Environmental viability as a non-appealable preparatory actViabilidad ambiental como acto de trámite inimpugnable

*090010151027CA* Res: 000029-F-TC-2011 CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL HACIENDA CASSATION COURT. San José, at nine o'clock on the twenty-second of December, two thousand eleven.

Ordinary proceeding filed in the Contencioso Administrativo Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José by ASOCIACIÓN DE ACUEDUCTO RURAL DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO, represented by its president, Nombre11591, farmer, resident of Limón, and ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO ESPECÍFICA PRO MEJORA DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO, represented by its proxy Nombre165224, single, laborer, resident of Limón; against the STATE, represented by the Procuradora Gloria Solano Martínez, resident of Heredia, and Nombre165225 TICO VERDE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by its president Nombre3455, agronomist, resident of San José. Additionally appearing as special judicial proxy for the Asociación de Acueducto Rural de La Perla de Guácimo, Nombre165226, single, and on behalf of the co-defendant Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima, licensed attorneys Jeffrey Ríos Córdoba, resident of San José, and Alfonso Vargas Araya, resident of Heredia. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the aforementioned exceptions, married and attorneys.

WHEREAS

1.- Based on the facts they set forth and legal provisions they cited, the plaintiffs filed an ordinary lawsuit, so that the judgment declares: "1. This lawsuit is upheld in its entirety. / 2. the (sic) absolute nullity of Resolutions Nos. 766-2008-SETENA; 1664-2008-SETENA, Nombre165227 for containing formal and substantial defects and illegalities to the detriment of the community. / 3. Resolutions numbers 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) and 2500-2007-SETENA be immediately executed; and the technical closure of the properties owned by the company Nombre165225 Tico Verde S.A., located in the (sic) community of La Perla, be carried out. / 4.- That Nombre165228 and MINAET be ordered to pay damages and restitution. / 5.- The officials of SETENA, including the members of the Plenary Commission, be jointly and severally and personally liable; as well as the professionals accredited by Nombre165228 who prepared the environmental impact study".

2.- The defendants answered in the negative. Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima raised the preliminary defense of expiration (caducidad) and the exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in both forms. The State, for its part, raised the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge and the exception of lack of right.

3.- The Pre-Trial Judge, Elías Baltodano Gómez, in interlocutory order with the character of judgment no. 3324-2010 of 11 o'clock, issued at the preliminary hearing held on September 2, 2010, ordered: "The preliminary defense raised by the State is upheld and, consequently, the inadmissibility of the lawsuit is declared according to Article 62.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This resolution is issued without a special award of costs." 4.- The plaintiffs file a cassation appeal with an express indication of the reasons on which they rely to refute the thesis of the Pre-Trial Judge.

5.- In the proceedings before this Court, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Opinion drafted by Judge León Feoli

CONSIDERING

I.- On July 18, 2005, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (hereinafter Nombre165228 or Secretaría Técnica), received the "Preliminary Environmental Assessment Form (FEAP)" for the project Nombre165225 Tico Verde (hereinafter Agroindustrial). Through resolution no. 2941-2005-SETENA, it requested the project developer to submit an Environmental Impact Study (EsIA) for the pineapple plantation project, and for this purpose granted a period of one year starting from October 31, 2005. Through resolution 349-2007-SETENA of February 26, 2007, it granted an additional period of six months from that date. Later, in resolution no. 1866-2007-SETENA at 13:00 on September 12, 2007, it halted the project for not having submitted the EsIA, by virtue of which "…it does not have environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental)." Likewise, of interest, it ordered the developer: a) The submission of a series of requirements, among others, "...6. Copy of the operating permit from the Ministry of Health, land use certificate (carta del uso del suelo) granted by the Municipality of Guácimo.". b) Submit a compensation plan for having begun work without having environmental viability. In resolution no. 2130-2007-SETENA, at 9 hours 4 minutes on October 22, 2007, it ordered the immediate halt of the works and operational tasks of the project "...due to non-compliance with what was ordered […] through Resolution No. 1866-2007, …" Subsequently, in resolution no. 2500-2007-SETENA, at 13 hours 40 minutes on December 13, 2007, it rejected the revocation appeal filed against resolution 1866-2007-SETENA; it warned the company representative "...for the third time, and formally, […] that, if he does not comply with the halt of the project, he could incur the crime of disobedience to authority, without prejudice to the civil and administrative liability he may incur." It also ordered that "…In order to prevent an immediate halt of the project from generating greater negative environmental impacts than the current ones, the developer is requested to submit, within a period of twelve business days […] a Plan for the Technical Closure (Cierre Técnico) of the pineapple planting and cultivation…". Furthermore, it granted a hearing of 10 days to the developer, to present arguments and exculpatory evidence regarding the complaint by "Foro Emaús," that the project continued operating despite the halt ordered in resolutions 1866-2007-SETENA and 2130-2007-SETENA. In resolution no. 766-2008-SETENA, at 16 hours 50 minutes on April 4, 2008, it lifted the project's technical closure "...the developer contributed documentation that remedies deficiencies or omissions of the EsIA, […] therefore the Environmental Impact Study (EsIA), submitted for evaluation by the developer, is approved.". Also, in order to continue with the EsIA evaluation procedure, it requested the fulfillment of a series of requirements. Then, in resolution no. 1585-2008-SETENA, at 9 hours 45 minutes on May 30, 2008, for being out of time, it rejected the revocation appeal filed by "Foro Emaús" against resolution 766-2008-SETENA, and elevated the appeal to the Ministerial Office. Finally, in resolution no. 1664-2008-SETENA, at 9 hours 15 minutes on June 10, 2008, among other aspects, it approved: a) The EsIA and its annex. b) The Sworn Statement of Environmental Commitments and the documentation provided, except for the hydrogeological study which must be submitted in the first oversight report, as well as the appointment of the environmental responsible party. Consequently, it granted environmental viability to the project. The Asociaciones de Acueducto Rural and de Desarrollo Específica, both "of La Perla de Guácimo," filed a lawsuit against the State, seeking the total annulment of resolutions numbers 766-2008-SETENA, Nombre165228 and 1585-2008-SETENA. Likewise, that resolutions 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) and 2500-2007-SETENA be executed, and the technical closure of the properties owned by Agroindustrial, located in the community of La Perla, be carried out. The pre-trial judge deemed the proceeding established against the State and the said company. Both defendants answered in the negative. Nombre165225 raised the preliminary defense of expiration, and the exceptions of lack of right, and lack of standing to sue and to be sued. The State, for its part, raised the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge, as well as that of lack of right. At the preliminary hearing, the pre-trial judge upheld the first defense raised by the State and declared the lawsuit inadmissible based on Article 62, subsection 2) of the CPCA, without a special award of costs. The representatives of the plaintiff Associations appear before this Chamber.

II- They begin with a reference to formal aspects, admissibility and requirements of the appeal. They then continue with a section IV they call "Motivation of the Appeal," which they subdivide as follows: A) "LEGAL REGIME OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN COSTA RICA". In this section, they highlight the importance of having as a reference the environmental impact model defined by national legislation. In this regard, they transcribe, in what is of interest to them, a vote of the Constitutional Chamber, in which it ruled on the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) as a protection instrument, its nature, and the phases it encompasses (a. An initial evaluation; b. Preparation of the EsIA or other evaluation instruments as applicable; and c. Control and monitoring of the activity, work or project through the established environmental commitments). The foregoing, according to Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental –EIA-, hereinafter Reglamento General). In the first stage, the constitutional judgment indicates, from that initial analysis, even a potential environmental viability (which is temporary) can be granted, or its conditioning to the submission of other assessment instruments for said impact. In the second stage, it explains what the EsIA is that the developer of an activity, work, or project must submit, prior to its execution. It then details that the environmental viability corresponds to the act in which the EIA process is approved, whether in its first phase or in the approval phase of the EsIA or the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental, PGA), depending on the activity in question and its merits. Based on the foregoing, the appellants affirm, it is clear that the EIA has become the legal mechanism through which, in consideration of the preventive principle, the State prevents or impedes activities, works, or projects from causing environmental damage. Therefore, they say, a broad regulatory framework has been developed that defines for the interested party the rules by which their project will be evaluated "a.- Article 50 of the Constitución Política and Preventive Principle; / b- International Treaties and other instruments, specifically, the Rio Declaration, whose principles ratify the interest in environmental impact assessment and its preventive nature (Principle 17); / c.- Ley Orgánica del Ambiente No. 7554 (Chapter Four Environmental Impact, arts. 17 to 24); / d.- Reglamento General Sobre la Organización y Funcionamiento de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) Decreto Ejecutivo No. No. (sic) 32631; / f.- Reglamento General Sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental de (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849; …”, as well as the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos para el Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (Manual de EIA), in its Parts I, II, III, IV and V (Decretos Ejecutivos nos. 32079, 32712, 32967, 32966 and 33959, respectively). They continue, as a result of this block of legality, Nombre165228 was granted the competence to environmentally evaluate activities, works, and projects that require it due to the scope of environmental impacts that their development entails. They cite another vote of the Constitutional Chamber, in which it is noted that Nombre165228 has the State's duty to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, under the terms of Article 50 of the Constitución Política. Regarding the administrative conduct of that agency, they highlight: a) by express provision of canon 17 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), by virtue of the preventive principle, its activity must be prior to the start of activities, works, or projects; and b) according to numeral 19 ibidem, its resolutions are binding both for private individuals and for public entities and bodies. They accuse, in the process underlying their appeal, none of these assumptions were respected. They explain that the EIA was not carried out nor was environmental viability granted prior to the pineapple planting, coupled with the fact that there were three resolutions from SETENA, technically grounded, that ordered the technical closure of the Agroindustrial project, which were never fulfilled. They reproach that in the development of the EIA, what is established in numerals 22 and 23 of the LOA regarding citizen participation, the referral of an extract of the EIA to the respective Municipality, and the publicity of information, was also not respected. B) "PARTICULARITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE". They cite doctrine regarding the strengthening of procedures for accessing environmental information and public participation in environmental decision-making processes; they refer to principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, and to a judgment of the Constitutional Chamber on the right to participation and access to environmental justice, which they transcribe in what is of interest. They continue, this principle implies the recognition of three basic guarantees: a) access to environmental information; b) public participation in decision-making; and c) application of environmental law. They emphasize the latter with a quote from doctrine. They emphasize that the violation incurred by the Court lies in considering that it is dealing with an act not subject to challenge because it is not a final act "...when (sic) by all accounts it is (sic) a final act, since it is the resolution that grants environmental viability to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation does not require any other requirement beyond that.". They add, no operating permit from the Ministry of Health is needed, nor is a municipal business license required to operate, so environmental viability is the only requirement requested of them to start operations. Therefore, they consider, it is an act that does create subjective rights and, consequently, is challengeable in this venue. C) "THE JURISDICTIONAL VENUES AVAILABLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER". They outline four constitutional judgments. The first, in which it is indicated that an amparo appeal is not a full venue that has the necessary means of proof to technically evaluate the environmental impact of hydrocarbon extraction activity. The second, referring to the competence of Nombre165228 to determine whether or not a project causes harm to the environment. The third, regarding how it exceeds the object of an amparo appeal to elucidate whether Nombre165228 circumvented environmental regulations on the occasion of an authorization, which constitutes a matter of pure legality. The fourth, relating to the amparo appeal filed for the same facts subject to this proceeding, in which it was indicated that the disagreement with the granting of environmental viability to the project, considering it irregular and illegal, seeking its revocation, must be discussed in the legality venue, where with due breadth it will be possible to determine if the EsIA and the resolution granting viability conform to the regulations applicable to the case. They point out, if in this venue it is resolved that those acts are not subject to challenge, they would be left completely defenseless "...placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to control by any jurisdictional body." Therefore, they affirm, except in cases where there is a violation of Article 50 of the Constitución Política, it has been understood that the appropriate venue to determine whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one. They continue with a section V, which they call "Grounds of the appeal," and which they subdivide as follows. A) "FACTUAL ASPECTS". In this section, they again explain what the matter is about and why the resolution granting environmental viability to the defendant company is being challenged; they affirm it is "...the final resolution of the administrative procedure." They emphasize, in this case there are no subsequent requirements requested from companies dedicated to pineapple cultivation "...The only requirement the State is asking of pineapple companies is environmental viability…." They criticize that at the preliminary hearing the preliminary defense was upheld, fundamentally, because the granting of environmental viability is not a final act. However, it was not analyzed that in this matter one is not in the scenario where subsequently there are other permits or authorizations necessary to carry out that activity. They affirm, it is a final act "...that creates rights, […] that creates a definitive status. No other subsequent permit exists." B) "BREACHES OF LEGALITY IN THE APPEALED JUDGMENT: DIRECT VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND NORMATIVE PROVISIONS". In this subsection they allege: a) violation of the principles "in dubio pro actione" and "10 of the Rio Convention", both due to lack of application. They transcribe, in what is of interest, an excerpt from a judgment of the Constitutional Chamber, in which it is indicated that the first of the cited principles imposes on jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret benignly any formality or procedural requirement that may prevent the issuance of a decision on the merits. They make two citations from the Spanish Constitutional Court. They continue, the questioned judgment has barred the possibility of the full exercise by the plaintiffs, community organizations, of their right to effective judicial protection, specifically, their right to appeal an action of an administrative body such as SETENA. This grants that entity a special regime, because its resolutions could not be reviewed in the contentious-administrative venue. The only appeals that exist are the revocation appeal before it and the appeal before the Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications. Neither can they be appealed before the Constitutional Chamber. They say, the violation of such principles occurs in this matter "...in that when deciding on the admissibility of the lawsuit, the Court has opted to deny it despite admitting that there are sufficient reasons for us to find ourselves […], defending our right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and our right of access to justice.". They transcribe an excerpt, indicating that it is what the Court says in this regard. They point out, the solution that bars or at least hinders access to justice was chosen, thereby violating the indicated principle. The foregoing is even more noticeable if the case is located in the context of environmental law, where a special openness of citizen participation and oversight in the application of those regulations prevails. b) They accuse a breach, due to lack of application, of norms 17 and 19 of the LOA, and of the preventive principle. They transcribe the first of the cardinal articles in two parts, even though the second is not a literal transcription of the indicated norm. They say, that precept was violated because the company began pineapple cultivation planting in 2005 without having environmental viability, which the Court did not consider when issuing its judgment. They explain, EsIAs are preventive tools to minimize environmental damage caused by various human activities. They reproduce part of the definition of EsIAs provided by the Reglamento General. They insist, that study is prior to the execution of the activity, work, or project. They recriminate, by granting environmental viability to the Agroindustrial project, Nombre165228 violated the right of the citizens of the Community of La Perla de Guácimo to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, contained in mandate 50 of the Constitución Política. They emphasize, environmental viability was granted to a company that began activities without this essential requirement; thereby, it is rewarded and the very content of that instrument, which is essentially preventive, is denaturalized. The activity has been operating for more than three years, they affirm, with severe negative impacts on the environment, such as land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), erosion, sedimentation, contamination of water and soil. The appropriate action, they say, is the closure of the activity, the technical closure and the restoration and repair measures at the expense of the violator. Nombre165228 granted environmental viability, without any certainty that there would be no contamination of the aquifers, because the hydrogeological study it had requested was not ready. They continue, that agency disregards three resolutions in which it ordered the technical closure, and grants environmental viability through a resolution lacking the requirements established in precept 19 of the LOA. The technical and legal justification that led Nombre165228 to change its criterion and closure order is surprising to them. c) They accuse a violation, due to lack of application, of provisions 87 of the LOA and 45 of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849. Transcribing the first numeral in what is of interest, they indicate that against the final resolutions of Nombre165228, a revocation appeal lies, as well as an appeal before the Minister of Environment and Energy, in accordance with the provisions of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). They affirm, that is how that Secretaría has understood it. As an example, they note, in resolution 1591-2007-SETENA that they challenge, the availability of both appeals is noted "...in accordance with articles 342 et seq. of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 87 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente". They continue, the same rule is provided in canon 45 of the Reglamento General. From this, they set forth, ordinary appeals are those reserved by the LGAP, for the acts provided in article 345 ibidem, a norm that they accuse was improperly applied, and which they transcribe. They conclude, from the foregoing "...It is clear that the legislator understood that in the case of resolutions from Nombre165228 granting environmental viability, one is faced with a final act of the procedure, which therefore creates a definitive status, specifically, it enables the enjoyment of natural resources under certain conditions defined by the developer together with the environmental authority. / Which evidently was misunderstood by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo and that is why we are appealing its resolution." III.- Prior to the analysis of the charges made, it is pertinent to clarify three important aspects regarding the appealed judgment. 1) First, as verified in the recording of the hearing and in the minute drawn up for that purpose (folio 243 of the case file), both in its considerations and in the operative part of the judgment, the judge bases his decision on norm 62 of the CPCA. In this regard, the following must be clarified. In this matter, the inadmissibility arises by virtue of upholding the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge raised by the State. In this sense, the applicable norm, based on the defense filed and its estimatory effects, is cardinal 92.5 ibidem. Unlike the foregoing, precept 62 alluded to in the judgment actually regulates the inadmissibility of the lawsuit, when it results from an ex officio assessment by the judge. So much so, that precisely that numeral imposes on the official the duty to inform the parties, before declaring it, of the reason on which it is based "...so that, within a period of five business days, they may argue what they deem appropriate and provide any pertinent documents." That is, the CPCA prescribes two routes, with particular regulations according to their origin (ex officio or upon preliminary defense), but with the same effect; inadmissibility, which, in the terms of the Code, will be "...of the lawsuit..." (provision 62) or "...of the proceeding..." (Article 92.5). Regarding the latter, it must be clarified that in reality, technically, as a procedural effect, it is also of the lawsuit. 2) Second, according to the provisions of subsection 5) of mandate 92 idem, when the preliminary defense filed is upheld, the norm states, the judge or pre-trial judge will declare the proceeding inadmissible and order the archiving of the case file; "...in this case, he/she must record, in writing, the full text of the judgment, within a period of five days after the hearing is held." (The underlining is not in the original). The foregoing is also established in canon 62.6.b of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda (Reglamento Autónomo). Having reviewed the case file, this Court observes the judge's non-compliance with that formality, but, it is clarified, the Code does not sanction it with nullity. However, this aspect should not be underestimated for that reason. It is even noteworthy that the judge in his decision considers a judgment of the Sixth Section of that Court, which was issued in writing precisely because it fell under the scenario of the cited numeral 92.5. 3) Comparing the video of the preliminary hearing in which the appealed resolution was issued, with the minute added to the case file (folio 243), the quoted text in the latter is not a literal reproduction of what was orally decided. Indeed, it should be noted that the ruling regarding costs was made through an ex officio addition to the judgment issued immediately after it was delivered, which was not specified in the indicated minute. Although, according to the provisions of norm 63, subsection 1) of the Reglamento Autónomo, "For all legal purposes, the recording of the hearing containing the requirements of Articles 97.3 and 102 of the CPCA, shall constitute the act itself of the appearance made in the preliminary stage or in the oral and public trial...", this does not exempt from the duty that the minute (which is added to the judicial case file), in what it indicates, even more so, in what it literally reproduces, also be a faithful testimony of what happened at the hearing. The foregoing, by virtue of what must be recorded in it (subsection 2) of cardinal 63 idem), which in reality, in the terms of the regulatory norm, is restricted to "...the date and time of the different proceedings carried out in it." It is evident that the previous situations, undoubtedly involuntary on the part of the judge, and which ultimately, in the specific case, do not by themselves cause nullity, nor were they decisive regarding the manner in which this matter is resolved, need to be pointed out by this Court, with the purpose that, hand in hand with the successful consolidation of a new procedure, aspects whose fulfillment and attention strengthen the principle of legal certainty are not left aside.

