Restitution of maritime-terrestrial zone in Ostional Refuge after criminal acquittalRestitución de zona marítimo terrestre en Refugio Ostional tras absolución penal

*110000040577PE* VOTO 380-12 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, at thirteen hours twenty-two minutes of October twenty-four, two thousand twelve.

Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) filed in the present case against [Name1]., […], for the crime of USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY (USURPACIÓN DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO) to the detriment of THE STATE (EL ESTADO). Participating in the decision of the appeal are judges [Name2], Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas and [Name3] Giovanni Mena Artavia. Appearing at this venue is licensed attorney [Name4], private defender of the accused; as well as the Auxiliary Environmental Prosecutor, licensed attorney [Name5].

RESULTANDO

1.- By judgment No. 36-12 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of February twenty-four, two thousand twelve, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Nicoya venue, resolved: "POR TANTO In accordance with the foregoing, articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 1, 30, 45, 50, 51, 227 subsection a) of the Penal Code; 1, 2, 3, 4, 59, 72, 73, 74, 265 to 279, 341, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [Name1] IS ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crime of USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY to the detriment of the STATE. RESTITUTION (RESTITUCIÓN) is ordered of the areas of public zone (zona pública) that have been discussed in this proceeding in favor of the STATE, clearing the zones of fencing and any other works not belonging to said zone, for which the state entity in charge of the administration of that area shall be commissioned. The costs of the proceeding are borne by the State. Regarding the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC (PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA), representing the STATE, against the civil defendant [Name1], the same is declared WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR) and this matter is resolved without special award of costs. Once this ruling becomes final, archive the case file. Notify by reading. LIC. [Name6] TRIAL JUDGE (JUEZ DE JUICIO) 2-. Against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorney [Name4], private defender of the accused, filed an appeal.

3.- Once the respective deliberation was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4.- The pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Name7]; and,

CONSIDERANDO

I- The private defender challenges the ruling through which his client was acquitted of the crime of usurpation of public domain property attributed to her, but which simultaneously ordered: "... the RESTITUCIÓN of the areas of public zone that have been discussed in this proceeding in favor of the STATE, clearing the zones of fencing and any other works not belonging to said zone, for which the state entity in charge of the administration of that area shall be commissioned." The complainant directs his reproaches exclusively against the ordered restitution (restitución) and requests that portion of the judgment be revoked. In order to ensure the logical order of the exposition, the last argument raised by the appellant must be examined, according to which restitution (restitución) is a right of the owner and not a power of the judge, such that the latter incurred the defect of "ultra petita" by acquitting the accused and declaring the action for damages (acción resarcitoria) brought by the State without merit, while ordering the referenced restitution (restitución). He adds that there was a lack of competence and "of jurisdiction," while the decision lacks reasoning. The complaint is not admissible. First, the appellant's view that restitution (restitución) of property cannot be decreed in an acquittal judgment is mistaken. Article 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly provides: "The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution (restitución) of objects seized in the proceeding that are not subject to confiscation (comiso), the necessary registrations, and shall fix the costs...". The foregoing means that both confiscation (comiso) and restitution (restitución) of property or the reconstruction, suppression, or reform of a legal act related to a false document may be ordered in an acquittal pronouncement and regardless of whether a civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) had been filed, which is only required as a prerequisite for imposing reparation of damage. This is confirmed by articles 489, 490, 491, and 492 of the procedural code. On the other hand, it is obvious that the trial judge (juez a quo) erred by declaring the civil action brought by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic without merit, since, as is known, even if a civil claim is not necessary to order the restitution (restitución) of property, no obstacle exists for the plaintiff to request—even as the sole claim of its lawsuit—that the object be restituted (in this regard, judgment No. 1462-04, of December 22, 2004, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice may be consulted). In this matter, it is recorded on folio 1770 verso that, at trial, the representative of the State (civil plaintiff) requested "that the things be returned to the State, the eviction and demolition be ordered," and the judge, incongruously, decrees that restitution (restitución) but declares the civil action without merit, whereas the logical and legally correct course was to grant it and impose the duty of restitution (restituir), even if other additional claims were denied, if applicable. The stated error only caused grievance to the civil plaintiff, can no longer be corrected due to the lack of an appeal on its part, and it is only important to emphasize that the restitution (restitución) order, in itself, is lawful and could have been pronounced even in the event that no action for damages (acción resarcitoria) had been brought, without this signifying the defect of "ultra petita" alleged by the appellant. It is therefore appropriate to reject the protest.

