Municipality orders removal of LED screen on public sidewalk during National Stadium inaugurationMunicipalidad ordena retiro de pantalla LED sobre acera pública en inauguración del Estadio Nacional

PROCEEDING OF COGNIZANCE CASE FILE No. 11-003128-1027-CA PLAINTIFF: I S.A.

DEFENDANT: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT. FIFTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA. ANNEX A.- At seven hours thirty minutes on the seventh day of August of two thousand twelve.

Proceeding of cognizance initiated by I SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, with legal entity identification number no. […], represented by its General Attorney-in-Fact without Limit of Amount Nombre2401, represented by attorneys Roberto Quirós Coronado and Natalia María Rodríguez Ríos, both of legal age, attorneys, in their capacity as Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact of that company, with Bar Association identification no. 11,556 and no. 20,518, respectively (f.36) against the Municipality of San José, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, attorney Mario Leitón Delgado, of legal age, attorney, Bar Association identification no. CED89467 (f.109)

WHEREAS:

1. Based on the facts it sets forth and the legal citations adduced, in this matter, the plaintiff indicated as its claim what is transcribed literally, which was adjusted at the preliminary hearing and ratified at the oral and public trial: "1) I request that the non-conformity of the administrative conduct of the Municipal Police of San José with the Costa Rican legal system be declared, by forcing my represented party to dismantle the advertising structure within 24 hours, without the possibility of having due process before a competent body, and in clear violation of the right to property. 2) That the Municipality of San José be ordered to pay the totality of the damages caused to my represented party by its illegal action, damages that amount to the sum of seventy-eight thousand eight hundred dollars in legal tender of the United States of America ($78,000.00): which includes: a) the amount my represented party ceased to receive for the totality of the advertising contracts, which I provide as documentary evidence. Said advertising contracts for advertising spots of the contracting companies could not be executed due to the abusive and irregular conduct of the public administration, which forced my represented party's personnel, under threat of demolition, to dismantle the advertising structure within a period of 24 hours. This damage amounts to the sum of $59,800.00 in legal tender of the United States of America. b) The rent of the property on which the advertising structure was situated. My represented party leased from Mrs. Yu Hongxia, in her capacity as possessor and administrator of the private property where the power plant, a protective barricade and an LED screen were installed. My represented party estimates this damage at the sum of one thousand dollars in legal tender of the United States of America ($1,000.00). c) Expenses for the rental, installation and operation of the LED screen, power plant and platform. My represented party carried out the rental of the electronic screen, power plant and platform with which it was intended to provide the advertising service, which had a cost of eighteen thousand dollars in legal tender of the United States of America ($18,000.00). 3) That the Municipality of San José be ordered to pay the totality of the corporate moral damages caused to my represented party by its illegal action, which amounts to the sum of eighty-two thousand dollars in legal tender of the United States of America ($82,000.00). This consists of the discredit and detriment suffered by my represented party in the advertising market as a consequence of the contractual breach with the companies with which my represented party had obligated itself to provide advertising spot transmission services. The damage is clearly reflected in the harm to the good name and trust placed by our clients in the seriousness and punctuality of the company, who were harmed by contracting us and not achieving the exposure of their name or product at an event of such importance and dynamism as the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional, which will undoubtedly result for my represented party in a great limitation to be contracted again. 4) That the Municipality of San José be ordered to pay the damages corresponding to the legal interest from the filing of the claim until the effective fulfillment of the payment. 5) I request that the Municipality of San José be ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this proceeding." (Disc of preliminary hearing and minute thereof visible at folios 150 and 151 of the judicial file and recording of the oral trial of July 6, 2012) 2. That the respective hearing having been granted to the Municipality of San José, it answered in a negative manner. At trial, it raised the defense of lack of right. (f. 114) 3. That the preliminary hearing established in numeral 90 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code was held on January 19, 2012, with the presence of the representatives of both parties.

4. That in the proceedings, the terms and prescriptions of law have been observed, and no defects or omissions capable of producing nullity or defenselessness to the parties are noted. This proceeding was declared complex in accordance with numeral 111, a decision that was communicated to the parties before concluding the oral and public trial, therefore this resolution is issued within the deadline indicated in numeral 111 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, hereinafter (CPCA), after deliberation.

Drafted by Judge Quirós Muñoz, with the affirmative vote of Judges Jiménez Villegas and Canales Hernández, and;

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are considered as such: 1) That on March 10, 2011, Mr. Nombre2401 filed before the Municipality of San José a request for a temporary permit to install, from Saturday the 26th to March 29, 2011, an electronic LED technology screen on the front part of a property located in front of the Estadio Nacional, 100 meters north of Canal 7, which belongs to Mrs. Yu Hongxia. (f. 47 of the judicial file). 2) That through official letter no. SPP2-0309-11 of March 21, 2011, attorney Mariano Rodríguez Solís, in his capacity as Head of the Permits and Licenses Section, addressed the request made by Mr. Bouza, an official letter in which he indicated: "In response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen will be installed is a 'Vía Nacional' (National Road), its administration corresponds to the MOPT, therefore this Municipality has no interference over it, consequently the corresponding procedure for this matter must be carried out before said Institution." (folio 49 of the judicial file) 3) That on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional building took place in the vicinity of Parque Metropolitano La Sabana in San José (public fact not contested). 4) That on March 26, 2011, a Giant LED Screen with image advertising spots was installed at Dirección13727, 100 meters north of Dirección13728, during the morning hours, managed by Ingenium Comunicaciones S.A. (statements of Mr. Nombre2401 at trial and of the Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José, Mr. Nombre5836) 5) That Mr. Rafael Arias Fallas, in his capacity as Assistant Director of the Mayor, appeared at the place where the Giant Screen of Ingenium was located and requested the Municipal Police of San José to remove it from the place. (statements of Mr. Nombre2401 at trial and of Municipal Police Officer Ana Gil Chaverri and the Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José) 6) That on March 26, 2011, Mr. Nombre2401, as representative of Ingenium, did not have any municipal permit or permit from any other public entity to carry out its commercial advertising activities via Giant LED technology Screen (statement of Mr. Nombre2401, of municipal police officer Ana Lorena Gil, and of Mr. Nombre5836, Assistant Director of the Mayor of San José, during the oral and public trial). 7) That the Municipal Police of San José notified Mr. Nombre2401 of the document identified as "Police Notification no. 11722" in which it was recorded that: "At 13:39 hours on the 26th day of March of the year 2011, specifically in the province of San José, Dirección3277, Pavas District, other directions West Side of the Estadio Nacional. Proceeding in accordance with current legislation to notify Javier Alberto Bouza Cordero, bearer of identity card or residence card no. CED89468, of the following provisions: Following Instructions from the Ministry of Health, from the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, from the Assistant of the Office of the Mayor, you are informed that you must remove the structure you have placed on public domain property (bienes demaniales) because the respective permits are not on file. This within a period of 24 hours. Witnesses: Nombre3640, […]; I, […], Nombre317, […], Nombre2401, […], Nombre79993, […]. Signature of person notified, ID […], Police Officer in Charge of Commission: Ana L. Gil Chavarría, of legal age, municipal police officer of San José, Costa Rican, identity card number […], locatable at Dirección13729 and Municipal Police Officer (2) Nombre113045, of legal age, Municipal Police Officer of San José, Costa Rican, Identity card number Placa20607, locatable at Altos Mercado Central. Note: Mr. Nombre3640, Vice President of the Municipal Council, is present at the act." (document no. 11722 visible at folio 60 of the administrative file) 8) That at the time of executing the notification record, the municipal police determined that the structure of the Giant Screen and the railings surrounding it were within a public zone (content of the record visible at folio 60 of the judicial file). 9) That on the same day, March 26, 2011, and once the order from the Municipal Police was received -approximately at thirteen hours forty minutes- the representative of I S.A. proceeded to give the order to turn off the transmission of advertising spots on the giant screen placed in front of the Estadio Nacional by his company (statement of municipal police officer Ana Lorena Gil and Mr. Javier Bouza Cordero). 10) That on March 26, 2011, at the time the notification was carried out by the Municipality of San José to the representative of I S.A., the structure and protective railings of the advertising screen located in front of the Estadio Nacional were invading part of the public space intended for the free transit of pedestrians (testimony of the Municipal Police official, Mrs. Nombre529 and Mr. Nombre5836, Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José).

II. FACTS NOT DEMONSTRATED

Sole: That the officials of the Municipality of San José engaged in acts of "bullying (matonismo)" or aggression on March 26, 2011, when they requested the plaintiff's representative to dismantle the platform (the case file).

III. ON THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF

In essence, the plaintiff's attorney indicates that I S.A. is a company dedicated to providing advisory services in the area of Marketing and Communication and the development of promotional and advertising events. He states that, prior to the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional, Mr. Javier Bouza appeared at various offices of the Municipality of San José, with the purpose of seeking information regarding the procedure he needed to follow to obtain a temporary permit to place an LED screen on the east boundary of the private property registered in the public registry under real folio number […], the property where the Xinhua News Agency of the People's Republic of China is located. This was for the purpose of operating said image screen from Saturday the 26th to Tuesday the 29th of March 2011, with operating hours from six in the morning to twelve midnight. He indicates that at the Municipality, the Head of Licenses pointed out to him that because it was an installation on private property and being on a national road, not a municipal one, the permit had to be requested from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. He says he went to the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the MOPT with a note setting forth the referred request; however, he affirms, there they indicated that this Department only authorizes the installation of flat or traditional billboards and signs, and not electronic or LED screens, for which reason he was referred to the Road Prevision Department of the MOPT. That same day, he adds, he met with the Head of said body, who, he adds, told him that the MOPT does not grant permits for the operation of LED or electronic screens on national roads, as this corresponds to a typology different from those regulated in Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT dated December 20, 2000, without being regulated by any norm. He indicates that, given what was stated by the MOPT officials, he returned to the Municipality of San José to request a temporary license (patente) and some type of permit, for which he delivered the request in writing. Nombre193, the Head of Licenses of that local Government, gave him note SPP-0309-11 in which he indicated that because the road in front of which the screen was to be installed was a national street, it did not have jurisdiction to grant the requested permit. He affirms that from that moment he arranged the rental of an electronic screen with dimensions of 5.28 meters wide by 5.28 meters high, and subsequently signed advertising spots with some of his clients to schedule advertisements on this screen during the days of March 26, 27, 28 and 29, 2011. He says that to place the screen, he rented the front area of the private property registered in the Public Registry under Real Folio […] with an area of 24.50 meters long by 3 meters wide. He relates that on March 25 and 26 of the cited month, the installation of the screen, the power plant, and the barricade on the leased property was carried out. He complains that on the 26th, when they already had their screen installed and in full operation, two supposed inspectors visited him, indicating that the installed structure had to be removed because it did not have the respective permits. He adds that later Mrs. Nombre529, a municipal police officer, appeared, accompanied by about 10 more officers, stating they had come to remove and take away the screen. He complains that despite presenting the Municipality's note, where he was told he did not need a permit, it was not accepted. He indicates the police officers said these were orders from the Ministry of Health and the MOPT, but they also did not present any written order, even though this was requested at the time. He says the screen had to be removed given the displays of bullying (matonismo), intimidation, and threats of forcible demolition, all of which occurred in the presence of the then Vice-President of the Municipal Council. He affirms that the administrative act carried out by the Municipality of San José is patently illegal and vitiated by nullity, among other reasons, for lack of jurisdiction. Added to this, he points out, this act caused him serious financial consequences. In support of his statements, he copies some excerpts from judicial resolutions referring to the intangibility of the public administration's own acts. He transcribes some regulations related to the powers of the Municipal Police of San José and, based on this, says the municipal police could not order the dismantling of the screen placed on private property, in front of a national street, and without following due process. He insists that the "act" carried out by that local government is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. He adds that, regarding this type of screen, there is no regulation, which is why many people install them without any type of permit, a situation he asserts was explained to him by Mr. Nombre113046 himself in his capacity as Head of the Road Prevision Department of the MOPT. He considers that once the Administration issues an act declaring subjective rights, as occurred in his case, where he was verbally authorized to install the electronic screen, his right could not be disregarded without initiating due process.

IV. ON THE ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT

For its part, the representation of the Municipality of San José centers its defense on indicating that, in reality, the screen was placed invading part of the sidewalk and the public passage space for pedestrians, for which reason the Municipal Police came to review the referred situation. It says that it was verified, through the police officers and a record drawn up for this purpose, that the screen was impeding the free transit of persons, and that based on the powers delegated to the Director of the Mayor's Office, he may make decisions to safeguard public property. It indicates that, without prejudice to the foregoing, when the municipal police officers appeared at the place where the screen was installed, the plaintiff company did not present them with any document supporting its assertions regarding the procedures carried out before the MOPT. It maintains that the screen structure was not placed only within a private area, but was invading the public area, therefore, according to extensive case law, it could be removed without prior procedure and unilaterally by the administration. In its view, the municipal police of San José has full jurisdiction to carry out the actions referred to by the plaintiff company, and has jurisdiction according to the police power, oversight authority, principle of legality, the efficiency of the administration, and because it must safeguard the interests of the community, among which public order stands out. In support of its thesis, it transcribes an excerpt from a resolution of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), referring to the police power.

V. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTS" AND "MATERIAL ACTIONS (ACTUACIONES)" OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Although it is true that the plaintiff company requests as its first claim that "the non-conformity of the administrative conduct of the Municipal Police of San José and of the Municipality of San José be declared...", the truth is that in the factual and legal argumentation of the lawsuit, it refers indistinctly to acts and material actions (actuaciones) of the local government, as if they were concepts with identical legal meaning, which leads this Court, in the first line of reasoning, to make the technical distinction of the case. According to national doctrine, the administrative function can materialize through acts or facts. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2nd reprint 2007, p. 357). Acts are the declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration made in the exercise of the administrative function, which produce concrete or general legal effects, of normative scope or not, directly or immediately; whereas facts are the material actions (actuaciones) or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function, that is, those carried out without the need for a law or a power, a jurisdiction, or a prior administrative act to enable them, unless they are illicit actions (actuaciones ilícitas), in which case they would be considered de facto actions (vías de hecho). Both, acts and material actions (actuaciones), in accordance with the provisions of numeral one of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, can be analyzed in this jurisdiction, as said article indicates that the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction established in Article 49 of the Political Constitution, has as its object to protect the legal situations of every person, guarantee or restore the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative law, as well as to hear and resolve the various aspects of the administrative legal relationship. The aforementioned distinction is important as it must be determined whether the conduct of the Municipality of San José was in accordance with the legal system or not, and for this, it is then necessary to define what type of administrative conduct is at issue, that is, whether it is an administrative act or a material action (actuación). In the specific case, the Court observes that the plaintiff company claims that the local government "forced it to dismantle the advertising structure within 24 hours, without the possibility of having a process before a competent body and in clear violation of the right to property." Note then that the conduct whose non-conformity with the legal system is requested to be declared is the order given verbally and notified by means of a municipal record, in which the company Ingenium Comunicaciones is forced to turn off the LED technology screen. Ergo, far from attacking a formal administrative act, what is actually being reproached is the existence of a material action (actuación material) by the local administration, which without having a prior act modifying official letter no. Placa20608, (in which it was indicated by the Head of Licenses that "In response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen will be installed is a National Road, its administration corresponds to the MOPT, therefore this Municipality has no interference over it, consequently the corresponding procedure for this matter must be carried out before said Institution") proceeded to order the dismantling of the structure of the LED light technology advertising screen.

VI. ON THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY (BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO)

The delimitation of this aspect is necessary in this resolution, as one of the issues discussed at oral trial was the eventual use of a public domain space by a private legal subject, and the powers that the municipal police can use to safeguard its free access. Therefore, it is fundamental to refer to the scope of numeral 261 of the Civil Code, which distinguishes between public and private property, as well as the criteria based on which one can distinguish between the two, because their use requires submission to different rules. In this regard, the said article establishes: "Public things (cosas públicas) are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which everyone can take advantage of by being delivered for public use. All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), taking into account the cited norm, has referred to the property that makes up the public domain in the following terms: "they are those that have a nature and legal regime different from private property -which are governed by the right to property under the terms of Article 45 of the Political Constitution- in that, by the express will of the legislator, they are affected to a special destiny of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and therefore, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, for which reason they cannot belong individually to private individuals, nor to the State, in the strict sense, because the latter is limited to its administration and protection... Furthermore, their use and exploitation are subject to the police power, in that, as they are property that cannot be the object of possession, much less of ownership, their use and exploitation is possible." (resolution no. 2007-2408 of 16 hours 13 minutes of February 21, 2007). With regard to the specific case, it must be noted that the sidewalk is part of the public domain (demanio público), and is defined as a space that is part of the public road, normally located at its edge, which is reserved for the transit of pedestrians, as established by the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) in its Article 1, subsection three. This leads to the conclusion that, given its nature, sidewalks are permanently affected for their use by the community, so that they have the characteristics indicated for public domain property (bienes de dominio público). It is for this reason that no private individual can validly prevent them from being applied to the use for which they are intended, much less claim any right over them, other than that of any person to freely transit them, as that is their natural use. For its part, the local Administration can directly exercise the mechanisms at its disposal when, by action or omission of any person, the transit of pedestrians is obstructed or impeded, this by virtue of its self-protection (autotutela) powers, which empower it to even use administrative coercion in protection of public interests, without the need to resort to the Courts of Justice, as has been recognized since long ago by the Constitutional Chamber in its resolution 3006-94 of June 17, 1994, which specifically stated: "...the prohibition emanating from the act of the Municipality that is being challenged here refers to two points: first, the possibility of using the sidewalk, a public domain property, to provide the company's service, which the Chamber considers is appropriate, because property that has the characteristics of that discussed here is not susceptible to private appropriation, and the authority in charge of its protection can order that said appropriation cease." In addition to the foregoing, this constitutional vote added "that the legal regime of the sidewalks is completed by the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) and the Municipal Code, the latter establishing that it is the duty of municipal authorities to remove objects, materials, or similar from the sidewalks that contaminate the environment or obstruct passage, which implies the municipal power to order such removal, and, if necessary, to execute it at the expense and on behalf of the appellant administrated party." The foregoing is without prejudice to the use permits that may be granted over such property, which if granted, despite their precarious nature, if subsequently revoked for reasons of necessity or general interest, require that a reasonable period be given for compliance with what was ordered, so that they cannot be removed arbitrarily or suddenly. In other words, for any private individual to be able to use public domain property –specifically sidewalks– for their benefit through commercial activities, the authorization (permit) of the public administration that holds ownership is required, since the fact that it is property arranged for the use of the community does not mean that its use depends on the free will of those who use it; rather, this is the power of the public authority, that is, the Municipality where such access ways are located.