IV.- Regarding the appeal, it must be remembered that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an appeal), since it is necessary to contrast what was decided with the general infraction that, in the opinion of the appellant, took place. As has been repeatedly stated, this appeal must be self-sufficient in terms of its full understanding, so that this Court can carry out its inherent controlling function and avoid being forced to interpret it, moreover, to perform the work of a trial court, in order to clarify everything that should have been stated explicitly and comprehensibly. In reality, in large part, the appeal focuses more on censuring the resolution challenged in the proceeding, than on refuting, in a timely manner, the judgment of the pre-trial judge which is what is reviewed in this instance.

V.- In this matter, as already indicated, the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge, raised by the State, was upheld. In this sense, it is on this core aspect that the analysis before this Court must focus, specifically, on the grounds supporting the decision. It must be clarified, based on the appellants' considerations, that what is not being discussed here is whether the right to a healthy environment has constitutional roots (mandate 50), or whether people can be informed and participate in the decision-making process in environmental matters (no. 10 Rio Declaration). The pre-trial judge specified that the point to resolve is limited to the nature of the challenged acts. In this sense, he considered the provisions of precept 345 of the LGAP, particularly subsection 3. He then determined that SETENA, through resolutions nos. Nombre165229, lifts a decreed technical closure; Nombre165228, grants environmental viability; and Nombre165227, resolves a revocation appeal. The judge indicated "...the matter here really, I reiterate, is to determine if those resolutions constitute acts of mere procedure or, on the contrary, are final acts or procedural acts with their own effects." (Transcription by this Chamber. Recording from 11:07:26 to 11:07:42).

He then referred to a judgment of the Sixth Section of that Court, which he says, confirmed by this Court of Cassation, in which it was considered that the administrative act granting an environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is a mere procedural act (acto de mero trámite), without its own effects, and it determines a specific circumstance, but does not itself or per se enable the performance of the activity. Based on this, he affirms, environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) does not have an authorizing connotation, “…Indeed, the act granting environmental viability is a mere procedural act…” (Reproduction by this Chamber. Recording from 11:10:46 to 11:10:50). Subsequently, he outlines a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, referring to the fact that procedural acts (actos de trámite) are not separately challengeable, but rather are instrumental to the resolutions, as they prepare them and make them possible. Says the constitutional ruling, it is not that they are not challengeable by themselves, that is, that they constitute a kind of sovereign domain of the Administration that is absolutely unreviewable by recourse. One must await the resolution of the procedure, in order to, through the challenge of that act, be able to raise all potential disagreements that the appellant may have about the manner in which it was processed, as well as about the legality of each and every one of the procedural acts. (Recording from 11:10:50 to 11:12:58). Based on the foregoing, he considered that “…regarding the issue of granting environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental), it is more than clear that it is a pure and simple procedural act, that is, without its own effect. From that perspective, that act as such is simply an act that is not separately challengeable, that is, from the act that will eventually constitute, if it is ever issued, the final act (acto final) of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.” (Transcription by this Chamber. Recording from 11:12:58 to 11:13:28). As for the other two acts, whose nullity is also sought, he qualified them in the same way, he says, with even greater reason. “…It is an act by which Nombre165228 at the time considered that certain conditions were met to lift a technical closure (cierre técnico). It does so, continues with the development of the procedure, and then the party simply challenges an act, I reiterate, nothing more than a procedural one, which was the means by which a series of conditions were deemed fulfilled that, in SETENA’s judgment, warranted lifting a technical closure (cierre técnico) that had been decreed at the time and which, as far as stated in the complaint, had not materialized at any point…” (Transcription by the Chamber. Recording from 11:13:28 to 11:14:10). With reference again to provision 345 of the LGAP, he concludes that they are procedural acts (actos de trámite) but without their own effect, therefore, in accordance with Article 62.1 of the CPCA, they are not challengeable in this venue.

VI.- It is clear that what the appellants seek arises from a series of circumstances that, by virtue of a joint analysis they perform, they believe give them reason in what is sought. 1) That the planting of pineapple began without the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) having been carried out previously, therefore, without having the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). 2) That this is a final act (acto final) that produces subjective rights, therefore, challengeable in this venue. “…it is the resolution that grants environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation requires no other requirement than that. / Let us review the legal requirements that the Legal System requests from activities that produce a high environmental impact, such as pineapple cultivation. No sanitary operating permit from the Ministry of Health is needed, nor is a municipal business license required to operate; therefore, environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is the only requirement requested to start operations…”. They insist that this is not a case where, subsequent to it, other permits or authorizations are necessary to carry out the activity. 3) Administratively, the challenges against said acts were denied. 4) That the Constitutional Chamber remits them to this venue, to discuss with due breadth whether the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental, EsIA) and the resolution that granted environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) conform to applicable regulations. 5) That by denying review of these acts in this court, as they are not susceptible to challenge, they are left in complete defenselessness “…placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to review by any jurisdictional body.” 6) Except in cases where a violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution is involved, it is understood, then, that the appropriate venue to elucidate whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not, is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one.

VII.- The issue raised, namely, the legal nature of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), was indeed already the subject of a pronouncement by this Court. Precisely, it is the one the judge resorted to as support, among others, for his decision. Due to the importance it holds for the subjúdice, it is necessary to transcribe, where relevant, what was considered in that ruling, with the peculiarity that must be noted, in that in that case, it concerned a building permit issue. “…For an administrative act to possess its own legal effects, it must not be subordinate to any later act. It must generate effects on the administered parties, unlike procedural or preparatory acts (actos de trámite o preparatorios) that inform or prepare the issuance of the main administrative act, so that they do not produce any external effect, but only through the latter. Only those that indefinitely suspend or make impossible the continuation of the procedure would be considered challengeable. A prior act may contain a decision, but it really does not resolve the substance; in the case under analysis, the technical aspects rendered are binding for the municipal corporation, which nonetheless may deny the permit for other causes. Hence, Nombre165228’s act does not have its own legal effects; even with a favorable resolution from it, the interested party cannot start the work. Thus, what the cassation appellant reproached is explained, regarding allowing the challenge of Nombre165228’s resolution that rejects the environmental license, as it constitutes a final or definitive act by putting an end to the procedure. Whereas, if it approves it, by itself it possesses no effect, but rather constitutes a requirement to access the corresponding municipal authority to process the construction permit. The latter would be the definitive act, the one that resolves the substantial extreme relating to the administered party's petition, which does not happen with the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) which is a mere requirement. The preventive nature on which one of the grounds for the appeal is based, far from contributing to granting the definitive character to the environmental incidence study, allows a greater understanding of its connotation as a preparatory act. Hence, it constitutes a pure and simple requirement to gain access to the issuance of the definitive act, the one that allows the development of the work.” With reference to Article 17 of the LOA, “…said study is prior and a necessary requirement for certain activities related to works or projects. In this particular case, it is conceived as a requirement to obtain the municipal building permit. Note that obtaining the license does not entail any effect, because if the interested party does not continue with the procedures, but rather is satisfied with this, it has no impact whatsoever. Therefore, contrary to what the appellant holds, this is not a title that enables its holder to exploit natural resources, as it constitutes a step towards the ultimate goal, which is the municipal permit to build. In this sense, it is that act that could be challenged, since, as can be appreciated, it is the one that has its own legal effects and grants a right to the administered party. This is explained because the environmental study is required for the issuance of the final act (acto final), without producing any external effect except through the latter.” (Resolution no. 104-F-TC-2009, at 11:10 a.m. on June 1, 2009).

VIII.- Based on the foregoing, and as there are no elements that motivate changing this Court’s line of reasoning, there is no reason to issue a different resolution in the subjúdice, but with the following clarifications that become indispensable. In its response to the complaint, at its core, the State representation based the preliminary defense raised on the ruling of the Contentious Administrative Court, Sixth Section, in the matter that the judge also considered in his decision. Thus, it referred to the instrumental character of the environmental license with respect to the main process that ultimately allows the exercise of the activity as its final effect, eliminating the possibility of it being considered a final act (acto final), or ultimately, a procedural act with its own effect. It made a transcription, as pertinent, of Considerandos IV, V, and VI of that ruling. However, this Court warns, that representation omits indicating which main process it was referring to. This situation persisted in the preliminary hearing, as it basically reiterated the arguments, with the addition that the indicated pronouncement had been ratified by this Court of Cassation, without, on that occasion either, referring to any main process in particular. For his part, Agroindustrial’s representative, in support of the State’s defense, given the opportunity provided by the processing judge in that sense, stated that “…environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) itself was not what gave the company authorization to continue; it was only to make the determination of environmental impact, as is determined, of an activity, what its impact on the environment will be, and what its mitigation will then be. […] but in itself, on the substance of the matter and the administrative act we are talking about, which although I do not consider to be a mere procedural administrative act, it is nevertheless a formal act that, in itself, what it provides is the possibility of exercising an activity, provided the corresponding administrative authorizations are held. Not that this resolution itself encompasses an administrative authorization to exercise an activity.” (Transcription by this Chamber. Recording from 10:10:26 to 10:11:28). From the above, a relevant situation emerges; both fail to specify which main process or administrative authorizations they refer to (which they were also not asked to specify). Added to this is the fact that the judge, in his considerations, limited himself to pointing out (as support along that line), that “…that act as such, simply is an act not separately challengeable, that is, from the act that will eventually constitute, if it is ever issued, the final act (acto final) of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.” However, similarly, he omits specifying which procedure he was referring to.

IX.- The foregoing leads us to an analysis of the regulatory framework, to support and reaffirm what this Court has already said in this respect, but according to the specific case. 1) The LOA, No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, in Chapter IV “Environmental Impact”, canon 17 “Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental)”, establishes that human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials “…shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) [...] Its prior approval by this body shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects….” (Underlining not in the original). In numeral 20 “Compliance with resolutions”, it indicates that Nombre165228 shall establish instruments and means to follow up on the observance of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) resolutions. “…In cases of violation of its content, it may order the stoppage of works….” When an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) is managed before Nombre165228, that office must compile a file (norms 22, 23, and 24); complete “an evaluation process” (cardinal 22 idem), i.e., analyze them and resolve them within the deadlines set forth by the LGAP (mandate 84, subsection a) ibidem). In precept 87 “Recourses”, it indicates that an appeal for revocation shall lie against the final agreements of SETENA, and an appeal before the Minister of Environment and Energy “…in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).” 2) Biodiversity Law. Article 7 defines the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) as a “Scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting what effects a specific action or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to inform decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global evaluation, the alternatives of greatest environmental benefit, a program for the control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance.” 3) General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) Procedures, Executive Decree No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, of May 24, 2004. In Chapter I “General Provisions”, Article 2 “EIA procedure for activities, works, or projects”, establishes that by its nature and purpose, the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedure “…must have been completed and approved prior to the start of project, work, or activity activities. This is particularly relevant when it concerns the approval of preliminary projects, projects, and segregations for urban or industrial purposes, procedures pertinent to land use (uso del suelo), building permits, and use of natural resources.” Following this, in Article 3, a series of definitions and abbreviations are detailed. Of interest to the matter, and in a logical order, the following are reproduced: “…37. Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA): Administrative scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting what effects an activity, work, or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to inform decision-making. Generally, the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) encompasses three phases: a) the Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI), b) the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) or other corresponding environmental assessment instruments, and c) the Environmental Control and Follow-up of the activity, work, or project through the established environmental commitments. / 35. Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI): Procedure for analyzing the environmental characteristics of the activity, work, or project, with respect to its location, to determine the significance of the environmental impact. It involves the submission of an environmental document signed by the developer (desarrollador), with the character and scope of a sworn statement. From its analysis, the granting of environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental) may derive, or the conditioning of it to the submission of other environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) instruments. / 34. Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA): It is a technical instrument of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), whose purpose is to analyze the proposed activity, work, or project, regarding the environmental condition of the geographic space in which it is proposed and, based on this, predict, identify, and assess the significant environmental impacts that certain actions may cause on that environment and to define the set of environmental measures that allow for their prevention, correction, mitigation, or failing that, compensation, in order to achieve the most harmonious and balanced insertion possible between the proposed activity, work, or project and the environment in which it will be located. (Thus amended the previous section by Article 1 of executive decree N° 32734 of August 09, 2005). / 63. Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental, VLA): Represents the condition of harmonization or acceptable balance, from the standpoint of environmental load (carga ambiental), between the development and execution of an activity, work, or project and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographic space where it is intended to be implemented. From the administrative and legal standpoint, it corresponds to the act approving the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) process, whether in its Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) phase, or Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) phase, or other environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) document. / 64. Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP): It is the environmental approval, of a temporary nature, granted by Nombre165228 to those activities, works, or projects that complete the Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) and still require the submission of other environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) documents for obtaining the definitive environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental, VLA). / 38. Administrative file (Expediente administrativo): Set of documents and information, which may be recorded or produced in written, digital, magnetic tape, or other means, and which is officially submitted to Nombre165228 or generated by it, related to an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedure for an activity, work, or project and which includes: all types of environmental assessment documents, review forms, environmental inspection reports, minutes, official communications, resolutions, technical reports, correspondence, diskettes, compact discs, cassette tapes, and those other documents and information that are officially issued by Nombre165228 or other public authorities or that are submitted by the developer (desarrolladora), third parties, and other interested parties and stakeholders.…” In Chapter II “Initial environmental evaluation (Evaluación ambiental inicial) of activities, works, or projects”, Article 11 “Scope of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedure before SETENA”, it is established that compliance with the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) procedure does not exempt the developer (desarrollador) of an activity, work, or project, from the procedure to be completed before other authorities of the Administration, in accordance with current competencies and regulations, nor from fulfilling the obligations or responsibilities deriving from its management. “…However, obtaining the Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP) would enable the developer (desarrollador) of the activity, work, or project to initiate paperwork before other entities, both public and private, on the understanding that, the commencement of activities as defined in this Regulation, could only occur with the Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental), which would be obtained once the respective phase of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) process is completed, and it fully and integrally complies with the terms of reference and guidelines that Nombre165228 has requested. Said Technical Secretariat, in the document it issues regarding the Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial), must indicate the technical and legal reasons why it will not will not (sic) grant the Potential Environmental Viability (viabilidad ambiental potencial, VAP) to a specific activity, work, or project.” Later, in Chapter III “Environmental impact studies (Estudios de impacto ambienta) (sic) (EsIA)”, in Section III “Granting of environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental)”, regarding its validity (canon 46), it indicates that once granted, it will have a maximum validity of two years “…prior to the start of activities of the activity, work, or project. In the event that, within that period, activities do not start, the developer (desarrollador) must request, prior to expiration, an extension of its validity from SETENA, in accordance with the procedure to be established in the EIA Manual.” X.- Based on all the foregoing, the following must be clarified. 1) By legal imperative, any human activity that alters or destroys elements of the environment or generates waste, toxic or hazardous materials, requires an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) by SETENA. “…Its prior approval, […] shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects.”. 2) In principle, when a developer (desarrollador) obtains the environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental, VLA), it does not imply an endorsement for the start of the activity. Even less so, not having the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA). Precisely, as initially occurred with the project subject to this complaint, such disregard motivated the issuance of Nombre165228’s resolutions that paralyzed the works and operational tasks, and ordered the technical closure (cierre técnico) (nos. 1866-2007-SETENA, 2130-207-SETENA, and 2500-2007-SETENA). 3) As the final act (acto final) of a procedure, the environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental, VLA) has no external incidence for the purpose of being susceptible to challenge, since, by its nature, thus legally and regulatorily determined, it merely approves the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) process, whether in its initial environmental evaluation (evaluación ambiental inicial) phase, or environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental, EsIA) phase, or other environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) document. It is reaffirmed, this is not a title that enables its holder to initiate the activity, meaning it does not constitute nor possess the characteristic of an authorizing act by itself. It is an indispensable prerequisite to be assessed in that other procedure that contemplates, as its final result, the authorization to carry out a specific activity, work, or project. 4) As a final result, that act (the environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental, VLA)) must necessarily be viewed in relation to the other, due to the transversality that characterizes environmental law, in the establishment of rules that make possible a harmonious existence in a balanced and sustainable environment, based on the maxim enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution. It is different when, as this Court already indicated in the precedent so many times alluded to, in the event that the result is the rejection of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental), it does produce a state regarding the petitioner, therefore, it is susceptible to challenge. 5) Finally, given the particularity of this matter, it must be stated that it is not through the nullity of the appealed acts, which by their nature are not susceptible to separate challenge, that the activity, work, or project that, even if holding environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental), pollutes, is to be challenged.

XI.- In merit of all the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (mandate 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA).

POR TANTO

The appeal is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by those who filed it. Let the processing judge take note of what was warned in Considerando III.

Anabelle Léon Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Nombre165204 Proceeding of a declaratory judgment action filed before the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José by **ASOCIACIÓN DE ACUEDUCTO RURAL DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO,** represented by its president, Nombre11591, farmer, resident of Limón, and **ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO ESPECÍFICA PRO MEJORA DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO,** represented by its attorney-in-fact Nombre165224, single, laborer, resident of Limón; against the **STATE**, represented by Procuradora Gloria Solano Martínez, resident of Heredia, and **Nombre165225 TICO VERDE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA**, represented by its president Nombre3455, agronomist, resident of San José. Also appearing are Nombre165226, single, as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the Asociación de Acueducto Rural de La Perla de Guácimo, and attorneys Jeffrey Ríos Córdoba, resident of San José, and Alfonso Vargas Araya, resident of Heredia, on behalf of the co-defendant Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the aforementioned exceptions, married and attorneys.

**WHEREAS** **1.-** Based on the facts they set forth and legal provisions they cited, the plaintiffs filed an ordinary claim, seeking that the judgment declare: *“1. The present claim upheld in all its respects. /* *2. the* (sic) *absolute nullity of Resolutions Nos. 766-2008-SETENA; 1664-2008-SETENA, Nombre165227 for containing formal, substantial, and illegal defects to the detriment of the community.* /* *3. Immediately enforce resolutions numbers 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA* (sic) *and 2500-2007-SETENA; and proceed to the technical closure of the farms owned by the company Nombre165225 Tico Verde S.A., located in the* (sic) *community of La Perla.* /* *4.- That Nombre165228 and MINAET be ordered to pay damages and losses and the consequent restitution.* /* *5.- That the officials of SETENA, including the members of the Plenary Commission, be held jointly and severally and personally liable; as well as the professionals accredited by Nombre165228 who prepared the environmental impact study.”* **2.-** The defendants answered negatively. Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima raised the preliminary defense of expiration and the exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in both modalities. For its part, the State alleged the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge and that of lack of right.

