Conviction for archaeological-monument damage: mediate authorship and monument conceptCondena por daño a monumento arqueológico: autoría mediata y concepto de monumento

PODER JUDICIAL COURT OF APPEALS OF SENTENCE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, Tel: 2456-9069 or [Telf1] [...] Fax: 2445-5193 _______________________________________________________________________________________ Res: 2012-00479 COURT OF APPEALS OF SENTENCE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN. SECTION ONE. San Ramón, at sixteen hundred hours on the fourteenth of June two thousand twelve.

CASSATION APPEAL filed in the present case against [Name1], Costa Rican, ID CED1 and [Name2], Costa Rican, ID CED1 for the crime of VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW, to the detriment of VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW. The Judges Alberto Alpízar Chaves, David Fallas Redondo and Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda participate in the decision on the appeal. Appearing in the appeal of sentence are the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, attorneys [Name3] and Marcela Araya Rojas. Likewise, the accused [Name1] and attorney [Name4], in the capacity of private defense counsel for the accused [Name2].

WHEREAS:

1.- That by means of judgment number 128-2011 at eight hours twenty-eight minutes on the twenty-fourth of October two thousand eleven, the Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón Venue, resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing and Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1, 18, 22, 30, 31, 50, 51, 59, 71 to 74, 76, 307 of the Criminal Code, Article 21 and 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, Articles 1, 2, 47, 142, 265, 266, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366 and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, [Name2] and [Name1] are declared responsible perpetrators of two crimes of VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW in material concurrence to the detriment of the national archaeological heritage by virtue of the provisions of Articles 21 and 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, imposing on them a fine of FIFTEEN THOUSAND COLONES for the first and THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT for the second, which they shall serve in the respective establishment, subject to credit for any pretrial detention suffered. For meeting the requirements set forth in Article 59 of the Criminal Code, [Name2] and [Name1] are granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence for a probationary period of three years. Advised that if during the probationary period they commit another crime punishable by imprisonment for more than six months, the benefit now granted will be revoked. [Name2] and [Name1] are ACQUITTED of all punishment and responsibility for the crime of DISOBEDIENCE. Once the judgment is final, send the customary certifications to the corresponding authorities. The costs of the proceedings are borne by the state. By means of reading, the judgment is fully notified at sixteen hundred hours on the thirty-first of October two thousand eleven, the parties being notified by said reading. [Name5]. Trial Judge".

2.- That against the preceding pronouncement, attorney [Name3], in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the accused [Name1], and attorney [Name4], in his capacity as private defense counsel for the accused [Name2], filed cassation appeals.

3.- That once the respective deliberation was carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 464 bis of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court proceeded to hear the appeal.

4.- That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by the Appeals of Sentence Judge [Name6]; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF THIS CASSATION COURT. In the present matter, an oral hearing was held at nine o'clock on the twenty-eighth of February two thousand twelve. Arguments for the challenge were not expanded upon during it, nor was new evidence offered or presented, with the parties presenting a summary of the arguments already included in the appeals they filed in writing. At said hearing, Judges [Name7], [Name8], and Alberto Alpízar Chaves were present. Nevertheless, at present, co-judge [Name9] no longer exercises the jurisdictional function, having been retired. Due to the impossibility of participation by said judge, this matter shall be decided by the two other judges who participated and by Judge David Fallas Redondo, who was appointed as the permanent holder of the position previously occupied by [Name7]. This does not compromise any guarantee or interest of the parties, since, as has been stated, no evidence whatsoever was received at the aforementioned hearing, meaning there is no impediment for a judge who was not present at it to participate in resolving the challenges in this case, as said judge is fully capable of ruling on the matter. This was determined by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, retaken and ratified in ruling No. 2007-15553 of 12:23 hours on November 30, 2007, where the following was indicated: "On the merits.- As mentioned in the background of this appeal, the question raised by the appellant regarding the constitutional conditions for the participation of the same cassation judges in the oral hearing and in the decision on the merits of the appeal was analyzed by the Chamber in judgment number 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on the tenth of December of nineteen ninety-six, and in it, the following was stated: "II. On the merits. The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other and often make the interpreter's task difficult when resolving complex situations; that is, those involving more than one value simultaneously. In these types of cases, it is very important for the constitutional interpreter to weigh and seek to balance - when possible given the circumstances of the case - the conflicting interests ... In the case under study, two interests of equal rank are at stake: due process and prompt and complete justice. The former because the principle of immediacy, according to which evidence must be received directly, immediately, and simultaneously, is derived from this right, and the latter, because the relationship between the problem raised and a swift response from the administration of justice is evident. This Court considers that it is not necessary to sacrifice one principle for another, it being perfectly possible - faced with a situation like the present one - to achieve a response that satisfies both interests equally. The solution suggested by the consulting Chamber fulfills that balance, insofar as it allows the involvement in the decision of some judges who were not present at the oral hearing, without affecting constitutional rights and avoiding, at the same time, unnecessary delays in the resolution of the cases submitted to their knowledge. Of course, any solution given to the case excludes criminal trial debates, and all those oral hearings where evidence is presented or any of the arguments or grounds are expanded upon verbally, because otherwise the principle of immediacy would be violated, derived from due process requiring proximity between the judge and the matters submitted to their knowledge during the debate. According to this principle and that of the physical identity of the judge, the judgment must be rendered by the same judges who participated in the hearing. Nevertheless, we know that this is so that, mainly – but not exclusively – in criminal matters, the rights of the accused are especially protected in evidentiary matters. This principle, an essential basis of modern criminal law, is not, in the opinion of this Chamber, of strict and absolute application in matters of a different nature from the criminal debate, as will be seen later. For this Chamber, it is possible - constitutionally speaking - that in those hearings where no elements of oral evidence are received or where the parties' arguments are already in writing, without contributing anything new - as occurs in most cassation appeals and some review appeals - where the parties attend the oral hearing to summarize the grounds for each of the reasons they have already presented in writing, other judges, different from those who participated in the hearing, may intervene at the time of making the decision, if and only if, they are capable of doing so and there exist justified reasons (which must be recorded in writing) that prevent those who were at the oral hearing from meeting promptly to study and resolve the matter. Due process and the principle of immediacy are not affected by this solution, insofar as in no case where evidence is received or a new element is contributed will judges other than those who were at the hearing be allowed to resolve the matter, and this may only be done when: a) justified reasons exist, or, b) when what occurs at the oral hearing is only a summarization of the grounds for each of the reasons that have already been presented or are previously recorded in writing, without contributing anything new. Indeed, in these types of situations, it is in the interest of speed and justice that unnecessary delays that harm both the interests of the parties and those of the administration of justice do not occur. It must be taken into account that when a case is unnecessarily delayed, not only are the direct interests of the party affected, but also those of other persons waiting their turn to obtain justice before a specific Court, as well as those of the citizens who contribute with their taxes the money that finances the administration of justice, in the understanding that it will be, as the Constitution states, prompt and complete ... it is evident that - as indicated in the background of this Chamber cited in the previous recital - if the reception of evidence by the members of the Cassation Court is involved, it will be legally necessary to preserve that composition at the time of making the decision on the merits of the matter, just as - incidentally - required by Article 449 bis of the Criminal Procedure Code. Similarly, and also as this Chamber had already stated in the mentioned background, said composition must be maintained when the arguments raised by the parties at the hearing differ from those alleged when filing or responding to the cassation appeal, this due to the still valid and convincing reasons given in the repeatedly cited resolution [Telf2]. Finally, it is not obligatory from the perspective of the right to due process to maintain the composition of the court that attended the hearing in the decision on the merits when these conditions do not occur, and rather, in the latter act, the parties are limited only to reiterating arguments already presented or insisting, from different perspectives, on arguments of fact and law already raised in writing. And the reason for this being so in this latter case lies in the fact that the broad review work demanded by the jurisprudential precedents cited by the appellant does not necessarily presuppose the requirement of immediacy and orality, given that it can be perfectly fulfilled by the Court without resorting to them, being, as indicated, in an essentially reviewing phase. IV.- Conclusion. In conclusion, this Chamber maintains in its entirety the criterion expressed in resolution 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on the tenth of December of nineteen ninety-six, insofar as it considers that it is not unconstitutional to allow new judges who were not present at the oral hearing to intervene in the decision of the case, provided that, as explained, at said hearing no evidentiary proceedings were conducted or any new element was contributed by the litigants, and always with the understanding that the modification in the composition is sufficiently and validly justified [...]". As deduced from the vote outlined above, the Constitutional Chamber ratifies the principles outlined in ruling No. 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, according to which, in those cases where at the cassation hearing no evidence was offered or received, nor were new arguments raised (as would occur in this case), it is constitutionally valid to be able to vary the composition when pronouncing and resolving the appeal, since this does not affect the principle of immediacy and rather protects the principle of speed (prompt justice). Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber itself points out that in no case where evidence has been received or new elements have been contributed could the composition of the hearing be varied; this could only be done under two hypotheses: (i).- When justified reasons exist; or (ii).- When what occurs at the hearing is only a summarization of the grounds for each of the reasons that have been presented or are previously recorded in writing. If we apply these principles to the present case, it can be observed that for the purposes of varying the composition of the hearing, constitutional jurisprudence requires compliance with either of these two scenarios (just one of them would be sufficient), and in this case, both would occur simultaneously, which allows us to understand that no violation of the rights and guarantees of the parties would occur.

II.- APPEAL OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE. By means of a document filed on November 18, 2011, attorney [Name3], in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, files a cassation appeal against judgment 128-2011, issued by the Criminal Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela at eight hours twenty-eight minutes on October 24, 2011, case No. 09-000103-0332-PE against [Name2] and [Name1], for the crime of Violation of the National Archaeological Heritage Law. In the sole ground, which is indicated as being on procedural grounds, a lack of reasoning is alleged regarding the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence granted by the Sentencing Court to the accused [Name2]. The challenger indicates that, based on Article 60 of the Criminal Code, the resolution granting dispensation from the material and effective serving of a custodial sentence must be reasoned. A situation which, in the challenger's opinion, did not occur in the judgment; she further adds that the Court carried out an erroneous assessment of the requirements set forth in Articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code to grant that favor to the sentenced individual. The foregoing, given that [Name2] "[...] does not have a clean criminal record, which is proven by the certification issued by the Judicial Registry of Delinquency for that person, which shows that on July 14, 2003, he was previously sentenced to one year in prison for committing a crime of disobedience to authority [...]" (folio 381 fte., transcription is literal). The appellant considers that the judgment is remiss in providing the reasons why it grants the conditional execution and, therefore, regarding the appealed point, it is ineffective, as it cannot be determined what the arguments were for which the judge considered it pertinent to grant that privilege to the accused. It is requested that the judgment be quashed regarding the point appealed and that a remand be ordered for a new proceeding regarding the point of granting [Name2] the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. The claim is upheld. The appellant is correct because. The judge in the judgment completely omits to indicate the reasons why she considers it appropriate to grant the accused [Name2] the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. As part of her brief reasoning, the a quo only points out that "[...] they are persons who possess a stable and consolidated social and employment situation [...]" (folio 377 fte., transcription is literal). Omitting to analyze whether, in the concrete case, the requirements demanded by Article 60 of the Criminal Code for granting a conditionally executed sentence are met. In view of the foregoing, this aspect of the judgment is annulled and the case is remanded for the repetition of the act, the court of origin having to analyze, according to Law, whether or not the granting of the conditional execution of the sentence to the accused [Name2] is appropriate.

III.- APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED. By means of a document filed on November 21, 2011, attorney [Name10], as private defense counsel for the accused [Name1], files a cassation appeal against the aforementioned judgment. In the first ground, the appellant alleges erroneous application of Articles 11 and 21 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, in that these articles constitute a "legal uncertainty" by not indicating clearly and precisely which local authorities must be notified of the discovery of archaeological objects. The appellant posits the existence of many local authorities in the same district and that, as the law does not expressly indicate to which authority it refers, the application of said norms is not possible. He further adds that on January 6, 2009, the archaeologists from the National Museum visited the site for the first time, and the National Museum was considered notified, so said Institution should have taken immediate actions and not waited three months and eight days to request that the San Ramón Prosecutor's Office order the suspension of the work. The appellant's argument is not accepted, for the reasons to be explained below. The normative mandate that emerges from a reading of Article 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage is clear, stating that "when monuments, ruins, inscriptions or any other object of archaeological interest are discovered on public or private lands, the local authorities must be informed immediately, so that the precautionary measures deemed appropriate may be taken". The appellant admits knowing this obligation, thus realizing that he was failing to comply with it. However, he argues that he did not comply with it because the norm does not specify which local authority it refers to. Nevertheless, under such conditions, the accused's non-compliance is intentional (doloso) and culpable. It is intentional because he knew that his inaction conformed to the punishable conduct penalized by Article 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, and for that reason, being a crime of pure omission, he knew of the unlawfulness of his conduct, and therefore also acted culpably. As it seems to emerge from the claim, once the possibility of a error of type or prohibition is discarded, the legal provision is inapplicable as the specific name of the authority to be informed is not indicated. But this is also not correct, since compliance was possible by communicating the finding to any local authority. The absence of greater specification in the norm means that the obligated party fulfills their legal duty by informing «[...] the local authorities immediately [...]». But it cannot lead to the party obligated by the mandate arbitrarily deciding to exempt themselves from it due to a supposed doubt and failing to inform any authority. Even if such doubt existed, which as stated is not about an element of the type or about the unlawfulness of the conduct, it could not be interpreted, capriciously and conveniently, as inertia in the fulfillment of the mandate, since the prior knowledge that the complainant admits having of the obligation established in Article 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage should have led him to properly inform himself about which was the most convenient local authority to make aware of the facts. Although, as has been said, he would have complied by communicating with any local authority. In view of the foregoing, this Appeals of Sentence Chamber confirms what was stated by the a quo, who considered that "[...] it was proven that the will of the active subjects was aimed at omitting to notify the authorities about the finding, an omission that caused the archaeological material damage located at the site [...]" (folio 373 fte. and 374 fte., literal transcription). Added to the above, it must be indicated that the visit that the National Museum archaeologists made on January 6, 2009, to the site where the works were being carried out did not exempt the accused from communicating «to the local authorities immediately» the findings in question. Prior to the National Museum officials appearing at the site, the accused were already aware that archaeological remains existed on the land and, despite this, they did not fulfill the duty to communicate this to the local authorities. The foregoing is proven by the superficial archaeological inspection report carried out by the archaeologist on April 26, 2008, as well as resolution [Telf3] of [Name11] in which the execution of the construction project was endorsed and the developing company was warned to comply with the environmental impact matrices presented in the "D1" form. In this way, from the start of the construction project, the accused had full knowledge of the existence of archaeological materials on their land, giving rise at that moment to the duty emanating from norm 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, which is to notify the authorities about the finding. For these reasons, the argument formulated is rejected.

IV.- In the second ground, the appellant [Name1] alleges erroneous application of Article 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage. The complainant considers that a correct application of this norm must start from the true and proven fact that the accused, either personally or through an order directed to third parties, damages or destroys an archaeological monument by any means, a situation which, in the appellant's opinion, was not proven in the present case. The appellant requests that the judgment be annulled for improper application of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, and failing that, that a new hearing of the debate be ordered to correctly apply the substantive law. This claim coincides with the first ground of the appeal filed by attorney [Name12], in his capacity as defense counsel for the accused [Name2], where a violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) is alleged, to the detriment of Articles 142, 184, and 369(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The complainant [Name12] considers that the sentencing judge did not properly substantiate the facts she considers proven. And that, on the contrary, she takes as true circumstances and events without anyone having verified them or even affirmed them, apart from the accusatory pleading. (i) In support of his argument, the appellant states that proven fact 5th (where the judge considers that [Name2] ordered the start of earthworks (movimientos de tierras) without the supervision of an archaeologist and also approved the use of heavy machinery and special equipment contracted by [Name13]) is a faithful copy of the accusation and lacks evidentiary support in the adversarial proceeding. (ii) The same occurs, in the appellant's opinion, with proven fact 7th, where the judge insists on resolving without evidentiary elements, because the proven factual framework includes that Mr. [Name13], from March 31 to April 2009, maintained the orders and directives adopted so that the heavy machinery, operated by people contracted by him, would continue carrying out large earthworks (movimientos de tierra). It is alleged that no evidence or evidentiary support exists to prove such fact, and the appellant also qualifies these actions as serious "judicial creationism". He also questions that the Prosecutor's Office could have, before having accused, requested the testimony of the workers to determine if someone gave the order to move the earth and who it was, or if it was their own decision, if they did it in an area that had not been indicated to them, or any other valid element to ascertain the true nature of the events, instead of the judge stating that those who carried out the earthworks (movimientos de tierra) did so because they had been contracted and directed by the company's representative. As both arguments are linked, they are resolved jointly. Both claims are declared without merit. The issue of authorship was extensively addressed in the challenged judgment, indicating the reasons why it was considered that the defendants are indeed the authors of the acts for which they are convicted. In general, the appellants claim that they did not directly carry out the action described in the criminal type and that it has also not been demonstrated that they gave an express order for the actions to be executed. However, a point the judge correctly explains in her resolution, it is not necessary for the author to personally perform the action described in the criminal type, since according to criminal law, "the author of the punishable act classified as such is anyone who commits it personally or by means of another or others, and co-authors are those who commit it jointly with the author" (Art. 45 CP). In the challenged resolution, as will be seen later, the a quo mentions a series of aspects from which she deduces that the accused indeed had «functional control of the act (dominio funcional del hecho)», the contribution made by both being necessary and indispensable for its commission, since if hypothetically either of them were removed, the result would not have occurred. There has not been an incorrect application of Article 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, since the participation of the accused has been duly proven with the evidence presented at trial. In this sense, this Chamber shares the arguments provided by the a quo, when the judgment states that "[...] it was demonstrated in the adversarial proceeding that both [Name2], in his capacity as representative of Grupo Industrial Plastimex S.A., and [Name1], in his capacity as Environmental Manager (Regente), were the responsible persons in charge of the work and were fully aware that archaeological materials existed on the land where the building construction project was being developed. This is evident not only from the testimonial statement of [Name14], who affirmed that [Name1] was the one who hired him because he needed a D1 and that he delivered the report to Julio at his home, but also because from the documentary evidence, it is extracted from the Archaeological Inspection form of [Name11] dated October twenty-six, two thousand eight, visible at folio 55, that the person in charge of the activity, work, or project was [Name2]. Likewise, Resolution [Telf4] of [Name11] at 10:20 a.m. on October 29, two thousand eight, visible at folio 58, where feasibility (environmental license (licencia ambiental)) is granted, lists [Name2] as authorized to carry out the procedures in his capacity as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact of Plastimex, as well as [Name1] as environmental manager (regente ambiental). Similarly, [Name14] stated that about a year after completing the D1, Mr. [Name1] sought him out to do the monitoring because he was responsible for doing and compiling all the studies and presenting them to SETENA. Likewise, [Name15] indicated that from the first inspection they carried out as officials of the Museum, they asked the environmental manager (regente) and the owner for the suspension of earthworks (movimientos de tierras) and that they provided them with the cadastral plan and the D1, which is a rapid inspection conducted by an archaeologist to determine if there are sites; that the project owner is [Name2] and that they called him to send the report, and that they did not speak with the environmental manager (regente) during the first inspections, but later, they did. For his part, witness [Name16] was clear in indicating that from the first visit, he met Mr. [Name2] and that he was the person who explained the project to them and who called the Environmental Manager (Regente) [Name1], because he had some documents. With these statements, it is evident that the accused were responsible for the project and were aware, from its inception and development, that archaeological materials existed at the site. This is consistent with the documentary evidence showing that the company itself submitted documents to [Name11] where it was warned that the presence of an archaeology professional was essential for supervising the earthworks (movimientos de tierra). That is, the works began with the accused having full control of the material actions carried out under the mandate of the representative of the legal entity owning the property, a company for which the environmental manager (regente ambiental) also works.