VII.ON THE OPERATION OF ADVERTISING SCREENS AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE COSTA RICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE PLAINTIFF: As noted in the Municipal Code in its Article 79, "to exercise any lucrative activity, the interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which will be obtained through the payment of a tax." In accordance with said norm, to exercise any lucrative activity, the interested party requests it from the local entity, and the latter (if the applicant meets the requirements for it) issues an authorization (license), from which the obligation to pay the license tax (impuesto de patentes) will subsequently derive, according to the corresponding tax rules. In this way, it corresponds to the municipal government to authorize each and every commercial activity carried out within its territorial circumscription, regardless of whether the exercise of commerce is carried out on private or public property. In the latter case, additional use permits must also be obtained (Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the requirements established for this purpose by the corresponding local regulations must be met. From this normative framework, this Court appreciates that, although it is true that as of March 26, 2011, and even to date, the use of luminous-type advertising screens –commonly called "LED screens," which by its English acronym refers to the phrase "Light Emitting Diode," and which is technically translated as a semiconductor diode that emits light– has not been specifically regulated in the Costa Rican legal system, there are indeed regulations that are applicable to the placement of advertising screens and billboards.

For purposes of analyzing the specific case, we begin —according to the plaintiff company's statements— from the premise that this involves a commercial activity, aimed at advertising slots on said screens for different brands and commercial establishments, which entails applying, as a general rule, numeral 79 of the Municipal Code. Now, starting from the assumption that said rule did not exist —it is clearly understood that it is in force and applicable—, it must be noted that regarding outdoor advertising, there are powers attributed to local governments, if dealing with municipal roads, and to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), through the General Directorate of Traffic Police and Traffic Engineering, if dealing with the national road network, this pursuant to Regulation no. 29253-MOPT. The first article of this regulatory body states that this regulation aims to administer, supervise, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as matters concerning the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelter advertisements on public or private land, or in the rights-of-way under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), which shall be the sole competent authority in this matter...". That is, the only agency that can authorize the material installation (not the exercise of the lucrative activity derived from it) of a billboard or advertising screen is the MOPT, a legal framework that leads to the conclusion that there is indeed a regulatory norm governing the placement of these billboards or screens. This is because the second article of the cited Regulation defines an Advertisement (Anuncio) as "any sign, writing, print, image generated by electronic media, painting, emblem, drawing, or other advertising medium, placed on the ground, natural or artificial structure, whose purpose is to make commercial propaganda or draw attention to a product, article, trademark, or to a commercial activity or business, service or recreation, profession or home occupation that is offered, sold, or carried out at a site different from where such advertisement appears". While it is true that the transcribed norm does not expressly mention LED light technology screens, that does not mean they are not regulated, since the regulation itself states that it can include advertisements of "writing, print, or image generated by electronic media...", which reflects general regulation over these. It is different if what is intended is a specific regulation on luminosity, size, and visual impact, which would indeed come to complement the existing norms, but not, for that reason, to render them inapplicable. Given the above, this Court concludes that for the installation of an LED-type light technology screen, Regulation 29253-MOPT is applicable regarding installation, replacement, reconstruction, and display permits, therefore the thesis presented in trial regarding the total absence of regulations to govern these advertising screens is not admissible (even if a public official so indicates due to error or ignorance).

VIII. ON THE POWERS OF THE MUNICIPAL POLICE

in the Costa Rican legal system, local governments enjoy political, administrative, and financial autonomy by constitutional provision. In accordance with this, the Municipal Code reaffirms this character and indicates, based on it, that "...within their powers are included: administering and providing municipal public services". While it is true, the traditional concept of municipal public service might refer to the idea of garbage collection services, street cleaning, rural aqueducts (asadas), park maintenance, among others, this conception has been extended to other areas of coverage, which, according to the General Law of Public Administration, is not only viable but necessary, as these must be adaptable to social needs (numeral 4). In this line, the guarantee of local security for the inhabitants —and visitors— of a canton is currently a priority within the administration of municipal services. The foregoing, although it has had a slow practical development, was actually foreseen by the legislator since the Construction Law of 1949, which in its first ordinal established: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that the cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions that are erected on their lands, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in this matter to other administrative bodies". Now, with regard to the internal municipal organization to provide said service, municipal police forces have been established in different cantons, which, due to their local characteristic, have coverage within their cantonal limits. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has expressed itself —hearing an action of unconstitutionality against the operation of the Municipal Police— making the distinctions that will be stated. Said Body states that this activity is limited to being executed in a determined local scope, and without prejudice to the respective coordination and cooperation actions with the national public force, without interference with the powers of the latter, whose origin is constitutional in rank (articles 12 and 140 of the Constitution). Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber starts from the premise that the municipal police covers the surveillance and control of properly communal services, such as, for example, "the care of parks, the protection of municipal buildings, control over stationary and itinerant sales, the supervision of licensed liquor establishments and permitted gaming centers, as well as the actions derived as a consequence of that supervision, all of this, considering the Municipality as the institution in charge of local interests and services". In the opinion of the Justices of said Chamber, far from there being an unconstitutionality due to the coexistence of a national police (with constitutional powers) and a local police, this latter surveillance body constitutes an additional guarantee for the inhabitants of the municipality where it is instituted (in this regard, consult resolution no. 2005-4705 of 3:01 p.m. on April 27, 2005, issued by the Constitutional Chamber). In that understanding, it must be noted that the municipal police of each local government can —and must— ensure order and safety for those who transit through its jurisdiction, and therefore if the local Administration detects the existence of any disregard for the legal order applicable in the canton, it may make use of its powers of surveillance and enforcement of order. Within such sphere of powers, where an ad hoc body exercises police power, the municipal administration seeks public order, health, tranquility, security of persons, as well as the organization of local society, an authority by virtue of which the imposition of restrictions is reasonable, as long as their justification is found precisely in the consideration that private interests are limited by those of other persons, since they must coexist with each and every one of the other fundamental rights. Within such faculties, this Chamber considers the protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales) and public order to be included, so the actions taken by the municipal police in the specific case are not outside its powers. This is because it was demonstrated that on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the National Stadium would take place, a date on which security operations existed on the part of the organizing administration, to guarantee that this event of national importance would take place completely normally, which included emphasizing the cooperation and coordination relations of the Central Government (ministries in the specific case) with the local administration of the canton of San José. So if it was reliably detected that any person —individual or juridical— was obstructing, for example, free passage through public domain areas, the municipal police could act to safeguard local security, the proper use of public domain assets, and public order. It must also be taken into account that in our legal system, we have the Indertictum propium, a figure that, although not legally regulated, has been widely developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pag. 363). The cited Chamber has held in this regard that the administration must and can protect public domain (dominio público) against attacks on it by the administered, even through de facto means —eviction or vacation— when the individual does not have a legal title to occupy it and has entered it via de facto means, in such case the "administrative action" substitutes the possessory remedies to recover the domain, without needing to resort to any file, nor to due process rules, including the power to remove property from occupied public sites (Ruling no. 2306-91 of 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991). In the case under analysis, this Court has no doubt that the structure of the advertising screen placed by the plaintiff company was invading the public zone, since despite there being opposing testimonies among the declarants offered by the plaintiff (Javier Bouza Cordero and Douglas Quesada Altamirano) and the defendant (Name529 and Name5836), a public document (folio 60) exists in the record that indicates unmistakably that the structure of the screen was located on public domain assets (bienes demaniales). Moreover, the witness in trial offered by the plaintiff, Mr. Name3640, signs that document as a witness to the municipal action, as does Mr. Javier Bouza, without any indication of disagreement from any of them with the content of the minutes, which precisely accuse the plaintiff here of invading the assets of the public domain (demanio público). The weighing of said document over the testimonies rendered is imposed in accordance with what the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has expressed regarding the value that must be given to evidence in application of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which, in this regard, indicated in Ruling no. 1155-S1-F-2009 of 2:05 p.m. on November 5, 2009, that "Regarding evidence in the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, this Collegiate Body stated: 'In this way, facts are proven, norms are applied, and rights and interests are declared or granted to those who requested by proving. However, for the coronation of such certainty in the facts, the legal system can attribute different assessment regimes, such as that of full and absolute freedom in valuation (in conscience); under sound criticism criteria, or also, under predetermined or assessed formulas by the legal system itself, in all, or some of the evidentiary elements. In this line, subsection 4 of article 82 proclaims: all evidence shall be assessed according to the rules of sound criticism. This provision takes a stand for evidentiary assessment under sound criticism criteria, subjecting the weighing of those to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime established by the same law for public documents and confessional evidence. There is therefore no fracture or dissociation with the general assessment regime established by the Costa Rican legal system. Those two particular evidentiary instruments (confession and public documents) hold, as has been said, a priority value over other evidence mechanisms, based on the public faith consigned in them or on the statement against the affected party. Ignoring this prevalence would produce absolute disauthorization for all public attesting officers and for those who accept a determined fact to their detriment, which would generate severe juridical insecurity and, therefore, chaos beyond the juridical. Therefore, it must be understood that the sound criticism rightly indicated in subsection 4 of numeral 82 is so without detriment and with full respect for the prevalence or predominance of the evidentiary value of those elements to which such potential is assigned by law (specifically, by the Civil Procedure Code). It can then be said that, in the new contentious administrative regime, the assessed evidence regime is not completely repealed, which does not mean either that it survives as an absolute, impregnable regime, or one impossible to prove to the contrary. The reduced evidentiary elements that have such a privilege in their assessment create a presumption about the assertion contained in them that cannot be taken as absolute truth, but as a relative presumption (iuris tantum), which implies that in certain cases, said presumption may be rebutted or destroyed with different evidentiary elements, which, regardless of their source or level, truthfully contradict what has been consigned in them. However, as long as that does not happen, they will continue maintaining their presumption, resistance, and evidentiary potential.'" In any case, suitable evidence was not provided to the record to disprove the content of what was indicated in the municipal minutes, for example, some notarial minutes indicating the contrary. It is necessary to note that the only evidence provided to the record to demonstrate the plaintiff's theory of the case —besides the said declarations— were a series of photographs where the structure of the screen is seen in the area where the events occurred. However, neither in the photographs provided with the lawsuit, nor in those offered at the trial hearing, is there any record of the date and time at which such fact was graphically recorded. The witnesses from the Municipality of San José were emphatic in stating that actually the advertising screen, at the moment when it was ordered removed, was invading the public zone (sidewalk) and that the graphics provided show a different image from what occurred around noon on March 26, 2011. In view of the fact that such evidence lacks the indication of the date and time they were taken (normally printed on digital photographs), the Court cannot conclude with this simple documentation that the facts the plaintiff alleges happened on that date are proven with these images. They are simple graphic reproductions of a place, without knowing with certainty from their observation to which date they correspond. Thus, this Court having weighed the value of the documentary evidence under the terms indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and delimited in preceding lines, in application of the rules of sound criticism, and weighing all evidence as a whole, it is concluded that there is no evidence that disproves what was stated in the minutes drawn up by the Municipality of San José on March 26, 2011, that is, the invasion of public property by the plaintiff company, without any permit or authorization for it, reiterated, for the use of a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), a fact that, according to the applicable block of legality set forth in this resolution, justifies the order for the immediate removal of said structure. For this reason, this Chamber considers that if indeed the public zone was invaded (as is demonstrated in proven fact no. 10), the municipal police could act to safeguard public domain assets (bienes demaniales) and in full application of the cited "Interdictum propium" figure, there being no actions by that body that should be reproached by this Court.

IX. ON THE COMPENSATION FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES

the damages (material and moral) claimed by the plaintiff company were conditional upon the declaration of non-conformity of the administrative conduct displayed by the municipal police of San José, a conclusion that this Body does not consider applicable in this case, for which reason the claim for damages (both) must be rejected, without it being necessary to refer to the evidence that was provided or is missing for that purpose.

IX. ON THE MERIT-BASED DEFENSES

regarding the defense of lack of right pleaded by the Municipality of San José, this must be upheld since, according to the examination conducted in Considerandos V, VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution, it was determined that there are no reasons to declare the non-conformity with the legal system of the conduct of the Municipality of San José, as it ordered the representative of the plaintiff company to dismantle the structure of the advertising screen placed in front of the National Stadium on March 26, 2011, since the administrative procedure claimed was not necessary for this, nor did a violation of the right to private property occur, so the filed lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its aspects.

X.ON COSTS. Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) establishes as a general rule that procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or else, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable rules and break the postulate of condemnation on the losing party, for which reason both costs are imposed on the plaintiff.

THEREFORE

The defense of lack of right is upheld. The lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are borne by the plaintiff.

Priscila Quirós Muñoz Francisco Jiménez Villegas Jonatan Canales Hernández This proceeding was declared complex pursuant to numeral 111, a decision that was communicated to the parties before the conclusion of the oral and public trial, and therefore this resolution is issued within the time limit indicated in numeral 111 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, hereinafter (CPCA), after deliberation.

*Drafted by Judge* **Quirós Muñoz**, *with the affirmative vote of Judges Jiménez Villegas and Canales Hernández and;* **CONSIDERING:** **I.- PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS):** The following are considered of this nature for purposes of resolving this matter: **1)** That on March 10, 2011, Mr. Nombre2401 filed with the Municipality of San José an application for a temporary permit to install, from Saturday, March 26 through March 29, 2011, an electronic screen using LED technology on the front part of a property located opposite the Estadio Nacional, 100 meters north of Canal 7, which belongs to Mrs. Yu Hongxia. (f. 47 of the judicial file). **2)** That by official letter no. SPP2-0309-11 of March 21, 2011, Mr. Mariano Rodríguez Solís, in his capacity as Head of the Permits and Licenses Section, responded to the request filed by Mr. Bouza, in an official letter in which he stated *"In response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen is to be installed is a 'National Road,' its administration corresponds to the MOPT, therefore this Municipality has no jurisdiction over it, and accordingly, the procedure for this matter must be carried out before said Institution"*. (folio 49 of the judicial file) **3)** That on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional building took place in the vicinity of Parque Metropolitano La Sabana in San José (a public fact not disputed). **4)** That on March 26, 2011, a Giant LED Screen with image advertising spots was installed at Dirección13727, 100 meters north of Dirección13728, during the morning hours, managed by Ingenium Comunicaciones S.A. (testimony of Mr. Nombre2401 at trial and of the Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José, Mr. Nombre5836) **5)** That Mr. Rafael Arias Fallas, in his capacity as Assistant Director of the Mayor, went to the location of Ingenium's Giant Screen and arranged for its removal from the site through the Policía Municipal de San José. (testimony of Mr. Nombre2401 at trial and of Municipal Police Officer Ana Gil Chaverri and the Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José) **6)** That on March 26, 2011, Mr. Nombre2401, as representative of Ingenium, did not have any municipal permit or permit from any other public entity to carry out his commercial advertising activities using a Giant LED Technology Screen (testimony of Mr. Nombre2401, municipal police officer Ana Lorena Gil, and Mr. Nombre5836, Assistant Director of the Mayor of San José, during the oral and public trial). **7)** That the Policía Municipal de San José notified Mr. Nombre2401 of the document identified as *"Police Notification no. 11722"* which recorded that: *"At 13:39 hours on the 26th day of the month of March of the year 2011, specifically in the province of San José, Dirección3277, District Pavas, other details West Side of the Estadio Nacional. Proceeding in accordance with current legislation to notify Javier Alberto Bouza Cordero, holder of identity card or residence card no. CED89468, of the following orders: Following Instructions from the Ministerio de Salud, from the Vice Minister of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, from the Assistant of the Office of the Mayor, you are instructed that you must remove the structure you have placed on public domain property (bienes demaniales) because the respective permits are not on record. This within a period of 24 hours. Witnesses: Nombre3640, […]; I, […], Nombre317, […], Nombre2401, […], Nombre79993, […]. Signature of notified person, ID Card […], Police Officer in Charge of Commission: Ana L. Gil Chavarría, adult, municipal police officer of San José, Costa Rican, identity card number […], locatable at Dirección13729 and Municipal Police Officer (2) Nombre113045, adult, Municipal Police Officer of San José, Costa Rican, Identity Card number Placa20607, locatable at Altos Mercado Central. Note: Present at the proceeding is Mr. Nombre3640, Vice President of the Concejo Municipal."* (document no. 11722 visible at folio 60 of the administrative file) **8)** That at the time of drafting the notification report, the municipal police determined that the structure of the Giant Screen and the railings surrounding it were located within a public zone (content of the report visible at folio 60 of the judicial file). **9)** That on the same day, March 26, 2011, and once the order from the Policía Municipal was received—at approximately thirteen forty hours—the representative of I S.A. proceeded to give the order to turn off the broadcast of advertising spots on the giant screen placed opposite the Estadio Nacional by his company (testimony of municipal police officer Ana Lorena Gil and Mr. Javier Bouza Cordero). **10)** That on March 26, 2011, at the time the notification was made by the Municipality of San José to the representative of I S.A., the structure and protective railings of the advertising screen located opposite the Estadio Nacional were encroaching on part of the public space intended for the free transit of pedestrians (testimony of Municipal Police officer Ms. Nombre529 and Mr. Nombre5836, Assistant Director of the Office of the Mayor of San José).

**II. FACTS NOT PROVEN (HECHOS NO DEMOSTRADOS): Single:** That the officials of the Municipality of San José engaged in acts of *"thuggery (matonismo)"* or aggression on March 26, 2011, when they asked the plaintiff's representative to dismantle the platform (the records).