**3.-** The case management judge, Elías Baltodano Gómez, in ruling No. 3324-2010 of 11:00 hours, issued as a final judgment in the preliminary hearing held on September 2, 2010, ordered: *“The preliminary defense raised by the State is upheld, and consequently, the claim is declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 62.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This resolution is issued without a special award of costs.”* **4.-** The plaintiffs filed a cassation appeal with an express indication of the reasons on which they rely to refute the thesis of the Case Management Judge.

**5.-** The procedures before this Tribunal have complied with the provisions of law.

**Drafted by Judge León Feoli** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.-** On July 18, 2005, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (hereinafter Nombre165228 or Secretaría Técnica), received the “Preliminary Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar, FEAP)” form for the Nombre165225 Tico Verde project (hereinafter Agroindustrial). Through resolution No. 2941-2005-SETENA, it requested the project proponent to submit an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) for the pineapple plantation project, granting a one-year term for this purpose starting October 31, 2005. Through resolution 349-2007-SETENA of February 26, 2007, it granted an additional six-month term from that date. Then, in resolution No. 1866-2007-SETENA of 13:00 hours on September 12, 2007, it halted the project for failure to submit the EsIA, by virtue of which it *“…does not have environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental).”* Also, of note, it ordered the developer: a) The submission of a series of requirements, among others, *“…6. Copy of the operating permit from the Ministry of Health, land-use (uso del suelo) certificate granted by the Municipality of Guácimo.”*. b) Submit a compensation plan for having commenced work without environmental viability. In resolution No. 2130-2007-SETENA, of 9:04 hours on October 22, 2007, it ordered the immediate halt of the works and operational activities of the project *“…due to non-compliance with what was ordered* […] *through Resolution No. 1866-2007, …”.* Subsequently, in resolution No. 2500-2007-SETENA, of 13:40 hours on December 13, 2007, it rejected the appeal for reversal filed against resolution 1866-2007-SETENA; it formally warned the company representative *“…**for the third time**, and with formal character,* […] *that, if they fail to **comply with the project halt**, they could incur in a crime of disobedience to authority, without prejudice to the civil and administrative liability incurred.”* It also ordered that *“…In order to avoid that an immediate halt of the project may generate greater negative environmental impacts than the current ones, the developer is requested to submit, within a term of twelve business days* […] *a Technical Closure Plan (Plan de Cierre Técnico) for the sowing and planting of pineapple…”*. Furthermore, it granted a 10-day hearing to the developer to present arguments and exculpatory evidence regarding the complaint by “Foro Emaús” that the project continued operating despite the halt ordered in resolutions 1866-2007-SETENA and 2130-2007-SETENA. In resolution No. 766-2008-SETENA, of 16:50 hours on April 4, 2008, it lifted the technical closure of the project *“…the developer provided documentation that remedies deficiencies or omissions of the EsIA,* […] *therefore the Environmental Impact Study (EsIA), submitted for evaluation by the developer, is approved.”*. Also, in order to continue with the EsIA evaluation procedure, it requested compliance with a series of requirements. Then, in resolution No. 1585-2008-SETENA, of 9:45 hours on May 30, 2008, as untimely, it rejected the appeal for reversal filed by “Foro Emaús” against resolution 766-2008-SETENA, and elevated the appeal to the Ministerial Office. Finally, in resolution No. 1664-2008-SETENA, of 9:15 hours on June 10, 2008, among other aspects, it approved: a) The EsIA and its annex. b) The Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments and the documentation provided, except for the hydrogeological study which was to be submitted in the first oversight report, as well as the appointment of the environmental manager. Consequently, it granted environmental viability to the project. The Asociaciones de Acueducto Rural and de Desarrollo Específica, both *“de La Perla de Guácimo”*, filed a claim against the State, with the purpose of having resolutions numbers 766-2008-SETENA, Nombre165228, and 1585-2008-SETENA annulled in their entirety. Likewise, that resolutions 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) and 2500-2007-SETENA be enforced, and to proceed with the technical closure of the farms owned by Agroindustrial, located in the community of La Perla. The case management judge deemed the proceeding established against the State and the aforementioned company. Both defendants answered negatively. Nombre165225 raised the preliminary defense of expiration, and the exceptions of lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing. For its part, the State alleged the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge, as well as that of lack of right. In the preliminary hearing, the case management judge upheld the first defense raised by the State and declared the claim inadmissible based on Article 62, subsection 2) of the CPCA, without a special award of costs. The representatives of the plaintiff Associations come before this Chamber.

**II-** They begin with a reference to formal aspects, the appropriateness and requirements of the appeal. Then, they continue with a section IV they call “Motivation of the Appeal,” which they subdivide as follows: A) *“LEGAL REGIME OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN COSTA RICA”*. In this, they highlight the importance of having as a reference the environmental impact model defined by national legislation. In that regard, they transcribe, as relevant to their interest, a vote from the Constitutional Chamber, in which it ruled on the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) as an instrument of protection, its nature, and the phases it encompasses (a. An initial evaluation; b. Preparation of the EsIA or other evaluation instruments as appropriate; and c. Control and monitoring of the activity, work, or project through the established environmental commitments). The above, according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental –EIA-, hereinafter Reglamento General). In the first stage, indicates the constitutional ruling, from that initial analysis it can even grant a potential environmental viability (which is temporary) or its conditioning upon the presentation of other instruments for assessing said impact. In the second stage, it explains what the EsIA is that the developer of an activity, work, or project must submit prior to its execution. Then it details that environmental viability corresponds to the act by which the EIA process is approved, whether in its first phase or in the approval phase of the EsIA or the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental, PGA), depending on the activity in question and what it warrants. Based on the above, the appellants affirm, it is clear that the EIA has become the legal mechanism through which, in consideration of the preventive principle, the State prevents or impedes activities, works, or projects from producing environmental damages. Therefore, they say, a broad regulatory framework has been developed that defines for the interested party the rules with which their project will be evaluated *“a.- Article 50 of the Constitución Política and the Preventive Principle; /* *b- International treaties and other instruments, specifically, the Rio Declaration, whose principles ratify the interest of environmental impact assessment and its preventive character (Principle 17); /* *c.- Ley Orgánica del Ambiente No. 7554 (Chapter Four Environmental Impact, arts. 17 to 24); /* *d.- Reglamento General Sobre la Organización y Funcionamiento de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) Decreto Ejecutivo No. No.* (sic) *32631; /* *f.- Reglamento General Sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental de (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849; …”*, as well as the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos para el Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (Manual de EIA), in its Parts I, II, III, IV, and V (Decretos Ejecutivos nos. 32079, 32712, 32967, 32966, and 33959, respectively). They continue, as a result of that block of legality, Nombre165228 was granted the competence to environmentally evaluate activities, works, and projects that require it due to the scope of the environmental impacts their development entails. They cite another vote from the Constitutional Chamber, which indicates that the State's duty to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, under the terms of Article 50 of the Constitución Política, falls upon Nombre165228. Regarding the administrative conduct of that agency, they highlight: a) by express provision of canon 17 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), by virtue of the preventive principle, its activity must be prior to the commencement of activities, works, or projects; and b) according to numeral 19 ibidem, its resolutions are binding both for private parties and for public entities and bodies. They accuse, in the process that grounds their appeal, none of those assumptions were respected. They explain, the EIA was not carried out nor was environmental viability granted prior to the planting of pineapple, coupled with the fact that three technically grounded resolutions from SETENA intervened, ordering the technical closure of the Agroindustrial project, which were never complied with. They reproach, in the development of the EIA, what was established in numerals 22 and 23 of the LOA was also not respected, regarding citizen participation, the referral of an extract of the EIA to the respective Municipality, and the publicity of information. B) *“PARTICULARITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE”*. They cite doctrine regarding the strengthening of procedures to access environmental information and public participation in environmental decision-making processes; they refer to principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, and to a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber on the right to participation and access to environmental justice, which they transcribe as relevant to their interest. They continue, that principle implies the recognition of three basic guarantees: a) access to environmental information; b) public participation in decision-making; and c) application of environmental law. They emphasize the latter with a doctrinal citation. They stress, the violation incurred by the Tribunal lies in considering that it is faced with an act not subject to challenge because it is not a final act *“…when* (sic) *it clearly is* (sic) *a final act, since it is the resolution that grants environmental viability to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation requires no further requirement than that.”*. They add, no operating permit from the Ministry of Health is needed, nor is a municipal license required to operate, thus environmental viability is the only requirement asked of them to commence operations. Therefore, they estimate, it is an act that does produce subjective rights, and hence, challengeable in this forum. C) *“THE JURISDICTIONAL AVENUES AVAILABLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER”*. They review four constitutional rulings. The first, in which it is indicated that amparo is not a full avenue that has at its disposal the necessary evidentiary means to technically evaluate the environmental impact of hydrocarbon extraction activity. The second, referring to the competence of Nombre165228 to determine whether a project entails harm to the environment or not. The third, regarding that it exceeds the purpose of amparo to elucidate whether Nombre165228 circumvented environmental regulations on the occasion of an authorization, which constitutes an issue of mere legality. The fourth, relating to the amparo appeal filed for the same facts subject to this proceeding, in which it was indicated that disagreement with the granting of environmental viability to the project, for considering it irregular and illegal, seeking its revocation, must be discussed in the legality avenue, where with the due breadth it will be possible to determine if the EsIA and the resolution granting viability conform to the regulations applicable to the case. They point out, if in this avenue it is resolved that those acts are not subject to challenge, they would be left completely defenseless *“…placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to control by any jurisdictional body.”* Therefore, they affirm, except in cases where a violation of Article 50 of the Constitución Política is involved, it has been understood that the appropriate avenue to elucidate whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one. They continue with a section V, which they call “Grounds of the appeal,” and subdivide it as follows. A) *“FACTUAL ASPECTS”*. Herein, they again explain what the matter is about, and why the resolution granting environmental viability to the defendant company is challenged, they affirm, *“…final resolution of the administrative process.”*. They emphasize, in this case, there are no subsequent requirements asked of companies dedicated to pineapple cultivation *“…The **only requirement that the State is asking of pineapple companies is environmental viability**….”*. They criticize, in the preliminary hearing, the preliminary defense was upheld, fundamentally, because the granting of environmental viability is not a final act. However, it was not analyzed that in this matter, this is not a case where subsequent to it there exist other permits or authorizations necessary to carry out that activity. They affirm, it is a final act *“…that creates rights, […] that creates State. No other subsequent permit exists.”*. B) *“LEGAL BREACHES IN THE APPEALED RULING: DIRECT VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND NORMATIVE PROVISIONS”*. In this subsection, they allege: a) violation of the principles “in dubio pro actione” and “10 of the Rio Convention,” both due to lack of application. They transcribe, as relevant to their interest, an extract from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, indicating that the first of the cited principles imposes on jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret benignly any formality or procedural requirement that could frustrate the issuance of a ruling on the merits. They make two citations from the Spanish Constitutional Court. They continue, the questioned ruling has prohibited the possibility of the full exercise by the plaintiff, community organizations, of their right to effective judicial protection, specifically, their right to challenge an action by an administrative body such as SETENA. Thereby, that entity is given a special regime, since its resolutions could not be reviewed in the contentious-administrative avenue. The only remedies that exist are the appeal for reversal before it and the appeal before the Minister of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications. Nor can they be appealed before the Constitutional Chamber.