II- In the remainder of the appeal, the appellant dedicates himself to presenting his view that the property ordered to be restituted to the State in the judgment does not form part of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (zona marítimo terrestre), since it was released (desafectado) by Laws No. 6919 and 7313 that created the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional) and later expanded it to include the territory between the mouth of the Nosara River and Punta Guiones. According to the complainant, said Wildlife Refuge does not constitute public domain property (bien demanial), since public nature can only be acquired by virtue of a formal law and not a provision of the Executive Branch, as occurs with protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas). Neither do they have the purpose of public use, characteristic of public domain properties (bienes demaniales), according to the provisions of article 261 of the Civil Code, but rather those of resource protection, environmental conservation, and promotion of scientific research, among others. The defender concludes that the Ostional Refuge is of mixed ownership; that the norms of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law (ley de la zona marítimo terrestre) are not applicable to it; and that by virtue of the fluctuations the issue has suffered in the legislative sphere, as well as the problems in the boundary marking (amojonamiento) and the interpretations that the appellant himself makes of various norms, it must be held that the defendant cannot be dispossessed of the property she occupies unless she is previously compensated. The objections are inadmissible. The complainant starts from erroneous assumptions and from an incorrect reading and interpretation of the applicable legal provisions in this matter. First, he maintains that, according to article 261 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the public nature of a property requires a formal law and not a mere decision of the Executive Branch, but later, incongruously, he acknowledges that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge was created not by executive provision but by law issued by the Legislative Assembly. Second, he asserts that the now-deceased spouse of the defendant bought the land located in Playa Guiones in 1976, from "...a private individual who had initiated a claim (denuncio) before the Municipality of Nicoya..." and later "built or improved his little house," since it was not until 1981 that the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) marked the boundary of the beach, indicating the limit of fifty meters (obviously, of the public zone (zona pública)). However, the defender forgets that by Law No. 5602, of November 4, 1974 (in force, therefore, two years before the alleged purchase of the land), the effect of the old "Law on Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone" was suspended and it was clearly provided: "No beach nor island, maritime or fluvial, regulated by Law No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, may be sold, leased, nor subleased, during the term of suspension of said law, without prejudice solely to the extensions of lease rights that are appropriate in accordance with the law whose effects are being suspended. The respective municipalities shall refrain from granting construction permits if such buildings are to be constructed on lands possessed as a consequence of the rights granted by the cited Law No. 4558." The foregoing means that since 1974 (although in fact well before, as will be seen), it has been known, as expressly provided by law, that the beaches or islands of the Republic cannot be subject to the dominion of private individuals and that not even persons who had constructed some building in those areas, under the supposed protection of the Law on Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, could transmit rights, much less sell lands. Therefore, the alleged purchase supposedly made in 1976 would constitute an absolutely null transaction whose object was a public property, insofar as it supposed an invasion of the public zone (zona pública), which suffices to dismiss the appellant's opinion that expropriation or some type of compensation is appropriate, since it must be kept in mind that the legislation that was enacted and put an end to the regulations related to the urbanization of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) was none other than the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law now in force (No. 6043, of March 2, 1977), and in its article 71 it was clearly indicated: "All acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions, carried out or made, from the enactment of Law No. 5602 of November 4, 1974, and that were contrary to its provisions, are absolutely null." Nevertheless, and as anticipated, it must be added that the Law on Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone itself, No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, cited above, provided in its article 6: "The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) from the ordinary high tide line shall be inalienable and in no case may be subject to lease or sale. Therefore, no one may claim any right whatsoever over said strip, which shall be dedicated to public use for purposes of recreation, leisure, or free circulation. The constructions or installations currently located in that zone may not be remodeled, and in case of their destruction, new constructions must respect that inalienable zone." From what has been stated, it is inferred, then, that not even pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone could private dominion exist over the public zone (zona pública); rather, the municipalities were granted dominion over the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) with the possibility of leasing lands located within the one hundred fifty meters now known as the "restricted zone (zona restringida)" and selling them to the lessees after ten years had elapsed since the contracting; but, it is reiterated, that law preserved the inalienability of the fifty meters that currently constitute the "public zone (zona pública)". It is also deduced from the foregoing that the defender's thesis that the land subject to this case (the part located within the public zone (zona pública)) forms part of a "mixed wildlife refuge" lacks any logical or legal basis since, besides the fact that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge was created by law and not by state and private co-participation, its territory already formed part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) long before such creation. The complainant's views are also erroneous and unsustainable regarding the supposed conflict between the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law and the wildlife refuges. Article 73 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law clearly provides: "This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones (zonas marítimo terrestres) included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation" (boldface supplied). There is, therefore, no conflict of laws. The areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), without that zone losing its name due to such circumstance (in fact, the recently transcribed provision itself so expresses). They continue to be part of the zone, but they are assigned a management or treatment different from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the perspective of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also attending to the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out pursuant to the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) may not be executed according to the Wildlife Conservation Law or other special regulations, and, conversely, the purposes proper to the reserves would allow the design of projects foreign to the purposes of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law and open the way for community participation, encouraged in article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while article 83 of that same text provides "The General Directorate of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, regarding the National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)." The law that created the Ostional Refuge itself (Law on Conservation of Wildlife, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India..." (highlighting supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (Wildlife Conservation Law), expanded it, placing it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Cantón of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste..." (boldface does not appear in the original). Moreover, the subject has been the object of multiple pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant himself, and in ruling No. [Telf1], of 8:30 hours of February 13, 2009, the referenced Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a "public domain property" that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain property (bien demanial) lack property rights. It is not superfluous to emphasize that the restitution (restitución) ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised within the public zone (zona pública) of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never have been subject to acquisition by private individuals. This being the case, the appeal filed is declared without merit in all its aspects.

POR TANTO

The appeal filed by the private defender of the accused is declared without merit. NOTIFÍQUESE.

