report of Mr. Nombre229498, to then point out that, along those lines, the recommendation for a protection and prevention system is due to the location of the posts. In his understanding, the criterion of section 2.1.23 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was set aside, contradicting sound judgment, to establish the existence of an omission by Conavi, by failing to conform to the unipersonal criterion of Mr. Nombre229498, thereby forgetting that containment barriers constitute a hazard in themselves. He alleges an infringement of canons 1, 3, and 5 of the Law Creating the National Roads Council (Ley no. 7798) by imposing on Conavi the design and installation of containment barriers based on the report of Mr. Nombre229498 and without considering the univocal criteria of science and technique from the Central American Manuals, the expert witnesses of CNFL, and the forensic expert report. e) The judges, he reproaches, did not hold as a proven fact that the permitted speed in the zone is 60 KPH, disregarding, he affirms, the official communications from the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito no. DGIT-SV 138-2010 and Placa43125. The recommendation to design and install containment barriers was not assessed based on the OIJ expert report, according to which the death was caused by excessive speed and would have occurred even with barriers. According to the mentioned official communications, which, he criticizes, were not heeded by the Court, the permitted speed in the San José-Cartago direction, on section no. 4, is 40 KPH. This is relevant, he explains, because Mr. Nombre229498, in his oral declaration, considered that on roads with a permitted speed of 40 KPH, the installation of barriers was not justified. He continues that the report of Mr. Nombre229498 should not have been assessed as a conclusive univocal technical criterion. In the same vein, he protests, the testimony of the expert witness Nombre229500 was not appreciated under the rules of sound judgment, when he stated that the environment, vehicle, and driver factors are the three elements that must be connected for a traffic incident to be avoided or minimized. However, he alleges, for the Court, Nombre1220 did not adjust its activity to rule 16 of the LGAP, according to which, in no case may acts contrary to the univocal rules of science or technique be dictated. In his criterion, that provision was misapplied, by believing that these rules depend on the subjective criterion of engineer Nombre229498. He reiterates that the true cause of the accident was excessive speed, but the judges did not adequately assess the technical evidence, based in turn on reports from the traffic police and OIJ reports that dealt with the incident. As stated in the expert report, if the post had not been placed in that location, he relates, the dynamics of the automobile's trajectory would have resulted in the possibility of more deaths, given that it was heading out of control toward the oncoming lane. In line with the foregoing, he also reproaches that the Cosevi documents from folios 474 to 480 were disregarded, according to which the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling had several infractions for five collisions, as well as the evidence from that same body dated August 3, 2011, which established that in that year, he had 3 instances of excessive speed of 90 KPH at that location.

**XVI.-** Related to the previous grievances, Nombre1220, for its part, accuses a violation of substantive norms due to the improper application of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. As he comments, the Court established that both the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices and the Geometric Design Manual for Regional Highways are not binding on the Costa Rican State. The foregoing, he says, was justified by indicating that both instruments set forth "suggestions" aimed at harmonizing highway construction and design criteria. In the same vein, he adds, it stated that the recommendations issued by the Laboratory through the "Road Safety Audit Report of the Florencio del Castillo Highway," pursuant to numerals 5 and 6 of Ley no. 8114, are also neither binding nor of mandatory compliance for Conavi. He asserts that the Administration is not obligated to comply with the indications made by both Sieca and Nombre109293, because what they issue are only desirable recommendations and suggestions, which each country, according to its own internal provisions and technical criteria, must evaluate in order to choose their application. What is intended, he adds, is that the recommendations be combined with the internal criteria of each country. In consideration of the principle of legality, established in canon 11 of the LGAP, he expresses that since those instruments (the manuals and the report) do not form part of the legal system, it is not mandatory for the Administration to comply with their recommendations. He articulates that they cannot be condemned to obey a recommendation—however valid it may be—if it does not constitute a norm of the internal legal order. He argues that Nombre1220 has, in any event, complied with many of the recommendations of the manuals, considering that their application contributes to the improvement of the country's road infrastructure. Its actions, he notes, are in accordance with the univocal rules of science and technique. However, he explains, it is not possible to condemn the non-application of the cited cardinal 16 to solutions that are not of a mandatory nature. He emphasizes that it is necessary to understand that the Administration's actions must be in accordance with the rules of science and technique, but as applied to a duly authorized act. He exalts that, in considering that the Council did have to comply with the recommendations of Nombre109293 in application of the mentioned rule 16, the principle of equality enshrined in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution was also violated, since article 16 was not applied equally to the actions carried out by CNFL. He highlights that, contrary to what was noted by the Court, Nombre1220 did comply with what is established in the cited canon 16, as there is sufficient technical justification regarding the location where the public lighting posts were placed. He expresses that it is evident from the testimonial evidence that an engineer from the Council decided on the location of the posts where they are found, in consideration of a “storm sewer system (sistema de alcantarillado de aguas pluviales)” that runs through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall. He notes that the OIJ expert established that the posts were correctly situated as provided in chapter 7.2.6, Position of Signs, of the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control of SIECA. Therefore, he says, the cited cardinal 16 was not infringed, as there exists, he accentuates, expert evidence that determined that the posts were technically well-placed, even complying with the SIECA manuals.

**XVII.-** In this first argument, the disregarding of various pieces of evidence is alleged. In general terms, the State representative claims that the judges omitted to analyze the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control, as well as the Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Highways, published by the Central American Integration Secretariat in the years 2000 and 2001. He says that these manuals should have been analyzed, especially since Engineer Nombre229498 used them to prepare his report. Regarding the application of these international instruments, the Court established the following: "…it must be indicated from the outset that the Central American Manuals invoked by the plaintiff (that is, the Central American Manual of Geometric Design for Regional Highways and the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control), while it is true they are issued by the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, are not binding on the Costa Rican State. This is because from the beginning, both manuals indicate that what they offer are suggestions aimed at harmonizing construction and highway design criteria and traffic control signs… there is no linkage whatsoever for the State of Costa Rica with respect to the provisions of the referenced manual, nor for the one pertaining to traffic control signs… it cannot be forgotten that the norms in question do not bind the countries; therefore, it is each one of these, according to its internal technical provisions, that will determine how public lighting posts are built and where they are located…" (dictum of the judgment starting at 15 hours 25 minutes). Upon analyzing the referenced documents, the Court is correct when it establishes that, at least, these Central American norms are not binding on the Costa Rican State. Thus, the Central American Manual of Environmental Standards for the Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Highways contains a set of recommendations referred specifically to the need for uniform standards for highway construction in Central America. Following the philosophy of the Manual itself, these norms "must not become a straitjacket nor generate conflicts in their application by the countries; rather, they should offer a solid and technically acceptable guide on the most desirable solutions for the geometric design of regional highways" (chapter I, point 1.2 on the Justification for a Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Highways). All these design patterns were devised to be used by the designer to propose the best technical solution applicable to each road project, taking into account future traffic projections, the physical difficulties to be overcome, habitual maintenance practices, and the availability of resources for the execution of the proposed works. But in themselves, they constitute more of an ideal or model to follow than an imperative of mandatory compliance. Even the Manual under analysis itself affirms that its objective is not for the proposals to serve as a "cookbook for immediate application," but as a reference, so that each specific case must be evaluated. Here it is necessary to recall that these study norms arose due to the lack of national and regional research in Central America on the particular requirements and local characteristics applicable to the geometric design of highways, for which the Consejo Sectorial de Ministros de Transporte de Centroamérica (Comitran) undertook the task of unifying criteria based on the deliberate selection of the most recognized international practices, such as those of the "American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials" (Aashto), the Transportation Research Board (TRB), and the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE), technical contributions from the Federal Highway Administration (FHA), or from the European Union itself. But it also establishes that none of its standards should substitute the good judgment and explicit reasoning of the road designer, which must be expressly supported in each case. In this way, its provisions constitute mere recommendations for the countries of the region on the subject of road safety. On the other hand, the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control arose due to the age of the regulations that were in force until the year 2000, which were already over 40 years old. The Central American Traffic Sign Manual, as the original annex to the Central American Agreement on Uniform Traffic Signs, was approved in 1958 and officially adopted by each country at a later date, so that the changes experienced in the region during recent times rendered those traffic signaling regulations incomplete and outdated. But these rules are also mere recommendations that seek to improve road safety on Central American highways; reduce unnecessary delays caused by traffic congestion; and provide timely and complete guidance to road users uniformly in any of the region's countries (chapter 1, point 1.2. Objectives of the Manual). The foregoing is explained by the simple reason that the local legislation of each country has its own laws and regulations on traffic circulation and the respective fine regime for infractions, therefore, for the application of that Manual, those rules of conduct, control devices, and other authorizations or restrictions established in the legal framework of each country must be considered first. It is thus that the analyzed document is very clear in chapter I on general provisions, point 1.4 on legal aspects, section 1.4.1 on the general legal framework and placement authority, that "…what is prescribed in this Manual is applicable to the extent that it does not contradict the traffic rules in force in any of the countries of the Central American region...". According to what has been set forth so far, it can be concluded that, in effect, the manuals cited by the appellant are not strictly applicable for Costa Rica. They can be applied, but those responsible for their implementation must justify and demonstrate that they represent the best criterion, especially when multiple recommendations and techniques for road construction and the installation of signs and other devices on highways exist at the international level. As things stand, any grievance from the State's representation and from Nombre1220 aimed at the analysis of the norms in both manuals is not admissible. Furthermore, it must be added that during the debate and the closing arguments, all the co-defendants insisted as their main defense on this matter that the norms of the manuals were not applicable in Costa Rica, so they cannot now claim that they be used to justify Nombre1220’s action (during the closing arguments stage, Fuerza y Luz at 15:17, Nombre1220 at 16:34, and the State at 17:00 on August 23, 2011). In fact, the State textually dismissed the application of the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control by saying that it was not relevant for the present case. But independently of the foregoing, it is insisted that the judges leaned toward its non-application as a norm of mandatory compliance, since its precepts are merely suggestions for the States, such that, in one way or another, those defenses of the sued parties on the subject had been addressed. From that perspective, the co-defendants requested the non-application of the international instruments, and the Court so acknowledged, so the analysis of their articles was of no interest. Likewise, the majority of the expert witnesses stated that at the time of installing the luminaires, they were unaware of the existence of the manuals, which ruled out that these were the technical criteria used. Another reason why the analysis of the rules sought should not be undertaken, at least regarding the Procuraduría, is that the order to install a safety barrier in sector four of the highway only affects the Council, not the State. Where joint and several liability does exist between both is in the payment of material and moral damages, but that is a point that will be analyzed in another section. For the reasons stated, the allegation regarding the disregarding of the manuals is unfounded. Consequently, the arguments concerning the report of the OIJ expert witness (from both appellants), the testimonies of engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro in relation to the location of the posts, and any argument regarding the recommended width for the median strip on four-lane highways, regional, urban, or suburban trunk roads, are also not understandable, because to support those, the appellants relied on norms from the Central American Manual for Highway Design, which, as explained, is not applicable in the present matter.

**XVIII.-** In relation to the construction of safety barriers and the speed limits that the State representation claims were not analyzed by the Court (according to official communications DGIT-SV 138-2010 and DGIT-SV-284-2010), this Chamber concludes that the State lacks standing in this aspect, as it is not apparent how the Court's order affects it, given that the obligation to build the guardrails falls exclusively on Conavi, which must face it with its budget according to the provisions of cardinals 3 and 4 of its Law of Creation (Ley no. 7798). In any case, regarding the supposed contradiction of engineer Nombre229498 concerning that in a 40 KPH zone there should be no protection barriers, it must be said that, strangely, at folio 530 of the file, in the questioned official communication, there is a photograph (not challenged) of the right side of the road in the San José-Cartago direction at Terramall, in which a protection barrier with a restricted speed sign of 40 KPH is observed at the edge of the roadway, so the engineer's statement would not be an obstacle for Nombre1220 to build the questioned barrier. The indicated disregarding of evidence is also not present, since, as will be seen below, the OIJ evidence regarding the speed at which the vehicle was being driven, as well as that certified by the reports for speeding violations that driver Nombre229496 had, was indeed taken into consideration by the Court, but to determine the degree of fault held by Nombre1220 and the State. The foregoing has no influence on the obligation that now weighs on Nombre1220 to build a barrier in the zone, because the speed at which Nombre229496 was driving was not a road aspect or factor that had to be taken into consideration by the judges when imposing the order. This is because the need for a containment barrier arises not only from a specific accident, but also from a technical report of a recognized Laboratory in the country. While it is true that the duty materializes with the plaintiff's claim, it must be remembered that the recommendation had existed since 2003, after Nombre109293 conducted a risk study or audit of Dirección13198. The responsibility for the consequences of the accident, where the Court did have to assess the speed of the motor vehicle, is one thing, and the duty that arises from an omission by the Administration is quite another, especially given that there was a technical opinion in between indicating the danger of the posts with rigid bases at the edge of the Florencio del Castillo highway in sector four, Pasoca-Terramall. These are two different issues that were duly analyzed by the Court; one is the omission of the Council, and the other is the degree of fault of the Administration, which was, to a certain extent, mitigated due to the excessive speed at which the crashed vehicle was traveling.

**XIX.-** Now then, the condemnation for the material and moral damage caused to the family of the deceased, the appellants must understand, is not made solely due to the placement of the posts, but mainly due to the failure to apply the recommendations made by Nombre109293 in March 2003 in the "Technical Audit Report on Road Safety, Florencio del Castillo Highway," given that section four of that road (between Pasoca and Terramall) presented an urgent level of attention due to the risk generated by the obstacles present on it, specifically the public lighting posts with rigid bases. An aspect that the expert witness and author of the report himself, Mr. Nombre229498, sufficiently referred to during the debate. While it is true that, to this day, these recommendations are also not of mandatory compliance as per the analysis of articles 5 and 6 of Ley 8114, they do constitute a valid and truthful technical criterion, supported by a laboratory of the Universidad de Costa Rica (specifically, an academic research unit attached to the School of Civil Engineering of that university institution). In accordance with cardinal 16 of the LGAP for the specific case, they are indeed univocal rules of technique that, in its actions, Nombre1220 should have implemented, or at least analyzed, to decide what type of measures would mitigate the risk described therein. Even though the report is dated after the placement of the posts, which date back to early 2002, the Council should have, in one way or another, addressed the recommendations established there, especially since none of them were disproportionate or exaggerated, as it was not established that the structures had to be changed or relocated; the recommended solution was to implement safety mechanisms (protection barriers or containment walls), which are even observed in other sectors of the road or on other national highways such as the San José-Caldera route (according to what was analyzed in the debate).

This Chamber considers that it is not in vain that Law 8114 establishes in the last paragraph of subsection 5, that the Laboratory shall report the final result of the technical audits performed, for "legal purposes" (lo que en derecho corresponda), to the Legislative Assembly, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman's Office. By informing the MOPT, the Council was automatically deemed notified of the report; therefore, it should have taken the necessary actions to address the warning and not simply archive or ignore the document, under the pretext that it is not binding. The foregoing becomes relevant if one considers that a road safety issue is at stake that requires urgent attention, because there are obstacles on the road that represent a danger to drivers and passengers, regardless of the speed at which the former travel, as this is an aspect that will always influence matters of liability, but which does not automatically exempt the State from fault, as will be analyzed in the following considerations. Assuming the foregoing, it must be added that, for the preparation of the report, Mr. Nombre229498 carried out, as he explained at trial, a site study, measurements, and a series of international technical criteria and recommendations were used, mainly those of Aashto. Nombre1220 has never discredited that study through the implementation of other specialized technical criteria; furthermore, to this day, that evidence is still lacking in the case file. The argument that the location of the posts responds to a criterion or "stormwater drainage system" (sistema de alcantarillado de aguas pluviales) that runs through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall is not sufficient to demonstrate that technical rules were followed in its actions within the terms of subsection 16 of the LGAP. First, because that was rather a circumstance or order that arose in the contracting process, so that Fuerza y Luz would place the posts closer to the road according to what the Council's engineers determined at that time; this was even against the criterion of the Company's specialists. On this point, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229499, head of the Public Lighting Department of the Company in 2002, was decisive. He stated that during the contract execution process, there was a supervising engineer from Nombre1220 in charge of defining how to place the posts; that the CNFL was going to place them in the center, but the Council established that this was not possible because there was a drain there; and that the Company generally follows the MOPT's instructions (statements on August 5, 2011, at 12:30 p.m. and 12:42 p.m.). It is for this reason that the Court exonerated the CNFL of liability, ordering that: "The engineers from Fuerza y Luz were clear in maintaining that it was, indeed, a person designated by Nombre1220 to supervise this work, and it was that official of Conavi, whose name was unknown, who determined where the posts should be located, explaining that they were not erected exactly in the center of the median because drains run through there, a reason that justified building them in a site closer to the road edge towards one of the two sides of the center. This being the case, and being clear that Fuerza y Luz was not the one that determined the location of the posts, nor could it determine it under the agreement, but rather, that the one who did so was Nombre1220, we therefore derive from this that the Company's conduct bears, in this case, no relation to the causation of the death of Mr. Nombre229501 ..." (issuance of the judgment at 3:30 p.m.). Secondly, this Chamber insists, the problem at the time this proceeding was initiated does not lie exclusively in the location of the posts, nor the material with which they are constructed, but in the failure to address a problem warned of by the Laboratory since 2003. Given that the technical criterion that the Council had to demonstrate concerns the convenience or not of installing a protection barrier, which was never demonstrated, the recommendation, and based on it, the technique employed by Nombre109293, remains decisive in this regard. Only if there were some convincing report from the Administration would the solutions provided by the Laboratory take a back seat, as there would be a better criterion regarding the warned-of problem, an aspect that, in any case, must be evaluated by the Court in each specific case. But to date, the only criterion in this matter is that of the Laboratory, and that report is conclusive in pointing out that: "the posts were not installed with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, but with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting posts represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and condition of rigidity" (page 27 of the report). The collision risk on that stretch is imminent and requires urgent attention, which is why Nombre109293 recommends "Designing and installing a protection and prevention system against potential collisions at the bases of the road's lighting posts…" (page 30, chapter 5.6 of the report). Hence the importance, it is inferred from the study, of building containment barriers. For these reasons, the Laboratory's report is vital to substantiate the liability of the State and its body Conavi, for failing to comply with the analyzed recommendations, which would surely have lessened the fatal consequences, at least of this accident in that specific sector of the road. This being the case, the Court was correct when it indicated that "In the present matter, a technical criterion was available, namely the report by Nombre109293, and there is no other document, submitted at any other time, that disavows Nombre109293's report. That is, we have a technical document prepared by engineers, validated by a specialized laboratory of a university of recognized prestige that furthermore has said specialized laboratory. And that technical criterion has at no time been refuted by anyone. Thus, the only thing available regarding the risk is precisely that audit report. And in that audit report, it is specified that on the fourth section of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the terms already indicated, there is a high collision risk and a high risk that such a collision will yield fatal results. A warning that was made in the year 2003..." (at 3:34 p.m. according to the recording of the judgment issuance). That was the technical criterion used by the Court to reach its conclusion, which is in accordance with the law and can be classified as the applicable technical rule for the case under examination, since in Costa Rica there is no express legal norm establishing how lighting posts on national roads must be placed, the type of structures to be used, or the protection systems that must be provided. This indicates that the only existing technical criterion is the one establishing that their current location is risky. Furthermore, the study considered, through the criterion of professionals on the subject, the characteristics and behavior of the road, leaving no doubt as to its impartiality and credibility as unequivocal technical rules. Moreover, the expert was emphatic in his testimony that foreign principles and techniques were used to prepare the report. He insisted on the implementation of the technical criteria of Aashto and the European Union, not on the recommendations of the Central American manuals as the State alleges, because the latter, Mr. Nombre229498 asserted, are rules established for the placement of traffic sign posts, not for lighting posts, which must follow other criteria (at 1:15 p.m., 5:48 p.m., 6:25 p.m.; 6:44 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and 8:45 p.m. on August 3, 2011). While it is true that one could indicate that the international standards used by the Laboratory are also recommendations, it is highlighted that by being included in the Laboratory's report, which is furthermore the only criterion regarding the Florencio del Castillo highway, they automatically become a technical criterion for a specific case, which Nombre1220 should at least have analyzed for legal purposes (lo que en derecho corresponda). This audit became significant due to the occurrence of the mishap where Nombre229497 and Nombre229502 died, but it should have been addressed since 2003. Those consequences were expressly warned of by Nombre109293 in the documentation that is questioned here and that Nombre1220 simply ignored. Thus, the alleged pretermission of evidence is not observed, at least regarding the Council's omission to address the risks on the road; nor is the violation of articles 16 of the LGAP, 5, 6 of Law 8114, or 128 of the CPCA observed, and therefore the grievances of the appellants must be rejected.

**XX.-** In the **second** grievance, again for pretermission and improper assessment of evidence, **the State representation** makes a statement regarding the items corresponding to the damages. It points out that, for the Court, the death of Mr. Nombre229497 implied for Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, the loss of their means of subsistence. In its view, that detriment did not occur, and if it existed, it would be only partial, based on the pretermitted documentary evidence, which corresponds to the certification from the National Insurance Institute (el INS or the Institute hereinafter) No. SOA-00272-2010 of January 26, 2010, and the official communication from the CCSS No. AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, previously cited. The judges, it states, considered as proven facts that the average net monthly salary received by Nombre229497 in the last year of his life was ¢325,154.25; that the co-plaintiffs received an aliquot compensation of ¢2,000,000.00 from the INS; and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ¢206,337.60. But the Court, it adds, did not consider that said income does not impair the right of the plaintiffs to receive additional redress for Conavi's alleged omission, for the cause of the first is the application of mandatory automobile insurance, and the other is because the deceased was contributing to social security. The documents establishing the payments from the INS and the CCSS were improperly assessed, because based on them, it explains, it should have been considered proven that the loss of income did not exist to the extent that was deemed demonstrated for setting the quantum of damages. It notes that the three incomes, whether commuted or lifetime, have the same purpose or object. It specifies that the income that Mr. Nombre229497 distributed in life among his dependents was supplied in two ways: by the compensation received due to the death in a fixed amount, and the other, by a lifetime pension for the widow and temporary for the orphans at a percentage of 50% and 30% of the victim's salary. It says that the Court should not have considered the existence of the damages claimed for 75% of the salary that Nombre229497 would have earned in life as confirmed based on the report of the mathematical expert Nombre37311, especially considering, as he acknowledged in his oral report, that he made a calculation without considering the existence of the INS compensation and the CCSS pension.

**XXI.-** On this specific point, the judges resolved the following: *"We have already established that in our criterion, there is a concurrence of fault between the omission by Nombre1220 to comply with the technical provisions of Nombre109293 to make the risk created by the placement of the public lighting posts on Dirección13198 acceptable and the reckless and irresponsible driving of Nombre229496 as causes of the death of Nombre229497 … despite the indicated concurrence, the liability of Nombre1220 and of Nombre229496 is not identical, but rather that of the latter is much greater than that of the former, to the point that for us it represents 65% of the total cause of the death of Mr. Nombre229497, while Nombre1220 assumes the remaining 35%… the death of Mr. Nombre229497 meant for Mrs. Nombre229490, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, the loss of ¢50,252,231.67. This amount corresponds to the material damage effectively suffered by the three said plaintiffs… of that stated amount, Nombre1220 must only respond to the extent of its liability, i.e., of the total amount, Nombre1220 must only pay 35%. Based on this… the National Road Council and the State are jointly and severally ordered to pay, as material damage, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, an amount that, in the execution of judgment, must be indexed from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment and must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries of this compensation…. the State's argument regarding the pension received by Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters, which is from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, becomes unheeded. This is because said pension derives from the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime, and its cause is the mere death of a person who was contributing to the indicated regime. That is, the pension is due to the social security system still prevailing in Costa Rica and does not have as its cause the material damage suffered by the widow and daughters of the deceased… Finally… the National Insurance Institute made a payment in favor of the three said persons, but that payment is due to the application of mandatory automobile insurance (seguro obligatorio automotor). Thus, its cause is also, completely different from the compensation that has been established here, and therefore it is equally irrelevant for the purposes of the right to redress for material damage…"* (Considerando XI from 4:11 p.m. of the judgment issuance). The State alleges pretermission of the INS certification No. SOA-00272-2010 and the CCSS official communication No. Placa43126 where it is recorded, respectively, that the plaintiff received an aliquot compensation of ¢2,000,000.00 from the Institute, and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ¢206,337.60. In reality, the second document, recall, was rejected during the oral hearing, so there could be no pretermission; and regarding the first, what is being alleged is its improper assessment. In the first place, the money that the plaintiff and her daughters receive from the CCSS as insurance for death and orphanhood is due to social insurance for the benefit of all workers, as a fundamental principle of the social rights and guarantees regime, which operates on the basis of mandatory contributions from the State, employers, and workers. This regime is broadly protected in canon 73 of the Political Constitution, 1, 2, 3 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS, 2 of the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance. Thus, it responds to a compensatory system distinct from the one under discussion here. The amount granted by the Court is due to a patrimonial compensation from the Administration for an omission, which is protected in canon 41 of the Magna Carta and 190 of the LGAP. In this regard, this latter norm establishes: *"1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…"*. This concerns the redress for the material damage and the losses caused to the deceased's family, which had not been determined, until this proceeding, in the terms of subsection 196 ibid. The other compensation system is a right of the insured party and their beneficiaries by the mere fact of contributing to the CCSS regime. For its part, the mandatory automobile insurance (Seguro Obligatorio Automotor, SOA) is also different from the compensation claimed by the plaintiff, since it arises by legal imperative, specifically from the Traffic Law on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) (Law 7331, in force at the time of the accident), which vehicle owners must keep current through the payment of a premium set by the Institute. The SOA covers injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not there is liability on the part of the driver. This insurance is collected annually and is a requirement to obtain the vehicle's circulation permit (precepts 38, 40, and 48 ibid). This compensation, therefore, is different from the liability regime established in the General Law of Public Administration, which compensates damages and losses caused to the administered party by legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the State and its bodies (strict liability). That redress is not contemplated by the aforementioned regimes, which operate by operation of law upon the occurrence of the event that gave rise to them; the first as a right of workers and their beneficiaries by the mere fact of contributing to the system; and the second as insurance for the undeniable risk involved in driving a motor vehicle. This being the case, the judgment did not improperly assess the INS certification as the cassation appellant alleges, and therefore the grievance must be rejected.

**XXII.-** In its **third** submission, the **Attorney General's Office** attributes violation of the constitutional norms or principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality. Regarding the percentage of Conavi's liability, it states that the Court considered that the Council's omission did not create a danger comparable to the recklessness, incompetence, and temerity of the driver Nombre229496, which is why it attributed 65% responsibility to the latter for his conduct regarding the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It asserts that the administrative omission was oversized to attribute greater liability than was appropriate. It is evident, it emphasizes, that the expert report and the oral testimony from the OIJ's Forensic Engineering Section were not taken into account. It reiterates that the Court did not appreciate that the cause of death was the excess speed at which Mr. Nombre229496 was driving. It considers that the recklessness, incompetence, and temerity of the driver are the exclusive or determining factor, almost 100%, in the death of Mr. Nombre229497. The location of the post, it alleges, is not the triggering factor for 35% of the death of Mr. Nombre229497 as the judges assessed. The vehicle had recently passed the vehicle technical inspection, and according to the official traffic report, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229503, and the OIJ report, the road was dry, it is flat, straight, and it was daytime, so the sole cause was the conduct of Mr. Nombre229498. It refers that, according to the testimony of Nombre229500, what is advised is to consider the stopping, reaction, or braking distance; thus, the maneuver upon facing a dead dog was to reduce speed, brake, and dodge it; move to the right lane; or have passed with the car centered. However, it criticizes, he maneuvered by invading the green zone without braking. It mentions that Mr. Nombre229496 was driving at a speed of 90 KPH, in an area that is regulated at 60 KPH. For engineer Nombre229498, it states, that limit seeks to reduce the consequences of a collision; even the established speed took into account the condition of the shoulder, stopping sight distance, and pedestrian activity. The forensic expertise, it highlights, referred to several aspects such as: a car at 60 KPH could dodge the dog, at a higher speed it would see a shadow; the speed was the cause of the outcome; at the permitted speed there are no deaths or damages; and, that all drivers know that in front of Terramall that is the speed. Given the foregoing, it considers it unreasonable that the Court exonerated the driver from his responsibility in the death of Mr. Nombre229497 by 35% when it should have charged him with, if not total 100% liability, at least more than 65% because even with the barriers, the death would have occurred. In relation to this, it deems the Central American Agreement on Road Circulation, approved by Law No. Placa43127, articles 3, 3.7, 3.8, and 4, violated due to lack of application, as the Court exonerated Nombre229496 from his obligation to drive without causing danger or harm to persons and to maintain a rational speed within the indicated limits by 35%. Also, article 7, second paragraph, of Traffic Law No. 7331, because the person responsible for the damages and losses was Mr. Nombre229496. Apart from the foregoing, it reproaches that precepts 3 of Law No. 7798 and 12 of the CPCA were violated through erroneous interpretation, by considering that the State must answer civilly together with Conavi for the omission attributed to the Council. As well as articles 199 to 202 and 1046 of the Civil Code, because it was considered that there is joint and several liability in matters of liability between the two. It outlines that if the legislator decided to grant legal personality to Conavi, endowing it with an independent patrimony and giving it freedom to contract separately, it is not possible to attribute Conavi's omissions within the framework of its competence to the State. It argues that in proven facts 5 through 8, it is accredited that the Council contracted the CNFL for the installation of lighting along Dirección3536 and that the agreement included the supervision of road safety aspects. Consequently, it imputes erroneous interpretation of articles 1, 3, and 5 of Law No. 7798/98 and 12.2 of the CPCA. In its view, the Court confused the subsidiary liability that may correspond to the State, when a public legal entity lacks sufficient patrimony to meet its duty, with the premise of the aforementioned norm 12.2, which does not intend to supplant the inquiry into said sufficiency. It adds that just because one has passive legitimation in a proceeding does not mean one must answer for the action. In that same vein, it says the meaning of articles 199 to 202 of Law No. 6227 was confused, which are not aimed at establishing joint and several liability in extracontractual civil liability between the State person and a body person. What they provide for, it points out, is the attribution in all cases to the organization on which the servants depend for actions taken in their name and on their behalf, which is not what operates in the other case. It accuses improper application of canon 1046 of the Civil Code because the legal system that regulates the Administration's activity is independent of civil law, pursuant to norms 3 and 9 of Law 6227, violated through lack of application. That norm, it clarifies, regulates the joint and several obligation to repair damages and losses for criminal offenses and in cases of participation as perpetrator or accomplice, which does not occur in the present matter. Finally, in addition to what was expressed at the beginning of the objection, through a brief submitted on October 10, 2011, which corresponds to an expansion of the appeal, it says the Court violated, indirectly, article 190 of Law 6227, by attributing civil liability to the State and the Council for a non-existent technical omission and by not deeming the causal link broken by the act of a third party, the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496, and by attributing a percentage of 35% liability for the death of Mr. Nombre229497.

It adds, there is no causal link of such gravity with the state conduct, and it is clear that what occurred has not produced an infraction and damage of the amount set.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In connection with the previous allegations, the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Nombre1220</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> criticizes the Court's criterion in naming it, along with the State, as 35% responsible for the death of Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. It says, the Court recognizes that the cause of the accident was provoked by the act of a third party, that is, the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling. It mentions, it was the lack of skill within reckless driving that provoked the fatal outcome. From the evidentiary body, it details, it was demonstrated that Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">disobeyed the permitted speed, and it was the excess speed that caused the loss of control of the car and the collision with the post. In the trial room, it states, the expert Gaudy Vega was asked <span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“if a guardrail -considering the speed the vehicle was traveling- would have avoided the fatal outcome, and her answer was </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">no</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. In its view, it was demonstrated that there is no certainty that even if the guardrail had existed, Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">would not have died.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> For this reason, it warns, it was not the Council that created the risk, but rather the reckless driving “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">of an irresponsible driver</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. It reinforces its allegation with norm 190 of the LGAP. It indicates, for the judges, an exemption from liability is presented, which is the act of a third party. In this way, it argues, there is no reason to try to attribute to Nombre1220 35% liability for the death of Nombre229497, especially since the Court argued its sentence on uncertain situations not proven in the debate. In its understanding, there is no causal link that relates the Council's action to the mishap.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XXIII.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The cassation appellants reproach a violation of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality, regarding the degree of liability assigned to them, but in substance, after</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> ordering the arguments, the objection is also for improper weighing of evidence and direct violation of norms, because in their understanding, the cited evidence is clear in indicating that Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">is solely responsible for the damages claimed by the plaintiff. This is due to the excess speed at which he was driving the vehicle the day of the accident. In relation to this point, in the considerations of the ruling, the judges established the following: “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The way the vehicle ended up, the description of the event, the absence of braking, and also, this is important, the very admission that Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">made about having several tickets, including several for excess speed, reveals to us that he was indeed traveling at a very high speed. The area in which he was traveling has a maximum limit of 60 KPH… Now, Mr. Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">even though he tries to deny it, the truth is that he was traveling at much more than the permitted speed; the excess speed is seen by the impossibility of controlling the vehicle. It is not credible that a vehicle at a maximum speed of 60 KPH would describe the movement as he narrated it…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> there is not the slightest doubt that those 60 KPH were more than disobeyed by Mr. Nombre229496… what happened was a loss of control of the vehicle as a direct consequence of excess speed. But other vehicles had passed at that moment, that morning, and the dog was there, so the supposed unforeseeability effect of not being able to see it is not understood, except for the excess speed that Ms. Gaudy accredited and which, based on the other evidence already mentioned, we estimate is credible</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">…” (reading of the sentence at 3:51 p.m.). In this way, there is no doubt that excess speed on the part of Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">was indeed weighed by the Court, which determined that it was an important cause of the accident that happened in front of Terramall that November 9, 2007. That human factor described by the expert witness Nombre229500, was considered by the judges, since there was abundant evidence in that regard. In that sense, there is the “Criminalistic Analysis Opinion” rendered by Gaudy Vega of the OIJ, as well as her deposition at trial; the records of tickets for excess speed of Nombre229496; the testimony of the bus “checker,” Nombre229504</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, who was at the site the day of the event; as well as the multiple photographs that show how the vehicle ended up after the impact. For these reasons, the judges determined that “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">…yes, there is an omission by Nombre1220, but the driving, and the only one responsible for the driving, is Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. Thus, this Court reaches the conclusion that there is a concurrence of causes in the production of the fatal result. On one hand, the omission of Nombre1220, on the other hand, the driving of Mr. Nombre229496… The reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">does not suppress the omission of Nombre1220, but the omission of Nombre1220 also does not suppress the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496. So both must be considered jointly liable in establishing the causal link between what happened, the omission and the driving, and the resulting death of Mr. Nombre229497.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> Now, this concurrence of causes is not equitable, it is not equal for both parties; it is true that there is an omission by Nombre1220 in addressing a risk pointed out by the University of Costa Rica, but the truth of the matter is that, proportionally speaking, it has not been accredited here that this is a constant collision zone. There are collisions, yes, there is risk, yes, it is high, it can produce fatal results, but it is also not a danger of such magnitude as to equate it to the daring, the lack of skill, and the recklessness of Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. What we are saying in other words is that, balancing both factors, both causes, the reckless conduct of Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">weighs more, considerably more, compared to the omission of Nombre1220...</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">” (reading of the sentence at 3:58 p.m.). Observe that for the Court, there is a concurrence of faults, since on one hand, as analyzed in previous considerandos, there is the omission and neglect of Nombre1220 to heed the recommendations given by the UCR, and on the other, the reckless and imprudent driving of a third party (Nombre229496). According to the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the representation of the State and the Council is not correct, since the conduct of Mr. Nombre229496</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">was indeed extensively analyzed, and furthermore, it has not been the sole and exclusive cause producing the damage claimed here. On the contrary, it would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and the rules of logic and experience, to consider that the Council's omission to fulfill its duty of care and maintenance of the roads, to mitigate a risk that a specialized entity warned of since the year 2003, did not have causal incidence in the death of Mr. Nombre229497. With its omissive conduct, it is emphasized, the Council did not help to mitigate the damages or consequences of this accident, taking into account that the rigid-base posts placed in sector four of the highway constitute true “shields” or “blades” to the detriment of the vehicles that transit there. In the event of a collision, it was demonstrated, the outcomes would be fatal due to their foundation and anchoring that makes them “unbreakable.” The construction methods are not questioned in the judgment, perhaps because indeed there was no clear norm that obligated installation in a specific way, nor was a substitution of the posts for others with breakaway bases being advised in the report, but the least that Nombre1220 could do, when an express recommendation arose in March 2003 about the risk of the structures, was to install safety mechanisms on the road, such as impact barriers or retaining walls. In this way, it is reasonable that the fault of the State and Nombre1220 exists, but it is of a lesser degree, since indeed the main cause of the accident was the reckless driving of the driver (act of a third party). This Chamber has already established in preceding matters that the existence of an exemption from liability, be it force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party, does not automatically imply that the Administration is freed from all liability regarding the reparation of the damage caused (in this regard, one can consult resolution no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8:35 a.m. on September 8, 2011). The foregoing is applicable to the case, since it was not only the driver's imprudence that had an impact on the death of Mr. Nombre229497, but also the conditions created and tolerated by the Council, given that the omissions in the exercise of its powers, specifically not installing the necessary and sufficient road protection measures, facilitated the vehicle where the accident victims were traveling colliding violently with the structure. Due to the speed of the vehicle, perhaps the consequences would have been the same, but that is a fact that cannot be known with exactness, and which also does not exempt the State and Nombre1220 from their duty of road maintenance.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Thus, the gradation of damages performed by the Court is also proportional to the demonstrated facts, so it would not be just and equitable to decrease the percentage of fault of the State and the Council. Their omissive conduct did have an impact on the accident, just like that of the driver Nombre229496. In this way, the pretermission of the evidence pointed out, and the infringement of the norms of Law 3148, 7 of Law 7331, and 190 of the LGAP, do not exist.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XXIV.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">- The other topic of the objection, that is, the solidary liability (responsabilidad solidaria) between the State and Conavi, the Court based it in the following manner: “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The instrumental legal personality that is granted to Nombre1220 is to administer funds and conclude contracts, it is not to commit damages, it is not to cause damages, so that, when it comes to the fulfillment of its functions, it is perfectly understandable that Nombre1220 can assume its liabilities by itself, but in what exceeds its functions and falls into the non-functional sphere, it must respond as the body it is, even if it has maximum deconcentration, with that entity to which it is attached. In this case, although it is true the attachment is to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Ministry of Public Works is not an entity, but rather the Central State is, it is clear that the body with maximum deconcentration of another body is linked in a criterion of imputation by normative provision to the entity to which the Ministry belongs, in this case to the Executive Power and the Central State… in Article 12 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, the joint participation between the body with instrumental personality and the entity to which it belongs is provided for, in this case Nombre1220 and the State, precisely because of the possibility that the conduct of the deconcentrated body that enjoys instrumental legal personality goes beyond its functions and has to respond with another subject, in this case the State… If we had determined a liability of Nombre1220 here, only in the breach of its functions, an error in the management of its budget, an error in a contract, a mistake of that type, we would have no problem in holding only Nombre1220 liable. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> But, facing an administered party for a damage like the one demonstrated here that is totally unlawful, we cannot exclude the solidarity of the State in these scenarios. Solidarity that derives from Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration because, facing the administered party in harmful acts, the Administration is one, even though the specific causer of the damage is Nombre1220</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">…” (final hearing at 4:03 p.m.). By express provision of subsection 2) of numeral 12 of the CPCA, when the proceeding is initiated against a conduct of an administrative body to which instrumental legal personality has been granted, it must also be considered as a defendant party, together with the State or the entity to which it is attached, as appropriate. Within this perspective, the rule is that the figure of the “organ-person,” given its particularities, and for purposes of representation, must be, to that extent, assimilated to the participation within the process of a decentralized entity, insofar as they hold an instrumental legal personality. But the foregoing applies, only, insofar as the conduct imputed to it is within the scope of the deconcentrated competence and with respect to which, it was granted legal personality. In this sense, the provision in numeral 12.2 of the CPCA referred to must be understood as a mechanism through which it is avoided that, after a process, it is determined that the conduct is not within the competence that the body exercises with the coverage of the instrumental personality granted to it, and therefore, it becomes indispensable that the State responds jointly and severally with the body in its quality as the larger entity. On this point, what was ordered by this Chamber in Voto 1202-A-S1-2009 can be cited, in which it was indicated: “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The idea underlying the norm is to avoid the problem for the administered party of defining whether the action (or omissive conduct) of the body was in the exercise of a competence covered by the instrumental legal personality, or outside of it, that is, submitted, for example, to the direction of the head of the entity in whose structure it is inserted. In short, what is relevant is the existence of an injury to the legal sphere of the administered party and the correlative repair duty. In the interest of the victim, the norm orders bringing the body and the entity to the litigation, so that the eventual condemnatory judgment can be executed against the patrimony of the one found liable. If the appearance of both is not required, the ruling would be ineffective, as it could not obligate to indemnify one who has not exercised the defense of their own interests in the process. Stated another way, the procedural mandate only orders that both the body with personality and the State or entity to which it belongs be incorporated into the judicial discussion. It then corresponds to the judge, in accordance with the substantive norms, to determine whether the questioned act, conduct, or negligence was carried out under personality, thus establishing whether it is the body that must respond with its own funds, or whether it is the entity or the State to which the duty to repair must be attributed.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">” Law 7798 says that the Council is a “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">body with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental and budgetary legal personality to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to enter into contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. In this matter, the State itself, through its body Conavi, placed the passengers of the crashed vehicle in a situation of imminent risk of death, a risk that, although materialized by the imprudent conduct of the driver Nombre229496, was also due to the omission to build safety barriers alongside the road. In the same ruling of this Chamber cited in the previous considerando (no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8:35 a.m. on September 8, 2011), this Chamber considered that in cases such as the present one, the degree of liability of the Administration is evident, since the obligation for the maintenance of public roads and the construction of pedestrian bridges corresponds, in this case, to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (now through its deconcentrated bodies), and by not doing so, it not only incurs in abnormality and unlawfulness for breach of its substantive legal obligations, but also because it directly attacks and endangers the life</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> not only of passers-by but also of drivers and passengers, who, without the existence of the indicated material work, find themselves needing to perform inadvertent maneuvers or, worse still, are exposed to unnecessary risks such as crashing against an unbreakable obstacle on the road, whatever the speed. In this sense, it must be highlighted that Article 2 of Law 3155 called “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">” provides, in what is relevant, that: <span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has as its object: a) Planning, building, and improving highways and roads.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Maintaining highways and collaborating with Municipalities in the</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">conservation of local roads. Regulating and controlling the</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">rights of way of existing or projected highways and roads.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Regulating, controlling, and monitoring traffic and transport</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">on public roads.”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Meanwhile, precept 4 of Law 7798 establishes: “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The objectives of the National Road Council shall be the following: a) Planning, programming, administering, financing, executing, and controlling the conservation and construction of the national road network, in concordance with the programs prepared by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. Article 24 ibid proclaims: <span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“All public works financed by the National Road Council will be carried out based on a construction and maintenance administration system for highways and roads (…) the road safety component must be considered and incorporated before its execution, in accordance with the detail that will be carried out by regulation and in a coordinated manner between bodies and entities. As part of road safety, preventions must be incorporated for the safe passage of pedestrians, including those at grade and grade-separated, protection for the safe longitudinal transit of pedestrians along the road, bays for public transport stops, bike paths, in the cases that correspond, and adequate visibility of the roads, including the elimination of obstacles on them and in the right of way thereof, and any other that the Regulation stipulates. To safeguard road safety, consideration must be taken of the urban environment that the roads cross (…) as well as all other elements, the technical specifications, the norms, and the procedures that guarantee the best road safety for pedestrians and drivers…”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. Based on this explanatory and normative framework,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> it is that the State and Nombre1220 have a degree of liability in this matter, which they must jointly and severally bear in accordance with the provisions of canon 190 of the LGAP, since it involves an evident abnormal functioning of the Administration outside the expected conduct of the organ-person. Thus, the reproach concerning the improper application of cardinals 12.2 of the CPCA, 3 of Law 7798, and 199 to 202 of the LGAP must be dismissed.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XXV.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">fourth</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> objection, the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">State</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> expresses that the expertise of the mathematical actuary expert, Nombre37311</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, was not assessed according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), as the expert stated in his oral deposition that the calculation was based on a regulation in whose drafting he had participated and that had been approved by the College of Economic Sciences, finding himself obligated to apply it to avoid a disciplinary sanction, when the truth is that according to official letter no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, the Regulation on which the expert based himself had not even been published, as it was in the process of adjustment and review to be approved. It protests, the expert based himself on a Draft Regulation of Actuarial Calculations that is not a norm of the College. Within the juridical observations or criticisms it makes of the Regulation, it argues, it was based, according to its Article 3, on the civil liability rules of canon 130 of the 1941 Criminal Code, which was repealed by Law no. Placa43128, “<span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">without mentioning its modification by Law 4891</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. Without sound criticism, it affirms, the Court considered reasonable the expert's proposition and his Regulation to indemnify 75% of the salary, given the condition of the deceased as the only source of income for the family nucleus. However, it alleges, for alimony, the salary cannot be liable for more than 50%, according to precept 172.3 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it mentions, numeral 6 of the Regulation on which the mathematical expert's report was based provides for the use of the mortality rate from 2000 from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), without considering that it is the one corresponding at birth. The Court, it comments, had as a proven fact a salary without the social security contributions, but it erred by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on all salary income according to cardinal 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (Law 4351), and it should have therefore set the net amount at ¢321,019.18 and not at ¢325,154.25. It bases the fact of not having been assessed according to sound criticism on the expert's report, for not limiting the economic dependency to 18 or 25 years if the daughters were studying, according to what is precepted in cardinal 173.5 of the Family Code and 12 of the Regulation of Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance. In the same sense, it indicates, it makes no sense for the Regulation to consider indemnification to the economically dependent (Article 2) and for the expert not to limit the retirement age by the CCSS of the deceased, in accordance with Article 5 of the Regulation of Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (65 years). The Court, it asserts, did not properly assess the report in this aspect, since it included in the calculation the age of up to 76.2 years, which includes the commutation factor of 17.21. For these reasons, in its view, the sentencing body had to strip all value and effectiveness from the mathematical expertise presented in writing and from the oral statement that complemented it. By not doing so, it affirms, it disrespected the rules of sound criticism in its assessment, since had the damages existed, it states, it should have left their estimation to the sentence execution phase with a new expertise that deserved credibility. The foregoing, it reproaches, represents improper application of norm 196 of the LGAP, since the existence of damages should not have been considered accredited based on the mathematical expert's report and with pretermission of the INS certification and Official Letters CPCE-JD-746-10 and CCSS AGP-362 cited, at least not in the amount set. At the end of the brief, it summarizes, lack of application of ordinal 172.3 of the Labor Code, by erroneously interpreting with the mathematical expertise rendered that it is possible to indemnify with 75% of the salary, when it is not consistent with the deceased’s living needs and could not mean a contribution to the home of more than 50% of said income. Numeral 173.5 of the Family Code for lack of application, by erroneously interpreting with the mathematical expert that the indemnification of the deceased's minor daughters can consider his income after reaching the age of majority or 25 years if they continue studying. Cardinal 5 of Law 4351 for not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on salary income.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XXVI.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> As clarified previously, official letter no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which deals with aspects of the Regulation on which the expert based his report, was rejected as evidence for a better ruling (prueba para mejor resolver) during the oral and public trial, because the Court considered that that document, despite being dated December 2, 2010, was not incorporated into the process on July 19, 2011, when the expert was extensively questioned on topics related to his expertise, specifically on the Regulation used in the expertise. The judges considered thus that it was not true that before the questioning, the State was unaware of the existence of the regulation used in the report.</span></p> Through the objection, the appellant seeks to incorporate the document into the proceedings again; however, as analyzed in Considerando VI of this ruling, the evidence was requested by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) from the CPCE as of November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the oral and public trial that began on July 19, 2011; therefore, in effect, it was not a document that arose as a result of the debate, but rather was already known to the State. Despite being prepared by that representation prior to the debate, it was not submitted in advance or at least during the expert witness's testimony, the appropriate procedural moment for doing so according to Article 105 of the CPCA. That is the opportunity to discuss expert reports, not afterwards when the stage is already precluded. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the judges briefly analyzed the State's criticism of the expert analysis, on the point that the calculation procedure used has not been adopted by the Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas. Regarding that argument, they held: “…in reality this is not relevant to the present matter, since the assumptions set forth by the expert are reasonable regardless of whether they are contemplated in a regulation or not, which is why this Court does not depart from the expert analysis…”. In this regard, it must be indicated that any analysis regarding the binding nature of the Regulation and the validity of its rules should not have been assessed, firstly, because there was no evidence duly submitted regarding that; secondly, this would leave the opposing party defenseless; thirdly, that was also not the object of the proceedings, since in reality, the Attorney General is not only questioning the expert report, but a good part of the rules of the cited instrument. This last point must be the subject of another proceeding. Now, the expert rendered his report based on the rules and guidelines imposed on him by the Colegio. For this Chamber, there is no evidence indicating the contrary; moreover, from the analysis of the report it follows that the criteria used were authorized by an internal Commission of the Colegio. As the specialist himself reported during the trial, he did not know if the Board of Directors had approved it, but he did know that they were rules that arose during the year 2008 in a forum held by the CPCE, due to the multiple proposals made by the Judicial Branch, since there was a lack of experts in the field, financial rather than actuarial bases were used, among other factors affecting the expert analyses (oral and public trial as of 11:39 a.m. on July 19, 2011). The criterion used, regardless of whether it was approved or not by the Board of Directors of the Colegio, contains technical bases and formulas that arose within the Colegio; indeed, the expert with 38 years of experience, as he narrated in the debate, gave a course on the matter. This data, which was not disproven, means the calculation has sufficient validity and credibility, so the State's criticisms are not accepted. For the purposes of the present matter, the rules of that Reglamento para Cálculos Actuariales para Peritos Autorizados del CPCE constitute more than a legal instrument; they constitute unified technical criteria or foundations for the preparation of mathematical expert reports. In addition to the foregoing, they are also mandatory for actuaries (statements of Mr. Nombre37311 during the trial held on July 19, 2011, as of 11:46 a.m.). It is a rule that the Colegio requires of experts, and non-compliance could generate disciplinary liability for the member. It should be highlighted that there is no other report, nor an express request from the State to perform a new calculation, so the legitimacy of the questioned document is even greater. As a consequence of all the foregoing, the challenges to the liability rules; the total percentages of the deceased's salary taken for purposes of compensation (point 3.d of the report); as well as the rates of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC) used, are aspects that must be dismissed in this proceeding, since these are guidelines regulated by the CPCE itself through its professional association. There is no evidence duly submitted to the proceedings proving the contrary, much less technical evidence indicating that the rules used are erroneous. In any case, it is insisted, the day of the debate, at the time of the expert's questioning, was the appropriate procedural moment to discuss the expert report of Mr. Nombre37311 with valid evidence. However, the State's representation did not present the documentation demonstrating that the percentages, indices, and results of the expert report do not correspond with the technical criterion used. This was attempted after that hearing, on August 3, 2011, when it untimely presented documentation it had available since 2010. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the questioned Regulation could indeed be subject to review in another proceeding, but not in this one, where its binding nature was sufficiently demonstrated, not only for the expert, but for all mathematical actuaries affiliated with the Colegio. Therefore, all the State's grievances referring to the validity and application of the cited regulation must be rejected.