In the processing of permits, the person responsible for executing the action is identified, not only through the activity of the environmental regent, but it is also observed that the property owner deployed various actions that contributed to the execution of the action. In the specific case of Mr. [Nombre2], it is not a matter of strict liability, in any way, as the defense has sought to portray it, because he was the person who promoted the project and to whom prior warnings had been made, that is, from the moment D1 was carried out by [Nombre14]. It is necessary to consider that according to the theory of control over the act, in intentional crimes, the perpetrator is the one who ultimately controls the realization of the crime. Those who carried out the earthworks (movimiento de tierras) did so because they were contracted and directed by the company’s representative and with the intervention of the environmental regent. Mr. [Nombre2] is mentioned in abundant evidence as the representative of the company that owns the property; it is observed that there is final control over the action, since he could objectively put an end to it or interrupt its execution. Mr. [Nombre1] was the person designated as Regent of the company before [Nombre11]. [Nombre11] warned Plastimex to comply with the environmental impact matrices presented in D1. This D1 form recommends earthworks (movimiento de tierra) under the supervision of an archaeologist so that, in the event archaeological material is found, the competent authority is immediately notified. From that moment on, both knew that there was archaeological material on the property, it not being determinative that D1 indicated that the material found was of low density, since the truth is that the archaeologist who conducted the study indicates that earthworks (movimientos de tierra) must be carried out under the supervision of a professional, because it cannot be ruled out that more objects of archaeological interest may be found. The environmental commitments included the protection of the archaeological heritage, for this reason it is not strict liability, but rather the highest-ranking official of the company and the regent paid by it knew the preventive measures to avoid probable archaeological damage. Therefore, from the moment the defendants omitted to carry out the earthworks (movimientos de tierras) under supervision, they generated an action over which they exercised control and direction. Those who knew of the possibility that there were monuments were Mr. [Nombre2], Mr. [Nombre1], and [Nombre14]. It must be remembered that a perpetrator is: he who carries out the act by himself; he who carries it out jointly with others in a way that all co-dominate the act; he who directs another subject to materially execute the action" (capital letters, bold, and underlined in the original, folios 368 to 371). Thus, the challenged judgment indicates which evidence leads to the affirmation that the accused are the perpetrators of the charged acts, providing an extensive reasoning based both on the rules of sound criticism and on the evidentiary elements incorporated into the debate, which thus justify the facts deemed proven. For which reason the claims made are declared without merit.

V.- APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED [Nombre2]. Through the brief filed on November 18, 2011, attorney [Nombre4], acting as private defense counsel for the accused [Nombre2], files an appeal in cassation against judgment No. 128-2011 of 8:28 a.m. on October 24, 2011, of the Criminal Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela.

In the second ground, which is indicated as being on the merits, it is alleged that the appealed judgment disregards the legal definition of a monument, because it decides that the ceramic fragments found on the land constitute archaeological monuments. The appellant considers that this statement is devoid of reasoning, since the Judge does not indicate whether each fragment is a monument or if a minimum quantity is required for that. Contrary to the criterion of the Sentencing Court, the appellant believes that the concept of "archaeological monument" refers to the category of immovable objects and not to movable objects as was understood in the judgment. The complainant affirms that the concept of archaeological monument is clarified by Law 7555 of October 4, 1995, called the Historical-Architectural Heritage Law of Costa Rica (Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico de Costa Rica), since it develops the concept under the category of immovable property, indicating that the immovable properties that make up the State's historical-architectural heritage are classified into five categories, one of which is a monument. Under this premise, the appellant indicates that a ceramic fragment, which is a movable good, does not constitute an "archaeological monument." In support of his allegations, the complainant cites Vote 461-2003 of 4:15 p.m. on May 22 of that year, from the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, where it refers to the definition of a monument in Law 7555. The claim is without merit. On these points and for the reasons that will be stated, this Chamber confirms what was stated by the lower court (a quo): "For its part, it is important to analyze, by the way in which it is resolved, that the concept of a monument is not related to the physical size of the goods, but to the historical and cultural transcendence of the object, due to its significance for the historical, anthropological, and archaeological development of the country. It deals, then, with movable and immovable goods of great significance and great relevance, not because of the physical space they occupy, but because of what they represent. In this way, we have that many works of art, even if they have a very small dimension, are considered monuments for their artistic and cultural significance. This legal and linguistic conception of a monument has already been accepted by the Costa Rican legislator, by ratifying various international conventions, even acquiring a rank superior to law, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution. The meaning of movable archaeological monument, used in the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), can be none other than that of archaeological goods, human remains, fauna and flora related to indigenous American cultures, of an important historical and cultural significance, regardless of the physical size of the objects. That conception is intimately linked to what is stipulated in Article 1 of that same law, by pointing out that the national archaeological heritage is constituted by 'movable or immovable goods, a product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna related to these cultures'" (folios 372 to 373, literal copy). Contrary to the above, attorney [Nombre12] maintains that according to our legislation, only immovable properties can be 'monuments,' since "according to Article 6, the monument is a category of IMMOVABLE goods, it is not me saying it, the law says it and the concept is developed but under the category of immovable properties" (verbatim copy, folio 388). This Chamber does not share the thesis of the appellant, as it is based on an incorrect interpretation of Article 6 of Law 7555, on the Historical-Architectural Heritage of Costa Rica. As stated in Article 1º of the same: "The objectives of this law are the conservation, protection, and preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica." So, from the outset, the legislator makes it clear that the law in question is directed exclusively to regulating matters related to the 'historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica,' a matter that is reaffirmed in the rest of the provisions it contains. So, Article 6 of Law 7555 does not regulate the concept of 'monument' in general, as attorney [Nombre12] believes, but rather makes a classification of the immovable goods that make up the historical-architectural heritage of our country, considering some of them as 'monuments,' according to the definition contained therein. Although the foregoing implies that such immovable goods must be considered 'monuments,' it cannot be inferred from this that only these can be so. For, as has been said, it is a specific regulation referring only, as the law itself clarifies, to the 'historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica,' which is why it is not possible to give it the general character that the complainant intends. Since the concept of 'monument' is not defined in the law, except for what corresponds to the goods cited above, the legal operator must provide content to this normative concept of the criminal type. The foregoing, far from being a task of 'praetorian creation' by the courts, is a basic and frequent function in the interpretation of criminal norms, because the legislator cannot construct criminal types exclusively with descriptive concepts, nor define each of the normative elements it uses. To determine what should be understood by 'monument,' the first rule of interpretation of the criminal norm is to attend to the grammatical meaning of the words. This is imposed both by Article 10 of the Civil Code, which indicates that "norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose," and it is also an obligation linked to the principle of legality. In this sense, the concept of '[Placa1]' is defined as an "object or document of utility for history, or for the ascertainment of any fact. Scientific, artistic, or literary work, which becomes memorable for its exceptional merit..." (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, entry '[Placa1]', twentieth ed., 1984). The foregoing does not exclude movable goods and also agrees with what is established in Article 14 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), which provides that "movable archaeological monuments may be transferred within the country, provided that prior notice is given to the Public Registry of the National Archaeological Heritage, which will immediately notify the National Archaeological Commission of the case," since the national archaeological heritage is composed of both "[...] movable or immovable goods, a product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna, related to these cultures" (Art. 1, Law 6703). So the criterion used by the judge to establish what a 'monument' is not whimsical or arbitrary; on the contrary, it conforms to the etymological meaning of the word (grammatical interpretation), in addition to respecting the objective will of the legislator to provide protection against damage or destruction to these goods, which is why the conduct established in Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico) was sanctioned. With respect to resolution 461-03 of the Cassation Court of Goicoechea, it is possible to point out that what was said by the lower court (a quo) and what is held here does not contradict it, since what was discussed there was whether it was possible to equate the concepts of 'archaeological site' and 'archaeological monument' and, although the definition contained in Article 6 of Law 7555 is mentioned, it is not stated that only immovable goods are 'archaeological monuments,' as the complainant claims. Finally, it is of no importance regarding the concept of 'monument' or in relation to the criminal typicality of the conduct that they are ceramic fragments. It is normal for this type of object, with the passage of time, to have lost parts, and they do not therefore lack cultural value, but furthermore, in the present case, the accused are attributed with damaging and destroying them, which is why what is found are small pieces resulting from the works attributed to the accused. The judgment indicates the reasons why it is considered that such damage was not prior, but rather the product of the activity carried out there by the accused. In this sense, the ruling states: "See that [Nombre2]. said that the fragments presented characteristics that evidenced their recent breakage, because they did not have adhered earth. This indicates that the fragmentation of the archaeological material and its consequent damage was recent, and in turn discards the defense's thesis that previous agricultural activity was the sole cause of the damage to the archaeological material. The [Placa2] is an unequivocal indicator that a warning had been given about the possibility that material of archaeological interest might exist. Mrs. [Nombre15] indicates that during visits to the property, she could observe how they were leveling the property and that where they had seen the material, it was left about four or five meters deep and that the mountain disappeared as a result of the earthworks (movimientos). That is, the earthworks (movimiento de tierras) were significant and that because of this activity, the archaeological material was damaged. In that sense, if one observes the photograph Fig 1 visible at folio 198, the height of the slopes can be noted, which reinforces the thesis that the earthworks (movimientos de tierras) were not superficial to remove the vegetative layer as the defense seeks to portray, but on the contrary, they were deep. Supervision was important due to the deepening of the earthworks (movimiento de tierras). Likewise, this witness indicated that the damage that the plow can cause can alter the superficial layers, but that it does not 'churn' everything, nor does it reach deeper layers. [Nombre2] was very clear in indicating at the end of his deposition, that the archaeological material in the place was damaged because of the earthworks (movimientos de tierra). According to the documentary evidence, specifically official letters DAH-079-2009 and DAH 132-2009, the magnitude of the earthworks (movimientos) impacted about ninety percent of the area of the development project. Which implies the alteration of the archaeological remains present in that area and that had been registered in the first inspections of the place. According to the cited official letters, the archaeological evidence that was in the area was altered by total removal, scraping, or coverage of a layer of material several meters high, irreversibly affecting the context" (verbatim copy, folios 371 and 372). So, there was indeed an affectation of the protected legal interest, since it was not the passage of time or the action of third parties that ended up destroying such objects, but the action of the accused. For all the above, the claim is declared without merit.

VI.- In the third ground, the appellant alleges that the judgment violates the principle of criminal typicality and therefore due process. He believes that the sanction and the criminal type of numeral 21 of Law 6703 are absolutely inapplicable, because it does not indicate which local authorities to notify of the finding and also omits to indicate to whom the fine of fifteen thousand colones, object of the conviction, is paid. The appellant adds that it is not possible to apply numeral 405 of the Penal Code, since it refers to fine-days ordered in accordance with that Code, not by special laws, which must indicate their destination. He requests that this appeal be granted, that the judgment of the Criminal Trial Court of San Ramón be annulled. The claim is without merit. Regarding the 'local authorities,' this Sentence Appeals Chamber, in order not to reiterate the arguments, refers the appellant to what was resolved in the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by attorney [Nombre10], acting as private defense counsel for the accused [Nombre1]. Regarding the allegation about the inapplicability of Article 21 of Law 6703, since the complainant argues that it does not say to whom it must be paid, it must be indicated that Article 3 of the Penal Code is applicable, which provides that "the general provisions of this Code shall also apply to punishable acts provided for in special laws, provided that the latter do not establish anything to the contrary." Precisely, as the appellant maintains, the referred Law does not provide anything in this regard, so what the Penal Code says is applicable. In this sense, Article 405 of the cited regulatory body orders that "the proceeds from the fine-days resulting from the application of this Code shall be transferred entirely to the Board for Construction, Installation, and Acquisition of Goods of Social Adaptation (Patronato de Construcción, Instalación y Adquisición de Bienes de Adaptación Social) [...]." Although the complainant maintains that this is incorrect as it clearly refers to the 'proceeds from the fine-days resulting from the application of this Code,' as has been said, such a norm must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the also cited Article 3 of the Penal Code; so, as long as the legislator does not expressly provide a different destination for the fine money, what is stated in the aforementioned Article 405 shall apply. A matter which in no way affects the principle of legality, since not only are the conduct and the sanction previously indicated by law (Art. 1 Penal Code), which allows the citizen to adapt their conduct to the primary norm or to know what the consequence is if they do not, but also the destination of the money has been established by the legislator, this last matter concerns the principle of administrative legality and not criminal legality. For the foregoing, the claim is not upheld.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The sole ground of the appeal filed by the Public Ministry is granted. The judgment is annulled insofar as it grants the conditional execution of the sentence to the accused [Nombre2]; the case is remanded to the Court of origin for the reinstatement of the proceeding, and it must be duly reasoned whether or not the granting of the cited benefit to said accused is appropriate. The challenges raised by the accused [Nombre1] and by attorney [Nombre12], representing the accused [Nombre2], are declared without merit. NOTIFY.

Alberto Alpízar Chaves David Fallas Redondo Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Appeals Judges of Sentence File No. 09-000103-332-PE Against: [Nombre2] and another, for the crime of: Infraction of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), to the detriment of: National Archaeological Heritage.

