No right to salary equalization for TAA official with judicial officer via executive decreeImprocedencia de homologación salarial de funcionario del TAA con perito judicial vía decreto ejecutivo

REFERENCE: Pure Legal Process. Nombre142428 . v. the STATE. Docket #11-001050-10527-CA.

No. 10-2012 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, SIXTH SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SAN JOSE, Dirección01 , at ten o'clock on January nineteenth, two thousand twelve.

Process of COGNIZANCE –regarding public employment– processed as a pure legal process brought by Nombre142428 , married, forestry engineer, ID number CED111919, resident of Heredia, San Francisco, against the STATE, represented by the Procuradora, Miss Luz Marina Gutiérrez Porras, single, resident of San José. The licensed attorneys Irene Araya Ortíz, single, ID number CED58675, and José Aparicio Guillén Herrera, divorced, residence ID number CED111920, appear as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff. All are of legal age and, with the stated exception, attorneys.

Recitals:

I.- That the plaintiff, based on the facts he set forth and the legal provisions he cited, in a brief filed on February 18, 2011, filed a complaint whose claim, clarified at the preliminary hearing, is so that the judgment may 1) establish that the State has engaged in an omissive conduct and that he has the right to have the respective homologation of his position and salary equivalent to judicial expert recognized; 2) that the foregoing declaration be retroactive to the moment of publication of Decreto Ejecutivo #36361-MINAE [sic], published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008; 3) that the State be ordered to pay the material damages consisting of the amounts he ceased to receive from 2008 to date, assessed at ¢8,309,884.26, and the subjective moral damages by reason of the impacts suffered due to the non-payment, the anguish of holding a position and not having it recognized, assessed at ¢5,000,000.00; 4) order the defendant to pay both sets of costs.

II.- That the defendant was duly notified. In a brief filed on September 5, 2011, it responded negatively and raised the defense of lack of right; it requests that the complaint be declared without merit in all its aspects, with costs charged to the party who filed it (folios 46 to 67).

III.- That the preliminary hearing provided for in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) was held on October 6, 2011, with the attendance of both parties. At that hearing, the court ordered the case be declared a pure legal matter, the attendees presented their conclusions, and it was ordered referred to this Tribunal for judgment.

IV.- That in the processing of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed.

DRAFTED BY JUDGE JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ, and;

Considering:

First: That the Tribunal deems the following facts proven for resolving the case: ----- 1°) that Mr. Nombre142428 has been working since December 5, 2005 at the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; he currently serves as an assistant in the Civil Service position #27517, with lifetime tenure, as a Civil Service Professional 1 with a specialty in forest engineering (see complaint brief, facts #1 and 2°, folios 1 to 23, its affirmative response at folios 46 to 67 and folio 281 of the administrative file issued by MINAET); ----- 2°) that in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 was published, whose article 4°, paragraph 2°, provided: “The remuneration of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Superior Courts of the Judicial Branch; that of the rest of the personnel shall be equated, as applicable, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other organs of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held.” This rule was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010 (complaint, fact #5 and its affirmative response), and ----- 3°) that in official letter #826-08 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Human Resources Department, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken so that his position be homologated to the corresponding one in the Judicial Branch (complaint, fact #9, and its affirmative response).

Second: Object of the process and objections raised in the complaint and response. That the claim made, with the clarification offered at the preliminary hearing, is to homologate the position and salary to the equivalent of judicial expert, in application of article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007; as material damages he claims the money he has failed to receive due to the non-homologation of the position and salary, and subjective moral damages for the anguish generated by the alleged omission. He invokes the constitutional principle of equality in salary matters. The Procuraduría General de la República in its written response stated that the Decree overreached and that the Ley de creación del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo #7554 does not authorize the intended homologation, nor does it authorize the State to recognize any right; in its oral conclusions it stated that, regarding the equating of salaries from one Branch of the Republic to another, a statute must intervene, according to Constitutional Chamber ruling #550-91, since each Branch has autonomy to set salaries.

Third: That the very extensive litany of facts set forth in the complaint, which in strict terms are a reproduction of what occurred in the administrative venue, revolve around an equating of position and salary agreed upon by way of regulation. In essence, it is sought that the State be compelled to fulfill the obligation resulting from that normative provision, which in the end would generate an expectant right and a significant employment advantage. In the first place, it should be clarified that article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, whose application is requested, was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. Therefore, when the complaint was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. However, the Tribunal will address the examination raised, due to the effects it may have produced while it was in effect between February 5, 2008 and June 30, 2010.

