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Res. 00084-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 2013
OutcomeResultado
The Court rejects nullities and moral damages but orders BNCR to indemnify external notaries for unilateral termination: 4 years' income for indefinite/open-term, 2 years for fixed-term extended.El Tribunal rechaza las nulidades y el daño moral, pero condena al BNCR a indemnizar a los notarios externos por la terminación unilateral de sus contratos: 4 años de ingresos para los de plazo indefinido/sin plazo, y 2 años para los de plazo fijo prorrogado.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Court orders Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to indemnify its external notaries for the unilateral termination of their contracts. It rules that although the bank acted within its legal powers by ending the appointments to comply with new public procurement requirements, it should have followed a prior indemnification procedure. Notaries appointed indefinitely or through background competitions without a fixed term, as well as those with fixed but extended terms, had a subjective right requiring fair compensation. Indemnification is set based on the maximum contract term allowed by the Public Procurement Law: four years of average income for indefinite and open-term notaries, and two years for fixed-term ones, all based on income as bank notaries in the years prior to December 1, 2009. Claims for nullity, moral damages, reinstatement, and post-termination income reduction are rejected.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo condena al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica a indemnizar a sus notarios externos por la terminación unilateral de la relación contractual. Se determina que, aunque el banco actuó dentro de sus potestades legales al cesar los nombramientos para cumplir con nuevas exigencias de contratación pública, debió seguir un procedimiento indemnizatorio previo. Los notarios nombrados en forma indefinida o mediante concurso de antecedentes sin plazo fijo, así como aquellos con plazo fijo prorrogado, tenían un derecho subjetivo que exigía una compensación justa. Se fija la indemnización en función del tiempo máximo de contratación permitido por la Ley de Contratación Administrativa: cuatro años de ingresos promedio para los indefinidos y sin plazo, y dos años para los de plazo fijo, todos sobre los ingresos como notarios del banco en los años previos al 1 de diciembre de 2009. Se rechazan las pretensiones de nulidad, daño moral, reinstalación e indemnización por disminución de ingresos post-terminación.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Applying the foregoing to the resolution of this matter, the petitioners are correct in their claims when they seek a declaration that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica must indemnify each of the plaintiff notaries, whether they were appointed directly and indefinitely by the Board of Directors or through a background competition, considering that they all have different legal regimes, conditions, and situations that must be weighed in the substantive analysis. The petitioners are right to sue for damages arising from the termination of the contract, from the cessation of the external notarial relationships that Banco Nacional held with the plaintiffs and the third parties with their own claims. Regarding the first group of plaintiff notaries, who had been appointed indefinitely through various Board resolutions, they were appointed as stated, based on the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, No. 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Administrative Procurement Regulation, No. 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Administrative Procurement Regulation took effect. Therefore, indeed, for external notaries appointed directly under these conditions without needing a background competition, before terminating the existing legal relationship with Banco Nacional, a minimum indemnification procedure should have been carried out to determine the damages they were owed after having worked for that entity, in some cases for over 30 or 40 years of uninterrupted service.Aplicado, lo anteriormente expuesto a la resolución del presente asunto, tenemos que llevan razón los gestionantes en sus pretensiones al accionar con el objeto de que se declare el deber que tiene el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica de indemnizar a cada uno de los notarios actores, bien sea que hayan sido nombrados en forma directa e indefinida por intermedio de la Junta Directiva o que hayan sido designados por medio de concurso de antecedentes, al tener todos ellos regímenes, condiciones y situaciones jurídicas diferentes que deben ser consideradas en el análisis de fondo. Llevan razón los promoventes al demandar para que se les reconozcan los daños y perjuicios por la terminación del contrato, por el cese de las relaciones contractuales de notariado externo que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica sostenía con los actores y con los terceros con pretensiones propias. Respecto al primer grupo de notarios actores, que habían sido nombrados en forma indefinida, por intermedio de sendos acuerdos de Junta Directiva, tenemos que ellos fueron nombrados como se expresó, con base en lo dispuesto en la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279 del dos de mayo de 1951, y el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7576 del 23 de setiembre de 1979, vigente hasta el 1 de mayo de 1996 en que entró a regir el Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa. Por ello, efectivamente, los notarios externos nombrados directamente bajos estas condiciones y sin tener que realizar concurso de antecedentes, de previo a darse por terminado la relación jurídica existente con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, debía realizarse un mínimo procedimiento indemnizatorio, en el cual se determinaran los daños y perjuicios que les correspondían después de haber laborado para dicha entidad durante incluso algunos por más de 30 y 40 años de servicio ininterrumpido.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"No está en discusión la capacidad y competencia de dicha entidad para que con base en los procedimientos establecidos... revocar o anular el derecho subjetivo, pero indemnizando en forma justa, correcta, adecuada, proporcional y plena, la afectación que se les estaba causando al dar por terminado la relación jurídica existente."
"The entity's capacity and competence to revoke or annul the subjective right based on established procedures is not in dispute, but it must indemnify in a just, correct, adequate, proportional, and full manner the impact caused by terminating the existing legal relationship."
Considerando II.4
"No está en discusión la capacidad y competencia de dicha entidad para que con base en los procedimientos establecidos... revocar o anular el derecho subjetivo, pero indemnizando en forma justa, correcta, adecuada, proporcional y plena, la afectación que se les estaba causando al dar por terminado la relación jurídica existente."
Considerando II.4
"La revocación de un acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos deberá hacerse por el jerarca del ente respectivo, previo dictamen favorable de la Contraloría General de la República, simultáneamente deberá contener el reconocimiento y si es posible el cálculo de la indemnización completa de los daños y perjuicios causados, so pena de nulidad absoluta."
"The revocation of an act declaring subjective rights must be made by the head of the respective entity, with a prior favorable opinion from the Comptroller General, and must simultaneously include the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of full compensation for the damages caused, under penalty of absolute nullity."
Considerando II.2
"La revocación de un acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos deberá hacerse por el jerarca del ente respectivo, previo dictamen favorable de la Contraloría General de la República, simultáneamente deberá contener el reconocimiento y si es posible el cálculo de la indemnización completa de los daños y perjuicios causados, so pena de nulidad absoluta."
Considerando II.2
"Si bien no llevan razón los promoventes al argumentar que su situación es la de un derecho patrimonial adquirido o de una situación jurídica consolidada... ello no enerva que se les deba indemnizar debidamente a tenor de los actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos."
"Although the petitioners are not correct in arguing that their situation is that of a vested patrimonial right or a consolidated legal situation... this does not detract from the fact that they must be duly indemnified in accordance with the administrative acts declaring subjective rights."
Considerando II.4
"Si bien no llevan razón los promoventes al argumentar que su situación es la de un derecho patrimonial adquirido o de una situación jurídica consolidada... ello no enerva que se les deba indemnizar debidamente a tenor de los actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos."
Considerando II.4
Full documentDocumento completo
Nº 84-2013 Nº 84-2013 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL TRIBUNAL, SECTION FOUR. II Judicial Circuit. 56th Street, at eight o'clock on the sixteenth of September of the year two thousand thirteen.- Consolidated ordinary proceedings, filed by Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, identity card number CED88617, Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García, identity card number CED88618, Mr. Gerardo Camacho Nassar, identity card number CED88619, Mr. Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez, identity card number CED88620, Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, identity card number CED88621, Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, identity card number CED67251, Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero, identity card number CED81021, Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro, identity card number CED22342, Mr. Milton Arguedas Salas, identity card number CED88622, Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, identity card number CED88623, Mr. Edgar Abellán Acevedo, identity card number CED71541, Mr. Virgilio Calvo Murillo, identity card number CED75390, Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, identity card number CED43251, Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero, identity card number CED88624, Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, identity card number CED41366, Ms. Zetty Bou Valverde, identity card number CED88625, Mr. Orlando Calzada Miranda, identity card number CED88626, Mr. Jorge Alfonso Castro Corrales, identity card number CED88575, Mr. Jorge Castro García, identity card number CED88627, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora, identity card number CED59977, Mr. Nombre112075, identity card number CED88628, Mr. Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi, identity card number CED43259, Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, identity card number CED88629, Mr. Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón, identity card number CED56850, Ms. Cecilia Fallas Amador, identity card number CED88630, Mr. Fernando Fallas Amador, identity card number CED67479, Mr. Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, identity card number CED55828, Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas, identity card number CED41633, Ms. Luz María González Rodríguez, identity card number CED81012, Mr. Mario González Porras, identity card number CED16622, Mr. Ernesto Guardia Hine, identity card number CED88631, Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo, identity card number CED88632, Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, identity card number CED88633, Mr. Jaime López Baudrit, identity card number CED88634, Ms. Laura Mora Camacho, identity card number CED88635, Mr. Carlos Mas Herrera, identity card number CED43285, Ms. Vilma Mesén Madrigal, identity card number CED14345, Mr. Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, identity card number CED88636, Mr. Erich Neurohr Trejos, identity card number CED88580, Mr. Rafael Antonio Ortega Ayón, identity card number CED46557, Ms. Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, identity card number CED88578, Mr. Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo, identity card number CED88580, Mr. José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza, identity card number CED88637, Ms. Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, identity card number CED43295, Mr. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, identity card number CED88638, Mr. Freddy Rojas López, identity card number CED88639, Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, identity card number CED88640, Mr. Braulio Enrique Sánchez González, identity card number CED75780, Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña, identity card number CED88641, Mr. Jorge Tristán Trelles, identity card number CED67471, Mr. Wilberth Enrique Vargas Brenes, identity card number CED88642, Mr. Nombre39622, identity card number CED31645, Mr. Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, identity card number CED88643, represented by their special judicial attorney-in-fact, Dr. Luis Vargas Jiménez, identity card number CED88644, bar card number 3780. Claim brought by Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, identity card number CED67435, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, identity card number CED18772, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, identity card number CED22377, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, identity card number CED74162, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, identity card number CED88645, represented by Attorney Livia Meza Murillo, on her own behalf and on behalf of them. Action brought by Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, and Fernando Solano Martínez, represented by Attorney Cindy Blanco González. Proceeding filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, identity card CED88646, and Ms. Mayra Rojas Guzmán, identity card number CED88647, represented by Attorney Freddy Mora Murillo. Claim brought by Ms. Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez, identity card number CED27104, represented by Attorney Minor González González. Action filed by Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar, representing herself. Proceeding brought by Mr. José Echeverría Zeledón, representing himself (Folio 3566 to 3569 of Volume VII of the case file). The following appear as passive coadjuvant third parties: Attorneys Edgar Alfaro Muñoz, identity card number CED88648, Ms. Nombre12561, identity card number CED88649, Ms. Nombre35409, identity card number CED28434, Ms. Nombre112076, identity card number CED88650, Ms. Nombre112077, identity card number CED13824, Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez, identity card number CED71728 (withdrew from the third-party intervention), and Ms. Nombre112078, identity card number CED88651. Mr. Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, identity card number CED88652, appears as a third party with claims of his own (folio 3562 of Volume VII of the case file), against Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and Ms. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, identity card number CED88653, represented by their general judicial attorneys-in-fact, Attorneys Mr. Hilel Zomer Befeler and Mr. Rafael Ángel Brenes Villalobos. All are of legal age and attorneys. Consolidated files processed under case file number 08-001455-1027-CA. The cases processed under numbers 10-000895-1027-CA, 09-000335-1027-CA, CED88616, , 10-001256-1027-CA, 10-004162-1027-CA, 10-001175-1027-CA, 10-001341-1027-CA, 10-004174-1027-CA, 10-00894-1027-CA, CED88654, CED88655, CED88656, and CED88657 were consolidated into this case file.
WHEREAS
I.The present ordinary proceeding is filed with the purpose that the judgment declares that the conduct of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in terminating the appointments and contracts and its communication to each of the plaintiffs is null and void; for this, they seek the nullity of articles 12 and 7 of Sessions 11467 and 11486 of January 29 and June 10, 2008, as well as the communication made to each notary by Ms. Lorena Herradora in her capacity as procurement officer of the BNCR. Payment of damages caused by the termination of the contract is sought, that is, the challenge to the cessation of the external notary contractual relationships that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with the third parties with claims of their own; that is, the compensation for damages arising from the cessation of the contractual relationships with the plaintiffs, the third parties with claims of their own, and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; the nullity of the act of hiring other notaries outside the legal framework through bidding procedure 2008LM-000024-01; they also request a declaration of non-conformity with the legal system of the institution's omission to fulfill its external notary role, that is, they seek damages for the breach of said role established by the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, because those credits were granted to the internal notaries of the Banco Nacional and reduced the delivery of work to all notaries, as well as the payment of both sets of costs of the proceeding (folios 1 to 10, 1257 to 1263, 3474 to 3480 of the case file).
II.At the trial hearing, the plaintiffs estimated the damages as follows: 1) Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, and Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, the amount of one hundred million colones each for non-material damage (daño moral) and material damage (daño material) according to expert determination, as well as indexation and interest on said sums. 2) The following individuals: Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García, Mr. Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Mr. Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez, Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro, Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero, Mr. Orlando Calzada Miranda, Mr. Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Mr. Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, Ms. Zetty Bou Valverde, Mr. Jorge Alfonso Castro Corrales, Mr. Jorge Castro García, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora, Mr. Nombre112075, Mr. Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi, Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón, Ms. Cecilia Fallas Amador, Mr. Fernando Fallas Amador, Mr. Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mr. Milton Arguedas Salas, Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas, Ms. Luz María González Rodríguez, Mr. Mario González Porras, Mr. Ernesto Guardia Hine, Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo, Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Mr. Jaime López Baudrit, Ms. Laura Mora Camacho, Mr. Carlos Mas Herrera, Ms. Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Mr. Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Mr. Erich Neurohr Trejos, Mr. Rafael Antonio Ortega Ayón, Ms. Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Mr. Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo, Mr. José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza, Ms. Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Mr. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Freddy Rojas López, Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, Mr. Braulio Enrique Sánchez González, Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña, Mr. Jorge Tristán Trelles, Mr. Wilberth Enrique Vargas Brenes, Mr. Nombre39622, and Mr. Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, the amount for non-material damage of one hundred million colones each and material damage according to expert determination. They request interest and indexation on said sums and until their effective payment, as well as damages for breach of the work role for the fees not received. 3) Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, the amount of 100 million colones for non-material damage and 67 million colones for damages; and Fernando Solano Martínez, the amount of 100 million colones for non-material damage and 55 million colones for damages. 4) Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega and Ms. Mayra Rojas Guzmán seek payment of 25 million colones for non-material damage and damages according to the expert report. 5) Ms. Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez, the amount of 100 million colones for non-material damage and 195 million colones for material damage. 6) Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar, the amount of 85 million colones for subjective non-material damage and 70 million colones for objective non-material damage, as well as reinstatement to her position. 7) Mr. José Echeverría Zeledón, the sum of one hundred million colones for non-material damage and for material damage, what he would have received until his death (trial hearing).
III.Once the due transfer was granted, the defendants opposed this action and filed the defenses of lack of right and expiration (caducidad), requesting that the plaintiff be ordered to pay costs (folios 122 to 141, 146 to 182, and 213 to 244, folio 3783 to 3839 of Volume VII ibid).
IV.During the course of the proceeding, the following individuals withdrew from the claim: Mr. José Javier Vega Araya (folio 4093 of Volume VIII of the principal file), Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero (folio 3484 of Volume VII of the principal file), Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro (folio 3485 of Volume VII of the principal file), Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba (folio 4002 of Volume VII of the principal file).
V.The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, acting as the Court of Cassation, through resolution number 130-F-TC-2009 at 5:00 p.m. on July 3, 2009, issued in an oral hearing and notified immediately, decided to grant the provisional remedy (medida cautelar) sought by Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, and Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, ordering the following: “(…) the cessation of notarial services ordered by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is suspended, and their legal status as external notaries of said banking entity in the geographic zones they have covered up to now is maintained, without prejudice to the rights of those who, for those same zones, acquire the notary status in accordance with the pending bidding process, the Bank, in this latter case, being obligated to respect the strict work role (…) all participants in this proceeding are hereby notified of this resolution” (folio 3369 of Volume Seven of the case file).
VI.Through a resolution at 11:15 a.m. on January 27, 2010, the Administrative Tribunal issued as a provisional, immediate, and prima facie provisional remedy, extending the effects of the provisional remedy granted by the Court of Cassation for Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters number 130-F-TC-2009 at 5:00 p.m. on July 13, 2009, to all the plaintiffs in the proceeding (folio 3590 of Volume VII of the sub judice).
VII.By resolution number 507-2011 at 3:00 p.m. on March 28, 2011, of the Administrative Tribunal, the provisional remedy sought by Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz was denied (folios 9210 to 9223 of Volume XVIII of the principal file).
VIII.By resolution at 2:20 p.m. on April 27, 2010, the Administrative Procedural Tribunal provisionally ordered Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to reinstate plaintiff Roxana Rodríguez Cascante in the case assignment work roles for the offices in which she has been handling matters (folio 6820 of Volume XIII of the case file).
IX.By resolution number 2568-2010 at 7:30 a.m. on July 8, 2010, of the Administrative Tribunal, the provisional remedy sought by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was denied (folios 7695 to 7608 of Volume XIV of the principal file). By resolution number 440-2010 at 3:33 p.m. on September 1, 2010, of the Administrative Tribunal, the provisional remedy sought by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was granted (folios 7605 to 7607 of Volume XIV of the principal file).
X.The oral and public trial was held from July 10 to 12, as well as on the 16th of the same month, with the presence of the parties. During the deliberation period, evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) was requested through a resolution at 1:00 p.m. on August 7 of the current year, in accordance with articles 82, 85, and 110 of the Administrative Procedural Code, and the proceeding was reopened on August 16 of the current year (Trial hearing and folios 10981 to 10988 of the principal file).
XI.By resolution number 677-2011 at 2:40 p.m. on May 6, 2011, the procedural judge of the Administrative Tribunal ordered, in favor of the plaintiffs, the suspension of the cessation of notarial services, preserving their status as external notaries of the BNCR (folio 8385 to 8387 of the principal file).
XII.The reporting judge, Carlos Espinoza Salas, was on sick leave on September 5 and 6, and judge Ricardo Madrigal Jiménez was on sick leave from September 9 to 13. Therefore, in accordance with article 81 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, the time limits for issuing the judgment are deemed suspended for the period of the sick leave (folios 1102 to 11047 of the principal file).
XIII.The present proceeding was declared to be of complex processing, in accordance with article 111 of the Administrative Procedural Code, and the judgment has been issued in accordance with article 47 of its regulation, due to the abundant evidence that must be examined, the diversity of parties, and the substantive aspect involving the discussion of compensation claims and the determination of the legal nature of the relationship between the external notaries and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which warrant a detailed and thorough analysis of the evidence in order to establish the true material truth of the investigated facts (trial hearing).
XIV.At the trial hearing, evidence for better resolution was requested in accordance with articles 82, 85, and 110 of the Administrative Procedural Code, and the proceeding was reopened on August 16 of the current year (Trial hearing and folios 10981 to 10988 of the principal file).
XV.The due legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings, and no defects or omissions capable of producing nullity of the actions or defenselessness to the parties are observed. This resolution is issued after deliberation, within the legal term, and by majority.
Judge Espinoza Salas drafts the majority vote; and C O N S I D E R I N G I)- REGARDING THE FACTS: I.1)- PROVEN FACTS: The following facts of interest for the resolution of this matter are deemed demonstrated, as they are consistent with the evidentiary elements cited in their support: 1) Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945 of December 15, 1964, article 18 (folio 7403 of Volume XIV of the judicial file). 2) Mr. Ernesto Guardia Hine was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1964 (folio 3948 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 3) Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero Mora was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 3 of August 7, 1965 (folio 4488 of Volume IX of the judicial file). 4) Mr. Jorge Castro García was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7141, article 05 of April 26, 1966 (folio 3886 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 5) Mr. Nombre112075 was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7729, article 4 of May 19, 1970 (folio 10982 of Volume XX of the judicial file). 6) Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1974 (folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 7) Mr. Jorge Tristrán Trelles was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8574, article 01 of May 17, 1976 (folio 3892 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 8) Mr. Erich Neurohr Trejos was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8594, article 49 of July 7, 1976 (folio 3882 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 9) Mr. Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8782, article 11 of October 18, 1977 (folio 3470 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 10) Mr. Fernando Fallas Amador was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10982 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 11) Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 12) Mr. Orlando Calzada Miranda was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8832, article 37 of February 25, 1978 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 13) Mr. Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8854, article 16 of June 2, 1978 (folio 10982 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 14) Mr. Nombre39622 was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8920, article 39 of November 7, 1978 (folio 3976 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 15) Mr. Luis A. Guillén Downing was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 5 of March 6, 1979 (folio 3559 of Volume Seven and folio 10983 of Volume XXI, of the judicial file). 16) Mr. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 05 of March 12, 1979 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 17) Mr. Jaime López Baudrit was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 26 of September 25, 1979 (folio 10982 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 18) Mr. José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9139, article 4 of August 26, 1980 (folio 3572 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 19) Ms. Vilma Mesen Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of August 11, 1981 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 20) Ms. Cecilia Fallas Amador was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9303, article 04 of January 12, 1982 (folio 10982 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 21) Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9319, article 27 of March 2, 1982 (folio 5458 of Volume XI of the judicial file). 22) Mr. Rafael Ortega Ayón was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9324, article 20 of March 16, 1982 (folio 3880 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 23) Mr. Horacio Montealegre Montealegre was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9327, article 02, of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 24) Mr. Wilberth Vargas Brenes was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 25) Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9354, article 20 of July 6, 1982; he was dismissed on July 6, 2008, and appointed again as an external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 26) Mr. Gerardo Camacho Nassar was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9389, article 06 of November 2, 1982 (folios 7904 of Volume XV, folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 27) Ms. Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397 of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 4896 of Volume X of the judicial file). 28) Ms. Luz María González Rodríguez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397, of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 29) Ms. Marta Barahona Melgar was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9407, article 19 of January 11, 1983 (folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 30) Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9410 of January 18, 1983, article 08 (folio 5877 of Volume XI of the judicial file, as well as folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 31) Through background competition (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-85, a bidding process was carried out for the selection of professionals for external notary services by the BNCR, establishing that regarding the validity period, the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment the latter requires it, leaving it to the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors to remove any of the awardees at the moment it deems convenient, following a reasoned resolution and whenever it is in the Institution's interest (folios 4019 to 4023 of Volume VIII of the case file). 32) Ms. Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1985 (folio 10984 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 33) Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 03 of July 5, 1985 (folio 10982 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 34) The Bidding Commission of the BNCR, in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985, designated as external notaries Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, Mr. Braulio Sánchez González, and Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo (folios 4016 to 4023 of Volume VIII of the case file). 35) Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3468 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 36) Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3897 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 37) Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985; he was dismissed on July 6, 2008, and appointed again as an external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 38) Mr. Braulio Sánchez González was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 11, 1985 (folio 3473 of Volume Seven of the judicial file). 39) Through background competition number 4-86, a bidding process was carried out for the selection of professionals for external notary services by the BNCR, establishing that regarding the validity period, the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment the latter requires it, leaving it to the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors to remove any of the awardees at the moment it deems convenient, following a reasoned resolution and whenever it is in the Institution's interest (administrative file of the background competition). 40) Mr. Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-84, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9761 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10985 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 41) Ms. Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9823, article 08 of December 1, 1986 (folio 10983 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 42) Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714 of November 5, 1985, article 13 (folio 6347 of Volume XII, folio 10988 of Volume XXI of the judicial file). 43) Mr. Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10986 of Volume XXI of the judicial file).
100) Messrs. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos, Jaime López Baudrit, Milton Arguedas Salas, and Rafael Ortega Ayón filed, on September 4, 2008, an appeal against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, thereby exhausting the administrative channel and notifying them of said resolution on March 20, 2009 (administrative file of Bernal Aragón Barquero composed of 45 folios).
101) In La Gaceta number 172 of September 5, 2008, modifications to Public Bid 2008-LN-24-2008 were published (folios 260 to 263 of volume one of the sub judice).
102) By resolution of 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, the Goods Directorate, and the General Provider's Office rejected the remedy of reconsideration filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as an external notary (folios 8120 to 8140 of volume XVI of the judicial file).
103) The Contraloría General de la República, through resolution number R-DCA-512-2008, at 10:00 a.m. on September 29, 2008, hearing objections to the first modification of the tender specifications of Public Bid number 2008LN-000024-2008 promoted by the BNCR, ordered that the objections made to the tender specifications by the participants be upheld (folios 4831 to 5118 of volume X of the judicial file).
104) By resolution of 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, the Goods Directorate, and the General Provider's Office rejected the remedy of reconsideration filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8998 to 9017 of volume XVIII of the judicial file).
105) By resolution of 8:51 a.m. on October 31, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, the Goods Directorate, and the General Provider's Office rejected the remedy of reconsideration filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 7375 to 7402 of volume XIV of the judicial file).
106) In session 11512 of November 25, 2008, article 8, the appeal filed by Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, and Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, notifying them of said resolution on November 28, 2008 (folios 603 and 604, 1333, 1490 to 1497 of volume two and three of the sub judice).
107) In session 11516 of January 13, 2009, article 29, the appeal filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. Notifying him of said resolution on January 19, 2009 (folios 8155 to 8156 of volume XVI of the sub judice).
108) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 8, the appeal filed by Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal on July 6, 2008, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, notifying him of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (folios 6076 to 6077 of volume two and three of the sub judice).
109) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 23, the appeal filed by Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. Notifying her of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar consisting of 106 folios).
110) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 28, the appeal filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. Notifying him of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (folios 7404 to 7405 of volume XIV of the sub judice).
111) In session 11518 of January 27, 2009, article 13, the appeal filed by Ms. Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante on August 12, 2008, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender specifications for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, notifying her of said resolution on February 3, 2009 (folio 6779 to 6780 of volume XIII of the sub judice).
112) Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as attorney and notary of the BNCR, in session of the Board of Directors 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3737 of volume VII of the judicial file).
113) Public Tender (Licitación pública) 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries was awarded in article 10 of session 11551 of June 23, 2009, and published in the Gazette of July 1, 2009, entering into force on December 1, 2009 (folios 3752 to 3755 of Volume VII, folio 4008, 4134 of Volume VIII of the judicial file). 114) Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as lawyer and notary of the BNCR, in session of the Board of Directors 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3738 of Volume VII of the judicial file). 115) That from the entry into force on December 1, 2009, of Public Tender 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries, the hiring of new notaries, and the establishment of a dual role for task assignment, the plaintiffs have seen their income reduced in the practice of notarial services for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 7199 of Volume XIV, folios 7752, 7909 of Volume XV, folio 8068 of Volume XVI, folio 9634 of Volume XIX of the sub judice, as well as the testimonies of Mrs. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, and Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá). 116) Mr. Carlos Castro Mora was appointed as lawyer and external notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10619, article 7 of December 1, 2009 (folio 4450 of Volume IX of the judicial file). 117) The Corporate Media Management Directorate, Material Resources Directorate managed Public Tender number 2010LN-000001-01, called "Selection of Professionals to Provide their Services as External Notaries" (folios 5207 to 5224 of Volume X ibid). 118) That Messrs. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, and Martha Barahona Melgar, were appointed indefinitely as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica through the Board of Directors, without a competitive process (concurso de antecedentes), nor public tender (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 119) That Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini were appointed through competitive process number 1-85, article 13 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9714 of November 5, 1985 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 120) That Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, were appointed through competitive process number 4-86, article 44 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 121) That Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz were appointed through competitive process number 2-90, article 25 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10267 of July 2, 1991, for a period of 2 years, renewable for two more if the evaluation is positive (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 122) That Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, were appointed through competitive process number 2-94, article 7 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10719 of January 10, 1995, for two years, on which date the performance of the professional will be evaluated and in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists for the period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 123) That Mr. Freddy Rojas López was appointed through competitive process number 1-95, article 14 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10680 of August 22, 1995, for a period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). 124) That Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya was appointed through competitive process number 1-96, article 9 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10789 of September 17, 1996, by means of the Administrative Contracting Law number 7494 of May 2, 1995, for a period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice).
I.2)- UNPROVEN FACTS: The plaintiffs did not demonstrate: 1) The amount of the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the actions of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica upon terminating them as external notaries (the record). 2) That Mrs. Nombre112022 was an external lawyer and notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (the record). 3) That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón caused them damages as a result of her actions (the record). 4) That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón incurred in willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of her duties that would have generated damages (the record). The co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica did not demonstrate: 1) That the expiration (caducidad) of the action brought by the plaintiffs for claiming the nullity of the challenged administrative acts has occurred (the record). 2) That there was any cause for breach of contract by the plaintiffs appointed through competitive processes that would imply the non-renewal of the contract (the record).
I.3)- EVIDENCE FOR BETTER ADJUDICATION: In accordance with article 50.2 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure, the documentation appearing on folios 10944 to 10957 and 10969 to 10970 of the main file was admitted in the trial hearing for better adjudication. Likewise, the following documentation contained in the judicial file was ordered as evidence for better adjudication: VOLUME ONE: folios 1 to 37 and 94 to 387. VOLUME TWO: folios 508 to 518, 580 to 594, 603 to 609, 619 to 817, and 988 to 1254. VOLUME THREE: folios 1267 to 1372, 1395 to 1486, and 1490 to 1517. VOLUME FOUR: folios 1572 to 2289. VOLUME FIVE: folios 2290 to 2935. VOLUME SIX: folios 2936 to 3299, and 3302 to 3348. VOLUME SEVEN: folios 3412 to 3468, 3558 TO 3561, 3570 to 3573, folio 3601, 3650 to 3672, 3737 to 3764. VOLUME EIGHT: folios 3877 to 3907, 4015 to 4045, 4095 to 4134. VOLUME NINE: folios 4197 to 4830 expert Nombre18237. VOLUME TEN: folios 4876 to 5408. VOLUME ELEVEN: folios 5433 to 5482 (María del Rosario Morera Alfaro), 5529 to 5626 (Milton Arguedas Salas), 5702 to 5724 (Hernán Cordero Maduro), 5728 to 5824, 5877 to 5894 Bernal Aragón Barquero, 5904 to 6011. VOLUME TWELVE: folios 6035 to 6553. VOLUME THIRTEEN: folios 6608 to 6906. VOLUME FOURTEEN: folios 7050 to 7135, 7199 to 7307, 7310 to 7367, 7374 to 7416, 7447 to 7526, 7621 to 7633. 7654 to 7671, folios 7705 to 7709. VOLUME FIFTEEN: folio 7750, 7752, folios 7994 to 7920, 7926 to 8013. VOLUME SIXTEEN: folios 8067 to 8227, 8234 to 8320, 8335, 8364 to 8379, 8425 to 8431, 8436 to 8440, 8515 to 8603, 8626 to 8629. VOLUME SEVENTEEN: folios 8675 to 8685, 8742 to 8753, 8762 to 8766, 8787 to 8918. VOLUME EIGHTEEN: folios 8937 to 9023, 9031 to 9119, 9136 to 9140, 9192 to 9216. VOLUME NINETEEN: folios 9323 to 9466, 9522 to 9531, 9611 to 9626, 9634, 9638 to 9645, 9652 to 9694. VOLUME TWENTY: folios 9914 to 1002. VOLUME TWENTY-ONE: folios 10273 to 10279, 10299 to 10322, 10331 to 10355, 10378 to 10402, 10477 to 10490, and 10632 to 10688. The evidence ordered in the interim measure (medida cautelar) hearing before this tribunal consisting of 404 folios. Notarial certification of the administrative file of Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, consisting of 238 folios. As well as in its entirety the various volumes of the administrative file provided to the judicial file by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
II.2) NATURE OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE NOTARIES OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA AND PROCEDURE FOR ITS TERMINATION: The Organic Law of the National Banking System, number 1644 of September 26, 1953, in its articles one and two, provides that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous entity that forms the National Banking System, which requires for the exercise of its functions and powers entrusted by law, in terms of articles 67, 101, 152, and 168, the contracting of notarial services for the purpose of materializing the acts and contracts necessary for its banking activity. To achieve this objective, this entity first hired notaries indefinitely, having as a regulatory legal framework the provisions of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and article 180 of the Regulation of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, which stipulated that contracting for the following services was not subject to the competitive process procedure: a) Notarial services, b) Legal services for the direction of legal matters or business. c) Medical interventions, d) Occasional notices or publications by mass media, e) Commercial brokerage and expert appraisal, f) Others of similar condition at the discretion of the General Comptroller's Office. For such purpose, Law 1279 did not contemplate within the budget assumptions for carrying out administrative contracting the notarial service provided by individuals to the Public Administration, by which many notaries were appointed indefinitely. On the other hand, the Regulation of Administrative Contracting also stipulated in article 174 the possibility of appointing external notaries through a competitive process, which was a procedure that had to be followed for the conclusion of all those administrative contracts whose purpose was the provision of technical or professional services without a relationship of labor legal subordination and where, to award, the price does not constitute a primary factor. Such competitive process was a procedure of a public nature, which begins with the publication in "La Gaceta" of the conditions or terms thereof and the corresponding invitation to compete (article 175 of regulation 7576). In that sense, such Competitive Process procedure was issued so that the Administration would seek to provide an opportunity in the contracts it concludes, which shall be carried out directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few persons. In turn, the Administrative Contracting Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, in force as of May 1, 1996, partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law, and configured the contracting of notarial services through the Public Tender process. Subsequently, the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa), number 25038 of March 6, 1996, was issued, which was in force from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, and established the modality for contracting technical or professional services by natural or legal persons in which the procedures of public tender, registered tender (licitación por registro), or restricted tender (licitación restringida) had to be followed according to the amount of the respective contract and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract, in accordance with the parameters established by the Administrative Contracting Law (numeral 69.1). The nature of this modality of contracting between the Administration and the contractor expressly provided that it originated a public employment relationship and was to be remunerated by professional tariffs (article 69.2), unless it concerned the provisions of articles 69.5 and 69.6, in which case the professionals or technicians were subject to a public employment relationship remunerated by a fixed salary. Such public employment modality established that public entities are authorized to contract with a fixed salary, using their ordinary regime for appointing officials, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals (avalúos), expert reports (peritajes), the handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they permanently provide. In these cases, the payment governed by honoraria (honorarios) for the provision of the corresponding activity would not apply, and the respective institution could not transfer the cost of contracting those professionals to the user of the corresponding services, but it must charge the other implicit costs such as document registration and payment of any levy (exacción). In that sense, the Administrative Contracting Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, stipulated in article 67 that public entities are authorized to, using their ordinary regime for appointing officials, contract, with a fixed salary, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, the handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they provide. For these purposes, the payment governed by honoraria for the provision of the activity shall not apply. The institution shall not transfer the cost of contracting these professionals to the user of the services; but it must charge the other implicit costs, when the respective document must be registered or it is required to pay some type of tax (tributo). In that sense, article 174 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, number 7558, is clear, specifying in the contracting of professional services that public financial entities shall be subject to the provisions of article 67 of the Administrative Contracting Law, for the contracting of professional services and stipulating in articles 31 and 163 that the term of the contracts shall be a maximum of four years. For its part, the new Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law, number 33411 of September 27, 2006, in force as of January 4, 2007, expresses in this regard in its article 163 that for the contracting of technical or professional services, by natural or legal persons, the Administration must follow the procedures of public tender, abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), or direct contracting (contratación directa), as applicable, and that this type of contracting shall not originate a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, and must be remunerated according to the respective tariffs, when the services are regulated by mandatory tariffs (aranceles obligatorios), however, it safeguarded the legal contracting conditions for those persons who had been appointed without a termination date having been set, prior to its entry into force on January 4, 2007 (Transitional Provision II). That transitional norm between the validity of the repealed norm and the present provision indicating that "All direct contracting authorizations without a term limitation that the General Comptroller of the Republic has granted before the validity of this Regulation shall be maintained under the same terms and conditions indicated for each particular case." Furthermore, it was provided, based on this new regulation, that the contracting of professional services typical of a public employment relationship is excluded from the application of the Administrative Contracting Law and the Regulation, so for its contracting, the provisions of the ordinary regime for appointing officials shall be followed. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code, articles 7 and 8 contemplated the regulation of the fees (honorarios) of staff public notaries in public institutions, providing that it is prohibited to attend to private professional matters in the offices of the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public companies structured as private entities, where they provide their services, as well as to authorize, in the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public companies, from which they receive a salary or per diem (dieta), legal acts or contracts where their employers or subsidiary companies appear as a party, however, they may authorize them provided they do not charge fees for this concept (article 7). For its part, article 8 ibid, expresses that it is prohibited for the Public Administration to contract the same notary in more than three institutions simultaneously, that to ensure compliance with this provision, the National Directorate of Notarial Services (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) shall keep a list of notaries in its registration records. Likewise, the Administration must communicate to this Directorate the contracting of notaries, in order to establish the respective control and that when in the legal acts or contracts in which the State, its companies, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions are a party, they are authorized by notaries who earn a salary, per diem, or other remuneration from the respective institution, the person authorizing them may not charge professional fees to the State or to third parties. Given this situation, of the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries, some staff notaries who cannot charge fees and other external notaries who earn stipends for their work, is that article 173 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica provided "that public financial entities, regulated by the Superintendency, that use the services of more than one public notary, whether staff or external, shall establish a single 'rota' for all the deeds (escrituras) in which that entity appears as the creditor. This 'rota' must be fulfilled permanently and in strict order, in order to guarantee an equitable and fair assignment of notarial tasks. The effective compliance with this 'rota' must be supervised by the internal audit of the respective financial entity. The official who, directly or indirectly, causes non-compliance or encourages the non-compliance with the 'rota' shall incur in serious breach of their duties." On the other hand, regarding the regime that must be followed for the termination of such modalities of legal relationship existing between the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the external notaries, a distinction must be made whether they are notaries appointed and contracted indefinitely, or through a competitive process with a fixed term or without a defined termination date. In the case of notaries appointed indefinitely by Board of Directors agreement, they shall be governed by the provisions of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation of Administrative Contracting, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting entered into force. Under the terms of article 180 of said Regulation, contracting for notarial services was not subject to the competitive process procedure. As things stand, notaries appointed under those conditions have as their legal condition the holding of a subjective right (derecho subjetivo), understanding a subjective right as the faculty that administered parties have to demand from the Public Administration the giving, doing, or not doing of a certain provision or conduct, or as Mr. Eduardo García Maynez, cited by Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, well expresses in Volume II of his Thesis on Administrative Law, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., San José, 2000, first edition, page 186, "(...) it is the possibility, granted to a person by a norm, to lawfully do or omit something... In the subjective right, the form consists of the permission of a behavior, or the content in what, in each case, the titleholder can lawfully do or not do." It has also been defined as “(…) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can assert against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties on them, in their own interest, recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position.” (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Course on Administrative Law. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). In that sense, Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, ibid, also tells us that it is the authorization of conduct given by the legal norm that produces in the subject the possibility of lawfully doing or omitting something. Given this situation, if the contracting administration wishes to dispense with the services of such external notaries appointed directly through a Board of Directors agreement, they must respect the principle of intangibility of the Administration's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública), safeguarding the subjective right they hold. Such right confers on external notaries who are under this condition the faculty to demand, before the desire of the contracting entity not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the subjective right. Should it be decided to decree the nullity of the administrative act declaratory of subjective rights, the lesividad procedure (procedimiento de lesividad) must be followed, which was contemplated by the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, articles 36 and 37, and currently the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure, article 34, as well as articles 173 and 174 of the General Law of Public Administration, either to request an absolute nullity in the judicial venue or in the administrative venue in the face of evident and manifest absolute nullity.
On the other hand, in the face of a subjective right such as the aforementioned appointments, the other option for terminating them without just cause is contemplated by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in its articles 152 to 156, by establishing the revocation procedure, through which the Public Administration is empowered to revoke it for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit, such power being exercisable when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship sought to be terminated (article 152 ibid). The revocation may be based on the emergence of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time the original act was issued; it may also be based on a different assessment of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the public interest affected (article 153 ibid). The revocation of an act declaring subjective rights must be carried out by the head of the respective entity, with a prior favorable opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República); simultaneously, it must contain the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of the full compensation for the damages and losses caused, under penalty of absolute nullity; in any case, the damages and losses must be liquidated by the Administration within the month following the request or appeal of the administered party containing the liquidation sought by the latter (article 155 ibid). To carry out the revocation of the administrative act declaring subjective rights, a minimum due process must be followed, in which at least the fundamental guarantees of the administered party are ensured. In the case of the revocation of the administrative act declaring their subjective rights by having appointed them indefinitely, the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), such entity, in the full exercise of its powers, holds the authority to revoke or terminate them as it did. This is a matter of exercising legitimate powers within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), without observing any non-conformity in the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the legitimate decision adopted, but it should have compensated the external notaries as stipulated in the cited article 155 and paid them the just and legitimate compensation to which they were entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years. On the other hand, regarding the external notaries appointed through a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established, regarding the administrative contract, in votes 6432-98 at 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, and number 998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, that it is characterized as commutative, onerous, and bilateral, having as its object the provision of a service or the execution of public work. It differs from private contracts, in that the Administration exercises prerogatives, powers, or exorbitant clauses based on the purpose and public interest it must protect and achieve, such as direction, modification, resolution, and execution, a principle called the mutability of the contract. Its foundation is found at the constitutional level in article 182, which establishes the bidding procedure for the conclusion of agreements with the Public Administration, which are defined as "the meeting of wills, generating obligations and therefore synallagmatic, concluded between a state organ, in the exercise of the administrative functions incumbent upon it, with another administrative organ or with a private individual or administered party, to satisfy public purposes." (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) 1205-96). Thus, by its commutative nature, in the administrative contract there are reciprocal rights and obligations, "which are summarized as follows: a) the contractor has the right to the realization of the object that was contracted and to the recognition of the agreed prices; as well as being owed not only fair and adequate treatment but also respect for the execution period agreed in the contract; and b) the contracting Administration may, within the framework of the contract, supervise, issue instructions, make certain modifications, administratively execute the guarantees, or resolve or terminate the contract." (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) 1205-96). In the case of these external notaries appointed through a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), their appointment was extended until December 1, 2009, when the 2008 public bidding (licitación pública) came into effect, so the process for their termination or conclusion had to comply with the contract extinction procedures contemplated in the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa) in its articles 203 and following. In that sense, article 203 ibid expressed that contracts are extinguished normally, by the occurrence of the term and the execution of the contractual object. Abnormally, by resolution (resolución), administrative rescission (rescisión administrativa), or declaration of nullity. Regarding contractual resolution (resolución contractual) under the former regulations, the Administration is empowered to unilaterally resolve contracts due to breach attributable to the contractor. Once the contractual resolution (resolución contractual) is final, the performance guarantee and any other fines shall be executed, if applicable, without any additional procedure. In the event that the Administration has provided retention clauses in the bidding terms (cartel), those amounts may be applied to the payment of recognized damages and losses. If the guarantees and retentions are insufficient, the necessary measures shall be taken in the administrative and judicial spheres to obtain full compensation (article 204 ibid). Regarding the power of rescission (rescisión), the Administration may unilaterally rescind its contracts, whether not yet commenced or in the course of execution, for duly accredited reasons of public interest, act of God (caso fortuito), or force majeure (fuerza mayor). To do so, it must issue a reasoned resolution indicating the existing cause and the evidence supporting it, which will be communicated to the contractor for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor for the part of the contract actually executed, in the event it has not done so previously, and the expenses that contractor has incurred for the complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission (rescisión) originates from reasons of public interest, the contractor may also be recognized any damage or loss that the termination of the contract causes them, upon prior invocation and verification. The lost profit (lucro cesante) corresponding to the unexecuted part may always be recognized within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, evaluating aspects such as the outstanding execution period, the degree of progress of contract execution, and the complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it will be considered as 10% of the total quoted amount (article 206 ibid). The National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) may also apply rescission by mutual agreement (rescisión por mutuo acuerdo), under the terms of articles 207 and following ibid, agreed upon when there are reasons of public interest and no cause for resolution attributable to the contractor exists. In this case, the Administration may agree on the items to be liquidated or compensated, always within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality. Once the rescission (rescisión) is agreed without further procedure, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), who will have twenty-five business days to issue its resolution. Once the cause for which contractual rescission (rescisión contractual) is appropriate has been verified, the Administration shall issue the contract suspension order and give the contractor a hearing for a period of ten business days, identifying the cause and the evidence on which it is based, among other matters. The contractor shall respond to the hearing by addressing the invoked cause and shall present a detail of the liquidation they request, providing the respective evidence. Once the hearing period has expired, the Administration shall, within the fifth business day, adopt any measure necessary to assess the liquidation presented by the contractor. Once the evidence has been discharged, the entity shall resolve within the following calendar month and shall be obliged to verify all the items presented. The resolution shall be subject to the ordinary remedies provided in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Once the rescission (rescisión) is final, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), who will have twenty-five business days to approve, disapprove, or make observations it deems pertinent (article 208 ibid). Thus, the aforementioned procedures not followed by the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) in its actions to annul the notaries appointed by merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes) are also regulated by the norms set forth in the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in its third and fourth chapters, by providing that the Administration has the rights of rescission (rescisión) and unilateral resolution (resolución unilateral) for reasons of breach, force majeure (fuerza mayor), act of God (caso fortuito), or when it suits the public interest, in compliance with due process (article 11). This is also contemplated in the new procedure and process stipulated in article 13, for its processing and compensation through resolution (resolución), unilateral contractual rescission (rescisión contractual unilateral), as well as termination by mutual agreement. It being clear and evident that the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) did not fulfill the duty to compensate the external notaries appointed through a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), given that it terminated the contractual relationship without recognizing such essential right, inherent and consubstantial to their legal condition.
II.3)- ON LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (CONFIANZA LEGITIMA) AND THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ADMINISTERED PARTY OBTAINED IN GOOD FAITH: On this subject, it is relevant to indicate that subjective rights are protected by the principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública), good faith (buena fe), and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima). The principle of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) being understood as that, according to what was stated by Caterina Balasso in her article "The Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations and its Applicability regarding the Spheres of Action of Public Power," "... if the actions of the bodies exercising public power completely contradict the logical deduction determined by their prior conduct, a violation of the principle of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) is configured, since '... when referring to the conduct that fosters the expectation, it consists not only of actions but also of abstentions and denials or voluntary omissions...'." The consequences of this principle have been described as follows: "The principle of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), together with that of good faith in legal-administrative relations, emanates from the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), that is, certainty in relations with public authorities, the administered party knowing what to expect from them, who must avoid objectively confusing situations and maintain legal situations even if they are not absolutely in conformity with the legal system" (Emphasis ours) (Jinesta Lobo (Ernesto)). Treaty of Administrative Law (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo). Volume I. Page 276. Therefore, legitimate expectation (confianza legítima) is a valid knowledge of what to expect, it is recognizing the good faith (buena fe) of the administered party so as not to subject them to political changes. It being important to indicate that this principle is fundamentally materialized in the theory of the intangibility of one’s own acts declaring rights for the administered party (intangibilidad de los actos propios declaratorios de derechos para el administrado), which was defined through vote 2006-15828 at 5:02 p.m. on October 31, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in this regard, resolved: "V.- The annulment or ex officio review of administrative acts favorable to or declaring rights for the administered party, as a possibility of public administrations and their bodies, constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the non-derogability of one's own acts favorable to the administered party (inderogabilidad de los actos propios y favorables para el administrado) or the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios), to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank because it derives from article 34 of the Political Constitution (see judgments #2186-94 at 5:03 p.m. on May 4, 1994, and #899-95 at 5:18 p.m. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaring rights for the administered party, the exceptions being ex officio annulment or review and revocation." In accordance with the constitutional principles emanating from articles 11 and 34 of our Political Constitution, and in light of the doctrine reiterated in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the Public Administration cannot suppress, by itself, those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers that confer subjective rights to private individuals. This is what we know as the cited principle of the non-derogability of one's own acts (inderogabilidad de los actos propios) or intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration has the possibility, by way of exception, of annulling or reviewing ex officio administrative acts favorable to or declaring rights for the administered party, with the exception regulated in articles 155 and 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), according to which the Administration is authorized to declare, in the administrative channel, the nullity of an act declaring rights, provided that such nullity, besides being absolute (absoluta), is evident and manifest, with a prior opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República). In other cases, for the Administration to be able to declare the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of its own act creating subjective rights in favor of the administered parties, it must resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to file the lesivity process (proceso de lesividad) indicated in articles 34, 39 subsection e) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as well as 173 and 183 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). The transcribed norm is clear in establishing that the Administration has one year counted from the day following that on which the act declaring rights was issued, unless the act contains defects of absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta), in which case such declaration may be made while its effects persist, counting the year from when the effects cease. The lesivity process (proceso de lesividad) has a purely annulment nature, meaning its sole purpose is the declaration of invalidity of an administrative act considered absolutely null and harmful to the interests of the State, and in this sense, it is conceived as a guarantee for private individuals that the act will not be annulled without a prior trial that fulfills all the guarantees of a judicial process, in which it is determined whether the act is vitiated or not. The jurisdictional body will only declare the nullity when, from the study of the case records, it verifies that a defect of nullity exists, that is, that said act does not meet the substantial requirements for its validity, insofar as it does not conform to the legal system. Regarding this, the provision establishes: “Article 34.- No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated situations.” A first approach and clarification of concepts is that although the norm is drafted oriented towards the law, it should not be understood restrictively to that, because, on the contrary, it also covers any norm of a general nature (Votes 3858-99, 431-99, and 934-98, all from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now, if norms of a general nature are subject to said principle (an evident manifestation of an imperium power), with greater reason are acts as execution of those (Vote 2382-96 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). Having delimited these concepts, a distinction must be made between acquired rights, subjective rights, and consolidated legal situations, noting that the constitutional framework presents a guarantee of non-retroactivity only with respect to the latter and not the former. "The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' ... the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing -material or immaterial, in the case of a previously third-party asset or a previously non-existent right- has entered into (or had an impact on) the person's patrimonial sphere, so that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial gain, but a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and its effects, even though these effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but that -by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared it- a clear and defined rule has emerged in legal life, connecting a factual presupposition (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect)" (Votes 2843-98, 1318-99, and 1308-99 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice). For their part, subjective rights are defined as "(...) the recognition by the Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can be asserted against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties on them, in their own interest, recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position." (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Course of Administrative Law (Curso de Derecho Administrativo). II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). Thus, the clear difference is observed between the legal condition of the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation, which imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not the subjective right, which can be revoked for breach, annulled in the judicial channel for lesivity or administratively according to article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), or revoked according to article 152 and following of said cited law.
II.4) SPECIFIC CASE: Applied the above to the resolution of this matter, we find that the petitioners are correct in their claims when acting with the object of declaring the duty of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) to compensate each of the plaintiff notaries, whether they were appointed directly and indefinitely through the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) or whether they were designated through a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), all of them having different regimes, conditions, and legal situations that must be considered in the substantive analysis. The petitioners are correct in suing for recognition of the damages and losses for the termination of the contract, for the cessation of the external notarial contractual relationships that the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) maintained with the plaintiffs and with the third parties with their own claims. As was accredited in the proven facts, the party statement and testimonial evidence gathered, and the legal basis expressed in substantive recitals (considerandos) II.1, II.2, and II.3, it is clear that the essential elements to declare such liability and the compensatory duty of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) occur in this case, for which the special and particular situation of each of the groups of external notary plaintiffs will be analyzed, to finally determine how they will be compensated. Regarding the first group of plaintiff notaries, who had been appointed indefinitely, through respective agreements of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), we have that they were appointed, as stated, based on the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República), number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa) came into effect. Therefore, effectively, for the external notaries appointed directly under these conditions and without having to undergo a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), before the existing legal relationship with the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) was terminated, a minimum compensatory procedure had to be carried out, in which the damages and losses corresponding to them would be determined after having worked for said entity, in some cases for more than 30 and 40 years of uninterrupted service. The subjective right held by a large part of the plaintiffs (the majority) who find themselves under this condition is evident, and it is regrettable that an attempt was made to terminate it purely and simply, without further study and analysis, and through a simple laconic communication and a meeting (proven facts 88 and 89), terminating the existing legal relationship, thus seriously affecting the subjective right they held. The capacity and competence of said entity to, based on the procedures established in the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) article 34, as well as articles 152 to 156, 173, and 174 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), revoke or annul the subjective right is not under discussion, but it must compensate fairly, correctly, adequately, proportionally, and fully, the harm caused to them by terminating the existing legal relationship and urging them to participate in the upcoming bidding processes. These were professionals who for many years had been providing their service for the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), so it was expected that such power to terminate said legal situation would be executed but following the compensatory procedures provided for in the law. The human aspect here is evident and was fully manifested in the long hearings of this trial; many of the notaries, the vast majority being older persons, some elderly, were suddenly, and based on a simple communication, left without their main source of income, so it is just to give them the due compensation. Although the Bank's conduct was carried out in compliance with public powers, and as can be inferred from the arguments put forth by the parties, from resolutions issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) in response to complaints filed by the parties regarding automatic extensions of the contracts, Official Letter FOE-FEC-0207 of March 21, 2006, DCA-2376-2008 of August 7, 2008, and R-DCA.245-2006 of May 25, 2006, cited in official letter R-DCA-413-2008 of August 11, 2008, in which it was indicated that it was imperative to resort to a bidding procedure (licitatorio) in order to select and contract the external notaries and thus regularize the situation (proven fact 81), it should have compensated the plaintiffs prior to their dismissal as announced in the communication issued through official letter number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, in which the director of the Legal Department (Dirección Jurídica) of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), Mrs. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, expressed to them that it would be upon the entry into force of the contracts that were to be concluded based on Public Bidding (Licitación) 2008LN-000024-01 that the role of notaries in which they currently appeared would be replaced, so that as of that date their contractual relationship with the National Bank as an external notary would be terminated, a date that occurred on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 113). This situation, as was demonstrated, implied that the plaintiffs saw their income reduced, because the work was now distributed among the newly appointed notaries. Although some notaries remained in their position, thanks to the precautionary measures they had filed, the income was no longer what it was before and was drastically reduced, especially since the same entity had stated that it managed a dual role, one for the internal staff notaries and another for the external notaries (proven facts 115). In this way, the conduct of the defendant entity violates the principles that protect the subjective rights of the plaintiff notaries: legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública), good faith (buena fe), and the aforementioned legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), which entails the maintenance of their legal situation, except termination upon prior compensation. Although the petitioners are not correct in arguing that their situation is that of an acquired patrimonial right or a consolidated legal situation, since it was an appointment that could be revoked upon prior compensation, a fact alien to the roots and status of an acquired right (already incorporated into the patrimony), and the consolidated legal situation (which confers an immovable legal status and prerogative) and that cannot be revoked or recognized, this does not negate that they must be duly compensated according to the administrative acts declaring subjective rights, so it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity under the terms of article 34 of the Constitution has been violated, nor that of due process, because at least a minimum administrative procedure was required, which was fulfilled, but without compensation. Consequently, the notaries who were appointed indefinitely, without a termination period being set for them, as stated in the documentation itself requested for better resolution (para mejor resolver) from the plaintiff Bank, and which is observed in proven facts 1 through 30 and 118, are the following: Messrs./Mmes. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, and Martha Barahona Melgar. All of them have in common having been appointed indefinitely and directly by the board of directors (junta directiva) of the banking entity as notaries of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), without a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes) or public bidding (licitación pública). For this reason, the compensation corresponding to them is four years of income as an external notary of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), which shall be obtained from the average income received in the four years prior to the termination of the external notary legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and solely and exclusively based on the income they obtained as notaries of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) in said period. For this reason, the Chamber (Cámara) departs from the criterion of the plaintiffs who claim lifetime compensation as if it were an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation, from the expert criterion of Mr. Nombre18237 who calculates compensation for life, as if throughout their entire existence they would hold the status of notaries of the defendant bank, or as if it were an asset or a legal situation incorporated into their patrimony, immovable, lifelong, and perpetual. Furthermore, the conditions had changed by legal provision, according to the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its Regulation, so it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity under the terms of article 34 of the Constitution has been violated. The Tribunal also departs from the criterion of expert Nombre39226, who had set the compensation as if it were a labor relationship. As stated in the substantive recitals (considerandos), we are facing a subjective right resulting from the appointments made by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), directly or through a merits-based competition (concurso de antecedentes), so there is no such consolidated and immutable right in their favor. For this, it must be considered that the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not the subjective right, which can be revoked for breach, annulled in the judicial channel for lesivity or administratively according to article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), or revoked according to article 152 and following of said cited law. For these reasons, the compensation cannot be indefinite, lifelong, for life, because such appointment is not a patrimony incorporated into their assets or an immovable situation without the possibility of dismissal.
