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Res. 01871-2013 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José · Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José · 2013
OutcomeResultado
The Public Prosecutor's appeal is dismissed, and the criminal acquittal for lack of intent is upheld, with the civil condemnation standing.Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación del Ministerio Público y se confirma la absolución penal por falta de dolo, manteniendo la condena civil.
SummaryResumen
The Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José upheld the acquittal of two defendants and the company Tico Verde S.A. for the crime of invasion of protected areas, among others. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the trial court had erroneously required the existence of a forest as an element of the offense under Article 58(a) of the Forestry Law. However, the Appeals Court determined that the acquittal was not based on the absence of forest, but on the failure to prove the specific intent (dolo) required by the criminal statute. Analyzing Article 58 and Article 33 of the same law, which defines protected areas, the court concluded that it was not proven that the defendants knew they were invading a protected area or had the will to do so, given that technical studies suggested the presence of artificial drains and the area had been previously altered. The appeal was dismissed.El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José confirmó la sentencia absolutoria dictada a favor de dos imputados y la empresa Tico Verde S.A. por el delito de invasión de zonas protegidas, entre otros. La Fiscalía apeló alegando que el tribunal de primera instancia había requerido erróneamente la existencia de un bosque como elemento del tipo penal del artículo 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal. Sin embargo, el Tribunal de Apelación determinó que la absolución no se basó en la ausencia de bosque, sino en la imposibilidad de acreditar el dolo requerido por el tipo penal. Analizando el artículo 58 y el artículo 33 de la misma ley, que define las áreas de protección, se concluyó que no se probó que los imputados tuvieran conocimiento de estar invadiendo una zona protegida ni la voluntad de hacerlo, ya que existían estudios técnicos que indicaban la presencia de drenajes artificiales y el área ya había sido alterada previamente. Se declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación.
Key excerptExtracto clave
According to Article 58(a) of Forestry Law No. 7575, the criminal action consists of invading 'a conservation or protection area, regardless of its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime, regardless of the area occupied...' This means that it contemplates at least two options of areas that cannot be invaded: either a conservation or protection area, or a forest or land subject to the forestry regime. [...] The evidentiary determination that was relevant for this case, then, was not whether the defendants invaded a forest area, but rather, whether they did so in a place where there were either permanent water springs, on the banks of a river, stream, or creek, on the shores of a lake, natural reservoirs, or artificial lakes built by the State, or in a recharge area or aquifer of a spring. [...] The foregoing means that the acquittal was not due to the absence of a normative element of the criminal type, namely, the lack of a forest, but because there was doubt that the defendants acted with the specific intent required for this crime, that is, knowledge that it was a protected area and the will to invade it.De acuerdo con el artículo 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal Nº 7575 la acción delictiva consiste en invadir "un área de conservación o protección, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, u otras áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal, cualquiera que sea el área ocupada..." Esto quiere decir que contempla al menos dos opciones de áreas que no pueden ser invadidas: o una de conservación o protección, o una de bosque o terreno sometido a régimen forestal. [...] La determinación probatoria que interesaba para este caso, entonces, no era si los imputados invadieron una zona de bosque sino, más bien, si lo hicieron en un lugar en que hubieran, o nacientes permanentes de agua, en riberas de un río, quebradas o arroyos, riberas de un lago, embalses naturales o lagos artificiales construidos por el Estado, o en un área de recarga o acuífero de algún manantial. [...] Lo transcrito quiere decir, que la absolutoria no fue porque faltaran un elemento normativo del tipo, a saber, ausencia de bosque, sino porque dudaron de que los acusados actuaran con el dolo requerido para este delito, es decir, el conocimiento de que se trataba de una zona protegida y la voluntad de invadirla.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"el tipo penal aplicable, el artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal es un tipo doloso, que requiere de conocimiento y voluntad de realizar la conducta descrita en la norma...y esto NO SE HA ACREDITADO"
"the applicable criminal statute, Article 58 of the Forestry Law, is an intentional offense, which requires knowledge and will to carry out the conduct described in the norm... and this HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN"
Considerando II
"el tipo penal aplicable, el artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal es un tipo doloso, que requiere de conocimiento y voluntad de realizar la conducta descrita en la norma...y esto NO SE HA ACREDITADO"
Considerando II
"los jueces que concurrimos al voto de mayoría concluimos que la plantación de piña dentro de la zona protectora de algunos de los cauces internos sin nombre de la finca de Tico Verde S.A. pudo originarse en que estas áreas ya habían sido invadidas por los anteriores dueños de la finca"
"the judges who participated in the majority vote concluded that the pineapple planting within the protective zone of some of the unnamed internal streams of the Tico Verde S.A. farm could have originated because these areas had already been invaded by the previous owners of the farm"
Considerando II
"los jueces que concurrimos al voto de mayoría concluimos que la plantación de piña dentro de la zona protectora de algunos de los cauces internos sin nombre de la finca de Tico Verde S.A. pudo originarse en que estas áreas ya habían sido invadidas por los anteriores dueños de la finca"
Considerando II
Full documentDocumento completo
2 JUDICIAL BRANCH CRIMINAL SENTENCE APPEALS COURT Resolution: [Telf1] Case File: 05-001806-0042-PE (06) CRIMINAL SENTENCE APPEALS COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at ten o'clock on the twenty-third of August, two thousand thirteen.- APPEAL filed in the present case against [Name1]., […] and [Name2]., […] for the crime of WATER CONTAMINATION, to the detriment of the ASOCIACIÓN AMBIENTALISTA DEL TRÓPICO HÚMEDO. Judges Lilliana García Vargas, Ingrid Estrada Venegas, and Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón participate in the decision of the appeal. Appearing before this court were attorney [Name3] as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office and attorney [Name4] as defense counsel for both defendants.
WHEREAS:
I.- That by judgment number 38-G-2013, at twelve fifty on the nineteenth of February, two thousand thirteen, the Criminal Trial Court, Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, articles 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 28, 39, 41 and 50 of the Political Constitution, 1, 18, 30, 31, 45, 103 to 109 and 261 of the Criminal Code, current rules on civil liability from the 1941 Criminal Code, 1, 6, 9, 142, 265 to 270, 360, 361, 363 to 366 and 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, article 132 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal and article 41 of the Ley de Suelos number 7770, in resolving this matter and by majority vote it is agreed: TO ACQUIT [Name1]. and [Name2]. OF ALL PENALTY for the crimes of Contamination of Water for Human Consumption, Contamination of Water for Wildlife and Invasion of Protection Zones, to the detriment of the water users of the Asada de la Perla de Guácimo and the environment, which were attributed to them by the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Procuraduría General de la República, based on certainty, statute of limitations (prescripción), and indubio pro reo, respectively. The Civil Reparation Action filed by the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted and [Name1]., [Name2]. AND TICO VERDE S.A. are jointly and severally ordered to pay the State the damages they caused to the detriment of the environment through erosion, a judgment rendered in the abstract, so the interested party must resort to the judgment enforcement proceeding to establish there the magnitude of the damage and the corresponding compensatory amount. It is resolved without special award of costs, considering that the parties have litigated in good faith, such that each shall bear its own expenses. It is further ordered that, upon finality of this judgment, the civilly liable parties must, within a period of two years, remove the pineapple crops outside the fifteen-meter protection area of the public domain watercourses (cauces de dominio público) that in this case have been enumerated as 1, 3, and 4, and any other of the same nature and condition; likewise, they must allow the natural regeneration of the flora corresponding to these zones; furthermore, the civilly liable parties must eliminate planting and furrows aligned with the slope, replacing them with contour cultivation or minimum tillage, warned that failure to do so will result in prosecution for the crime of Disobedience to Authority; for a period of four years, Minaet shall supervise, at least once a year, compliance with the obligations hereby imposed on [Name5]., . and the company Tico Verde S.A. Once the judgment is final, the corresponding parts shall be communicated to Minaet for the purposes established herein. Notify through public reading." (sic).