[Nombre17] </p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">CASSATION APPEAL</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> filed in the present case brought against</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> [Nombre1], </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Costa Rican, CED1</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">[Nombre2], </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Costa Rican, CED1</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">for the crime of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> to the detriment of</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">The Judges </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Alberto Alpízar Chaves, David Fallas Redondo, and Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> participate in the decision on the appeal. The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, licensed attorneys [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and Marcela Araya Rojas, appear in the sentence appeal. Likewise, the accused [Nombre1] and licensed attorney [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, as private defense counsel for the accused [Nombre2], appear.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> WHEREAS:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">1.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> That by judgment number </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">128-2011 </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">of eight hours twenty-eight minutes on the twenty-fourth of October two thousand eleven, the Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón Venue, resolved: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">\"THEREFORE: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">In accordance with the foregoing and Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1, 18, 22, 30, 31, 50, 51, 59, 71 to 74, 76, 307 of the Penal Code, Articles 21 and 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, Articles 1, 2, 47, 142, 265, 266, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366, and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">[Nombre2], and [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> are declared guilty as perpetrators of two crimes of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE LAW</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> in material concurrence to the detriment of the national archaeological heritage, pursuant to Articles 21 and 23 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, imposing on them a fine of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">FIFTEEN THOUSAND COLONES</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> for the first and </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> for the second, which they must serve in the respective establishment, with credit for any pre-trial detention served. As they meet the requirements established by Article 59 of the Penal Code, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">[Nombre2], and [Nombre1] are granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence for a probation period of three years</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. Warned that if during the probation period they commit another crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months, the benefit now granted shall be revoked. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">[Nombre2], and [Nombre1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> are ACQUITTED of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">DISOBEDIENCE</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. Once the judgment is final, send the certified copies of record to the corresponding authorities. The costs of the proceeding are charged to the State. By reading, the judgment was fully notified at sixteen hours on the thirty-first of October two thousand eleven, the parties being notified by said reading. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">[Nombre5]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">. Trial Judge</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">\".</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">2.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">That against the foregoing ruling, licensed attorney [Nombre3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the accused [Nombre1], and licensed attorney [Nombre4]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, as private defense counsel for the accused [Nombre2], filed appeals in cassation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">3.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> That, having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 464 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court proceeded to hear the appeal.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">4.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Drafted by the Sentence Appeals Judge [Nombre6] ; and,</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">WHEREAS:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">I.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">REGARDING THE COMPOSITION OF THIS CASSATION COURT</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. In the present matter, an oral hearing was held at nine o'clock on the twenty-eighth of February two thousand twelve, in which the grounds for the challenge were not expanded upon and no new evidence was offered or presented, with the participants delivering a summary of the arguments already included in the appeals they filed in writing. Present at said hearing as judges were [Nombre7]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, [Nombre8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and Alberto Alpízar Chaves. However, currently the substitute judge</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">[Nombre9]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">does not exercise the jurisdictional function, having retired. By reason of the foregoing, due to the impossibility of participation of the cited judge, the present matter shall be resolved by the two other judges who participated and by Judge David Fallas Redondo, who was appointed as the permanent holder of the position previously occupied by [Nombre7]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. This does not compromise any guarantee or interest of the parties, since, as stated, no evidence was received at the aforementioned hearing, and therefore there is no impediment to a judge who was not present at it participating in resolving the challenges in this case, as he is fully capable of ruling on the matter. The Constitutional Chamber so ruled in vote Nº 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, reaffirmed and ratified in vote Nº 2007-15553 of 12:23 hours on November 30, 2007, which stated the following: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">On the merits.- As mentioned in the background of this appeal, the question raised by the appellant regarding the constitutional conditions for the participation of the same cassation judges in the oral hearing and in the final decision on that appeal was analyzed by the Chamber in judgment number 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on December ten, nineteen ninety-six, in which the following was stated: \"II. On the merits. The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other, and often make the interpreter's task difficult when resolving complex situations, that is, those involving more than one value at a time. In this type of case, it is very important for the constitutional interpreter to weigh and attempt to balance -when possible given the circumstances of the case-, the conflicting interests ... In the case under study, two interests of equal rank are at stake: due process and the right to prompt and effective justice. The first because the principle of immediacy, according to which evidence must be received directly, immediately, and simultaneously, is derived from this right, and the second because the relationship between the issue raised and a prompt response from the administration of justice is evident. This Court considers that it is not necessary to sacrifice one principle for another, it being perfectly possible -in a situation like the present one-, to achieve a response that satisfies both interests equally. The solution suggested by the consulting Chamber meets that balance, insofar as it allows the intervention in the decision of some judges who were not present at the oral hearing, without affecting constitutional rights, while avoiding unnecessary delays in the resolution of the proceedings submitted for its consideration. Of course, any solution given to the case excludes criminal law debates, and all those oral hearings in which evidence is presented or any of the arguments or grounds are expanded upon orally, because otherwise the principle of immediacy, derived from due process, which requires a close connection between the judge and the matters submitted for their consideration during the debate, would be violated. According to this principle and that of the physical identity of the judge, the sentence must be pronounced by the same judges who participated in the hearing. However, we know that this is so, mainly –but not exclusively-, in criminal matters, to specially protect the rights of the accused in evidentiary matters. This principle, an essential basis of modern criminal law, is not, in the opinion of this Chamber, of strict and absolute application in matters of a different nature than the criminal debate, as will be seen later. For this Chamber, it is possible -constitutionally speaking-, that in those hearings where no oral evidentiary elements are received, or where the arguments of the parties are already in writing, without contributing anything new -as occurs in most cassation appeals and some review appeals-, where the parties attend the oral hearing to summarize the grounds of each of the grounds they have already set forth in writing, other judges, different from those who participated in the hearing, may intervene at the time of making the decision, if and only if, they are able to do so and there are justified reasons (which must be recorded in writing) that prevent those who were at the oral hearing from meeting in the near future to study and resolve the matter. Neither due process nor the principle of immediacy is affected by this solution, insofar as in no case where evidence is received, or a new element is contributed, will judges other than those who were at the hearing be permitted to resolve the matter, and this may only be done when: a) there are justified reasons, or, b) when what occurs in the oral hearing is only a summarization of the grounds of each of the grounds that have already been set forth or are already in writing previously, without contributing anything new. Rather, in this type of situation, it is in the interest of speed and justice that unnecessary delays that harm both the interests of the parties and those of the administration of justice not occur. It must be taken into account that when a case is unnecessarily delayed, this not only affects the direct interests of the party, but also those of the other persons who are waiting their turn to obtain justice before a given Court, as well as those of the citizens who contribute with their taxes the money that finances the administration of justice, in the understanding that it will be, as the Constitution states, prompt and effective ... it is evident that -as indicated in the background of this Chamber cited in the preceding whereas clause- if the reception of evidence by the members of the Cassation Court is at stake, it will be legally necessary to maintain that composition when making the final decision on the matter, just as -incidentally- required by Article 449 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the same way, and also as this Chamber had already stated in the aforementioned background, said composition must be maintained when the arguments raised by the parties in the hearing differ from those alleged at the time of filing or responding to the cassation appeal, for the still valid and convincing reasons given in the repeatedly cited resolution [Telf2]. Finally, it is not mandatory from the perspective of the right to due process to maintain in the final decision the composition of the court that attended the hearing when these conditions are not met, and rather, in this last proceeding, the parties merely limit themselves to reiterating already stated arguments or insist, from different perspectives, on arguments of fact and law already raised in writing. And the reason for this being so in this last case is that the broad review task required by the jurisprudential antecedents cited by the appellant does not require, as a necessary prerequisite for its execution, the requirement of immediacy and orality, given that it can be perfectly and fully carried out by the Court without resorting to them, being, as indicated, in an essentially reviewing phase. IV.- Conclusion. In conclusion, this Chamber fully maintains the criterion set forth in resolution 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on December ten, nineteen ninety-six, insofar as it considers that it is not unconstitutional to allow new judges who were not at the oral hearing to intervene in the decision of the case, provided that, as explained, no evidentiary proceedings were conducted in said hearing or that some new element was contributed by the litigants, and always in the understanding that the modification in the composition is sufficiently and validly justified [...]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">\". As deduced from the previously cited vote, the Constitutional Chamber ratifies the principles outlined in vote Nº 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, according to which, in those cases where, in the cassation hearing, no evidence was offered or received, nor were any new arguments raised (as would occur in the present case), it is constitutionally valid to vary the composition when ruling on and resolving the appeal, since this does not affect the principle of immediacy and rather protects the principle of speed (prompt justice). Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber itself points out that in no case where evidence has been received or new elements have been contributed could the composition of the hearing be varied, which could only be done in two scenarios: (i).- When there are justified reasons; or (ii).- When what occurs in the hearing is only a summarization of the grounds of each of the grounds that have been set forth or are already in writing previously.</span></p> If we apply these principles to the present case, it becomes evident that in order to vary the composition of the panel, constitutional jurisprudence requires the fulfillment of either of these two scenarios (just one of them would be sufficient), and in this case both are occurring simultaneously, which allows us to understand that no violation of the parties' rights and guarantees would occur.

II.- APPEAL BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE (MINISTERIO PÚBLICO). By means of a brief filed on November 18, 2011, licensed attorney [Nombre3], in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) against judgment 128-2011, handed down by the Criminal Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela at eight hours and twenty-eight minutes on October 24, 2011, in case number 09-000103-0332-PE against [Nombre2] and [Nombre1], for the crime of Violation of the National Archaeological Heritage Law. In the sole ground, which is indicated as procedural, a lack of reasoning is alleged regarding the suspended execution of sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) granted by the Sentencing Court to the defendant [Nombre2]. The appellant indicates that, based on Article 60 of the Criminal Code, the decision dispensing with the material and effective execution of a custodial sentence must be reasoned. A situation which, in the appellant's opinion, did not occur in the judgment; she further adds that the Court made an erroneous assessment of the requirements set forth in Articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code for granting this grace to that convicted person. The foregoing, because [Nombre2] "[...] does not have a clean criminal record, which is proven by the certification issued by the Judicial Registry of Delinquency for that person, which records that on July 14, 2003, he was previously sentenced to one year in prison for committing a crime of disobedience to authority [...]" (folio 381 fte., the transcription is literal). The appellant considers that the ruling fails to give the reasons why it grants the suspended execution and therefore, regarding the appealed point, it is ineffective, since it is impossible to determine what the arguments were by which the judge considered it pertinent to grant that privilege to the accused. She requests that the judgment be quashed regarding the appealed point and a remand be ordered for a new proceeding regarding the granting of the suspended execution of sentence benefit to [Nombre2]. The complaint is upheld. The appellant is correct because the judge in the judgment entirely fails to indicate the reasons why she deems it appropriate to grant the defendant [Nombre2] the suspended execution of sentence benefit. As part of her succinct reasoning, the lower court (a quo) merely states that "[...] they are persons who possess a stable and consolidated social and employment situation [...]" (folio 377 fte., the transcription is literal). She omits to analyze whether the specific case meets the requirements demanded by Article 60 of the Criminal Code for granting a suspended execution sentence. Thus, this topic of the judgment is annulled and the case is remanded for the repetition of the act, with the trial court of origin needing to analyze, according to Law, whether the granting of the suspended execution of the sentence to the defendant [Nombre2] is appropriate or not.

III.- APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT. By means of a brief filed on November 21, 2011, licensed attorney [Nombre10], as private defense counsel for the defendant [Nombre1], filed a cassation appeal against the aforementioned judgment. In the first ground, the appellant alleges erroneous application of Articles 11 and 21 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law, because these articles constitute "legal uncertainty" as they do not clearly and precisely indicate which local authorities must be notified of the discovery of archaeological objects. The appellant assumes the existence of many local authorities in the same district and that by not expressly stating which authority the law refers to, the application of said norms is impossible. He further adds that on January 6, 2009, the National Museum archaeologists visited the site for the first time and the National Museum was thereby considered notified, so that Institution should have taken immediate action and not waited three months and eight days to request the San Ramón Prosecutor's Office to order the suspension of the work. The appellant's argument is not accepted, for the reasons that will be set forth below. The normative mandate that emerges from reading Article 11 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law is clear, when it states that "when monuments, ruins, inscriptions or any other object of archaeological interest are discovered on public or private lands, the local authorities must be notified immediately, so that any precautionary measures deemed appropriate may be taken." The appellant admits knowing said obligation, so he knew he was failing to comply with it. However, he argues he did not obey it because the norm does not specify which local authority it refers to. Nonetheless, under such conditions, the defendant's non-compliance is intentional and culpable. It is intentional because he knew that his inaction fit the punishable conduct penalized by Article 11 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law and for that reason, as this is a crime of pure omission, he knew of the unlawfulness of his conduct and therefore also acted culpably. As seems to emerge from the complaint, having discarded the possibility of an error of type or prohibition, the legal provision is inapplicable as the specific name of the authority to be informed is not indicated. But this is also incorrect, since compliance was possible by communicating the finding to any local authority. For the absence of greater specification in the norm entails that the obligated person fulfills his legal duty by informing "[...] the local authorities immediately [...]". But it cannot lead to the person obligated by the mandate arbitrarily deciding to exempt himself from it, facing an alleged doubt, and not informing any authority. But even if such a doubt existed, which as stated is not about an element of the offense or the unlawfulness of the conduct, it could not be interpreted, whimsically and conveniently, as inertia in carrying out the mandate, since the prior knowledge that the complainant admits having of the obligation established in Article 11 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law should have led him to duly inform himself about which was the most convenient local authority to make aware of the facts. Although, as has been said, he would have complied by communicating to any local authority. This being so, this Sentence Appeals Chamber confirms what was stated by the lower court (a quo), which considered that "[...] it was proven that the will of the active subjects was aimed at omitting to notify the authorities about the finding, an omission that caused the archaeological material damage located at the site [...]" (folio 373 fte. and 374 fte., literal transcription). In addition to the foregoing, it must be noted that the visit that the National Museum archaeologists made on January 6, 2009, to the site where the works were being carried out did not exempt the accused from communicating "to the local authorities immediately" the findings in question. For, prior to the National Museum officials appearing at the site, the defendants already knew that archaeological remains existed on the land and, despite that, they did not fulfill the duty to communicate it to the local authorities. The foregoing is proven by the superficial archaeological inspection report carried out by the archaeologist on April 26, 2008, as well as resolution [Telf3] of the [Nombre11] in which the execution of the construction project was endorsed and the developing company was warned to comply with the environmental impact matrices submitted in form "D1". Thus, the defendants had full knowledge from the beginning of the construction project about the existence of archaeological materials on their land, the duty arising from norm 11 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law emerging at that moment, which is to notify the authorities about the finding. For the reasons stated, the formulated argument is rejected.

IV.- In the second ground, the appellant [Nombre1] alleges erroneous application of Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law. The complainant believes that a correct application of this norm must start from the true and proven fact that the defendant, either personally or through an order directed to third parties, damaged or destroyed an archaeological monument by any means, a situation that, in the appellant's opinion, was not proven in the present case. The appellant requests that the judgment be annulled for improper application of the National Archaeological Heritage Law and, failing that, orders a new hearing of the trial to correctly apply the substantive law. This complaint coincides with the first ground of the appeal filed by licensed attorney [Nombre12], in his capacity as defense counsel for the defendant [Nombre2], where a violation of the rules of sound judgment is alleged, to the detriment of Articles 142, 184, and 369 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The complainant [Nombre12] considers that the sentencing judge did not properly substantiate the facts she deems proven. And that, on the contrary, she takes certain circumstances and events as true without anyone having verified them or even affirmed them, except the accusatory document. (i) In support of his argument, the appellant states that proven fact 5 (where the judge considers that [Nombre2] ordered the start of earthworks (movimientos de tierras) without the supervision of an archaeologist and also approved the use of heavy machinery and special equipment contracted by [Nombre13]) is a faithful copy of the accusation, and lacks evidentiary support in the adversarial proceeding. (ii) The same occurs, in the appellant's opinion, with proven fact 7 where the judge insists on deciding without evidentiary elements, this because it is included within the proven factual framework that Mr. [Nombre13], from March 31 to April 2009, maintained the orders and directives adopted so that the heavy machinery operated by persons contracted by him continued carrying out large earth movements. It is reproached that there is no evidence or evidentiary support to prove such fact, and the appellant also qualifies these actions as a serious "judicial creationism." He further questions that the Prosecutor's Office could have, before having accused, requested the testimony of the workers to determine if someone gave the order to remove the earth and who it was, or if it was their own decision, if they did it in an area that had not been indicated to them, or any other valid element to know the true nature of the facts, instead of the judge saying that those who carried out the earthworks did so because they were hired and directed by the company representative. Since both arguments are linked, they are resolved jointly. Both complaints are dismissed. The issue of authorship was extensively addressed in the challenged ruling, indicating the reasons why it was considered that the accused are indeed the authors of the facts for which they are convicted. In general, the appellants complain that they did not directly carry out the action described in the criminal offense and that it has also not been demonstrated that they directed an express order for the acts to be executed. However, an issue which the judge properly explains in her decision, it is not necessary for the author to carry out the action described in the criminal offense with his own hand, since according to criminal law "the author of a punishable act defined as such is whoever carries it out by himself or using another or others, and co-authors those who carry it out jointly with the author" (art. 45 PC). In the challenged decision, as will be seen later, the lower court (a quo) mentions a series of aspects from which she deduces that the accused indeed had "functional control of the act (dominio funcional del hecho)," the contribution provided by both being necessary and indispensable for its realization, because if hypothetically any one of them is eliminated, it would not have occurred. There has been no incorrect application of Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law, because the participation of the defendants has been duly proven with the evidence produced at trial. In this sense, this Chamber shares the arguments provided by the lower court (a quo), when the judgment states that "[...] it was demonstrated in the adversarial proceeding that both [Nombre2], in his capacity as representative of Grupo Industrial Plastimex S.A., and [Nombre1], in his capacity as Project Supervisor (Regente), were the responsible persons in charge of the work and had full knowledge that archaeological materials existed on the land where the building construction project was being developed. The foregoing emerges not only from the testimonial statement of [Nombre14] who stated that it was [Nombre1] who hired him because he needed a D1 and that he delivered the report to Julio at his home, but also because from the documentary evidence it is extracted from the Archaeological Inspection form of [Nombre11] dated October twenty-sixth, two thousand eight, visible on folio 55, that the person in charge of the activity, work, or project was [Nombre2]. Likewise, Resolution [Telf4] of [Nombre11] at 10:20 a.m. on October 29, two thousand eight, visible on folio 58, where viability (environmental license) is granted, [Nombre2] is listed as authorized to carry out procedures in his capacity as General Legal Representative of Plastimex, and [Nombre1] as environmental project supervisor (regente ambiental). Similarly, [Nombre14] stated that about a year after having done the D1, Mr. [Nombre1] sought him out to go do the monitoring because he was in charge of doing and gathering all the studies and submitting them to SETENA. Likewise, [Nombre15] indicated that from the first inspection they carried out as Museum officials, they asked the project supervisor and the owner to suspend the earthworks and that they provided the cadastral map and the D1, which is a rapid inspection conducted by an archaeologist to determine if there are sites, that the project owner is [Nombre2] and that they called him to send the report and that they did not speak with the project supervisor during the first inspections, but later, they did. For his part, witness [Nombre16] was clear in stating that from the first visit he met Mr. [Nombre2] and that he was the person who explained the project to them and who called Project Supervisor [Nombre1], because he had some documents. From these statements it is evident that the defendants were responsible for the project and had knowledge, from its beginning and development, that archaeological materials existed at the site. This is consistent with the documentary evidence demonstrating that the company itself submitted documents before [Nombre11] where it was warned that the presence of an archaeology professional was essential for supervising the earthworks. That is, the works were started with the accused having full control of the material actions carried out by the mandate of the representative of the legal entity that owns the property, a company for which the environmental project supervisor also works. In the processing of permits, the person responsible for executing the action is visualized, not only through the activity of the environmental project supervisor, but it is also observed that the property owner deployed various actions that contributed to the execution of the action. In the specific case of Mr. [Nombre2], it is in no way a matter of strict liability, as the defense has tried to argue, because he was the person who promoted the project and to whom prior warnings had been made, that is, from the moment the D1 was carried out by [Nombre14]. It is necessary to consider that according to the theory of control of the act, in intentional crimes, the author is whoever ultimately controls the commission of the crime. Those who carried out the earthworks did so because they were hired and directed by the company representative and with the intervention of the environmental project supervisor. Mr. [Nombre2] is mentioned in abundant evidence as the representative of the company that owns the property; it is observed that there is final control of the action, because he could objectively end it or interrupt its execution. Mr. [Nombre1] was the person designated as the company’s Project Supervisor (Regente) before [Nombre11]. [Nombre11] warned Plastimex about compliance with the environmental impact matrices presented in the D1. This D1 form recommends earth movement under supervision by an archaeologist so that if archaeological material is found, the competent authority is immediately notified. From this moment on, both knew that archaeological material existed on the property, it not being decisive that the D1 indicated the material found was of low density, as the truth is that the archaeologist conducting the study indicated that earthworks must be carried out under the supervision of a professional, because it cannot be ruled out that more objects of archaeological interest would be found. The environmental commitments included the protection of the archaeological heritage, for this reason it is not strict liability, but rather the highest hierarchy of the company and the project supervisor paid by it knew the preventive measures to avoid probable archaeological damage. Therefore, from the moment the accused omitted to carry out the earthworks under supervision, they generated an action over which they exercised control and direction. Those who knew of the possibility that there were monuments were Mr. [Nombre2], Mr. [Nombre1], and [Nombre14]. It must be remembered that an author is: whoever carries out the act by himself alone; whoever carries it out jointly with others in such a way that everyone co-controls the act; the one who directs another subject to materially execute the action" (uppercase, bold and underlining in the original, folios 368 to 371). So then, the questioned judgment indicates what the evidence is that leads to affirming that the accused are the authors of the charged acts, providing an extensive reasoning based both on the rules of sound judgment and on the evidentiary elements incorporated into the trial, which thus justify the facts deemed proven.