[Name2] GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS [Name3] GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA SENTENCE APPEALS JUDGES (JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA) C/ M.

OF./ D./ Usurpation of Public Domain Property IGONZALEZ Judicial Circuit of Santa Cruz, [Address1], Telephones: [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Email: [...]

3.- Having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4.- The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Nombre7] ; **CONSIDERANDO** **I-** The private defense counsel challenges the judgment through which his client was acquitted of the crime of usurpation of public domain property (usurpación de bienes de dominio público) attributed to her, but which simultaneously ordered: *"... the RESTITUTION of the public zone areas that have been discussed in this proceeding in favor of the STATE, clearing the areas of fences and any other works not belonging to said zone, for which purpose the state entity in charge of administering that area shall be commissioned"*. The complainant directs his objections exclusively against the ordered restitution and requests that this part of the sentence be revoked. To ensure the logical order of the exposition, the last argument raised by the appellant must be examined, according to which restitution is a right of the owner and not a power of the judge, such that the latter incurred the defect of "ultra petita" (ultrapetita) by acquitting the accused and dismissing the civil action for damages (acción resarcitoria) brought by the State, yet ordering the said restitution. He adds that there was a lack of competence and "jurisdiction," while the decision lacks reasoning. **The complaint is not admissible.** Firstly, the appellant's criterion that restitution of property cannot be decreed in an acquittal judgment is mistaken. Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) clearly states: *"The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of objects affected by the proceeding that are not subject to confiscation (comiso), the necessary registrations, and shall set costs..."*. This means that both confiscation (comiso) and restitution of property, or the reconstruction, suppression, or reform of a legal act related to a false document, may be ordered in an acquittal judgment regardless of whether or not a civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) had been filed, which is only required as a prerequisite for imposing reparation for the damage. This is confirmed by Articles 489, 490, 491, and 492 of the Procedural Code. Moreover, it is obvious that the *a quo* judge erred by dismissing the civil action brought by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) because, as is known, although a civil claim is not necessary to order the restitution of property, there is no obstacle whatsoever for the plaintiff to request—even as the sole claim of their lawsuit—that the object be restituted (in this regard, see judgment No. 1462-04, of December 22, 2004, from the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this matter, it is recorded on folio 1770 verso that, during the trial (debate), the representative of the State (civil actor) requested *"that the things be returned to the State, the eviction and demolishing be ordered"*, and the judge, incongruously, decrees that restitution but dismisses the civil action, when the logical and legally sound approach was to grant it and impose the duty to restitute, even if other additional claims were rejected, if applicable. The stated error only caused grievance to the civil actor, cannot now be corrected due to the lack of an appeal on their part, and it is only important to emphasize that the restitution order, in itself, is lawful and could be pronounced even in the event that no action for damages had been brought, without this signifying the defect of "ultra petita" alleged by the appellant. Consequently, the objection must be rejected.