**III. REGARDING THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF PARTY:** In essence, the legal representative of the plaintiff indicates that I S.A. is a company dedicated to providing consulting services in the area of Marketing and Communication and to the development of promotional and advertising events. He relates that, prior to the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional, Mr. Javier Bouza visited various offices of the Municipality of San José to seek information regarding the procedure required to obtain a temporary permit to place an LED screen on the eastern boundary of the private property registered in the public registry under real folio number […], the property where the Xinhua News Agency of the People's Republic of China is located. This was for the purpose of operating said image screen from Saturday, March 26 through Tuesday, March 29, both in 2011, with operating hours from six in the morning until twelve midnight. He indicates that at the Municipality, the Head of Licenses told him that because it was an installation on private property and located on a national, not municipal, road, the permit had to be requested from the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. He says he went to the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the MOPT with a note outlining the aforementioned request; however, he asserts, they told him there that this Department only authorizes the installation of billboards and flat or traditional signs, and not electronic or LED screens, so he was referred to the Department of Road Planning of the MOPT. That same day, he adds, he met with the Head of that body, who, he adds, told him that the MOPT does not grant permits for the operation of LED or electronic screens on national roads, as these correspond to a different category than those regulated in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29253-MOPT of December 20, 2000, since they were not regulated by any rule. He indicates that, given what was stated by the MOPT officials, he returned to the Municipality of San José to request a temporary license and some type of permit, therefore submitting the request in writing. Nombre193, the Head of Licenses of that local Government, gave him note SPP-0309-11 in which he indicated that because the road in front of which the screen was to be installed was a national road, the Municipality lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested permit. He affirms that, from that moment, he arranged the rental of an electronic screen with dimensions of 5.28 meters wide by 5.28 meters high, and subsequently signed advertising spots with some of his clients to schedule ads on this screen for the days of March 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2001. He says that to place the screen, he rented the front area of the private property registered in the Public Registry under Real Folio No. […] with an area of 24.50 meters long by 3 meters wide. He recounts that on March 25 and 26 of the cited month, they proceeded with the installation of the screen, the power generator, and the barrier on the rented property. He complains that on the 26th, when they already had their screen installed and fully operational, two alleged inspectors visited him, stating that the installed structure had to be removed because it lacked the respective permits. He adds that later, Ms. Nombre529, a municipal police officer, arrived accompanied by about 10 more police officers, stating that they had come to remove and take away the screen. He complains that despite presenting the Municipality's note, which indicated that a permit was not required, it was not accepted. He indicates that the police officers said these were orders from the Ministerio de Salud and the MOPT, but they also did not present any written order, even though one was requested at the time. He says the screen had to be removed given the displays of thuggish behavior, intimidation, and threats to tear it down by force, all of which occurred in the presence of the then vice-president of the Concejo Municipal. He affirms that the administrative action taken by the Municipality of San José is clearly illegal and null and void (viciado de nulidad), among other reasons, for lack of jurisdiction. Added to this, he notes, this action caused serious financial consequences. In support of his claims, he copies some excerpts from judicial rulings referring to the inviolability of the public administration's own acts. He transcribes some regulations related to the powers of the Policía Municipal de San José and, based on this, says that the municipal police could not order the dismantling of the screen placed on private property, in front of a national road, and without following due process. He insists that the "action (acto)" carried out by that local government is null due to lack of jurisdiction. He adds that, regarding this type of screen, there is no regulation, which is why many people install them without any type of permit, a situation he asserts was explained to him by Mr. Nombre113046 himself, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Road Planning of the MOPT. He considers that once the Administration issues an action (acto) declaring subjective rights, such as what occurred in his case, where he was verbally authorized to install the electronic screen, his right could not be disrespected without initiating due process.

**IV. REGARDING THE ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT PARTY:** For its part, the representation of the Municipality of San José focuses its defense on indicating that in reality the screen was placed encroaching on part of the sidewalk and the public space for pedestrian passage, which is why the Policía Municipal came to review the referenced situation. It says it was verified, through the police officers and a report drawn up for this purpose, that the screen was impeding the free transit of people, and that based on the powers delegated to the Director of the Office of the Mayor, he may make decisions to protect public property. It indicates that, without prejudice to the foregoing, when the municipal police officers went to the site where the screen was installed, they were not presented with any document by the plaintiff company that would support its assertions regarding the steps taken before the MOPT. It maintains that the screen structure was not placed solely within a private area, but was encroaching on the public area, and therefore, according to extensive case law, it could be removed without prior procedure and unilaterally by the administration. In its view, the Policía Municipal de San José has full jurisdiction to carry out the actions referred to by the plaintiff company, and it has jurisdiction in accordance with the police power (poder de policía), the oversight authority (potestad fiscalizadora), the principle of legality, the efficiency of the administration, and because it must safeguard the interests of the community, among which public order stands out. In support of its thesis, it transcribes an excerpt from a ruling of the Sala Constitucional regarding the police power (poder de policía).

**V. REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTIONS (ACTOS)" AND "MATERIAL CONDUCT (ACTUACIONES)" OF THE ADMINISTRATION:** Although it is true that the plaintiff company requests as its first claim that *"the nonconformity with the law of the administrative conduct of the Policía Municipal de San José and the Municipality of San José be declared..."*, the fact is that in the factual and legal argumentation of the complaint, it refers indiscriminately to actions (actos) and material conduct (actuaciones) of the local government, as if they were concepts with identical legal meaning, which leads this Court, as a preliminary matter, to make the technical distinction for this case. According to national doctrine, the administrative function may materialize through actions (actos) or facts (hechos). (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2nd reprint 2007, pg. 357). Actions (actos) are the declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration made in the exercise of the administrative function, which produce specific or general legal effects, whether of a normative scope or not, in a direct or immediate manner; whereas facts (hechos) are the material operations or technical activities carried out in the exercise of the administrative function, that is, those carried out without requiring a law, a power, a jurisdiction, or a prior administrative action (acto) to enable them, unless they are unlawful activities, in which case they would constitute de facto measures (vías de hecho). Both, actions (actos) and material conduct (actuaciones), in accordance with the provisions of the first numeral of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, may be reviewed in this jurisdiction, as said article indicates that the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction established in Article 49 of the Constitución Política has the purpose of protecting the legal situations of every person, guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the administrative-legal relationship. The distinction noted is important inasmuch as it must be determined whether the conduct of the Municipality of San José was in accordance with the legal order or not, and for this, it is therefore necessary to define what type of administrative conduct is at issue, that is, whether one is dealing with an administrative action (acto administrativo) or material conduct (actuación). In the specific case, the Court observes that the plaintiff company claims that the local government *"forced it to dismantle the advertising structure within a period of 24 hours, without the possibility of a proceeding by a competent body and in clear violation of the right to property."* Note, then, that the conduct for which a declaration of nonconformity with the legal order is requested is the order given verbally and notified by way of a municipal report, in which the company Ingenium Comunicaciones is forced to turn off the LED technology screen. Ergo, far from attacking a formal administrative action (acto administrativo), what is actually challenged is the existence of material conduct (actuación material) by the local administration, which, without a prior action (acto) modifying official letter no. Placa20608 (in which the Head of Licenses indicated that *"In response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen is to be installed is a National Road, its administration corresponds to the MOPT, therefore this Municipality has no jurisdiction over it, and accordingly, the procedure for this matter must be carried out before said Institution"*), proceeded to order the dismantling of the structure of the advertising screen with LED light technology.

**VI. REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY (BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO):** Delimiting this aspect is necessary in this resolution, as one of the issues discussed in the oral trial was the eventual use of a public domain space by a private legal subject, and the powers the municipal police can use to protect its free access.

Therefore, it is essential to refer to the scope of article 261 of the Civil Code, which distinguishes between public and private goods, as well as the criteria based on which one can distinguish between both, because their use requires submission to different rules. In this regard, the cited article establishes: "Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined to any service of general utility, and those that everyone can take advantage of because they are delivered for public use. All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." The Constitutional Chamber, taking into account the cited rule, has referred to the goods that make up the public domain in the following terms: "are those that have a nature and legal regime different from private goods -which are governed by the right of property under the terms of article 45 of the Political Constitution- insofar as, by the express will of the legislator, they are dedicated to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that, for this reason, cannot be the object of private property, so they are outside the commerce of men, and therefore, they cannot individually belong to private individuals, nor to the State, in the strict sense, since the latter limits itself to its administration and guardianship... Moreover, their use and exploitation are subject to the police power, since, as they are goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, their utilization and exploitation are possible". (resolution no. 2007-2408 of 4:13 p.m. on February 21, 2007). As relevant to the specific case, it must be noted that the sidewalk is part of the public domain, and is defined as a space that is part of the public thoroughfare, normally located at its edge, which is reserved for the transit of pedestrians, as established in Article 1, subsection 3 of the Reglamento de Construcciones. This leads to the conclusion that, given their nature, sidewalks are permanently dedicated to their use by the community, such that the characteristics indicated for public domain goods are inherent to them. It is for this reason that no private individual can validly prevent them from being applied to the use for which they are intended, much less claim any right over them, other than that of any person to freely transit them, as that is their natural use. For its part, the local Administration can directly exercise the mechanisms within its reach when, by action or omission of any person, pedestrian transit is obstructed or impeded, by virtue of its powers of self-enforcement (autotutela), which empower it to even use administrative coercion to protect public interests, without needing to resort to the Courts of Justice, as recognized since long ago by the Constitutional Chamber in its resolution 3006-94 of June 17, 1994, which specifically stated "...the prohibition emanating from the Municipality's act challenged here refers to two points: first, the possibility of using the sidewalk, a public domain good, to provide the company's service, which the Chamber considers appropriate, since goods having the characteristics of the one discussed here are not susceptible to private appropriation and the authority in charge of its guardianship can order that such appropriation cease." In addition to the foregoing, this constitutional vote added "that the legal regime of sidewalks is completed by the Ley General de Caminos Públicos and the Código Municipal, the latter establishing that it is the duty of municipal authorities to remove objects, materials, or similar items from sidewalks that contaminate the environment or obstruct passage, which implies the municipal power to order such removal, and, if necessary, to execute it at the expense and charge of the appealing administrated party." The foregoing is without prejudice to the use permits that could be granted over such goods, which, if granted, despite their precarious nature, if subsequently revoked for reasons of necessity or general interest, require a reasonable period for compliance with the ordered action, so that they cannot be removed arbitrarily or unexpectedly. In other words, for any private individual to take advantage of public domain goods for their benefit through commercial activities—specifically sidewalks—authorization (permit) from the public administration holding title is required, since the fact that it is a good intended for the use of the community does not mean that its use depends on the free will of those who use it; rather, this is the prerogative of the public authority, that is, the Municipality where such access ways are located.

VII.ON THE OPERATION OF ADVERTISING SCREENS AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE COSTA RICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE PLAINTIFF: as indicated in article 79 of the Código Municipal, "to carry out any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which will be obtained through the payment of a tax." According to this rule, to carry out any lucrative activity, the interested party requests it from the local entity, and the latter (if the applicant meets the requirements) issues an authorization (license) from which will subsequently derive, and according to the corresponding tax rules, the obligation to pay the business license tax. Thus, the municipal government is responsible for the authorization of each and every commercial activity carried out within its territorial circumscription, regardless of whether the trade is carried out on private or public property. In the latter case, additional use permits must also be obtained (Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), along with the requirements established for this purpose by the corresponding local regulations. From this regulatory framework, this Court observes that although it is true that, as of March 26, 2011, and even to date, the specific use of luminous advertising screens—commonly called "LED screens," which by its acronym in English refers to the phrase "Light Emitting Diode," technically translated as a semiconductor diode that emits light—has not been specifically regulated in the Costa Rican legal system, there are regulations applicable to the placement of advertising screens and billboards. For purposes of analyzing the specific case, we start—according to the statement of the plaintiff company—from the premise that this is a commercial activity, aimed at advertising spots on said screens for different brands and commercial establishments, which leads to applying, as a general rule, article 79 of the Código Municipal. Now, starting from the assumption that said rule did not exist—though it is clear it is indeed in force and applicable—it must be pointed out that regarding outdoor advertising, there are powers attributed to local governments, if dealing with municipal roads, and to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, through the Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito and Ingeniería de Tránsito, if dealing with the national road network, this according to Reglamento no. 29253-MOPT. The first article of this regulatory body indicates that this regulation aims to administer, supervise, and regulate nationally the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as matters concerning the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, and bus shelters on public or private land, or in the rights-of-way under the care of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, which will be the sole competent authority in this matter...". That is, the only agency that can authorize the material installation (not the exercise of the lucrative activity derived from it) of a billboard or advertising screen is the MOPT, a legal framework that leads to the conclusion that there is indeed a normative regulation governing the placement of these billboards or screens. This is because the second article of the cited Reglamento defines Advertisement as "any sign, writing, print, image generated by electronic media, painting, emblem, drawing, or other advertising medium, placed on the ground, natural or artificial structure, whose purpose is to make commercial propaganda or draw attention to a product, article, trademark, or to a commercial activity or business, service or recreation, profession or domiciliary occupation that is offered, sold, or carried out at a site different from where such advertisement appears." Although it is true that the transcribed rule does not expressly indicate screens of LED light technology, that does not mean they are not regulated, since the regulation itself states it can include advertisements of "writing, print, or image generated by electronic media..." which reflects a general regulation on these. A different matter is if what is intended is a specific regulation of luminosity, size, and visual impact, which would indeed complement the existing rules, but not, therefore, disapply them. Having said this, this Court concludes that for the installation of an LED technology screen, Reglamento 29253-MOPT is applicable regarding licenses for installation, substitution, reconstruction, and exhibition; therefore, the thesis presented at trial regarding the total absence of regulations to govern these advertising screens is not admissible (even if a public official so indicates by error or ignorance).

VIII. ON THE POWERS OF THE MUNICIPAL POLICE

in the Costa Rican normative system, local governments enjoy political, administrative, and financial autonomy by constitutional provision. In accordance with this, the Código Municipal reaffirms this character and indicates, based on this, that "...within its powers are included: administering and providing municipal public services." Although it is true that the traditional concept of municipal public service could refer to the idea of garbage collection services, street cleaning, rural aqueduct associations (asadas), park ornamentation, among others, this conception has been extended to other areas of coverage, which, according to the Ley General de la Administración Pública, is not only viable but necessary, as these must be adaptable to social needs (article 4). Along these lines, the guarantee of local security for the inhabitants—and visitors—of a canton is currently a priority within the administration of municipal services. The foregoing, although it has had a slow practical development, was actually foreseen by the legislator since the Ley de Construcciones of 1949, which in its first article established: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, healthiness, comfort, and beauty in their public thoroughfares and in the buildings and constructions erected on their lands, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in this matter to other administrative bodies." Now, with regard to the internal municipal organization to provide said service, municipal police forces have been established in different cantons, which, due to their local characteristic, have coverage within their cantonal limits. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber has pronounced itself—addressing an unconstitutionality action against the operation of the Municipal Police—making the distinctions that will be stated. That Body indicates that said activity is limited to being executed in a specific local area, and without prejudice to the respective coordination and cooperation actions with the national public force, without interference with the powers proper to the latter, whose origin is of constitutional rank (articles 12 and 140 of the Magna Carta). Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber starts from the premise that the municipal police covers the surveillance and control of strictly communal services, such as, for example, "the care of parks, the protection of municipal buildings, control over stationary and itinerant sales, supervision of licensed liquor and permitted gaming establishments, as well as actions derived as a consequence of that supervision, all considering the Municipality as the institution responsible for local interests and services." In the opinion of the Magistrates of said Chamber, far from an unconstitutionality occurring due to the coexistence of a national police (with constitutional powers) and a local police, this latter surveillance body constitutes an additional guarantee for the inhabitants of the municipality where it is instituted (regarding this, consult resolution no. 2005-4705 of 3:01 p.m. on April 27, 2005, issued by the Constitutional Chamber). In this understanding, it must be pointed out that the municipal police of each local government can—and must—ensure the order and safety of those who transit through its circumscription, so if the local Administration detects the existence of any disregard for the applicable legal system in the canton, it can make use of its powers of surveillance and imposition of order. Within such sphere of powers, where an ad hoc body exercises the police power, the municipal administration seeks public order, health, tranquility, the safety of persons, as well as the organization of local society, an attribution by virtue of which the imposition of restrictions is reasonable, as long as their justification lies precisely in the consideration that particular interests are limited by those of other persons, since they must coexist with each and every one of the other fundamental rights. Within such faculties, this Chamber considers that the protection of public domain goods and public order is included, so the actions taken by the municipal police in the specific case are not outside their powers. This is because it was demonstrated that on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the Estadio Nacional would take place, a date on which security operations were in place by the organizing administration, in order to guarantee that this event of national importance would occur in complete normality, which included emphasizing the relations of cooperation and coordination of the Central Government (Ministries in the specific case) with the local administration of the canton of San José. So if it was reliably detected that any person—physical or legal—was obstructing, for example, free passage through public domain areas, the municipal police could act to safeguard local security, the appropriate use of public domain goods, and public order. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that in our legal system, we have the Indertictum propium, a figure that, although not legally regulated, has been extensively developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2nd reprint 2007, pag. 363). The cited Chamber has consistently held in this regard that the administration must and can protect the public domain against attacks on it by the administrated parties, even through self-help measures (vías de hecho)—eviction or vacation—when the private individual does not have a legal title to occupy it and has entered it through self-help, in which case the "administrative action" substitutes the injunctions to recover the domain, without needing to resort to any administrative file, nor to due process rules, including the faculty to remove goods from occupied public sites (vote no.2306-91 of 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991). In the case under analysis, this Court has no doubt that the structure of the advertising screen placed by the plaintiff company was invading the public zone, since despite existing opposing testimonies between the declarants offered by the plaintiff (Javier Bouza Cordero and Douglas Quesada Altamirano) and the defendant (Nombre529 and Nombre5836), a public document (folio 60) is on file that unmistakably indicates that the screen structure was located on public domain goods. Even the trial witness offered by the plaintiff, Mr. Nombre3640, signs that document as a witness of the municipal conduct, as does Mr. Javier Bouza, without any disagreement from any of them with the content of the record being indicated, where precisely the plaintiff here is accused of invading public domain goods. The weighing of said document over the testimonies rendered is imposed in accordance with what has been expressed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in relation to the value that must be given to evidence in application of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which for this purpose indicated in vote no. 1155-S1-F-2009 of 2:05 p.m. on November 5, 2009 that "Regarding evidence in the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo this Collegiate Body stated: In this way, facts are proven, rules are applied, and rights and interests are declared or granted to those who requested by proving. However, for the crowning of such certainty in the facts, the legal system can attribute different regimes of appreciation, such as that of full and absolute freedom in evaluation (in conscience); under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), or also, under predetermined formulas or those assessed by the legal system itself, in all or some of the evidentiary elements. Along these lines, subsection 4 of article 82 proclaims: all evidence will be evaluated according to the rules of sound judgment. This provision opts for evidentiary evaluation under criteria of sound judgment, subjecting the weighing of those to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In this sense, it is important to clarify that with this, the prevailing regime established by the same law for public documents and confessional evidence is not discarded, repealed, or destroyed. There is therefore no fracture or dissociation with the general evaluation regime established by the Costa Rican legal system. Those two particular evidentiary instruments (confession and public documents), as has been said, hold a priority value over the other evidentiary mechanisms, based on the public faith recorded in them or on the statement made against the affected party itself. Ignoring this prevalence would produce absolute disauthorization for all notaries public and those who accept a determined fact to their detriment, which would generate severe legal uncertainty and, therefore, chaos beyond the legal. Therefore, it must be understood that the sound judgment correctly indicated by subsection 4 of article 82 applies without detriment to and with full respect for the prevalence or predominance of the evidentiary value of those elements to which such potentiality is assigned by law (specifically, by the Código Procesal Civil). It can therefore be said that, in the new administrative contentious regime, the regime of assessed evidence is not completely repealed, which does not mean either that it survives as an absolute, inexpugnable regime, or one impossible to prove otherwise. The reduced evidentiary elements that have such a privilege in their evaluation create a presumption on the statement contained in them that cannot be taken as absolute truth, but as a relative presumption (iuris tantum), which implies that in certain cases, said presumption may be refuted or destroyed with different evidentiary elements, which, regardless of their source or level, truthfully contradict what has been recorded in them. Nevertheless, as long as that does not occur, they will continue maintaining their presumption, resistance, and evidentiary potential." In any case, suitable evidence that distorted the content of what was indicated in the municipal record was also not contributed to the case file, for example, any notarial record indicating the contrary. It is necessary to point out that the sole evidence contributed to the case file to demonstrate the plaintiff's theory of the case—in addition to the said declarations—were a series of photographs where the screen structure in the zone where the events occurred is observed. However, neither in the photographs contributed with the complaint, nor in those offered at the trial hearing, is there in any way recorded the date and time when such a fact was graphically recorded. The witnesses from the Municipality of San José were emphatic in pointing out that in reality, the advertising screen, at the moment when its removal was ordered, was invading the public zone (sidewalk) and that the contributed graphics show a different image from what occurred around noon on March 26, 2011. Given that such evidence lacks the indication of the date and time they were taken (normally printed on digital photographs), the Court cannot conclude with this simple documentation that the facts the plaintiff alleges occurred on that date are proven with these images. They are simple graphic reproductions of a place, without it being known with certainty from their observation to which date they correspond. Thus, having this Court weighed the value of the documentary evidence under the terms indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and delimited in preceding lines, in application of the rules of sound judgment and weighing all evidence as a whole, it is concluded that there is no evidence whatsoever that distorts what is stated in the record drawn up by the Municipality of San José on March 26, 2011, that is, the invasion of public property by the plaintiff company, without any permission or authorization for it, it is reiterated, for the use of a public domain good, a fact that, according to the applicable block of legality and set forth in this resolution, justifies the order of immediate removal of said structure. For this reason, this Chamber considers that if indeed the public zone was invaded (as demonstrated in proven fact no. 10), the municipal police could act to safeguard public domain goods and in full application of the cited "Interdictum propium" figure, finding no actions on the part of this body that should be reproached by this Court.

