Acquittal for atypicality in plantation timber transportAbsolución por atipicidad en transporte de madera de plantación

*120017460412PE* VOTE No. 40-13 SENTENCE APPEALS COURT OF GUANACASTE, Santa Cruz, at fourteen hours fifty minutes on the nineteenth of February two thousand thirteen.

Appeal (Recurso de apelación) filed in the present case against [Nombre1], [...], case pursued for the crime of ILLEGAL TRANSPORT OF TIMBER, to the detriment of the LEY FORESTAL. The Court is composed of Judge Roy Antonio Badilla Rojas and Judges Ana Cecilia Salazar Quirós and Cynthia Dumani Stradtmann. Appearing for the appeal, attorney [Nombre2], Assistant Environmental Prosecutor of the Public Ministry. Attorney [Nombre3] as private defense counsel for the accused.

WHEREAS

1. By judgment number 67-12, at fifteen hours two minutes on the sixteenth of October two thousand twelve, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz seat, resolved: "POR TANTO: In accordance with the foregoing and Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, Articles 10, 11 subsection 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 142, 184, 265, 266, 267, 360, 366, of the Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 45, Criminal Code, Articles 27, 28, 29, 42, 56, 63, of the Ley Forestal, [Nombre1] is ACQUITTED due to atypicality of ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the Crime of Illegal Transport of Timber that was being attributed to him to the detriment of the Ley Forestal, any precautionary measure pending against him shall cease, the costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the State, the return is ordered both of the vehicle [Nombre4] [Placa1] and of the timber consisting of three hundred twenty-eight pieces of TEAK, by reading the parties are notified. Lic. Miguel Porras Cascante Trial Judge.

2. Against the preceding pronouncement, attorney [Nombre2], Assistant Environmental Prosecutor of the Public Ministry, filed an appeal (recurso de apelación).

3. Having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. In the proceedings, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Judge [Nombre5] and,

CONSIDERING

I.- FIRST: “VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF SOUND CRITICAL JUDGMENT IN THE REASONING OF THE JUDGMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE”: The Court did not adequately assess the extensive evidence provided which demonstrated that plantation timber was moved without the respective documentation. The omission concerned the contribution of witnesses [Nombre6] and [Nombre7], who are professionals in the field. Furthermore, with the contribution of officer M of the Public Force, it can be established that the accused, at the time of his arrest, did not carry any documentation, thereby configuring the crime charged.

II.- SECOND: “DISAGREEMENT WITH THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION DUE TO ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 28, 56 AND 63 OF THE LEY FORESTAL IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 5 OF DECRETO EJECUTIVO 309108 OF DECEMBER 4, 2002, IN DISREGARD OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 363 SUBSECTIONS B AND D OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.” The Trial Court erroneously justifies its decision on an alleged contradiction between Articles 28 and 56 of the Ley Forestal, arguing with certainty that the accused's action is atypical. The appellant highlights that an inadequate interpretation is made of numerals 28, 56 and 63 of the Ley Forestal, since the latter two are articles that complement each other, but an accusation cannot be sustained based on numeral 28 of that same law, because it contains exceptions to the requirement of a permit for cutting (corta), transport, and industrialization, aspects that make its application incompatible with the norms already indicated. For the Public Ministry, no such contradiction exists; rather, cases arise under Article 56 in relation to Article 63 when a decision is made to transport without having the necessary guides when dealing with timber from a forest or plantation. It was determined in the adversarial proceedings that the accused was transporting teak logs in a quantity of 328 logs, without having the respective documentation, so a clear objective element is determined, an aspect that was supported by the declaration of officer [Nombre8].G. who explained this during the trial phase. He affirms that the contrasted norms do not contradict each other; while numeral 28 speaks of a permit, 56 mentions respective documentation, a situation that does not oppose them or make them mutually exclusive. He continues arguing that testimonial evidence was provided at trial clarifying that the permit from the State Forestry Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado) is one thing, and the respective documentation, which legitimizes timber transport, such as the certificate of origin and the transport guide, is another. The Prosecutor's Office argues that it demonstrated the existence of the objective elements of the criminal offense classification contained in Article 56, but the judge accepted the defense's thesis, which was solely based on the argument that plantation timber does not require a permit according to Article 28. According to this thesis, no document whatsoever would need to be carried, which would clearly make it impossible to prosecute any forestry trafficking (trasiego forestal). Requests that the proposed grounds be granted, the contested judgment be annulled, and the corresponding new trial be ordered. (See appeal on folios 47 to 51).

III.- THIRD: The defense, for its part, requests that the appeal be dismissed. It reiterates the arguments put forward in the concluding phase of the adversarial proceedings, alleging that the accused had the transport guide that was provided the day after his arrest, and likewise had the certificate of origin that the seized pieces came from a forest plantation (plantación forestal). Indicates that this aspect was reinforced by the declaration of engineer [Nombre6], an official of the Minaet, who testified at trial and also submitted a report which appears on folio 37 onward, called "valuation" (avalúo), a document that allows establishing that the timber seized from the accused measured 27 centimeters, a measurement that does not meet the parameter of Article 42 of the same law, which grants that quality to any piece that is equal to or greater than 29 centimeters, reiterating that for that type of timber, originating from a plantation, no transport permit is required. Maintains that it is not possible to apply numeral 62 because this norm applies to the breach of a forest plan and what is charged against his client is timber transport. Requests that the appeal be dismissed and the contested judgment be affirmed. (See brief on folios 55 to 63).