Similarly, the compensation for termination of the notarial legal relationships cannot include office expenses, furniture and equipment, payment of labor obligations for their employees, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in providing the notarial service, which are inherent to their professional practice, are incorporated into their assets, and it would constitute unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento indebido) to request that they be compensated if they form part of their assets. Furthermore, in the legal relationship entered into with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, it was not agreed that upon its termination, the expenses incurred to provide the notarial service would have to be paid. The banking entity contracted for a service as an external notary, for which fees were set that do not include the expenses that external notaries must necessarily incur to provide the service, which are expenses that the service provider must necessarily and logically assume, without being able to be passed on to the banking entity. In this case, the external notaries who participated in the background-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) or who were appointed indefinitely by agreement of the Board of Directors, knew that they had to have the necessary conditions for the service provided, which they are responsible for obtaining and providing, but without such material conditions and necessary expenses for its provision having to be compensated upon its termination. In the same vein, although the appointment is indefinite, the compensation for dismissal, which must be set within the maximum term that the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) placed as a cap for this type of legal relationship, is not indefinite, this being so since these legal relationships occurred before the Law of Administrative Procurement established limits in this regard, and upon its entry into force, the relationships had to be subject to it, which the Bank did not do at the time. Therefore, the compensation is set at 4 years, because this is the maximum term that the new regulation had established for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Law of Administrative Procurement) and which is applied prevalently to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs; therefore, the corresponding amount will be determined during the judgment enforcement proceedings, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, as it is a value obligation born from the judgment, interest which is awarded as it is included within the damages (daños y perjuicios) claimed by all the plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment. Once the compensation owed to each plaintiff is determined in the judgment enforcement phase, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted. Regarding the external notaries appointed through the background-based selection process, it was proven that they participated in the background-based selection processes conducted under numbers 1-85, 4-86, 2-90, 2-94, 1-96, and 1-95, as verified in proven facts 1 to 30, as well as 120 to 124, information provided by the banking entity and expressed in all the proven facts that establish the process number and the Board of Directors agreement endorsing it. As stated, one group of such notaries was appointed without a termination period being established, and another group with a two-year term, extendable for one year or two years depending on their service evaluation. Regarding the first group, for which no term was set, the background-based selection process number 1-85 stipulated, concerning the validity period, that the appointed notaries commit to providing services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, with the removal of any of the awardees remaining at the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors at the moment it deems convenient, subject to a reasoned prior resolution and provided it is in the Institution's interest (proven facts 31 to 38). The same modality was applied for the background-based selection process number 4-86, in which the modality of requiring their services when the defendant requires them was stipulated (proven facts 39 to 45). Subsequently, through the background-based selection process 2-90, it was established that the professionals would be appointed as external lawyers and notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 46 to 66), and in turn, the background-based selection process 2-94 appointed the external notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 67 to 74). A year later, through background-based selection process number 1-95 and 1-96, which appointed professionals who would provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for two years, at which date the professional's performance would be evaluated, and in the event that said evaluation was positive, it would be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists (proven facts 75 to 80). Such plaintiffs were governed by the Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, which in article 174 contemplated the possibility of appointing external notaries through a background-based selection process, a procedure followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts whose purpose was the provision of technical or professional services without a labor subordination relationship and where, for awarding, the price does not constitute a primary factor. Such a background-based selection process was a public procedure, which begins with the publication in "La Gaceta" of its conditions or terms and the corresponding invitation to participate (canon 175 of regulation 7576). In that sense, such a Background-Based Selection Process procedure was enacted so that the Administration would seek to give opportunity in the contracts it executes, which shall be done directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few people. However, if the will of the administration was to revoke or rescind it, the stipulations of the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement in its ordinals 203 and following had to be applied, as well as the provisions of the Law of Administrative Procurement in its third and fourth chapters and article 13 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Procurement, which clearly contemplate the due procedures to extinguish such contracts through normal means, by the occurrence of the term and the execution of the contractual object, or abnormally, by resolution, unilateral administrative rescission, or declaration of nullity. Thus, the plaintiffs who fall under this condition, and who are substantiated by proven facts 118 to 124, as well as all the facts where the form and date of their appointment are recorded, are: Messrs./Mmes. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through the background-based selection process number Placa6725, Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez: appointed through the background-based selection process number 4-86, Messrs./Mmes. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz: appointed through the background-based selection process number 2-90, Messrs./Mmes. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán: appointed through the background-based selection process number 2-94, Mr. Freddy Rojas López: appointed through the background-based selection process number 1-95, and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya: appointed through the background-based selection process number 1-96. As can be seen from the terms of the expressed processes, although they were carried out through a background-based selection process, a distinction in the contracting conditions is observed, warranting different treatment. On one hand, those appointed in processes numbers 1-85 and 4-86, for whom it is clearly determined from the contracting terms that there is no term, no validity period; they were appointed for an indefinite term. The contracting conditions state that they commit to providing services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, observing that such legal relationship was extended over time indefinitely, with their services being constantly needed because the bank's services so required. For more than 20 years, this service modality was continuously maintained over time, by merit of which, just like the other group of directly appointed notaries without time limits, they must be compensated for the unilateral termination of this subjective right and without a rescission or contractual resolution procedure having been carried out, as stipulated in the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement in its ordinals 203 and following, as well as in the new procedure and process stipulated by the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Procurement in its ordinal 13, regulating the forms of termination of these contractual relationships through the occurrence of the term, the execution of the contractual relationship, resolution, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. Such norms have as a common denominator that the Administration has the power to terminate the appointment by background-based selection process, but upon prior payment of the due compensation. Therefore, since the defendant entity did not duly compensate these notaries appointed without a fixed term, they must be recognized the compensation corresponding to four years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and it shall be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. Such compensation term, as stated, is based on being the maximum time that the new regulation set for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Law of Administrative Procurement) and which is applied prevalently to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs; therefore, the corresponding amount will be determined during the judgment enforcement proceedings, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, as it is a value obligation born from the judgment, interest which is awarded as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment. This condition of having been appointed without a fixed time applies to Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through the background-based selection process number 1-85, Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez. Once the compensation owed to each plaintiff is determined in the judgment enforcement phase, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted. On the other hand, we have the notaries who were appointed for a fixed term, but whose contract was nonetheless extended, it being clear regarding them that in the background-based selection processes in which they participated, they were appointed for a defined time, for a fixed and determined term. As observed from the processes, 2-90, 2-94, 1-95, and 1-96, they were appointed for two years, a term that would be extendable if the evaluation is positive, with said extension being established for one or two years. Thus, the nature of said contracts is to have a fixed term; they were not created to be indefinite, and the fact that they were extended over time does not grant them such a condition. The fact that the needs of the Administration implied the continuous requirement of their work does not have the virtue of changing the provision that, by mutual agreement and based on the background-based selection process, set a limit on time. Given said situation, and since it was proven that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years and that no cause had occurred to render the appointment void due to non-compliance, the appropriate course is to compensate them for the non-extension of their contract without justified cause, the appropriate action being to compensate them with two years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, which shall be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. Consequently, as already stated and for the cited reasons, in both cases, both for those appointed without a term and those appointed for a defined time, the Chamber departs from the plaintiffs' criterion claiming lifetime compensation, as well as from the expert Mr. Nombre18237 who compensates for life, and from the criterion of expert Mr. Nombre39226, who had set the compensation as if it were an employment relationship. Compensation is set at 2 years, because this is the maximum term for which the contract would have been extended, it being the power of the defendant bank, as indicated, to rescind or revoke the contract, but duly compensating, as dictated here, and the corresponding amount will be determined during the judgment enforcement proceedings, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, as it is a value obligation born from the judgment, interest which is awarded as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. This compensation corresponds to Messrs./Mmes. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz who were appointed through the background-based selection process number 2-90. To Messrs./Mmes. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, appointed through the background-based selection process number 2-94. To Mr. Freddy Rojas López appointed through the background-based selection process number 1-95 and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, appointed through the background-based selection process number 1-96. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment. Once the compensation owed to each plaintiff is determined in the judgment enforcement phase, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted. Likewise, as expressed supra, in none of the expressed scenarios, whether indefinite or fixed-term appointment, were the expressed expenses for furniture and equipment, payment of labor obligations for their employees, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in providing the notarial service included in the compensation provided; they had to be assumed at their own account and risk, and were not part of the fee agreed upon with the banking entity. Without the defendant's arguments that this is a simple right to participate in a roster being admissible, the plaintiffs are external notaries, were appointed by background-based selection process and by agreement of the Board of Directors, they hold a subjective right by merit of such designation, exercising notarial duties for the defendant, so it is not simply, as the banking entity expresses, a mere random roster for assignment of duties that excludes the payment of damages, because said roster is a mechanism devised for the distribution of notarial work (ordinal 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica), which originated from an administrative act declaratory of subjective rights that must be compensated upon the administrative decision to revoke it. Regarding the annulment claims filed by the plaintiffs, these are rejected, as stated, no nullity is observed in the administrative procedures followed and in the decisions adopted by the plaintiff Bank, which executed them in the exercise of its competencies, but without having compensated as appropriate. Although the plaintiffs base the nullity on the violation of due process for having carried out a procedure without compensation or not adhering to the provisions of the law of administrative procurement, it is not a matter of declaring nullity for nullity's sake. The invalidity and ineffectiveness of administrative provisions are ordered when there is harm to the administered party, and in this case, more than in the procedure followed, the affectation consists of the non-payment of the fair and correct compensation that corresponded to each and every one of the plaintiffs. The banking entity had the power to exercise revocation, nullity, rescission, or termination by mutual agreement of the acts declaratory of subjective rights, this is unquestionable, it was empowered by the supra-cited regulations of the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the General Law of Public Administration, the Law of Administrative Procurement and its Regulations, but it had to compensate and at least follow a minimal administrative procedure like the one followed, but fully compensating the petitioners, therefore there is no reason to declare the nullity of the challenged agreements and procedures, especially since reinstatement is not possible for the expressed reasons, as it is not a statutory relationship protected by lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad), and because it corresponds to legitimate powers of the Administration, a declaration of nullity becomes unnecessary, thus making the compensation claim the essential and main pronouncement of this process. Furthermore, there is no nullity due to the fact that Mrs. Herradora Chacón communicated the termination of the external notarial legal relationships, since she, in her capacity as Supplier of the banking entity, did not assume attributions that did not correspond to her, but rather limited herself to communicating the decisions adopted by the Board of Directors. On the other hand, the compensation claim for the application of the double roster by the banking entity is rejected, as well as for the decrease in income they received as of December first, 2009, this being so because granting plaintiffs compensation for the termination of their legal relationship and also compensating them for having seen their income reduced would constitute a double payment. For this, it must be assessed that the Law imposed the new contracting modality through public bidding, the plaintiffs remained in their positions due to filed precautionary measures, and furthermore the Bank had the power to revoke or rescind the subjective right upon prior compensation, which is ordered here. We would be wrong to grant compensation for termination and for decrease in income in the continuity of the position; both claims are not compatible, and imply a contradiction in the face of the exercise of legal powers by the bank, by merit of which the reinstatement claims must be rejected, as we are not facing a public employment relationship under the terms of constitutional ordinals 190 and 191. Although at folio 116, it is verified and a proven fact that as of the entry into force on December 1, 2009, of Public Bid 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries, the contracting of new notaries, and the establishment of a double roster for work assignment, the plaintiffs have seen their income in the exercise of notarial services for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica reduced, and for this, as well as to demonstrate non-economic damages (daño moral), the witnesses Mrs. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, Mrs. Flory Eugenia González Rodríguez, and Mrs. Luz María González Rodríguez are provided. However, and despite this, compensating the petitioners for such affectation is evidently incompatible with the compensation for the unilateral termination of the subjective right of the status as notaries that is being granted to them in this judgment. This collegiate body could not award damages based on income received years before Public Bid 2008LN-000024-01 entered into force and also grant damages because their income was lowered due to said public procurement. For this, as expressed, it must be indicated that the banking entity was within its right to terminate the subjective right through revocation or rescission but had to compensate; in view of this, if it was decided to terminate said legal relationship, it was a fact that the petitioners could not continue as of December 1, 2009, and if they did so, it was due to the filing of injunctive relief measures, awaiting the outcome of the process and a possible reinstatement. Consequently, upon recognizing in this judgment the legitimate power of the banking entity to choose not to continue with such contracting, it is not appropriate to also grant them compensation for the decrease in their income, when it was a fact that they could no longer continue due to the defendant's decision. The appropriateness of compensation for the termination having been discussed and endorsed, compensation cannot also be granted for having continued without the conditions they previously had, thanks to the precautionary measures adopted. The discussion of compensation for the non-compliance of the double roster and for the decrease in their income due to said reason would acquire relevance if it had been decided to grant the reinstatement of the notaries, but upon endorsing the bank's capacity to terminate them, it is not feasible to grant damages for having continued in such duties after the banking entity's decision to terminate and settle them. Likewise, the collection of subjective and objective non-economic damages claimed by the plaintiffs must be rejected, since the Bank acted in the exercise of its competencies when terminating the legal relationship it had with the external notaries, without it being observed that non-economic damages must be compensated as a result, as they are conducts exercised due to the legislative change brought about by the obligation to put such contracts out to bid and in the exercise of administrative powers protected by law, to be able to rescind, revoke, or even annul administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights. Regarding the lawsuit filed against the official Lorena María Herradora Chacón, it is feasible to indicate that, being a public servant, her liability to third parties is governed by the stipulations in numerals 199 to 202 of the General Law of Public Administration, in which it is provided that the public official shall respond personally when she has incurred in fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of her duties and functions or on the occasion thereof. In turn, it is established that without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall respond jointly and severally to the affected parties for fault in selection (culpa in eligendo) or fault in supervision (culpa in vigilando). By merit of this, for the servant to respond subjectively and personally to the affected parties, it is required that she acted in the exercise of her competencies and functions and that there was subjective unlawfulness in her conduct by having incurred in fraud or gross negligence. However, in the present matter, as the petitioners have not proven that the defendant official incurred in conduct of fraud or gross negligence in the exercise of her functions that would have generated damages, the action filed against her must be denied. The actions incurred by the defendant servant through the communication she made to the petitioners in the exercise of her position were executed in the exercise of legitimate administrative powers, without observing abuse of power or illegitimate action in the functions entrusted under her competence, which entails that the lawsuit filed against her must be declared without merit. It must be taken into consideration that the decision to compensate the petitioners was outside the scope of competence of Mrs. Herradora Chacón, she limited herself in the exercise of her position to communicating what had been decided by the Board of Directors of the defendant banking entity. Regarding Mrs. Nombre112022, it is observed that she was included by mistake in the initial complaint, but it is a manifest material error, because, as could be verified in the evidence requested for better resolution and which appears at folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice, she is not a notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, has not received any appointment, and therefore lacks standing to sue, for which reason the filed lawsuit must be rejected.
II.5)-REGARDING THE FORMS OF EARLY TERMINATION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: The Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establishes in its title VI on the termination of the process, chapter one, that in addition to the other mechanisms established by law (conciliation and judgment), the process may terminate early or abnormally, through the means of withdrawal (desistimiento) verbal or written (113 ibid), acquiescence (allanamiento) (114 ibid), extra-procedural administrative satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal administrativa) (115 ibid), the application of a final favorable administrative resolution (116 ibid), settlement (transacción) (117 ibid), and compliance with the omission conduct (118 ibid). All of which shall have the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (112 ibid), and requires supervision and homologation by the judge. As regards withdrawal, it must be formulated before the judgment of the Trial Court is issued, and if filed by the Public Administration, it shall be accompanied by the agreement or resolution adopted by the supreme hierarchical superior or by authorization from the Attorney General of the Republic if said body had filed it. This institution consists of the "unconditional and unequivocal declaration of will by the plaintiff in the process by which they express their will to put an end to the process before the judgment is issued without extinguishing the right. The basis of withdrawal is the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) by virtue of which the plaintiff decides when to sue and conclude the initiated process" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual of the Contentious-Administrative Process. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 227). Although, in legal systems such as the Argentine one (Gozaíni Osvaldo A. Elements of Civil Procedural Law. First edition. Buenos Aires. Editorial Ediar. 2005. Page 398), withdrawal of the right is admitted, as well as of the process, in our national system the procedural code, as well as the civil jurisdiction (numeral 206 of the Civil Procedural Code), opted to admit it only regarding the latter, with which the petitioner retains the possibility of suing again, unless the waiver of the right operates (article 207 of the Civil Procedural Code), not expressly contemplated in contentious-administrative procedural matters, but supplementarily applicable. Consequently, "withdrawal puts an end to the process, but not to the substantial legal situations on the merits that the plaintiff party may invoke in a new process" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual of the Contentious-Administrative Process. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 229). Thus, once the request is filed, a resolution will be issued approving or homologating it, in which the process will be deemed terminated, the filing of the proceedings will be ordered, and the administrative file will be returned.
Applying the foregoing to the present matter, we have that by means of briefs submitted to the court, Messrs. José Javier Vega Araya, Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Rolando Laclé Castro, and Oscar Mora Córdoba expressly request that the present proceeding be deemed withdrawn, a request that is endorsed by the presiding judge. By virtue thereof, it is observed that such request meets the legal requirements set forth in ordinal 113 of the Code of Procedure. This is so because it is an express, unconditional, and unequivocal request from the moving party, which was made before the judgment was issued, and therefore, it is appropriate to deem it admitted, as was resolved at the procedural stage.
II.6)- DEFENSES: By reason of the foregoing, the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, being understood as granted in that which was not awarded and denied in that which was expressly awarded; this is because, in accordance with the cited regulations, evidence provided, and the factual and legal grounds set forth, the plaintiff is partially assisted by the right invoked in support of its claims, given that it was declared that she has the right to be compensated for the unilateral termination of her notarial legal relationship with the Bank. Regarding the claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, the defense of lack of right filed is granted, and the claim brought against her is denied in its entirety. Regarding the defense of statute of limitations (excepción de caducidad), it is rejected as the peremptory fatal term for bringing this action has not elapsed. Ex officio, the lack of standing (legitimación) of Mrs. Nombre112022 to sue in this proceeding is declared, the claim brought is declared without merit, and the matter is resolved without a special award of costs.
THEREFORE:
The defense of statute of limitations (excepción de caducidad) is rejected, and the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, being understood as denied in that which was expressly awarded and granted in that which was not awarded; consequently, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals: Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the income for four years as an external notary (notario externo) of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income earned solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009; amounts that shall be indexed from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals: Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López, and Federico Alfaro Araya, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the income for two years as an external notary (notario externo) of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income earned solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009; amounts that shall be indexed from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Both costs are to be borne by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón is declared without merit in its entirety, the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the defendant is granted, and the matter is resolved without a special award of costs. The claim brought by Mr. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba is deemed withdrawn, as well as the third-party claim (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. Ex officio, the lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) of Mrs. Nombre112022 is declared, the claim brought is declared without merit, and the matter is resolved without a special award of costs. Judge Madrigal Jiménez sets forth his reasoning in a separate opinion.- Carlos Espinoza Salas Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Rodrigo Huertas Durán Dissenting Opinion of Judge Madrigal Jiménez: Although I fully respect the solid position of my colleagues on the Panel, there are several aspects on which I depart, and I will proceed to point them out.
On one hand, it could have retained the notaries who did not have a fixed term and carried out one or several public tenders to comply with the law, warning the former that their contracts would no longer be indefinite and allowing them to adjust to the new reality. It could also have opted to revoke the existing contracts and hold a new competition where all participants entered on equal terms. What it certainly could not continue doing was maintaining the factual situation under the same conditions as if the legal imperative were not another, where a list of essentially closed beneficiaries was kept and no new competitions were generated. The other aspect on which an unjustified inertia of the bank is located centers on the absence of applying the new law, given that it indefinitely and for several decades allowed the norm to be emptied of legal content, of legal effect, as if it were a mere moral imperative. On this matter, it is nothing more than obligatory to call attention to and expose the manifest non-compliance that was taking place. On the other hand, as the resolution before us rightly sets forth, the Administrative Contracting Law and Regulation permitted the contracting of professionals under the ordinary regime for appointing officials. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code, Articles 7 and 8 provided for the regulation of fees of staff public notaries in public institutions. Faced with that situation of the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries—staff notaries who cannot charge fees but rather a salary, and external notaries who earn stipends for their work—during the trial it was attempted to make it seem that the existence of that dual role was an act of bad faith by the defendant, which is incorrect. The norm of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica guarantees in sound logic that there exists a single role among external notaries, in a transparent and orderly manner and not merely as a mechanism of favoritism; but that did not prohibit the existence of an internal role of notaries who did not charge fees. The reason for this internal registry is very varied: thus, banks carry out projects of social interest where charging fees is not possible due to the public purposes pursued; there also exist commercial transactions which, by their very line of business, an attractive aspect of the activity consisted in not charging fees. Nowadays it is public and notorious that this mechanism is employed by various banking entities. Thus, the plaintiffs’ interpretation that the existence of an internal role of notaries is contrary to law has no reason to be, and on the contrary, they are attempting to accommodate the norm to their interests. We must be more than clear in indicating that the right held did not guarantee a specific number of instruments, much less a determined value thereof, in such a way as to assure the livelihood of those professionals; their right was limited to being on a roll to be eventually assigned, with the possibility that said list could grow as much as the public entity saw fit. That also did not prevent the Bank from presenting a system of staff notaries, as already mentioned, whether to attend to matters of public interest or simply because it was aligned with its interests. This judge must be more than clear in indicating that he is aware that current market conditions, within a system of free competition, determine that the commissions, expenses, and fees that a person once had to pay to meet a banking obligation are nowadays assumed by the banking entity as a mechanism to attract clientele. In this framework, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, one of the largest and most solid in the region, must enter the market with due aggressiveness vis-à-vis its clients, offering not only what its other competitors also offer but also other riskier benefits, such as interest or bonuses, because otherwise it would be destined to perish in the market. Although the Superintendence of Financial Entities establishes a series of requirements regarding debt ceilings, that does not impede a healthy free competition appropriate to the framework of Articles 45 and 46 of the Constitution for the benefit of the consumer. One cannot forget either that public banks, although they carry out commercial activity that is not distinguishable from the external standpoint from that performed by private parties, it is unquestionable that their acts are vested with public interest. Otherwise, they would have no reason for existing. In that reasoning, it is logical to think that there must be many situations in which it is not convenient or prudent to charge attorney fees, a living example of which we find in the subject matter of the National System for Housing Law. Faced with such a situation, if the contracting administration was called upon to reorient the services of the external notaries appointed directly through a Board of Directors agreement (or by another body authorized by it), that is what in effect had to be done in strict adherence to legality. Such right confers upon the external notaries who find themselves under said condition the power to demand, in the face of the contracting entity’s desire not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the pre-existing right under the stated terms. During the oral and public trial, the plaintiffs confined themselves to the argument that the only way they could be removed from their condition was through the lesivity procedure already analyzed, which, as we have been indicating, is incorrect. The award act disposed at the time is in accordance with the legal system of that time, and via Article 34 of the Constitution it is not possible to apply to them a norm that arose later. Thus, it is not possible to locate a nullity in the terms argued by the plaintiffs; rather, we are in the presence of a revocation (or rescission, according to the terms of the Administrative Contracting Law). It would be illogical to pretend that the public commercial entity was obligated to maintain a contractual relationship indefinitely, which eventually made it less competitive or created a drag on it in that matter, by reason of the existence of the agreement with the plaintiffs, even if that ultimately implies having to make some reparation or indemnification, as will be seen. We reiterate time and again that the Administration is under the obligation to adapt to circumstances and to the service entrusted to it, especially when it is in competition, renouncing the own prerogatives that the legal system establishes. Acting under those conditions, it is entirely lawful to revoke existing contracts. Even so, see how at the trial hearing, the representative of the defendant—who is believed under the principle of procedural loyalty—openly maintained that the Comptroller General of the Republic itself called them to account regarding the situation and made them see that they had to regularize it and suppress those indefinite contracts they held with the notaries who are plaintiffs here. Management that had begun based on a complaint from another independent professional. If those statements are true, they were right; fifteen years had already passed without the bank regularizing and maintaining certain notaries indefinitely, as an elite that benefited from the commercial transactions of the public entity. A situation contrary to the legal system was simply being generated for the benefit of a group in a way that could not be justified. The revocation is about the exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Law of the Public Administration, without observing any non-conformity in the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the legitimate decision adopted. It is not superfluous to point out that although the use of the ordinary administrative procedure is not appreciated, the components of due process are indeed located, insofar as the interested parties were informed of the reasons for the administrative decision and were invited to participate, which they could eventually have done, as indeed some of them did. In their reasoning, some of the plaintiffs maintained that they did not participate because that would entail legitimizing the competition—a respectable stance, but one removed from the legal framework, insofar as it could well have allowed them to re-enter the notary registry and eventually claim some indemnification if applicable. Nor does the record show the authorization of the comptroller entity in the case, but, as stated, it was that very department that urged the administrative action. Furthermore, that topic was not the subject of controversy between the parties, nor was it argued or the subject of any dispute. We would be facing mere failures of form, which did not impede the exercise of the right of defense and, more importantly, which were not debated, argued, or discussed during the trial hearing. As is known in law, nullity does not exist for its own sake, and exactly that is what would be generated in the event of declaring a nullity in this case, when the defendant entity only sought to regularize the situation with its external notaries. What we do locate that could well generate a contrary application of the law lies in the fact that the corresponding analysis should have been carried out as to whether it was appropriate to indemnify the external notaries in accordance with the provisions of Article 155 cited and to have paid them the just and legitimate amounts to which they were entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years. In any event, that matter becomes more complicated and will be taken up again later. What is possible to conclude so far, and which coincides with what is set forth in the majority vote, is that the nullity sought cannot be upheld and on the contrary must be dismissed for lack of right.
"[....] Even regarding the acquired rights claimed by an attorney of the National Insurance Institute, who had been in charge of judicial collections for several years and considered that the fact that the appealed institution decided to open a public bidding competition for the contracting of those professional services violated the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution, this Constitutional Tribunal, through judgment number 2004-12511 at 16:16 hours of November 9, 2004, established the following: ‘…) In any event, as the Comptroller General of the Republic pointed out, the benefit received by staff attorneys for the judicial collection of the delinquent portfolio does not have the character of salary, but of emoluments or fees for the provision of a professional service (DAGJ-2225-2000 of August 31, 2000, visible at folios 16-21), the receipt of which depends on a contingent, eventual, or hypothetical circumstance such as a client’s delinquency. Finally, it is not pertinent to adduce an acquired right arising from an administrative practice that arose outside and against the Administrative Contracting Law—Article 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution—which, at the same time, has support in the Law of the Constitution (Article 182 of the Political Constitution), as was pointed out by the organ of constitutional relevance—Comptroller General of the Republic—charged with the supervision and oversight of the Public Treasury (DAGJ-1420-2002 of August 26, 2002, visible at folios 22-26).’ Both criteria are applicable in the specific case insofar as they allow reaffirming, in the first place, the constitutionality of the procedures for external contracting of attorneys to perform judicial collection functions in public institutions, and, in the second place, that the economic benefits received by staff attorneys for judicial collection cannot be considered as salary but rather as fees for the provision of a professional service” (our underlining). Therefore, insofar as such concepts are liquidated as part of a salary not received or as fixed income to which the plaintiff was entitled, such items of the liquidation must be dismissed.
Several conclusions must be drawn. All expert reports that seek to apply criteria typical of labor law to the plaintiffs’ situation must be dismissed without further questioning. Indeed, the Administration was empowered, via the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulation, to rescind the bond that united it with the plaintiffs. In such case, there is an obligation to pay the contractor the portion actually executed of the contract, and the expenses that party would have incurred to complete execution. In what corresponds to the case, there is not a single claim for unpaid amounts; on the contrary, everything seems to indicate that there is no debt for that concept. It is clear to the plaintiffs that the absence of continuing the contract implicitly entails a decrease in their standard of living and its projection, but due to a conjuncture of economic conditions. The bank could have retained the plaintiffs and carried out massive contracting of external notaries, and equally, by a lawful mechanism and without any liability, a decrease in the income of the historical external notaries who are now suing would occur. It could even carry out all of its instruments through internal notaries, which again is lawful and in principle is not a basis for generating liability. We reiterate that the plaintiffs only have the right to form part of a list or roll, without a guarantee as to how many instruments would be assigned to them or what fees they will receive from them. On that matter, it is a mere expectation, without any basis. Under such conditions, it could not be considered that damage susceptible to indemnification is being produced. Nor is it possible to assure that there was bad faith in the matter on the part of the bank or that the decision was untimely, because on the contrary there was administrative inertia for many years; even though the period between the communication to the interested parties and their removal from the roll is indeed short under the rules of rationality and proportionality, considering that they had provided services for many years. What is possible to recognize is the damages, specifically the profit they were entitled to receive. It must be stressed that although during the oral and public trial the plaintiffs disputed the competence of the specific official who adopted the termination act, which according to them created an absolute defect in the adopted act, the public entity does well in setting forth how internal regulations exist that delegate the possibility of revoking contracts to said official, which entails that that formal requirement of the administrative action is satisfied. Reiterating the dismissal of the allegation of nullity of the act and confirming its validity.
Given this situation, having established that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years, and that no cause had arisen to nullify the appointment due to non-compliance, the proper course is to compensate them for the non-renewal of their contract without justified cause, the proper course being that they be compensated with two years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average net income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the legal relationship as notaries, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, which shall be calculated solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period.
POR TANTO:
The statute of limitations defense (excepción de caducidad) is rejected, and the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially upheld, being understood as denied in what was expressly granted and upheld in what was not granted; consequently, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay to Messrs. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, as damages (perjuicios), the net income of the profit for four years as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the four years prior to the termination of the legal relationship as notaries, deducting the corresponding expenses, a matter to be determined by the corresponding expert, that is, the four years prior to December of two thousand nine, sums that must be indexed from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation owed to each plaintiff. Also, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay to Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López, and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, as damages (daños y perjuicios) of the net profit income (deducting expenses) for two years as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the two years prior to the termination of the legal relationship as notaries, that is, the two years prior to the first of December of two thousand nine, sums that must be indexed from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation owed to each plaintiff. Both cost orders (costas) are to be borne by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón is dismissed in its entirety, the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the defendant being upheld, and resolved without a special order as to costs (costas). The claims brought by Messrs. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba are deemed withdrawn, as is the third-party claim (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. The lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) of Mrs. Nombre112022 is declared sua sponte, dismissing the claim brought, and resolved without a special order as to costs (costas).- Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Ordinary proceeding.
Plaintiffs: Edgar Abellán Acevedo and others.
Against: El Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Lorena María Herradora Chacón.
Goicoechea, Dirección01, 50 meters west of the BNCR, in front of Dirección02. Telephones: 2545-0003 - 2545-0004. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006. Email: ...01 During the deliberation period, evidence was required for a better resolution by means of a resolution at 1:00 p.m. on August 7 of the current year, in accordance with numerals 82, 85 and 110 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure and the proceeding was reopened on August 16 of the current year (Trial Hearing and folios 10981 to 10988 of the main file).
**XI.** By resolution number 677-2011 at 2:40 p.m. on May 6, 2011, the procedural judge of the Contentious Court ordered, in favor of the plaintiffs, the suspension of the cessation of notarial services, preserving their status as external notaries of the BNCR (folio 8385 to 8387 of the main file).
**XII.** The presiding judge Carlos Espinoza Salas was on sick leave on September 5 and 6, and judge Ricardo Madrigal Jiménez was on sick leave from September 9 to 13, therefore, in accordance with ordinal 81 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction, the deadlines for issuing judgment are suspended for the period of the sick leave (folios 1102 to 11047 of the main file).
**XIII.** That the present proceeding was declared complex processing, in accordance with article 111 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure and the judgment has been issued in accordance with ordinal 47 of its regulation, due to the abundant evidence that must be evaluated, the diversity of parties, and the substantive aspect involves the discussion of claims for damages and determination of the legal nature of the relationship between the external notaries and the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which warrant the detailed and itemized analysis of the evidence in order to establish the true material reality of the investigated facts (trial hearing).
**XIV.** That in the trial hearing, evidence was required for a better resolution in accordance with numerals 82, 85 and 110 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure and the proceeding was reopened on August 16 of the current year (Trial Hearing and folios 10981 to 10988 of the main file).
**XV.** In the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed, and no defects or omissions susceptible of causing nullity of what has been done or defenselessness to the parties are observed. This resolution is issued after deliberation, within the legal term and by majority.
**The majority vote is drafted by judge Espinoza Salas; and** **C O N S I D E R I N G** **I)- REGARDING THE FACTS: I.1)- PROVEN FACTS:** The following facts of interest for the resolution of this matter are considered proven, as they are consistent with the elements of conviction cited in their support: **1)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945 of December 15, 1964, article 18 (folio 7403 of volume XIV of the judicial file). **2)** Mr. Ernesto Guardia Hine was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1964 (folio 3948 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **3)** Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero Mora was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 3 of August 7, 1965 (folio 4488 of volume IX of the judicial file). **4)** Mr. Jorge Castro García was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7141, article 05 of April 26, 1966 (folio 3886 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **5)** Mr. Nombre112075 was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7729, article 4 of May 19, 1970 (folio 10982 of volume XX of the judicial file). **6)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1974 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **7)** Mr. Jorge Tristrán Trelles was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8574, article 01 of May 17, 1976 (folio 3892 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **8)** Mr. Erich Neurohr Trejos was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8594, article 49 of July 7, 1976 (folio 3882 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **9)** Mr. Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8782, article 11 of October 18, 1977 (folio 3470 of volume seven of the judicial file). **10)** Mr. Fernando Fallas Amador was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **11)** Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **12)** Mr. Orlando Calzada Miranda was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8832, article 37 of February 25, 1978 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **13)** Mr. Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8854, article 16 of June 2, 1978 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **14)** Mr. Nombre39622 was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8920, article 39 of November 7, 1978 (folio 3976 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **15)** Mr. Luis A. Guillén Downing was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 5 of March 6, 1979 (folio 3559 of volume seven and folio 10983 of volume XXI, of the judicial file). **16)** Mr. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 05 of March 12, 1979 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **17)** Mr. Jaime López Baudrit was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 26 of September 25, 1979 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **18)** Mr. José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9139, article 4 of August 26, 1980 (folio 3572 of volume seven of the judicial file). **19)** Mrs. Vilma Mesen Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of August 11, 1981 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **20)** Mrs. Cecilia Fallas Amador was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9303, article 04 of January 12, 1982 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **21)** Mrs. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9319, article 27 of March 2, 1982 (folio 5458 of volume XI of the judicial file). **22)** Mr. Rafael Ortega Ayón was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9324, article 20 of March 16, 1982 (folio 3880 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **23)** Mr. Horacio Montealegre Montealegre was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9327, article 02, of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **24)** Mr. Wilberth Vargas Brenes was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **25)** Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9354, article 20 of July 6, 1982, he was dismissed on July 6, 2008 and appointed again as external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of volume seven of the judicial file). **26)** Mr. Gerardo Camacho Nassar was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9389, article 06 of November 2, 1982 (folios 7904 of volume XV, folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **27)** Mrs. Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397 of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 4896 of volume X of the judicial file). **28)** Mrs. Luz María González Rodríguez was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397, of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **29)** Mrs. Marta Barahona Melgar was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9407, article 19 of January 11, 1983 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **30)** Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9410 of January 18, 1983, article 08 (folio 5877 of volume XI of the judicial file, as well as folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **31)** By means of background competition number 1-85, a tender was conducted for the selection of professionals for the external notarial service provided by the BNCR, providing regarding the period of validity that the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the time it requires them, leaving it to the discretion of the General Board of Directors of the Institution to remove any of the awardees at any time it deems convenient, upon a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the interest of the Institution (folios 4019 to 4023 of volume VIII of the records). **32)** Mrs. Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1985 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **33)** Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 03 of July 5, 1985 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **34)** The Tender Committee (Comisión de Licitaciones) of the BNCR in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985, designated as external notaries Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, Mr. Braulio Sánchez González, and Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo (folios 4016 to 4023 of volume VIII of the records). **35)** Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3468 of volume seven of the judicial file). **36)** Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3897 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **37)** Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985, he was dismissed on July 6, 2008 and appointed again as external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of volume seven of the judicial file). **38)** Mr. Braulio Sánchez González was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 11, 1985 (folio 3473 of volume seven of the judicial file). **39)** By means of background competition number 4-86, a tender was conducted for the selection of professionals for the external notarial service provided by the BNCR, providing regarding the period of validity that the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the time it requires them, leaving it to the discretion of the General Board of Directors of the Institution to remove any of the awardees at any time it deems convenient, upon a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the interest of the Institution (administrative file of the background competition). **40)** Mr. Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-84, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9761 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **41)** Mrs. Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9823, article 08 of December 1, 1986 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **42)** Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714 of November 5, 1985, article 13 (folio 6347 of volume XII, folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **43)** Mr. Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **44)** Mr. Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folios 7454 of volume XIV and folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **45)** Mr. Mario González Porras was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86 article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **46)** By means of background competition 2-90, the Tender Section (Sección de Licitaciones) of the BNCR received offers on January 8, 1991 for the selection of professionals who provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (folios 1395 to 1402 of main volume three). **47)** By official communication S.L. 197-91 of May 17, 1991, the Tender Office (Oficina de Licitaciones) of the BNCR recommends appointing for tender 2-90 for the selection of professionals who provide their services as external lawyers and notaries the following persons: **In San José:** Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla. **In San Pedro:** Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mrs. Livia Meza Murillo. **Alajuela:** Mrs. Zetty Bou Valverde. **Nombre37415:** Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas. **Nombre19780:** Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña. **Puriscal:** Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga (folios 1395 to 1410 of volume three of the records). **48)** Licentiate Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla has provided services as a notary for said institution since the month of July 1991 (folio 1395 to 1410 of volume three of the sub judice). **49)** Mr. Carlos Mas Herrera was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90 article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**50)** Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**51)** Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**52)** Mr. Virgilio Fernando Calvo Murillo was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**53)** Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**54)** Mr. Milton Arguedas Salas was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**55)** Ms. Zetty María Bou Valverde was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**56)** Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10267 of July 2, 1991, article 25 (folio 5538 of volume XI of the judicial file).
**57)** Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**58)** Ms. Livia Meza Murillo was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**59)** Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**60)** Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**61)** Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**62)** Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**63)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**64)** Mr. Federico Carlos Sáenz de Mendiola was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**65)** Mr. Edgar Antonio Abellán Acevedo was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9354, article 20 of July 6, 1992 (folio 3879 of volume VIII of the judicial file).
**66)** Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 12 of the Board of Directors, session 10565 of June 28, 1994 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**67)** Through background competition 2-94, named for the selection of professionals providing their services as external lawyers and notaries, external notaries were appointed for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (administrative file of said contracting).
**68)** Mr. Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**69)** Ms. Laura Mora Camacho was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**70)** Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García was appointed as lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folios 8069 of volume XVI, folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**71)** Ms. Mayra Rojas Guzmán was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**72)** Mr. José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**73)** Mr. Jorge Castro Corrales was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10619, article 07 of January 10, 1995 (folio 3887 of volume VIII and folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**74)** Mr. Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 14 of the Board of Directors, session 10621 of January 17, 1995 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**75)** By background competition number 1-95, the appointment was made at the BNCR of professionals who will provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for two years, on which date the professional's performance will be evaluated and in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists (folios 8068 to 8079 of volume XVI of the principal).
**76)** Mr. Freddy Rojas López was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10680, article 14 of August 22, 1995 (folio 3883 of volume VIII of the judicial file).
**77)** Through background competition 1-96, named for the selection of professionals providing their services as external lawyers and notaries, external notaries were appointed for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (administrative file of said contracting).
**78)** Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya was appointed as external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 1-96, article 9 of the Board of Directors, session 10789 of September 17, 1996 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**79)** Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante was appointed as external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 11155 of June 25, 2002, article 03 (folio 6614 of volume XIII of the judicial file).
**80)** Mr. Freddy Antonio Rojas López was appointed as external lawyer and notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the Muelle San Carlos Agency, effective June 17, 2005 (folio 3928 of volume VIII of the judicial file).
**81)** In Board of Directors session of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, it was resolved that, due to the requirements of the Contraloría General de la República to promote public competitions with defined terms in professional services contracts, as well as the legal opinion of Licenciada Herrera Cantillo expressed in official letter D.J.2245-207 of December 27, 2007, from the Legal Directorate, through which a proposal for a bid specifications document is presented for the contracting of professionals who provide their services to the Banco Nacional as external notaries, by unanimous vote the text of the bid specifications document for the selection of external lawyers of the Banco Nacional is approved, named Selection of professionals who provide their services as external lawyers, in accordance with the terms set forth in official letter D.J.2245-207 of December 27, 2007, and the publication of the bid specifications document for the selection of external lawyers is ordered (folio 1 of volume one of the sub judice).
**82)** In Gaceta number 69 of April 9, 2008, the BNCR published the Reglamento para la prestación de servicios externos of the BNCR (uncontested fact, statements of claim, folios 728 to 739 of volume two ibid).
**83)** In Board of Directors session of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11486 of June 10, 2008, article 7, the agreement adopted in session number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, was declared final and binding (folio 2 of volume one of the judicial file).
**84)** Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on July 6, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bid specifications document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, thereby exhausting the administrative channel and notifying her of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro consisting of 75 folios).
**85)** On July 6, 2008, Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro was notified of the official letter of July 6, 2008, regarding the communication of the Board of Directors agreements of the Banco Nacional adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11486 (administrative file of Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro consisting of 2 folios).
**86)** By official letter number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, the director of the Legal Directorate of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Ms. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, summoned the external notaries of said entity to a meeting to be held in the auditorium of said Bank on July 4, 2008, for the purpose of establishing the form of contracting external notaries (uncontested fact, statements of claim, folio 3, 1280, of volume one and three, folio 3558 of volume seven of the judicial file, folios 4027 to 4029 of volume VIII of the principal).
**87)** At the meeting held on July 6, 2008, held in the auditorium of the plaintiff Bank, the external notaries were given the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the following: “By this means, you are informed in your capacity as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, that by agreements of the Board of Directors, adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions No. Placa20031 and No. 11486 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, the text of the bid specifications document for the selection of external notaries was approved, named 'Selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries'. The purpose of this bid specifications document is to support a Licitación Pública on the basis of which a new roster of the Bank's external notaries will be formed, rendering the current roster void. This decision is adopted by virtue of the expiration of the maximum validity period that the Contraloría General de la República admits for the contracting of professional services, which is four years, in accordance with the provisions of article 163 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. For the purpose of maintaining continuity in the provision of the service, it will be upon the entry into force of the contracts that are concluded based on said Licitación, that the roster of notaries on which you currently appear will be replaced. Therefore, as of that date, your contractual relationship with the Banco Nacional as an external notary will be terminated, in accordance with the provisions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. The current status you hold as an external notary of the Bank, nor the eventual termination of your contractual relationship with it, constitute an impediment to your participation in the new competition; for which reason we urge you to participate, under the terms of the invitation that will be published soon in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Against this decision, the remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) before the General Board of Directors are admissible, which may be filed within three days at this General Procurement Office, in accordance with the provisions of article 346 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.” (uncontested fact, statements of claim, folio 4, 1281, 1336 of volume one and three of the records, folio 3571 of volume VII, folio 3930, 3935, 3937 of volume VIII, folio 5467 of volume XI).
**88)** That the notaries Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jaime López Baudrit and Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal and Livia Meza Murillo, filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 698 to 704, 1249 to 1251, 1282 to 1283 of volume two and three, folios 3742 to 3749 of volume VII of the judicial file).
**89)** Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on July 6, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bid specifications document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 15, thereby exhausting the administrative channel and notifying him of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz consisting of 52 folios).
**90)** That the notary Ananías Matamoros Carvajal filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 6046 to 6050 of volume XII of the judicial file).
**91)** By brief of July 8, 2008, Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García and Miguel Rodríguez Gómez filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8083 to 8086 of volume XVI of the judicial file).
**92)** By brief of July 9, 2008, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 7375 to 7402 of volume XIV of the judicial file).
**93)** By brief of July 9, 2008, Messrs. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, and Juan Carlos Solano García, filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8963 to 8984 of volume XVIII of the judicial file).
**94)** By brief of July 9, 2008, Ms. Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante filed a remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Provider of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 6749 to 6753 of volume XIII of the judicial file).
**95)** In Gaceta number 138 of July 27, 2008, the BNCR published Licitación Pública number 2008-LN-24-2008, named “Selección de Profesionales que brinden sus servicios como Notarios Externos” (uncontested fact, statements of claim, folios 218 to 219 of volume one ibid).
**96)** By resolution at 2:45 p.m. on July 29, 2008, of the Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Goods and General Procurement, the remedy of reconsideration (revocatoria) filed by the plaintiffs against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, is rejected (folios 705 to 727, 1284 to 1296 of volumes two and three of the records).
**97)** The Contraloría General de la República, through resolution number R-DCA-413-2008, at 2:00 p.m. on August 11, 2008, hearing remedies of objection to the bid specifications document of Licitación Pública number 2008LN-000024-2008 promoted by the BNCR, decided to accept objections, ordering the tendering administration to proceed with the pertinent modifications, corrections, and clarifications (folios 5258 to 5332 of volume X of the judicial file).
**98)** Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero filed a nullity action on August 12, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bid specifications document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, thereby exhausting the administrative channel and notifying him of said resolution on March 5, 2009 (administrative file of Bernal Aragón Barquero consisting of 31 folios).
**99)** By official letter D.J.
1587-2008 of August 22, 2008, from the Legal Directorate of the BNCR, informs Licenciada Lorena Herradora Chacón that the existing external notary contracts will remain in force until the contracts resulting from the award of the tender called "Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos" enter into effect, and that pursuant to the provisions of Article 182 of the Political Constitution, Articles 1, 4, 5, and 6 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and 1, 2 subsections a) d) and e), 92 subsection d) and 163 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Reglamento de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the only legal means for contracting professional notary services is the holding of the respective public tender (licitación pública) and the only way for a notary professional to eventually achieve the status of awardee of the competition is by participating in a timely and proper manner in the competition (folios 7 and 8 of volume one of the principal case file). 100) Messrs. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos, Jaime López Baudrit, Milton Arguedas Salas, and Rafael Ortega Ayón filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on September 4, 2008, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms (cartel) for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, with the administrative channel (vía administrativa) being deemed exhausted and being notified of said resolution on March 20, 2009 (administrative file of Bernal Aragón Barquero consisting of 45 folios). 101) In Gaceta number 172 of September 5, 2008, amendments to Public Tender 2008-LN-24-2008 were published (folios 260 to 263 of volume one of the subjudice). 102) By resolution at 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, Goods Directorate, General Procurement Department (Proveeduría General), rejects the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as an external notary (folios 8120 to 8140 of volume XVI of the judicial file). 103) The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), through resolution number R-DCA-512-2008, at 10:00 a.m. on September 29, 2008, hearing objections (recursos de objeción) to the first amendment of the bidding terms of Public Tender number 2008LN-000024-2008 promoted by the BNCR, ordered that objections made to the bidding terms by the participants be upheld (folios 4831 to 5118 of volume X of the judicial file). 104) By resolution at 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, Goods Directorate, General Procurement Department, rejects the motion for reversal filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8998 to 9017 of volume XVIII of the judicial file). 105) By resolution at 8:51 a.m. on October 31, 2008, the Corporate Media Management Directorate, Goods Directorate, General Procurement Department, rejects the motion for reversal filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 7375 to 7402 of volume XIV of the judicial file). 106) In session 11512 of November 25, 2008, article 8, the appeal filed by Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, and Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with them being notified of said resolution on November 28, 2008 (folios 603 and 604, 1333, 1490 to 1497 of volumes two and three of the subjudice). 107) In session 11516 of January 13, 2009, article 29, the appeal filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. He was notified of said resolution on January 19, 2009 (folios 8155 to 8156 of volume XVI of the subjudice). 108) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 8, the appeal filed by Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal on July 6, 2008, is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with him being notified of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (folios 6076 to 6077 of volumes two and three of the subjudice). 109) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 23, the appeal filed by Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. She was notified of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar consisting of 106 folios). 110) In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 28, the appeal filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. He was notified of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (folios 7404 to 7405 of volume XIV of the subjudice). 111) In session 11518 of January 27, 2009, article 13, the appeal filed by Ms. Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante on August 12, 2008, is rejected, against the official communication regarding the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors' agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding terms for the selection of external notaries was approved, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with her being notified of said resolution on February 3, 2009 (folios 6779 to 6780 of volume XIII of the subjudice). 112) Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as lawyer and notary of the BNCR, in session of the Board of Directors 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3737 of volume VII of the judicial file). 113) Public Tender 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries was awarded in article 10, of session 11551 of June 23, 2009, and published in the Gaceta on July 1, 2009, entering into force on December 1, 2009 (folios 3752 to 3755 of Volume VII, folio 4008, 4134 of volume VIII of the judicial file). 114) Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as lawyer and notary of the BNCR, in session of the Board of Directors 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3738 of volume VII of the judicial file). 115) That from the entry into force on December 1, 2009, of Public Tender 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide services as external notaries, the hiring of new notaries, and the establishment of a dual role for assignment of tasks, the plaintiffs have seen their income diminished in the practice of notary work for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 7199 of volume XIV, folios 7752, 7909 of volume XV, folio 8068 of volume XVI, folio 9634 of volume XIX of the subjudice, as well as statements by Ms. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Ms. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, and Ms. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá). 116) Mr. Carlos Castro Mora was appointed as lawyer and external notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10619, article 7 of December 1, 2009 (folio 4450 of volume IX of the judicial file). 117) The Corporate Media Management Directorate, Material Resources Directorate managed Public Tender number 2010LN-000001-01, called "Selección de Profesionales que brinden sus servicios como Notarios Externos" (folios 5207 to 5224 of volume X ibid). 118) That Messrs. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, and Martha Barahona Melgar, were appointed indefinitely as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica by the Board of Directors, without a competitive review of credentials (concurso de antecedentes), nor public tender (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 119) That Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini were appointed through competitive review of credentials number 1-85, article 13 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9714 of November 5, 1985 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 120) That Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, were appointed through competitive review of credentials number 4-86, article 44 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 121) That Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz were appointed through competitive review of credentials number 2-90, article 25 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10267 of July 2, 1991, for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 122) That Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, were appointed through competitive review of credentials number 2-94, article 7 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10719 of January 10, 1995, for two years, at which time the professional's performance will be evaluated and, in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service to the Bank persists for a term of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 123) That Mr. Freddy Rojas López was appointed through competitive review of credentials number 1-95, article 14 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10680 of August 22, 1995, for a term of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice). 124) That Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya was appointed through competitive review of credentials number 1-96, article 9 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10789 of September 17, 1996, by means of the Administrative Contracting Law number 7494 of May 2, 1995, for a term of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice).
I.2)- UNPROVEN FACTS: The plaintiffs did not demonstrate: 1) The amount of the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the actions of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in terminating them as external notaries (from the court record). 2) That Ms. Nombre112022 was a lawyer and external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (from the court record). 3) That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón caused them damages as a result of her actions (from the court record). 4) That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón engaged in conduct involving willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of her functions that generated damages to them (from the court record). The co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica did not demonstrate: 1) That the statute of limitations (caducidad) for the action filed by the plaintiffs for the claim of nullity of the challenged administrative acts has expired (from the court record). 2) That there existed any cause for breach of contract by the plaintiffs appointed through competitive review of credentials that would imply the non-renewal of the contract (from the court record).
I.3)- EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER): Pursuant to section 50.2 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the documentation appearing at folios 10944 to 10957 and 10969 to 10970 of the principal case file was admitted at the trial hearing for better decision. Likewise, the following documentation contained in the judicial file was ordered as evidence for better decision: VOLUME ONE: folios 1 to 37 and 94 to 387. VOLUME TWO: folios 508 to 518, 580 to 594, 603 to 609, 619 to 817, and 988 to 1254. VOLUME THREE: folios 1267 to 1372, 1395 to 1486, and 1490 to 1517. VOLUME FOUR: folios 1572 to 2289. VOLUME FIVE: folios 2290 to 2935. VOLUME SIX: folios 2936 to 3299, and 3302 to 3348. VOLUME SEVEN: folios 3412 to 3468, 3558 TO 3561, 3570 to 3573, folio 3601, 3650 to 3672, 3737 to 3764. VOLUME EIGHT: folios 3877 to 3907, 4015 to 4045, 4095 to 4134. VOLUME NINE: folios 4197 to 4830 expert Nombre18237. VOLUME TEN: folios 4876 to 5408. VOLUME ELEVEN: folios 5433 to 5482 (María del Rosario Morera Alfaro), 5529 to 5626 (Milton Arguedas Salas), 5702 to 5724 (Hernán Cordero Maduro), 5728 to 5824, 5877 to 5894 Bernal Aragón Barquero, 5904 to 6011. VOLUME TWELVE: folios 6035 to 6553. VOLUME THIRTEEN: folios 6608 to 6906. VOLUME FOURTEEN: folios 7050 to 7135, 7199 to 7307, 7310 to 7367, 7374 to 7416, 7447 to 7526, 7621 to 7633. 7654 to 7671, folios 7705 to 7709. VOLUME FIFTEEN: folio 7750, 7752, from folio 7994 to 7920, 7926 to 8013. VOLUME SIXTEEN: folios 8067 to 8227, 8234 to 8320, 8335, 8364 to 8379, 8425 to 8431, 8436 to 8440, 8515 to 8603, 8626 to 8629. VOLUME SEVENTEEN: folios 8675 to 8685, 8742 to 8753, 8762 to 8766, 8787 to 8918. VOLUME EIGHTEEN: folios 8937 to 9023, 9031 to 9119, 9136 to 9140, 9192 to 9216. VOLUME NINETEEN: folios FROM 9323 to 9466, 9522 to 9531, 9611 to 9626, 9634, 9638 to 9645, 9652 to 9694. VOLUME TWENTY: folios 9914 to 1002. VOLUME TWENTY-ONE: folios 10273 to 10279, 10299 to 10322, 10331 to 10355, 10378 to 10402, 10477 to 10490, and 10632 to 10688. The evidence ordered in the hearing for precautionary measure (medida cautelar) before this court consisting of 404 folios. Notarial certification of the administrative file of Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, consisting of 238 folios. As well as in its entirety the various volumes of the administrative file contributed to the judicial file by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
In the present matter, the oldest action, to which the later ones were consolidated, was filed on December 5, 2008, requesting a declaration that the conduct of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in terminating the appointments and contracts and its communication with each of the plaintiffs is null and void; for this purpose, they seek the annulment of Articles 12 and 7 of Sessions 11467 and 11486 of January 29 and June 10, 2008, as well as the communication made to each notary by Mrs. Lorena Herradora in her capacity as supplier of the BNCR on July 6, 2008. They seek payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) for the termination of the contract, that is, the challenge to the cessation of the external notary contractual relationships that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with third parties with their own claims; that is, compensation for the damages caused by the cessation of the contractual relationships with the plaintiffs, the third parties with their own claims, and the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; the annulment of the act of hiring other notaries outside the legal framework through bidding procedure 2008LM-000024-01; and the declaration of non-conformity with the legal system of the institution's failure to comply with its external notary role. That is, they seek damages for the breach of the role established by the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, because those transactions were granted to the internal notaries of the Banco Nacional, which reduced the distribution of work to all notaries. As can be observed from the proven facts, it is clear that the peremptory, inexorable, and fatal one-year lapse period (caducidad) for seeking the requested annulment has not elapsed, since the challenged acts are those issued in the session of the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11467 of January 29, 2008, Article 12, (proven fact 81), as well as the session issued by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11486 of June 10, 2008, Article 7, in which the agreement adopted in session number 11467 of January 29, 2008, Article 12, was declared firm (proven fact 83), and the communication dated July 4, 2008, which was made on July 6, 2008, at the meeting called by Mrs. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (proven facts 86 and 87), which was also challenged by the petitioners when they filed the motions for reconsideration and subsidiary appeal; it is observed that such remedies were resolved in the following months (proven facts 84, 85, 88, 89 to 94, 96, 102, 104, and 105). Consequently, it is evident that the lapse period has not elapsed, whether taking as a starting point the issuance of the challenged acts, the date of the communication of the resolution of the remedies, or the exhaustion of administrative remedies (proven facts 84, 89, 98, 100, 106, 107 to 111). Furthermore, such one-year lapse period applies when the annulment of an administrative act is being challenged, but not when actions are involved in which damages resulting from administrative conduct are claimed. In this sense, Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration is clear, stating that the right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the fact giving rise to the liability, and the right to request compensation against public servants shall prescribe in four years from when the harmful act becomes known. Therefore, in the present matter, regardless of the issue of the alleged annulment, it is observed that the claims for compensation are principal claims that cannot be deemed lapsed given such claims for civil state liability filed against the defendant entity. Moreover, as the challenged communication itself states, dated July 6, 2008 and delivered to the notaries on July 6, 2008, and in which the notaries are informed and made aware of the agreements of the Board of Directors, adopted in Articles 12 and 7 of Sessions No. 11,467 and No. 11,486 of January 29, 2008 and June 10, 2008, the act does not become immediately final, but rather from “the entry into force of the contracts that may be concluded based on said Bid, which will replace the notary role in which You currently appear. Therefore, as of that date, your contractual relationship with the Banco Nacional as an external notary will be terminated (…)”, and said contracts and public bid 2008LN-000024-01 having become final on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 115), the alleged lapse period runs from that date, so the one-year term, as stated, has not elapsed.