IX. CONCERNING THE INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES

the damages (material and moral) claimed by the plaintiff company were conditional upon a declaration of non-conformity of the administrative conduct carried out by the San José municipal police, a conclusion that this Body does not consider applicable in the present case, which is why the claim for damages (both) must be rejected, without it being necessary to refer to the evidence that was provided or is lacking to that effect.

IX. CONCERNING THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES

with respect to the defense of lack of right argued by the Municipality of San José, this must be upheld given that, pursuant to the examination conducted in Considerandos V, VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution, it was determined that there are no reasons to declare the non-conformity with the legal system of the conduct of the Municipality of San José, insofar as it ordered the representative of the plaintiff company to dismantle the structure of the advertising screen placed in front of the Estadio Nacional on March 26, 2011, given that the administrative procedure claimed was not necessary for this, nor did a violation of private property rights occur, and therefore the filed lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its extremes.

X.CONCERNING COSTS. Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes as a general rule that procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemning the losing party, which is why both costs are imposed on the plaintiff.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of right is upheld. The lawsuit is declared without merit in all its extremes. Both costs are borne by the plaintiff.

Priscila Quirós Muñoz Francisco Jiménez Villegas Jonatan Canales Hernández **III. ON THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF:** In essence, the plaintiff's attorney indicates that I S.A. is a company engaged in providing consulting services in the area of Marketing and Communication and in the development of promotional and advertising events. He relates that, prior to the inauguration of the National Stadium, Mr. Javier Bouza appeared at different offices of the Municipality of San José, in order to seek information regarding the procedure he had to follow to obtain a temporary permit to place an LED screen on the eastern boundary of the private property registered in the public registry under real folio number […], a property where the Xinhua News Agency of the People's Republic of China is located. This with the purpose of operating said image screen from Saturday the 26th to Tuesday the 29th, both days of March 2011, with operating hours from six in the morning until twelve midnight. He indicates that at the Municipality, the Head of Patents pointed out to him that, because it was an installation on private property and facing a national, not municipal, road, the permit had to be requested from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. He says he went to the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the MOPT with a note setting forth the aforementioned request; however, he claims, there they indicated that said Department only authorizes the installation of billboards and flat or traditional signs, and not electronic or LED screens, so he was referred to the Department of Road Prevision of the MOPT. That same day, he adds, he met with the Head of said body, who, he adds, indicated to him that the MOPT does not grant permits for the operation of LED or electronic screens on national roads, as they correspond to a different typology than those regulated in Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT of December 20, 2000, and they were not regulated by any rule. He indicates that, given what was stated by the MOPT officials, he returned to the Municipality of San José to request a temporary license and some type of permit, for which reason he submitted the request in writing. He adds that the Head of Patents of that local Government gave him note SPP-0309-11, in which he was informed that because the road in front of which the screen was to be installed was a national road, the Municipality lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested permit. He claims that, from that moment on, he arranged the rental of an electronic screen with dimensions of 5.28 meters wide by 5.28 meters high, and subsequently signed advertising schedules with some of his clients to program advertisements on this screen during March 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2001. He says that to place the screen, he rented the frontal area of the private property registered in the Public Registry under Real Folio […] with an area of 24.50 meters long by 3 meters wide. He relates that on March 25 and 26 of the cited month, the installation of the screen, the power plant, and the barricade on the leased property proceeded. He complains that on the 26th, when they already had their screen installed and in full operation, two supposed inspectors visited him, indicating that the installed structure had to be removed due to not having the respective permits. He adds that later, Mrs. A, a municipal police officer, appeared, accompanied by about 10 more police officers, stating that they had come to remove and take down the screen. He complains that despite presenting the note from the Municipality, where it was indicated that he did not require a permit, it was not accepted. He indicates that the police officers said they were orders from the Ministry of Health and the MOPT, but they also did not present any written order, even though this was requested at the time. He says the screen had to be removed given the displays of bullying, intimidation, and threats of forcible demolition, all of which happened in the presence of the then vice-president of the Municipal Council. He states that the administrative act carried out by the Municipality of San José is clearly illegal and vitiated by nullity, among other reasons, for lack of jurisdiction. Added to this, he notes, this act caused him serious financial consequences. In support of his statements, he copies some excerpts from judicial decisions referring to the intangibility of the public administration's own acts. He transcribes some regulations related to the powers of the Municipal Police of San José and, based on this, says the municipal police could not order the dismantling of the screen placed on private property, fronting a national road, and without following due process. He insists that the "act" carried out by that local government is null due to lack of jurisdiction. He adds that, in relation to this type of screen, there is no regulation, so many people install them without any type of permit, a situation he asserts was explained to him by Mr. Jorge Rojas himself, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Road Prevision of the MOPT. He considers that once the Administration issues an act declaratory of subjective rights, as occurred in his case, where he was verbally authorized to install the electronic screen, his right could not be violated without initiating due process.

**IV. ON THE ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT:** For its part, the representation of the Municipality of San José centers its defense on indicating that in reality the screen was placed invading part of the sidewalk and the public space designated for pedestrian passage, which is why the Municipal Police went to review the referred situation. It says it was verified by means of the police officers and a report drawn up for that purpose, that the screen was impeding the free transit of persons, and that based on the powers delegated to the Director of the Mayor's Office, the latter can make decisions to safeguard public property. It indicates that without prejudice to the foregoing, when the municipal police officers appeared at the place where the screen was installed, no document supporting their assertions regarding the procedures carried out before the MOPT was presented to them by the plaintiff company. It maintains that the screen structure was not placed solely within a private area, but rather was found to be invading the public area, so that according to ample jurisprudence, it could be removed without prior procedure and unilaterally by the administration. In its view, the municipal police of San José has full jurisdiction to carry out the actions referred to by the plaintiff company, and it has jurisdiction according to the police power, oversight power, principle of legality, efficiency of the administration, and because it must protect the interests of the community, among which it highlights public order. In support of its thesis, it transcribes an excerpt from a decision of the Constitutional Chamber, referring to the police power.

**V. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTS" AND "MATERIAL ACTIONS" OF THE ADMINISTRATION:** While it is true that the plaintiff company requests as its first claim that "the nonconformity of the administrative conduct of the Municipal Police of San José and of the Municipality of San José... be declared," the truth is that in the factual and legal argumentation of the complaint, it refers interchangeably to acts and material actions of the local government, as if they were concepts with identical legal meaning, which leads this Court, as a first order of ideas, to make the technical distinction of the case. According to domestic doctrine, the administrative function can be realized through acts or facts. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pág. 357). Acts are declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration made in the exercise of the administrative function, which produce concrete or general legal effects, of a normative or non-normative scope, directly or immediately; whereas facts are the material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function, that is, those that are carried out without the need for a law or a power, a jurisdiction, or a prior administrative act to enable them, unless they are unlawful actions, in which case they would be considered de facto actions. Both, acts and material actions, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, can be analyzed in this jurisdiction, as said article indicates that the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction established in Article 49 of the Political Constitution has the purpose of protecting the legal situations of any person, guaranteeing or reestablishing the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the legal-administrative relationship. The noted distinction is important insofar as it must be determined whether the conduct of the Municipality of San José was in conformity or not with the legal system, and for this, it is then necessary to define what type of administrative conduct is involved, that is, whether it is an administrative act or a material action. In the specific case, the Court observes that the plaintiff company claims that the local government "forced it to dismantle the advertising structure within 24 hours, without the possibility of having a process before a competent body and in clear violation of the right to property." Note then that the conduct for which a declaration of nonconformity with the legal system is requested is the order given verbally and notified by means of a municipal report, where the company Ingenium Comunicaciones is forced to turn off the LED technology screen. Ergo, far from attacking a formal administrative act, what is actually reproached is the existence of a material action of the local administration, which, without having a prior act that modified official note no. SPP2-0309-11 (in which the Head of Patents indicated that "In attention and response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen is to be installed is a National Road, its administration corresponds to the MOPT, therefore this Municipality has no jurisdiction over it, thus the corresponding procedure for this matter must be made before said Institution"), proceeded to order the dismantling of the LED light technology advertising screen structure.

**VI. ON THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY:** The delineation of this aspect is necessary in this decision, as one of the issues discussed in the oral trial was the eventual use of a public domain space by a private legal entity, and the powers that the municipal police can use to safeguard its free access. For this reason, it is fundamental to refer to the scope of Article 261 of the Civil Code, which distinguishes between public and private property, as well as the criteria based on which both can be distinguished, this because their use requires submitting to different rules. In this regard, the said article establishes: "Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can take advantage of because they are delivered for public use. All other things are private and subject to private ownership, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." The Constitutional Chamber, taking into account the cited rule, has referred to the property that makes up the public domain in the following terms: "they are those that have a nature and legal regime diverse from private property – which are governed by the right of property under the terms of Article 45 of the Political Constitution – insofar as, by the express will of the legislator, they are affected by a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and for that reason, they cannot be subject to private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, and therefore, they cannot belong individually to private persons, nor to the State, strictly speaking, as the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship... Furthermore, their use and enjoyment is subject to the police power, as, because they are property that cannot be subject to possession, and much less to property, their utilization and enjoyment is possible." (resolution no. 2007-2408 of 16 hours 13 minutes of February 21, 2007). As is relevant to the specific case, it must be noted that the sidewalk is part of the public domain, and is defined as a space that is part of the public road, normally located at its edge, which is reserved for the transit of pedestrians, as established by the Construction Regulations in its article one, subsection three.

This leads to the conclusion that, given their nature, sidewalks (aceras) are permanently subject to use by the community, such that they possess the characteristics indicated for public domain assets. It is for this reason that no private individual can validly prevent them from being applied to the use for which they are intended, and even less so, claim any right over them other than that of any person to freely transit them, as that is their natural use. For its part, the local Administration may directly exercise the mechanisms within its reach when, by action or omission of any person, pedestrian traffic is obstructed or impeded, by virtue of its self-help powers, which empower it to even employ administrative coercion in protection of public interests, without needing to resort to the Courts of Justice, as has been recognized since long ago by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its resolution 3006-94 of June 17, 1994, which specifically stated: <i>"...the prohibition emanating from the act of the Municipality that is challenged here refers to two points: firstly, the possibility of using the sidewalk (acera), a public domain asset, to provide the company's service, which this Chamber considers appropriate, since assets that have the characteristics of the one discussed here are not susceptible to private appropriation and the authority in charge of their custody may order that such appropriation cease."</i> In addition to the foregoing, it was added in this constitutional vote that <i>"the legal regime of sidewalks (aceras) is completed by the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) and the Municipal Code, the latter establishing that it is the duty of municipal authorities to remove objects, materials, or similar items from sidewalks (aceras) that contaminate the environment or obstruct passage, which implies the municipal power to order such removal, and if necessary, to execute it at the expense and charge of the appealing administered party."</i> The foregoing is without prejudice to the use permits that may be granted over such assets, which, if they have been granted, despite their precarious nature, if subsequently revoked for reasons of necessity or general interest, obligate the granting of a reasonable period for compliance with what has been ordered, such that they cannot be removed arbitrarily or unexpectedly. In other words, for any private individual to be able to utilize public domain assets for their benefit through commercial activities—specifically sidewalks (aceras)—authorization (permit) from the public administration that holds ownership is required, since the fact that it is an asset intended for the community's use does not mean that its use depends on the free will of those who use it; rather, that is the power of the public authority, that is, of the Municipality where such access routes are located.

VII.ON THE OPERATION OF ADVERTISING SCREENS AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE COSTA RICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE PLAINTIFF: as indicated by the Municipal Code in its Article 79, <i>"to engage in any for-profit activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax."</i> In accordance with said norm, to engage in any for-profit activity, the interested party requests it from the local entity and the latter (if the applicant meets the requirements for it) issues an authorization (license) from which the obligation to pay the patent tax will subsequently derive, according to the corresponding tax rules. In this way, the municipal government is responsible for authorizing each and every commercial activity carried out within its territorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether the exercise of commerce takes place on private or public property. In the latter case, additional use permits must also be obtained (Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), along with the requirements established for that purpose by the corresponding local regulations. Based on this regulatory framework, this Court observes that although it is true that, as of March 26, 2011, and still to date, the use of luminous advertising screens—commonly called "LED screens," whose English acronym refers to the phrase "Light Emitting Diode," and which is technically translated as a light-emitting semiconductor diode—has not been specifically regulated in the Costa Rican legal system, there are regulations that are applicable to the placement of advertising screens and billboards. For purposes of analyzing the specific case, we start—according to the plaintiff company's statement—from the premise that this is a commercial activity aimed at advertising spots on said screens for different brands and commercial establishments, which leads to applying numeral 79 of the Municipal Code as a general rule. However, assuming that said norm did not exist—while it is clearly understood that it is in force and applicable—it must be noted that, in the case of outdoor advertising, there are powers attributed to local governments, if facing municipal roads, and to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, through the General Directorate of Traffic Police and Traffic Engineering (Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito y de Ingeniería de Tránsito), if dealing with the national road network, this in accordance with Regulation No. 29253-MOPT. The first article of this regulatory body indicates that this regulation aims to administer, supervise, and regulate at the national level the rights of way of the national road network, as well as matters concerning the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters on public or private land, or in the rights of way that are under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which will be the sole competent authority in this matter...". That is, the only department that can authorize the material installation (not the exercise of the for-profit activity derived from it) of a billboard or advertising screen is the MOPT, a legal framework that leads to the conclusion that a regulation does exist that regulates the placement of these billboards or screens. This is because the second article of the cited Regulation defines an Advertisement as <i>"any sign, writing, print, image generated by electronic means, painting, emblem, drawing, or other advertising medium, placed on the ground, natural or artificial structure, whose purpose is to make commercial propaganda or draw attention to a product, item, trademark, or toward a commercial activity or business, service or recreation, profession or home-based occupation that is offered, sold, or carried out at a site other than where such advertisement appears."</i> While it is true that the transcribed norm does not expressly indicate LED light technology screens, that does not mean they are not regulated, since the regulation itself says it can include advertisements of "writing, print or image generated by electronic means...," which reflects a general regulation over these. It is different if what is intended is a specific regulation of luminosity, size, and visual impact, which would indeed complement the existing norms, but not because of that, disapply them. Having said the above, this Court concludes that for the installation of an LED light technology screen, Regulation 29253-MOPT is applicable regarding installation, substitution, reconstruction, and exhibition licenses. Therefore, the thesis presented at trial regarding the total absence of regulations to regulate these advertising screens is not admissible (even if a public official so states due to error or ignorance).