IV.Regarding the disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. This ground is dismissed. The foregoing because the contested judgment does indeed analyze the evidence that the appealing Prosecutor claims was omitted. Reviewed the video recording of the judgment, starting at time sequence 15:34:05, the substantive analysis begins with the introductory considerations made by the First Instance Judge. More precisely starting at time sequence 15:40:04, the Judge analyzes the testimonial contributions. First, he mentions the summary of [Nombre6] who stated: "... he is a technician specialized in forestry matters, that when speaking of the specific case, it concerned a plantation, that that plantation, that farm, was a forest plantation (plantación forestal) and was cataloged as such, from what he says it can be deduced thus, because he says he is a Forest Regent (Regente Forestal), he is knowledgeable in the field, in the forest law and its regulation (reglamento), so he indicates that what corresponds to him to verify is that there is a regent contract, that there is a whole forest study regarding what is being worked on there on the farm and that the permits are established, permits that are given solely and exclusively by a forest regent. We see that everything else he analyzes there is about the teak species, about the transport permits that for the purposes would have some meaning and validity for another type of transport that is not the one being analyzed here. Because for the purposes here we are talking about forest plantations (plantaciones forestales), which Article 28 establishes thus, forest plantations, which contravenes Article 56 of that same special norm. It is not the witnesses' fault for coming here and reporting this situation; they are adapted to a procedure established by a special norm and a regulation." until 15:42:40. Then he continues with the description of the declaration of [Nombre9].., "who is an officer of the public force and describes the entire operation they conduct regarding the detention of you and 328 logs of teak species timber, they follow the protocol, inform the prosecutor, the routine checks and roadblocks that the Public Force carries out, and the documentation; if it is vehicle checks, they request the documentation; if it is in this matter, they request the timber transport guide, information also provided by [Nombre7] himself, who is the forest regent, who issues the transport guides and provided a general overview of what he does. He also speaks of plantations, says I was hired by some people, the plantation is large. It required approximately 150 guides, he speaks of plantations in general and that for this type of timber a guide was required." He finishes this summary at time sequence 15:46:40. Highlighted in that section is a general analysis by the judge of each witness for the prosecution, emphasizing the work each witness carries out in this investigation, so it is untrue when it is stated in this appeal that the judgment is silent on this matter. The problem is that the judge does not reach the conclusions that the accusing entity intended. For the judge of first instance, the witnesses' contributions are not subject to doubt, since each witness testifies about their area of knowledge: one as a forestry engineer (S), who was tasked with inspecting the seized timber and renders a report called "valuation" (avalúo), appearing from folio 37. Another as an officer of the public force (B) who describes the protocol followed in the present case and how the accused and the seized items were placed at the disposal of the respective authority. The last witness for the prosecution was the forest regent himself, who highlights the existence of a forest management plan in this case and that under his responsibility, the number of transport guides estimated useful for the development of that plan had been previously issued. For the judge, these witnesses allow establishing the existence of the timber and that the accused was responsible for its transport when he was arrested and that he did not carry the transport guide, but they do not resolve the contradiction that, in his judgment, arises. The witnesses do coincide that it is common for the guide to be used for transport, but this mention cannot substitute the existence of the express norm regarding an exception contained in numeral 28 of Law 7575, an aspect he develops later in his judgment. In short, the judge analyzes the contribution of each witness and highlights their relevant aspects, to then determine if the legal assumptions applicable to the case under study can be inferred from the information provided by the deponents. The Judge does assess the testimonial evidence in its entirety, obtaining elements to resolve the case presented to him, thereby making this claim inadmissible.

V.Regarding the erroneous interpretation of the applicable norm. This ground is dismissed. The contested judgment in relation to this aspect, starting at time sequence 15:43:46 indicates: "an analysis must be made of what is established by Article 28 in relation to Article 56, both of the forest law, in one it speaks of an infraction of the forest law and in the other of an exception to the timber cutting permit, and the fact is that despite saying cutting permit, it speaks of the transport of timber, and it is that verb "to transport" which leads me to determine that you cannot be held guilty in this crime and for that reason you must be acquitted." He finishes this initial approach at time sequence 15:47:27. Even though the idea developed by the trial judge is quite succinct, he is correct in his essential approach. The law must be interpreted comprehensively as a whole; in this case, Article 56 of the forestry norm establishes the infraction of the Ley Forestal when it comes to moving timber by stating: "ARTICLE 56.- Movement of timber Timber in logs (trozas), squared (escuadrada) or sawn (aserrada) from a forest or plantation may not be moved if the respective documentation is not available." As can be seen, this norm constitutes the criminal offense classification in relation to the movement of timber, the objective elements being timber in log, both squared and sawn form. These are the descriptive elements of the offense classification, while the normative elements establish movement without having the respective documentation; that requirement must be interpreted by the operator in accordance with the decrees and regulations (decretos y reglamentos) of the matter. These objective elements of the offense classification constitute the factual assumption of the norm. The complement to that norm, i.e., the legal consequence, is provided in numeral 63 of the same legal body. The problem with that body of norms is that it requires evaluating the exception in numeral 28, which, in relevant part, indicates: "ARTICLE 28.- Exception to cutting permit Forest plantations, including agroforestry systems and individually planted trees and their products, shall not require a permit for cutting (corta), transport, industrialization, or export. However, in cases where, prior to the entry into force of this law, a forest contract exists, signed with the State to receive Certificados de Abono Forestal or deductions from income tax, cutting must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the management plan approved by the State Forestry Administration." (The italics and underlining are added). For this Chamber, it is necessary to analyze this norm, because although it is true that it is an exception established initially for forest cutting without a permit, the legislative error lies in including the word "transport," because it extends the lack of a permit to the transport of plantation timber. The witnesses consistently indicated the need for a transport guide for moving timber, but given the exception indicated in numeral 28, that guide would be necessary for cases falling outside the exception of the aforementioned numeral 28, since the transport mentioned in that norm is a modality of timber movement, which is what is penalized by numeral 56. At this point, it is easy to understand that there is no erroneous interpretation of the applicable norm, as the appellant wants to suggest, but rather a poor normative construction by the legislator that confuses the correct or proper application of the norms. On the other hand, despite not having been analyzed by the first instance judge, it was proposed by the defense counsel, and it is the argument of lack of typical elements due to the following. Article 56 penalizes the movement of logs without having the respective documentation and does not specify what that documentation is. The term log (troza), for its precision, must be complemented with the scope of numeral 42 of the same forest law, which indicates: "ARTICLE 42.- Forest tax A general forest tax of three percent (3%) is established on the market transfer value of timber in logs, which shall be determined by the State Forestry Administration. Payment of the tax shall be made in accordance with the stipulations of Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, and its amendments. Timber in logs (madera en troza) shall be understood to mean the section of the tree free of branches, with a diameter greater than or equal to 29 centimeters at the thinner end. The taxable event of the created tax shall be considered at the time of the primary industrialization of the timber or, in the case of imported timber, the tax must be paid at customs according to the real value. Timber shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax, established in Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, less three percentage points. Natural or legal persons, owners of primary timber industrialization centers, are obliged to comply with the payment of this tribute." (The italics are added) Logs of timber must be understood as any piece whose diameter at its thinner end exceeds 29 centimeters. Based on the valuation (avalúo) on folio 37, prepared by the witness for the prosecution [Nombre6], the pieces seized from the accused had an average diameter of 27 centimeters, meaning they fall below the average measurement to be considered logs of timber under the forest law, so they constituted 328 pieces of timber, not logs, falling outside the typical characterization contemplated in numeral 56 of the aforementioned forest law. This is an aspect that was not considered by the judge to determine the atypicality of the conduct, an obligation that the Public Ministry also omitted at the time of formulating its accusation. For these reasons, the claim must be rejected, as well as the present appeal in all its respects.