**XXVII.-** In another part of its statement of grounds, the Attorney General alleges that the Court took as a proven fact a salary without social security contributions, but even so, he comments, the judges erred by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that burdens all salary income according to Article 5 of Ley 4351. In the judgment, the judges established the following: “…the first thing that happened with Mr. Nombre229497’s salary, is that the contributions he was required to make for the maintenance of the solidary social security regime were deducted from it; that is, the amounts he was required to contribute… for the disability, old age, and death pension regime or IVM regime; and for the sickness and maternity insurance or SEM, both of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, must be subtracted. After making such subtraction, the liquid salary corresponding to the deceased is obtained, and it is this – that is, the liquid salary – the sum from which the real impact on his widow and daughters can be determined. Well, it happens that in this case, the expert did not deduct those social charges from the salary earned by Mr. Nombre229497 when performing his calculations, but rather started from the gross sums reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social… the operation yields the sum of ¢353,428.58, which is the sum the expert uses as the starting point for his calculations. It happens, for the reasons we explained a little while ago, that this initial figure from Mr. Nombre37311 is erroneous, because it improperly included as net salary two items that the worker does not receive in cash… which are the contribution for the disability, old age, and death regime and the contribution for the sickness and maternity insurance. So that is not part of what he materially contributed to the household…” (dictation of the judgment as of 4:15 p.m.). Up to this point, it can be said that the Court was clear on the point; it even deducted the contributions for the disability, old age, and death pension regime, as well as that for the sickness and maternity insurance. Now, Article 5 of Ley 4351 establishes, regarding the labor fund, that it will be formed by two types of contributions: “a)… a monthly ½ % on remuneration, whether wages or salaries, to be paid by employers, the Branches of Government, and all public institutions; and b)… a monthly 1% on remuneration, whether wages or salaries, to be paid by workers. Employers shall deduct the workers’ contribution and must deposit it in the Bank in the manner and within the time limits determined by the Regulation of this law”. According to this rule, the mandatory savings made by the worker is 1% and not 1.5%, since the remaining ½% is made by the employer. Ley de Protección al Trabajador, No. 7983, which in one way or another came to complement this savings, also established mechanisms to expand coverage and strengthen the CCSS’s Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime as the main solidary system for worker protection. In this sense, the Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias (ROP) was created, which is an individual capitalization system, whose contributions will be registered and controlled by the CCSS’s Centralized Collection System and administered by the operators chosen by the workers. Among the resources with which the ROP is financed are: “…a) The one percent (1%) established in subsection b) of Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by Article 8 of that law has elapsed. b) Fifty percent (50%) of the employer contribution provided in subsection a) of Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by Article 8 of that same law has elapsed…” (Article 13 Ley 7983). Thus, it is clear that Mr. Nombre229497 indeed had to contribute 1% to this system, which should have been considered by the expert when extracting the compensation amounts. The foregoing constitutes an omission on the part of the expert, which the judges also did not appreciate, meaning the State is correct in its argument. This being the case, the amount corresponding to the material damage granted by the Court must be modified, so that instead, the 1% that the worker had to contribute to the ROP is taken into consideration. Regardless of whether there is evidence of this contribution and that it was also not alleged during the trial, the Attorney General is correct in his grievance, since this is an aspect totally distinct from the application of a regulation by the expert, given that it is a percentage that, by legal imperative, the employer must deduct from employees or officials. However, as the judges rightly establish, this error by the expert can be corrected since there is evidence at folio 607 of the judicial file, which is the CCSS contribution study, and because the expert clearly explained the method that should be used to calculate the damages. What must be done is to take each gross monthly salary recorded in said document, and subtract from each one the corresponding IVM, SEM, and ROP contributions, thus obtaining the 12 amounts, one for each month from November 2006 to October 2007 (the last year of Mr. Nombre229497’s life). The 12 figures resulting from the operation of subtracting said contributions are added together and divided by the number of months (i.e., by 12) and yield ¢321,619.96. Next, the same steps as the expert are followed. The sum corresponding to the average salary of the deceased during the year prior to his death is ¢3,859,439.52. From that amount, the 75% corresponding, according to the expert, to the percentage for the support of his family is extracted. That operation yields ¢2,894,579.64. What proceeds now is to multiply that figure by the so-called commutation factor the expert used based on the table at folio 611. As the Court correctly analyzes, if those variables from folio 611 are used and applied for a person who at the time of his death was 36 years old, as was the case of Mr. Nombre229497, the commutation factor is 17.1721. This operation yields the result that at the time of his death, that is, for November 7, 2007, the death of Mr. Nombre229497 meant for the claimants the loss of ¢49,706,011.03 and not ¢50,252,231.67 as resolved by the Court.

Of that amount, the cassation appellants must pay the three beneficiaries equitably, 35%, that is, ¢17,397,103.86. The foregoing is broken down in the following schedule:

Thus, the judgment must be modified solely regarding the total amount corresponding to compensation for material damage, since its calculation did not consider the worker’s 1% contribution to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones), which would yield a result of ¢17,397,103.86 and not ¢17,588,281.08 as ordered by the lower court (Tribunal).

**XXVIII.-** In the **fifth** objection, related to the moral damages (daño moral) awarded in the judgment, the **State** considers that the lower court did not assess the circumstances of the case in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and equality, by finding that a subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) of ¢80,000,000 was caused to the deceased’s two daughters, of ₡35,000,000.00 to the widow, and of ₡20,000,000.00 to the parents. It exaggerates, the amount at which the moral damage was valued, beyond reproaching the alleged unlawful injury caused, artificially elevates the damage so that the State and Nombre1220 must cover what in ordinary terms they would have had to assume if total liability had been attributed to them. It highlights that the circumstances presented do not reasonably, proportionally, and equitably justify compensation of the magnitude established, since it transgressed the limits of judicial discretion. It should have been considered, it indicates, that the plaintiffs’ living conditions were not significantly affected thanks to the CCSS pension they continued to receive. Emotionally, it alludes, the daughters have had the support of their mother and grandparents, of whose impact there is no direct evidence. It adds that three years after the death, the widow remarried, providing the minors with a new figure who serves in a paternal capacity.

It details that the activity attributed to the State and Conavi was not directed at causing the claimed damage, since, it points out, it involves the imputation of neglect based on a technical criterion regarding road safety. It notes that the compensation awarded is unjust for being excessive, turning what should have been adequate compensation into an irrational benefit, thereby violating articles 190 and 196 of the LGAP by lack of application. Article 190, it asserts, because there is no causal link between the state conduct and what occurred; it adds that no damage of the fixed amount was produced. Article 196, because it requires that the damage be effective and, in the amount granted, it adds, it cannot be taken as certain. It qualifies the total sum granted for moral damage (moral damage) (in the amount of ¢47,500,000.00) as disproportionate, inequitable, and unreasonable; therefore, it affirms, the contested judgment is arbitrary, given that, besides transgressing the principles of law, it incurred in an excess of power.

**XXIX.-** From the preceding recital, it is observed that the appellant is dissatisfied, initially, with the award of moral damage (daño moral), and in a second stage, with the amount granted for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo). Thus, the fundamental point of the appeal lies in determining whether the moral damage is proper and, if so, whether the sums granted to each of the claimants for that item conform to the evidence in the record, the rules of sound rational criticism, the legal system, and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness adduced. This Chamber, referring to this type of damage, has indicated that it is associated with states of anguish, despondency, frustration, impotence, insecurity, desperation, anxiety, grief, unease, disillusionment, among others. Their common denominator is suffering or emotional affliction, as it is verified when the sphere of an individual's non-pecuniary interest is injured (in this regard, judgments no. 269 of 9 hours 10 minutes on April 23, 2004, and no. 845 of 10 hours 5 minutes on November 23, 2007, may be consulted). As it presupposes an unjust disturbance of emotional conditions, it does not require direct proof but can be inferred from human presumptions. In this sense, it has been considered: “*Regarding proof of moral damage, the principle is as follows: its existence and gravity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through human presumptions inferred from circumstantial evidence, since the unlawful generating act reveals the moral damage, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage; therefore, it is said that proof of moral damage exists ‘in re ipsa’…*” (judgment no. 112 of 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, cited in judgment no. 000096-F-S1-2009 of 16 hours on January 29, 2009). It is sufficient, on some occasions, for the culpable act to have occurred for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the trial judges, when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. Along the same lines, it has stated: “*…The human presumption is a logical judgment by the judge, by virtue of which a fact is considered probable, based on the general maxims of experience, which indicate the normal way in which things and events occur…*” (judgment no. 878-F-2007 of 8 hours 15 minutes on December 14, 2007).

**XXX.-** In this matter, the Court deemed subjective moral damage proper because Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491 both with the surnames Nombre229491, as well as Nombre229493 and Nombre229492, demonstrated an emotional impact due to the departure of their husband, father, and son respectively. In this understanding, it ordered: “*…we consider that due to the severity and intensity of the damage, the subjective moral affectation of the minors Nombre229491 must in principle be compensated with the indemnity sought by them, that is, the sum of ¢40,000,000.00 for each one of them. For her part, for Mrs. Nombre229490, her subjective moral affectation being somewhat less intense than that of her daughters, we consider that she is in principle entitled to an indemnity of ¢35,000,000.00. However, it must be remembered that the parties causing this damage are both Nombre1220 and Nombre229496, and that the former is only liable for 35% of the damage, for which reason it is that percentage that Nombre1220 must cover jointly and severally with the State, as already indicated regarding the subjective moral affectation generated to the three said plaintiffs. In the case of the parents of Mr. Nombre229497, Mr. Nombre229493 and Mrs. Jeanette Agüero Céspedes, this Tribunal considers that only Mrs. Nombre229490 made a slight reference to what the death of their son implied for them, since Mrs. Nombre229490 stated that he is a pensioner and she is a housewife, making it impossible for them to financially assist their granddaughters. We therefore consider that there was an affectation for them, as it is reasonable to consider that they suffered upon losing their son, but the evidence available in this proceeding only allows establishing a significantly lesser affliction than that of their former daughter-in-law and their granddaughters. Therefore, we consider that for each one of them, an indemnity of ¢10,000,000.00 colones is in principle proper for the subjective moral damage suffered, an amount for which Nombre1220, jointly and severally with the State, is liable for only 35%...*” (issuance of the judgment as of 16 hours 28 minutes). For this Chamber, independently of the circumstantial evidence, which alone is sufficient, regarding the death of Mr. Nombre229497, there is additional proof that demonstrates the anguish, suffering, fears, insecurity, and depression that the plaintiffs experienced as a result of the death of their husband, father, and son. Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughter Nombre229491 testified that the deceased indeed maintained a very good relationship with them and with his parents Nombre229493 and Nombre229492. Mrs. Nombre229491 extensively recounted the emotional and economic difficulties they experienced, especially since from the age of 18 she had lived in marriage with Nombre229497 (at the time of his death she was 31 years old). The death of the minors’ father, it can be inferred from her statement, represented a hard emotional blow for them; they had to radically change their lives, mainly due to the difficult economic situation they went through and because they relocated their domicile from Cartago to San Carlos. Also noteworthy is the change of school that the young woman Nombre229491 had to undergo. Even during the trial, the minor stated that after turning 15, it has been harder to recognize and accept the death of her parent (at 16 hours 28 minutes on July 19, 2011). She expressed how difficult it has been to see her mother work after the accident, since before the incident, she had always been at home with them. In view of both statements, the suffering experienced by the youngest of Mrs. Nombre229490’s daughters was also demonstrated, who still asks for her father because she was barely two years old when the death occurred. The parents of the deceased, it is inferred from Mrs. Nombre229490’s statements, also suffer, although to a lesser extent. However, their status as older adults cannot be ignored either. There is a direct relationship between that moral damage caused to the family of Mr. Nombre229497 and the negligent conduct of the State and Conavi. The foregoing indicates that the judges, when setting each of those sums for subjective moral damage, relied both on human presumptions and on the evidence in the record, which corresponds to the statements of Mrs. Nombre229490 and Nombre229491. The emotional pain that entails the unexpected loss of a loved one who represented a fundamental pillar within the family nucleus, being an excellent husband, father, and son, is undeniable, above all due to the reckless act of a driver and the omission by a State body in heeding the recommendations and warnings of danger existing on the route to Cartago. It is unquestionable that this loss produced an affliction that Mr. Nombre229497’s family will have to face with great difficulty for the rest of their lives. The argument that the plaintiff contracted a new marriage is not acceptable, as it is not a cause that discredits the suffering she experienced at the time, besides the fact that this event forms part of the recovery process to which Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters are entitled, who will never recover the figure of their father. As a consequence of all the foregoing, for this deciding body, the amount granted is reasonable and proportional due to the moral suffering, emotional impact, insecurity, and sadness that the deceased’s family experienced and that is still perceived in the minor daughters. For these amounts, Nombre1220 and the State are jointly and severally liable for only 35%. Taking the amounts corresponding to each one, these are consistent with the pain caused and are adequate to their suffering. In this way, the net sums that Nombre5059 and the Council must pay to Nombre229490 (¢12,250,000), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229493 (¢3,500,000), and to Nombre229492 (¢3,500,000.00) conform to the presuppositions and parameters of proportionality and reasonableness, as they maintain balance and relationship with the injury inflicted, which is the death of a loved one. These sums are fair, proportionate, rational, in accordance with the legal system, as a mechanism for compensating the damage inflicted on the inner emotional sphere of the direct relatives of Mr. Nombre229497. For the reasons stated, the cassation appeal filed regarding the amount of the indemnity granted for subjective moral damage must be rejected.

**XXXI.-** By virtue of the reasoning and exposition, it is proper to reject the appeal of the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) and partially uphold the one formulated by the State. Consequently, the judgment of the Court is annulled insofar as it granted material damage without deducting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution that Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones). In its place, resolving on the merits, the State and Conavi must jointly and severally pay the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491. In all other respects, the appealed judgment remains intact.

**POR TANTO** The evidence for a better decision offered by the State is denied. The appeal filed by the National Road Council is rejected. The appeal of the State is partially upheld. The contested judgment is annulled only insofar as it granted material damage without deducting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution that Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund. In its place, resolving on the merits, the State and Conavi must jointly and severally pay, for material damage, the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491.

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line-height:200%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Nombre11387</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández</span></p> <p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify"><span>&#xa0;</span></p> <p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Nombre165468</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101"> </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p> The special judicial attorney-in-fact of Mrs. Wendy Vega Fonseca argued in the complaint giving rise to this proceeding that, in March 2003, the Technical Road Safety Audit of the National Laboratory of Materials and Structural Models (hereinafter Lanamme or the Laboratory) issued the "Technical Road Safety Audit Report for the Florencio del Castillo Highway," which, in point 5.6 entitled "Presence of Obstacles and Other Lateral Hazards," stated in the pertinent part that: "Rural and interurban highways must have a completely clear zone of sufficient width on both sides of the roadway.

For this clear zone to have sufficient width and be safe, there must be wide shoulders, the ditches and side slopes must have a gentle grade, and furthermore, <b><u>there must be no dangerous obstacle in that zone</u></b>… some elements that limit the clear zone of the highway are:…. <b><u>Public utility poles</u></b>…” </i>(the emphasis is from the statement of claim).&nbsp;&nbsp; In that same audit, he noted, the Laboratory indicated that the lighting poles installed by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz (the Company, Fuerza y Luz, or CNFL in future references) along the entire roadway significantly improved nighttime visibility. However, he criticized, the study warns that “<i>the poles were not installed with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, but with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting poles represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and rigid condition</i>.” For this reason, he highlighted, among the proposed recommendations is: “<i>Design and install a protection and prevention system for potential collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting poles</i>.” He added that on November 9, 2007, Mr. Roy Alexander Monge Agüero died when the vehicle in which he was heading to work, driven by Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo, collided with the poured concrete base that supports one of the poles installed on that highway. He indicated that Mrs. Wendy Vega Fonseca, in her capacity as surviving spouse and mother of the minors Nicole and Jimena, both Monge Vega, filed a probate proceeding, which also includes as presumed heirs the deceased's parents, Jeannette Agüero Céspedes and Fernando Monge Herrera. By resolution at 8:12 a.m. on October 13, 2008, the Civil Court of Cartago appointed Mrs. Vega Fonseca as provisional executor, a role accepted on October 23, 2008 through a resolution at 3:03 p.m. from that same Office. As a consequence of Mr. Roy Alexander's death, he added, a series of pecuniary damages and losses were caused, as well as subjective moral damage to each member of his family, consisting of Mrs. Wendy, his two daughters, and his parents. The moral damage, he explained, was due to the anguish, unhappiness, and affliction experienced. He stressed that due to the event, the deceased's wife and his two daughters show a series of emotional sequelae that even warrant psychological treatment at the San Carlos Hospital. He indicated that the alleged damages and losses (including moral damages) arose as a direct and immediate consequence “<i>of the illegal, abnormal, and inefficient action</i>” of the CNFL and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad (the Council or Conavi hereinafter), which departed from the recommendations provided by the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (Sieca) for the placement of public utility poles, in the document called Manual de Diseños Geográficos de las Carreteras Regionales, and because they disregarded recommendations from the Technical Road Safety Audit report provided by Lanamme, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system for potential collisions with the bases of public lighting poles along the roadway. He said the deceased was the main provider of the family unit, and his death caused a radical change in the life of Wendy Vega, because she had to change her domicile and seek employment, a situation aggravated by the fact that she has no university education or work experience. This situation, he argued, also affected the deceased's parents, as they saw their son's family and granddaughters have to move from Cartago to San Carlos due to the economic and emotional situation experienced. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:200%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>II.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> Based on the foregoing, he sued Fuerza y Luz, Conavi, and the State and requested that the judgment declare: a) The claim is admitted. b) The lighting poles installed by the defendant administrations along the Florencio del Castillo highway represent a serious hazard in case of collision, due to their rigidity, lack of protection, and lack of signage. c) The lack of oversight by the Council and the State regarding the correct execution of the works developed for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo. d) The joint and several liability of the co-defendants for the damages and losses caused, as a consequence “<i>of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient action</i>.” e) The co-defendants be ordered to design and install a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles along the Florencio del Castillo roadway. f) The Company must install lighting poles along any highway with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, or failing that, build a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the structures. g) Both costs of the proceeding are to be borne jointly and severally by the co-defendants. He estimated the damages and losses prudentially as follows: ₡194,610,432.00 for damages, ₡200,000,000.00 for subjective moral damage (₡40,000,000.00 for each family member), and ₡50,000,000.00 for psychological damage (₡10,000,000.00 per person). The defendants answered in the negative. The Council raised defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations; the State raised lack of passive standing, interest, right, and statute of limitations; for its part, the Company raised lack of right and passive standing. The Court upheld the defense of lack of right alleged by Fuerza y Luz, thus declaring the claim dismissed. It rejected the statute of limitations defenses raised by the Council and the State, as well as the defenses of lack of interest, passive standing, and active standing alleged by the latter. It partially upheld the lack of right defense argued by both the Council and the State, being understood as denied in that which was granted to the plaintiff. Consequently, it declared the claim partially admitted. It ordered the Council and the State jointly and severally to pay: 1) To the plaintiff and her daughters, for material damage, the sum of ₡17,588,281.08, an amount to be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries and indexed in the enforcement of judgment phase, from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment. 2) By virtue of the subjective moral damage caused to Wendy Vega Fonseca, the sum of ₡12,250,000.00; to Nicole Natalia Monge Vega and to María Jimena Monge Vega the amount of ₡14,000,000.00 each; to Jeannette Agüero Céspedes and Fernando Monge Herrera, the figure of ₡3,500,000.00 each; amounts to be indexed in the enforcement of judgment from the date the ruling becomes final until its effective payment. 3) Both costs of the proceeding. Furthermore, it ordered the Council to build and install, within six months from the date the judgment becomes final, a containment barrier on the Florencio del Castillo highway (on the stretch between Terra Mall and Pasoca), in both the Cartago–San José and San José–Cartago directions. The condemned parties file a cassation appeal based on procedural and substantive violations. […] </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:200%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>XVIII.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> Regarding the construction of safety barriers and the speed limits that the State representation says were not analyzed by the Court (according to official letters DGIT-SV 138-2010 and DGIT-SV-284-2010), this Chamber concludes that the State lacks interest in this aspect, as it does not appear how the Court's order affects it, if the obligation to build the guardrails falls exclusively on Conavi, which must cover them with its budget according to the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of its Law of Creation (Law no. 7798). In any case, regarding the alleged contradiction of engineer Valverde concerning the notion that no protective barriers should exist in a 40KPH zone, it must be said that, oddly enough, on folio 530 of the case file, in the questioned official letter, there is a photograph (not challenged) of the right side of the roadway in the San José-Cartago direction by Terramall, in which a protective barrier with a restricted speed sign of 40KPH is observed at the edge of the road, so the engineer's statement would not be an obstacle for Conavi to build the questioned barrier. The alleged omission of evidence is not present either, because, as will be seen later, the evidence from OIJ regarding the speed at which the vehicle was driven, as well as that certified by the speeding citations of driver Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo, were indeed taken into consideration by the Court, but to determine the degree of fault of Conavi and the State. The foregoing in no way influences the obligation now incumbent upon Conavi to build a barrier in the zone, because the speed at which Juan Octavio was driving was not a road aspect or factor that the judges had to take into consideration when imposing the order. This is because the need for a containment barrier does not arise solely from a specific mishap, but also from a technical report by a recognized Laboratory of the country. While it is true the duty materializes with the plaintiff's claim, it must be remembered that the recommendation existed since 2003, after Lanamme conducted a risk study or audit of the Florencio del Castillo highway. One thing is the liability for the consequences of the accident, where the Court did have to assess the motor vehicle's speed, and quite another is the duty arising from an omission by the Administration, especially since there was a technical opinion indicating the danger of poles with rigid bases at the edge of the Florencio del Castillo highway in sector four Pasoca-Terramall. These are two different issues that are duly analyzed by the Court: one is the Council's omission, and the other is the degree of fault of the Administration, which was somewhat attenuated due to the excessive speed at which the wrecked vehicle was traveling.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:200%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>XIX.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> Now then, the appellants must understand that the condemnation for the material and moral damage caused to the deceased's family is not made solely for the placement of the poles, but mainly for the failure to apply the recommendations given by Lanamme in March 2003 in the “Informe de Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial Carretera Florencio del Castillo,” since section four of that roadway (between Pasoca and Terramall) presented an urgent level of attention due to the risk generated by the obstacles present on it, specifically the public lighting poles with rigid bases. An aspect that the very expert and author of the report, Mr. Germán Valverde, referred to sufficiently during the trial. While it is true that to this day these recommendations are also not mandatory according to what is derived from the analysis of articles 5 and 6 of Law 8114, they do constitute a valid and truthful technical criterion, backed by a laboratory of the University of Costa Rica (specifically an academic research unit attached to the School of Civil Engineering of that university institution). In accordance with article 16 of the LGAP for the specific case, they are unequivocal technical rules that Conavi, in its actions, should have implemented or at least analyzed to decide what type of measures would mitigate the risk described therein. Although the report is dated after the placement of the poles, which date from early 2002, the Council had one way or another to address the recommendations established therein, especially since none of them were disproportionate or exaggerated, given that it was not established that the structures had to be changed or relocated; the recommended solution was to implement safety mechanisms (protective barriers or retaining walls), which are even seen in other sectors of the roadway or on other national highways such as the San José–Caldera highway (as analyzed in the trial). This Chamber considers that it is not in vain that Law 8114 establishes in the last paragraph of article 5 that the Laboratory shall report for “<i>what legally corresponds</i>,” to the Asamblea Legislativa, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), the Contraloría General de la República, and the Defensoría de los Habitantes, the final result of the technical audits carried out. By informing the MOPT, the Council was automatically deemed notified of the report; therefore, it should have taken the necessary actions to address the warning and not simply file away or ignore the document, under the pretext that it is not binding. The foregoing becomes relevant if one considers that a matter of road safety is involved that requires urgent attention, because there are obstacles on the roadway that represent a danger to drivers and passengers, regardless of the speed at which the former travel, as this is an aspect that will always influence liability issues but does not automatically exempt the State from fault, as will be analyzed in the following considerations. Given the foregoing, it must be added that in preparing the report, Mr. Valverde González carried out, as he explained at trial, a site study, measurements, and used a series of international technical criteria and recommendations, mainly those of the Aashto. Conavi has never discredited that study through the implementation of other technical and specialized criteria; moreover, to this day, such evidence is lacking from the case file. The argument that the location of the poles responds to a criterion or “<i>stormwater drainage system</i>” that passes through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall is not sufficient to demonstrate that its actions followed technical rules within the terms of article 16 of the LGAP. First, because that was rather a circumstance or order that arose in the contracting process, so that Fuerza y Luz would place the poles closer to the roadway according to what the Council's engineers determined at that time; this was even against the criterion of the Company's specialists. On this point, the testimony of Mr. Guillermo Ureña Granados, head of the Public Lighting Department of the Company in 2002, was decisive, stating that during the contract execution process, there was a supervising engineer from Conavi in charge of defining how to place the poles; that the CNFL was going to locate them in the center, but the Council established that this was not possible because there was a drain there; and that the Company generally complies with MOPT's instructions (statements on August 5, 2011, at 12:30 p.m. and 12:42 p.m.). It is for this reason that the Court exonerated the CNFL from liability, ordering that: “<i>The engineers from Fuerza y Luz were clear in maintaining that it was, effectively, a person designated by Conavi to supervise this work, and it was that Conavi official, whose name was not known, who ordered where the poles should be located, explaining that they were not erected in the exact center of the median because drains pass through there, a reason that justified building them in a site closer to the edge of the roadway toward one of the two sides of the center. This being the case, and having clear that Fuerza y Luz did not determine, nor could it determine by the agreement, the location of the poles, but rather that it was Conavi who did so, we then derive from this that the Company's conduct bears, in this case, no relationship to the causation of the death of Mr. Roy Alexander Monge Vega…</i>” (rendition of judgment at 3:30 p.m.). Secondly, this Chamber insists, the problem at the time this proceeding was filed does not lie exclusively in the location of the poles, nor the material with which they are built, but in the failure to address a problem warned of by the Laboratory since 2003. The technical criterion that the Council had to demonstrate concerns the advisability or not of installing a protective barrier, which was never demonstrated; therefore, the recommendation and, based on it, the technique used by Lanamme remains determinative in this regard. Only if a convincing report from the Administration existed, would the solutions provided by the Laboratory take a back seat, as there would be a better criterion regarding the warned-about problem, an aspect that, in any case, the Court must assess in each specific case. But to date, the only criterion on this matter is that of the Laboratory, and that report is conclusive in pointing out that: “<i>the poles were not installed with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, but with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting poles represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and rigid condition</i>” (page 27 of the report). The collision risk on that stretch is imminent and requires urgent attention, which is why Lanamme recommends “<i>Design and install a protection and prevention system for potential collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting poles…</i>” (page 30, chapter 5.6 of the report). Hence the importance, it is inferred from the study, of building containment barriers. For these reasons, the Laboratory's report is vital to prove the liability of the State and its body Conavi, for not abiding by the analyzed recommendations, which would surely have diminished the fatal consequences, at least of this accident in that specific sector of the highway. Thus, the Court was correct when it indicated that “<i>In the present matter, we had a technical criterion, which is the Lanamme report, and there is no other document, issued at any other time, that overrules the Lanamme report. That is, we have a technical document prepared by engineers, validated by a specialized laboratory of a university of recognized prestige that also has that specialized laboratory. And that technical criterion has never been refuted by anyone. So the only thing available in relation to the risk is precisely that audit report. And in that audit report, it is specified that in the fourth section of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the terms already indicated, there is a high risk of collision and a high risk that such a collision will bring fatal results. A warning made in the year 2003</i>...” (at 3:34 p.m., according to the recording of the judgment rendition). That was the technical criterion used by the Court to reach its conclusion, which is in accordance with law and can be classified as the technical rule applicable to the case under examination, since in Costa Rica there is no express legal norm that establishes how lighting poles should be placed on national highways, the type of structures to be used, or the protection systems that must be provided. This means the only existing technical criterion is the one establishing that their current location is risky. Additionally, the study considered, through the criterion of professionals in the field, the characteristics and behavior of the roadway, leaving no doubt as to its impartiality and credibility as unequivocal technical rules. Moreover, the expert was emphatic in his testimony that to prepare the report, foreign principles and techniques were used. He insisted on the implementation of the technical criteria of the Aashto and the European Union, not the recommendations of the Central American manuals as the State alleges, because these last, Mr. Germán assured, are rules established for the placement of traffic signal poles, not for lighting poles, which must follow other criteria (at 1:15 p.m., 5:48 p.m., 6:25 p.m., 6:44 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and 8:45 p.m. on August 3, 2011). While it is true that one could indicate that the international standards used by the Laboratory are also recommendations, it is highlighted that, being contemplated in the Laboratory's report, which is also the only criterion referring to the Florencio del Castillo highway, they automatically make it a technical criterion for a specific case, which Conavi should at least have analyzed for what legally corresponds. This audit became transcendent due to the occurrence of the mishap where Roy Alexander Monge Agüero and Karla Muñoz Piedra died, but it should have been addressed since 2003. Those consequences were expressly warned of by Lanamme in the documentation questioned here, and which Conavi simply ignored. In this manner, the alleged omission of evidence is not observed, at least regarding the Council's omission to address the risks on the roadway; nor is the violation of articles 16 of the LGAP, 5 and 6 of Law 8114, or 128 of the CPCA, so the grievances of the appellants must be rejected.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:200%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>XX.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> In the <b>second</b> grievance, also for omission and improper evaluation of evidence, <b>the State representation</b> speaks regarding the categories corresponding to damages. It points out that for the Court, the death of Mr. Monge Agüero meant for Mrs. Wendy and her daughters, Nicole and Jimena, the loss of their means of subsistence. In its criterion, that detriment did not occur, and if it existed, it would be only partial, based on the omitted documentary evidence corresponding to the certification of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (the INS or the Institute hereinafter) no. SOA-00272-2010 of January 26, 2010, and the official letter from the CCSS no. AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, previously cited. The judges, it states, held as proven facts that the average monthly net salary received by Roy Alexander in the last year of his life was ₡325,154.25; that the co-plaintiffs received a proportional indemnity of ₡2,000,000.00 from the INS; and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ₡206,337.60. But the Court, it adds, did not consider that said income does not undermine the claimants' right to receive additional compensation for the alleged omission of Conavi, because the cause of the first is the application of mandatory insurance, and the other because the deceased was contributing to social security. The documents establishing the payments from the INS and the CCSS were improperly evaluated, because based on them, it explains, it should have been considered proven that the loss of income did not exist to the magnitude that was taken as demonstrated to set the quantum of the damages. It notes that the three incomes, whether commuted or lifetime, have the same purpose or object.

It specifies that the income that Mr. Monge Agüero distributed among his dependents during his lifetime was replaced in two ways: by the compensation received due to the death in a fixed amount, and the other, by a lifetime pension for the widow and a temporary one for the orphaned daughters at a percentage of 50% and 30% of the victim's salary. It states that the Court should not have considered the existence of the damages claimed for 75% of the salary that Roy Alexander would have earned in life to be confirmed based on the report of the mathematical expert Mario Herrera, especially if it is taken into account, as he acknowledged in his oral report, that he made a calculation without considering the existence of the compensation from the INS and the pension from the CCSS.

**XXI.-** On this specific point, the judges resolved the following: *"We have already established that in our opinion there is a concurrence of fault between the omission of Conavi to comply with the technical provisions of Lanamme to make the risk created by the placement of public lighting poles on the Florencio del Castillo highway acceptable, and the reckless and irresponsible driving of Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo as causes of the death of Roy Alexander Monge Agüero… despite the indicated concurrence, the responsibility of Conavi and Juan Octavio is not identical; rather, the latter's is much greater than the former's to such an extent that for us it represents 65% of the total cause of Mr. Monge Agüero's death, while Conavi assumes the remaining 35%… the death of Don Roy meant for Doña Wendy, Nicole Natalia and María Jimena, the loss of ¢50,252,231.67. This amount is what corresponds to the material damage (daño material) actually suffered by the three said plaintiffs… from the said figure, Conavi must only answer to the extent of its responsibility, that is, of the total amount, Conavi only has to pay 35%. Based on this… the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) and the State are jointly and severally ordered to pay, for material damage, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08 in favor of Wendy Vega Fonseca, Nicole Natalia Monge Vega and María Jimena Monge Vega, an amount that at the execution of sentence stage must be indexed from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment and must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries of this compensation…. the State's allegation in relation to the pension that Mrs. Vega Fonseca and her daughters receive, which is from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, becomes untenable. This is because said pension derives from the Disability, Old Age, and Death (Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) regime and the cause thereof is the mere death of a person who was contributing to the indicated regime. That is, the pension is due to the social security system still in force in Costa Rica and does not have as its cause the material damage experienced by the widow and daughters of the deceased… Finally… the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) made a payment in favor of the three said persons, but that payment is for the application of mandatory automobile insurance (seguro obligatorio automotor). So the cause thereof is also completely different from the compensation (indemnización) that has been established here, for which reason it becomes equally inconsequential for the purposes of the right to reparation (resarcimiento) of the material damage…"* (Recital XI starting at 16:11 of the judgment dictation). The State claims pretermission of the certification from the INS no. SOA-00272-2010 and of the official letter from the CCSS no. AGP-362, which respectively state that the plaintiff received a prorated compensation of ¢2,000,000.00 from the Institute, and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ¢206,337.60. In reality, the second document, it should be remembered, was rejected during the debate so there could be no pretermission; and regarding the first, what is alleged would be an improper valuation. First of all, the money that the plaintiff and her daughters receive from the CCSS as death and orphan's insurance is due to social insurance for the benefit of all workers, as a fundamental principle of the regime of social rights and guarantees, which operates based on the forced contribution of the State, employers, and workers. This regime is amply protected in canon 73 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 1, 2, 3 of the Constitutive Law (Ley Constitutiva) of the CCSS, and 2 of the Regulations of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte). So it responds to a compensatory system distinct from the one being discussed here. The amount granted by the Court is due to a patrimonial compensation by the Administration (Administración) for omissive conduct, which is protected in canon 41 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) and 190 of the LGAP. In this regard, this latter norm establishes: *"1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim (culpa de la víctima) or act of a third party (hecho de un tercero)…"*. It concerns the reparation of the material damage and the losses caused to the family of the deceased and which, until this process, had not been determined in the terms of cardinal 196 ibidem. The other compensation system is a right of the insured and their beneficiaries for the mere fact of contributing to the regime of the CCSS. For its part, the mandatory automobile insurance (SOA) is also distinct from the compensation claimed by the plaintiff, since it arises by legal imperative, namely from the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, Ley 7331, in force at the time of the accident) which vehicle owners must keep in force by paying a premium set by the Institute. The SOA covers the injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not there is driver liability. This insurance is collected annually and is a requirement to obtain the vehicle's circulation permit (precepts 38, 40 and 48 ibidem). This compensation, therefore, is different from the liability regime established in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which compensates damages and losses caused to the administered party by the legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation of the State and its bodies (strict liability - responsabilidad objetiva). That reparation is not contemplated by the previous regimes, which operate by operation of law when the event that originated them occurs; the first as a right of workers and their beneficiaries for the mere fact of contributing to the system; and the second as insurance for the undeniable risk involved in driving a motor vehicle. This being the case, the judgment did not improperly value the certification from the INS as the cassation appellant claims, so the grievance must be rejected.