VIII. ON THE POWERS OF THE MUNICIPAL POLICE

in the Costa Rican regulatory system, local governments enjoy political, administrative, and financial autonomy by constitutional provision. In accordance with this, the Code on the matter reaffirms such character and indicates, based on it, that <i>"...within their attributions are included: administering and providing municipal public services."</i> Although it is true that the traditional concept of municipal public service might refer to the idea of garbage collection services, road cleaning, rural water boards, park ornamentation, among others, this conception has been extended to other areas of coverage, which according to the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not only viable but necessary, as these must be adaptable to social needs (numeral 4). In this line, the guarantee of local safety for the inhabitants—and visitors—of a canton is currently a priority within the administration of municipal services. The foregoing, although it has had a slow practical development, was actually foreseen by the legislator since the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) of 1949, which in its first ordinal established: <i>"The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other populations meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the faculties that the laws grant in this matter to other administrative bodies."</i> Now, regarding the internal municipal organization to provide said service, municipal police forces have been established in different cantons, which, due to their local characteristic, have coverage within their cantonal limits. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has pronounced itself—addressing an action of unconstitutionality against the operation of the Municipal Police—making the distinctions that will be stated. That Body indicates that such activity is limited to being executed in a determined local scope, and without prejudice to the respective coordination and cooperation actions with the national public force, without interference with the latter's own powers, whose origin is of constitutional rank (articles 12 and 140 of the Magna Carta). Second, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) starts from the premise that the municipal police covers the vigilance and control of properly community services, such as, for example, <i>"the care of parks, the protection of municipal buildings, the control of stationary and street sales, the supervision of licensed liquor and permitted gaming establishments, as well as the actions derived as a consequence of that supervision, all of this considering the Municipality as the institution in charge of local interests and services."</i> In the opinion of the Justices of said Chamber, far from there being an unconstitutionality due to the coexistence of a national police (with constitutional powers) and a local police, this latter vigilance body constitutes an additional guarantee for the inhabitants of the municipality in which it is instituted (in this regard, consult resolution no. 2005-4705 of 3:01 p.m. on April 27, 2005, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). In that understanding, it must be noted that the municipal police of each local government can—and must—ensure the order and safety of those who transit through its jurisdiction. Therefore, if the local Administration detects the existence of some neglect of the legal system applicable in the canton, it may use its powers of vigilance and imposition of order. Within such sphere of competencies, where an ad hoc body exercises the police power, the municipal administration seeks public order, health, tranquility, the security of persons, as well as the organization of local society, an attribution by virtue of which the imposition of restrictions is reasonable, as long as its justification is found precisely in the consideration that particular interests are limited by those of other persons, since they must coexist with each and every one of the other fundamental rights. Within such faculties, this Chamber considers that the protection of public domain assets and public order is included, so what was done by the municipal police in the specific case is not outside its powers. This is because it was taken as demonstrated that on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the National Stadium would take place, a date on which security operations existed by the organizing administration, in order to guarantee that this event of national importance occurred in complete normality, which included emphasizing the cooperation and coordination relations of the Central Government (ministries in the specific case) with the local administration of the canton of San José. So that if it was reliably detected that any person—physical or legal—obstructed, for example, free passage through public domain areas, the municipal police could act to protect local security, the adequate use of public domain assets, and public order. It must also be taken into account that in our legal system, we have the *Indertictum propium*, a figure that, although not legally regulated, has been widely developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pag. 363). The cited Chamber has sustained in this regard that the administration must and can protect the public domain against attacks on it by the administered parties, even through direct action—eviction or vacation—when the private individual lacks a legal title to occupy it and has entered it by direct action; in such case, the <i>"administrative action"</i> substitutes the interdicts to recover the domain, without needing to resort to any administrative file, nor rules of due process, including the faculty to remove goods from occupied public sites (vote no. 2306-91 of 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991). In the case under analysis, this Court has no doubt that the structure of the advertising screen placed by the plaintiff company was invading the public zone, since despite there being opposing testimonies between the declarants offered by the plaintiff party (Javier Bouza Cordero and Douglas Quesada Altamirano) and the defendant (A and R), there appears in the record a public document (folio 60) that indicates unmistakably that the screen structure was located on public domain assets. Even the witness at trial offered by the plaintiff party, Mr. D, signs that document as a witness to the municipal conduct, as does Mr. Javier Bouza, without any indication of disagreement from any of them with the content of the record, where precisely the plaintiff here is accused of invading the assets of the public domain. The weighing of said document over the testimonies given is imposed in accordance with what has been expressed by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) in relation to the value that must be given to evidence in application of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, which to that effect indicated in vote no. 1155-S1-F-2009 of 2:05 p.m. on November 5, 2009, that <i>"Regarding evidence in the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, this Collegiate Body stated: In this way, facts are proven, norms are applied, and rights and interests are declared or granted to those who requested by proving. However, for the coronation of such certainty in the facts, the legal system can attribute different regimes of appreciation, such as that of full and absolute freedom in evaluation (in conscience); under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), or also, under predetermined formulas or rates by the legal system itself, in all, or some of the evidentiary elements. In this line, paragraph 4 of Article 82 proclaims: all evidence shall be appreciated according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). This provision opts for evidentiary evaluation under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), subjecting the weighing of those to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. However, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify <b>that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime that the same law establishes for public documents and confessional evidence</b>. There is therefore no fracture or dissociation with the general evaluation regime established by the Costa Rican legal system. Those two particular evidentiary instruments (confession and public documents), <b>hold, as has been said, a priority value over the other mechanisms of proof, on the basis of the public faith consigned in them or of the statement against the affected party herself.</b> Ignoring this prevalence would produce absolute discredit for all public certifiers and for those who accept a determined fact to their detriment, which would generate severe legal uncertainty and therefore, chaos beyond the legal. Therefore, it must be understood that the sound judgment (sana crítica) correctly indicated by paragraph 4 of numeral 82 is so without detriment and with full respect for the prevalence or predominance of the probative value of those elements to which such potentiality is assigned by law (specifically, by the Civil Procedural Code). It can then be said that, in the new contentious-administrative regime, the system of graded proof is not entirely repealed, which also does not mean that it survives as an absolute, unassailable regime, or as impossible to prove otherwise. The reduced evidentiary elements that count with such a privilege in their evaluation create a presumption on the assertion contained in them that cannot be taken as absolute truth, but rather as a relative presumption (iuris tantum), which implies that in certain cases, said presumption may be rebutted or destroyed with different means of proof, which, regardless of their source or level, truthfully contradict what has been consigned in them. However, as long as that does not occur, they will continue to maintain their presumption, resistance, and probative potentiality."</i> In any case, suitable evidence was not provided to the record that would distort the content of what was indicated in the municipal record, for example, some notarial record indicating the contrary. It is necessary to point out that the only evidence provided to the record to demonstrate the plaintiff party's theory of the case—besides the said statements—were a series of photographs where the structure of the screen is seen in the zone where the events occurred. However, neither in the photographs provided with the complaint nor in those offered at the trial hearing is indicated in any way the date and time at which graphic record of such fact was left. The witnesses for the Municipality of San José were emphatic in stating that in reality the advertising screen, at the moment it was ordered to be removed, was invading the public zone (sidewalk (acera)) and that the graphics provided have a different image of what happened near midday on January 26, 2011. Given that such evidence lacks the indication of the date and time when they were taken (normally printed on digital photographs), the Court cannot conclude with this simple documentation that the events that the plaintiff party claims happened on that date are proven with these images. They are simple graphic reproductions of a place, without it being known with certainty, from their observation, to what date they correspond.

Thus, having weighed by this Court the value of the documentary evidence in the terms indicated by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) and delimited in the preceding lines, applying the rules of sound criticism and weighing all the evidence together, it is concluded that there is no evidence whatsoever to rebut what is stated in the record drawn up by the Municipality (Municipalidad) of San José on March 26, 2011, that is, the invasion of public property by the plaintiff company, without any permit or authorization whatsoever for it, it is reiterated, for the use of a public domain asset, a fact which, in accordance with the applicable legal framework set forth in this resolution, justifies the order for the immediate removal of said structure. For this reason, this Chamber considers that if, in effect, the public zone was invaded (as is taken as demonstrated in proven fact no. 10), the municipal police could act in protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales) and in full application of the cited figure of the "Interdictum propium", there being no actions on the part of that body that should be reproached by this Court.

IX. ON THE COMPENSATION (INDEMNIZACIÓN) FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES

the damages (material and moral) claimed by the plaintiff company were conditional upon the declaration of the non-conformity of the administrative conduct deployed by the municipal police of San José, a conclusion that this Body does not consider applicable in the species, for which reason the claim for damages (both) must be rejected, without it being necessary to refer to the evidence that was provided or is lacking to that effect.

IX. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO)

in relation to the defense of lack of right argued by the Municipality of San José, this must be accepted, given that in accordance with the examination carried out in Considerandos V, VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution, it was determined that there are no reasons to declare the non-conformity with the legal system of the conduct of the Municipality of San José, insofar as it ordered the representative of the plaintiff company to dismantle the structure of the advertising screen placed in front of the National Stadium on March 26, 2011, since the administrative procedure claimed was not necessary for this, nor did a violation of the right to private property occur, for which reason the filed lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its extremes." He states that, given what was explained by the MOPT officials, he returned to the Municipality of San José to request a temporary patent and some type of permit, for which he submitted the request in writing. Nombre193, the Head of Patents of that local Government, gave him note SPP-0309-11 in which he indicated that, because the road in front of which the screen was going to be installed was a national road, he lacked competence to grant the requested permit. He affirms that, from that moment on, he managed the rental of an electronic screen with dimensions of 5.28 meters wide by 5.28 meters high, and subsequently signed advertising contracts with some of his clients to schedule advertisements on this screen during the days of March 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2001. He says that, to place the screen, he rented the front area of the private property registered in the Public Registry under Folio Real […] with an area of 24.50 meters long by 3 meters wide. He relates that, on March 25 and 26 of the cited month, they proceeded with the installation of the screen, the power generator, and the barricade on the rented property. He claims that, on the 26th, when they already had their screen installed and fully operational, two supposed inspectors visited him, indicating that the installed structure had to be removed because it lacked the respective permits. He adds that later, Mrs. Nombre529, a municipal police officer, accompanied by about 10 more police officers, appeared, stating that they had come to remove and take down the screen. He claims that, despite presenting the note from the Municipality, where he was told he did not require a permit, it was not accepted. He indicates that the police officers said they were orders from the Ministry of Health and the MOPT, but they also did not present any written order, even though this was requested at the time. He says the screen had to be removed given the displays of bullying, intimidation, and threats of forcible demolition, all of which happened in the presence of the then vice-president of the Municipal Council. He affirms that the administrative action carried out by the Municipality of San José is clearly illegal and null and void, among other reasons, for lack of competence. Added to this, he points out, this action caused him serious financial consequences. In support of his statements, he copies some excerpts from judicial rulings referring to the intangibility of the public administration's own acts. He transcribes some regulations related to the powers of the Municipal Police of San José and, based on this, says that the municipal police could not order the dismantling of the screen placed on private property, in front of a national road, and without following due process. He insists that the "action" carried out by that local government is null due to lack of competence. He adds that, regarding this type of screen, there is no regulation, which is why many people install them without any type of permit, a situation he asserts was explained to him by Mr. Nombre113046 himself, in his capacity as Head of the MOPT Department of Road Planning. He considers that, once the Administration issues an act declaring subjective rights, as occurred in his case, where he was verbally authorized to install the electronic screen, his right could not be violated without initiating due process.

IV. REGARDING THE ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT

For its part, the representation of the Municipality of San José centers its defense on indicating that in reality the screen was placed invading part of the sidewalk and the public space for pedestrian passage, which is why the Municipal Police went to review the referred situation. It says that it was verified by the police officers and a report drawn up for this purpose that the screen was impeding the free transit of people, and that, based on the powers delegated to the Director of the Mayor's Office, he can make decisions to safeguard public property. It indicates that, without prejudice to the foregoing, when the municipal police officers appeared at the place where the screen was installed, some document supporting their assertions regarding the steps taken before the MOPT was not presented to them by the plaintiff company. It maintains that the screen structure was not placed solely within a private area, but rather was invading the public area, and therefore, according to ample case law, it could be removed without prior procedure and unilaterally by the administration. In its opinion, the municipal police of San José has full competence to carry out the actions referred to by the plaintiff company, and it has competence according to police power, supervisory authority, the principle of legality, the efficiency of the administration, and because it must protect the interests of the community, among which public order stands out. In support of its thesis, it transcribes an excerpt from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, referring to police power.

V. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTS" (ACTOS) AND "MATERIAL ACTIONS" (ACTUACIONES) OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Although it is true that the plaintiff company requests as its first claim that "the non-conformity of the administrative conduct of the Municipal Police of San José and the Municipality of San José... be declared," the truth is that in the factual and legal argumentation of the complaint, it refers indistinctly to acts and material actions of the local government, as if they were concepts with identical legal meaning, which leads this Tribunal, in the first order of ideas, to make the technical distinction of the case. According to national doctrine, the administrative function can materialize through acts or facts. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2nd reprint 2007, p. 357). Acts are declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration made in the exercise of the administrative function, which produce concrete or general legal effects, whether normative or not, directly or immediately; while facts are material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function, that is, those that are performed without the need for a law or a power, a competence, or a prior administrative act that enables them, unless they are illicit actions, in which case they would constitute de facto actions (vías de hecho). Both acts and material actions, in accordance with the provisions of the first numeral of the Code of Administrative Procedure, can be analyzed in this jurisdiction, as said article indicates that the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction established in Article 49 of the Political Constitution has the purpose of protecting the legal situations of every person, guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the administrative legal relationship. The distinction noted is important in that it must be determined whether the conduct of the Municipality of San José was in conformity with the legal system or not, and for this, it is then necessary to define what type of administrative conduct is at issue, that is, whether it is an administrative act or a material action. In the specific case, the Tribunal observes that the plaintiff company claims that the local government "obliged it to dismantle the advertising structure within 24 hours, without the possibility of having a process before a competent body and in clear violation of property rights." Note then that the conduct for which a declaration of non-conformity with the legal system is requested is the order given verbally and notified by municipal report, in which the company Ingenium Comunicaciones is forced to turn off the LED technology screen. Ergo, far from attacking a formal administrative act, what is actually reproached is the existence of a material action by the local administration, which, without having beforehand an act modifying official note no. Placa20608, (in which the Head of Patents indicated that "In attention and response to your note dated March 9 of this year, I inform you that since the road in front of which the screen is to be installed is a National Road, its administration corresponds to the MOPT, so this Municipality has no involvement over it, therefore the corresponding procedure for this matter must be carried out before said Institution") proceeded to order the dismantling of the structure of the advertising screen using LED light technology.

VI. ON THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY

The delimitation of this aspect is necessary in this resolution, as one of the topics discussed in the oral trial was the eventual use of a public domain space by a private legal subject, and the powers that the municipal police can use to safeguard its free access. For this reason, it is essential to refer to the scope of numeral 261 of the Civil Code, which distinguishes between public and private property, as well as the criteria based on which a distinction can be made between the two, this because their use requires submission to different rules. In this regard, the said article establishes: "Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can take advantage of because they are delivered to public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." The Constitutional Chamber, taking into account the cited rule, has referred to the property that makes up the public domain in the following terms: "they are those that have a nature and legal regime different from private property -which are governed by property rights under the terms of Article 45 of the Political Constitution- insofar as, by express will of the legislator, they are allocated for a special destiny of serving the community, be it the public interest, and because of this, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, and therefore, cannot belong individually to individuals, nor to the State, in the strict sense, since the State is limited to its administration and tutelage... Furthermore, their use and enjoyment are subject to police power, since, being property that cannot be the object of possession, and much less of property, their utilization and enjoyment is possible." (resolution no. 2007-2408 of 4:13 p.m. on February 21, 2007). In what is of interest to the specific case, it must be noted that the sidewalk is part of the public domain (demanio público), and is defined as a space that is part of the public road, normally located at its edge, which is reserved for the transit of pedestrians, as established by the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) in its article one, subsection three. This leads to the conclusion that, given their nature, sidewalks are permanently allocated for their use by the community, so the characteristics indicated for public domain property are proper to them. It is for this reason that no individual can validly prevent them from being applied to the use for which they are intended, and even less, claim any right over them, other than that of any person to transit them freely, as that is their natural use. For its part, the local Administration can directly exercise the mechanisms within its reach, when, by action or omission of any person, the transit of pedestrians is obstructed or impeded, this by virtue of its powers of self-protection (autotutela), which empower it to even use administrative coercion in protection of public interests, without needing to resort to the Courts of Justice, as has been recognized for a long time by the Constitutional Chamber in its resolution 3006-94 of June 17, 1994, which specifically stated: "...the prohibition emanating from the act of the Municipality challenged herein refers to two points: first, the possibility of using the sidewalk, a public domain property, to provide the company's service, which the Chamber considers admissible, since property that has the characteristics of the one discussed here is not subject to particular appropriation and the authority responsible for its tutelage can order that such appropriation cease." In addition to what was indicated, this constitutional vote added "that the legal regime of sidewalks is completed by the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) and the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), the latter establishing that it is the duty of municipal authorities to remove objects, materials, or similar from sidewalks that contaminate the environment or obstruct passage, which implies the municipal power to order such removal, and if necessary, to execute it at the expense and charge of the appealing citizen." The foregoing is without prejudice to the use permits that could be granted over such property, which, if they had been granted, despite their precarious nature, if they were subsequently revoked for reasons of necessity or general interest, oblige the granting of a reasonable period for compliance with what was ordered, so that they cannot be removed in an arbitrary or surprising manner. In other words, for any individual to be able to utilize public domain property for their benefit with commercial activities—specifically sidewalks—the authorization (permit) of the public administration that holds its ownership is required, since the fact that it is a property designated for the use of the community does not mean that its use depends on the free will of those who utilize it; rather, this is the power of the public authority, that is, of the Municipality where such access ways are located.