POR TANTO

The present appeal is dismissed in all its respects. Let it be notified.

ROY ANTONIO BADILLA ROJAS ANA CECILIA SALAZAR QUIRÓS [Nombre10] APPEAL JUDGES Judicial Circuit of Santa Cruz, [Dirección1], Telephones: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Email: [...]

Miguel Porras Cascante Trial Judge.

2. The attorney [Name2], Assistant Environmental Prosecutor of the Public Ministry, filed an appeal against the above ruling.

3. Having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court took up the issues raised in the appeal.

4. The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Name5] and, **CONSIDERANDO** **I.- FIRST:** **“VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF SOUND CRITICISM IN THE REASONING OF THE JUDGMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE”**: The Court did not adequately assess the ample evidence presented, which demonstrated that plantation wood was mobilized without the respective documentation; the omission concerned the statements of witnesses [Name6] and [Name7], who are professionals in the field; additionally, with the statement of Public Force officer M, it can be established that the accused was not carrying any documentation at the time of arrest, thus configuring the charged offense.

**II.- SECOND: “DISAGREEMENT WITH THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION DUE TO ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 28, 56, AND 63 OF THE LEY FORESTAL IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 5 OF DECRETO EJECUTIVO 309108 OF DECEMBER 4, 2002, IN DISREGARD OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 363 SUBSECTIONS B AND D OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.”** The Court erroneously justifies its decision on an alleged contradiction between articles 28 and 56 of the Ley Forestal, arguing with certainty that the defendant's action is atypical. The appellant highlights that an inappropriate interpretation is made of articles 28, 56, and 63 of the Ley Forestal, given that the latter two are articles that complement each other, but an accusation cannot be sustained based on article 28 of that same law, because it contains exceptions to the requirement for a logging, transportation, and industrialization permit, aspects that make its application incompatible with the previously indicated articles. For the Public Ministry, no such contradiction exists; rather, the cases of article 56 in relation to article 63 arise when one decides to transport without the necessary guides in the case of wood from a forest or plantation. It was determined in the adversarial proceedings that the accused was transporting teak wood logs in a quantity of 328 logs, without having the respective documentation, thereby clearly establishing an objective element, an aspect that was supported by the statement of officer [Name8].G., who explained this during the trial phase. The appellant affirms that the contrasted articles do not contradict each other; while article 28 speaks of a permit, article 56 mentions respective documentation, a situation that does not set them against each other nor make them mutually exclusive. The appellant continues arguing that testimonial evidence was presented at trial clarifying that the permit from the State Forest Administration is one thing, and the respective documentation that legitimizes the transportation of the wood, such as the certificate of origin and the transportation guide, is another. The Prosecutor's Office argues that it demonstrated the existence of the objective elements of the criminal definition contained in article 56, but the judge accepted the defense's thesis, which was based solely on the argument that plantation wood does not require a permit according to article 28. Under this thesis, no documentation would need to be carried, which would clearly make it impossible to pursue any forest trafficking. It requests that the proposed grounds be granted, the contested judgment be annulled, and the corresponding new trial be ordered. (See appeal on folios 47 to 51).

**III.- THIRD:** The defense, for its part, requests that the appeal be dismissed. It reiterates the arguments put forth in the concluding phase of the adversarial proceedings, alleging that the accused had the transportation guide that was presented the day after his arrest; likewise, he had the certificate of origin showing that the seized pieces came from a forest plantation. It indicates that this aspect was reinforced by the statement of engineer [Name6], an official of the Minaet, who testified at trial and also submitted a report which appears starting on folio 37, called "appraisal (avalúo)", a document that allows establishing that the wood seized from the accused had a measurement of 27 centimeters, a measurement that does not meet the parameter of article 42 of the same law, which grants that classification to any piece that is equal to or greater than 29 centimeters, reiterating that for that type of wood, coming from a plantation, no transportation permit is required. It maintains that it is not possible to apply article 62 because this regulation is for the breach of a forest plan and what is accused against its client is wood transportation. It requests that the appeal be dismissed and the contested sentence be confirmed. (See document on folios 55 to 63).