**II-** In the remainder of the appeal, the appellant dedicates himself to presenting his criterion that the property ordered restituted to the State in the judgment is not part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), as it was declassified (desafectado) by Laws No. 6919 and 7313, which created the Ostional Mixed Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional) and later expanded it to include the territory between the mouth of the Nosara River and Punta Guiones. According to the appellant, said Mixed Wildlife Refuge does not constitute public domain property (bien demanial), since public nature can only be acquired by virtue of a formal law and not by a provision of the Executive Branch, as occurs with protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas). Nor do they have the purpose of public use, characteristic of public domain property (bienes demaniales), pursuant to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code, but rather those of protecting resources, conserving the environment, and promoting scientific research, among others. The defense counsel concludes that the Ostional Refuge is of mixed ownership; that the rules of the maritime-terrestrial zone law do not apply to it; and that by virtue of the fluctuations the subject has suffered in the legislative sphere, as well as the problems in demarcation (amojonamiento) and the interpretations the appellant himself makes of various norms, it must be maintained that the defendant cannot be dispossessed of the property she occupies without prior compensation. **The objections are inadmissible.** The appellant departs from erroneous assumptions and from the incorrect reading and interpretation of the legal provisions applicable in this matter. Firstly, he maintains that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the public nature of a property requires a formal law and not a mere decision of the Executive Branch, but then, incongruously, he acknowledges that the Ostional Mixed Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional) was created, not by executive provision, but by law enacted by the Legislative Assembly. Secondly, he affirms that the now-deceased spouse of the defendant purchased the land located on Playa Guiones in 1976, from *"... a private individual who had initiated a denouncement (denuncio) before the Municipality of Nicoya..."* and subsequently *"built or improved his little house"*, since it was not until 1981 when the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) demarcated (amojonó) the beach, marking the limit of the fifty meters (obviously, of the public zone). However, the defender forgets that by Law No. 5602, of November 4, 1974 (thus in force two years before the alleged purchase of the land), the validity of the old "Law on Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone" was suspended, and it was clearly stated: *"No beach or island, maritime or fluvial, regulated by Law No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, may be sold, leased, or subleased during the term of suspension of said law's validity, without prejudice solely to the extensions of lease rights that are appropriate in accordance with the law whose effects are suspended. The respective municipalities shall refrain from granting construction permits if said buildings are to be built on lands possessed as a consequence of the rights granted by the cited Law No. 4558"*. This means that since 1974 (though in reality since much earlier, as will be seen) it is known, as expressly provided by law, that the beaches or islands of the Republic cannot be subjected to private domain and that not even persons who had built some structure on those areas, under the supposed protection of the urbanization law of the maritime-terrestrial zone, could transfer rights or, much less, sell lands. Therefore, the alleged purchase supposedly made in 1976 would constitute an absolutely null transaction whose object was a public property, insofar as it involved an invasion of the public zone, which is sufficient to dismiss the appellant's opinion that expropriation or some type of compensation is appropriate, since it must be kept in mind that the legislation that was promulgated and put an end to the regulations related to the urbanization of the maritime-terrestrial zone was none other than the maritime-terrestrial zone law currently in force (No. 6043, of March 2, 1977), and its Article 71 clearly indicated: *"All acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions, carried out or made, as from the enactment of Law No. 5602 of November 4, 1974, and that are contrary to its provisions, are absolutely null"*. However, and as anticipated, it must be added that the Law on Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, cited earlier, provided in its Article 6: *"The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone starting from the ordinary high tide mark shall be inalienable and in no case may be subject to lease or sale. Therefore, no one may claim any right whatsoever over said strip, which shall be dedicated to public use for purposes of leisure, recreation, or free transit. The constructions or installations currently located in that zone may not be remodeled, and in case of their destruction, new constructions must respect that inalienable zone"*. From the above, it is inferred, then, that even under the provisions of the urbanization law of the maritime-terrestrial zone, private domain over the public zone could not exist; rather, the municipalities were granted domain of the maritime-terrestrial zone with the possibility of leasing lands located within the one hundred and fifty meters now known as the "restricted zone (zona restringida)" and selling them to the tenants after ten years from the contracting; but, it is reiterated, that law preserved the inalienability of the fifty meters that currently constitute the "public zone". It is also deduced from the above that the defense counsel's thesis that the land that is the object of this case (the part located within the public zone) forms part of a "mixed wildlife refuge", lacks any logical or legal basis because, besides the fact that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional) was created by law and not by state and private co-participation, its territory already formed part of the maritime-terrestrial zone long before such creation. The appellant’s criteria regarding the alleged conflict between the maritime-terrestrial zone law and the wildlife refuges are equally erroneous and untenable. Article 73 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law clearly states: *"This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation"* (the bold is supplied). There is, therefore, no conflict of laws. The areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without this circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, the recently transcribed norm itself expresses this). They continue forming part of the zone, but they are assigned a management or treatment different from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the viewpoint of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also considering the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out under the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone may not be executed under the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations, and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects unrelated to the purposes of the maritime-terrestrial zone law and open the way for community participation, promoted in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while Article 83 of that same text provides *"The General Directorate of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to the National Wildlife Refuges (Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre) that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone"*. The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Law on Conservation of Wildlife, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it *"... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India..."* (the highlighting is supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, situating it *"... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste..."* (the bold does not appear in the original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), some cited by the appellant themselves, and in ruling No. [Telf1], of 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 2009, the referred Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional) is a "public domain property (bien de dominio público)" that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain property (bien demanial) lack ownership rights. It is not superfluous to emphasize that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised within the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never have been subject to acquisition by private parties. This being the case, the filed appeal is dismissed in all its aspects.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by the private defense counsel of the accused is dismissed. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.

**[Nombre2]** **GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS** ** [Nombre3] GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA** **APPEAL JUDGES OF SENTENCE (JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA)** C/ **M.** OF./ D./ Usurpation of Public Domain Property (Usurpación de Bienes de Dominio Público) IGONZALEZ Santa Cruz Judicial Circuit, [Dirección1], Telephone: [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3].