Reason for which the claims filed are declared without merit.

**V.- APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED [Name2]**. Through the brief filed on November 18, 2011, Attorney [Name4], acting as private defense counsel for the accused *[Name2]*, files a cassation appeal against judgment No. 128-2011 issued at 8:28 a.m. on October 24, 2011, by the Criminal Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela.

In the **second ground**, which is stated to be on the merits, it is alleged that the appealed judgment disregards the legal definition of a monument, because it decides that the ceramic fragments found on the land constitute archaeological monuments. The appellant considers this assertion to be devoid of foundation, since the Judge does not indicate whether each fragment is a monument or if a minimum quantity is required for that. Contrary to the criterion of the Sentencing Court, the appellant considers that the concept of "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)" refers to the category of immovable objects and not to movable objects as was understood in the judgment. The complainant affirms that the concept of archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico) is clarified by Law 7555 of October 4, 1995, called the Historical-Architectural Heritage Law of Costa Rica (Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico de Costa Rica), since it develops the concept under the category of immovable property, indicating that the immovable properties that make up the historical-architectural heritage of the State are classified into five categories, one of which is monument. Under this premise, the appellant indicates that a ceramic fragment, which is movable property, does not constitute an "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)". In support of his arguments, the complainant cites Voto 461-2003 issued at 4:15 p.m. on May 22 of that year, by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, where it refers the definition of monument to Law 7555. **The claim is without merit**. On these points and for the reasons to be stated, this Chamber confirms what was said by the *a quo*: "*For its part, it is important to analyze, due to the way in which it is resolved, that the concept of monument is not related to the physical size of the goods, but to the historical and cultural significance of the object, due to its importance for the historical, anthropological and archaeological development of the country. It concerns, then, movable and immovable goods of great significance and great relevance, not for the physical space they occupy, but for what they represent. In this way, we have that many works of art, even if they have a very small dimension, are considered monuments for their artistic and cultural significance. This juridical and linguistic conception of the monument has already been adopted by the Costa Rican legislator, upon ratifying several international conventions, thereby acquiring even a rank superior to law, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution. The meaning of movable archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico mueble), used in the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), can be none other than that of archaeological goods, human remains, and fauna and flora related to American indigenous cultures, of important historical and cultural significance, regardless of the physical size of the objects. That conception is intimately linked to what is stipulated in Article 1 of that same law, when it states that the national archaeological heritage is constituted by 'the movable or immovable property, product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna related to these cultures'*" (folios 372 to 373, literal copy). Contrary to the foregoing, Attorney [Name12] maintains that according to our legislation only immovable property can be "monuments", since "*according to Article 6 the monument is a category of IMMOVABLE property, I am not saying it, the law says it and the concept is developed but under the category of immovable property*" (textual copy, folio 388). This Chamber does not share the appellant's thesis, as it is based on an incorrect interpretation of Article 6 of Law 7555, on the Historical-Architectural Heritage of Costa Rica. As referred to in Article 1 of the same: "*The objectives of this law are the conservation, protection and preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica*". So that from the outset the legislator makes it clear that the law in question is directed exclusively to regulating matters relating to the "historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica (patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica)", a matter that is reaffirmed in the rest of the provisions it contains. So that Article 6 of Law 7555 does not regulate in general the concept of "monument (monumento)", as Attorney [Name12] considers, but rather a classification is made of the immovable property that makes up the historical-architectural heritage of our country, considering some of them as "monument (monumento)", according to the definition contained therein. **While the foregoing implies that such immovable property must be considered "monuments", it cannot be inferred from this that only these can be so**. For, as has been said, it is a **specific** regulation referring solely, as the law itself clarifies, to the "historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica (patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica)", which is why it is not possible to give it the **general** character that the complainant intends. The concept of "monument (monumento)" not being defined in the law, except as corresponds to the aforementioned property, the legal operator must give content to this normative concept of the criminal type. The foregoing, far from being a task of "*praetorian creation*" by the courts, is a basic and frequent function in the interpretation of criminal norms, since the legislator cannot construct criminal types exclusively with descriptive concepts nor define each of the normative elements used. To determine what must be understood by "monument (monumento)", the first rule of interpretation of the criminal norm is to attend to the grammatical sense of the words. This is mandated both by Article 10 of the Civil Code, which indicates that "*norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative antecedents and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose*", as well as being an obligation linked to the principle of legality. In that sense the concept of "[Placa1]" is defined as a "*object or document of utility for history, or for the inquiry of any fact. Scientific, artistic or literary work, which becomes memorable for its exceptional merit...*" (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, entry "[Placa1]", twentieth ed., 1984). The foregoing does not exclude movable property and furthermore agrees with what is established in Article 14 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), which provides that "*the movable archaeological monuments (monumentos arqueológicos muebles) may be transferred within the country, provided that prior notification is given to the Public Registry of the National Archaeological Heritage, which will immediately communicate the case to the National Archaeological Commission*", for the national archaeological heritage is composed of both "*[...] the movable or immovable property, product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna, related to these cultures*" (Art. 1, Law 6703). So that the criterion used by the judge to establish what a "monument (monumento)" is is not capricious or arbitrary, on the contrary it conforms to the etymological sense of the word (grammatical interpretation), besides respecting the objective will of the legislator to provide protection against damage or destruction to these goods, which is why the conduct established in Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico) was sanctioned. Regarding resolution 461-03 of the Cassation Court of Goicoechea, it is possible to point out that what was said by the *a quo* and what is held here does not contradict it, because what was discussed there was whether it was possible to equate the concepts of "archaeological site (sitio arqueológico)" and "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)" and although the definition contained in Article 6 of Law 7555 is mentioned, it is not affirmed that only immovable property are "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)", as the complainant intends. Finally, it is of no importance regarding the concept of "monument (monumento)" or in relation to the typicality of the conduct that they are ceramic fragments. It is normal that this type of object, due to the passage of time, may have lost parts and not for that reason do they lack cultural value, but furthermore in the present case the accused are attributed with damaging and destroying them, which is why what is found are small pieces resulting from the tasks attributed to the accused. The judgment indicates the reasons why it is considered that such damage was not prior, but rather a product of the activity carried out there by the accused. In this sense it is stated in the ruling: "*Note that [Name2] said that* ***the fragments presented characteristics that evidenced their recent breakage, because they did not have earth adhered to them***. ***This indicates that the fragmentation of the archaeological material and its consequent damage was recent, and in turn rules out the defense's thesis that previous agricultural activity was the sole cause of the damage to the archaeological material.*** *The [Placa2] is an unequivocal indicator that warning had been given about the possibility that material of archaeological interest could exist. Mrs. [Name15] indicates that during visits to the property, she could observe how they were leveling the property and that where they had seen the material it was left about four or five meters deep and that the mountain disappeared as a result of the earthworks (movimientos de tierra).* ***That is, the earthworks (movimientos de tierras) were significant and that due to this activity the archaeological material was damaged.*** *In that sense, if one observes the photograph Fig 1 visible on folio 198, the height of the slopes can be noted, which reinforces the thesis that the earthworks (movimientos de tierras) were not superficial to remove the vegetative layer as the defense tries to make it seem, and on the contrary they were deep. Supervision was important due to the deepening of the earthworks (movimientos de tierras). Likewise, this witness indicated that the damage that the plow can cause can alter the superficial layers, but that it does not 'churn up' everything, nor reach deeper layers. [Name2] was very clear at the end of his testimony in indicating that the archaeological material at the site was damaged due to the earthworks (movimientos de tierra). According to the documentary evidence, specifically official letters DAH-079-2009 and DAH 132-2009, the magnitude of the earthworks (movimientos) impacted nearly ninety percent of the area of the development project. Which implies the alteration of the archaeological remains present in that area and which had been recorded in the first inspections at the site. According to the cited official letters, the archaeological evidence that was in the area was altered by total removal, scraping, or coverage of a layer* ***of material several meters high irreversibly affecting the context***" (textual copy, folios 371 and 372). So there was indeed an affectation of the protected legal interest, for it was not the passage of time or the action of third parties what ended up destroying such objects, but the action of the defendants. For all the stated reasons, the claim is declared without merit.

**VI.-** In the **third ground** the appellant alleges that the judgment violates the principle of criminal typicality and therefore due process. He considers that the sanction and the type of numeral 21 of Law 6703 are absolutely inapplicable, insofar as it does not indicate which local authorities to notify of the finding and also omits indicating to whom the fine of fifteen thousand colones that is the object of the conviction is paid. The appellant adds that it is not possible to apply numeral 405 of the Penal Code, since it refers to day fines that are ordered in accordance with that Code, not by special laws, which must indicate their destination. Requests that the present appeal be granted, the judgment of the Criminal Court of San Ramón be annulled. **The claim is without merit**. Regarding the "local authorities (autoridades locales)", this Sentence Appeals Chamber, in order not to reiterate the arguments, refers the appellant to what was resolved in the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by Attorney [Name10], acting as private defense counsel for the accused [Name1]. Regarding the allegation about the inapplicability of Article 21 of Law 6703, as the complainant maintains that it does not say to whom it must be paid, it must be indicated that Article 3 of the Penal Code is applicable, which provides that "*the general provisions of this Code shall also apply to punishable acts provided for in special laws, provided that the latter do not establish anything to the contrary*". Precisely, as the appellant maintains, the referred Law does not provide anything in that regard, so that what the Penal Code says is applicable. In that sense, Article 405 of the cited normative body orders that "*the product of the day fines that results from the application of this Code, shall be transferred in its entirety to the Board for Construction, Installation and Acquisition of Social Adaptation Goods (Patronato de Construcción, Instalación y Adquisición de Bienes de Adaptación Social) [...]*". Although the complainant maintains that this is not correct because it clearly refers to the "*product of the day fines that results from the application of this Code*", as has been said, such norm must be interpreted in accordance with what is provided by the also cited Article 3 Penal Code; so that as long as the legislator does not expressly provide a different destination for the money from the fine, what is stated in the referred Article 405 shall apply. The foregoing matter does not affect the principle of legality at all, for not only is the conduct and the sanction previously established by law (Art. 1 Penal Code), which allows the citizen to adapt their conduct to the primary norm or to know what the consequence is if they do not do so, but also the destination of the money has been established by the legislator, this last matter concerning the administrative legality principle and not the criminal one. For the stated reasons, the claim is not upheld.

**POR TANTO:** The sole ground of the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is granted. The judgment is annulled insofar as it grants the conditional execution of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) to the accused [Name2], the case is remitted to the Court of origin for the reconduction of the act, having to duly justify whether or not the granting of the cited benefit to said accused is appropriate. The challenges filed by the accused [Name1] and by Attorney [Name12], on behalf of the accused [Name2], are declared without merit.

**NOTIFY.** Alberto Alpízar Chaves David Fallas Redondo Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Appellate Judges of Sentencing Case File No. 09-000103-332-PE Against: [Name2] and another, for the crime of: Violation of the National Archaeological Heritage Law, to the detriment of: National Archaeological Heritage. [Name17] In that sense, the concept of “<span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">monument</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">” is defined as an “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">object or document useful for history, or for the investigation of any fact. Scientific, artistic, or literary work, which becomes memorable for its exceptional merit...”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, entry for «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">[Placa1]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">», twentieth ed., 1984). The foregoing does not exclude movable property (bienes muebles) and furthermore agrees with the provisions of Article 14 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), which states that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">“movable archaeological monuments (monumentos arqueológicos muebles) may be transferred within the country, provided that prior notification is given to the Public Registry of National Archaeological Heritage, which shall immediately communicate the case to the National Archaeological Commission”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, since the national archaeological heritage is composed of both “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">[...] the movable or immovable property, product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporaneous with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna, related to these cultures</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">” (art. 1, Ley 6703). Thus, the criterion used by the judge to establish what a «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">monument</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">» is not capricious or arbitrary; on the contrary, it conforms to the etymological meaning of the word (grammatical interpretation), in addition to respecting the objective will of the legislator to provide protection against damage or destruction to these assets, which is why the conduct established in Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law was penalized. With respect to resolution 461-03 of the Goicoechea Court of Cassation, it is possible to point out that what was said by the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a quo</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and what is maintained here does not contradict it, since what was discussed there was whether it was possible to equate the concepts of «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">archaeological site</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">» and «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">archaeological monument</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">» and although the definition contained in Article 6 of Ley 7555 is mentioned, it is not affirmed that only immovable property are «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">archaeological monuments</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">», as the complainant claims. Finally, it is of no importance with respect to the concept of «</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">monument</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">» or in relation to the typicality of the conduct that the pieces in question are ceramic fragments. It is normal that this type of object may have lost parts over time and not for that reason do they lack cultural value, but moreover in the present case the accused are charged with damaging and destroying them, for which reason what is found are small pieces resulting from the tasks attributed to the accused. The judgment indicates the reasons why it is considered that such damage was not prior but rather the product of the activity carried out there by the defendants. In that sense, the ruling states: “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">See that [Nombre2] said that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">the fragments presented characteristics that evidenced their recent breakage, because they did not have earth adhered to them</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">This indicates that the fragmentation of the archaeological material and its consequent damage was recent, and in turn discards the defense's thesis that prior agricultural activity was the sole cause of the damage to the archaeological material.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> The [Placa2] is an unequivocal indicator that a warning had been made about the possibility that material of archaeological interest could exist. [Nombre3] states that in visits to the property, she could observe how the property was being leveled and that where they had seen the material, it ended up about four or five meters deep and that the mountain disappeared as a result of the movements. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">That is, the earthworks (movimiento de tierras) were significant and because of this activity the archaeological material was damaged.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> In that sense, if photograph Fig 1 visible on folio 198 is observed, the height of the slopes can be noted, which reinforces the thesis that the earthworks were not superficial to remove the vegetation layer as the defense tries to portray, and on the contrary they were deep. Supervision was important due to the deepening of the earthworks. Likewise, this witness indicated that the damage that the plow can cause can alter the superficial layers, but that it does not "turn over" everything, nor does it reach deeper layers. [Nombre4] was very clear in indicating at the end of his deposition, that the archaeological material at the site was damaged due to the earthworks. According to the documentary evidence, specifically official letters DAH-079-2009 and DAH 132-2009, the magnitude of the earthworks impacted nearly ninety percent of the development project area. Which implies the alteration of the archaeological remains present in that area and that had been registered in the first inspections of the site. According to the cited official letters, the archaeological evidence that was in the area was altered by total removal, scraping, or coverage by a layer </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">of material several meters high, irreversibly affecting the context</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">” (verbatim copy, folios 371 and 372). Therefore, there was indeed an affectation of the protected legal interest, since it was not the passage of time or the action of third parties that ended up destroying such objects, but rather the action of the accused.”</span> Having met the requirements established by article 59 of the Penal Code, [Name2] and [Name1] are granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) for a probationary period of three years. Warned that if during the probationary period they commit another crime punishable by a prison sentence of more than six months, the benefit now granted will be revoked. [Name2] and [Name1] are ACQUITTED of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of DISOBEDIENCE. Once the judgment becomes final, the corresponding official certifications shall be sent to the relevant authorities. The costs of the proceeding are borne by the state. The judgment was fully notified by reading at sixteen hundred hours on October thirty-first, two thousand eleven, with the parties being notified by said reading. [Name5]. Trial Judge".

2.- That against the preceding ruling, attorney [Name3], in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the accused [Name1], and attorney [Name4], in his capacity as private defense counsel for the accused [Name2], filed cassation appeals.

3.- That having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 464 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court proceeded to hear the appeal.