**IV.** Regarding the disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. **The ground is dismissed.** This is because the contested judgment does include an analysis of the evidence that the appealing Prosecutor alleges was omitted. A review of the audiovisual record of the judgment, starting at the time sequence 15:34:05, shows the substantive analysis begins with the introductory considerations made by the first-instance judge. More precisely, starting at the time sequence 15:40:04, the judge analyzes the testimonial evidence. First, he mentions the summary of [Name6], who stated: "... is a technician specialized in forest matters, that when the specific case was discussed, it was a plantation, that that farm was a forest plantation and was cataloged as such, from what he says it can be deduced, because he says he is a Forest Regent (Regente Forestal), he is knowledgeable in the field, in the forest law and the regulation, so he indicates that his role is to verify that there is a regency contract, that there is a complete forest study regarding what is being worked on at the farm, and that the permits are established, permits given solely and exclusively by a forest regent. We see that everything else he analyzes there is about the teak species, about the transportation permits which, for these purposes, would have some meaning and validity for another type of transportation that is not the one being analyzed here. Because for these purposes, we are talking about forest plantations, as article 28 establishes, forest plantations, which contradicts article 56 of that same special regulation. It is not the witnesses' fault to come here and report this situation; they are adapted to a procedure established by a special regulation and a regulation." up to 15:42:40. He then continues with the description of the statement of [Name9]... ", "who is a public force officer and describes the entire operation they carried out for the arrest of you and 328 logs of teak wood, they follow the protocol, inform the prosecutor, the usual activities of the operations and checkpoints conducted by the Public Force, and the documentation; if it is a vehicle checkpoint, they request documentation; if it is in this matter, they request the wood transportation guide, information also provided by [Name7] himself, who is the forest regent, who issues the transportation guides and gives a general overview of what he does. He also speaks of plantations, says I was hired by some people, the plantation is large. Approximately 150 guides were needed, he speaks of plantations in general and that for this type of wood a guide was required." This summary concludes up to the time sequence 15:46:40. Highlighted in this section is a general analysis by the judge of each witness for the prosecution, emphasizing the work each witness performed in this investigation, so it is untrue to state in the present appeal that the judgment is silent on this matter. The issue is that the judge does not reach the conclusions that the prosecuting entity sought. For the first-instance judge, the testimony of the witnesses is not in doubt, since each witness testifies about their area of knowledge: one as a forest engineer (S), who was responsible for inspecting the seized wood and renders a report called "appraisal (avalúo)", which appears starting on folio 37; another as a public force officer (M), who describes the protocol followed in the present case and how the accused and the seized goods were placed at the disposal of the respective authority; the last witness for the prosecution was the forest regent himself, who highlights the existence of a forest management plan (plan de manejo forestal) in this case and that, under his charge, the number of transportation guides estimated useful for the development of that plan were issued beforehand. For the judge, these witnesses allow establishing the existence of the wood and that the accused was in charge of its transportation when he was detained, and that he was not carrying the transportation guide, but they do not resolve the contradiction that, in his judgment, arises. The witnesses do agree that the guide is commonly used for transportation, but this mention cannot substitute the existence of the express regulation regarding an exception contained in article 28 of Law 7575, an aspect he develops later in his judgment. In short, the judge analyzes the testimony of each witness and highlights their relevant aspects, to then establish whether the legal assumptions applicable to the case under study can be inferred from the information provided by the deponents. The Judge does assess the testimonial evidence in its entirety, obtaining elements to resolve the case presented to him, thereby making this claim unmerited.

**V.** Regarding the erroneous interpretation of the applicable regulations. **The ground is dismissed.** The contested judgment, in relation to this aspect, starting at the time sequence 15:43:46, indicates: "an analysis must be made of what article 28 establishes in relation to article 56, both of the forest law; one speaks of an infraction of the forest law and the other of an exception to the logging permit, and it is that even though it says logging permit, it speaks of the transportation of the wood, and it is that the verb 'transport' is what leads me to determine that I cannot establish guilt on you in this crime, and for that reason you must be acquitted." This initial argument concludes at the time sequence 15:47:27. Even though the idea developed by the trial judge is very brief, his essential argument is correct. The law must be interpreted in an integrated manner as a whole; in this case, article 56 of the forest regulation establishes the infraction of the Ley Forestal when it concerns the mobilization of wood by stating: "ARTICLE 56.- Wood mobilization Wood in logs, squared or sawn, from forest or plantation, may not be mobilized without the respective documentation." As can be appreciated, this regulation constitutes the criminal definition related to wood mobilization, the objective elements being log wood, both squared and sawn. These are the descriptive elements of the criminal definition, while the normative elements establish mobilization without the respective documentation; this requirement must be interpreted by the operator according to the decrees and regulations on the matter. These objective elements of the criminal definition constitute the factual premise of the regulation. The complement of that regulation, i.e., the legal consequence, is provided in article 63 of the same legal body. The problem with this legal body is that it requires assessing the exception in article 28, which, as relevant, states: "ARTICLE 28.- Exception to logging permit Forest plantations, including agroforestry systems and individually planted trees and their products, shall not require a logging, transportation, industrialization, or export permit. However, in cases where, before this law enters into force, a forest contract exists, signed with the State to receive Certificates of Forest Payment (Certificados de Abono Forestal) or income tax deductions, the logging must be carried out in accordance with what is established in the management plan approved by the State Forest Administration." (Italics and underlining supplied). For this Chamber, it is necessary to analyze this regulation, because even though it is an exception established initially for forest logging without a permit, the legislative error lies in including the word "transportation," because it extends the lack of a permit to the transportation of plantation wood. The witnesses consistently indicated the need for a transportation guide for wood transfer, but in view of the exception indicated in article 28, that guide would be necessary for cases that fall outside the exception of the already mentioned article 28, since the transportation mentioned by that regulation is a modality of wood mobilization, which is what is penalized by article 56. On this point, it is easy to understand that there is no erroneous interpretation of the applicable regulations, as the appellant attempts to suggest, but rather a very poor regulatory construction by the legislature that confuses the correct or proper application of the regulations. On the other hand, despite not having been analyzed by the first-instance judge, an argument proposed by the defender concerns the lack of typical elements for the following reason. Article 56 penalizes the mobilization of logs (trozas) without the respective documentation and does not specify what that documentation is. The term log (troza), for precision, must be complemented with the scope of article 42 of the same forest law, which indicates: "ARTICLE 42.- Forest tax A general forest tax of three percent (3%) is established on the transfer value in the market of log wood, which shall be determined by the State Forest Administration. The tax payment shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, and its amendments. Log wood shall be understood as the section of the tree free of branches, with a diameter greater than or equal to 29 centimeters at the thinner end. The taxable event of the created tax shall be considered to occur at the moment of primary industrialization of the wood, or, in the case of imported wood, the tax must be paid at customs according to the actual value. Wood shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax established in Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, less three percentage points. Natural or legal persons who own primary wood industrialization centers are obliged to comply with the payment of this tribute." (Italics supplied) Wood logs (trozas de madera) must be understood as any piece whose diameter at its thinner end is greater than 29 centimeters. Considering the appraisal (avalúo) on folio 37, prepared by the prosecution witness [Name6], the pieces seized from the accused had an average diameter of 27 centimeters, meaning they are below the average measurement to be considered a wood log (troza de madera) under the forest law, thus constituting 328 pieces of wood, not logs, falling outside the typical classification contemplated by article 56 of the aforementioned forest law. This is an aspect that was not considered by the judge to determine the atypicality of the conduct, an obligation that the Public Ministry also omitted at the time of formulating its accusation.