**“I- […] The appellant directs his criticisms exclusively against the restitution ordered and requests that this part of the judgment be revoked. In order to ensure the logical order of the presentation, the last argument raised by the appellant must be examined, according to which restitution is a right of the owner and not a power of the judge, such that the latter incurred the vice of "ultra petita" by acquitting the accused and dismissing the civil action for damages (acción resarcitoria) filed by the State, while ordering the aforementioned restitution. He adds that there was a lack of competence and "of jurisdiction," while the decision lacks reasoning. The complaint is not admissible. First, the appellant's criterion that in an acquittal ruling the restitution of property cannot be ordered is mistaken. Article 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) clearly provides: "The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of the objects affected by the proceeding that are not subject to confiscation, the necessary registrations, and shall set the costs...". The foregoing means that both confiscation and the restitution of property, or the reconstruction, suppression, or reform of a legal act related to a false document, may be ordered in an acquittal ruling regardless of whether a civil action for damages had been filed, which is only required as a prerequisite to impose reparation for the damage. This is confirmed by Articles 489, 490, 491, and 492 of the procedural Code. Moreover, it is evident that the judge a quo erred in dismissing the civil action filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) since, as is well known, although a civil claim is not necessary to order the restitution of property, there is no obstacle whatsoever for the plaintiff to request—even as the sole claim of their lawsuit—that the object be restored (in this regard, see judgment No. 1462-04, of December 22, 2004, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this matter, it is recorded on folio 1770 verso that, during the trial, the representative of the State (private prosecutor, actor civil) requested that "the return of the things to the State, the eviction, and demolition be ordered," and the judge, incongruously, decreed that restitution but dismissed the civil action, when the logical course consistent with the law would have been to grant it and impose the duty to restore, even if rejecting other additional claims, as the case may be. The said error only caused harm to the private prosecutor, can no longer be corrected in the absence of an appeal on his part, and it is only important to emphasize that the restitution order, in itself, is lawful and could have been issued even in the event that no civil action for damages had been brought, without this signifying the vice of "ultra petita" alleged by the appellant. It is therefore appropriate to reject the protest.** **II- In the remainder of the appeal, the appellant dedicates himself to setting forth his criterion that the property ordered in the judgment to be restored to the State is not part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), because it was declassified by Laws No. 6919 and 7313 that created the Ostional Wildlife Refuge and later expanded it to include the territory between the mouth of the [Dirección1] Nosara and Punta Guiones. According to the appellant, said Wildlife Refuge does not constitute a public domain asset (bien demanial), since public nature can only be acquired by virtue of a formal law and not by a provision of the Executive Branch, as occurs with protected wildlife areas. Nor do they have the purpose of public use, characteristic of public domain assets, in accordance with the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but rather those of protecting resources, conserving the environment, and promoting scientific research, among others. The defense concludes that the Ostional Refuge is of mixed property; that the rules of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law do not apply to it, and that by virtue of the fluctuations that the topic has suffered in the legislative sphere, as well as the problems in the demarcation (amojonamiento) and the interpretations that the appellant himself makes of various norms, it must be maintained that the defendant cannot be dispossessed of the property she occupies without being previously compensated. The objections are inadmissible. The appellant starts from erroneous assumptions and from the incorrect reading and interpretation of the applicable legal provisions in this matter. First, he maintains that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the public nature of a property requires a formal law and not a mere decision of the Executive Branch, but then, incongruously, he recognizes that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional) was created, not by executive provision, but by a law issued by the Legislative Assembly. Second, he asserts that the now-deceased spouse of the defendant bought the land located in Playa Guiones in 1976, from "... a private individual who had initiated a claim (denuncio) before the Municipality of Nicoya..." and later "built or improved his little house," since it was not until 1981 that the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) demarcated the beach, indicating the limit of the fifty meters (obviously, of the public zone). However, the defense forgets that by Law No. 5602, of November 4, 1974 (in force, therefore, two years before the alleged purchase of the land), the validity of the former "Law for the Tourist Development of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone" (Ley de Urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre) was suspended and it was clearly provided: "No beach or island, maritime or fluvial, regulated by Law No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, may be sold, leased, or subleased during the period of suspension of the validity of said law, without prejudice only to the extensions of lease rights that are appropriate in accordance with the law whose effects are suspended. The respective municipalities shall refrain from granting construction permits if said buildings are to be constructed on lands possessed as a consequence of the rights granted by the cited Law No. 4558." The foregoing means that since 1974 (although in reality since much earlier, as will be seen) it has been known, as expressly provided by law, that the beaches or islands of the Republic cannot be subjected to the ownership of private individuals, and that not even persons who had built some building in those areas, under the supposed protection of the law for the tourist development of the maritime-terrestrial zone, could transfer rights or, much less, sell lands. Therefore, the alleged purchase supposedly made in 1976 would constitute an absolutely null transaction that had as its object a public asset, insofar as it presupposed an invasion of the public zone, which is sufficient to discard the appellant's opinion that expropriation or some type of compensation is appropriate, since it must be kept in mind that the legislation that was enacted and put an end to the regulations related to the development of the maritime-terrestrial zone was none other than the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law now in force (No. 6043, of March 2, 1977) and its Article 71 clearly indicated: "All acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions, carried out or taken, as of the enactment of Law No. 5602 of November 4, 1974, and which were contrary to its provisions, are absolutely null." However, and as anticipated, it must be added that the very Law for the Tourist Development of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, cited above, provided in its Article 6: "The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone from the ordinary high tide line shall be inalienable and in no case may be subject to lease or sale. Therefore, no one may claim any right whatsoever over said strip, which shall be dedicated to public use for purposes of leisure, recreation, or free circulation. The constructions or installations currently located in that zone may not be remodeled and in the event of their destruction, the new constructions must respect that inalienable zone." From the foregoing, it is inferred, then, that not even in accordance with the provisions of the law for the tourist development of the maritime-terrestrial zone could there be private ownership over the public zone; rather, the domain of the maritime-terrestrial zone was granted to the municipalities with the possibility of leasing lands situated within the one hundred and fifty meters now known as the "restricted zone" (zona restringida) and selling them to the lessees after ten years from the contracting had elapsed; but, it is reiterated, that law preserved the inalienability of the fifty meters that currently make up the "public zone." It is also deduced from what has been set forth that the defense's thesis that the land subject to this case (the part situated within the public zone) forms part of a "mixed wildlife refuge" lacks any logical or legal basis since, besides the fact that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge was created by law and not by state and private co-participation, its territory already formed part of the maritime-terrestrial zone long before such creation. Likewise erroneous and unsustainable are the appellant's criteria regarding the supposed conflict between the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law and the wildlife refuges. Article 73 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law clearly provides: "This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation" (the bold is supplied). There is, then, no conflict of laws. The areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be found within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without this circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, this is what the recently transcribed rule itself expresses). They continue to be part of the zone, but are assigned a different management or treatment from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the standpoint of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also in accordance with the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out in accordance with the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone may not be executed in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) or other special regulations, and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects unrelated to the purposes of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law and open the way for community participation, encouraged in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while Article 83 of that same text provides: "The General Directorate of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to the National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone." The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Law for the Conservation of Wildlife, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India..." (the highlighting is supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (Wildlife Conservation Law), expanded it, situating it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste..." (the bold does not appear in the original). Moreover, the topic has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant himself, and in Ruling No. [Telf1], of 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 2009, the said Chamber expressly emphasized that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a "public domain asset" (bien de dominio público) that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain asset lack property rights. It is not superfluous to stress that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised within the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never have been the object of acquisition by private individuals.** Given the foregoing, the appeal filed is dismissed in all its respects.