They allege that the violation of these principles occurs in this matter <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in that when deciding on the admissibility of the complaint, the Tribunal opted to deny it despite admitting that there are sufficient grounds for us to find ourselves </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, defending our right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and our right of access to justice.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. They transcribe an excerpt, indicating that it is what the Tribunal says on the matter. They emphasize that the solution chosen prohibits or at least hinders access to justice, thereby violating the indicated principle. The foregoing is more notable if the case is placed in the context of environmental law, where a special opening for citizen participation and oversight prevails in the application of that regulation. b) They accuse breach, for lack of application, of norms 17 and 19 of the LOA, and the preventive principle. They transcribe the first of the articles in two parts, even though the second is not a literal transcription of the indicated norm. They say this precept was violated because the company began planting the pineapple crop in 2005 without having the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), which the Tribunal did not consider when issuing its ruling. They explain that environmental impact assessments (Evaluaciones de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) are preventive tools to minimize the environmental damage caused by various human activities. They reproduce part of the definition of EsIA provided by the General Regulation. They insist that this study is conducted prior to the execution of the activity, work, or project. They reproach that, by granting Nombre165228 the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) for the Agroindustrial project, it violated the right of the citizens of the Community of La Perla de Guácimo to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, contained in mandate 50 of the Political Constitution. They emphasize that the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) was granted to a company that began activities without having this essential requirement, thereby rewarding it and distorting the very content of that instrument, which is essentially preventive. The activity has been operating for more than three years, they state, with severe negative impacts on the environment, such as land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), erosion, sedimentation, contamination of water and soils. The proper course of action, they say, is the closure of the activity, the technical closure, and the restoration and remediation measures at the expense of the offender. Nombre165228 granted the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) without there being certainty that there would be no contamination of the aquifers, because the hydrogeological study it had requested was not ready. They continue, that office disregards three resolutions in which it ordered the technical closure, and grants the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) through a resolution that lacks the requirements established in precept 19 of the LOA. They find the technical and legal justification that led Nombre165228 to change its criterion and closure order strange. c) They accuse violation, for lack of application, of provisions 87 of the LOA and 45 of Executive Decree No. 31849. With a transcription of the first numeral in what concerns them, they indicate that against the final resolutions of Nombre165228, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) is available, as well as an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Minister of Environment and Energy, in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). They state that the Secretariat has understood it this way. As an example, they point out that in resolution 1591-2007-SETENA, which they challenge, the availability of both remedies is noted <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in accordance with articles 342 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration and 87 of the Organic Law of the Environment”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. They continue, the same rule is provided in canon 45 of the General Regulation. Based on this, they explain that the ordinary remedies are those reserved by the LGAP for the acts provided in article 345 ibidem, a norm they accuse of being improperly applied, and which they transcribe. They conclude, from the foregoing <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…It is clear that the legislator understood that in the case of the resolutions of Nombre165228 that grant an environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), one is facing a final act of procedure, which therefore creates a definitive legal status (crea estado), specifically, it enables the enjoyment of natural resources under certain conditions defined by the developer together with the environmental authority. / Which was evidently misunderstood by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal and that is why we are appealing its resolution.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">III.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Prior to the analysis of the charges formulated, it is pertinent to clarify three important aspects regarding the appealed ruling. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> First, as verified in the recording of the hearing and in the minute drawn up for this purpose (folio 243 of the expediente), both in its considerations and in the operative part of the ruling, the judge bases the decision on norm 62 of the CPCA. In this regard, the following must be clarified. In this matter, the inadmissibility arises by virtue of accepting the preliminary defense of an act not susceptible to challenge raised by the State. In this sense, the applicable norm, based on the defense filed and its estimatory effects, is cardinal 92.5 ibidem. Unlike the foregoing, precept 62 alluded to in the ruling actually regulates the inadmissibility of the complaint, when it results from an ex officio assessment by the judge. So much so, that precisely this numeral imposes on the official the duty to inform the parties, before declaring it, of the reason on which it is based <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…so that, within a period of five business days, they may argue what they deem appropriate and accompany the documents that may be necessary.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> That is, the CPCA prescribes two routes, with particular regulations according to their origin (ex officio or upon preliminary defense), but with the same effect; inadmissibility, which, in the terms of the Code, shall be</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…of the complaint…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (provision 62) or </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…of the process…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (article 92.5). Regarding the latter, it must be clarified that in reality, technically, as a procedural effect, it is also of the complaint. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Second, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 5) of mandate 92 idem, when the preliminary defense formulated is accepted, the norm states, the judge-instructor will declare the process inadmissible and order the archiving of the expediente; <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in this case, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">they must record, in writing, the full text of the ruling, within five days after the hearing is held</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">.”</span> (The underline is not from the original). The foregoing is also established in canon 62.6.b of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Reglamento Autónomo). Having reviewed the expediente, this Tribunal observes the judge's non-compliance with that formality, but, it is clarified, the Code does not sanction this with nullity. However, this aspect should not therefore be diminished in importance. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the judge in their decision considers a ruling of the Sixth Section of that Tribunal, which was issued in writing precisely because it fell under the assumption of the cited numeral 92.5. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">3)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Having compared the video of the preliminary hearing in which the appealed resolution was issued, with the minute attached to the expediente (folio 243), the text in quotation marks in the latter is not a literal reproduction of what was decided orally. Indeed, note that the pronouncement regarding costs was made by an ex officio addition to the ruling issued immediately after it was dictated, which was not specified in the indicated minute. Although, in accordance with the provisions of norm 63, subsection 1) of the Autonomous Regulation, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“For all legal purposes, the recording of the hearing containing the requirements of articles 97.3 and 102 of the CPCA shall constitute the very act of the appearance made in the preliminary stage or in the oral and public trial...”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, this does not exempt from the duty that the minute (which is added to the judicial expediente), in what is indicated, even more so, in what is literally reproduced, also be a faithful testimony of what occurred in the hearing. The foregoing, by virtue of what must be recorded in it (subsection 2) of cardinal 63 idem), which in reality, in the terms of the regulatory norm, is restricted to </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“...the date and time of the different actions carried out in it.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It is evident that the previous situations, undoubtedly involuntary on the part of the judge, and which ultimately, in the specific case, do not in themselves cause nullity, nor were they determinative regarding the way this matter is resolved, need to be noted by this Tribunal, with the purpose that alongside the successful consolidation of a new process, aspects whose compliance and attention strengthen the principle of legal certainty are not left aside. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IV.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> As far as the appeal is concerned, it must be remembered that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary remedy (such as the apelación), as it is necessary to contrast what was decided with the general infraction that, in the cassation appellant's opinion, took place. As has been repeatedly pointed out, this appeal must suffice unto itself for its full understanding, so that this Tribunal carries out its proper oversight function and avoids having to be forced to interpret it, even more, to carry out the work of an instance judge, in order to clarify everything that should have been stated explicitly and understandably. In reality, to a large extent, the appeal focuses more on censuring the resolution challenged in the process, than on refuting, in a timely manner, the ruling of the judge-instructor, which is what is reviewed in this instance.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">V.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In this matter, as already indicated, the preliminary defense of an act not susceptible to challenge, raised by the State, was accepted. In this sense, it is on that core aspect that the analysis before this Tribunal must be adjusted, specifically, on the foundations that support the decision. It must be clarified, based on the appellants' considerations, that what is not under discussion here is that the right to a healthy environment has constitutional roots (mandate 50), nor that people may be informed and participate in the decision-making process on environmental matters (no. 10 Rio Declaration). The judge-instructor specified that the point to be resolved is limited to the nature of the challenged acts. In this sense, they considered the provisions of precept 345 of the LGAP, particularly subsection 3. Next, they determined that SETENA, through resolutions nos. Nombre165229, lifts a decreed technical closure; Nombre165228, grants the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental); and Nombre165227, resolves a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria). The judge indicated <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…the matter here in reality, is, I reiterate, to determine whether these resolutions constitute mere procedural acts or, on the contrary, are final acts or procedural acts with their own effects.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 11:07:26 to 11:07:42). Then, they referred to a judgment of the Sixth Section of that Tribunal, which, they say, was confirmed by this Cassation Tribunal, in which it was considered that the administrative act by which an environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) is granted is a mere procedural act, without its own effects, and it arranges a certain circumstance, but does not enable the execution per se of the activity. Based on this, they state, the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) does not have an authorizing connotation, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…Effectively, the act by which the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) is granted is a mere procedural act….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Reproduction of this Chamber. Recording from 11:10:46 to 11:10:50). Subsequently, they review a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, referring to the fact that procedural acts are not challengeable separately, but rather are instrumental to the resolutions, insofar as they prepare them, make them possible. The constitutional ruling says, it is not that they are not challengeable by themselves, that is, that they constitute a sort of sovereign domain of the Administration that is absolutely unauditable through remedies. One must wait for the resolution of the procedure, in order to, through the challenge of that act, be able to raise all the eventual discrepancies that the appellant has about the way in which it was processed, as well as the legality of each and every one of the procedural acts. (Recording from 11:10:50 to 11:12:58). Based on the foregoing, they considered that </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…regarding the issue of granting environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), it is more than clear that it is a pure and simple procedural act, that is, without its own effect. From that perspective, that act as such, is simply an act that is unchallengeable separately, that is, from the act that in due course will constitute, if it is ever issued, the final act of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 11:12:58 to 11:13:28). As for the other two acts, whose nullity is also sought, they were classified in the same way, they say, with even greater reason. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…It is an act by which Nombre165228 at the time considered that certain conditions were being met to lift a technical closure. It does so, continues with the development of the procedure, and then the party simply challenges an act, I reiterate, merely procedural, which was the means by which a series of conditions were deemed fulfilled that, in SETENA's opinion, warranted lifting a technical closure that had been decreed at the time and which, as far as stated in the complaint, had not materialized at any time….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of the Chamber. Recording from 11:13:28 to 11:14:10). With reference again to provision 345 of the LGAP, they conclude that they are procedural acts but without their own effect, therefore, pursuant to article 62.1 of the CPCA, they are unchallengeable in this venue.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It is clear that what the appellants seek arises from a series of circumstances which, by virtue of a joint analysis they carry out, lead them to believe they are right in what they seek. 1) That the planting of pineapple began without the EIA having been previously carried out, therefore, without having the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental). 2) That one is facing a final act that produces subjective rights, therefore, challengeable in this venue. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…it is the resolution that grants environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation does not require any other requirement. / Let us review the legal requirements that the Legal System demands of activities that produce a high environmental impact, such as pineapple cultivation. No sanitary operating permit from the Ministry of Health is needed, nor is a municipal license required to operate, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">therefore environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) is the only requirement</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> requested of them to begin operations…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. They insist, this is not the assumption that after that, there are other permits or authorizations necessary to carry out the activity. 3) That administratively, the challenges against those acts were denied. 4) That the Constitutional Chamber refers them to this venue, to discuss with due breadth whether the EsIA and the resolution that granted the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) comply with the applicable regulations. 5) That by denying the review of those acts in this venue, as they are not susceptible to challenge, they are left in complete defenselessness <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to review by any jurisdictional body.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. 6) Except in cases involving a violation of article 50 of the Political Constitution, it is then understood that the corresponding venue to determine whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The issue raised, namely, the legal nature of the EIA, has indeed already been the subject of a pronouncement by this Tribunal. It is precisely the one that the judge resorted to as support, among others, for their decision. Due to the significance it holds for the sub judice case, it is necessary to transcribe, where pertinent, what was considered in that ruling, with the particularity that must be noted, in that in that case, it was regarding an issue of a construction permit. <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…For an administrative act to possess its own legal effects, it must not be subordinated to any subsequent act. It must generate effects on the administered, unlike procedural or preparatory acts that inform or prepare the issuance of the main administrative act, so they produce no external effect whatsoever, but only through the latter. Only those that indefinitely suspend or make it impossible to continue the procedure would be considered challengeable. A prior act may contain a decision, but in reality it does not resolve the merits; in the case under analysis, the technical aspects provided are binding for the municipal corporation, which nonetheless may deny the permit for other reasons. Hence, the act of Nombre165228 does not have its own legal effects; even with a favorable resolution from it, the interested party cannot begin the work. Thus, what the cassation appellant reproaches is explained, regarding allowing the challenge of the resolution of Nombre165228 that rejects the environmental license, as it constitutes a final or definitive act by putting an end to the procedure. Whereas, if it approves it, it does not possess any effect by itself, but rather constitutes a requirement to apply to the corresponding municipal authority to process the construction permit. That would be the definitive act, the one that resolves regarding the substantial extreme related to the petition of the administered, which does not happen with the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) which is a mere requirement. The preventive nature on which one of the grounds of the appeal rests, far from contributing to granting the environmental impact study the character of definitive, allows for a greater understanding of its connotation as a preparatory act. Hence, it constitutes a pure and simple requirement to access the issuance of the definitive act, the one that allows the development of the work.” </span>With reference to article 17 of the LOA,<span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> “…said study is prior to and a necessary requirement for certain activities related to works or projects. In the present case, it is conceived as a requirement to obtain the municipal construction permit. Note, that if the license is obtained, this does not entail any effect, because if the interested party does not continue with the procedures, but rather is satisfied with this, it has no incidence whatsoever. Therefore, contrary to what the appellant maintains, one is not facing a title that enables its holder to exploit natural resources, as it constitutes a step towards the ultimate end, which is the municipal permit to build. In this sense, it is that act that could be challenged, since as can be seen, it is the one that has its own legal effects and grants a right to the administered. This is explained because the environmental study is required for the issuance of the final act, without producing any external effect except through the latter.”</span> (Resolution No. 104-F-TC-2009, at 11:10 a.m. on June 1, 2009).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Based on the foregoing, and as there are no elements that motivate changing the line of this Tribunal, there is no reason to issue a different resolution in the sub judice case, but with the following clarifications that become indispensable. In the response to the complaint, at its core, the State representation based the preliminary defense filed on the decision of the Contentious Tribunal, Sixth Section, in the matter that the judge also considered in their decision. Thus, they referred to the instrumental nature of the environmental license with respect to the main process that allows, as a final effect, the exercise of the activity, suppressing the possibility that it be considered a final act, or at the very least, a procedural act with its own effect. They made a transcription, in what concerned them, of the considerations IV, V, and VI of that ruling. However, this Tribunal notes that this representation omits to indicate which main process they were referring to. Such situation was maintained in the preliminary hearing, as they basically reiterated the arguments, with the addition that the indicated pronouncement had been ratified by this Cassation Tribunal, without, on that occasion, making reference to any particular main process either. For their part, the representative of Agroindustrial, in support of the State's defense, given the opportunity provided by the judge-instructor in that sense, indicated that <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) in itself, was not what gave authorization to the company to continue, it was merely to determine the environmental impact, as is thus determined, of an activity, what its impact on the environment will be, and what the mitigation thereof will be.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> […] but in itself, regarding the merits of the matter and the administrative act we are talking about, that although I do not consider it to be a mere procedural administrative act either, it is a formal act that in itself, provides the possibility of exercising an activity, provided the corresponding administrative authorizations are held. Not in itself that this resolution encompasses an administrative authorization to be able to exercise an activity.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 10:10:26 to 10:11:28). From the foregoing, a relevant situation emerges; both fail to specify which main process or administrative authorizations they refer to (which they were also not asked to clarify). Added to this is the fact that the judge, in their considerations, limited themselves to pointing out (as support in that line), that “…<span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">that act as such, is simply an act that is unchallengeable separately, that is, from the act that in due course will constitute, if it is ever issued, the final act of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. However, similarly, they omit to specify which procedure they were referring to.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IX.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The foregoing leads us to an analysis of the regulatory framework, to support and reaffirm what this Tribunal has already said on the matter, but in accordance with the particular case.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The LOA, No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, in Chapter IV “Environmental Impact”, canon 17 “Environmental Impact Assessment”, establishes that human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[...] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Its prior approval, by this body, shall be an indispensable requirement to begin the activities, works, or projects</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">….”</span> (The underline is not from the original). In numeral 20 “Compliance with resolutions”, it indicates that Nombre165228 shall establish instruments and means to monitor the observance of the resolutions of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental). <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…In cases of violation of its content, it may order the stoppage of the works….”</span>. When an EIA is processed before Nombre165228, that office must prepare an expediente (norms 22, 23, and 24); complete <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“an evaluation process”</span> (cardinal 22 idem), that is, analyze and resolve them within the periods provided by the LGAP (mandate 84, subsection a) ibidem). In precept 87 “Remedies”, it indicates that a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) may be filed against the final agreements of SETENA, and an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Minister of Environment and Energy <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Public Administration”</span>. 2) Biodiversity Law. In article 7, it defines the EIA as <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“Scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting what effects a specific action or project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighting them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global assessment, the most environmentally beneficial alternatives, a control and minimization program for negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the environmental compliance guarantee.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. 3) General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures (EIA), Executive Decree No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, of May 24, 2004. In Chapter I “General Provisions”, article 2 “EIA Procedure for activities, works, or projects”, establishes that by its nature and purpose, the EIA procedure <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…must have been completed and approved prior to the start of activities of the project, work, or activity.</span></span> This is particularly relevant when it involves the approval of preliminary plans (anteproyectos), projects, and segregations for urban development or industrial purposes, procedures pertinent to land use, construction permits, and the exploitation of natural resources." Subsequently, in Article 3, a series of definitions and abbreviations are detailed. Of interest to the matter, and in a logical order, the following are reproduced: "…**37. Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA):** A scientific-technical administrative procedure that allows for identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work, or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to guide decision-making. Generally, the Environmental Impact Assessment encompasses three phases: a) the Initial Environmental Evaluation, b) the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study or other corresponding environmental assessment instruments, and c) the Environmental Control and Follow-up of the activity, work, or project through the established environmental commitments. / **35. Initial Environmental Evaluation (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI):** An analysis procedure of the environmental characteristics of the activity, work, or project, with respect to its location, to determine the significance of the environmental impact. It involves the submission of an environmental document signed by the developer, with the character and scope of a sworn statement (declaración jurada). From its analysis, the granting of the environmental viability (license) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental) may derive, or the conditioning of the same to the submission of other EIA instruments. / **34. Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA):** It is a technical instrument of the environmental impact assessment, whose purpose is to analyze the proposed activity, work, or project, regarding the environmental condition of the geographic space in which it is proposed and, on this basis, predict, identify, and assess the significant environmental impacts that certain actions may cause on that environment and to define the set of environmental measures that allow for their prevention, correction, mitigation, or, failing that, compensation, in order to achieve the most harmonious and balanced insertion possible between the proposed activity, work, or project and the environment in which it will be located. (Subsection thus amended by Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32734 of August 9, 2005). / **63. Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental, VLA):** Represents the condition of acceptable harmonization or balance, from the point of view of environmental burden, between the development and execution of an activity, work, or project and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographic space where it is intended to be implemented. From an administrative and legal point of view, it corresponds to the act in which the EIA process is approved, whether in its Initial Environmental Evaluation phase, or Environmental Impact Study phase, or another EIA document. / **64. Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP):** It is the temporary environmental approval (visto bueno) that Nombre165228 grants to those activities, works, or projects that undergo the Initial Environmental Evaluation and still require the submission of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA. / **38. Administrative case file (Expediente administrativo):** A set of documents and information, which may be embodied or produced in written, digital, tape-recording, or other media, and which is officially submitted to or generated by Nombre165228, related to an EIA procedure for an activity, work, or project, and which includes: all types of environmental assessment documents, review forms, environmental inspection reports, minutes (actas), official letters (oficios), resolutions (resoluciones), technical reports, correspondence, floppy disks, compact discs, cassettes, and those other documents and information that are officially issued by Nombre165228 or other public authorities or that are submitted by the developer, third parties, and other interested parties and parties involved.…" In Chapter II "Initial Environmental Evaluation of activities, works, or projects," Article 11 "Scope of the EIA procedure before SETENA," it is established that fulfillment of the EIA procedure does not exempt the developer of an activity, work, or project from the procedure to be completed before other Administration authorities, in accordance with current competencies and regulations, nor from complying with its obligations or responsibilities derived from its management. "…However, obtaining the Potential Environmental Viability (VAP) would enable the developer of the activity, work, or project to initiate formalities before other entities, both public and private, on the understanding that the commencement of activities as defined in this Regulation could only occur with the Environmental Viability (License) (VLA), which would be obtained once the respective phase of the EIA process is completed, and it fully and completely complies with the terms of reference and guidelines that Nombre165228 has requested. Said Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica), in the document it issues regarding the Initial Environmental Evaluation, must indicate the technical and legal reasons why it will not grant will not grant (sic) the VAP for a specific activity, work, or project." Next, in Chapter III "Environmental Impact Studies (EsIA)," in Section III "Granting of environmental viability (license)," regarding its validity (canon 46), it indicates that once granted, it will have a maximum validity of two years "…prior to the commencement of activities of the activity, work, or project. In the event that activities do not commence within that period, the developer must, prior to expiration, request an extension of its validity before SETENA, in accordance with the procedure that will be established in the EIA Manual." **X.-** Based on all the foregoing, the following must be specified. 1) By legal mandate, any human activity that alters or destroys elements of the environment or generates waste, toxic or hazardous materials, requires an EIA by SETENA. "…Its prior approval, […] shall be an indispensable requirement to start the activities, works, or projects." 2) In principle, when a developer obtains the VLA (Environmental Viability (License)), it does not imply an endorsement for the start of the activity. Even less so, not having the EIA. Precisely, as initially occurred with the project that is the subject of this lawsuit, such inattention motivated the issuance of the resolutions of Nombre165228 that halted the works and operational tasks, and ordered the technical closure (nos. 1866-2007-SETENA, 2130-207-SETENA, and 2500-2007-SETENA). 3) As the final act of a procedure, the VLA has no external impact for the purposes of being susceptible to challenge (impugnación), since, by its nature, thus determined legally and regulatorily, what it does is approve the EIA process, whether in its initial environmental evaluation phase, or the EsIA, or another EIA document. It is reaffirmed, this is not a title that enables its holder to start the activity; that is, it does not constitute nor possess the characteristic of an authorizing act by itself. It is an indispensable prerequisite to be assessed in that other procedure that contemplates, as its final result, the authorization to carry out a specific activity, work, or project. 4) As a final result, that act (the VLA) must necessarily be viewed in relation to that other procedure, due to the transversality that characterizes environmental law, in establishing rules that make possible a harmonious existence in a balanced and sustainable environment, based on the maxim enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution. It is different when, as this Tribunal already indicated in the precedent so many times alluded to, in the case that the result is the rejection of the environmental viability, it does produce a legal standing with respect to the petitioner; therefore, it is susceptible to challenge. 5) Finally, given the particularity of this matter, it must be indicated that it is not by nullifying the appealed acts, which by their nature are not susceptible to challenge separately, that one may demand action against that activity, work, or project that, even with environmental viability, pollutes.

**XI.-** In virtue of all the foregoing, the appeal is rejected, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (mandate 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The appeal is dismissed (sin lugar) with its costs to be borne by those who filed it. Let the processing judge (juez tramitador) take note of what was advised in Considerando III.

**Anabelle Léon Feoli** **Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** Nombre165204 5.- That SETENA officials, including the members of the Plenary Commission, be held jointly and personally liable; as well as the professionals accredited by Nombre165228 who prepared the environmental impact study." **2.-** The defendants answered negatively. Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima raised the preliminary defense of expiration (caducidad) and the exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in both modalities. For its part, the State alleged the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge and the exception of lack of right.

**3.-** The case management judge, Elías Baltodano Gómez, in ruling no. 3324-2010 of 11:00 a.m., issued at the preliminary hearing held on September 2, 2010, ordered: *"The preliminary defense filed by the State is granted, and consequently, the inadmissibility of the claim is declared pursuant to Article 62.2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. This resolution is issued without a special award of costs."* **4.-** The plaintiffs file a cassation appeal expressly indicating the reasons on which they rely to refute the thesis of the Case Management Judge.

**5.-** The procedures before this Court have observed the prescriptions of law.

**Drafted by Judge León Feoli** **CONSIDERING** **I.-** On July 18, 2005, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, hereinafter Nombre165228 or Technical Secretariat), received the "Preliminary Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar, FEAP)" form for the project Nombre165225 Tico Verde (hereinafter Agroindustrial). By resolution no. 2941-2005-SETENA, it requested the project developer to submit an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) for the pineapple plantation project, and for this purpose granted a period of one year starting from October 31, 2005. By resolution 349-2007-SETENA of February 26, 2007, it granted an additional period of six months from that date. Then, in resolution no. 1866-2007-SETENA of 1:00 p.m. on September 12, 2007, it halted the project for not having submitted the EsIA, by virtue of which it *"...does not have environmental viability."* Likewise, of interest, it ordered the developer: a) The presentation of a series of requirements, among others, *"...6. Copy of the operating permit from the Ministry of Health, land-use certificate (carta del uso del suelo) issued by the Municipality of Guácimo."*. b) To present a compensation plan for having begun work without having environmental viability. In resolution no. 2130-2007-SETENA, of 9:04 a.m. on October 22, 2007, it ordered the immediate stoppage of the construction works and operational tasks of the project *"...due to non-compliance with what was ordered* […] *through Resolution No 1866-2007, …"* Subsequently, in resolution no. 2500-2007-SETENA, of 1:40 p.m. on December 13, 2007, it rejected the motion to revoke filed against resolution 1866-2007-SETENA; it warned the company's representative *"…* ***for the third time***, *and formally,* […] *that, should they* ***fail to comply with the stoppage of the project***, *they could incur the crime of disobedience to authority, without prejudice to any civil and administrative liability incurred."* Also, it ordered that *"...In order to prevent an immediate stoppage of the project from generating negative environmental impacts greater than the current ones, the developer is requested to submit, within a period of twelve working days* […] *a Technical Closure Plan for the sowing and planting of pineapple…"*. Moreover, it granted the developer a 10-day hearing to present arguments and exculpatory evidence regarding the complaint by "Foro Emaús" that the project continued operating despite the stoppage ordered in resolutions 1866-2007-SETENA and 2130-2007-SETENA. In resolution no. 766-2008-SETENA, of 4:50 p.m. on April 4, 2008, it lifted the technical closure of the project *"...the developer provided documentation that remedies deficiencies or omissions in the EsIA, […] therefore the Environmental Impact Study (EsIA), submitted for evaluation by the developer, is approved."*. Also, for the purpose of continuing the EsIA evaluation procedure, it requested compliance with a series of requirements. Then, in resolution no. 1585-2008-SETENA, of 9:45 a.m. on May 30, 2008, as untimely, it rejected the motion to revoke filed by "Foro Emaús" against resolution 766-2008-SETENA, and elevated the appeal to the Ministerial Office. Finally, in resolution no. 1664-2008-SETENA, of 9:15 a.m. on June 10, 2008, among other aspects, it approved: a) The EsIA and its annex. b) The Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments and the documentation provided, except the hydrogeological study which had to be submitted in the first oversight report, as well as the appointment of the environmental manager. Consequently, it granted environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) to the project. The Rural Water Supply and Specific Development Associations, both *"of La Perla de Guácimo"*, filed a claim against the State, seeking the total annulment of resolutions numbers 766-2008-SETENA, Nombre165228 and 1585-2008-SETENA. Likewise, that resolutions 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) and 2500-2007-SETENA be executed, and that the technical closure of the farms owned by Agroindustrial, located in the community of La Perla, be carried out. The case management judge established the proceedings against the State and the aforementioned company. Both defendants answered negatively. Nombre165225 raised the preliminary defense of expiration (caducidad), and the exceptions of lack of right, and of active and passive standing. For its part, the State alleged the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge, as well as that of lack of right. At the preliminary hearing, the case management judge granted the first defense raised by the State and declared the claim inadmissible based on Article 62, subsection 2) of the CPCA, without a special award of costs. The representatives of the plaintiff Associations come before this Chamber.