**XXII.-** In its **third** argument, the **Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría)** attributes violation of the constitutional norms or principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality. Regarding the percentage of Conavi's liability, it states, the Court considered that the Council's omission did not generate a danger such as to equate it to the daring, lack of skill, and recklessness of the driver Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo, therefore attributing to the latter 65% responsibility for his conduct, regarding the death of Mr. Monge Agüero. It asserts that the administrative omission was oversized to saddle it with greater responsibility than it should have borne. It is evident, it emphasizes, that the expert report and the oral deposition of the Forensic Engineering Section (Sección de Ingeniería Forense) of the OIJ were not taken into account. It reiterates that the Court did not appreciate that the cause of the death was the excessive speed at which Don Juan Octavio was driving. It considers that the imprudence, lack of skill, and recklessness of the driver are the exclusive or determining factor in almost 100% of Mr. Monge's death. The location of the pole, it alleges, is not the triggering factor for 35% of Mr. Monge Agüero's death as the judges appreciated. The vehicle had recently passed the technical vehicle inspection, and according to the official traffic report, the testimony of Mr. Salguero Quirós and the OIJ report, the road was dry, it is flat, straight, and it was daytime, so the only cause was the conduct of Mr. Valverde. It refers, according to the testimony of Iván Pastrana, what is advised is to take into account the stopping, reaction, or braking distance; thus, the maneuver when faced with a dead dog was to reduce speed, brake, and dodge it; move to the right lane; or have passed with the car centered. However, it criticizes, he maneuvered by invading the green zone without braking. It mentions that Mr. Valverde Castillo was driving at a speed of 90 KPH, in a zone that is regulated at 60 KPH. For the engineer Valverde González, it states, that limit tries to reduce the consequences of a collision; the set speed even took into account the condition of the shoulder (espaldón), stopping sight distance, and pedestrian activity. The forensic expertise, it highlights, referred to several aspects such as: a car at 60 KPH could dodge the dog, at a higher speed it would see a shadow; the speed was the cause of the outcome; at the permitted speed there are no deaths or damages; and, that all drivers know that in front of Terramall that is the speed. In view of the above, it considers unreasonable that the Court exonerated the driver from his responsibility in the death of Mr. Monge Agüero by 35% when it should have assigned him, if not a total responsibility of 100%, one greater than 65% because even with barriers, the death would have occurred. In relation to this, it deems the Central American Agreement on Highway Circulation, approved by Law no. 3148/63, articles 3, 3.7, 3.8 and 4, infringed by lack of application, because the Court exonerated Juan Octavio by 35% from his obligation to drive without causing danger or harm to persons and to maintain a reasonable speed within the indicated limits. Also ordinal 7, second paragraph of the Transit Law no. 7331, because the person responsible for the damages and losses was Mr. Valverde Castillo. Apart from the above, it reproaches as violated by erroneous interpretation precepts 3 of Law no. 7798 and 12 of the CPCA, considering that the State must respond civilly jointly with Conavi, for the omission attributed to the Council. As well as numerals 199 to 202 and 1046 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) for appreciating that there is joint and several liability in tort matters between both. It outlines, if the legislator decided to grant Conavi legal personality (personalidad), endowing it with an independent patrimony and giving it freedom to contract separately, it is not possible to attribute to the State the omissions of the former within the framework of its competence. It argues, in the demonstrated facts 5 to 8, it is accredited that the Council contracted the CNFL for the placement of the lighting on the Florencio del Castillo highway and that what was agreed included the supervision of road safety aspects. Consequently, it imputes erroneous interpretation of articles 1, 3 and 5 of Law no. 7798/98 and 12.2 of the CPCA. In its view, the Court confused the subsidiary liability that may correspond to the State, when a public legal entity lacks sufficient patrimony to meet its duty, with the scenario of the mentioned norm 12.2 which does not intend to substitute the inquiry into that sufficiency. It adds, just because one has passive legitimation in a process does not mean one must be held to answer for the action. In that same line of thought, it says the meaning of cardinals 199 to 202 of Law no. 6227 was confused, which are not aimed at establishing joint and several liability in non-contractual civil liability between the State-person and an organ-person. What they foresee, it points out, is the imputation in all cases to the organization on which the servants depend for actions taken in its name and on its behalf, which is not what operates in the other case. It accuses improper application of canon 1046 of the Civil Code because the legal system that regulates the activity of the Administration is independent of civil law, in accordance with norms 3 and 9 of Law 6227 violated by lack of application. That norm, it clarifies, regulates the obligation to jointly repair damages and losses for criminal offenses and in case of participation as perpetrator or accomplice, which does not occur in the present matter. Finally, in addition to what was expressed at the beginning of the objection, by means of a brief filed on October 10, 2011, which corresponds to an extension of the appeal, it says, the Court indirectly violated article 190 of Law 6227, by attributing to the State and the Council a civil liability for a non-existent technical omission and by not considering the causal link broken by the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero), the reckless driving of Mr. Juan Valverde, as well as by attributing a percentage of 35% responsibility in the death of Mr. Monge. It adds, there is no causal link of such seriousness with the state conduct and it is clear that what happened has not produced an infraction and damage of the set amount. Linked to the previous allegations, **Conavi** criticizes the Court's criterion in pointing it out along with the State as 35% responsible for the death of Don Roy Alexander Monge Agüero. It says, the Court recognizes that the cause of the accident was caused by the act of a third party, that is, the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling. It mentions, it was the lack of skill within reckless driving that caused the fatal outcome. From the evidentiary list, it details, it was demonstrated that Juan Octavio Valverde disrespected the permitted speed and it was the excessive speed that caused the loss of control of the car and the collision with the pole. In the courtroom, it states, the expert Gaudy Vega was asked *"if a guardrail -considering the speed the vehicle was carrying- would have avoided the fatal outcome, and her answer was **no**"*. In its opinion, it was demonstrated that there is no certainty that even if the guardrail had existed, Mr. Monge Agüero would not have died. For this reason, it warns, it was not the Council that created the risk, but the reckless driving *"of an irresponsible driver"*. It reinforces its allegation with norm 190 of the LGAP. It indicates, for the judges, an exonerating circumstance of liability is presented, such as the act of a third party. In this way, it argues, there is no reason to want to attribute to Conavi 35% responsibility for the death of Roy Alexander, especially since the Court based its conviction on uncertain situations not proven in the debate. In its understanding, there is no causal link relating the Council's action with the mishap.

**XXIII.-** The cassation appellants reproach violation of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality, regarding the degree of responsibility attributed to them, but in essence, after ordering the arguments, the objection is also for improper valuation of the evidence and direct violation of norms, because in their understanding, the cited evidence is clear in pointing out that Juan Octavio is the sole party responsible for the damages claimed by the plaintiff. This is due to the excessive speed at which he was driving the vehicle on the day of the accident. In relation to this point, in the considerations of the ruling the judges established the following: *"The way the vehicle ends up, the description of the event, the absence of braking and also, this is important, the admission that Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo himself made about having several tickets, including several for excessive speed, reveals to us that he was indeed traveling at very high speed. The area in which he was traveling has a maximum limit of 60 KPH… Now, Don Juan Octavio, although he tries to deny it, the truth is that he was traveling well above the permitted speed; the excessive speed is appreciated by the impossibility of controlling the vehicle. It is not credible that the vehicle at a maximum speed of 60 KPH would describe the movement as he narrated it… there is not the slightest doubt that those 60 KPH were more than disrespected by Don Juan Octavio… what happened was a loss of control of the vehicle as a direct consequence of the excessive speed. But other vehicles had passed at that moment, that morning, and the dog was there so the supposed unforeseeability effect of not being able to see it is not understood, except for the excessive speed that Doña Gaudy accredited and which, based on the other evidence already mentioned, we consider is credible…"* (judgment dictation at 15 hours 51 minutes). Thus, there is no doubt that the excessive speed by Juan Octavio was valued by the Court, which determined it was an important cause of the accident that occurred in front of Terramall on that November 9, 2007. That human factor described by the expert witness Iván Pastrana was considered by the judges, since there was abundant evidence in this regard. In this sense, there is the "Criminalistic Analysis Opinion" rendered by Gaudy Vega of the OIJ, as well as her deposition at trial; the records of tickets for excessive speed for Juan Octavio; the testimony of the bus "checker," David Moisés Salguero, who was at the site on the day of the event; as well as the multiple photographs that show how the vehicle ended up after the impact. For these reasons, the judges determined that *"…there is indeed an omission by Conavi, but driving and the only person responsible for the driving is Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo. As such, this Court concludes there is a concurrence of causes in the production of the fatal result. On one hand, Conavi's omission, on the other hand, Don Juan Octavio's driving… Don Juan Octavio's reckless driving does not eliminate Conavi's omission, but Conavi's omission also does not eliminate Don Juan Octavio's reckless driving. Therefore, both must be considered as jointly responsible in establishing the causal nexus between what happened, the omission and driving, and the result of Don Roy Alexander's death. Now, this concurrence of causes is not equitable, it is not equal for both parties; it is true that there is an omission by Conavi in attending to a risk pointed out by the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), but the truth of the matter is that proportionally speaking, it has not been accredited here that this is a constant collision zone. There are collisions, yes there is risk, yes it is high, yes it can produce fatal results, but neither is it a danger of such magnitude as to equate it to the daring, lack of skill, and recklessness of Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo. What we are saying in other words is that compensated both factors, both causes, the reckless conduct of Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo weighs more, considerably more, compared to Conavi's omission..."* (judgment dictation at 15 hours 58 minutes). It is observed that for the Court there is a concurrence of fault (concurrencia de culpas), since on one hand, as analyzed in previous recitals, there is the omission and neglect by Conavi to comply with the recommendations given by the UCR and on the other hand, the reckless and imprudent driving of a third party (Juan Octavio). According to the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the representation of the State and the Council is not correct, since Don Juan Octavio's conduct was indeed amply analyzed, and moreover, it was not the sole and exclusive cause producing the damage claimed here. On the contrary, it would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, to the rules of logic and experience, to consider that the Council's omission to fulfill its duty of care and maintenance of the roads, to mitigate a risk that a specialized entity warned about since 2003, had no causal impact on the death of Don Roy Alexander. With its omissive conduct, it is emphasized, the Council did not help to mitigate the damages or consequences of this accident, taking into account that the rigid-base poles placed in sector four of the highway constitute true "shields" or "blades" to the detriment of vehicles that transit there. In case of a collision, it was demonstrated, the outcomes would be fatal due to their foundation and anchoring that makes them "unbreakable." The construction methods are not questioned in the judgment, perhaps because indeed, there was no clear norm obligating them to be installed in a certain way, nor was the report advising a substitution of the poles for others with breakaway bases, but the least Conavi could have done when an express recommendation arose in March 2003 about the risk of the structures was to install safety mechanisms on the road, such as impact barriers or containment walls. In this way, it is reasonable that the fault of the State and Conavi exists, but it is of a lesser degree, since indeed the main cause of the mishap was the reckless driving of the driver (act of a third party). This Chamber has already established in previous matters that the fact that an exonerating circumstance of liability exists, be it force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party, does not imply that the Administration is automatically released from all liability regarding the reparation of the damage caused (in this regard, resolution no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8 hours 35 minutes of September 8, 2011, can be consulted). The foregoing applies to this case, since not only the imprudence of the driver was what impacted the death of Mr. Monge Agüero, but also the conditions created and tolerated by the Council, given that the omissions in the exercise of its powers, specifically not installing the necessary and sufficient road protection measures, facilitated that the vehicle in which the accident victims were traveling crashed spectacularly with the structure. Due to the speed of the vehicle, perhaps the consequences would have been the same, but that is a fact that cannot be known with exactitude, and which also does not exempt the State and Conavi from their road maintenance duty. Thus, this being the case, the graduation of the damage carried out by the Court is also proportional to the facts demonstrated, so it would not be fair and equitable to reduce the percentage of fault of the State and the Council. Their omissive action did have an impact on the mishap, just like that of the driver Valverde Castillo.

Thus, there is no omission of the indicated evidence, nor violation of the provisions of Law 3148, Article 7 of Law 7331, and Article 190 of the LGAP.

**XXIV.**- The other issue of the objection, namely the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) between the State and Conavi, was based by the Tribunal as follows: “*The instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) granted to Conavi is for administering funds and entering into contracts, not for committing damages, not for causing damages, so that, when it comes to the fulfillment of its functions, it is perfectly understandable that Conavi can assume its responsibilities on its own, but when it exceeds its functions and falls into the non-functional sphere, it must answer as the body it is, even though it has maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima), with that entity (ente) to which it is attached. In this case, while it is true the attachment (adscripción) is to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Ministry of Public Works is not an entity (ente), but rather the Central State is, it is clear that the body with maximum deconcentration of another body is linked by a criterion of imputation by normative provision to the entity to which the Ministry belongs, in this case to the Executive Branch and the Central State… Article 12 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code provides for the joint participation between the body with instrumental personality and the entity to which it belongs, in this case Conavi and the State, precisely because of the possibility that the conduct of the deconcentrated body that enjoys instrumental legal personality goes beyond its functions and must answer with another subject, in this case the State… If we had determined here a responsibility of Conavi, solely in the breach of its functions, an error in the management of its budget, an error in a contract, a mistake of that type, we would have no problem attributing liability exclusively to Conavi. But, against an administered party (administrado) for a damage such as the one demonstrated here, which is totally unlawful, we cannot exclude the solidarity of the State in these cases. Solidarity that derives from Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration since, against the administered party in damaging events, the Administration is one single entity, even if the specific causer of the damage is Conavi*…” (final hearing at 16 hours 3 minutes). By express provision of subsection 2) of numeral 12 of the CPCA, when proceedings are brought against conduct of an administrative body to which instrumental legal personality has been granted, it must also be considered a defendant party, together with the State or the entity to which it is attached, as appropriate. Within this perspective, the rule is that the figure of the “body-person” (órgano-persona), given its particularities, and for purposes of representation, must, in that regard, be assimilated to the participation within the process of a decentralized entity, insofar as they possess an instrumental legal personality. But the foregoing is applicable only insofar as the conduct attributed to it falls within the scope of the deconcentrated competence and in respect of which it was granted legal personality. In this sense, the provisions of numeral 12.2 of the CPCA referred to must be understood as a mechanism by which it is avoided that, after a process, it is determined that the conduct is not within the competence exercised by the body with the coverage of the instrumental personality granted to it, whereupon it does become indispensable that the State answers jointly and severally with the body in its capacity as the larger entity. On this point, one may cite the provisions of this Chamber in vote 1202-A-S1-2009, in which it was indicated: “*The idea underlying the rule is to avoid for the administered party the problem of defining whether the action (or omissive conduct) of the body was in the exercise of a competence covered by the instrumental legal personality, or outside it, that is, subject for example to the direction of the head of the entity in whose structure it is inserted. In sum, what is relevant is the existence of an injury to the legal sphere of the administered party and the correlative duty to repair. In the interest of the victim, the rule provides for bringing the body and the entity into the litigation, so that the eventual favorable judgment can be executed against the assets of whichever is found responsible. If the appearance of both were not required, the ruling would be ineffective, since it could not obligate to compensate one who has not exercised the defense of its own interests in the process. Put another way, the procedural mandate orders only that both the body with personality and the State or entity to which it belongs be incorporated into the judicial discussion. It then falls to the judge, in accordance with the substantive rules, to determine whether the act, conduct, or indolence in question was carried out or not under personality, thereby establishing whether it is the body that must answer with its own funds, or whether it is the entity or the State to which the duty to repair must be attributed.*”” Law 7798 states that the Council is a “*body with maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental and budgetary legal personality to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to enter into the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law…*”. In this matter, the State itself, through its body Conavi, placed the passengers of the damaged vehicle in a situation of imminent risk of death, a risk that, although materialized by the reckless conduct of driver Octavio Valverde, was also caused by the omission to construct safety barriers on the side of the road. In the same ruling of this Chamber cited in the preceding recital (no. 001084-F-S1-2011 at 8 hours 35 minutes on September 8, 2011), this Chamber considered that in cases like the present one, the degree of responsibility of the Administration is evident, because the obligation for the maintenance of public roads and the construction of pedestrian bridges corresponds, in this case, to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (today through its deconcentrated bodies), and by not doing so, it not only incurs abnormality and unlawfulness for breach of its legal-material obligations, but also because it directly attacks and endangers the lives not only of passersby but also of drivers and passengers, who, without the existence of the indicated material work, see themselves in the necessity of carrying out inadvertent maneuvers or, worse still, expose themselves to unnecessary risks such as colliding with an unbreakable obstacle on the road, at whatever speed. In this sense, it must be highlighted that Article 2 of Law 3155 called “*Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT)*” provides, as relevant, that: *“The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has as its purpose: a) To plan, construct, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. To regulate and control the rights of way of existing or projected highways and roads. To regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transport on public roads.”* For its part, precept 4 of Law 7798 establishes: “*The objectives of the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) shall be the following: a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs prepared by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport…*”. Article 24 of the same law proclaims: “*All public works financed by the National Road Council shall be carried out based on a system of construction and maintenance administration of highways and roads (…) the road safety component must be considered and incorporated before its execution, in accordance with the detail to be made in a regulatory manner and in a coordinated fashion between bodies and entities. As part of road safety, provisions shall be incorporated for the safe passage of pedestrians, including those at grade and grade-separated, protection for the safe longitudinal transit of pedestrians along the road, bays for public transport stops, cycle routes, where applicable, and adequate visibility of the roads, including the elimination of obstacles on them and in their right of way and any other as provided by the Regulation. To safeguard road safety, consideration must be taken of the urban environment through which the roads pass (…) as well as all other elements, technical specifications, standards, and procedures that guarantee the best road safety for pedestrians and drivers…*”. Based on this explanatory and normative framework, it is that the State and Conavi have a degree of responsibility in this matter, which they must jointly and severally defray in accordance with what is established in canon 190 of the LGAP, since this is an evident abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) of the Administration outside the expected conduct of the body-person. That being the case, the reproach concerning the improper application of cardinals 12.2 of the CPCA, 3 of Law 7798, and 199 to 202 of the LGAP must be rejected. […] **XXVII.-** In another part of his statement of grounds, the Procurator alleges that the Tribunal had as a proven fact a salary without the social security contributions, but even so, he comments, the judges erred by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs upon all salary income according to cardinal 5 of Law 4351. In the judgment, the judges established the following: “*…the first thing that occurred with Mr. Roy’s salary was that from it were deducted the quotas he had to contribute for the maintenance of the solidary social security regime, that is, the amounts he had to contribute… for the regime of disability, old age, and death pensions or IVM regime; and for the sickness and maternity insurance or SEM, both of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). After making such subtraction, the liquid salary that corresponded to the deceased is obtained, and it is this, that is to say the liquid salary, the sum from which the real impact for his widow and daughters can be determined. Well, it turns out that in this case, the expert did not discount those social charges from the salary earned by Mr. Roy at the time of making his calculations, but rather started from the gross sums reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund… the operation yields as a result the sum of ¢353,428.58, which is the sum the expert uses as a starting point to make his calculations. It turns out that, for the reasons we explained a little while ago, this initial figure of Mr. Mario is erroneous, because he improperly included as net salary two items that the worker does not receive in cash… which are the quota for the disability, old age, and death regime and the quota for the sickness and maternity insurance. So that is not part of what he materially contributed to the house…*” (dictation of judgment at 16 hours 15 minutes). Up to this point, it can be said that the Tribunal had the point clear, even deducting the quotas of the disability, old age, and death pension regime, as well as that of the sickness and maternity insurance. Now, cardinal 5 of Law 4351, regarding the labor fund, establishes that it shall be formed by two types of contributions: “*a)… of ½% per month on remunerations, be they wages or salaries that must be paid by employers, the Powers of the State, and all public institutions; and b)… of 1% per month on the remunerations, be they wages or salaries that must be paid by workers. Employers shall deduct from workers their contribution and shall deposit it in the Bank in the manner and timeframes determined by the Regulation of this law*”. According to this rule, the mandatory savings made by the worker is 1% and not 1.5%, since the remaining ½% is made by the employer. The Worker Protection Law, No. 7983, which in one way or another came to complement this savings, also established mechanisms to expand coverage and strengthen the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS as the principal solidarity system in worker protection. In this sense, the Mandatory Complementary Pensions Regime (ROP) was created, which is a system of individual capitalization, whose contributions shall be registered and controlled through the Centralized Collection System of the CCSS and administered by the operators elected by the workers. Among the resources with which the ROP is financed are: “*…a) The one percent (1%) established in subsection b) of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the period set by Article 8 of that law has elapsed. b) Fifty percent (50%) of the employer contribution provided in subsection a) of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the period set by Article 8 of that same law has elapsed…*” (Article 13 Law 7983). In this way, it is clear that Mr. Roy Alexander indeed had to contribute 1% to this system, which should have been considered by the expert when extracting the compensatory amounts. The foregoing constitutes an omission by the expert and one that the judges also did not appreciate, which means the State is correct in its argument. That being the case, the amount corresponding to the material damage awarded by the Tribunal must be modified, so that in its place the 1% that the worker had to contribute to the ROP is taken into consideration. Irrespective of whether there is no proof of this contribution and that it was also not alleged in the trial, the Procurator is correct in his grievance, since this is an aspect totally distinct from the application of a regulation by the expert, given that it is a percentage that by legal imperative the employer must deduct from employees or officials. However, as the judges rightly establish, this error by the expert can be corrected since there exists the evidence on folio 607 of the judicial file, which is the quota study of the CCSS, and because the expert clearly explained the method that must be used to calculate the damages. What must be done is to take each gross monthly salary recorded in said document and subtract from each one the corresponding quotas for IVM, SEM, and ROP, thus obtaining the 12 amounts, one for each month from November 2006 to October 2007 (the last year of Mr. Roy’s life). The 12 figures resulting from the operation of subtracting said contributions are added up and divided by the number of months (that is, by 12) and result in ¢321,619.96. The same steps of the expert are then followed. The sum corresponding to the average salary of the deceased during the year prior to his death is ¢3,859,439.52. From that amount, the 75% that corresponds, according to the expert, to the maintenance percentage for his family is extracted. That operation results in ¢2,894,579.64. What is now appropriate is to multiply that figure by the so-called commutation factor that the expert used based on the table on folio 611. As the Tribunal correctly analyzes, if those variables from folio 611 are used and applied to a person who at the moment of his death was 36 years of age, as was the case of Mr. Roy, the commutation factor is 17.1721. This operation results in that at the moment of his death, that is, as of November 7, 2007, the death of Mr. Roy Alexander signified for the claimants the loss of ¢49,706,011.03 and not ¢50,252,231.67 as the Tribunal resolved. Of that amount, the cassation appellants must pay the three beneficiaries equitably 35%, that is ¢17,397,103.86. […] **XXIX.-** From the preceding recital, it is observed that the appellant is displeased first by the award of moral damages (daño moral), and in a second stage with the amount granted for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Thus, the fundamental point of the appeal lies in determining whether moral damages are appropriate and, if so, whether the sums awarded to each of the claimants for that aspect conforms to the evidence on record, to the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), to the legal system, and to the adduced principles of proportionality and reasonableness. This Chamber, referring to this type of damage, has indicated that it is associated with states of anguish, discouragement, frustration, impotence, insecurity, despair, anxiety, grief, unease, disillusionment, among others. Its common denominator is suffering or emotional affliction, as it is verified when the sphere of non-pecuniary interest of the individual is injured (on this, see judgments no. 269 at 9 hours 10 minutes on April 23, 2004, and 845 at 10 hours 5 minutes on November 23, 2007). Since it implies an unjust disturbance of the mental or emotional conditions, it does not require direct proof but can be inferred from human presumptions. In this sense, it has been considered: “*Regarding proof of moral damages, the principle is as follows: its existence and severity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through human presumptions inferred from indicia, since the unlawful generating fact reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, privacy, etc. are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that proof of moral damages exists ‘in re ipsa’…*” (judgment no. 112 at 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, cited in ruling no. 000096-F-S1-2009 at 16 hours on January 29, 2009). It suffices, on some occasions, with the commission of the culpable act for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the trial judges, when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. Along the same lines, it has stated: “*…The human presumption is a logical judgment of the judge, by virtue of which a fact is considered probable, based on the general maxims of experience, which indicate what is the normal way things and facts happen…*” (judgment no. 878-F-2007 at 8 hours 15 minutes on December 14, 2007).

**XXX.-** In this matter, the Tribunal deemed subjective moral damages appropriate, because Wendy Vega Fonseca, Nicole Natalia and María Jimena both with the surnames Monge Vega, as well as Fernando Monge Herrera and Jeannette Agüero Céspedes demonstrated an emotional impact due to the departure of their husband, father, and son respectively. In this understanding, it ordered: “*…we consider that due to the severity and intensity of the damage, the subjective moral impact of the minors Monge Vega must be compensated in principle with the compensation requested by them, that is, the sum of ¢40,000,000.00 for each one of them. For her part, for Mrs. Vega Fonseca, her subjective moral impact being a little less intense than that of her daughters, we consider that in principle she is entitled to compensation of ¢35,000,000.00. However, it must be remembered that the causers of this damage are both Conavi and Juan Octavio Valverde Castillo, and that the former only answers for 35% of the damage, which is why it is that percentage which Conavi must cover jointly and severally with the State, as already indicated for the subjective moral impact generated to the three said female plaintiffs. In the case of the parents of Mr. Roy Alexander, Mr. Fernando Monge Herrera and Mrs. Jeanette Agüero Céspedes, this Tribunal considers that only Mrs. Wendy made a slight reference to what their son’s death implied for them, because Mrs. Vega Fonseca stated that he is a pensioner and she is a housewife, making it impossible for them to assist their granddaughters financially. We thus consider that there was an impact for them, as it is plausible to consider that they suffered upon losing their son, but the evidence available in this process only allows establishing a significantly smaller affliction than that of their former daughter-in-law and their granddaughters. Therefore, we consider that in principle for each of them, compensation of ¢10,000,000 colones is appropriate for the subjective moral damages suffered, an amount of which Conavi, jointly and severally with the State, answers for only 35%…*” (issuance of judgment from 16 hours 28 minutes). For this Chamber, independently of the indicia, which already on their own are sufficient, due to the death of Mr. Roy Alexander, there is additional evidence that demonstrates the anguish, suffering, fears, insecurity, and depression that the plaintiffs experienced as a result of the death of their husband, father, and son. Mrs. Wendy and her daughter Nicole declared that the deceased indeed maintained a very good relationship with them and with his parents Fernando Monge Herrera and Jeannette Agüero Céspedes. Mrs. Vega narrated extensively the emotional and economic difficulties they experienced, especially since she had lived in marriage with Monge Agüero since the age of 18 (at the time of death she was 31 years old). The death of the minors’ father, it emerges from their declaration, represented a hard emotional blow for them; they had to radically change their lives, due mainly to the difficult economic situation they went through and because they made a change of domicile from Cartago to San Carlos. Also notable is the school change that the young Nicole had to carry out. Even in the trial, the minor stated that after turning 15 years old, it has been harder to recognize and accept the death of her father (at 16 hours 28 minutes on July 19, 2011). She expressed how difficult it has been to see her mother work after the accident since before the mishap, she was always at home with them. In view of both declarations, the suffering experienced by the youngest daughter of Mrs. Wendy was also demonstrated, who still asks for her dad because she was barely two years old when the death occurred. The parents of the deceased, it is inferred from the declarations of Mrs. Wendy, also suffer, albeit to a lesser extent. However, their condition as elderly adults cannot be ignored either. There is a direct relationship between that moral damage caused to Mr. Roy’s family and the omissive conduct of the State and Conavi. The foregoing shows that the judges, when setting each of those sums for subjective moral damages, based themselves on both human presumptions and the evidence on record, which correspond to the declarations of Mrs. Wendy Vega and of Nicole Natalia. The emotional pain that entails the unexpected loss of a loved one who represented a fundamental pillar within the family nucleus, being an excellent husband, father, and son, is undeniable, above all, because of the reckless action of a driver and the omission of a State body in attending to the recommendations and warnings of danger that exist on the route to Cartago. It is unquestionable that this loss produced an affliction that, with great difficulty, Mr. Roy’s family will have to face for the rest of their lives. The argument that the plaintiff entered into a new marriage is not receivable, since it is not a cause that discredits the suffering she experienced at the time, in addition to the fact that this fact is part of the recovery process to which Mrs. Wendy and her daughters are entitled, who will never recover the figure of their father. As a consequence of all of the above, for this deciding body, the amount awarded is reasonable and proportional due to the moral suffering, emotional impact, insecurity, and sadness that the family of the deceased experienced and that is still perceived in the minor daughters. For those amounts, Conavi and the State are jointly and severally liable for only 35%. Taking the amounts that correspond to each one, these are commensurate with the pain caused, being adequate to their sufferings.

In this way, the net sums that the State and the Council must pay to Wendy Vega Fonseca (¢12,250,000), to Nicole Natalia Monge Vega (¢14,000,000.00), to María Jimena Monge Vega (¢14,000,000.00), to Fernando Monge Herrera (¢3,500,000), and to Jeannette Agüero Céspedes (¢3,500,000.00) are in accordance with the budgetary assumptions and parameters of proportionality and reasonableness, as they maintain balance and relation with the injury inflicted, which is the death of a loved one. These sums are fair, proportionate, rational, and consistent with the legal system, as a compensation mechanism for the damage inflicted on the internal emotional sphere of the direct relatives of Mr. Roy. For the reasons expressed, the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed regarding the amount of compensation awarded for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) must be rejected.

**XXXI.-** By virtue of the reasoning and arguments set forth, it is appropriate to reject the appeal of the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) and to partially uphold the one filed by the State. Consequently, the ruling of the Trial Court is annulled, insofar as it granted material damages (daño material) without deducting, in its calculations, the 1% corresponding to the contribution that Mr. Roy Alexander Monge Agüero made to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones). In its place, ruling on the merits, the State and CONAVI must jointly and severally pay the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Wendy Vega Fonseca, Nicole Natalia Monge, and María Jimena Monge Vega." He indicated that the damages and losses alleged (including moral damages), arose as a direct and immediate consequence “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">of the illegal, abnormal, and inefficient action</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” of CNFL and the National Road Council (the Council or Nombre1220 hereinafter), which departed from the recommendations provided by the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (Sieca) for the placement of public utility poles, in the document called Manual of Geographic Designs for Regional Roads, and because they disregarded recommendations from the Technical Road Safety Audit report provided by Nombre109293, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions at the bases of the public lighting poles on the road. She said the deceased was the main provider for the family nucleus, and his death generated a radical change in the life of Nombre229490, because she had to change her domicile and seek employment, which was aggravated because she does not have a university education or work experience. This situation, she argued, also affected the parents of the deceased, since they saw how the family of their son and granddaughters had to move from Cartago to San Carlos due to the economic and emotional situation experienced. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">II.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Based on the foregoing, she sued Fuerza y Luz, Conavi, and the State and requested that the judgment declare: a) The claim is upheld.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> b) The lighting poles installed by the defendant administrations along the Florencio del Castillo highway represent a serious danger in the event of a collision, due to their rigidity, lack of protection, and lack of signage. c) The lack of oversight by the Council and the State in the correct execution of the works developed in the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo. d) The joint and several liability of the co-defendants for the damages and losses caused, as a consequence “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient action</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">”. e) The co-defendants be ordered to design and install a protection and prevention system against collisions, at the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio del Castillo road. f) The Company must install lighting poles along any highway with a flexible, breakable, or frangible base, or failing that, erect a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the structures. g) Both costs of the proceeding be jointly and severally borne by the co-defendants. She estimated the damages and losses prudentially as follows: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">¢194,610,432.00 for losses, ¢200,000,000.00 for subjective moral damages (¢40,000,000.00 for each of the family members), and ¢50,000,000.00 for psychological damage (¢10,000,000.00 per person). The defendants answered negatively. The Council raised the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations; the State raised those of lack of: passive standing, interest, right, and statute of limitations; for its part, the Company raised those of lack of: right and</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> passive standing. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The Tribunal upheld the defense of lack of right alleged by Fuerza y Luz, and therefore dismissed the claim. It rejected the exceptions of statute of limitations raised by the Council and the State, as well as those of lack of: interest, passive and active standing, alleged by the latter. It partially upheld the exception of lack of right adduced by both the Council and the State, it being understood as denied regarding what was granted to the claimant party. Consequently, it partially upheld the claim. It jointly and severally ordered the Council and the State to pay: 1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> To the claimant and her daughters, for material damage, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08, an amount that must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries and indexed in the judgment enforcement phase, from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment. 2) By virtue of the subjective moral damage caused to Nombre229490</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, the sum of ¢12,250,000.00; to Nombre229491</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and to Nombre229491</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">the amount of ¢14,000,000.00 for each of them; to Nombre229492</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and to Nombre229493</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, the figure of ¢3,500,000.00 for each one; amounts that must be indexed in judgment enforcement from the date the ruling becomes final until its effective payment. 3) Both costs of the proceeding. On the other hand, it ordered the Council to build and install, within six months from the date the judgment becomes final, a containment barrier at Dirección13198</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">(on the stretch between Dirección3257</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and Pasoca), in both the Cartago – San José and San José – Cartago directions. The condemned parties file an appeal in cassation for procedural and substantive defects.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">III.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Before analyzing the grievances, it must be noted that to avoid unnecessary reiteration, both appeals will be heard jointly, because the objections of one and the other are related to and revolve around the same issues. Only the State representation brings cassation grounds for violation of procedural rules. Not so in the substantive arguments; however, it must also be noted that in those of the State, this Chamber proceeded to order and reclassify them, since on several occasions they dealt with identical questions, were dispersed, or did not correspond to the indicated grievance.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IV.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The representation of the State offers in this instance as evidence for a better decision, a certification of the recent marriage of the claimant, a copy of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regulations of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, report no. DAE-580-11 of that institution, web studies of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and of the University of Costa Rica, as well as the testimony of its assistant Nombre160993</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The possibility of incorporating evidence in cassation is expressly regulated by the CPCA in two scenarios: 1.- Documents that the parties may provide during the processing of the appeal </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…that they swear not to have known previously, about new facts subsequent to the appealed judgment”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (canon 145, first paragraph). 2.- That which is optional for the corresponding instance, be it this Chamber or the Administrative Litigation Court of Cassation (cardinal 148, subsection 1 ibidem). In this scenario, its incorporation depends solely and exclusively on the deciding body, as it is a power granted to it for the purpose of clarifying any factual question it deems relevant or pertinent that cannot be inferred from the evidentiary collection offered. As has been reiterated, it is evidence for the judge and not for the parties; it is the judge who decides on its convenience and necessity; and it corresponds to a discretionary assessment, which can be dispensed with without needing to be expressly resolved. Even the omission of a ruling does not generate defenselessness, since there is no duty to collect or reject it, such that it is absolutely beyond control in this venue. In this case, it is clear that the documents offered</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> do not comply with the provisions of subsection 1) of precept 145 idem, especially the CCSS document no. DAE-580-11, which is dated September 27, 2011. This is a formal requirement of an imperative nature, by virtue of which, whoever offers documents during the processing of the cassation appeal must swear not to have known them previously and that they concern new facts subsequent to the appealed judgment. That rule does not discriminate as to the reason why the petitioner did not know about that documentary evidence relating to novel facts that occurred after the challenged decision. In that case, whether the documents existed before that resolution or were issued or learned of subsequently, the truth is that the oath is required and, under such premise, must be observed. In the present case, the proponent omits it, thereby rendering the offer of the outlined evidence inadmissible. Even under the hypothesis that this mandate were dispensed with, this Chamber considers that there are sufficient elements of conviction to resolve the challenges raised by the two defendants, so that the evidence the appellant procures for a better decision is unnecessary. The majority could have offered it at the opportune procedural moment, but did not do so; accepting it would mean palliating their own negligence, which is not appropriate. A separate considering paragraph will be dedicated to this point further on, as it is the subject of the appeal. For the same reason, in upcoming references, the reason why the testimony of assistant Nombre160993</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">is irrelevant and lacking in interest will be analyzed. Consequently, it is appropriate to declare the evidence offered for a better decision inadmissible.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Violation of procedural rules</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">V.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In its </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">first</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> argument, the State representation alleges a violation of due process and the right of defense. According to its comments, the Tribunal did not exercise the power conferred by Article 50 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (CPCA) regarding untimely documentary evidence that can be admitted for a better decision, pursuant to numeral 82 subsection 1) of the same regulatory body. In that sense, it points out that official letter no. AGP-362 of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), no. CPCE-JD-746-10, and the publication of La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, were rejected. The reason for the rejection, it alleges, was the time when they were provided; however, it did not assess, it says, that it intended to combat the expert evidence produced in the debate. The judges, it opines, cannot ignore that expert testimony can be contested after it is known. It points out that this evidence from the mathematical expert was presented at the hearing of July 19, 2011, and the evidence that was rejected was offered at the continuation hearing on August 3 following. It insists that the Tribunal must leave open the possibility of presenting new evidentiary material if the circumstances warrant it. Articles 94 subsection 7) and 105 subsection 1) ibidem, it adds, establish that expert evidence is provided partly in writing and made known to the litigants, complemented orally during the trial, with which, it notes, there is the opportunity to request clarifications and additions. In its view, the Tribunal erroneously interpreted the cited rules by understanding that it is not possible to introduce evidence once the parties have fully known the expert report. Such a restrictive interpretation, it attributes, violates the right of defense and does not contribute to the investigation of the real truth. In this sense, it adds, the expert ensured that he was forced to render his report based on a Regulation approved by the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences of Costa Rica (CPCE) under penalty of disciplinary sanction. That element, it explains, was not on record, and therefore, the State should have been given the opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence. Along these lines, it expresses that the certification from the CCSS was introduced to rebut the mathematical expert report, because, according to the expert's oral report, the lifetime annuity and the commuted annuity or compensation both aim to replace income no longer received by the dependents of the deceased. In its view, no defenselessness was caused to the opposing party, because the Tribunal could, pursuant to Article 50 subsection 2), grant a three-business-day period for it to refer to the evidence introduced by the State. In this way, it states, it infringed that regulation due to lack of application and Article 100 subsection 1) paragraph e) ibidem. Furthermore, it deems violated precept 94 subsection 7) ibidem –in relation to the right of defense– because the written report of the OIJ expert was not made known to the parties with the required advance notice, but rather one day before the expert's interrogation was conducted. It explains that on the first day of the debate, the report was delivered, and the following day the statement was received, at which time, without adequate preparation, they had to conduct the interrogation. In accordance with the foregoing, it exalts that there was no period to learn the written report, prepare the interrogation, and obtain defense evidence. It emphasizes that the purpose of the parties knowing the written report of the expert opinions after the preliminary hearing and before the trial –as the rule provides– is so that they can exercise their right of defense. That opportunity, it assures, did not exist, being suppressed by the Tribunal, which, it indicates, constitutes a violation of the right of defense. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> On August 3, 2011, during the third day of trial, the State representative filed a request to admit, among other documents, official letter AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, which states that the claimant receives a survivor's pension from the CCSS; that of the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences, CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which mentions aspects of the Regulations on which the expert relied to prepare his report; and the publication of La Gaceta no. 125 of June 29, 2010, regarding a draft bill, in relation to the technical reports of Nombre109293. The Tribunal rejected them outright. The official letter from the CCSS, because the expert indicated he had not analyzed the pension factor in his report, and also because that document had been produced after the specialist's statement. It considered that the issue of compensation for death is one aspect and that of a pension is another. Regarding the CPCE letter, they indicated it was issued on December 2, 2010, before the expert was extensively interrogated on that aspect, so it was not true that prior to the interrogation, the State was unaware of the existence of the regulations used in the expert report. In relation to the document from La Gaceta, the judges established that it is from June 29, 2010, and the preliminary hearing took place on July 1, 2010, that is, after the publication, so its existence was already known (continuation of the oral and public trial on August 3, 2011, starting at 9:30 a.m.). The State filed a motion for revocation requesting that the documentation be analyzed in the judgment. The Tribunal denied it. In the specific case, the representative of the Procuraduría says that the documents were filed for the purpose of questioning the expert report; however, this Chamber observes that all the documents mentioned by the appellant existed before the expert rendered his statement on July 19, 2011, and therefore their admission was inappropriate, especially since the State representative did not justify why they were not presented earlier. It must be remembered that cardinal 50 of the CPCA establishes that after the claim and its answer, only those documents dated after said filings and </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">those that could not have been provided previously for a reason not attributable to the interested party</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> may be admitted. As the Tribunal correctly indicates, the State representative already knew about the written report of the mathematical actuary when the interrogation was conducted, so it is not true that they could not contest it, when they knew in advance the technical criterion used by the professional. It is on record in the judicial file that the transfer of the report occurred on November 26, 2010 (folio 616) and the statement is from July 19, 2011 (folio 676). In addition to the above, it must be noted that admitting that evidence at that stage of the proceeding (after the expert's statement) would imply not only a disadvantage for the claimant party, as it would cause defenselessness, but also an unjustified delay in the continuation of the debate that would not only imply suspending the proceeding unnecessarily but also receiving the professional's statement again. The foregoing is accentuated if one considers that the issues the procurador questions had already been raised by the parties, not only during the expert's interrogation but also in the claim. Regarding the official letter from the CCSS, it was a known fact by all that the deceased was a salaried employee, so the availability of a survivor's pension was evident. The same occurs with the document from the CPCE, which was requested from that entity by the Procuraduría on November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the oral and public trial of July 19, 2011. It was not even a document that arose from the discussions in the debate, but rather one already known to the State, which it did not provide in a timely manner during the witness's deposition, the appropriate procedural time for it, as inferred from the analysis of canon 105 of the CPCA. For its part, the publication in La Gaceta is dated June 29, 2010, so its presentation could have been made even during the preliminary hearing that continued on July 1 of that year, and not until August 3, 2011, at trial, thus it also proves inappropriate. In this way, each of the documents presented is evidence that should have been offered during the preliminary hearing or at least before the expert's interrogation, and not during the third day of trial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be noted that in any case, it will be the Tribunal that, in each case, evaluates the admission of evidence for a better decision, so its mere proposition is not sufficient for it to be admitted; even if said evidence were accepted, it will be in the judgment that it is determined whether it is assessed as evidentiary material, as inferred from cardinals 50 and 110 of the Code on the matter. Regarding evidence for a better decision, this Chamber has stated that: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">it is not a matter of correcting the omissions, negligence, or carelessness of the parties regarding the evidentiary burden incumbent upon them, or of remedying deficiencies in defense techniques, given that under this hypothesis, equality between the litigants would be seriously harmed and the impartiality of the judge would be compromised. Hence, when ordering it, the guarantee of defense in trial for each of those involved in the litigation must be respected. Thus, on the contrary, it must be introduced with the sole purpose of clarifying points of uncertainty or doubt that may arise after weighing the elements provided by the litigants…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” (ruling no. 000213-F-S1-2008 at 8:20 a.m. on March 25, 2008). In general terms, it is not appropriate to attempt, by offering evidence that should have been provided and practiced at the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Accepting this petition would mean that the parties could remedy their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered in due time and did not. Evidence for a better decision corresponds to a power granted to the judge, who, if deemed pertinent, admits it or not; it is not a means to make up for the parties' deficiencies. Regarding the report of the OIJ expert, the alleged violation does not exist, because rule 94 of the CPCA only provides that the expert report must be made known to all parties, without indicating a specific deadline. The important thing, under the tenor of the precept, is that the expert report is forwarded to the parties. Likewise, the litigants had sufficient opportunity to question the expert during the debate; even during the interrogation, a sequence of photographs that the OIJ itself provided to the State representative was admitted for a better decision, with the purpose of having the expert supplement her opinion under the terms of cardinal 105 of the CPCA (starting at 3:15 p.m. on July 20, 2011). It is also important to highlight on this last point that the Procurador does not clearly explain how the transfer of the expert report harmed him, if from the analysis of the judgment it is deduced that this report was fundamental in proving the excess speed at which the driver of the wrecked vehicle was operating, a key aspect in the State's defense. Furthermore, from the outset the parties knew of the existence of abundant evidence, including technical evidence, so the incorporation of an expert report ordered at trial on April 25, 2011, should not be considered unexpected. Likewise, the alleged defenselessness does not exist either, since this report was mostly based on the evidentiary elements that already existed in the file, such as Police Report no. 163-SDURU-07 prepared by the OIJ of La Unión on November 9, 2007 (folios 243 to 247, which is part of the documentary evidence admitted to the State on July 1, 2010, during the preliminary hearing). For all these reasons, this Chamber considers that the defenselessness and violation of the principle of defense alleged by the cassation appellant do not exist, and therefore the objection must be rejected. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Second.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It alleges a violation of the right of defense, due to</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> breach of subsections 3) and 4) of ordinal 100 of the CPCA, since in its view, the organizational problems of the Judicial Branch cannot be transferred to the litigants, in a way that affects the principle of concentration of the oral process. It adduces that in 2011, the trial was processed in its oral phase on July 19 and 20, continued on August 3 and 5, and concluded on the 23rd of that month. It argues that the purpose of the principle of unity and concentration is for the parties and the judges to be engaged in the knowledge of the matter, without distractions, in order to allow them to retain what occurred in their memory. However, it states that due to the prolonged suspensions, the recollection of what happened was diluted, causing an unjust ruling, all of which harmed the right of defense and due process. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the present matter, the oral and public trial was conducted over several days, but this was not due to the negligence of the Tribunal, but to the number of witness statements, depositions, and expert reports that had to be received. In fact, this Chamber verifies that this is a complex proceeding that in cassation entails the detailed examination of the different evidentiary elements, for the purpose of guaranteeing a just and equitable ruling. From the analysis of the debate, it is observed that the judges have had to make an effort to organize the Tribunal's agenda and thereby avoid unnecessary delays, but always in their determinations, they tried to ensure that the witness statements and expert reports were conducted in a single hearing to avoid affecting the principle of unity and evidentiary concentration. An example of the above is observed with the testimony of the witness-expert Nombre229498</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, which lasted an entire day of hearing, even until 9:00 p.m. on August 3, 2011. With each deponent, the hearings were conducted without interruptions and over several sessions to avoid infringing the analyzed principles, this under the terms of canon 100 of the CPCA. While the first two days of the debate were conducted normally (July 19 and 20, 2011), it is also true that its continuation, on three occasions, could not be on consecutive days (August 3, 5, and 23 of that same year); however, in this Chamber's view, this is not grounds for nullifying the ruling for two specific reasons. Firstly, because none of these suspension periods between hearings exceeded the 15 business days mentioned in cardinal 100 subsection 5) ibidem, a scenario for declaring the absolute nullity of all proceedings and rulings. Secondly, because in each hearing, the judges followed the previously agreed order for receiving the evidence, without cuts or interruptions making its comprehension impossible in the respective hearing. This, far from affecting the right of defense, strengthens it, since each of the parties had sufficient space to ask questions to the declarants and to prepare their defense. It is reiterated that the principle of unity and evidentiary concentration has also not been harmed, since the witness statements were received in the respective and duly convened hearings, without interruptions or vicissitudes that cast doubt on their veracity and credibility. Similarly, the conclusions stage was developed within the expected chronological order and in a single act, on August 23, 2011. Moreover, there was physical identity of the judges. Whether the ruling is just or not is an aspect that must be challenged through the violations established by the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code in cardinal 138 (cassation for violation of substantive rules) and not through this objection, since it is foreseeable that in this type of matter declared complex, the trial will last several days, which, it is insisted, at no time exceeded the 15 business days established in the Code itself, which from the outset rules out the eventual violation of due process or the harm to procedural rules penalized with absolute nullity (precept 137 subsections b) and h) ibidem). Finally, it must be added that during the recess and suspension time, the Code on the matter allows not only the judges but also the parties' attorneys to participate or intervene in other trials or hearings (ordinal 101 subsection 3). This being the case, the appropriate course is to reject the objection.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IX.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">third</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> grievance, it maintains that the right of defense was similarly violated, now by virtue of the interpretation given by the Tribunal to Article 109 ibidem, by unreasonably reducing the time for conclusions, harming the State, because it could not introduce the complete analysis of the evidence, especially, it adds, that of the mathematical expert, as well as the applicable rules to the case.</span></p> **X.-** In the current contentious-administrative proceeding, conducted through oral hearings, in addition to the principles of orality, transparency, immediacy, contradiction, real truth, and concentration, the judge must ensure respect for procedural celerity. To this end, the judge must moderate the discussion, preventing impertinent and unjustifiably prolonged interventions, and reject clearly inappropriate or dilatory requests, while always respecting the parties' right of defense (articles 85, 97, 99 subsection 2), 109 of the CPCA and 57, 62 subsection 10), 73 subsection 14) of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction). In the specific case, considering that there were five intervening parties, this Chamber considers that the one-hour period for delivering closing arguments is more than sufficient to achieve that unity of the act, since if that time had been exceeded, the contested procedural stage could not have been concluded on that August 23, 2011, which would eventually mean a breach of that principle of unity and concentration, as well as of procedural equity. Now, from the beginning of the trial, the parties were aware that the maximum time for presenting closing arguments was 40 minutes, extendable if necessary (resolution of July 8, 2011, visible on folios 652 to 653). That determination by the Court was duly communicated sufficiently in advance for the litigants to adequately prepare their final arguments. No surprise is observed, and much less defenselessness, from that point of view, since the parties had to subject their actions to the rules previously established by the Court. Lawyers, in this understanding, must prepare their presentations within the time established for that purpose. The period originally granted for issuing closing arguments was even extended to one hour for all litigants. Now, each of these management measures adopted by the judges, including the establishment of a maximum time for issuing closing arguments (precept 109 CPCA), tends, as indicated, to protect the postulates of orality, including the principle of procedural celerity, as well as to equalize the participation of the parties in this procedural stage, with the aim that everyone has equality of arms to issue their final criteria, which is why the right of defense would not be violated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State representative fails to explain clearly and precisely how the time limitation referenced affected him, given that the conclusions regarding the mathematical expert opinion were indeed raised. In this sense, during the last part of his intervention, he described the reasons why he opposed the opinion of the mathematical expert, so it is not true that he had no space for it, especially when the Court indicated to him, as it did with the plaintiff, not to worry about the time, to "take it easy" ("tenga calma") and calmly present his ideas (at 5:41 p.m. on August 23, 2011). He was not cut off; on the contrary, the time was extended from 40 minutes to one hour, sufficient time and much longer than what is customary in an oral process, since the number of testimonies and existing evidence was taken into account. Finally, nor is any express request observed at the end of the State's intervention from the Procurador to obtain an extension of the granted period in order to analyze the mathematical expert opinion; on the contrary, it is insisted, the mathematical report was in fact extensively questioned during that space (closing arguments hearing starting at 6:00 p.m.). The foregoing leads to the objection being dismissed, as the claimed violation of due process is not evident.