II.- That attorney [Name3], as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, filed an appeal against the preceding ruling.
III.- That having completed the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.
IV.- That the relevant legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by Criminal Sentence Appeals Judge [Name6]; and,
CONSIDERING:
I.- Attorney [Name3], prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in his appeal claims that the judgment incurred in an erroneous interpretation of article 58 subsection a) in relation to article 33 subsection b), both of the Ley Forestal. This is because he alleges that the Judge misinterpreted the requirements needed to deem the crime of invasion of protected zones as proven, specifically by demanding that the protection area (área de protección) be forest (bosque), and by considering the conduct atypical if, in those locations, some activity other than protection was carried out in the past. He explains that this crime does not require it to be a zone covered by forest. He adds that article 33 of that same normative body did not define what is understood by forest based on protection areas, but rather did so with the aim of protecting ecosystems, independently of the territorial space where they are located. He explains that the concept of what a forest is was also misapplied in the judgment, when it was considered that the defendants had not cleared vegetation from the protected area, but rather had planted pineapple in a place that previous farm owners had already dedicated to grazing and macadamia planting. In his opinion, neither the fact that there was no forest, nor that other people previously had another type of crop, were sufficient factors to consider that the crime provided for in numeral 58 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal could not be applied. He considers that a correct analysis of that regulation would have allowed the accused to be held as perpetrators of the crime the Public Prosecutor's Office attributed to them. He requests the appeal be granted, the judgment be annulled, and a retrial be ordered for new proceedings. Defense's Criterion. Attorney [Name4], both in a brief received on April 30, 2013 (see folio 1160) and during the oral hearing he requested, maintained his position that the appeal should be dismissed. From his perspective, the core issue is not the objective typicality or non-typicality of the facts, but the absence of the other elements of the Theory of Crime, including intent (dolo). In particular, because he believes his clients did not act with intent nor was there any violation of the protected legal interest. He adds that the main topic of discussion was always whether the place where his clients cultivated was or was not a protected zone. He explains that since 2008, they carried out technical studies to determine that the site contained artificial drainages that did not qualify as a protection area, and that they always had inspections from SETENA officials and were never reprimanded for any type of invasion. Rather, he points out that it was the defendants and the company they represent who sought to carry out investigations and studies to reach the truth of the facts, such that there was never any intention to contravene the legal system, and therefore they did not commit the crime for which they were accused of invasion of protected zones. During the hearing held before this Court, the Private Defense emphasized that his clients were accused of many other crimes and that only for one was the claim for conviction maintained. However, he considered that the issue should not be treated as a problem of lack of proof of the facts, but rather as an absence of knowledge and willingness on the part of his clients regarding having planted pineapple in a protected zone. He offers some photographs to demonstrate that his clients complied with the order given in the judgment, in the sense that they had to remove their crops.
II.- The appeal is dismissed. It is convenient to make a determination of interest, even though the basis on which the Public Prosecutor's Office appealed was that it considered the judgment required a typical element that does not exist in the crime of invasion of protection zones, namely, that it be a forest; it turns out that the reasons for which the acquittal for this offense was ordered have nothing to do with the Judges having required that typical element. On the contrary, it seems more that the appellant has accommodated his appeal to a subjective interpretation of what was said in the majority vote that acquitted both accused. This situation was precisely evidenced in the oral presentation both parties made before this Court, since, while the Public Prosecutor's Office argued that it was not necessary for the defendants to invade a forest, but rather that it was enough that it was a protected zone, the defense made its arguments in the sense that it was not proven that their clients acted with intent because, in their opinion, they never believed they were planting the pineapple crop in a protected area. As can be seen without much difficulty, these are not the same topic, and this occurred because the Public Prosecutor's Office formulated its appeal without taking into account what the judgment actually indicated to acquit both accused of the crime of invasion of a protected zone. It is important, in any case, to analyze what this criminal conduct implies to compare this with the reasons given for having issued an acquittal in favor of the accused for such charge. According to article 58 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal Nº 7575, the criminal action consists of invading "a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime, whatever the area occupied..." This means it contemplates at least two options for areas that cannot be invaded: either a conservation or protection one, or a forest or land area subject to the forestry regime. It is true that for this matter, the second possibility is not relevant, but only whether it was a conservation or protection area, because that is how the Prosecutor's Office charged it (see folio 773 verso). Under this stance, it was not relevant whether the place had forest, understood as defined by article 3 of this same law, that is: "Native or autochthonous ecosystem, whether intervened or not, regenerated by natural succession or other forestry techniques, which occupies an area of two or more hectares, characterized by the presence of mature trees of different ages, species, and varied bearing." On the contrary, what was relevant was whether or not a conservation or protection zone existed, as defined in article 33 of the law under comment, which, in turn, provides for several possibilities, namely: "a) The areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes permanentes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks (ríos, quebradas o arroyos), if the land is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the land is sloped. c) A zone of fifty meters measured horizontally on the banks of natural lakes and reservoirs (lagos y embalses naturales) and on artificial lakes or reservoirs built by the State and its institutions. Private artificial lakes and reservoirs are excepted. d) The recharge areas and aquifers of springs, whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law." The evidentiary determination that was relevant for this case, then, was not whether the defendants invaded a forest zone, but rather, whether they did so in a place where there were either permanent water springs, on the banks of a river, stream, or creek, on the banks of a lake, natural reservoirs, or artificial lakes built by the State, or in a recharge area or aquifer of some spring. Under such consideration, the judgment did the right thing in analyzing the documentary evidence, with the various technical reports, as well as the testimonies that allowed it to establish that it was not proven that on the farm there existed "springs or public domain watercourses (cauces de domino público) different from the Cartarata and Leona Creeks (Quebrada Cartarata y la Leona), which they had to protect (sic) in the areas ordered by the forest law (ley forestal)" (sic) (see folio 800). Although it is likely that the claim presented by the Prosecutor's Office was because, later on, the judgment adds another argument: "already by the year 2000, some four years before Tico Verde S.A. acquired the farm, in what engineer [Name7]. 