II.2) NATURE OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NOTARIES OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA AND THE PROCEDURE FOR ITS TERMINATION: The Organic Law of the National Banking System, number 1644 of September 26, 1953, in its Articles one and two, provides that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous entity that forms part of the National Banking System, which, for the exercise of its functions and powers entrusted by law under the terms of Articles 67, 101, 152, and 168, requires the contracting of notarial services to materialize the acts and contracts necessary for its banking activity. To achieve this purpose, said entity initially hired notaries on an indefinite basis, having as its regulatory legal framework the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and Article 180 of the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, which stipulated that the procurement of the following services was not subject to the background contest procedure: a) Notary services, b) Legal counsel for directing legal affairs or business, c) Medical interventions, d) Occasional notices or publications in mass media, e) Commercial brokerage and expert appraisals, f) Others of a similar condition at the discretion of the Comptroller General. For this purpose, Law 1279 did not include, among the requirements for performing administrative procurement, the notary service provided by private individuals to the Public Administration, for which many notaries were appointed on an indefinite basis. On the other hand, the Regulation of Administrative Procurement also stipulated in Article 174 the possibility of appointing external notaries through a background contest, which was a procedure to be followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts aimed at providing technical or professional services without a labor law subordination relationship and where, for awarding, price is not a primary factor. Such background contest was a public procedure, initiated with the publication in "La Gaceta" of the conditions or terms thereof and the corresponding invitation to participate (Article 175 of Regulation 7576). In that sense, such Background Contest procedure was issued so that the Administration should seek to provide an opportunity, in the contracts it executes, which shall be made directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, so that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few persons. In turn, the Law of Administrative Procurement, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, effective as of May 1, 1996, partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law and established the procurement of notarial services through the Public Bid procedure. Subsequently, the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement, number 25038 of March 6, 1996, was issued, effective from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, establishing the modality for contracting technical or professional services by individuals or legal entities, in which public bid, registry bid, or restricted bid procedures should be followed according to the amount of the respective procurement and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract, in accordance with the parameters established by the Law of Administrative Procurement (Article 69.1). The nature of this contracting modality between the Administration and the contractor expressly stated that it gave rise to a public employment relationship and should be remunerated according to professional fee schedules (Article 69.2), except for the provisions of Articles 69.5 and 69.6, in which case the professionals or technicians were subject to a public employment relationship remunerated with a fixed salary. Such public employment modality established that public entities are authorized to contract, with a fixed salary, using their ordinary system for appointing officials, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, the handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they permanently provide. In these cases, the payment governed by fees for the provision of the corresponding activity shall not apply, and the respective institution may not pass the cost of contracting those professionals on to the user of the corresponding services, but must charge the other implicit costs, such as those for document registration and payment of any tax. In this sense, the Law of Administrative Procurement, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, stipulated in Article 67 that public entities are authorized, using their ordinary system for appointing officials, to contract, with a fixed salary, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, the handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they provide. For these purposes, the payment governed by fees for the provision of the activity shall not apply. The institution shall not pass the cost of contracting those professionals on to the user of the services; but it must charge the other implicit costs, when the respective document must be registered or some type of tax must be paid. In this sense, Article 174 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, number 7558, is clear, specifying regarding the procurement of professional services that public financial entities shall be subject to the provisions of Article 67 of the Law of Administrative Procurement and stipulating in Articles 31 and 163 that the term of the contracts shall be a maximum of four years. For its part, the new Regulation to the Law of Administrative Procurement, number 33411 of September 27, 2006, effective as of January 4, 2007, states in this regard in its Article 163 that, for the procurement of technical or professional services by individuals or legal entities, the Administration must follow public bid, abbreviated bid, or direct contracting procedures, as appropriate, and that this type of procurement shall not give rise to a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, and shall be remunerated according to the respective fee schedules when the services are regulated by mandatory fee schedules; however, it safeguarded the legal contracting conditions for those persons who had been appointed without a termination date being set, prior to its entry into force on January 4, 2007 (Transitory II). Said transitional rule between the effectiveness of the repealed regulation and this provision states that "All direct contracting authorizations without a fixed term that the Comptroller General of the Republic granted before the effectiveness of this Regulation shall remain under the same terms and conditions indicated for each particular case." Furthermore, it was provided, based on this new regulation, that the procurement of professional services inherent to a public employment relationship is excluded from the application of the Law of Administrative Procurement and the Regulation; therefore, for their procurement, the provisions of the ordinary system for appointing officials shall be followed. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code, the regulation of fees for staff notaries in public institutions was contemplated in Articles 7 and 8, by providing that it is prohibited to handle professional matters for private individuals in the offices of the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public enterprises structured as private entities, where they provide their services, as well as to authorize, in the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public enterprises from which they receive a salary or stipend, acts or legal contracts where their employers or subsidiary companies appear as parties; however, they may authorize them provided they do not charge fees for this concept (Article 7). For its part, Article 8 of the same body of law states that it is prohibited for the Public Administration to contract the same notary in more than three institutions simultaneously; to ensure compliance with this provision, the National Directorate of Notariado shall maintain a list of notaries in its registration records. Likewise, the Administration must notify this Directorate of the contracting of notaries to establish the respective control, and that when acts or legal contracts in which the State, its companies, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions are a party are authorized by notaries who receive a salary, stipend, or other remuneration from the respective institution, whoever authorizes them may not charge professional fees to the State or to third parties. Given this situation of the coexistence in public entities of two types of notaries—staff notaries who cannot charge fees and external ones who earn emoluments for their work—Article 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica provided "that public-law financial entities, regulated by the Superintendency, that use the services of more than one notary public, whether staff or external, shall establish a single 'role' for all deeds in which that entity appears as creditor. Said 'role' must be followed permanently and in strict order, to guarantee an equitable and fair assignment of notarial tasks. The effective compliance with that 'role' must be supervised by the internal audit department of the respective financial entity. Any official who, directly or indirectly, causes it not to be complied with or promotes its non-compliance shall incur a serious breach of their duties." On the other hand, regarding the regime to be followed for the termination of such modalities of the existing legal relationship between the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the external notaries, a distinction must be made as to whether they are notaries appointed and contracted on an indefinite basis, or through a background contest with a fixed term, or without a defined termination date. In the case of notaries appointed on an indefinite basis by agreement of the Board of Directors, they shall be governed by the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, effective until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement entered into force. Under the terms of Article 180 of said Regulation, procurement for notary services was not subject to the background contest procedure. Thus, notaries appointed under these conditions have, as their legal condition, a vested right (derecho subjetivo); a vested right is understood as the power of the administered to demand that the Public Administration give, do, or refrain from doing a specific provision or conduct, or, as Mr. Eduardo García Maynez, cited by Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, in Volume II of his Administrative Law Thesis, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., San José, 2000, first edition, page 186, well expresses it, "(...) is the possibility, granted to a person by a norm, to lawfully do or omit something... In vested right, the form consists of the permission of a behavior, and the content in what, in each case, the holder can lawfully do or not do." It has also been defined as "(...) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can be enforced against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties upon them, in their own interest, a recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position." (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Course of Administrative Law. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). In this sense, Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, ibid, further tells us that it is the authorization of conduct given by the legal norm that produces in the subject the possibility of lawfully doing or omitting something. Given this situation, if the contracting administration wishes to dispense with the services of such external notaries directly appointed through an agreement of the Board of Directors, it must respect the principle of the intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, safeguarding the vested right they hold. Such right grants the power to external notaries under such condition to demand, given the contracting entity's desire not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the annulment or revocation of the vested right. If choosing to decree the annulment of the administrative act declaring vested rights, the adverse procedure (procedimiento de lesividad) contemplated by the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, Articles 36 and 37, and currently by the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Article 34, as well as Articles 173 and 174 of the General Law of Public Administration, must be followed, either to seek absolute annulment in a judicial venue or through administrative channels in the case of evident and manifest absolute annulment. On the other hand, regarding a vested right like the aforementioned appointments, the other option for terminating them without just cause is contemplated by the General Law of Public Administration, in its Articles 152 to 156, which establish the revocation procedure, through which the Public Administration is empowered to revoke it for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit, such power being applicable when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship sought to be terminated (Article 152 ibid). The revocation may be based on the emergence of new factual circumstances that did not exist or were not known at the time the original act was issued; it may also be based on a different valuation of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest (Article 153 ibid). The revocation of an act declaring vested rights must be carried out by the head of the respective entity, after a favorable opinion from the General Comptroller of the Republic; simultaneously, it must contain the acknowledgment and, if possible, the calculation of the full compensation for the resulting damages, under penalty of absolute nullity; in any case, the damages must be settled by the Administration within one month following the request or appeal by the interested party containing the settlement sought by them (Article 155 ibid). To carry out the revocation of the administrative act declaring vested rights, a minimum due process must be followed, guaranteeing at least the fundamental guarantees of the administered individual. In the case of the revocation of the administrative act declaring their vested rights by having appointed them on an indefinite basis, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, such entity, in the full exercise of its powers, holds the authority to revoke them or terminate them, as it did. It is an exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Law of Public Administration, without any non-conformity with the procedure followed or absolute annulment of the legitimate decision adopted being observed; but it should have compensated the external notaries as stipulated in Article 155 cited above and should have paid them the fair and legitimate compensation to which they were entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years. Moreover, regarding external notaries appointed through a background contest, the Constitutional Chamber has established, in rulings 6432-98 at 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, and number 998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, that the administrative contract is characterized as commutative, burdensome, and bilateral, its purpose being the provision of a service or the execution of a public work. It differs from private contracts in that, herein, the Administration exercises prerogatives, powers, or exorbitant clauses based on the public purpose and interest it must protect and achieve, such as direction, modification, resolution, and execution—a principle called the mutability of the contract. Its foundation is found at the constitutional level in Article 182, which establishes the bidding procedure for the execution of agreements with the Public Administration, defined as "the meeting of wills, generating obligations and therefore synallagmatic, entered into between a state organ, in the exercise of its corresponding administrative functions, with another administrative organ or with a private individual or administered person, to satisfy public purposes." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). Thus, due to its commutative nature, in the administrative contract there are reciprocal rights and obligations, "which are summarized as follows: a) the contractor has the right to the realization of the contracted purpose and to the recognition of the agreed prices; likewise, he is owed not only fair and adequate treatment, but also respect for the execution period agreed upon in the contract; and b) the contracting Administration may, within the framework of procurement, supervise, issue instructions, make certain modifications, administratively enforce guarantees, or else, resolve or terminate the contract." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). In the case of these external notaries appointed through a background contest, their appointments were successively extended until December 1, 2009, when public bid 2008 entered into force; therefore, the procedure for their expiration or termination had to conform to the contract extinction procedures contemplated in the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement in its Articles 203 et seq. In this regard, Article 203 of said regulation stated that contracts are extinguished normally by the expiration of the term and the execution of the contractual purpose, and abnormally by resolution, administrative termination, or declaration of annulment. Regarding contractual resolution under the former legal framework, the Administration is empowered to unilaterally resolve contracts due to a breach attributable to the contractor. Once the contractual resolution is final, the performance guarantee and any other fines shall be executed, if relevant, without any additional procedure. In the event that the Administration has provided for retention clauses in the bid documents, those amounts may be applied to the payment of the acknowledged damages. Should the guarantees and retentions be insufficient, the necessary measures shall be adopted in administrative and judicial venues to obtain full compensation (Article 204 ibid). Regarding the power of termination, the Administration may unilaterally terminate its contracts, whether not yet initiated or in the course of execution, for reasons of public interest, fortuitous events, or force majeure, duly accredited. For this purpose, it must issue a reasoned resolution stating the existing cause and the evidence supporting it, which shall be brought to the attention of the contractor for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor for the part of the contract actually executed, should it not have done so previously, and the costs that contractor has incurred for the complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When termination arises for reasons of public interest, the contractor may also be acknowledged any damage that the termination of the contract causes them, upon prior claim and verification. The loss of profit corresponding to the unexecuted part may be acknowledged within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, assessing aspects such as the remaining execution period, the degree of progress in the contract's execution, and the complexity of the purpose.
When the profit has not been declared, it shall be considered to be 10% of the total amount quoted (article 206 ibid). The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica may also apply rescission by mutual agreement, under the terms of numerals 207 et seq. ibid, agreed upon when reasons of public interest exist and no cause for termination attributable to the contractor is present. In this case, the Administration may agree on the items to be liquidated or indemnified, always within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality. Once the rescission is agreed upon without further procedure, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Contraloría General de la República, which shall have twenty-five business days to issue its resolution. Once the cause for which contractual rescission is to be declared has been verified, the Administration shall proceed to issue the contract suspension order and shall grant the contractor a hearing for a period of ten business days identifying the cause and the evidence supporting it, among other things. The contractor shall attend the hearing referring to the invoked cause and shall present a detail of the liquidation requested, providing the respective evidence. Once the hearing period has expired, the Administration shall adopt, within the fifth business day, any measure necessary to assess the liquidation presented by the contractor. Once the evidence has been completed, the entity shall resolve within the following calendar month and shall be obligated to verify all the items presented. The resolution shall have the ordinary remedies provided for in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Once the rescission is final, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Contraloría General de la República, which shall have twenty-five business days to approve, reject, or make the observations it deems pertinent (article 208 ibid). Thus, the aforementioned procedures not followed by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in its actions to terminate the notaries appointed by background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes) are also governed, as a regulatory framework, by the rules set forth in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa in its chapters three and four, by providing that the Administration has the rights of rescission and unilateral termination for reasons of non-compliance, force majeure, fortuitous event, or when it is convenient for the public interest, in compliance with due process (article 11). Which is also contemplated in the new procedure and process stipulated by ordinal 13, for its processing and indemnification through the route of termination, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. It being clear and evident that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica did not fulfill its duty to indemnify the external notaries appointed through a background-based competitive process, since it terminated the contractual relationship without recognizing such an essential right inherent to their legal status.
**II.3)- REGARDING LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (CONFIANZA LEGITIMA) AND THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ADMINISTERED PARTY OBTAINED IN GOOD FAITH:** On this topic, it is relevant to indicate that subjective rights are protected by the principles of legal certainty, intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, good faith, and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima). Understanding the principle of legitimate expectations as that according to what was stated by Caterina Balasso in her article "*The Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations and its Applicability regarding the spheres of action of public power*", "... if the actions of the bodies exercising public power completely contradict the logical deduction determined by their previous conduct, a violation of the principle of legitimate expectations is configured, because '... when referring to the conduct that fosters the expectation, it is not only constituted by actions, but is also formed by abstentions and negative manifestations or voluntary omissions...'". The consequences of this principle have been described as follows: "*The principle of legitimate expectations, together with that of good faith in legal-administrative relations, emanates from the principle of legal certainty, that is, certainty in relations with public powers, the administered party knowing what to expect from them, who must avoid objectively confusing situations* <span style="text-decoration:underline">*and maintain legal situations even if they are not absolutely in conformity with the legal system*</span> *"* (Emphasis is ours) (Jinesta Lobo (Ernesto)). Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. Page 276. Therefore, legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) are a valid knowledge of what to expect, it is recognizing the good faith of the administered party so as not to subject them to political changes. It being important to indicate that this principle is fundamentally realized in the theory of the intangibility of an entity's own acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, which was defined through ruling Voto 2006-15828 of 5:02 p.m. on October 31, 2006, the Sala Constitucional, in this regard, resolved: " V.- The ex officio annulment or review of favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, as a possibility for public administrations and their bodies, constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the irrevocability of an entity's own acts favorable to the administered party or the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank as it derives from ordinal 34 of the Constitución Política (see rulings #2186-94 of 5:03 p.m. on May 4, 1994 and #899-95 of 5:18 p.m. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being ex officio annulment or review and revocation. ". In accordance with the constitutional principles emanating from numerals 11 and 34 of our Constitución Política, and in light of the doctrine reiterated in the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional, the Public Administration cannot suppress by itself those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers that confer subjective rights upon individuals. This is what we know as the cited principle of irrevocability of one's own acts or intangibility of one's own acts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration has the possibility, by way of exception, to annul or review ex officio favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, with the exception regulated in articles 155 and 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública according to which the Administration is authorized to declare, in the administrative channel, the nullity of an act declaratory of rights provided that said nullity, in addition to being absolute, is evident and manifest, after a prior opinion from the Procuraduría General de la República. In the other cases, for the Administration to be able to declare the absolute nullity of its own act creating subjective rights in favor of the administered parties, it must resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to file the action for lesividad (action for annulment of an act harmful to the State) indicated in articles 34, 39 subsection e) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, as well as 173 and 183 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. The transcribed rule is clear in establishing that the Administration has one year counted from the day following the one on which the act declaratory of rights was issued, unless the act contains defects of absolute nullity, in which case, said declaration may be made while its effects endure, counting the year from when the effects cease. The action for lesividad has a strictly annulling nature, that is, its sole purpose is the declaration of invalidity of an administrative act considered absolutely null and harmful to the interests of the State, and in that sense it is conceived as a guarantee for individuals that the act will not be annulled without a prior trial that complies with all the guarantees of a judicial process, in which it is determined whether the act is vitiated or not. The jurisdictional body will only declare nullity when, from the study of the case file, it verifies that a defect of nullity exists, that is, that said act does not meet the substantial requirements for its validity, insofar as it does not conform to the legal system. In this regard, the provision stipulates: “Article 34.- No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated situations.” A first approach and precision of concepts is that although the rule is drafted oriented towards the law, it should not be understood restrictively to that, because on the contrary it also covers any general rule (Votos 3858-99, 431-99 and 934-98, all from the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia). Now, if general rules are subject to said principle (an evident manifestation of a power of imperium), those acts as execution thereof are even more so (Voto 2382-96 of the Sala Constitucional). Having delimited said concepts, a distinction must be made between acquired rights, subjective rights, and consolidated legal situations, noting that the constitutional framework presents a guarantee of non-retroactivity with respect only to the latter and not the former. “ The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' ... the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing –material or immaterial, in the case of a previously owned asset or a previously non-existent right– has entered into (or affected) the person's patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much an increase in assets, but rather a state of affairs fully defined regarding its legal characteristics and effects, even when these have not yet been extinguished. The relevant aspect regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but that –by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared it– a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect)” (Votos 2843-98, 1318-99 and 1308-99 of the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia). For their part, subjective rights are defined as “(...) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject who can enforce it against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties upon them, in their own interest, recognition that implies the judicial protection of said legal position.” (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). Thus, the clear difference is observed between the legal condition of the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation, which imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not so for the subjective right, which can be revoked for non-compliance, annulled in the judicial channel through the action for lesividad or administratively according to ordinal 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, or revoked according to article 152 et seq. of said cited law.
**II.4) SPECIFIC CASE:** Applied, the foregoing to the resolution of the present matter, we find that the petitioners are correct in their claims when taking action with the aim of having it declared that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica has the duty to indemnify each of the plaintiff notaries, whether they were appointed directly and for an indefinite term through the Junta Directiva or whether they were designated through a background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes), as all of them have different regimes, conditions, and legal situations that must be considered in the substantive analysis. The plaintiffs are correct in suing to be recognized for the damages and losses due to the termination of the contract, due to the cessation of the external notary contractual relationships that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with the third parties with their own claims. As was accredited in the proven facts, the testimony and statements of the parties gathered, and the legal basis expressed in substantive recitals II.1, II.2, and II.3, it is clear that the essential elements occur in the present matter to declare such responsibility and duty to indemnify on the part of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, for which the special and particular situation of each of the groups of external notary plaintiffs will be analyzed, to finally determine the manner in which they will be indemnified. Regarding the first group of notary plaintiffs, who had been appointed for an indefinite term, through respective agreements of the Junta Directiva, we have that they were appointed as stated, based on the provisions of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa came into effect. **Therefore, effectively, for the external notaries appointed directly under these conditions and without having to complete a background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes)**, prior to the termination of the existing legal relationship with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a minimum indemnification procedure had to be carried out, in which the damages and losses corresponding to them were determined after having worked for said entity, in some cases for more than 30 and 40 years of uninterrupted service. The subjective right held by a large part of the plaintiffs (the majority), who are under this condition, is evident, and it is lamentable that with a communication, an attempt is made to terminate purely and simply, without further study and analysis, and by means of a simple laconic communication and a meeting (proven facts 88 and 89), that the existing legal relationship is terminated, thus seriously affecting the subjective right they held. Not under discussion is the capacity and competence of said entity so that, based on the procedures established in the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo ordinal 34, as well as ordinals 152 to 156, 173 and 174 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to revoke or annul the subjective right, but indemnifying in a fair, correct, adequate, proportional, and full manner, the impact that was being caused to them by terminating the existing legal relationship and compelling them to participate in the upcoming bidding processes. These were professionals who for many years had been providing their service to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, so it was to be expected that such power to terminate said legal situation would be executed, but following the indemnification procedures provided by law. The human aspect here is evident and was fully manifested in the long hearings of this trial; many of the notaries, the vast majority of whom are older persons, some elderly, who suddenly and based on a simple communication are left without their main source of income, so the fair thing is to give them the due indemnification. Although the Bank's conduct was carried out in accordance with public powers, and as emerges from the arguments put forth by the parties, from resolutions issued by the Contraloría General de la República in response to complaints presented by the parties regarding automatic contract extensions, Official Letter FOE-FEC-0207 of March 21, 2006, DCA-2376-2008 of August 7, 2008, and R-DCA.245-2006 of May 25, 2006, cited in official letter R-DCA-413-2008 of August 11, 2008, in which it was indicated that it was imperative to resort to a bidding procedure in order to select and hire external notaries and thus regularize the situation (proven fact 81), it should have indemnified the plaintiffs prior to their dismissal as was announced in the communication issued through official letter number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, in which the director of the Dirección Jurídica of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Ms. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, expresses to them that it will be as of the entry into force of the contracts to be concluded based on Bidding Process 2008LN-000024-01 that the role of notaries in which they currently appear will be replaced, so as of that date their contractual relationship with the Banco Nacional as external notary will be terminated, a date that occurred on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 113). This situation, as was demonstrated, meant that the plaintiffs saw their income reduced, because the work was now distributed among the newly appointed notaries. Although some notaries remained in their position, thanks to the interim measures (medidas cautelares) they had formulated, their income was no longer what it was before and was drastically reduced, especially since the same entity had stated that it kept a double role, one for internal staff notaries and another for external notaries (proven facts 115). In this way, the conduct of the defendant entity violates the principles protecting the subjective rights of the notary plaintiffs of legal certainty, intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, good faith, and the aforementioned legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), which entails the maintenance of their legal situation, except termination by prior indemnification. Although the plaintiffs are not correct in arguing that their situation is that of an acquired patrimonial right or a consolidated legal situation, as it is an appointment that could be revoked prior to indemnification, a fact unrelated to the rootedness and status of the acquired right (already incorporated into the patrimony), and the consolidated legal situation (which confers an immovable legal status and prerogative) and which cannot be revoked or recognized, this does not preclude that they must be duly indemnified in accordance with the administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights, which is why it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity in the terms of constitutional ordinal 34 has been violated, nor that of due process, because at least a minimum administrative procedure was required, which was fulfilled, but without indemnification. **Consequently, the notaries who were appointed for an indefinite term, without a termination period being set for them**, as recorded from the documentation itself required for a better resolution requested from the plaintiff Bank, and which is observed in proven facts 1 to 30 and 118, are the following: Mr. and Ms. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, and Martha Barahona Melgar. All of them have in common having been appointed for an indefinite term and directly by the board of directors (junta directiva) of the banking entity as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, without a background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes) or public bidding (licitación pública). By reason thereof, the indemnification corresponding to them is four years of income as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income received in the four years prior to the termination of the legal relationship of external notaries, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. By reason thereof, the Chamber differs from the criterion of the plaintiffs who claim lifetime indemnification (indemnización vitalicia) as if it were an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation, from the expert criterion of Mr. Nombre18237 which indemnifies for life, as if they would hold the condition of notaries of the defendant bank for their entire existence, or as if it were an asset or a legal situation incorporated into their patrimony, immovable, for a lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad), and perennial. Furthermore, the conditions had changed by provision of law, in accordance with the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its Regulations, which is why it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity in the terms of constitutional ordinal 34 has been violated. The Court also differs from the criterion of the expert Nombre39226, who had set the indemnification as if it were a labor relationship. As was expressed in the substantive recitals, we are faced with a subjective right arising from the appointments made by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, directly or by background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes), so such a consolidated and immutable right does not exist in their favor. For this, it must be considered that the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, not so the subjective right, which can be revoked for non-compliance, annulled in the judicial channel through the action for lesividad or administratively according to ordinal 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, or revoked according to article 152 et seq. of said cited law. For these circumstances, the indemnification cannot be indefinite, for a lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad), for life, because such an appointment is not a patrimony incorporated into their assets or an immovable situation without the possibility of dismissal. In the same way, the indemnification for the termination of the notarial legal relationships cannot include office expenses, furniture and equipment, payment of labor obligations for the employees under their charge, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in the provision of the notarial service, which are inherent to their professional practice, are incorporated into their patrimony, and it would constitute unjust enrichment to request that they be indemnified for them, if they form part of their assets. Furthermore, in the legal relationship established with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, it was not agreed that upon its termination, the expenses incurred to be able to generate the notarial service would have to be paid. The banking entity contracted for a service as an external notary, for which fees were set that do not contemplate the expenses that the external notaries must necessarily incur to be able to provide the service, which are expenditures that the service provider must necessarily and logically assume, and which cannot be transferred to the banking entity. In this case, the external notaries who participated in the background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes) or who were appointed for an indefinite term by agreement of the Junta Directiva knew they had to have the necessary conditions for the service provided, the obtaining and providing of which are at their own expense, but without such material conditions and necessary expenses for its provision having to be compensated upon its termination. In that same vein, while the appointment is indefinite, the indemnification for dismissal is not, which must be set at the maximum term that the Ley de Contratación Administrativa set as a limit for this type of legal relationship, this being so since these legal relationships arose before the Ley de Contratación Administrativa established limits in that regard and, given its validity, the relationships should have been subjected to it, which the Bank did not do at the time. Therefore, the indemnification is set at 4 years, because it is the maximum term that the new regulations had established for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and which applies prevalently to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs, so it will be in the sentence execution (ejecución de sentencia) proceedings where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, as it is a value obligation arising in the judgment, interest that is granted as it is found included within the damages and losses claimed by all the plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed as of the finality of this judgment. Once the indemnification corresponding to each plaintiff is set in the sentence execution (ejecución de sentencia) proceedings, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted.
**Regarding the external notaries appointed through the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes)**, it was proven that they participated in the qualifications-based selection processes (concursos de antecedentes) conducted under numbers 1-85, 4-86, 2-90, 2-94, 1-96, and 1-95, as verified in proven facts 1 through 30, as well as 120 through 124, information provided by the banking entity and expressed in all proven facts that establish the selection process number and the Board of Directors' agreement that supports it. As stated, such notaries were appointed, one group without a termination period being established and another with a two-year term, extendable by one or two years depending on the evaluation of their service. Regarding the first group in which no term was set, it was provided in the **qualifications-based selection process number 1-85**, concerning the effective period, that the appointed notaries commit to providing services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, with the removal of any of the awardees remaining at the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors at the moment it deems convenient, following a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the Institution's interest (proven facts 31 through 38). The same modality was applied for **qualifications-based selection process number 4-86**, in which the modality of requiring their services when the defendant requires them was provided (proven facts 39 through 45). Subsequently, **through qualifications-based selection process 2-90**, it was established that the professionals will be appointed as external attorneys and notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 46 through 66), and in turn, **qualifications-based selection process 2-94** appointed external notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 67 through 74). One year later, through **qualifications-based selection process number 1-95 and 1-96**, which made the appointment of professionals who will provide their services as external attorneys and notaries for two years, on which date the professional's performance will be evaluated, and in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively while good service for the Bank persists (proven facts 75 through 80). Such plaintiffs were governed by the Regulation of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, which in article 174 contemplated the possibility of appointing external notaries through the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), a procedure followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts whose purpose was the provision of technical or professional services without a relationship of legal labor subordination and where, for awarding, price does not constitute a primary factor. Such qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) was a public procedure, which begins with the publication in "La Gaceta" of the conditions or terms thereof and the corresponding invitation to compete (canon 175 of regulation 7576). In that sense, such procedure of Qualifications-Based Selection Process (Concurso de Antecedentes) was enacted so that the Administration would seek to provide opportunity in the contracts it executes, which will be done directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become the privilege of only one or a few persons. However, if it was the will of the administration to revoke or rescind it, what was stipulated in the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa) in its ordinals 203 and following had to be applied, as well as what is provided in the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in its third and fourth chapters and article 13 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting, which clearly contemplate the due procedures to extinguish such contracts through the normal route, by the occurrence of the term and the execution of the contractual object, or abnormally, by resolution, administrative rescission, or declaration of nullity. Thus, the plaintiffs who are under this condition, and which is verified from proven facts 118 to 124, as well as from all the facts where the form of their appointment and the date are recorded, are: Messrs./Mmes. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number Placa6725, Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 4-86, Messrs./Mmes. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 2-90, Messrs./Mmes. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 2-94, Mr. Freddy Rojas López: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-95, and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-96. As can be seen from the terms of the expressed selection processes, although they were conducted through the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), a distinction is observed in the contracting conditions, which merit different treatment. On one hand, those appointed in **selection processes (concursos) number 1-85 and 4-86**, for which it is clearly determined from the contracting terms that they have no term, they have no effective period, they are appointed for an indefinite time. The contracting conditions state that they commit to providing services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, observing that such legal relationship was extended over time indefinitely, their services being needed constantly, because the bank's services required it. Throughout more than 20 years, this service modality was maintained continuously over time, by virtue of which, like the other group of notaries appointed directly, without a time limit, they must be compensated for the unilateral termination of this subjective right without a contractual rescission or resolution procedure having been carried out, as stipulated in the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting in its ordinals 203 and following, as well as in the new procedure and process stipulated in the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting in its ordinal 13, regulating the forms of termination of these contractual relationships through the occurrence of the term, the execution of the contractual relationship, resolution, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. Such rules have as a common denominator that the Administration has the power to terminate the appointment through the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), but prior to payment of the due compensation. Therefore, since the defendant entity did not duly compensate these notaries appointed without a fixed term, they must be recognized the corresponding compensation equivalent to four years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the four years prior to the termination of the legal relationship of notaries, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and it will be calculated solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. Such compensatory term, as expressed, is supported by being the maximum time that the new regulations set for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Law of Administrative Contracting) and which is applied prevalently to the plaintiffs' subjective rights, therefore, it will be in the execution of judgment proceedings where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until its effective payment, as it is a value obligation born in judgment, interest that is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be adjusted for inflation starting from the finality of this judgment. This condition of having been appointed without a fixed time applies to Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-85, and Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez. Once the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff is set in the execution of judgment, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted. **On the other hand, we have the notaries who were appointed for a fixed term**, but despite this, their contract was successively extended, it being clear regarding them that in the qualifications-based selection processes (concursos de antecedentes) in which they participated, they were appointed for a defined time, for a fixed and determined term. As observed from the selection processes (concursos), **2-90, 2-94, 1-95, and 1-96**, they are appointed for two years, a term that will be extendable if the evaluation is positive, with said extension established at one and two years. Thus, the nature of said contracts is to have a fixed term; they were not born to be indefinite, and the fact that they have been extended over time does not grant them such condition. The fact that the Administration's needs implied the continuous requirement of their work does not have the virtue of mutating the provision that, by mutual agreement and based on the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), set a term in time. Given said situation, having proven that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years, and that no cause had occurred to render the appointment without effect due to breach, the appropriate action is to compensate them for the non-extension of their contract without justified cause, the appropriate action being that they be compensated with two years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the legal relationship of notaries, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, which will be calculated solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. For this reason, as already expressed and for the cited reasons, in both cases, those appointed without subjection to a term, as well as those appointed for a defined time, the Chamber departs from the criteria of the plaintiffs who claim lifetime compensation, as well as from the expert Mr. Nombre18237 who compensates for life, as well as from the criterion of the expert Mr. Nombre39226, who had set the compensation as if it were a labor relationship. The compensation is set at 2 years, because it is the maximum term for which the contract would have been extended, it being the power, as indicated, of the defendant bank to rescind or revoke the contract, but duly compensating, as ordered here, and it will be in the execution of judgment proceedings where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until its effective payment, as it is a value obligation born in judgment, interest that is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. This compensation corresponds to Messrs./Mmes. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, who were appointed **through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 2-90**. To Messrs./Mmes. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, appointed **through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 2-94**. To Mr. Freddy Rojas López appointed **through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-95**, and to Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, appointed **through qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-96**. Furthermore, such sums must be adjusted for inflation starting from the finality of this judgment. Once the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff is set in the execution of judgment, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted. Likewise, as expressed supra, in none of the expressed scenarios, of indefinite or fixed-term appointment, did the compensation provided include the expressed expenses for furniture and equipment, payment of labor burdens for their employees, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in the provision of notarial services, which had to be borne at their own account and risk, and were not part of the fee agreed with the banking entity. The arguments of the defendant regarding it being merely the right to participate in a roster are not admissible; the plaintiffs are external notaries, were appointed through the qualifications-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) and by agreement of the Board of Directors, hold a subjective right by virtue of such designation, performing notarial duties for the defendant, therefore it is not simply, as the banking entity states, a mere random roster for assignment of duties that excludes the payment of damages, because such roster is a mechanism devised for the distribution of notarial work (ordinal 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica), which originated in an administrative act declaratory of subjective rights that must be compensated in the face of the administrative decision to revoke it. **Regarding the annulment claims** filed by the plaintiffs, these are rejected; as expressed, no nullity is observed in the administrative procedures followed and in the decisions adopted by the plaintiff Bank, which executed them in the exercise of its powers, but without having compensated as required. Although the plaintiffs base the nullity on the violation of due process for having carried out a procedure without compensation or not having adhered to the provisions of the law of administrative contracting, it is not a matter of declaring nullity for nullity's sake. The invalidity and ineffectiveness of administrative provisions are declared when there is harm to the administered party, and in this case, more than in the procedure followed, the affectation consists of the non-payment of the just and correct compensation that corresponded to each and every one of the plaintiffs. The banking entity was empowered to exercise the revocation, nullity, rescission, or termination by mutual agreement of the acts declaratory of subjective rights; this is unquestionable, it was authorized by the aforementioned regulations of the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the General Law of Public Administration, the Law of Administrative Contracting and its Regulations, but it had to compensate and follow at least a minimum administrative procedure like the one followed but fully indemnifying the plaintiffs, therefore there is no reason to declare the nullity of the challenged agreements and procedures, especially since reinstatement is not possible for the expressed reasons, because it is not a statutory relationship protected by lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad), and because it corresponds to legitimate powers of the Administration, a nullity pronouncement is unnecessary, thus making the compensation claim the essential and principal pronouncement of this process. Furthermore, there is no nullity due to the fact that Ms. Herradora Chacón communicated the termination of the legal relationships of external notaryship, since she, in her capacity as Provider of the banking entity, did not assume attributions that do not correspond to her, but merely communicated the decisions adopted by the Board of Directors. **On the other hand, the compensation claim for the application of the double roster by the banking entity is rejected**, as well as for the decrease in income they received as of December 1, 2009; this is so because granting the plaintiffs compensation for the termination of their legal relationship and also compensating them for having seen their income reduced would incur a double payment. For this, it must be assessed that the Law imposed the new contracting modality through public bidding; the plaintiffs remained in their positions due to formulated precautionary measures, and furthermore, the Bank had the power to revoke or rescind the subjective right prior to compensation, which is ordered here. We would be wrong to grant compensation for termination and for the decrease in income during the continuity of the position; both claims are incompatible and imply a contradiction to the exercise of legal powers by the bank, by virtue of which the reinstatement claims must be rejected, as we are not before a public employment relationship in the terms of constitutional ordinals 190 and 191. Although at folio 116, it is verified and a proven fact that starting from the entry into force on December 1, 2009, of Public Bid 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries, the hiring of new notaries, and the establishment of a double roster for assignment of duties, the plaintiffs have seen their income decreased in the exercise of the notary function for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and for this, as well as to demonstrate moral damage, the witnesses Ms. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Ms. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, Ms. Flory Eugenia González Rodríguez, and Ms. Luz María González Rodríguez are provided. However, and despite this, compensating the plaintiffs for such affectation is clearly incompatible with the compensation for the unilateral termination of the subjective right of the notary condition that is being granted to them in this ruling. This collegiate body could not grant damages based on the income received years before Public Bid 2008LN-000024-01 came into force and also grant damages because their income was reduced due to said public contracting. For this, as expressed, it must be indicated that the banking entity was within its right to terminate the subjective right through revocation or rescission, but it had to compensate; given this, if it decided to terminate said legal relationship, it was a fact that the plaintiffs could not continue as of December 1, 2009, and if they did so, it was due to the filing of precautionary measures, awaiting the results of the process and a possible reinstatement. Consequently, since this ruling recognizes the legitimate power of the banking entity to opt not to continue with such contracts, it is not also appropriate to recognize the decrease in their income, when it was a fact that they could no longer continue due to the defendant's decision. Having discussed and endorsed the appropriateness of compensation for the termination, they cannot also be granted compensation for having continued without the conditions they previously had, thanks to the precautionary measures adopted. The discussion of compensation for the non-fulfillment of the double roster and for the decrease in their income for said reason would acquire relevance if it had been resolved to grant the reinstatement of the notaries, but since the bank's capacity to terminate them is endorsed, it is not permissible to grant damages for having continued in such duties after the banking entity's decision to end and settle them. Likewise, the claim for subjective and objective moral damages claimed by the plaintiffs must be rejected, since the Bank acted in the exercise of its powers when terminating the legal relationship it had with the external notaries, without it being observed that moral damage must be compensated for this, as these are actions exercised in the face of the legislative change operated by the obligation to put such contracts out to bid and in the exercise of administrative powers protected by law, to be able to rescind, revoke, or annul administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights. **Regarding the lawsuit filed against the official Lorena María Herradora Chacón**, it is appropriate to indicate that, being a public servant, her liability to third parties is governed by the stipulations of numerals 199 to 202 of the General Law of Public Administration, in which it is provided that the public official shall be personally liable when they have incurred in fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof. In turn, it is established that without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall be jointly liable to those affected for fault in choosing (culpa in eligendo) or in supervising (culpa in vigilando). By virtue of this, for the servant to be subjectively and personally liable to those affected, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their powers and functions and that the conduct was subjectively unlawful due to having incurred in fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). However, in the present matter, since the plaintiffs have not proven that the defendant official incurred in conduct of fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of her functions that would have caused them damages, the action filed against her must be denied. The actions incurred by the defendant servant through the communication she made to the plaintiffs in the exercise of her position were executed in the exercise of legitimate administrative powers, without abuse of power or illegitimate exercise of the functions entrusted under her competence being observed, which leads to the lawsuit filed against her being declared without merit. It must be taken into consideration that the decision to compensate the plaintiffs was beyond the scope of competence of Ms. Herradora Chacón, she limited herself in the exercise of her position to communicating what had been decided by the Board of Directors of the defendant banking entity. **Regarding Ms. Nombre112022**, it is observed that she was mistakenly included within the initial complaint, but this is an evident material error, because, as could be verified in the evidence required for better judgment and which appears at folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice, she is not a notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, has not received any appointment, therefore she lacks standing to sue, for which reason the filed lawsuit must be rejected.