**XI.-** It complains, in the **fourth** censure, that numeral 95 subsection 1) ibidem was violated, by considering that there is a diffuse interest to claim the design and placement of a containment barrier in section no. 4 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, which, it asserts, was not alleged by the plaintiff. In this sense, it alleges article 10 subsection 1. c) of the CPCA was violated by considering the existence of that diffuse interest. Canon 95 cited was also injured, it states, by considering as material damage what was demanded in the complaint as damages. In both cases, it concludes, the parties should have been heard, and by not doing so, it generated a defect of nullity.

**XII.-** The appellant locates the grievance within the section on violation of due process and the right of defense, because in its understanding, in the two claimed cases, the Court had to suspend the hearing for five business days if it considered that the claim needed to be adjusted or clarified. In its view, the plaintiff never alleged a diffuse interest regarding the construction of a guardrail on Dirección13198, therefore that extreme should have been corrected. Note that in the fifth pleading of the complaint, it expressly requested that "...CONAVI, the State, and the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions at the bases of the lighting poles..." (folio 26). No adjustments were made to that claim during the preliminary hearing. For this reason, in the judgment, the Court considered that Nombre1220 should "...develop its activities in observance of road safety criteria, and one of these being to guarantee the proper transit of drivers... must... fulfill the technical recommendation issued by Nombre109293 in relation to section number four of its study, between Pasoca and Terramall, consisting of the placement therein of a railing or containment barrier in the Cartago to San José direction and in the San José to Cartago direction..." (Considerando XII starting at 4:36 p.m. of the sentencing hearing). According to the transcript, it is clear that the plaintiff party did expressly request the placement of a protection barrier on Dirección13198 (in the accident zone where her husband died). Now, when resolving the defense of lack of interest raised by the State, the Court ordered that the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code provides for action by diffuse interests and that in this case, there was an interest of any eventual user of Dirección13198 in traveling on a road as safe as possible, so the plaintiffs did indeed have standing regarding that extreme (during the issuance of the ruling starting at 4:46 p.m.). The analyzed claim did not merit suspending the hearing as the appellant alleges; on the contrary, it had to be analyzed and qualified in the judgment, since in the terms set forth in the complaint and discussed in the process, it did not generate any doubt about its content and scope, within the possibilities established in canon 10 subsection 1) of the CPCA. If the State's representation disagreed with that claim, it should have so stated when answering the complaint or during the preliminary hearing; however, in those stages, it did not oppose or request the adjustment now sought, which constitutes sufficient reason for the rejection of the grievance pursuant to canon 137 subsection 2) of the CPCA. Added to the above, it must be indicated that in any case, the State's grievance lacks interest, since that obligation to do, the judges explained: "weighs only on Nombre1220 and not on the State because what is ordered here is indeed within the technical functions assigned by law to Conavi, not the State." Regarding the other point, it must be noted that in the complaint, it was clearly requested and broken down as "economic material damage", an amount that it also called "damages due to death" consisting of the non-receipt of her spouse's salary during the period according to his life expectancy (folio 9). Regardless of the qualification that the plaintiff gave to this claim, the grievance of the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) is not admissible, for the same reasons established previously, especially because at no time did it timely oppose the qualification that the plaintiff made of her claims, therefore according to cardinal 137 subsection 2) ibidem, the objection must be rejected. In any case, if the issue was extensively discussed, it is the Court that ultimately corresponds to qualify the claim, be it a material damage or damages. Thus, the grievance must be rejected, as no violation of due process or the indicated nullity is observed.

**XIII.- Fifth.** It explains that the right of defense was violated, thus violating article 111 subsection 1) ibidem, because the notification of the ruling was made orally. It alleges that when the complexity of the matter demands the detailed consideration of multiple evidentiary elements, this must be given in writing. It assures that the period for the parties to appeal in cassation is affected when they must obtain a DVD or CD recording of the judgment, in order to proceed not with reading it, but with transcribing it to learn what was ordered, reducing the time provided by cardinal 139 subsection 1) ibidem for preparing the defense. In this matter, it maintains, the digital medium was not delivered to the State until September 19, 2011, when the reading was on the 13th of the previous month, for which it accuses canon 111 subsection 1 of the CPCA of being violated.

**XIV.-** On this point, it must be highlighted that based on the process model adopted by the CPCA, with a line founded on partial orality, as well as different provisions in its articles and in the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, approved by the Corte Plena, a written judgment is not always necessary. Of interest, canon 57 of the cited Code, located within chapter I "Norms applicable to all processes", of Title V "Procedural Activity", expressly establishes: "Any resolution issued in any of the stages of the process, whether oral or written, must be duly reasoned." Even if the position is taken that the expression "whether oral or written" refers to resolutions issued in different stages of the process and not properly to the judgment, it is true that the precept is limited to qualifying the form of the dictation, without differentiating the type of resolution it addresses, when indicating; the reason of the norm, that "...must be duly reasoned." The foregoing, based on the logical reasoning that what matters is that they are reasoned. Even note that numeral 111 located in chapter VII "Oral and Public Trial", of Title V, does not provide how the judgment should be issued, so in the face of that presumed omission, it is appropriate to apply that principle. For its part, the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, prescribes in numeral 83 "On the form and content of the judgment", located in Chapter III "On the functioning of the Court" of Title II "Specific Provisions". It establishes "1) The judgment shall be issued orally, duly recording it in the corresponding technological means possessed and available to the Judicial Branch. When strictly necessary, it may be issued in written form. // When it becomes essential to transcribe it for its execution, only the necessary aspects will be recorded. ..." (emphasis added not in original). In other words, orality is contemplated as a form for the issuance of the judgment. From the analysis of the Code it is deduced that only in five cases did the legislator expressly provide otherwise: a) article 92, subsection 5, which referring to the defenses of cardinal 66 ibidem that lead to the inadmissibility of the process, literally says: "...in this case, it must record, in writing, the full text of the ruling, within the five days following the holding of the hearing." (Underline not in original); b) canon 130 subsection 3), on the effects of the annulment judgment of an administrative act of general scope, regarding which, due to the effects it produces, once final it must be "...published in full in the official gazette La Gaceta, ..." (Underline not in original); c) numeral 149 subsection 2), regarding the cassation judgment whose wording has particular complexity, imposes the duty to communicate the "...total content." of the judgment. The foregoing is also applicable in the case of subsection 3) of that norm; d) precept 153 subsection 3), referring to the cassation appeal in the interest of the Legal Order, which establishes the duty to publish the judgment issued "...in a special section of the official gazette La Gaceta ..."; e) numeral 154 referring to the extraordinary appeal for review. This has been considered by this Chamber in rulings no. 206-2009 of 4:20 p.m. on February 26, 2009, 380-2009 of 9:00 a.m. on April 20 of the same year, and recently in no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 of 9:30 a.m. on March 15, 2012. Moreover, there is also no violation of due process because oral judgments, according to canon 88 of the CPCA, are considered notified upon their issuance at the hearing called for that purpose. In another vein, there is no proof that the digital medium of the judgment was not provided on the day of the hearing to the State representation. In any event, even if that were true, it is not evident that this event caused it harm, first, because in application of article 23 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República (Law 6815), the State requested an extension of the term to file the appeal, which was granted by this Chamber (folios 808 and 810 of this file); second, because the appeal was finally filed within the required time and form on October 7, 2010. In this understanding, the appropriate course is to reject the appellant's grievance.

**Violation of substantive norms** **XV.-** In the **first** objection, the **State** refers to the alleged omission of Nombre1220 and the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It argues that the Court did not evaluate the evidence in the record according to sound judgment. **a)** The Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Roads and the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control, published by the Secretariat for Central American Integration in the years 2000 and 2001. For the judges, according to the internal technical provisions, it notes, each country must determine how lighting poles are constructed and where they are located. However, it says, in the contested ruling there is no citation of any technical provision of Costa Rica that would allow one to know on which it was based to determine that the Council violated it when placing the lighting poles. Instead, it reviews, the criterion of engineer Nombre229498 was assumed, as expressed in the Technical Road Safety Audit report of the Florencio del Castillo highway, prepared by Nombre109293 in 2003. It emphasizes that Mr. Nombre229498 declared that in the country there is no official technical norm that indicates how poles should be placed, so international ones are used. What was omitted, it says, is that Mr. Nombre229498 stated that in the report he used both the Traffic Control Manual and the Road Design Manual, "the AASHTO one and European ones." It adds, "In fact, from the analysis of this technical evidence, it turns out that sections 2.1.23 of the Manual and 7.2.6 of its Annex A, B, and E; as well as sections 4.3.1; 4.8 and 8.2.7 and 8.3.6, provide a solid and technically acceptable guide on the most desirable solutions (section 1.2 of the cited Design Manual) for the placement of public lighting in our country, which the Court overlooked." In this way, it refers, contrary to sound judgment, the Court not only omitted to use the unequivocal criteria accepted at the Central American level, but also failed to observe that the only criterion used, that of Engineer Nombre229498, used them. In this sense, it reinforces its argument with the transcription of the sections that it says were overlooked. It asserts that from the Central American technical criteria it is clear that, to prevent those who leave the road from impacting the support structure of lighting poles on a divided highway with 3.6-meter wide lanes, the desirable lateral clearance towards the roadway would be 1.80 meters and the minimum 0.50 meters. It highlights that Mr. Nombre229498 affirmed that the referenced manuals did not regulate the lateral clearance, but rather international technical criteria, according to which the poles must be 6 meters from the road. However, this criterion on which the Court bases itself is contradicted by documents and depositions of civil engineers. In another section of the appeal, still in relation to this grievance, it specifies that, by not understanding that said manuals are part of the content of the unequivocal rules of science and technique applicable to the country regarding the location of poles, the Court violated, by lack of application, cardinal 16 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP). In a similar sense, it states, that same regulation was violated by understanding that these rules are found in the report of Mr. Nombre229498 from 2003. In this sense, it criticizes, numerals 5 and 6 of the Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law (Law no. 8114) are also violated, by attributing to the Technical Road Safety Audit contained in Mr. Nombre229498's report the character of a technical norm, as it considers it limits discretion, when according to those provisions, the competence of Nombre109293 relates to the quality, not the safety, of the roads. It asserts that, despite the judges recognizing that the report from that laboratory is not binding, they give it that effect by accusing its non-compliance as if it were a mandate imposed by the legal system. It also imputes as violated by improper application article 128 of the CPCA, by considering the existence of an omission to fulfill the recommendation to design and install barriers in "sector 4" of Dirección5540, since for the norm it is necessary to consider an inactivity, the existence of a limit or mandate imposed by the legal system. Engineer Nombre229498's report, it argues, is neither a mandate nor a limit that imposed obligations on Nombre1220 prior to the accident. It is a technical criterion that the Administration did not adopt and that has been contested with the forensic expert opinion and the engineering report of the CNFL. **b)** Nombre193, the Forensic Engineering Section of the OIJ, concluded regarding the location of pole no. 106, that the minimum distance for placing poles is 1.80 meters and the pole was located at 3.40 meters, so at the time of the accident it "was geometrically well situated." But that opinion, it warns, has also not been duly valued by the Court, not only to understand the criterion of Engineer Nombre229498 as contested, but to establish based on the manuals that the impacted pole was placed according to unequivocal technical criteria. It comments that Mr. Nombre229498 in his deposition attempted to question the criterion of the aforementioned Forensic Engineering Section, maintaining that the lateral clearance without lighting poles in section 7.2.6 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was 3.65 meters, because there was no shoulder. This, it alludes, contradicts Mr. Nombre229498's report –folio 22-, according to which the speed limit set in the zone took into account the condition of the shoulder, given that, for forensic engineering, there is indeed a shoulder. **c)** It affirms that engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro, in their depositions, indicated that the Central American Manual provides for the placement of lighting poles at a minimum of 0.50 meters from the roadway. It continues, Mr. Guillermo added that the Manual recommends a greater distance for pole withdrawal because US statistics indicate that accidents occur at 1.2 meters. In response to questions from the plaintiff, he indicated that in practice, Fuerza y Luz installs poles at 0.50 meters from the road, this being customary. According to it, the engineers of the CNFL are professionals of ample experience, however, it says, the Court, in accordance with sound judgment, did not consider that technical criterion that refutes that of Mr. Nombre229498. In this way, it reiterates, the criterion of Mr. Nombre229498 on which the deciding body based its conclusions was contested with the expert report of the OIJ, the statements of the expert, and the engineers of the Company, from which it is clear that it is not possible to establish that the placement of the lighting poles on the Florencio del Castillo highway does not maintain the lateral clearance required by science and technique. **d)** In its view, another aspect that the Court did not value with sound judgment was the recommended width for the "median strip (mediana separadora)" on four-lane, regional, urban, or suburban trunk highways, as Mr. Nombre229498 classified the Florencio del Castillo. According to the Manual of Geometric Design, it points out, the measurement is a minimum of 3 meters and a maximum of 4.3 meters. Because of this, it argues, the recommended width at the Central American level for the "median strip or central dividing strip (mediana o franja separadora central)" is consistent with the requirement that the clearances of the lighting poles be at 1.8 meters. It is, it argues, an unequivocal criterion at the Central American level that the Court overlooked. The foregoing, it explains, is relevant if one considers that the entire theory of the plaintiff's case rests on the inconsistency of the electrical pole placement based on both SIECA manuals, warned by engineer Nombre229498 in 2003.

The Laboratory's recommendation, it refutes, stems from the placement of containment barriers or a protection system by virtue of the improper placement of the posts. It then partially reproduces the report of Mr. Nombre229498, to later point out that, along those lines, the recommendation for a protection and prevention system is due to the location of the posts. In its view, the criterion of section 2.1.23 of the Manual of Uniform Devices was set aside, contradicting sound criticism, to establish the existence of an omission by Conavi, by not conforming to the sole personal criterion of Mr. Nombre229498, thereby forgetting that containment barriers constitute a danger in themselves. It alleges an infringement of canons 1, 3, and 5 of the Law Creating the Roadway Council (Ley no. 7798) by imposing on Conavi the design and installation of containment barriers based on the report of Mr. Nombre229498 and without considering the unequivocal criteria of science and technique from the Central American Manuals, expert witnesses from CNFL, and forensic expertise.

• e)The judges, it reproaches, did not consider it a proven fact that the permitted speed in the area is 60 KPH, disregarding, it asserts, the official communications from the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito no. DGIT-SV 138-2010 and Placa43125. The recommendation to design and install containment barriers was not assessed based on the OIJ expert report, according to which the death was caused by excessive speed and would have occurred just the same with barriers. According to the mentioned official communications, which, it criticizes, were not heeded by the Tribunal, the permitted speed in the San José-Cartago direction, in section no. 4, is 40 KPH. This is relevant, it explains, because Mr. Nombre229498 in his oral testimony considered that on roadways with a permitted speed of 40 KPH, the installation of barriers was not justified. It continues, Mr. Nombre229498's report should not have been assessed as a conclusive, unequivocal technical criterion. In the same vein, it protests, the testimony of the expert witness Nombre229500 was not appreciated under the rules of sound criticism, when he pointed out that the environment, vehicle, and driver factors are the three elements that must be connected for a traffic incident to be avoided or minimized. Nevertheless, it alleges, for the Tribunal, Nombre1220 did not adjust its activity to rule 16 of the LGAP, according to which, in no case may acts contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique be issued. In its criterion, that provision was misapplied, by believing that these rules depend on the subjective criterion of engineer Nombre229498. It reiterates that the true cause of the accident was excessive speed, but the judges did not properly assess the technical evidence, based in turn on traffic police reports and reports from the OIJ that handled the incident. As stated in the expert report, if the post had not been placed in that location, it relates, the dynamics of the automobile's trajectory would have translated into the possibility of more deaths, given that it was heading out of control toward the oncoming lane. In line with the foregoing, it also reproaches having disregarded Cosevi documents from folios 474 to 480, according to which the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling had several infractions for five collisions, as well as the evidence from that same body dated August 3, 2011, which established that in that year, he had 3 incidents of excessive speed at 90 KPH at the location.

**XVI.-** Related to the previous grievances, **Nombre1220**, for its part, accuses a violation of substantive rules due to the improper application of constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. According to its comments, the Tribunal established that both the Geometric Design Manual for Traffic Devices and the Geometric Design Manual for Regional Highways are not binding on the Costa Rican State. The foregoing, it says, was justified by indicating that both instruments set forth "*suggestions*" aimed at harmonizing highway design construction criteria. In the same sense, it adds, it stated that the recommendations issued by the Laboratory through the "Road Safety Audit Report for the Florencio del Castillo Highway," pursuant to numerals 5 and 6 of Ley no. 8114, are also neither binding nor of mandatory compliance for Conavi. It asserts that the Administration is not obligated to comply with the indications made by both Sieca and Nombre109293, because in them, only recommendations and desirable suggestions are issued, which each country, according to its internal provisions and technical criteria, must evaluate to decide on their application. What is intended, it adds, is that the recommendations be combined with each country's internal criteria. In accordance with the principle of legality, established in canon 11 of the LGAP, it expresses, as those instruments (the manuals and the report) do not form part of the legal system, the Administration is not obligated to comply with their recommendations. It articulates that they cannot be condemned to obey a recommendation –however valid it may be– if it does not constitute a norm of the internal legal order. It argues that Nombre1220 has, in any case, adopted many of the manuals' recommendations, deeming that their application contributes to the improvement of the country's road infrastructure. Its actions, it notes, are in accordance with the unequivocal rules of science and technique. However, it explains, it is not possible to condemn the non-application of article 16 cited, to solutions that are not of a mandatory nature. It emphasizes that it is necessary to understand that the Administration's actions must be in accordance with the rules of science and technique, but applying them to a duly authorized act. It exalts that, by considering that the Council indeed had to comply with the recommendations of Nombre109293 in application of the mentioned rule 16, the principle of equality enshrined in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution was also violated, since article 16 was not applied equally to the actions carried out by CNFL. It highlights that, contrary to what was noted by the Tribunal, Nombre1220 did comply with what is established in canon 16 cited, as there is sufficient technical justification for the place where the public lighting posts were placed. It expresses that from the testimonial evidence, it emerges that an engineer from the Council decided the location of the posts where they are situated in attention to a "*stormwater drainage system*" that passes through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall. It notes that the OIJ expert established that the posts were well situated as provided in chapter 7.2.6 on Position of Signs from the SIECA Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control. Therefore, it says, article 16 cited was not infringed, as there exists, it stresses, expert evidence that determined that the posts were technically well located, even complying with SIECA manuals.

**XVII.-** In this first argument, the disregard of several pieces of evidence is imputed. Generally speaking, the State representative alleges that the judges omitted to analyze the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control, as well as the Central American Manual of Standards for the Geometric Design of Regional Highways, published by the Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana in the years 2000 and 2001. They say these manuals should have been analyzed, especially since Engineer Nombre229498 used them to prepare his report. Regarding the application of these international instruments, the Tribunal established the following: "…*it must be indicated from the outset, that the Central American Manuals invoked by the claimant (that is, the Central American Manual of Geometric Design for Regional Highways and the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control) although it is true they are issued by the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, they are not binding on the Costa Rican State. This is because from the beginning, both manuals indicate that what they offer are suggestions aimed at the harmonization of construction and design criteria for highways and traffic control signs… there is no binding effect whatsoever for the State of Costa Rica with regard to the provisions of the referenced manual, nor for the one concerning traffic control signs… it cannot be forgotten that the commented standards do not bind the countries; therefore, it is each of these, in accordance with internal technical provisions, that will determine how public lighting posts are constructed and where they are located*…" (dictation of the judgment starting at 15 hours 25 minutes). Upon analyzing the referenced documents, the Tribunal is correct when it establishes that at least these Central American standards are not binding on the Costa Rican State. Thus, the Manual Centroamericano de Normas Ambientales para el Diseño, Construcción y Mantenimiento de Carreteras contains a set of recommendations specifically referring to the need for uniform standards for highway construction in Central America. Following the philosophy of the Manual itself, these standards "*should not become a straitjacket nor generate conflicts in their application by the countries, but rather should offer a solid and technically acceptable guide on the most desirable solutions for the geometric design of regional highways*" (chapter I, point 1.2 on the Justification for a Standards Manual for the Geometric Design of Regional Highways). All these design patterns were conceived to be used by the designer to thus propose the best technical solution applicable to each road project, bearing in mind future traffic projections, the physical difficulties to overcome, usual maintenance practices, and the availability of resources for the execution of the proposed works. But in themselves, they constitute more of a model or ideal to follow than a mandatory compliance imperative. Even the Manual itself, which is being analyzed, states that its objective is not for the proposals to serve as a "*recipe book for immediate application,*" but rather as a reference, for which each concrete case must be evaluated. Here it is necessary to recall that the study standards arose due to the lack of national and regional research in Central America on the particular requirements and local characteristics applicable to the geometric design of highways, for which the Consejo Sectorial de Ministros de Transporte de Centroamérica (Comitran) undertook the task of unifying criteria based on the deliberate selection of the most recognized international practices, such as those of the "American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials" (Aashto), the Transportation Research Board (TRB), and the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE), technical contributions from the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) or from the European Union itself. But it also establishes that none of its standards should replace the good judgment and explicit criteria of the road designer, which must be expressly supported in each case. In this way, its provisions constitute simple recommendations for the region's countries on the topic of road safety. On the other hand, the Central American Manual of Uniform Devices for Traffic Control arose due to the outdated nature of the regulations that were in force until the year 2000, which were already over 40 years old. The Manual de Señales Viales Centroamericano, as an original annex to the Acuerdo Centroamericano sobre Señales Viales Uniformes, was approved in 1958 and officially adopted by each country at a later date, such that given the changes experienced in the region during recent times, those regulations regarding road signage became incomplete and outdated. But these rules are also mere recommendations that seek to improve road safety on Central American highways; reduce unnecessary delays caused by traffic congestion; and supply timely and complete guidance to road users uniformly in any of the region's countries (chapter 1, point 1.2. Objectives of the Manual). The foregoing is explained by the simple reason that the local legislation of each country has its own laws and regulations on traffic circulation and the respective regime of fines for infractions, and therefore, for the application of that Manual, those driving rules, control devices, and other authorizations or restrictions established in the legal framework of each country must be considered first. Thus, the analyzed document is very clear in chapter I of general provisions, point 1.4 on legal aspects, section 1.4.1 on the general legal framework and placement authority, in that "…*what is prescribed in this Manual is applicable to the extent that it does not contradict the traffic rules in force in any of the countries of the Central American region*…". According to what has been presented so far, it can be concluded that indeed, the manuals cited by the appellant for cassation are not of strict application for Costa Rica. They can be applied, but those responsible for their implementation must justify and demonstrate that they are the best criterion, especially when multiple recommendations and techniques exist internationally for the construction of roads and the installation of signs and other highway devices. This being the case, any grievance from the State's representation and from Nombre1220 tending toward the analysis of the standards of both manuals is not admissible. Furthermore, it must be added that during the debate and conclusions, all co-defendants insisted as a primary defense regarding this topic that the standards in the manuals were not applicable in Costa Rica, so they cannot now pretend that they be used to justify the action of Nombre1220 (during the conclusions stage, Fuerza y Luz at 15:17, Nombre1220 at 16:34, and the State at 17:00 on August 23, 2011). Even the State textually dismissed the application of the Central American Manual of Uniform Provisions for Traffic Control by saying it was not of interest to the present case. But regardless of the foregoing, it is insisted, the judges leaned toward its non-application as a mandatory compliance norm since its precepts are only suggestions for the States, so one way or another, those defenses of the defendant parties on the topic had been addressed. From that perspective, the co-defendants requested the non-application of the international instruments and the Tribunal recognized this, so the analysis of its articles lacked interest. Likewise, the majority of the expert witnesses stated that at the time of installing the luminaries, they were unaware of the existence of the manuals, for which reason it was ruled out that this was the technical criterion used. Another reason for not entering into the analysis of the rules it intends, at least regarding the Procuraduría, is that the order to install a safety barrier in sector four of the highway only affects the Council, not the State. There is joint and several liability between both in the payment of material and moral damage, but that is a point to be analyzed in another section. For the stated reasons, the allegation regarding the disregard of the manuals is unfounded. As a consequence of the foregoing, the arguments regarding the OIJ expert's report (from both appellants for cassation), the testimonies of engineers Nombre229499 and Mynor Navarro Alfaro in relation to the location of the posts, are also not understandable; nor is any argument regarding the recommended width for the separating median on four-lane, regional, urban, or suburban trunk highways; since for this, the appellants for cassation based themselves on standards from the Central American Manual for Highway Design, which, as explained, is not applicable in the present matter.

**XVIII.-** In relation to the construction of safety barriers and the speed limits that the State representation says were not analyzed by the Tribunal (according to official communications DGIT-SV 138-2010 and DGIT-SV-284-2010), this Chamber concludes that the State lacks interest in this aspect, since it is not observed how the Tribunal's order affects it, if the obligation to build the guardrails rests exclusively with Conavi, which will have to meet it with its budget according to what articles 3 and 4 of its Law Creating It (Ley no. 7798) provide. In any case, regarding the alleged contradiction of engineer Nombre229498 concerning that in a 40KPH zone there should be no protection barriers, it must be said that strangely, at folio 530 of the case file, in the questioned official communication, there is a photograph (not challenged) of the right sector of the roadway in the San José - Cartago direction near Terramall, in which a protection barrier with a restricted speed sign of 40KPH is observed on the edge of the road, so the engineer's statement would not be an obstacle for Nombre1220 to build the questioned barrier. The indicated disregard of evidence is also not present, since, as will be seen later, the OIJ evidence regarding the speed at which the vehicle was being driven, as well as that certified by the speeding tickets that driver Nombre229496 had, was indeed taken into consideration by the Tribunal, but to determine the degree of fault that Nombre1220 and the State had. The foregoing in no way influences the obligation now weighing on Nombre1220 to build a barrier in the area, because the speed at which Nombre229496 was driving was not a road aspect or factor that should have been taken into consideration by the judges at the moment of imposing the order. This is because the need for a containment barrier does not arise solely from a specific accident, but also from a technical report from a recognized Laboratory in the country. While it is true the duty materializes with the claimant's action, it must be remembered that the recommendation had existed since 2003, after Nombre109293 conducted a risk study or audit of the Dirección13198. One thing is the responsibility for the consequences of the accident, where the Tribunal indeed had to assess the vehicle's speed, and quite another is the duty that arises from an omission by the Administration, especially given that there was a technical opinion indicating the danger of the posts with rigid bases at the edge of the Florencio del Castillo highway in sector four Pasoca - Terramall. They are two different issues that are duly analyzed by the Tribunal; one is the Council's omission, and the other is the Administration's degree of fault, which in a certain way was attenuated due to the excessive speed at which the wrecked vehicle was traveling.

**XIX.-** Having said that, the condemnation for the material and moral damage caused to the deceased's family, the appellants must understand, is not made solely for the placement of the posts, but mainly for the failure to apply the recommendations given by Nombre109293 in March 2003 in the "Informe de Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial Carretera Florencio del Castillo," since section four of that roadway (between Pasoca and Terramall) presented an urgent level of attention due to the risk generated by the hazards present on it, specifically the public lighting posts with rigid bases. An aspect that the expert and author of the report, Mr. Nombre229498, sufficiently referred to during the debate. While it is true that to this day these recommendations are also not of mandatory compliance as inferred from the analysis of articles 5 and 6 of Ley 8114, they do constitute a valid and truthful technical criterion, backed by a laboratory of the Universidad de Costa Rica (exactly an academic research unit attached to the School of Civil Engineering of that university institution). In accordance with article 16 of the LGAP for this concrete case, they are indeed unequivocal rules of technique that, in its actions, Nombre1220 should have implemented or at least analyzed, to decide what type of measures would mitigate the risk described there. Even though the report is dated after the placement of the posts, which date back to the beginning of 2002, the Council should have, in one way or another, addressed the recommendations established there, especially since none of them were disproportionate or exaggerated, given that it was not established that the structures had to be changed or relocated; the recommended solution was to implement safety mechanisms (protection barriers or containment walls), which are even observed in other sectors of the roadway or on other national highways such as the San José – Caldera highway (as per what was analyzed in the debate). This Chamber considers that it is not in vain that Ley 8114 establishes in the last paragraph of article 5, that the Laboratory will report for "*what in law corresponds*," to the Legislative Assembly, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), the Contraloría General de la República, and the Defensoría de los Habitantes, the final result of the technical audits conducted. By informing MOPT, the Council was automatically considered notified of the report, and therefore, it should have taken the necessary actions to address the warning and not simply file or ignore the document, under the pretext that it is not binding. The foregoing takes on relevance if one considers that a road safety issue is involved, requiring urgent attention, because there are hazards on the roadway that represent a danger to drivers and passengers, regardless of the speed at which the former travel, since this is an aspect that will always influence liability issues but does not automatically exempt the State from fault, as will be analyzed in the following considerations. Given the above, it must be added that for the preparation of the report, Mr. Nombre229498 carried out, as he explained at trial, a study of the site, measurements, and a series of international technical criteria and recommendations were used, mainly those of Aashto. Nombre1220 has at no time discredited that study through the implementation of other types of technical and specialized criteria; moreover, to this day that evidence is notably absent from the case file. The argument that the location of the posts responds to a criterion or "*stormwater drainage system*" that passes through the center of the median in the sector between Pasoca and Terramall is not sufficient to demonstrate that in its action, rules of technique were followed in the terms of article 16 of the LGAP. First, because that was rather a circumstance or order that arose in the contracting process, so that Fuerza y Luz would place the posts closer to the roadway according to what the Council's engineers determined at that time; this even against the criterion of the Company's specialists. On this point, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229499, head of the Public Lighting Department of the Company in 2002, was decisive; he stated that in the contract execution process, there was a supervising engineer from Nombre1220 responsible for defining how to place the posts; that CNFL was going to locate them in the center, but the Council established that this was not possible because there was a drain there; and that the Company generally complies with MOPT's instructions (statements on August 5, 2011, at 12 hours 30 minutes and 12 hours 42 minutes).