4.- That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by the Sentence Appeals Judge [Name6]; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- REGARDING THE COMPOSITION OF THIS CASSATION COURT. In the present matter, an oral hearing was held at nine o'clock on February twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve, in which the grounds for the challenge were not expanded upon and no new evidence was offered or produced, with the participants presenting a summary of the arguments already included in the appeals they formulated in writing. Present at said hearing as judges were [Name7], [Name8], and Alberto Alpízar Chaves. However, today the alternate judge [Name9] no longer exercises jurisdictional functions, having retired. By reason of the foregoing, and given the impossibility of participation of the cited judge, this matter shall be resolved by the two other judges who participated and by Judge David Fallas Redondo, who was appointed as the permanent holder of the position previously occupied by [Name7]. The foregoing does not compromise any guarantee or interest of the parties, since, as stated, no evidence whatsoever was received at the referenced hearing, and therefore there is no impediment to a judge who was not present at the hearing, and who is fully able to rule on the matter, participating in resolving the challenges in this case. This has been established by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling No. 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, resumed and ratified in ruling No. 2007-15553 of 12:23 hours on November 30, 2007, which stated the following: "On the merits.- As mentioned in the background of this appeal, the question raised by the appellant regarding the constitutional conditions for the participation of the same cassation judges in the oral hearing and in the decision on the merits of that appeal was analyzed by this Chamber in judgment number 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on December tenth, nineteen ninety-six, and it stated the following: "II. On the merits. The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other and often make the interpreter's task difficult when resolving complex situations, that is, those involving more than one value at a time. In such cases, it is very important for the constitutional interpreter to weigh and seek to balance—when possible given the circumstances of the case—the conflicting interests ... In the case under review, two interests of equal rank are at stake: due process and the right to swift and complete justice. The first, because the principle of immediacy, according to which evidence must be received in a direct, immediate, and simultaneous manner, is derived from this right, and the second, because the relationship between the issue raised and a prompt response from the administration of justice is evident. This Court considers that it is not necessary to sacrifice one principle for another, it being perfectly possible—in a situation such as the present one—to achieve a response that satisfies both interests equally. The solution suggested by the consulting Chamber meets this balance, insofar as it allows some judges who were not present at the oral hearing to participate in the decision, without affecting constitutional rights, while avoiding unnecessary delays in resolving the cases submitted for their consideration. Of course, any solution given to the case excludes criminal trial debates, and all those oral hearings at which evidence is produced or any of the arguments or grounds are verbally expanded upon, because otherwise the principle of immediacy, derived from due process, which requires closeness between the judge and the matters submitted for consideration during the debate, would be violated. According to this principle and that of the physical identity of the judge, the judgment must be issued by the same judges who participated in the hearing. However, we know this is so in order to protect the accused's rights, mainly—but not exclusively—in criminal matters, especially regarding evidence. This principle, an essential basis of modern criminal law, is not, in this Chamber's opinion, of strict and absolute application in matters of a different nature from a criminal debate, as will be seen later. For this Chamber, it is possible—constitutionally speaking—that in those hearings at which no oral evidence is received, or where the parties' arguments are already in writing without contributing anything new—as occurs in most cassation appeals and some review appeals—where the parties attend the oral hearing to summarize the grounds for each of the reasons they have already set out in writing, other judges, different from those who participated in the hearing, may intervene when making the decision, if and only if they are capable of doing so and there are justified reasons (which must be recorded in writing) that prevent those who were present at the oral hearing from meeting at an early date to study and resolve the matter. This solution does not affect due process or the principle of immediacy, to the extent that under no circumstances where evidence is received, or a new element is contributed, will judges who were not at the hearing be permitted to resolve the matter, and this may only be done when: a) justified reasons exist, or b) when what occurs at the oral hearing is merely a summarization of the grounds for each of the reasons already set out or previously recorded in writing, without contributing anything new. Rather, in such situations, it is in the interest of promptness and justice to avoid unnecessary delays that harm both the interests of the parties and those of the administration of justice. It must be taken into account that when a case is unnecessarily delayed, it affects not only the direct interests of the party but also those of the other individuals waiting their turn to obtain justice before a given Court, as well as those of the citizens who contribute with their taxes the funds that finance the administration of justice, on the understanding that it will be, as the Constitution states, swift and complete ... it is evident that—as indicated in this Chamber's precedent cited in the previous considering paragraph—if the reception of evidence by the members of the Cassation Court is involved, it will be legally necessary to preserve that composition at the time of making the decision on the merits of the matter, just as—incidentally—required by article 449 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Likewise, and also as this Chamber stated in the referenced precedent, said composition must be maintained when the arguments set forth by the parties at the hearing differ from those alleged when filing or responding to the cassation appeal, for the still valid and convincing reasons given in the repeatedly cited resolution [Telf2]. Finally, it is not mandatory from the perspective of the right to due process to maintain the composition of the court that attended the hearing in the decision on the merits when these conditions are not present, and rather in the latter act, the parties merely limit themselves to reiterating arguments already made or to insisting, from different perspectives, on arguments of fact and law already set forth in writing. And the reason this is so in the latter case lies in the fact that the extensive review work required by the jurisprudential precedents cited by the appellant does not have, as a necessary prerequisite for its performance, the requirement of immediacy and orality, given that it can be perfectly fulfilled by the Court in its entirety without resorting to them, being, as indicated, in an essentially review phase. IV.- Conclusion. In conclusion, this Chamber fully maintains the criterion set forth in resolution 6681-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on December tenth, nineteen ninety-six, in that it considers it is not unconstitutional to allow new judges who were not present at the oral hearing to intervene in the decision of the case, provided that, as explained, no evidentiary measures were carried out or any new element was contributed by the litigants at said hearing, and always on the understanding that the modification in composition is justified in a sufficient and valid manner [...]". As deduced from the ruling described above, the Constitutional Chamber ratifies the principles outlined in ruling No. 6681-96 of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, according to which, in those cases where no evidence was offered or received at the cassation hearing, nor were new arguments raised (as occurs in the instant case), it is constitutionally valid to vary the composition when ruling on and resolving the appeal, because this does not affect the principle of immediacy and rather protects the principle of promptness (swift justice). Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber itself points out that under no circumstances where evidence has been received or new elements have been contributed could the composition of the hearing be varied, which may only be done under two scenarios: (i).- When justified reasons exist; or (ii).- When what occurs at the hearing is merely a summarization of the grounds for each of the reasons that were set forth or previously recorded in writing. If we apply these principles to the present case, it can be noted that in order to vary the composition of the hearing, constitutional jurisprudence requires the fulfillment of either of these two scenarios (just one would be sufficient), and in any case, in the instant matter, both occur simultaneously, which makes it understandable that no infringement of the parties' rights and guarantees would occur.

II.- APPEAL BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE. By means of a brief filed on November 18, 2011, attorney [Name3], in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, filed a cassation appeal against judgment 128-2011, issued by the Criminal Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela at eight hours twenty-eight minutes on October 24, 2011, in case No. 09-000103-0332-PE against [Name2] and [Name1], for the crime of Violation of the National Archaeological Heritage Law. In the sole ground for appeal, which is indicated as procedural, a lack of reasoning is alleged regarding the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) granted by the Sentencing Court to the accused [Name2]. The appellant indicates that, based on article 60 of the Penal Code, the resolution dispensing the material and effective execution of a custodial sentence must be reasoned. A situation which, in the appellant's view, did not occur in the judgment; she also adds that the Court made an erroneous assessment of the requirements set forth in articles 59 and 60 of the Penal Code for granting this grace to the sentenced individual. The foregoing, because [Name2] "[...] does not have a clean criminal record, which is proven by the certification issued by the Judicial Register of Delinquency for this person, which shows that on July 14, 2003, they were previously sentenced to one year in prison for committing a crime of disobedience to authority [...]" (folio 381 fte., transcription is literal). The appellant considers that the decision fails to provide the reasons why it grants the conditional execution, and therefore, as regards the appealed part, it is ineffective, as it is impossible to determine what arguments the judge considered pertinent for granting that privilege to the defendant. She requests that the judgment be overturned as to the appealed point and that a remand be ordered for a new proceeding regarding the granting to [Name2] of the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. The claim is upheld. The appellant is correct for the following reason. The judge in the judgment completely omits to state the reasons why she deemed it appropriate to grant the accused [Name2] the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. As part of her scant reasoning, the lower court judge (a quo) merely points out that "[...] they are persons who have a stable and consolidated social and labor situation [...]" (folio 377 fte., transcription is literal). Failing to analyze whether the requirements demanded by article 60 of the Penal Code for granting a conditional execution sentence are met in the specific case. Therefore, that topic of the judgment is annulled, and the case is remanded for the act to be redone, with the court of origin needing to analyze, in accordance with the law, whether the granting of the conditional execution of the sentence to the accused [Name2] is or is not appropriate.

III.- APPEAL BY THE ACCUSED. By means of a brief filed on November 21, 2011, attorney [Name10], as private defense counsel for the accused [Name1], filed a cassation appeal against the aforementioned judgment. In the first ground for appeal, the challenger alleges an erroneous application of articles 11 and 21 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, because these articles constitute a "legal uncertainty" by not clearly and precisely stating which local authorities must be notified of the discovery of archaeological objects. The appellant assumes the existence of many local authorities in the same district and that, since the law does not expressly indicate which authority it refers to, the application of said rules is not possible. He further adds that on January 6, 2009, archaeologists from the National Museum visited the site for the first time and the National Museum was deemed notified, meaning said Institution should have taken immediate action and not waited three months and eight days to request that the San Ramón Prosecutor's Office order the suspension of the work. The appellant's argument is inadmissible for the reasons set forth below. The normative mandate derived from reading article 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage is clear, stating that "when monuments, ruins, inscriptions, or any other object of archaeological interest are discovered on public or private lands, the local authorities must be notified immediately so that the precautionary measures deemed convenient may be taken". The challenger admits knowing of said obligation, so he knew he was failing to comply with it. Nevertheless, he argues that he did not comply because the rule does not specify which local authority it refers to. However, under such conditions, the accused's non-compliance is intentional and culpable. It is intentional because he knew that his inaction conformed to the punishable conduct sanctioned by article 11 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, and for that reason, since this is a crime of pure omission, he knew the unlawfulness of his conduct and therefore also acted culpably. As seems to emerge from the claim, excluding the possibility of an error regarding the elements of the crime or its prohibition, the legal provision is inapplicable because the specific name of the authority to be informed is not stated. But this is also incorrect, since compliance with the provision was possible by communicating the discovery to any local authority. The absence of greater specificity in the rule means that the obligee fulfills their legal duty by informing "[...] the local authorities immediately [...]". But it cannot lead to the obligee arbitrarily deciding to exempt themselves from the mandate, based on an alleged doubt, and failing to inform any authority.

But even if such a doubt existed, which as stated does not concern an element of the offense or the unlawfulness of the conduct, it could not be interpreted, capriciously and conveniently, as inertia in fulfilling the mandate, since the prior knowledge that the complainant admits having of the obligation established in Article 11 of the Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico should have led him to duly inform himself about which local authority was most appropriate to notify of the facts. Although, as has been said, he would have complied by notifying any local authority. Thus, this Sentencing Appeals Chamber confirms what was stated by the court of origin (a quo), which considered that "[...] it was proven that the will of the active subjects was aimed at omitting to give notice to the authorities about the find, an omission that caused the archaeological material damage located at the site [...]" (folio 373 front and 374 front, literal transcription). In addition to the foregoing, it must be noted that the visit made on January 6, 2009, by archaeologists from the Museo Nacional to the site where the works were being carried out did not exempt the defendants from communicating "to the local authorities immediately" the finds in question. Because prior to the officials of the Museo Nacional arriving at the site, the defendants already knew that archaeological remains existed on the land and, despite this, they did not fulfill the duty to communicate it to the local authorities. The foregoing is proven by the superficial archaeological inspection report conducted by the archaeologist on April 26, 2008, as well as the resolution [Telf3] of the [Nombre11] in which the execution of the construction project was endorsed and the developing company was warned to comply with the environmental impact matrices presented in the "D1" form. In this way, the defendants had full knowledge from the beginning of the construction project about the existence of archaeological materials on their land, at which point the duty arising from Article 11 of the Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, which is to notify the authorities of the find, arose. For the foregoing reasons, the argument formulated is rejected.

IV.- On the second ground, the appellant [Nombre1] alleges erroneous application of Article 23 of the Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico. The complainant believes that a correct application of this rule must start from the true and proven fact that the defendant, whether personally or through an order directed to third parties, damages or destroys an archaeological monument (monumento) by any means, a situation which, in the appellant's opinion, was not proven in the present case. The appellant requests that the sentence be annulled due to improper application of the Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico and, failing that, a new trial hearing be ordered to correctly apply the substantive law. This claim coincides with the first ground of the appeal filed by attorney [Nombre12], in his capacity as defense counsel for the defendant [Nombre2], which alleges violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), to the detriment of Articles 142, 184, and 369 subsection d) of the Código Procesal Penal. The complainant [Nombre12] considers that the sentencing judge did not duly substantiate the facts she deems proven. And that, on the contrary, she takes as true circumstances and events without anyone having verified them or even affirmed them, except for the accusatory piece. (i) In support of his argument, the appellant states that proven fact 5 (where the judge considers that [Nombre2] ordered the start of earthworks (movimientos de tierras) without the supervision of an archaeologist and also approved the use of heavy machinery and special equipment contracted by [Nombre13]) is a faithful copy of the accusation, and lacks evidentiary support in the adversarial proceedings. (ii) The same occurs, in the appellant's opinion, with proven fact 7 where the judge insists on resolving without evidentiary elements, because it includes within the accredited factual framework that Mr. [Nombre13], from March 31 to April 2009, maintained the orders and directives adopted so that the heavy machinery operated by people contracted by him would continue carrying out large earthworks (movimientos de tierra). It is reproached that there is no evidence or evidentiary support to prove such a fact, and the appellant also describes these actions as a serious "judicial creationism" (creacionismo judicial). He also questions that the Fiscalía could have, before having accused, requested the testimony of the workers to determine if someone gave the order to remove the earth and who it was, or if it was a decision of their own, if they did it in an area not indicated to them, or any other valid element to know the true nature of the facts, instead of the judge saying that those who carried out the earthworks (movimiento de tierras) did so because they were hired and directed by the company's agent. As both arguments are linked, they are resolved jointly. Both claims are declared without merit. The issue of authorship was extensively addressed in the contested ruling, indicating the reasons why it was considered that the accused are indeed the perpetrators of the acts for which they are convicted. In general, the appellants claim that they did not directly carry out the action described in the criminal offense (tipo penal) and that it has also not been proven that they issued an express order for the acts to be executed. However, a matter the judge duly explains in her resolution, it is not necessary for the perpetrator to carry out the action described in the criminal offense (tipo penal) with his own hand, since according to criminal law, "the perpetrator of a punishable act defined as such is whoever carries it out by himself or by using another or others, and co-perpetrators are those who carry it out jointly with the perpetrator" (Art. 45 CP). In the contested resolution, as will be seen below, the court of origin (a quo) mentions a series of aspects from which it deduces that the accused indeed had "functional control over the act" (dominio funcional del hecho), the contribution provided by both being necessary and indispensable for its realization, since if either of them is hypothetically eliminated, it would not have occurred. There has been no incorrect application of Article 23 of the Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, because the participation of the defendants has been duly proven with the evidence presented at trial. In this sense, this Chamber shares the arguments provided by the court of origin (a quo), when it states in the sentence that "[...] it was demonstrated in the adversarial proceedings that both [Nombre2], in his capacity as representative of Grupo Industrial Plastimex S.A., and [Nombre1], in his capacity as Regente, were the responsible managers of the work and had full knowledge that on the land where the building construction project was being developed, archaeological materials existed. The foregoing is evident not only from the testimonial statement of [Nombre14], who affirmed that it was [Nombre1] who hired him because he needed a D1 and that he delivered the report to Julio at his house, but also because from the documentary evidence, it is extracted from the Archaeological Inspection form of the [Nombre11] dated October twenty-sixth, two thousand eight, visible at folio 55, that the person in charge of the activity, work, or project was [Nombre2]. Likewise, Resolution [Telf4] of the [Nombre11] at 10:20 hours on October 29, two thousand eight, visible at folio 58, where viability (environmental license or licencia ambiental) is granted, names [Nombre2] as authorized to carry out the procedures in his capacity as Generalísimo Apoderado of Plastimex, as well as [Nombre1] as Regente Ambiental. Similarly, [Nombre14] stated that about a year after completing the D1, Mr. [Nombre1] sought him out to do the monitoring because he was in charge of doing and gathering all the studies and presenting them to SETENA. Also, [Nombre15] indicated that from the first inspection they conducted as Museum officials, they asked the Regente and the owner for the suspension of earthworks (movimiento de tierras) and that they provided them with the cadastral map and the D1, which is a rapid inspection carried out by an archaeologist to determine if there are sites, that the project owner is [Nombre2] and that they call him to send the report, and that they did not speak with the Regente during the first inspections, but later they did. For his part, the witness [Nombre16] was clear in indicating that from the first visit he met Mr. [Nombre2] and that he was the person who explained the project to them and who called Regente [Nombre1], because he had some documents. From these statements, it is evident that the defendants were responsible for the project and were aware, from its beginning and development, that archaeological materials existed at the site. The foregoing is consistent with the documentary evidence demonstrating that the company itself submitted documents to [Nombre11] in which it was warned that the presence of an archaeology professional was essential for the supervision of earthworks (movimientos de tierra). That is to say, the works began with the defendants having full control over the material actions carried out under the mandate of the representative of the legal entity that owns the property, a company for which the Regente Ambiental also works. In the processing of permits, the person responsible for executing the action is visible, not only through the activity of the Regente Ambiental, but it is also seen that the property owner undertook various actions that contributed to the execution of the action. In the specific case of Mr. [Nombre2], this is not a case of strict liability, in any way, as the defense has sought to argue, because he was the person who promoted the project and to whom prior warnings had been made, that is, from the time the D1 was carried out by [Nombre14]. It is necessary to consider that according to the theory of control over the act (dominio del hecho), in intentional crimes, the perpetrator is the one who ultimately controls the realization of the crime. Those who carried out the earthworks (movimiento de tierras) did so because they were hired and directed by the company's agent and with the intervention of the Regente Ambiental. Mr. [Nombre2] is mentioned in abundant evidence as the representative of the company that owns the property; it is observed that there is final control over the action, as he could objectively put an end to it or interrupt its execution. Mr. [Nombre1] was the person designated as Regente of the company before [Nombre11]. [Nombre11] warned Plastimex to comply with the environmental impact matrices presented in the D1. This D1 form recommends earthworks (movimiento de tierra) under the supervision of an archaeologist so that if archaeological material is found, the competent authority is immediately notified. From this moment on, both knew that archaeological material existed on the property, it not being decisive that the D1 indicated the material found was of low density, since the truth is that the archaeologist conducting the study indicates that earthworks (movimientos de tierra) must be carried out under the supervision of a professional, because it cannot be ruled out that more objects of archaeological interest might be found. The environmental commitments included the protection of the archaeological heritage, for this reason it is not strict liability, but rather that the highest hierarchy of the company and the Regente paid by it knew the preventive measures to avoid probable archaeological damage. Therefore, from the moment the defendants omitted to carry out the earthworks (movimientos de tierras) under supervision, they generated an action over which they exercised control and direction. Those who knew about the possibility of monuments (monumentos) were Mr. [Nombre2], Mr. [Nombre1], and [Nombre14]. It must be remembered that a perpetrator is: whoever carries out the act by himself; whoever carries it out jointly with others in such a way that all co-control the act; that person who directs another subject to materially execute the action" (uppercase, bold, and underline in the original, folios 368 to 371). Thus, the contested sentence indicates what evidence leads to affirming that the defendants are the perpetrators of the accused acts, providing an extensive substantiation based both on the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and on the evidentiary elements incorporated into the trial, which thus justify the facts deemed proven. For this reason, the claims formulated are declared without merit.