VII.ON THE OPERATION OF ADVERTISING SCREENS AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE COSTA RICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE PLAINTIFF: As indicated by the Municipal Code in its article 79, "to carry out any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license (licencia municipal), which will be obtained through the payment of a tax." In accordance with said rule, to carry out any lucrative activity, the interested party requests it from the local entity and this (if the applicant meets the requirements for it) issues an authorization (license) from which the obligation to pay the patent tax (impuesto de patentes) will subsequently derive, in accordance with the corresponding tax rules. In this way, it corresponds to the municipal government to authorize each and every commercial activity that is carried out within its territorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether the exercise of commerce takes place on private or public property. In the latter case, additional use permits must also be obtained (Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública), along with the requirements established for this purpose by the corresponding local regulations. From this regulatory framework, this Tribunal appreciates that, although it is true that as of March 26, 2011, and even to date, the use of luminous-type advertising screens—commonly called "LED screens" (pantallas LED), which by its acronym in English refers to the phrase "Light Emitting Diode," and is technically translated as a semiconductor diode that emits light—has not been specifically regulated in the Costa Rican legal system, there are regulations that are applicable to the placement of advertising screens and billboards. For the purpose of analyzing the specific case, we start—according to the statement of the plaintiff company—from the premise that this is a commercial activity aimed at advertising spots on said screens for various brands and commercial establishments, which leads to applying numeral 79 of the Municipal Code as a general rule. Now, assuming that said rule did not exist—and it is clear that it is in force and applicable—it must be noted that, in the case of outdoor advertising, there are competences attributed to local governments, if it involves municipal roads, and to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), through the General Directorate of Traffic Police and Traffic Engineering, if it involves the national road network, this in accordance with Regulation no. 29253-MOPT. The first article of this regulatory body indicates that this regulation aims to administer, supervise, and regulate at the national level, the rights of way of the national road network, as well as matters concerning the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of announcements, signs, billboards, bus shelters on public or private land, or in the rights of way that are under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which will be the sole competent authority in this matter...". That is, the only agency that can authorize the material installation (not the exercise of the lucrative activity derived from it) of an advertising billboard or screen is the MOPT, a legal framework that leads to the conclusion that there is indeed a regulatory norm that regulates the placement of these billboards or screens. This is because the second article of the cited Regulation defines an Advertisement (Anuncio) as "any sign, writing, print, image generated by electronic means, painting, emblem, drawing, or other advertising medium, placed on the ground, natural or artificial structure, whose purpose is to make commercial propaganda or draw attention to a product, article, trademark, or towards a commercial activity or business, service or recreation, profession or home occupation that is offered, sold, or carried out in a place different from where such advertisement appears." Although it is true that the transcribed norm does not expressly indicate screens of LED light technology, that does not mean they are not regulated, since the regulation itself says it can include advertisements of "writing, print, or image generated by electronic means..." which reflects a general regulation over these. It is different if what is sought is a specific regulation of luminosity, size, and visual impact, which would indeed complement the existing norms, but not, for that reason, disapply them. Having said the above, this Tribunal concludes that for the installation of an LED-type light technology screen, Regulation 29253-MOPT is applicable with regard to installation, substitution, reconstruction, and exhibition licenses, so the thesis presented at trial regarding the total absence of regulations to regulate these advertising screens is not admissible (even if a public official so indicates in error or ignorance).

VIII. ON THE POWERS OF THE MUNICIPAL POLICE

In the Costa Rican regulatory system, local governments enjoy political, administrative, and financial autonomy by constitutional provision. In accordance with this, the Code on the matter reaffirms such character and indicates, based on this, that "...within its attributions are included: administer and provide municipal public services." While it is true that the traditional concept of municipal public service might refer to the idea of garbage collection services, street cleaning, rural water associations (asadas), park beautification, among others, this conception has extended to other areas of coverage, which, according to the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), is not only viable but necessary, as these must be adaptable to social needs (numeral 4). In this vein, the guarantee of local security for the inhabitants—and visitors—of a canton is currently a priority within the administration of municipal services. The foregoing, although it has had a slow practical development, was actually foreseen by the legislator since the 1949 Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), which in its first ordinal established: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other populations meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in this matter to other administrative bodies." Now, with regard to the internal municipal organization to provide said service, municipal police forces have been established in different cantons, which, due to their local characteristic, have coverage within their cantonal limits. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has ruled—addressing an action of unconstitutionality against the operation of the Municipal Police—making the distinctions that will be stated. That Body indicates that said activity is limited to being executed within a specific local sphere, and without prejudice to the respective coordination and cooperation actions with the national public force, without interference with the competencies belonging to the latter, whose origin is of constitutional rank (articles 12 and 140 of the Magna Carta). Secondly, the Constitutional Chamber starts from the premise that the municipal police covers the surveillance and control of strictly communal services, such as, for example, "the care of parks, the protection of municipal buildings, control over stationary and itinerant sales, supervision of licensed liquor establishments and permitted gaming centers, as well as actions derived as a consequence of that supervision, all considering the Municipality as the institution responsible for local interests and services." In the opinion of the Justices of said Chamber, far from there being an unconstitutionality due to the coexistence of a national police (with constitutional competencies) and a local police, this latter surveillance body constitutes an additional guarantee for the inhabitants of the municipality in which it is instituted (in this regard, consult resolution no. 2005-4705 of 15 hours and 01 minutes on April 27, 2005, issued by the Constitutional Chamber). In this understanding, it must be pointed out that the municipal police of each local government can—and must—ensure the order and safety of those who transit through its jurisdiction, so if the local Administration detects the existence of any neglect of the applicable legal framework in the canton, it can make use of its powers of surveillance and imposition of order.

Within such a sphere of competencies, where an ad hoc body exercises the police power (poder de policía), the municipal administration seeks public order, health, tranquility, the safety of persons, as well as the organization of local society, an attribution by virtue of which the imposition of restrictions is reasonable, insofar as its justification lies precisely in the consideration that particular interests are limited by those of other persons, since they must coexist with each and every other fundamental right. Within such faculties, this Chamber deems that the protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales) and public order is included, for which reason the actions taken by the municipal police in the specific case are not alien to its powers.

This is because it was proven that on March 26, 2011, the inauguration of the National Stadium was to take place, a date on which security operations were in place by the organizing administration to ensure that this nationally significant event proceeded with complete normalcy, which included emphasizing the cooperation and coordination relations between the Central Government (ministries in this specific case) and the local administration of the canton of San José. So, if it was reliably detected that any person—natural or legal—was obstructing, for example, the free passage through public domain areas, the municipal police could act to safeguard local security, the proper use of public domain assets, and public order. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that in our legal system, we have the Indertictum propium, a figure that although not legally regulated, has been extensively developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pag. 363). The cited Chamber has maintained in this regard that the administration must and can protect the public domain against attacks on it by the citizens, even through direct action (vías de hecho)—eviction or disoccupation—when the individual lacks a legal title to occupy it and has entered it via direct action; in such a case, the "administrative action" (acción administrativa) replaces the possessory interdicts (interdictos) to recover dominion, without the need to resort to any administrative record (expediente) or to rules of due process, including the power to remove property from occupied public sites (voto no. 2306-91 of 14 hours 45 minutes on November 6, 1991). In the case under analysis, this Tribunal has no doubt that the structure of the advertising billboard placed by the plaintiff company was encroaching upon the public area, since despite the existence of opposing testimonies between the witnesses offered by the plaintiff (Javier Bouza Cordero and Douglas Quesada Altamirano) and the defendant (Nombre529 and Nombre5836), there is on record a public document (folio 60) which indubitably indicates that the billboard structure was located on public domain assets (bienes demaniales). Even the court witness offered by the plaintiff, Mr. Nombre3640, signed that document as a witness to the municipal action, as did Mr. Javier Bouza, without any dissent from any of them with the content of the record (acta) being indicated, where precisely the plaintiff here is accused of invading the assets of the public domain. The weighing of said document over the testimonies rendered is imposed in accordance with what the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has expressed regarding the value that must be given to evidence in application of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which to that effect indicated in voto no. 1155-S1-F-2009 of 14 hours 05 minutes on November 5, 2009, that "Regarding evidence in the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, this Collegiate Body stated: In this way, facts are proven, rules are applied, and rights and interests are declared or granted to those who petitioned by proving. However, for the coronation of such certainty in the facts, the legal system can attribute different regimes of appreciation, such as that of full and absolute freedom in assessment (in conscience); under criteria of sound judgment (sana crítica), or also, under formulas predetermined or assessed by the legal system itself, in all or some of the evidentiary elements. In this line, subsection 4 of article 82 proclaims: all evidence shall be assessed according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). This provision takes a stand for evidentiary assessment under criteria of sound judgment, subjecting the weighing thereof to the rules of science, logic, psychology, and experience. Nevertheless, its interpretation must be careful and with great adherence to the total and broader legal system to which it belongs. In that sense, it is important to clarify that this does not discard, repeal, or destroy the prevailing regime established by the same law for public documents and confession evidence. There is therefore no fracture or dissociation with the general assessment regime established by the Costa Rican legal system. Those two particular evidentiary instruments (confession and public documents), as has been stated, hold priority value over other evidentiary mechanisms, on the basis of the public faith (fe pública) consigned in them or of the very statement against the interest of the affected party. Disregard for this prevalence would produce absolute disauthorization for all notaries public (fedatarios públicos) and for those who accept a determined fact to their detriment, which would generate severe legal uncertainty and, therefore, chaos beyond the legal realm. Therefore, it must be understood that the sound judgment (sana crítica) correctly indicated by subsection 4 of numeral 82 is without detriment to and with full respect for the prevalence or predominance of the evidentiary value of those elements to which such potentiality is assigned by law (specifically, by the Civil Procedure Code). It can be said, then, that in the new contentious administrative regime, the regime of assessed evidence (prueba tasada) is not entirely repealed, which does not mean, however, that it survives as an absolute, impregnable regime, or one impossible to disprove. The few evidentiary elements that have such privilege in their assessment create a presumption about the assertion contained in them that cannot be considered an absolute truth, but rather a relative presumption (iuris tantum), which implies that in certain cases, said presumption may be refuted or destroyed with different evidentiary elements, which, regardless of their source or level, truthfully contradict what has been consigned in them. However, as long as that does not occur, they will continue to maintain their presumption, resistance, and evidentiary potential." In any case, no suitable evidence was contributed to the records that refutes the content indicated in the municipal record (acta municipal), for example, some notarial record (acta notarial) indicating the contrary. It is necessary to point out that the only evidence contributed to the records to demonstrate the theory of the case of the plaintiff—aside from the said statements—were a series of photographs where the structure of the billboard is seen in the area where the events occurred. However, neither in the photographs contributed with the complaint nor in those offered at the trial hearing is there any record whatsoever of the date and time at which graphic proof of that fact was recorded. The witnesses for the Municipality of San José were emphatic in pointing out that in reality, the advertising billboard, at the time when its removal was requested, encroached upon the public area (sidewalk) and that the graphics contributed show a different image of what occurred around midday on March 26, 2011. In view of the fact that such evidence lacks the indication of the date and time when they were taken (normally printed on digital photographs), the Tribunal cannot conclude with this simple documentation that the facts the plaintiff alleges occurred on that date are verified by these images. They are simple graphic reproductions of a place, without it being known with certainty from their observation which date they correspond to. This being the case, having this Tribunal weighed the value of the documentary evidence in the terms indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and delimited in preceding lines, in application of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) and weighing all evidence as a whole, it is concluded that there is no evidence whatsoever that refutes what was stated in the record (acta) drawn up by the Municipality of San José on March 26, 2011, namely, the invasion of public property by the plaintiff company, without any permission or authorization for it, it is reiterated, for the use of a public domain asset, a fact that, in accordance with the applicable legal block (bloque de legalidad) set forth in this resolution, justifies the order for the immediate removal of said structure. For this reason, this Chamber considers that if, in effect, the public area was invaded (as is proven in proven fact no. 10), the municipal police could act in protection of the public domain assets and in full application of the cited figure of "Interdictum propium," finding no actions on the part of that body that should be reproached by this Tribunal.

IX. ON COMPENSATION FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES

The damages (material and moral) claimed by the plaintiff company were conditional upon the declaration of non-conformity of the administrative conduct deployed by the municipal police of San José, a conclusion that in this case this Body does not consider applicable, for which reason the claim for damages (both) must be rejected, without it being necessary to refer to the evidence that was contributed for that purpose or that is found lacking.

IX. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO)

In relation to the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) argued by the Municipality of San José, this must be granted, since in accordance with the examination carried out in Considerandos V, VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution, it was determined that there are no reasons to declare non-conformity with the legal system of the conduct of the Municipality of San José, as it ordered the representative of the plaintiff company to dismantle the structure of the advertising billboard placed in front of the National Stadium on March 26, 2011, given that the administrative procedure claimed was not necessary, nor was there a violation of the right to private property, and therefore the filed lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its aspects.

X.ON COSTS (COSTAS). Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes as a general rule that procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when, in the opinion of the Tribunal, there is sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is dictated by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable rules and break the postulate of condemnation of the losing party, for which reason both costs are imposed on the plaintiff.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is granted. The lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiff.

Priscila Quirós Muñoz Francisco Jiménez Villegas Jonatan Canales Hernández

PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR : I S.A.

DEMANDADO: MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSE Resolución n o. 72-2012 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN QUINTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA. ANEXO A.- A las siete horas treinta minutos del día siete de agosto de dos mil doce.

Proceso de conocimiento incoado por I SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, con cédula de persona jurídica no. […], representada por su Apoderado Generalísimo sin Límite de Suma Nombre2401, representado por los licenciados Roberto Quirós Coronado y Natalia María Rodríguez Ríos, ambos mayores, abogados, en su condición de Apoderados Especiales Judiciales de esa compañía, con carné del Colegio de Abogados no.11.556 y no.20.518, respectivamente (f.36) contra la Municipalidad de San José, representada por su Apoderado Especial Judicial licenciado Mario Leitón Delgado, mayor, abogado, carné del Colegio de Abogados no. CED89467 (f.109)

RESULTANDO:

1. Sustentada en los hechos que expone y citas legales aducidas, en este asunto , l a parte actora indicó como pretensión lo que se transcribe de forma literal , la cual fue ajustada en la audiencia preliminar y ratificada en el juicio oral y público: "1) Solicito se declare la disconformidad de la conducta administrativa de la Policía Municipal de San José con el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, al obligar a mi representada a desmantelar la estructura publicitaria en el plazo de 24 horas, sin la posibilidad de tener un debido proceso por un órgano competente, y en clara violación del derecho de propiedad. 2) Que se condene a la Municipalidad de San José al pago de la totalidad de los daños ocasionados a mi representada por su acción ilegal, daños que ascienden a la suma de setenta y ocho mil ochocientos dólares en moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América ($78.000.00): lo cual comprende: a) el monto dejado de percibir por mi representada por la totalidad de contratos de publicidad, los cuales aporto como prueba documental. Dichos contratos de publicidad de spots publicitarios de las empresas contratantes, no pudieron ser ejecutados debido al actuar abusivo e irregular de la administración pública, que obligó a los personeros de mi representada bajo amenaza de derribo, a desmantelar en un lapso de 24 horas la estructura de publicidad. Este daño asciende a la suma de $59.800.00 en moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América. b) El alquiler del inmueble sobre el cual se situó la estructura publicitaria. Mi representada arrendó a la señora Yu Hongxia, en su calidad de poseedora y administradora de la propiedad privada donde se instaló la planta eléctrica, una barricada de protección y una pantalla Leds. Mi representada estima este daño en la suma de un mil dólares en moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América. ($1.000.00) c) Gastos de alquiler, instalación y operación de la pantalla leds, planta eléctrica y tarima. Mi representada realizó el alquiler de la pantalla electrónica, planta eléctrica y tarima con la cual se pretendía brindar el servicio de publicidad la cual tuvo un costo de dieciocho mil dólares en moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América. ($18.000.00) 3) Que se condene a la Municipalidad de San José al pago de la totalidad del daño moral empresarial ocasionado a mi representada con su acción ilegal que asciende a la suma de ochenta y dos mil dólares dólares (sic) en moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América ($82.000.00). Este consiste en el descrédito y demérito sufrido por mi representada en el mercado publicitario como consecuencia del incumplimiento contractual a las empresas con las cuales se había obligado mi representada a brindar los servicios de transmisión de spots publicitarios. El daño se ve claramente reflejado en la afectación al buen nombre y confianza depositada por nuestros clientes en la seriedad y puntualidad de la empresa, quienes se vieron perjudicados al contratarnos y no lograr la exposición de su nombre o producto en un evento de tanta importancia y dinamismo como lo fue la inauguración del Estadio Nacional, lo cual redundará sin duda alguna para mi representada en una gran limitación para ser contrata (sic) nuevamente. 4) Que se condene a la Municipalidad de San José, al pago de los perjuicios que corresponden a los intereses de ley desde la interposición de la demanda y hasta el efectivo cumplimiento del pago. 5) Solicito se condene a la Municipalidad de San José al pago de costas procesales y personales del presente proceso". (Disco de audiencia preliminar y minuta de esta visible a folios 150 y 151 del expediente judicial y grabación de juicio oral del 6 de julio de 2012) 2. Que conferida la audiencia respectiva a la Municipalidad de San José, esta contestó de modo negativo. En el juicio opuso la defensa de falta de derecho.(f. 114) 3. Que la audiencia preliminar establecida en el numeral 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo fue realizada el día 19 de enero de 2012, con la presencia de los representantes de ambas partes.

4. Que e n los procedimientos se han observado los términos y prescripciones de ley, y no se notan vicios u omisiones susceptibles de producir nulidad o indefensión a las partes. Este proceso fue declarado complejo conforme al numeral 111, decisión que fue comunicada a las partes antes de concluir el juicio oral y público, por lo que la presente resolución se emite dentro del plazo indicado en el numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en adelante (CPCA), previa deliberación.