For this reason, the Court exonerated CNFL from liability by ordering that: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">The engineers from Fuerza y Luz were clear in maintaining that it was, indeed, a person designated by Nombre1220 to supervise this work, and it was that official from Conavi, whose name was not learned, who ordered where the poles should be located, explaining that they were not erected in the exact center of the median because drains cross there, a reason that justified constructing them in a site closer to the edge of the road toward one of the two sides of the center. This being the case, and it being clear that Fuerza y Luz was not the one who determined, nor could it determine under the agreement, the location of the poles, but rather, it was Nombre1220 who did so, then we derive from this that the Company's conduct bears, in this case, no relation to causing the death of Mr. Nombre229501</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” (dictation of the judgment at 15 hours 30 minutes). Secondly, this Chamber insists, the problem at the time this proceeding was filed does not lie exclusively in the location of the poles, nor the material with which they are built, but in the lack of attention to a problem warned of by the Laboratory since 2003. Given that the technical criterion the Council had to demonstrate concerns the advisability or not of installing a protection barrier, which was never demonstrated, the recommendation and, based on it, the technique employed by Nombre109293 therefore remains determinative in this regard. Only if some convincing report from the Administration existed would the solutions given by the Laboratory take a back seat, as there would be a better criterion regarding the problem warned of, an aspect which, in any event, it will be up to the Court to assess in each specific case. But until now, the only criterion on this matter is that of the Laboratory, and that report is conclusive in pointing out that: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">the poles were not installed with flexible, breakable, or frangible bases, but with a rigid base consisting of a concrete box. The bases of the lighting poles represent a serious collision hazard, given their location and rigid condition</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” (page 27 of the report). The collision risk on that stretch is imminent and requires urgent attention, which is why Nombre109293 recommends “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Designing and installing a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting poles…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">” (page 30, chapter 5.6 of the report). Hence the importance, it is inferred from the study, of building containment barriers. For these reasons, the Laboratory's report is vital to establish the liability of the State and its body Conavi, for not heeding the analyzed recommendations, which surely would have diminished the fatal consequences at least in this accident on that specific sector of the road. Thus, the Court was right when it stated that “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">In the present matter, a technical criterion existed, which is the report by Nombre109293, and there is no other document on record, rendered at another time, that discredits the report by Nombre109293. That is to say, we have a technical document prepared by engineers, validated by a specialized laboratory of a university of recognized prestige that also has that specialized laboratory. And this technical criterion has at no time been contradicted by anyone.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Thus, the only thing available relating to the risk is precisely that audit report. And in that audit report, it is specified that in the fourth section of the Florencio del Castillo highway, under the terms already indicated, there is a high collision risk and a high risk that this collision will bring about fatal results. A warning that was made in the year 2003</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">...” (at 15 hours 34 minutes according to the recording of the judgment's dictation). That was the technical criterion used by the Court to reach its conclusion, which is in accordance with the law and can be categorized as the applicable technical rule for the case under examination, since in Costa Rica there is no express legal standard that establishes how lighting poles must be placed on national roads, the type of structures to be used, nor the protection systems they must have. This indicates that the only existing technical criterion is the one establishing that their current location is risky. Moreover, the study considered, through the criterion of professionals on the subject, the characteristics and behavior of the road, thus leaving no doubt as to its impartiality and credibility as unequivocal rules of technique. Furthermore, the expert was emphatic in his testimony that, to prepare the report, foreign principles and techniques were used. He insisted on the implementation of the technical criteria of Aashto and the European Union, not on the recommendations of the Central American manuals as the State alleges, because these latter ones, Mr. Nombre229498 assured, are rules that were established</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> for the placement of poles for traffic signs, not for lighting poles, which must follow other criteria (at 1:15 p.m., 5:48 p.m., 6:25 p.m.; 6:44 p.m., 8:00 p.m., and 8:45 p.m. on August 3, 2011). While it is true, one could point out that the international standards used by the Laboratory are also recommendations, it must be emphasized that, being included in the Laboratory's report, which is also the only criterion regarding the Florencio del Castillo highway, they automatically become a technical criterion for a specific case, which Nombre1220 at least had to analyze for whatever is legally appropriate. This audit transcended due to the occurrence of the mishap where Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and Nombre229502</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">died, but it should have been addressed since the year 2003. Those consequences were expressly warned of by Nombre109293 in the documentation questioned here and which Nombre1220 simply ignored. Thus, the alleged preterition of evidence is not observed, at least regarding the Council's omission to address the risks on the road; nor is there a violation of articles 16 of the LGAP, 5, 6 of Law 8114, nor 128 of the CPCA, so the grievances of the appellants must be rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">XX.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">second</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> grievance, again for preterition and improper assessment of evidence, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">the State representation</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> addresses the items corresponding to damages. It points out that, for the Court, the decease of Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">implied for Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters, Nombre229491 and Nombre229491, the loss of their means of subsistence. In its opinion, that detriment did not occur and, if it existed, it would be only partial based on the documentary evidence preterited, which corresponds to the certification of the National Insurance Institute (the INS or the Institute, hereinafter) no. SOA-00272-2010 of January 26, 2010, and the official letter of the CCSS no. AGP-362 of July 22, 2011, previously cited. The judges, it states, held as proven facts that the average monthly net salary that Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">received in the last year of his life was ¢325,154.25; that the co-plaintiffs received an aliquot indemnification of ¢2,000,000.00 from the INS; and, that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ¢206,337.60. But the Court, it adds, did not consider that said incomes do not diminish the plaintiffs' right to receive additional compensation for the alleged omission by Conavi, since the cause of the former is the application of mandatory automobile insurance and the latter, because the deceased was contributing to social security. The documents that established the payments from the INS and the CCSS were improperly assessed, because from them, it explains, it should have been held as proven that the loss of income did not exist to the extent that was demonstrated to set the quantum of damages. It notes that the three incomes, commuted or lifetime, have the same purpose or object. It specifies that the income that Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">distributed in life among his dependents was supplied in two ways: by the indemnification received due to death in a fixed amount, and another, by a lifetime pension for the widow and temporary for the orphans at a percentage of 50% and 30% of the victim's salary. It says that the Court should not have held as confirmed, based on the report of the mathematical expert Nombre37311, the existence of the damages claimed for the 75% of the salary that Nombre229497 would have earned in life</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, especially if one considers, as he acknowledged in his oral report, that he made a calculation without considering the existence of the INS indemnification and the CCSS pension.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">XXI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> On this specific point, the judges resolved the following: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“We have already established that, in our opinion, there is a concurrence of faults between the omission by Nombre1220 to heed the technical provisions of Nombre109293 to make the risk created by the placement of the public lighting poles on Dirección13198 acceptable</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">and the reckless and irresponsible driving of Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">as causes of the death of Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">… despite the indicated concurrence, the liability of Nombre1220 and Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">is not identical; rather, that of the latter is much greater than that of the former, to such an extent that for us it means 65% of the total cause of the death of Mr. Nombre229497, while Nombre1220 assumes the remaining 35%… the decease of Mr. Nombre229497 meant for Mrs. Nombre229490, Nombre229491</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">and Nombre229491,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> the loss of ¢50,252,231.67. This amount is that which corresponds to the material damages actually suffered by the three said plaintiffs… from that said figure, Nombre1220 should only respond to the extent of its responsibility, that is, of the total amount, Nombre1220 is only obligated to pay 35%. Starting from this… the National Roadway Council and the State are jointly and severally ordered to pay, as material damages, the sum of ¢17,588,281.08 in favor of Nombre229490</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, Nombre229491</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">and Nombre229491</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, an amount which, in execution of judgment, must be indexed from November 7, 2007, until the date of its effective payment and must be distributed equitably among the three beneficiaries of this indemnification…. the State's allegation regarding the pension that Mrs. Nombre229490</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">and her daughters receive, which is from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, becomes untenable. This is because said pension derives from the Disability, Old Age, and Death (Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) regime and its cause is the mere death of a person who was contributing to the indicated regime. That is, the pension is due to the social security system still prevailing in Costa Rica and does not have as its cause the material harm experienced by the widow and daughters of the deceased… Finally… the National Insurance Institute made a payment in favor of the three said persons, but that payment is for the application of mandatory automobile insurance.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Thus, its cause is also completely different from the indemnification that has been established here, so it becomes equally irrelevant for the purposes of the right to compensation for material harm…” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">(Considerando XI starting at 16:11 of the judgment's dictation). The State alleges preterition of the INS certification no. SOA-00272-2010 and the official letter from the CCSS no. Placa43126 where it is recorded, respectively, that the plaintiff received an aliquot indemnification of ¢2,000,000.00 from the Institute, and that they receive a widow's and orphan's pension of ¢206,337.60. In reality, the second document, it must be recalled, was rejected during the debate, so preterition could not exist; and regarding the former, what is alleged would be an improper assessment. First, the money the plaintiff and her daughters receive from the CCSS as death and orphan's insurance is due to social insurance for the benefit of all workers, a fundamental principle of the regime of social rights and guarantees, which operates on the basis of compulsory contributions from the State, employers, and workers. This regime is widely protected in canon 73 of the Political Constitution, and articles 1, 2, 3 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS, and 2 of the Regulation on Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte). Thus, it responds to a compensatory system distinct from the one discussed here. The amount granted by the Court is due to patrimonial indemnification from the Administration for an omissive conduct, which is protected in canon 41 of the Magna Carta and article 190 of the LGAP.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In this regard, this latter provision establishes: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. This involves the compensation for material harm and the damages caused to the family of the deceased, which, until this proceeding, had not been determined in the terms of article 196 ibid. The other compensatory system is a right of the insured and their beneficiaries for the mere fact of contributing to the CCSS regime. For its part, mandatory automobile insurance (SOA) is also distinct from the indemnification claimed by the plaintiff, since it arises by legal mandate, namely from the Traffic on Public Land Roads Law (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, Law 7331, in force at the time of the accident), which vehicle owners must keep current through the payment of a premium set by the Institute. The SOA covers injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not there is liability on the part of the driver. This insurance is collected annually and is a requirement to obtain the vehicle's circulation permit (provisions 38, 40 and 48 ibid). This indemnification, therefore, is different from the liability regime established in the General Law of Public Administration, which compensates damages caused to the administered party by legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the State and its bodies (strict liability). That compensation is not covered by the previous regimes, which operate by full right upon the occurrence of the event that gives rise to them; the first as a right of workers and their beneficiaries for the mere fact of contributing to the system; and the second as insurance for the undeniable risk that driving a motor vehicle involves. Thus, the judgment did not improperly assess the INS certification as the appellant alleges, so the grievance must be rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">XXII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In its </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">third </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">argument, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Procuracy</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> asserts a violation of the constitutional norms or principles of reasonability, proportionality, and equality. Regarding the percentage of Conavi's responsibility, it states that the Court considered that the Council's omission did not generate a danger comparable to the recklessness, incompetence, and temerity of the driver Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, which is why it attributed 65% responsibility to the latter for his conduct, in relation to the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It asserts that the administrative omission was overdimensioned to assign it a greater responsibility than what was appropriate. It is evident, it emphasizes, that the expert report and the oral testimony from the Forensic Engineering Section of the OIJ were not taken into account. It reiterates that the Court did not appreciate that the cause of death was the excess of speed at which Mr. Nombre229496 was driving. It considers that the imprudence, incompetence, and temerity of the driver is the exclusive or determining factor in nearly 100% of the death of Mr. Nombre229497. The location of the pole, it asserts, is not the trigger for 35% of the death of Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">as the judges assessed. The vehicle had recently passed the vehicle technical review, and according to the official traffic accident report, the testimony of Mr. Nombre229503</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and the OIJ report, the road surface was dry, it is flat, straight, and it was daytime, so the only cause was the conduct of Mr. Nombre229498. It refers that, according to the testimony of Nombre229500, what is advised is to consider the stopping, reaction, or braking distance; thus, the maneuver faced with a dead dog was to reduce speed, brake, and swerve; move to the right lane; or have driven over it with the car centered. However, it criticizes,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> he maneuvered by swerving into the green area without braking. It mentions that Mr. Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">was driving at a speed of 90 KPH, in an area regulated at 60 KPH. For engineer Nombre229498, it states, that limit seeks to reduce the consequences in the event of a collision; even the set speed took into account the condition of the shoulder, stopping sight distance, and pedestrian activity.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The forensic expert report, it highlights, referred to various aspects such as: a car at 60 KPH could swerve to avoid the dog, at higher speed it would see a shadow; speed was the cause of the outcome; at the permitted speed, there are no deaths or damages; and, that all drivers know that in front of Terramall that is the speed. Given the foregoing, it considers it unreasonable that the Court exonerated the driver from his responsibility for the death of Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">by 35%, when it should have assigned him, if not total responsibility of 100%, a responsibility greater than 65% because even with the barriers, the death would have occurred. In relation to this, it considers the Central American Agreement on Road Circulation (Acuerdo Centroamericano sobre Circulación por Carretera), approved by Law no. Placa43127, articles 3, 3.7, 3.8, and 4, violated due to lack of application, because the Court exonerated Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">by 35% from his obligation to drive without causing danger or harm to persons and to maintain a reasonable speed within the posted limits. Also article 7, second paragraph of the Traffic Law no. 7331,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> because the person responsible for the damages was Mr. Nombre229496. Apart from the foregoing, it reproaches articles 3 of Law no. 7798 and 12 of the CPCA as violated due to erroneous interpretation, by considering that the State must respond civilly with Conavi, for the omission attributed to the Council. As well as articles 199 to 202 and 1046 of the Civil Code, because it is considered that there is joint and several liability in matters of responsibility between the two. It outlines that if the legislator chose to grant Conavi legal personality, endowing it with an independent patrimony and giving it the freedom to contract separately, it is not possible to attribute the State for the omissions of the former within the scope of its competence.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It argues that in proven facts 5 through 8, it is accredited that the Council contracted CNFL for the installation of the lighting on Dirección3536</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">and that the agreement included the supervision of road safety aspects. Consequently, it attributes an erroneous interpretation of articles 1, 3, and 5 of Law no. 7798/98 and 12.2 of the CPCA. In its view, the Court confused the subsidiary liability that may correspond to the State when a public legal entity lacks sufficient patrimony to meet its obligation, with the scenario of the mentioned provision 12.2, which does not intend to substitute the investigation of that sufficiency. It adds that just because one has passive legitimacy in a proceeding, it does not mean one must be held liable for the action. Along those same lines, it states that the meaning of articles 199 to 202 of Law no. 6227 was confused, which are not directed at establishing joint and several liability in extra-contractual civil matters between the State as a person and a body as a person. What they provide for, it points out, is the attribution in any case to the organization upon which the servants depend for acts performed in their name and on their behalf, which is not what applies in the other case. It accuses improper application of canon 1046 of the Civil Code because the legal system that regulates the Administration's activity is independent from civil law, pursuant to provisions 3 and 9 of Law 6227, violated due to lack of application. That norm, it clarifies, regulates the obligation to jointly and severally repair the damages caused by criminal offenses and in the case of participation as a principal or accomplice, which does not apply in the present matter. Finally, in addition to what was expressed at the beginning of the objection, through a brief filed on October 10, 2011, which corresponds to an expansion of the appeal, it states that the Court indirectly violated article 190 of Law 6227, by charging the State and the Council with civil liability for a non-existent technical omission and by not considering the causal link broken due to the act of a third party, the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496, as well as by attributing a 35% percentage of responsibility for the death of Mr. Nombre229497. It adds that no causal link exists of such seriousness with the State's conduct, and it is clear that what occurred has not produced an infraction and damages of the amount set.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Linked to the previous allegations, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Nombre1220</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> censures the Court's criterion by singling it out, along with the State, as 35% responsible for the death of Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. It states that the Court recognizes that the cause of the accident was brought about by the act of a third party, that is, the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was traveling. It mentions that it was the lack of expertise within reckless driving that brought about the fatal outcome. From the evidentiary body, it details, it was demonstrated that Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">disregarded the permitted speed and that excess speed was what caused the loss of control of the car and the collision with the pole. In the courtroom, it states, the expert Gaudy Vega was asked</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> “if a protective guardrail -considering the speed at which the vehicle was traveling- would have avoided the fatal outcome, and her answer was </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">no</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">”. In its opinion, it was demonstrated that there is no certainty that even if the protective guardrail had existed, Mr. Nombre229497</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">would not have died.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Therefore, it warns, the one who created the risk was not the Council, but rather the reckless driving “</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">of an irresponsible driver</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">”. It reinforces its allegation with article 190 of the LGAP. It indicates that, for the judges, an exoneration from liability exists, such as the act of a third party. In this way, it argues, there is no reason to seek to attribute to Nombre1220 liability for 35% of the death of Nombre229497, especially since the Court based its judgment on uncertain situations not proven in the debate. In its understanding, there is no causal nexus linking the Council's conduct to the mishap.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">XXIII.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The appellants reproach a violation of constitutional principles of reasonability, proportionality, and equality, with respect to the degree of responsibility attributed to them, but in essence, after</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> organizing the arguments, the objection is also for improper assessment of evidence and direct violation of provisions, because in their understanding, the cited evidence is clear in pointing out that Nombre229496</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">is the sole person responsible for the damages claimed by the plaintiff.</span></p> This was due to the excessive speed at which he was driving the vehicle on the day of the accident. Regarding this point, in the considerations of the ruling, the judges established the following: “The way the vehicle ended up, the description of the event, the absence of braking, and also, importantly here, the admission made by Nombre229496 himself about having several citations, including several for speeding, reveals to us that he was indeed traveling at a very high speed. The area where he was traveling has a maximum limit of 60 KPH… Now, Mr. Nombre229496, although he tries to deny it, the truth is that he was traveling at much more than the permitted speed; the excessive speed is evident from the impossibility of controlling the vehicle. It is not believable that a vehicle at a maximum speed of 60 KPH would follow the movement as he described it… there is no doubt that those 60 KPH were more than disrespected by Mr. Nombre229496… what happened was a loss of control of the vehicle as a direct consequence of the excessive speed. But other vehicles had passed by at that time, that morning, and the dog was there, so the supposed unforeseeable effect of not being able to see it is not understood, except for the excessive speed which Ms. Gaudy proved and which, based on the other evidentiary elements already mentioned, we consider credible…” (dictation of the judgment at 3:51 p.m.). In this way, there is no doubt that the excessive speed on the part of Nombre229496 was indeed assessed by the Court, which determined that it was a significant cause of the accident that occurred in front of Terramall on that November 9, 2007. That human factor, described by the expert witness Nombre229500, was considered by the judges, as there was abundant evidence in that regard. To this effect, there is the “Criminalistic Analysis Opinion (Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico)” rendered by Gaudy Vega of the OIJ, as well as her testimony at trial; the records of speeding citations for Nombre229496; the testimony of the bus “checker,” Nombre229504, who was at the site on the day of the event; as well as the multiple photographs showing how the motor vehicle ended up after the impact. By reason of the foregoing, the judges determined that “… yes, there is an omission by Nombre1220, but the driving and the sole person responsible for the driving is Nombre229496. Thus, this Court reaches the conclusion that there is a concurrence of causes in the production of the fatal result. On one hand, the omission of Nombre1220, and on the other hand, the driving of Mr. Nombre229496… The reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496 does not eliminate the omission of Nombre1220, but the omission of Nombre1220 also does not eliminate the reckless driving of Mr. Nombre229496. So both must be considered jointly responsible in establishing the causal link between what happened, the omission and the driving, and the result of the death of Mr. Nombre229497. Now, this concurrence of causes is not equitable; it is not equal for both parties. It is true that there is an omission by Nombre1220 in addressing a risk pointed out by the University of Costa Rica, but the truth of the matter is, proportionally speaking, it has not been proven that this is an area of constant collisions. There are collisions, yes there is risk, yes it is high, yes it can produce fatal results, but it is also not a danger of such magnitude as to equate it to the audacity, the lack of skill (impericia), and the recklessness of Nombre229496. What we are saying in other words is that, weighing both factors, both causes, the reckless conduct of Nombre229496 weighs more, considerably more, against the omission of Nombre1220…” (dictation of the judgment at 3:58 p.m.). It is observed that for the Court, there is a concurrence of fault (concurrencia de culpas), since on one hand, as analyzed in previous recitals, there is the omission and neglect of Nombre1220 to comply with the recommendations given by the UCR, and on the other, the reckless and imprudent driving of a third party (Nombre229496). According to the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the representation of the State and the Council is incorrect, since the conduct of Mr. Nombre229496 was indeed extensively analyzed, and furthermore, it has not been the sole and exclusive cause producing the damage claimed here. On the contrary, it would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and the rules of logic and experience to consider that the omission of the Council to fulfill its duty of care and maintenance of the roads, to mitigate a risk that a specialized entity warned about since the year 2003, had no causal incidence in the death of Mr. Nombre229497. With its omissive conduct, it is emphasized, the Council did not help mitigate the damages or consequences of this accident, considering that the rigid-base posts placed in sector four of the highway constitute veritable “shields” or “blades” to the detriment of the vehicles that travel there. In the event of a collision, it was demonstrated, the outcomes would be fatal due to their foundation and anchoring, which makes them “unbreakable (irrompibles).” The construction methods are not questioned in the judgment, perhaps because indeed, there was no clear regulation requiring them to be installed in a specific way, nor was the report advising a substitution of the posts for others with breakaway bases, but the very least that Nombre1220 could have done when an express recommendation regarding the risk of the structures emerged in March 2003, was to install safety mechanisms on the road, such as impact barriers or containment walls. Thus, it is reasonable that the fault of the State and the Nombre1220 exists, but this is of a lesser degree, since indeed the main cause of the mishap was the reckless driving of the driver (an act of a third party). This Chamber has already established in previous cases that the fact that an exemption from liability exists, be it force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or an act of a third party, does not imply that the Administration is automatically freed from all liability regarding the reparation of the caused damage (in this regard, resolution no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8:35 a.m. on September 8, 2011, can be consulted). The foregoing is applicable to the case, since it was not only the imprudence of the driver that influenced the death of Mr. Nombre229497, but also the conditions created and tolerated by the Council, given that the omissions in the exercise of its powers, specifically the failure to install the necessary and sufficient road protection measures, facilitated the vehicle in which the accident victims were traveling to crash violently into the structure. Due to the speed of the motor vehicle, perhaps the consequences would have been the same, but that is a fact that cannot be known with exactitude, and which also does not exonerate the State and Nombre1220 from their duty of road maintenance. Thus, the grading of the damage (graduación del daño) performed by the Court is also proportional to the demonstrated facts, so it would not be just and equitable to reduce the percentage of fault of the State and the Council. Their omissive action did have an influence on the mishap, just like that of the driver Nombre229496. In this way, there is no overlooking of the indicated evidence, nor violation of the rules of Law 3148, 7 of Law 7331, and 190 of the LGAP.

**XXIV.**- The other topic of the objection, namely the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) between the State and Conavi, was founded by the Court as follows: “The instrumental legal personality granted to Nombre1220 is for administering funds and executing contracts; it is not for committing damages, not for causing damages. So, when it comes to the fulfillment of its functions, it is perfectly understandable that Nombre1220 can assume its responsibilities alone, but when it exceeds its functions and falls into the non-functional sphere, it must respond, as the organ it is, even though it has maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima), with that entity to which it is attached. In this case, although it is true the attachment is to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Ministry of Public Works is not an entity, but rather the Central State is, it is clear that the organ of maximum deconcentration of another organ is linked, under a criterion of imputation by regulatory provision, to the entity to which the Ministry belongs, in this case to the Executive Branch and the Central State… Article 12 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code provides for the joint participation between the organ with instrumental personality and the entity to which it belongs, in this case Nombre1220 and the State, precisely because of the possibility that the conduct of the deconcentrated organ that enjoys instrumental legal personality might go beyond its functions and must answer with another subject, in this case the State… If we had determined here a liability of Nombre1220, solely for the breach of its functions, an error in the management of its budget, an error in a contract, a mistake of that kind, we would have no problem in imposing the liability exclusively on Nombre1220. But, before an administered party for a damage like the one demonstrated here, which is entirely unlawful, we cannot exclude the joint and several liability (solidaridad) of the State in these cases. Joint and several liability (solidaridad) that derives from Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration because, before the administered party in harmful events, the Administration is a single entity, although the specific cause of the damage is Nombre1220…” (final hearing at 4:03 p.m.). By express provision of subsection 2) of numeral 12 of the CPCA, when proceedings are brought against a conduct of an administrative organ which has been granted instrumental legal personality, it must also be considered as a defendant party, together with the State or the entity to which it is attached, as appropriate. Within this perspective, the rule is that the figure of the “organ-person,” given its particularities and for representation purposes, must, to that extent, be assimilated to the participation within the process of a decentralized entity, insofar as they possess an instrumental legal personality. But the foregoing applies only insofar as the conduct imputed to it falls within the scope of the deconcentrated competence and with respect to which it was granted legal personality. In this sense, what is provided in numeral 12.2 of the CPCA referred to, must be understood as a mechanism by which it is avoided that, after a process, it is determined that the conduct is not within the competence exercised by the organ with the coverage of the instrumental personality granted to it, whereby it becomes essential that the State responds jointly and severally with the organ in its capacity as the greater entity. On this point, what was held by this Chamber in ruling 1202-A-S1-2009 can be cited, in which it was stated: “The idea underlying the norm is to avoid the problem for the administered party of defining whether the action (or omissive conduct) of the organ was in the exercise of a competence covered by the instrumental legal personality, or outside of it, that is, subject, for example, to the direction of the head of the entity within whose structure it is inserted. In short, what is relevant is the existence of an injury to the legal sphere of the administered party and the correlative duty to repair. In the interest of the victim, the norm orders bringing the organ and the entity to the litigation, so that the eventual favorable judgment can be executed against the patrimony of the one found responsible. If the appearance of both were not required, the ruling would be ineffective, as it could not obligate someone to indemnify who has not exercised the defense of their own interests in the process. Said another way, the procedural mandate orders only that both the organ with personality and the State or entity to which it belongs be incorporated into the judicial discussion. It then falls to the judge, pursuant to the substantive rules, to determine if the questioned act, conduct, or indolence was carried out or not under personality, establishing thereby whether it is the organ that must respond with its own funds, or if it is the entity or the State to which the duty to repair must be attributed.” Law 7798 states that the Council is an “organ with maximum deconcentration (órgano con desconcentración máxima), attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Council shall have instrumental and budgetary legal personality to administer the National Road Network Fund, as well as to enter into the contracts and loans necessary for the exercise of its functions, in accordance with this law…”. In this matter, the State itself, through its organ Conavi, placed the passengers of the crashed vehicle in a situation of imminent risk of death, a risk that, although it materialized through the imprudent conduct of driver Nombre229496, also occurred due to the omission of constructing safety barriers alongside the road. In the same ruling of this Chamber cited in the previous recital (no. 001084-F-S1-2011 of 8:35 a.m. on September 8, 2011), this Chamber considered that in cases like the present one, the degree of liability of the Administration is evident, because the obligation for the maintenance of public roads and the construction of pedestrian bridges corresponds, in this case, to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (today through its deconcentrated organs), and by not doing so, it not only incurs in abnormality and unlawfulness for breach of its legal material obligations, but also because in a direct manner, it threatens and endangers the life not only of the pedestrians but also of the drivers and passengers, who, without the existence of the indicated material work, find themselves needing to perform inadvertent maneuvers or, worse still, are exposed to unnecessary risks such as crashing against an unbreakable obstacle on the highway, whatever the speed. In this regard, it must be highlighted that Article 2 of Law 3155, called “Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, MOPT)”, provides, insofar as is relevant, that: “The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the following objective: a) To plan, build, and improve highways and roads. Maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of neighborhood roads. Regulate and control the rights of way of existing or projected highways and roads. Regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transport on public roads.” Meanwhile, precept 4 of Law 7798 establishes: “The objectives of the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) shall be the following: a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs elaborated by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport…”. Article 24 of the same law proclaims: “All public work financed by the National Road Council shall be carried out based on a system of administration of construction and maintenance of highways and roads (…) the road safety component must be considered and incorporated before its execution, in accordance with the detail to be made by regulation and in a coordinated manner between organs and entities. As part of road safety, provisions must be incorporated for the safe passage of pedestrians, including those at grade and grade-separated, protection for the safe longitudinal movement of pedestrians along the road, bays for public transport stops, cycle routes, in applicable cases, and adequate visibility of the roads, including the elimination of obstacles on them and in their right of way, and any other as provided by the Regulation. To safeguard road safety, the urban environment through which the roads pass must be taken into consideration (…) as well as all other elements, technical specifications, norms, and procedures that guarantee the best road safety for pedestrians and drivers…”. Based on this explanatory and regulatory framework, the State and Nombre1220 have a degree of liability in this matter, which they must jointly and severally pay (sufragar solidariamente) in accordance with the provisions of canon 190 of the LGAP, since this constitutes an evident abnormal functioning of the Administration outside the expected conduct of the organ-person. Thus, the objection concerning the improper application of cardinals 12.2 of the CPCA, 3 of Law 7798, and 199 to 202 of the LGAP must be rejected.

**XXV.**- In the **fourth** objection, the **State** states that the expertise of the actuarial mathematician expert witness, Nombre37311, was not appreciated according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), as the expert stated in his oral testimony that the calculation was based on a regulation in whose drafting he had participated and which had been approved by the College of Economic Sciences (Colegio de Ciencias Económicas), being obligated to apply it to avoid disciplinary sanction, when the truth is that, according to official letter no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, the Regulation on which the expert relied had not even been published, as it was in a process of adjustment and review for approval. It protests that the expert relied on a Draft Regulation for Actuarial Calculations (Proyecto de Reglamento de Cálculos Actuariales) that is not a standard of the College. Among the legal observations or criticisms it makes of the Regulation, it argues that it was based, according to its Article 3, on the rules of civil liability of canon 130 of the Penal Code of 1941, which was repealed by Law no. Placa43128, “without mentioning its modification by Law 4891.” Without sound criticism (sana crítica), it affirms, the Court considered the expert’s proposition and his Regulation to indemnify 75% of the salary reasonable, given the condition of the deceased as the sole source of income for the family nucleus. However, it alleges, for alimony (pensión alimentaria), the salary cannot be liable for more than 50%, according to precept 172.3 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Likewise, it mentions, numeral 6 of the Regulation on which the mathematician expert’s report was based foresees the use of the mortality rate of the year 2000 from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INEC), without considering that this corresponds to the rate at birth. The Court, it comments, considered as a proven fact a salary without social security contributions, but erred by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that applies to all salary income according to cardinal 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (Bank for Popular and Community Development) (Law 4351), by which the net amount should have been set at ¢321,019.18 and not at ¢325,154.25. It bases its argument that the expert report was not appreciated according to sound criticism (sana crítica) on the fact that economic dependence was not limited to 18 or 25 years if the daughters were studying, as mandated in cardinal 173.5 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and 12 of the Regulation of Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte). In the same vein, it indicates that it makes no sense for the Regulation to consider compensation for the economically dependent (Article 2) and for the expert not to limit the retirement age of the deceased by the CCSS, according to Article 5 of the Regulation of Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance (65 years). The Court, it asserts, did not properly appreciate the report in this aspect, for it included in the calculation the age of up to 76.2 years, which includes the commutation factor of 17.21. For these reasons, in its view, the sentencing organ had to strip all value and efficacy from the mathematical expert opinion presented in writing and from the oral declaration that complemented it. By not doing so, it affirms, it disrespected the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) in its assessment, since, had the damages existed, it establishes, it should have left their estimation to the sentence execution phase with a new expert opinion that merited credibility. The foregoing, it recriminates, represents an improper application of norm 196 of the LGAP, since the existence of damages should not have been considered proved based on the mathematician expert’s report and overlooking the INS certification and Official Letters CPCE-JD-746-10 and CCSS AGP-362 cited, at least not in the established amount. At the end of the document, it summarizes the lack of application of ordinal 172.3 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), by erroneously interpreting, with the mathematical expert opinion rendered, that it is possible to indemnify with 75% of the salary, when this is not consistent with the living needs of the deceased and could not mean a contribution to the household exceeding 50% of said income. Numeral 173.5 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) for lack of application, by erroneously interpreting, with the mathematician expert, that the compensation for the deceased’s minor daughters could consider his income after reaching the age of majority or 25 years if they continue studying. Cardinal 5 of Law 4351 for not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that applies to salary income.

**XXVI.**- As clarified earlier, official letter no. CPCE-JD-746-10 of December 2, 2010, which deals with aspects of the Regulation on which the expert based his report, was rejected as evidence for a better decision during the oral and public trial, because the Court considered that this document, despite being dated December 2, 2010, was not incorporated into the process on July 19, 2011, when the expert was extensively questioned on topics related to his expert opinion, specifically about the Regulation used in the expertise. The judges thus considered that it was not true that before the questioning, the State was unaware of the existence of the regulation used in the report. Through the objection, the appellant intends to reincorporate the written document into the process; however, as analyzed in recital VI of this judgment, the evidence was requested by the Attorney General's Office from the CPCE on November 22, 2010, that is, after the preliminary hearing and before the oral and public trial started on July 19, 2011, meaning that it was not a document that arose from the debate, but one already known to the State. Despite being prepared by that representation prior to the debate, it was not provided in advance or at least during the testimony of the expert witness, the appropriate procedural moment according to cardinal 105 of the CPCA. That is the opportunity to discuss expert reports, not afterward when the stage is already precluded. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the judges briefly analyzed the state representation's criticism of the expert opinion, on the point that the calculation procedure used had not been adopted by the College of Professionals in Economic Sciences (Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas). Regarding that claim, they considered: “… in reality, that is not relevant for the present matter, since the assumptions the expert set forth are reasonable regardless of whether or not they are contemplated in a regulation, a reason for which this Court does not depart from the expert opinion…”. In this regard, it must be stated that any analysis of the binding nature of the Regulation and the validity of its norms should not have been assessed, firstly, because there was no duly provided evidence on this matter; secondly, this would cause defenselessness to the opposing party; thirdly, that was also not the object of the process, given that in reality, the State Attorney is not only questioning the expert report but a good part of the norms of the cited instrument. This latter issue must be the object of another process. Now, the expert rendered his report based on the rules and guidelines imposed upon him by the College. For this Chamber, there is no evidence indicating otherwise; moreover, from the analysis of the report, it is evident that the criteria used were authorized by a Commission within the College. As the specialist himself reported during the trial, he did not know if the Board of Directors had approved it, but he did know that these were rules that emerged during the year 2008 at a forum held by the CPCE, due to the multiple requests made by the Judicial Branch, because there was a lack of experts in the subject, financial bases were being used instead of actuarial ones, among other factors affecting the expert opinions (oral and public trial at 11:39 a.m. on July 19, 2011). The criterion used, regardless of whether it is approved or not by the Board of Directors of the College, contains technical bases and formulas that arose within the College; indeed, the expert with 38 years of experience, as he narrated in the debate, taught a course on the subject. These undisproven data make the calculation sufficiently valid and credible, so the State’s criticisms are not acceptable. For the purposes of the present matter, the norms of that Regulation for Actuarial Calculations for Authorized Experts of the CPCE constitute, more than a legal instrument, unified technical criteria or foundations for the preparation of mathematical expert reports.

In addition to the foregoing, these are also of mandatory compliance for actuaries (statements by Mr. Nombre37311 during the trial held on July 19, 2011, at 11:46 a.m.). It is a standard that the Colegio demands of its expert witnesses, and non-compliance could give rise to disciplinary liability for the member. It should be noted that there is no other report, nor an express request by the State to perform a new calculation, which lends even greater legitimacy to the questioned document. As a consequence of all the foregoing, the challenges to the liability rules; the total percentages of the deceased's salary taken for purposes of compensation (point 3.d of the report); as well as the rates from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC) used, are aspects that must be dismissed in this proceeding, since these are guidelines regulated by the CPCE itself through its professional association, there is no evidence duly provided in the proceeding that proves otherwise, much less technical evidence indicating that the rules used are erroneous. In any event, it is reiterated, the appropriate procedural moment to discuss, with valid evidentiary elements, the expert report of Mr. Nombre37311 was up to the day of the debate, at the time of the cross-examination of the expert witness. However, the State's representation did not present documentation demonstrating that the percentages, indices, and results of the expert report do not correspond to the technical criterion used. This was attempted after that hearing, on August 3, 2011, when it untimely presented documentation it had at its disposal since 2010. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the questioned Regulation could indeed be subject to review in another proceeding, but not in this one where its binding nature was sufficiently demonstrated, not only for the expert witness, but for all mathematical actuaries who are members of the Colegio. By reason of the foregoing, all of the State's grievances that refer to the validity and application of the cited regulations must be dismissed.

**XXVII.-** In another part of its statement of grounds, the Procurador alleges that the Tribunal accepted as a proven fact a salary without social security contributions, but even so, he comments, the judges erred by not deducting the 1.5% mandatory contribution that weighs on all salary income according to Article 5 of Law 4351. In the judgment, the adjudicators established the following: "*…the first thing that happened with Mr. Nombre229497's salary, is that the quotas that he had to contribute for the maintenance of the solidary social security regime were deducted from it, that is, the amounts he was required to contribute… for the disability, old age, and death pension regime or IVM regime; and for the sickness and maternity insurance or SEM, both of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, must be subtracted. After making such subtraction, the net salary corresponding to the deceased is obtained and it is this, that is, the net salary, the sum from which the real impact for his widow and daughters can be determined. Well, it turns out that in this case, the expert witness did not discount these social charges from the salary earned by Mr. Nombre229497 when making his calculations, but rather started from the gross sums reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social… the operation yields the sum of ¢353,428.58, which is the sum the expert witness uses as a starting point for making his calculations. It turns out that, for the reasons we explained a moment ago, this initial figure from Mr. Nombre37311 is erroneous, since he improperly included as net salary two items that the worker does not receive in cash… which are the quota for the disability, old age, and death regime and the quota for sickness and maternity insurance. So that is not part of what he materially contributed to the household…*" (pronouncement of the judgment at 4:15 p.m.). Up to this point, it can be said that the Tribunal was clear on the point, even deducting the quotas for the disability, old age, and death pension regime, as well as that for sickness and maternity insurance. Now, Article 5 of Law 4351 establishes, regarding the labor fund, that it shall be formed by two types of contributions: " *a)… of ½% monthly on remuneration, whether salaries or wages that must be paid by employers, the Powers of the State and all public institutions; and b)… of 1% monthly on remuneration, whether salaries or wages that must be paid by workers. Employers shall deduct the workers' contribution from them and must deposit it in the Bank in the manner and within the time limits determined by the Regulations of this law*". According to this norm, the mandatory savings made by the worker is 1% and not 1.5%, since the remaining ½% is made by the employer. The Worker Protection Law, No. 7983, which in one way or another came to complement these savings, also established mechanisms to expand coverage and strengthen the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS as the main system of solidarity in the protection of workers. In this regard, the Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime (ROP) was created, which is a system of individual capitalization, whose contributions will be registered and controlled by means of the Centralized Collection System of the CCSS and administered by means of the operators chosen by the workers. Among the resources with which the ROP is financed are: "*…a) The one percent (1%) established in subsection b) of article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by article 8 of that law has elapsed. b) Fifty percent (50%) of the employer contribution provided for in subsection a) of article 5 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, of July 11, 1969, after the term set by article 8 of that same law has elapsed…*" (article 13 Law 7983). In this way, it is clear that Mr. Nombre229497 effectively had to contribute 1% to this system, which should have been considered by the expert witness when extracting the compensation amounts. The foregoing constitutes an omission on the part of the expert witness that the judges also did not appreciate, which means the State is correct in its argument. This being the case, the amount corresponding to the material damage awarded by the Tribunal must be modified, so that the 1% that the worker had to contribute to the ROP is instead taken into consideration. Regardless of the fact that there is no evidence of this contribution and that it was not alleged during the trial, the Procurador is correct in his grievance, since this is an aspect totally distinct from the application of a regulation by the expert witness, given that it is a percentage that by legal imperative, the employer must deduct from employees or officials. However, as the adjudicators correctly establish, this error by the expert witness can be corrected since there is evidence on page 607 of the judicial file, which is the CCSS contribution study, and because the expert witness clearly explained the method that must be used to calculate the damages. What must be done is to take each gross monthly salary set forth in said document, and subtract from each one the corresponding IVM, SEM, and ROP quotas, thus obtaining the 12 amounts, one for each month from November 2006 to October 2007 (the last year of Mr. Nombre229497's life). The 12 figures resulting from the operation of subtracting said contributions are added and divided by the number of months (that is, by 12) yielding the result of ¢321,619.96. The same steps of the expert witness are then followed. The sum corresponding to the average salary of the deceased during the year prior to his death is ¢3,859,439.52. From that amount, the corresponding 75% is extracted, which, according to the expert witness, is the percentage for the maintenance of his family. That operation yields the result of ¢2,894,579.64. What should now be done is to multiply that figure by the so-called commutation factor that the expert witness used based on the table on page 611. As the Tribunal correctly analyzes, if those variables from page 611 are used and applied to a person who at the time of his death was 36 years old, as was the case of Mr. Nombre229497, the commutation factor is 17.1721. This operation yields the result that at the time of his death, that is, on November 7, 2007, the death of Mr. Nombre229497 meant for the claimants the loss of ¢49,706,011.03 and not ¢50,252,231.67 as resolved by the Tribunal.

Of that amount, the appellants on cassation must pay the three beneficiaries equitably, 35%, that is, ¢17,397,103.86. The foregoing is broken down in the following table:

Thus, the judgment must be modified only with respect to the total amount corresponding to compensation for material damage, since its calculation did not take into account the worker’s 1% contribution to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones), which would yield a result of ¢17,397,103.86 and not ¢17,588,281.08 as ordered by the lower court (Tribunal).

**XXVIII.-** In the **fifth** objection, related to the moral damages (daño moral) awarded in the judgment, the **State** considers that the lower court did not assess the circumstances of the case in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and equality, by finding that subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) of ¢80,000,000 were caused to the deceased’s two daughters, ¢35,000,000.00 to the widow, and ¢20,000,000.00 to the parents. It criticizes the amount at which the moral damages were valued; beyond reproaching the alleged unlawful injury caused, it artificially inflates the damage so that the State and Nombre1220 must cover what, in ordinary terms, they would have had to assume if total liability had been attributed to them. It highlights that the circumstances presented do not reasonably, proportionately, and equitably justify compensation of the magnitude set, since it exceeded the limits of judicial discretion (arbitrio judicial). It indicates that it should have been considered that the plaintiffs’ living conditions were not significantly affected thanks to the CCSS pension they continued to receive. Emotionally, it alludes, the daughters have had the support of their mother and grandparents, of whose impact there is no direct evidence. It adds that three years after the death, the widow remarried, giving the minors a new figure who acts as a paternal figure.

XXIX.- From the preceding whereas clause, it is observed that the appellant is dissatisfied, first, with the award for moral damages (daño moral), and second, with the amount granted for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Thus, the fundamental point of the appeal lies in determining whether the moral damages are appropriate and, if so, whether the sums awarded to each claimant on that point conform to the evidence in the record, the rules of sound rational judgment (sana crítica racional), the legal system, and the asserted principles of proportionality and reasonableness. This Chamber, referring to this type of damage, has indicated that it is associated with states of anguish, discouragement, frustration, impotence, insecurity, desperation, anxiety, grief, unease, disillusionment, among others. Their common denominator is suffering or emotional affliction, as it occurs when the individual's sphere of extra-patrimonial interest is harmed (in this regard, see judgments no. 269 of 9:10 a.m. on April 23, 2004, and no. 845 of 10:05 a.m. on November 23, 2007). As it involves an unjust disturbance of mental and emotional conditions, it does not require direct proof but can be inferred from human presumptions (presunciones humanas). In this sense, it has been held: “Regarding the proof of moral damages, the principle is as follows: its existence and severity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through human presumptions inferred from circumstantial evidence, since the unlawful generating event makes the moral damage evident, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are harmed, the damage is easy to infer; therefore, it is said that the proof of moral damage exists ‘in re ipsa’…” (judgment no. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, cited in ruling no. 000096-F-S1-2009 of 4:00 p.m. on January 29, 2009). On some occasions, the occurrence of the culpable act is sufficient for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the trial judges, when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. Along the same lines, it has stated: “…The human presumption is a logical judgment by the judge, by virtue of which a fact is considered probable, based on the general maxims of experience, which indicate the normal way things and events happen…” (judgment no. 878-F-2007 of 8:15 a.m. on December 14, 2007).

XXX.- In this matter, the Court deemed the subjective moral damages appropriate, because Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491, both with surnames Nombre229491, as well as Nombre229493 and Nombre229492, demonstrated an emotional impact due to the departure of their husband, father, and son, respectively. In this understanding, it ordered: “…we consider that due to the severity and intensity of the damage, the subjective moral impact on the minors Nombre229491 must be compensated, in principle, with the compensation requested by them, that is, the sum of ¢40,000,000.00 for each of them. For her part, for Mrs. Nombre229490, her subjective moral impact being somewhat less intense than that of her daughters, we consider that, in principle, she is entitled to compensation of ¢35,000,000.00. However, it must be remembered that the parties causing this damage are both Nombre1220 and Nombre229496, and that the former is only liable for 35% of the damage, which is why it is that percentage that Nombre1220 must cover jointly and severally with the State, as already indicated regarding the subjective moral impact generated to the three aforementioned plaintiffs. In the case of Mr. Nombre229497’s parents, Mr. Nombre229493 and Mrs. Jeanette Agüero Céspedes, this Court considers that only Mrs. Nombre229490 made a slight reference to what their son's death meant to them, since Mrs. Nombre229490 stated that he is a pensioner and she is a housewife, finding it impossible for them to financially assist their granddaughters. We therefore consider that there was an impact on them, as it is reasonable to consider that they suffered from losing their son, but the evidence available in this proceeding only allows establishing a significantly lesser affliction than that of their former daughter-in-law and their granddaughters. Therefore, we consider that, in principle, for each of them, compensation of ¢10,000,000.00 colones is appropriate for the subjective moral damages suffered, an amount for which Nombre1220 jointly and severally with the State is liable for only 35%…” (issuance of the judgment starting at 4:28 p.m.). For this Chamber, regardless of the circumstantial evidence, which is already sufficient on its own, due to the death of Mr. Nombre229497, there is additional proof demonstrating the anguish, suffering, fears, insecurity, and depression experienced by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their husband, father, and son. Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughter Nombre229491 declared that the deceased indeed maintained a very good relationship with them and with his parents, Nombre229493 and Nombre229492. Mrs. Nombre229491 narrated at length the emotional and economic difficulties they experienced, especially since she had been living in marriage with Nombre229497 since the age of 18 (she was 31 at the time of his death). The death of the minors' father, as can be inferred from her statement, represented a hard emotional blow for them; they had to radically change their lives, mainly due to the difficult economic situation they went through and because they moved their domicile from Cartago to San Carlos. Also notable is the change of school that the young Nombre229491 had to make. Even during the trial, the minor stated that after turning 15, it had become harder to recognize and accept the death of her parent (at 4:28 p.m. on July 19, 2011). She expressed how difficult it has been to see her mother work after the accident, since before the incident, she was always home with them. In view of both statements, the suffering experienced by the youngest daughter of Mrs. Nombre229490 was also demonstrated, who still asks for her father because she was barely two years old when the death occurred. The parents of the deceased, as can be inferred from the statements of Mrs. Nombre229490, also suffer, although to a lesser extent. However, their status as older adults cannot be ignored either. There is a direct causal link (nexo causal) between that moral damage caused to the family of Mr. Nombre229497 and the omission (conducta omisiva) of the State and Conavi. The foregoing indicates that the judges, when setting each of those sums for subjective moral damages, based their decision on both human presumptions and the evidence in the record, which corresponds to the statements of Mrs. Nombre229490 and Nombre229491. The emotional pain caused by the unexpected loss of a loved one who represented a fundamental pillar within the family nucleus—being an excellent husband, father, and son—is undeniable, especially due to the reckless conduct of a driver and the omission of a State body in heeding the recommendations and warnings of danger existing on the route to Cartago. It is unquestionable that this loss produced an affliction that the family of Mr. Nombre229497 will have to face with great difficulty for the rest of their lives. The argument that the plaintiff entered into a new marriage is not acceptable, as it is not a cause that discredits the suffering she experienced at the time, and furthermore, this fact is part of the recovery process to which Mrs. Nombre229490 and her daughters are entitled, who will never recover their father figure. As a consequence of all of the above, for this deciding body, the amount granted is reasonable and proportional given the moral suffering, emotional impact, insecurity, and sadness that the deceased's family experienced, and which is still perceived in the minor daughters. For these amounts, Nombre1220 and the State are jointly and severally liable for only 35%. Taking the amounts corresponding to each person, these are consistent with the pain caused and are appropriate to their suffering. Thus, the net sums that Nombre5059 and the Council must pay to Nombre229490 (¢12,250,000), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229491 (¢14,000,000.00), to Nombre229493 (¢3,500,000), and to Nombre229492 (¢3,500,000.00) are consistent with the parameters and requirements of proportionality and reasonableness, as they maintain balance and relation with the injury inflicted, which is the death of a loved one. These sums are fair, proportionate, rational, and consistent with the legal system, as a mechanism for compensating the damage inflicted on the internal emotional sphere of the direct relatives of Mr. Nombre229497. For the reasons expressed, the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed regarding the amount of compensation awarded for subjective moral damages must be rejected.

XXXI.- By merit of what has been reasoned and set forth, the appeal of the National Roadway Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) is rejected, and the appeal filed by the State is partially upheld. Consequently, the ruling of the Court is annulled only insofar as it awarded material damages (daño material) without deducting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund (Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones). In its place, resolving on the merits, the State and Conavi must jointly and severally pay the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491. In all other respects, the appealed judgment remains unaltered.

POR TANTO

The evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) offered by the State is denied. The appeal filed by the National Roadway Council is rejected. That of the State is partially upheld. The appealed ruling is annulled only insofar as it awarded material damages without deducting from the calculations the 1% corresponding to the contribution Mr. Nombre229497 made to the Mandatory Pension Fund. In its place, resolving on the merits, the State and Conavi must jointly and severally pay, for material damages, the sum of ¢17,397,103.86 in favor of Nombre229490, Nombre229491, and Nombre229491.

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Nombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre165468

*090028671027CA* Res. 001039-F-S1-2013 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las ocho horas treinta y cinco minutos del catorce de agosto de dos mil trece.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por Nombre229490 , viuda, ama de casa, vecina de Alajuela, en su doble condición como actora y como madre en ejercicio de las menores, Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 ; contra la COMPAÑÍA NACIONAL DE FUERZA Y LUZ, representada por su apoderado general judicial, Guillermo Sánchez Williams, el CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD, representado por su subdirector ejecutivo, Carlos Solís Murillo, administrador de empresas, y el ESTADO, representado por el procurador, Luis Diego Flores Zúñiga, no indica calidades, ni domicilio. Se tuvo como coadyuvante al PATRONATO NACIONAL DE LA INFANCIA, representado por su presidenta ejecutiva, Nombre128173 , divorciada, psicóloga. Figuran como beneficiarios de los daños solicitados Nombre229492 , ama de casa, vecina de Cartago, y Nombre229493 , divorciado, vendedor, vecino de Cartago. Figuran además como apoderados especiales judiciales, de la actora, Nombre23579 , no indica estado civil; por la CNFL, Henry López Esquivel, Francisco Cabezas Murillo, Nombre229494 , vecina de Heredia; por el CONAVI, Nombre105421 , divorciada, vecina de Alajuela, Nombre15051 , vecina de Heredia; y por el PANI, Nombre229495 , no indica estado civil. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, el actor estableció proceso de conocimiento, para que en sentencia se declare: "1. … con lugar en todos sus extremos el Presente Proceso de Trámite Común. 2. Que se declare que la instalación de postes que la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz hizo a lo largo de la Dirección13198 , representan un grave peligro en caso (sic) colisión, dada su condición de rigidez y ausencia de protección y señalamiento, por lo que aumentan de manera inaceptable el riesgo de sufrir un accidente de fatales consecuencias. 3. Que se declare que la omisión en la labor de fiscalización por parte del Nombre1220 y del Estado en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados para la iluminación de la Dirección5540 por parte de la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, permitió que se instalaran los postes en detrimento del derecho a la movilidad y libertad de tránsito en las mejores condiciones de seguridad, que están obligados a garantizar por ley. 4. Que se declare que con responsables solidariamente por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia de su actuación ilícita, anormal e ineficiente y por lo que deben responder patrimonialmente la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, el Nombre1220 y el Estado por su conducta ilícita, anormal e ineficiente, la primera por ubicar postes con bases rígidas y sin ninguna protección ni señalamientos en la Dirección13198 . El Nombre1220 y el Estado por omisión en su labor de fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados para la iluminación de la Florencio del Castillo. Especificados en la estimación provisional de esta demanda. Consistente en: - Por Perjuicios: 194,610.432 Ciento noventa y cuatro millones seiscientos diez mil cuatrocientos treinta y dos colones. – Por Daño Moral Subjetivo: 200,000.000 Doscientos millones de colones. – Por Daño Psicológico: 50,000.000 Cincuenta millones de colones. Para un total de: 444,610.432 Cuatrocientos cuarenta y cuatro millones seiscientos diez mil cuatrocientos treinta y dos colones. 5. Que se ordene al CONAVI, al Estado y a la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en el diseño e instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la Dirección24741 () . 6. Que se le ordene a la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en que los postes de iluminación a lo largo de cualquier carretera deben ser con bases flexibles, rompibles o quebradizas. En caso de que no sea posible y se le daba (sic) fijar una base rígida conformada por un cajón de hormigón, instale un sistema de protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado. 7. Que se condene a los demandados solidariamente, al pago de las costas procesales y personales, del presente proceso.” 2.- Los apoderados de los entes demandados contestaron negativamente. El CNFL interpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación pasiva y prescripción; el Nombre1220 opuso las excepciones de prescripción, y falta de derecho; por su parte, el representante estatal interpuso las de prescripción, falta de interés y falta de derecho.

3.- El licenciado Flores Zúñiga, expresó la negativa por conciliar, por lo que se prescindió de dicha trámite.

4.- Al ser las 13 horas 30 minutos del 31 de mayo de 2010 inició la audiencia preliminar, oportunidad en que hicieron uso de la palabra los representantes de ambas partes.

5.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Cuarta, integrada por las Juezas Ileana Sánchez Navarro y Lilliana Quesada Corella y el Juez Julio Cordero Mora, en sentencia no. 346-2011 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 13 de setiembre de 2011, resolvió: “Se declaran inadmisibles los hechos nuevos propuestos por el Estado durante la audiencia preliminar. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho incoada por la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, por lo que, en lo que respecta a esa demanda, se declara sin lugar la demanda, deviniendo entonces innecesario pronunciarse respecto de las restantes excepciones que opuso. Se rechaza la excepción de prescripción opuesta por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad. Se rechazan las excepciones de prescripción, falta de interés, falta de legitmación pasiva y falta de legitimación activa opuestas por el Estado. Se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de de derecho opuesta tanto por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad como por el Estado, entendiéndose denegada en lo no expresamente concedido a la parte actora. En consecuencia, se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda, entendiéndose denegada en lo que no se conceda expresamente. Se condena solidariamente al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad y al Estado, a pagar, por concepto de daño material, la suma de diecisiete millones quinientos ochenta y ocho mil doscientos ochenta y un colones, (sic) con ocho céntimos (₵17.588.281,08), a favor de Nombre229490 , Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 , monto que en ejecución de sentencia deberá ser indexado desde el 7 de noviembre de 2007 y hasta la fecha de su efectivo pago y deberá ser distribuido equitativamente entre las tres beneficiarias de esta indemnización. Se condena solidariamente al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad y al Estado a pagar a Nombre229490 , la suma de doce millones de doscientos cincuenta mil colones (₵12.250.000,00); a Nombre229491 , la suma de catorce millones de colones (₵14.000.000,00); a Nombre229491 , la suma de catorce millones de colones (₵14.000.000,00); a Nombre229493 , la suma de tres millones quinientos mil colones (₵3.500.000,00); a Nombre229492 , la suma de tres millones quinientos mil colones (₵3.500.000,00); correspondiendo todos esos montos por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, los cuales serán indexados en ejecución de sentencia desde la fecha de firmeza de este fallo hasta la fecha de efectivo pago. Se condena al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad a construir e instalar, en el plazo de seis meses contados a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia, una barrera de contención en la Dirección24742 , específicamente en el tramo comprendido entre Terra Mall (sic) y Pasoca, tanto en el sentido CARTAGO – San José como en el sentido San José – Cartago. Se condena solidariamente al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad y al Estado, al pago de ambas costas por el presente proceso. Por estimarse que hubo motivo suficiente para litigar, se dicta esta sentencia sin especial condenatoria en costas contra la parte actora en relación con las pretensiones dirigidas contra la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz. Se rechaza la petición del Estado para que se testimonien piezas ante el Ministerio Público contra Nombre229496 .” 6.- Los representantes del Estado y del Nombre1220 formulan sendos recursos de casación indicando las razones en que se apoyan para refutar la tesis del Tribunal.