V.- APPEAL OF DEFENDANT [Nombre2]. By means of the brief filed on November 18, 2011, attorney [Nombre4], in his capacity as private defense counsel for the defendant [Nombre2], files a cassation appeal against sentence No. 128-2011 of 8:28 hours on October 24, 2011, of the Tribunal Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela.

On the second ground, which is indicated as being on the merits, it is alleged that the appealed sentence disregards the legal definition of monument (monumento), because it decides that the pieces of ceramic found on the land constitute archaeological monuments (monumentos). The appellant considers this statement to be devoid of substantiation, as the Judge does not indicate whether each piece is a monument (monumento) or if a minimum quantity is required for this. Contrary to the criterion of the Sentencing Tribunal, the appellant believes that the concept of "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)" refers to the category of immovable objects and not to movable objects as was understood in the sentence. The complainant affirms that the concept of archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico) is clarified by Ley 7555 of October 4, 1995, called Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico de Costa Rica, as it develops the concept under the category of immovable property, indicating that the immovable properties that make up the state's historical-architectural heritage are classified into five categories, one of which is monument (monumento). Under this premise, the appellant indicates that a piece of ceramic, which is a movable good, does not constitute an "archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico)". In support of his arguments, the complainant cites Voto 461-2003 of 16:15 hours on May 22 of that year, from the Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, where it refers the definition of monument (monumento) to Ley 7555. The claim is without merit. On these points and for the reasons that will be stated, this Chamber confirms what was said by the court of origin (a quo): "For its part, it is important to analyze, due to the way it is resolved, that the concept of monument (monumento) is not related to the physical size of the goods, but to the historical and cultural significance of the object, for its importance for the historical, anthropological, and archaeological development of the country. It concerns, therefore, movable and immovable goods of great significance and great relevance, not because of the physical space they occupy, but because of what they represent. In this way, many works of art, even if they are very small in dimension, are considered monuments (monumentos) for their artistic and cultural significance. This legal and linguistic conception of the monument (monumento) has already been accepted by the Costa Rican legislator, upon ratifying several international conventions, even acquiring a rank superior to law, in accordance with Article 7 of the Constitución Política. The meaning of movable archaeological monument (monumento arqueológico mueble), used in the Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, can be none other than that of archaeological goods, human remains, and fauna and flora related to American indigenous cultures, of significant historical and cultural importance, regardless of the physical size of the objects. This conception is intimately linked to what is established in Article 1 of that same law, stating that the national archaeological heritage consists of 'movable or immovable goods, products of indigenous cultures prior or contemporary to the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human, flora, and fauna remains related to these cultures'" (folios 372 to 373, literal copy). Contrary to the foregoing, attorney [Nombre12] maintains that according to our legislation, only immovable goods can be 'monuments (monumentos)', since "according to Article 6, monument (monumento) is a category of IMMOVABLE goods, I do not say it, the law says it and the concept is developed but under the category of immovable goods" (textual copy, folio 388). This Chamber does not share the appellant's thesis, because it is based on an incorrect interpretation of Article 6 of Ley 7555, on the Patrimonio Histórico-Arquitectónico of Costa Rica. As stated in Article 1 of the same: "The objectives of this law are the conservation, protection, and preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica." So from the outset, the legislator makes clear that the law in question is exclusively aimed at regulating matters related to the "historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica," a matter reaffirmed in the rest of the provisions it contains. Thus, Article 6 of Ley 7555 does not regulate the concept of "monument (monumento)" in general, as attorney [Nombre12] believes, but rather classifies the immovable goods that make up the historical-architectural heritage of our country, some of them being considered a "monument (monumento)," according to the definition contained therein. While the foregoing implies that such immovable goods must be considered "monuments (monumentos)," it cannot be inferred from this that only these can be so. Because, as has been said, it is a specific regulation referring only, as the law itself clarifies, to the "historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica," which is why it is not possible to give it the general character that the complainant intends. As the concept of "monument (monumento)" is not defined in the law, except for what corresponds to the aforementioned goods, the legal operator must provide content to this normative concept of the criminal offense (tipo penal). The foregoing, far from being a task of "praetorian creation (creación pretoriana)" by the courts, is a basic and frequent function in the interpretation of criminal norms, because the legislator cannot construct criminal offenses (tipos penales) exclusively with descriptive concepts nor define each of the normative elements he uses. To determine what should be understood by "monument (monumento)," the first rule of interpretation of the criminal norm is to attend to the grammatical sense of the words. This is imposed both by Article 10 of the Código Civil, which indicates that "norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose," as it is also an obligation linked to the principle of legality. In this sense, the concept of "[Placa1]" is defined as an "object or document useful for history, or for the investigation of any fact. Scientific, artistic, or literary work, which is made memorable for its exceptional merit..." (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, entry "[Placa1]", twentieth ed., 1984).

The foregoing does not exclude movable property and is also consistent with the provisions of Article 14 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), which provides that "movable archaeological monuments may be moved within the country, provided that prior notice is given to the Public Registry of the National Archaeological Heritage (Registro Público del Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), which shall immediately communicate the case to the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional)," since the national archaeological heritage is composed of both "[...] movable or immovable property, a product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporaneous with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora and fauna, related to these cultures" (Art. 1, Ley 6703). Therefore, the criterion used by the judge to establish what a "monument" is is not capricious or arbitrary; on the contrary, it conforms to the etymological meaning of the word (grammatical interpretation), in addition to respecting the objective will of the legislator to provide protection against damage to or destruction of these assets, which is why the conduct established in Article 23 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law was penalized. Regarding resolution 461-03 of the Goicoechea Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación de Goicoechea), it is possible to point out that what was said by the lower court (a quo) and what is held herein does not contradict it, since what was discussed there was whether it was possible to equate the concepts of "archaeological site" and "archaeological monument" and although the definition contained in Article 6 of Ley 7555 is mentioned, it is not stated that only immovable property can be "archaeological monuments," as the complainant claims. Finally, it is of no importance regarding the concept of "monument" or in relation to the characterization of the conduct that the items are pieces of pottery. It is normal for such objects, with the passage of time, to have lost parts, and they do not thereby lack cultural value; moreover, in the present case, the defendants are charged with damaging and destroying them, which is why only small pieces are found as a product of the activities attributed to the defendants. The judgment indicates the reasons why it is considered that such damage was not prior but rather a product of the activity carried out there by the accused. In this regard, the judgment states: "See that [Name2] said that the pieces presented characteristics that evidenced their recent breakage, because they did not have earth adhering to them. This indicates that the fragmentation of the archaeological material and its consequent damage was recent, and in turn rules out the defense's thesis that prior agricultural activity was the sole cause of the damage to the archaeological material. The [Plate2] is an unequivocal indicator that a warning had been given about the possibility that material of archaeological interest might exist. Ms. [Name15] indicates that during visits to the property, she was able to observe how they were leveling the property and that where they had seen the material it ended up about four or five meters deep and that the hill disappeared as a result of the earthworks (movimientos de tierra). That is to say, the earthworks were significant and that this activity damaged the archaeological material. In that sense, if one observes the photograph Fig 1 visible on folio 198, the height of the slopes can be noted, which reinforces the thesis that the earthworks were not superficial, merely to remove the vegetative layer as the defense seeks to portray, and on the contrary, they were deep. Supervision was important due to the deepening of the earthworks. Likewise, this witness indicated that the damage a plow can cause can alter the superficial layers, but that it does not "churn" everything, nor does it reach deeper layers. [Name2] was very clear in indicating at the end of his deposition that the archaeological material at the site was damaged due to the earthworks. According to the documentary evidence, specifically official communications DAH-079-2009 and DAH 132-2009, the magnitude of the earthworks impacted nearly ninety percent of the development project area. This implies the alteration of the archaeological remains present in that area and which had been recorded during the first inspections of the site. According to the cited official communications, the archaeological evidence that was in the area was altered by total removal, scraping, or covering by a layer of material several meters high, irreversibly affecting the context" (textual copy, folios 371 and 372). Therefore, there was indeed an impact on the protected legal interest, for it was not the passage of time or the action of third parties that ended up destroying such objects, but rather the action of the defendants. For all the foregoing, the claim is dismissed.

VI.- In the third ground, the appellant alleges that the judgment violates the principle of criminal legality (tipicidad penal) and therefore due process. He considers that the penalty and the offense described in numeral 21 of Ley 6703 are absolutely inapplicable, since it does not indicate which local authorities must be notified of the find and also omits indicating to whom the fine of fifteen thousand colones subject to the conviction is paid. The appellant adds that it is not possible to apply numeral 405 of the Penal Code, since it refers to fine-days imposed in accordance with that Code, not by special laws, which must indicate their destination. He requests that this appeal be granted, and that the judgment of the Criminal Trial Court of San Ramón (Tribunal Penal de San Ramón) be annulled. The claim is dismissed. Regarding the "local authorities," this Sentence Appeals Chamber (Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia), in order not to reiterate the arguments, refers the challenger to what was resolved in the first ground of the appeal in cassation filed by attorney [Name10], acting as private defense counsel for the defendant [Name1]. Regarding the argument about the inapplicability of Article 21 of Ley 6703, as the complainant maintains that it does not say to whom the fine must be paid, it must be indicated that Article 3 of the Penal Code is applicable, which provides that "the general provisions of this Code shall also apply to punishable acts provided for in special laws, provided that the latter do not establish anything to the contrary." Precisely, as the challenger maintains, the said Law does not provide anything in this regard, so what the Penal Code says is applicable. In that sense, Article 405 of the cited body of law orders that "the product of the fine-days resulting from the application of this Code shall be remitted in full to the Board for Construction, Installation and Acquisition of Social Adaptation Assets (Patronato de Construcción, Instalación y Adquisición de Bienes de Adaptación Social) [...]". Although the complainant maintains that this is not correct because clear reference is made to the "product of the fine-days resulting from the application of this Code," as has been said, such rule must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the also-cited Article 3 of the Penal Code; therefore, as long as the legislator does not expressly provide a different destination for the money from the fine, what is stated in the referred Article 405 shall apply. The foregoing matter does not at all affect the principle of legality, since not only are the conduct and the penalty previously provided for by law (Art. 1 Penal Code), which allows the citizen to adapt his conduct to the primary norm or else know what the consequence is if he does not, but also the destination of the money has been established by the legislator, a matter that concerns the administrative principle of legality and not the criminal one. For the stated reasons, the claim is not upheld.

POR TANTO:

The sole ground of the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is granted. The judgment is annulled insofar as it grants the conditional suspension of the penalty to the defendant [Name2]. The case is remanded to the court of origin for the repetition of the act, which must be duly reasoned regarding whether or not the granting of the cited benefit to said defendant is appropriate. The challenges filed by the defendant [Name1] and by attorney [Name12], representing the defendant [Name2], are dismissed. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Alberto Alpízar Chaves David Fallas Redondo Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Appeals Judges of Sentence (Jueces de Apelación de Sentencia) Contra: [Nombre2] and another, for the crime of: Violation of the National Archaeological Heritage Law (Infracción a la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico), to the detriment of: National Archaeological Heritage (Patrimonio Arqueológico Nacional). [Nombre17]

PODER JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, Tel: 2456-9069 ó [Telf1] [...] Fax: 2445-5193 _______________________________________________________________________________________ Res: 2012-00479 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN. SECCIÓN PRIMERA. San Ramón, a las dieciséis horas del catorce de junio de dos mil doce.

RECURSO DE CASACIÓN interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1], costarricense, CED1 y [Nombre2], costarricense, CED1 por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY DE PATRIMONIO NACIONAL ARQUEOLÓGICO, en perjuicio de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY DE PATRIMONIO NACIONAL ARQUEOLÓGICO. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los Jueces Alberto Alpízar Chaves, David Fallas Redondo y Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda. Se apersonan en apelación de sentencia, los representantes del Ministerio Público, las licenciadas [Nombre3] y Marcela Araya Rojas. Asimismo, el imputado [Nombre1] y el licenciado [Nombre4] , en condición de defensor particular del imputado [Nombre2].

RESULTANDO:

1.- Que mediante sentencia número 128-2011 de las ocho horas veintiocho minutos del veinticuatro de octubre de dos mil once, el Tribunal de Juicio del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, Sede San Ramón, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con expuesto y los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, 11 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 8 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 1, 18, 22, 30, 31, 50, 51, 59, 71 a 74, 76, 307 del Código Penal, artículo 21 y 23 de la Ley Sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, artículos 1, 2, 47, 142, 265, 266, 267, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal, se declara a [Nombre2], y [Nombre1], autores responsables de dos delitos de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY DE PATRIMONIO NACIONAL ARQUEOLÓGICO en concurso material en perjuicio del patrimonio nacional arqueológico en razón de lo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 23 de la Ley de Sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, imponiéndoseles la multa de QUINCE MIL COLONES por el primero y de TRES AÑOS DE PRISIÓN por el segundo, que deberán descontar en el establecimiento respectivo, previo abono de la preventiva que hubiese sufrido. Por reunir los requisitos que establece el artículo 59 del Código Penal se les otorga a [Nombre2], y [Nombre1] el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena por un período de prueba de tres años. Advertidos que si durante el período de prueba comete otro delito sancionado con pena de prisión de más de seis meses se le revocará el beneficio que ahora se le otorga. Se ABSUELVE de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre2], y [Nombre1] por el delito de DESOBEDIENCIA. Una vez firme la sentencia envíense los testimonios de estilo a las autoridades correspondientes. Son las costas del proceso a cargo del estado. Mediante lectura notifíquese integralmente la sentencia a las dieciséis horas del treinta y uno de octubre del dos mil once quedando notificadas las partes con dicha lectura. [Nombre5] . Jueza de Juicio".

2.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, la licenciada [Nombre3] en condición de representante del Ministerio Público, el imputado [Nombre1] y el licenciado [Nombre4] , en condición de defensor particular del imputado [Nombre2], interpusieron recursos de casación.

3.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 464 bis del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal procedió a conocer del recurso.