6043, regarding the National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)." The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India..." (emphasis supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, placing it "... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste..." (bold does not appear in the original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), some cited by the challenger himself, and in ruling No. [Telf1], of 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 2009, the aforementioned Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a "public domain asset (bien de dominio público)" that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain asset lack any property right. It is worth emphasizing that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised within the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never have been subject to acquisition by private individuals. This being the case, the appeal filed is denied in all its aspects.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by the private defender of the accused is denied. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.

**[Nombre2]** **GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS** ** [Nombre3] GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA** **JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA** C/ **M.** OF./ D./ Usurpación de Bienes de Dominio Público IGONZALEZ Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...]

*110000040577PE* VOTO 380-12 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, a las trece horas veintidós minutos de veinticuatro de octubre de dos mil doce.

Recurso de Apelación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1]., […], por el delito de USURPACIÓN DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO en perjuicio de EL ESTADO. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces [Nombre2] , Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas y [Nombre3] Giovanni Mena Artavia. Se apersonó en esta sede el licenciado [Nombre4] , defensor particular de la encartada; así como el fiscal Auxiliar Ambiental, licenciado [Nombre5] .

RESULTANDO

1.- Mediante sentencia No. 36-12 de quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos de veinticuatro de febrero de dos mil doce, el Tribunal de Juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Nicoya, resolvió: "POR TANTO De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 1, 30, 45, 50, 51, 227 inciso a) del Código Penal; 1, 2, 3, 4, 59, 72, 73, 74, 265 a 279, 341, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 y 459 del Código Procesal Penal, SE ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a [Nombre1]. por el delito de USURPACIÓN DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO en perjuicio del ESTADO. Se ordena la RESTITUCIÓN de las áreas de zona pública que se han discutido en este proceso a favor del ESTADO, limpiando las zonas de cerca y cualquier otra obra que no sea propia de dicha zona, para lo cual se comisionará a la entidad estatal encargada de la administración de esa área. Son los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado. Con relación a la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por la PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, en representación del ESTADO en contra de la demandada civil [Nombre1]. , se declara SIN LUGAR la misma y se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas. Una vez firme este fallo archívese la causa. Mediante lectura notifíquese. LIC. [Nombre6] JUEZ DE JUICIO 2-. Contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre4] , defensor particular de la acusada, interpuso recurso de apelación.

3.- Verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

4.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el juez [Nombre7] ; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I- El defensor particular impugna el fallo a través del cual se absolvió a su defendida del delito de usurpación de bienes de dominio público que se le atribuía, pero a la vez se ordenó: "... la RESTITUCIÓN de las áreas de zona pública que se han discutido en este proceso a favor del ESTADO, limpiando las zonas de cerca y cualquier otra obra que no sea propia de dicha zona, para lo cual se comisionará a la entidad estatal encargada de la administración de esa área". El quejoso dirige sus reproches, de modo exclusivo, contra la restitución ordenada y pide se revoque ese extremo de la sentencia. A fin de asegurar el orden lógico de la exposición, ha de examinarse el último alegato planteado por el recurrente, según el cual la restitución es un derecho del propietario y no una facultad del juez, de suerte que este incurrió en el vicio de "ultrapetita" al absolver a la acusada y declarar sin lugar la acción resarcitoria entablada por el Estado, pero ordenando la referida restitución. Añade que hubo falta de competencia y "de jurisdicción", al tiempo que lo resuelto no posee motivaciones. La queja no es atendible. En primer término, el criterio del recurrente en el sentido de que en el fallo absolutorio no puede decretarse la restitución de bienes, es equivocado. Con claridad dispone el artículo 366 del Código Procesal Penal: "La sentencia absolutoria ordenará la libertad del imputado, la cesación de las medidas cautelares, la restitución de los objetos afectados al procedimiento que no sean sujetos a comiso, las inscripciones necesarias y fijará las costas...". Lo anterior significa que tanto el comiso como la restitución de bienes o la reconstrucción, supresión o reforma de un acto jurídico relacionado con un documento falso, pueden ser ordenados en un pronunciamiento absolutorio y con prescindencia de que se hubiese formulado o no acción civil resarcitoria, la cual únicamente se requiere como presupuesto para imponer la reparación del daño. Así lo confirman los artículos 489, 490, 491 y 492 del Código de rito. Por otra parte, salta a la vista que el juez a quo incurrió en yerro al declarar sin lugar la acción civil entablada por la Procuraduría General de la República pues, como es sabido, aunque la demanda civil no sea necesaria para ordenar la restitución de un bien, no existe obstáculo alguno para que el actor pida -incluso como única pretensión de su demanda- que se restituya el objeto (en tal sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia No. 1462-04, de 22 de diciembre de 2004, de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En este asunto, consta en el folio 1770 vuelto que, en el debate, el representante del Estado (actor civil), solicitó "se ordene devolver las cosas al Estado, el desahucio y demoler", y el juez, de forma incongruente, decreta esa restitución, pero declara sin lugar la acción civil, cuando lo lógico y apegado a derecho era acogerla e imponer el deber de restituir, aunque se rechazaran otras pretensiones adicionales, si fuere del caso. El yerro dicho solo causó agravio al actor civil, no puede ya enmendarse, a falta de recurso de su parte y solo interesa recalcar que la orden de restitución, en sí misma, es lícita y podía pronunciarse aun en el evento de que no hubiese mediado acción resarcitoria, sin que ello significara el vicio de "ultra petita" alegado por el recurrente. Procede, entonces, rechazar la protesta.