7.- En los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la magistrada León Feoli

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El apoderado especial judicial de la señora Nombre229490 , argumentó en la demanda origen de este proceso, que en marzo de 2003, la Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial del Laboratorio Nacional de Modelos y Materiales Estructurales (en lo sucesivo Nombre109293 o el Laboratorio), emitió el “Informe de Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial Carretera Florencio del Castillo”, el cual, en el punto 5.6 denominado “Presencia de Obstáculos y otros Peligros Laterales” en lo conducente señaló que: “Las carreteras rurales e interurbanas deben poseer una zona completamente despejada y de ancho suficiente para ambos lados de la calzada. Para que esta zona despejada posea un ancho suficiente y sea segura deben existir espaldones anchos, las cunetas y los taludes laterales deben tener una pendiente suave y además, no debe existir ningún obstáculo peligroso en esa zona… algunos elementos que limitan la zona despejada de la carretera, son:…. Postes de servicio público…” (lo resaltado es del escrito de demanda). En esa misma auditoría, acotó, el Laboratorio indicó que los postes de iluminación instalados por la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz (la Compañía, Fuerza y Luz o CNFL en futuras referencias) a lo largo de toda la vía, mejoraron notablemente la visibilidad nocturna. Sin embargo, criticó, el estudio advierte que “los postes no se instalaron con bases flexibles, rompibles o quebradizas, sino con una base rígida conformada por un cajón de hormigón. Las bases de los postes de iluminación representan un grave peligro de colisión, dada su ubicación y condición de rigidez”. Por este motivo, exaltó, entre las recomendaciones propuestas se encuentra: “Diseñar e instalar un sistema de protección y prevención ante eventuales condiciones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la vía”. Agregó, el 9 de noviembre de 2007, el señor Nombre229497 falleció cuando el vehículo en que se dirigía a su trabajo y era conducido por Nombre229496 , colisionó contra la base de concreto chorreada que sirve de soporte a uno de los postes instalados en esa carretera. Indicó, la señora Nombre229490 , en su condición de cónyuge supérstite, madre de las menores Nombre229491 y Nombre229491, ambas Nombre229491 , presentó proceso sucesorio, donde además figuran como presuntos herederos, los padres del occiso, señores Nombre229492 y Nombre229493 . Mediante resolución de las 8 horas 12 minutos del 13 de octubre de 2008, el Juzgado Civil de Cartago, nombró como albacea provisional, a la señora Nombre229490 , cargo que fue aceptado el 23 de octubre de 2008 a través de resolución de las 15 horas 3 minutos de ese mismo Despacho. Consecuencia de la muerte de don Nombre229497 , añadió, se ocasionó una serie de daños y perjuicios patrimoniales, así como un daño moral subjetivo a cada uno de los miembros de su familia, constituida por doña Nombre229490, sus dos hijas y sus padres. El daño moral, explicó, debido a la angustia, infelicidad y aflicción vividas. Resaltó que debido al acontecimiento, la esposa del fallecido y sus dos hijas, evidencian una serie de secuelas emocionales que incluso ameritan tratamiento psicológico en el Hospital de San Carlos. Indicó, los daños y perjuicios alegados (incluido el moral), surgieron como consecuencia directa e inmediata “de la actuación ilegal, anormal e ineficiente” de la CNFL y del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad (el Consejo o Nombre1220 en adelante), que se apartaron de las recomendaciones brindadas por la Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (Sieca) para la colocación de los postes de servicio público, en el documento denominado Manual de Diseños Geográficos de las Carreteras Regionales y porque desatendieron recomendaciones del informe de Auditoria Técnica de Seguridad Vial brindada por Nombre109293, el cual recomendó diseñar e instalar un sistema de protección y prevención ante eventuales colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado público de la vía. Dijo, el occiso era el principal proveedor del núcleo familiar y su muerte generó un cambio radical en la vida de Nombre229490 , debido a que tuvo que cambiar su domicilio y buscar empleo, lo cual se agravó porque no posee estudios universitarios ni experiencia laboral. Esta situación, esgrimió, también afectó a los padres del fallecido, ya que vieron cómo la familia de su hijo y nietas, tuvieron que trasladarse de Cartago a San Carlos en virtud de la situación económica y emocional vivida.

II.- En razón de lo expuesto, demandó a Fuerza y Luz, al Conavi, al Estado y solicitó que en sentencia se declare: a) Con lugar la demanda. b) Los postes de alumbrado instalados por las administraciones demandadas a lo largo de la carretera Florencio del Castillo representan un grave peligro en caso de colisión, debido a su rigidez, ausencia de protección y de señalamiento. c) La falta de fiscalización por parte del Consejo y del Estado en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados en la iluminación de la Florencio del Castillo. d) La responsabilidad solidaria de las co-demandadas, por los daños y perjuicios causados, como consecuencia “de su actuación ilícita, anormal e ineficiente”. e) Se ordene a las co-demandadas a diseñar e instalar un sistema de protección y prevención ante colisiones, en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la vía Florencio del Castillo. f) La Compañía debe instalar postes de iluminación a lo largo de cualquier carretera con base flexible, rompible o quebradiza, o en su defecto, que erija un sistema de protección y prevención ante colisiones en las bases de las estructuras. g) Ambas costas del proceso de forma solidara a cargo de los co-demandadas. Los daños y perjuicios los estimó prudencialmente de la siguiente forma: ¢194.610.432,00 por concepto de perjuicios, ¢200.000.000,00 de daño moral subjetivo (¢40.000.000,00 para cada uno de los familiares) y ¢50.000.000,00 por el daño psicológico (¢10.000.000 por persona). Las demandadas contestaron negativamente. El Consejo interpuso las defensas de falta de derecho y prescripción; el Estado las de falta de: legitimación pasiva, interés, derecho y prescripción; por su parte la Compañía las de falta de: derecho y legitimación pasiva. El Tribunal acogió la defensa de falta de derecho alegada por Fuerza y Luz, por lo que declaró sin lugar la demanda. Rechazó las excepciones de prescripción opuestas por el Consejo y el Estado, así como las de falta de: interés, legitimación pasiva y activa, alegadas por este último. Acogió parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho aducida tanto por el Consejo como por el Estado, entendiéndose denegada en lo concedido a la parte actora. En consecuencia, declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Condenó solidariamente al Consejo y al Estado a pagar: 1) A la actora y a sus hijas, por concepto de daño material, la suma de ¢17.588.281,08, monto que deberá ser distribuido equitativamente entre las tres beneficiarias e indexado en la vía de ejecución de sentencia, desde el 7 de noviembre de 2007 hasta la fecha de su efectivo pago. 2) En virtud del daño moral subjetivo causado a Nombre229490 , la suma de ¢12.250.000,00; tanto a Nombre229491 como a Nombre229491 el monto de ¢14.000.000,00 para cada una de ellas; a Nombre229492 y a Nombre229493 , la cifra de ¢3.500.000,00 para cada uno; montos que deben indexarse en ejecución de sentencia desde la fecha de firmeza del fallo hasta su efectivo pago. 3) Ambas costas del proceso. Por otro lado, condenó al Consejo a construir e instalar, en el plazo de seis meses contados a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, una barrera de contención en la Dirección13198 (en el tramo comprendido entre Dirección3257 y Pasoca), tanto en sentido Cartago – San José como San José - Cartago. Las condenadas formulan recurso de casación por quebrantos procesales y sustantivos.

III.- De previo al análisis de los agravios, debe advertirse que para evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, ambos recursos serán conocidos conjuntamente, debido a que los reparos de uno y otro se encuentran relacionados y gravitan sobre los mismos temas. Por vulneración de normas procesales solo la representación estatal interpone motivos de casación. No así en los alegatos de fondo, empero, también debe advertirse que en los del Estado, esta Sala procedió a ordenarlos y recalificarlos, puesto que en varias ocasiones versaban sobre idénticos cuestionamientos, estaban dispersos o no correspondían al agravio señalado.

IV.- La representación del Estado, ofrece en esta instancia como prueba para mejor resolver, una certificación de matrimonio reciente de la actora, copia del Reglamento de Invalidez Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el informe de oficio DAE-580-11 de esa institución, estudios web del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos y de la Universidad de Costa Rica, así como el testimonio de su asistente Nombre160993 . La eventualidad de incorporar prueba en casación, está regulada expresamente por el CPCA en dos supuestos: 1.- Documentos que pueden aportar las partes durante el trámite del recurso “…que jure no haber conocido con anterioridad, sobre hechos nuevos y posteriores a la sentencia recurrida” (canon 145, apartado primero). 2.- La que resulta facultativa, para la instancia que corresponda, sea esta Sala o el Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo (cardinal 148, inciso 1 ibídem). En este supuesto, su incorporación depende única y exclusivamente del órgano decisor, por tratarse de una facultad que se le otorga con la finalidad de aclarar alguna cuestión fáctica que considere relevante o pertinente y que no se logre colegir del acervo probatorio ofrecido. Como se ha reiterado, es prueba del juez y no de las partes; es él quien decide su conveniencia y necesidad; y corresponde a una valoración discrecional, de la que puede prescindir sin necesidad de que se resuelva expresamente. Incluso, el omitir pronunciamiento no genera indefensión, ya que no existe el deber de recabarla o rechazarla, de modo tal que es absolutamente ajena al control en esta sede. En este caso, es claro que los documentos ofrecidos no cumplen con lo establecido en el inciso 1) del precepto 145 ídem, especialmente el documento de la CCSS no. DAE-580-11 que es de fecha 27 de setiembre de 2011. Se trata de un requisito formal de carácter imperativo, en virtud del cual, quien ofrezca documentos durante el trámite del recurso de casación, debe jurar no haberlos conocido con anterioridad y que sean sobre hechos nuevos y posteriores a la sentencia recurrida. No discrimina esa norma el motivo por el que el gestionante no conoció de esa documental relativa a hechos novedosos, acaecidos luego del fallo impugnado. En ese caso, ya sea que los documentos existiesen antes de esa resolución o que se emitieron o conocieron con posterioridad, lo cierto es que el juramento se exige y, en tal predicado, ha de observarse. En la especie, el proponente lo omite, con lo cual hace improcedente el ofrecimiento de la prueba reseñada. Aún en la hipótesis de que se dispensara ese mandato, estima esta Sala que existen suficientes elementos de convicción para resolver las impugnaciones planteadas por las dos demandadas, de modo que la prueba que para mejor proveer gestiona el recurrente, resulta ser innecesaria. La mayoría pudo ofrecerla en el momento procesal oportuno, pero no lo hizo, de ser aceptada significaría paliar su propia incuria, lo cual no resulta procedente. Sobre este punto se dedicará más adelante un considerando aparte por ser objeto del recurso. Por la misma razón, en próximas referencias se analizará por qué motivo resulta intrascendente y falto de interés el testimonio del asistente Nombre160993 . En consecuencia, procede declarar inadmisible la prueba para mejor resolver ofrecida.

Violación de normas procesales V.- En su primer planteamiento, la representación estatal aduce violación del debido proceso y derecho de defensa. Según comenta, el Tribunal no ejerció la potestad que le confiere el artículo 50 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) sobre la prueba documental extemporánea que puede ser admitida para mejor resolver, conforme al numeral 82 inciso 1) del mismo cuerpo normativo. En ese sentido, apunta, fue rechazado el oficio no. AGP-362 de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), el no. CPCE-JD-746-10 y la publicación de La Gaceta no. 125 del 29 de junio de 2010. La razón para el rechazo, alega, fue el momento cuando se aportaron, empero, no se valoró, dice, que pretendía combatir la prueba pericial evacuada en el debate. Los jueces, opina, no pueden desconocer que la experticia puede ser controvertida después de ser conocida. Señala, esa probanza del perito matemático se presentó en la audiencia de 19 de julio de 2011 y la probanza que se rechazó fue ofrecida en la audiencia de continuación el 3 de agosto siguiente. Insiste, el Tribunal debe dejar abierta la posibilidad de presentar nuevo material probatorio si las circunstancias lo ameritan. Los artículos 94 inciso 7) y 105 inciso 1) ibídem, agrega, establecen que la prueba pericial se brinda en parte por escrito y se pone en conocimiento de los contendientes, complementado en forma oral durante el juicio, con lo cual, acota, se tiene la oportunidad de pedir aclaraciones y adiciones. En su criterio, el Tribunal interpretó erróneamente las normas citadas, al entender que no es posible introducir prueba una vez que las partes hayan conocido en su totalidad el peritaje. Una interpretación tan restrictiva, endilga, vulnera el derecho de defensa y no contribuye a la investigación de la verdad real. En este sentido, agrega, el perito aseguró que se vio obligado a rendir su informe con base en un Reglamento aprobado por el Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas de Costa Rica (CPCE) bajo pena de sanción disciplinaria. Ese elemento, explica, no constaba y por ende, debió dársele la oportunidad al Estado de aportar prueba de rebate. En esta línea, expresa, la certificación de la CCSS fue introducida para rebatir la pericia matemática, pues, según el informe oral del perito, la renta vitalicia y la renta conmutada o indemnización, pretenden igualmente suprimir ingresos dejados de percibir por los dependientes del occiso. En su parecer, no se causaba indefensión a la contraparte, porque el Tribunal podía conforme al artículo 50 inciso 2), dar traslado por tres días hábiles para que se refiriera a la probanza introducida por el Estado. De esta forma, expone, infringió esa normativa por falta de aplicación y el artículo 100 inciso 1) párrafo e) ibídem. Además, estima vulnerado el precepto 94 inciso 7) ibídem –en relación al derecho de defensa-, porque el informe escrito de la experta del OIJ no fue puesto en conocimiento de las partes con la antelación requerida, sino un día antes de realizarse el interrogatorio de la perito. Explica, el primer día del debate se entregó el informe y al siguiente se recibió la declaración, momento en el cual, sin la preparación adecuada debieron hacer el interrogatorio. De conformidad con lo anterior, exalta, no hubo plazo para conocer el informe escrito, preparar el interrogatorio y conseguir pruebas de defensa. Recalca, el propósito de que las partes tengan conocimiento del informe escrito de las experticias después de la audiencia preliminar y antes del juicio –como prevé la norma-, es para que puedan ejercer su derecho de defensa. Esa oportunidad, asegura, no existió, siendo suprimida por el Tribunal, lo cual, indica, constituye una violación de derecho de defensa.

VI.- El 3 de agosto de 2011, durante el tercer día de juicio, el representante estatal presentó una solicitud para que se admitieran entre otros documentos, el oficio AGP-362 del 22 de julio de 2011 en el que consta que la actora recibe una pensión por muerte por parte de la CCSS; el del Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas, CPCE-JD-746-10 de 2 de diciembre de 2010 que menciona aspectos del Reglamento en que se basó el perito para realizar su informe, y la publicación de La Gaceta no. 125 del 29 de junio de 2010 sobre un proyecto de Ley, en relación con las autorías técnicas de Nombre109293. El Tribunal los rechazó de plano. El oficio de la CCSS, porque el perito indicó que no había analizado el factor pensión en su informe, además porque ese documento había sido producido después de la declaración del especialista. Consideró, un aspecto es el tema de indemnización por muerte y otro el de pensión. En cuanto al oficio del CPCE, indicaron que fue realizado el 2 de diciembre de 2010 antes de que el perito fuera interrogado ampliamente sobre ese aspecto, por lo que no era cierto que previo al interrogatorio, el Estado desconocía la existencia del reglamento utilizado en la experticia. En relación con el documento de La Gaceta, los juzgadores establecieron que es del 29 de junio de 2010 y la audiencia preliminar se llevó a cabo el primero de julio de 2010, sea después de la publicación, por lo que ya se tenía conocimiento de su existencia (continuación del juicio oral y público el 3 de agosto de 2011 a partir de las 9 horas 30 minutos). El Estado interpuso recurso de revocatoria solicitando que la documentación fuera analizada en sentencia. El Tribunal lo denegó. En el caso concreto, dice el representante de la Procuraduría, que los escritos fueron presentados con la finalidad de cuestionar el dictamen pericial, sin embargo, esta Cámara observa que todos los escritos mencionados por el recurrente existían desde antes de que el perito rindiera su declaración el 19 de julio de 2011, por lo cual su admisión resultaba improcedente, máxime que el representante estatal no justificó por qué no fueron presentados con anterioridad. Recuérdese, que el cardinal 50 del CPCA establece que después de la demanda y la contestación, solo se podrán admitir aquellos documentos de fecha posterior a dichos escritos y los que no haya sido posible aportar con anterioridad por causa que no sea imputable a la parte interesada. Como bien indica el Tribunal, el representante estatal ya conocía sobre el informe escrito del actuario matemático cuando se realizó el interrogatorio, por lo cual no es cierto que no lo pudo combatir, cuando de antemano sabía el criterio técnico utilizado por el profesional. Consta en el expediente judicial, que el traslado del informe se hizo el 26 de noviembre de 2010 (folio 616) y la declaración es del 19 de julio de 2011 (folio 676). Aunado a lo anterior, debe señalarse que la admisión de esa probanza a esas alturas del proceso (después de la declaración del perito) implicaría no solo una desventaja para la parte actora, pues le causaría indefensión, sino también un retardo injustificado en la continuación del debate que no solo implicaría suspender el proceso innecesariamente, sino también volver a recibir la declaración del profesional. Lo anterior se acentúa si se considera que los temas que el procurador cuestiona, ya habían sido manifestados por las partes, no solo durante el interrogatorio del perito, sino también en la demanda. En relación con el oficio de la CCSS, era un hecho conocido por todos que el fallecido era asalariado, por lo cual resultaba evidente la procedencia de una pensión por muerte. Igual sucede con el escrito del CPCE que fue solicitado por la Procuraduría a ese ente el 22 de noviembre de 2010, sea después de la audiencia preliminar y antes del juicio oral y público del 19 de julio de 2011. No se trataba ni siquiera de un documento que surgió a raíz de las discusiones del debate, sino que ya era de conocimiento del Estado, pero que no lo aportó oportunamente durante la deposición del testigo, momento procesal adecuado para ello, según se desprende del análisis del canon 105 del CPCA. Por su parte, la publicación en La Gaceta es de fecha 29 de junio de 2010, por lo que su presentación se pudo haber hecho incluso durante la audiencia preliminar que se continuó el primero de julio de ese año y no hasta el 3 de agosto de 2011 en el juicio, por lo que también deviene improcedente. De este modo, cada uno de los escritos presentados, es prueba que debió ofrecerse durante la audiencia preliminar o al menos antes del interrogatorio al perito y no durante el tercer día de juicio. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, hay que señalar que de todos modos, será el Tribunal el que en cada caso, valore la admisión de prueba para mejor resolver, por lo que no basta su proposición para que sea admitida; incluso aún aceptada dicha probanza, será en el fallo que se determine si es valorada como elemento probatorio, así se infiere de los cardinales 50 y 110 del Código de la materia. Sobre la prueba para mejor resolver, ha dicho esta Sala, que: “no se trata de corregir las omisiones, negligencias o descuidos de las partes en cuanto a la carga probatoria que les incumbe o bien subsanar deficiencias en las técnicas de defensa, dado que en esta hipótesis se vería seriamente lesionada la igualdad entre los litigantes y comprometería la imparcialidad del juzgador. De ahí que al ordenarla, deba respetarse la garantía de defensa en juicio de cada uno de los involucrados en el litigio. Así, por el contrario, debe ser introducida con el único objeto de esclarecer puntos de incertidumbre o de duda que puedan surgir luego de ponderar los elementos aportados por los litigantes…” (fallo no. 000213-F-S1-2008 de las 8 horas 20 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2008). En términos generales, no es oportuno intentar, mediante el ofrecimiento de probanzas que debieron aportarse y practicarse en la etapa procesal correspondiente, abrir de nuevo el debate. Darle cabida a esta petición, significaría que las partes estén en la posibilidad de subsanar sus omisiones respecto de la prueba que pudieron haber ofrecido en su oportunidad y no lo hicieron. La prueba para mejor resolver corresponde a una facultad concedida al juez, quien si la estima pertinente la admite o no, no es un medio para suplir deficiencias de las partes. Respecto del informe de la perito del OIJ, no existe la violación apuntada, porque la norma 94 del CPCA lo único que dispone es que el informe pericial debe ser puesto en conocimiento de todas las partes, sin indicar un plazo al respecto. Lo importante, al tenor del precepto, es que el peritaje sea remitido a las partes. Asimismo, los litigantes dispusieron del espacio suficiente para preguntar a la experta durante el debate, incluso, durante el interrogatorio, al representante estatal le fue admitida para mejor resolver, una secuencia de fotografías que el propio OIJ le suministró y con la finalidad de que la perito adicionara su dictamen en los términos del cardinal 105 del CPCA (a partir de las 15:15 horas del 20 de julio de 2011). También es importante resaltar en este último punto, que el Procurador no explica con claridad de qué forma le perjudicó el traslado del peritaje, si del análisis de la sentencia se deduce que este informe fue fundamental para acreditar el exceso de velocidad conque manejaba el conductor del vehículo siniestrado, aspecto fundamental en la defensa del Estado. Además, desde un inicio las partes conocían la existencia de abundante prueba, entre esta la técnica, por lo cual no debe considerarse espontánea la incorporación de un peritaje que fue ordenado en juicio desde el 25 de abril de 2011. Asimismo, tampoco existe la indefensión alegada, ya que este informe se basó en su mayoría por los elementos probatorios que ya existían en el expediente, como el Informe policial no. 163-SDURU-07 realizado por el OIJ de La Unión el 9 de noviembre de 2007 (folios 243 al 247 que es parte de la prueba documental admitida al Estado el primero de julio de 2010 durante la audiencia previa). Por todas estas razones, estima esta Cámara, no existe la indefensión y violación al principio de defensa alegado por el casacionista, por lo cual el reparo ha de rechazarse.

VII.- Segundo. Alega vulneración del derecho de defensa, por quebranto de los incisos 3) y 4) del ordinal 100 del CPCA, puesto que en su criterio, los problemas de organización del Poder Judicial no pueden trasladarse a los contendientes, de modo que afecte el principio de concentración del proceso oral. Aduce, en el año 2011, el juicio tuvo una tramitación en su fase oral los días 19 y 20 de julio, continuó el 3 y 5 de agosto, finalizando el 23 de ese mes. Arguye, la finalidad del principio de unidad y concentración, es que las partes y los jueces, estén avocados al conocimiento del asunto, sin distractores, con el objeto de permitirles retener en su memoria lo ocurrido. Sin embargo, manifiesta, debido a las prolongadas suspensiones, el recuerdo de lo acaecido se diluyó provocando un fallo injusto, todo lo cual, lesionó el derecho de defensa y del debido proceso.

VIII.- En el presente asunto, el juicio oral y público se desarrolló durante varios días, pero ello no se debió a la incuria del Tribunal, sino a la cantidad de testimonios, declaraciones y peritajes que había que recibir. De hecho, esta Sala comprueba que este es un proceso complejo que en casación conlleva el examen detallado de los diferentes elementos probatorios, con la finalidad de garantizar un fallo justo y equitativo. Del análisis del debate se observa que los jueces han tenido que realizar un esfuerzo para ordenar la agenda del Tribunal y evitar con ello dilaciones innecesarias, pero siempre en sus determinaciones, trataron de que los testimonios y peritajes fueran practicados en una sola audiencia para evitar que con ello se afecte el principio de unidad y concentración probatoria. Ejemplo de lo anterior se observa con el testimonio del testigo-perito Nombre229498 , el cual duró todo un día de audiencia, incluso hasta las 21 horas del 3 de agosto de 2011. Con cada deponente, las audiencias se realizaron sin interrupciones y durante varias sesiones para evitar infringir los principios analizados, esto en los términos del canon 100 del CPCA. Si bien los dos primeros días del debate se desarrollaron con normalidad (19 y 20 de julio de 2011), también es cierto que su continuación, en tres ocasiones, no pudo ser en días consecutivos (3, 5 y 23 de agosto de ese mismo año); sin embargo, en criterio de esta Cámara, esto no es motivo de nulidad del fallo por dos razones concretas. En primer término porque ninguno de estos lapsos de suspensión sobrepasó, entre cada audiencia, los 15 días hábiles que menciona el cardinal 100 inciso 5) ibídem, supuesto para declarar la nulidad de pleno derecho de todo lo actuado y resuelto. En segundo término, porque en cada audiencia, los jueces han seguido el orden en la recepción de la prueba acordado previamente, sin cortes ni interrupciones que hagan imposible su conocimiento en la audiencia respectiva. Esto, lejos de afectar el derecho de defensa lo fortalece, ya que cada una de las partes contó con espacio suficiente para realizar preguntas a los declarantes y para preparar su defensa. Se reitera, tampoco el principio de unidad y concentración probatoria se han visto lesionados, ya que los testimonios fueron recibidos en las audiencias respectivas y debidamente convocadas, sin interrupciones ni vicisitudes que hagan dudar de su veracidad y credibilidad. De igual forma la etapa de conclusiones fue desarrollada dentro del orden cronológico esperado y en un solo acto, el 23 de agosto de 2011. Además, hubo identidad física en los juzgadores. Si el fallo es justo o no, ese es un aspecto que debe ser atacado mediante las violaciones que estatuye el Código Procesal Contencioso en el cardinal 138 (casación por violación de normas sustantivas) y no mediante este reparo, puesto que es previsible que en este tipo de asuntos declarados complejos, el juicio dure varios días, los cuales, se insiste, en ningún momento sobrepasaron los 15 días hábiles establecidos en el propio Código, lo que de entrada descarta la eventual violación del debido proceso o la lesión de normas procesales que se sanciona con nulidad absoluta (precepto 137 incisos b) y h) ibídem). Finalmente, debe añadirse que durante el tiempo del receso y suspensión, el Código de la materia permite no solo a los jueces, sino también a los abogados de las partes, que participen o intervengan en otros juicios o audiencias (ordinal 101 inciso 3). Así las cosas, lo que procede es el rechazo del reparo.

IX.- En el tercer agravio, sostiene, de igual forma se infringió el derecho de defensa, ahora en virtud de la interpretación dada por el Tribunal al artículo 109 ibídem, al reducir de forma irrazonable el tiempo para conclusiones, perjudicando al Estado, porque no pudo introducir el análisis completo de la prueba, en especial, añade, la del perito matemático, así como las normas aplicables al caso. Resalta, el juicio demoró 5 días, es decir 40 horas de recepción de prueba, por lo que reducir las conclusiones a 1 hora no tiene proporción.

X.- En el proceso contencioso administrativo actual, desarrollado a través de audiencias orales, además de los principios de oralidad, transparencia, inmediatez, contradicción, verdad real, concentración, el juez debe procurar que se respete el de celeridad procesal. Para ello, debe moderar la discusión, impidiendo intervenciones impertinentes e injustificadamente prolongadas, rechazar las solicitudes notoriamente improcedentes o dilatorias, pero respetando siempre el derecho de defensa de las partes (artículos 85, 97, 99 inciso 2), 109 del CPCA y 57, 62 inciso 10), 73 inciso 14) del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda). En el caso concreto, tomando en consideración que eran cinco las partes intervinientes, estima esta Sala que el plazo de una hora para emitir conclusiones es más que suficiente para lograr esa unidad del acto, ya que de haberse sobrepasado ese tiempo, la etapa procesal cuestionada no se hubiera podido terminar ese 23 de agosto de 2011 lo que eventualmente significaría un quebranto a ese principio de unidad y concentración, así como al de equidad procesal. Ahora, desde el inicio del juicio las partes estaban enteradas que el plazo máximo para exponer las conclusiones era de 40 minutos, prorrogable de ser necesario (resolución del 8 de julio de 2011 visible a folios 652 al 653). Esa determinación del Tribunal fue debidamente informada con antelación suficiente para que los litigantes prepararan adecuadamente sus alegatos finales. No se observa sorpresa y mucho menos indefensión desde ese punto de vista, puesto que las partes debían sujetar su actuación a las reglas previamente establecidas por el Tribunal. Los abogados en este entendido, han de preparar sus exposiciones en el tiempo para ello establecido. Incluso el plazo otorgado originalmente para emitir conclusiones se extendió hasta en una hora para todos los litigantes. Ahora, cada una de estas medidas de ordenación adoptadas por los jueces, incluidas el establecimiento de un tiempo máximo para emitir alegatos de cierre (precepto 109 CPCA), tienden como se indicó, a proteger los postulados de la oralidad, incluido el principio de celeridad procesal, así como también a equiparar la participación de las partes en esta etapa procesal, con la finalidad de que todos dispongan de igualdad de armas para emitir sus criterios finales, razón por la cual el derecho de defensa no se vería vulnerado. Sin perjuicio de lo dicho, el representante estatal omite explicar de forma clara y precisa, de qué manera le afectó la limitación del tiempo a que hace referencia, ya que las conclusiones sobre el peritaje matemático sí fueron planteadas. En este sentido, durante la última parte de su intervención, describió las razones por las cuales se oponía al dictamen del perito matemático, por lo cual no es cierto que no tuvo espacio para ello, máxime cuando el Tribunal le indicó al igual que lo hizo con la parte actora que no se preocupara por el tiempo, que “tenga calma” que expusiera tranquilamente sus ideas (al ser las 17 horas 41 minutos del día 23 de agosto de 2011). No se le cortó, por el contrario, se amplió de 40 minutos a una hora, tiempo suficiente y mucho más amplio que el acostumbrado en un proceso oral, puesto que se tomó en cuenta la cantidad de testimonios y la prueba existente. Finalmente, tampoco se observa al final de la intervención estatal, la solicitud expresa del Procurador para obtener una extensión del plazo otorgado con el fin de analizar el peritaje matemático; por el contrario, se insiste, el informe matemático sí fue ampliamente cuestionado durante esa espacio (audiencia de conclusiones a partir de las 18 horas). Lo anterior conduce a que el reparo deba ser desestimado por no presentarse la violación al debido proceso apuntada.

XI.- Reclama, en la cuarta censura, se transgredió el numeral 95 inciso 1) ibídem, al estimarse que hay un interés difuso para reclamar el diseño y colocación de una barrera de contención en el tramo no. 4 de la autopista Florencio del Castillo, el cual, asevera, no fue aducido por la actora. En este sentido, alega transgredido el artículo 10 inciso 1. c) del CPCA al estimar la existencia de ese interés difuso. También se lesionó el canon 95 citado, expone, al considerar como daño material lo que en demanda se exigió como perjuicios. En ambos supuestos, concluye, debió darse audiencia a las partes y al no hacerlo, generó un vicio de nulidad.

XII.- El casacionista ubica el agravio dentro del apartado de violación del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, porque a su entender, en los dos supuestos reclamados, el Tribunal debía suspender la audiencia por cinco días hábiles si consideraba que la pretensión debía ajustarse o aclararse. En su criterio, la actora nunca adujo un interés difuso en relación con la construcción de una baranda de protección en la Dirección13198 , por lo cual ese extremo debió ser corregido. Nótese que en la petitoria quinta de la demanda, solicitó expresamente que “…se le ordene al CONAVI, al Estado y a la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en el diseño e instalación de un sistema protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado…” (folio 26). Durante la audiencia preliminar no se realizaron ajustes a esa pretensión. Por tal motivo, en sentencia, el Tribunal estimó que Nombre1220 debía “…desarrollar sus actividades en observancia de criterios de seguridad vial y siendo uno de estos el de garantizar el adecuado transitar de los conductores… debe…. cumplir la recomendación técnica emitida por Nombre109293 en relación con la sección número cuatro de su estudio, entre Pasoca y Terramall, consistente en la colocación en la misma de una baranda o barrera de contención en el sentido Cartago y San José y en el sentido San José Cartago…” (Considerando XII a partir de las 16 horas 36 minutos de la audiencia de dictado). De acuerdo a lo transcrito, es claro que la parte accionante sí solicitó expresamente la colocación de una barrera de protección en la Dirección13198 (en la zona del accidente donde murió su esposo). Ahora bien, a la hora de resolver la defensa de falta de interés planteada por el Estado, el Tribunal dispuso que el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo prevé la acción por intereses difusos y que en este caso, había un interés de cualquier eventual usuario de la Dirección13198 en transitar por una vía lo más segura posible, por lo que sí gozaban de interés los actores en cuanto a ese extremo (durante la emisión del fallo a partir de las 16 horas 46 minutos). La pretensión analizada no merecía suspender la audiencia como alega el casacionista, por el contrario, debía ser analizada y calificada en la sentencia, ya que en los términos expuestos en la demanda y discutida en el proceso, no generaba ninguna duda sobre su contendido y alcances, dentro de las posibilidades establecidas en el canon 10 inciso 1) del CPCA. Si la representación del Estado se encontraba disconforme con esa pretensión, así debió manifestarlo al contestar la demanda o durante la audiencia preliminar, sin embargo en esas etapas, no se opuso o solicitó el ajuste ahora pretendido, lo cual deviene en motivo suficiente para el rechazo del agravio al tenor de lo establecido en el canon 137 inciso 2) del CPCA. Sumado a lo anterior, debe indicarse que de todos formas, el agravio del Estado carece de interés, ya que esa obligación de hacer, explicaron los jueces: “pesa solo sobre el Nombre1220 y no sobre el Estado pues lo ordenado aquí sí se encuentra dentro de las funciones técnicas asignadas por ley a Conavi, no al Estado”. En torno al otro punto, debe señalarse que en la demanda, claramente se solicitó y desglosó como “daño material económico”, un monto que a la vez denominó “perjuicio por la muerte” consistente en la no percepción del salario de su conyugue durante el periodo acorde con su expectativa de vida (folio 9). Independientemente de la calificación que la demandante le diera a esta pretensión, el agravio de la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) no es de recibo, por las mismas razones establecidas anteriormente, sobre todo porque en ningún momento se opuso oportunamente a la calificación que la actora hizo de sus pretensiones, por lo que según el cardinal 137 inciso 2) ibídem el reparo debe rechazarse. En todo caso, si el tema fue ampliamente discutido, es al Tribunal a quien corresponde en definitiva calificar la pretensión, sea esta un daño material o un perjuicio. De esta forma, el agravio ha de ser rechazado, ya que no se observa la violación al debido proceso ni la nulidad apuntada.

XIII.- Quinto. Explica, se atentó contra el derecho de defensa, violando con ello el artículo 111 inciso 1) ibídem, porque la notificación del fallo se hizo de forma oral. Alega, cuando la complejidad del asunto demanda la consideración pormenorizada de múltiples elementos probatorios, este debe darse por escrito. Asegura, el plazo para que las partes recurran en casación se ve afectado, cuando deben obtener una grabación en DVD o CD de la sentencia, para proceder no a su lectura, sino a su transcripción a fin de enterarse de lo dispuesto, reduciendo el tiempo que informa el cardinal 139 inciso 1) ibídem para preparar la defensa. En este asunto, sostiene, el soporte digital no le fue entregado al Estado, sino hasta el 19 de setiembre de 2011, cuando la lectura fue el día 13 anterior, por lo cual acusa vulnerado el canon 111 inciso 1 del CPCA.

XIV.- Sobre el particular, debe resaltarse que a partir del modelo de proceso que adopta el CPCA, con una línea fundada en la oralidad parcial, así como de diferentes disposiciones en su articulado y en el Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, aprobado por la Corte Plena, no siempre debe mediar una sentencia escrita. De interés, el canon 57 del Código de cita, que se ubica dentro del capítulo I “Normas aplicables a todos los procesos”, del Título V “Actividad Procesal”, expresamente establece: “Toda resolución dictada en cualquiera de las etapas del proceso, sea oral o escrita, deberá estar debidamente motivada.”. Aún y cuando se tome posición de que la expresión “sea oral o escrita”, está referida a las resoluciones que se emitan en diferentes etapas del proceso y no propiamente a la sentencia, cierto es que el precepto se limita a calificar la forma del dictado, sin diferenciar el tipo de resolución que trate, al señalar; razón de la norma, que “…deberá estar debidamente razonada”. Lo anterior, a partir del razonamiento lógico de que lo que interesa es que se motiven. Incluso, nótese como el numeral 111 ubicado en el capítulo VII “Juicio Oral y Público”, del Título V, no dispone de qué manera debe dictarse la sentencia, por lo que ante esa presunta omisión, procede aplicar ese principio. Por su parte, el Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, preceptúa en el numeral 83 “De la forma y contenido de la sentencia”, ubicado en el Capítulo III “Del funcionamiento del Tribunal” del Título II “Disposiciones específicas”. Establece “1) La sentencia será dictada en forma oral, consignándola debidamente en los medios tecnológicos correspondientes que posea y disponga el Poder Judicial. Cuando sea estrictamente necesario podrá dictarse en forma escrita.//Cuando resulte imprescindible transcribirla para su ejecución, sólo se consignarán los aspectos necesarios. …” (lo resaltado no es del original). En otras palabras, la oralidad está contemplada como una forma, para la emisión de la sentencia. Del análisis del Código se desprende que solo en cinco casos, el legislador, expresamente dispuso lo contrario: a) artículo 92, inciso 5, que refiriéndose a las defensas del cardinal 66 ibídem que conlleven a la inadmisibilidad del proceso, literalmente dice: “...en este caso, deberá consignar, por escrito, el texto íntegro del fallo, en el plazo de los cinco días posteriores a la realización de la audiencia.” (El subrayado no es del original); b) canon 130 inciso 3), sobre los efectos de la sentencia anulatoria de un acto administrativo de alcance general, respecto de la cual, por los efectos que produce, una vez firme debe ser “…publicada íntegramente en el diario oficial La Gaceta, …” (El subrayado no es del original); c) numeral 149 inciso 2), respecto de la sentencia en casación cuya redacción tenga una particular complejidad, impone el deber de comunicar el “…contenido total.” de la sentencia. Lo anterior, también es aplicable en el supuesto del inciso 3) de esa norma; d) precepto 153 inciso 3), referido al recurso de casación en interés del Ordenamiento Jurídico, que establece el deber de publicar la sentencia que se dicte “…en una sección especial del diario oficial La Gaceta …”; e) ordinal 154 referente al recurso extraordinario de revisión. Así lo ha considerado esta Sala en los fallos no. 206-2009 de las 16 horas 20 minutos del 26 de febrero de 2009, 380-2009 de las 9 horas del 20 de abril del mismo año y recientemente en el no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 15 de marzo de 2012. Por lo demás, tampoco existe violación del debido proceso porque las sentencias verbales, según el canon 88 del CPCA, quedan notificadas con su dictado en la audiencia convocada al efecto. En otro orden de ideas, no existe prueba de que el soporte digital de la sentencia, no fue suministrado el día de la audiencia a la representación estatal. De todos modos, aunque eso sea cierto, no se observa que ese evento le haya causado perjuicio, primero, porque en aplicación del artículo 23 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (Ley 6815), el Estado solicitó ampliación del plazo para presentar el recurso el cual le fue otorgado por esta Sala (folios 808 y 810 de esta carpeta); segundo, porque el recurso finalmente fue interpuesto en tiempo y forma el 7 de octubre de 2010. En este entendido, lo que procede es el rechazo del agravio del recurrente.