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:16pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">II.5)-REGARDING THE FORMS OF EARLY TERMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION PROCESS:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> The Administrative Litigation Procedure Code establishes in its Title VI on the termination of the process, Chapter One, that in addition to the other mechanisms established by law (conciliation and judgment), the process may terminate early or abnormally,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> through withdrawal (desistimiento) verbal or written (113 ibid), acquiescence (allanamiento) (114 ibid), extra-procedural administrative satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal administrativa) (115 ibid), the application of a final favorable administrative resolution (116 ibid), settlement (transacción) (117 ibid), and compliance with the conduct of omission (118 ibid). All of which shall have the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (112 ibid), and requires supervision and homologation by the judge. Regarding withdrawal, it must be formulated before the issuance of the judgment by the Trial Court and, if filed by the Public Administration, it shall be accompanied by the agreement or resolution adopted by the highest hierarchical superior or by authorization from the Procurador General de la República if said body had initiated it. This legal concept (instituto) consists of the "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt">unconditional and unequivocal declaration of will by the plaintiff in the process by which they express their will to end the process before the judgment is issued without extinguishing the right. The basis of withdrawal is the principle of party disposition by virtue of which the plaintiff decides when to bring an action and conclude the initiated process</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">(Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual del Proceso Contencioso Administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 227). Although, in legal systems such as the Argentine one (Gozaíni Osvaldo A. Elementos de Derecho Procesal Civil. First edition. Buenos Aires. Editorial Ediar. 2005. Page 398), the withdrawal of the right is admitted, as well as the withdrawal of the process, in our national system the procedural code, as well as the civil jurisdiction (numeral 206 of the Civil Procedure Code), chose to admit it only regarding the latter, which leaves the promoter the possibility of filing the action again, unless the waiver of the right operates (Article 207 of the Civil Procedure Code), not expressly contemplated in administrative litigation procedural matters, but supplementally applicable. Consequently, "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt">the withdrawal ends the process, but not the substantive underlying legal situations that the plaintiff may assert in a new process</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual del Proceso Contencioso Administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 229). Thus, once the request is filed, a resolution will be issued approving or homologating it, in which the process will be terminated, the archiving of the proceedings will be ordered, and the return of the administrative case file (expediente) will proceed. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">Applying the foregoing to the present matter</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, we have that through briefs filed with the court, Messrs. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba expressly request that the present process be considered withdrawn, a request that is endorsed by the processing judge. By virtue of this, it is observed that such request meets the legal requirements established by numeral 113 of the procedural Code. This is so because it is an express, unconditional, and unequivocal request by the promoter, which has been formulated before the issuance of the judgment, therefore, it is appropriate to consider it admitted, as was resolved in the procedural stage.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:16pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">II.6)- DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES):</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">By reason of the foregoing, the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">is partially granted</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> filed by the co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, it being understood as granted in what was not awarded and denied in what was expressly conceded, this because in accordance with the cited regulations, evidence provided, and the factual and legal grounds set forth, the right invoked by the plaintiff in support of her claims partially assists her, since it was declared that she has the right to be compensated for the unilateral termination of her notarial legal relationship with the Banking entity. Regarding the claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, the defense of lack of right filed is granted, the claim filed against her being denied in all its aspects. Regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad), it is rejected as the fatal, peremptory term for filing this action had not elapsed. Ex officio, the lack of standing (legitimación) of Mrs. Nombre112022</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">to bring action in this process is declared, the claim filed being dismissed and resolved without a special award of costs (costas).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:16pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">III) COSTS (COSTAS):</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">In accordance with numerals 119, 193, and 194 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, it is necessary to resolve this process by ordering Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to pay both sets of costs, this in application of the general principle of condemning the losing party and because the circumstances that allow it to be exempted from such payment, in accordance with numeral 194 of the cited Code, are not present in this case. Although the claim was partially granted, it must be taken into consideration that the civil compensatory claims awarded constitute the main claim of this action. Regarding the claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, it is resolved without a special award of costs, since despite the action against her being dismissed, there was sufficient reason for the promoters to litigate, her participation in the facts needing to be determined in order to establish her eventual compensatory liability.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:16pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">THEREFORE (POR TANTO):</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The defense of expiration is rejected and the defense of lack of right filed by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, understood as denied in what was expressly awarded and granted in what was not conceded. Consequently, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay Messrs./Mmes. Nombre112075</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, Nombre39622</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, as damages (daños y perjuicios) the income for four years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the four years prior to the termination of the notaries' legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, sums that must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay Messrs./Mmes. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López, and Federico Alfaro Araya, as damages the income for two years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which shall be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the two years prior to the termination of the notaries' legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, sums that must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Both sets of costs are to be borne by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón is dismissed in all its aspects, the defense of lack of right filed by the defendant being granted and resolved without a special award of costs. The claim filed by Mr. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba, as well as the third-party claim (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez, is considered withdrawn. Ex officio, the lack of active standing ad causam of Mrs. Nombre112022</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">is declared, the claim filed being dismissed and it is resolved without a special award of costs. Judge Madrigal Jiménez reasons his vote separately.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Carlos Espinoza Salas</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> Rodrigo Huertas Durán </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Dissenting Vote of Judge Madrigal Jiménez:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Even though I fully respect the solid position of my colleagues on the Chamber, there are several aspects on which I differ, which I will now proceed to point out.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">I) Regarding the Proven and Unproven Facts:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> I maintain the list of proven and unproven facts, adding to the latter the following: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">The plaintiffs did not demonstrate: 5)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> That the decision of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to terminate the relationship with the notaries at the base of the process was untimely, arbitrary, or in any way flawed in its reasoning (the case file). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">6</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The specific amount of income the plaintiffs received for the activity performed for the clients of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (there is no evidence in that regard). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">7)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> That the relationship of the plaintiffs with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica represented a condition of exclusivity, such that they could not provide their services to other clients in the ordinary liberal exercise (there is insufficient evidence). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">8)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> That there are works performed by the notaries that have not been paid for to date (the case file)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">. 9)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> That there are expenses incurred by the notaries to fulfill the contract that have not been paid for at this time (there is no evidence in that regard).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">II) Regarding Expiration:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In accordance with the majority reasoning, expiration has not operated in this case by virtue of the fact that, because a claim for liability was filed jointly with the nullity claim (full jurisdiction process), the only applicable term is the one hundred and ninety-eight day term of the General Law of Public Administration. This would prevent the fatal time from having elapsed. In this matter, I consider it advisable to clarify that the issue was especially complex and debatable in the old jurisdiction, where on the one hand it came to be held that the mechanism of seeking compensation</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> produced the suppression of the expiration term, circumventing the preclusive legal concept (instituto); which at the time led to the determination that one could only request the non-conformity of the act to subsequently derive liability from there (but not its nullity). In recent decades, case law has been oriented towards pointing out the inapplicability of expiration when there is a claim for compensation, basically on two grounds: on the one hand, the pro actione principle that leads to the obligation to interpret restrictively all those measures tending to reduce access to the Administration of justice, and on the other, effective judicial protection. In addition to accepting a non-conformity of an act with the legal system without being able to declare its nullity, we would find ourselves in the illogical condition of having to recognize reparations into the future indefinitely while the act would subsist. This has determined that the latest thesis progressively gains strength, as expressed by my colleagues. However, in the terms in which it has been stated, it appears as if the matter were today beyond discussion, which is not necessarily true.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> On the contrary, the issue remains current. What I do share with them is that if we consider the moment in which the events that determined the contractual breach occurred with respect to the date of the filing of the claims, it is evident that the legal term had not elapsed, rendering the discussion on this matter sterile. For this reason, and only for this reason, I consider that the substantive defense must be rejected. Even more so if we take into account when the act challenged in this venue became final, as an interrupting aspect of the computation of the legal period.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">III) Regarding Declaratory Acts of Rights and the Absence of a Right to the Immutability of the Legal System: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Although the majority judgment does not do so, it is my opinion that it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding declaratory acts of rights and the absence of immutability of the legal system as a right. In accordance with the principles contained in Constitutional numerals 11 and 34, the Administration is prohibited from freely suppressing those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers, and which confer subjective rights on individuals, since such rights constitute a limit in relation to the possibility of annulling, revoking, or unilaterally modifying the acts emanating from it. It is a guarantee for the citizen, against the possibility of eventual arbitrariness by the Administration; a guarantee that undoubtedly constitutes one of the manifestations of our republican system consolidated and developed on fundamental values, among them: legal certainty. The principle of intangibility of subjective legal situations and of the rights of the administered, the legal system prohibits the Administration from freely withdrawing declaratory acts of rights. Consequently, such withdrawal is exceptional and must also be based on the existence of absolute nullity, under the terms of Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP) or eventually a revocation as will be analyzed later. In the first case, it implies that the defect of the act must be of such gravity that it affects public order, which in turn originates the legal duty to withdraw and not execute the act so vitiated. And that is why the Administration is allowed to exercise its power of self-tutelage. On the contrary, in the case of absolute nullity that is not evident and manifest, it must resort to the administrative litigation process, previously declaring the act detrimental (lesivo). Therefore, in administrative proceedings, the declaration of nullity is subject to limits and only proceeds insofar as the nullity is absolute, evident, and manifest under the terms of Article 173 of the Law. It is a serious defect that makes the existence of the act incompatible with the legal system. On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber in judgment 2002-12054 of 9:03 a.m. on December 20, 2002, referred to the administrative power to review ex officio acts issued by it, and the propriety of issuing their nullity in that proceeding: “ </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(…) Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires that certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations concur that qualify it. // The nullity that justifies the ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, according to the provisions of numeral 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, “evident and manifest</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The evident and manifest is that which is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and that offers no margin of doubt or that does not require a dialectical or logical verification process or effort to discover it, precisely, because of its gross and serious nature. In this sense, it is enough to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that gives it coverage to reach such a conclusion, without the need for any hermeneutics or exegesis. It is necessary to add that numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration does not create a kind of bipartition of absolute nullities, some being simple and others evident and manifest, but rather what it tries to promote is that in the case of the second ones, the deep and expert analysis of the administrative litigation judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate their review in administrative proceedings.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In accordance with what has been pointed out, there are two ways to declare the nullity of an administrative act: one, referring to the declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, in accordance with the referenced numeral 173, and two, in those cases where the defect of the act does not possess the characteristics of evident and manifest, one may resort to the judicial route, after a prior declaration of its detrimental nature. Our General Law of Public Administration provides for the possibility of annulling administrative acts for reasons of legality (Art. 158 et seq.) and also of revoking them for reasons of opportunity, convenience, merit, or legality (Art. 152 et seq.). The issue of the legality of an act brings up a series of highly relevant aspects. If the act presented a defect from its formation, the logic that prevails is that it must be annulled via a detrimentality process, so revocation could only operate in two scenarios, the first being when the term to declare nullity has elapsed, or alternatively when we are dealing with a supervening illegality. This last scenario evokes those cases where the act was in accordance with the legal system at the time it was issued, but a subsequent change in the legal system makes it unsustainable.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> We are in the area of the survival of abolished law, versus consolidated legal situations or vested rights, under the protection of Constitutional canon 34; note that if it is a mere legitimate interest, there would be no right to request that the law be maintained to obtain the benefit, but only the right to bring action to seek that the new norm be invalidated and the previous law be maintained.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The logic regarding abolished law is that the generated acts and rights are maintained over time until their effects conclude, but there are multiple scenarios where this is not possible due to an open clash with the public interest. In such cases, the appropriate action is the revocation of the act. The other scenarios for revocation of the formal activity of the administration are based on convenience and merit, administrative criteria of prudence and not of legality. In addition to what has been said, revocation is only possible for discretionary acts (Art. 156.1 a contrario sensu), whereas for regulated acts it would be nonsensical insofar as every time they are adopted, the same administrative action would be produced again. It is established as a requirement that there must also be a serious divergence between its effects of the act and the public interest (Art. 152.2); which may be based on the appearance of new factual circumstances or a new assessment of those initially taken into account or of the affected public interest (Art. 153). Article 155 establishes a cardinal principle in this matter: the revocation of a declaratory act of rights is only possible by a decision of the respective head (jerarca) that simultaneously contains the recognition of the damages that such decision causes the administered party.</span></p> This principle admits the exception provided for in the preceding paragraph, which states the following: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Article 154.- Permits for the use of public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right of an individual on a precarious basis, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period must be granted in all cases for compliance with the revocation order</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">". The scholar Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz explained the scope of the foregoing provision as follows: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">"This alludes to the situation of certain types of acts we discussed yesterday that produce rights which do not become consolidated. Because it is known in advance, upon granting them, that they are subject to any change due to new facts or circumstances or due to a change in the authority's criteria. This occurs, for example, in acts and permits for public domain, and the doctrine recognizes that so-called police power acts are generally of this type. They do not create vested rights. I grant the permit to open a business of a type that is considered subject to supervision because it is a source of disturbances. But this permit does not create the right to keep the business open, if the authority considers any change of criteria or a subsequent circumstance that warrants its elimination. In such cases, it is understood that the clause called precarious, that is, the reservation of the power to revoke, is implicit in the act and that the act can be revoked without any compensation; it was known in advance that the right was precarious and highly unstable. That is the hypothesis… As you will see, it is exceptional because immediately afterward, we require, for the other cases where the right is consolidated, compensation in the event that the act is revoked and suppressed</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (legislative file no. A23E5452, record no. 102, session of October 1, 1970, pages 3 and 4). The possibility of revoking acts that confer rights on a precarious basis without any right to compensation is, furthermore, a doctrinally accepted possibility, although always under the condition that such revocation not be untimely or arbitrary. Moreover, it has been maintained that this is the sole instance in which, at least in our legal system, revocation is possible (Miguel Marienhoff, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Volume II, Buenos Aires, Abeledo-Perrot, 1966, p. 577). The power of revocation is subject to compliance with the following requirements: 1) Revocation may occur for reasons of opportunity and convenience, taking into account what was previously indicated regarding the content of these reasons. 2) The revocation must not be untimely, arbitrary, or illegitimate. The first being understood as not being outside of time and reason. 3) In all cases, a reasonable period must be granted for compliance with the revocation order.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Likewise, when we are in the presence of a right proper and not a precarious one, this must necessarily be preceded by compensation. Doctrine has long discussed the possibility of recognizing any payment for permits or authorizations held on a precarious basis, and while the general rule is a negative answer (except when the decision is untimely or arbitrary), exceptions have been recognized, especially when a singular, special, and intense sacrifice can be identified, under the modality of liability for lawful conduct. We reiterate that we would be facing an exception. With respect to rights proper, there are multiple lawful and normal circumstances where the Administration may find itself obligated to suppress an already recognized right, from the very figure of expropriation as a limit on private property, to the need to reorganize the administrative function, among many other cases.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Of course, again, we are in the presence of liability for lawful conduct (as long as the act presents the due motivation and is adopted following all legal procedures). One aspect on which we have not dedicated any lines but which it is imperative to clarify is that the legal system, by its very nature, is dynamic; human relationships vary and the Law must adjust to regulate them. The legislator, consequently, must be modifying legal norms to provide solutions to the various new or different problems that society presents, which entails that the legal system must undergo modifications. Canon 34 of the fundamental charter guarantees that there will be no illegitimate impairments to vested rights and consolidated situations, but it does not prevent norms from changing and adapting to those new realities.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The mere possibility of considering that the legal system does not adjust would entail a renunciation of the legislative function, as a basic activity of the State, and would allow the social order to progressively be lost, delegitimizing the very existence of the State. The legitimacy of public powers is based on fulfilling the function that determines their name (legislative, executive, and judicial), with the State absorbing the totality of the use of force to the detriment of individuals but for the benefit of social peace. If the State does not fulfill the entrusted functions, it is calling upon the inhabitants to adopt the measures they find convenient by their own hand, retreating within the social paradigm we present. The Law is legitimized insofar as it resolves social situations and not when it ignores them. As far as the dispute corresponds, it is possible to see that the legislator varied the norms regarding control for administrative contracting, making them more rigorous for the benefit of the public treasury, so that it was performing a lawful and legal function.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Therefore, the legislator changing the norms is a normal activity and a fundamental part of the obligations that the citizenry has entrusted to it. In matters of public finance, such as administrative contracting, it is normal for requirements to be varied and conditions to be established to ensure that everything is being carried out with due transparency. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">IV) Regarding the legal nature of the relationship of the notaries</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">As well maintained by Recital II.2 of this resolution, the Financial Administration Law established a system for contracting notaries through inclusion on a roster list. One must be clear about the age of the provision (1953), when professionals were few and generally with living standards very different from today's; in that framework, having a reasonable number of professionals was the ideal. A breadth of offerors was sought. See also how the norm did not guarantee (nor does it today) a specific number of potential clients who would contract with the Bank, nor does it establish the value of the transactions that would be generated; rather, it was the commercial activity that would determine how many potential billable hours were to be received; the entire situation was within a highly random matter. It is debatable whether we are in the presence of a right proper or a mere authorization to be placed on a roster to eventually be assigned to execute deeds. Every act of award within a contracting process is presupposed to constitute a subjective right in favor of the beneficiary, but in this case, the right consisted solely of being added to a roster list and that removal from it had to comply with due process. The effective content of the supposedly granted right is highly debatable. The Administration had the power to hold as many competitions as it saw fit, and those entering would do so under the same conditions as those already part of the list. The legal nature of that benefit is hybrid. That explains why the legislator did not establish greater requirements, because it was not granting a real direct benefit, but an expectation within the roster; within an open list. Where even the amount to be charged was defined by guild provision. The topic is otherwise interesting and a matter for arguments for or against. In any case, we can define without major question that the majority of the plaintiffs had the right to belong to the aforementioned registry, where they were assigned deeds by rotation. The fees for these deeds were not paid by the defendant bank directly, but by the latter's clients; which generates a triangular relationship, where the defendant secured the fees and expenses of the professional to deliver them later. A relationship that is otherwise complex. It must be specified on this point that the Regulations to the Financial Administration Law did not include price as a factor to be assessed, because it was known that the professionals were subject to a guild fee schedule, over which they could not charge less or more, under penalty of incurring unfair competition. The legal mechanism sought the distribution of wealth under the protection of constitutional canon fifty, with the advantage that the Bank always retained the possibility of opening as many competitions as it saw fit, with the sole interest of maintaining an updated list in accordance with its needs. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the data discussed in the oral and public trial and pointed out by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the system became distorted such that a very closed elite of notaries who formed that group was fostered. I add to the foregoing that, as the operations carried out and their value grew, by a basic rational sense, some of the notaries involved became enriched, this being essentially the basis of the litigation before us. Without the existence of any legal reform, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic began to warn of the unsuitability of the norm in the terms in which it was drafted since the mid-eighties, and through repeated resolutions, made the Administrations see the need for such contracting arrangements to be set for reasonable periods of two or four years, in no case exceeding six years, with the sole interest of ensuring that a reevaluation of what had been done and of the professionals contracted was carried out. This was a logical and indispensable control measure that was complied with in many cases. Even, as was shown in the oral and public debate, the defendant public bank included some of its professionals under this modality. With automatic extensions. The most serious error lies in not establishing a limit on said extensions, as it fell back into an indefinite contract. In any case, we have up to this point two groups of contracted professionals: a first group whose contracting by background has no term, and a second group, which does have one. But the problem becomes more complex as will be seen.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> With the enactment of the Administrative Contracting Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, effective as of May 1, 1996, it partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law, and the General Regulations on Administrative Contracting, number 25038 of March 6, 1996, which was in force from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, as indicated in the majority vote, established the modality of contracting technical or professional services provided by individuals or legal entities in which the procedures for public bidding, registry bidding, or restricted bidding had to be followed according to the amount of the respective contract and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Up to this point, it is necessary to make at least two clarifications. The first of them is that, although the legal imperative was more than unquestionable, the Bank omitted regularizing the situation as the legislator ordered, with several paths existing.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> On one hand, it could have maintained the notaries who had no fixed term and carried out one or several public biddings to comply with the law, warning the former group that their contracts would no longer be indefinite and allowing them to adjust to the new reality. It could also have opted to revoke the existing contracts and hold a new competition where all participants entered under equal conditions. What it could not continue doing was maintaining the factual situation under the same conditions as if the legal imperative were something else, where a list of essentially closed benefited notaries was maintained without generating new competitions. The other aspect on which an unjustified inertia of the bank is located centers on the absence of applying the new law, such that it left the norm indefinitely and for several lustrums devoid of legal content, of legal effect, as if it were a mere moral imperative. On this topic, it is nothing less than obligatory to call attention and expose the manifest non-compliance that was occurring.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> On the other hand, as well exposed by the resolution before us, the Administrative Contracting Law and its Regulations allowed the contracting of professionals under the ordinary regime for appointing public officials. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code, the regulation of the fees of in-house notaries public in public institutions was contemplated in Articles 7 and 8. In view of this situation, the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries: some in-house who cannot charge fees but rather salary, and others external who earn stipends for their work. During the trial, an attempt was made to suggest that the existence of this dual role was an act of bad faith on the part of the defendant, which is incorrect. The norm of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica guarantees in sound logic that a single roster exists among external notaries, in a transparent and orderly manner and not merely as a mechanism of favoritism; but that did not forbid the existence of an internal roster of notaries who did not charge fees.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The reason for this internal registry is highly varied: banks carry out projects of social interest where charging fees is not possible due to the public purposes pursued; there also exist commercial transactions where, by their very nature, an attractive aspect of the activity consisted of not charging fees. Today, it is public and notorious that this mechanism is used by several banking entities. In this way, the plaintiffs' interpretation that the existence of an internal roster of notaries is contrary to law has no reason to be and, on the contrary, it is being attempted to accommodate the norm to their interests. We must be more than clear in indicating that this right held did not guarantee a specific number of deeds, much less a determined value for them, in such a way as to secure the livelihood of those professionals; their right was limited to being on a roster to be eventually assigned, with the possibility that said list could grow as much as the public entity saw fit. That also did not prevent the Bank from presenting a system of in-house notaries, as already advanced, whether to attend to matters of public interest or simply because it was in line with its interests.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> This adjudicator must be more than clear in indicating that he is aware that the current market conditions, within a system of free competition, determine that the commissions, expenses, and fees that a person formerly had to pay to face a bank obligation are today assumed by the banking entity as a mechanism to attract clientele.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In this framework, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, one of the largest and most solid in the region, must enter the market with due aggressiveness towards its clients, offering not only what its other competitors also offer but also other more risky benefits, such as interest rates or bonuses, because otherwise it would be destined to perish in the market. Although the Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras establishes a series of requirements on debt limits, that does not prevent healthy free competition appropriate to the framework of Articles 45 and 46 of the Constitution for the benefit of the consumer. One cannot forget either that public banks, although they carry out commercial activity that is not differentiated from an external plane from that carried out by private parties, it is unquestionable that their acts are clothed with public interest. Otherwise, there would be no reason for their existence. In that reasoning, it is logical to think that there must be many instances in which the charging of attorney's fees is not convenient or prudent; a living example of that is located in matters related to the Law of the National Housing Finance System. In view of this situation, if the contracting administration was called upon to reorient the services of external notaries appointed directly through an agreement of the Board of Directors (or by another body authorized by it), what in effect had to be done in strict adherence to legality. Such a right confers upon the external notaries who find themselves under that condition the power to demand, in the face of the contracting entity's desire not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the pre-existing right in the terms set forth. During the oral and public trial, the plaintiffs confined themselves to the argument that the only way they could be removed from their condition was through the "lesividad" procedure already analyzed, which, as we have been indicating, is incorrect. The act of award at the time ordered was in accordance with the legal system of that time and, via Article 34 of the Constitution, it is not possible to apply a norm that arose subsequently to them. In this way, it is not possible to locate a nullity in the terms argued by the plaintiffs; rather, we are in the presence of a revocation (or rescission, according to the terms of the Administrative Contracting Law). It would be illogical to pretend that the public commercial entity was obligated to maintain a contractual relationship indefinitely, one that eventually made it less competitive or generated a hindrance in this matter, due to the existence of the agreement with the plaintiffs. Even if that ultimately implies having to make some reparation or compensation as will be seen. We reiterate time and again that the Administration is obligated to adapt to the circumstances and the entrusted service, especially when it is in competition, renouncing the prerogatives that the legal system establishes. Acting under those conditions, it is entirely lawful to revoke the existing contracts. Even, see how in the trial hearing, the representative of the defendant, who is believed under the principle of procedural loyalty, openly maintains that the very Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic called them to account on the situation and made them see that they had to regularize it and suppress those indefinite contracts they maintained with the notaries who are plaintiffs here. A procedure that had begun following a complaint from another liberal professional. If those statements were true, they were correct; fifteen years had already passed without the bank regularizing and it maintained some notaries indefinitely, like an elite that benefited from the commercial transactions of the public entity. A situation contrary to the legal system was simply being generated for the benefit of a group that could not be justified in any way. The revocation is an exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of their competence and authorized by the General Law of Public Administration, without observing any non-conformity in the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the legitimate decision adopted.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> It is not out of place to indicate that although the use of the ordinary administrative procedure is not appreciated, the components of due process are located, insofar as the interested parties were informed of the reasons for the administrative decision and were invited to participate, which they could eventually have done, as indeed some of them did. In their reasoning, some of the plaintiffs maintained that they did not participate because this would entail legitimizing the competition, a respectable position, but removed from the legal framework, insofar as it could well have allowed them to re-enter the registry of notaries and eventually claim some compensation if appropriate. The authorization of the oversight body in the case is also not on record, but as stated, it was that same agency that urged the administrative action. Furthermore, that issue was not a matter of controversy between the parties, nor was it argued or a matter of any dispute. We would be facing mere formal non-compliances, which did not prevent the exercise of the right of defense and, more importantly, were not debated, argued, or discussed during the trial hearing. As is known in law, nullity does not exist for its own sake, and that is exactly what would be generated if a nullity were declared in this case, when the defendant entity only sought to regularize the situation with its external notaries. What we do locate that could well generate a contrary application of the law is found in the fact that the corresponding analysis should have been carried out as to whether it was appropriate to indemnify the external notaries according to the provisions of the cited Article 155 and to have paid them the just and legitimate amounts to which they would have been entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years. In any case, this issue becomes more complicated and will be revisited later. What it is possible to conclude up to now, and which coincides with that set forth in the majority vote, is that the nullity sought cannot be granted and, on the contrary, must be denied for lack of right.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">V) Regarding the merits of the matter: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Having denied the nullity sought, it is pertinent to proceed to consider what corresponds to the requested compensation. From the requested claims, it can be seen without major question that what is requested are notary income not received and that some of the plaintiffs could eventually present if the pre-existing situation were maintained. Thus arises one of the most debated points of the process, and which generates the most conflict, since the defendant bank roundly denies the appropriateness of such payments, warning that this income cannot and must not be considered as part of a salary. On this aspect, there is a clear jurisprudential line that denies the income received by lawyer-officials of public institutions who had within their legal departments in-house lawyers, who in turn provided their services as notaries and directors of judicial collection processes, the nature of salary; rather, they are considered income for professional services. In this regard, it is worth reviewing, among many others, what was considered in Voto 9041-2006 of fifteen hours and fifteen minutes of June twenty-seventh, two thousand six, of the Constitutional Chamber, on the subject: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma">"[....] Even, regarding the vested rights claimed by a lawyer of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, who had been in charge of judicial collections for several years and considered that the fact that the respondent institution decided to open a public bidding competition for the contracting of those professional services violated the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution, this Constitutional Court, through judgment number 2004-12511 of 16:16 hours of November 9, 2004, established the following: '…) In any case, as pointed out by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the benefit received by in-house lawyers for the judicial collection of the non-performing loan portfolio does not have the character of salary, but rather of emoluments or fees for the provision of a professional service (DAGJ-2225-2000 of August 31, 2000, visible at folios 16-21), the receipt of which depends on a contingent, eventual, or hypothetical circumstance such as a client's delinquency. Finally, it is not pertinent to allege a vested right based on an administrative practice arising outside of and against the Administrative Contracting Law - Article 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution -, which, at the same time, is supported by the Law of the Constitution (Article 182 of the Political Constitution), as was pointed out by the body of constitutional relevance - Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic - in charge of the supervision and vigilance of the Public Treasury (DAGJ-1420-2002 of August 26, 2002, visible at folios 22-26).' Both criteria are applicable in the specific case insofar as they allow reasserting, in the first place, the constitutionality of the procedures for external contracting of lawyers to perform judicial collection functions in public institutions, and, in the second place, that the economic benefits received by in-house lawyers for judicial collection cannot be considered as salary but rather as fees for the provision of a professional service". (our underlining). Therefore, insofar as such concepts are liquidated as part of a salary not received or as a fixed income to which the plaintiff had a right, such extremes of the liquidation must be rejected. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma">We must draw several conclusions; all expert reports that attempt to apply criteria specific to labor law to the situation of the plaintiffs must be rejected without further question. Now, the Administration was empowered via the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulations to rescind the bond that united it with the plaintiffs. In such a case, it is obligatory to pay the contractor the part of the contract effectively executed, and the expenses it had incurred to complete execution. As far as this case corresponds, there is not a single claim for the concept of unpaid amounts; on the contrary, everything seems to indicate that there is no debt owed for this concept. It is clear for the plaintiffs that the absence of continuing with the contract implicitly entails a decrease in their living standard and its projection, but due to a juncture of economic conditions.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The bank could have maintained the plaintiffs and carried out massive contracting of external notaries and equally, through a lawful mechanism and without any liability, a decrease in the income of the historical external notaries who are now plaintiffs would have been produced.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Even, it could well have carried out all of its deeds through internal notaries, which is again lawful and, in principle, is not a basis for generating liability.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> We reiterate that the plaintiffs only have the right to form part of a list or roster, without any guarantee of how many deeds would be assigned to them or what fees they would receive from them. On this matter, it is a mere expectation, without any basis. Under these conditions, it cannot be considered that a damage susceptible to compensation is being produced.</span> Nor can it be assured that there was bad faith in the matter on the part of the bank or that the decision was untimely, since, on the contrary, there was administrative inertia of many years; even though the period between the communication to the interested parties and their removal from the roster is indeed short from the standpoint of rationality and proportionality, considering that they had provided services for many years. What is indeed recognizable are the damages, specifically regarding the profit they were entitled to receive. It must be specified that while during the oral and public trial the plaintiffs disputed the specific competence of the official who adopted the termination act, which generated, according to them, an absolute defect in the adopted act; the public entity rightly exposes how internal regulations exist that delegate the possibility of revoking contracts to said official, which entails that this formal requirement of the administrative action is satisfied. Reiterating the rejection of the allegation of nullity of the act and confirming its validity.
**VI) As for the merits of the matter:** As indicated in the statement of unproven facts, there is no clarity as to how much their activity with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica represented for each of the plaintiffs, whether it was a lot or a little; indeed, from their own description, it is evident there was much uncertainty on the subject, as the figures for some were several times higher than those of others. Likewise, some of the plaintiffs stated that the activity with the bank prevented them from having other types of clients, due to the delivery times and the required speed, but on that subject, there is also no clear and unquestionable proof that allows reaching the conclusion that this comment is true. Both remain only on a speculative plane. We reiterate that the rule is clear, that while the Bank's conduct was carried out in accordance with public powers, it should have compensated the plaintiffs. Even having communicated its decision several months in advance, we do not consider that the time employed was correct or necessary to generate equity between the parties. As already stated, there is no accreditation of payment shortfalls for services rendered, nor for damages suffered. The undersigned shares the classification of the notaries made in the majority vote, but recognizing them only the amount corresponding to the profit they could actually have received, within the timeframes reasoned by my colleagues. Thus, with respect to the notaries who had an indefinite-term contract, the profit must be for a period of four years, taking as a basis for that purpose the average of the last four years of contracting. This entails that everything related to operating expenses inherent to the notarial activity must be deducted, by virtue of the fact that said money would be received by third parties and not by the plaintiffs herein. Considering only what was received for services to clients of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and for notarial activity. Furthermore, applying criteria of justice, equity, and reasonableness, within said period it is possible for the person to adjust to their new life condition. It is not inappropriate to indicate that in the absence of reliable supporting documents in this regard, there is a regulatory norm that allows presuming what the profit margin (margen de utilidad) of the notaries was. It is worth returning to the subject that at the trial hearing, the plaintiffs said they were older persons and were not at an age to be changing their professional activity, always within the law, which prevented them from adjusting to the market. We do not doubt that the assertion is true, insofar as as a person advances in age, adjusting to changes becomes more complicated, but this reality, unquestionable by common sense, is not a matter that is the resort and responsibility of the public entity. The problem of the saturation of professionals, especially lawyers, has been a highly discussed matter for almost twenty years. The number of professionals registered with the bar association today is almost three hundred percent compared to what it was at that time. Carving out a space in the market and generating a niche that allows for a dignified professional existence is increasingly complicated. Not only for the plaintiffs but for all professionals. Many lawyers have resorted to carrying out complementary activities to provide a more integral service and thereby have a better market position. Without trying to locate a motive, which for this case is irrelevant, the truth is that the pointed-out problem is not that of the plaintiffs but of the profession in general and under no circumstances can it be charged to the defendant public entity. On the other hand, the net profit must be taken, with the understanding that there are many costs that were ordinarily covered by the fees and that, if those expenses are not incurred, unjust enrichment would be generated if the gross amount is paid. It is evident that the professionals made significant investments to offer good service to the bank, as they themselves describe and which by sound critical reasoning must be true; thus they acquired larger or more comfortable offices, hired personnel, among other items that form part of the business criteria of each of those professionals. The bank did not demand these conditions nor does it request that they maintain them; they were decisions made by the interested party within the prosperity they were enjoying and, upon having to face less positive times, they must assess which of those investments prove profitable in their new reality. All within a market analysis that is exclusively theirs and on which neither the bank nor this jurisdictional body can even issue a recommendation. This concerns investments made several years ago, within the period of better conditions for the plaintiffs. Nothing guarantees that this situation would be maintained for life; on the contrary, sound management calls for the liberal professional to seek to optimize the earnings received in lucrative activities that help them sustain themselves in their more advanced ages. Naturally, establishing the net profit implicitly entails a series of studies of the costs in the period, against the professionals' accounting books and by an expert in the matter; where the reports to the Tax Administration that they must have made will play a preponderant role. It is a matter of burden of proof, under the protection of canon three hundred seventeen of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), where the interested party must be the first to provide clear, concise, and conclusive documentation that allows the expert to establish a certain amount lacking any doubt, without prejudice to that which is already in the case file (expediente). It is worth noting, as was anticipated, that there is no right for the Law to remain unscathed or invariable to the interests of a party, but on the contrary, it must be updated and modified to new realities. The change in legislation, according to the Law of Public Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its Regulations (Reglamento), is why it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity has been violated in the terms of constitutional article 34. In such circumstances, the compensation cannot be indefinite, lifetime tenure (vitalicia), for life, or by projection thereof, because such an appointment does not constitute an asset incorporated into their earnings or an immovable situation without the possibility of dismissal. Consequently, while the appointment is indefinite, the compensation for dismissal is not, which must be set within the maximum period that the Law of Public Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) put as a limit for this type of legal relationship, this being so since these legal relationships occurred before the Law of Public Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) established limits in that sense and, given its validity, the relationships should have submitted to it, which the Bank did not do at the time. Therefore, the compensation is set at 4 years, because it is the maximum period the new regulations had established for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Law of Public Procurement, Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and which is applied prevalently to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs, for which reason the corresponding amount will be set in sentence execution proceedings (trámite de ejecución de sentencia), with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment, as it is an obligation of value arising from the judgment, interest that is granted as it is found included within the damages claimed by all plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed starting from the finality of this judgment. Once set in sentence execution proceedings, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. With respect to the second group, as reasoned in the majority vote, it consists of two subgroups, some without a defined term and others for a period of one or two years, renewable. Through background-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes) number 1-95 and 1-96, which made the appointment of professionals who would provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for two years, a date on which the professional's performance will be evaluated and, in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists (proven facts 75 to 80). Those appointed in selection processes number 1-85 and 4-86, for whom it is clearly determined from the contracting terms that they have no term, have no period of validity, are appointed for an indefinite time. The contracting conditions express that they commit to providing services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica when it requires it, observing that said legal relationship was extended in time indefinitely, requiring their services constantly, because the bank's services so required. It is not inappropriate to indicate that this modality of indefinitely renewable contracts manifestly violates the law, as the idea of the term is exactly that: to avoid perpetual contractual legal relationships, which would make those renewals unlawful and, in principle, no one can take advantage of an act contrary to law, an aspect we do not consider as it is not the basis of the conflict. Adding to the aforementioned, the concern that arises before the absence of records demonstrating that this periodic evaluation was performed. Throughout more than 20 years, this service modality was maintained continuously over time, in merit of which, like the other group of notaries appointed directly, without a time limit, they must be compensated for the unilateral termination of this subjective right without having carried out a complete contractual rescission or resolution procedure that guaranteed them compensation, as stipulated in the General Regulations on Public Procurement (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa) in its articles 203 and following, as well as in the new procedure and process stipulated by the Regulations to the Law of Public Procurement (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in its article 13, regulating the forms of termination of these contractual relationships by way of the occurrence of the term, the execution of the contractual relationship, the resolution, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. Such norms have as a common denominator that the Administration has the power to terminate the appointment by background-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), but upon prior payment of the due compensation. Therefore, as the defendant entity did not duly compensate these notaries appointed without a fixed term (indefinite term), they must be recognized the compensation corresponding to four years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average profit income obtained in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and it will be computed solely and exclusively on the income from profits they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. It is an identical treatment to that of the group noted above. Such compensation period, as expressed, is based on being the maximum time the new regulations set for these notarial legal relationships, with civil legal interest accruing on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment, as it is an obligation of value arising from the judgment, interest that is granted as it is found included within the damages claimed by all plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed starting from the finality of this judgment. Once set in sentence execution proceedings, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. On the other hand, we have the notaries who were appointed for a fixed term, but whose contract was nevertheless extended for them, it being clear regarding them that in the background-based selection processes in which they participated, they were appointed for a defined time, for a fixed and determined period. As observed from the selection processes, 2-90, 2-94, 1-95 and 1-96, they are appointed for two years, a period that will be renewable if the evaluation is positive, with said extension being established at one and two years. Given the circumstances, the nature of these contracts is to have a fixed term, they were not created to be indefinite, and the fact that they have been extended over time does not grant them such a condition. The fact that the Administration's needs implied the continuous requirement of their work does not have the virtue of changing the provision that, by mutual agreement and based on the background-based selection process (concurso de antecedentes), set a term over time. Given this situation, having accredited that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years, that no cause for rendering the appointment ineffective due to non-compliance had occurred, the appropriate course is to compensate them for the non-renewal of their contract without justified cause for it, the appropriate course being that they be compensated with two years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average net income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, which will be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period.
**VII) Other Considerations:** In all other respects, I share the majority vote.
**THEREFORE:** The exception of statute of limitations (caducidad) is rejected and the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) formulated by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, it being understood as denied in what is expressly granted and granted in what is not conceded; consequently, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the individuals Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, as damages, the net income of the profit for four years as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, deducting the corresponding expenses, an aspect to be determined by the corresponding expert, that is, the four years prior to December 2009, sums that must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts accruing from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment. The tax burden corresponding to each plaintiff must be deducted from the compensation. Also, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the individuals Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López and the individual Federico Alfaro Araya, as damages, the net profit income (deducting expenses) for two years as an external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, sums that must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts accruing from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment. The tax burden corresponding to each plaintiff must be deducted from the compensation. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The complaint filed against the individual Lorena María Herradora Chacón is declared without merit in all its aspects, granting the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) formulated by the defendant and resolving without a special ruling on costs. The claim brought by the individuals José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba is considered withdrawn (desistida), as well as the third-party claim (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. The lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) of the individual Nombre112022 is declared ex officio, declaring the filed claim without merit and resolving without a special ruling on costs.- **Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez** **Exp Nº 08-001455-1027-CA.** **Ordinary Proceeding (Proceso de conocimiento).** **Plaintiffs: Edgar Abellán Acevedo and others.** **Against: El Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Lorena María Herradora Chacón.** Goicoechea, Dirección01 , 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Dirección02 . Telephones: 2545-0003 - 2545-0004. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006.
Voto 00084 - 2013 **VOTO DE MAYORÍA** **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at 8:00 a.m. on September 16, 2013.
In an acción de inconstitucionalidad (constitutional challenge) brought by [Name 1], bearer of identity card number [...], against the phrase "and the Notary" contained in [sections X, Y, Z] of the Reglamento para la Contratación de Servicios Notariales Externos por parte del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Regulations for the Contracting of External Notarial Services by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), published in La Gaceta No. 112 on June 12, 2012.
**RESULTANDO:** 1. By a document received at the Secretariat of this Chamber on August 10, 2012, the petitioner files an acción de inconstitucionalidad (constitutional challenge) and states the grounds therefor. He indicates that there is an asunto base (underlying case) pending before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección IV, file number 080014551027CA.
2. [...] ... 6. [...] ... **Considerando I.-** Object of the challenge. The petitioner challenges the phrase "and the Notary" contained in [sections X, Y, Z] of the Reglamento para la Contratación de Servicios Notariales Externos por parte del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, published in La Gaceta No. 112 on June 12, 2012. [...]
**Considerando II.-** [...]. According to the above, what is relevant for this Chamber is to determine whether the challenged rule infringes the right to equality, the principle of reasonableness, and the intangibilidad de los actos propios (intangibility of one's own acts) derived from the principio de confianza legítima (principle of legitimate expectations).
**Considerando III.-** Preliminary clarifications regarding the specific nature of the rule in question and the nature of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
[The Chamber will analyze etc.]
**Por tanto:** The acción is dismissed. Judge [Name 2] provides reasons.
“II.2) NATURE OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE NOTARIES OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA AND PROCEDURE FOR ITS TERMINATION: The Organic Law of the National Banking System, number 1644 of September 26, 1953, in its first and second articles, provides that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous entity that forms part of the National Banking System, which requires, for the exercise of its functions and powers entrusted by law under the terms of articles 67, 101, 152, and 168, the contracting of notarial services in order to materialize the acts and contracts necessary for its banking activity.
To achieve said task, said entity first contracted notaries on an indefinite basis, having as its regulatory legal framework for this the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and article 180 of the Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, which stipulated that contracting for the following services was not subject to the competitive bidding procedure (concurso de antecedentes): a) Notarial services, b) Legal counsel for the direction of legal affairs or business, c) Medical interventions, d) Occasional notices or publications by mass media, e) Commercial brokerage and expert appraisal, f) Others of a similar nature at the discretion of the General Comptroller's Office. For this purpose, Law 1279 did not contemplate, within the budgets for carrying out administrative procurement, the notarial service provided by private individuals to the Public Administration, for which many notaries were appointed on an indefinite basis. On the other hand, the Regulation of Administrative Procurement also stipulated in article 174 the possibility of appointing external notaries through a competitive bidding procedure, which was a procedure that had to be followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts whose object was the provision of technical or professional services without a relationship of legal labor subordination and where, for awarding, price did not constitute a primary factor. This competitive bidding procedure was a process of a public nature, which began with the publication in "La Gaceta" of its conditions or rules and the corresponding invitation to bid (canon 175 of regulation 7576). In this sense, such a Competitive Bidding procedure was issued so that the Administration would endeavor to provide opportunity in the contracts it executes, which will be carried out directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few persons. In turn, the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), number 7494 of May 2, 1995, in force as of May 1, 1996, partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law, and configured the contracting of notarial services through the Public Bidding (Licitación Pública) procedure. Subsequently, the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa), number 25038 of March 6, 1996, was issued, which was in force from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, and established the modality for contracting technical or professional services by natural or legal persons in which the procedures of public bidding, registered bidding, or restricted bidding had to be followed according to the amount of the respective contract and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract, in accordance with the parameters established by the Administrative Procurement Law (subsection 69.1). The nature of this contracting modality between the Administration and the contractor expressly provided that it originated a public employment relationship and had to be remunerated according to professional fee schedules (article 69.2), unless it concerned the provisions of articles 69.5 and 69.6, in which case the professionals or technicians were subject to a public employment relationship remunerated with a fixed salary. This public employment modality established that public entities are authorized to contract, with a fixed salary, using their ordinary regime for appointing officials, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they permanently provide. In these cases, the payment governed by the concept of fees for the provision of the corresponding activity will not be applicable, and the respective institution may not transfer the cost of contracting those professionals to the user of the corresponding services, but it must charge the other implicit costs such as document registration fees and payment of any tax. In this sense, the Administrative Procurement Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, stipulated in article 67 that public entities are authorized to, using their ordinary regime for appointing officials, contract, with a fixed salary, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, handling of judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they provide. For these purposes, the payment governed by the concept of fees for the provision of the activity will not be applicable. The institution will not transfer the cost of contracting those professionals to the user of the services; but it must charge the other implicit costs, when the respective document must be registered or the payment of some type of tax is required. In this sense, subsection 174 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, number 7558, is clear, specifying in the contracting of professional services that public financial entities will be subject to the provisions of article 67 of the Administrative Procurement Law, for the contracting of professional services, and stipulating in articles 31 and 163 that the term of the contracts will be a maximum of four years. For its part, the new Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law, number 33411 of September 27, 2006, in force as of January 4, 2007, expresses in this regard in its article 163, that for the contracting of technical or professional services, by natural or legal persons, the Administration must follow the procedures of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate, and that this type of contracting will not originate a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, and must be remunerated according to the respective fee schedules, when the services are regulated by mandatory fee schedules; however, it safeguarded the legal contracting conditions for those persons who had been appointed without having set a termination deadline, prior to its entry into force on January 4, 2007 (transitory provision II). This transitional rule between the validity of the repealed regulation and the present provision indicates that "All direct contracting authorizations without subjection to a deadline that have been granted by the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic before the validity of this Regulation will be maintained under the same terms and conditions indicated for each particular case." Furthermore, it was provided based on this new regulation that the contracting of professional services characteristic of a public employment relationship is excluded from the application of the Administrative Procurement Law and the Regulation, so for its contracting, the provisions of the ordinary regime for appointing officials will be followed. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial), articles 7 and 8 contemplated the regulation of the fees of in-house public notaries in public institutions, by providing that it is prohibited to handle professional matters of private individuals in the offices of the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public enterprises structured as private entities, where they provide their services, as well as to authorize in the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public enterprises from which they receive a salary or per diem, legal acts or contracts where their employers or subsidiary companies appear as a party; however, they may authorize them as long as they do not charge fees for this concept (article 7). For its part, article 8 ibid expresses that the Public Administration is prohibited from contracting the same notary in more than three institutions simultaneously; to ensure compliance with this provision, the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs will keep a list of notaries in its registration records. Likewise, the Administration must notify this Directorate of the contracting of notaries, in order to establish the respective control, and that when in legal acts or contracts where the State, its companies, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions are a party and are authorized by notaries who earn a salary, per diem, or other remuneration from the respective institution, the person authorizing them may not charge professional fees to the State or to third parties. Given this situation, regarding the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries, some in-house who cannot charge fees and others external who earn stipends for their work, it is that subsection 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica provided "that public law financial entities, regulated by the Superintendency, which use the services of more than one notary public, whether in-house or external, shall establish a single 'rol' for all deeds in which that entity appears as creditor. Said 'rol' must be complied with permanently and in strict order, in order to guarantee an equitable and fair assignment of notarial tasks. The effective compliance with that 'rol' must be supervised by the internal audit office of the respective financial entity. The official who, directly or indirectly, causes non-compliance or fosters the breach of the 'rol' shall incur a serious breach of their duties." **On the other hand, regarding the regime that must be followed for the termination of such modalities of legal relationship existing between the National Bank of Costa Rica and the external notaries**, a distinction must be made whether they are notaries appointed and contracted on an indefinite basis, or through a competitive bidding procedure with a fixed term or without a defined termination deadline. In the case of notaries appointed on an indefinite basis by agreement of the Board of Directors, they will be governed by the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement entered into force. Under the terms of article 180 of said Regulation, contracting for notarial services was not subject to the competitive bidding procedure. Thus, the notaries appointed under such conditions have as their legal condition the possession of a subjective right (derecho subjetivo), understood as the power that individuals have to require the Public Administration to give, do, or not do a certain provision or conduct, or as Mr. Eduardo García Maynez, cited by Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, in Volume II of his Thesis on Administrative Law, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., San José, 2000, first edition, page 186, well expresses it, "(...) it is the possibility, granted to a person by a rule, of lawfully doing or omitting something... In subjective right, the form consists of the permission of a behavior, or the content in what in each case the holder may lawfully do or not do." It has also been defined as "(...) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can be enforced against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties on them, in their own interest, recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position." (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Course on Administrative Law. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). In this sense, Mr. Eduardo Ortiz, ibid, further tells us that it is the authorization of conduct given by the legal rule that produces in the subject the possibility of lawfully doing or omitting something. In light of this situation, if the contracting administration wishes to dispense with the services of such external notaries appointed directly through a Board of Directors agreement, they must respect the principle of intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, safeguarding the subjective right they hold. This right confers upon the external notaries who are under such condition the power to demand, in the face of the contracting entity's desire not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the subjective right. If one opts to decree the nullity of the administrative act declaring subjective rights, the lesividad procedure must be followed, as contemplated by the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, articles 36 and 37, and currently the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, article 34, as well as articles 173 and 174 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), whether to seek absolute nullity in court or through an administrative channel in the case of evident and manifest absolute nullity. On the other hand, in the case of a subjective right such as the aforementioned appointments, the other option for terminating them without just cause is contemplated by the General Law of the Public Administration in its articles 152 to 156, by establishing the revocation (revocación) procedure, through which the Public Administration is empowered to revoke it for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit, such power being applicable when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship to which it is intended to put an end (article 152 ibid). The revocation may be based on the appearance of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time the original act was issued; it may also be based on a different valuation of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest (article 153 ibid). The revocation of an act declaring subjective rights must be carried out by the head of the respective entity, with a prior favorable opinion from the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic, and shall simultaneously contain the acknowledgment and, if possible, the calculation of the complete indemnification for damages caused, under penalty of absolute nullity, and in any case the damages must be settled by the Administration within one month following the individual's request or appeal containing the settlement sought by the latter (subsection 155 ibid). To carry out the revocation of the administrative act declaring subjective rights, a minimum due process must be followed, guaranteeing at least the fundamental rights of the individual. In the case of the revocation of the administrative act declaring their subjective rights by having appointed them on an indefinite basis, the National Bank of Costa Rica, such entity, in the full exercise of its powers, holds the authority to revoke them or terminate them as it did. This is the exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Law of the Public Administration, without observing any non-conformity with the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the legitimate decision adopted, but it should have indemnified the external notaries as stipulated in cited article 155 and paid them the fair and legitimate indemnification to which they were entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years.
**On the other hand, regarding the external notaries appointed through competitive bidding**, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established regarding the administrative contract, in rulings 6432-98 at 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, and number 998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, that it is characterized by being commutative, onerous, and bilateral, having as its object the provision of a service or the execution of a public work. It differs from private contracts because the Administration exercises prerogatives, powers, or exorbitant clauses founded on the purpose and public interest it must protect and achieve, such as direction, modification, resolution, and execution, a principle called the mutability of the contract. Its basis is found at the constitutional level in article 182, which establishes the bidding procedure for the execution of agreements with the Public Administration, which are defined as "the agreement of wills, generating obligations and therefore synallagmatic, executed between an organ of the state, in the exercise of the administrative functions within its competence, with another administrative organ or with a private individual or administered person, to satisfy public purposes." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). Thus, due to its commutative nature, in the administrative contract there are reciprocal rights and obligations, "which are synthesized in the following: a) the contractor has the right to the execution of the object that was contracted and to the recognition of the agreed prices; at the same time, they are owed not only fair and adequate treatment but also respect for the execution deadline agreed in the contract; and b) the contracting Administration may, within the framework of the contract, supervise, issue instructions, make certain modifications, administratively execute the guarantees, or else, resolve or rescind the contract." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). In the case of these external notaries appointed through competitive bidding, their appointment was extended until December 1, 2009, when the 2008 public bidding came into effect, so the procedure for their termination or ending had to conform to the contract extinction procedures contemplated by the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement in its articles 203 and following. In this sense, article 203 ibid expressed that contracts are extinguished normally, by the passage of the term and the execution of the contractual object. Abnormally, by resolution, administrative rescission (rescisión administrativa), or declaration of nullity. Regarding contractual resolution in light of the former regulations, the Administration is empowered to unilaterally resolve contracts due to non-compliance attributable to the contractor. Once the contractual resolution is final, the performance guarantee and any other fines will be executed, if pertinent, without any additional procedure. In the event that the Administration has provided for retention clauses in the bidding terms, those amounts may be applied to the payment of the acknowledged damages. If the guarantees and retentions are insufficient, the necessary measures will be adopted at the administrative and judicial level to obtain full indemnification (article 204 ibid). Regarding the power of rescission, the Administration may unilaterally rescind its contracts, not yet started or in the course of execution, for reasons of public interest, force majeure, or unforeseeable circumstances, duly accredited. For this, it must issue a reasoned resolution indicating the existing cause and the supporting evidence, which will be brought to the contractor's attention for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor the effectively executed part of the contract, in the event it had not done so previously, and the expenses that contractor has incurred for the complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission originates from reasons of public interest, any damage or harm that the termination of the contract may cause the contractor may also be recognized, upon prior invocation and proof. The loss of profit corresponding to the unexecuted part may be recognized always within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, valuing aspects such as the remaining execution term, the degree of progress of the contract execution, and the complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it will be considered as 10% of the total quoted amount (article 206 ibid). The National Bank of Costa Rica may well also apply rescission by mutual agreement, under the terms of articles 207 and following ibid, agreed upon when reasons of public interest exist and there is no cause for resolution attributable to the contractor. In this case, the Administration may agree on the terms to settle or indemnify, always within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality. Once the rescission is agreed upon without further procedure, the respective settlement will be sent for approval to the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic of the Republic, which will have twenty-five business days to issue its resolution. Once the cause for which it is appropriate to declare the contractual rescission is verified, the Administration will proceed to issue the contract suspension order and will give the contractor a hearing for a period of ten business days, identifying the cause and the supporting evidence, among others. The contractor will attend the hearing referring to the invoked cause and will present a detail of the settlement they request, providing the respective evidence. Once the hearing period has expired, the Administration will adopt, within the fifth business day, any measure necessary to evaluate the settlement presented by the contractor. Once the evidence is gathered, the entity will resolve within the following calendar month and will be obliged to verify all the items presented.
The resolution shall have the ordinary remedies provided for in the General Law of the Public Administration. Once the rescission becomes final, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Comptroller General of the Republic, who shall have twenty-five business days to approve, disapprove, or make any observations deemed pertinent (article 208 ibid). Thus, the aforementioned procedures not followed by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in its actions to nullify the appointments of notaries designated through a background-based competitive process (concurso de antecedentes) are also governed, as a regulatory framework, by the provisions set forth in chapters three and four of the Law on Administrative Procurement, stipulating that the Administration has the rights of rescission and unilateral resolution for reasons of non-performance, force majeure, fortuitous event, or when it suits the public interest, with due adherence to due process (article 11). This is, moreover, also contemplated in the new procedure and process stipulated by section 13, for its processing and indemnification via resolution, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. It being clear and evident that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica failed to fulfill its duty to indemnify the external notaries appointed through background-based competitive process, since it terminated the contractual relationship without recognizing this essential right inherent to their legal condition.
II.3)- ON LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (LA CONFIANZA LEGITIMA) AND THE ADMINISTERED PARTY'S SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS OBTAINED IN GOOD FAITH: On this subject, it is relevant to indicate that subjective rights are protected by the principles of legal certainty, the intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, good faith, and legitimate expectations. The principle of legitimate expectations being understood as that which, according to Caterina Balasso in her article "The Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations and its Applicability Regarding the Spheres of Action of Public Power," " ... if the actions of the bodies exercising public power completely contradict the logical deduction determined by their previous conduct, a transgression of the principle of legitimate expectations is configured, because '... when referring to conduct that fosters expectation, such conduct is not constituted solely by actions, but is also made up of abstentions and denials or voluntary omissions...'". The consequences of this principle have been described as follows: "The principle of legitimate expectations, together with that of good faith in legal-administrative relations, emanates from the principle of legal certainty, that is, certainty in relations with public powers, the administered party knowing what to expect from them, who must avoid objectively confusing situations and maintain legal situations even if they are not absolutely in conformity with the legal system" (Emphasis ours) (Jinesta Lobo (Ernesto)). [citation truncated] For this reason, legitimate expectations constitute knowing what to validly expect, it is recognizing the good faith of the administered party so as not to subject them to political changes. It is important to note that this principle is fundamentally materialized in the theory of the intangibility of the administration's own acts that declare rights for the administered party, which was defined through vote 2006-15828 at 17:02 hours on October 31, 2006, of the Constitutional Chamber, which, in this regard, resolved: " V.- The ex officio annulment or revision of favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, as a possibility for public administrations and their bodies, constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the non-revocation of the administration's own favorable acts for the administered party or the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank as it derives from section 34 of the Political Constitution (see judgments #2186-94 at 17:03 hrs. on May 4, 1994, and #899-95 at 17:18 hrs. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaring rights for the administered party, with the exceptions being ex officio annulment or revision and revocation. ". In accordance with the constitutional principles emanating from numerals 11 and 34 of our Political Constitution, and in light of the doctrine reiterated in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, the Public Administration cannot, by itself, suppress those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers that confer subjective rights upon private individuals. This is what we know as the cited principle of the non-revocation of one's own acts or intangibility of one's own acts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration has the possibility, by way of exception, to ex officio annul or revise favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, with the exception regulated in articles 155 and 173 of the General Law of the Public Administration according to which, the Administration is authorized to declare, in the administrative venue, the nullity of an act declaratory of rights provided that such nullity, besides being absolute, is evident and manifest, prior to the opinion of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic. In all other cases, for the Administration to declare the absolute nullity of an act that created subjective rights in favor of the administered parties, it must resort to the administrative litigation jurisdiction to file the action for declaration of injuriousness (proceso de lesividad) indicated in articles 34, 39 subsection e) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, as well as 173 and 183 of the General Law of the Public Administration. The transcribed norm is clear in establishing that the Administration has one year counted from the day after the act declaring rights was issued, unless the act contains defects of absolute nullity, in which case, said declaration may be made while its effects last, with the year counted from when the effects cease. The action for declaration of injuriousness has a purely annulment nature, that is, its sole purpose is the declaration of invalidity of an administrative act considered absolutely null and injurious to the interests of the State, and in that sense, it is conceived as a guarantee for private individuals that the act will not be annulled without a prior trial that complies with all the guarantees of a judicial process, in which it is determined whether the act is defective or not. The jurisdictional body will only declare nullity when, from the study of the case records, it verifies that a defect of nullity exists, that is, that said act does not meet the substantial requirements for its validity, as it is not in conformity with the legal system. In this respect, the provision states: “Article 34.- No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated situations.” An initial approach and clarification of concepts is that although the norm is drafted focusing on the law, it should not be understood as restrictive to that, because on the contrary, it also covers any norm of a general nature (Votes 3858-99, 431-99 and 934-98, all from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now then, if the norms of a general nature are subject to said principle (evident manifestation of a power of authority), with even greater reason are the acts as execution of those (Vote 2382-96 of the Constitutional Chamber). Having delimited those concepts, a distinction must be made between acquired rights, subjective rights, and consolidated legal situations, noting that the constitutional framework presents a guarantee of non-retroactivity only regarding the latter and not the former. “ The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' ... the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing –material or immaterial, being a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right– has entered into (or had an impact on) the patrimonial sphere of the person, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. In turn, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial surplus, but a state of affairs fully defined regarding its legal characteristics and its effects, even when these effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but rather that –by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared it– a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, which connects a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect)" (Votes 2843-98, 1318-99 and 1308-99 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). For their part, subjective rights are defined as "(...) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject who can enforce it against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties upon them, in their own interest, a recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position." (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). Thus, we observe the clear difference between the legal condition of the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation, which imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not so of the subjective right, which can be revoked for non-performance, annulled in the judicial venue via the action for declaration of injuriousness or administratively according to section 173 of the General Law of the Public Administration, or otherwise revoked according to article 152 and following of said cited law.
II.4) SPECIFIC CASE: Applied, the foregoing, to the resolution of the present matter, we find that the claimants are correct in their claims when taking action so that the duty of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to indemnify each of the plaintiff notaries be declared, whether they had been appointed directly and indefinitely through the Board of Directors or had been designated through a background-based competitive process, given that all of them have different regimes, conditions, and legal situations that must be considered in the analysis of the merits. The promoting parties are correct in claiming so that the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) they suffered due to the termination of the contract, due to the cessation of the external notarial contractual relationships that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with the third parties asserting their own claims, be recognized. As was accredited in the proven facts, the party testimony and witness evidence collected, and the legal basis expressed in the merit-based recitals II.1, II.2, and II.3, it is clear that the essential elements to declare such liability and indemnification duty of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica concur in the present matter, for which purpose the special and particular situation of each of the groups of external plaintiff notaries will be analyzed, to finally determine the manner in which they will be indemnified. Regarding the first group of plaintiff notaries, who had been appointed indefinitely, through respective agreements of the Board of Directors, we find that they were appointed, as stated, based on the provisions of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic, number 1279 of May second, one thousand nine hundred fifty-one, and the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement entered into force. Therefore, effectively, the external notaries appointed directly under these conditions and without having to undergo a background-based competitive process, prior to the termination of the existing legal relationship with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a minimum indemnification procedure should have been carried out, in which the damages and losses corresponding to them after having worked for said entity, in some cases for more than 30 and 40 years of uninterrupted service, were determined. The subjective right that a large portion of the plaintiffs (the majority), who find themselves under this condition, have is evident, and it is lamentable that with a communiqué, they sought to terminate the relationship in a pure and simple manner, without further study and analysis, and by means of a simple laconic communiqué and a meeting (proven facts 88 and 89), that the existing legal relationship is terminated, thus gravely affecting the subjective right they held. The capacity and competence of said entity to, based on the procedures established in section 34 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, as well as sections 152 to 156, 173 and 174 of the General Law of the Public Administration, revoke or annul the subjective right is not under discussion, but doing so by indemnifying in a just, correct, adequate, proportional, and full manner, the harm that was being caused to them by terminating the existing legal relationship and compelling them to participate in the forthcoming bidding processes. These were professionals who for many years had been providing their services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, so it was to be expected that such power to terminate said legal situation would be executed, but following the indemnification procedures provided for in the law. The human aspect here is evident and was fully manifested in the long hearings of this trial; many of the notaries, the vast majority, are elderly persons, some older adults, who suddenly and based on a simple communiqué are left without their main source of income, therefore what is fair is to give them the due indemnification. Even though the Bank's conduct was carried out in adherence to public powers, and as can be inferred from the arguments put forth by the parties, and from resolutions issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic attending to complaints filed by the parties regarding automatic contract renewals, Official communication FOE-FEC-0207 of March 21, 2006, DCA-2376-2008 of August 07, 2008 and R-DCA.245-2006 of May 25, 2006, cited in official communication R-DCA-413-2008 of August 11, 2008, which indicated it was imperative to resort to a bidding procedure in order to select and contract the external notaries and thus regularize the situation (proven fact 81), it should have indemnified the plaintiffs prior to their removal as announced in the communiqué issued through official communication number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, in which the director of the Legal Directorate of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Mrs. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, expresses to them that from the entry into force of the contracts that may be concluded based on Bid Solicitation 2008LN-000024-01, the role of notaries in which they currently appear will be substituted, so that as of that date their contractual relationship with the National Bank as external notaries will be terminated, a date which occurred on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 113). This situation, as was demonstrated, implied that the plaintiffs saw their income diminished, because the work was now distributed among the newly appointed notaries. Although some notaries remained in their positions, thanks to the precautionary measures they had filed, their income was no longer what it was before and was drastically diminished, especially since the same entity had stated that it managed a dual role, one for internal in-house notaries and another for external notaries (proven fact 115). In this way, the conduct of the sued entity violates the principles that protect the subjective rights of the plaintiff notaries, namely legal certainty, intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, good faith, and the aforementioned legitimate expectations, which entails the maintenance of their legal situation, except termination by prior indemnification.
Although the petitioners are not correct in arguing that their situation constitutes a vested property right (derecho patrimonial adquirido) or a consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), since this involved an appointment that could be revoked subject to compensation, a fact unrelated to the entrenched nature and status of a vested right (already incorporated into one's assets), and a consolidated legal situation (which confers an immovable legal status and prerogative) that cannot be revoked or recognized, this does not negate the fact that they must be duly compensated in accordance with the administrative acts that declare subjective rights. Therefore, it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity has been violated under the terms of Article 34 of the Constitution, nor that of due process, because at least a minimal administrative procedure was required, which was fulfilled, but without compensation.
This is so, given that it concerns an express, unconditional, and unequivocal request from the petitioner, which was formulated prior to the issuance of the judgment; therefore, it is appropriate to deem it admitted, just as it was resolved during the procedural stage.” This ruling is issued following prior deliberation, within the legal term and by majority.
**The majority vote is drafted by Judge Espinoza Salas; and** **C O N S I D E R A N D O** **I)- REGARDING THE FACTS: I.1)- PROVEN FACTS:** The following facts of interest for the resolution of this matter are deemed proven, as they are consistent with the elements of conviction cited in their support: **1)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945 of December 15, 1964, article 18 (folio 7403 of volume XIV of the judicial file). **2)** Mr. Ernesto Guardia Hine was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1964 (folio 3948 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **3)** Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero Mora was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 3 of August 7, 1965 (folio 4488 of volume IX of the judicial file). **4)** Mr. Jorge Castro García was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7141, article 05 of April 26, 1966 (folio 3886 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **5)** Mr. Nombre112075 was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7729, article 4 of May 19, 1970 (folio 10982 of volume XX of the judicial file). **6)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 6945, article 18 of December 15, 1974 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **7)** Mr. Jorge Tristrán Trelles was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8574, article 01 of May 17, 1976 (folio 3892 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **8)** Mr. Erich Neurohr Trejos was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8594, article 49 of July 7, 1976 (folio 3882 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **9)** Mr. Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8782, article 11 of October 18, 1977 (folio 3470 of volume seven of the judicial file). **1** **0)** Mr. Fernando Fallas Amador was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **11)** Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8830, article 32 of February 21, 1978 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **12)** Mr. Orlando Calzada Miranda was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8832, article 37 of February 25, 1978 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **13)** Mr. Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8854, article 16 of June 2, 1978 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **14)** Mr. Nombre39622 was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8920, article 39 of November 7, 1978 (folio 3976 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **15)** Mr. Luis A. Guillén Downing was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 5 of March 6, 1979 (folio 3559 of volume seven and folio 10983 of volume XXI, of the judicial file). **16)** Mr. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 8966, article 05 of March 12, 1979 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **17)** Mr. Jaime López Baudrit was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 26 of September 25, 1979 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **18)** Mr. José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9139, article 4 of August 26, 1980 (folio 3572 of volume seven of the judicial file). **19)** Mrs. Vilma Mesen Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of August 11, 1981 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **20)** Mrs. Cecilia Fallas Amador was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9303, article 04 of January 12, 1982 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **21)** Mrs. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9319, article 27 of March 2, 1982 (folio 5458 of volume XI of the judicial file). **22)** Mr. Rafael Ortega Ayón was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9324, article 20 of March 16, 1982 (folio 3880 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **23)** Mr. Horacio Montealegre Montealegre was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9327, article 02, of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **24)** Mr. Wilberth Vargas Brenes was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9326, article 40 of March 23, 1982 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **25)** Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9354, article 20 of July 6, 1982, was dismissed on July 6, 2008, and reappointed as external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of volume seven of the judicial file). **26)** Mr. Gerardo Camacho Nassar was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9389, article 06 of November 2, 1982 (folios 7904 of volume XV, folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **27)** Mrs. Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397 of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 4896 of volume X of the judicial file). **28)** Mrs. Luz María González Rodríguez was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9397, of November 30, 1982, article 30 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **29)** Mrs. Marta Barahona Melgar was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9407, article 19 of January 11, 1983 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **30)** Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9410 of January 18, 1983, article 08 (folio 5877 of volume XI of the judicial file, as well as folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **3** **1)** **Through background competition number 1-85**, a tender was conducted for the selection of professionals for external notary services carried out by the BNCR, stipulating regarding the term of validity that the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, leaving it to the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors to remove any of the awardees at any time it deems convenient, following a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the interest of the Institution (folios 4019 to 4023 of volume VIII of the court records). **32)** Mrs. Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1985 (folio 10984 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **33)** Mr. Edgar Arroyo Cordero was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 7040, article 03 of July 5, 1985 (folio 10982 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **34)** The Tenders Committee of the BNCR in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985, designated as external notaries Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, Mr. Braulio Sánchez González, and Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo (folios 4016 to 4023 of volume VIII of the court records). **35)** Mr. Juan Vicente Rojas Morera was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3468 of volume seven of the judicial file). **36)** Mr. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9031, article 13 of November 5, 1985 (folio 3897 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **37)** Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 5, 1985, was dismissed on July 6, 2008, and reappointed as external notary of the Cartago Branch in article 10, session 11551 of June 23, 2009 (folio 3737 of volume seven of the judicial file). **38)** Mr. Braulio Sánchez González was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714, article 13 of November 11, 1985 (folio 3473 of volume seven of the judicial file). **39) Through** **background competition number 4-86**, a tender was conducted for the selection of professionals for external notary services carried out by the BNCR, stipulating regarding the term of validity that the appointed notaries undertake to provide services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, leaving it to the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors to remove any of the awardees at any time it deems convenient, following a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the interest of the Institution (administrative file of the background competition). **40)** Mr. Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-84, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9761 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **41)** Mrs. Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9823, article 08 of December 1, 1986 (folio 10983 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **42)** Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9714 of November 5, 1985, article 13 (folio 6347 of volume XII, folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **4** **3)** Mr. Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **44)** Mr. Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86, article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folios 7454 of volume XIV and folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **45)** Mr. Mario González Porras was appointed as external attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 4-86 article 44 of the Board of Directors, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **46)** **Through background competition 2-90**, the Tenders Section of the BNCR received offers on January 8, 1991, for the selection of professionals who provide their services as external attorneys and notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (folios 1395 to 1402 of volume three principal). **47)** By official letter S.L. 197-91 of May 17, 1991, the Tenders Office of the BNCR recommends appointing for tender 2-90 for the selection of professionals who provide their services as external attorneys and notaries, the following persons: **In San José:** Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla. **In San Pedro:** Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo. **Alajuela:** Zetty Bou Valverde. **Nombre37415:** Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas. **Nombre19780:** Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña. **Puriscal:** José Luis Herrera Zúñiga (folios 1395 to 1410 of volume three of the court records). **48)** Licentiate Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla has provided services as a notary for said institution since the month of July 1991 (folio 1395 to 1410 of volume three of the sub judice). **49)** Mr. Carlos Mas Herrera was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90 article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **50)** Mr. Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **51)** Mr. José Luis Herrera Zúñiga was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **52)** Mr. Virgilio Fernando Calvo Murillo was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **53)** Mr. Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **54)** Mr. Milton Arguedas Salas was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **55)** Mrs. Zetty María Bou Valverde was appointed as attorney and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **56)** Mrs. Lorena Herradora Chacón was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10267 of July 2, 1991, article 25 (folio 5538 of volume XI of the judicial file).