Redacta la jueza Quirós Muñoz , con el voto afirmativo de los jueces Jiménez Villegas y Canales Hernández y;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para la resolución de este asunto se tienen como de esta naturaleza los siguientes: 1) Que el día 10 de marzo de 2011 el señor Nombre2401 presentó ante la Municipalidad de San José una solicitud de permiso temporal para instalar del día sábado 26 y hasta el 29 de marzo del 2011, una pantalla electrónica de tecnología LED en la parte frontal una propiedad ubicada frente al Estadio Nacional, 100 metros al norte de Canal 7 y que le pertenece a la señora Yu Hongxia. ( f. 47 del expediente judicial). 2) Que mediante oficio no. SPP2-0309-11 del 21 de marzo de 2011 el licenciado Mariano Rodríguez Solís, en su condición de Jefe de la Sección de Permisos y Patentes atendió la solicitud planteada por el señor Bouza, oficio en que indicó "En atención y respuesta a su nota con fecha 9 de marzo del presente año, le informo que siendo la vía frente a la cual se va a instalar la pantalla, "Vía Nacional", su administración corresponde al MOPT, por lo que esta Municipalidad no tiene ingerencia sobre la misma, por lo tanto la gestión correspondiente a este trámite debe hacerla ante dicha Institución".(folio 49 del expediente judicial) 3) Que el día 26 de marzo de 2011 se realizó en las inmediaciones del Parque Metropolitano La Sabana de San José, la inauguración del edificio del Estadio Nacional (hecho público no controvertido). 4) Que el día 26 de marzo de 2011 estuvo instalada en Dirección13727 , 100 metros al norte de Dirección13728 , una Pantalla Led Gigante con pautas publicitarias de imagen durante las horas de la mañana, administrada por Ingenium Comunicaciones S.A. (declaraciones del señor Nombre2401 en juicio y del Asistente Director del Despacho del Alcalde de San José, señor Nombre5836) 5) Que el señor Rafael Arias Fallas, en su condición de Asistente Director del Alcalde se apersonó al lugar donde estaba ubicada la Pantalla Gigante de Ingenium y gestionó ante la Policía Municipal de San José el retiro de esta del lugar. (declaraciones del señor Nombre2401 en juicio y de la Policía Municipal Ana Gil Chaverri y del Asistente Director del Despacho del Alcalde de San José) 6) Que el día 26 de marzo de 2011 el señor Nombre2401, como representante de Ingenium no contaba con ningún permiso municipal o de alguna otra entidad pública para realizar sus actividades comerciales de publicidad mediante Pantalla Gigante de tecnología LED (declaración del señor Nombre2401, de la policía municipal Ana Lorena Gil y del señor Nombre5836, Asistente Director del Alcalde de San José, durante el juicio oral y público). 7) Que la Policía Municipal de San José notificó al señor Nombre2401 el documento identificado como "Notificación Policial no. 11722" en donde se consignó que: "Al ser las 13:39 horas del día 26 del mes de marzo del año 2011, propiamente en la provincia de San José, Dirección3277 , Distrito Pavas, otras señas Costado Oeste del Estadio Nacional. Se procede de conformidad a la legislación vigente a notificar a Javier Alberto Bouza Cordero, portador de la cédula de identidad o cédula de residencia no. CED89468, las siguientes disposiciones: Siguiendo Instrucciones del Ministerio de Salud, de la Vice Ministra del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, del Asistente del Despacho del Señor Alcalde, se le indica que debe de retirar la estructura que tiene colocada sobre los bienes demaniales en razón que no constan los respectivos permisos. Esto en un plazo de 24 horas. Testigos: Nombre3640, […]; I, […], Nombre317, […], Nombre2401, […], Nombre79993, […]. Firma de persona notificada, Cédula […], Policía Encargado de Comisión: Ana L. Gil Chavarría, mayor, policía municipal de San José, costarricense, cédula de identidad número […], localizable en Dirección13729 y Policía Municipal (2) Nombre113045 , mayor, Policía Municipal de San José, Costarricense, Cédula de identidad número Placa20607, localizable en Altos Mercado Central. Nota: Se encuentra presente en el acto el señor Nombre3640, Vicepresidente del Concejo Municipal." (documento no. 11722 visible a folio 60 del expediente administrativo) 8) Que al momento de realizar el acta de notificación, la policía municipal determinó que la estructura de la Pantalla Gigante y las barandas que cercaban esta, se encontraban dentro de zona pública (contenido del acta visible a folio 60 del expediente judicial). 9) Que el mismo día 26 de marzo de 2011 y una vez recibida la orden de la Policía Municipal, -aproximadamente a las trece horas cuarenta minutos- el representante de I S.A. procedió a dar la orden de apagar la transmisión de pautas publicitarias en la pantalla gigante colocada frente al Estadio Nacional por su compañía (declaración de la policía municipal Ana Lorena Gil y del señor Javier Bouza Cordero). 10) Que el día 26 de marzo de 2011, en el momento en que se realizó la notificación por parte de la Municipalidad de San José al representante de I S.A., la estructura y varandas de protección de la pantalla publicitaria ubicada frente al Estadio Nacional, se encontraba invadiendo parte del espacio público destinado al libre tránsito de los peatones (testimonio de la funcionaria de la Policía Municipal, señora Nombre529 y del señor Nombre5836, Asistente Director del Despacho del Alcalde de San José).

II. HECHOS NO DEMOSTRADOS

Único: Que los funcionarios de la Municipalidad de San José hayan tenido actos de "matonismo" o agresión el día 26 de marzo de 2011 cuando solicitaron al representante de la actora desmantelar la tarima (los autos).

III. SOBRE LOS ARGUMENTOS DE LA PARTE ACTORA

en lo medular, el apoderado de la demandante indica que I S.A. es una sociedad que se dedica a brindar servicios de asesorías en el área de Mercadeo y Comunicación y al desarrollo de eventos promocionales y publicitarios. Refiere, de previo a la inauguración del Estadio Nacional, el señor Javier Bouza se apersonó a distintas oficinas de la Municipalidad de San José, con el fin de buscar información respecto del trámite que debía realizar para obtener un permiso temporal para colocar una pantalla Leds en la colindancia este de la propiedad privada inscrita en el registro público con número de folio real […], inmueble en que se encuentra ubicada la Agencia de Noticias Xinhua de la República Popular de China. Esto con el propósito de poner a funcionar dicha pantalla de imagen desde el sábado 26 y hasta el martes 29, ambos de marzo de 2011, con un horario de funcionamiento de las seis de la mañana y hasta las doce media noche. Indica, en la Municipalidad el Jefe de Patentes le señaló que por tratarse de una instalación en propiedad privada y al estar en calle nacional, no municipal, el permiso debía solicitarlo al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Dice, fue al Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones del MOPT con una nota en la que planteaba la solicitud referida, no obstante, afirma, allí le indicaron que ese Departamento solo autoriza la instalación de vallas y rótulos planos o tradicionales y no así las pantallas electrónicas o de Leds, por lo que fue referido al Departamento de Previsión Vial del MOPT. Ese mismo día, agrega se reunió con el Jefe del órgano dicho, quien agrega, le indicó que el MOPT no otorga permisos para el funcionamiento de pantallas Leds o electrónicas en los caminos nacionales, pues corresponde a una tipología distinta a las reguladas en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29253-MOPT de fecha 20 de diciembre de 2000, sin que estuvieran reguladas por alguna norma. Indica, ante lo expuesto por los servidores del MOPT, regresó a la Municipalidad de San José para pedir una patente temporal y algún tipo de permiso, por lo que entregó por escrito la solicitud. Nombre193, el Jefe de Patentes de ese Gobierno local le entregó la nota SPP-0309-11 en donde le indicó que debido a que la vía frente a la cual se iba a instalar la pantalla era calle nacional no tenía competencia para entregar el permiso solicitado. Afirma, a partir de ese momento gestionó el alquiler de una pantalla electrónica con unas dimensiones de 5.28 metros de ancho por 5.28 metros de altura, y firmó posteriormente, pautas publicitarias con algunos de sus clientes para programar anuncios en esta pantalla durante los días 26, 27, 28 y 29 de marzo de 2001. Dice, para colocar la pantalla alquiló el área frontal de la propiedad privada inscrita en el Registro Público bajo el Folio Real […] con un área de 24.50 metros de largo por 3 metros de ancho. Relata, los días 25 y 26 de marzo del mes de cita, se procedió con la instalación de la pantalla, la planta eléctrica y la barricada en la propiedad arrendada. Reclama, el día 26 cuando ya tenían instalada y en pleno funcionamiento su pantalla, le visitaron dos supuestos inspectores, indicando que debía retirarse la estructura instalada en razón de no contar con los permisos respectivos. Agrega, más tarde se presentó la señora Nombre529, policía municipal, acompañada de unos 10 policías más, señalando que venían a remover y retirar la pantalla. Reclama, pese a que presentó la nota de la Municipalidad, donde se le indicó que no requería permiso, no fue aceptada. Indica, los policías dijeron que eran órdenes del Ministerio de Salud y del MOPT, pero tampoco presentaron ninguna orden por escrito, pese a que esta fue pedida en el momento. Dice, hubo que retirar la pantalla dadas las muestras de matonismo, intimidación y amenazas de derribo por la fuerza, todo lo cual sucedió en presencia del entonces vice-presidente del Concejo Municipal. Afirma, el acto administrativo llevado a cabo por la Municipalidad de San José, es a todas luces ilegal y viciado de nulidad, entre otras razones, por falta de competencia. Aunado a esto, apunta, este acto le provocó serias consecuencias patrimoniales. En apoyo de sus manifestaciones copia algunos extractos de resoluciones judiciales referidas a la intangibilidad de los actos propios de la administración pública. Transcribe alguna normativa relacionada con las potestades de la Policía Municipal de San José y con base en esta dice, la policía municipal no podía ordenar el desmantelamiento de la pantalla colocada en una propiedad privada, frente a calle nacional y sin seguir el debido proceso. Insiste, el "acto" llevado a cabo por ese gobierno local es nulo por falta de competencia. Agrega, en relación a este tipo de pantallas, no existe una regulación por lo que mucha gente las instala sin ningún tipo de permiso, situación que asevera le fue explicada por el propio señor Nombre113046 en su condición de Jefe del Departamento de Previsión Vial del MOPT. Estima, una vez que la Administración dicta un acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos, como el que se dio en su caso, donde verbalmente se le autorizó a instalar la pantalla electrónica, no podía irrespetarse su derecho sin iniciar un debido proceso.

IV. SOBRE LOS ARGUMENTOS DE LA PARTE DEMANDADA

por su parte la representación de la Municipalidad de San José centra su defensa en indicar que en realidad la pantalla se encontraba colocada invadiendo parte de la acera y el espacio público de paso para los peatones, por lo que la Policía Municipal, acudió a revisar la situación referida. Dice, se constata por medio de los policías y de un acta levantada al efecto, que la pantalla estaba impidiendo el libre tránsito de las personas, y que con fundamento en las potestades delegadas al Director del Despacho del Alcalde, este puede tomar decisiones en resguardo de los bienes públicos. Indica, sin perjuicio de lo anterior, cuando los policías municipales se apersonaron al lugar donde estaba instalada la pantalla, no les fue presentado por parte de la empresa actora, algún documento que respaldase sus aseveraciones en relación a las gestiones realizadas ante el MOPT. Sostiene, la estructura de la pantalla no estaba colocada dentro de un área privada únicamente, sino que se encontraba invadiendo el área pública, por lo que conforme a amplia jurisprudencia, podía ser retirada sin procedimiento previo y unilateralmente por parte de la administración. En su criterio, la policía municipal de San José tiene total competencia para realizar las actuaciones referidas por la empresa actora, y tiene competencia de acuerdo al poder de policía, potestad fiscalizadora, principio de legalidad, de la eficiencia de la administración y porque debe tutelar los intereses de la colectividad, de los que destaca el orden público. En apoyo de su tesis transcribe un extracto de una resolución de la Sala Constitucional, referida al poder de policía.

V. SOBRE LA DISTINCIÓN ENTRE "ACTOS" Y "ACTUACIONES" DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN

si bien es cierto, la empresa actora solicita como pretensión primera que "se declare la disconformidad de la conducta administrativa de la Policía Municipal de San José y de la Municipalidad de San José...", lo cierto es que en la argumentación fáctica y jurídica de la demanda, se refiere de manera indistinta a actos y actuaciones del gobierno local, como si se tratara de conceptos con idéntico sentido jurídico, lo que conlleva a que este Tribunal, en primer orden de ideas, realice la distinción técnica del caso. De acuerdo con la doctrina patria, la función administrativa puede materializarse mediante actos o hechos. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pág. 357). Los actos son las declaraciones de voluntad, juicio o conocimiento de la Administración Pública efectuada en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, que produce efectos jurídicos concretos o generales, de alcance normativo o no, en forma directa o inmediata; en tanto que los hechos son las actuaciones materiales u operaciones técnicas realizadas en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, es decir, aquellas que se realizan sin necesidad de una ley o de una potestad, una competencia o un acto administrativo previo que las habilite, salvo que se trate de actuaciones ilícitas, en cuyo caso se trataría de las vías de hecho. Ambos, actos y actuaciones, conforme a lo establecido en el numeral primero del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, pueden ser analizados en esta jurisdicción, en tanto dicho artículo indica que la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa establecida en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, tiene por objeto tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona, garantizar o restablecer la legalidad de cualquier conducta de la Administración Pública sujeta al Derecho administrativo, así como conocer y resolver los diversos aspectos de la relación jurídico administrativa. La distinción apuntada resulta importante en cuanto debe determinarse si la conducta de la Municipalidad de San José estuvo apegada o no al ordenamiento jurídico, y para ello, precisa entonces definir ante qué tipo de conducta administrativa se está, es decir, se se está ante un acto administrativo o bien una actuación. En el caso concreto, observa el Tribunal que la empresa actora reclama que el gobierno local "le obligó a desmantelar la estructura publicitaria en el plazo de 24 horas, sin la posibilidad de tener un proceso por un órgano competente y en clara violación al derecho de propiedad". Nótese entonces que la conducta de la que se pide declarar la disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico es la orden dada de forma verbal y notificada mediante acta municipal, en donde se obliga a la empresa Ingenium Comunicaciones, a apagar la pantalla de tecnología LED. Ergo, lejos de atacarse un acto administrativo formal, en realidad se reprocha la existencia de una actuación material de la administración local, que sin tener de previo un acto que modificara el oficio no. Placa20608, (en el que se indicó por parte del Jefe de Patentes que "En atención y respuesta a su nota con fecha 9 de marzo del presente año, le informo que siendo la vía frente a la cual se va a instalar la pantalla, Vía Nacional, su administración corresponde al MOPT, por lo que esta Municipalidad no tiene injerencia sobre la misma, por lo tanto la gestión correspondiente a este trámite debe hacerla ante dicha Institución") procedió a ordenar el desmantelamiento de la estructura de la pantalla publicitaria de tecnología de luces LED.

VI. SOBRE EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO APLICABLE A LOS BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO

la delimitación de este aspecto resulta necesario en la presente resolución, en tanto uno de los temas discutidos en juicio oral, fue el eventual uso de un espacio de dominio público por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, y los poderes que puede utilizar la policía municipal en resguardo de su libre acceso. Por ello resulta fundamental referirse a los alcances del numeral 261 del Código Civil, el cual distingue entre bienes públicos y privados, así como los criterios con base en los cuales se puede distinguir entre ambos, esto porque su uso obliga a someterse a reglas distintas. Al respecto el artículo dicho establece: "Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado o a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona." La Sala Constitucional, tomando en cuenta la norma de cita, se ha referido sobre los bienes que integran el dominio público en los siguientes términos: "son aquellos que tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico diverso de los bienes privados -los cuales se rigen por el derecho de propiedad en los términos del artículo 45 de la Constitución Política- en tanto, por expresa voluntad del legislador se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada, de modo que están fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo cual, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado, en sentido estricto, por cuanto este se limita a su administración y tutela...Además su uso y aprovechamiento está sujeto al poder de policía, en tanto, por tratarse de bienes que no pueden ser objeto de posesión, y mucho menos de propiedad su utilización y aprovechamiento es posible". (resolución no. 2007-2408 de las 16 horas 13 minutos del 21 de febrero de 2007). En lo que interesa al caso concreto, debe rescatarse que la acera es parte del demanio público, y se define como un espacio que es parte de la vía pública, normalmente ubicada en su orilla, que se reserva para el tránsito de los peatones, conforme lo establece el Reglamento de Construcciones en su artículo primero inciso tres. Esto conlleva a concluir que, dada su naturaleza, las aceras están afectas permanentemente a su uso por parte de la colectividad, de forma que le son propias las características señaladas para los bienes de dominio público. Es por tal motivo, que ningún particular puede impedir válidamente que se apliquen al uso al que están destinadas y menos aún, alegar derecho alguno sobre ellas, que no sea el de cualquier persona de transitarlas libremente, pues ese es su uso natural. De su parte la Administración local puede ejercer directamente los mecanismos a su alcance, cuando por acción u omisión de cualquier persona, se obstaculice o impida el tránsito de los peatones, ello en virtud de sus potestades de autotutela, que le facultan para usar incluso la coacción administrativa en protección de los intereses públicos, sin necesidad de acudir a los Tribunales de Justicia, tal y como lo ha reconocido desde vieja data la Sala Constitucional en su resolución 3006-94 del 17 de junio de 1994, que en lo particular señaló "...la prohibición emanada del acto de la Municipalidad que aquí se impugna, se refiere a dos puntos: en primer lugar, a la posibilidad de usar la acera, bien de dominio público, para brindar el servicio de la compañía, lo cual considera la Sala es procedente, pues los bienes que tienen las características del que aquí se discute, no son suceptibles de apropiación particular y la autoridad encargada de su tutela puede disponer que dicha apropiación cese". Amén de lo señalado, se agregó en este voto constitucional "que el régimen jurídico de las aceras lo completan la Ley General de Caminos Públicos y el Código Municipal, estableciéndose en este último que es deber de las autoridades municipales remover objetos, materiales o similares de las aceras que contaminen el ambiente u obstaculicen el paso, lo que implica la potestad municipal para ordenar tal remoción, y de ser necesario, ejecutarla por cuenta y con cargo al administrado recurrente". Lo anterior sin perjuicio de los permisos de uso que pudieran otorgarse sobre tales bienes, los que de haberse concedido, pese a su naturaleza precaria, si fuesen revocados posteriormente por razones de necesidad o interés general, obligan a brindar un plazo razonable para el cumplimiento de lo ordenado, de modo que no pueden quitarse de modo arbitrario o sorpresivo. Dicho de otro modo, para que cualquier particular pueda aprovechar para su beneficio con actividades comerciales los bienes de dominio público -específicamente las aceras- se requiere de la autorización (permiso) de la administración pública que tenga su titularidad, pues el hecho de que se trate de un bien dispuesto para el aprovechamiento de la colectividad, no significa que su uso dependa de la libre voluntad de quienes le utilizan; sino que ello es potestad de la autoridad pública, es decir, a la Municipalidad donde se encuentren tales vías de acceso.