Violación de normas sustantivas XV.- En el primer reparo, el Estado se refiere a la supuesta omisión del Nombre1220 y la muerte del señor Nombre229497 . Arguye, el Tribunal no valoró conforme a la sana crítica la probanza existente en autos. a) El Manual Centroamericano de Normas para el Diseño Geométrico de Carreteras Regionales y el Manual Centroamericano de Disposiciones Uniformes para el Control de Tránsito, publicados por la Secretaría de integración Centroamericana en los años 2000 y 2001. Para los jueces, de acuerdo a las disposiciones técnicas internas, anota, cada país debe determinar cómo se construyen los postes de alumbrado y donde se ubican. Sin embargo, dice, en el fallo impugnado no hay cita de ninguna disposición técnica de Costa Rica, que permita saber en cuál se fundó para determinar que el Consejo la violentó al momento de situar los postes de alumbrado. En su lugar, reseña, se asumió el criterio del ingeniero Nombre229498 , vertido en el informe de Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial de la carretera Florencio del Castillo, elaborado por Nombre109293 en el 2003. Enfatiza, el señor Nombre229498 declaró que en el país no hay norma técnica oficial que indique como deben colocarse los postes, por lo que se usan las internacionales. Lo que se obvió, expresa, es que el señor Nombre229498 expresó que en el informe usó tanto el Manual para el Control de Tránsito, cuanto el Manual de Diseño de Carreteras, “el de la AASHTO y europeos.” Adiciona, “De hecho del análisis de esta prueba técnica, resulta que en los apartados 2.1.23 del Manual y 7.2.6 de su Anexo A, B y E; cuanto de los apartados 4.3.1; 4.8 y 8.2.7 y 8.3.6, se brinda una guía sólida y técnicamente aceptable sobre las soluciones más deseables (apartado 1.2 del Manual de Diseño citado) para la colocación del alumbrado público en nuestro país, que el Tribunal pretirió.” De este modo, refiere, contrario a la sana crítica, el Tribunal no solo omitió utilizar los criterios unívocos aceptados a nivel centroamericano, sino que también dejó de observar que el único criterio empleado, el del Ingeniero Nombre229498, los utilizó. En tal sentido, refuerza su planteamiento con la transcripción de los apartados que dice, fueron preteridos. Asevera, de los criterios técnicos centroamericanos se desprende que, para evitar que quienes se salgan de la ruta lleguen a impactar la estructura de soporte de postes de alumbrado en una vía dividida con carriles de 3.6 metros de ancho, el claro lateral deseable hacia la calzada sería de 1.80 metros y el mínimo de 0.50 metros. Resalta, don Nombre229498 afirmó que los manuales aludidos no regulaban el claro lateral, sino criterios técnicos internacionales, según los cuales, los postes deben estar a 6 metros de la vía. Empero, este criterio en que se basa el Tribunal, se contradice con documentos y deposiciones de ingenieros civiles. En otro apartado del recurso, siempre en relación con este agravio, especifica, al no entender el Tribunal que los manuales dichos forman parte del contenido de las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica aplicable al país en torno a la ubicación de los postes, violentó por falta de aplicación el cardinal 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). En igual sentido, expone, se vulneró esa misma normativa al entenderse que esas reglas constan en el informe del señor Nombre229498 del año 2003. En este sentido, critica, también se transgreden los ordinales 5 y 6 de la Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias (Ley no. 8114), al atribuirle a la Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial contenida en el informe del señor Nombre229498 , carácter de norma técnica, pues estima que limita la discrecionalidad, cuando conforme a esas disposiciones, la competencia de Nombre109293 hace relación a la calidad no a la seguridad de la vías. Asevera, pese a que los jueces reconocen que el informe de ese laboratorio no tiene carácter vinculante, le dan ese efecto al acusar su incumplimiento como si se tratara de un mandato impuesto por el ordenamiento. Imputa también violentado por indebida aplicación el artículo 128 del CPCA, al estimar la existencia de una omisión de cumplir la recomendación de diseñar e instalar barreras en el “sector 4” de la Dirección5540 , ya que para la norma es necesario para considerar una inactividad, la existencia de un límite o mandato impuesto por el ordenamiento. El informe del Ingeniero Nombre229498, arguye, ni es un mandato, ni un límite que impusiera al Nombre1220 obligaciones, previo al accidente. Se trata de un criterio técnico que no adoptó la Administración y que ha sido controvertido con la pericia forense y de ingeniería de la CNFL. b) Nombre193, la Sección de Ingeniería Forense del OIJ, concluyó en punto a la ubicación del poste no. 106, que la distancia mínima de colocación de los postes es de 1.80 metros y el poste estaba colocado a 3.40 metros, por lo que en el momento del accidente “se encontraba geométricamente bien situado”. Pero ese dictamen, advierte, tampoco ha sido valorado debidamente por el Tribunal, no solo para entender controvertido el criterio del Ingeniero Nombre229498, sino para instaurar con base en los manuales, que el poste impactado estaba colocado de acuerdo a criterios técnicos unívocos. Comenta, don Nombre229498 en su deposición pretendió cuestionar el criterio de la Sección de Ingeniería Forense aludida, al sostener que el claro lateral sin postes de alumbrado del apartado 7.2.6 del Manual de Dispositivos Uniformes, era el de 3.65 metros, porque no había espaldón. Lo anterior, alude, contradice el informe del señor Nombre229498 –folio 22-, según el cual, el límite de velocidad fijado en la zona tuvo en cuenta la condición del espaldón, dado que, para la ingeniería forense si hay espaldón. c) Afirma, los ingenieros Nombre229499 y Mynor Navarro Alfaro, en sus deposiciones señalaron que el Manual Centroamericano prevé la colocación de los postes de alumbrado a un mínimo de 0.50 metros de la calzada. Continúa, don Guillermo agregó que el Manual recomienda una distancia mayor de retiro del poste porque la estadística de Estados Unidos, refiere que los accidentes se producen a 1.2 metros. Ante preguntas de la actora, indicó que en la práctica, Fuerza y Luz instala los postes a 0.50 metros de la carretera, siendo lo acostumbrado. Según señala, los ingenieros de la CNFL son profesionales de basta experiencia, sin embargo, dice, el Tribunal conforme a la sana crítica, no consideró ese criterio técnico que rebate el del señor Nombre229498 . De este modo, reitera, el criterio de don Nombre229498 en que basó sus conclusiones el órgano decisor fue controvertido con el informe pericial del OIJ, las declaraciones de la perito y los ingenieros de la Compañía, de los cuales se desprende que no es posible establecer que la colocación de los postes de alumbrado en la autopista Florencio del Castillo no guardan el retiro lateral exigido por la ciencia y la técnica. d) En su parecer, otro aspecto que no valoró el Tribunal con sana crítica, fue el ancho recomendado para la “mediana separadora” en autopistas de cuatro carriles, regionales, urbanas o troncales suburbanas, como ubicó el señor Nombre229498 a la Florencio del Castillo. Según el Manual de Diseño Geométrico, destaca, la medida es de un mínimo de 3 metros y máximo de 4.3 metros. En razón de ello, aduce, el ancho recomendado a nivel centroamericano para la “mediana o franja separadora central”, es conteste con la exigencia de que los retiros de los postes de alumbrado se hallen a 1.8 metros. Se trata, argumenta, de un criterio unívoco a nivel centroamericano que el Tribunal pretirió. Lo anterior, explica, es relevante si se considera que toda la teoría del caso de la parte actora, descansa sobre la inconsistencia del posteado eléctrico con base en ambos manuales del Sieca, advertidos por el ingeniero Nombre229498 en el 2003. La recomendación del Laboratorio, refuta, parte de que se coloquen barreras de contención o un sistema de protección en virtud de la indebida colocación de los postes. De seguido reproduce de forma parcial el informe de don Nombre229498, para luego señalar que, en esa línea, la recomendación de un sistema de protección y prevención obedece a la ubicación de los postes. A su entender, el criterio del apartado 2.1.23 del Manual de Dispositivos Uniformes se dejó de lado, contrariando la sana crítica, para establecer la existencia de una omisión de Conavi, al no ajustarse al criterio unipersonal del señor Nombre229498 , olvidando con ello, que las barreras de contención constituyen un peligro en sí mismas. Alega infracción de los cánones 1, 3 y 5 de la Ley de Creación del Consejo de Vialidad (Ley no. 7798) al imponer al Conavi, el diseño e instalación de barreras de contención con base en el informe de don Nombre229498 y sin considerar los criterios unívocos de la ciencia y la técnica de los Manuales Centroamericanos, testigos peritos de la CNFL y pericia forense. e) Los juzgadores, recrimina, no tuvieron como hecho demostrado que la velocidad permitida en la zona es de 60 KPH, pretiriendo, afirma, los oficios de la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito no. DGIT-SV 138-2010 y Placa43125. La recomendación de diseñar e instalar barreras de contención no fue valorada con base en la pericia del OIJ, según la cual, la muerte se produjo por exceso de velocidad e igual hubiera sucedido con barreras. Según los oficios mencionados, los cuales, critica, no fueron atendidos por el Tribunal, la velocidad permitida en el sentido San José -Cartago, en el tramo no. 4, es de 40 KPH. Esto es relevante, explica, porque el señor Nombre229498 en su declaración oral consideró que en las vías cuya velocidad permitida fuera de 40 KPH no se justificaba la instalación de barreras. Continúa, el informe de don Nombre229498 no debió ser valorado como un criterio técnico unívoco concluyente. En igual sentido, protesta, no se apreció bajo las reglas de la sana crítica, el testimonio del testigo perito Nombre229500 , al señalar que el factor ambiente, vehículo y conductor son los tres elementos que deben estar conectados para que el hecho de tránsito se evite o minimice. No obstante, alega, para el Tribunal Nombre1220 no ajustó su actividad a la norma 16 de la LGAP, según la cual, en ningún caso podrían dictarse actos contrarios a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica. En su criterio, esa disposición fue mal aplicada, al creer que estas reglas dependen del criterio subjetivo del ingeniero Nombre229498. Reitera la verdadera causa del accidente fue el exceso de velocidad, pero los jueces no valoraron adecuadamente la prueba técnica, basada a su vez en informes de la policía de tránsito e informes del OIJ que atendió el suceso. Como se afirmó en la pericia, si el poste no hubiera estado colocado en ese lugar, relata, la dinámica de la trayectoria del automóvil se hubiera traducido con posibilidad de más muertes, dado que, se dirigía sin control hacia el carril contrario. Al hilo de lo expuesto, también recrimina preterido los documentos del Cosevi de folios 474 a 480, según los cuales, el conductor del vehículo en que viajaba el occiso tenía varias infracciones por cinco colisiones, así como la prueba de ese mismo órgano del 3 de agosto de 2011, que establecía que en ese año, presentaba 3 excesos de velocidad de 90 KPH en el lugar.

XVI.- Relacionado con los agravios anteriores, el Nombre1220 por su lado, acusa violación de normas sustantivas por la indebida aplicación de principios constitucionales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad. Según comenta, el Tribunal estableció que tanto el Manual de Diseño Geométrico de Dispositivos de Tránsito como el de Diseño Geométrico de las Carreteras Regionales, no son vinculantes para el Estado costarricense. Lo anterior, dice, lo justificó indicando que en ambos instrumentos se señalan “sugerencias” tendientes a la armonización de criterios de construcción de diseño de carreteras. En igual sentido, agrega, manifestó que las recomendaciones emitidas por el Laboratorio mediante el “Informe de Auditoría de Seguridad Vial de la Carretera Florencio del Castillo”, conforme a los numerales 5 y 6 de la Ley no. 8114, tampoco son vinculantes ni de acatamiento obligatorio para el Conavi. Asegura, la Administración no se encuentra obligada a acatar las indicaciones realizadas tanto por el Sieca como por Nombre109293, porque en ellos, lo que se emiten son solo recomendaciones y sugerencias deseables, que cada uno de los países conforme a sus disposiciones y criterios técnicos internos deben valorar para optar por su aplicación. Lo que se pretende, añade, es que las recomendaciones sean conjugadas con los criterios internos de cada país. En atención al principio de legalidad, establecido en el canon 11 de la LGAP, expresa, al no formar esos instrumentos parte del ordenamiento jurídico (los manuales y el informe), no es obligatorio que la Administración acate sus recomendaciones. Articula, no se les puede condenar a obedecer una recomendación –por válida que sea-, si esta no constituye una norma del ordenamiento interno. Arguye, Nombre1220 de todos modos ha acatado muchas de las recomendaciones de los manuales, por estimar que su aplicación contribuye al mejoramiento de la infraestructura vial del país. Sus actuaciones, anota, se encuentran en concordancia con las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica. Empero, explica, no es posible condenar la no aplicación del cardinal 16 de cita, a soluciones que no son de carácter obligatorio. Enfatiza, es preciso entender que las actuaciones de la Administración tienen que estar en concordancia con las reglas de la ciencia y la técnica, pero aplicándose a un acto debidamente autorizado. Exalta, al considerar el Tribunal que el Consejo sí debía acatar las recomendaciones de Nombre109293 en aplicación de la norma 16 mencionada, también se lesionó el principio de igualdad consagrado en el numeral 33 de la Constitución Política, ya que no se aplicó de igual forma el artículo 16 a las actuaciones desarrolladas por la CNFL. Resalta, contrario a lo advertido por el Tribunal, Nombre1220 sí cumplió con lo establecido en el canon 16 de cita, pues hay justificación técnica suficiente sobre el lugar donde se colocaron los postes del alumbrado público. Expresa, de la prueba testimonial se desprende que un ingeniero de Consejo decidió la ubicación de los postes en el lugar donde se encuentran en atención a un “sistema de alcantarillado de aguas pluviales” que pasa en el centro de la medianera en el sector comprendido entre Pasoca y Terramall. Anota, la perito del OIJ estableció que los postes se encontraban bien situados conforme lo dispone el capítulo 7.2.6 de Posición de las Señales del Manual Centroamericano de Dispositivos Uniformes para el Control del Tránsito del SIECA. Por ello, dice, no se infringió el cardinal 16 citado, al existir, acentúa, prueba pericial que determinó que los postes técnicamente se encontraban bien ubicados, cumpliendo incluso con los manuales del SIECA.

XVII.- En este primer planteamiento, se endilga la preterición de varios medios de prueba. En términos generales alega el representante estatal, los jueces omitieron analizar el Manual Centroamericano de Disposiciones Uniformes para el Control de Tránsito, así como el Manual Centroamericano de Normas para el Diseño Geométrico de Carreteras Regionales, publicados por la Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana en los años 2000 y 2001. Dice, esos manuales debían ser analizados, máxime que el Ingeniero Nombre229498 los utilizó para realizar su informe. En torno a la aplicación de estos instrumentos internacionales, el Tribunal estableció lo siguiente: “…debe indicarse desde ya, que los Manuales Centroamericanos invocados por la parte actora (es decir, el Manual Centroamericano de Diseño Geométrico para las Carreteras Regionales y el Manual Centroamericano de Dispositivos Uniformes para el Control del Tránsito) si bien es cierto son emitidos por la Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, los mismos no son vinculantes para el Estado costarricense. Esto porque desde el inicio, en ambos manuales se indica que lo que ofrecen son sugerencias tendientes a la armonización de criterios de construcción y de diseño de carreteras y de signos de control del tránsito… no hay vinculación alguna para el Estado de Costa Rica en lo que respecta a las disposiciones del referido manual, ni tampoco para el atinente a los signos de control del tránsito… no puede olvidarse que las normas de comentario no vinculan a los países; por lo que son cada uno de estos, los que conforme a las disposiciones técnicas internas, los que van a determinar cómo se construyen los postes de alumbrado público y dónde se ubican…” (dictado de la sentencia a partir de las 15 horas 25 minutos). Al analizarse los documentos referidos, lleva razón el Tribunal cuando establece que al menos estas normas centroamericanas no son vinculantes para el Estado costarricense. Así, el Manual Centroamericano de Normas Ambientales para el Diseño, Construcción y Mantenimiento de Carreteras, lo que contiene es un cúmulo de recomendaciones referidas específicamente a la necesidad de contar con normas uniformes para la construcción de las carreteras en Centroamérica. Siguiendo la filosofía del propio Manual, estas normas “no deben constituirse en una camisa de fuerza ni generar conflictos en su aplicación por los países, antes bien deben ofrecer una guía sólida y técnicamente aceptable sobre las soluciones más deseables para el diseño geométrico de las carreteras regionales” (capítulo I, punto 1.2 sobre la Justificación de un Manual de Normas para el Diseño Geométrico de las Carreteras Regionales). Todos estos patrones de diseño se idearon para ser utilizados por el diseñador y así proponer la mejor solución técnica aplicable a cada proyecto vial, teniendo a la vista las proyecciones del tránsito futuro, las dificultades físicas a superar, las prácticas habituales del mantenimiento y las disponibilidades de recursos para la ejecución de las obras propuestas. Pero en sí constituyen más que un imperativo de acatamiento obligatorio, un ideal o modelo a seguir. Incluso el propio Manual que se analiza afirma, que su objetivo no es que las propuestas sirvan de “recetario de aplicación inmediata”, sino de referencia, por lo que deberá valorarse cada caso concreto. Aquí es necesario recordar que las normas de estudio, surgieron debido a la carencia de investigaciones nacionales y regionales en Centroamérica, sobre los requerimientos particulares y las características locales aplicables al diseño geométrico de las carreteras por lo que el Consejo Sectorial de Ministros de Transporte de Centroamérica (Comitran), se dio a la tarea de unificar criterios con base en la selección deliberada de las prácticas internacionales más reconocidas como las de la propia “American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials” (Aashto, Asociación Americana de Funcionarios de Carreteras Estatales y Transporte), el Transportation Research Board (TRB) y el Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE), aportes técnicos de la Federal Highway Administration (FHA) o de la propia Unión Europea. Pero también establece, que ninguna de sus normas debe sustituir el buen criterio y el juicio explícito del diseñador vial, lo cual debe ser expresamente sustentado en cada caso. De esta forma, sus disposiciones constituyen simples recomendaciones para los países de la región en el tema de la seguridad vial. Por otra parte, el Manual Centroamericano de Dispositivos Uniformes para el Control de Tránsito surge por la antigüedad de la normativa que estuvo vigente hasta el año 2000, la cual ya sobrepasaba los 40 años. El Manual de Señales Viales Centroamericano, como anexo original del Acuerdo Centroamericano sobre Señales Viales Uniformes, fue aprobado en 1958 y oficialmente adoptado por cada país en una fecha posterior, por lo que ante los cambios vividos en la región durante los últimos tiempos, hicieron que esa normativa en materia de señalamiento vial resultara incompleta y desactualizada. Pero estas reglas, también son meras recomendaciones que procuran mejorar la seguridad vial en las carreteras centroamericanas; reducir las demoras innecesarias provocadas por congestionamiento en el tránsito y suministrar una orientación oportuna y completa a los usuarios de las vías en forma uniforme en cualquiera de los países de la región (capítulo 1, punto 1.2. Objetivos del Manual). Lo anterior se explica, por la simple razón de que la legislación local de cada país tiene sus propias leyes y reglamentos sobre circulación de tránsito y el respectivo régimen de multas por infracciones, por lo cual, para la aplicación de ese Manual, deben ser consideradas en primer término, aquellas reglas de conducción, dispositivos de control y demás autorizaciones o restricciones establecidas en el marco jurídico de cada país. Es así como el documento analizado, es muy claro en el capítulo I de disposiciones generales, punto 1.4 sobre aspectos legales, apartado 1.4.1 del marco jurídico general y autoridad de colocación, en que “…lo prescrito en este Manual es aplicable en la medida que no contradiga las reglas de tránsito vigentes en cualquiera de los países de la región centroamericana...”. Según lo expuesto hasta ahora, se puede concluir que en efecto, los manuales citados por el casacionista no son de aplicación estricta para Costa Rica. Pueden ser aplicados, pero los encargados de su implementación deben justificar y demostrar que son el mejor criterio, máxime cuando a nivel internacional existen múltiples recomendaciones y técnicas para la construcción de vías e instalación de señales y otros dispositivos en carretera. Así las cosas, cualquier agravio de la representación del Estado y del Nombre1220 tendiente al análisis de las normas de ambos manuales, no son de recibo. Además, hay que agregar que durante el debate y las conclusiones, todas las co-demandadas insistieron como defensa principal en cuanto a este tema, que las normas de los manuales no eran de aplicación en Costa Rica, por lo que no pueden pretender hasta ahora, que sean utilizadas para justificar la actuación de Nombre1220 (durante la etapa de conclusiones Fuerza y Luz al ser las 15:17, el Nombre1220 a las 16:34 y el Estado a las 17:00 del 23 de agosto de 2011). Incluso, el Estado descartó textualmente la aplicación del Manual Centroamericano de Disposiciones Uniformes para el Control de Tránsito al decir que este no interesaba para el presente caso. Pero independientemente de lo anterior, se insiste, los jueces se inclinaron por su no aplicación como norma de acatamiento obligatorio ya que sus preceptos son solo sugerencias para los Estados, por lo que de una u otra forma, aquellas defensas de las partes accionadas sobre el tema habían sido atendidas. Desde esa perspectiva, las co-demandadas solicitaron la no aplicación de los instrumentos internacionales y así lo reconoció el Tribunal, por lo que el análisis de su articulado carecía de interés. Así mismo, la mayor parte de los testigos peritos manifestaron que al momento de instalar las luminarias, desconocían la existencia de los manuales, por lo cual se descartó que este fuera el criterio técnico utilizado. Otro motivo por lo que no se debe entrar al análisis de las reglas que pretende, al menos en cuanto a la Procuraduría, es que la orden de instalación de una barrera de seguridad en el sector cuatro de la carretera, solo afecta al Consejo, no así al Estado. En lo que sí existe una responsabilidad solidaria entre ambos es en el pago del daño material y moral, pero ese es un punto que será analizado en otro apartado. Por las razones dichas, el alegato sobre preterición de los manuales es improcedente. Consecuencia de lo anterior, tampoco resultan comprensibles los argumentos en torno al informe de la perito del OIJ (de ambos casacionistas), a los testimonios de los ingenieros Nombre229499 y Mynor Navarro Alfaro en relación a la ubicación de los postes; y tampoco, cualquier planteamiento sobre el ancho recomendado para la mediana separadora en autopistas de cuatro carriles, regionales, urbanas o troncales suburbanas; ya que para ello, los casacionistas se fundamentaron en normas del Manual Centroamericano para el Diseño de Carreteras, el cual como se explicó, no es de aplicación en el presente asunto.

XVIII.- En relación con la construcción de barreras de seguridad y los límites de velocidad que la representación estatal dice, no fueron analizados por el Tribunal (según los oficios DGIT-SV 138-2010 y DGIT-SV-284-2010), esta Sala concluye que el Estado carece de interés en este aspecto, ya que no se observa como la orden del Tribunal le afecta, si la obligación de construir las barandas recae exclusivamente en el Conavi, la cual tendrá que afrontar con su presupuesto según lo que disponen los cardinales 3 y 4 de su Ley de Creación (Ley no. 7798). De todos modos, sobre la supuesta contradicción del ingeniero Nombre229498 en torno a que en una zona de 40KPH no deben existir barreras de protección, debe decirse que extrañamente a folio 530 del expediente, en el oficio cuestionado, rola una fotografía (no impugnada) del sector derecho de la vía en el sentido San José - Cartago por Terramall, en la que se observa en el borde de la calzada, una barrera de protección con una señal de velocidad restringida de 40KPH, por lo que la manifestación del ingeniero no sería obstáculo para que el Nombre1220 construya la barrera cuestionada. La preterición de prueba indicada tampoco se presenta, pues, como se verá más adelante, la probanza del OIJ sobre la velocidad con la que era conducido el vehículo, así como la que certifican los partes por exceso de velocidad que tenía el conductor Nombre229496 , sí fue tomada en consideración por el Tribunal, pero para determinar el grado de culpa que tenía el Nombre1220 y el Estado. Lo anterior, en nada influye sobre la obligación que ahora pesa sobre Nombre1220 de edificar una barrera en la zona, porque la velocidad con la que manejaba Nombre229496 , no era un aspecto o factor vial que debía ser tomado en consideración por los jueces a la hora de imponer la orden. Esto debido a que la necesidad de una barrera de contención, no surge únicamente de un percance concreto, sino también de un informe técnico de un Laboratorio reconocido del país. Si bien es cierto, el deber se materializa con la pretensión de la actora, debe recordarse que la recomendación existía desde el año 2003, después de que Nombre109293 realizó un estudio de riesgo o auditoría de la Dirección13198 . Una cosa es la responsabilidad por las consecuencias del accidente donde el Tribunal sí debía valorar la velocidad del automotor, y otra muy distinta es el deber que surge ante una omisión de la Administración, máxime que de por medio existía un dictamen técnico que indicaba la peligrosidad de los postes con bases rígidas a la orilla de la carretera Florencio del Castillo en el sector cuatro Pasoca - Terramall. Son dos cuestiones diferentes que se encuentran debidamente analizadas por el Tribunal, una es la omisión del Consejo y la otra el grado de culpa de la Administración que en cierta forma fue atenuado, debido al exceso de velocidad con la que viajaba el vehículo siniestrado.

XIX.- Ahora bien, la condena por el daño material y moral causado a la familia del occiso, deben entender los recurrentes, no se hace únicamente por la colocación de los postes, sino principalmente, por la falta de aplicación de las recomendaciones dadas por Nombre109293 en Marzo de 2003 en el “Informe de Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial Carretera Florencio del Castillo”, ya que la sección cuatro de esa vía (entre Pasoca y Terramall), presentaba un nivel urgente de atención por el riesgo que generaban los obstáculos presentes en ella, concretamente los postes de alumbrado público con bases rígidas. Aspecto que el propio perito y autor del informe, don Nombre229498 refirió suficientemente durante el debate. Si bien es cierto, hasta el día de hoy estas recomendaciones tampoco son de acatamiento obligatorio según se desprende del análisis de los artículos 5 y 6 la Ley 8114, sí constituyen un criterio técnico válido y veraz, respaldado por un laboratorio de la Universidad de Costa Rica (exactamente una unidad académica de investigación adscrita a la Escuela de Ingeniería Civil de esa institución universitaria). De conformidad con el cardinal 16 de la LGAP para el caso concreto, sí son reglas unívocas de la técnica que en sus actuaciones, el Nombre1220 debió implementar o al menos analizar, para decidir qué tipo de medidas mitigarían el riesgo ahí descrito. Aunque el informe sea de fecha posterior a la colocación de los postes, que datan desde inicios del año 2002, el Consejo debió de una u otra forma, atender las recomendaciones ahí establecidas, máxime que ninguna de ellas era desproporcional o exagerada, ya que no se establecía que las estructuras debían ser cambiadas o reubicadas, la solución recomendada era implementar mecanismos de seguridad (barreras de protección o muros de contención), que incluso se observan en otros sectores de la vía o en otras carreteras nacionales como la de San José – Caldera (según lo analizado en el debate). Considera esta Cámara, que no en vano la Ley 8114 establece en el último párrafo del cardinal 5, que el Laboratorio informará para lo “que en derecho corresponda”, a la Asamblea Legislativa, al Ministerio de la Presidencia, al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), a la Contraloría General de la República y a la Defensoría de los Habitantes, el resultado final de las auditorias técnicas realizadas. Al informarse al MOPT, el Consejo automáticamente se daba por comunicado del informe, por ende, debió tomar las acciones necesarias para atender la advertencia y no simplemente archivar o hacer caso omiso del escrito, bajo el pretexto de que no es vinculante. Lo anterior toma relevancia si se considera que de por medio se encuentra un tema se seguridad vial que requiere urgente atención, debido a que existen obstáculos en la vía que representan un peligro para los conductores y pasajeros, independientemente de la velocidad con la que circulen los primeros, ya que este es un aspecto que siempre influirá en temas de responsabilidad, pero que no exime automáticamente al Estado de culpa como se analizará en las próximas consideraciones. Supuesto lo anterior, hay que agregar, que para la elaboración del informe, el señor Nombre229498 realizó, según explicó en el juicio, un estudio del sitio, mediciones y se utilizaron una serie de criterios y recomendaciones técnicas internacionales, principalmente los de la Asshto. El Nombre1220 en ningún momento ha desacreditado ese estudio, mediante la implementación de otro tipo de criterios técnicos y especializados, es más, hasta el día de hoy esa prueba se extraña en el expediente. El argumento de que la ubicación de los postes responde a un criterio o “sistema de alcantarillado de aguas pluviales” que pasa en el centro de la medianera en el sector comprendido entre Pasoca y Terramall, no es suficiente para demostrar que en su actuación se siguieron reglas de la técnica en los términos del cardinal 16 de la LGAP. Primero, porque ello más bien fue una circunstancia u orden que surgió en la contratación, para que Fuerza y Luz colocara los postes más cerca de la vía según lo que determinaron en ese momento los ingenieros del Consejo; esto incluso en contra del criterio de los especialistas de la Compañía. Sobre este punto fue determinante el testimonio del señor Nombre229499 , jefe del Departamento de Alumbrado Público de la Compañía en el año 2002, el cual manifestó que en el proceso de ejecución del contrato, hubo un ingeniero supervisor del Nombre1220 encargado de definir la forma de colocar los postes; que la CNFL los iba a ubicar en el centro, pero el Consejo estableció que eso no era posible porque ahí había un desagüe; y, que la Compañía por lo general cumple las instrucciones del MOPT (declaraciones el día 5 de agosto de 2011 al ser las 12 horas 30 minutos y 12 horas 42 minutos). Por esta razón es que el Tribunal exoneró de responsabilidad a la CNFL al disponer que: “Fueron claros los ingenieros de Fuerza y Luz, al sostener que fue, efectivamente, una persona designada por Nombre1220 para supervisar esta obra, y fue ese funcionario de Conavi, de quien no se supo el nombre, quien dispuso donde debían ubicarse los postes explicando que no se levantaron en el justo centro de la mediana, porque allí atraviesan desagües, razón que justificó la construcción de los mismos en un sitio más próximo al borde de la carretera hacia uno de los dos lados del centro. Siendo esto así y teniendo claro que Fuerza y Luz no fue la que determinó ni tampoco podía determinar por el convenio, la ubicación de los postes sino que, quien lo hizo fue Nombre1220, entonces derivamos de ello, que la conducta de la Compañía no guarda, en este caso, ninguna relación con la causación de la muerte de don Nombre229501 …” (dictado de la sentencia al ser las 15 horas 30 minutos). En segundo lugar, esta Sala insiste, el problema al momento de entablarse este proceso, no radica exclusivamente en la ubicación de los postes, ni el material con el que están construidos, sino en la falta de atención de un problema advertido por el Laboratorio desde el 2003. Siendo que el criterio técnico que el Consejo debía demostrar, lo es sobre la conveniencia o no de instalar una barrera de protección, el cual nunca se demostró, por lo que la recomendación y con base en ella, la técnica empleada por Nombre109293 sigue siendo determinante al respecto. Solo en caso de existir algún informe convincente por parte de la Administración, es que las soluciones dadas por el Laboratorio pasarían a segundo plano, pues, habría un mejor criterio en relación con la problemática advertida, aspecto que de todos modos será el Tribunal el que lo debe valorar en cada caso concreto. Pero hasta el momento, el único criterio en este asunto es el del Laboratorio, y ese informe es concluyente en señalar que: “los postes no se instalaron con bases flexibles, rompibles o quebradizas, sino con una base rígida conformada por un cajón de hormigón. Las bases de los postes de iluminación representan un grave peligro de colisión, dada su ubicación y condición de rigidez” (página 27 del informe). El riesgo por colisión en ese trayecto es inminente y requiere atención urgente, por eso es que Nombre109293 recomienda “Diseñar e instalar un sistema de protección y prevención ante eventuales colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la vía…” (página 30, capítulo 5.6 del informe). De ahí la importancia, se infiere del estudio, de construir barreras de contención. Debido a estas razones, el informe del Laboratorio resulta vital para acreditar la responsabilidad del Estado y de su órgano Conavi, por no acatar las recomendaciones analizadas, lo cual seguramente habría disminuido las consecuencias fatales al menos de este accidente en ese sector específico de la carretera. Así las cosas, lleva razón el Tribunal cuando indicó que “En el presente asunto se contó con un criterio técnico cual es el informe de Nombre109293 y no consta ningún otro documento, que se haya vertido en otro momento, que desautorice el informe de Nombre109293. Es decir, tenemos un documento técnico elaborado por ingenieros, validado por un laboratorio especializado de una universidad de reconocido prestigio que además cuenta con ese laboratorio especializado. Y ese criterio técnico en ningún momento ha sido desvirtuado por nadie. De manera que lo único con que se cuenta en relación con el riesgo, es precisamente ese informe de auditoría. Y en ese informe de auditoría se precisa que en la sección cuarta de la carretera Florencio del Castillo en los términos ya indicados, hay un alto riesgo de colisión y un alto riesgo de que esa colisión acarree resultados fatales. Advertencia que se hizo en el año 2003...” (al ser las 15 horas 34 minutos según soporte del dictado de la sentencia). Ese fue el criterio técnico utilizado por el Tribunal para llegar a su conclusión, el cual es conforme a derecho y se puede encasillar como la regla técnica aplicable al supuesto que se examina, ya que en Costa Rica no existe norma legal expresa que establezca cómo se deben colocar los postes de iluminación en las carreteras nacionales, el tipo de estructuras a emplearse, ni los sistemas de protección que deben disponer. Ello dice que el único criterio técnico existente es el que establece que su ubicación actual es riesgosa. Por lo demás, el estudio consideró mediante el criterio de profesionales en el tema, las características y comportamiento de la vía, por lo que no deja duda de su imparcialidad y credibilidad como reglas unívocas de la técnica. Además, el perito fue tajante en su deposición, que para elaborar el informe, se acudió a principios y técnicas extranjeras. Insistió en la implementación de los criterios técnicos de la Aashto y de la Unión Europea, no en las recomendaciones de los manuales centroamericanos como alega el Estado, porque estos últimos aseguró don Nombre229498, son reglas que se establecieron para la colocación de los postes de las señales de tránsito, no para los de luminaria, los cuales deben seguir otros criterios (al ser las 13:15, 17:48, 18:25; 18:44, 20:00 y 20:45 horas del día 3 de agosto de 2011). Si bien es cierto, se podría indicar que las normas internacionales utilizadas por el Laboratorio también son recomendaciones, se resalta que al estar contempladas en el informe del Laboratorio, el cual es además el único criterio referente a la carretera Florencio del Castillo, automáticamente lo convierten en criterio técnico para un caso concreto, que el Nombre1220 al menos debió analizar para lo que en derecho corresponda. Esta auditoría, trascendió debido a la ocurrencia del percance donde murió Nombre229497 y Nombre229502 , pero desde el año 2003 debió ser atendida. Esas consecuencias fueron advertidas expresamente por Nombre109293 en la documentación que aquí se cuestiona y que Nombre1220 simplemente ignoró. De este modo, no se observa la preterición de prueba alegada, al menos en torno a la omisión del Consejo de atender los riesgos en la vía; tampoco la vulneración de los ordinales 16 de la LGAP, 5, 6 de la Ley 8114, ni el 128 del CPCA, por lo que los agravios de los recurrentes han de rechazarse.

XX.- En el segundo agravio, siempre por preterición e indebida valoración de prueba, la representación estatal se manifiesta sobre los rubros correspondientes a los perjuicios. Señala, para el Tribunal, el deceso del señor Nombre229497 implicó para doña Nombre229490 y sus hijas, Nombre229491 y Nombre229491, la pérdida de los medios de subsistencia. En su criterio, ese detrimento no operó y de existir, sería solo parcial con base en la prueba documental preterida y que responde a la certificación del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (el INS o el Instituto en adelante) no. SOA-00272-2010 del 26 de enero de 2010 y el oficio de la CCSS no. AGP-362 del 22 de julio de 2011 anteriormente citado. Los juzgadores, manifiesta, tuvieron como hechos probados que el salario líquido promedio mensual que recibía Nombre229497 en el último año de vida era de ¢325.154,25; que las co-actoras recibieron una indemnización alícuota de ¢2.000.000,00 por parte del INS; y, que reciben una pensión por viudez y orfandad de ¢206.337,60. Pero el Tribunal, agrega, no consideró que dichas rentas no menoscaban el derecho de las demandantes a recibir un resarcimiento adicional por la supuesta omisión del Conavi, pues, la causa de la primera, es la aplicación del seguro obligatorio y la otra, porque el occiso estaba cotizando para la seguridad social. Se valoraron de forma indebida los documentos que establecieron los pagos del INS y la CCSS, porque a partir de ellos, explica, debió tenerse por acreditado que la pérdida de ingresos no existió en la magnitud que se tuvo por demostrado para fijar el quantum de los perjuicios. Acota, las tres rentas, conmutadas o vitalicias tienen el mismo fin u objeto. Puntualiza, los ingresos que en vida distribuía el señor Nombre229497 entre sus dependientes se suplieron de dos formas: por la indemnización recibida debido a la muerte en un monto fijo, y la otra, por una pensión vitalicia para la viuda y temporal para las huérfanas en un porcentaje de 50% y 30% del salario de la víctima. Dice, el Tribunal no debió tener por confirmado a partir del informe del perito matemático Nombre37311 , la existencia de los perjuicios reclamados por el 75% del salario que hubiera devengado en vida Nombre229497 , máxime, si se tiene en cuenta, como lo reconoció en su informe oral, que hizo un cálculo sin considerar la existencia de la indemnización del INS y la pensión de la CCSS.

XXI.- En este punto específico, los jueces resolvieron lo siguiente: “Ya hemos establecido que en nuestro criterio hay una concurrencia de culpas entre la omisión del Nombre1220 de acatar las disposiciones técnicas de Nombre109293 para tornar aceptable el riesgo creado por la colocación de los postes de alumbrado público en la Dirección13198 y la conducción temeraria e irresponsable de Nombre229496 como causas de la muerte de Nombre229497 … pese a la concurrencia indicada la responsabilidad del Nombre1220 y de Nombre229496 no es idéntica, sino que la de este último es mucho mayor que la del primero a tal punto que para nosotros significa 65% de la causa total de la muerte del señor Nombre229497 , mientras que el Nombre1220 asume el 35% restante… el fallecimiento de don Nombre229497 significó para doña Nombre229490, Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 , la pérdida de ¢50.252.231.67. Este monto es el que corresponde al daño material efectivamente sufrido por las tres actoras dichas… de la cifra dicha, Nombre1220 solo debe responder en la medida de su responsabilidad, es decir del monto total a Nombre1220 solo le corresponde pagar el 35%. Partiendo de esto… se condena solidariamente al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad y al Estado, a pagar por concepto de daño material, la suma de ¢17. 588.281,08 a favor de Nombre229490 , Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 , monto que en ejecución de sentencia deberá ser indexado desde el 7 de noviembre de 2007 hasta la fecha de su efectivo pago y deberá ser distribuido equitativamente entre las tres beneficiarias de esta indemnización…. el alegato del Estado en relación con la pensión que reciben la señora Nombre229490 y sus hijas, que es de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deviene inatendible. Esto por cuanto dicha pensión deriva del régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte y la causa de la misma, es la sola muerte de una persona que estuviese cotizando para el régimen indicado. Es decir, la pensión obedece al sistema de seguridad social aún imperante en Costa Rica y no tiene como causa el daño material vivido por la viuda e hijas del fallecido… Finalmente… el Instituto Nacional de Seguros efectuó un pago a favor de las tres personas dichas, pero ese pago es por la aplicación del seguro obligatorio automotor. De manera que la causa del mismo es también, completamente diferente a la indemnización que aquí se ha establecido, por lo que deviene igualmente intrascendente para los efectos del derecho al resarcimiento del daño material…” (Considerando XI a partir de las 16:11 del dictado de sentencia). El Estado aduce preterición de la certificación del INS no. SOA-00272-2010 y del oficio de la CCSS no. Placa43126 donde consta, respectivamente, que la demandante recibió una indemnización alícuota de ¢2.000.000,00 por parte del Instituto, y que reciben una pensión por viudez y orfandad de ¢206.337,60. En realidad, el segundo documento, recuérdese, fue rechazado durante el debate por lo que no podría existir preterición; y en torno al primero sería una indebida valoración lo que se acusa. En primer término, el dinero que recibe la actora y sus hijas por parte de la CCSS como seguro por muerte y orfandad, obedece al seguro social en beneficio de todos los trabajadores, como principio fundamental del régimen de derechos y garantías sociales, el que funciona sobre la base de la contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores. Este régimen se encuentra tutelado ampliamente en el canon 73 de la Constitución Política, 1, 2, 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS, 2 del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte. De manera que responde a un sistema compensatorio distinto del que aquí se discute. El monto concedido por el Tribunal obedece a una indemnización patrimonial de la Administración por conducta omisiva, que se encuentra tutelado en el canon 41 de la Carta Magna y 190 de la LGAP. Al respecto, esta última norma establece: “1. La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero…”. Se trata del resarcimiento del daño material y los perjuicios provocados a la familia del fallecido y que, hasta este proceso, no había sido determinado en los términos del cardinal 196 ibídem. El otro sistema de compensación, es un derecho del asegurado y sus beneficiarios por el solo hecho de cotizar para el régimen de la CCSS. Por su lado, el seguro obligatorio para vehículos automotores (SOA), también es distinto a la indemnización reclamada por la actora, puesto que surge por imperativo legal, a saber de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres (Ley 7331, vigente al momento del accidente) el cual deben mantener vigente los propietarios de los vehículos por medio del pago de una prima que fija el Instituto. El SOA cubre la lesión y la muerte de las personas, víctimas de un accidente de tránsito, exista o no responsabilidad del conductor. Este seguro se cobra anualmente y es requisito para obtener el permiso de circulación del vehículo (preceptos 38, 40 y 48 ibídem). Esta indemnización por lo tanto, es diferente del régimen de responsabilidad establecido en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual indemniza daños y perjuicios causados al administrado por funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal del Estado y sus órganos (responsabilidad objetiva). Ese resarcimiento no se encuentra contemplado por los regímenes anteriores, los cuales operan de pleno derecho al acontecer el evento que los originó; el primero como un derecho de los trabajadores y sus beneficiarios por el solo hecho de cotizar para el sistema; y el segundo como un seguro por el riesgo innegable que involucra la conducción de un vehículo automotor. Así las cosas, la sentencia no valoró indebidamente la certificación del INS como alega el casacionista, por lo que el agravio debe ser rechazado.

XXII.- En su tercer planteamiento, la Procuraduría endilga violación de las normas o principios constitucionales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad e igualdad. Sobre el porcentaje de responsabilidad del Conavi, enuncia, el Tribunal consideró que la omisión del Consejo no generó un peligro como para equipararlo al atrevimiento, la impericia y la temeridad del conductor Nombre229496 , por lo que le atribuyó a este último un 65% de responsabilidad por su conducta, respecto al fallecimiento del señor Nombre229497 . Asegura, se sobredimensionó la omisión administrativa para achacarle una responsabilidad mayor de la que correspondía. Es evidente, enfatiza, no se tomó en cuenta el informe pericial y la deposición oral de la Sección de Ingeniería Forense del OIJ. Reitera, el Tribunal no apreció que la causa del deceso fue el exceso de velocidad con la que conducía don Nombre229496 . Considera, la imprudencia, impericia y temeridad del conductor, es el factor exclusivo o determinante casi en un 100% de la muerte del señor Nombre229497. La ubicación del poste, alega, no es el detonante en un 35% de la muerte del señor Nombre229497 como lo apreciaron los juzgadores. El vehículo recientemente había pasado la revisión técnica vehicular, y conforme al parte oficial de tránsito, el testimonio del señor Nombre229503 y el informe del OIJ, la calzada estaba seca, es plana, recta y era de día, de manera que la única causa fue el proceder del señor Nombre229498. Refiere, según el testimonio de Nombre229500 , lo que se aconseja es tomar en cuenta la distancia de parada, reacción o frenado; así, la maniobra frente a un perro muerto era reducir la velocidad, frenar y esquivarlo; pasarse al carril derecho; o haber pasado con el carro centrado. Sin embargo, critica, maniobró invadiendo la zona verde sin freno. Menciona, el señor Nombre229496 manejaba a una velocidad de 90 KPH, en una zona que está regulada en 60 KPH. Para el ingeniero Nombre229498 , expresa, ese límite trata de reducir las consecuencias ante una colisión, incluso la velocidad fijada tuvo en cuenta la condición del espaldón, distancia de visibilidad de parada y la actividad peatonal. La pericia forense, destaca, refirió varios aspectos como que: un auto a 60 KPH podía esquivar el perro, a mayor velocidad vería una sombra; la velocidad fue la causa del desenlace; a la velocidad permitida no hay muertes ni daños; y, que todos los conductores saben que frente a Terramall esa es la velocidad. Ante lo anterior, considera irrazonable que el Tribunal haya exonerado al conductor de su responsabilidad en la muerte del señor Nombre229497 en un 35% cuando debió acusarle sino una responsabilidad total del 100%, una mayor al 65% porque aún con las barreras, se hubiera producido la muerte. En relación con esto, estima infringido por falta de aplicación, el Acuerdo Centroamericano sobre Circulación por Carretera, aprobado por la Ley no. Placa43127, artículos 3, 3.7, 3.8 y 4, por cuanto el Tribunal exoneró en un 35% a Nombre229496 de su obligación de conducir sin causar peligro o daños a las personas y de mantener una velocidad racional dentro de los límites señalados. También el ordinal 7 párrafo segundo de la Ley de Tránsito no. 7331, porque el responsable de los daños y perjuicios era el señor Nombre229496 . Al margen de lo anterior, recrimina vulnerados por errónea interpretación los preceptos 3 de la Ley no. 7798 y 12 del CPCA, al estimar que el Estado debe responder civilmente con el Conavi, por la omisión achacada al Consejo. Así como los numerales 199 a 202 y 1046 del Código Civil por apreciarse que existe una solidaridad en materia de responsabilidad entre ambos. Reseña, si el legislador dispuso otorgarle personalidad a Conavi, dotándolo de un patrimonio independiente y darle libertad para contratar de forma separada, no es posible atribuirle al Estado las omisiones de aquél en el marco de su competencia. Argumenta, en los hechos demostrados del 5 al 8, está acreditado que el Consejo contrató a la CNFL para la colación del alumbrado de la Dirección3536 y que lo convenido incluía la supervisión de los aspectos de seguridad vial. En consecuencia, imputa errónea interpretación de los artículos 1, 3 y 5 de la Ley no. 7798/98 y 12.2 del CPCA. En su parecer, el Tribunal confundió la responsabilidad subsidiaria que puede corresponder al Estado, cuando una persona jurídica pública carece de patrimonio suficiente para hacer frente a su deber, con el supuesto de la norma 12.2 mencionada que no pretende suplir la averiguación de esa suficiencia. Agrega, no porque se tenga legitimación pasiva en un proceso, se ha de tenerse que responder por la acción. En ese mismo orden de ideas, dice se confundió el sentido de los cardinales 199 a 202 de la Ley no. 6227, que no están dirigidos a establecer una solidaridad en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual entre el Estado persona y un órgano persona. Lo que prevén, señala, es la imputación en todo caso a la organización de la cual dependen los servidores por lo actuado en su nombre y cuenta, que no es lo que opera en el otro caso. Acusa aplicación indebida del canon 1046 del Código Civil porque el ordenamiento jurídico que regula la actividad de la Administración es independiente del derecho civil, conforme a las normas 3 y 9 de la Ley 6227 violadas por falta de aplicación. Esa norma, aclara, regula la obligación de reparar de forma solidaria los daños y perjuicios por ilícitos penales y en caso de participación como autor o cómplice, lo cual no se da en el presente asunto. Finalmente, en adición de lo expresado al inicio del reparo, mediante escrito presentado el 10 de octubre de 2011, que corresponde a una ampliación del recurso, dice, el Tribunal violó en forma indirecta el artículo 190 de la Ley 6227, al sindicarle al Estado y al Consejo una responsabilidad civil por una omisión técnica inexistente y al no estimar roto el nexo causal por el hecho de un tercero, la conducción temeraria del señor Nombre229496 , cuanto al atribuirle un porcentaje del 35% de responsabilidad en la muerte del señor Nombre229497. Agrega, no existe nexo causal de tal gravedad con la conducta estatal y es claro que lo acontecido no ha producido una infracción y daño de la cuantía fijada. Vinculado a los anteriores alegatos, el Nombre1220 censura el criterio del Tribunal al señalarlo junto con el Estado, como responsable en un 35% de la muerte de don Nombre229497 . Dice, el Tribunal reconoce que la causa del accidente fue provocada por el hecho de un tercero, sea, el conductor del vehículo en que viajaba el occiso. Menciona, fue la falta de pericia dentro de una conducción temeraria la que provocó el fatal desenlace. Del elenco probatorio, detalla, se demostró que Nombre229496 irrespetó la velocidad permitida y fue el exceso de velocidad, lo que provocó el descontrol del carro y la colisión con el poste. En la sala de juicio, enuncia, se le preguntó a la perito Gaudy Vega “si una baranda de protección -considerando la velocidad que llevaba el vehículo- hubiera evitado el fatal desenlace, y su respuesta fue no”. En su criterio, se demostró que no hay certeza de que aun existiendo la baranda de protección, el señor Nombre229497 no hubiera fallecido. Por ello, advierte, el que creó el riesgo no fue el Consejo, sino el manejo temerario “de un conductor irresponsable”. Refuerza su alegato con la norma 190 de la LGAP. Indica, para los jueces, se presenta una eximente de responsabilidad como lo es el hecho de un tercero. De este modo, argumenta, no hay razón para querer atribuir al Nombre1220 la responsabilidad en un 35% por la muerte de Nombre229497 , máxime que el Tribunal argumentó su condena en situaciones inciertas no comprobadas en el debate. A su entender, no hay nexo causal que relacione la actuación de Consejo con el percance.