II- En el resto del recurso se dedica el impugnante a exponer su criterio de que el bien que en sentencia se ordena restituir al Estado no forma parte de la zona marítimo terrestre, pues fue desafectado por las leyes No. 6919 y 7313 que crearon el Refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional y luego lo ampliaron para incluir el territorio comprendido entre la desembocadura del Río Nosara y Punta Guiones. Según el quejoso, dicho Refugio de Vida Silvestre no constituye un bien demanial, ya que la naturaleza pública solo puede ser adquirida en virtud de una ley formal y no de una disposición del Poder Ejecutivo, cual ocurre con las áreas silvestres protegidas. Tampoco tienen la finalidad de uso público, característica de los bienes demaniales, conforme las previsiones del artículo 261 del Código Civil, sino las de protección de los recursos, conservación del ambiente y promoción de la investigación científica, entre otras. Concluye el defensor que el Refugio de Ostional es de propiedad mixta; que las normas de la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre no le son aplicables y que en virtud de los vaivenes que el tema ha sufrido en el ámbito legislativo, así como los problemas en el amojonamiento y las interpretaciones que el propio recurrente hace de diversas normas, ha de sostenerse que la justiciable no puede ser despojada del bien que ocupa si no es previamente indemnizada. Los reparos son inatendibles. Parte el quejoso de suposiciones erróneas y de la lectura e interpretación incorrectas de las previsiones legales aplicables en este asunto. En primer término, sostiene que, con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 261 del Código Civil, la declaratoria de la naturaleza pública de un bien requiere de una ley formal y no una mera decisión del Poder Ejecutivo, pero luego, de modo incongruente, reconoce que el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional fue creado, no por disposición ejecutiva, sino por ley emitida por la Asamblea Legislativa. En segundo lugar, afirma que el ya fallecido cónyuge de la justiciable compró el terreno situado en Playa Guiones en 1976, de manos de "... un particular que había iniciado un denuncio ante la Municipalidad de Nicoya..." y posteriormente "construyó o mejoró su casita", pues no fue sino en 1981 cuando el Instituto Geográfico Nacional amojonó la playa, señalando el límite de los cincuenta metros (obviamente, de la zona pública). Sin embargo, olvida el defensor que por Ley No. 5602, de 4 de noviembre de 1974 (vigente, entonces, dos años antes de la alegada compra del terreno), se suspendió la vigencia de la antigua "Ley de Urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre" y se dispuso con claridad: "Ninguna playa ni isla, marítima o fluvial, reguladas por la ley Nº 4558 de 22 de abril de 1970, podrá ser vendida, arrendada, ni subarrendada, durante el plazo de suspensión de la vigencia de dicha ley, sin perjuicio únicamente de las prórrogas de derechos de arrendamientos que sean procedentes de conformidad con la ley cuyos efectos se suspenden. Las respectivas municipalidades se abstendrán de conceder permisos de construcción si dichas edificaciones van a ser construidas en terrenos que se poseen como consecuencia de los derechos que otorga la citada ley Nº 4558". Lo anterior significa que desde el año 1974 (aunque en realidad desde mucho antes, como se verá) se sabe, por así disponerlo de forma expresa la ley, que las playas o las islas de la República no pueden ser sometidas al dominio de los particulares y que ni siquiera las personas que hubiesen construido alguna edificación en esas áreas, al supuesto amparo de la ley de urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre, podían transmitir derechos ni, mucho menos, vender terrenos. Por ende, la alegada compra que se supone hecha en el año 1976 constituiría un negocio absolutamente nulo que tuvo por objeto un bien público, en cuanto supusiese una invasión de la zona pública, lo cual basta para descartar la opinión del impugnante de que procede la expropiación o algún tipo de resarcimiento, pues debe tenerse presente que la legislación que se promulgó y puso fin a las normativas relacionadas con la urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre, no fue otra que la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre ahora en vigor (No. 6043, de 2 de marzo de 1977) y en su artículo 71 se indicó con claridad: "Son absolutamente nulos todos los actos, contratos, acuerdos y disposiciones, realizados o tomados, a partir de la promulgación de la ley Nº 5602 de 4 de noviembre de 1974 y que fueren contrarios a sus disposiciones". Sin embargo, y como se adelantó, ha de añadirse que la propia Ley de urbanización turística de la zona marítimo terrestre, No. 4558 de 22 de abril de 1970, antes citada, dispuso en su artículo 6: "Los cincuenta metros de la zona marítimo terrestre a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, serán inalienables y en ningún caso puede ser objeto de arrendamiento o venta. Por lo tanto, nadie puede alegar derecho alguno sobre dicha franja, que estará dedicada a uso público para fines de esparcimiento, recreo o libre circulación. Las construcciones