'springs', which we now know are not, there was no forest cover (cobertura boscosa)" (see folio 800 verso). But it turns out that the judgment cannot be analyzed in isolation but is a set of reasonings, and in this way it turns out that the following is said later: "However, by majority vote of the co-judges... we reach the conclusion that although it is true that these courses were devoid of vegetation in the protection zone and the pineapple was planted partly within what would correspond to the cited protection zone, which would lead us to say it is typical conduct and no cause of justification was found or indicated, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ATTRIBUTE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE DEFENDANTS, because the applicable criminal statute, article 58 of the Ley Forestal, is an intentional crime (tipo doloso), which requires knowledge and willingness to carry out the conduct described in the norm... and this HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN" (underlining supplied, see folios 802 verso and 803). What is transcribed means that the acquittal was not because a normative element of the statute was missing, namely, the absence of forest, but because they doubted that the accused acted with the intent (dolo) required for this crime, that is, the knowledge that it was a protected zone and the willingness to invade it. So much so, that the majority vote adds the following: "It is for this reason that we judges concurring in the majority vote conclude that the planting of pineapple within the protective zone of some of the unnamed internal watercourses of the Tico Verde S.A. farm could have originated from the fact that these areas had already been invaded by the previous owners of the farm, and it is for this reason that, lacking certainty that it was due to intentional conduct as required by the criminal statute of article 58... we finally deem it as not typical; even because, in the category of culpability, it could not already be a matter of an invincible prohibition error (error de prohibición no vencible) given the circumstances, since they even to this day maintain that these are artificial watercourses (cauces artificiales), and to this day this aspect has not been fully defined" (see folio 803 verso). It is important to take into account that at the level of typicality (tipicidad), according to the Theory of Crime of the Complex Type (Teoría del Delito de Tipo Complejo), both the objective elements of the statute (according to the description in question) and the subjective element, that is, intent (dolo), must be present. This means that neither the appellant nor the defense applied these criteria correctly. The former because he did not weigh that what the judgment was excluding was subjective typicality, that is, intent; and the latter, because he referred to a problem of absence of culpability (culpabilidad), when he was alluding to the lack of knowledge and willingness of his clients to invade an area they knew was protected. Note that the decision to acquit them, for lack of proof of intent, did not prevent the judgment from determining the obligation of the defendants, both to repair the damages they may have caused in the abstract, and that, once the judgment was final, the civilly liable parties must remove the pineapple crops outside the protection area (see folio 819 verso). An aspect that the defense attorney himself brought up during the hearing, stating that his clients have already started removing this crop, without it being necessary or pertinent, for this resolution, to admit the photographs he also presented at that hearing. In conclusion, the appellant cannot be found right when he argued that the judgment erred in the application of the regulations referring to the crime of invasion of a protected zone, because it is not true that the Judges required typical elements that were not relevant to the case, such as the absence of a forest, if, ultimately, the acquittal was due to them being unable to deem it proven that the accused acted with intent since, due to the multiple studies carried out, they believed it was not a protected zone, which could have implied they acted under an invincible mistake of fact (error de tipo invencible), to the extent that those technical studies would have concluded in such a sense. Incidentally, this Chamber also does not appreciate any error in the evidentiary analysis that led the majority of the Court to such determination; on the contrary, it is observed that such conclusion was well-grounded in the totality of the evidence provided and has not been refuted by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Consequently, based on all of the above, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal that has been filed by the Prosecutor's Office.
THEREFORE:
The appeal is dismissed. LET IT BE NOTIFIED.
Lilliana García Vargas Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Ingrid Estrada Venegas Criminal Sentence Appeal Judges Case File: 05-001806-0042-PE (06) Defendant: A.
Victim: Asociación ambiental del Trópico Húmedo Crime: Water contamination AVARGASQ Notify by reading</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">.\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> (sic).</span> II.- That the attorney [Name3], as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) against the foregoing ruling.
III.- That after carrying out the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.
IV.- That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by the Appeals Judge of Sentence [Name6]; and,
CONSIDERING:
I.- The attorney [Name3], prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in his appeal claims that the judgment incurred an erroneous interpretation of Article 58 subsection a) in relation to Article 33 subsection b), both of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). The foregoing because he alleges that the Judge misinterpreted what the requirements were for the crime of invasion of protected zones (invasión de zonas protegidas) to be considered accredited, specifically by requiring that the protection area be forest (bosque), and considering the conduct atypical if, in those places, in the past, some activity other than protection was carried out. He explains that this crime does not require that it be a forest-covered zone. He adds that Article 33 of that same regulatory body did not define what is understood by forest in terms of protection areas, but rather did so with the aim of protecting ecosystems, independently of the territorial space where they are located. He explains that the concept of what a forest is was also poorly applied in the judgment, when it was considered that the defendants had not carried out a clearing of vegetation in the protected area, but rather had planted pineapple in a place that previous owners of the farm had already dedicated to grazing and the planting of macadamia. In his opinion, neither the fact that there was no forest, nor that other persons previously had another type of crop, were sufficient factors to consider that the crime provided for in numeral 58 subsection a) of the Forestry Law could not be applied. He considers that a correct analysis of that regulation would have allowed the accused to be held as perpetrators of the crime that the Public Prosecutor's Office attributed to them. He requests that the appeal be granted (declarar con lugar el recurso) and the judgment be annulled, ordering a retrial (juicio de reenvío) for new substantiation. Criterion of the Defense. The attorney [Name4], both in a writing received on April 30, 2013 (see folio 1160), and during the oral hearing that he requested, maintained his position that the appeal must be dismissed (declarar sin lugar el recurso). From his perspective, the core point is not regarding the objective typicity (tipicidad) or not of the facts, but rather the absence of the other elements of the Theory of Crime (Teoría del Delito) including intent (dolo). Particularly, because he considers that his clients did not act with intent nor was there any violation of the protected legal right (bien jurídico tutelado). He adds that the main topic of discussion was always whether the place where his clients cultivated was a protected zone or not. He explains that they, since 2008, carried out technical studies to determine that what existed at the site were artificial drainages that did not qualify as a protection area and that they always had inspections by officials of SETENA and were never reprimanded for any type of invasion. Rather, he points out that it was the defendants and the company they represent who endeavored to conduct investigations and studies to arrive at the truth of the facts, so there was never any intention to contravene the legal system, which is why they did not commit the crime for which they were accused of invasion of protected zones. During the hearing held before this Tribunal, the Private Defense emphasized that his clients were accused of many other crimes and that the claim for conviction was upheld for only one. However, he considered that the issue should not be treated as a problem of lack of demonstration of the facts, but as an absence of knowledge and will on the part of his clients regarding whether they had planted pineapple in a protected zone. He offers some photographs to demonstrate that his clients complied with the order given in the judgment, in the sense that they had to remove their crops.