For these reasons the claim must be rejected, as must the present appeal in all its aspects.

**POR TANTO** The present appeal is declared without merit in all its aspects. Notify.

**ROY ANTONIO BADILLA ROJAS** **ANA CECILIA SALAZAR QUIRÓS [Nombre10]** **APPEAL JUDGES OF SENTENCE** It requests that the appeal be dismissed and the contested judgment be affirmed. (See brief on folios 55 to 63).

**IV.** Regarding the disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. *The ground is dismissed.* The foregoing is because the contested judgment does include an analysis of the evidence that the appealing Prosecutor alleges was omitted. Upon review of the audiovisual recording of the ruling, starting at time sequence 15:34:05, the substantive analysis begins with the introductory considerations made by the first-instance Judge. More precisely, starting at time sequence 15:40:04, the Judge analyzes the testimonial contributions. First, he mentions the summary of [Name6], who stated: "...he is a technician specialized in forestry matters, that when discussing the specific case, it was about plantation, that that plantation, that farm was a forestry plantation and was cataloged as such, from what he says it can be deduced, because he says he is a Forest Regent (Regente Forestal), is knowledgeable in the matter, in the Ley Forestal and the regulation, so he indicates that what is his responsibility is to verify that there is a regent contract, that there is a complete forestry study regarding what is being worked on there on the farm and that the permits are established, permits that are given solely and exclusively by a forest regent. We see that everything else he goes on to analyze there is about the teak species, about the transport permits that for these purposes would have some meaning and some validity for another type of transport that is not the one being analyzed here. Because for these purposes, we are talking about forestry plantations, as established in Article 28, forestry plantations, which contravenes Article 56 of that same special norm. It is not the fault of the witnesses to come here and report this situation; they are adapted to a procedure, which they have established by a special norm and a regulation." up to 15:42:40. He then continues with the description of the statement of [Name9]..."who is a public force officer and describes the entire operation that they carry out regarding your detention and 328 logs of teak wood, they follow the protocol, inform the prosecutor, the usual operations and checkpoints that the Public Force carries out, and the documentation, if it is vehicle checkpoints they ask for documentation, if it is in this matter they ask for the wood transport guide, information that [Name7] also gives, who is the forest regent, is the one who gives the transport guides and a general outline of what he does. He also speaks of plantations, says I was hired by some people, the plantation is large. It required about 150 guides approximately, he speaks of plantations in general and that for this type of wood a guide was needed." He finishes this summary up to time sequence 15:46:40. In this section, a general analysis by the judge of each prosecution witness stands out, highlighting the work that each witness performs in this investigation, so it is untrue when it is affirmed in this appeal that the judgment is silent on the matter. The problem is that the judge does not reach the conclusions that the prosecuting entity sought. For the first-instance judge, the contribution of the witnesses is not in doubt, since each witness testifies about their area of knowledge, one as a forestry engineer (S), whose responsibility it was to inspect the seized wood and renders a report called "appraisal (avalúo)", which appears starting on folio 37. Another as a public force officer (M) who describes the protocol followed in the present case and how the accused and the seized goods were placed at the disposal of the respective authority. The last prosecution witness was the forest regent himself, who highlights the existence of a forest management plan (plan de manejo forestal) in this case and that, under his responsibility, the number of transport guides estimated useful for the development of that plan were issued beforehand. For the judge, these witnesses allow establishing the existence of the wood and that the defendant was in charge of its transport when he was detained and that he did not carry the transport guide, but they do not resolve the contradiction that, in his opinion, is presented. The witnesses do agree that for transport, it is common to use the guide, but this mention cannot substitute the existence of the express norm regarding an exception contained in numeral 28 of Ley 7575, an aspect he develops later in his judgment. In short, the judge analyzes the contribution of each witness and highlights the relevant aspects of their testimonies, to later establish whether from the information provided by the deponents, the applicable legal assumptions for the case under study are inferred. The Judge does assess the testimonial evidence in its entirety, obtaining elements to resolve the case presented to him, making this claim therefore inadmissible.

**V.** Regarding the erroneous interpretation of the applicable regulations. *The ground is dismissed.* The contested judgment, in relation to this aspect, starting at time sequence 15:43:46 indicates: "an analysis must be made of what Article 28 establishes in relation to Article 56, both of the Ley Forestal; one speaks of an infraction of the Ley Forestal and the other of an exception to the felling permit (permiso de corta), and it is that even though it says felling permit, it speaks of the transport of wood, and it is that verb 'to transport' is what leads me to determine that you cannot be assigned blame in this crime and therefore you must be acquitted." He finishes this initial approach at time sequence 15:47:27. Even though the idea developed by the first-instance judge is very brief, he is correct in his essential approach. The law must be interpreted integrally as a whole; in this case, Article 56 of the forestry regulations establishes the infraction of the Ley Forestal when it comes to mobilizing wood by stating: "ARTICLE 56.- Wood mobilization No wood may be mobilized in logs (troza), squared nor sawn, coming from forest or plantation, without the respective documentation." As can be appreciated, this norm constitutes the criminal offense in relation to wood mobilization, the objective elements being wood in log form, both squared and sawn. These are the descriptive elements of the offense type, while the normative elements establish mobilization without the respective documentation; that requirement must be interpreted by the operator according to the decrees and regulations on the matter. These objective elements of the offense type constitute the factual assumption of the norm. The complement of that norm, that is, the legal consequence, is provided for in numeral 63 of the same legal body. The problem with this normative body is that it requires assessing the exception of numeral 28, which in the part that is of interest indicates: "ARTICLE 28.- Felling permit exemption Forestry plantations, including agroforestry systems and individually planted trees and their products, shall not require a felling, transport, industrialization, or export permit. However, in cases where before this law comes into effect there exists a forestry contract signed with the State to receive Certificados de Abono Forestal or income tax deduction, the felling must be carried out in accordance with what is established in the management plan approved by the Administración Forestal del Estado." (Italics and underlining supplied). For this Chamber, it is necessary to analyze this norm, because although it is true that it is an exemption established, initially, for forestry felling without a permit, the legislative error lies in including the word "transport," because it extends the lack of permit to the transport of plantation wood. The witnesses consistently indicated the need for the transport guide for moving wood, but attending to the exception indicated in numeral 28, that guide would be necessary for cases that are outside the exception of the already indicated numeral 28, since that transport mentioned in the referred norm is a modality of wood mobilization, which is what is penalized by numeral 56. At this point, it is easy to understand that there is no erroneous interpretation of the applicable regulations, as the appellant wishes to make it seem, but rather a poorly constructed regulation by the legislator that confuses the correct or due application of the norms. On the other hand, despite not having been analyzed by the first-instance judge, it was proposed by the defender, it is the argument of the lack of typical offence elements for the following reason. Article 56 penalizes the mobilization of logs without the respective documentation and does not indicate what that documentation is. The term log (troza), for its precision, must be complemented with the scope of numeral 42 of the same Ley Forestal which indicates: "ARTICLE 42.- Forestry tax A general forestry tax of three percent (3%) is established on the market transfer value of wood in logs (troza), which shall be determined by the Administración Forestal del Estado. Payment of the tax shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, and its amendments. Wood in log (troza) shall be understood as the section of the tree free of branches, with a diameter greater than or equal to 29 centimeters at the thinnest end. The taxable event of the created tax shall be considered at the moment of primary industrialization of the wood or, in the case of imported wood, the tax must be paid at customs according to the real value. Wood shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax, established in Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, less three percentage points. Natural or legal persons owning centers for primary wood industrialization are obliged to comply with the payment of this tribute." (Italics supplied). Wood in logs (trozas de madera) must be understood as any piece whose diameter at its thinnest end is greater than 29 centimeters. Attending to the appraisal report on folio 37, prepared by the prosecution witness [Name6], the pieces seized from the defendant had an average diameter of 27 centimeters, that is, they are below the average measurement to be considered wood logs according to the Ley Forestal; therefore, they constituted 328 pieces of wood, not logs, falling outside the typical adaptation contemplated by numeral 56 of the mentioned Ley Forestal. This is an aspect that was not considered by the judge to determine the atypicality of the conduct, an obligation that the Ministerio Público also omitted when formulating its accusation. For these reasons, the claim must be rejected, as well as the present appeal in all its respects.