**57)** Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante was appointed as an external lawyer and notary (abogada y notario externa), through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 25 of the Board of Directors, session 10267 of July 2, 1991 (folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **58)** Ms. Livia Meza Murillo was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **59)** Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá was appointed as an external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **60)** Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **61)** Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **62)** Mr. José Alberto Herrera Lobo was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **63)** Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **64)** Mr. Federico Carlos Sáenz de Mendiola was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 4 of the Board of Directors, session 10333 of February 25, 1992 (folio 10987 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **65)** Mr. Edgar Antonio Abellán Acevedo was appointed as an external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 9354, article 20 of July 6, 1992 (folio 3879 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **66)** Mr. Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-90, article 12 of the Board of Directors, session 10565 of June 28, 1994 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **67)** Through background competition 2-94, designated for the selection of professionals providing their services as external lawyers and notaries, external notaries were appointed for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (administrative file of said contracting). **68)** Mr. Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **69)** Ms. Laura Mora Camacho was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **70)** Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García was appointed as a lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folios 8069 of volume XVI, folio 10988 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **71)** Ms. Mayra Rojas Guzmán was appointed as an external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **72)** Mr. José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza was appointed as an external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 7 of the Board of Directors, session 10619 of January 10, 1995 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **73)** Mr. Jorge Castro Corrales was appointed as an external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10619, article 07 of January 10, 1995 (folio 3887 of volume VIII and folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **74)** Mr. Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos was appointed as an external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 2-94, article 14 of the Board of Directors, session 10621 of January 17, 1995 (folio 10986 of volume XXI of the judicial file).
**75)** By background competition number 1-95, the appointment at the BNCR of professionals who would provide their services as external lawyers and notaries was made for two years, at which date the professional's performance would be evaluated and, in the event that said evaluation was positive, it would be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service to the Bank persists (folios 8068 to 8079 of volume XVI of the principal). **76)** Mr. Freddy Rojas López was appointed as an external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10680, article 14 of August 22, 1995 (folio 3883 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **77)** Through background competition 1-96, designated for the selection of professionals providing their services as external lawyers and notaries, external notaries were appointed for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (administrative file of said contracting). **78)** Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya was appointed as an external lawyer and notary, through Background Competition No. 1-96, article 9 of the Board of Directors, session 10789 of September 17, 1996 (folio 10985 of volume XXI of the judicial file). **79)** Ms. Roxana Rodríguez Cascante was appointed as an external lawyer and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 11155 of June 25, 2002, article 03 (folio 6614 of volume XIII of the judicial file). **80)** Mr. Freddy Antonio Rojas López was appointed as an external lawyer and notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the Muelle San Carlos Agency, effective June 17, 2005 (folio 3928 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **81)** In session of the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, it was resolved that due to the requirements of the Contraloría General de la República to promote public tenders with defined terms in professional services contracts, as well as the legal opinion of Licenciada Herrera Cantillo expressed in official letter D.J.2245-207 of December 27, 2007, from the Legal Directorate, by which a proposal for a tender document for the contracting of professionals providing their services to the Banco Nacional as external notaries is presented, by unanimous vote the text of the tender document for the selection of external lawyers of the Banco Nacional is approved, denominated Selection of professionals providing their services as external lawyers, in accordance with the terms set forth in official letter D.J.2245-207 of December 27, 2007, and the publication of the tender document for the selection of external lawyers is ordered (folio 1 of volume one of the subjudice). **82)** In Gaceta number 69 of April 9, 2008, the BNCR published the Regulation for the provision of external services of the BNCR (undisputed fact, statements of claim, folios 728 to 739 of volume II ibid). **83)** In session of the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11486 of June 10, 2008, article 7, the agreement adopted in session number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, was declared a firm agreement (folio 2 of volume one of the judicial file). **84)** Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on July 6, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the agreements of the General Board of Directors adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, with the administrative channel (vía administrativa) being deemed exhausted and said resolution being notified to her on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Ms. María del Rosario Morera Alfaro consisting of 75 folios). **85)** On July 6, 2008, Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro was notified of the official letter of July 6, 2008, regarding the communication of the agreements of the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11486 (administrative file of Mr. Hernán Cordero Maduro consisting of 2 folios). **86)** By official letter number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, the director of the Legal Directorate of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Ms. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, summoned the external notaries of said entity to a meeting to be held in the auditorium of said Bank on July 4, 2008, for the purpose of establishing the form of contracting of external notaries (undisputed fact, statement of claims, folio 3, 1280, of volume one and three, folio 3558 of volume seven of the judicial file, folios 4027 to 4029 of volume VIII of the principal). **87)** At the meeting held on July 6, 2008, in the auditorium of the plaintiff Bank, the external notaries were given the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the following: "By this means you are informed, in your capacity as external notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, that by agreements of the Board of Directors, adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions No. Placa20031 and No. 11486 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, the text of the tender document for the selection of external notaries was approved, denominated “Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos”. The purpose of this tender document is to provide support for a Public Tender (Licitación Pública) based on which a new roster of external notaries of the Bank will be formed, rendering the current roster without effect. This decision is adopted by virtue of the expiration of the maximum validity period that the Contraloría General de la República allows for the contracting of professional services, which is four years, in accordance with the provisions of article 163 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. For the purposes of maintaining continuity in the provision of the service, it will be upon the entry into force of the contracts that are agreed upon based on said Tender that the roster of notaries in which you currently appear will be replaced. Therefore, as of that date, your contractual relationship with the Banco Nacional as an external notary will be terminated, pursuant to the provisions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. The current status you hold as an external notary of the Bank, nor the eventual termination of your contractual relationship with it, constitute an impediment to your ability to participate in the new tender; for which reason we urge you to participate, under the terms of the invitation, which will be published shortly in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Against this decision, the remedies of revocation (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) before the General Board of Directors are available, which may be filed within three days in this General Supplier’s Office, in accordance with the provisions of article 346 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública." (undisputed fact, statements of claim, folio 4, 1281, 1336 of volume one and three of the proceedings, folio 3571 of volume VII, folio 3930, 3935, 3937 of volume VIII, folio 5467 of volume XI). **88)** That notaries Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jaime López Baudrit and Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal and Livia Meza Murillo, filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) and subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 698 to 704, 1249 to 1251, 1282 to 1283 of volume two and three, folios 3742 to 3749 of volume VII of the judicial file). **89)** Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on July 6, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the agreements of the General Board of Directors adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 15, with the administrative channel being deemed exhausted and said resolution being notified to him on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz consisting of 52 folios). **90)** That notary Ananías Matamoros Carvajal filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) and subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 6046 to 6050 of volume XII of the judicial file). **91)** By pleading of July 8, 2008, Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García and Miguel Rodríguez Gómez filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8083 to 8086 of volume XVI of the judicial file). **92)** By pleading of July 9, 2008, Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 7375 to 7402 of volume XIV of the judicial file). **93)** By pleading of July 9, 2008, Messrs. Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Mr. Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, and Juan Carlos Solano García filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8963 to 8984 of volume XVIII of the judicial file). **94)** By pleading of July 9, 2008, Ms. Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria) against the official letter of July 6, 2008, signed by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Supplier of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which she informs them of the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 6749 to 6753 of volume XIII of the judicial file). **95)** In Gaceta number 138 of July 27, 2008, the BNCR published Public Tender number 2008-LN-24-2008, denominated “Selección de Profesionales que brinden sus servicios como Notarios Externos” (undisputed fact, statements of claim, folios 218 to 219 of volume one ibid). **96)** By resolution at 2:45 p.m. on July 29, 2008, of the Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Goods and General Supplier’s Office, the appeal for revocation filed by the plaintiffs against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the agreements of the General Board of Directors adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, is rejected (folios 705 to 727, 1284 to 1296 of volumes two and three of the proceedings). **97)** The Contraloría General de la República, through resolution number R-DCA-413-2008, at 2:00 p.m. on August 11, 2008, hearing objections to the tender document of Public Tender number 2008LN-000024-2008 promoted by the BNCR, resolved to accept objections, ordering the contracting administration to proceed with the pertinent modifications, corrections, and clarifications (folios 5258 to 5332 of volume X of the judicial file). **98)** Mr. Bernal Aragón Barquero filed a nullity action (nulidad) on August 12, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the agreements of the General Board of Directors adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, with the administrative channel being deemed exhausted and said resolution being notified to him on March 5, 2009 (administrative file of Bernal Aragón Barquero consisting of 31 folios). **99)** By official letter D.J. 1587-2008 of August 22, 2008, from the Legal Directorate of the BNCR, it indicates to Licenciada Lorena Herradora Chacón that the existing external notary contracts will remain in force until the contracts derived from the award of the tender denominated “Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos” come into effect and that, in accordance with the provisions of article 182 of the Political Constitution, articles 1, 4, 5, and 6 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, and 1, 2 subsections a) d) and e), 92 subsection d), and 163 of the Reglamento de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the only legal avenue for the contracting of professional notary services is the holding of the respective public tender and that the only way for a notary professional to eventually achieve the status of awardee of the competition is by participating in a timely and proper manner in the competition (folios 7 and 8 of volume one of the principal). **100)** Messrs. Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos, Jaime López Baudrit, Milton Arguedas Salas, and Rafael Ortega Ayón filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) on September 4, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals providing their services as external notaries and against the agreements of the General Board of Directors adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the tender document for the selection of external notaries was approved, which was rejected in session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 10, with the administrative channel being deemed exhausted and said resolution being notified to them on March 20, 2009 (administrative file of Bernal Aragón Barquero consisting of 45 folios). **101)** In Gaceta number 172 of September 5, 2008, modifications to Public Tender 2008-LN-24-2008 were published (folios 260 to 263 of volume one of the subjudice). **102)** By resolution at 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Goods, General Supplier’s Office, rejects the appeal for revocation filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notary (folios 8120 to 8140 of volume XVI of the judicial file).
**103)** The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), through resolution number R-DCA-512-2008, at 10:00 a.m. on September 29, 2008, hearing objections to the first modification of the bidding documents for Public Tender (Licitación Pública) number 2008LN-000024-2008 promoted by the BNCR, ordered the acceptance of objections made to the bidding documents by the participants (folios 4831 to 5118 of volume X of the judicial file). **104)** By resolution at 3:20 p.m. on September 29, 2008, the Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Assets, General Procurement Office, rejected the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 8998 to 9017 of volume XVIII of the judicial file). **105)** By resolution at 8:51 a.m. on October 31, 2008, the Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Assets, General Procurement Office, rejected the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega against the termination of the contractual relationship as external notaries (folios 7375 to 7402 of volume XIV of the judicial file). **106)** In session 11512 of November 25, 2008, article 8, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Mr. Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, Ms. Livia Meza Murillo, Mr. Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Mr. Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, and Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with said resolution being notified to them on November 28, 2008 (folios 603 and 604, 1333, 1490 to 1497 of volumes two and three of the sub judice). **107)** In session 11516 of January 13, 2009, article 29, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Mr. Juan Carlos Solano García, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. He was notified of said resolution on January 19, 2009 (folios 8155 to 8156 of volume XVI of the sub judice). **108)** In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 8, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Mr. Ananías Matamoros Carvajal on July 6, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with said resolution being notified to him on January 21, 2009 (folios 6076 to 6077 of volumes two and three of the sub judice). **109)** In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 23, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. She was notified of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (administrative file of Ms. Martha Barahona Melgar consisting of 106 folios). **110)** In session 11517 of January 20, 2009, article 28, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted. He was notified of said resolution on January 21, 2009 (folios 7404 to 7405 of volume XIV of the sub judice). **111)** In session 11518 of January 27, 2009, article 13, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Ms. Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante on August 12, 2008, against the official letter regarding the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries and against the General Board of Directors agreements adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions 11467 and 11468 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, respectively, in which the text of the bidding documents for the selection of external notaries was approved, is rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, with said resolution being notified to her on February 3, 2009 (folios 6779 to 6780 of volume XIII of the sub judice). **112)** Mr. Carlos Rivera Bianchini was appointed as attorney and notary of the BNCR, in Board of Directors session 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3737 of volume VII of the judicial file). **113)** Public Tender 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries was awarded in article 10, of session 11551 of June 23, 2009, and published in La Gaceta on July 1, 2009, entering into force on December 1, 2009 (folios 3752 to 3755 of Volume VII, folio 4008, 4134 of volume VIII of the judicial file). **114)** Mr. Fernando Solano Martínez was appointed as attorney and notary of the BNCR, in Board of Directors session 11551 of June 23, 2009, at the Cartago Branch (folio 3738 of volume VII of the judicial file). **115)** That as of the entry into force on December 1, 2009, of Public Tender 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals to provide their services as external notaries, the hiring of new notaries, and the establishment of a dual role for work assignment, the plaintiffs have seen their income diminished in the practice of notarial duties for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folio 7199 of volume XIV, folios 7752, 7909 of volume XV, folio 8068 of volume XVI, folio 9634 of volume XIX of the sub judice, as well as statements by Ms. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Ms. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, and Ms. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá). **116)** Mr. Carlos Castro Mora was appointed as external attorney and notary by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in session 10619, article 7 of December 1, 2009 (folio 4450 of volume IX of the judicial file). **117)** The Corporate Directorate of Media Management, Directorate of Material Resources, managed Public Tender number 2010LN-000001-01, called "Selection of Professionals to provide their services as External Notaries" (folios 5207 to 5224 of volume X ibid). **118)** That Messrs. Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, and Martha Barahona Melgar, were appointed indefinitely as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica by the Board of Directors, without a background competition (concurso de antecedentes) or public tender (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **119)** That Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini were appointed **through background competition number 1-85**, article 13 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9714 of November 5, 1985 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **120)** That Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, were appointed **through background competition number 4-86**, article 44 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 9791 of August 5, 1986 (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **121)** That Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz were appointed **through background competition number 2-90**, article 25 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10267 of July 2, 1991, for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **122)** That Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, were appointed **through background competition number 2-94**, article 7 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10719 of January 10, 1995, for two years, at which time the professional's performance will be evaluated and in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists for the period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **123)** That Mr. Freddy Rojas López, was appointed **through background competition number 1-95**, article 14 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10680 of August 22, 1995, for a period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice). **124)** That Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, was appointed **through background competition number 1-96**, article 9 of the General Board of Directors of the BNCR, session 10789 of September 17, 1996, through the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) number 7494 of May 2, 1995, for a period of 2 years (folios 10981 to 10988 of the sub judice).
**I.2)- UNPROVEN FACTS:** **The plaintiffs did not demonstrate:** **1)** The amount of damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the actions of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in terminating them as external notaries (the record). **2)** That Ms. Nombre112022 was an external attorney and notary of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (the record). **3)** That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón caused them damages (daños y perjuicios) as a result of her actions (the record). **4)** That the co-defendant Lorena María Herradora Chacón incurred in intentional misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of her functions that would have generated damages (daños y perjuicios) for them (the record). **The co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica did not demonstrate:** **1)** That the expiry (caducidad) of the action filed by the plaintiffs for the claim of nullity of the contested administrative acts has occurred (the record). **2)** That there existed any cause for non-compliance by the plaintiffs appointed through a background competition that would imply the non-renewal of the contract (the record).
**I.3)- EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION:** In accordance with article 50.2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the documentation appearing at folios 10944 to 10957 and 10969 to 10970 of the main file was admitted at the trial hearing for better decision. Likewise, the following documentation contained in the judicial file was ordered as evidence for better decision: VOLUME ONE: folios 1 to 37 and 94 to 387. VOLUME TWO: folios 508 to 518, 580 to 594, 603 to 609, 619 to 817, and 988 to 1254. VOLUME THREE: folios 1267 to 1372, 1395 to 1486, and 1490 to 1517. VOLUME FOUR: folios 1572 to 2289. VOLUME FIVE: folios 2290 to 2935. VOLUME SIX: folios 2936 to 3299, and 3302 to 3348. VOLUME SEVEN: folios 3412 to 3468, 3558 TO 3561, 3570 to 3573, folio 3601, 3650 to 3672, 3737 to 3764. VOLUME EIGHT: folios 3877 to 3907, 4015 to 4045, 4095 to 4134. VOLUME NINE: folios 4197 to 4830 expert Nombre18237. VOLUME TEN: folios 4876 to 5408. VOLUME ELEVEN: folios 5433 to 5482 (María del Rosario Morera Alfaro), 5529 to 5626 (Milton Arguedas Salas), 5702 to 5724 (Hernán Cordero Maduro), 5728 to 5824, 5877 to 5894 Bernal Aragón Barquero, 5904 to 6011. VOLUME TWELVE: folios 6035 to 6553. VOLUME THIRTEEN: folios 6608 to 6906. VOLUME FOURTEEN: folios 7050 to 7135, 7199 to 7307, 7310 to 7367, 7374 to 7416, 7447 to 7526, 7621 to 7633. 7654 to 7671, folios 7705 to 7709. VOLUME FIFTEEN: folio 7750, 7752, folios 7994 to 7920, 7926 to 8013. VOLUME SIXTEEN: folios 8067 to 8227, 8234 to 8320, 8335, 8364 to 8379, 8425 to 8431, 8436 to 8440, 8515 to 8603, 8626 to 8629. VOLUME SEVENTEEN: folios 8675 to 8685, 8742 to 8753, 8762 to 8766, 8787 to 8918. VOLUME EIGHTEEN: folios 8937 to 9023, 9031 to 9119, 9136 to 9140, 9192 to 9216. VOLUME NINETEEN: folios 9323 to 9466, 9522 to 9531, 9611 to 9626, 9634, 9638 to 9645, 9652 to 9694. VOLUME TWENTY: folios 9914 to 1002. VOLUME TWENTY-ONE: folios 10273 to 10279, 10299 to 10322, 10331 to 10355, 10378 to 10402, 10477 to 10490, and 10632 to 10688. The evidence provided at the interim measure (medida cautelar) hearing before this court, consisting of 404 folios. Notarial certification of the administrative file of Mr. Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, composed of 238 folios. As well as the entirety of the various volumes of the administrative file provided to the judicial file by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
**II) ON THE MERITS: II.1. REGARDING THE ALLEGATION OF EXPIRY (CADUCIDAD) FORMULATED BY THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFFS:** Article 39 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code establishes that the maximum period to initiate the process shall be one year, which shall be counted, when the contested act must be notified, from the day following the notification. In the same sense, article 175 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is conclusive in expressing that the administered party may challenge an absolutely null act, in the administrative or judicial channel, within a period of one year counted from the day following its communication, but that in the case of acts of continued effects, the period shall be computed from the cessation of their effects. On the other hand, in the case of processes in which the liability of the Administration is claimed as a main indemnification claim for damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from administrative conduct, the aforementioned expiry (caducidad) term does not run, but rather article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration applies, which provides that the right to claim indemnification from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the fact that motivates the liability, and that the right to claim indemnification against public servants shall prescribe in four years from the time knowledge of the harmful fact is obtained. In the present matter, we have that the oldest action, to which the subsequent ones were consolidated, was initiated on December 5, 2008, requesting that it be declared that the conduct of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in terminating the appointments and contracts and its communication to each of the plaintiffs is null; for this, they request the nullity of articles 12 and 7 of Sessions 11467 and 11486 of January 29 and June 10, 2008, as well as the communication made to each notary by Ms. Lorena Herradora in her capacity as procurement officer of the BNCR on July 6, 2008; they request payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) for the termination of the contract, that is, the challenge of the cessation of the external notary contractual relationships that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with the third parties with their own claims, that is, the indemnification of damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from the cessation of the contractual relationships with the plaintiffs, the third parties with their own claims, and the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the nullity of the act of hiring other notaries outside the legal framework through the bidding procedure 2008LM-000024-01, and the declaration of non-conformity with the legal system of the omissive conduct of non-compliance with the external notary roster that the institution has, that is, they require damages (daños y perjuicios) for the non-compliance with the roster established by the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, because those credits were granted to the internal notaries of the Banco Nacional and it reduced the delivery of work to all notaries. As can be observed from the proven facts, it is clear that the peremptory, inexorable, and fatal term of annual expiry (caducidad) to request the petitioned nullity has not occurred, given that the contested acts are those issued in the Board of Directors session of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, (proven fact 81), as well as the session issued by the Board of Directors of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, number 11486 of June 10, 2008, article 7, in which the agreement adopted in session number 11467 of January 29, 2008, article 12, was declared a firm agreement (proven fact 83), and the communication dated July 4, 2008, which was made on July 6, 2008, at the meeting to which they were summoned by Ms. Lorena Herradora Chacón, General Procurement Officer of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (proven facts 86 and 87), which was also challenged by the petitioners, by filing the appeals for reversal (recursos de revocatoria) and subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria), observing that such appeals were resolved in the following months (proven facts 84, 85, 88, 89 to 94, 96, 102, 104, and 105). With which it is evident that the expiry (caducidad) has not elapsed, neither taking as a starting point the issuance of the contested acts, nor the date of the communication of the resolution of the appeals, nor the exhaustion of the administrative channel (proven facts 84, 89, 98, 100, 106, 107 to 111). Furthermore, such expiry (caducidad) term of one year applies when the nullity of an administrative act is being challenged, but not when actions are involved in which damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from administrative conducts are claimed. In that sense, article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration is clear, which expresses that the right to claim indemnification from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the fact that motivates the liability, and the right to request indemnification against public servants shall prescribe in four years from the time knowledge of the harmful fact is obtained. Therefore, in the present matter, independently of the issue of the alleged nullity, it is observed that the indemnification claims are main claims that cannot be considered expired (caducas) given such civil liability claims against the public treasury filed against the sued entity. Moreover, as expressed in the contested communication itself, dated July 6, 2008, and delivered to the notaries on July 6, 2008, and in which the notaries are informed and made aware of the agreements of the Board of Directors, adopted in articles 12 and 7 of sessions No. 11,467 and No. 11,486 of January 29, 2008, and June 10, 2008, the act does not become final immediately, but rather upon "the entry into force of the contracts that are eventually concluded based on said Tender, the notary roster in which you currently figure will be replaced." Therefore, as of that date, your contractual relationship with Banco Nacional as an external notary will be considered terminated (...)”, and those contracts and public tender 2008LN-000024-01 having become final on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 115), it is from that date that the alleged expiration period runs, meaning that the one-year term has not elapsed as stated.
II.2) NATURE OF THE EXISTING LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NOTARIES OF BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA AND THE PROCEDURE FOR ITS TERMINATION: The Organic Law of the National Banking System, number 1644 of September 26, 1953, provides in its first and second articles that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous entity that forms part of the National Banking System, which requires, for the exercise of its functions and powers entrusted by law under the terms of articles 67, 101, 152, and 168, the contracting of notarial services for the purpose of materializing the acts and contracts necessary for its banking activity. To achieve this objective, said entity first contracted notaries on an indefinite basis, having as its regulatory legal framework the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and article 180 of the Regulation on Administrative Contracting, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, which stipulated that contracting for the following services was not subject to the prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes): a) Notarial services, b) Legal counsel for directing legal affairs or business, c) Medical interventions, d) Occasional notices or publications through mass media, e) Commercial brokerage and expert appraisal, f) Others of a similar nature at the discretion of the Comptroller General’s Office. For this purpose, Law 1279 did not contemplate, within the budgets for administrative contracting, the notarial service provided by private individuals to the Public Administration, which led to many notaries being appointed on an indefinite basis. On the other hand, the Regulation on Administrative Contracting also stipulated in article 174 the possibility of appointing external notaries through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes), which was a procedure to be followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts whose purpose was the provision of technical or professional services without a legal labor subordination relationship and where, for awarding, price did not constitute a primary factor. Said prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes) was a public procedure, initiated with the publication in "La Gaceta" of its conditions or terms and the corresponding invitation to participate (canon 175 of Regulation 7576). In this sense, such a prequalification procedure was established so that the Administration would seek to provide opportunity in the contracts it executes, which would be done directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few persons. In turn, the Administrative Contracting Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, effective as of May 1, 1996, partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law, and configured the contracting of notarial services through the Public Tender procedure. Subsequently, the General Regulation on Administrative Contracting, number 25038 of March 6, 1996, which was in effect from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, was enacted and established the modality for contracting technical or professional services by individuals or legal entities, in which public tender, tender by registry, or restricted tender procedures had to be followed according to the amount of the respective contract and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract, in accordance with the parameters established by the Administrative Contracting Law (article 69.1). The nature of this contracting modality between the Administration and the contractor expressly provided that it originated a public employment relationship and was to be remunerated by professional tariffs (article 69.2), unless the provisions of articles 69.5 and 69.6 applied, in which case the professionals or technicians were subject to a public employment relationship remunerated with a fixed salary. Such public employment modality established that public entities are authorized to contract, with a fixed salary, using their ordinary official appointment regime, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, attention to judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they permanently provide. In these cases, the payment governing professional fees for the provision of the corresponding activity shall not apply, and the respective institution may not transfer the cost of contracting those professionals to the user of the corresponding services, but it must charge the other implicit costs such as document registration fees and payment of any levy. In that sense, the Administrative Contracting Law, number 7494 of May 2, 1995, stipulated in article 67 that public entities are authorized so that, using their ordinary official appointment regime, they contract, with a fixed salary, the professionals they require to formalize operations, appraisals, expert reports, attention to judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other type of professional intervention related to the services they provide. For these purposes, the payment governing professional fees for the provision of the activity shall not apply. The institution shall not transfer the cost of contracting those professionals to the user of the services; but it must charge the other implicit costs, when the respective document must be registered or some type of tax must be paid. In this sense, article 174 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, number 7558, is clear, specifying in the contracting of professional services that public financial entities shall be subject to the provisions of article 67 of the Administrative Contracting Law for the contracting of professional services and stipulating in articles 31 and 163 that the term of the contracts shall be a maximum of four years. For its part, the new Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law, number 33411 of September 27, 2006, effective as of January 4, 2007, expresses in this regard in its article 163 that for the contracting of technical or professional services by individuals or legal entities, the Administration must follow the public tender, abbreviated tender, or direct contracting procedures, as appropriate, and that this type of contracting shall not originate a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, and must be remunerated according to the respective tariffs, when the services are regulated by mandatory fee schedules; however, it safeguarded the legal contracting conditions for those persons who had been appointed without a fixed termination date, prior to its entry into force on January 4, 2007 (Transitional Provision II). Said transitional rule between the validity of the repealed norm and this provision stating that "All direct contracting authorizations without subjection to a term that the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic has granted before the effectiveness of this Regulation shall remain under the same terms and conditions indicated for each particular case." Furthermore, it was provided based on this new regulation that the contracting of professional services typical of a public employment relationship is excluded from the application of the Administrative Contracting Law and its Regulation, so its contracting shall follow the provisions of the ordinary official appointment regime. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code, articles 7 and 8 contemplated the regulation of the fees of in-house public notaries in public institutions, by providing that it is prohibited to attend to professional matters of private individuals in the offices of the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public companies structured as private entities, where they provide their services, as well as to authorize, in the Public Administration, decentralized state institutions, or public companies from which they receive a salary or stipend, legal acts or contracts where their employers or subsidiary companies appear as parties; however, they may authorize them provided they do not charge fees for this concept (article 7). For its part, article 8 ibid expresses that the Public Administration is prohibited from contracting the same notary in more than three institutions simultaneously; to ensure compliance with this provision, the National Directorate of Notaries shall keep a list of notaries in its registration records. Likewise, the Administration must notify this Directorate of the contracting of notaries, in order to establish the respective control, and that when the State, its companies, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions are parties to legal acts or contracts authorized by notaries who earn a salary, stipend, or other remuneration from the respective institution, the person authorizing them may not charge professional fees to the State or to third parties. Given this situation of the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries, some in-house who cannot charge fees and others external who earn emoluments for their work, article 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica provided “that public law financial entities, regulated by the Superintendency, which use the services of more than one public notary, whether in-house or external, shall establish a single ‘roster’ (rol) for all deeds in which that entity appears as creditor. Said ‘roster’ must be fulfilled permanently and in strict order, in order to guarantee an equitable and just assignment of notarial tasks. The effective fulfillment of that ‘roster’ must be supervised by the internal audit of the respective financial entity. The official who, directly or indirectly, causes non-fulfillment or encourages non-fulfillment of the ‘roster’ shall incur a serious breach of their duties.” On the other hand, regarding the procedure to be followed for the termination of such modalities of the existing legal relationship between Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and external notaries, a distinction must be made as to whether they are notaries appointed and contracted on an indefinite basis, or through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes) with a fixed term or without a defined termination term. In the case of notaries appointed on an indefinite basis, by agreement of the Board of Directors, they shall be governed by the provisions of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation on Administrative Contracting, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in effect until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation on Administrative Contracting entered into force. Under the terms of article 180 of said Regulation, contracting for notarial services was not subject to the prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes). Thus, notaries appointed under such conditions have as their legal condition the holding of a legal right (derecho subjetivo), a legal right being understood as the power that the administered have to demand that the Public Administration give, do, or not do a certain provision or conduct, or as well expressed by Don Eduardo García Maynez, cited by Don Eduardo Ortiz, in Volume II of his Thesis on Administrative Law, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., San José, 2000, first edition, page 186, "(...) is the possibility, granted to a person by a norm, to licitly do or omit something... In the legal right, the form consists of the permission of a behavior, and the content in what in each case the holder can licitly do or not do". It has also been defined as “(...) the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can be asserted against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties on them, in their own interest, recognition that implies the judicial protection of said position.” (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Course on Administrative Law. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). In that sense, Don Eduardo Ortiz, ibid, further tells us that it is the authorization of conduct given by the legal norm that produces in the subject the possibility of licitly doing or omitting something. Given this situation, if the contracting administration wishes to dispense with the services of such external notaries appointed directly through a Board of Directors agreement, they must respect the principle of intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, safeguarding the legal right they hold. Said right confers upon the external notaries who are under such condition the power to demand, given the desire of the contracting entity not to continue with their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the legal right. If the option is to declare the nullity of the administrative act declaring legal rights, the lesivity procedure contemplated by the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, articles 36 and 37, and currently the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, article 34, must be followed, as well as articles 173 and 174 of the General Law of the Public Administration, whether to seek absolute nullity in judicial venue or in administrative venue in case of evident and manifest absolute nullity. On the other hand, regarding a legal right such as the aforementioned appointments, the other option for terminating them without just cause is contemplated by the General Law of the Public Administration in its articles 152 to 156, by establishing the revocation procedure, through which the Public Administration is empowered to revoke it for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit, such power taking place when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship intended to be terminated (article 152 ibid). The revocation may be based on the appearance of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time the original act was issued; it may also be based on a different valuation of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest (article 153 ibid). The revocation of an act declaring legal rights must be carried out by the head of the respective entity, with a prior favorable opinion from the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic; simultaneously, it must contain the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of the complete indemnification for the damages caused, under penalty of absolute nullity; in any case, the damages must be liquidated by the Administration within the month following the request or appeal of the administered containing the liquidation claimed by them (article 155 ibid). To carry out the revocation of the administrative act declaring legal rights, a minimum due process must be followed in which at least the fundamental guarantees of the administered are ensured. In the case of the revocation of the administrative act declaring their legal rights due to their having been appointed on an indefinite basis by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, said entity, in the full exercise of its powers, holds the attribution of being able to revoke them or terminate them as it did. It is a matter of the exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Law of the Public Administration, without observing non-conformity of the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the legitimate decision adopted, but it should have indemnified the external notaries according to the provisions of cited article 155 and have paid them the just and legitimate indemnification to which they were entitled, after having served the banking entity for many years. On the other hand, regarding external notaries appointed through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes), the Constitutional Chamber has established regarding the administrative contract, in rulings 6432-98 of 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, and number 998-98 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, that it is characterized as commutative, onerous, and bilateral, having as its object the provision of a service or the execution of a public work. It differs from private contracts in that the Administration exercises prerogatives, powers, or exorbitant clauses based on the purpose and the public interest it must protect and realize, such as direction, modification, resolution, and execution, a principle called mutability of the contract. Its foundation is found at the constitutional level in article 182, which establishes the public tender procedure for the execution of agreements with the Public Administration, which are defined as "the meeting of wills, generating obligations and therefore synallagmatic, entered into between a state organ, in the exercise of the administrative functions incumbent upon it, with another administrative organ or with a private individual or administered, to satisfy public purposes." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). Thus, due to its commutative nature, in the administrative contract there are reciprocal rights and obligations, "which are synthesized in the following: a) the contractor has the right to the realization of the object that was contracted and to the recognition of the agreed prices; furthermore, they are owed not only fair and adequate treatment, but also respect for the execution term agreed upon in the contract; and b) the contracting Administration may, within the framework of the contract, supervise, give instructions, make certain modifications, administratively execute the guarantees, or else, resolve or rescind the contract." (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber 1205-96). In the case of these external notaries appointed through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes), their appointment was successively extended until December 1, 2009, when the 2008 public tender entered into force; therefore, the procedure for their termination or ending had to conform to the contract extinction procedures contemplated by the General Regulation on Administrative Contracting in its article 203 and following. In that sense, article 203 ibid stated that contracts are extinguished normally, by the expiration of the term and the execution of the contractual object. Abnormally, by unilateral resolution (resolución), rescission (rescisión administrativa), or declaration of nullity. Regarding contractual resolution in light of the former regulation, the Administration is empowered to unilaterally resolve contracts due to non-compliance attributable to the contractor. Once the contractual resolution is final, the performance guarantee and any other fines shall be executed, if pertinent, without any additional procedure. In the event that the Administration has provided for retention clauses in the tender documents, those amounts may be applied to the payment of recognized damages. Should the guarantees and retentions be insufficient, the necessary administrative and judicial measures shall be adopted to obtain full indemnification (article 204 ibid). Regarding the power of rescission, the Administration may unilaterally rescind its contracts, not initiated or in progress, for reasons of public interest, fortuitous event, or force majeure, duly accredited. To this end, it must issue a reasoned resolution indicating the existing causal grounds and the supporting evidence, which will be communicated to the contractor for a term of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor for the part of the contract effectively executed, in the event it had not done so previously, and the expenses that contractor incurred for full execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission originates from reasons of public interest, any damage or harm that the termination of the contract caused the contractor may also be recognized, upon prior invocation and verification. The lost profit corresponding to the unexecuted portion may be recognized, always within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, assessing aspects such as the outstanding execution term, the degree of progress of the contract execution, and the complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it shall be considered as 10% of the total quoted amount (article 206 ibid). Banco Nacional de Costa Rica may also well apply rescission by mutual agreement, under the terms of articles 207 and following ibid, agreed upon when there are reasons of public interest and no cause for resolution attributable to the contractor exists. In this case, the Administration may agree on the amounts to be liquidated or indemnified, always within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality. Once the rescission is agreed upon without further procedure, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic, which shall have twenty-five business days to issue its resolution. Once the causal grounds for which the contractual rescission is to be declared are verified, the Administration shall proceed to issue the contract suspension order and shall grant the contractor a hearing for a term of ten business days, identifying the causal grounds and the supporting evidence, among others. The contractor shall attend the hearing referring to the causal grounds invoked and shall present a detail of the liquidation requested, providing the respective evidence. Once the hearing period expires, the Administration shall adopt, within the fifth business day, any measure necessary to assess the liquidation presented by the contractor. Once the evidence is discharged, the entity shall resolve within the following calendar month and shall be obligated to verify all the items presented. The resolution shall have the ordinary remedies provided for in the General Law of the Public Administration. Once the rescission is final, the respective liquidation shall be sent for approval to the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic, which shall have twenty-five business days to approve, reject, or make the observations it deems pertinent (article 208 ibid). Thus, the aforementioned procedures not followed by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in its actions to terminate the notaries appointed through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes) also have, as their regulatory framework, the rules provided in the Administrative Contracting Law in its third and fourth chapters, by providing that the Administration has the rights of unilateral rescission and resolution for reasons of non-compliance, force majeure, fortuitous event, or when it suits the public interest, with adherence to due process (article 11). Which is also contemplated in the new procedure and process stipulated by article 13, for its processing and indemnification via unilateral contractual resolution or rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. It being clear and evident that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica did not fulfill its duty to indemnify the external notaries appointed through a prequalification procedure (concurso de antecedentes), since it terminated the contractual relationship without recognizing this essential right, inherent and consubstantial to their legal condition.
II.3)- REGARDING LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (CONFIANZA LEGÍTIMA) AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS (DERECHOS SUBJETIVOS) OF THE ADMINISTERED OBTAINED IN GOOD FAITH: On this topic, it is relevant to indicate that legal rights are protected by the principles of legal certainty, intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts, good faith, and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima). Understanding the principle of legitimate expectations as that according to what was stated by Caterina Balasso in her article "The Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations and its Applicability regarding the areas of action of public power", " ... if the actions of the organs exercising public power completely contradict the logical deduction determined by their previous conduct, a transgression of the principle of legitimate expectations is configured, because '... when referring to the conduct that fosters the expectation, it is not only constituted by actions, but is also composed of abstentions and denials or voluntary omissions...'" The consequences of this principle have been described as follows: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The principle of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), together with good faith in legal-administrative relations, stems from the principle of legal certainty, that is, certainty in dealings with public authorities, the administered party knowing what to expect from them, who must avoid objectively confusing situations</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline"> and maintain legal situations even if they are not absolutely in conformity with the legal system</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> (Emphasis added) (Jinesta Lobo (Ernesto)). Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Volume I. Page 276.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">Therefore, legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) is a valid knowledge of what to expect, it is recognizing the good faith of the administered party so as not to subject them to political changes. It is important to note that this principle is fundamentally realized in the theory of the intangibility of one's own acts declaratory of rights for the administered party (intangibilidad de los actos propios declaratorios de derechos), which was defined by Constitutional Chamber ruling (voto) 2006-15828 at 5:02 p.m. on October 31, 2006, which resolved: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">V.- The annulment or ex officio review of favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, as a possibility for public administrations and their bodies, constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the irrevocability of one's own acts favorable to the administered party or the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts, to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional standing as it derives from Article 34 of the Political Constitution (see rulings #2186-94 at 5:03 p.m. on May 4, 1994, and #899-95 at 5:18 p.m. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being ex officio annulment or review and revocation. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">". In accordance with the constitutional principles stemming from Articles 11 and 34 of our Political Constitution, and in light of the doctrine reiterated in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, the Public Administration cannot by itself suppress those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers that confer subjective rights upon individuals. This is what we know as the cited principle of the irrevocability of one's own acts or intangibility of one's own acts. However, the Administration has the possibility, by way of exception, of annulling or reviewing ex officio favorable administrative acts or acts declaratory of rights for the administered party, with the exception regulated in Articles 155 and 173 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) according to which, the Administration is authorized to declare, in administrative proceedings, the nullity of an act declaratory of rights provided that such nullity, in addition to being absolute, is evident and manifest, after a prior opinion from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República). In other cases, for the Administration to be able to declare the absolute nullity of its own act creating subjective rights in favor of the administered parties, it must resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to file the action for declaration of harmfulness to public interests (proceso de lesividad) indicated in Articles 34 and 39(e) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as well as 173 and 183 of the General Public Administration Law. The transcribed rule is clear in establishing that the Administration has one year counted from the day after the act declaratory of rights was issued, unless the act contains defects of absolute nullity, in which case, such declaration may be made while its effects persist, counting the year from when the effects cease. The action for declaration of harmfulness to public interests has a purely annulment character, meaning its sole purpose is the declaration of invalidity of an administrative act deemed absolutely null and harmful to the interests of the State, and in that sense, it is conceived as a guarantee for individuals that the act will not be annulled without a prior trial that satisfies all the guarantees of a judicial process, in which it is determined whether the act is defective or not. The jurisdictional body will only declare the nullity when, from the study of the case file, it verifies that a defect of nullity exists, that is, that the act does not meet the substantial requirements for its validity, insofar as it is not in conformity with the legal system. In this regard, the provision states: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Article 34.- No law shall have retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated situations</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">” A first approach and clarification of concepts is that although the rule is drafted focusing on the law, it should not be understood restrictively as limited to it, as on the contrary, it also covers any general rule (Rulings 3858-99, 431-99 and 934-98, all from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now, if general rules are subject to said principle (an evident manifestation of a sovereign power), acts executed in application of those rules are all the more so (Ruling 2382-96 of the Constitutional Chamber). Having delimited these concepts, a distinction must be made between acquired rights (derechos adquiridos), subjective rights (derechos subjetivos), and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), noting that the constitutional framework presents a guarantee of non-retroactivity with respect only to the latter and not the former. “</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' ... the first denotes a consummated circumstance in which a thing –material or immaterial, being a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right– has entered into (or impacted) the person's patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial gain, but a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even if these effects have not yet been exhausted. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but that –by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared– a rule, clear and defined, has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">” </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">(Rulings 2843-98, 1318-99 and 1308-99 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). For their part, subjective rights are defined as “(...) </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt">the recognition by Law of a power in favor of a specific subject that can be asserted against other subjects, imposing obligations or duties upon them, in their own interest, a recognition that implies judicial protection of said position</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">.” (Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, page 35). Thus, a clear difference is observed between the legal status of the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation, which imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not so for the subjective right, which may be revoked for non-compliance, annulled through judicial action for harmfulness (lesividad) or administratively according to Article 173 of the General Public Administration Law, or revoked according to Article 152 et seq. of said cited law. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:16pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">II.4) SPECIFIC CASE:</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">Applying the foregoing to the resolution of the present matter, we find that the claimants are correct in their claims by bringing this action to declare the duty of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to compensate each of the plaintiff notaries, whether they were appointed directly and indefinitely through the Board of Directors or were appointed through a competitive evaluation of credentials (concurso de antecedentes), all of them having different regimes, conditions, and legal situations that must be considered in the substantive analysis. The petitioners are correct in suing for recognition of the damages caused by the termination of the contract, by the cessation of the external notarial contractual relations that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica maintained with the plaintiffs and with third parties with their own claims. As has been evidenced in the proven facts, the party and witness testimony gathered, and the legal basis expressed in substantive whereas clauses (considerandos) II.1, II.2 and II.3, it is clear that the essential elements for declaring such liability and compensatory duty of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica are present in this case, for which the special and particular situation of each group of plaintiff external notaries will be analyzed, to ultimately determine the manner in which they will be compensated. Regarding the first group of plaintiff notaries, who had been appointed indefinitely, through respective agreements of the Board of Directors, we have that they were appointed as stated, based on the provisions of the Organic Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República), number 1279 of May 2, 1951, and the Regulation on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, when the General Regulation on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa) came into effect. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">Therefore, effectively, for the external notaries appointed directly under these conditions and without having to undergo a competitive evaluation of credentials</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, prior to terminating the existing legal relationship with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a minimal compensation procedure had to be carried out, in which the damages they were entitled to would be determined after having worked for said entity, some even for more than 30 and 40 years of uninterrupted service. The subjective right held by a large part of the plaintiffs (the majority), who are in this condition, is evident, and it is lamentable that an attempt was made to terminate it purely and simply, without further study and analysis, by means of a simple laconic communication and a meeting (proven facts 88 and 89), that the existing legal relationship is terminated, thus seriously affecting the subjective right they held. The capacity and competence of said entity is not in dispute, to revoke or annul the subjective right based on the procedures established in the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code Article 34, as well as Articles 152 to 156, 173, and 174 of the General Public Administration Law, but compensating in a fair, correct, adequate, proportional, and full manner for the impact being caused to them by terminating the existing legal relationship and compelling them to participate in the upcoming bidding processes. These were professionals who for many years had been providing their service to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, so it was expected that such power to terminate that legal situation would be exercised, but following the compensatory procedures provided by law. The human aspect here is evident and was fully manifested in the long hearings of this trial; many of the notaries, the vast majority, are elderly persons, some older adults, who suddenly, based on a simple communication, were left without their main source of income, so the fair thing is to grant them the due compensation. Even though the Bank's conduct was carried out in accordance with public powers, and as deduced from the arguments put forth by the parties, from resolutions issued by the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) responding to complaints filed by the parties regarding automatic contract extensions, Official Communication FOE-FEC-0207 of March 21, 2006, DCA-2376-2008 of August 7, 2008, and R-DCA.245-2006 of May 25, 2006, cited in official communication R-DCA-413-2008 of August 11, 2008, in which it was indicated that it was imperative to resort to a bidding process to select and contract the external notaries and thus regularize the situation (proven fact 81), it should have compensated the plaintiffs prior to their dismissal as announced in the communication issued through official communication number D.J/1195-2008 of June 27, 2008, in which the director of the Legal Department of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Ms. Marietta Herrera Cantillo, expressed to them that it would be as of the entry into force of the contracts to be concluded based on Bid 2008LN-000024-01, that the role of notaries in which they currently appear would be replaced, so as of that date their contractual relationship with Banco Nacional as external notary would be terminated, a date that occurred on December 1, 2009 (proven fact 113). This situation, as demonstrated, meant that the plaintiffs saw their income diminished, because the work was now distributed among the newly appointed notaries. Although some notaries remained in their positions, thanks to the precautionary measures they had filed, their income was no longer what it was and was drastically reduced, especially since the entity itself had indicated that it maintained a dual role, one for internal staff notaries and another for external notaries (proven fact 115). In this way, the conduct of the defendant entity violates the principles protecting the subjective rights of the plaintiff notaries: legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), intangibility of the Public Administration's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios), good faith (buena fe), and the aforementioned legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), which entails the maintenance of their legal situation, except termination via prior compensation. Even though the petitioners are not correct in arguing that their situation is that of a acquired patrimonial right or a consolidated legal situation, it being an appointment that could be revoked with prior compensation, a fact unrelated to the rootedness and status of the acquired right (already incorporated into the patrimony), and the consolidated legal situation (which confers an immovable legal status and prerogative) and which cannot be revoked or acknowledged, this does not vitiate the fact that they must be duly compensated pursuant to the administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights. Therefore, it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity under the terms of Article 34 of the Constitution was violated, nor was due process, because at least a minimal administrative procedure was required, which was fulfilled, but without compensation. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">Consequently, the notaries who were appointed indefinitely, without a termination period being set</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, as evidenced by the documentation itself requested for a better resolution from the plaintiff Bank, and observed in proven facts 1 to 30 and 118, are the following: Messrs./Mmes. Nombre112075</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, Nombre39622</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, and Martha Barahona Melgar. They all have in common having been appointed indefinitely and directly by the Board of Directors of the banking entity as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, without a competitive evaluation of credentials, nor public bidding. By reason of this, the compensation to which they are entitled is four years of income as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income received in the four years prior to the termination of the legal relationship as external notaries, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009, and solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in that period. For this reason, the Chamber diverges from the criterion of the plaintiffs who claim lifetime compensation as if it were an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation, from the expert criterion of Mr. Nombre18237</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">who compensates for life, as if for their entire existence they would hold the status of notaries of the defendant bank, or as if it were a good or a legal situation incorporated into their patrimony, immovable, lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad), and perennial. Furthermore, conditions had changed by legal provision, pursuant to the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its Regulation, so it is not deemed that the principle of non-retroactivity under the terms of Article 34 of the Constitution was violated. The Court also diverges from the criterion of the expert Mr. Nombre39226</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, who had set the compensation as if it were an employment relationship. As stated in the substantive whereas clauses, we are faced with a subjective right resulting from the appointments made by the Board of Directors of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, either directly or through a competitive evaluation of credentials, so no such consolidated and immutable right exists in their favor. For this, it must be considered that the acquired patrimonial right and the consolidated legal situation imply a defined state of affairs, a consummated circumstance, but not the subjective right, which can be revoked for non-compliance, annulled judicially through an action for harmfulness (lesividad) or administratively according to Article 173 of the General Public Administration Law, or revoked according to Article 152 et seq. of said cited law. Due to these circumstances, the compensation cannot be indefinite, lifetime, for life, because such appointment is not a patrimony incorporated into their assets or an immovable situation without the possibility of removal. Similarly, what cannot be included within the compensation for the termination of the notarial legal relationships are office expenses, furniture and equipment, payment of labor obligations for the employees under their charge, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in the provision of the notarial service, which are inherent to their professional practice, are incorporated into their patrimony, and it would constitute unjust enrichment to request that these be compensated, if they form part of their assets. Moreover, in the legal relationship established with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, it was not agreed that upon its termination the expenses incurred to generate the notarial service would have to be paid. The banking entity contracted for a service as an external notary, for which fees were set that do not contemplate the expenses that the external notaries must necessarily incur to provide the service, which are disbursements that the service provider necessarily and logically must assume, and which cannot be transferred to the banking entity. In this case, the external notaries who participated in the competitive evaluation of credentials or who were appointed indefinitely through a Board of Directors agreement, knew they had to have the necessary conditions for the service provided, which they are responsible for obtaining and providing, but without such material conditions and necessary expenses for its provision having to be reimbursed upon its termination. In that same vein, although the appointment is indefinite, the compensation for dismissal is not, and must be set at the maximum term that the Law on Administrative Procurement established as a limit for this type of legal relationship, this being so since these legal relationships occurred before the Law on Administrative Procurement established limits in this regard and upon its entry into force the relationships should have been submitted to this, which the Bank did not carry out at the time. Therefore, the compensation is set at 4 years, because that is the maximum term that the new regulation had established for these notarial legal relationships (Articles 31 and 163 of the Law on Administrative Procurement) and which applies predominantly to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs. Hence, it will be in the sentence execution phase that the corresponding amount will be determined, with statutory civil interest accruing on such sums from the date this judgment becomes final and until its effective payment because it is an obligation of value arising from the judgment, interest that is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed as of the date this judgment becomes final.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">Once set in the sentence execution phase, the tax burden corresponding to such income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">Regarding the external notaries appointed through the competitive evaluation of credentials</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, it was proven that they participated in the competitive evaluations of credentials carried out under numbers 1-85, 4-86, 2-90, 2-94, 1-96, and 1-95, as verified in the proven facts 1 to 30, as well as 120 to 124, information provided by the banking entity and expressed in all the proven facts establishing the competition number and the Board of Directors agreement endorsing it. As stated, such notaries were appointed, one group without a termination period being established and another with a term of two years, extendable by one year or two years depending on the evaluation of their service. Regarding the first group in which no term was set, it was provided in the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">competitive evaluation of credentials number 1-85</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, regarding the period of validity, that the appointed notaries commit to providing services to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, with the removal of any of the awardees being at the discretion of the Institution's General Board of Directors at the time it deems convenient, upon a reasoned resolution and provided it is in the Institution's interest (proven facts 31 to 38). The same modality was applied for </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">competitive evaluation of credentials number 4-86</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, in which the modality of requiring their services when the defendant requires it was provided (proven facts 39 to 45). Subsequently, </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">through competitive evaluation of credentials 2-90</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">it was established that the professionals will be appointed as external lawyers and notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for two more if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 46 to 66) and in turn, the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">competitive evaluation of credentials 2-94</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> appointed external notaries for a period of 2 years, extendable for one more year if the evaluation is positive (proven facts 67 to 74). One year later, through </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">competitive evaluation of credentials number 1-9</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">5 and 1-96</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt">, which carried out the appointment of professionals who will provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for two years, a date on which the professional's performance will be evaluated and in the event that said evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively as long as good service for the Bank persists (proven facts 75 to 80). Such plaintiffs were governed by the Regulation on Administrative Procurement, number 7576 of September 23, 1979, in force until May 1, 1996, which in Article 174 contemplated the possibility of appointing external notaries through a competitive evaluation of credentials, a procedure followed for the execution of all those administrative contracts whose object was the provision of technical or professional services without a labor subordination relationship and where, for awarding, the price does not constitute a primary factor. Such competitive evaluation of credentials was a procedure of a public nature, which begins with the publication in "La Gaceta" of the conditions or terms thereof and the corresponding call to compete (canon 175 of Regulation 7576). In that sense, such a Competitive Evaluation of Credentials procedure was issued so that</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt"> the Administration would seek to provide opportunity in the contracts it executes, which shall be done directly, to different professionals or companies that meet characteristics of suitability and reliability, in such a way that the provision of such services does not become a privilege of only one or a few persons.