II.- The appeal is dismissed. It is convenient to make a determination that is of interest, although the basis on which the Public Prosecutor's Office has appealed was that it considered that the judgment required a typical element that does not exist in the crime of invasion of protection zones, namely, that it be a forest, it so happens that the reasons why the acquittal (absolutoria) was issued for this crime have nothing to do with the Judges having required that typical element. On the contrary, it rather seems that the appellant has accommodated his appeal to a subjective interpretation of what was said in the majority vote that acquitted both defendants. Precisely this situation was evidenced in the oral exposition that both parties made before this Court since, while the Public Prosecutor's Office alleged that it was not necessary for the defendants to invade a forest, but rather that it was enough that it be a protected zone, the defense made its arguments in the sense that it was not demonstrated that its clients acted with intent because, in its opinion, they never believed they were planting the pineapple crop in a protected area. As can be seen without much difficulty, it is not about the same topic and this occurred because the Public Prosecutor's Office formulated its appeal without taking into account what the judgment really indicated to acquit both defendants of the crime of invasion of a protected zone. It is important, in any case, to analyze what this criminal conduct entails to compare this with the reasons given for an acquittal judgment having been issued in favor of the defendants for such accusation. According to Article 58 subsection a) of the Forestry Law No. 7575, the criminal action consists of invading \"an area of conservation or protection, whatever its management category, or other areas of forests or lands subject to the forestry regime, whatever the area occupied...\" This means it contemplates at least two options of areas that cannot be invaded: either one of conservation or protection, or one of forest or land subject to forestry regime. It is true that for this matter the second possibility is not of interest, but only that it was an area of conservation or protection, because that is how the Prosecutor's Office charged it (see folio 773 verso). Under this position, it did not matter if the place had forest, understood as defined by Article 3 of this same law, that is: \"Native or autochthonous ecosystem, intervened or not, regenerated by natural succession or other forestry techniques, which occupies an area of two or more hectares, characterized by the presence of mature trees of different ages, species, and varied size\". On the contrary, what mattered was whether there existed a conservation or protection zone, as defined in Article 33 of the law in question and which foresees, in turn, several possibilities, namely: \"a) The areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes), defined in a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty meters horizontally, if the terrain is broken. c) A zone of fifty meters measured horizontally on the banks of natural lakes and reservoirs and on artificial lakes or reservoirs built by the State and its institutions. Private artificial lakes and reservoirs are excepted. d) The recharge areas and aquifers of springs, whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law.\" The evidentiary determination that was of interest for this case, then, was not whether the defendants invaded a forest zone but, rather, whether they did so in a place where there were, either permanent water springs, on banks of a river, streams or creeks, banks of a lake, natural reservoirs or artificial lakes built by the State, or in a recharge area or aquifer of some spring. Under such consideration, the judgment did the right thing by analyzing the documentary evidence, with the different technical reports, as well as the testimonies that allowed it to establish that it was not demonstrated that on the farm there existed \"springs or watercourses of public domain other than the Cartarata and La Leona streams, that had to be protected (sic) in the areas mandated by the forestry law\" (sic) (see folio 800). Although it is probable that the claim presented by the Prosecutor's Office was because, later on, the judgment adds another argument: \"by the year 2000, some four years before Tico Verde S.A. acquired the farm, already in what engineer [Name7]... 'springs', which we now know are not, there was no forest cover (cobertura boscosa)\" (see folio 800 verso). But it turns out that the judgment cannot be analyzed in isolation but is a set of reasonings and, in this way, the following is then stated: \"However, by majority vote of the co-judges... we reached the conclusion that although it is true that these watercourses being devoid of vegetation in the protection zone and the pineapple planted partly within what would correspond to the cited protection zone, which would lead us to say that it is typical conduct and no cause of justification was found or indicated, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ATTRIBUTE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANTS because the applicable criminal type, Article 58 of the Forestry Law, is an intentional crime, which requires knowledge and will to carry out the conduct described in the norm... and THIS HAS NOT BEEN ACCREDITED\" (the underlining is added, see folios 802 verso and 803). What is transcribed means that the acquittal was not because a normative element of the type was missing, namely, absence of forest, but because they doubted that the defendants acted with the intent required for this crime, that is, the knowledge that it was a protected zone and the will to invade it. So much so, that the majority vote adds the following: \"It is for the aforementioned that the judges who concur with the majority vote conclude that the pineapple plantation within the protection zone of some of the unnamed internal watercourses of the Tico Verde S.A. farm could have originated in the fact that these areas had already been invaded by the previous owners of the farm, and it is for this reason that, not having the certainty that it obeyed intentional conduct as required by the criminal type of Article 58... we finally consider the same not to be typical; even because, at the level of culpability (culpabilidad), it could not be treated as an invincible error of prohibition (error de prohibición) given the circumstances, since they themselves to this day maintain that these are artificial watercourses and to this day this aspect had not been fully defined\" (see folio 803 verso). It is important to take into account that at the level of typicity, in accordance with the Theory of Crime of Complex Type, both the objective elements of the type (according to the description in question) and the subjective element, that is, intent, must be present. This means that neither the appellant nor the defense correctly applied these criteria. The first because it did not consider that what the judgment was excluding was subjective typicity, i.e., intent, and the second, because it referred to a problem of absence of culpability, when it was alluding to the lack of knowledge and will of its clients in invading a zone they knew to be protected. Note that the decision to acquit them, for lack of proof of intent, did not prevent the judgment from making the determination to obligate the defendants, both to repair in the abstract the damages they may have caused, and to, once the judgment is final, the civilly convicted must remove the pineapple crops outside of the protection area (see folio 819 verso). An aspect that the defense attorney himself brought up during the hearing, stating that his clients have already started the removal of this crop, without it being necessary or pertinent, for this ruling, to admit the photographs that he also presented at that act. Ultimately, the appellant cannot be deemed correct when he has argued that the judgment erred in the application of the regulations referring to the crime of invasion of a protected zone, because it is not true that the Judges had required typical elements that were not relevant, such as the absence of a forest, if, ultimately, the acquittal was due to the fact that they could not consider it proven that the defendants acted with intent since, due to the multiple studies that were carried out, they believed it was not a protected zone, which could have implied that they acted under an invincible error of type, to the extent that those technical studies had concluded in such a sense. Incidentally, this Chamber also does not appreciate any error in the evidentiary analysis that led the majority of the Court to such a determination; on the contrary, it is observed that such a conclusion was well-founded in the totality of the evidence that was provided and that has not been refuted by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Consequently, from all of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal that has been filed by the Prosecutor's Office.
THEREFORE:
The appeal is dismissed.
</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">NOTIFY.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Lilliana García Vargas</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Ingrid Estrada Venegas</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Judges of Appeal of Criminal Sentence</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Case File :</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 05-001806-0042-PE (06) </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Defendant</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> :</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> A. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Victim</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> :</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Asociación ambiental del Trópico Húmedo </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Crime</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> :</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Water Contamination</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">AVARGASQ</span></p></div></body></html> The licensed attorney [Name3] appeared at this venue as representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the licensed attorney [Name4] appeared as defense counsel for both defendants.