**II-** They begin with a reference to formal aspects, admissibility, and requirements of the appeal. Then, they continue with a section IV they call "Grounds for the Appeal", which they subdivide as follows: A) *"LEGAL REGIME OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN COSTA RICA"*. In this, they highlight the importance of having the environmental impact assessment model defined by national legislation as a reference. In this sense, they transcribe, as relevant to their interests, a decision of the Constitutional Chamber in which it ruled on the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) as a protective instrument, its nature, and the phases it encompasses (a. An initial evaluation; b. Preparation of the EsIA or other evaluation instruments as appropriate; and c. Control and follow-up of the activity, work, or project through the established environmental commitments). The foregoing, according to Executive Decree no. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, (General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures –EIA–, hereinafter General Regulation). In the first stage, the constitutional ruling indicates, from that initial analysis even a potential environmental viability (which is temporary) can be granted or its conditioning on the submission of other instruments for assessing said impact. In the second stage, it explains what the EsIA is that the developer of an activity, work, or project must submit prior to its execution. It then details that environmental viability corresponds to the act approving the EIA process, whether in its first phase or in the phase of approving the EsIA or the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental, PGA), depending on the activity in question and what it warrants. Based on the foregoing, the appellants assert, it is clear that the EIA has become the legal mechanism through which, pursuant to the preventive principle, the State prevents or impedes activities, works, or projects from causing environmental damage. Therefore, they say, a broad regulatory framework has been developed that defines for the interested party the rules by which their project will be evaluated *"a.- Article 50 of the Political Constitution and the Preventive Principle; / b- Treaties and other international instruments, specifically, the Rio Declaration, whose principles ratify the interest of environmental impact assessment and its preventive nature (Principle 17); / c.- Organic Environmental Law No. 7554 (Chapter Four Environmental Impact, Arts. 17 to 24); / d.- General Regulation on the Organization and Functioning of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) Executive Decree No. No.* (sic) *32631; / f.- General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures, Executive Decree No. 31849; …"*, as well as the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Manual de EIA), in its Parts I, II, III, IV and V (Executive Decrees nos. 32079, 32712, 32967, 32966 and 33959, respectively). They continue, as a result of this block of legality, Nombre165228 was granted the competence to environmentally evaluate activities, works, and projects that so require due to the scope of the environmental impacts that their development entails. They cite another decision of the Constitutional Chamber, in which it is noted that the duty of the State to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, under the terms of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, falls on Nombre165228. Regarding the administrative conduct of that agency, they highlight: a) by express provision of canon 17 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, LOA), by virtue of the preventive principle, its activity must be prior to the start of activities, works, or projects; and b) according to numeral 19 ibidem, its resolutions are binding both on individuals and on public entities and bodies. They accuse, in the process underlying their appeal, none of these assumptions were respected. They explain, the EIA was not carried out nor was environmental viability granted prior to the sowing of the pineapple, coupled with the fact that three resolutions from SETENA, technically grounded, which ordered the technical closure of the Agroindustrial project, were never complied with. They reproach, in the development of the EIA, what was established in numerals 22 and 23 of the LOA regarding citizen participation, the referral of an extract of the EIA to the respective Municipality, and the publicity of information was also not respected. B) *"PARTICULARITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"*. They cite doctrine regarding the strengthening of procedures to access environmental information and public participation in environmental decision-making processes; they refer to principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, and to a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber on the right to participation and access to environmental justice, which they transcribe as relevant. They continue, this principle implies the recognition of three basic guarantees: a) access to environmental information; b) public participation in decision-making; and c) application of environmental law. They highlight the latter with a citation from doctrine. They emphasize, the violation incurred by the Court lies in considering that it is an act not subject to challenge because it is not a final act *"...when* (sic) *it clearly* (sic) *is a final act, since it is the resolution that grants environmental viability to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation requires no other requirement than that."*. They add, no operating permit from the Ministry of Health is needed, nor are they asked for a municipal license to operate, so environmental viability is the only requirement they are asked for to begin operations. For the foregoing, they estimate, it is an act that does create subjective rights, therefore, challengeable through this avenue. C) *"THE JURISDICTIONAL AVENUES ACCESSIBLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER"*. They summarize four constitutional rulings. The first, in which it is indicated that amparo is not a plenary avenue that has the necessary evidentiary means available to technically evaluate the environmental impact of the hydrocarbon extraction activity. The second, referring to the competence of Nombre165228 to determine whether or not a project causes harm to the environment. The third, as to the fact that clarifying whether Nombre165228 circumvented environmental regulations on the occasion of an authorization exceeds the scope of amparo, which constitutes an extreme of mere legality. The fourth, regarding the amparo appeal filed for the same facts that are the subject of this process, in which it was indicated that the disagreement with the granting of environmental viability to the project, considering it irregular and illegal, seeking its revocation, must be discussed in the legality avenue, where with due breadth it can be determined whether the EsIA and the resolution granting viability conform to the regulations applicable to the case. They point out, if it is resolved in this avenue that these acts are not subject to challenge, they would be left completely defenseless *"…placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to control by any jurisdictional body."* For the foregoing, they affirm, except in cases where there is a violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, it has been understood that the appropriate avenue to clarify whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one. They continue with a section V, which they call "Grounds for the appeal", and which they subdivide as follows. A) *"FACTUAL ASPECTS"*. In this, they again explain what the matter is about, and why the resolution granting environmental viability to the defendant company is challenged, they affirm, *"…final resolution of the administrative process."* They emphasize, in this case there are no later requirements that are asked of companies dedicated to pineapple cultivation *"…The* ***only requirement the State is asking of pineapple companies is environmental viability*** *…."* They criticize, at the preliminary hearing the preliminary defense is granted, fundamentally, because the granting of environmental viability is not a final act. However, it was not analyzed that in this matter, it is not under the assumption that after it there are other permits or authorizations necessary to carry out that activity. They affirm, it is a final act *"...that creates rights, […] that creates established situations. There is no other later permit."* B) *"BREACHES OF LEGALITY OF THE APPEALED RULING: DIRECT VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS"*. In this sub-section they allege: a) violation of the principles "in dubio pro actione" and "10 of the Rio Convention", both due to lack of application. They transcribe, as relevant, an excerpt from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, indicating that the first of the cited principles imposes on jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret benignly any procedural formality or requirement that could prevent the issuance of a ruling on the merits. They make two citations from the Spanish Constitutional Court. They continue, the questioned ruling has barred the possibility of the full exercise by the plaintiff party, community organizations, and of their right to effective judicial protection, specifically, their right to challenge an action by an administrative body such as SETENA. With this, that entity is given a special regime, since its resolutions could not be heard in the contentious-administrative avenue. The only remedies that exist are the motion to revoke before it and the appeal before the Minister of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications. They also cannot be challenged before the Constitutional Chamber. They say, the violation of such principles occurs in this matter *"...insofar as when deciding on the admissibility of the claim, the Court has opted to deny it even though it admits that there are sufficient reasons for us to be* […]*, defending our right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and our right of access to justice."*. They transcribe an excerpt, indicating that this is what the Court says in this regard. They point out, the solution that prohibits or at least hinders access to justice was chosen, thereby violating the indicated principle. The foregoing stands out more, if the case is placed in the context of environmental law, where a special openness of citizen participation and oversight in the application of said regulations prevails. b) They accuse a breach, due to lack of application, of norms 17 and 19 of the LOA, and of the preventive principle. They transcribe the first of the articles in two parts, although the second is not a literal transcription of the indicated norm. They say, that precept was violated because the company began planting the pineapple crop in 2005 without having environmental viability, which the Court did not consider when issuing its ruling. They explain, EsIAs are tools of a preventive nature to minimize the environmental damage caused by various human activities. They reproduce part of the definition of EsIAs given by the General Regulation. They insist, this study is prior to carrying out the activity, work, or project. They recriminate, by granting environmental viability to the Agroindustrial project, Nombre165228 violated the right of the citizens of the Community of La Perla de Guácimo to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, contained in mandate 50 of the Political Constitution. They emphasize, environmental viability was granted to a company that began activities without having that essential requirement, thereby rewarding it and denaturing the very content of that instrument, which in essence is preventive. The activity operates for more than three years, they affirm, with severe negative impacts on the environment, such as land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), erosion, sedimentation, contamination of waters and soils. What is appropriate, they say, is the closure of the activity, the technical closure, and the restoration and repair measures at the expense of the offender. Nombre165228 granted environmental viability without certainty that there would be no contamination of the aquifers, because the hydrogeological study it had requested was not ready. They continue, that agency ignores three resolutions in which it ordered the technical closure, and grants environmental viability through a resolution that lacks the requirements established in precept 19 of the LOA. The technical and legal justification that led Nombre165228 to change its criterion and closure order surprises them. c) They accuse violation, due to lack of application, of provisions 87 of the LOA and 45 of Executive Decree no. 31849. With a transcription of the first numeral as relevant, they indicate, against the final resolutions of Nombre165228, a motion to revoke is available, as well as an appeal before the Minister of Environment and Energy, in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). They affirm, this is how that Secretariat has understood it. As an example, they note, in resolution 1591-2007-SETENA which they challenge, it warns of the availability of both remedies *"...in accordance with Articles 342 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration and 87 of the Organic Environmental Law"*. They continue, the same rule is provided in canon 45 of the General Regulation. From this, they state, the ordinary remedies are those reserved by the LGAP, for the acts provided for in Article 345 ibidem, a norm they accuse as unduly applied, and which they transcribe. They conclude, from the foregoing *"...It is clear that the legislator understood that in the case of the resolutions of Nombre165228 that grant environmental viability, one is facing a final act of the procedure, which therefore creates an established situation, specifically, it enables the use of natural resources under certain conditions defined by the developer jointly with the environmental authority. / Which was evidently misunderstood by the Contentious-Administrative Court and that is why we are appealing its resolution."* **III.-** Prior to the analysis of the charges formulated, it is pertinent to specify three important aspects regarding the appealed ruling. **1)** In the first place, as verified in the recording of the hearing and in the minute drawn up for this purpose (folio 243 of the file), both in its considerations and in the operative part of the ruling, the judge bases the decision on norm 62 of the CPCA. In this regard, the following must be clarified. In this matter, the inadmissibility arises by virtue of granting the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge raised by the State. In this sense, the applicable norm, based on the defense filed and its estimatory effects, is canon 92.5 ibidem. Unlike the foregoing, precept 62 alluded to in the ruling actually regulates what pertains to the inadmissibility of the claim, when it results from an ex officio appreciation by the judge.