Nevertheless, if it was the will of the administration to revoke or terminate it, the stipulations in the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa) in its articles 203 and following should have been applied, as well as the provisions in the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in its third and fourth chapters and article 13 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), which clearly contemplate the due procedures to extinguish such contracts through the normal means, by the expiration of the term and the execution of the contractual object, or abnormally, by resolution, administrative termination (rescisión administrativa), or declaration of nullity. Thus, the plaintiffs who are under this condition, and which is verified from proven facts 118 through 124, as well as all the facts where the form of their appointment and the date are recorded, are: Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through background competition (concurso de antecedentes) number Placa6725, Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez: appointed through background competition number 4-86, Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz: appointed through background competition number 2-90, Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán: appointed through background competition number 2-94, Mr. Freddy Rojas López: appointed through background competition number 1-95, and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya: appointed through background competition number 1-96. As can be seen from the terms of the expressed competitions, although they were conducted by means of a background competition, a distinction is observed in the contracting conditions, which merit different treatment. On one hand, those appointed in competitions number 1-85 and 4-86, for whom it is clearly determined from the contracting terms that they have no term, no period of validity, and are appointed for an indefinite time. The contracting conditions state that they commit to providing services to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the moment it requires them, observing that such legal relationship was extended in time indefinitely, their services being needed constantly, because the bank's services so required. Throughout more than 20 years, this service modality was maintained continuously in time, in merit of which, just like the other group of notaries appointed directly, without a time limit, they must be compensated for the unilateral termination of this subjective right without having carried out a procedure of administrative termination (rescisión) or contractual resolution, according to the stipulations in the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement in its articles 203 and following, as well as the new procedure and process stipulated by the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law in its article 13, regulating the forms of termination of these contractual relationships through the expiration of the term, the execution of the contractual relationship, resolution, unilateral contractual termination (rescisión), as well as termination by mutual agreement. Such norms have as a common denominator that the Administration has the power to terminate the appointment by background competition, but prior to the payment of the due compensation. Therefore, by not having duly compensated these notaries appointed without a fixed term by the defendant entity, they must be granted the corresponding compensation equivalent to four years of income as external notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 01, 2009, and will be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. Such compensatory term, as expressed, is supported by being the maximum time that the new regulations set for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Administrative Procurement Law) and which is applied prevalently to the plaintiffs' subjective rights, for which reason it will be in the sentence execution proceeding where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest running on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until its effective payment as it is a value obligation born in judgment, interest that is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment. This condition of having been appointed without a fixed time applies to Messrs. Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, and Carlos Rivera Bianchini: appointed through background competition number 1-85, and Messrs. Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez. Once set in sentence execution, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. On the other hand, we have the notaries who were appointed for a fixed term, but despite that, their contract was being extended, it being clear regarding them that in the background competitions in which they participated they were appointed for a defined time, for a fixed and determined term. As can be observed from competitions 2-90, 2-94, 1-95, and 1-96, they are appointed for two years, a term that will be extendable if the evaluation is positive, establishing said extension in one and two years. Thus, the nature of these contracts is to have a fixed term; they were not created to be indefinite, and the fact that they were extended in time does not grant them such condition. The fact that the Administration's needs implied the continuous requirement of their work does not have the virtue of changing the provision that by common agreement and based on the background competition set a term in time. Given this situation, having been proven that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years, that no cause had occurred to render the appointment without effect due to non-compliance, the proper course is to compensate them for the non-extension of their contract without justified cause, it being proper to compensate them with two years of income as external notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 01, 2009, which will be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. For this reason, as already expressed and for the cited motives, in both cases, both those appointed without subjection to a term and those appointed for a defined time, the Chamber separates itself from the criterion of the plaintiffs who claim lifetime compensation, as well as from the expert witness Mr. Nombre18237 who compensates for life, as well as from the criterion of expert witness Mr. Nombre39226, who had set the compensation as if it were an employment relationship. The compensation is set at 2 years, because that is the maximum term that the contract would have been extended, it being the power, as indicated, of the defendant bank to terminate (rescindir) or revoke the contract, but duly compensating, as dictated here, and it will be in the sentence execution proceeding where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest running on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until its effective payment as it is a value obligation born in judgment, interest that is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all the plaintiffs. Said compensation corresponding to Messrs. Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, and Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz who were appointed through background competition number 2-90. To Messrs. Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, and Mayra Rojas Guzmán, appointed through background competition number 2-94. To Mr. Freddy Rojas López appointed through background competition number 1-95 and to Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, appointed through background competition number 1-96. Furthermore, such sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment. Once set in sentence execution, the tax burden corresponding to said income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Likewise, as expressed supra, in none of the expressed scenarios, of indefinite appointment or fixed term, were the expressed expenses of furniture and equipment, payment of labor charges for the employees under their charge, office expansions, and other expenses incurred in the provision of notary services contemplated within the compensation provided, which had to be assumed at their own account and risk, and did not form part of the fee agreed with the banking entity. Without the arguments of the defendant being acceptable regarding that it concerns the simple right to participate in a roster (rol), the plaintiffs are external notaries, they were appointed by background competition and by agreement of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), they hold a subjective right in merit of such designation, exercising notarial tasks for the defendant, so it is not simply a matter, as the banking entity states, of a mere random roster for assigning tasks that excludes the payment of damages, because such roster is a mechanism devised for the distribution of notarial work (article 173 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica), which originated in an administrative act declaratory of subjective rights which must be compensated before the administrative decision to revoke it. Regarding the annulment claims filed by the plaintiffs, these are rejected, as expressed, no nullity is observed in the administrative procedures followed and in the decisions adopted by the plaintiff Bank, which executed them in the exercise of its powers, but without having compensated as appropriate. While the plaintiffs base the nullity on the violation of due process for having carried out a procedure without compensation or not having adhered to what is established in the administrative procurement law, it is not a matter of declaring nullity for the sake of nullity itself. The invalidity and ineffectiveness of administrative provisions are decreed when there is harm to the administered party, and in this case, more than in the followed procedure, the affectation consists of the non-payment of the just and correct compensation that corresponded to each and every one of the plaintiffs. The banking entity had the power to exercise revocation, nullity, administrative termination (rescisión), or termination by mutual agreement of the acts declaratory of subjective rights, this is unquestionable, it was empowered by the aforementioned regulations of the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the Administrative Procurement Law and its Regulations, but it had to compensate and following at least a minimum administrative procedure like the one followed but fully indemnifying the promoters, so there is no reason to decree the nullity of the challenged agreements and procedures, especially since reinstatement is not possible for the expressed reasons, because it is not a statutory relationship covered by job stability (inamovilidad), and because it corresponds to legitimate powers of the Administration, a pronouncement of nullity is unnecessary, thus making the compensation claim the essential and main pronouncement of this process. Furthermore, there is no nullity due to the fact that Mrs. Herradora Chacón carried out the communication to terminate the external notarial legal relationships, given that she, in her capacity as Supplier (Proveedora) of the banking entity, did not assume attributions that do not correspond to her, but rather limited herself to communicating the decisions adopted by the Board of Directors. On the other hand, the compensation claim for the application of the double roster (doble rol) by the banking entity is rejected, as well as for the decrease in income they received as of December first, 2009, this is so because granting the plaintiffs compensation for the termination of their legal relationship and also compensating them for having seen their income decrease would constitute a double payment. To this end, it must be assessed that the Law imposed the new contracting modality through public bidding (licitación pública), the plaintiffs remained in their positions due to precautionary measures filed, and furthermore, the Bank had the power to revoke or terminate (rescindir) the subjective right prior compensation, which is ordered here. We would be wrong to grant compensation for termination and for decrease in income in the continuity of the position, both claims are not compatible, and imply a contradiction before the exercise of legal powers by the bank, in merit of which the reinstatement claims must be rejected, as we are not facing a public employment relationship in the terms of constitutional articles 190 and 191. While on folio 116, it is verified and in a verified fact that as of the entry into force on December 01, 2009, of the public bidding 2008LN-000024-01 for the selection of professionals who provide their services as external notaries, the contracting of new notaries, and the establishment of a double roster for assigning tasks, the plaintiffs have seen their income decreased in the exercise of notarial services for Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and for this, as well as to demonstrate moral damages, the witnesses Mrs. Nombre112079, Mr. Nombre112080, Mr. Manuel Jiménez Costillo, Mr. Sergio Cortés Rosabal, Mr. Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, Mrs. Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, Mrs. Flory Eugenia González Rodríguez, and Mrs. Luz María González Rodríguez are provided. However, and despite this, compensating the promoters for such affectation appears clearly incompatible with the compensation that is being granted in this ruling for the unilateral termination of the subjective right of the notary condition. This collegiate body could not grant damages based on the income received years before public bidding 2008LN-000024-01 came into force and also grant damages because their income was reduced due to said public contracting. To this end, as expressed, it must be indicated that the banking entity was within its right to terminate the subjective right by way of revocation or administrative termination (rescisión) but had to compensate; given this, if it decided to terminate said legal relationship, it was a fact that the promoters could not continue after December 01, 2009, and if they did, it was due to the filing of precautionary measures, awaiting the results of the process and eventual reinstatement. Consequently, by recognizing in this ruling the legitimate power of the banking entity to choose not to continue with such contracts, it is not proper to also grant them compensation for the decrease in their income, when it was a fact that they could no longer continue due to the defendant's decision. The propriety of compensation for termination having been discussed and endorsed, compensation cannot also be granted for having continued without the conditions they had previously, thanks to the adopted precautionary measures. The discussion of compensation for the non-compliance with the double roster and for the decrease in their income for that reason would acquire relevance if it had been decided to accept the reinstatement of the notaries, but by endorsing the banking capacity to terminate them, it is not feasible to grant damages for having continued in such tasks after the banking entity's decision to cease and complete them. Similarly, the claim for subjective and objective moral damages claimed by the plaintiffs must be rejected, given that the Bank acted in the exercise of its powers by terminating the legal relationship it had with the external notaries, without it being observed that moral damages should be compensated for this, as it concerns conduct exercised before the legislative change operated by the obligation to put such contracts out to tender (sacar a concurso) and in the exercise of administrative powers protected by law, of being able to terminate (rescindir), revoke, or annul administrative acts declaratory of subjective rights. Regarding the lawsuit filed against the official Lorena María Herradora Chacón, it is feasible to indicate that, being a public servant, her liability to third parties is governed by the stipulations in articles 199 to 202 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provide that the public official shall respond personally when they have incurred in intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof. In turn, it is established that without prejudice to the qualification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall respond jointly and severally to the affected parties for fault in selection (culpa in eligendo) or fault in supervision (culpa in vigilando). In merit of this, for the servant to respond subjectively and personally to the affected parties, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their powers and functions and that the subjective unlawfulness of their conduct exists by having incurred in intent or gross negligence. However, in the present matter, as the promoters have not proven that the defendant official incurred in conduct of intent or gross negligence in the exercise of her functions that would have generated damages, the action filed against her must be denied. The actions the defendant servant incurred, regarding the communication she made to the promoters in the exercise of her position, were executed in the exercise of legitimate administrative powers, without abuse of power or illegitimate action of the functions entrusted under her competence being observed, which leads to the lawsuit filed against her being declared without merit. It must be taken into consideration that the decision to compensate the promoters fell outside the scope of competence of Mrs. Herradora Chacón, she limiting herself in the exercise of her position to communicating what had been decided by the Board of Directors of the defendant banking entity. Regarding Mrs. Nombre112022, it is observed that she was mistakenly included in the initial complaint, but it concerns an evident material error, because as could be verified in the evidence required for a better resolution and which appears on folios 10981 to 10988 of the subjudice, she is not a notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, has not received any appointment, and therefore lacks standing to sue, for which reason the filed lawsuit must be rejected.
**II.5)-ON THE FORMS OF EARLY TERMINATION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS:** The Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) establishes in its Title VI on the termination of the process, first chapter, that in addition to the other mechanisms established by law (conciliation and judgment), the process may terminate early or abnormally, by way of withdrawal (desistimiento) verbal or written (113 ibid), acquiescence (allanamiento) (114 ibid), extra-procedural administrative satisfaction (115 ibid), the application of a firm favorable administrative resolution (116 ibid), settlement (transacción) (117 ibid), and compliance with the omissive conduct (118 ibid). All of which shall have the character of res judicata (112 ibid), and requires supervision and approval by the judge. Regarding withdrawal, it must be formulated before the issuance of the judgment by the Trial Court and, if raised by the Public Administration, shall be accompanied by the agreement or resolution adopted by the supreme hierarchical superior or by authorization from the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República) if said body had filed it. This institute consists of the "unconditional and unequivocal declaration of will of the plaintiff of the process by which they manifest their will to put an end to the process before the issuance of the judgment without extinguishing the right. The foundation of the withdrawal is the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) by virtue of which the plaintiff decides when to sue and conclude the initiated process" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual of the Contentious Administrative Process. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 227). Although in legal systems such as the Argentine one (Gozaíni Osvaldo A. Elements of Civil Procedural Law. First edition. Buenos Aires. Editorial Ediar. 2005. Page 398), withdrawal of the right is admitted, as well as of the process, in our national system the procedural code, as well as the civil jurisdiction (article 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, Código Procesal Civil), opted to admit it only regarding the latter, with which the promoter has the possibility of refiling the action, unless the waiver of the right operates (article 207 of the Civil Procedure Code), not expressly contemplated in contentious procedural matters, but applicable supplementarily. Consequently, "the withdrawal puts an end to the process, but not to the substantial legal situations on the merits that the plaintiff may allege in a new process" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual of the Contentious Administrative Process. Editorial Jurídica Continental. First edition. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Page 229). Thus, once the request is submitted, a resolution will be issued approving or homologating it, in which the process will be declared terminated, the archiving of the proceedings will be ordered, and the administrative file will be returned. **Applied, the foregoing exposition to the present matter**, we have that through written submissions filed with the court, Messrs. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba expressly request to have the present process considered withdrawn, a request that is endorsed by the processing judge. In merit of this, it is observed that such request meets the legal requirements provided by article 113 of the procedural code.
This is so because it concerns an express, unconditional, and unequivocal request from the petitioner, which was made before the judgment was issued, and therefore it is appropriate to deem it admitted, as was resolved in the preliminary phase.
**II.6)- EXCEPTIONS:** Based on the foregoing, the exception of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the co-defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, it being understood as granted in what was not awarded and denied in what was expressly conceded, this being so because, in accordance with the cited regulations, the evidence provided, and the factual and legal grounds set forth, the right invoked by the plaintiff in support of her claims partially assists her, given that the right she holds to be compensated for the unilateral termination of her notarial legal relationship with the banking entity was declared. Regarding the claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, the exception of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed is granted, and the claim brought against her is denied in all its aspects. Regarding the exception of expiration (excepción de caducidad), it is rejected, as the peremptory deadline for filing this action had not elapsed. On the Court's own motion, the lack of standing (falta de legitimación) of Mrs. Nombre112022 to sue in this proceeding is declared, the claim filed is deemed without merit, and it is resolved without a special ruling on costs.
**III) COSTS:** In accordance with articles 119, 193, and 194 of the Code of Administrative Litigation (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), this proceeding must be resolved by ordering Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to pay both sets of costs, this in application of the general principle of condemning the losing party and because the circumstances that allow it to be exempted from such payment, per article 194 of the cited Code, are not present in this case. Although the claim was partially granted, it must be considered that the civil compensatory claims awarded constitute the main claim of this action. Regarding the claim brought against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón, it is resolved without a special ruling on costs, given that even though the action against her was deemed without merit, there was sufficient reason for the petitioners to litigate, as her participation in the facts had to be determined in order to establish her potential compensatory liability.
**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** The exception of expiration (excepción de caducidad) is rejected, and the exception of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially granted, it being understood as denied in what was expressly awarded and granted in what was not conceded. Consequently, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals, by way of damages (daños y perjuicios), the income for four years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez. Said income shall be derived from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to December 1, 2009. These sums must be adjusted for inflation (indexadas) from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil statutory interest on said amounts accruing from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation owed to each plaintiff. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals, by way of damages (daños y perjuicios), the income for two years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López, and Federico Alfaro Araya. Said income shall be derived from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009. These sums must be adjusted for inflation (indexadas) from the date this judgment becomes final, as well as the payment of civil statutory interest on said amounts accruing from the date this judgment becomes final until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation owed to each plaintiff. Both sets of costs are to be borne by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The claim filed against Mrs. Lorena María Herradora Chacón is deemed without merit in all its aspects, the exception of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the defendant is granted, and it is resolved without a special ruling on costs. The claim brought by Mr. José Javier Vega Araya, Mr. Jorge Campabadal Herrer o, Mr. Rolando Laclé Castro, and Mr. Oscar Mora Córdoba, as well as the third-party claim (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez, are deemed withdrawn (desistida). On the Court's own motion, the lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) of Mrs. Nombre112022 is declared, the claim filed is deemed without merit, and it is resolved without a special ruling on costs. Judge Madrigal Jiménez delivers his vote separately.- **Dissenting Vote of Judge Madrigal Jiménez:** While I fully respect the solid position of my colleagues on the Panel, there are several aspects on which I differ, which I shall now set forth.
**I) Regarding the Proven and Unproven Facts:** I maintain the list of proven and unproven facts, adding to the latter the following: **The plaintiffs did not demonstrate: 5)** That the decision of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to terminate the relationship with the notaries forming the basis of the proceeding was untimely, arbitrary, or in any way flawed in its motivation (from the case file). **6)** The specific amount of income the plaintiffs received for the activity carried out for the clients of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (there is no evidence in this regard). **7)** That the plaintiffs' relationship with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica represented a condition of exclusivity, such that they could not provide their services to other clients in the ordinary liberal practice (there is insufficient evidence). **8)** That there are works performed by the notaries that have not been paid to date (from the case file). **9)** That there are expenses incurred by the notaries to fulfill the contract that have not been paid at this time (there is no evidence in this regard).
**II) Regarding Expiration (Caducidad):** In agreement with the majority's reasoning, expiration has not occurred in this case by virtue of the fact that, because a liability claim was filed together with the nullity claim (a plenary jurisdiction proceeding), the only applicable deadline is that of one hundred and ninety-eight of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This would prevent the fatal timeframe from having elapsed. On this matter, I consider it advisable to clarify that the issue was particularly complex and debatable in the former jurisdiction, where on the one hand it was held that the mechanism of seeking compensation produced the suppression of the expiration period, circumventing the preclusive institution; which at one point determined that one could only seek the declaration of non-conformity of the act to subsequently derive liability from there (but not its nullity). In recent decades, case law has been oriented towards indicating the inapplicability of expiration when there is a claim for compensation, basically on two grounds: on the one hand, the pro actione principle, which leads to the obligation to interpret restrictively all measures aimed at reducing access to the Administration of justice, and on the other, effective judicial protection. Furthermore, to accept a non-conformity of an act with the legal system without being able to declare its nullity would place us in the illogical condition of having to recognize reparations indefinitely into the future insofar as the act would subsist. This has determined that the latest thesis, expressed by my colleagues, progressively gains strength. However, in the terms in which it has been set forth, it appears as if the matter were now beyond discussion, which is not necessarily true. On the contrary, the topic remains current. What I do share with them is that if we take into account the moment when the events that determined the contractual breach occurred in relation to the date of filing the claims, it is evident that the legal deadline had not elapsed, rendering the discussion on this matter futile. For this reason, and solely on this basis, I consider that the substantive defense must be rejected. This is especially true if we take into account when the act challenged in this venue became final, as an interruptive aspect of the computation of the legal period.
**III) Regarding Declaratory Acts of Rights and the Absence of a Right to the Immutability of the Legal System:** Although the majority judgment does not do so, it is my opinion that some clarifications are necessary regarding declaratory acts of rights (actos declarativos de derechos) and the absence of immutability of the legal system as a right. Pursuant to the principles contained in constitutional articles 11 and 34, the Administration is forbidden from freely suppressing those acts it has issued in the exercise of its powers that confer subjective rights on individuals, since such rights constitute a limit concerning the possibility of unilaterally annulling, revoking, or modifying acts emanating from itself. It is a guarantee for the citizen against the possibility of eventual arbitrariness by the Administration; a guarantee that undoubtedly constitutes one of the manifestations of our republican system, consolidated and developed upon fundamental values, among them: legal certainty. By virtue of the principle of intangibility of subjective legal situations and the rights of the administered parties, the legal system prohibits the Administration from freely withdrawing declaratory acts of rights. Consequently, such withdrawal is exceptional and must furthermore be based on the existence of absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta), under the terms of Article 173 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP), or eventually a revocation as will be analyzed later. In the first of these cases, it implies that the defect of the act must be of such gravity that it affects public order, which in turn originates the legal duty to withdraw and not to execute the act thus vitiated. And it is for this reason that the Administration is permitted to exercise its power of self-tutelage. Rather, in the case of absolute nullity that is not evident and manifest (evidente y manifiesta), it must resort to the administrative litigation process, having previously declared the act harmful (lesivo). Consequently, in administrative channels, the declaration of nullity is subject to limits and only proceeds insofar as the nullity is absolute, evident, and manifest under the terms of Article 173 of the Law. It concerns a serious defect that makes the existence of the act incompatible with the legal system. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in judgment 2002-12054 at 9:03 a.m. on December 20, 2002, referred to the administrative power to review acts issued by it ex officio, and the appropriateness of declaring their nullity through that channel: "(...) Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires the concurrence of certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations that qualify it. // The nullity that justifies ex officio review must be of such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, according to the provisions of Article 173, paragraph 1, of the General Public Administration Law, 'evident and manifest'. That which is evident and manifest is that which is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and which offers no margin for doubt or which does not require a dialectical or logical verification process or effort to discover it, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In this sense, it suffices to confront the administrative act with the legal or regulatory provision that provides its coverage to reach such a conclusion, without any need for hermeneutics or exegesis whatsoever. It is necessary to add that Article 173 of the General Public Administration Law does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, some being simple and others evident and manifest. Rather, what it seeks to promote is that, in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the administrative litigation judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate their review through administrative channels." In accordance with what has been noted, there are two avenues to declare the nullity of an administrative act: one, referring to the declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, pursuant to the aforementioned Article 173; and two, in those cases where the defect of the act does not possess the characteristics of being evident and manifest, the judicial avenue may be resorted to, after a prior declaration that the act is harmful (declaratoria de lesividad). Our General Public Administration Law provides for the possibility of annulling administrative acts for reasons of legality (Art. 158 et seq.) and also of revoking them for reasons of opportunity, convenience, merit, or legality (Art. 152 et seq.). The topic of the legality of an act brings into play a series of highly relevant aspects. If the act had a defect from its formation, the prevailing logic is that it must be annulled via a lesivity proceeding, so revocation could only operate in two scenarios: the first, when the deadline to declare nullity has elapsed, or failing that, when we are facing supervening illegality. This latter scenario evokes those cases where the act was in conformity with the legal system at the time it was issued, but subsequently a change in the legal system occurs that makes it unsustainable. We are in the realm of the survival of the abolished right (derecho abolido), versus consolidated legal situations or acquired rights, under the protection of constitutional canon 34. Note that if it is a mere legitimate interest, there would be no right to request that the law be maintained in order to obtain the benefit, but only standing to sue to seek the new regulation's annulment so the previous right is maintained. The logic regarding the abolished right is that the generated acts and rights are maintained over time until their effects conclude, but there are multiple scenarios where this is not possible due to an open conflict with the public interest. In such cases, revocation of the act is the appropriate course of action. The other assumptions for revoking the formal activity of the administration are based on convenience and merit, which are administrative criteria of prudence and not legality. Add to this that revocation is only possible for discretionary acts (Art. 156.1 a contrario sensu), as for regulated acts, it would be senseless insofar as each time they were adopted, the same administrative action would be reproduced. It is established as a requirement that there must also be serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest (Art. 152.2); which may be founded on the appearance of new factual circumstances or on a new evaluation of those initially taken into account or of the affected public interest (Art. 153). Article 155 establishes a cardinal principle in this matter: the revocation of an act declaratory of rights is only possible through a decision of the respective senior official that simultaneously contains the acknowledgment of the damages (daños y perjuicios) that such decision causes to the administered party. This principle admits the exception provided for in the preceding article, which stipulates the following: "Article 154.- Permits for the use of public domain, and other acts that recognize an expressly and validly granted precarious right to an administered party, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability for the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary, and a prudential period for compliance with the revocation act must be granted in all cases." Professor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz explained the scope of the preceding provision thus: "This alludes to the situation of certain types of acts we spoke of yesterday that produce rights that do not consolidate. Because it is known in advance upon granting them that they are subject to any change due to new facts or circumstances or a change in the authority's criteria. This occurs, for example, in acts, permits for public domain, and the doctrine recognizes that so-called police acts are generally of this type. They do not create acquired rights. I grant the permit to open a business of a certain type that is considered subject to surveillance because it is a source of scandals. But this permit does not create the right to keep the business open if the authority considers any change in criteria or a subsequent circumstance that warrants its elimination. In these cases, it is understood that the clause called precarious, that is, the reservation of the power to revoke, is implicit in the act and that the act can be revoked without any compensation; it was known in advance that the right was precarious and very unstable. That is the hypothesis... Which, as you will see, is exceptional because immediately afterward we demand, for the other cases where the right is consolidated, compensation in the event that the act is revoked and the right is suppressed" (legislative file No. A23E5452, record No. 102, session of October 1, 1970, pages 3 and 4). This possibility of revoking acts that confer rights on a precarious basis without any right to compensation is, moreover, a doctrinally accepted possibility, although always under the condition that such revocation is not untimely or arbitrary. Furthermore, it has been held that this is the only scenario in which, at least in our legal system, revocation is possible (Miguel Marienhoff, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, volume II, Buenos Aires, Abeledo-Perrot, 1966, p. 577). The revocatory power is subject to compliance with the following requirements: 1) They may be revoked for reasons of opportunity and convenience, taking into account what was indicated opportunely about the content of these reasons. 2) The revocation must not be untimely, arbitrary, or illegitimate. The first being understood as not being outside of time and reason. 3) In all cases, a prudential period for compliance with the revocation act must be granted. Likewise, when we are in the presence of a right properly speaking and not a precarious one, this must necessarily be preceded by compensation. Doctrine has long discussed the possibility of recognizing some payment with precarious permits or authorizations, and although the rule is a negative response (except when the decision is untimely or arbitrary), exceptions have been recognized, especially when a singular, special, and intense sacrifice can be located, under the modality of liability for lawful conduct. We reiterate that we would be facing an exception. With respect to rights properly speaking, there are multiple lawful and normal scenarios where the Administration can find itself obligated to suppress a right already recognized, from the very figure of expropriation as a limit to private property, to the need to reorganize the administrative function, among many other cases. Of course, again, we are in the presence of liability for lawful conduct (insofar as the act presents due motivation and is adopted following all legal procedures).
One aspect on which we have not dedicated a single line but which it is imperative to clarify is that the legal system by its very nature is dynamic; human relations vary and the Law must adjust to regulate them. The legislator, consequently, must be modifying legal norms to provide a solution to the various new or different problems that society presents, which entails that the legal system must undergo modifications. Canon 34 of the fundamental charter guarantees that there will be no illegitimate effects on acquired rights and consolidated situations, but it does not prevent norms from mutating and adapting to those new realities. The mere possibility of considering the existence of a legal system that does not adjust would entail a renunciation of the legislative function, as a basic activity of the State, and would allow the social order to progressively be lost, delegitimizing its very existence. The legitimacy of public powers is sustained by fulfilling the function that determines their name (legislative, executive, and judicial), with the State absorbing the totality of the use of force to the detriment of individuals but for the benefit of social peace. If the State does not fulfill its entrusted functions, it is calling upon the inhabitants to adopt the measures they find convenient by their own hand, regressing in the social paradigm we present. Law legitimizes itself insofar as it resolves social situations and not when it ignores them. Regarding the matter at hand in the dispute, it is possible to see that the legislator varied the norms regarding control for administrative contracting, making them more rigorous for the benefit of the public treasury, such that it was carrying out a lawful and legal function. Thus, the legislator changing the norms is normal activity and a fundamental part of the obligations that the citizenry has entrusted to it. In matters of public finance, as in administrative contracting, it is normal for requirements to be varied and conditions established to ensure that everything is being carried out with due transparency.
**IV) Regarding the legal nature of the relationship of the notaries**: As well sustained by considerando II.2 of this resolution, the Financial Administration Law (Ley de Administración Financiera) established a system for contracting notaries through inclusion in a roster list. One must be clear about the antiquity of the provision (1953), when professionals were few and generally with living standards very different from current ones; within that framework, having a reasonable number of professionals was considered ideal. A breadth of offerors was intended. Note also how the norm did not guarantee (nor does it today) a specific number of potential clients who would contract with the Bank, nor does it establish the value of the transactions that would be generated, but rather it was the commercial activity that would determine how many potential fees were to be received; the entire situation was quite aleatory. It is debatable whether we are in the presence of a right properly speaking or a mere authorization to be placed on a roster to eventually be assigned to execute deeds. Every act of award within a contracting process is presumed to constitute a subjective right in favor of the beneficiary, but in this case, the right consisted solely of being added to a rotating list and that due process had to be followed for removal from it. The effective content of the supposedly granted right is highly debatable. The Administration had the power to hold as many competitions as it deemed appropriate, which would enter under the same conditions as those who already formed part of the list. The legal nature of that benefit is hybrid. That explains why the legislator did not establish greater requirements, since it was not granting a real direct benefit, but an expectation within the roster; within an open list. Where even the amount to be charged was defined by guild provision. The topic is otherwise interesting and the subject of arguments for or against. In any case, we can define without major question that most of the plaintiffs had the right to belong to the aforementioned registry, where by rotation they were assigned deeds. The fees for these deeds were not paid directly by the defendant bank, but by the latter's clients; which generates a triangular relationship, where the defendant secured the professional's fees and expenses to deliver them later. An otherwise complex relationship. It must be specified on this point that the Regulation to the Financial Administration Law did not include price as a factor to be evaluated, because it was known that the professionals were subject to a guild fee tariff, over which they could charge neither less nor more, under penalty of incurring unfair competition. The legal mechanism sought the distribution of wealth under the protection of constitutional canon fifty, with the advantage that the Bank always retained the possibility of opening as many competitions as it deemed appropriate, with the sole interest of maintaining an updated list consistent with its needs. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the data discussed in the oral and public trial noted by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), the system became distorted, such that a very closed elite of notaries was fostered who formed that group. I add to the foregoing, that as the operations carried out grew and the value thereof, through a basic rational sense, an enrichment of some of the involved notaries occurred, being fundamentally the basis of the litigation before us. Without the existence of any legal reform, the Comptroller General of the Republic began to warn of the inconvenience of the norm in the terms in which it was drafted since the mid-eighties and through various resolutions made the Administrations see the need for that type of contracting to be set for reasonable periods of two or four years, in no case exceeding six years, with the sole interest of ensuring that a reassessment of what had been done and of the contracted professionals was carried out. It was a logical and indispensable control measure that was complied with in many cases. Indeed, as was shown in the oral and public debate, the defendant public bank included some of its professionals under this modality. With automatic extensions. The most serious error lies in not establishing a limit on said extensions, because it fell back into an indefinite contract. In any case, we have so far two groups of contracted professionals: a first group of those whose contract by background has no term, and a second group, which does have one. Yet the problem becomes more complex as will be seen. With the promulgation of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), number 7494 of May 2, 1995, effective as of May 1, 1996, it partially repealed the articles of the Financial Administration Law, and the General Regulation for Administrative Contracting (Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa), number 25038 of March 6, 1996, which was effective from March 28, 1996, to September 27, 2006, as indicated in the majority vote, established the modality for contracting technical or professional services by natural or legal persons, in which the procedures of public bidding (licitación pública), bidding by registry, or restricted bidding had to be followed according to the amount of the respective contract and the volume of the ordinary budget of the Administration interested in the contract. Up to this point, it is necessary to make at least two clarifications. The first of them, that although the legal imperative was more than unquestionable, the Bank omitted to regularize the situation as ordered by the legislator, with several paths existing. On one hand, it could have kept the notaries who had no fixed term and conducted one or more public biddings for compliance with the law, warning the former that their contracts would no longer be indefinite and allowing them to adjust to the new reality. It could also have chosen to revoke the existing contracts and conduct a new competition where all participants entered under equal conditions. What it definitely could not continue doing was maintaining the factual situation under the same conditions as if the legal imperative were not there, where an essentially closed list of benefited notaries was maintained without generating new competitions. The other aspect on which an unjustified inertia by the bank is centered focuses on the absence of applying the new law, given that it left for an indefinite period and for several lustrums the norm emptied of legal content, of legal effect, as if it were a mere moral imperative. On this topic, it is nothing more than obligatory to call attention and expose the manifest non-compliance that was occurring. On the other hand, as well exposed by the resolution before us, the Administrative Contracting Law and its Regulation allowed the contracting of professionals under the ordinary regime for appointing officials. In turn, with the entry into force of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial), the regulation of the fees of in-house public notaries in public institutions was contemplated in Articles 7 and 8. Given that situation, the co-existence in public entities of two types of notaries: some in-house who cannot charge fees but rather a salary, and others external who earn stipends for their work. During the trial, an attempt was made to suggest that the existence of that double role was an act of bad faith by the defendant, which is incorrect. The norm of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, in sound logic, guarantees that a single role exists among external notaries, in a transparent and orderly manner and not merely as a mechanism of favoritism; but that did not prohibit the existence of an internal role of notaries who did not charge fees. The reason for this internal registry is quite varied; thus, banks carry out projects of social interest where charging fees is not possible due to the public purposes pursued; there are also commercial transactions where, due to their very nature, an attractive aspect of the activity consisted of not charging fees. Today it is publicly known that this mechanism is used by various banking entities. In this way, the plaintiffs' interpretation that the existence of an internal role of notaries is contrary to the law has no reason to be, and on the contrary, they are attempting to accommodate the norm to their interests. We must be more than clear in indicating that said right held did not guarantee a specific number of deeds, much less a determined value thereof, in such a way as to secure the livelihood of those professionals; their right was limited to being on a roster to be eventually assigned, with the possibility that said list would grow as much as the public entity deemed appropriate. That also did not prevent the Bank from establishing a system of in-house notaries, as already advanced, whether to attend to matters of public interest or simply because it was aligned with its interests. This judge must be more than clear in indicating that he is aware that current market conditions, within a system of free competition, determine that the commissions, expenses, and fees that a person formerly had to pay to meet a banking obligation are now assumed by the banking entity as a mechanism to attract clients. Within that framework, the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), one of the largest and most solid in the region, must enter the market with due aggressiveness towards its clients, offering not only what its other competitors also offer but also other, riskier benefits, such as interest rates or bonuses, because otherwise it would be destined to perish in the market. Although the Superintendency of Financial Entities establishes a series of requirements on debt ceilings, that does not prevent healthy and adequate free competition within the framework of Constitutional Articles 45 and 46 for the benefit of the consumer. One cannot forget, either, that public banks, although they carry out commercial activity that is not differentiated from an external standpoint from that carried out by private entities, it is unquestionable that their acts are vested with public interest. Otherwise, they would have no reason for existence. In that reasoning, it is logical to think that there must be many assumptions in which charging lawyer fees is not convenient or prudent; a living example of this is found in matters of the National Housing System Law (Ley del Sistema Nacional para la Vivienda). Given that situation, if the contracting administration was called upon to reorient the services of the external notaries appointed directly through an agreement of the Board of Directors (or another body authorized by it), that was what indeed had to be done in strict adherence to legality. Such right confers on the external notaries who find themselves under that condition the power to demand, upon the desire of the contracting entity to discontinue their services, that the administrative procedures be followed to declare the nullity or revoke the pre-existing right in the terms set forth. During the oral and public trial, the plaintiffs confined themselves to the argument that the only way they could be removed from their condition was through the lesivity procedure already analyzed, which, as we have been indicating, is incorrect. The act of award, as ordered at the time, was in accordance with the legal system of that time, and via constitutional Article 34 it is not possible to apply a norm that arose subsequently to them. In that way, it is not possible to locate a nullity under the terms argued by the plaintiffs, but rather we are in the presence of a revocation (or rescission, according to the terms of the Administrative Contracting Law). It would be illogical to pretend that the public commercial entity was obligated to maintain a contractual relationship indefinitely, which eventually made it less competitive or generated a burden in that area, due to the existence of the agreement with the plaintiffs. Even if that ultimately implies having to make some reparation or pay compensation, as will be seen. We reiterate time and again that the Administration is under the obligation to adapt to circumstances and to the entrusted service, especially when in competition, renouncing the prerogatives that the legal system establishes. Acting under these conditions, it is entirely lawful to revoke existing contracts. Indeed, note how in the trial hearing, the defendant's representative, who is believed under the principle of procedural loyalty, openly maintained that the Comptroller General of the Republic itself called them to account on the situation and made them see that they had to regularize it and suppress those indefinite contracts they had with the notaries who are plaintiffs here. Management that had begun based on a complaint from another liberal professional. If those statements were true, they were correct; fifteen years had already elapsed without the bank regularizing and it maintained some notaries indefinitely, as an elite that benefited from the commercial transactions of the public entity. A situation contrary to the legal system was simply being generated for the benefit of a group in a way that could not be justified. The revocation involves the exercise of legitimate powers exercised within the scope of its competence and authorized by the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), without observing non-conformity in the procedure carried out, nor absolute nullity of the adopted legitimate decision. It is not out of place to indicate that although the use of the ordinary administrative procedure is not observed, the components of due process are located, insofar as the interested parties were communicated the reasons for the administrative decision and were invited to participate, which they eventually could have done, as indeed some of them did. In their reasoning, some of the plaintiffs maintained that they did not participate because that would entail legitimizing the competition, a respectable stance, but far removed from the legal framework, since it could well have allowed them to enter the registry of notaries again and eventually claim some compensation if it were appropriate. Nor is the authorization of the comptroller entity on file in this case, but as was said, it was that same department that urged the administrative action. Furthermore, that topic was not a subject of controversy between the parties, nor was it argued or a subject of any dispute. We would be facing mere non-compliances of form, which did not prevent the exercise of the right of defense and, more importantly, were not debated, argued, or discussed during the trial hearing. As is known in law, nullity does not exist for itself, and exactly that is what would be generated in the event of declaring a nullity in this case, when the defendant entity only sought to regularize the situation with its external notaries. What we do locate, which could well generate a contrary application of the law, lies in the fact that the corresponding analysis should have been conducted on whether it was appropriate to compensate the external notaries according to what is stipulated in the cited Article 155 and have paid them the fair and legitimate amounts to which they would have had a right, after having served the banking entity for many years. In any case, that topic becomes more complicated and will be revisited later. What is possible to conclude so far, and which coincides with what was set forth in the majority vote, is that the nullity sought cannot be entertained and, on the contrary, must be rejected for lack of right.
**V) Regarding the merits of the matter**: Having rejected the nullity sought, it is relevant to proceed to consider the matter of the compensation requested. From the requested items, one can see without major question that what is requested are notarial income not received and that some of the plaintiffs could eventually present if the pre-existing situation were maintained. Thus arises one of the most debated points of the process, and which generates the greatest conflict, because the defendant bank categorically denies the appropriateness of such payments, warning that said income cannot and must not be considered as part of a salary. On this aspect, there is a clear jurisprudential line that denies the income received by in-house lawyer-officials of public institutions who counted among their legal departments in-house lawyers, who also provided their services as notaries and directors of judicial collection processes, the nature of salary; rather, they are considered as income for professional services. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note, among many others, what was considered in Vote number 9041-2006 at fifteen hours fifteen minutes on June 27, two thousand six, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on the topic:
"[....] Even regarding the acquired rights claimed by a lawyer from the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), who had been in charge of judicial collections for several years and considered that the fact that the appealed institution decided to open a public bidding competition for the contracting of those professional services violated the provisions of constitutional Article 34, this Constitutional Court, through ruling number 2004-12511 at 16:16 hours on November 9, 2004, established the following: '(…) In any case, as pointed out by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the benefit received by in-house lawyers for the judicial collection of the delinquent portfolio does not have the character of salary, but rather of emoluments or fees for the provision of a professional service (DAGJ-2225-2000 of August 31, 2000, visible at folios 16-21), whose perception depends on a contingent, eventual, or hypothetical circumstance such as a client's delinquency. Finally, it is not pertinent to adduce an acquired right from an administrative practice arisen outside and against the Administrative Contracting Law —Article 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution—, which, at the same time, has support in the Law of the Constitution (Article 182 of the Political Constitution), as was pointed out by the organ of constitutional relevance —the Comptroller General of the Republic— in charge of supervision and vigilance of the Public Treasury (DAGJ-1420-2002 of August 26, 2002, visible at folios 22-26).' Both criteria are applicable in the specific case insofar as they reaffirm, in the first place, the constitutionality of the procedures for external contracting of lawyers to perform judicial collection functions in public institutions, and, in the second place, that the economic benefits received by in-house lawyers for judicial collection cannot be considered as salary but as fees for the provision of a professional service". (our underline). Therefore, insofar as such concepts are liquidated as part of a forgone salary or as a fixed income to which the plaintiff had a right, such items of the liquidation must be rejected.
Several conclusions must be drawn; all the expert studies that attempt to apply criteria proper to labor law to the plaintiffs' situation must be rejected without further question. However, the Administration was empowered, via the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulation, to rescind the link that united it with the plaintiffs. In that case, it is an obligation to pay the contractor the part of the contract effectively executed, and the expenses the latter would have incurred to complete the execution. Regarding the case at hand, there is not a single claim for unpaid amounts; on the contrary, everything seems to indicate that there is no debt on that concept. It is clear to the plaintiffs that the absence of continuing with the contract implicitly entails a decrease in their living standards and their projection thereof, but due to a conjuncture of economic conditions. The bank could have maintained the plaintiffs and carried out massive contracting of external notaries, and equally, by a lawful mechanism and without any responsibility, a decrease in the income of the historic external notaries who are now filing suit would be produced. Indeed, it could well carry out the totality of its deeds using internal notaries, which is again lawful and, in principle, is not a basis for generating responsibility. We reiterate that the plaintiffs only have the right to form part of a list or roster, without any guarantee of how many deeds would be assigned to them or which fees they would receive from them. On this matter, it is a mere expectation, without any support. Under those conditions, it could not be considered that a damage susceptible to being compensated is being produced. It is not possible to ensure, either, that there is bad faith in the matter on the part of the bank or that the decision was untimely, because on the contrary, there was administrative inertia for many years; even though the existing period between the communication to the interested parties and their withdrawal from the roster is indeed short according to the rules of rationality and proportionality, considering that they had provided services for many years. What is possible to recognize is damages (perjuicios), specifically in the profit they had the right to receive. It must be specified that although during the oral and public trial the plaintiffs discussed the competence of the specific official who adopted the cessation act, which generated, according to them, an absolute defect in the adopted act; the public entity rightly sets forth how there is internal regulation that delegates the possibility of revoking contracts to said official, which entails that this form requirement of the administrative action is satisfied. Reiterating the rejection of the pleading of nullity of the act and confirming its validity.
**VI) Regarding the merits of the matter**: As indicated in the statement of unproven facts, there is no clarity regarding how much the activity with the National Bank of Costa Rica represented for each of the plaintiffs, whether it was a lot or a little; indeed, from their own description, it is evident how much randomness (alea) there was on the topic, insofar as the figures for some were several times greater than those for others. Similarly, some of the plaintiffs pointed out that the activity with the bank prevented them from having another type of clientele, due to the delivery times and the required speed, but on this topic there is also no clear and indubitable proof that allows reaching the conclusion that this comment is true. Both remain solely on the speculative plane. We reiterate that the norm is clear, that although the Bank's conduct was carried out in adherence to public powers, it should have compensated the plaintiffs. Even having communicated its decision several months in advance, we do not consider that the time used was correct or necessary to generate equity between the parties. As already stated, there is no accreditation of payment shortfalls for services rendered, nor for damages suffered. The undersigned shares the classification of the notaries made in the majority vote, but recognizing to them only the corresponding effective profit they could have received, within the timeframes reasoned by my colleagues. Thus, with respect to the notaries who had an indefinite-term contract, the profit must be for a period of four years, taking for this purpose as a base the average of the last four years of contracting. This entails that all expenses related to operating costs proper to the notarial activity must be deducted, by virtue that said money would be received by third persons and not by the plaintiffs here. Considering only that received for services for clients of the National Bank of Costa Rica and for notarial activity. Furthermore, applying criteria of justice, equity, and reasonableness, within that period it is possible for the person to adapt to their new life condition. It is not out of place to indicate that in the absence of reliable vouchers in this respect, there is a regulatory norm that allows presuming what the profit margin of the notaries was. It must be revisited on this topic that in the trial hearing, the plaintiffs said they were older persons and not of an age to be varying their professional activity, always within the law, which prevented them from adjusting to the market. We do not doubt that the assertion is true, insofar as as a person advances in age, adjusting to changes becomes more complicated, but this unquestionable reality by common sense is not a matter that falls to and is the responsibility of the public entity.
The problem of professional saturation, especially of lawyers, is a matter that has been widely discussed for nearly twenty years. The number of professionals currently affiliated is almost three hundred percent compared to the number that existed at that time. Gaining a foothold in the market and generating a niche that allows for a dignified professional existence is becoming more complicated every day. Not only for the plaintiffs but for the totality of professionals. Many lawyers have resorted to carrying out complementary activities to provide a more comprehensive service and thereby obtain a better market position. Without trying to identify a reason, which for this case is irrelevant, the truth is that the problem pointed out does not belong to the plaintiffs but to the profession in general and under no circumstances can it be charged to the defendant public entity. On the other hand, net profit (utilidad neta) must be taken, on the understanding that there are many costs that were ordinarily covered by fees and, since those expenses are no longer incurred, there would be unjust enrichment if the gross amount were paid. It is evident that the professionals made significant investments to offer good service to the bank, as they themselves describe and which, by sound rational criticism, must be true; thus they acquired larger or more comfortable offices, hired staff, among other items that form part of the business criteria of each of those professionals. The bank did not demand those conditions nor does it request that they maintain them; they were decisions taken by the interested party within the prosperity they were enjoying and, when having to face less positive times, they must assess whether those investments prove beneficial in their new reality. All within a market analysis that is exclusive to them and on which neither the bank nor this jurisdictional body can even issue any recommendation. These are investments made several years ago, within the period of better conditions for the plaintiffs. Nothing guarantees that this situation would be maintained for life; on the contrary, sound administration calls for the independent professional to seek to optimize the earnings received in lucrative activities that help them sustain themselves in their more advanced ages. Naturally, establishing net profit (utilidad neta) implicitly involves a series of studies of the costs in the period, against the professionals' accounting books and under the charge of an expert in the matter; where the reports to the Tax Administration that they should have made will play a preponderant role. It is a matter of the burden of proof, under the protection of canon 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), where the interested party must be the first to provide clear, concise, and conclusive documentation that allows the expert to establish a certain amount free of all doubt, without prejudice to that which is already on record in the case file. It should be noted, as previously advanced, that there is no right for the Law to remain unaltered or invariable to the interests of a party, but rather, on the contrary, it must be updated and modified according to new realities. The change in legislation, in accordance with the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its Regulations (Reglamento), therefore it is not considered that the principle of non-retroactivity has been violated in the terms of constitutional article 34. In such circumstances, the compensation cannot be indefinite, lifelong, for life, or by its projection, because such an appointment does not constitute an asset incorporated into their income or a permanent situation without the possibility of dismissal. Consequently, although the appointment is indefinite, the compensation for dismissal is not, which must be set within the maximum term that the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) established as a limit for this type of legal relationships; this is so because these legal relationships occurred before the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) established limits in this sense, and upon its entry into force, the relationships should have been submitted to it, which the Bank did not carry out at the time. Therefore, the compensation is set at 4 years, because that is the maximum term that the new regulations had established for these notarial legal relationships (articles 31 and 163 of the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa)) and which applies prevalently to the subjective rights of the plaintiffs. Consequently, it will be in the execution of judgment proceedings where the corresponding amount will be set, with civil legal interest running on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until its effective payment, as it is a value obligation born in the judgment; interest is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all plaintiffs. In addition, such sums must be indexed as of the finality of this judgment. Once established in the execution of judgment, the tax burden corresponding to such income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Regarding the second group, as reasoned in the majority vote, it consists of two subgroups: some without a defined term and others for the period of one or two years on an extendable basis. Through background competition number 1-95 and 1-96, which carried out the appointment of professionals who would provide their services as external lawyers and notaries for two years, on which date the professional's performance will be evaluated and, in the event that such evaluation is positive, it will be extended for one more year and so on successively while good service for the Bank persists (proven facts 75 to 80). Those appointed in competitions number 1-85 and 4-86, which is clearly determined from the terms of contracting, have no term, have no period of validity, they are appointed for an indefinite time. The contracting conditions state that they undertake to provide services to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica at the time the latter requires it, observing that this legal relationship was extended over time indefinitely, their services being needed on a constant basis, because the bank's services so required. It is not superfluous to indicate that this modality of indefinitely extendable contracts manifestly violates the law, insofar as the idea of a term is exactly that: to avoid perpetual contractual legal relationships, which would make those extensions unlawful, and in principle no one can take advantage of an act contrary to law, an aspect we do not consider as it is not the basis of the conflict. Adding to the foregoing is the concern that arises from the absence of records demonstrating that this periodic evaluation was carried out. Over the course of more than 20 years, this service modality was maintained continuously over time, by virtue of which, like the other group of notaries appointed directly, without a time limit, they must be compensated for the unilateral termination of this subjective right and without having carried out a complete contractual rescission or resolution procedure that would guarantee them compensation, as stipulated in the General Regulations of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa) in its articles 203 and following, as well as in the new procedure and process stipulated by the Regulations to the Law of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in its article 13, regulating the forms of termination of these contractual relationships by way of the expiration of the term, the execution of the contractual relationship, resolution, unilateral contractual rescission, as well as termination by mutual agreement. Such norms have as a common denominator that the Administration has the power to terminate the appointment by background competition, but with prior payment of the due compensation. Therefore, since the defendant entity did not duly compensate these notaries appointed without a fixed term (indefinite term), they must be recognized the compensation corresponding to four years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average profit income obtained in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the four years prior to the first of December two thousand nine, and this will be computed solely and exclusively on the profit income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period. It is treatment identical to that of the previously indicated group. Such compensatory term, as expressed, is based on being the maximum time that the new regulations fixed for these notarial legal relationships, with civil legal interest running on such sums from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment, as it is a value obligation born in the judgment; interest is granted as it is included within the damages claimed by all plaintiffs. In addition, such sums must be indexed as of the finality of this judgment. Once established in the execution of judgment, the tax burden corresponding to such income must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. On the other hand, we have the notaries who were appointed for a fixed term, but who despite this saw their contract successively extended. It being clear regarding them that in the background competitions in which they participated, they were appointed for a defined time, for a fixed and determined term. As observed from competitions 2-90, 2-94, 1-95, and 1-96, they are appointed for two years, a term that will be extendable if the evaluation is positive, establishing said extension at one and two years. Thus, the nature of these contracts is to have a fixed term; they were not born to be indefinite, and the fact that they were extended over time does not grant them such a condition. The fact that the Administration's needs implied the continuous requirement of their work does not have the virtue of changing the provision that, by common agreement and based on the background competition, set a time limit for them. Faced with this situation, having been attested that such plaintiffs were appointed for two years, that no cause had arisen to nullify the appointment due to non-compliance, the appropriate course is to compensate them for the non-extension of their contract without justified cause, with the proper course being to compensate them with two years of income as external notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average net income obtained in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to December 1, 2009, which will be computed solely and exclusively on the income they obtained as notaries of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in said period.
POR TANTO:
The exception of expiration (caducidad) is rejected, and the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) filed by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is partially upheld, it being understood as denied in what is expressly granted and upheld in what is not granted. Consequently, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals: Nombre112075, Nombre39622, Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, and Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, as damages the net profit income (ingreso neto de la utilidad) for four years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the four years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, deducting the corresponding expenses, an aspect to be determined by the corresponding expert, that is, the four years prior to December two thousand nine. These sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Also, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is ordered to pay the following individuals: Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López, and Mr. Federico Alfaro Araya, as damages the net profit income (ingreso de la utilidad neta) (deducting expenses) for two years as an external notary of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which will be obtained from the average income obtained solely and exclusively as notaries of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the two years prior to the termination of the notarial legal relationship, that is, the two years prior to the first of December two thousand nine. These sums must be indexed from the finality of this judgment, as well as the payment of civil legal interest on said amounts running from the finality of this judgment and until their effective payment. The corresponding tax burden must be deducted from the compensation corresponding to each plaintiff. Both legal costs (costas) are to be borne by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The lawsuit filed against Ms. Lorena María Herradora Chacón is declared without merit in all its extremes, the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) filed by the defendant is upheld, and it is resolved without a special award of costs (costas). The lawsuit filed by Messrs. José Javier Vega Araya, Jorge Campabadal Herrero, Rolando Laclé Castro, and Oscar Mora Córdoba is deemed withdrawn, as is the joinder (tercería) of Mr. Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. Ex officio, the lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) of Ms. Nombre112022 is declared, the lawsuit filed is declared without merit, and it is resolved without a special award of costs (costas).- Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Proceso de conocimiento. Actores: Edgar Abellán Acevedo and others. Contra: El Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Lorena María Herradora Chacón.
Goicoechea, Dirección01 , 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Dirección02 . Telephones: 2545-0003 - 2545-0004. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006. Email: ...01
Nº 84-2013 Nº 84-2013 TRIBUNAL PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCION CUARTA. II Circuito Judicial. Dirección56 , a las ocho horas del dieciséis de setiembre del año dos mil trece.- Procesos de conocimiento acumulados, interpuestos por don Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, cédula de identidad número CED88617, don Juan Carlos Solano García, cédula de identidad número CED88618, don Gerardo Camacho Nassar, cédula de identidad número CED88619, don Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez, cédula de identidad número CED88620, doña Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, cédula de identidad número CED88621, don Ananías Matamoros Carvajal cédula de identidad número CED67251, don Bernal Aragón Barquero, cédula de identidad número CED81021, don Hernán Cordero Maduro, cédula de identidad número CED22342, don Milton Arguedas Salas, cédula de identidad número CED88622, doña María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, cédula de identidad número CED88623, don Edgar Abellán Acevedo, cédula de identidad número CED71541, don Virgilio Calvo Murillo, cédula de identidad número CED75390, don Federico Alfaro Araya, cédula de identidad número CED43251, don Edgar Arroyo Cordero, cédula de identidad número CED88624, don Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, cédula de identidad número CED41366, doña Zetty Bou Valverde, cédula de identidad número CED88625, don Orlando Calzada Miranda, cédula de identidad número CED88626, don Jorge Alfonso Castro Corrales, cédula de identidad número CED88575, don Jorge Castro García, cédula de identidad número CED88627, don Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora, cédula de identidad número CED59977, don Nombre112075 , cédula de identidad número CED88628, don Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi, cédula de identidad número CED43259, don Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, cédula de identidad número CED88629, don Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón, cédula de identidad número CED56850, doña Cecilia Fallas Amador, cédula de identidad número CED88630, don Fernando Fallas Amador, cédula de identidad número CED67479, don Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, cédula de identidad número CED55828, don Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas, cédula de identidad número CED41633, doña Luz María González Rodríguez, cédula de identidad número CED81012, don Mario González Porras, cédula de identidad número CED16622, don Ernesto Guardia Hine, cédula de identidad número CED88631, don José Alberto Herrera Lobo, cédula de identidad número CED88632, don José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, cédula de identidad número CED88633, don Jaime López Baudrit, cédula de identidad número CED88634, doña Laura Mora Camacho, cédula de identidad número CED88635, don Carlos Mas Herrera, cédula de identidad número CED43285, doña Vilma Mesén Madrigal, cédula de identidad número CED14345, don Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, cédula de identidad número CED88636, don Erich Neurohr Trejos, cédula de identidad número CED88580, don Rafael Antonio Ortega Ayón, cédula de identidad número CED46557, doña Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, cédula de identidad número CED88578, don Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo, cédula de identidad número CED88580, don José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza, cédula de identidad número CED88637, doña Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, cédula de identidad número CED43295, don Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, cédula de identidad número CED88638, don Freddy Rojas López, cédula de identidad número CED88639, don Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, cédula de identidad número CED88640, don Braulio Enrique Sánchez González, cédula de identidad número CED75780, don Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña, cédula de identidad número CED88641, don Jorge Tristán Trelles, cédula de identidad número CED67471, don Wilberth Enrique Vargas Brenes, cédula de identidad número CED88642, don Nombre39622 , cédula de identidad número CED31645, don Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, cédula de identidad número CED88643, representados por su apoderado especial judicial el Doctor Luis Vargas Jiménez, cédula de identidad número CED88644, carné de abogado 3780. Demanda incoada por don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, cédula de identidad número CED67435, doña Livia Meza Murillo, cédula de identidad número CED18772, don Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, cédula de identidad número CED22377, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, cédula de identidad número CED74162, don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, cédula de identidad número CED88645, representados por la Licenciada Livia Meza Murillo, por si y en representación de ellos. Acción incoada por Don Carlos Rivera Bianchini, y Fernando Solano Martínez, representados por la Licenciada Cindy Blanco González. Proceso formulado por Don Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, cédula de identidad CED88646, y doña Mayra Rojas Guzmán, cédula de identidad número CED88647, representados por el Licenciado Freddy Mora Murillo. Demanda incoada por Doña Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez, cédula de identidad número CED27104, representada por el Licenciado Minor González González. Acción interpuesta por Doña Martha Barahona Melgar, representándose a sí misma. Proceso incoado por Don José Echeverría Zeledón, representándose a sí mismo (Folio 3566 a 3569 del tomo VII de los autos). Intervienen como terceros coadyuvantes pasivos los Licenciados Edgar Alfaro Muñoz, cédula de identidad número CED88648, doña Nombre12561 , cédula de identidad número CED88649, doña Nombre35409 , cédula de identidad número CED28434, doña Nombre112076 , cédula de identidad número CED88650, doña Nombre112077 , cédula de identidad número CED13824, don Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez , cédula de identidad número CED71728 (desistió de la tercería), y doña Nombre112078 , cédula de identidad número CED88651. Interviene como tercero con pretensiones propias el señor Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, cédula de identidad número CED88652 (folio 3562 del tomo VII de los autos), en contra de el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, y doña Lorena María Herradora Chacón, cédula de identidad número CED88653, representados por sus apoderados generales judiciales, los Licenciados don Hilel Zomer Befeler y don Rafael Ángel Brenes Villalobos. Todos son mayores y abogados. Expedientes acumulados tramitados bajo el expediente número 08-001455-1027-CA. Se acumularon al presente expediente los casos tramitados bajo los números 10-000895-1027-CA, 09-000335-1027-CA, CED88616, , 10-001256-1027-CA, 10-004162-1027-CA, 10-001175-1027-CA, 10-001341-1027-CA, 10-004174-1027-CA, 10-00894-1027-CA, CED88654, CED88655, CED88656, y el CED88657.