**WHEREAS:**
**I.-** That by judgment number 38-G-2013, issued at twelve hours fifty minutes on the nineteenth of February two thousand thirteen, the Criminal Trial Court, Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, resolved: **"THEREFORE:** *In accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, articles 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 28, 39, 41 and 50 of the Political Constitution, 1, 18, 30, 31, 45, 103 to 109 and 261 of the Criminal Code, the rules in force on civil liability from the 1941 Criminal Code, 1, 6, 9, 142, 265 to 270, 360, 361, 363 to 366 and 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, articles 33 and 58 of the Ley Forestal and article 41 of the Ley de Suelos number 7779, in resolving this matter and by majority vote it is agreed: TO ACQUIT [Name1] AND [Name2] OF ALL PENALTY for the crimes of Contamination of Water for Human Consumption, Contamination of Water for Wildlife and Invasion of Protection Zones, to the detriment of the water users of the Asada de la Perla de Guácimo and the environment, which the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office had been attributing to them, due to certainty, due to statute of limitations (prescripción) and due to in dubio pro reo, respectively. The Civil Reparations Action filed by the Attorney General’s Office is partially granted and [Name1], [Name2] AND TICO VERDE S.A. are jointly and severally ordered to pay the State the damages they produced by erosion to the detriment of the environment, a judgment that is made in the abstract and therefore the interested party must resort to the sentence execution process to establish there the magnitude of the damage and the corresponding compensatory amount. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs, considering that the parties have litigated in good faith, and therefore each shall bear its own expenses. It is further ordered that from the moment this sentence becomes final, the civilly condemned parties must remove, within a period of two years, the pineapple crops outside the fifteen-meter protection area of the public-domain watercourses that in this case have been listed as 1, 3 and 4 and any other of the same nature and condition; likewise they must allow the natural regeneration of the flora corresponding to these zones; the civilly condemned parties must also eliminate the planting and furrows that favor slope, changing them to contour farming or minimum tillage, warned that failing to do so, they will be prosecuted for the crime of Disobedience to Authority; for a period of four years MINAE will supervise at least once a year the fulfillment of the obligations imposed here on [Name5] and the company Tico Verde S.A. Once the sentence is final, the corresponding notice shall be communicated to MINAE for the purposes established herein. Notify by reading.*" (sic).
**II.-** That the licensed attorney [Name3], as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, filed an appeal against the foregoing ruling.
**III.-** That after conducting the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.
**IV.-** That the pertinent legal formalities have been observed in the proceedings.
The Sentence Appeals Judge [Name6] writes the opinion; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.-** The licensed attorney [Name3], prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, claims in his appeal that the sentence made an erroneous interpretation of article 58 subsection a) in relation to article 33 subsection b), both of the Ley Forestal. The foregoing because he alleges that the Adjudicator misinterpreted the requirements needed to consider the crime of invasion of protected zones as proven, specifically by requiring that the protection area be forest, and by considering the conduct atypical if in those places, in the past, some activity other than protection was carried out. He explains that this crime does not require it to be a forest-covered zone. He adds that article 33 of that same body of law did not define what is understood by forest in terms of protection areas, but was enacted in an effort to protect ecosystems, independently of the territorial space where they are located. He explains that the concept of what a forest is was also wrongly applied in the sentence, when it was considered that the defendants had not carried out a clearing of vegetation in the protected area, but rather that they had planted pineapple in a place that earlier, other owners of the farm, had dedicated to grazing and the planting of macadamia. In his judgment, neither the fact that there was no forest, nor the fact that other people previously had another type of crop, were sufficient factors to consider that the crime provided for in article 58 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal could not be applied. He considers that a correct analysis of that regulation would have allowed the accused to be held as perpetrators of the crime attributed to them by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He requests the appeal be granted and the sentence annulled, ordering a retrial (juicio de reenvío) for new substantiation. *Defense's Criterion.* The licensed attorney [Name4], both in a written submission received on April 30, 2013 (see folio 1160), and during the oral hearing he requested, maintained his position that the appeal should be denied. From his perspective, the core point is not the objective typicality or not of the acts, but the absence of the other elements of the Theory of Crime, including intent (dolo). Particularly, because he considers that his clients did not act with intent, nor was there any violation of the protected legal interest. He adds that the main topic of discussion was always whether the place where his clients farmed was or was not a protected zone. He explains that they, since 2008, carried out technical studies to determine that the site contained artificial drainages that did not qualify as a protection area and that they always had inspections by SETENA officials and were never reprimanded for any type of invasion. Rather, he points out that it was the defendants and the company they represent who sought to conduct investigations and studies to arrive at the truth of the facts, so there was never any intention to contravene the legal system, which is why they did not commit the crime of invasion of protected zones for which they were accused. During the hearing held before this Court, the Private Defense emphasized that his clients were accused of many other crimes and that only for one was the claim for conviction maintained. However, he considered that the matter should not be treated as a problem of lack of proof of the facts, but rather as an absence of knowledge and will on the part of his clients regarding having planted pineapple in a protected zone. He offers some photographs to demonstrate that his clients complied with the order given in the sentence, in the sense that they had to remove their crops.