4.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez de Apelación de Sentencia [Nombre6] ; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ACERCA DE LA INTEGRACIÓN DE ESTE TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN. En el presente asunto se realizó audiencia oral a las nueve horas del veintiocho de febrero de dos mil doce, en la misma no se ampliaron los fundamentos de la impugnación y tampoco se ofreció o evacuó prueba nueva, exponiendo los participantes un resumen de los alegatos que ya aparecen incluidos en los recursos que formularon por escrito. En dicho acto estuvieron presentes como jueces [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y Alberto Alpízar Chaves. No obstante, hoy día el cojue[Nombre9] no ejerce la función jurisdiccional al haber sido jubilado. En razón de lo anterior, ante la imposibilidad de participación del citado juez, el presente asunto será resuelto por los dos otros jueces que intervinimos y por el juez David Fallas Redondo, quien fue nombrado como propietario en la plaza que ocupaba [Nombre7] . Con lo anterior no se vería comprometida ninguna garantía o interés de las partes, pues como se ha dicho no se recibió prueba alguna en la referida audiencia, de donde no existe ningún impedimento para que en este caso concurra a resolver las impugnaciones un juez que no estuvo presente en la misma, el cual está en plenas condiciones de pronunciarse al respecto. Así lo ha dispuesto la Sala Constitucional en el voto Nº 6681-96 de las 15:30 horas del 10 de diciembre de 1996, retomado y ratificado en el voto Nº 2007-15553 de las 12:23 horas del 30 de noviembre de 2007, donde se indicó lo siguiente: "Sobre el fondo.- Tal y como se menciona en los antecedentes de este recurso, la cuestión que plantea el recurrente respecto de las condiciones constitucionales para participación de los mismos jueces de casación en la audiencia oral y en la toma de la decisión de fondo sobre ese recurso, fue analizado por la Sala en la sentencia número 6681-96 de las quince horas treinta minutos del diez de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis y en ella se expuso lo siguiente: "II. Sobre el fondo. La Constitución Política contiene una serie de valores de importancia suprema para una nación, los cuales interactúan entre sí, y muchas veces hacen difícil la labor del intérprete a la hora de resolver situaciones compuestas, es decir, aquellas en que interviene más de un valor a la vez. En este tipo de casos, es muy importante que el intérprete constitucional pondere y procure equilibrar -cuando sea posible por las circunstancias del caso-, los intereses en conflicto ... En el caso en estudio, están en juego dos intereses de igual rango: el debido proceso y el de justicia pronta y cumplida. El primero porque el principio de inmediación, según el cual la prueba debe ser recibida de una manera directa, inmediata y simultánea, es derivado de este derecho, y en el segundo, porque es evidente la relación que tiene el problema planteado con una respuesta celera de la administración de justicia. Estima este Tribunal que no es necesario sacrificar un principio por otro, siendo perfectamente posible -ante una situación como la presente-, lograr una respuesta que satisfaga ambos intereses por igual. La solución que sugiere la Sala consultante cumple con ese balance, en la medida en que permite la intervención en la decisión de algunos jueces que no estuvieron presentes en la audiencia oral, sin afectar derechos constitucionales y evitar a la vez dilaciones innecesarias en la solución de los procesos sometidos a su conocimiento. Por supuesto que cualquier solución que se dé al caso, excluye los debates de la materia penal, y todas aquellas audiencias orales en las que se evacuen pruebas o se amplíe verbalmente alguno de los argumentos o fundamentos, esto porque sino se violaría el principio de inmediación, derivado del debido proceso que exige un acercamiento entre el juzgador y los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento durante el debate. Según este principio y el de identidad física del juzgador, la sentencia debe ser dictada por los mismos que intervinieron en la audiencia. No obstante, sabemos que ello es así para que, principalmente –pero no en forma excluyente-, en materia penal, se proteja especialmente en materia probatoria, los derechos del acusado. Este principio, base esencial del derecho penal moderno, no es a juicio de esta Sala de aplicación estricta y absoluta en asuntos de distinta naturaleza a la del debate penal, como se verá luego. Para esta Sala, si es posible -constitucionalmente hablando-, que en aquellas vistas en las que no se reciban elementos de prueba oral o, que las argumentaciones de las partes consten ya por escrito, sin que se aporte nada nuevo -como ocurre en la mayoría de los recursos de casación y algunos de los de revisión-, donde las partes van a la audiencia oral a sintetizar los fundamentos de cada uno de los motivos que ya han expuesto por escrito, puedan intervenir otros jueces, distintos a los que participaron en la vista, a la hora de tomar la decisión, si y sólo si, están en capacidad de hacerlo y existen razones justificadas (que deberán constar por escrito) que impidan que quienes estuvieron en la audiencia oral se reúnan en fecha próxima a estudiar y resolver el asunto. No se afecta el debido proceso, ni el principio de inmediación, con esta solución, en la medida en que en ningún caso en que se reciba prueba, o se aporte un elemento nuevo, se permitirá que jueces distintos a los que estuvieron en la audiencia resuelvan el asunto, y esto sólo podrá hacerse cuando: a) existan razones justificadas, o, b) cuando lo que se da en audiencia oral es sólo una sintetización de los fundamentos de cada uno de los motivos que ya han expuesto o constan por escrito con anterioridad, sin aportar nada nuevo. Más bien en este tipo de situaciones, es de interés de la celeridad y justicia, que no se den dilaciones innecesarias que perjudiquen tanto los intereses de las partes, como los de la administración de justicia. Hay que tomar en cuenta que cuando un caso se atrasa innecesariamente, con ello no sólo se afectan los intereses directos de la parte, sino de las otras personas que están esperando turno para obtener justicia ante un determinado Tribunal, así como los de los ciudadanos que aportan con sus impuestos el dinero que financia la administración de justicia, en el entendido de que ésta será, como lo dice la Constitución, pronta y cumplida ... es evidente que -como se indica en el antecedente de esta Sala citado en el considerando anterior- si se (sic) está de por medio la recepción de prueba por parte de los integrantes del Tribunal de casación, será jurídicamente necesario conservar esa integración al momento de tomar la decisión de fondo sobre el asunto, tal y como -dicho sea de paso- lo exige el artículo 449 bis del Código Procesal Penal. De la igual forma y también como lo había expuesto ya esta Sala en el antecedente mencionado, dicha integración debe mantenerse cuando las argumentaciones planteadas por las partes en la vista difieren de las alegadas en el momento de plantear o responder el recurso de casación, ello por las todavía válidas y convincentes razones dadas en la resolución [Telf2] de repetida cita. Finalmente, no resulta obligado desde la perspectiva del derecho al debido proceso mantener en la decisión de fondo la integración del tribunal que asistió a la vista cuando no se de (sic) estas condiciones y más bien en éste último acto, solamente se limiten las partes a reiterar alegatos ya expuestos o a insistir con diferentes perspectivas en argumentos de hecho y de derecho ya planteados por escrito. Y la razón para ello sea así en este último caso, está en que la labor de revisión amplia que exigen los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados por el recurrente, no tiene como presupuesto necesario para su realización el requerimiento de inmediación y de la oralidad, dado que ser perfectamente cumplida por el Tribunal a cabalidad sin acudir a ellos, al estarse como se indicó en una fase esencialmente revisora. IV.- Conclusión. En conclusión, esta Sala mantiene en su totalidad el criterio expuesto en la resolución 6681-96 de las quince horas treinta minutos del diez de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis, en tanto estima que no es inconstitucional que se permita a jueces nuevos que no estuvieron en la audiencia oral, intervenir en la decisión del caso, siempre y cuando, tal y como se explicó, en dicha audiencia no se hayan realizado diligencias de prueba o bien que se haya aportado algún elemento nuevo por parte de los litigantes y siempre en el entendido de que la modificación en la integración se justifique de forma suficiente y válida [...]". Conforme se deduce del voto antes reseñado, la Sala Constitucional ratifica los principios esbozados en el voto Nº 6681-96 de las 15:30 horas del del 10 de diciembre de 1996, según los cuales en aquellos casos donde en la audiencia de vista de casación no se haya ofrecido ni recibido prueba, ni tampoco se hayan planteado argumentos nuevos (como ocurriría en la especie), es constitucionalmente válido que se pueda variar la integración a la hora de pronunciarse y resolver el recurso, pues con ello no se afecta el principio de inmediación y más bien se tutela el de celeridad (justicia pronta). Es más, la propia Sala Constitucional apunta a que en ningún caso en que se haya recibido prueba o se hayan aportado elementos nuevos, podría variarse la integración de la vista, lo que solo podría hacerse en dos hipótesis: (i).- Cuando existan razones justificadas; o (ii).- Cuando lo que se da en la audiencia de vista es sólo una sintetización de los fundamentos de cada uno de los motivos que se hayan expuesto o constan por escrito con anterioridad. Si aplicamos estos principios al presente caso, se logra advertir que a efectos de variar la integración de la vista, la jurisprudencia constitucional exige el cumplimiento de cualquiera de estos dos supuestos (uno solo de ellos sería suficiente), siendo que de cualquier modo en la especie se estarían dando los dos a la vez, lo que permite comprender que no se presentaría ninguna infracción a los derechos y garantías de las partes.

II.- RECURSO DEL MINISTERIO PÚBLICO. Por medio de escrito presentado el 18 de noviembre de 2011, la licenciada [Nombre3] , en su carácter de representante del Ministerio Público, interpone recurso de casación contra la sentencia 128-2011, dictada por el Tribunal Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela a las ocho horas veintiocho minutos del 24 de octubre del año 2011, causa Nº 09-000103-0332-PE contra [Nombre2] y [Nombre1], por el delito de Infracción a la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico. En el único motivo, el cual se indica que es por la forma, se alega falta de fundamentación respecto al beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena otorgado por el Tribunal Sentenciador al imputado [Nombre2]. Indica la impugnante que con base en el artículo 60 del Código Penal la resolución que dispensa la ejecución material y efectiva de una pena privativa de libertad debe ser motivada. Situación que a criterio del impugnante no se dio en la sentencia, agrega además que el Tribunal realizó una equivocada valoración de los requisitos previstos en los artículos 59 y 60 del Código Penal para conceder esa gracia a ese ajusticiado. Lo anterior, por cuanto [Nombre2] "[...] no es de limpios antecedentes penales, lo cual se acredita con la certificación emitida por el Registro Judicial de Delincuencia de esa persona, mediante la cual consta que en fecha 14 de julio del 2003, fue condenada anteriormente a un año de prisión, por la comisión de un delito de desobediencia a la autoridad [...]" (folio 381 fte., la trascripción es literal). Considera el recurrente que el fallo es omiso en dar las razones por las cuales concede la ejecución condicional y por ello, en cuanto al extremo recurrido, es ineficaz, ya que no se puede determinar cuáles fueron los argumentos por los cuales la juzgadora consideró pertinente otorgar ese privilegio al encausado. Solicita se case la sentencia en cuanto al punto recurrido y se ordene el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación en cuanto al extremo de concesión a [Nombre2] del beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena. Con lugar el reclamo. Lleva razón el recurrente por cuanto. La jueza en sentencia del todo omite indicar los motivos por los cuales considera oportuno otorgarle al imputado [Nombre2] el beneficio de ejecución de condicional de la pena. Como parte de su escueto razonamiento la a quo únicamente señala que "[...] se trata de personas que poseen una situación social y laboral estable y consolidada [...]" (folio 377 fte., la trascripción es literal). Omitiendo analizar si en el caso concreto se cumplen los requisitos exigidos por el artículo 60 Código Penal para el otorgamiento de la condena de ejecución condicional. Así las cosas, se anula tal tópico de la sentencia y se remite la causa para la reposición del acto, debiendo el tribunal de origen analizar, conforme a Derecho, si procede o no el otorgamiento de la ejecución condicional de la pena al imputado [Nombre2].

III.- RECURSO DEL IMPUTADOR. Mediante escrito presentado el 21 de noviembre de 2011, el licenciado [Nombre10] , como defensor particular del imputado [Nombre1], interpone un recurso de casación en contra de la sentencia supra mencionada. En el primer motivo, el impugnante alega errónea aplicación de los artículos 11 y 21 de la Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, por cuanto estos artículos constituyen una "incertidumbre legal" al no indicar en forma clara y precisa a cuáles autoridades locales se debe dar aviso sobre el descubrimiento de objetos arqueológicos. Supone el recurrente la existencia de muchas autoridades locales en un mismo distrito y que al no indicar la ley expresamente a cuál autoridad se refiere no es posible la aplicación de dichas normas. Agrega además que el día 6 de enero de 2009, los arqueólogos del Museo Nacional visitaron por primera vez el sitio y se dio por notificado el Museo Nacional, debiendo dicha Institución tomar las acciones inmediatas y no esperar tres meses y ocho días para solicitar a la Fiscalía de San Ramón que ordenará la suspensión de la obra. No es de recibo el alegato del recurrente, por las razones que se expondrán a continuación. Es claro el mandato normativo que se desprende de la lectura del artículo 11 de la Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, al indicar que "cuando se descubran monumentos, ruinas, inscripciones o cualquier otro objeto de interés arqueológico, en terrenos públicos o particulares, deberá darse cuenta a las autoridades locales de manera inmediata, para que se tomen las medidas precautorias que se estimen convenientes". El impugnante admite conocer dicha obligación, de manera que sabía que estaba incumpliendo con la misma. Sin embargo argumenta que no la acató pues la norma no especifica a qué autoridad local se refiere. Sin embargo en tales condiciones el incumplimiento del imputado es doloso y culpable. Es doloso pues sabía que su inacción se ajustaba a la conducta punible castigada por el artículo 11 Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico y por tal razón, tratándose de un delito de omisión propia, conocía de la ilicitud de su proceder y por ende también actuaba culpablemente. Según parece desprenderse del reclamo, descartada la posibilidad de un error de tipo o prohibición, la disposición legal es inaplicable al no indicarse el nombre concreto de la autoridad que debe ser informada. Pero ello tampoco es correcto, ya que era posible el cumplimiento de la misma comunicando el hallazgo a cualquier autoridad local. Pues la ausencia de una mayor especificación en la norma conlleva a que el obligado cumple con su deber legal informando «[...] a las autoridades locales de manera inmediata [...]». Pero no puede conducir a que arbitrariamente el obligado por el mandato decida eximirse del mismo, ante una supuesta duda y no informe a ninguna autoridad. Pero aún cuando existiera tal duda, que como se dijo no es sobre un elemento del tipo o sobre la ilicitud de la conducta, la misma no podía ser interpretada, antojadiza y convenientemente, como la inercia en la realización del mandato, ya que el previo conocimiento que el quejoso admite tener de la obligación establecida en el artículo 11 de la Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, debió llevarle a informarse debidamente sobre cuál era la autoridad local más conveniente para ponerle en conocimiento de los hechos. Aunque, como se ha dicho, habría cumplido con comunicar a cualquier autoridad local. Así las cosas, esta Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia confirma lo dicho por el a quo, quien consideró que "[...] se acreditó que la voluntad de los sujetos activos estaba encaminada a omitir dar aviso a las autoridades sobre el hallazgo, omisión que ocasionó el daño material arqueológico localizado en el lugar [...]" (folio 373 fte. y 374 fte., trascripción literal). Aunado a lo anterior debe indicarse que la visita que el día 6 de enero del 2009 realizaron los arqueólogos del Museo Nacional al sitio donde realizaban las obras, no eximía a los encartados de comunicar «a las autoridades locales de manera inmediata» los hallazgos de marras. Pues previamente a que los funcionarios del Museo Nacional se hicieran presentes al sitio, ya los imputados tenían conocimiento de que existían restos arqueológicos en el terreno y, pese a ello, no cumplieron con el deber de comunicarlo a las autoridades locales. Lo anterior queda acreditado con el informe de inspección arqueológica superficial realizado por la arqueóloga el día 26 de abril de 2008, así como la resolución [Telf3] de la [Nombre11] en la cual se avaló la realización del proyecto de construcción y se previno a la empresa desarrolladora el cumplimiento de las matrices de impacto ambiental presentados en el formulario "D1". De esta forma, los imputados tenían desde el inicio del proyecto de construcción pleno conocimiento sobre la existencia de materiales arqueológicos en sus terrenos, surgiendo en este momento el deber emanado de la norma 11 de la Ley sobre Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, el cual es dar aviso a las autoridades sobre el hallazgo. Por lo dicho se rechaza el alegato formulado.

IV.- En el segundo motivo el recurrente [Nombre1] alega errónea aplicación del artículo 23 de la Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico. Estima el quejoso que una correcta aplicación de esta norma debe partir del hecho cierto y probado de que el imputado, ya sea en forma personal o por medio de una orden dirigida a terceras personas, dañe o destruya mediante cualquier medio un monumento arqueológico, situación que a criterio del impugnante no se comprobó en el presente caso. Solicita el impugnante se anule la sentencia por indebida aplicación de la Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico y en su defecto se ordene la nueva celebración de la audiencia del debate para realizar la correcta aplicación de la ley sustantiva. Coincide este reclamo con el primer motivo del recurso formulado por el licenciado [Nombre12] , en su condición de defensor del imputado [Nombre2], en donde se alega violación a las reglas de la sana crítica, en detrimento de los artículos 142, 184, y 369 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal. Considera el quejoso [Nombre12] que la jueza sentenciada no fundamentó debidamente los hechos que tiene por probados. Y que por el contrario toma por ciertas circunstancias y eventos sin que nadie los haya constatado y ni siquiera afirmado, salvo la pieza acusatoria. (i) En fundamento de su alegato expone el impugnante que el hecho probado 5º (en donde la jueza estima que [Nombre2] ordenó iniciar las obras de movimientos de tierras sin contar con la supervisión de un arqueólogo y que además aprobó el uso de maquinaria pesada y equipo especial contratado por [Nombre13]) es copia fiel de la acusación, y no cuenta con sustento probatorio en el contradictorio. (ii) Lo mismo sucede a criterio del recurrente con el hecho probado 7º donde la jueza insiste en resolver sin elementos probatorios, esto porque se incluye dentro del cuadro fáctico acreditado, que el señor [Nombre13] desde el 31 de marzo hasta abril de 2009, mantuvo las órdenes y directrices adoptadas, para que la maquinaria pesada operada por personas contratadas por él, siguieran realizando grandes movimientos de tierra. Se reprocha que no existe evidencia ni sustento probatorio que acredite tal hecho, así mismo califica el impugnante estas acciones como un grave "creacionismo judicial". Cuestiona además que la Fiscalía pudo, antes de haber acusado, solicitar la deposición de los operarios, para determinar si alguien dio la orden de remover la tierra y quién fue o si se trató de una decisión propia de ellos, si lo hicieron en un área que no se les hubiese indicado o cualquier otro elemento válido para conocer la verdadera naturaleza de los hechos, en lugar de decir la jueza que los que realizaron el movimiento de tierras lo hicieron por haber sido contratados y dirigidos por el personero de la empresa. Encontrándose vinculados los dos alegatos se resuelven conjuntamente. Se declaran sin lugar ambos reclamos. El tema de la autoría fue ampliamente abordado en el fallo cuestionado, indicándose las razones por las cuales se estimó que efectivamente los acusados son autores de los hechos por los cuales se les condena. En general los impugnantes reclaman que no realizaron directamente la acción descrita en el tipo penal y que tampoco se ha demostrado que dirigieran una orden expresa para que los hechos fueran ejecutados. Sin embargo, cuestión que la jueza explica debidamente en su resolución, no es necesario que el autor realice de propia mano la acción descrita en el tipo penal, pues según la ley penal "es autor del hecho punible tipificado como tal, quien lo realizare por sí o sirviéndose de otro u otros, y coautores los que lo realizaren conjuntamente con el autor" (art. 45 CP). En la resolución impugnada, como luego se verá, el a quo menciona una serie de aspectos de los cuales deduce que efectivamente los endilgados tenían «dominio funcional del hecho», siendo el aporte que ambos brindaron necesario e indispensable para la realización del mismo, pues si hipotéticamente se elimina alguno de ellos, no se hubiera producido. No ha existido una incorrecta aplicación del artículo 23 de la Ley sobre el Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, pues la participación de los imputados ha quedado debidamente acreditada con la prueba evacuada en debate. En tal sentido esta Cámara comparte los argumentos brindados por el a quo, cuando en sentencia indica que "[...] fue demostrado en el contradictorio que tanto [Nombre2] en su carácter de representante de Grupo Industrial Plastimex S.A. como [Nombre1], en su condición de Regente, eran los encargados responsables de la obra y tenían pleno conocimiento que en el terreno donde se desarrollaba el proyecto de construcción de un edificio, existían materiales arqueológicos. Lo anterior se desprende no sólo de la declaración testimonial de [Nombre14] que afirmó que fue [Nombre1] el que lo contrata porque ocupaba un D1 y que el informe se lo entregó a Julio en su casa, sino también por cuanto de la prueba documental se extrae del formulario de Inspección Arqueológica de la [Nombre11] del veintiséis de octubre del dos mil ocho visible a folio 55, que el encargado de la actividad, obra o proyecto era [Nombre2]. Así mismo la Resolución [Telf4] de la [Nombre11] de las 10:20 horas del 29 de octubre del dos mil ocho visible a folio 58 donde se otorga la viabilidad (licencia ambiental) se tiene a [Nombre2]. por legitimado para realizar los trámites en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo de Plastimex, así como a [Nombre1] como regente ambiental. De igual forma [Nombre14], manifestó que como un año después de haber realizado el D1, don [Nombre1] lo buscó para que fuera a hacer el monitoreo porque él era el encargado de hacer y reunir todos los estudios y presentarlos ante la Setena. Igualmente [Nombre15]. indicó que desde la primera inspección que realizan como personeros del Museo, se le pide al regente y al dueño, la suspensión del movimiento de tierras y que ellos les facilitaron el plano catastrado y el D1, que es una inspección rápida realizada por un arqueólogo para determinar si hay sitios, que el dueño del proyecto es [Nombre2] y que lo llaman para enviarle el informe y que con el regente no hablaron en las primeras inspecciones, pero que luego, sí lo hicieron. Por su parte el testigo [Nombre16], fue claro al indicar que desde la primera visita conoció a don [Nombre2]. y que fue la persona que les explicó el proyecto y quien llamó al Regente [Nombre1], porque él tenía unos documentos. Con estas declaraciones resulta evidente que los imputados eran los responsables del proyecto y tenían conocimiento, desde su inicio y desarrollo, que en el lugar existían materiales arqueológicos. Lo anterior es coherente con la prueba documental que demuestra que la propia empresa presentó documentos ante [Nombre11] en donde se le advirtió que resultaba indispensable la presencia de un profesional en arqueología para la supervisión de los movimientos de tierra. Es decir, las obras se inician, teniendo los encausados el dominio pleno de las acciones materiales que se realizaron por el mandato del representante de la persona jurídica propietaria del inmueble, empresa para la que además trabaja el regente ambiental. En la tramitación de permisos, se visualiza el responsable de la ejecución de la acción, no sólo por la actividad del regente ambiental, sino que se aprecia que el dueño de la propiedad desplegó acciones diversas que contribuyeron en la ejecución de la acción. En el caso específico de don [Nombre2]., no se trata de una responsabilidad objetiva, de ninguna forma, tal y como lo ha querido plantear la defensa, porque era él la persona que impulsó el proyecto y al que se habían hecho advertencias previas, es decir, desde que se realiza el D1 por parte de [Nombre14]. Es menester considerar que según la teoría del dominio del hecho, en los delitos dolosos es autor quien domina finalmente la realización del delito. Los que realizaron el movimiento de tierras lo hicieron por haber sido contratados y dirigidos por el personero de la empresa y con la intervención del regente ambiental. Don [Nombre2] es mencionado en abundante prueba como el representante de la empresa dueña del inmueble, se aprecia que hay dominio final de la acción, pues podía objetivamente ponerle fin o interrumpir su ejecución. Don [Nombre1] fue la persona designada como Regente de la empresa ante la [Nombre11]. LA [Nombre11] le previene a Plastimex el cumplimiento de las matrices de impacto ambiental presentados en el D1. Este formulario D1 recomienda el movimiento de tierra bajo supervisión por parte de un arqueólogo para que en caso de encontrarse material arqueológico, se le de aviso de inmediato a la autoridad competente. Desde este momento ambos sabían que existía material arqueológico en la propiedad, no siendo determinante que se indicara en el D1 que el material encontrado era de una densidad baja, ya que lo cierto es que se indica por parte del arqueólogo que hace el estudio, que se deben realizar los movimientos de tierra bajo supervisión de un profesional, porque no puede descartarse que no se vaya a encontrar más objetos de interés arqueológico. Los compromisos ambientales incluían la tutela del patrimonio arqueológico, por esta razón no es una responsabilidad objetiva, sino que la jerarquía máxima de la empresa y el regente pagado por ella conocían las medidas preventivas para evitar un daño arqueológico probable. Entonces, desde el momento en que se omitió por parte de los encausados realizar los movimientos de tierras bajo supervisión, generaron una acción sobre la que ejercían dominio y dirección. Los que conocían la posibilidad que hubiese monumentos fueron don [Nombre2], don [Nombre1] y [Nombre14]. Se debe recordar que autor es: quien realiza el hecho por sí solo; quien lo realiza conjuntamente con otros de manera tal que todos co-dominan el hecho; aquel que dirige a otro sujeto para que ejecute, materialmente, la acción" (mayúscula, letra negrita y subrayado en el original, folios 368 a 371). Así entonces, la sentencia cuestionada indica cuál es la prueba que lleva a afirmar que los encartados son autores de los hechos acusados, realizando una amplia fundamentación basada tanto en las reglas de la sana crítica como en los elementos probatorios incorporados al debate, que justifican de esta manera los hechos tenidos como probados. Razón por la que se declaran sin lugar los reclamos formulados.