VII.SOBRE EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LAS PANTALLAS DE PUBLICIDAD Y SU REGULACIÓN EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO COSTARRICENSE Y LAS ACTIVIDADES PUBLICITARIAS DESARROLLADAS POR LA ACTORA: conforme lo señala el Código Municipal en su artículo 79, "para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa, los interesados deberán contar con la licencia municipal respectiva, la cual se obtendrá mediante el pago de un impuesto". Acorde con dicha norma, para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa, el interesado lo solicita al ente local y este (si el solicitante cumple con los requisitos para ello) emite una autorización (licencia) de lo cual derivará posteriormente y conforme a las reglas tributarias correspondientes, en la obligación de pagar el impuesto de patentes. De este modo, le corresponde al gobierno municipal, la autorización de todas y cada una de las actividades comerciales que se realicen dentro de su circunscripción territorial, independientemente de que el ejercicio del comercio se realice en una propiedad privada o pública. En este último además deberá contarse con permisos adicionales de uso (Artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y con los requisitos que al efecto establezca la normativa local correspondiente. A partir de este marco normativo, aprecia este Tribunal que si bien es cierto, al día 26 de marzo de 2011 y aún a la fecha, no se ha regulado en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense de manera específica el uso de pantallas publicitarias de tipo luminoso -denominadas comúnmente "pantallas LED" que por sus siglas en inglés se refiere a la frase "Light Emitting Diode", y que se traduce técnicamente como diodo semiconductor que emite luz- sí existen regulaciones que resultan aplicables a la colocación de pantallas y vallas publicitarias. Para efectos de analizar el caso concreto, se parte -según el dicho de la empresa actora- de que se trata de una actividad comercial, tendente a publicitar pautas en dichas pantallas para distintas marcas y establecimientos comerciales, lo que conlleva a aplicar como regla general el numeral 79 del Código Municipal. Ahora bien, partiendo del supuesto de que dicha norma no existiera, -que se tiene claro sí está vigente y resulta aplicable, debe señalarse que tratándose de publicidad exterior, existen competencias atribuidas a los gobiernos locales, si se está frente a vías municipales, y al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, a través de la Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito y de Ingeniería de Tránsito, si se trata de la red vial nacional, esto conforme el Reglamento no. 29253-MOPT. El artículo primero de este cuerpo normativo señala que esa reglamentación tiene por objeto administrar, fiscalizar y regular a nivel nacional, los derechos de vía de la red vial nacional, así como lo concerniente a la instalación, sustitución, construcción, reconstrucción y exhibición de todo tipo de anuncios, rótulos, vallas, parabuses en terrenos públicos o privados, o en los derechos de vía que están al cuidado del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, quien será la única autoridad competente en esta materia...". Es decir, la única dependencia que puede autorizar la instalación material (que no el ejercicio de la actividad lucrativa que se deriva de esta) de una valla o pantalla publicitaria es el MOPT, marco jurídico que conlleva a concluir que sí existe una regulación normativa que regula la colocación de estas vallas o pantallas. Esto porque el artículo segundo del Reglamento de cita, define como Anuncio "todo letrero, escritura, impreso, imagen generada por medios electrónicos, pintura, emblema, dibujo u otro medio publicitario, colocado sobre el terreno, estructura natural o artificial, cuyo propósito sea hacer una propaganda comercial o llamar la atención hacia un producto, artículo, marca de fábrica o hacia una actividad comercial o negocio, servicio o recreación, profesión u ocupación domiciliaria que se ofrece, vende o lleva a cabo en un sitio distinto de aquel donde aparece tal anuncio". Si bien es cierto la norma transcrita no indica expresamente pantallas de tecnología de luces LED, eso no significa que no estén reguladas, toda vez que la propia normativa dice que puede incluir anuncios de "escritura, impreso o imagen generada por medios electrónicos..." lo que refleja una regulación general sobre estas. Distinto es, si lo que se pretende es una regulación específica de luminosidad, tamaño, e impacto visual, lo que en efecto vendría a complementar las normas existentes, mas no por ello, a desaplicarlas. Dicho lo anterior, este Tribunal concluye que para la instalación de una pantalla de tecnología de luces tipo LED resulta aplicable el Reglamento 29253-MOPT en lo que a licencias de instalación, sustitución, reconstrucción y exhibición se refiere, por lo que no resulta admisible (aun si por error o desconocimiento así lo indica un funcionario público) la tesis expuesta en juicio, respecto de la ausencia total de normativa para regular estas pantallas publicitarias.

VIII. SOBRE LAS POTESTADES DE LA POLICÍA MUNICIPAL

en el sistema normativo costarricense, los gobiernos locales gozan de autonomía política, administrativa y financiera por disposición constitucional. Acorde con ello, el Código de la materia, reafirma tal carácter e indica, con fundamento en ello que "...dentro de sus atribuciones se incluyen: administrar y prestar los servicios públicos municipales". Si bien es cierto, el concepto tradicional de servicio público municipal podría remitir a la idea de servicios de recolección de basura, limpieza de vías, asadas, ornato de parques, entre otros, dicha concepción se ha extendido a otros ámbitos de cobertura, lo que conforme a la Ley General de la Administración Pública, no solo es viable sino necesario, en tanto estos deben ser adaptables a las necesidades sociales (numeral 4). En esa línea, la garantía de seguridad local para los habitantes -y visitantes- de un cantón, es actualmente una prioridad dentro de la administración de los servicios municipales. Lo anterior, aunque ha tenido un lento desarrollo práctico, en realidad fue previsto por el legislador desde la Ley de Construcciones de 1949, que en su ordinal primero estableció: "Las Municipalidades de la República son las encargadas de que las ciudades y las demás poblaciones reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad, comodidad y belleza en sus vías públicas y en los edificios y construcciones que en terrenos de las mismas se levanten sin perjuicio de las facultades que las leyes conceden en esta materia a otros órganos administrativos". Ahora bien, en lo que respecta a la organización municipal a lo interno para brindar dicho servicio, se han establecido en distintos cantones, cuerpos de policía municipal, que por su característica de local, tienen cobertura dentro de sus límites cantonales. Sobre el punto, la Sala Constitucional se ha manifestado, -atendiendo una acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra del funcionamiento de la Policía Municipal- haciendo las distinciones que se dirán. Señala ese Órgano, que dicha actividad está limitada a ser ejecutada en un ámbito local determinado, y sin perjuicio de las acciones de coordinación y cooperación respectivas con la fuerza pública nacional, sin interferencia de las competencias propias de esta última, cuyo origen es de rango constitucional (artículos 12 y 140 de la Carta Magna). En segundo término, la Sala Constitucional parte de la premisa de que la policía municipal, cubre la vigilancia y control de los servicios propiamente comunales, como por ejemplo, "el cuidado de los parques, la protección de los edificios municipales, el control sobre las ventas estacionarias y ambulantes, la fiscalización de los patentados de licores y centros de juego permitidos, así como las acciones que deriven como consecuencia de esa fiscalización, todo ello, considerando a la Municipalidad como institución encargada de los intereses y servicios locales". En criterio de los Magistrados de la Sala dicha, lejos de darse una inconstitucionalidad por la coexistencia de una policía nacional (con competencias constitucionales) y una policía local, este último cuerpo de vigilancia constituye una garantía adicional para los habitantes del municipio en que se instituya (al respecto consúltese la resolución no. 2005-4705 de las 15 horas con 01 minuto del 27 de abril de 2005, dictada pro la Sala Constitucional). En esa inteligencia, ha de señalarse que la policía municipal de cada gobierno local, puede -y debe- velar por el orden y la seguridad de quienes transiten por su circunscripción, por lo que si la Administración local detecta la existencia de alguna desatención del ordenamiento jurídico aplicable en el cantón, puede hacer uso de sus potestades de vigilancia e imposición del orden. Dentro de tal esfera de competencias, donde un órgano ad hoc ejerce el poder de policía, la administración municipal procura el orden público, la salubridad, la tranquilidad, la seguridad de las personas, así como la organización de la sociedad local, atribución en virtud de la cual, la imposición de restricciones resulta razonable, en tanto su justificación se encuentre precisamente en la consideración de que los intereses particulares se encuentren limitados por los de las demás personas, toda vez que deben coexistir con todos y cada uno de los otros derechos fundamentales. Dentro de tales facultades, estima esta Cámara se encuentra la protección de los bienes demaniales y del orden público, por lo que lo actuado por la policía municipal en el caso concreto, no está ajeno a sus potestades. Esto porque se tuvo por demostrado que el día 26 de marzo de 2011 se realizaría la inauguración del Estadio Nacional, fecha en que existían operativos de seguridad por parte de la administración organizadora, a fin de garantizar que ese evento de trascendencia nacional se diera en completa normalidad, lo que incluía enfatizar las relaciones de cooperación y coordinación del Gobierno Central (ministerios en el caso concreto) con la administración local del cantón de San José. De modo que si se detectaba de manera fehaciente que alguna persona -física o jurídica- obstruía por ejemplo el paso libre por las zonas demaniales, la policía municipal podía actuar en resguardo de la seguridad local, el uso adecuado de los bienes demaniales y el orden público. Debe además tomarse en cuenta que en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, contamos con el Indertictum propium, figura que si bien no está regulada de forma legal, ha sido desarrollada de manera amplia por la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, 2da reimpresión 2007, pag. 363). La Sala de cita ha sostenido al respecto que la administración debe y puede proteger el dominio público, frente a los ataques a este por parte de los administrados, incluso a través de las vías de hecho -desalojo o desocupación- cuando el particular no cuenta con un título jurídico para ocuparlo y se ha introducido en este por la vía de hecho, en tal caso la "acción administrativa" sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio, sin necesidad de acudir a expediente alguno, ni a reglas del debido proceso, incluyendo la facultad de retirar los bienes de los sitios públicos ocupados (voto no.2306-91 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 6 de noviembre de 1991). En el caso de análisis, este Tribunal no tiene duda de que la estructura de la pantalla publicitaria colocada por la empresa actora, estuvo invadiendo la zona pública, ya que a pesar de existir testimonios opuestos entre los declarantes que ofreció la parte actora (Javier Bouza Cordero y Douglas Quesada Altamirano) y la demandada (Nombre529 y Nombre5836), consta en autos un documento público (folio 60) que señala de modo indubitable que la estructura de la pantalla estuvo ubicada sobre bienes demaniales. Incluso, el testigo en juicio que ofreció la parte actora, señor Nombre3640, firma ese documento en calidad de testigo de la conducta municipal, así como el señor Javier Bouza, sin que se indique disconformidad de alguno de ellos con el contenido del acta, donde precisamente se acusa a la aquí demandante, de estar invadiendo los bienes del demanio público. La ponderación de dicho documento sobre los testimonios rendidos, se impone de conformidad con lo que ha expresado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en relación al valor que debe dársele a las probanzas en aplicación del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que al efecto indicó en el voto no. 1155-S1-F-2009 de las 14 horas 05 minutos del 5 de noviembre de 2009 que "En cuanto a la prueba en el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo este Órgano Colegiado, señaló: De este modo, los hechos se prueban, las normas se aplican y los derechos e intereses se declaran u otorgan a quienes pidieron probando. Sin embargo, para la coronación de tal certeza en los hechos, el ordenamiento jurídico puede atribuir distintos regímenes de apreciación, como el de plena y absoluta libertad en la valoración (en conciencia); bajo criterios de la sana crítica, o también, bajo fórmulas predeterminadas o tasadas por el propio ordenamiento jurídico, en todo, o algunos de los elementos probatorios. En esta línea, el apartado 4 del artículo 82 pregona: todas las pruebas serán apreciadas conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica. Esta disposición toma partido por la valoración probatoria bajo criterios de la sana crítica, sujetando la ponderación de aquéllas, a las reglas de la ciencia, la lógica, la psicología y la experiencia. No obstante, su interpretación debe ser cuidadosa y con gran apego al sistema jurídico total y más amplio al que pertenece. En ese sentido, importa aclarar que con ello no se desecha, deroga o destruye el régimen prevalente que establece la misma ley para los documentos públicos y la prueba confesional. No hay por ende, una fractura o disociación, con el régimen general de valoración que establece el sistema jurídico costarricense. Esos dos particulares instrumentos probatorios (confesión y documentos públicos), guardan, según se ha dicho, un valor prioritario sobre los demás mecanismos de prueba, sobre la base de la fe pública que en ellos se consigna o del propio dicho en contra de la parte afectada. El desconocimiento de esta prevalencia produciría desautorización absoluta para todos los fedatarios públicos y de quienes aceptan en su perjuicio un hecho determinado, lo cual generaría una severa inseguridad jurídica y por ende, caos más allá de lo jurídico. Por tanto, debe entenderse que la sana crítica que señala con acierto el apartado 4 del numeral 82, lo es sin detrimento y con respeto pleno a la prevalencia o predominio del valor probatorio de aquellos elementos a los que por ley se asigna tal potencialidad (en concreto, por el Código Procesal Civil). Se puede decir entonces que, en el nuevo régimen contencioso administrativo no se deroga del todo el régimen de prueba tasada, lo cual no quiere decir tampoco, que perviva como un régimen absoluto, inexpugnable o de imposible prueba en contrario. Los reducidos elementos probatorios que cuentan con semejante privilegio en su valoración, crean una presunción sobre el aserto en ellos contenido que no se puede tener como verdad absoluta, sino como presunción relativa (iuris tantum), lo que implica que en determinados supuestos, dicha presunción podrá ser rebatida o destrozada con diferentes elementos de prueba, que con independencia de su fuente o nivel, contradigan con veracidad lo que se ha consignado en ellos. Empero, entre tanto eso no ocurra, seguirán manteniendo su presunción, resistencia y potencialidad probatoria." En todo caso, tampoco se aportó a los autos prueba idónea que desvirtúe el contenido de lo indicado en el acta municipal, verbigracia, algún acta notarial que indicara lo contrario. Es preciso señalar que la única probanza aportada a los autos para demostrar la teoría del caso de la parte actora -amén de las declaraciones dichas- fueron una serie de fotografías donde se aprecia la estructura de la pantalla en la zona que se dieron los hechos. No obstante, ni en las fotografías aportadas con la demanda, ni en las ofrecidas en la audiencia de juicio, consta de modo alguno, la fecha y la hora en qué se dejo constancia gráfica de tal hecho. Los testigos de la Municipalidad de San José fueron enfáticos en señalar que en realidad la pantalla publicitaria, al momento en que se pide retirarla, invadía la zona pública (acera) y que las gráficas aportadas tienen una imagen distinta de lo ocurrido cerca del medio día del 26 de enero de 2011. En vista de que tales pruebas carecen de la indicación de la fecha y hora en que fueron tomadas, (normalmente impresa en las fotografías digitales), el Tribunal no puede concluir con esta simple documentación que los hechos que la parte actora alega sucedieron en esa data, se comprueban con estas imágenes. Son simples reproducciones gráficas de un lugar, sin que se sepa con certeza de su observación, a qué data corresponden. Así las cosas, habiendo ponderado este Tribunal el valor de la prueba documental en los términos señalados por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y delimitados en líneas precedentes, en aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica y ponderando todas las probanzas en conjunto, se concluye que no existe prueba alguna que desvirtúe lo dicho en el acta levantada por la Municipalidad de San José el día 26 de marzo de 2011, sea la invasión de la propiedad pública por parte de la empresa actora, sin permiso ni autorización alguna para ello, se reitera, para el uso de un bien de dominio público, hecho que conforme al bloque de legalidad aplicable y expuesto en esta resolución, justifica la orden de retiro inmediato de dicha estructura. Por tal motivo, esta Cámara considera que si en efecto, se invadió la zona pública, (como se tiene por demostrado en el hecho probado no. 10) la policía municipal podía actuar en resguardo de los bienes demaniales y en plena aplicación de la figura del "Interdictum propium" citada, no encontrándose actuaciones por parte de ese órgano que deban ser reprochadas por este Tribunal.

IX. SOBRE LA INDEMNIZACIÓN POR LOS DAÑOS ALEGADOS

los daños (material y moral) reclamados por la empresa actora estaban condicionado a la declaratoria de la disconformidad de la conducta administrativa desplegada por la policía municipal de San José, conclusión que en la especie no considera aplicable este Órgano, motivo por el que la pretensión de daños (ambos) deberá rechazarse, sin que sea necesario referirse a las probanzas que al efecto se aportaron o se echan de menos.

IX. SOBRE LAS EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO

en relación a la excepción de falta de derecho argumentada por la Municipalidad de San José esta deberá acogerse toda vez que conforme al examen realizado en los Considerandos V, VI, VII y VIII de esta resolución, se determinó que no existen razones para declarar la disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico de la conducta de la Municipalidad de San José, en tanto ordenó al representante de la empresa actora desmantelar la estructura de la pantalla publicitaria colocada frente al Estadio Nacional el día 26 de marzo de 2011, toda vez que no era necesario para ello el procedimiento administrativo que reclama ni se dio una violación del derecho de propiedad privada, por lo que se deberá declarar sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda planteada.

X.SOBRE LAS COSTAS. El artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece como norma general que las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, no encuentra este órgano colegiado motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido, motivo por el cual se imponen ambas costas a la parte actora.

POR TANTO

Se acoge la defensa falta de derecho. Se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Son ambas costas a cargo de la actora.

Priscila Quirós Muñoz Francisco Jiménez Villegas Jonatan Canales Hernández