**II.- The appeal is denied.** It is convenient to make a determination that is of interest, although the basis on which the Public Prosecutor's Office has appealed was that it considered the sentence required a typical element that does not exist in the crime of invasion of protection zones, namely, that it must involve a forest, it happens that the reasons why the acquittal was issued for this crime do not have to do with the Judges having required that typical element. On the contrary, it seems rather that the appellant has tailored his appeal to a subjective interpretation of what was said in the majority vote that acquitted both accused. Precisely this situation was evidenced in the oral presentation that both parties made before this Court since, while the Public Prosecutor's Office alleged that it was not necessary for the defendants to invade a forest, but that it sufficed that it involved a protected zone, the defense made its arguments in the sense that it was not proven that its clients acted with intent because, in its judgment, they never believed they were planting the pineapple crop in a protected area. As can be seen without much difficulty, it is not about the same issue and this occurred because the Public Prosecutor's Office formulated its appeal without considering what the sentence actually indicated to acquit both defendants of the crime of invasion of a protected zone. It is important, in any case, to analyze what this criminal conduct implies in order to compare this with the reasons given for issuing an acquittal in favor of the accused for such accusation. According to article 58 subsection a) of the Ley Forestal No. 7575 the criminal action consists of invading "*a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category, or other areas of forests or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the area occupied...*" This means that it contemplates at least two options of areas that cannot be invaded: either a conservation or protection one, or one of forest or land subject to the forest regime. It is true that for this matter the second possibility is not relevant, but only whether it was a conservation or protection area, because that is how the Prosecutor's Office accused it (see folio 773 verso). Under this situation, it was not relevant whether the place had a forest, understood as defined by article 3 of this same law, that is: "*Native or autochthonous ecosystem, whether intervened or not, regenerated by natural succession or other forestry techniques, which occupies an area of two or more hectares, characterized by the presence of mature trees of different ages, species and varied size*". On the contrary, what was relevant was whether or not there was a conservation or protection zone, as defined in article 33 of the law in discussion and which provides, in turn, several possibilities, namely: "*a) The areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes permanentes), defined in a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in a rural zone and ten meters in an urban zone, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams or creeks, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is uneven. c) A zone of fifty meters measured horizontally on the banks of natural lakes and reservoirs and on artificial lakes or reservoirs built by the State and its institutions. Private artificial lakes and reservoirs are excepted. d) The recharge areas and aquifers of the springs (manantiales), whose limits will be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law.*" The evidentiary determination that was of interest for this case, then, was not whether the defendants invaded a forest zone but, rather, whether they did so in a place where there were either permanent water springs (nacientes permanentes), on the banks of a river, creeks or streams, banks of a lake, natural reservoirs or artificial lakes built by the State, or in a recharge area or aquifer of some spring (manantial). Under such consideration, the sentence did the right thing by analyzing the documentary evidence, with the different technical reports, as well as the testimonies that allowed it to establish that it was not proven that on the farm there existed "*springs (nacientes) or public domain watercourses other than the Quebrada Cartarata and the La Leona, which they had to protect (sic) in the areas ordered by the Ley Forestal*" (sic) (see folio 800). Although it is probable that the claim presented by the Prosecutor's Office was because, further on, the sentence adds another argument: "*already by the year 2000, some four years before Tico Verde S.A. acquired the farm, already in what the engineer [Name7] "springs (nacientes)", which today we know are not, there was no forest cover (cobertura boscosa)*" (see folio 800 verso). But it turns out that the sentence cannot be analyzed in isolation but is a set of reasonings and, in this way, it turns out that later the following is said: "*However, by majority vote of the co-judges... we reached the conclusion that although it is true that these watercourses were devoid of vegetation in the protection zone and the pineapple planted partly within what would correspond to the cited protection zone,* ***which would lead us to say that it is a typical conduct*** *and no cause of justification was found or indicated, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ATTRIBUTE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE DEFENDANTS, this because the applicable criminal statute, article 58 of the Ley Forestal is an intentional offense (tipo doloso), which requires knowledge and will to carry out the conduct described in the norm... and this HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN*" (the underlining is supplied, see folios 802 verso and 803). What is transcribed means that the acquittal was not due to a missing normative element of the offense (tipo), namely, the absence of a forest, but because they doubted that the accused acted with the intent required for this crime, that is, the knowledge that it was a protected zone and the will to invade it. So much so was this, that the majority vote adds the following: "*It is for the stated reasons that the judges concurring in the majority vote conclude that the planting of pineapple within the protective zone of some of the unnamed internal watercourses on the farm of Tico Verde S.A. could have originated from the fact that these areas had already been invaded by the previous owners of the farm, and it is for this reason that, not having the certainty* ***that this was due to intentional conduct*** *as required by the criminal statute of article 58... we ultimately consider it to be not typical; especially because it could not, in the category of culpability, be treated as an invincible mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición no vencible) given the circumstances, since they to this day maintain that these are artificial watercourses and to this day this aspect had not been fully defined*" (see folio 803 verso). It is important to take into account that at the level of typicality, in accordance with the Theory of the Complex Offense (Teoría del Delito de Tipo Complejo), both the objective elements of the offense (tipo) (according to the description in question) and the subjective element, that is, intent (dolo), must be present. This means that neither the appellant nor the defense correctly applied these criteria. The first because he did not weigh that the sentence was excluding subjective typicality, i.e., intent and, the second, because he referred to a problem of absence of culpability, when he was alluding to the lack of knowledge and will of his clients in invading a zone they knew was protected. Note that the decision to acquit them, due to lack of proof of intent, did not prevent the sentence from taking the determination to obligate the defendants, both to repair in the abstract the damages they may have caused, and to require that, once the sentence is final, the civilly condemned parties must remove the pineapple crops outside the protection area (see folio 819 verso). An aspect that the defense attorney himself brought up during the hearing, saying that his clients have already begun the removal of this crop, without it being necessary or pertinent, for this resolution, to admit the photographs he also presented at that time. In short, the appellant cannot be given reason when he has argued that the sentence was mistaken in the application of the regulations related to the crime of invasion of a protected zone, because it is not true that the Adjudicators required extra typical elements that were not relevant, such as the absence of a forest if, in the end, the acquittal was due to the fact that they could not consider it proven that the accused acted with intent since, due to the multiple studies that were conducted, they believed it was not a protected zone, which could have implied they acted under an invincible mistake of fact (error de tipo invencible), insofar as those technical studies had concluded in that sense. Indeed, this Chamber also does not perceive any error in the evidentiary analysis that led the majority of the Court to such a determination; on the contrary, it is observed that such a conclusion was well-founded on the totality of the evidence that was provided and which has not been refuted by the Public Prosecutor's Office.
As a consequence of all the foregoing, the proper course is to dismiss the appeal (recurso de apelación) that has been filed by the Prosecution.
POR TANTO:
The appeal (recurso de apelación) is dismissed. NOTIFY.
Lilliana García Vargas Rosaura Chinchón Calderón Ingrid Estrada Venegas Criminal Sentence Appeal Judges File Number: 05-001806-0042-PE (06) Defendant: A.
Victim: Asociación ambiental del Trópico Húmedo Crime: Water contamination
2 PODER JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL Resolución: [Telf1] TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, al ser las diez horas del veintitrés de agosto del dos mil trece.- RECURSO DE APELACIÓN interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1]., […] y [Nombre2]., […] por el delito de CONTAMINACIÓN DE AGUAS, en perjuicio de ASOCIACIÓN AMBIENTALISTA DEL TRÓPICO HÚMEDO. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas Lilliana García Vargas, Ingrid Estrada Venegas y Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón. Se apersonaron en esta sede el licenciado [Nombre3] como representante del Ministerio Público y el licenciado [Nombre4] como abogado defensor de ambos imputados .