XXIII.- Los casacionistas recriminan violación de principios constitucionales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad e igualdad, respecto del grado se responsabilidad que se les endilga, pero en el fondo, luego de ordenados los planteamientos, el reparo también es por indebida valoración de la prueba y violación directa de normas, porque a su entender, la probanza citada es clara en señalar que Nombre229496 es el único responsable por los daños reclamados por la actora. Esto debido al exceso de velocidad con la que desplazaba el vehículo el día del siniestro. En relación con este punto, en las consideraciones del fallo los juzgadores establecieron lo siguiente: “La forma como queda el vehículo, la descripción del evento, la ausencia de frenado y también, aquí es importante, la propia admisión que hizo Nombre229496 sobre tener varios partes, incluidos varios por exceso de velocidad nos revela que efectivamente el viajaba a muy alta velocidad. La zona en que el viajaba tiene un limite máximo de 60 KPH… Ahora, don Nombre229496 aunque trate de negarlo, lo cierto es que viajaba a mucho más de la velocidad permitida, el exceso de velocidad se aprecia por la imposibilidad de controlar el vehículo. No es creíble que el vehículo a una velocidad máxima de 60 KPH describa el movimiento como el lo narró… no cabe la menor duda que esos 60 KPH fueron más que irrespetados por don Nombre229496 … lo que sucedió fue un descontrol del vehículo como consecuencia directa del exceso de velocidad. Pero habían pasado otros vehículos en ese momento, en esa mañana, y el perro estuvo ahí de manera que el supuesto efecto de imprevisibilidad de no poder verlo no se entiende, salvo por el exceso de velocidad que acreditó doña Gaudy y que con base en los otros elementos de prueba ya mencionados estimamos que es creíble…” (dictado de la sentencia al ser las 15 horas 51 minutos). De esta forma, no cabe duda de que el exceso de velocidad por parte de Nombre229496 sí fue valorado por el Tribunal, el cual determinó que fue una causa importante del accidente que sucedió en frente de Terramall aquel 9 de noviembre de 2007. Ese factor humano descrito por el testigo perito Nombre229500 , fue considerado por los jueces, puesto que existía abundante prueba al respecto. En ese sentido se tiene el “Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico” rendido por Gaudy Vega del OIJ, así como su deposición en juicio; las constancias de partes por exceso de velocidad de Nombre229496 ; el testimonio del “chequeador” de buses, Nombre229504 , que se encontraba en el sitio el día del suceso; así como las múltiples fotografías que muestran como quedó el automotor después del impacto. En razón de lo anterior, los juzgadores determinaron que “…sí hay una omisión de Nombre1220, pero el conducir y el único responsable de la conducción es Nombre229496 . Así las cosas, este Tribunal llega a concluir que hay una concurrencia de causas en la producción del resultado fatal. Por un lado la omisión del Nombre1220 por otro lado la conducción de don Nombre229496 … La conducción temeraria de don Nombre229496 no suprime la omisión de Nombre1220, pero la omisión de Nombre1220, tampoco suprime la conducción temeraria de don Nombre229496 . De manera que ambos deben tenerse como corresponsables en el establecimiento del nexo causal entre lo sucedido, la omisión y conducción, y el resultado muerte de don Nombre229497 . Ahora, esta concurrencia de causas no es equitativa, no es por ambas partes igual, es cierto que hay una omisión de Nombre1220 en la atención de un riesgo señalado por la Universidad de Costa Rica, pero lo cierto del caso es que proporcionalmente hablando, aquí no se ha acreditado que esa sea una zona de colisión constante. Hay colisiones, sí hay riesgo, sí es alto, sí puede producir resultados fatales, pero tampoco es un peligro de tal magnitud, como para equipararlo al atrevimiento, a la impericia y a la temeridad de Nombre229496 . Lo que estamos diciendo en otras palabras es que compensados ambos factores, ambas causas, pesa más, bastante más la conducta temeraria de Nombre229496 , frente a la omisión de Nombre1220...” (dictado de la sentencia al ser las 15 horas 58 minutos). Obsérvese que para el Tribunal existe una concurrencia de culpas, ya que por un lado, como se analizó en considerandos anteriores, existe la omisión y desatención de Nombre1220 de acatar las recomendaciones dadas por la UCR y por el otro, la conducción temeraria e imprudente de un tercero (Nombre229496 ). Según lo expuesto, considera esta Sala que no lleva razón la representación del Estado y del Consejo, ya que la conducta de don Nombre229496 sí fue ampliamente analizada, y además, no ha sido la única y exclusiva causa productora del daño que aquí se reclama. Por el contrario, resultaría opuesto a los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, a las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia, considerar que la omisión del Consejo de cumplir con su deber de cuidado y mantenimiento de las vías, de mitigar un riesgo que un ente especializado advirtió desde el año 2003, no tuviera incidencia causal en la muerte de don Nombre229497 . Con su conducta omisiva, se recalca, el Consejo no ayudó a mitigar los daños o consecuencias de este accidente, tomando en cuenta que los postes de bases rígidas colocados en el sector cuatro de la carretera, constituyen verdaderos “escudos” o “cuchillas” en perjuicio de los vehículos que por ahí transiten. En caso de colisión, se demostró, los desenlaces serían fatales debido a su cimentación y anclaje que los vuelve “irrompibles”. No se cuestiona en la sentencia los métodos de construcción, quizás porque en efecto, no había norma clara que obligara a instalarlos de determinada forma, tampoco se estaba aconsejando en el informe una sustitución de los postes por otros de bases quebradizas, pero lo menos que pudo realizar el Nombre1220 al surgir en marzo de 2003, una recomendación expresa sobre el riesgo de las estructuras, era instalar mecanismos de seguridad en la vía, como barreras de impacto o muros de contención. De este modo, es razonable que la culpa del Estado y el Nombre1220 exista, pero esta es de menor grado, ya que en efecto la causa principal del percance fue la conducción temeraria del conductor (hecho de un tercero). Ya ha establecido esta Sala en asuntos precedentes, que el hecho de que exista una eximente de responsabilidad, llámese fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero, no implica que automáticamente la Administración queda liberada de toda responsabilidad en cuanto a la reparación del daño ocasionado (al respecto se puede consultar la resolución no. 001084-F-S1-2011 de las 8 horas 35 minutos del 8 de setiembre de 2011). Lo anterior es aplicable al caso, puesto que no solo la imprudencia del conductor fue lo que incidió en la muerte del señor Nombre229497 , sino también las condiciones creadas y toleradas por el Consejo, toda vez que las omisiones en el ejercicio de sus competencias, concretamente el no instalar las medidas de protección vial, necesarias y suficientes, facilitaron que el vehículo donde viajaban las víctimas del accidente chocaran aparatosamente con la estructura. Debido a la velocidad del automotor, tal vez las consecuencias hubieran sido las mismas, pero ese es un hecho que no se puede saber con exactitud, y que tampoco exime al Estado y al Nombre1220 de su deber de mantenimiento vial. Así, las cosas, la graduación del daño realizada por el Tribunal también resulta proporcional a los hechos demostrados, por lo que no sería justo y equitativo disminuir el porcentaje de culpa del Estado y el Consejo. Su actuación omisiva sí tuvo incidencia en el percance al igual que la del conductor Nombre229496 . De este modo, no existe la preterición de la prueba apuntada, la vulneración de las normas de la Ley 3148, 7 de la Ley 7331 y 190 de la LGAP.

XXIV.- El otro tema del reparo, sea la responsabilidad solidaria entre el Estado y el Conavi, el Tribunal la fundamentó de la siguiente forma: “La personalidad jurídica instrumental que se concede a Nombre1220 es para administrar fondos y celebrar contratos, no es para cometer daños, no es para causar daños, de manera que, cuando se trate del cumplimiento de sus funciones, es perfectamente entendible que Nombre1220 pueda asumir sus responsabilidades por sí solo, pero en lo que extralimita sus funciones y cae en el ámbito no funcional, debe responder como órgano que es, aunque tenga desconcentración máxima, con aquél ente al cual está adscrito. En este caso, si bien es cierto la adscripción es al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas no es un ente, sino que el Estado Central lo es, está claro que el órgano de desconcentración máxima de otro órgano pues está vinculado en un criterio de imputación por disposición normativa al ente al cual pertenece el Ministerio, en este caso al Poder Ejecutivo y al Estado Central… en el artículo 12 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo se prevé la participación conjunta entre el órgano con personalidad instrumental y el ente al cual pertenece, en este caso Nombre1220 y Estado, precisamente por la posibilidad de que la conducta del órgano desconcentrado que goza de personalidad jurídica instrumental, sea más allá de sus funciones y tenga que responder con otro sujeto, en este caso el Estado… Si hubiéramos determinado aquí una responsabilidad de Nombre1220, únicamente en el incumplimiento de sus funciones, un error en el manejo de su presupuesto, un error en un contrato, un equívoco de ese tipo, no tendríamos ningún problema en sentarle la responsabilidad exclusivamente al Nombre1220. Pero, frente a un administrado por un daño como el que aquí se ha demostrado que es totalmente ilícito, no podemos excluir la solidaridad del Estado en estos supuestos. Solidaridad que deriva del artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública pues frente al administrado en hechos dañosos, la Administración es una sola, aunque el causante concreto del daño sea Nombre1220…” (audiencia final al ser las 16 horas 3 minutos). Por disposición expresa del inciso 2) del numeral 12 del CPCA, cuando el proceso se instaure contra una conducta de un órgano administrativo al cual le ha sido otorgado personalidad jurídica instrumental, también se debe considerar como parte demandada a este, junto con el Estado o al ente al cual se encuentre adscrito, según corresponda. Dentro de esta perspectiva, la regla es que la figura del “órgano-persona”, dada sus particularidades, y para efectos de representación, debe ser, en ese tanto, asimilado a la participación dentro del proceso de un ente descentralizado, en la medida en que ostentan una personalidad jurídica instrumental. Pero lo anterior resulta de aplicación, únicamente, en tanto la conducta que se le imputa se encuentre dentro del ámbito de la competencia desconcentrada y respecto de la cual, se le otorgó personalidad jurídica. En este sentido, lo dispuesto en el numeral 12.2 del CPCA a que se hizo referencia, debe ser entendido como un mecanismo mediante el cual se evite que, luego de un proceso, se determine que la conducta no se encuentra dentro de la competencia que ejerce el órgano con la cobertura de la personalidad instrumental que le fue otorgada, por lo que ahí sí se hace indispensable que responda el Estado solidariamente con el órgano en su calidad de ente mayor. Sobre este punto, puede citarse lo dispuesto por esta Sala en el voto 1202-A-S1-2009, en el que se indicó: “La idea que subyace en la norma es la de evitar al administrado el problema de definir si la actuación (o conducta omisiva) del órgano, lo fue en ejercicio de una competencia cubierta por la personalidad jurídica instrumental, o bien, fuera de ella, es decir, sometida por ejemplo, a dirección del jerarca del ente en cuya estructura está inserto. En suma, lo relevante es la existencia de una lesión a la esfera jurídica del administrado y el correlativo deber reparador. En interés de la víctima, la norma dispone traer el órgano y el ente a la lite, a fin de que la eventual sentencia estimatoria pueda ejecutarse contra el patrimonio del que resulte responsable. De no exigirse la comparecencia de ambos, el fallo sería ineficaz, pues no podría obligar a indemnizar a quien no ha ejercido la defensa de sus propios intereses en el proceso. Dicho de otro modo, el mandato procesal ordena únicamente que se incorpore a la discusión judicial, tanto al órgano con personalidad como al Estado u ente al que pertenece. Corresponde luego al juez o jueza, con arreglo a las normas sustantivas, determinar si el acto, conducta o indolencia cuestionados se desarrolló o no bajo personalidad, estableciendo de este modo, si es el órgano el que debe responder con su propio peculio, o si es el ente o el Estado a quien debe atribuirse el deber de reparar.” La ley 7798 dice que el Consejo es un “órgano con desconcentración máxima, adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. El Consejo tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental y presupuestaria para administrar el Fondo de la red vial nacional, así como para suscribir los contratos y empréstitos necesarios para el ejercicio de sus funciones, de conformidad con la presente ley…”. En este asunto, el propio Estado a través de su órgano Conavi, colocó en una situación de inminente riesgo de muerte a los pasajeros del vehículo accidentado, un riesgo que se si bien se vio materializado con la conducta imprudente del conductor Nombre229496 , también lo fue por la omisión de construir barreras de seguridad a un costado de la vía. En el mismo fallo de esta Sala citado en el considerando anterior (no. 001084-F-S1-2011 de las 8 horas 35 minutos del 8 de setiembre de 2011), esta Sala consideró que en casos como el presente, resulta evidente el grado de responsabilidad de la Administración, pues la obligación del mantenimiento de las vías públicas y la construcción de puentes peatonales, corresponde en este caso, al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (hoy por intermedio de sus órganos desconcentrados), y al no hacerlo, no sólo incurre en anormalidad e ilicitud por incumplimiento de sus obligaciones jurídico materiales, sino además porque en forma directa, atenta y pone en peligro la vida no solo de los transeúntes sino también de los conductores y pasajeros, quienes sin la existencia de la obra material indicada, se ven en la necesidad de realizar maniobras inadvertidas o peor aún, se exponen a riesgos innecesarios como chocar contra un obstáculo irrompible en carretera, sea cual sea la velocidad. En este sentido, hay que resaltar que el artículo 2 de la Ley 3155 denominada “Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT)” dispone, en lo que interesa que: “El Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes tiene por objeto: a) Planificar, construir y mejorar las carreteras y caminos. Mantener las carreteras y colaborar con las Municipalidades en la conservación de los caminos vecinales. Regular y controlar los derechos de vía de las carreteras y caminos existentes o en proyecto. Regular, controlar y vigilar el tránsito y el transporte por los caminos públicos.” Por su parte el precepto 4 de la Ley 7798, establece: “Serán objetivos del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad los siguientes: a) Planear, programar, administrar, financiar, ejecutar y controlar la conservación y la construcción de la red vial nacional, en concordancia con los programas que elabore la Dirección de Planificación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes…”. El 24 ibídem, pregona: “Toda obra pública financiada por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad se realizará con fundamento en un sistema de administración de construcción y mantenimiento de carreteras y caminos (…) se deberá considerar e incorporar el componente de seguridad vial antes de su ejecución, de conformidad con el detalle que se efectuará de manera reglamentaria y en forma coordinada entre órganos y entes. Como parte de la seguridad vial deberán incorporarse prevenciones para el paso seguro de peatones, incluidos aquellos a nivel y a desnivel, la protección para el tránsito seguro de peatones longitudinal a la vía, las bahías para las paradas de transporte público, las ciclorutas, en los casos que corresponda, y la adecuada visibilidad de las vías, incluida la eliminación de obstáculos en ellas y en el derecho de vía de estas y cualquier otro que disponga el Reglamento. Para salvaguardar la seguridad vial, deberá tomarse en consideración e el entorno urbano que atraviesen las vías (…) así como todos los otros elementos, las especificaciones técnicas, las normas y los procedimientos que garanticen la mejor seguridad vial de los peatones y conductores…”. Con base en este marco explicativo y normativo, es que el Estado y el Nombre1220 tienen un grado de responsabilidad en este asunto, el cual deben sufragar solidariamente de conformidad con lo establecido en el canon 190 de la LGAP, ya que se trata de un evidente funcionamiento anormal de la Administración fuera de la conducta esperada del órgano persona. Así las cosas, el reproche referente a la indebida aplicación de los cardinales 12.2 del CPCA, 3 de la Ley 7798 y 199 a 202 de la LGAP debe ser rechazado.

XXV.- En el cuarto reparo, el Estado expresa que la experticia del perito actuario matemático, Nombre37311 , no se apreció conforme a la sana crítica, al afirmar el experto en su deposición oral, que el cálculo se basaba en un reglamento en cuya redacción había participado y que había aprobado el Colegio de Ciencias Económicas, viéndose obligado a aplicarlo para no recibir una sanción disciplinaria, cuando lo cierto, es que de acuerdo al oficio no. CPCE-JD-746-10 de 2 de diciembre de 2010, el Reglamento en que se basó el perito ni siquiera había sido publicado, ya que estaba en proceso de ajuste y revisión para ser aprobado. Protesta, el perito se basó en un Proyecto de Reglamento de Cálculos Actuariales que no es norma del Colegio. Dentro de las observaciones jurídicas o críticas que realiza al Reglamento, arguye, se basó según su artículo 3, en las reglas de responsabilidad civil del canon 130 del Código Penal de 1941, el cual fue derogado por la Ley no. Placa43128, “sin mencionar su modificación por Ley 4891”. Sin una sana crítica, afirma, el Tribunal estimó razonable la proposición del perito y su Reglamento de indemnizar un 75% del salario, dada la condición del fallecido al ser la única fuente de ingresos del núcleo familiar. No obstante, alega, por pensión alimentaria, el salario no puede responder por más del 50%, según el precepto 172.3 del Código de Trabajo. Asimismo, menciona, el numeral 6 del Reglamento en que se basó el informe del perito matemático, prevé el uso de la tasa de mortalidad del 2000 del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), sin considerarse que es la que corresponde al nacer. El Tribunal, comenta, tuvo como hecho probado un salario sin las contribuciones a la seguridad social, pero se equivocó al no deducir el 1.5% de contribución obligatoria que pesa sobre todo ingreso salarial según el cardinal 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (Ley 4351), por lo que debió fijarse el líquido en ¢321.019,18 y no en ¢325.154,25. Fundamenta el hecho de no haberse apreciado conforme a la sana crítica el informe pericial, al no limitarse la dependencia económica a los 18 o 25 años si las hijas estaban estudiando, según lo preceptuado en el cardinal 173.5 del Código de Familia y 12 del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte. En igual sentido, indica, no tiene sentido que el Reglamento considere la indemnización a los dependientes económicamente (artículo 2) y que el perito no limitara la edad de jubilación por la CCSS del occiso, conforme al artículo 5 del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (65 años). El Tribunal, asevera, no apreció debidamente el informe en este aspecto, pues comprendió en el cálculo la edad de hasta 76,2 años que incluye el factor de conmutación de 17,21. Por estas razones, en su criterio, el órgano sentenciador tenía que restarle todo valor y eficacia al peritaje matemático presentado por escrito y a la declaración oral que lo complementó. Al no hacerlo, afirma, irrespetó las reglas de la sana crítica en su valoración, ya que de haber existido los perjuicios, asienta, debió dejar su estimación a la fase de ejecución de sentencia con un nuevo peritaje que mereciera credibilidad. Lo expuesto, recrimina, representa aplicación indebida de la norma 196 de la LGAP, puesto que no debió tenerse por acreditada la existencia de perjuicios con base en el informe del perito matemático y con preterición de la certificación del INS y los Oficios CPCE-JD-746-10 y CCSS AGP-362 citados, no al menos en la cuantía fijada. Al final del escrito, resume, falta de aplicación del ordinal 172. 3 del Código de Trabajo, al interpretar erróneamente con la pericia matemática rendida que es posible indemnizar con el 75% del salario, cuando no es acorde con las necesidades en vida del occiso y que no podía significar un aporte al hogar superior al 50% de dicho ingreso. El numeral 173. 5 del Código de Familia por falta de aplicación, al interpretar erróneamente con el perito matemático, que la indemnización de las hijas menores del occiso, pueda considerar los ingresos de este después de alcanzada la mayoridad o los 25 años si continúan estudiando. El cardinal 5 de la Ley 4351 al no deducir el 1.5% de contribución obligatoria que pesa sobre el ingreso salarial.

XXVI.- Como se aclaró anteriormente, el oficio no. CPCE-JD-746-10 de 2 de diciembre de 2010 que trata aspectos del Reglamento en que se basó el perito para realizar su informe, fue rechazado como prueba para mejor resolver durante el juicio oral y público, porque el Tribunal estimó que ese documento, pese a estar fechado 2 de diciembre de 2010, no fue incorporado al proceso el 19 de julio de 2011, cuando el perito fue interrogado ampliamente sobre temas relacionados con su peritaje, concretamente sobre el Reglamento utilizado en la experticia. Los jueces consideraron así, que no era cierto que antes del interrogatorio, el Estado desconocía la existencia del reglamento utilizado en el informe. Mediante el reparo, pretende el recurrente incorporar nuevamente el escrito al proceso, empero, como se analizó en el considerando VI de este fallo, la probanza fue solicitada por la Procuraduría al CPCE desde el 22 de noviembre de 2010, sea después de la audiencia preliminar y antes del juicio oral y público iniciado el 19 de julio de 2011, por lo que en efecto, no se trataba de un documento que surgió a raíz del debate, sino que ya era de conocimiento del Estado. Pese a ser preparado por esa representación previo al debate, no se aportó de antemano o al menos durante la deposición del testigo perito, momento procesal adecuado para ello según reza el cardinal 105 del CPCA. Esa es la oportunidad para discutir los informes periciales, no después cuando la etapa ya se encuentra precluida. No obstante lo anterior, los juzgadores analizaron brevemente la crítica de la representación estatal a la pericia, sobre el punto de que el procedimiento de cálculo utilizado no ha sido adoptado por el Colegio de Profesionales en Ciencias Económicas. Sobre ese alegato, estimaron: “…en realidad ello no es relevante para el presente asunto, pues, los supuestos que expuso el perito son razonables independientemente de que estén contemplados o no en un reglamento, razón por la cual este Tribunal no se separa de la pericia…”. Al respecto, debe indicarse que cualquier análisis sobre la vinculatoriedad del Reglamento y la validez de sus normas no debía ser valorado, en primer término, porque no había prueba debidamente aportada sobre ello; segundo, esto causaría indefensión a la contraparte; tercero, tampoco ese era el objeto del proceso, puesto que en realidad, el Procurador no solo está cuestionando el informe pericial, sino buena parte de las normas del citado instrumento. Esto último debe ser objeto de otro proceso. Ahora, el perito rindió su informe con base en las reglas y directrices que le fueron impuestas por el Colegio. Para esta Cámara, no hay prueba que indique lo contrario, es más, del análisis del informe se desprende que los criterios utilizados fueron autorizados por una Comisión a lo interno del Colegio. Como el propio especialista informó durante el juicio, no sabía si la Junta Directiva lo había aprobado, pero sí conocía que eran reglas que surgieron durante el año 2008 en un foro realizado por el CPCE, debido a los múltiples planteamientos que había realizado el Poder Judicial, ya que faltaban expertos en la materia, se utilizaban bases financieras y no actuariales, entre otros factores que afectaban las pericias (juicio oral y público al ser las 11 horas 39 minutos del 19 de julio de 2011). El criterio utilizado, independientemente si se encuentra aprobado o no por la Junta Directiva del Colegio, contiene bases y fórmulas técnicas que surgieron en el seno del Colegio, incluso el perito de 38 años de experiencia, según narró en el debate, brindó un curso sobre el particular. Esos datos no desvirtuados, hacen que el cálculo tenga suficiente validez y credibilidad, por lo que las críticas del Estado no son recibo. Para los efectos del presente asunto, las normas de ese Reglamento para Cálculos Actuariales para Peritos Autorizados del CPCE, constituyen más que un instrumento jurídico, criterios o fundamentos técnicos unificados para la elaboración de informes periciales matemáticos. Aunado a lo anterior, también son de acatamiento obligatorio para los actuarios (manifestaciones del señor Nombre37311 durante el juicio realizado el 19 de julio de 2011 al ser las 11 horas 46 minutos). Es norma que el Colegio exige a los peritos, y su desacato podría generar responsabilidad disciplinaria del agremiado. Cabe resaltar que no existe otro informe, o la solicitud expresa del Estado de realizar un nuevo cálculo, por lo que la legitimidad del documento cuestionado es aún mayor. Consecuencia de todo lo anterior, es que los cuestionamientos a las reglas de responsabilidad; los porcentajes totales del salario del occiso que se toman para efectos de la indemnización (punto 3.d del informe); así como las tasas del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC) utilizadas, son aspectos que deben ser desestimados en este proceso, puesto que se trata de directrices regladas por el propio CPCE a través de su gremio, no hay prueba debidamente aportada al proceso que pruebe lo contrario, mucho menos prueba técnica que indique que las reglas empleadas son erróneas. De todos modos, se insiste, era hasta el día del debate, al momento del interrogatorio del perito, el momento procesal oportuno para discutir, con elementos de prueba válidos, el peritaje del señor Nombre37311 . No obstante, la representación estatal no presentó la documentación que demuestre que los porcentajes, índices y resultados del peritaje no corresponden con el criterio técnico utilizado. Esto se intentó después de esa audiencia, el 3 de agosto de 2011, cuando de forma intempestiva presentó documentación que disponía desde el año 2010. No obstante lo anterior, esta Sala estima que el Reglamento cuestionado sí podría ser objeto de revisión en otro proceso, pero no en este donde su vinculatoriedad quedó suficientemente demostrada, no solo para el perito, sino para todos los actuarios matemáticos agremiados al Colegio. En razón de lo anterior, todos los agravios del Estado que se refieren a la validez y aplicación de la citada reglamentación deben ser rechazados.

XXVII.- En otra parte de su exposición de motivos, el Procurador alega que el Tribunal tuvo como hecho probado un salario sin las contribuciones a la seguridad social, pero aún así, comenta, los jueces se equivocaron al no deducir el 1.5% de contribución obligatoria que pesa sobre todo ingreso salarial según el cardinal 5 de la Ley 4351. En la sentencia, los juzgadores establecieron lo siguiente: “…lo primero que sucedía con el salario de don Nombre229497, es que del mismo se descontaban las cuotas que debía aportar para el sostenimiento del régimen solidario de seguridad social, es decir, deben restarse los montos que correspondía aportar… para el régimen de pensiones por invalidez, vejez y muerte o régimen de IVM; y para el seguro de enfermedad y maternidad o SEM, ambos de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Luego de efectuada tal resta, se obtiene el salario líquido que correspondía al fallecido y es esta, o sea el salario líquido, la suma a partir de la cual puede determinarse la afectación real para su viuda e hijas. Pues bien, sucede que en este caso, el perito no descontó esas cargas sociales del salario devengado por don Nombre229497 a la hora de efectuar sus cálculos, sino que partió de las sumas brutas reportadas a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social… la operación nos arroja como resultado la suma de ¢353.428,58, que esa es la suma que utiliza el perito, como punto de partida para efectuar sus cálculos. Sucede, que por las razones que expusimos hace un ratito, esta cifra inicial de don Nombre37311 es errónea, pues indebidamente incluyó como salario neto dos rubros que el trabajador no recibe en efectivo… que son la cuota para el régimen de invalidez, vejez y muerte y la cuota para el seguro de enfermedad y maternidad. De manera que no es eso parte de lo que aportaba materialmente a la casa…” (dictado de la sentencia al ser las 16 horas 15 minutos). Hasta aquí se puede decir que el Tribunal tuvo claro el punto, incluso descontó las cuotas del régimen de pensiones por invalidez, vejez y muerte, así como la del seguro de enfermedad y maternidad. Ahora bien, establece el cardinal 5 de la Ley 4351, sobre el fondo de trabajo, que se formará por dos tipos de aportes: “a)… del ½ % mensual sobre las remuneraciones, sean salarios o sueldos que deben pagar los patronos, los Poderes del Estado y todas las instituciones públicas; y b)… del 1% mensual sobre las remuneraciones, sean salarios o sueldos que deben pagar los trabajadores. Los patronos deducirán a los trabajadores su aporte y deberán depositarlo en el Banco en la forma y plazos que determine el Reglamento de esta ley”. Según esta norma, el ahorro obligatorio que realiza el trabajador es de un 1% y no de un 1,5% ya que el ½% restante lo realiza el patrono. La Ley de Protección al Trabajador, no 7983, que de una y otra forma vino a complementar este ahorro, también estableció mecanismos para ampliar la cobertura y fortalecer el Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la CCSS como principal sistema de solidaridad en la protección de los trabajadores. En este sentido, se creó el Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias (ROP), que es un sistema de capitalización individual, cuyos aportes serán registrados y controlados por medio del Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación de la CCSS y administrados por medio de las operadoras elegidas por los trabajadores. Entre los recursos con los cuales se financia el ROP se encuentran: “…a) El uno por ciento (1%) establecido en el inciso b) del artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, de 11 de julio de 1969, luego de transcurrido el plazo fijado por el artículo 8 de esa ley. b) El cincuenta por ciento (50%) del aporte patronal dispuesto en el inciso a) del artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, No. 4351, de 11 de julio de 1969, luego de transcurrido el plazo fijado por el artículo 8 de esa misma ley…” (artículo 13 Ley 7983). De este modo, queda claro que don Nombre229497 , efectivamente debía aportar un 1% a este sistema, que debía ser considerado por el perito a la hora de extraer los montos indemnizatorios. Lo anterior constituye una omisión de parte del perito y que los jueces tampoco apreciaron, lo cual hace que lleve razón el Estado en su alegato. Así las cosas, el monto correspondiente al daño material otorgado por el Tribunal debe ser modificado, para que en su lugar se tome en consideración el 1% que debía aportar el trabajador al ROP. Independientemente de que no exista prueba de este aporte y que tampoco se haya alegado en el juicio, lleva razón el Procurador en su agravio, ya que este es un aspecto totalmente distinto a la aplicación de un reglamento por parte del perito, puesto que se trata de un porcentaje que por imperativo legal, el patrono debe descontar a los empleados o funcionarios. Sin embargo, como bien establecen los juzgadores, este error del perito se puede subsanar ya que existe la prueba de folio 607 del expediente judicial que es el estudio de cuotas de la CCSS y debido a que el perito explicó claramente, cómo es el método que se debe utilizar para calcular los daños. Lo que hay que hacer es tomar cada salario mensual bruto consignado en el documento dicho, y restarle a cada uno, las cuotas correspondientes de IVM, SEM y ROP obteniéndose así los 12 montos, uno por cada mes desde noviembre de 2006 a octubre de 2007 (último año de vida de don Nombre229497). Las 12 cifras resultantes de la operación de restar los aportes dichos, se suman y se dividen entre la cantidad de meses (es decir entre 12) y dan como resultado ¢321.619,96. A continuación se siguen los mismos pasos del perito. La suma correspondiente al salario promedio del occiso durante el año previo a su muerte, es de ¢3.859.439,52. A ese monto, se le extrae el 75% que corresponde, según el perito, al porcentaje de manutención de su familia. Esa operación da como resultado ¢2.894.579,64. Lo que procede ahora es multiplicar esa cifra por el denominado factor de conmutación que utilizó el perito con base en la tabla de folio 611. Como bien lo analiza el Tribunal, si se utilizan esas variables de folio 611 y se aplican para una persona que al momento de su muerte tenía 36 años de edad como era el caso de don Nombre229497, el factor de conmutación es de 17,1721. Esta operación da como resultado que para el momento de su muerte, es decir, para el 7 de noviembre de 2007, el fallecimiento de don Nombre229497 significó para las reclamantes, la pérdida de ¢49.706.011,03 y no ¢50.252.231.67 como resolvió el Tribunal. De ese monto los casacionistas deben pagar a las tres beneficiarias de forma equitativa, el 35%, sea ¢17.397.103,86. Lo anterior se desglosa en el siguiente esquema:

PERIODO SALARIO CUOTA SEM CUOTA IVM ROP (1%) NETO 01/11/2006 340.313,00 18.717,00 8.508,00 3.403,13 309.684,87 01/12/2006 329.519,00 18.124,00 8.238,00 3.295,19 299.861,81 01/01/2007 344.263,00 18.934,00 8.607,00 3.442,63 313.279,37 01/02/2007 343.960,00 18.918,00 8.599,00 3.439,60 313.003,4 01/03/2007 343.960,00 18.918,00 8.599,00 3.439,60 313.003,4 01/04/2007 343.809,00 18.909,00 8.595,00 3.438,09 312.866,91 01/05/2007 343.960,00 18.918,00 8.599,00 3.439,60 313.003,4 01/06/2007 343.960,00 18.918,00 8.599,00 3.439,60 313.003,4 01/07/2007 377.152,00 20.743,00 9.429,00 3.771,52 343.208,48 01/08/2007 375.943,00 20.677,00 9.399,00 3.759,43 342.107,57 01/09/2007 377.152,00 20.743,00 9.429,00 3.771,52 343.208,48 01/10/2007 377.152,00 20.743,00 9.429,00 3.771,52 343.208,48 Total ¢3.859.439,57 Mensual promedio ¢321.619,96 75 % Manutención ¢2.894.579,64 Factor de Conmutación 17,1721 Resultado ¢49.706.011,03 35 % Responsabilidad ¢17.397.103,86 De este modo, la sentencia se debe modificar solamente en torno al monto total que corresponde a indemnización por el daño material, ya que en su cálculo, no se consideró el aporte del trabajador de un 1% al Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones, el cual daría como resultado ¢17.397.103,86 y no ¢17.588.281,08 como dispuso el Tribunal.

XXVIII.- En el quinto reparo, relacionado con el daño moral concedido en la sentencia, el Estado considera que el Tribunal no apreció conforme a los principios de razonabilidad e igualdad las circunstancias del caso, al considerar que se causó un daño moral subjetivo de ¢80.000.000 a las dos hijas del occiso, de ¢35.000.000,00 a la viuda y de ¢20.000.000,00 a los padres. Exalta, el monto en que se valoró el daño moral, más allá de reprochar la supuesta lesión antijurídica causada, eleva artificialmente el daño con el objeto de que el Estado y el Nombre1220 deban cubrir lo que en términos ordinarios hubieran tenido que asumir si se les hubiese endilgado la total responsabilidad. Resalta, las circunstancias expuestas no justifican de forma razonable, proporcional y equitativa, una indemnización de la magnitud que se estableció, puesto que transgredió los límites del arbitrio judicial. Se debió considerar, indica, que las condiciones de vida de las actoras no se vieron significativamente afectadas merced a la pensión de la CCSS que continuaron recibiendo. En lo emocional, alude, las hijas han contado con el apoyo de su madre y abuelos, de cuya afectación no hay prueba directa. Agrega, tres años después del deceso, la viuda contrajo nupcias, teniendo las menores una nueva figura que hace las veces de la paterna. Detalla, la actividad que se le atribuye al Estado y al Conavi, no estuvo dirigida a la causación del daño reclamado, pues, se trata, apunta, de la imputación de un descuido basado en un criterio técnico sobre la seguridad vial. Acota, el resarcimiento conferido es injusto por excesivo, convirtiendo lo que debió ser una compensación adecuada, en un beneficio irracional, violando con ello por falta de aplicación los artículos 190 y 196 de la LGAP. El 190, asegura, porque no existe nexo causal entre la conducta estatal y lo acontecido, añade, no se produjo un daño de la cuantía fijada. El 196, porque exige que el daño sea efectivo y en el monto otorgado, agrega, no puede tenerse por cierto. Califica la suma total otorgada por concepto de daño moral (en el monto de ¢47.500.000,00) como desproporcionada, inequitativa e irrazonable, por ello, afirma, el fallo impugnado resulta arbitrario, dado que, además de transgredir los principios del derecho, incurrió en exceso de poder.

XXIX.- Del considerando anterior se observa que el recurrente se encuentra disconforme en un primer momento por la condena del daño moral, y en un segundo estadio con el monto otorgado por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. De manera que el punto fundamental del recurso estriba en determinar si es procedente el daño moral y de ser así, si las sumas concedidas a cada uno de los reclamantes por ese extremo, se ajusta a las pruebas constantes en autos, a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, al ordenamiento jurídico y a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad aducidos. Esta Cámara, refiriéndose a este tipo de daño, ha indicado que se asocia a los estados de angustia, desánimo, frustración, impotencia, inseguridad, desesperación, zozobra, ansiedad, pena, intranquilidad, desilusión, entre otros. Su común denominador es el sufrimiento o la aflicción emocional, pues se verifica cuando se lesiona la esfera de interés extrapatrimonial del individuo (al respecto pueden consultarse las sentencias no. 269 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 23 de abril de 2004 y 845 de las 10 horas 5 minutos del 23 de noviembre de 2007). Al suponer una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas, no requiere prueba directa, sino que puede inferirse a partir de presunciones humanas. En este sentido se ha estimado: “En lo referente a la prueba del daño moral el principio es el siguiente: debe acreditarse su existencia y gravedad, carga que le corresponde a la víctima, sin embargo se ha admitido que tal prueba se puede lograr a través de presunciones de hombre inferidas de los indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc. es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe "in re ipsa"…” (sentencia no. 112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992 citada en el fallo no. 000096-F-S1-2009 de las 16 horas del 29 de enero de 2009). Basta, en algunas ocasiones, con la realización del hecho culposo para que de este surja el daño, conforme a la prudente apreciación de los jueces de mérito, cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios. En la misma línea, ha dicho: “…La presunción humana es un juicio lógico del juez, en virtud del cual se considera probable un hecho, con fundamento en las máximas generales de la experiencia, que indican cuál es el modo normal como suceden las cosas y los hechos…” (sentencia no. 878-F-2007 de las 8 horas 15 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2007).

XXX.- En este asunto, el Tribunal estimó procedente el daño moral subjetivo, porque Nombre229490 , Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 ambas de apellidos Nombre229491 , así como Nombre229493 y Nombre229492 demostraron una afectación emocional debido a la partida de su esposo, padre e hijo respectivamente. En este entendido, dispuso: “…consideramos que por la severidad e intensidad del daño, la afectación moral subjetiva de las menores Nombre229491 debe ser compensada en principio con la indemnización requerida por ellas, es decir, la suma de ¢40.000.000,00 para cada una de ellas. Por su parte, para la señora Nombre229490 , siendo su afectación moral subjetiva un poco menos intensa que la de sus hijas consideramos que en principio le corresponde una indemnización de ¢35.000.000,00. Sin embargo, debe recordarse que los causantes de este daño son tanto Nombre1220 como Nombre229496 , y que el primero solo responde por el 35% del daño, razón por la cual es ese porcentaje el que debe cubrir Nombre1220 solidariamente con el Estado, según se indicó ya por la afectación moral subjetiva generada a las tres actoras dichas. En el caso de los padres de don Nombre229497 , el señor Nombre229493 y la señora Jeanette Agüero Céspedes, estima este Tribunal que solo doña Nombre229490 hizo una referencia leve a lo que para ellos implicó el fallecimiento de su hijo, pues la señora Nombre229490 manifestó que él es pensionado y ella es ama de casa resultándoles imposible asistir económicamente a sus nietas. Estimamos pues que sí hubo una afectación para ellos, pues es dable considerar que sufrieron al perder a su hijo, pero la prueba con que se cuenta en este proceso, solo permite establecer una aflicción significativamente menor que la de su ex nuera y sus nietas. Por lo que consideramos que en principio para cada uno de ellos, procede una indemnización de ¢10.000.000 de colones, por el daño moral subjetivo sufrido, monto del cual el Nombre1220 solidariamente con el Estado responde tan solo en un 35%...” (emisión de la sentencia a partir de las 16 horas 28 minutos). Para esta Cámara, independientemente de los indicios, que ya de por sí son suficientes, por la muerte del señor Nombre229497 , existe prueba adicional que demuestra la angustia, padecimientos, temores, inseguridad y depresión que vivieron los actores, a raíz de la muerte de su esposo, padre e hijo. Doña Nombre229490 y su hija Nombre229491, declararon que el fallecido, efectivamente mantenía una muy buena relación con ellas y con sus padres Nombre229493 y Nombre229492 . La señora Nombre229491 narró ampliamente las dificultades emocionales y económicas que vivieron, máxime que desde los 18 años de edad convivía en matrimonio con Nombre229497 (al momento de la muerte tenía 31 años). El deceso del padre de las menores, se desprende de su declaración, representó un duro golpe emocional para ellas, tuvieron que cambiar radicalmente de vida, debido principalmente a la difícil situación económica que atravesaron y porque realizaron un traslado de domicilio desde Cartago a San Carlos. Sobresale también el cambio de escuela que tuvo que realizar la joven Nombre229491. Incluso en el juicio, la menor manifestó que después de cumplir 15 años, ha sido más duro reconocer y aceptar la muerte de su progenitor (al ser las 16 horas 28 minutos del 19 de julio de 2011). Expresó lo difícil que ha sido ver trabajar a su madre después del accidente puesto que antes del percance, siempre pasaba en la casa con ellas. Con vista en ambas declaraciones, también quedó demostrado el sufrimiento que vive la menor de las hijas de doña Nombre229490, quien aún pregunta por su papá porque apenas tenía dos años cuando se dio el fallecimiento. Los padres del occiso, se infiere de las declaraciones de doña Nombre229490, también sufren, aunque en menor medida. Sin embargo, tampoco se puede dejar de lado su condición de adultos mayores. Existe relación directa entre ese daño moral causado a la familia de don Nombre229497 y la conducta omisiva del Estado y el Conavi. Lo anterior dice, que los juzgadores a la hora de fijar cada una de esas sumas por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, se fundamentaron tanto en presunciones humanas como en las pruebas constantes en autos, las cuales corresponden a las declaraciones de doña Nombre229490 y de Nombre229491 . Resulta innegable el dolor emocional que conlleva la pérdida inesperada de un ser querido que representaba un pilar fundamental dentro del núcleo familiar, siendo este un excelente esposo, padre e hijo, sobre todo, por el actuar imprudente de un conductor y por la omisión de un órgano del Estado en atender las recomendaciones y advertencias de peligro que existen en la ruta hacia Cartago. Es incuestionable que esa pérdida produjo una aflicción que con gran dificultad deberán enfrentar por el resto de su vida la familia de don Nombre229497. No resulta de recibo el argumento de que la actora contrajo nuevas nupcias, ya que no es una causa que desacredite el sufrimiento que en su momento vivió, además de que este hecho forma parte del proceso de recuperación a que tiene derecho doña Nombre229490 y sus hijas, quienes nunca recuperaran la figura de su padre. Consecuencia de todo lo expuesto, para este órgano decisor, el monto otorgado resulta razonable y proporcional debido al sufrimiento moral, afectación emocional, inseguridad y tristeza que la familia del fallecido vivió y que aún se percibe en las hijas menores. Sobre esos montos responden solidariamente el Nombre1220 y el Estado tan solo en un 35%. Tomándose los montos que corresponde a cada uno, estos resultan acordes al dolor causado, los cuales son adecuados a sus padecimientos. De esta forma, las sumas netos que deben pagar el Nombre5059 y el Consejo a Nombre229490 (¢12.250.000), a Nombre229491 (¢14.000.000,00), a Nombre229491 (¢14.000.000,00), a Nombre229493 (¢3.500.000) y a Nombre229492 (¢3.500.000,00) resultan conformes a los presupuestos y parámetros de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, al guardar equilibrio y relación con la lesión infringida que es la muerte de un ser querido. Estas sumas son justas, proporcionadas, racionales, acordes al ordenamiento jurídico, ello como mecanismo de compensación del daño infringido en la esfera interna emocional de los familiares directos de don Nombre229497. Por lo expresado, habrá de rechazarse el recurso de casación formulado en lo referente al monto de la indemnización concedido por concepto de daño moral subjetivo.

XXXI.- En mérito de lo razonado y expuesto, procede rechazar el recurso del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad y se acoge parcialmente el formulado por el Estado. En consecuencia, se anula el fallo del Tribunal, en cuanto otorgó el daño material sin descontar en los cálculos, el 1% correspondiente al aporte que realizaba el señor Nombre229497 al Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones. En su lugar, resolviendo por el fondo, el Estado y el Conavi, deberán pagar solidariamente la suma de ¢17.397.103,86 a favor de Nombre229490 , Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 . En lo demás, se mantiene incólume la sentencia recurrida.

POR TANTO

Se deniega la prueba para mejor resolver ofrecida por el Estado. Se rechaza el recurso interpuesto por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad. Se acoge parcialmente el del Estado. Se anula el fallo impugnado solo en cuanto otorgó el daño material sin descontar en los cálculos, el 1% correspondiente al aporte que realizaba el señor Nombre229497 al Fondo Obligatorio de Pensiones. En su lugar, resolviendo por el fondo, el Estado y el Conavi, deberán pagar solidariamente por concepto de daño material la suma de ¢17.397.103,86 a favor de Nombre229490 , Nombre229491 y Nombre229491 .

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Nombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre165468