POR TANTO

The present appeal is dismissed in all its respects. Let it be notified.

ROY ANTONIO BADILLA ROJAS ANA CECILIA SALAZAR QUIRÓS [Name10] JUDGES OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Correo electrónico: [...]

*120017460412PE* VOTO No. 40-13 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DE GUANACASTE, Santa Cruz, a las catorce horas cincuenta minutos del diecinueve de febrero del dos mil trece.

Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1], [...] , seguida causa por el delito de TRANSPORTE ILEGAL DE MADERA, en perjuicio de la LEY FORESTAL. Conforman el Tribunal el juez Roy Antonio Badilla Rojas y las juezas Ana Cecilia Salazar Quirós y Cynthia Dumani Stradtmann. Se apersonó al recurso de apelación, el licenciado [Nombre2] , Fiscal Auxiliar Ambiental del Ministerio Publico. El licenciado [Nombre3] como defensor particular del encartado.

RESULTANDO

1. Mediante sentencia número 67-12, de las quince horas dos minutos del dieciséis de octubre del dos mil doce el Tribunal de Juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Santa Cruz, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto y los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, artículos 10, 11 inciso 1 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 142, 184, 265, 266, 267, 360, 366, de Código Procesal Penal, artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12 ,14, 18 ,19, 20, 30, 31, 45, Código Penal, artículos 27, 28, 29, 42, 56, 63, de la Ley Forestal se ABSUELVE por atipicidad de TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a [Nombre1] por el Delito de Transporte Ilegal de Madera que se le venía atribuyendo en perjuicio de la Ley Forestal, cese cualquier medida cautelar que se siga en su contra, son las costas del proceso a cargo del estado, se ordena la devolución tanto del vehículo [Nombre4] [Placa1] y de la madera que consiste en trescientos veintiocho pieza de TECA, mediante lectura las partes quedan notificadas. Lic. Miguel Porras Cascante Juez de Juicio.

2. Contra el anterior pronunciamiento el licenciado [Nombre2] , Fiscal Auxiliar Ambiental del Ministerio Publico, interpuso recurso de apelación.

3. Verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4. En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el juez [Nombre5] y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.- PRIMERO: “VIOLACIÓN A LAS REGLAS DE LA SANA CRÍTICA EN LA FUNDAMENTACIÓN DEL FALLO E INCONFORMIDAD CON LA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA”: No se valoró adecuadamente por el Tribunal la amplia prueba que se aportó y que demostró que se movilizó madera de plantación sin contar con la documentación respectiva, la omisión fue sobre el aporte de los testigos [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , quienes son profesionales en la materia, además con el aporte del oficial M oficial de la Fuerza Pública se puede establecer que el encartado al momento de ser detenido no portaba documentación alguna, con lo cual se configura el delito acusado.

II.- SEGUNDO: “INCONFORMIDAD CON LA INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA POR ERRÓNEA APLICACIÓN DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 28,56 Y 63 DE LA LEY FORESTAL EN RELACIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 5 DEL DECRETO EJECUTIVO 309108 DE 4 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2002, EN DESATENCIÓN A LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 363 INCISO B Y D DEL CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL.” El Tribunal de manera errónea justifica su decisión en una supuesta contradicción entre los artículos 28 y 56 de la Ley Forestal, argumentando por certeza que la actuación del imputado es atípica. Resalta el recurrente que se hace una interpretación inadecuada de los numerales 28, 56 y 63 de la Ley Forestal, por cuanto los dos últimos son artículos que se complementan entre sí, pero que no se puede sustentar una acusación con base en el numeral 28 de esa misma ley, por cuanto la misma contiene excepciones para contar con permiso de corta, transporte, industrialización, aspectos que hacen la aplicación incompatible con las normas ya indicadas. Para el Ministerio Público no existe tal contradicción, sino que se presenta los casos del artículo 56 en relación con el 63 cuando se decide transportar sin tener las guías necesarias cuando se trate de madera de bosque o plantación. Se determinó en el contradictorio que el encartado transportaba trozas de madera de teca en una cantidad de 328 trozas, sin tener la documentación respectiva, por lo que se determina un elemento objetivo de manera clara, aspecto que fue respaldado por la declaración del oficial [Nombre8] .G. quien así lo explicó en la fase de juicio. Afirma que las normas contrastadas no se contradicen, que mientras el numeral 28 habla de permiso, el 56 menciona documentación respectiva, situación que no las enfrenta ni las hace excluyentes. Sigue argumentando que en juicio se aportó prueba testimonial que aclaró que una cosa es el permiso de la Administración Forestal del Estado y otra es la documentación respectiva, que legitima el transporte de la madera, como son el certificado de origen y la guía de transporte. La Fiscalía aduce que demostró la existencia de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal contenidos en el artículo 56, pero el juzgador acogió la tesis de la defensa que solo se basó en el argumento de que la madera de plantación no requiere permiso según el artículo 28. Según esta tesis no se requeriría portar documento alguno lo que claramente imposibilitaría perseguir cualquier trasiego forestal. Solicita se declaren con lugar los motivos propuestos se anule el fallo impugnado y se ordene el juicio de reenvío correspondiente. (Ver recurso de folios 47 a 51).