RESULTANDO:
I.- Que mediante sentencia número 38-G-2013, de las doce horas cincuenta minutos del diecinueve de febrero del dos mil trece, el Tribunal Penal, II Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con las reglas de la sana crítica racional, artículos 8.2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 28, 39, 41 Y 50 de la Constitución Política, 1, 18, 30, 31, 45, 103 a 109 Y 261 del Código Penal, reglas vigentes sobre responsabilidad civil del Código Penal de 1941, 1, 6, 9, 142, 265 a 270, 360, 361, 363 a 366 y 378 del Código Procesal Penal, artículo 132 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, artículos 33 y 58 de la Ley Forestal y artículo 41 de la Ley de Suelos número 7770, al resolver este asunto y por mayoría de votos se acuerda: ABSOLVER DE TODA PENA A [Nombre1]. y [Nombre2]. por los delitos de Contaminación de Aguas para el Consumo Humano, Contaminación de Aguas para la Vida Silvestre e Invasión de Zonas de Protección, en perjuicio de los usuarios del agua de la Asada de la Perla de Guácimo y el medio ambiente, que le venían atribuyendo el Ministerio Público y la Procuraduría General de la República, por certeza, por prescripción y por indubio pro reo respectivamente. Se declara con lugar parcialmente la Acción por Reparación Civil interpuesta par la Procuraduría General de la República y se condena a [Nombre1]., [Nombre2]. Y TICO VERDE S.A. a pagar en forma solidaria al Estado os daños que por erosión produjeron en perjuicio del medio ambiente, condena que se hace en abstracto por lo que deberá acudir la interesada a la vía de ejecución de sentencia para que se establezca allí la magnitud del daño y el monto indemnizatorio correspondiente. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas por considerar que las partes han litigado de buena fe, por lo que cada una correrá con sus propios gastos. Se dispone además que a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia los condenados civiles deberán retirar en un plazo de dos años los cultivos de piña fuera del área de protección de quince metros de los cauces de dominio público' que en esta causa se han enumerado como 1, 3 Y 4 Y de cualquier otro de la misma naturaleza y condición, igualmente deberán permitir la regeneración natural de la flora correspondiente a estas zonas; deberán además los condenados civiles eliminar la siembra y surcos a favor de pendiente cambiándola por cultivo a contorno o de labranza mínima, apercibidos de que de no hacerlo se les seguirá causa por el delito de Desobediencia a la Autoridad; por un período de cuatro años el Minaet supervisará al menos una vez por año el cumplimiento de las obligaciones que aquí se imponen a [Nombre5] ., . y la empresa Tico Verde S.A. Firme la sentencia se comunicará lo correspondiente al Minaet para los efectos que aquí se han establecido. Mediante lectura notifíquese. ." (sic).
II.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento interpuso recurso de apelación el licenciado [Nombre3] como representante del Ministerio Público. III.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código de Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso de apelación.
IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.
Redacta la Jueza de Apelación de Sentencia [Nombre6] ; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
I.- El licenciado [Nombre3] , fiscal del Ministerio Público, en su recurso de apelación reclama que la sentencia incurrió en una errónea interpretación del artículo 58 inciso a) en relación con el artículo 33 inciso b) ambos de la Ley Forestal. Lo anterior porque alega que el Juzgador interpretó mal cuáles eran los requisitos para que se tuviera por acreditado el delito de invasión de zonas protegidas, concretamente al exigir que el área de protección fuera de bosque, y considerar atípica la conducta si en esos sitios, en el pasado, se ejerció alguna actividad distinta a la protección. Explica que este delito no requiere que se trate de una zona cubierta de bosque. Agrega que el artículo 33 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo no definió lo que se entiende por bosque en función de las áreas de protección, sino que se hizo con el afán de proteger los ecosistemas, de manera independiente al espacio territorial donde se ubiquen. Explica que el concepto de lo que es un bosque también fue mal aplicado en la sentencia, cuando se consideró que los imputados no habían hecho una tala de la vegetación del área protegida, sino que habían sembrado piña en un lugar que ya antes, otros dueños de la finca, habían dedicado al pastoreo y la siembra de macadamia. En su criterio, ni el hecho de que no hubiera un bosque, ni que otras personas tuvieran antes otro tipo de cultivo, eran factores suficientes para considerar que no se podía aplicar el delito previsto el numeral 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal. Considera que un correcto análisis de esa normativa habría permitido tener a los acusados como autores del delito que el Ministerio Público les atribuyó. Solicita se declare con lugar el recurso y se anule la sentencia, ordenándose el juicio de reenvío para nueva sustanciación. Criterio de la Defensa. El licenciado [Nombre4] , tanto por escrito recibido el 30 de abril de 2013 (ver folio 1160), como durante la audiencia oral que él solicitó, mantuvo su posición respecto a que se debe declarar sin lugar el recurso. Desde su perspectiva, el punto medular no es respecto a la tipicidad objetiva o no de los hechos, sino a la ausencia de los demás elementos de Teoría del Delito incluido el dolo. En particular, porque considera que sus defendidos no actuaron con dolo ni tampoco hubo vulneración al bien jurídico tutelado. Agrega que el tema principal de discusión siempre fue si el lugar en que cultivaron sus representados era o no una zona protegida. Explica que ellos, desde el año 2008 realizaron estudios técnicos para determinar que en el sitio lo que habían eran drenajes artificiales que no calificaban como un área de protección y que siempre tuvieron inspecciones de funcionarios de la SETENA y nunca fueron reprendidos por algún tipo de invasión. Más bien, hace ver que fueron los imputados y la empresa que representan, quienes se procuraron hacer investigaciones y estudios para llegar a la verdad de los hechos, de modo que nunca hubo ningún ánimo de contravenir el ordenamiento jurídico por lo que ellos no cometieron el delito por el que se les acusó de invasión de zonas protegidas. Durante la audiencia que se realizó ante este Tribunal, la Defensa Particular enfatizó que sus defendidos fueron acusados de muchos otros delitos y que solamente por uno se mantuvo la pretensión de la condena. Sin embargo, consideró que el tema no debe ser tratado como un problema de falta de demostración de los hechos, sino como una ausencia de conocimiento y voluntad de sus defendidos respecto a que hubieran sembrado piña en una zona protegida. Ofrece unas fotografías para demostrar que sus representados cumplieron con la orden que se dio en la sentencia, en el sentido de que debían retirar sus cultivos.