So much so, that precisely this provision imposes on the official the duty to inform the parties, before declaring it, of the grounds on which it is based </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…so that, within a period of five business days, they may argue what they deem appropriate and submit the relevant documents.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> That is, the CPCA prescribes two avenues, with particular regulations according to their origin (ex officio or in response to a preliminary defense), but with the same effect; inadmissibility, which, in the terms of the Code, shall be</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…of the complaint…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (provision 62) or </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…of the proceeding…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (article 92.5). Regarding the latter, it must be specified that in reality, technically, as a procedural effect, it is also an inadmissibility of the complaint. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Secondly, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 5) of mandate 92 idem, when the preliminary defense filed is upheld, the rule states, the motion judge shall declare the proceeding inadmissible and order the filing of the case file; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in this case, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">he/she must record, in writing, the full text of the judgment, within the period of five days following the holding of the hearing</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (The underlining is not from the original). The foregoing is also established in canon 62.6.b of the Autonomous Regulation for the Organization and Service of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Reglamento Autónomo). Having reviewed the case file, this Court finds that the judge failed to comply with this formality, but, it should be clarified, the Code does not sanction such non-compliance with nullity. However, this aspect should not be considered less important. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the judge, in his decision, considers a ruling of the Sixth Section of this Court, which was issued in writing precisely because it fell under the scenario of the cited provision 92.5. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">3)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> When comparing the video of the preliminary hearing in which the appealed resolution was issued with the minute added to the case file (folio 243), the text quoted in the latter is not a literal reproduction of what was decided orally. Furthermore, note that the ruling regarding costs was made via an ex officio addition to the judgment delivered immediately after it was announced, which was not specified in the mentioned minute. Although, according to the provisions of rule 63, subsection 1) of the Autonomous Regulation, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“For all legal purposes, the recording of the hearing containing the requirements of articles 97.3 and 102 of the CPCA shall constitute the actual minutes of the appearance held in the preliminary stage or in the oral and public trial...”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, this does not exempt from the duty that the minute (which is added to the judicial case file), in what it indicates, and even more so, in what it reproduces literally, must also be a faithful testimony of what occurred at the hearing. The foregoing, by virtue of what must be recorded in it (subsection 2) of cardinal 63 idem), which in reality, in the terms of the regulatory rule, is restricted to </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“...the date and time of the different actions carried out therein.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It is evident that the foregoing situations, undoubtedly unintentional on the part of the judge, and which ultimately, in this specific case, do not by themselves cause nullity, nor were they decisive regarding the manner in which this matter is resolved, need to be noted by this Court, for the purpose of ensuring that, alongside the successful consolidation of a new process, aspects whose compliance and attention strengthen the principle of legal certainty are not neglected. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IV.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> As far as the appeal is concerned, it must be remembered that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an apelación), since it is necessary to contrast the decision with the general violation that, in the opinion of the appellant, took place. As has been repeatedly stated, this appeal must be self-sufficient in terms of its full understanding, so that this Court may carry out the supervisory work that is proper to it and avoid being forced to interpret it, or even more so, to carry out the work of an instance judge, in order to clarify everything that it should have stated explicitly and understandably. In reality, a large part of the appeal focuses more on criticizing the resolution challenged in the proceeding than on refuting, in a specific manner, the ruling of the motion judge, which is the one being reviewed in this instance.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">V.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In this matter, as already indicated, the preliminary defense of an act not susceptible to challenge, raised by the State, was upheld. In this sense, the analysis before this Court must be adjusted to that core aspect, specifically, the grounds supporting the decision. It must be specified, based on the appellants' considerations, that what is not under discussion here is whether the right to a healthy environment has constitutional roots (mandate 50), nor that persons may be informed and participate in the decision-making process on environmental matters (no. 10 Rio Declaration). The motion judge specified that the point to be resolved is limited to the nature of the challenged acts. In this sense, he considered the provisions of precept 345 of the LGAP, particularly subsection 3. Next, he determined that SETENA, through resolutions nos. Nombre165229, lifts a technical closure that was decreed; Nombre165228, grants environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental); and Nombre165227, resolves an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria). The judge stated </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…the issue here, in reality, is, I reiterate, to determine whether those resolutions constitute mere procedural acts or, on the contrary, whether they are final acts or procedural acts with their own effects.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 11:07:26 to 11:07:42). Then, he referred to a judgment from the Sixth Section of this Court, which, he states, was upheld by this Court of Cassation, in which it was considered that the administrative act granting an environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is a mere procedural act, without its own effects, and it provides for a certain circumstance, but does not authorize the performance of the activity by itself or per se. Based on that, he affirms, the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) does not have an authorizing connotation, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…Effectively, the act granting the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is a mere procedural act….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Reproduction of this Chamber. Recording from 11:10:46 to 11:10:50). Subsequently, he reviews a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, referring to the fact that procedural acts are not separately challengeable, but are instrumental to the resolutions, insofar as they prepare them, making them possible. The constitutional ruling states, it is not that they are not challengeable by themselves, as if they constituted a sort of sovereign domain of the Administration that is absolutely unauditable through appeals. One must wait for the resolution of the procedure, in order, through the challenge of that act, to be able to raise all the eventual disagreements that the appellant may have about the manner in which it was processed, as well as about the legality of each and every one of the procedural acts. (Recording from 11:10:50 to 11:12:58). Based on the foregoing, he considered that </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…regarding the issue of granting environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental), it is more than clear that it is a pure and simple procedural act, that is, without its own effect. From this perspective, that act as such is simply an act that is not challengeable separately, that is, from the act that, in due course, will constitute, if it is even issued, the final act of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 11:12:58 to 11:13:28). As for the other two acts, whose nullity is also sought, he classified them in the same way, stating, with even greater reason. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…It is an act by which Nombre165228 at the time considered that certain conditions were being met to lift a technical closure. It does so, the procedure continues, and then the party simply challenges an act, I reiterate, nothing more than a procedural act, which was the means by which a series of conditions were considered fulfilled that, in SETENA's opinion, warranted lifting a technical closure that had at one time been decreed and which, as far as stated in the complaint, had not materialized at any time….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of the Chamber. Recording from 11:13:28 to 11:14:10). Referring again to provision 345 of the LGAP, he concludes that they are procedural acts but not with their own effect, therefore, in accordance with article 62.1 of the CPCA, they are not challengeable in this venue.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> It is clear that what the appellants seek arises from a series of circumstances which, by virtue of a joint analysis they carry out, lead them to believe they are right in their claim. 1) That the planting of pineapple began without the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) having been previously carried out, therefore, without having obtained the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). 2) That we are dealing with a final act that produces subjective rights, therefore, challengeable in this venue. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…it is the resolution that grants environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) to a pineapple planting project for which national legislation requires no further requirement than that. / Let us review the legal requirements that the Legal System demands of activities that produce a high environmental impact, such as pineapple cultivation. A sanitary operating permit from the Ministry of Health is not needed, nor is a municipal patent required to operate, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">therefore, environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is the only requirement</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> that is required of them to initiate operations…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. They insist, this is not a scenario where, subsequent to that, other permits or authorizations are necessary to carry out the activity. 3) Administratively, challenges against those acts were denied. 4) That the Constitutional Chamber referred them to this venue, to discuss with the due breadth, whether the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) and the resolution granting environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) conform to the applicable regulations. 5) That by denying the review of those acts in this venue, because they are not susceptible to challenge, they are left in complete defenselessness </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…placing Nombre165228 in a privileged situation, since its acts are not subject to review by any jurisdictional body.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. 6) Except for cases where a violation of article 50 of the Political Constitution occurs, it is understood then, that the corresponding venue to determine whether the granting of an environmental license is legitimate or not, is the ordinary jurisdiction and not the constitutional one.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The issue raised, namely, the legal nature of EIAs, has indeed already been the subject of a pronouncement by this Court. It is precisely the one the judge relied upon as support, among others, for his decision. Given the importance it holds for the subjúdice, it is necessary to transcribe, where pertinent, what was considered in that ruling, with the particularity that must be noted, that in that case, it concerned a matter of a construction permit. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…For an administrative act to possess its own legal effects, it must not be subordinated to any other subsequent act. It must generate effects on the administered parties, unlike procedural or preparatory acts that inform or prepare the issuance of the main administrative act, so they produce no external effect whatsoever, but only through the latter. Only those that indefinitely suspend or make impossible the continuation of the procedure would be considered challengeable. A prior act may contain a decision, but in reality it does not resolve the merits; in the case under analysis, the technical aspects presented are binding for the municipal corporation, which, however, may deny the permit for other reasons. Hence, the act of Nombre165228 does not have its own legal effects; even with a favorable resolution from it, the interested party cannot begin the work. This explains the complaint by the appellant, regarding the challengeability of the Nombre165228 resolution rejecting the environmental license, as it constitutes a final or definitive act by ending the procedure. Whereas, if it approves it, it does not by itself possess any effect, but rather constitutes a requirement to appear before the corresponding municipal authority to process the construction permit. That would be the definitive act, the one that resolves the substantial extreme relating to the petition of the administered party, which does not happen with the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), which is a mere requirement. The preventive nature on which one of the grounds of the appeal is based, far from contributing to granting the environmental impact study a definitive character, allows one to better understand its connotation as a preparatory act. Hence, it constitutes a pure and simple requirement to access the issuance of the definitive act, the one that allows the work to be developed.” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">With reference to article 17 of the LOA,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> “…said study is prior and a necessary requirement for certain activities pertaining to works or projects. In the present case, it is conceived as a requirement to obtain the municipal construction permit. Note that obtaining the license does not entail any effect, because if the interested party does not continue with the procedures, but merely settles for it, it has no impact whatsoever. Therefore, contrary to what the appellant maintains, this is not a title that enables its holder to exploit natural resources, as it constitutes a step towards the ultimate goal, which is the municipal building permit. In this sense, it is that act which could be challenged, since, as can be seen, it is the one that has its own legal effects and grants a right to the administered party. This is explained because the environmental study is required for the issuance of the final act, without producing any external effect except through the latter.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Resolution no. 104-F-TC-2009, of 11 hours 10 minutes of June 1, 2009).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Based on the foregoing, and as there are no elements that motivate a change in the approach of this Court, there is no reason to issue a different resolution in the subjúdice, but with the following clarifications that become indispensable. In the answer to the complaint, on the core point, the State's representation based the preliminary defense filed on what was decided by the Contentious-Administrative Court, Sixth Section, in the matter that the judge also considered in his decision. Thus, it referred to the instrumental nature of the environmental license regarding the main procedure that allows, as a final effect, the exercise of the activity, eliminating the possibility that it be considered a final act, or in the latter case, a procedural act with its own effect. It transcribed, in what was of interest to it, the recitals IV, V, and VI of that ruling. However, this Court notes, that representation omits to indicate which main procedure it was referring to. This situation persisted in the preliminary hearing, as it basically reiterated the arguments, with the addition that the indicated pronouncement had been ratified by this Court of Cassation, without, on that occasion either, making reference to any particular main procedure. For his part, the representative of Agroindustrial, in support of the State's defense, given the opportunity granted by the motion judge in that regard, indicated that </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) in itself was not what gave the company authorization to continue, it was only to carry out the determination of the environmental impact, as is determined, of an activity, what its impact on the environment will be, and what the mitigation of that will then be.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> […] but in itself, regarding the merits of the matter and the administrative act we are talking about, although I also do not consider it to be a mere procedural administrative act, it is a formal act that in itself, what it provides is the possibility of exercising an activity, provided that the corresponding administrative authorizations are held. Not that this resolution itself encompasses an administrative authorization to be able to exercise an activity.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Transcription of this Chamber. Recording from 10:10:26 to 10:11:28). From the foregoing, a relevant situation emerges; neither of them specifies which main procedure or administrative authorizations they are referring to (which they were also not asked to clarify). Added to this is also the fact that the judge, in his considerations, limited himself to pointing out (as support in this line), that “…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">that act as such, is simply an act that is not challengeable separately, that is, from the act that in due course will constitute, if it is even issued, the final act of a truly complex procedure followed in environmental matters.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. However, in the same way, he omits to specify which procedure he was referring to.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IX.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The foregoing leads us to an analysis of the regulatory framework, to support and reaffirm what has already been said by this Court in this regard, but in accordance with the particular case.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The LOA, no. 7554 of October 4, 1995, in Chapter IV “Environmental Impact”, canon 17 “Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental)”, establishes that human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or dangerous materials </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…will require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[...] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Its prior approval, by this body, will be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (The underlining is not from the original). In provision 20 “Compliance with resolutions”, it indicates that Nombre165228 will establish instruments and means to monitor the observance of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) resolutions. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…In cases of violation of their content, it may order the stoppage of works….”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. When an EIA is processed before Nombre165228, that office must prepare a case file (rules 22, 23, and 24); complete </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“an evaluation process”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (cardinal 22 idem), that is, analyze them and resolve them within the deadlines provided by the LGAP (mandate 84, subsection a) ibidem). In precept 87 “Recursos”, it indicates that an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) shall be available against the firm agreements of SETENA, and an appeal (apelación) before the Minister of Environment and Energy </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…in accordance with the provisions of the Ley General de la Administración Pública”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. 2) Biodiversity Law. Article 7 defines EIA as </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“A scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting which effects a specific action or project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. It includes specific effects, their global evaluation, alternatives of greater environmental benefit, a program for control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. 3) General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) Procedures, Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, of May 24, 2004. In Chapter I “General Provisions”, article 2 “EIA Processing for activities, works, or projects”, establishes that by its nature and purpose, the EIA processing </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…must have been completed and approved prior to the start of the project, work, or activity. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the approval of preliminary projects, projects, and segregations for urban or industrial purposes, procedures related to land use (uso del suelo), construction permits, and the use of natural resources.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Subsequently, in article 3, a series of definitions and abbreviations are detailed. Of interest to the matter, and in a logical order, the following are reproduced: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">37. Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> A scientific-technical administrative procedure that allows identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work, or project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. Generally, the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) encompasses three phases: a) the Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial), b) the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) or other corresponding environmental assessment instruments, and c) the Environmental Control and Monitoring of the activity, work, or project through established environmental commitments. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">/</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">35. Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> An analysis procedure of the environmental characteristics of the activity, work, or project, regarding its location, to determine the significance of the environmental impact. It involves the submission of an environmental document signed by the developer, with the character and scope of a sworn statement (declaración jurada). Its analysis may lead to the granting of environmental viability (licencia) (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental) or the conditioning of the same upon the submission of other EIA instruments. / </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">34. Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> It is a technical instrument of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), whose purpose is to analyze the proposed activity, work, or project, regarding the environmental condition of the geographical space in which it is proposed and, on this basis, to predict, identify, and value the significant environmental impacts that certain actions may cause on that environment and to define the set of environmental measures that allow their prevention, correction, mitigation, or failing that, compensation, in order to achieve the most harmonious and balanced integration possible between the proposed activity, work, or project and the environment in which it will be </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">located. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(As thus amended the preceding subsection by article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32734 of August 9, 2005). </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">/ </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">63. Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental, VLA):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Represents the condition of harmonization or acceptable balance, from the point of view of environmental load, between the development and execution of an activity, work, or project and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographical space where it is intended to be implemented. From the administrative and legal point of view, it corresponds to the act approving the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) process, whether in its Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) phase, or Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) phase, or another EIA document. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">/</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">64. Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> It is the environmental approval, of a temporary nature, that Nombre165228 grants to those activities, works, or projects that complete the Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) and still require the submission of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">/</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">38. Administrative file (Expediente administrativo):</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Set of documents and information, which can be captured or produced in written, digital, magnetic tape, or other means, and which is officially submitted to Nombre165228 or generated by it, related to an EIA procedure for an activity, work, or project and which includes: all types of environmental assessment documents, review forms, environmental inspection reports, minutes (actas), official communications (oficios), resolutions, technical reports, correspondence, diskettes, compact discs, cassettes, and any other documents and information that are officially issued by Nombre165228 or other public authorities or submitted by the developer, third parties, and other interested parties and parties.…”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In Chapter II “Initial environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental inicial) of activities, works, or projects”, article 11 “Scope of EIA processing before SETENA”, it is established that compliance with the EIA procedure does not exempt the developer of an activity, work, or project from the processing required before other Administration authorities, in accordance with current competencies and regulations, nor from complying with the obligations or responsibilities arising from its management.

...However, obtaining the Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP) would enable the developer of the activity, work, or project to begin processing procedures before other entities, both public and private, on the understanding that the start of activities, as defined in this Regulation, could occur only with the Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental), which would be obtained only upon completion of the respective phase of the EIA process, and upon full and complete compliance with the terms of reference and guidelines that the Nombre165228 has requested. Said Technical Secretariat, in the document it issues regarding the Initial Environmental Assessment, must indicate the technical and legal reasons why it will not grant not grant (sic) the VAP to a specific activity, work, or project." Subsequently, in chapter III "Environmental Impact Studies (EsIA)," in Section III "Granting of the environmental viability (license)," regarding its validity (canon 46), it states that once granted, it will have a maximum validity of two years "...prior to the start of activities of the activity, work, or project. Should activities not commence within that period, the developer must request, prior to expiration, an extension of its validity before SETENA, in accordance with the procedure to be established in the EIA Manual." **X.-** Based on all of the foregoing, the following must be clarified. 1) By legal imperative, all human activity that alters or destroys elements of the environment or generates waste, toxic or hazardous materials, requires an EIA by SETENA. "...Its prior approval, [...] shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects." 2) In principle, when a developer obtains the VLA (Environmental Viability (License)), it does not imply an endorsement to start the activity. Still less, the lack thereof does not constitute an endorsement. Precisely, as occurred initially with the project that is the subject of this lawsuit, such neglect prompted the issuance of resolutions from Nombre165228 that halted the works and operational tasks, and ordered a technical closure (nos. 1866-2007-SETENA, 2130-207-SETENA, and 2500-2007-SETENA). 3) As the final act of a procedure, the VLA has no external effect for the purposes of being subject to challenge, given that, by its nature, as legally and regulatorily determined, what it does is approve the EIA process, whether in its initial environmental assessment phase, or the EsIA phase, or another EIA document. It is reaffirmed, this is not a title that enables its holder to start the activity; that is, it does not constitute nor does it bear the characteristic of an authorizing act by itself. It is an indispensable prerequisite to be assessed in that other procedure that contemplates, as the final result, authorization to carry out a specific activity, work, or project. 4) As a final result, that act (the VLA) must necessarily be viewed in light of that other act, due to the cross-cutting nature that characterizes environmental law, in establishing rules that make possible a harmonious existence in a balanced and sustainable environment, based on the maxim enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution. The outcome is different when, as this Court has already indicated in the precedent alluded to so many times, in the event that the result is the denial of the environmental viability, it does produce a state with respect to the petitioner, and is therefore subject to challenge. 5) Finally, given the particularity of this matter, it must be stated that it is not through the annulment of the appealed acts—which by their nature are not susceptible to challenge separately—that one may demand action against that activity, work, or project which, even having the environmental viability, pollutes.

**XI.-** By virtue of all the foregoing, the recourse must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (mandate 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The recourse is dismissed, with costs to be borne by those who filed it. The processing judge shall take note of what was indicated in Considerando III.

**Anabelle Léon Feoli** **Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** Nombre165204

*090010151027CA* Res: 000029-F-TC-2011 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas del veintidós de diciembre de dos mil once.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José por ASOCIACIÓN DE ACUEDUCTO RURAL DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO, representada por su presidente, Nombre11591 , agricultor, vecino de Limón y ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO ESPECÍFICA PRO MEJORA DE LA PERLA DE GUÁCIMO, representada por su apoderado Nombre165224 , soltero, operario, vecino de Limón; contra el ESTADO, representado por la Procuradora Gloria Solano Martínez, vecina de Heredia y Nombre165225 TICO VERDE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por su presidente Nombre3455 , ingeniero agrónomo, vecino de San José. Figuran además, como apoderada especial judicial de la Asociación de Acueducto Rural de La Perla de Guácimo, Nombre165226 , soltera, y por parte de la codemandada Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima, los licenciados Jeffrey Ríos Córdoba, vecino de San José y Alfonso Vargas Araya, vecino de Heredia. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades dichas, casados y abogados.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expusieron y disposiciones legales que citaron, las actoras establecieron demanda ordinaria, a fin de que en sentencia se declare: “1. Con lugar en todos sus extremos la presente demanda. / 2. la (sic) nulidad absoluta de las Resoluciones Nos. 766-2008-SETENA; 1664-2008-SETENA, Nombre165227 por contener vicios formales y sustanciales e ilegales en perjuicio de la colectividad. / 3. De inmediato se ejecuten las resoluciones números 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) y 2500-2007-SETENA; y se proceda al cierre técnico de las fincas propiedad de la empresa Nombre165225 Tico Verde S.A., ubicadas en el (sic) comunidad de La Perla. / 4.- Que se condene a la Nombre165228 y al MINAET al pago de los daños y perjuicios y a la consecuente restitución. / 5.- Se condene de manera solidaria, y de forma personal a los funcionarios de la SETENA, incluyendo los miembros de la Comisión Plenaria; así como a los profesionales acreditados por Nombre165228 que elaboraron el estudio de impacto ambiental”.

2.- Los demandados contestaron negativamente. Nombre165225 Tico Verde Sociedad Anónima opuso la defensa previa de caducidad y las excepciones de falta de derecho y de legitimación en ambas modalidades. Por su parte, el Estado alegó defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación y la de falta de derecho.

3.- El Juez tramitador, Elías Baltodano Gómez, en auto con carácter de sentencia no. 3324-2010 de las 11 horas, dictado en audiencia preliminar celebrada el 2 de setiembre de 2010, dispuso: "Se declara con lugar la defensa previa interpuesta por el Estado y por consiguiente se declara la inadmisibilidad de la demanda según artículo 62.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Se dicta la presente resolución sin especial condenatoria en costas." 4.- Las actoras formulan recurso de casación con indicación expresa de las razones en que se apoyan para refutar la tesis del Juez Tramitador.

5.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal se han observado los prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Magistrada León Feoli

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El 18 de julio de 2005, la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (en lo sucesivo Nombre165228 o Secretaría Técnica), recibió el formulario de “Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar (FEAP)”, del proyecto Nombre165225 Tico Verde (en adelante Agroindustrial). Mediante resolución no. 2941-2005-SETENA, solicitó al proyectista la presentación de un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsIA) para el proyecto de plantación de piña, y a tal efecto le otorgó el plazo de un año a partir del 31 de octubre de 2005. Mediante resolución 349-2007-SETENA de 26 de febrero de 2007, concedió un plazo adicional de seis meses a partir de esa fecha. Luego, en resolución no. 1866-2007-SETENA de las 13 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2007, paralizó el proyecto por no haber presentado el EsIA, en virtud de lo cual “…no cuenta con viabilidad ambiental”. Asimismo, de interés, ordenó al desarrollador: a) La presentación de una serie de requerimientos, entre otros, “…6. Copia del permiso de funcionamiento del Ministerio de Salud, carta del uso del suelo otorgado por la Municipalidad de Guácimo.”. b) Presentar un plan de compensación por haber iniciado labores sin contar con la viabilidad ambiental. En resolución no. 2130-2007-SETENA, de las 9 horas 4 minutos del 22 de octubre de 2007, ordenó la inmediata paralización de las obras y las labores operativas del proyecto “…debido al desacato a lo ordenado […] mediante la Resolución No 1866-2007, …” Posteriormente, en resolución no. 2500-2007-SETENA, de las 13 horas 40 minutos del 13 de diciembre de 2007, rechazó el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto contra la resolución 1866-2007-SETENA; apercibió al representante de la empresa “…por tercera vez, y con carácter formal, […] que, de no acatar la paralización del proyecto, podría incurrir en un delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad civil y administrativa en la que incurra.” También, dispuso que “…Con el fin de evitar que una paralización inmediata del proyecto pueda generar impactos ambientales negativos mayores que los actuales, se solicita al desarrollador presentar, en el plazo de doce días hábiles […] un Plan de Cierre Técnico de la siembra y plantación de piña…”. Además, concedió audiencia por 10 días al desarrollador, para presentar los argumentos y pruebas de descargo respecto de la denuncia de “Foro Emaús”, de que el proyecto continuaba operando a pesar de la paralización ordenada en resoluciones 1866-2007-SETENA y 2130-2007-SETENA. En resolución no. 766-2008-SETENA, de las 16 horas 50 minutos del 4 de abril de 2008, levantó el cierre técnico del proyecto “…el desarrollador aportó documentación que subsana deficiencias u omisiones del EsIA, […] por lo cual se aprueba el Estudio de Impacto Ambienta (EsIA), sometido a evaluación por el desarrollador.”. También, a efecto de continuar con el procedimiento de evaluación al EsIA, solicitó el cumplimiento de una serie de requerimientos. Luego, en resolución no. 1585-2008-SETENA, de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 30 de mayo de 2008, por extemporáneo, rechazó el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto por el “Foro Emaús” contra la resolución 766-2008-SETENA, y elevó el de apelación ante el Despacho Ministerial. Finalmente, en resolución no. 1664-2008-SETENA, de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 10 de junio de 2008, entre otros aspectos, aprobó: a) El EsIA y su anexo. b) La Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales y la documentación aportada, excepto el estudio hidrogeológico que debía ser remitido en el primer informe regencial, así como el nombramiento del responsable ambiental. En consecuencia, otorgó la viabilidad ambiental al proyecto. Las Asociaciones de Acueducto Rural y de Desarrollo Específica, ambas “de La Perla de Guácimo”, formularon demanda contra el Estado, con el objeto de que se anulen de manera total las resoluciones números 766-2008-SETENA, Nombre165228 y 1585-2008-SETENA. Asimismo, se ejecuten las resoluciones 1899-2007-2130-2007-SETENA (sic) y 2500-2007-SETENA, y se proceda al cierre técnico de las fincas propiedad de Agroindustrial, ubicadas en la comunidad de La Perla. El juez tramitador tuvo por establecido el proceso contra el Estado y la referida compañía. Ambos demandados contestaron negativamente. Nombre165225 opuso la defensa previa de caducidad, y las excepciones de falta de derecho, y de legitimación activa y pasiva. Por su parte, el Estado alegó la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación, así como la de falta de derecho. En la audiencia preliminar el juez tramitador acogió la primera de las opuestas por el Estado y declaró inadmisible la demanda con base en el artículo 62, inciso 2) del CPCA, sin especial condenatoria en costas. Acuden ante esta Sala los representantes de las Asociaciones actoras.