III.- TERCERO: La defensa por su parte solicita se declare sin lugar el recurso. Reitera los argumentos esgrimidos en la fase conclusiva del contradictorio, alegando que el encartado contaba con la guía de transporte que se aportó al día siguiente de su detención, de igual manera contaba con el certificado de origen de que las piezas decomisadas provenían de una plantación forestal. Indica que este aspecto fue reforzado por la declaración del ingeniero [Nombre6] funcionario del Minaet, quien declaró en el juicio y además rindió un informe el cual consta a partir de folio 37 denominado "avalúo", documento que permite establecer que la madera decomisada al acusado tenía una medida de 27 centímetros, medida que no cumple con el parámetro del artículo 42 de la misma ley, el cual le da esa calidad a cualquier pieza que sea igual o superior a 29 centímetros, reiterando que para ese tipo de madera, proveniente de plantación no se requiere permiso de transporte. Sostiene que no es posible aplicar el numeral 62 por cuanto esta norma es para el incumplimiento de un plan forestal y lo que se acusa en contra de su representado es transporte de madera. Solicita se declare sin lugar el recurso y se confirme la sentencia impugnada. (Ver escrito de folio 55 a 63).

IV.En lo que se refiere a la inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba. Se declara sin lugar el motivo. Lo anterior por cuanto en la sentencia impugnada si se hace un análisis de la prueba que el Fiscal recurrente alega haberse omitido. Revisado el audiovisual del fallo a partir de la secuencia horaria 15:34:05 se inicia el análisis de fondo con las consideraciones introductorias que hace el Juzgador de primera instancia. De manera más exacta a partir de la secuencia horaria 15:40:04, el Juzgador analiza los aportes testimoniales. Primero menciona la reseña de [Nombre6] quien señaló: "... es un técnico especializado en la materia forestal, que cuando se hablaba del caso en concreto se estaba hablando de plantación, que esa plantación esa finca era una plantación forestal y así estaba catalogada, de lo que él dice así se puede deducir, porque él dice que es un Regente Forestal, es un conocedor de la materia, de la ley forestal y del reglamento, entonces él indica que lo que le corresponde a él verificar es que haya un contrato regente , que haya todo un estudio, forestal con respecto a lo que ese está trabajando ahí en la finca y que se establezcan los permisos, permisos que les da única y exclusivamente un regente forestal. Vemos que todo lo demás que él viene analizando ahí es sobre la especie teca, sobre los permisos de transporte que para los efectos tendrían algún significado y alguna validez para otro tipo de transporte que no es el que se está analizando acá. Porque para los efectos aquí estamos hablando de plantaciones forestales, que el artículo 28 así lo establece, plantaciones forestales, que se contraviene con el artículo 56 de esa misma norma especial. No es culpa de los testigos venir aquí e informar de esta situación, ellos están adecuados a un procedimiento, que tienen establecido por una norma especial y por un reglamento. " hasta 15:42:40. Luego sigue con la descripción de la declaración de [Nombre9] .. , “quien es oficial de la fuerza pública y describe todo el operativo que ellos hacen de la detención de usted y 328 trozas de madera de la especia teca, siguen el protocolo informan al fiscal, lo común de los operativos y retenes que hace la Fuerza Pública, y la documentación, si es retenes de vehículos piden la documentación, si es en esta materia piden la guía de transporte de la madera, información que igual da el mismo [Nombre7] quien es el regente forestal, es el que da las guías de transporte y una pincelada general de lo que él hace. Habla también de plantaciones, dice que fui contratado por una gente, la plantación es grande. Ocupaba unas 150 guías aproximadamente, se habla de plantaciones en general y que para este tipo de madera se ocupaba una guía". Finaliza esta reseña hasta la secuencia horaria 15:46:40. Se destaca en ese apartado un análisis general por parte del juzgador de cada testigo de cargo, resaltando la labor que cada testigo realiza en esta investigación, por lo que se falta a la verdad cuando se afirma en el presente recurso que la sentencia es omisa. El problema es que no llega el juzgador a las conclusiones que el ente acusador pretendía. Para el sentenciador de primera instancia, el aporte de los testigos no se pone en duda, ya que cada testigo declara sobre su área de conocimiento, uno como ingeniero forestal (S), a quien le correspondió inspeccionar la madera secuestrada y rinde un informe denominado “avalúo”, que consta a partir de folio 37. Otro como oficial de la fuerza pública ( M ) quien describe el protocolo seguido en el presente caso y como se puso al acusado y los bienes decomisado a la orden de la autoridad respectiva. El último testigo de cargo, fue el propio regente forestal, quien resalta la existencia de un plan de manejo forestal en este caso y que a su cargo se extendieron de manera previa la cantidad de guías de transporte que se estimó útiles para el desarrollo de ese plan. Para el juzgador estos testigos permiten establecer la existencia de la madera y que el encartado se encargaba de su transporte cuando fue detenido y que no portaba la guía de transporte, pero no le resuelven la contradicción que a su juicio se presenta. Los testigos sí coinciden en que para el transporte es común que se use la guía, pero esta mención no puede sustituir la existencia de la norma expresa respecto a una excepción contenida en el numeral 28 de la ley 7575, aspecto que desarrolla posteriormente en su sentencia. En definitiva el juzgador analiza el aporte de cada testigo y resalta los aspectos relevantes de ellos, para luego establecer si de la información que brindan los deponentes, se infieren los presupuestos legales aplicables al caso de estudio. Si valora el Juez la prueba testimonial en su totalidad, obteniendo elementos para resolver el caso que se le planteó, haciendo por ello improcedente este reclamo.