o instalaciones actualmente ubicadas en esa zona, no podrán ser remodeladas y en caso de destrucción de las mismas, las nuevas construcciones deberán respetar esa zona inalienable". De lo dicho se infiere, entonces, que ni aun con arreglo a las previsiones de la ley de urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre podía existir dominio particular sobre la zona pública; sino que se concedía a los municipios el dominio de la zona marítimo terrestre con la posibilidad de arrendar terrenos situados dentro de los ciento cincuenta metros que ahora se conocen como "zona restringida" y venderlos a los arrendatarios transcurridos diez años desde la contratación; pero, se reitera, aquella ley preservó la inalienabilidad de los cincuenta metros que en la actualidad conforman la "zona pública". También se colige de lo expuesto que la tesis del defensor de que el terreno objeto de esta causa (la parte situada dentro de la zona pública), forma parte de un "refugio de vida silvestre mixto", carece de todo asidero lógico o jurídico pues, amén de que el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional fue creado por ley y no por coparticipación estatal y privada, su territorio formaba parte ya de la zona marítimo terrestre mucho tiempo antes de tal creación. Son asimismo erróneos e insostenibles los criterios del quejoso en cuanto al supuesto conflicto entre la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre y los refugios de vida silvestre. Con claridad dispone el artículo 73 de la Ley de la zona marítimo terrestre: "La presente ley no se aplica a las zonas marítimo terrestres, incluidas en los parques nacionales y reservas equivalentes, las cuales se regirán por la legislación respectiva" (la negrita es suplida). No hay, entonces, conflicto de leyes. Las áreas de parques nacionales, refugios y reservas pueden hallarse dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, sin que por tal circunstancia esa zona pierda su nombre (de hecho, así lo expresa la propia norma recién transcrita). Continúan siendo parte de la zona, pero se les asigna un manejo o trato distinto del aplicable al resto de esa zona en el territorio nacional, no solo desde el punto de vista de su gestión administrativa (instituciones diversas a cargo de su administración), sino atendiendo al uso y las finalidades a los que deben responder, de modo que proyectos que podrían realizarse con arreglo a las disposiciones sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, no podrán ejecutarse de acuerdo con la ley de conservación de la vida silvestre u otras normativas especiales y, a la inversa, las finalidades propias de las reservas permitirían el diseño de proyectos ajenos a los propósitos de la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre y abren paso a la participación comunitaria, fomentada en el artículo 17 de la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre; mientras que el artículo 83 de ese mismo texto dispone "La Dirección General de Vida Silvestre tendrá las facultades y deberes que establece la Ley No. 6043, respecto de los Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre que incluyen áreas de la zona marítimo terrestre". La propia ley que creó el Refugio de Ostional (Ley de Conservación de la fauna silvestre, No. 6919 de 17 de noviembre de 1983) lo ubicó "... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo-terrestre que se extiende desde la margen derecha de la desembocadura del Río Nosara hasta la Punta India..." (el resaltado es suplido); en tanto que la Ley No. 7317, de 30 de octubre de 1992 (ley de conservación de la vida silvestre), lo amplió, situándolo "... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo terrestre que se extiende desde Punta India hasta Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste..." (la negrita no aparece en el original). Por lo demás, el tema ha sido objeto de múltiples pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional, algunos citados por el propio impugnante y en el fallo No. [Telf1], de 8:30 horas de 13 de febrero de 2009, la referida Sala destacó de forma expresa que el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional es un "bien de dominio público" que se extiende sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, añadiendo que el Estado tiene el deber de protegerlo y que los particulares que ocupan de modo precario ese bien demanial carecen de derecho de propiedad. No sobra recalcar que la restitución ordenada en la sentencia de mérito se refiere a las áreas comprendidas en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre, las cuales, por las razones aquí expuestas, nunca pudieron ser objeto de adquisición por los particulares. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos el recurso de apelación planteado.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el defensor particular de la imputada. NOTIFÍQUESE.

[Nombre2] GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS [Nombre3] GIOVANNI MENA ARTAVIA JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA C/ M.

OF./ D./ Usurpación de Bienes de Dominio Público IGONZALEZ Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf2]. Fax: [Telf3]. Correo electrónico: [...]