II- Inician con una referencia de aspectos formales, procedencia y requisitos del recurso. Luego, prosiguen con un aparte IV que denominan “Motivación del Recuso”, que subdividen de la siguiente manera: A) “RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LA EVALUACIÓN DE IMPACTO AMBIENTAL EN COSTA RICA”. En este, resaltan la importancia de tener como referencia el modelo de impacto ambiental definido por la legislación nacional. En tal sentido, transcriben en lo de su interés un voto de la Sala Constitucional, en que se pronunció sobre la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) como instrumento de protección, su naturaleza, y las fases que abarca (a. Una evaluación inicial; b. Confección del EsIA o de otros instrumentos de evaluación según corresponda; y c. Control y seguimiento de la actividad, obra o proyecto a través de los compromisos ambientales establecidos). Lo anterior, según el Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental –EIA-, en adelante Reglamento General). En la primera etapa, indica el fallo constitucional, de ese análisis inicial se puede otorgar incluso una viabilidad ambiental potencial (que es temporal) o su condicionamiento a la presentación de otros instrumentos de valoración de dicho impacto. En la segunda etapa se explica qué es el EsIA que debe presentar el desarrollador de una actividad, obra o proyecto, de previo a su realización. Luego detalla que la viabilidad ambiental corresponde al acto en que se aprueba el proceso de EIA, ya sea en su primera fase o en la de aprobación del EsIA o del Plan de Gestión Ambiental (PGA), según la actividad que se trate y amerite. A partir de lo anterior, afirman los recurrentes, es claro que la EIA ha pasado a ser el mecanismo jurídico mediante el cual, en atención al principio preventivo, el Estado previene o impide que las actividades, obras o proyectos no produzcan daños ambientales. Por ello, dicen, se ha desarrollado un amplio marco normativo que define al interesado las reglas con las que será evaluado su proyecto “a.- Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política y Principio Preventivo; / b- Tratados y demás instrumentos internacionales, en específico, la Declaración de Río, cuyos principios ratifican el interés de la evaluación de impacto ambiental y su carácter preventivo (Principio 17); / c.- Ley Orgánica del Ambiente No. 7554 (Capítulo Cuarto Impacto Ambiental, arts. 17 a 24); / d.- Reglamento General Sobre la Organización y Funcionamiento de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) Decreto Ejecutivo No. No. (sic) 32631; / f.- Reglamento General Sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental de (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849; …”, así como el Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos para el Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (Manual de EIA), en sus partes I, II, III, IV y V (Decretos Ejecutivos nos. 32079, 32712, 32967, 32966 y 33959, respectivamente). Continúan, como resultado de ese bloque de legalidad, se le otorgó a la Nombre165228 la competencia para evaluar ambientalmente las actividades, obras y proyectos que así lo requieran por el alcance de los impactos ambientales que supone su desarrollo. Citan otro voto de la Sala Constitucional, en que se señala que sobre la Nombre165228 recae el deber del Estado de garantizar un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, en los términos del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. De la conducta administrativa de esa dependencia, destacan: a) por expresa disposición del canon 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), en virtud del principio preventivo, su actividad debe ser previa al inicio de actividades, obras o proyectos; y b) de acuerdo con el numeral 19 ibidem, sus resoluciones son obligatorias tanto para los particulares como para los entes y organismos públicos. Acusan, en el proceso que fundamenta su recurso, ninguno de esos supuestos fueron respetados. Explican, no se realizó la EIA ni se otorgó la viabilidad ambiental de manera previa a la siembra de la piña, aunado a que mediaron tres resoluciones de SETENA, fundamentadas técnicamente, que ordenaron el cierre técnico del proyecto Agroindustrial, que nunca fueron cumplidas. Reprochan, en el desarrollo de la EIA tampoco se respetó lo establecido en los numerales 22 y 23 de la LOA, respecto de la participación ciudadana, la remisión de un extracto de la EIA a la Municipalidad respectiva, y la publicidad de la información. B) “PARTICULARIDADES DE LA JUSTICIA AMBIENTAL”. Hacen una cita de doctrina respecto del fortalecimiento de los procedimientos para acceder a la información ambiental y la participación pública en los procesos de toma de decisiones ambientales; se refieren al principio 10 de la Declaración de Río, y a un fallo de la Sala Constitucional sobre el derecho de participación y acceso a la justicia ambiental, que transcriben en lo de su interés. Continúan, ese principio implica el reconocimiento de tres garantías de base: a) acceso a la información ambiental; b) participación del público en la toma de decisiones; y c) de aplicación del derecho ambiental. Resaltan esta última con una cita de doctrina. Enfatizan, la violación en que incurre el Tribunal, radica en considerar que se está ante un acto no susceptible de impugnación por no tratarse de un acto final “…cuándo (sic) a todas luces sí (sic) un acto final, ya que es la resolución que otorga la viabilidad ambiental a un proyecto de siembra de piña al que la legislación nacional no le pide ningún requisito más que ese.”. Agregan, no se necesita permiso de funcionamiento del Ministerio de Salud, tampoco se les pide patente municipal para operar, por lo que la viabilidad ambiental es el único requisito que se les solicita para iniciar operaciones. Por lo anterior, estiman, es un acto que sí produce derechos subjetivos, por lo tanto, impugnable en esta vía. C) “LAS VÍAS JURISDICCIONALES A QUE SE TIENE ACCESO EN MATERIA AMBIENTAL SEGÚN LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL”. Reseñan cuatro fallos constitucionales. El primero, en que se indica que el amparo no es una vía plena que tenga a disposición los medios probatorios necesarios para evaluar técnicamente el impacto ambiental de la actividad de extracción de hidrocarburos. El segundo, referido a la competencia de la Nombre165228 para determinar si un proyecto acarrea o no un perjuicio en el ambiente. El tercero, en cuanto a que excede el objeto del amparo el dilucidar si la Nombre165228 soslayó la normativa ambiental con ocasión de una autorización, lo que constituye un extremo de mera legalidad. El cuarto, relativo al recurso de amparo interpuesto por los mismos hechos objeto de este proceso, en que se indicó que la inconformidad con el otorgamiento de la viabilidad ambiental al proyecto, por considerarlo irregular e ilegal, pretendiendo su revocatoria, debe discutirse en la vía de legalidad, donde con la amplitud debida se podrá determinar si el EsIA y la resolución que otorgó la viabilidad se ajustan a la normativa aplicable al caso. Puntualizan, si en esta vía se resuelve que esos actos no son susceptibles de impugnación, quedarían en completa indefensión “…colocado a la Nombre165228 en una situación privilegiada, ya que sus actos no son sujetos de control por parte de ningún órgano jurisdiccional.” Por lo anterior, afirman, salvo casos en donde medie una violación del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, se ha entendido que la vía que corresponde para dilucidar si el otorgamiento de una licencia ambiental es o no legítima, es la jurisdicción ordinaria y no la constitucional. Continúan con un apartado V, que denominan “Fundamentos del recurso”, y que lo subdividen de la siguiente manera. A) “ASPECTOS FÁCTICOS”. En este, nuevamente explican de qué trata el asunto, y del por qué se impugna la resolución que otorgó la viabilidad ambiental a la empresa demandada, afirman, “…resolución final del proceso administrativo.” Enfatizan, en este caso no existen requisitos posteriores que se les solicite a las empresas dedicadas al cultivo de la piña “…El único requisito que le está pidiendo el Estado a las empresas piñeras es la viabilidad ambiental….” Critican, en la audiencia preliminar se acoge la defensa previa, en lo fundamental, porque el otorgamiento de la viabilidad ambiental no es un acto final. Sin embargo, no se analizó que en este asunto no se está en el supuesto de que posterior a ello existan otros permisos o autorizaciones necesarias para realizar esa actividad. Afirman, es un acto final “…que crea derechos, […] que crea Estado. No existe ningún otro permiso posterior.” B) “QUEBRANTOS DE LEGALIDAD DEL FALLO RECURRIDO: VIOLACIÓN DIRECTA DE PRINCIPIOS CONSTITUCIONALES Y DISPOSICIONES NORMATIVAS”. En este subinciso alegan: a) violación de los principios “in dubio pro actione” y “10 de la Convención de Río”, ambos por falta de aplicación. Transcriben en lo de su interés, un extracto de un fallo de la Sala Constitucional, en que se indica que el primero de los principios citados, le impone a los órganos jurisdiccionales interpretar de forma benigna cualquier formalidad o requisito procesal que pueda enervar el dictado de un pronunciamiento de fondo. Hacen dos citas del Tribunal Constitucional Español. Continúan, el fallo cuestionado ha vedado la posibilidad del ejercicio pleno de la parte actora, organizaciones comunales, y de su derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, en concreto, su derecho a recurrir una actuación de un órgano administrativo como es la SETENA. Con ello, se le da un régimen especial a esa entidad, pues sus resoluciones no se podrían conocer en la vía contenciosa. Los únicos recursos que existen son el de revocatoria ante ella y el de apelación ante el Ministro de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones. Tampoco pueden ser recurridas ante la Sala Constitucional. Dicen, la violación a tales principios se produce en este asunto “…en el tanto a la hora de decidir sobre la admisibilidad de la demanda, el Tribunal ha optado por denegarla a pesar de que admite que existen suficientes motivos para que nos encontremos […], defendiendo nuestro derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y nuestro derecho de acceso a la justicia.”. Transcriben un extracto, indicando que es lo que dice el Tribunal al respecto. Puntualizan, se eligió la solución que veda o al menos obstaculiza el acceso a la justicia, con lo que se viola el principio indicado. Lo anterior resalta más, si se ubica el caso en el contexto del derecho ambiental, en donde impera una especial apertura de participación y fiscalización ciudadana en la aplicación de la esa normativa. b) Acusan quebranto, por falta de aplicación, de las normas 17 y 19 de la LOA, y del principio preventivo. Transcriben en dos partes el primero de los cardinales, pese a que la segunda no es literal de la norma indicada. Dicen, se violentó ese precepto porque la empresa inició la siembra del cultivo de piña desde el año 2005 sin contar con la viabilidad ambiental, lo que el Tribunal no consideró para emitir su fallo. Explican, los EsIA son herramientas con carácter preventivo para minimizar los daños ambientales que causan las diversas actividades humanas. Reproducen parte de la definición que de los EsIA hace el Reglamento General. Insisten, ese estudio es previo a la realización de la actividad, obra o proyecto. Recriminan, al otorgar Nombre165228 la viabilidad ambiental al proyecto Agroindustrial, violentó el derecho de las y los ciudadanos de la Comunidad de La Perla de Guácimo, de gozar de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, contenido en el mandato 50 de la Constitución Política. Enfatizan, se otorgó la viabilidad ambiental a una empresa que inició actividades sin contar con ese requisito esencial, con ello, se le premia y se desnaturaliza el mismo contenido de ese instrumento, que en esencia es preventivo. La actividad opera por más de tres años, afirman, con impactos negativos severos al ambiente, como el cambio de uso del suelo, la erosión, sedimentación, contaminación de aguas y suelos. Lo procedente, dicen, es la clausura de la actividad, el cierre técnico y las medidas de restauración y reparación a cargo del infractor. Nombre165228 otorgó la viabilidad ambiental, sin existir certeza de que no habría contaminación de los mantos acuíferos, por no estar listo el estudio hidrogeológico que había solicitado. Continúan, esa dependencia desconoce tres resoluciones en las que ordenaba el cierre técnico, y otorga la viabilidad ambiental mediante una resolución que carece de los requisitos establecidos en el precepto 19 de la LOA. Les extraña la justificación técnica y jurídica que llevó a Nombre165228 a variar su criterio y orden de cierre. c) Acusan violación, por falta de aplicación de las disposiciones 87 de la LOA y 45 del Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849. Con transcripción del primer numeral en lo de su interés, indican, contra las resoluciones firmes de la Nombre165228 cabe recurso de revocatoria, así como el de apelación ante el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, de conformidad con lo establecido por la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). Afirman, así lo ha entendido esa Secretaría. Como ejemplo, señalan, en la resolución 1591-2007-SETENA que impugnan, se advierte de la procedencia de ambos recursos “…de conformidad con los artículos 342 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 87 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente”. Continúan, la misma regla se dispone en el canon 45 del Reglamento General. A partir de ello, exponen, los recursos ordinarios son los reservados por la LGAP, para los actos previstos en el artículo 345 ibidem, norma que acusa indebidamente aplicada, y que transcriben. Finalizan, de lo anterior “…Es claro que el legislador entendió que en el caso de las resoluciones de la Nombre165228 que otorgan una viabilidad ambiental, se está frente a un acto final de procedimiento, que por ello, crea estado, en concreto, habilita el disfrute de los recursos naturales en determinadas condiciones definidas por el desarrollador en conjunto con la autoridad ambiental. / Lo que evidentemente fue mal entendido por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y por eso estamos recurriendo su resolución.” III.- De previo al análisis de los cargos formulados, resulta pertinente precisar tres aspectos importantes respecto del fallo recurrido. 1) En primer lugar, según se comprueba en la grabación de la audiencia y en la minuta levantada al efecto (folio 243 del expediente), tanto en sus consideraciones cuanto en el dispositivo del fallo, el juez sustenta lo resuelto en la norma 62 del CPCA. Al respecto, debe aclararse lo siguiente. En este asunto, la inadmisibilidad surge en virtud de acogerse la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación opuesta por el Estado. En tal sentido, la norma aplicable, a partir de la defensa incoada y de sus efectos estimatorios, es el cardinal 92.5 ibidem. A diferencia de lo anterior, el precepto 62 que se alude en el fallo, en realidad regula lo relativo a la inadmisibilidad de la demanda, cuando resulta de una apreciación oficiosa del juzgador. Tanto así, que precisamente ese numeral impone al funcionario el deber de informar a las partes, antes de declararla, el motivo en que se funda “…para que, en el término de cinco días hábiles, aleguen lo que estimen procedente y acompañen los documentos a que haya lugar.” Es decir, el CPCA preceptúa dos vías, con regulaciones particulares según su origen (de oficio o ante defensa previa), pero con el mismo efecto; la inadmisibilidad, que, en los términos del Código, lo será “…de la demanda…” (disposición 62) o “…del proceso…” (artículo 92.5). Respecto del último, debe precisarse que en realidad, técnicamente, como efecto procesal, también lo es de la demanda. 2) En segundo lugar, conforme a lo establecido en el inciso 5) del mandato 92 idem, cuando es acogida la defensa previa formulada, reza la norma, la jueza o el juez tramitador declarará inadmisible el proceso y ordenará el archivo del expediente; “…en este caso, deberá consignar, por escrito, el texto íntegro del fallo, en el plazo de los cinco días posteriores a la realización de la audiencia.” (El subrayado no es del original). Lo anterior también se establece en el canon 62.6.b del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda (Reglamento Autónomo). Revisado el expediente, aprecia este Tribunal el incumplimiento de esa formalidad por parte del juzgador, pero, se aclara, que el Código no sanciona con nulidad. Sin embargo, no por ello debe restarse importancia a ese aspecto. Incluso, llama la atención que el juzgador en su decisión, considera un fallo de la Sección Sexta de ese Tribunal, que fue emitido por escrito precisamente por estar ante el supuesto del citado numeral 92.5. 3) Confrontado el video de la audiencia preliminar en que se dictó la resolución recurrida, con la minuta agregada al expediente (folio 243), el texto entrecomillado en la última no resulta una reproducción literal de lo decidido oralmente. Incluso, obsérvese que el pronunciamiento respecto de las costas, fue mediante una adición de oficio al fallo emitida inmediatamente después de haberse dictado, lo que no se especificó en la indicada minuta. Si bien, conforme a lo establecido en la norma 63, inciso 1) del Reglamento Autónomo, “Para todos los efectos jurídicos, la grabación de la audiencia conteniendo los requisitos de los artículos 97.3 y 102 del CPCA, se constituirá como el acta misma de la comparecencia realizada en la etapa preliminar o en el juicio oral y público...”, ello no exime del deber de que la minuta (que se agrega al expediente judicial), en lo que se indique, más aún, en lo que se reproduzca literalmente, también resulte un testimonio fiel de lo acaecido en la audiencia. Lo anterior, en virtud de lo que en ella debe consignarse (inciso 2) del cardinal 63 idem), que en realidad, en los términos de la norma reglamentaria, se restringe a “...la fecha y hora de las diferentes actuaciones realizadas en ella.” Es evidente que las anteriores situaciones, sin duda, involuntarias del juzgador, y que a la postre, en el caso concreto no causan por sí mismas una nulidad, ni resultaron determinantes respecto de la forma en que se resuelve este asunto, requieren ser advertidas por este Tribunal, con el propósito de que de la mano de la consolidación exitosa de un nuevo proceso, no se dejen de lado aspectos cuyo cumplimiento y atención, fortalecen el principio de seguridad jurídica.

IV.- En lo que al recurso concierne, debe recordarse que esta instancia procesal no corresponde a un recurso ordinario (como es la apelación), pues es necesario el contraste de lo decidido con la infracción general que, en criterio del casacionista, tuvo lugar. Como reiteradamente se ha señalado, este recurso debe bastarse a sí mismo en cuanto a su cabal entendimiento, para que este Tribunal lleve a cabo la labor contralora que le es propia y evitar que tenga que verse obligado a interpretarlo, más aún, realizar una labor de juez de instancia, a fin de esclarecer todo aquello que debió decir de modo explícito y comprensible. En realidad, en gran parte, el recurso se enfoca más a censurar la resolución impugnada en el proceso, que a rebatir, de manera puntual, el fallo del juez tramitador que es el que se revisa en esta instancia.