RESULTANDO
I.Con el presente proceso de conocimiento se acciona con el objeto de que en sentencia se declare que la conducta del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al dar por terminados los nombramientos y contratos y su comunicación con cada uno de los actores es nulo, para ello requieren la nulidad de los artículos 12 y 7 de las Sesiones 11467 y 11486 de 29 de enero y 10 de junio del 2008, así como de la comunicación realizada a cada notario por la señora Lorena Herradora en su condición de proveedora del BNCR. Se requiere el pago de los daños y perjuicios por la terminación del contrato, es decir la impugnación del cese de las relaciones contractuales de notariado externo que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica sostenía con los actores y con los terceros con pretensiones propias, es decir la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios derivados del cese de las relaciones contractuales con los actores, los terceros con pretensiones propias y el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, la nulidad del acto de contratar a otros notarios al margen del ordenamiento jurídico mediante el procedimiento de licitación 2008LM-000024-01, solicitan además se declare la disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico de la conducta omisiva de incumplimiento del rol de notariado externo que tiene la institución, es decir requieren daños y perjuicios por el incumplimiento de dicho rol que establece la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, por cuanto esos créditos le fueron otorgados a los notarios internos del Banco Nacional y les disminuyó la entrega de trabajo a todos los notarios, así como el pago de ambas costas del proceso (folios 1 al 10, del 1257 al 1263, del 3474 al 3480 de los autos).
II.En la audiencia de juicio los promoventes estimaron los daños y perjuicios de la siguiente forma: 1) Don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, doña Livia Meza Murillo, don Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola y don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal el monto de cien millones de colones cada uno por daño moral y el daño material conforme la fijación pericial, así como indexación e intereses sobre dichas sumas. 2) Los señores (as) don Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, don Juan Carlos Solano García, don Gerardo Camacho Nassar, don Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez, doña Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, don Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, don Hernán Cordero Maduro, don Bernal Aragón Barquero, Don Orlando Calzada Miranda, Don Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Don Edgar Abellán Acevedo, don Federico Alfaro Araya, doña María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, don Edgar Arroyo Cordero, don Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, doña Zetty Bou Valverde, don Jorge Alfonso Castro Corrales, don Jorge Castro García, don Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora, don Nombre112075 , don Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi, don Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, don Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón, doña Cecilia Fallas Amador, don Fernando Fallas Amador, don Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, don Milton Arguedas Salas, don Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas, doña Luz María González Rodríguez, don Mario González Porras, don Ernesto Guardia Hine, don José Alberto Herrera Lobo, don José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, don Jaime López Baudrit, doña Laura Mora Camacho, don Carlos Mas Herrera, doña Vilma Mesén Madrigal, don Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, don Erich Neurohr Trejos, don Rafael Antonio Ortega Ayón, doña Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, don Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo, don José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza, doña Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, don Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Freddy Rojas López, don Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, don Braulio Enrique Sánchez González, don Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña, don Jorge Tristán Trelles, don Wilberth Enrique Vargas Brenes, don Nombre39622 , y don Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, el monto por daño moral de cien millones de colones cada uno y el daño material conforme la fijación pericial. Pide intereses e indexación sobre dichas sumas y hasta su efectivo pago, así como daños y perjuicios por incumplimiento del rol de trabajo por los honorarios dejados de percibir. 3) Don Carlos Rivera Bianchini el monto de 100 millones de colones de daño moral y 67 millones de colones por perjuicios y Fernando Solano Martínez la cantidad de 100 millones de colones de daño moral y 55 millones de colones por perjuicios. 4) Don Rodolfo Cortés Noriega y doña Mayra Rojas Guzmán requieren el pago de 25 millones de colones por daño moral y los perjuicios conforme al peritaje. 5) Doña Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez la cantidad de 100 millones de colones por daño moral y 195 millones de colones por daño material. 6) Doña Martha Barahona Melgar el monto de 85 millones de colones por daño moral subjetivo y 70 millones de colones por daño moral objetivo, así como reinstalación en su cargo. 7) Don José Echeverría Zeledón la suma de cien millones de colones por daño moral y por daño material lo que hubiere recibido hasta su muerte (audiencia de juicio).
III.Conferido el traslado de rigor, las accionadas se opusieron a la presente acción y formularon las excepciones de falta de derecho y de caducidad, requiriendo la condenatoria en costas a la promovente (folios 122 al 141, del 146 al 182 y del 213 al 244, del folio 3783 al 3839 del tomo VII ibid).
IV.Durante el transcurso del proceso desistieron de la demanda los señores José Javier Vega Araya (folio 4093 del tomo VIII del principal), don Jorge Campabadal Herrero (folio 3484 del tomo VII del principal), don Rolando Laclé Castro (folio 3485 del tomo VII del principal), don Oscar Mora Córdoba (folio 4002 del tomo VII del principal),
V.La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia actuando como Tribunal de Casación, mediante resolución número 130-F-TC-2009 de las 17:00 horas del 03 de julio el año 2009, dictada en audiencia oral y notificada en el acto, dispuso acoger la medida cautelar promovida por Don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, doña Livia Meza Murillo, don Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola y don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, ordenando lo siguiente: “(…) se suspende la cesación de los servicios notariales dispuesta por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a quienes se les mantiene en su estatus jurídico como notarios externos de dicho ente bancario en las zonas geográficas que hasta el momento han cubierto, sin perjuicio de los derechos de quienes para esas mismas zonas adquieran las condiciones de notario de acuerdo con la licitación pendiente, debiendo el Banco en este último caso, respetar el estricto rol de trabajo (…) quedan notificados todos los intervinientes de esta resolución en este momento” (folios 3369 del tomo séptimo de los autos).
VI.Mediante resolución de las 11:15 horas del 27 de enero del año 2010 el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo dictó como medida cautelar provisionalísima, inmediata y prima facie, extender los efectos de la medida cautelar otorgada por el Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda número 130-F-TC-2009 de las 17:00 horas del 13 de julio del año 2009 a todos los actores del proceso (folio 3590 del tomo VII del subjudice).
VII.Por resolución número 507-2011 de las 15:00 horas del 28 de marzo del 2011 del Tribunal Contencioso se le deniega al señor Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz la medida cautelar incoada (folios 9210 9223 del tomo XVIII del principal).
VIII.Por resolución de las 14:20 horas del 27 de abril del 2010 el Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo ordena en forma provisional al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, la reinclusión de la actora Roxana Rodríguez Cascante en los roles de asignación de casos para las oficinas en las que ha venido atendiendo asuntos (folio 6820 del tomo XIII de los autos).
IX.Por resolución número 2568-2010 de las 7:30 horas del 8 de julio del 2010 del Tribunal Contencioso se le deniega al señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega la medida cautelar incoada (folios 7695 al 7608 del tomo XIV del principal). Por resolución número 440-2010 de las 15:33 horas del 01 de setiembre del 2010 del Tribunal Contencioso, se le acoge al señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega la medida cautelar incoada (folios 7605 al 7607 del tomo XIV del principal).
X.Que el juicio oral y público se realizó de los días 10 al 12 de julio, así como el 16 del mismo mes, con la presencia de las partes. Siendo que durante el período de deliberación se requirió de prueba para mejor resolver mediante resolución de las 13:00 horas del 07 de agosto en curso, acorde con los numerales 82, 85 y 110 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y el proceso se reabrió el día 16 de agosto del año en curso (Audiencia de juicio y folios 10981 al 10988 del principal).
XI.Por resolución número 677-2011 de las 14:40 horas del 06 de mayo del 2011 , el juez de trámite del Tribunal Contencioso ordenó a favor de los actores la suspensión de la cesación de servicios notariales, conservado sus estatus de notarios externos del BNCR (folio 8385 al 8387 del principal).
XII.El juez ponente Carlos Espinoza Salas, estuvo incapacitado los días 5 y 6 de setiembre, y el juez Ricardo Madrigal Jiménez estuvo incapacitado del día 9 al 13 de setiembre, por lo que de conformidad con el ordinal 81 del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, los términos para el dictado de la sentencia se tienen por suspendidos por el período de la incapacidad (folios 1102 al 11047 del principal).
XIII.Que el presente proceso se declaró de trámite complejo, conforme con el artículo 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y la sentencia se ha dictado de acuerdo con el ordinal 47 de su reglamento, por la abundante probanza que debe ser evacuada, hay diversidad de partes y el aspecto de fondo entraña la discusión de reclamos indemnizatorios y determinación de la naturaleza jurídica de la relación entre los notarios externos y el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, que ameritan el análisis detallado y pormenorizado de la probanza con el objeto de establecer la verdad real material de los hechos investigados (audiencia de juicio).
XIV.Que en la audiencia de juicio se requirió de prueba para mejor resolver acorde con los numerales 82, 85 y 110 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y el proceso se reabrió el día 16 de agosto del año en curso (Audiencia de juicio y folios 10981 al 10988 del principal).
XV.En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales de rigor, y no se observan vicios u omisiones susceptibles de producir nulidad de lo actuado o indefensión a las partes. Se dicta esta resolución previa deliberación, dentro del término de ley y por mayoría.
Redacta el voto de mayoría juez Espinoza Salas; y C O N S I D E R A N D O I)- SOBRE LOS HECHOS: I.1)- HECHOS PROBADOS: Se tienen por demostrados los siguientes hechos de interés para la resolución de este asunto, por ser contestes con los elementos de convicción que en su apoyo se citan: 1) El señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 6945 del 15 de diciembre de 1964, artículo 18 (folio 7403 del tomo XIV del expediente judicial). 2) El señor Ernesto Guardia Hine fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 6945, artículo 18 del 15 de diciembre de 1964 (folio 3948 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 3) El señor Edgar Arroyo Cordero Mora fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 7040, artículo 3 del 07 de agosto de 1965 (folio 4488 del tomo IX del expediente judicial). 4) El señor Jorge Castro García fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 7141, artículo 05 del 26 de abril de 1966 (folio 3886 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 5) El señor Nombre112075 fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 7729, artículo 4 del 19 de mayo de 1970 (folio 10982 del tomo XX del expediente judicial). 6) El señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 6945, artículo 18 del 15 de diciembre de 1974 (folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 7) El señor Jorge Tristrán Trelles fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8574, artículo 01 del 17 de mayo de 1976 (folio 3892 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 8) El señor Erich Neurohr Trejos fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8594, artículo 49 del 07 de julio de 1976 (folio 3882 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 9) El señor Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8782, artículo 11 del 18 de octubre de 1977 (folio 3470 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 1 0) El señor Fernando Fallas Amador fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8830, artículo 32 del 21 de febrero de 1978 (folio 10982 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 11) El señor Hernán Cordero Maduro fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8830, artículo 32 del 21 de febrero de 1978 (folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 12) El señor Orlando Calzada Miranda fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8832, artículo 37 del 25 de febrero de 1978 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 13) El señor Carlos Miguel Chacón Sartoressi fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8854, artículo 16 del 02 de junio de 1978 (folio 10982 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 14) El señor Nombre39622 fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8920, artículo 39 del 07 de noviembre de 1978 (folio 3976 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 15) El señor Luis A. Guillén Downing fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8966, artículo 5 del 06 de marzo de 1979 (folio 3559 del tomo séptimo y folio 10983 del tomo XXI, del expediente judicial). 16) El señor Miguel Rodríguez Gómez fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 8966, artículo 05 del 12 de marzo de 1979 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 17) El señor Jaime López Baudrit fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9031, artículo 26 del 25 de setiembre de 1979 (folio 10982 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 18) El señor José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9139, artículo 4 del 26 de agosto de 1980 (folio 3572 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 19) La señora Vilma Mesen Ivette Pierre Dixon fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9326, artículo 40 del 11 de agosto de 1981 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 20) La señora Cecilia Fallas Amador fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9303, artículo 04 del 12 de enero de 1982 (folio 10982 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 21) La señora María del Rosario Morera Alfaro fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9319, artículo 27 del 02 de marzo de 1982 (folio 5458 del tomo XI del expediente judicial). 22) El señor Rafael Ortega Ayón fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9324, artículo 20 del 16 de marzo de 1982 (folio 3880 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 23) El señor Horacio Montealegre Montealegre fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9327, artículo 02, del 23 de marzo de 1982 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 24) El señor Wilberth Vargas Brenes fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9326, artículo 40 del 23 de marzo de 1982 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 25) El señor Fernando Solano Martínez fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9354, artículo 20 del 06 de julio de 1982, fue cesado el 06 de julio del 2008 y nombrado de nuevo como notario externo de la Sucursal de Cartago en el artículo 10, sesión 11551 del 23 de junio del 2009 (folio 3737 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 26) El señor Gerardo Camacho Nassar fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9389, artículo 06 del 02 de noviembre de 1982 (folios 7904 del tomo XV, folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 27) La señora Sonia Teresa González Rodríguez fue nombrada como abogada y notaria externa por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9397 del 30 de noviembre de 1982, artículo 30 (folio 4896 del tomo X del expediente judicial). 28) La señora Luz María González Rodríguez fue nombrada como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9397, del 30 de noviembre de 1982, artículo 30 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 29) La señora Marta Barahona Melgar fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9407, artículo 19 del 11 de enero de 1983 (folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 30) El señor Bernal Aragón Barquero fue nombrado como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9410 del 18 de enero de 1983, artículo 08 (folio 5877 del tomo XI del expediente judicial, así como folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 3 1) Mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-85 se efectuó licitación para la selección de profesionales para notariado externo efectuado por el BNCR, disponiéndose en cuanto al período de vigencia que los notarios nombrados se comprometen a prestar los servicios al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en el momento en que éste lo requiera, quedando a criterio de la Junta Directiva General de la Institución, la remoción de cualquiera de los adjudicatarios en el momento que lo crea conveniente previa resolución razonada y siempre que sea de interés de la Institución (folios 4019 al 4023 del tomo VIII de los autos). 32) La señora Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero de 1985 (folio 10984 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 33) El señor Edgar Arroyo Cordero fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 7040, artículo 03 del 05 de julio de 1985 (folio 10982 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 34) La Comisión de Licitaciones del BNCR en sesión 9714, artículo 13 del 05 de noviembre de 1985, designó como notarios externos a don Carlos Rivera Bianchini, don Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, don Juan Vicente Rojas Morera, don Braulio Sánchez González, y de don José Alberto Herrera Lobo (folios 4016 al 4023 del tomo VIII de los autos). 35) El señor Juan Vicente Rojas Morera fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9714, artículo 13 del 5 de noviembre de 1985 (folio 3468 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 36) El señor Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9031, artículo 13 del 05 de noviembre de 1985 (folio 3897 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 37) El señor Carlos Rivera Bianchini fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9714, artículo 13 del 05 de noviembre de 1985, fue cesado el 06 de julio del 2008 y nombrado de nuevo como notario externo de la Sucursal de Cartago en el artículo 10, sesión 11551 del 23 de junio del 2009 (folio 3737 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 38) El señor Braulio Sánchez González fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9714, artículo 13 del 11 de noviembre de 1985 (folio 3473 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial). 39) Mediante concurso de antecedentes número 4-86 se efectuó licitación para la selección de profesionales para notariado externo efectuado por el BNCR, disponiéndose en cuanto al período de vigencia que los notarios nombrados se comprometen a prestar los servicios al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en el momento en que éste lo requiera, quedando a criterio de la Junta Directiva General de la Institución la remoción de cualquiera de los adjudicatarios en el momento que lo crea conveniente previa resolución razonada y siempre que sea de interés de la Institución ( expediente administrativo del concurso de antecedentes). 40) El señor Jorge Luis Quesada Hidalgo fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 4-84, artículo 44 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 9761 del 05 de agosto de 1986 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 41) La señora Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9823, artículo 08 del 01 de diciembre de 1986 (folio 10983 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 42) El señor Ananías Matamoros Carvajal fue nombrado como abogado y notario externa por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9714 del 05 de noviembre de 1985, artículo 13 (folio 6347 del tomo XII, folio 10988 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 4 3) El señor Luis Guillermo Espinoza Picón fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 4-86, artículo 44 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 9791 del 05 de agosto de 1986 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 44) El señor Víctor Eduardo Murillo Rodríguez fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 4-86, artículo 44 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 9791 del 05 de agosto de 1986 (folios 7454 del tomo XIV y folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 45) El señor Mario González Porras fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 4-86 artículo 44 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 9791 del 05 de agosto de 1986 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 46) Mediante concurso de antecedentes 2-90 la Sección de Licitaciones del BNCR se recibieron ofertas el día 8 de enero de 1991 para la selección de profesionales que brindan sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos por un período de 2 años, prorrogables dos más si la evaluación es positiva (folios 1395 al 1402 del tomo tercero principal). 47) Por oficio S.L. 197-91 del 17 de mayo de 1991 la Oficina de Licitaciones del BNCR recomienda nombrar para la licitación 2-90 para la selección de profesionales que brindan sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos a las siguientes personas: En San José: don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, don José Alberto Herrera Lobo, don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, don Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls, don Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Don Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla. En San Pedro: don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, don Carlos Eduardo Mas Herrera, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo. Alajuela: Zetty Bou Valverde. Nombre37415: don Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas. Nombre19780: don Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña. Puriscal: José Luis Herrera Zúñiga (folios 1395 al 1410 del tomo tercero de los autos). 48) El Licenciado Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla ha prestado servicios como notario para dicha institución desde el mes de julio de 1991 (folio 1395 al 1410 del tomo tercero del subjudice). 49) El señor Carlos Mas Herrera fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90 artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 50) El señor Manuel Antonio Solano Ureña fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 51) El señor José Luis Herrera Zúñiga fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 52) El señor Virgilio Fernando Calvo Murillo fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 53) El señor Guillermo Enrique Azuola Valls fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 54) El señor Milton Arguedas Salas fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10987del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 55) La señora Zetty María Bou Valverde fue nombrada como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 56) La señora Lorena Herradora Chacón fue nombrada como abogada y notario externa por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991, artículo 25 (folio 5538 del tomo XI del expediente judicial). 57 ) La señora Roxana Rodríguez Cascante fue nombrada como abogada y notario externa, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991 (folio 10988 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 58) La señora Livia Meza Murillo fue nombrada como abogada y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 59) El señor Fabio Vincenzi Guilá fue nombrado como abogada y notario externa, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 60) El señor Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 61) El señor Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 62) El señor José Alberto Herrera Lobo fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 63) El señor Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 64) El señor Federico Carlos Sáenz de Mendiola fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 4 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10333 del 25 de febrero de 1992 (folio 10987 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 65) El señor Edgar Antonio Abellán Acevedo fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 9354, artículo 20 del 06 de julio de 1992 (folio 3879 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 66) El señor Rafael Alberto Gamboa Arguedas fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-90, artículo 12 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10565 del 28 de junio de 1994 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 67) Mediante concurso de antecedentes 2-94 denominado para la selección de profesionales que brindan sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos, se nombraron notarios externos por un período de 2 años, prorrogables un año más si la evaluación es positiva (expediente administrativo de dicha contratación). 68) El señor Carlos Eduardo Castro Mora fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero de 1995 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 69) La señora Laura Mora Camacho fue nombrada como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero de 1995 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 70) El señor Juan Carlos Solano García fue nombrado como abogado y notario, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero de 1995 (folios 8069 del tomo XVI, folio 10988 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 71) La señora Mayra Rojas Guzmán fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero 1995 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 72) El señor José Ángel Ramírez Espinoza fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo , mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10619 del 10 de enero de 1995 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 73) El señor Jorge Castro Corrales fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 10619, artículo 07 del 10 de enero de 1995 (folio 3887 del tomo VIII y folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 74) El señor Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 2-94, artículo 14 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10621 del 17 de enero de 1995 (folio 10986 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 75) Por concurso de antecedentes número 1 -95, se realizó el nombramiento en el BNCR de profesionales que brindarán sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos por dos años, fecha en la cual se evaluará el desempeño del profesional y en el evento de que dicha evaluación fuere positiva, se prorrogará por un año más y así sucesivamente mientras persista un buen servicio para el Banco (folios 8068 al 8079 del tomo XVI del principal). 76) El señor Freddy Rojas López fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 10680, artículo 14 del 22 de agosto de 1995 (folio 3883 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 77) Mediante concurso de antecedentes 1-96 denominado para la selección de profesionales que brindan sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos, se nombraron notarios externos por un período de 2 años, prorrogables un año más si la evaluación es positiva (expediente administrativo de dicha contratación). 78) El señor Federico Alfaro Araya fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo, mediante Concurso de antecedentes N° 1-9 6, artículo 9 de la Junta Directiva, sesión 10789 del 17 de setiembre de 1996 (folio 10985 del tomo XXI del expediente judicial). 79) La señora Roxana Rodríguez Cascante fue nombrada como abogada y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 11155 del 25 de junio del 2002, artículo 03 (folio 6614 del tomo XIII del expediente judicial). 80) El señor Freddy Antonio Rojas López fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en la Agencia de Muelle San Carlos, desde el día 17 de junio del 2005 (folio 3928 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 81) En sesión de Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, número 11467 del 29 de enero del 2008, artículo 12, se dispuso que con motivo de los requerimientos de la Contraloría General de la República de promover concursos públicos con plazos determinados en los contratos de servicios profesionales, como por el criterio legal de la Licenciada Herrera Cantillo externado en el oficio D.J.2245-207 del 27 de diciembre del 2007 de la Dirección Jurídica por el que se presenta una propuesta de cartel para la contratación de profesionales que brinden sus servicios al Banco Nacional como notarios externos, por votación unánime se aprueba el texto del cartel para la selección de abogados externos del Banco Nacional, denominado Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como abogados externos, de conformidad con los términos consignados en el oficio D.J.2245-207 del 27 de diciembre del 2007, y se encarga la publicación del cartel para la selección de abogados externos (folio1 del tomo primero del subjudice). 82) En la Gaceta número 69 del 09 de abril del 2008, el BNCR publicó el Reglamento para la prestación de servicios externos del BNCR (hecho no controvertido, escritos de demanda, folios 728 al 739 del tomo segundo ibid). 83) En sesión de Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, número 11486 del 10 de junio del 2008, artículo 7, se declaró acuerdo firme el adoptado en la sesión número 11467 del 29 de enero del 2008, artículo 12 (folio 2 del tomo primero del expediente judicial). 84) La señora María del Rosario Morera Alfaro interpuso recurso de apelación el día 6 de julio del 2008 en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos, que fue rechazado en sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 10, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa y notificándole de dicha resolución el día 21 de enero del 2009 (expediente administrativo de doña María del Rosario Morera Alfaro compuesto por 75 folios). 85) El día 6 de julio del 2008 se le comunicó al señor Hernán Cordero Maduro el oficio del 6 de julio del 2008 relativo a la comunicación de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11486 (expediente administrativo de don Hernán Cordero Maduro que consta de 2 folios). 86) Por oficio número D.J/1195-2008 del 27 de junio del 2008, la señora directora de la Dirección Jurídica del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, doña Marietta Herrera Cantillo, convoca a los notarios externos de dicha entidad, que se celebrará una reunión en el auditorio de dicho Banco a celebrarse el día 4 de julio del 2008, con el objeto de establecer la forma de contratación de los notarios externos (hecho no controvertido, escrito de demandas, folio 3, 1280, del tomo primero y tercero, folio 3558 del tomo séptimo del expediente judicial, folios 4027al 4029 del tomo VIII del principal). 87) En la reunión celebrada el día 6 de julio del 2008, efectuada en el auditorio del Banco actor, se les entrega a los notarios externos el oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica lo siguiente: “Por este medio se le informa en su condición de notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, que por acuerdos de la Junta Directiva, adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones No. Placa20031 y No. 11486 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos, denominado “Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos”. El propósito de este cartel es dar sustento a una Licitación Pública con base en la cual se integrará un nuevo rol de notarios externos del Banco, dejándose sin efecto el rol actual. Esta decisión se adopta en virtud del vencimiento del plazo máximo de vigencia que la Contraloría General de la República admite para la contratación de servicios profesionales, que es de cuatro años, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 163 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Para efectos de mantener la continuidad en la prestación del servicio será a partir de la entrada en vigencia de los contratos que se lleguen a concertar con base en dicha Licitación, que se sustituirá el rol de notarios en el cual Usted figura en la actualidad. Por lo que a partir de esa fecha se dará por terminada su relación contractual con el Banco Nacional como notario externo, al tenor de las previsiones de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. La condición actual que ostenta como notario externo del Banco, ni la eventual terminación de su relación contractual con el mismo, constituyen un impedimento para que pueda participar en el nuevo concurso; en razón de lo cual lo instamos a participar, en los términos de la invitación, que se estará publicando próximamente en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Contra esta decisión caben los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio ante la Junta Directiva General, los cuales podrán interponerse dentro de tercero día en esta Proveeduría General, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 346 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.” (hecho no controvertido, escritos de demanda, folio 4, 1281, 1336 del tomo primero y tercero de los autos, folio 3571 del tomo VII, folio 3930, 3935, 3937 del tomo VIII, folio 5467 del tomo XI). 88) Que los notarios don Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jaime López Baudrit y Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, doña Livia Meza Murillo, don Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal y Livia Meza Murillo, formularon recurso de revocatoria y de apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 698 a 704, 1249 a 1251, 1282 a 1283 del tomo segundo y tercero, folios 3742 al 3749 del tomo VII del expediente judicial). 89) El señor Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz interpuso recurso de apelación el día 6 de julio del 2008 en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos, que fue rechazado en sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 15, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa y notificándole de dicha resolución el día 21 de enero del 2009 (expediente administrativo de don señor Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz compuesto por 52 folios). 90) Que el notario Ananías Matamoros Carvajal formuló recurso de revocatoria y de apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 6046 al 6050 del tomo XII del expediente judicial). 91) Mediante libelo del 8 de julio del 2008, los señores Juan Carlos Solano García y Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, formula recurso de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 8083 al 8086 del tomo XVI del expediente judicial). 92) Mediante libelo del 9 de julio del 2008, el señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega formula recurso de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 7375 al 7402 del tomo XIV del expediente judicial). 93) Mediante libelo del 9 de julio del 2008, los señores Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, el señor Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz y Juan Carlos Solano García, formulan recurso de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 8963 al 8984 del tomo XVIII del expediente judicial). 94) Mediante libelo del 9 de julio del 2008, la señora Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante formula recurso de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria en contra del oficio del 6 de julio del 2008, suscrito por la señora Lorena Herradora Chacón, Proveedora General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en la cual les comunica el cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 6749 al 6753 del tomo XIII del expediente judicial). 95) En la Gaceta número 138 del 27 de julio del 2008, el BNCR publicó la Licitación Pública número 2008-LN-24-2008, denominada “Selección de Profesionales que brinden sus servicios como Notarios Externos” (hecho no controvertido, escritos de demanda, folios 218 al 219 del tomo primero ibid). 96) Por resolución de las 14:45 horas del 29 de julio del 2008 de la Dirección Corporativa de Gestión de Medios, Dirección de Bienes y Proveeduría General se rechaza el recurso de revocatoria formulado por los actores en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008 (folios 705 al 727, 1284 a 1296 de los tomos segundo y tercero de los autos). 97) La Contraloría General de la República mediante resolución número R-DCA-413-2008, de las 14:00 horas del 11 de agosto del 2008, conociendo recursos de objeción al cartel de la Licitación Pública número 2008LN-000024-2008 promovida por el BNCR, dispuso acoger objeciones, ordenando a la administración licitante proceder con las modificaciones, correcciones y aclaraciones pertinentes (folios 5258 al 5332 del tomo X del expediente judicial). 98) El señor Bernal Aragón Barquero interpuso nulidad el día 12 de agosto del 2008 en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos, que fue rechazado en sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 10, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa y notificándole de dicha resolución el día 05 de marzo del 2009 (expediente administrativo de Bernal Aragón Barquero compuesto por 31 folios). 99) Por oficio D.J. 1587-2008 del 22 de agosto del 2008, de la Dirección Jurídica del BNCR, le indica a la Licenciada Lorena Herradora Chacón que los contratos de notariado externos existentes se mantendrán en vigencia hasta que entren a regir los contratos derivados de la adjudicación de la licitación denominada “Selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos” y que conforme a lo previsto en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, artículos 1, 4, 5 y 6 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y 1, 2 incisos a) d) y e), 92 inciso d) y 163 del Reglamento de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la única vía legal para la contratación de servicios profesionales de notariado, es la celebración de la respectiva licitación pública y que la única forma para que un profesional en notariado alcance eventualmente la condición de adjudicatario del concurso, es participando en tiempo y forma en el concurso (folios 7 y 8 del tomo primero del principal). 100) Los señores Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos, Jaime López Baudrit, Milton Arguedas Salas y Rafael Ortega Ayón formularon el día 04 de setiembre del 2008 recurso de apelación en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos, que fue rechazado en sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 10, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa y notificándole de dicha resolución el día 20 de marzo del 2009 (expediente administrativo de Bernal Aragón Barquero compuesto por 45 folios). 10 1) En la Gaceta número 172 del 05 de setiembre del 2008, se publicaron modificaciones a la Licitación Pública 2008-LN-24-2008 (folios 260 a 263 del tomo primero del subjudice). 10 2) Mediante resolución de las 15:20 horas del 29 de setiembre del 2008, la Dirección Corporativa de Gestión de Medios, Dirección de Bienes, Proveeduría General, rechaza el recurso de revocatoria formulado por don Juan Carlos Solano García en contra del cese de la relación contractual como notario externo (folios 8120 al 8140 del tomo XVI del expediente judicial). 103) La Contraloría General de la República mediante resolución número R-DCA-512-2008, de las 10:00 horas del 29 de setiembre del 2008, conociendo recursos de objeción a la primera modificación del cartel de la Licitación Pública número 2008LN-000024-2008 promovida por el BNCR, dispuso acoger objeciones efectuadas al cartel por los participantes (folios 4831 al 5118 del tomo X del expediente judicial). 104) Mediante resolución de las 15:20 horas del 29 de setiembre del 2008, la Dirección Corporativa de Gestión de Medios, Dirección de Bienes, Proveeduría General, rechaza el recurso de revocatoria formulado por don Juan Carlos Solano García en contra del cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 8998 al 9017 del tomo XVIII del expediente judicial). 105) Mediante resolución de las 8:51 horas del 31 de octubre del 2008, la Dirección Corporativa de Gestión de Medios, Dirección de Bienes, Proveeduría General, rechaza el recurso de revocatoria formulado por don Rodolfo Cortés Noriega en contra del cese de la relación contractual como notarios externos (folios 7375 al 7402 del tomo XIV del expediente judicial). 106) En sesión 11512 del 25 de noviembre del año 2008, artículo 8, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por don Eugenio Francisco Jiménez Bonilla, doña Livia Meza Murillo, don Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, don Federico Sáenz de Mendiola y don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa, notificándoseles de dicha resolución el día 28 de noviembre del 2008 (folios 603 y 604, 1333, 1490 al 1497 del tomo segundo y tercero del subjudice). 107) En sesión 11516 del 13 de enero del año 2009, artículo 29, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por el señor Juan Carlos Solano García, en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa. Notificándole de dicha resolución el día 19 de enero del 2009 (folios 8155 al 8156 del tomo XVI del subjudice). 108) En sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 8, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por don Ananías Matamoros Carvajal el día 6 de julio del 2008 en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa, notificándose le dicha resolución el día 21 de enero del 2009 (folios 6076 al 6077 del tomo segundo y tercero del subjudice). 109) En sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 23, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por doña Martha Barahona Melgar en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa. Notificándole dicha resolución el día 21 de enero del 2009 (expediente administrativo de doña Martha Barahona Melgar que consta de 10 6 folios). 11 0) En sesión 11517 del 20 de enero del año 2009, artículo 28, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por el señor Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa. Notificándole de dicha resolución el día 21 de enero del 2009 (folios 7404 a 7405 del tomo XIV del subjudice). 111) En sesión 11518 del 27 de enero del año 2009, artículo 13, se rechaza el recurso de apelación formulado por la señora Roxana María Rodríguez Cascante el día 12 de agosto del 2008, en contra del oficio relativo a la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos y de los acuerdos de Junta Directiva General adoptados en los artículos 12 y 7 de las sesiones 11467 y 11468 del 29 de enero del 2008 y 10 de junio del 2008, respectivamente, en los cuales se aprobó el texto del cartel para la selección de notarios externos y se da por agotada la vía administrativa, notificándo sele de dicha resolución el día 03 de febrero del 2009 (folio 6779 a 6780 del tomo XIII del subjudice). 112) El señor Carlos Rivera Bianchini fue nombrado como abogado y notario del BNCR, en sesión de la Junta Directiva 11551 del 23 de junio del año 2009 en la Sucursal de Cartago (folio 3737 del tomo VII del expediente judicial). 113) La Licitación pública 2008LN-000024-01 para la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos fue adjudicada en el artículo 10, de la sesión 11551 del 23 de junio del 2009 y publicada en la Gaceta del 01 de julio del 2009, entrando en vigencia el 01 de diciembre del 2009 (folios 3752 al 3755 del Tomo VII, folio 4008, 4134 del tomo VIII del expediente judicial). 114) El señor Fernando Solano Martínez fue nombrado como abogado y notario del BNCR, en sesión de la Junta Directiva 11551 del 23 de junio del año 2009 en la Sucursal de Cartago (folio 3738 del tomo VII del expediente judicial). 115) Que a partir de la entrada en vigencia el 01 de diciembre del 2009 de la Licitación pública 2008LN-000024-01 para la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos, la contratación de nuevos notarios, y la instauración de un doble rol de asignación de labores, los actores han visto disminuidos sus ingresos en el ejercicio del notariado para el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 7199 del tomo XIV, folios 7752, 7909 del tomo XV, folio 8068 del tomo XVI, folio 9634 del tomo XIX del subjudice, así como declaraciones de doña Nombre112079 , don Nombre112080 , don Manuel Jiménez Costillo, don Sergio Cortés Rosabal, don Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, doña Andreina Vincenzi Guilá y doña Andreina Vincenzi Guilá). 116) El señor Carlos Castro Mora fue nombrado como abogado y notario externo por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sesión 10619, artículo 7 del 01 de diciembre de 2009 (folio 4450 del tomo IX del expediente judicial). 117) La Dirección Corporativa de Gestión de Medios, Dirección de Recursos Materiales gestionó la Licitación Pública número 2010LN-000001-01, denominada “Selección de Profesionales que brinden sus servicios como Notarios Externos” (folios 5207 al 5224 del tomo X ibid). 1 18) Que los señores Nombre112075 , Nombre39622 , Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez y Martha Barahona Melgar, fueron nombrados en forma indefinida como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por medio de la Junta Directiva, sin concurso de antecedentes, ni licitación pública (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 119) Que los señores Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal y Carlos Rivera Bianchini fueron nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-85, artículo 13 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 9714 del 05 de noviembre de 1985 (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 120) Que los señores Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, y Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, fueron nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 4-86, artículo 44 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 9791 del 05 de agosto de 1986 (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 121) Que los señores Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, y Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz fueron nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-90, artículo 25 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 10267 del 02 de julio de 1991, por un período de 2 años, prorrogables dos más si la evaluación es positiva (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 122) Que los señores Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, y Mayra Rojas Guzmán, fueron nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-94, artículo 7 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 10719 del 10 de enero de 1995, por dos años, fecha en la cual se evaluará el desempeño del profesional y en el evento de que dicha evaluación fuere positiva, se prorrogará por un año más y así sucesivamente mientras persista un buen servicio para el Banco por el plazo de 2 años (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 123) Que el señor Freddy Rojas López, fue nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-95 , artículo 14 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 10680 del 22 de agosto de 1995, por el plazo de 2 años (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice). 124) Que el señor Federico Alfaro Araya, fue nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-96, artículo 9 de la Junta Directiva General del BNCR, sesión 10789 del 17 de setiembre de 1996, por intermedio de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa número 7494 del 02 de mayo de 199 5 por el plazo de 2 años (folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice).
I.2)- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: No demostraron los actores: 1) El monto de los daños y perjuicios causados por las actuaciones del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al cesarlos como notarios externos (los autos). 2) Que la señora Nombre112022 haya sido abogada y notaria externa del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (los autos). 3) Que la co-demanda Lorena María Herr adora Chacón les haya producido daños y perjuicios producto de sus actuaciones (los autos). 4) Que la co-demanda Lorena María Herradora Chacón haya incurrido en una conducta de dolo o culpa grave en el ejercicio de sus funciones que les hubiere generado daños y perjuicios (los autos). No demostró la co-demandada Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: 1) Que haya acaecido la caducidad de la acción formulada por los actores para el reclamo de la nulidad de los actos administrativos impugnados (los autos). 2) Que hubiere existido alguna causal de incumplimiento de los actores nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes que implicara la no renovación del contrato (los autos).
I.3)- PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER: De conformidad con el ordinal 50.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se admitió en la audiencia de juicio para mejor resolver la documentación que rola en folios 10944 a 10957 y del 10969 al 10970 del principal. De igual forma se ordenó como prueba para mejor resolver la siguiente documentación que consta en el expediente judicial : TOMO UNO: folios 1 al 37 y del 94 al 387. TOMO DOS: folios 508 al 518, del 580 al 594, del 603 al 609, del 619 al 817, y del 988 al 1254. TOMO TRES: folios 1267 al 1372, del 1395 al 1486, y del 1490 al 1517. TOMO CUATRO: folios 1572 al 2289. TOMO QUINTO: folios 2290 al 2935. TOMO SEXTO: folios 2936 al 3299, y del 3302 al 3348. TOMO SEPTIMO: folios 3412 al 3468, 3558 AL 3561, del 3570 al 3573, folio 3601, del 3650 al 3672, del 3737 al 3764. TOMO OCTAVO: folios 3877 al 3907, del 4015 al 4045, del 4095 al 4134. TOMO NOVENO: folios 4197 al 4830 perito Nombre18237 . TOMO DECIMO: folios 4876 al 5408. TOMO DECIMO PRIMERO: folios 5433 al 5482 (María del Rosario Morera Alfaro), del 5529 al 5626 (Milton Arguedas Salas), del 5702 al 5724 (Hernán Cordero Maduro), del 5728 al 5824, del 5877 al 5894 Bernal Aragón Barquero, del 5904 al 6011. TOMO DECIMO SEGUNDO: folios 6035 al 6553. TOMO DECIMO TERCERO: folios 6608 al 6906. TOMO DECIMO CUARTO: folios 7050 al 7135, del 7199 al 7307, del 7310 al 7367, del 7374 al 7416, del 7447 al 7526, del 7621 al 7633. Del 7654 al 7671, folios 7705 al 7709. TOMO DECIMO QUINTO: folio 7750, 7752, del folio 7994 al 7920, del 7926 al 8013. TOMO DECIMO SEXTO: folios del 8067 al 8227, del 8234 al 8320, 8335, del 8364 al 8379, del 8425 al 8431, del 8436 al 8440, del 8515 al 8603, del 8626 al 8629. TOMO DECIMO SEPTIMO: folios del 8675 al 8685, del 8742 al 8753, del 8762 al 8766, del 8787 al 8918. TOMO DECIMO OCTAVO: folios 8937 al 9023, del 9031 al 9119, del 9136 al 9140, del 9192 al 9216. TOMO DECIMO NOVENO: folios DEL 9323 al 9466, del 9522 al 9531, del 9611 al 9626, 9634, del 9638 al 9645, del 9652 al 9694. TOMO VEINTE: folios del 9914 al 1002. TOMO VEINTIUNO: folios 10273 al 10279, del 10299 al 10322, del 10331 al 10355, del 10378 al 10402, del 10477 al 10490, y del 10632 al 10688. La prueba prevenida en audiencia de medida cautelar ante este tribunal que consta de 404 folios. Certificación notarial del expediente administrativo de Don Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, compuesto por 238 folios. Así como en su totalidad los diversos tomos del expediente administrativo aportado al expediente judicial por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
II.2) NATURALEZA DE LA RELACION JURIDICA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS NOTARIOS DEL BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA Y PROCEDIMIENTO PARA SU TERMINACION: Dispone la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, número 1644 del 26 de setiembre de 1953, en su ordinal primero y segundo, que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica es una entidad autónoma que conforma el Sistema Bancario Nacional, la cual requiere para el ejercicio de sus funciones y competencias encomendadas por ley en los términos de los ordinales 67, 101, 152 y 168, la contratación de los servicios notariales con el objeto de materializar los actos y contratos necesarios para su actividad bancaria. Para lograr dicho cometido, tal entidad primeramente contrató notarios en forma indefinida, teniendo para ello como marco jurídico regulatorio lo dispuesto en la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279 del 02 de mayo de 1951, y el ordinal 180 del Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7576 del 23 de setiembre de 1979, el cual estipulaba que no se encontraba sujeto al procedimiento de concurso de antecedentes las contrataciones para los siguientes servicios: a) Notariado, b) Abogacía para la dirección de asuntos o negocios jurídicos. c) Intervenciones médicas, d) Avisos o publicaciones ocasionales por los medios de comunicación colectiva, e) Correduría de comercio y peritaje, f) Otros de similar condición a juicio de la Contraloría General. Para dicho fin, la Ley 1279 no contemplaba dentro de los presupuestos para la realización de la contratación administrativa el servicio de notariado brindado por particulares a la Administración Pública, por el cual fueron nombrados muchos notarios en forma indefinida. Por otro lado, el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, estipuló también en el artículo 174, la posibilidad de nombrar los notarios externos por medio de concurso de antecedentes, el cual era un procedimiento que debía seguirse para la celebración de todos aquellos contratos administrativos que tenían por objeto la prestación de servicios técnicos o profesionales sin relación de subordinación jurídica laboral y en donde, para adjudicar, el precio no constituye factor primordial. Tal concurso de antecedentes se trataba de un procedimiento con carácter público, el cual se inicia con la publicación en "La Gaceta" de las condiciones o bases del mismo y la correspondiente invitación a concursar (canon 175 del reglamento 7576). En ese sentido, tal procedimiento de Concurso de Antecedentes se dictó con el objeto de que la Administración procurará dar oportunidad en las contrataciones que celebre, las cuales se harán en forma directa, a diferentes profesionales o empresas que reúnan características de idoneidad y confiabilidad, de tal manera que la prestación de tales servicios no se convierta en privilegio de sólo una o pocas personas. A su vez, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, número 7494 del 02 de mayo de 1995, vigente a partir del primero de mayo de 1996, derogó parcialmente el articulado de la Ley de Administración Financiera, y configuró la contratación de los servicios notariales mediante el trámite de la Licitación Pública. Posteriormente, se dictó el Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa, número 25038 del 06 de marzo de 1996 el cual estuvo vigente del 28 de marzo de 1996 al 27 de setiembre del 2006 y establecía la modalidad de contratación de servicios técnicos o profesionales a cargo de personas físicas o jurídicas en el que se debían de seguir los procedimientos de licitación pública, licitación por registro o licitación restringida de acuerdo con el monto de la respectiva contratación y el volumen del presupuesto ordinario de la Administración interesada en el contrato, de conformidad con los parámetros que establece la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (numeral 69.1). La naturaleza de esta modalidad de esta contratación entre la Administración y el contratista se disponía expresamente que originaba relación de empleo público y se le debía remunerar por los aranceles profesionales (artículo 69.2), salvo que se tratara de lo dispuesto en los artículos 69.5 y 69.6, en cuyo caso los profesionales o técnicos quedaban sujetos a una relación de empleo público remunerada con sueldo fijo. Tal modalidad de empleo público, establecía que las entidades públicas están autorizadas para contratar con sueldo fijo, utilizando su régimen ordinario de nombramiento de funcionarios, a los profesionales que requieran para formalizar las operaciones, los avalúos, los peritajes, la atención de diligencias judiciales o administrativas o cualquier otro tipo de intervención profesional relacionada con los servicios que brindan permanentemente. En estos supuestos no operará el pago que rija por concepto de honorarios para la prestación de la actividad correspondiente y la institución respectiva no podrá trasladar el costo de la contratación de aquellos profesionales al usuario de los servicios correspondientes, pero sí deberá cobrar los demás costos implícitos como los de inscripción de documentos y pago de alguna exacción. En ese sentido la Ley de la Contratación administrativa, número 7494 del 2 de mayo de 1995, estipuló en el artículo 67 que se autoriza a las entidades públicas para que, utilizando su régimen ordinario de nombramiento de funcionarios, contraten, con sueldo fijo, a los profesionales que requieran para formalizar las operaciones, los avalúos, los peritajes, la atención de diligencias judiciales o administrativas o cualquier otro tipo de intervención profesional relacionada con los servicios que brindan. Para esos efectos, no operará el pago que rija por concepto de honorarios para la prestación de la actividad. La institución no trasladará el costo de la contratación de esos profesionales al usuario de los servicios; pero sí deberá cobrar los demás costos implícitos, cuando deba inscribirse el documento respectivo o se requiera pagar algún tipo de tributo. En ese sentido, es claro el numeral 174 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, número 7558, especificando en la contratación de servicios profesionales que las entidades financieras públicas estarán sujetas a lo dispuesto en el artículo 67 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, para la contratación de servicios profesionales y estipulando en los ordinales 31 y 163, que el plazo de los contratos será de un máximo de cuatro años. Por su parte, el nuevo Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, número 33411 del 27 de setiembre del 2006, vigente a partir del 04 de enero del 2007, expresa al respecto en su artículo 163, que para la contratación de servicios técnicos o profesionales, a cargo de personas físicas o jurídicas, la Administración, deberá seguir los procedimientos de licitación pública, abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda y que ese tipo de contrataciones no originará relación de empleo público entre la Administración y el contratista, y deberá remunerarse conforme las respectivas tarifas, cuando los servicios se encuentren regulados por aranceles obligatorios, no obstante salvaguardó las condiciones jurídicas de contratación, para aquellas personas que habían sido nombradas sin haberse fijado plazo de finalización, de previo a su entrada en vigencia el día 4 de enero del 2007 (transitorio II). Indicando tal norma de tránsito entre la vigencia de la norma derogada y la presente disposición, que "Todas las autorizaciones de contratación directa sin sujeción a plazo que haya otorgado la Contraloría General de la República antes de la vigencia de este Reglamento se mantendrán en los mismos términos y condiciones indicados para cada caso particular.". Además, se dispuso con base a esta nueva regulación, que la contratación de servicios profesionales propios de una relación de empleo público, está excluida de la aplicación de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y del Reglamento, por lo que para su contratación se seguirán las disposiciones del régimen ordinario de nombramiento de funcionarios. A su vez, con la entrada en vigencia del Código Notarial, se contempló en los artículos 7 y 8, la regulación de los honorarios de los notarios públicos de planta en las instituciones públicas, al disponerse que está prohibido atender asuntos profesionales de particulares en las oficinas de la Administración Pública, instituciones estatales descentralizadas o empresas públicas estructuradas como entidades privadas, donde preste sus servicios, así como autorizar en la Administración Pública, instituciones estatales descentralizadas o empresas públicas, de las cuales reciba salario o dieta, actos o contratos jurídicos donde aparezcan como parte sus patronos o empresas subsidiarias, no obstante, podrá autorizarlos siempre que no cobre honorarios por este concepto (artículo 7). Por su parte, el ordinal 8 ibid, expresa que se encuentra prohibido a la Administración Pública contratar a un mismo notario en más de tres instituciones simultáneamente, que para velar por el cumplimiento de esta disposición, la Dirección Nacional de Notariado llevará en sus registros de inscripción una lista de notarios. Asimismo, la Administración deberá comunicar a esta Dirección la contratación de los notarios, a fin de establecer el respectivo control y que cuando en los actos o contratos jurídicos en que sean parte el Estado, sus empresas, las instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas, sean autorizados por notarios que devenguen salario, dieta u otra remuneración de la institución respectiva, quien los autorice no podrá cobrar honorarios profesionales al Estado ni a terceros. Ante dicha situación, de la co-existencia en las entidades públicas de dos tipos de notarios, unos de planta que no pueden cobrar honorarios y otros externos que devengan estipendios por su labor, es que el numeral 173 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica dispuso “que las entidades financieras de derecho público, reguladas por la Superintendencia, que utilicen los servicios de más de un notario público, sean de planta o externos, establecerán un único "rol" para todas las escrituras en que figure esa entidad como acreedora. Dicho "rol" deberá cumplirse permanentemente y por estricto orden, a efecto de garantizar una asignación equitativa y justa de las labores de notariado. El cumplimiento efectivo de ese "rol" deberá ser supervisado por la auditoría interna de la respectiva entidad financiera. Incurrirá en falta grave a sus deberes, el funcionario que, en forma directa o indirecta, haga que no se cumpla o propicie el incumplimiento del "rol" ”. Por otro lado, en cuanto al régimen que debe seguirse para la terminación de tales modalidades de relación jurídica existente entre el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica y los notarios externos, se debe distinguir si se trata de notarios nombrados y contratados en forma indefinida, o por medio del concurso de antecedentes con plazo fijo o bien sin plazo definido de terminación. De tratarse de notarios nombrados en forma indefinida, por acuerdo de Junta Directiva, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279 del dos de mayo de 1951, y el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7576 del 23 de setiembre de 1979, vigente hasta el 1 de mayo de 1996 en que entró a regir el Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa. En los términos del ordinal 180 de dicho Reglamento, no se encontraba sujeto al procedimiento de concurso de antecedentes las contrataciones para los servicios de notariado. Así las cosas, los notarios nombrados bajo dichas condiciones tienen como condición jurídica el tener un derecho subjetivo, entendiéndose un derecho subjetivo como la facultad que tienen los administrados de poder exigir a la Administración Pública el dar, hacer o no hacer una determinada prestación o conducta, o como bien lo expresa Don Eduardo García Maynez, citado por don Eduardo Ortiz, en el tomo II de su Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., San José, 2000, primera edición, página 186, "(...) es la posibilidad, concedida a una persona por una norma, de hacer u omitir lícitamente algo...En el derecho subjetivo la forma consiste en la permisión de un comportamiento, o el contenido en lo que en cada caso el título puede lícitamente hacer o no hacer". También se ha definido como “(...) el reconocimiento por el Derecho de un poder en favor de un sujeto concreto que puede hacer valer frente a otros sujetos, imponiéndoles obligaciones o deberes, en su interés propio, reconocimiento que implica la tutela judicial de dicha posición.” (Eduardo García de Enterría y Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, página 35). En ese sentido nos dice además Don Eduardo Ortiz, ibid, que es la autorización de conducta dada por la norma jurídica que produce en el sujeto la posibilidad de hacer u omitir lícitamente algo. Ante dicha situación, si la administración contratante desea prescindir de los servicios de tales notarios externos nombrados directamente por intermedio de un acuerdo de Junta Directiva, deben respetar el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública, salvaguardando el derecho subjetivo que ostentan. Tal derecho les confiere la facultad a los notarios externos que se encuentren bajo dicha condición, de exigir ante el deseo de la entidad contratante de no continuar con sus servicios, que se sigan los procedimientos administrativos para declarar la nulidad o revocar el derecho subjetivo. De optarse por dictar la nulidad del acto administrativo declaratorio de derecho subjetivos se debe seguir el procedimiento de lesividad que contemplara la otrora Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, ordinales 36 y 37 y actualmente el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo ordinal 34, así como los artículos 173 y 174 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, bien sea para requerir una nulidad absoluta en sede judicial o bien en vía administrativa ante nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta. Por otro lado, ante un derecho subjetivo como los nombramientos supracitados, la otra opción para darlos por terminados sin justa causa, la contempla la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en sus ordinales 152 al 156 , al establecer el procedimiento de revocación, por medio del cual se faculta a la Administración Pública a revocarlo por razones de oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito, teniendo lugar tal potestad cuando haya divergencia grave entre los efectos del acto y el interés público, pese al tiempo transcurrido, a los derechos creados o a la naturaleza y demás circunstancias de la relación jurídica a que se intenta poner fin (artículo 152 ibid). La revocación podrá fundarse en la aparición de nuevas circunstancias de hecho, no existentes o no conocidas al momento de dictarse el acto originario, también podrá fundarse en una distinta valoración de la mismas circunstancias de hecho que dieron origen al acto, o del interés público afectado (artículo 153 ibid). La revocación de un acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos deberá hacerse por el jerarca del ente respectivo, previo dictamen favorable de la Contraloría General de la República, simultáneamente deberá contener el reconocimiento y si es posible el cálculo de la indemnización completa de los daños y perjuicios causados, so pena de nulidad absoluta, en todo caso los daños y perjuicios deberán ser liquidados por la Administración dentro del mes posterior a la solicitud o recurso del administrado que contenga la liquidación pretendida por éste (numeral 155 ibid). Para realizar la revocación del acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos subjetivos, debe seguirse un mínimo debido proceso en el que se garanticen al menos las garantías fundamentales del administrado. En el caso de la revocatoria del acto administrativo declaratorio de sus derechos subjetivos al haberlos nombrados en forma indefinida, el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, tal entidad en el ejercicio pleno de sus potestades ostenta la atribución de poder revocarlos o darlos por terminado como lo hizo. Se trata del ejercicio de potestades legítimas ejercidas en el ámbito de su competencia y autorizadas por la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sin que se observe disconformidad del procedimiento efectuado, ni nulidad absoluta de la decisión legítima adoptada, pero debió de haber indemnizado a los notarios externos según lo estipulado en el artículo 155 citado y haberles cancelado la justa y legítima indemnización a la que tenían derecho, después de haber servido por muchos años a la entidad bancaria. Por otro lado en lo referente a los notarios externos nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes, la Sala Constitucional ha establecido sobre el contrato administrativo, en los votos 6432-98 de las 10:30 horas del 4 de setiembre de 1998, y número 998-98 de las 11:30 del 16 de febrero de 1998, que el mismo se caracteriza por ser conmutativo, oneroso y bilateral, teniendo por objeto la prestación de un servicio o la realización de una obra pública. Se diferencia de los contratos privados, por ejercer en este la Administración prerrogativas, poderes o cláusulas exorbitantes fundadas en el fin y el interés público que debe proteger y realizar, tales como la dirección, modificación, resolución, y ejecución, principio denominado de la mutabilidad del contrato. Su fundamento se encuentra a nivel constitucional en el ordinal 182, en el cual se estatuye el procedimiento de la licitación para la celebración de convenios con la Administración Pública, los cuales se definen como "el acuerdo de voluntades, generador de obligaciones y por ello sinalagmático, celebrado entre un órgano del estado, en ejercicio de las funciones administrativas que le competen, con otro órgano administrativo o con un particular o administrado, para satisfacer finalidades públicas." (Voto de la Sala Constitucional 1205-96). Así las cosas, por su carácter conmutativo, en el contrato administrativo hay derechos y obligaciones recíprocas, "que se sintetizan en los siguientes: a) el contratista tiene derecho a la realización del objeto que fue contratado y al reconocimiento de los precios pactados; a la vez que a él se le debe no sólo un trato justo y adecuado, sino también el respeto del plazo de ejecución convenido en el contrato; y b) la Administración contratante puede, dentro del marco de la contratación, fiscalizar, impartir instrucciones, realizar ciertas modificaciones, ejecutar administrativamente las garantías o bien, resolver o rescindir el contrato." (Voto de la Sala Constitucional 1205-96). En el caso de estos notarios externos nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes, a ellos se les fue prorrogando su nombramiento hasta el día 01 de diciembre del 2009, en que entró en vigencia las licitación pública del 2008, por lo que el trámite para su fenecimiento o terminación, debía de ajustarse a los procedimientos de extinción del contrato que contempla el Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa en sus ordinales 203 y siguientes. En ese sentido, expresaba el ordinal 203 ibid, que los contratos se extinguen por la vía normal, por el acaecimiento del plazo y la ejecución del objeto contractual. De modo anormal, por resolución, rescisión administrativa o declaratoria de nulidad. Sobre la resolución contractual a la luz de la otrora normativa, la Administración se encuentra facultada para resolver unilateralmente los contratos por motivo de incumplimiento imputable al contratista. Una vez firme la resolución contractual se procederá a ejecutar la garantía de cumplimiento y cualesquiera otras multas, si ello resulta pertinente, sin ningún procedimiento adicional. En el evento de que la Administración haya previsto en el cartel cláusulas de retención, se podrán aplicar esos montos al pago de los daños y perjuicios reconocidos. De ser las garantías y retenciones insuficientes, se adoptarán las medidas en sede administrativa y judicial necesarias para obtener la plena indemnización (artículo 204 ibid). En lo atinente a la facultad de rescisión, la Administración podrá rescindir unilateralmente sus contratos, no iniciados o en curso de ejecución, por razones de interés público, caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, debidamente acreditadas. Para ello deberá emitir una resolución razonada en donde señale la causal existente y la prueba en que se apoya, la cual será puesta en conocimiento del contratista por el plazo de quince días hábiles. La entidad deberá cancelar al contratista la parte efectivamente ejecutada del contrato, en el evento de que no lo hubiera hecho con anterioridad y los gastos en que ese contratista haya incurrido para la completa ejecución, siempre que estén debidamente probados. Cuando la rescisión se origine por motivos de interés público, además se podrá reconocer al contratista cualquier daño o perjuicio que la terminación del contrato le causare, previa invocación y comprobación. El lucro cesante correspondiente a la parte no ejecutada podrá reconocerse siempre dentro de criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, valorando aspectos tales como el plazo de ejecución en descubierto, grado de avance de la ejecución del contrato, complejidad del objeto. Cuando la utilidad no haya sido declarada se considerará que es un 10% del monto total cotizado (artículo 206 ibid). Bien puede también aplicar el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica la rescisión por mutuo acuerdo, en los términos de los numerales 207 y siguientes ibid, convenida cuando existan razones de interés público y no concurra causa de resolución imputable al contratista. En este caso la Administración podrá acordar los extremos a liquidar o indemnizar, siempre dentro de los límites de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Acordada la rescisión sin mayor trámite, se enviará la respectiva liquidación a aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República de la República, quien contará con veinticinco días hábiles para emitir su resolución. Verificada la causal por la cual procede declarar la rescisión contractual, la Administración procederá a emitir la orden de suspensión del contrato y dará al contratista audiencia por el plazo de diez días hábiles identificando la causal y la prueba en que se sustenta, entre otros. El contratista atenderá la audiencia refiriéndose a la causal invocada y presentará un detalle de la liquidación que pide aportando la prueba respectiva. Vencido el plazo de audiencia, la Administración adoptará, dentro de quinto día hábil cualquier medida necesaria para valorar la liquidación presentada por el contratista. Evacuada la prueba, la entidad resolverá dentro del mes calendario siguiente y estará obligada a la verificación de todos los rubros presentados. La resolución tendrá los recursos ordinarios previstos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Una vez firme la rescisión, la respectiva liquidación se enviará a aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República de la República, quien contará con veinticinco días hábiles para aprobar, improbar o efectuar las observaciones que considere pertinentes (artículo 208 ibid). Así las cosas, los procedimientos supracitados no seguidos por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en sus actuaciones para dejar sin efecto los notarios nombrados por concurso de antecedentes, tienen además, como marco regulatorio, las normas dispuestas en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa en sus capítulos tercero y cuarto, al disponer que la Administración tiene los derechos de rescisión y resolución unilateral por motivos de incumplimiento, fuerza mayor, caso fortuito o cuando convenga al interés público, con apego al debido proceso (artículo 11). Lo cual además, es contemplado también en el nuevo al procedimiento y trámite que estipula el ordinal 13, para su trámite e indemnización por la vía de la resolución, rescisión contractual unilateral, así como la terminación por mutuo acuerdo. Siendo claro y evidente que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, no cumplió con el deber de indemnizar a los notarios externos nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes, toda vez que dio por finalizada la relación contractual sin reconocerles tal derecho esencial y consustancial a su condición jurídica.