V.- RECURSO DEL IMPUTADO [Nombre2]. Por medio del escrito presentado el 18 de noviembre de 2011, el licenciado [Nombre4] , en carácter de defensor particular del imputado [Nombre2], interpone un recurso de casación contra la sentencia Nº 128-2011 de las 8:28 horas del 24 de octubre del año 2011 del Tribunal Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela.

En el segundo motivo, el cual se indica que es por el fondo, se alega que la sentencia recurrida desconoce la definición legal de monumento, esto porque decide que los trozos de cerámica que se encontraron en el terreno constituyen monumentos arqueológicos. Considera el impugnante que esta afirmación está desprovista de fundamentación, ya que la Jueza no indica si cada trozo es un monumento o si se requiere de una cantidad mínima para ello. De forma contraria al criterio del Tribunal Sentenciador estima el recurrente que el concepto de "monumento arqueológico" hace referencia a la categoría objetos inmuebles y no a objetos muebles como se entendió en la sentencia. Afirma el quejoso que el concepto de monumento arqueológico se esclarece con la Ley 7555 del 4 de octubre de 1995, denominada Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico de Costa Rica, ya que desarrolla el concepto bajo la categoría de inmueble, indicando que los inmuebles que integran el patrimonio histórico arquitectónico del Estado, se clasifican en cinco categorías, una de las cuales es el monumento. Bajo este presupuesto, indica el impugnante que un trozo de cerámica, el cual es un bien mueble no constituye "monumento arqueológico". En apoyo a sus alegatos cita el quejoso el Voto 461-2003 de las 16:15 horas del 22 de mayo de ese año, del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, donde refiere la definición de monumento a la Ley 7555. Sin lugar el reclamo. Sobre estos extremos y por las razones que se dirán, confirma esta Cámara lo dicho por el a quo: "Por su parte, es importante analizar, por la forma en la que se resuelve, que el concepto de monumento no se relaciona con el tamaño físico de los bienes, sino con la trascendencia histórica y cultural del objeto, por su significación para el desarrollo histórico, antropológico y arqueológico del país. Se trata, entonces de bienes muebles e inmuebles de gran significación y de gran relevancia, no por el espacio físico que ocupan, sino por lo que representan. De esta forma tenemos que muchas obras de arte aunque tengan una dimensión muy pequeña, son consideradas como monumentos por su significación artística y cultural. Esta concepción jurídica y lingüística del monumento ya la acogió el legislador costarricense, al ratificar varias convenciones internacionales, adquiriendo incluso un rango superior a la ley, de conformidad con el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. El sentido de monumento arqueológico mueble, utilizado en la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, no puede ser otro que el de bienes arqueológicos, restos humanos, de la fauna y flora relacionados con las culturas indígenas americanas, de una importante significación histórica y cultural, con independencia del tamaño físico de los objetos. Esa concepción se encuentra íntimamente ligada a lo estatuido en el artículo 1 de esa misma ley, al señalarse que el patrimonio nacional arqueológico está constituido por «los muebles o inmuebles, producto de las culturas indígenas anteriores o contemporáneas al establecimiento de la cultura hispánica en el territorio nacional, así como los restos humanos, flora y fauna relacionados con estas culturas»" (folios 372 a 373, copia literal). Contrario a lo anterior el licenciado [Nombre12] sostiene que conforme a nuestra legislación únicamente los inmuebles pueden ser «monumentos», ya que "de acuerdo al Artículo 6 el monumento es una categoría de bienes INMUEBLES, no lo digo yo, lo dice la ley y se desarrolla el concepto pero bajo la categoría de inmuebles" (copia textual, folio 388). No comparte esta Cámara la tesis del impugnante, pues la misma se fundamenta en una incorrecta interpretación del artículo 6 de la Ley 7555, sobre el Patrimonio Histórico- Arquitectónico de Costa Rica. Según se refiere en el artículo 1º de la misma: "Los objetivos de la presente ley son la conservación, la protección y la preservación del patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica". De manera que desde un inicio el legislador deja claro que la ley en cuestión se dirige exclusivamente a regular lo relativo al «patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica», cuestión que es reafirmada en el resto de disposiciones que la misma contiene. De manera que el artículo 6 de la Ley 7555, no regula en general sobre el concepto de «monumento», como estima el licenciado [Nombre12] , sino que se hace una clasificación de los bienes inmuebles que integran el patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de nuestro país, considerándose como «monumento» algunos de ellos, según la definición allí contenida. Si bien lo anterior implica que tales bienes inmuebles deben ser considerados «monumentos», de ello no puede desprender que únicamente estos puedan serlo. Pues, como se ha dicho, se trata de una regulación específica referida únicamente, como la misma ley aclara, al «patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica», razón por la cual no es posible darle el carácter general que pretende el quejoso. No encontrándose definido el concepto de «monumento» en la ley, salvo en lo que corresponde a los bienes supra citados, debe el operador jurídico dotar de contenido a este concepto normativo del tipo penal. Lo anterior, lejos de ser una labor de «creación pretoriana» por parte de los tribunales, es una función básica y frecuente en la interpretación de las normas penales, pues el legislador no puede construir los tipos penales exclusivamente con conceptos descriptivos y tampoco definir cada uno de los elementos normativos que utiliza. Para determinar que debe entenderse por «monumento» la primera regla de interpretación de la norma penal es atender al sentido gramatical de las palabras. Así lo imponen tanto el artículo 10 del Código Civil, el cual indica que "las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas", como también es una obligación vinculada al principio de legalidad. En tal sentido el concepto de «[Placa1]» es definido como un "objeto o documento de utilidad para la historia, o para la averiguación de cualquier hecho. Obra científica, artística o literaria, que se hace memorable por su mérito excepcional..." (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, voz «[Placa1]», vigésima ed., 1984). Lo anterior no excluye a los bienes muebles y además concuerda con lo establecido en el artículo 14 de la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, la cual dispone que "los monumentos arqueológicos muebles podrán ser trasladados dentro del país, siempre que se notifique de previo al Registro Público del Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, el que comunicará inmediatamente el caso a la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional", pues el patrimonio nacional arqueológico está compuesto tanto por "[...] los muebles o inmuebles, producto de las culturas indígenas anteriores o contemporáneas al establecimiento de la cultura hispánica en el territorio nacional, así como los restos humanos, flora y fauna, relacionados con estas culturas" (art. 1, Ley 6703). De manera que el criterio utilizado por la jueza para establecer qué es un «monumento» no resulta antojadizo o arbitrario, por el contrario se ajusta al sentido etimológico de la palabra (interpretación gramatical), además de respetar la voluntad objetiva del legislador de dotar de protección respecto a daños o destrucción a estos bienes, razón por la cual se sancionó la conducta establecida en el artículo 23 de la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico. En cuanto respecta a la resolución 461-03 del Tribunal de Casación de Goicoechea, es posible señalar que lo dicho por el a quo y lo aquí sostenido no contradice la misma, pues allí lo que se discutió fue si era posible equiparar los conceptos de «sitio arqueológico» y «monumento arqueológico» y si bien se menciona la definición contenida en el artículo 6 de la Ley 7555, no se afirma que únicamente sean «monumento arqueológico» los bienes inmuebles, como pretende el quejoso. Finalmente no tiene importancia respecto al concepto de «monumento» o bien con relación a la tipicidad de la conducta que se trate de trozos de cerámica. Es normal que este tipo de objetos por el paso del tiempo puedan haber perdido partes y no por ello carecen de valor cultural, pero además en el presente caso a los imputados se les atribuye el dañar y destruir los mismos, por la cual lo que se encuentran son pequeñas piezas producto de las labores atribuidas a los imputados. Indicándose en sentencia las razones por las cuales se considera que tales daños no fueron previos, sino producto de la actividad allí realizada por los acusados. En tal sentido se dice en el fallo: "Véase que [Nombre2]. dijo que los trozos presentaban características que evidenciaban su ruptura reciente, porque no tenían tierra adherida. Esto indica que la fragmentación del material arqueológico y su consecuente daño fue reciente, y a su vez descarta la tesis de la defensa de que la actividad agrícola anterior haya sido la causante de forma única del daño del material arqueológico. El [Placa2] es un indicador inequívoco que se había advertido sobre la posibilidad que pudiera existir material de interés arqueológico. Doña [Nombre15] indica que en las visitas a la propiedad, pudo observar como fueron aplanando la propiedad y que donde habían visto el material quedó como a cuatro o cinco metros de profundidad y que la montaña desapareció producto de los movimientos. Es decir, que el movimiento de tierras fue significativo y que por esta actividad se dañó el material arqueológico. En ese sentido, si se observa la fotografía Fig 1 visible al folio 198 se puede notar la altura de los taludes lo que refuerza la tesis de que lo movimientos de tierras no fueron superficiales para quitar la capa vegetal como pretende hacerlo ver la defensa, y por el contrario los mismos fueron profundos. La supervisión era importante por la profundización del movimiento de tierras. Igualmente, esta testigo indicó que el daño que el arado puede causar puede alterar las capas superficiales, pero que no "revuelca" todo, ni alcanza capas más profundas. [Nombre2] fue muy claro al indicar al final de su deposición, que se dañó el material arqueológico en el lugar a causa de los movimientos de tierra. De acuerdo a la prueba documental, concretamente los oficios DAH-079-2009 y DAH 132-2009, la magnitud de los movimientos impactó cerca del noventa por ciento del área del proyecto de desarrollo. Lo que implica la alteración de los restos arqueológicos presentes en esa área y que habían sido registrados en las primeras inspecciones al lugar. Según los citados oficios, la evidencia arqueológica que había en el área fue alterada por remoción total, raspado, o cobertura de una capa de material de varios metros de altura afectando irreversiblemente el contexto" (copia textual, folios 371 y 372). De manera que sí existió una afectación del bien jurídico tutelado, pues no fue el paso del tiempo o la acción de terceras personas lo que terminó por destruir tales objetos, sino la acción de los encartados. Por todo lo dicho se declara sin lugar el reclamo.

VI.- En el tercer motivo el recurrente alega que la sentencia viola el principio de tipicidad penal y por ende el debido proceso. Estima que la sanción y el tipo del numeral 21 de la Ley 6703 son absolutamente inaplicables, por cuanto no indica a cuáles autoridades locales dar aviso del hallazgo y omite también indicar a quién se le paga la multa de los quince mil colones objeto de la condenatoria. Agrega el recurrente que no es posible aplicar el numeral 405 del Código Penal, ya que se refiere a días multa que se dispongan de conformidad con ese Código, no por leyes especiales, que deben señalar su destino. Solicita se declare con lugar el presente recurso, se anule la sentencia del Tribunal Penal de San Ramón. Sin lugar el reclamo. Respecto a las «autoridades locales», esta Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia, a efectos de no reiterar los argumentos, refiere al impugnante a lo resuelto en el primer motivo del recurso de casación planteado por el licenciado [Nombre10] , en carácter de defensor particular del imputado [Nombre1]. Respecto al alegato sobre la inaplicabilidad del artículo 21 de la Ley 6703, pues sostiene el quejoso que no se dice a quién debe pagársele la misma, debe indicarse que resulta de aplicación el artículo 3 del Código Penal, el cual dispone que "las disposiciones generales de este Código se aplicarán también a los hechos punibles previstos en las leyes especiales, siempre que éstas no establezcan nada en contrario". Precisamente, tal como sostiene el impugnante, la referida Ley no dispone nada al respecto, de manera que resulta aplicable lo que diga el Código Penal. En tal sentido el artículo 405 del citado cuerpo normativo ordena que "el producto de los días multa que resulte de la aplicación de este Código, se girará íntegro al Patronato de Construcción, Instalación y Adquisición de Bienes de Adaptación Social [...]". Aunque el quejoso sostiene que ello no es correcto pues claramente se hace referencia al «producto de los días multa que resulte de la aplicación de este Código», como se ha dicho, tal norma debe interpretarse de acuerdo con lo dispuesto por el también citado artículo 3 Código Penal; de manera que mientras el legislador no disponga expresamente un destino diverso para el dinero de la multa, será de aplicación lo dicho en el referido artículo 405. Cuestión la anterior que no afecta en absoluto el principio de legalidad, pues no solamente la conducta y la sanción se encuentran previamente señaladas por la ley (art. 1 Código Penal), lo que permite al ciudadano adecuar su conducta a la norma primaria o bien conocer cuál es la consecuencia si no lo hace, sino también el destino del dinero ha sido establecido por el legislador, cuestión esta última que atañe al principio de legalidad administrativo y no al penal. Por lo dicho no se acoge el reclamo.

POR TANTO:

Se acoge el único motivo del recurso formulado por el Ministerio Público. Se anula la sentencia en cuanto otorga la ejecución condicional de la pena al imputado [Nombre2], se remite la causa al Despacho de origen para la reposición del acto, debiendo fundamentarse debidamente si procede o no el otorgamiento del citado beneficio a dicho imputado. Se declaran sin lugar las impugnaciones formuladas por el imputado [Nombre1] y por el licenciado [Nombre12] , en representación del imputado [Nombre2]. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Alberto Alpízar Chaves David Fallas Redondo Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Jueces de Apelación de Sentencia Contra: [Nombre2] y otro, por el delito de: Infracción a la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, en perjuicio de: Patrimonio Arqueológico Nacional.

[Nombre17]