II.- Se declara sin lugar el recurso . Conviene hacer una determinación que resulta de interés, aunque la base por la que ha recurrido el Ministerio Público ha sido que consideró que la sentencia requirió de un elemento típico que no existe en el delito de invasión de zonas de protección, a saber, que se tratara de un bosque, ocurre que las razones por las que se dictó la absolutoria por esta delincuencia, no tienen que ver con que los Jueces hubieran requerido de ese elemento típico. Por el contrario, más parece que el recurrente ha acomodado su recurso a una subjetiva interpretación de qué fue lo que se dijo en el voto de mayoría que absolvió a ambos acusados. Precisamente esta situación se evidenció en la exposición oral que ambas partes hicieron ante este Tribunal puesto que, mientras el Ministerio Público alegaba que no era necesario que los imputados invadieran un bosque, sino que bastaba que se tratara de una zona protegida, la defensa hizo sus alegatos en el sentido de que no se demostró que sus defendidos actuaron con dolo porque, en su criterio, ellos nunca creyeron que estuvieran sembrando el cultivo de piña en un área protegida. Como se puede ver sin mayor dificultad, no se trata del mismo tema y esto ocurrió así porque el Ministerio Público formuló su recurso sin tomar en cuenta qué fue lo que realmente indicó la sentencia para absolver a ambos acusados del delito de invasión de zona protegida. Es importante, de todas formas, analizar qué implica esta conducta delictiva para cotejar esto con las razones dadas para haberse dictado una sentencia absolutoria en favor de los acusados por tal imputación. De acuerdo con el artículo 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal Nº 7575 la acción delictiva consiste en invadir "un área de conservación o protección, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, u otras áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal, cualquiera que sea el área ocupada..." Esto quiere decir que contempla al menos dos opciones de áreas que no pueden ser invadidas: o una de conservación o protección, o una de bosque o terreno sometido a régimen forestal. Es cierto que para este asunto no interesa la segunda posibilidad, sino solamente el que se tratara de un área de conservación o protección, porque así fue como lo acusó la Fiscalía (ver folio 773 vuelto). Bajo esta tesitura, no interesaba que el lugar tuviera bosque, entendido como lo define el artículo 3 de esta misma ley, o sea: "Ecosistema nativo o autóctono, intervenido o no, regenerado por sucesión natural u otras técnicas forestales, que ocupa una superficie de dos o mas hectáreas, caracterizada por la presencia de árboles maduros de diferentes edades, especies y porte variado". Por el contrario, lo que interesaba era si existía o no una zona de conservación o protección, tal y como se define en el artículo 33 de la ley en comentario y que preve, a su vez, varias posibilidades, a saber: "a) Las áreas que bordeen nacientes permanentes, definidas en un radio de cien metros medidos de modo horizontal. b) Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado. c) Una zona de cincuenta metros medida horizontalmente en las riberas de los lagos y embalses naturales y en los lagos o embalses artificiales construidos por el Estado y sus instituciones. Se exceptúan los lagos y embalses artificiales privados. d) Las áreas de recarga y los acuíferos de los manantiales, cuyos límites serán determinados por los órganos competentes establecidos en el reglamento de esta ley." La determinación probatoria que interesaba para este caso, entonces, no era si los imputados invadieron una zona de bosque sino, más bien, si lo hicieron en un lugar en que hubieran, o nacientes permanentes de agua, en riberas de un río, quebradas o arroyos, riberas de un lago, embalses naturales o lagos artificiales construidos por el Estado, o en un área de recarga o acuífero de algún manantial. Bajo tal consideración, la sentencia hizo lo correcto al analizar la prueba documental, con los distintos informes técnicos, así como los testimonios que le permitieron establecer que no se demostró que en la finca existieran "nacientes o cauces de domino público diversos de la Quebrada Cartarata y la Leona, que tuvieran que debieran proteger (sic) en las áreas que ordena la ley forestal" (sic) (ver folio 800). Aunque es probable que el reclamo que presenta la Fiscalía haya sido porque, más adelante la sentencia agrega otro argumento: "ya para el año 2000, unos cuatro años antes de que Tico Verde S.A. adquiriera la finca, ya en lo que el ingeniero [Nombre7] . "nacientes", que hoy sabemos que no lo son, no existía cobertura boscosa" (ver folio 800 vuelto). Pero resulta que la sentencia no puede analizarse en forma aislada sino que es un conjunto de razonamientos y, de esta manera resulta que luego se dice lo siguiente: "Sin embargo por voto de mayoría de los co jueces... llegamos a la conclusión de que si bien es cierto al estar estos causes desprovistos de la vegetación en zona de protección y la piña sembrada en parte dentro de lo que correspondería a la citada zona de protección, lo cual nos pondría a decir que se trata de una conducta típica y no se encontró ni indicó causa de justificación, NO ES POSIBLE ATRIBUIR RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL A LOS IMPUTADOS ello por cuanto el tipo penal aplicable, el artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal es un tipo doloso, que requiere de conocimiento y voluntad de realizar la conducta descrita en la norma...y esto NO SE HA ACREDITADO" (el subrayado se suple, ver folios 802 vuelto y 803). Lo transcrito quiere decir, que la absolutoria no fue porque faltaran un elemento normativo del tipo, a saber, ausencia de bosque, sino porque dudaron de que los acusados actuaran con el dolo requerido para este delito, es decir, el conocimiento de que se trataba de una zona protegida y la voluntad de invadirla. Tanto fue así, que el voto de mayoría agrega lo siguiente: "Es por lo dicho que los jueces que concurrimos al voto de mayoría concluimos que la plantación de piña dentro de la zona protectora de algunos de los cauces internos sin nombre de la finca de Tico Verde S.A. pudo originarse en que estas áreas ya habían sido invadidas por los anteriores dueños de la finca, y es por ello que al no tener la certeza de que la misma obedeciera a una conducta dolosa como lo exige el tipo penal del artículo 58... tengamos finalmente por no típica la misma; incluso porque no podría ya en la categoría de la culpabilidad tratarse de un error de prohibición no vencible dadas las circunstancias, ya que los mismos al día de hoy sostienen que se tratan de cauces artificiales y hasta el día de hoy este aspecto no había sido definido de manera plena" (ver folio 803 vuelto). Es importante tomar en cuenta que en el nivel de la tipicidad, de acuerdo con la Teoría del Delito de Tipo Compejo, tanto se deben presentar los elementos objetivos del tipo (según la descripción de que se trate) como el elemento subjetivo, es decir, el dolo. Quiere decir que ni el recurrente ni la defensa aplicaron correctamente estos criterios. El primero porque no ponderó que la sentencia lo que estaba excluyendo era la tipicidad subjetiva, o sea el dolo y, el segundo, porque hizo referencia a un problema de ausencia de culpabilidad, cuando estaba aludiendo a la falta de conocimiento y voluntad de sus defendidos en invadir una zona que conocieran era protegida. Véase que la decisión de absolverlos, por falta de la demostración del dolo, no impidió que la sentencia tomara la determinación de obligar a los imputados, tanto a reparar en abstracto los daños que hubieran causado, como a que, una vez firme la sentencia, los condenados civiles tengan que retirar los cultivos de piña fuera del área de protección (ver folio 819 vuelto). Aspecto que el propio abogado de la defensa trajo a colación durante la audiencia, al decir que ya sus defendidos iniciaron el retiro de este cultivo, sin que resulte necesario o pertinente, para esta resolución, admitir las fotografías que también presentó en ese acto. En definitiva, no se le puede dar la razón al recurrente cuando ha argumentado que la sentencia se equivocó en la aplicación de la normativa referida al delito de invasión de zona protegida, porque no es cierto que los Juzgadores hubiesen requerido elementos típicos que no venían al caso, como la ausencia de un bosque si, en definitiva, la absolutoria se debió a que no pudieron tener por demostrado que los acusados actuaran con dolo ya que por los múltiples estudios que se practicaron creyeron que no era una zona protegida lo que podía haber implicado que actuaran bajo error de tipo invencible, en la medida que esos estudios técnicos hubieran concluido en tal sentido. Por cierto, esta Cámara, tampoco aprecia ningún error en el análisis probatorio que llevó a la mayoría del Tribunal a tal determinación, por el contrario, se observa que tal conclusión fue bien fundamentada en la globalidad de la prueba que se aportó y que no ha sido refutada por el Ministerio Público. En consecuencia de todo lo expuesto, lo que procede es declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación que ha sido interpuesto por la Fiscalía.
POR TANTO:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación. NOTIFÍQUESE.
Lilliana García Vargas Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Ingrid Estrada Venegas Juezas de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Imputado : A.
Ofendido : Asociación ambiental del Trópico Húmedo Delito : Contaminación de aguas AVARGASQ
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