II.3)- SOBRE LA CONFIANZA LEGITIMA Y LOS DERECHOS SUBJETIVOS DEL ADMINISTRADO OBTENIDOS DE BUENA FE: Sobre este tema es relevante indicar que los derechos subjetivos se amparan en los principios de seguridad jurídica, intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública, el de buena fe y confianza legítima. Entendiéndose por el principio de confianza legítima aquel según lo señalado por Caterina Balasso en su artículo "El Principio de Protección de la Confianza Legítima y su Aplicabilidad respecto de los ámbitos de actuación del poder público", " ... si las actuaciones de los órganos que ejercen el poder público contrarían por completo la deducción lógica determinada por sus procederes anteriores, se configura una transgresión del principio de la confianza legítima, pues "... cuando se alude a la conducta que fomenta la expectativa, la misma no está constituida tan sólo de actuaciones, sino que también se conforma con abstenciones y manifestaciones denegatorias u omisiones voluntarias...". Las consecuencias de este principio, han sido descritas de la siguiente manera: "El principio de la confianza legítima, junto con el de buena fe en las relaciones jurídico-administrativas dimana del principio de seguridad jurídica, esto es, la certidumbre en las relaciones con los poderes públicos, saber, el administrado, a qué atenerse con éstos, quienes deben evitar las situaciones objetivamente confusas y mantener las situaciones jurídicas aunque no sean absolutamente conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico " (El destacado es nuestro) (Jinesta Lobo (Ernesto)). Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. Página 276. Por ello, la confianza legítima es un saber a que atenerse válidamente, es reconocer la buena fe del administrado para no someterlo a los cambios políticos. Siendo importante indicar que este principio se concreta fundamentalmente en la teoría de la intangibilidad de los actos propios declaratorios de derechos para el administrado, la cual fue definida mediante voto 2006-15828 de las 17:02 horas del 31 de octubre de 2006, la Sala Constitucional, al respecto, resolvió: " V.- La anulación o revisión de oficio de los actos administrativos favorables o declaratorios de derechos para el administrado, como posibilidad de las administraciones públicas y sus órganos, constituye una excepción calificada a la doctrina de la inderogabilidad de los actos propios y favorables para el administrado o del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, al que esta Sala especializada le ha conferido rango constitucional por derivar del ordinal 34 de la Constitución Política (ver sentencias #2186-94 de las 17:03 hrs. del 4 de mayo de 1994 y #899-95 de las 17:18 hrs. del 15 de febrero de 1995). La regla general es que la administración pública respectiva no puede anular un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado, siendo las excepciones la anulación o revisión de oficio y la revocación. ". De conformidad con los principios constitucionales que dimanan de los numerales 11 y 34 de nuestra Constitución Política, y a la luz de la doctrina reiterada en la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, la Administración Pública no puede suprimir por sí misma, aquellos actos que haya emitido en ejercicio de sus competencias, y que confieran derechos subjetivos a los particulares. Esto es lo que conocemos como el principio citado de inderogabilidad de los actos propios o intangibilidad de los actos propios. No obstante lo dicho, la Administración tiene la posibilidad, por la vía de excepción, de anular o revisar de oficio actos administrativos favorables o declaratorios de derechos para el administrado, con la excepción regulada en los artículos 155 y 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública según la cual, se autoriza a la Administración a declarar, en vía administrativa, la nulidad de un acto declaratorio de derechos siempre y cuando esa nulidad, además de absoluta, sea evidente y manifiesta, previo dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República. En los demás supuestos, para que la Administración pueda declarar la nulidad absoluta de un acto propio creador de derechos subjetivos a favor de los administrados debe acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa a interponer el proceso de lesividad señalado en los artículos 34, 39 inciso e) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, así como 173 y 183 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. La norma transcrita, es clara al establecer que la Administración tiene un año contado a partir del día siguiente a aquel en que haya sido dictado el acto declaratorio de derechos, salvo si el acto contiene vicios de nulidad absoluta, en cuyo caso, dicha declaratoria podrá hacerse mientras perduran sus efectos, contando el año a partir de que cesen los efectos. El proceso de lesividad ostenta un carácter netamente anulatorio, es decir, su finalidad única es la declaratoria de invalidez de un acto administrativo que se considera absolutamente nulo y lesivo a los intereses del Estado y en ese sentido está concebido como una garantía para los particulares, de que el acto no será anulado sin un juicio previo que cumpla con todas las garantías de un proceso judicial, en el cual se determine si el acto se encuentra viciado o no. El órgano jurisdiccional solo declarará la nulidad, cuando del estudio de los autos, constate que existe un vicio de nulidad, es decir, que dicho acto no cumpla los requisitos sustanciales para su validez, en tanto éste no resulte conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico. Al respecto la disposición estatuye: “Artículo 34.- A ninguna ley se le dará efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna o de sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones consolidadas.” Un primer acercamiento y precisión de conceptos es que si bien la norma está redactada orientándose hacia la ley, no deben entenderse restrictiva a aquella, pues por el contrario cubre también a toda norma de carácter general (Votos 3858-99, 431-99 y 934-98, todas de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Ahora bien, si las normas de carácter general están afectas a dicho principio (manifestación evidente de una facultad de imperio), con mayor razón lo están los actos como ejecución de aquellos (Voto 2382-96 de la Sala Constitucional). Delimitados dichos conceptos, debe realizarse una distinción entre derechos adquiridos, derechos subjetivos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, advirtiendo que el marco constitucional presenta una garantía de irretroactividad con respecto solamente a las segundas y no a las primeras. “ Los conceptos de “derecho adquirido” y “situación jurídica consolidada” ... el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa –material o inmaterial, tratándose de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la “situación jurídica consolidada”, representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aún cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que –por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado)” (Votos 2843-98, 1318-99 y 1308-99 de la Sala constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Por su parte los derechos subjetivos se definen como “(...) el reconocimiento por el Derecho de un poder en favor de un sujeto concreto que puede hacer valer frente a otros sujetos, imponiéndoles obligaciones o deberes, en su interés propio, reconocimiento que implica la tutela judicial de dicha posición.” (Eduardo García de Enterría y Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo. II. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1977, página 35). Así las cosas, se observa la clara diferencia entre la condición jurídica del derecho patrimonial adquirido y la situación jurídica consolidada, que implican un estado de cosas definido, una circunstancia consumada, no así del derecho subjetivo, el cual puede ser revocado por incumplimiento, anulado en la vía judicial por lesividad o administrativa acorde al ordinal 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o bien revocado según el artículo 152 y siguientes de dicha ley citada.
II.4) CASO CONCRETO: Aplicado, lo anteriormente expuesto a la resolución del presente asunto, tenemos que llevan razón los gestionantes en sus pretensiones al accionar con el objeto de que se declare el deber que tiene el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica de indemnizar a cada uno de los notarios actores, bien sea que hayan sido nombrados en forma directa e indefinida por intermedio de la Junta Directiva o que hayan sido designados por medio de concurso de antecedentes, al tener todos ellos regímenes, condiciones y situaciones jurídicas diferentes que deben ser consideradas en el análisis de fondo. Llevan razón los promoventes al demandar para que se les reconozcan los daños y perjuicios por la terminación del contrato, por el cese de las relaciones contractuales de notariado externo que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica sostenía con los actores y con los terceros con pretensiones propias. Tal y como se acreditara en los hechos probados, la declaración de parte y testimonial recabada, y del fundamento jurídico expresado en los considerandos de fondo II.1, II,.2 y II.3, es claro que acaecen en el presente asunto los elementos esenciales para declarar tal responsabilidad y deber indemnizatorio del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, para lo cual se analizará la situación especial y particular de cada uno de los grupos de notarios externos actores, para determinar finalmente la forma como se les indemnizará. Respecto al primer grupo de notarios actores, que habían sido nombrados en forma indefinida, por intermedio de sendos acuerdos de Junta Directiva, tenemos que ellos fueron nombrados como se expresó, con base en lo dispuesto en la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279 del dos de mayo de 1951, y el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7576 del 23 de setiembre de 1979, vigente hasta el 1 de mayo de 1996 en que entró a regir el Reglamento General de la Contratación Administrativa. Por ello, efectivamente, los notarios externos nombrados directamente bajos estas condiciones y sin tener que realizar concurso de antecedentes, de previo a darse por terminado la relación jurídica existente con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, debía realizarse un mínimo procedimiento indemnizatorio, en el cual se determinaran los daños y perjuicios que les correspondían después de haber laborado para dicha entidad durante incluso algunos por más de 30 y 40 años de servicio ininterrumpido. Es evidente el derecho subjetivo que tienen una gran parte de los actores (la mayoría), que se encuentran bajo esta condición, y resulta lamentable que con un comunicado se pretenda dar por terminado en forma pura y simple, sin mayor estudio y análisis, y mediante un simple lacónico comunicado y una reunión (hechos probados 88 y 89), que se da por terminada la relación jurídica existente, afectando así gravemente el derecho subjetivo que ostentaban. No esta en discusión la capacidad y competencia de dicha entidad para que con base en los procedimientos establecidos en el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo ordinal 34, así como los ordinales 152 al 156, 173 y 174 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, revocar o anular el derecho subjetivo, pero indemnizando en forma justa, correcta, adecuada, proporcional y plena, la afectación que se les estaba causando al dar por terminado la relación jurídica existente y conminarlos a participar en los procesos licitatorios en ciernes. Se trataba de profesionales que durante muchos años venían brindado su servicio para el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, por lo que era lo esperable que se ejecutara tal potestad de dar por terminada tal situación jurídica, pero siguiendo los trámites indemnizatorios previstos en la ley. El aspecto humano aquí es evidente y quedó plenamente manifiesto en las largas audiencias de este juicio, muchos de los notarios, en su gran mayoría son personas mayores, algunos adultos mayores, que intempestivamente y con base en un simple comunicado se quedan sin su principal fuente de ingreso, por lo que lo justo es darles la indemnización debida. Si bien, la conducta del Banco se realizó con apego a potestades públicas, y como se desprende de los alegatos esgrimidos por las partes, de resoluciones dictadas por la Contraloría General de la República atendiendo denuncias presentadas por las partes por prórrogas automáticas de los contratos, Oficio FOE-FEC-0207 del 21 de marzo del 2006, DCA-2376-2008 del 07 de agosto del 2008 y la R-DCA.245-2006 del 25 de mayo del 2006, citada en el oficio R-DCA-413-2008 del 11 de agosto del 2008, en las que se indicaba ser imperativo recurrir a un procedimiento licitatorio con el fin de seleccionar y contratar los notarios externos y así regularizar la situación (hecho probado 81), debió de haber indemnizado a los actores previamente a su destitución como se anunciaba en el comunicado expedido mediante oficio número D.J/1195-2008 del 27 de junio del 2008, en el cual la señora directora de la Dirección Jurídica del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, doña Marietta Herrera Cantillo, les expresa que será a partir de la entrada en vigencia de los contratos que se lleguen a concertar con base en la Licitación 2008LN-000024-01, que se sustituirá el rol de notarios en el cual ellos figuran en la actualidad, por lo que a partir de esa fecha se dará por terminada su relación contractual con el Banco Nacional como notario externo, fecha que acaeció el día 01 de diciembre del 2009 (hecho probado 113). Esta situación como se demostró, implicó que los actores vieran disminuidos sus ingresos, debido a que el trabajo ahora se distribuía entre los nuevos notarios recién nombrados. Si bien algunos notarios se mantuvieron en su cargo, merced a las medidas cautelares que habían formulado, ya los ingresos no eran los de antes y se vieron disminuidos drásticamente, máxime que la misma entidad había manifestado que llevaba un doble rol, uno para los notarios internos de planta y otros para los notarios externos (hechos probados 115). De este modo, la conducta del ente accionado violenta los principios que amparan los derechos subjetivos de los notarios actores de seguridad jurídica, intangibilidad de los actos propios de la Administración Pública, el de buena fe y el confianza legítima supracitado, que conlleva el mantenimiento de su situación jurídica, salvo terminación por indemnización previa. Si bien no llevan razón los promoventes al argumentar que su situación es la de un derecho patrimonial adquirido o de una situación jurídica consolidada, al tratarse de un nombramiento que podía ser revocado previa indemnización, hecho ajeno a la raigambre y estatus del derecho adquirido (ya incorporada al patrimonio), y la situación jurídica consolidada (que confiere un estatus jurídico y prerrogativa inamovible) y que no puede ser revocado o reconocido, ello no enerva que se les deba indemnizar debidamente a tenor de los actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos, por lo que no se estima que se haya violentado el principio de irretroactividad en los términos del ordinal 34 constitucional, ni el del debido proceso, porque al menos se requería un mínimo trámite administrativo, que fue cumplido, pero sin indemnización. Consecuentemente, los notarios que fueron nombrados en forma indefinida, sin fijárseles plazo de terminación, como consta de la propia documentación requerida para mejor resolver requerida al Banco actor, y que se observa en los hechos probados 1 al 30 y el 118, son los siguientes: los señores (as) Nombre112075 , Nombre39622 , Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez y Martha Barahona Melgar. Todos ellos tienen en común haber sido nombrados en forma indefinida y directa por parte de la junta directiva de la entidad bancaria como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, sin concurso de antecedentes, ni licitación pública. En razón de ello, la indemnización que les corresponde es de cuatro años de ingresos como notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio recibido en los cuatro años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios externos , es decir los cuatro años previos al 01 de diciembre del 2009 y única y exclusivamente sobre los ingresos que obtuvieran como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en dicho período. En razón de ello, la Cámara se separa del criterio de los actores que reclaman indemnización vitalicia como si se tratara de un derecho adquirido o de una situación jurídica consolidada, del criterio pericial de don Nombre18237 que indemniza de por vida, como si toda en toda su existencia ostentarían la condición de notarios del banco demandado, o si se tratara de un bien o una situación jurídica incorporada a su patrimonio, inamovible, vitalicia y perenne. Además, las condiciones habían cambiado por disposición de ley, a tenor de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su Reglamento, por lo que no se estima que se haya violentado el principio de irretroactividad en los términos del ordinal 34 constitucional. Se separa también el Tribunal del criterio del perito Nombre39226 , que había fijado la indemnización como si se tratara de una relación laboral. Como se expresara en los considerando de fondo, nos encontramos frente a un derecho subjetivo producto de los nombramientos efectuados por la Junta Directiva del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en forma directa o bien por concurso de antecedentes, por lo que no existe tal derecho consolidado e inmutable en su favor. Para ello debe considerarse que el derecho patrimonial adquirido y la situación jurídica consolidada implican un estado de cosas definido, una circunstancia consumada, no así el derecho subjetivo, el cual puede ser revocado por incumplimiento, anulado en la vía judicial por lesividad o administrativa acorde al ordinal 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o bien revocado según el artículo 152 y siguientes de dicha ley citada. Por tales circunstancias la indemnización no puede ser indefinida, vitalicia, de por vida, porque tal nombramiento no se trata de un patrimonio incorporado a sus haberes o de una situación inamovible sin posibilidad de destitución. De la misma forma, no puede ser contemplada dentro de la indemnización por la terminación de las relaciones jurídicas de notariado, lo correspondiente a los gastos de oficina, mobiliario y equipo, pago de cargas laborales por los empleados a su cargo, ampliaciones de oficina y demás gastos efectuados en la prestación del servicio de notariado, los cuales son propios de su ejercicio profesional, se encuentran incorporados a su patrimonio y constituiría un enriquecimiento indebido el pedir que les sean indemnizados, si forman parte de sus activos. Además, en la relación jurídica entablada con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, no se pactó que con su terminación hubiere que cancelar los gastos en que se incurrió para poder generar el servicio de notariado. La entidad bancaria pactó por un servicio como notario externo, para lo cual se fijaron honorarios que no contemplan los gastos en que los notarios externos deben incurrir necesariamente para poder brindar el servicio, los cuales son erogaciones que necesariamente y lógicamente debe asumir el prestatario, y sin que puedan ser trasladados a la entidad bancaria. En este caso los notarios externos que participaron en el concurso de antecedentes o que fueron nombrados en forma indefinida mediante acuerdo de Junta Directiva, sabían que debían tener las condiciones necesarias para el servicio brindado, las cuales corren por su cuenta el obtener y proveerse de ellas, pero sin que tales condiciones materiales y gastos necesarios para su prestación deban ser resarcidos a su terminación. En ese mismo sentido, si bien el nombramiento es indefinido, no así la indemnización por destitución, la cual debe fijarse en el plazo máximo que la Ley de Contratación Administrativa puso como tope para este tipo de relaciones jurídicas, esto así toda vez que estas relaciones jurídicas se dieron antes de que la Ley de Contratación Administrativa estableciera límites en tal sentido y ante su vigencia las relaciones debieron someterse a ello, lo que el Banco no realizó en su momento. Por ello, se fija en 4 años la indemnización, porque es el plazo máximo que la nueva normativa había establecido para estas relaciones jurídicas notariales (artículos 31 y 163 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) y que se aplica en forma prevalente a los derechos subjetivos de los actores, por lo que será en trámite de ejecución de sentencia donde se fijará el monto correspondiente, corriendo intereses legales civiles sobre tales sumas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago por tratarse de una obligación de valor nacida en sentencia, intereses que se otorgan al encontrarse incluidos dentro de los daños y perjuicios reclamados por todos los actores. Además, tales sumas deben ser indexadas a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia. Una vez fijada en ejecución de sentencia, de la indemnización que corresponde a cada actora deberá deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente a dichos ingresos. Respecto a los notarios externos nombrados por medio del concurso de antecedentes, se acreditó, que ellos participaron en los concursos de antecedentes efectuados bajo los números 1-85, 4-86, 2-90, 2-94, 1-96 y 1-95, como se constata en los hechos probados 1 al 30, así como el 120 al 124, información brindada por la entidad bancaria y que se expresa en todos los hechos probados que establecen el número del concurso, y el acuerdo de Junta Directiva que lo avala. Como se expresó, tales notarios fueron nombrados un grupo sin establecerse plazo de terminación y otro con un plazo de dos años, prorrogables un año o dos años dependiendo de la calificación de su servicio. Respecto al primer grupo en el cual no se fijó plazo, se dispuso en el concurso de antecedentes número 1-85, en cuanto al período de vigencia que los notarios nombrados se comprometen a prestar los servicios al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en el momento en que éste lo requiera, quedando a criterio de la Junta Directiva General de la Institución la remoción de cualquiera de los adjudicatarios en el momento que lo crea conveniente previa resolución razonada y siempre que sea de interés de la Institución (hechos probados 31 al 38) . Igual modalidad se aplicó para el concurso de antecedentes número 4-86, en el que se dispuso la modalidad de requerir de sus servicios cuando la accionada lo requiera (hechos probados 39 al 45). Posteriormente, mediante concurso de antecedentes 2-90, se estableció que los profesionales serán nombrados como abogados y notarios externos por un período de 2 años, prorrogables dos más si la evaluación es positiva (hechos probados 46 al 66) y a su vez el concurso de antecedentes 2-94 nombró los notarios externos por un período de 2 años, prorrogables un año más si la evaluación es positiva (hechos probados 67 al 74). Un año después, mediante Por concurso de antecedentes número 1-9 5 y el 1-96, los cuales realizaron el nombramiento de profesionales que brindarán sus servicios como abogados y notarios externos por dos años, fecha en la cual se evaluará el desempeño del profesional y en el evento de que dicha evaluación fuere positiva, se prorrogará por un año más y así sucesivamente mientras persista un buen servicio para el Banco (hechos probados 75 al 80). Tales actores se regían por el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7576 del 23 de setiembre de 1979, vigente hasta el 1 de mayo de 1996, el cual en el artículo 174 contemplaba la posibilidad de nombrar los notarios externos por medio de concurso de antecedentes, procedimiento seguido para la celebración de todos aquellos contratos administrativos que tenían por objeto la prestación de servicios técnicos o profesionales sin relación de subordinación jurídica laboral y en donde, para adjudicar, el precio no constituye factor primordial. Tal concurso de antecedentes se trataba de un procedimiento con carácter público, el cual se inicia con la publicación en "La Gaceta" de las condiciones o bases del mismo y la correspondiente invitación a concursar (canon 175 del reglamento 7576). En ese sentido, tal procedimiento de Concurso de Antecedentes se dictó con el objeto de que la Administración procurará dar oportunidad en las contrataciones que celebre, las cuales se harán en forma directa, a diferentes profesionales o empresas que reúnan características de idoneidad y confiabilidad, de tal manera que la prestación de tales servicios no se convierta en privilegio de sólo una o pocas personas. No obstante, si era la voluntad de la administración revocarlo o rescindirlo, debía de aplicarse lo estipulado en el Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa en sus ordinales 203 y siguientes, así como lo dispuesto en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa en sus capítulos tercero y cuarto y el artículo 13 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, que contemplan claramente los procedimientos debidos para extinguir tales contratos por la vía normal, por el acaecimiento del plazo y la ejecución del objeto contractual o de modo anormal, por resolución, rescisión administrativa o declaratoria de nulidad. Así las cosas, los actores que se encuentran bajo esta condición, y que se comprueba de los hechos probados 118 al 124, así como de todos los hechos donde se consigna la forma de su nombramiento y la fecha, son: los señores (as) Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal y Carlos Rivera Bianchini: nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número Placa6725, los señores Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, y Víctor Murillo Rodríguez: nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 4-86, los señores Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, y Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz: nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-90, los señores Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, y Mayra Rojas Guzmán: nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-94, el señor Freddy Rojas López: nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-95, y el señor Federico Alfaro Araya: nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-96. Como se aprecia de los términos de los concursos expresados, aunque se realizaron por medio de concurso de antecedentes, se observa una distinción en las condiciones de contratación, que ameritan un tratamiento diferente. Por un lado los nombrados en los concursos número 1-85 y el 4-86, que con claridad se determina de los términos de contratación, que no tienen plazo, no tienen período de vigencia, se les nombra por tiempo indefinido. Las condiciones de contratación expresan que se comprometen a prestar los servicios al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en el momento en que éste lo requiera, observándose que tal relación jurídica se prorrogó en el tiempo en forma indefinida, necesitándose sus servicios en forma constante, debido a que los servicios del banco así lo requerían. A lo largo de más de 20 años, se mantuvo continuamente en el tiempo esta modalidad de servicio, en mérito de lo cual, al igual que el otro grupo de los notarios nombrados directamente, sin límite de tiempo, se les debe indemnizar por la terminación unilateral de este derecho subjetivo y sin haberse realizado un procedimiento de rescisión o de resolución contractual, según lo estipulado en el Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa en sus ordinales 203 y siguientes, así como en el nuevo procedimiento y trámite que estipula el Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa en su ordinal 13, regulando las formas de terminación de estas relaciones contractuales por la vía del acaecimiento del plazo, la ejecución de la relación contractual, la resolución, rescisión contractual unilateral, así como la terminación por mutuo acuerdo. Tales normas tiene como común denominador el que la Administración tiene la potestad de dar por terminado el nombramiento por concurso de antecedentes, pero previo pago de la indemnización debida. Por ello, al no haber indemnizado debidamente la entidad demandada a estos notarios nombrados sin fijación de plazo, se les debe reconocer la indemnización correspondiente a cuatro años de ingresos como notarios externos del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido en los cuatro años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios, es decir los cuatro años previos al 01 de diciembre del 2009, y se computará única y exclusivamente sobre los ingresos que obtuvieran como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en dicho período. Tal plazo indemnizatorio, como se expresó, tiene sustento en ser el tiempo máximo que la nueva normativa fijó para estas relaciones jurídicas notariales (artículos 31 y 163 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) y que se aplica en forma prevalente a los derechos subjetivos de los actores, por lo que será en trámite de ejecución de sentencia donde se fijará el monto correspondiente, corriendo intereses legales civiles sobre tales sumas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago por tratarse de una obligación de valor nacida en sentencia, intereses que se otorgan al encontrarse incluidos dentro de los daños y perjuicios reclamados por todos los actores. Además, tales sumas deben ser indexadas a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia. Recayendo esta condición de haber sido nombrados sin fijación de tiempo en los señores Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, y Carlos Rivera Bianchini: nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-85, los señores Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, y Víctor Murillo Rodríguez. Una vez fijada en ejecución de sentencia, de la indemnización que corresponde a cada actora deberá deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente a dichos ingresos. Por otro lado, tenemos los notarios que fueron nombrados por un plazo fijo, pero que pese a ello se les fue prorrogando el contrato, siendo claro respecto a ellos que en los concursos de antecedentes en los cuales participaron se les nombró por un tiempo definido, por un plazo fijó y determinado. Como se observa de los concursos, 2-90 , 2-94,-1-95 y 1-96, se les nombra por dos años, plazo que será prorrogable si al evaluación es positiva, estableciéndose dicha prórroga en uno y dos años. Así las cosas, la naturaleza de dichos contratos es la de tener un plazo fijo, no nacieron para ser indefinidas y el hecho de que se hayan prorrogado en el tiempo no les otorga tal condición. El hecho de que las necesidades de la Administración haya implicado el requerimiento continuo de su labor, no tiene la virtud de mutar la disposición que de común acuerdo y con base al concurso de antecedentes le fijó plazo en el tiempo. Ante dicha situación, al haberse acreditado que tales actores se encontraban nombrados por dos años, que no había acaecido alguna causal para dejar sin efecto el nombramiento por incumplimiento, lo procedente es indemnizarlos por la no prórroga de su contrato sin haber causa justificada para ello siendo lo procedente que se les indemnice con dos años de ingresos como notarios externos del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido en los dos años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios, es decir los dos años previos al 01 de diciembre del 2009, el cual se computará y única y exclusivamente sobre los ingresos sobre los ingresos que obtuvieran como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica en dicho período. En razón de ello, como ya se expresó y por los motivos citados , en ambos casos, de los nombrados sin sujeción a plazo, como los nombrados a tiempo definido, la Cámara se separa del criterio de los actores que reclaman indemnización vitalicia, así como del señor perito de don Nombre18237 que indemniza de por vida, así como del criterio del señor perito Nombre39226 , que había fijado la indemnización como si se tratara de una relación laboral. Se fija en 2 años la indemnización, porque es el plazo máximo que se hubiera prorrogado el contrato, siendo potestad como se indicó del banco accionado rescindir o revocar el contrato, pero indemnizando debidamente, como se dicta aquí, y será en trámite de ejecución de sentencia donde se fijará el monto correspondiente, corriendo intereses legales civiles sobre tales sumas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago por tratarse de una obligación de valor nacida en sentencia, intereses que se otorgan al encontrarse incluidos dentro de los daños y perjuicios reclamados por todos los actores. Correspondiendo dicha indemnización a los señores (as) Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante y Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz que fueron nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-90 . A los señores (as) Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos y Mayra Rojas Guzmán, nombrados mediante concurso de antecedentes número 2-94. A don Freddy Rojas López nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-95 y al señor Federico Alfaro Araya, nombrado mediante concurso de antecedentes número 1-96 . Además, tales sumas deben ser indexadas a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia. Una vez fijada en ejecución de sentencia, de la indemnización que corresponde a cada actora deberá deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente a dichos ingresos. De igual forma, como se expresara supra, en ninguno de los supuestos expresados, de nombramiento indefinido o a plazo fijo, se contempló dentro de la indemnización brindada, los gastos expresados de mobiliario y equipo, pago de cargas laborales por los empleados a su cargo, ampliaciones de oficina y demás gastos efectuados en la prestación del servicio de notariado, los cuales debían de ser asumidos por su cuenta y riesgo, y no formaban parte del honorario pactado con la entidad bancaria. Sin que sean de recibo las argumentaciones de la accionada respecto a que se trata del simple derecho a participar de un rol, los actores son notarios externos, fueron nombrados por concurso de antecedentes y por acuerdo de Junta Directiva, ostentan un derecho subjetivo en mérito de tal designación, ejerciendo para la accionada labores notariales, por lo que no se trata simplemente como expresa la entidad bancaria de un mero rol aleatorio de asignación de labores que excluye el pago de daños y perjuicios, debido a que tal rol es un mecanismo ideado para la distribución del trabajo de notariado (ordinal 173 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica), que se originó en un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos subjetivos el cual debe ser indemnizado ante la decisión administrativa de revocarlo. Respecto a las pretensiones anulatorias incoadas por los actores, estas se rechazan, como se expresó, no se observa nulidad en los trámites administrativos seguidos y en las decisiones adoptadas por el Banco actor, que las ejecutó en el ejercicio de sus competencias, pero sin haber indemnizado como corresponde. Si bien los actores sustentan la nulidad en la violación al debido proceso por haberse realizado un procedimiento sin indemnización o no haberse apegado a los establecido en la ley de contratación administrativa, no se trata de dictar la nulidad por la nulidad misma. La invalidez e ineficacia de las disposiciones administrativas se dicta cuando hay perjuicio al administrado, y en este caso, más que en el procedimiento seguido, la afectación consiste el no pago de la justa y correcta indemnización que le correspondían a todos y cada uno los actores. La entidad bancaria se encontraba en la potestad de ejercer la revocación, nulidad, rescisión o terminación por mutuo acuerdo de los actos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos, ello es incuestionable, la facultaba la normativa supracitada de la otrora Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y sus Reglamentos, pero debía indemnizar y siguiendo al menos un mínimo procedimiento administrativo como el seguido pero resarciendo plenariamente a los promoventes, por lo que no hay razón para dictar la nulidad de los acuerdos y procedimientos impugnados, máxime que al no ser posible la reinstalación por los motivos expresados, por no tratarse de una relación estatutaria cobijada por la inamovilidad, y por corresponder a potestades legítimas de la Administración, resulta innecesario un pronunciamiento de nulidad, convirtiéndose de ese modo la pretensión indemnizatoria en el pronunciamiento esencial y principal de este proceso. Además, no hay nulidad por el hecho de que la señora Herradora Chacón haya realizado la comunicación de dar por terminados las relaciones jurídicas de notariado externo, toda vez que élla en su condición de Proveedora de la entidad bancaria, no asumió atribuciones que no le corresponde, sino que se limitó a comunicar las decisiones adoptadas por la Junta Directiva.Por otro lado, se rechaza la reclamación indemnizatoria por la aplicación del doble rol por parte de la entidad bancaria, así como por la disminución de los ingresos que recibieron a partir del primero de diciembre del 2009, ello así porque sería incurrir en un doble pago el otorgarles a los actores indemnización por la terminación de su relación jurídica y además resarcirlos por haber visto disminuido sus ingresos. Para ello, debe valorarse que la Ley impuso la nueva modalidad de contratación por medio de licitación pública, los actores se mantuvieron en sus cargos debido a medidas cautelares formuladas, y además el Banco tenía la potestad de revocar o rescindir el derecho subjetivo previa indemnización, que aquí se ordena. Mal haríamos en otorgar indemnización por terminación y por disminución de ingresos en la continuidad del puesto, ambas pretensiones no son compatibles, e implican una contradicción ante el ejercicio de potestades legales por parte del banco, en mérito de lo cual las pretensiones de reinstalación deben rechazarse, al no encontrarnos ante una relación de empleo público en los términos del ordinal 190 y 191 constitucional. Si bien a folio 116, se constata y en un hecho constatado que a partir de la entrada en vigencia el 01 de diciembre del 2009 de la Licitación pública 2008LN-000024-01 para la selección de profesionales que brinden sus servicios como notarios externos, la contratación de nuevos notarios, y la instauración de un doble rol de asignación de labores, los actores han visto disminuidos sus ingresos en el ejercicio del notariado para el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica y para ello, así como para demostrar el daño moral, se aportan los testigos doña Nombre112079 , don Nombre112080 , don Manuel Jiménez Costillo, don Sergio Cortés Rosabal, don Oscar Emilio Zeledón Grau, doña Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, doña Andreina Vincenzi Guilá, doña Flory Eugenia González Rodríguez y doña Luz María González Rodríguez. Sin embargo, y pese a ello, indemnizar a los promoventes para tal afectación resulta a todas luces incompatible, con la indemnización que por la terminación unilateral del derecho subjetivo de la condición de notarios se les está otorgando en el presente fallo. No podría este órgano colegiado otorgar daños y perjuicios en los que se tomó como base los ingresos percibidos años antes de que entrara en vigencia la Licitación pública 2008LN-000024-01 y además conceder daños y perjuicios porque se les rebajó el ingreso con motivo de dicha contratación pública. Para ello, como se expresó debe indicarse que la entidad bancaria se encontraba en su derecho de terminar por la vía de la revocación o rescisión el derecho subjetivo pero debía indemnizar, ante ello si se decidía terminar dicha relación jurídica, era un hecho que los promoventes no podían continuar a partir del 01 de diciembre del 2009 y si lo hicieron fueron debido a la interposición de medidas cautelares incoadas, a la espera de las resultas del proceso y de una eventual reinstalación. Por consiguiente, al reconocerse en este fallo la potestad legítima de la entidad bancaria de optar por no continuar con tales contrataciones, no procede además reconocerles la disminución de sus ingresos, cuando era un hecho que ya no podían continuar por la decisión del accionado. Discutida y avalada la procedencia de la indemnización por la terminación, no puede además otorgárseles indemnización por haber continuado sin las condiciones que tenían anteriormente, gracias a las medidas cautelares adoptadas. Adquiriría relevancia la discusión de indemnizaciones por el incumplimiento del doble rol y por la disminución de sus ingresos por dicho motivo, si se hubiere resuelto acoger la reinstalación de los notarios, pero al avalarse la capacidad bancaria de darlos por terminado, no es dable otorgar daños y perjuicios por haber continuado en tales labores después de la decisión del ente bancario de fenecerlos y finiquitarlos. De igual forma debe rechazarse el cobro de daño moral subjetivo y objetivo reclamado por los actores, toda vez que el Banco actuó en el ejercicio de sus competencias al dar por terminada la relación jurídica que tenía con los notarios externos, sin que se observe que por ello deba indemnizarse daño moral al tratarse de conductas ejercidas ante el cambio legislativo operado por la obligación de sacar a concurso tales contrataciones y en el ejercicio de potestades administrativas amparada en la ley, de poder rescindir, revocar o bien anular actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos subjetivos. Respecto a la demanda incoada en contra de la funcionaria Lorena María Herradora Chacón, es dable indicar que tratándose de un servidor público su responsabilidad ante terceros se rige por lo estipulado en los numerales 199 a 202 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en los cuales se dispone que el funcionario público responderá en forma personal cuando haya incurrido en dolo o culpa grave en el ejercicio de sus deberes y funciones o con ocasión del mismo. A su vez, se establece que sin perjuicio de la calificación de la conducta del servidor, la Administración responderá en forma solidaria para con los afectados por culpa in eligendo o in vigilando. En mérito de ello, para que responda en forma subjetiva y personal ante los afectados el servidor, se requiere que haya actuado en el ejercicio de sus competencias y funciones y la antijuridicidad subjetiva de su conducta al haber incurrido en dolo o culpa grave. Si embargo, en el presente asunto, al no haber acreditado los promoventes que la funcionaria accionada haya incurrido en una conducta de dolo o culpa grave en el ejercicio de sus funciones que les hubiere generado daños y perjuicios debe denegarse la acción incoada en su contra. Las actuaciones en que incurrió la servidora demanda por la comunicación que efectuó a los promoventes en el ejercicio de su cargo , las ejecutó en el ejercicio de potestades legítimas administrativas, sin que se observe abuso de poder o actuar ilegítimo de las funciones encomendadas bajo su competencia , lo que conlleva a que se deba declarar sin lugar la demanda incoada en su contra. Debe tomarse en consideración que la decisión de indemnizar a los promoventes escapaba del ámbito de competencia de la señora Herradora Chacón, limitándose ella en el ejercicio de su cargo a comunicar lo que había sido decidido por la Junta Directiva de la entidad bancaria demandada. En lo atinente a la señora Nombre112022 , se observa que por error se incluyó dentro del libelo de demanda inicial, pero se trata de un evidente error material, debido a que como se pudo constatar en la probanza requerida para mejor resolver y que rola a folios 10981 al 10988 del subjudice, que no es notaria del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, no ha recibido nombramiento alguno por lo que carece de legitimación para accionar, en razón de lo cual debe rechazarse la demanda incoada.
II.5)-SOBRE LAS FORMAS DE TERMINACION ANTICIPADA DEL PROCESO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO: Establece el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en su título VI sobre la terminación del proceso, capítulo primero, que además de los otros mecanismos establecidos por la ley (conciliación y sentencia), el proceso podrá terminar de manera anticipada o anormal, por la vía del desistimiento verbal o escrito (113 ibid), allanamiento (114 ibid), satisfacción extraprocesal administrativa (115 ibid), la aplicación de la resolución administrativa favorable firme (116 ibid), la transacción (117 ibid), y el cumplimiento de la conducta omisiva (118 ibid). Todo lo cual tendrá el carácter de cosa juzgada (112 ibid), y requiere de la supervisión y homologación de parte del juzgador. En lo que respecta al desistimiento, éste deberá formularse antes del dictado de la sentencia del Tribunal de Juicio y de plantearla la Administración Pública se acompañará del acuerdo o resolución adoptada por el superior jerárquico supremo o por autorización del Procurador General de la República si la hubiere incoado dicho órgano. Este instituto consiste en la "declaración incondicional e inequívoca de voluntad del actor del proceso por la que manifiesta su voluntad de poner fin al proceso antes del dictado de la sentencia sin extinguir el derecho. El fundamento del desistimiento lo constituye el principio dispositivo en virtud del cual el actor decide cuándo accionar y concluir el proceso iniciado" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual del Proceso Contencioso Administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental. Primera edición. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Página 227). Si bien, en ordenamientos jurídicos como el argentino (Gozaíni Osvaldo A. Elementos de Derecho Procesal Civil. Primera edición. Buenos Aires. Editorial Ediar. 2005. Página 398), se admite el desistimiento del derecho, así como del proceso, en nuestro sistema patrio el código de rito, así como la jurisdicción civil (numeral 206 del Código Procesal Civil), optó por admitirla únicamente en cuanto a la segunda, con lo cual le queda la posibilidad al promovente de volver a incoar la acción, salvo que opere la renuncia del derecho (artículo 207 del Código Procesal Civil), no contemplada expresamente en materia procesal contenciosa, pero aplicable supletoriamente. Por consiguiente, "el desistimiento pone fin al proceso, pero no a las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de fondo que pueda aducir la parte actora en un proceso nuevo" (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. Manual del Proceso Contencioso Administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental. Primera edición. San José Costa Rica. 2008. Página 229). Así las cosas, presentada la solicitud, se dictará una resolución aprobando u homologándolo, en la cual se dará por terminado el proceso, se ordenará el archivo de las actuaciones y se procederá con la devolución del expediente administrativo. Aplicado, lo anteriormente expuesto al presente asunto, tenemos que mediante libelos presentados a estrados, los señores José Javier Vega Araya, don Jorge Campabadal Herrero, don Rolando Laclé Castro y don Oscar Mora Córdoba solicitan expresamente tener pro desistido el presente proceso, gestión que es avalada por el juez tramitador. En mérito de ello, se observa que tal gestión cumple con los presupuestos legales que dispone el ordinal 113 del Código de rito. Ello así debido a que se trata de una solicitud expresa incondicional e inequívoca del promovente, la cual ha sido formulada antes del dictado de la sentencia, por lo que procede tener por admitida la misma, tal y como se resolviera en la etapa de trámite.
II.6)- EXCEPCIONES: En razón de lo expuesto, se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por la co-demandada Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, entendiéndose acogida en lo no otorgado y denegada en lo expresamente concedido, esto así porque de conformidad con la normativa citada, prueba aportada y los fundamentos de hecho y derecho expuestos, le asiste parcialmente el derecho invocado a la actora en sustento de sus pretensiones, toda vez que se declaró la razón que le asiste de ser indemnizada por la terminación unilateral de su relación jurídica de notariado que tenía con la entidad Bancaria. Respecto a la demanda formulada en contra de la señora Lorena María Herradora Chacón se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho formulada, denegándose la demanda incoada en su contra en todos sus extremos. Respecto a la excepción de caducidad se rechaza al no haber transcurrido el término fatal perentorio para incoar la presente acción. De oficio se declara la falta de legitimación de la señora Nombre112022 para accionar en este proceso, declarándose sin lugar la demanda incoada y resolviéndose sin especial condenatoria en costas III) COSTAS: De conformidad con los ordinales 119, 193 y 194 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se impone resolver este proceso condenando al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al pago de ambas costas, esto así en aplicación del principio general de condena al vencido y por no configurarse en el caso los supuestos que permiten eximirlo de ese pago, de acuerdo con el numeral 194 del Código citado. Si bien se acogió la demanda en forma parcial, debe tomarse en consideración que las pretensiones civiles indemnizatorias otorgadas constituyen la pretensión principal de la presente acción. Respecto a la demanda incoada en contra de la señora Lorena María Herradora Chacón, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas, toda vez que pese a declararse sin lugar la acción en su contra, había suficiente motivo para litigar de parte de los promoventes, debiendo determinarse su participación en los hechos a efecto de establecer su eventual responsabilidad indemnizatoria.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza la excepción de caducidad y se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho formulada por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, entendiéndose denegada en lo expresamente otorgado y acogida en lo no concedido, en consecuencia se condena al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica a pagarle a los señores (as) Nombre112075 , Nombre39622 , Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini , Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, y Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, a título de daños y perjuicios el ingreso por cuatro años como notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido única y exclusivamente como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en los cuatro años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios, es decir los cuatro años previos al 01 de diciembre del 2009, sumas que deberán ser indexadas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia, así como el pago de intereses legales civiles sobre dichos montos que corren desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. De la indemnización que corresponde a cada actora debe deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente. Se condena al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al pago a los señores (as) Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán , Freddy Rojas López y a Federico Alfaro Araya, a título de daños y perjuicios del ingreso por dos años como notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido única y exclusivamente como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en los dos años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios, es decir los dos años previos al 01 de diciembre del 2009, sumas que deberán ser indexadas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia, así como el pago de intereses legales civiles sobre dichos montos que corren desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. De la indemnización que corresponde a cada actora debe deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente. Son ambas costas a cargo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda formulada en contra de la señora Lorena María Herradora Chacón, acogiéndose la excepción de falta de derecho formulada por la demandada y resolviéndose sin especial condenatoria en costas. Se tiene por desistida la demanda incoada por don José Javier Vega Araya, don Jorge Campabadal Herrer o, don Rolando Laclé Castro y don Oscar Mora Córdoba, así como la tercería de don Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. De oficio se declara la falta de legitimación ad causam activa de la señora Nombre112022 , declarándose sin lugar la demanda incoada y se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. El Juez Madrigal Jiménez razona por separado su voto.- Carlos Espinoza Salas Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Rodrigo Huertas Durán Voto Salvado del Juez Madrigal Jiménez: Aún cuando respeto plenamente la solida posición de mis compañeros de Cámara existen varios aspectos en los cuales me separo, entrando en seguida a señalarlos.
"[....] Incluso, respecto de los derechos adquiridos que reclamó una abogada del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, quien había estado a cargo de los cobros judiciales por varios años y consideraba que el hecho que la institución recurrida decidiera abrir un concurso por licitación pública para la contratación de esos servicios profesionales, vulneraba lo dispuesto en el artículo 34 constitucional, esta Tribunal Constitucional mediante la sentencia número 2004-12511 de las 16:16 horas del 9 de noviembre del 2004 estableció lo siguiente: '…) En todo caso, tal y como lo apuntó la Contraloría General de la República el beneficio recibido por los abogados de planta por el cobro judicial de la cartera de morosos no tiene carácter de salario, sino de emolumentos u honorarios por la prestación de un servicio profesional (DAGJ-2225-2000 del 31 de agosto del 2000, visible a folios 16-21), cuya percepción depende de una circunstancia contingente, eventual o hipotética como lo es la morosidad de un cliente. Finalmente, no resulta pertinente aducir un derecho adquirido a partir de una práctica administrativa surgida al margen y en contra de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa -artículo 129, párrafo in fine, de la Constitución Política-, la que, al propio tiempo tiene sustento en el Derecho de la Constitución (artículo 182 de la Constitución Política), tal y como fue apuntado por el órgano de relevancia constitucional -Contraloría General de la República- encargado de la supervisión y vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública (DAGJ-1420-2002 del 26 de agosto del 2002, visible a folios 22-26).' Ambos criterios resultan aplicables en el caso concreto en la medida que permiten reafirmar, en primer término, la constitucionalidad de los procedimientos de contratación externa de abogados para realizar las funciones de cobro judiciales en las instituciones públicas, y, en segundo término, que los beneficios económicos recibidos por los abogados de planta por el cobro judicial no pueden considerarse como salario sino como honorarios por la prestación de un servicio profesional". (subrayado nuestro). Por lo que, en tanto se liquiden tales conceptos como parte de un salario dejado de percibir o como un ingreso fijo al que el actor tenía derecho, deben ser rechazados tales extremos de la liquidación.
Varias conclusiones debemos sacar, todos los estudios periciales que pretenden aplicar criterios propios del derecho laboral a la situación de los actores deben ser rechazados sin mayores cuestionamientos. Eso sí la Administración estaba facultada vía Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento a rescindir el vínculo que los unía con los accionantes. En dicho caso, es obligación cancelar al contratista la parte efectivamente ejecutada del contrato, y los gastos en que ese hubiera incurrido para completar la ejecución. En lo que al caso corresponde, no existe un solo reclamo por concepto de importes no pagados, por el contrario todo parece indicar que por ese concepto no existe adeudo. Es claro para los actores que la ausencia de continuar con la contratación les lleva implícito una disminución en su estatus de vida y proyección de esta, pero por una coyuntura de las condiciones económicas. El banco podría haber mantenido a los actores y realizar contrataciones masivas de notarios externos e igualmente, por mecanismo lícito y sin ninguna responsabilidad, se produciría un decrecimiento de los ingresos de los notarios externos históricos que ahora accionan. Incluso, bien podría realizar la totalidad de sus escrituras mediante notarios internos, lo que nuevamente es lícito y en principio no es base para generar responsabilidad. Reiteramos que los actores solo tienen derecho a formar parte de una lista o rol, sin garantía de cuantas escrituras se les iba a asignar o cuales honorarios van a recibir de esas. Sobre esa materia se trata de una mera espectativa, sin sustento alguno. No podría en dichas condiciones considerarse que se esta produciendo un daño susceptible de ser indemnizado. No es posible asegurar tampoco que exista mala fe en la materia por parte del banco o que la decisión fue intempestiva, pues por el contrario hubo inercia administrativa de muchos años; aún cuando el plazo existente entre el comunicado a los interesados y el retiro de ellos del rol si resulta corto desde las reglas de la racionalidad y proporcionalidad, atendiendo a que ellos habían prestado servicios por muchos años. Lo que si es posible reconocimiento es de los perjuicios, específicamente en la utilidad que tenían derecho a recibir. Es de precisar que si bien durante el juicio oral y público los actores discutieron la competencia de la funcionaria en concreto que adoptó el acto de cese, lo que generaba según ellos un vicio absoluto en el acto adoptado; bien hace el ente público en exponer como existe normativa interna que delega la posibilidad de revocar contrataciones en dicha funcionaria, lo que lleva aparejado que ese requisito de forma de la actuación administrativa se encuentre satisfecho. Reiterando el rechazo del alegato de nulidad del acto y confirmando la validez de este.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza la excepción de caducidad y se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho formulada por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, entendiéndose denegada en lo expresamente otorgado y acogida en lo no concedido, en consecuencia se condena al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica a pagarle a los señores Nombre112075 , Nombre39622 , Carlos Chacón Sartoressi, Cecilia Fallas Amador, Edgar Abellán Acevedo, Edgar Arroyo Cordero, Erich Neurohr Trejos, Ernesto Guardia Hine, Fernando Fallas Amador, Horacio Montealegre Montealegre, Jaime López Baudrit, Jorge Castro García, Jorge Tristrán Trelles, Luz María González Rodríguez, Manuel Antonio Víquez Jiménez, Miguel Rodríguez Gómez, Myrna Ivette Pierre Dixon, Orlando Calzada Miranda, Rafael Ortega Ayón, Vilma Mesén Madrigal, Wilberth Vargas Brenes, Luis Alberto Guillén Downing, José Rafael Echeverría Zeledón, Sonia González Rodríguez, Hernán Cordero Maduro, Bernal Argón Barquero, María del Rosario Morera Alfaro, Gerardo Camacho Nassar, Rodolfo Cortés Noriega, Fernando Solano Martínez, Martha Barahona Melgar, Arnoldo Chryssopoulos Morúa, Braulio Sánchez González, Juan Rojas Morera, Juan Ananías Matamoros Carvajal, Carlos Rivera Bianchini, Jorge Quesada Hidalgo, Luis Espinoza Picón, Mario González Porras, y Víctor Murillo Rodríguez, a título de perjuicios el ingreso neto de la utilidad por cuatro años como notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido única y exclusivamente como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en los cuatro años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios descontando los gastos correspondientes, aspecto a determinar por el perito correspondiente, es decir los cuatro años previos al previos de diciembre de dos mil nueve, sumas que deberán ser indexadas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia, así como el pago de intereses legales civiles sobre dichos montos que corren desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. De la indemnización que corresponde a cada actor debe deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente. También, se condena al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al pago a los señores Carlos Mas Herrera, Guillermo Azuola Valls, José Herrera Lobo, José Luis Herrera Zúñiga, Manuel Solano Ureña, Rafael Gamboa Arguedas, Virgilio Calvo Murillo, Zetty Bou Valverde, Fabio Vincenzi Guilá, Livia Meza Murillo, Eugenio Jiménez Bonilla, Rodolfo Cortés Rosabal, Federico Sáenz de Mendiola, Milton Arguedas Salas, Roxana Rodríguez Cascante, Víctor Emilio Soto Cruz, Juan Carlos Solano García, Ana Cecilia Rivas Tinoco, Carlos Castro Mora, Jorge Castro Corrales, José Ramírez Espinoza, Laura Mora Camacho, Manuel Enrique Fernández Campos, Mayra Rojas Guzmán, Freddy Rojas López y al señor Federico Alfaro Araya, a título de daños y perjuicios del ingreso de la utilidad neta (descontando los gastos) por dos años como notario externo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, los cuales se obtendrán del ingreso promedio obtenido única y exclusivamente como notarios del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en los dos años anteriores a que se diera por terminada la relación jurídica de notarios, es decir los dos años previos al primero de diciembre del dos mil nueve, sumas que deberán ser indexadas desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia, así como el pago de intereses legales civiles sobre dichos montos que corren desde la firmeza de la presente sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. De la indemnización que corresponde a cada actor debe deducirse la carga tributaria correspondiente. Son ambas costas a cargo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda formulada en contra de la señora Lorena María Herradora Chacón, acogiéndose la excepción de falta de derecho formulada por la demandada y resolviéndose sin especial condenatoria en costas. Se tiene por desistida la demanda incoada por los señores José Javier Vega Araya, don Jorge Campabadal Herrero, don Rolando Laclé Castro y don Oscar Mora Córdoba, así como la tercería de don Jorge Arturo Obando Méndez. De oficio se declara la falta de legitimación ad causam activa de la señora Nombre112022 , declarándose sin lugar la demanda incoada y se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas.- Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Proceso de conocimiento.
Actores: Edgar Abellán Acevedo y otros.
Contra: El Banco Nacional de Costa Rica y Lorena María Herradora Chacón.
Goicoechea, Dirección01 , 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Dirección02 . Teléfonos: 2545-0003 - 2545-0004. Fax: 2241-5664 y 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: ...01
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