V.En lo relativo a la errónea interpretación de la normativa aplicable. Se declara sin lugar el motivo. La sentencia impugnada en relación con este aspecto, a partir de la secuencia horaria 15:43:46 indica: "debe hacerse un análisis de lo que establece el artículo 28 en relación con el artículo 56, ambos de la ley forestal en uno se habla de una infracción a la ley forestal y en otro de una excepción al permiso de corta de la madera, y es que a pesar de que dice permiso de corta habla del transporte de la madera y es que ese verbo transportar es lo me lleva a mí a determinar que no se le puede establecer a usted una culpa en este delito y por eso se le debe absolver". Finaliza este planteamiento inicial en la secuencia horaria 15:47:27. Aun cuando la idea desarrollada por el juzgador de instancia es muy escueta, lleva razón en su planteamiento esencial. La ley debe ser interpretada de manera integral como un conjunto, en este caso el artículo 56 de la normativa forestal establece la infracción a la Ley Forestal cuando se trata de movilizar madera al indicar: "ARTÍCULO 56.- Movilización de madera No se podrá movilizar madera en trozas, escuadrada ni aserrada proveniente de bosque ni de plantación, si no se cuenta con la documentación respectiva." Como se puede apreciar esta norma constituye el tipo penal en relación con la movilización de la madera, siendo los elementos objetivos la madera en troza, tanto escuadrada y aserrada. Estos son los elementos descriptivos del tipo, mientras que los elementos normativos establece movilización sin contar con la documentación respectiva, ese requisito debe ser interpretado por el operador de acuerdo con los decretos y reglamentos de la materia. Estos elementos objetivos del tipo constituyen el supuesto de hecho de la norma. El complemento de esa norma, sea la consecuencia jurídica está prevista en el numeral 63 del mismo cuerpo legal. El problema de ese cuerpo normativo es que requiere valorar la excepción del numeral 28, que en lo que interesa indica: "ARTÍCULO 28.- Excepción de permiso de corta Las plantaciones forestales, incluidos los sistemas agroforestales y los árboles plantados individualmente y sus productos, no requerirán permiso de corta, transporte, industrialización ni exportación. Sin embargo, en los casos en que antes de la vigencia de esta ley exista un contrato forestal, firmado con el Estado para recibir Certificados de Abono Forestal o deducción del impuesto sobre la renta, la corta deberá realizarse conforme a lo establecido en el plan de manejo aprobado por la Administración Forestal del Estado."(La cursiva y el subrayado son suplidos). Para esta Cámara sí es necesario analizar esta norma, porque si bien es cierto que es una excepción establecida, inicialmente para la corta forestal sin permiso, el yerro legislativo está al incluir la palabra “transporte”, porque amplía la falta de permiso al transporte de madera de plantación. Los testigos indicaron de manera conteste la necesidad de la guía de transporte para el traslado de madera, pero atendiendo a la excepción que se indica en el numeral 28 esa guía sería necesaria para los casos que están fuera de la excepción del numeral 28 ya indicado, ya que ese transporte que menciona la referida norma es una modalidad de movilización de madera, que es lo sancionado por el numeral 56. En este punto es fácil comprender que no existe errónea interpretación de la normativa aplicable, como lo quiere hacer ver el recurrente, sino una pésima construcción normativa por parte del legislador que confunde la aplicación correcta o debida de las normas. Por otra parte, a pesar de no haber sido analizado por el juzgador de primera instancia, sí fue propuesto por el defensor, es el argumento de falta de elementos típicos por lo siguiente. El artículo 56 sanciona la movilización de trozas sin contar con la documentación respectiva y no señala cual es esa documentación. El término troza para su precisión debe ser complementado con los alcances del numeral 42 de la misma ley forestal que indica: "ARTÍCULO 42.- Impuesto forestal Se establece un impuesto general forestal del tres por ciento (3%) sobre el valor de transferencia en el mercado de la madera en trozas, el cual será determinado por la Administración Forestal del Estado. El pago del impuesto se efectuará de conformidad con lo estipulado en la Ley No. 6826, del 8 de noviembre de 1982, y sus reformas. Se entenderá por madera en troza, la sección del árbol libre de ramas, con un diámetro mayor o igual a 29 centímetros en el extremo más delgado. Se considerará el hecho generador del impuesto que se crea, en el momento de la industrialización primaria de la madera o, en el caso de madera importada, el impuesto deberá ser pagado en aduanas de acuerdo con el valor real. La madera pagará un impuesto de ventas igual al impuesto general de ventas, establecido en la Ley No. 6826, del 8 de noviembre de 1982, menos tres puntos porcentuales. Las personas físicas o jurídicas, propietarias de centros de industrialización primaria de maderas, están obligadas a cumplir con el pago de este tributo." (La cursiva es suplida) Se debe entender por trozas de madera cualquier pieza cuyo diámetro en su extremo más delgado es superior a 29 centímetros. Atendiendo al avalúo de folio 37, confeccionado por el testigo de cargo [Nombre6], las piezas decomisadas al encartado tenían un diámetro promedio de 27 centímetros, es decir están por debajo de la medida promedio para ser considerada troza de madera según la ley forestal, por lo que constituían 328 piezas de madera, no trozas, quedando por fuera de la adecuación típica que contempla el numeral 56 de la mencionada ley forestal. Este es un aspecto que no fue estimado por el juzgador para determinar la atipicidad de la conducta, obligación que también omitió el Ministerio Público al momento de formular su acusación. Por estas razones el reclamo debe ser rechazado al igual que el presente recurso en todos sus extremos.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos el presente recurso de apelación. Notifíquese.

ROY ANTONIO BADILLA ROJAS ANA CECILIA SALAZAR QUIRÓS [Nombre10] JUEZAS Y JUEZ DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2]. Correo electrónico: [...]