V.- En este asunto, como ya se indicó, se acogió la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación, opuesta por el Estado. En tal sentido, es sobre ese aspecto medular que debe ajustarse el análisis ante este Tribunal, en concreto, en los fundamentos que sustentan lo decidido. Debe precisarse, a partir de las consideraciones de los recurrentes, que acá no se discute que el derecho a un ambiente sano tenga raigambre constitucional (mandato 50), ni que las personas puedan informarse y participar en el proceso de toma de decisiones en materia ambiental (no. 10 Declaración de Río). El juez tramitador precisó que el punto a resolver se circunscribe a la naturaleza de los actos impugnados. En tal sentido, consideró lo establecido en el precepto 345 de la LGAP, particularmente el inciso 3. En seguida, determinó que la SETENA, mediante las resoluciones nos. Nombre165229, levanta un cierre técnico decretado; Nombre165228, otorga la viabilidad ambiental; y Nombre165227, resuelve un recurso de revocatoria. Indicó el juzgador “…el asunto aquí en realidad, es, reitero, determinar si esas resoluciones constituyen actos de mero trámite o por el contrario, se trata de actos finales o actos de trámite con efectos propios.” (Transcripción de esta Sala. Registro de las 11:07:26 a las 11:07:42). Luego, se refirió a una sentencia de la Sección Sexta de ese Tribunal, que dice, confirmada por este Tribunal de Casación, en la que se consideró, que el acto administrativo mediante el cual se otorga una viabilidad ambiental es un acto de mero trámite, sin efectos propios y dispone una determinada circunstancia, pero no habilita la realización por sí misma o per se de la actividad. A partir de ello, afirma, la viabilidad ambiental no tiene una connotación autorizatoria, “…Efectivamente el acto mediante el cual se otorga la viabilidad ambiental es un acto de mero trámite….” (Reproducción de esta Sala. Registro de las 11:10:46 a las 11:10:50). Posteriormente, reseña un fallo de la Sala Constitucional, referente a que los actos de trámite no son impugnables separadamente, sino que son instrumentales de las resoluciones, en tanto las preparan, las hacen posibles. Dice el fallo constitucional, no es que no sean impugnables por sí mismos, sea que constituyan una suerte de dominio soberano de la Administración que resulte absolutamente infiscalizable por los recursos. Habrá que esperar la resolución del procedimiento, para, a través de la impugnación de ese acto, poder plantear todas las eventuales discrepancias que el recurrente tenga sobre el modo en que este se tramitó, así como, sobre la legalidad de todos y cada uno de los actos de trámite. (Registro de las 11:10:50 a las 11:12:58). Con base en lo indicado, consideró que “…en torno al tema del otorgamiento de la viabilidad ambiental, es más que claro que se trata de un acto de trámite puro y simple, sea, sin efecto propio. Desde esa perspectiva, ese acto como tal, sencillamente es un acto inimpugnable en forma separada, es decir, del acto que en su momento constituirá, si es que llega a dictarse, acto final de un procedimiento verdaderamente complejo que se sigue en materia ambiental.” (Transcripción de esta Sala. Registro de las 11:12:58 a las 11:13:28). En cuanto a los otros dos actos, cuya nulidad también se pretende, los calificó de igual forma, dice, con mayor razón. “…Se trata de un acto mediante el cual la Nombre165228 en su momento consideró que se estaban dando ciertas condiciones para levantar un cierre técnico. Lo hace, prosigue con el desarrollo del procedimiento, y luego la parte lo que sencillamente hace es impugnar un acto, reitero, nada más de trámite, que fue mediante el cual se tuvo por cumplido una serie de condiciones que, en criterio de la SETENA, pues ameritaban levantar un cierre técnico que se había en su momento decretado y que, hasta donde se dice en la demanda, no se había materializado en momento alguno….” (Transcripción de la Sala. Registro de grabación de las 11:13:28 a las 11:14:10). Con referencia nuevamente a la disposición 345 de la LGAP, concluye que son actos de trámite pero no con efecto propio, por ende, conforme al artículo 62.1 del CPCA, son inimpugnables en esta vía.

VI.- Resulta claro que lo pretendido por las recurrentes surge a partir de una serie de circunstancias que, en virtud de un análisis en conjunto que realizan, estiman tener la razón en lo pretendido. 1) Que la siembra de la piña se inició sin que se realizara previamente la EIA, por ende, sin contar con la viabilidad ambiental. 2) Que se está ante un acto final que produce derechos subjetivos, por tanto, impugnable en esta vía. “…es la resolución que otorga la viabilidad ambiental a un proyecto de siembra de piña al que la legislación nacional no le pide ningún requisito más que ese. / Repasemos los requisitos legales que le solicita el Ordenamiento Jurídico a las actividades que producen un alto impacto ambiental como son las de cultivo de piña. No se necesita permiso sanitario de funcionamiento del Ministerio de Salud, tampoco se les pide patente municipal para operar, por lo tanto la viabilidad ambiental es el único requisito que se les solicita para iniciar operaciones…”. Insisten, no se está en el supuesto de que posterior a ello, existan otros permisos o autorizaciones necesarias para realizar la actividad. 3) Administrativamente se denegaron las impugnaciones contra dichos actos. 4) Que la Sala Constitucional los remite a esta vía, para discutir con la amplitud debida, si el EsIA y la resolución que otorgó la viabilidad ambiental se ajustan a la normativa aplicable. 5) Que al denegarse el control de esos actos en esta sede, por no ser susceptibles de impugnación, quedan en completa indefensión “…colocando a la Nombre165228 en una situación privilegiada, ya que sus actos no son sujetos de control por parte de ningún órgano jurisdiccional.”. 6) Salvo los casos en donde medie una violación del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, se entiende entonces, que la vía que corresponde para dilucidar si el otorgamiento de una licencia ambiental es o no legítima, es la jurisdicción ordinaria y no la constitucional.

VII.- El tema planteado, a saber, la naturaleza jurídica de las EIA, en efecto ya fue objeto de pronunciamiento de este Tribunal. Precisamente es al que acudió el juzgador como sustento, entre otros, de su decisión. Por la trascendencia que reviste para el subjúdice, es menester transcribir, en lo oportuno, lo considerado en dicho fallo, con la particularidad que debe ser advertida, en cuanto a que en aquél, lo fue respecto de un tema de permiso de construcción. “…Para que un acto administrativo posea efectos jurídicos propios no debe estar subordinado a ningún otro posterior. Ha de generar efectos sobre los administrados, a diferencia de los de trámite o preparatorios que informan o preparan la emisión del acto administrativo principal, de modo que no producen efecto externo alguno, sino solo a través de este último. Únicamente se considerarían impugnables aquellos que suspenden indefinidamente o hacen imposible la continuación del procedimiento. Puede que un acto previo contenga una decisión, pero en realidad no resuelve el fondo, en el caso de análisis los aspectos técnicos vertidos son vinculantes para la corporación municipal, la cual no obstante, puede denegar el permiso por otras causas. De ahí, el acto de la Nombre165228 no tiene efectos jurídicos propios, aún con una resolución favorable de esta, el interesado no puede iniciar la obra. Así, se explica lo reprochado por el casacionista, en cuanto a que se permita la impugnación de la resolución del Nombre165228 que rechaza la licencia ambiental, pues se constituye en un acto final o definitivo al poner fin al procedimiento. Mientras, que si la aprueba, por si misma no posee efecto alguno, sino que constituye un requisito para acceder ante la autoridad municipal correspondiente a tramitar el permiso de construcción. Ese vendría a ser el acto definitivo, el que resuelve respecto al extremo sustancial relativo a la petición del administrado, lo cual no sucede con la evaluación de impacto ambiental que es un mero requisito. El carácter de prevención sobre el que se apoya uno de los motivos del recurso, lejos de contribuir a otorgarle el carácter de definitivo al estudio de incidencia al ambiente, permite comprender en mayor medida su connotación de acto preparatorio. De ahí, que se constituya en un requisito puro y simple para acceder al dictado del acto definitivo, aquel que permite desarrollar la obra.” Con referencia al artículo 17 de la LOA, “…dicho estudio es previo y una exigencia necesaria para ciertas actividades atinentes a obras o proyectos. En la especie, se concibe como un requisito para obtener el permiso municipal de construcción. Nótese, que de obtenerse la licencia, ello no conlleva ningún efecto, porque si el interesado no continúa con los trámites, sino que se conforma con esta, no tiene incidencia alguna. Por ello, contrario a lo sostenido por la recurrente no se está ante un título que habilite a su titular a explotar los recursos naturales, pues se constituye en un paso hacía el fin último, que es el permiso municipal para edificar. En este sentido, es ese acto el que podría ser impugnado, ya que como se aprecia, es el que tiene efectos jurídicos propios y otorga un derecho al administrado. Esto se explica porque el estudio ambiental, es exigido para la emisión del acto final, sin que produzca ningún efecto externo sino por medio del último.” (Resolución no. 104-F-TC-2009, de las 11 horas 10 minutos del 1° de junio de 2009).

VIII.- A partir de lo anterior, y al no existir elementos que motiven variar la línea de este Tribunal, no hay razón para emitir una resolución diferente en el subjúdice, pero con las siguientes precisiones que se tornan en indispensables. En la contestación de la demanda, en lo medular, la representación estatal sustentó la defensa previa incoada en lo resuelto por el Tribunal Contencioso, Sección Sexta, en el asunto que el juzgador también consideró en su decisión. Así, se refirió al carácter instrumental de la licencia ambiental respecto del proceso principal que permite, como efecto final, el ejercicio de la actividad, suprimiendo la posibilidad de que sea considerado un acto final, o en último caso, uno de trámite con efecto propio. Realizó una transcripción, en lo de su interés, de los considerandos IV, V y VI de ese fallo. Sin embargo, advierte este Tribunal, omite esa representación indicar a cuál proceso principal se refería. Tal situación se mantuvo en la audiencia preliminar, pues básicamente reiteró los argumentos, con la adición de que el indicado pronunciamiento había sido ratificado por este Tribunal de Casación, sin que tampoco, en esa ocasión, hiciera referencia a algún proceso principal en particular. Por su parte, el representante de Agroindustrial, en apoyo a la defensa del Estado, ante la posibilidad que le dio el juez tramitador en ese sentido, indicó que “…la viabilidad ambiental en sí, no fue la que dio autorización a la empresa para continuar, nada más era para hacer la determinación del impacto ambiental, como así se determina, de una actividad, cuál va a ser su impacto al medio ambiente, y cuál va a ser la mitigación entonces de ello. […] pero en sí, sobre el fondo del asunto y el acto administrativo de que estamos hablando, que si bien yo no considero que sea también un acto administrativo de mero trámite, pero si un acto formal que en sí, lo que da es la posibilidad de ejercer una actividad, siempre y cuando se tengan las autorizaciones administrativas correspondientes. No en sí que esta resolución en ella encierra una autorización administrativa para poder ejercer una actividad.” (Transcripción de esta Sala. Registro de las 10:10:26 a las 10:11:28). De lo anterior, se desprende una situación relevante; ambos no especifican a cuál proceso principal o autorizaciones administrativas se refieren (lo que tampoco les fue solicitado precisar). A ello se suma también el hecho de que el juzgador, en sus consideraciones, se limitó a señalar (como sustento en esa línea), que “…ese acto como tal, sencillamente es un acto inimpugnable en forma separada, es decir, del acto que en su momento constituirá, si es que llega a dictarse, acto final de un procedimiento verdaderamente complejo que se sigue en materia ambiental.”. Sin embargo, de igual manera, omite especificar a cuál procedimiento se refería.

IX.- Lo anterior, nos lleva a un análisis del marco normativo, para sustentar y reafirmar lo ya dicho por este Tribunal al respecto, pero acorde al caso particular. 1) La LOA, no 7554 de 4 de octubre de 1995, en el capítulo IV “Impacto Ambiental”, canon 17 “Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental”, establece que las actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos “…requerirán una evaluación de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental [...] Su aprobación previa, de parte de este organismo, será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos….” (El subrayado no es del original). En el numeral 20 “Cumplimiento de las resoluciones”, señala que la Nombre165228 establecerá instrumentos y medios para dar seguimiento a la observancia de las resoluciones de la evaluación de impacto ambiental. “…En los casos de violación de su contenido, podrá ordenar la paralización de las obras….”. Cuando se gestione ante la Nombre165228 una EIA, esa dependencia debe confeccionar un expediente (normas 22, 23 y 24); cumplir “un proceso de evaluación” (cardinal 22 idem), sea, analizarlas y resolverlas dentro de los plazos previstos por la LGAP (mandato 84, inciso a) ibidem). En el precepto 87 “Recursos”, señala que cabrá recurso de revocatoria contra los acuerdos firmes de la SETENA, y de apelación ante el Ministro del Ambiente y Energía “…de conformidad con lo establecido por la Ley General de la Administración Pública”. 2) Ley de Biodiversidad. En el artículo 7 define a la EIA como “Procedimiento científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente una acción o proyecto específico, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. Incluye los efectos específicos, su evaluación global, las alternativas de mayor beneficio ambiental, un programa de control y minimización de los efectos negativos, un programa de monitoreo, un programa de recuperación, así como la garantía de cumplimiento ambiental.”. 3) Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, de 24 de mayo de 2004. En el Capítulo I “Disposiciones Generales”, artículo 2° “Trámite de EIA para actividades, obras o proyectos”, establece que por su naturaleza y finalidad, el trámite de la EIA “…debe haberse completado y aprobado de previo al inicio de actividades del proyecto, obra o actividad. Esto es particularmente relevante cuando se trate de la aprobación de anteproyectos, proyectos y segregaciones con fines urbanísticos o industriales, trámites pertinentes al uso del suelo, permisos constructivos y aprovechamiento de recursos naturales.” De seguido, en el artículo 3, se detalla una serie de definiciones y abreviaciones. De interés al asunto, y en un orden lógico, se reproducen las siguientes: “…37. Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA): Procedimiento administrativo científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente, una actividad, obra o proyecto, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. De forma general, la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, abarca tres fases: a) la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, b) la confección del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o de otros instrumentos de evaluación ambiental que corresponda, y c) el Control y Seguimiento ambiental de la actividad, obra o proyecto a través de los compromisos ambientales establecidos. / 35. Evaluación Ambiental Inicial (EAI): Procedimiento de análisis de las características ambientales de la actividad, obra o proyecto, con respecto a su localización para determinar la significancia del impacto ambiental. Involucra la presentación de un documento ambiental firmado por el desarrollador, con el carácter y los alcances de una declaración jurada. De su análisis, puede derivarse el otorgamiento de la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental o en el condicionamiento de la misma a la presentación de otros instrumentos de la EIA. / 34. Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsIA): Es un instrumento técnico de la evaluación de impacto ambiental, cuya finalidad es la de analizar la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto, respecto a la condición ambiental del espacio geográfico en que se propone y, sobre esta base, predecir, identificar y valorar los impactos ambientales significativos que determinadas acciones puedan causar sobre ese ambiente y a definir el conjunto de medidas ambientales que permitan su prevención, corrección, mitigación, o en su defecto compensación, a fin de lograr la inserción más armoniosa y equilibrada posible entre la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto y el ambiente en que se localizará. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1° del decreto ejecutivo N° 32734 del 09 de agosto de 2005). / 63. Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental (VLA): Representa la condición de armonización o de equilibrio aceptable, desde el punto de vista de carga ambiental, entre el desarrollo y ejecución de una actividad, obra o proyecto y sus impactos ambientales potenciales, y el ambiente del espacio geográfico donde se desea implementar. Desde el punto de vista administrativo y jurídico, corresponde al acto en que se aprueba el proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, ya sea en su fase de Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, o de Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o de otro documento de EIA. / 64. Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP): Es el visto bueno ambiental, de tipo temporal, que otorga la Nombre165228 a aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos que realizan la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial y todavía requieren de la presentación de otros documentos de EIA para la obtención de la VLA definitiva. / 38. Expediente administrativo: Conjunto de documentos e información, que pueden plasmarse o producirse de manera escrita, digital, magnetofónica u otros medios y que es presentado a la Nombre165228 oficialmente o generado por esta, relacionados con un procedimiento de EIA de una actividad, obra o proyecto y que incluye: todos los tipos de documentos de evaluación ambiental, formularios de revisión, reportes de inspecciones ambientales, actas, oficios, resoluciones, informes técnicos, correspondencia, disquetes, discos compactos, casetes y aquellos otros documentos e información que sean emitidos de forma oficial por la Nombre165228 u otras autoridades públicas o que sean presentados por la desarrolladora, terceros y demás interesados y partes.…” En el capítulo II “Evaluación ambiental inicial de actividades, obras o proyectos”, artículo 11° “Alcance del trámite del EIA ante la SETENA”, se establece que el cumplimiento del procedimiento de EIA no exime al desarrollador de una actividad, obra o proyecto, del trámite a cumplir ante otras autoridades de la Administración, de conformidad con las competencias y normativas vigentes, ni de cumplir con sus obligaciones o responsabilidades que de su gestión deriven. “…Sin embargo, la obtención de la Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP) habilitaría al desarrollador de la actividad, obra o proyecto para iniciar gestiones de trámites ante otras entidades tanto públicas como privadas, en el entendido de que, el inicio de actividades tal y como se define en este Reglamento, podría darse únicamente con la Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental, la cual se obtendría hasta que se finalice con la respectiva fase del proceso de EIA, y cumpla de forma cabal e íntegra con los términos de referencia y lineamientos que la Nombre165228 ha solicitado. Dicha Secretaría Técnica, en el documento que emita respecto a la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, deberá indicar las razones técnicas y legales por las que no otorgará no otorgará (sic) la VAP a una actividad, obra o proyecto determinado.”. Luego, en el capítulo III “Los estudios de impacto ambienta (EsIA), en la Sección III “Otorgamiento de la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental”, en cuanto a su vigencia (canon 46), señala que una vez otorgada tendrá una validez máxima de dos años “…de previo al inicio de actividades de la actividad, obra o proyecto. En caso de que, en ese plazo, no se inicien las actividades, el desarrollador deberá requerir, de previo al vencimiento, una prórroga de su vigencia ante la SETENA, conforme con el procedimiento que se establecerá en el Manual del EIA”.

X.- A partir de todo lo anterior, debe precisarse lo siguiente. 1) Por imperativo de ley, toda actividad humana que altere o destruya elementos del ambiente o genere residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligros, requiere una EIA por parte de la SETENA. “…Su aprobación previa, […] será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos.”. 2) En tesis de principio, cuando un desarrollador obtiene la VLA (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental), no implica un aval para el inicio de la actividad. Menos aún, el no contar con el EIA. Precisamente, como ocurrió inicialmente con el proyecto objeto de esta demanda, tal desatención motivó la emisión de las resoluciones de Nombre165228 que paralizaban las obras y labores operativas, y ordenaron el cierre técnico (nos. 1866-2007-SETENA, 2130-207-SETENA, y 2500-2007-SETENA). 3) Como acto final de un procedimiento, la VLA no tiene incidencia externa a los efectos de resultar pasible de impugnación, toda vez que, por su naturaleza, así determinada legal y reglamentaria, lo que hace es aprobar el proceso de EIA, ya sea en su fase de evaluación ambiental inicial, o de EsIA o de otro documento de EIA. Se reafirma, no se está ante un título que habilite a su titular para iniciar la actividad, es decir, no se constituye ni reviste la característica de un acto autorizatorio por sí mismo. Es un presupuesto indispensable a valorar en ese otro procedimiento que contempla, como resultado final, la autorización para realizar determinada actividad, obra o proyecto. 4) Como resultado final, ese acto (la VLA) debe visualizarse necesariamente en función de aquél, por la transversalidad que caracteriza al derecho ambiental, en el establecimiento de reglas que hagan posible la existencia armónica en un medio ambiente equilibrado y sostenible, a partir de la máxima consagrada en el artículo 50 constitucional. Distinto resulta cuando, como ya lo indicó este Tribunal en el precedente tantas veces aludido, en el caso de que el resultado sea el rechazo de la viabilidad ambiental, sí produce estado respecto del peticionario, por ende, resulta pasible de impugnación. 5) Finalmente, ante la particularidad de este asunto, debe indicarse que no es con la nulidad de los actos recurridos, que por su naturaleza no son susceptibles de impugnación separadamente, que se demande aquella actividad, obra o proyecto que, aún contando con la viabilidad ambiental, contamine.

XI.- En mérito de todo lo anterior, procede rechazar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo de quienes lo interpusieron (mandato 150 inciso 3) del CPCA).

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso con sus costas a cargo de quienes lo interpusieron. Tome nota el juez tramitador de lo advertido en el considerando III.

Anabelle Léon Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Nombre165204