Fourth: On the merits of the case. That by express provision of article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], according to the amendment introduced by Ley #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges “may not”: 1) apply statutes or other norms or acts of any nature that are contrary to the Political Constitution or to the international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any other higher-ranking norm. Before resolving the issue raised, judges must ask themselves whether the norm applicable to the case conforms to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not administrators of justice or passive subjects at the service of the legislator, limited to applying the norm issued by the parliament or the Executive Branch. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and to the valid statute, and must consult the Constitutional Chamber when they have well-founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, conforming interpretation, and the immediate and direct effectiveness of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence (articles 10 and 154 of the Political Constitution –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the latter amended by Ley #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and rulings #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036, and #3039 of 1996). The Constitutional Chamber, in the well-known ruling #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated:

“… From which it follows that statutes and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only to have been enacted by competent organs and through due processes, but also to pass substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as standards of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to the constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the statute not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with its object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights limitations or burdens other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. In summary, the concept of due process, starting from Magna Carta, but very especially in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, has developed in the three main senses described: a) that of legal due process, adjective or formal, understood as reservation of statute and conformity with it in procedural matters; b) that of constitutional due process or due process per se, as a just judicial procedure, still adjective or formal –procedural–; and c) that of substantive due process or the principle of reasonableness, understood as the concordance of all statutes and norms of any category or content and of the acts of public authorities with the norms, principles, and values of the Law of the Constitution.” (Considering I, subparagraph c).

The foregoing confirms that active, critical, guardian role that judges and tribunals must have in a Democratic State of Law regarding norms in relation to the Political Constitution, as a preliminary operation before their practical application, in the incessant search for just decisions and the guarantee of strict legality or substantive legality of the legal order.

Fifth: That by provision of article 191 of the CP, relations between the State and public servants are regulated by means of a norm called the civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil). This statute was enacted pursuant to Ley #1581 of May 30, 1953; in its chapter X, relating to the salary regime, article 48, subparagraph b), indicates that the salaries of the servants of the Executive Branch shall be determined by a Salary Law that shall set the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, #2166 of October 9, 1957, was enacted, which constitutes the official system of remuneration for all classes of positions classified in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (article 1). From these normative antecedents, related to articles 57 and 180 of the CP and 19 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública [LGAP], it follows that the determination of the salary of a public servant is a matter reserved to formal statute. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which public sector salaries are to be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Executive Branch. Not even by Budget Law can these items be established. This concerns, on one hand, the generation or creation of periodic obligations chargeable to the State, and not simply paying or executing a disbursement authorized in a budget line item. The Constitutional Chamber, in ruling #552-91 of 6:50 p.m. on March 15, stated: “VI.- In the same sense, that statutory reservation implies that of an ordinary statute, not that of the budget, since the latter does not have the purpose of creating obligations for the State but only of authorizing the expenditure of public funds, establishing a limit (maximum), such that the Public Administration (that of the Executive Branch and that of the other branches or decentralized organs, as applicable) is not obliged but only authorized to pay in accordance with the budget line items. Furthermore, creating obligations for the State is a function of ordinary legislation, while recognizing them is a function of the Administration, within its budgetary limits; the budget is neither one nor the other.” On the other hand, said determination is embedded within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a minimum wage subject to periodic setting capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to statute law, by virtue of constituting a guarantee for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the fluctuations of politics or other movements or interests of transient power-holding groups. In this sense and in the same ruling, the Chamber stated: “VII.- … But remunerating the provision of a service to the State, of whatever rank or nature it may be, as well as granting aids or facilities for its performance, within the limits of proportionality and reasonableness implicit in any democratic constitutional order, does not constitute a privilege, but on the contrary, is a fundamental principle of sound administration, also intimately linked to the democratic state, because it is obvious that to encourage or even favor the provision of those services free of charge or for symbolic or meager remuneration would amount to nothing less than limiting access to public positions only to persons in a position to hold them because they enjoy a privileged situation of fortune, or else because they lack the necessary scruples to refrain from improperly using them.” Sixth: That the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, #7554 of October 4, 1995, in its chapter XXI, articles 103 to 112, created the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, and regulated its powers, composition, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but made no provision regarding the salary remuneration of its members or its personnel. The cited article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, before its repeal, provided: “The remuneration of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Superior Courts of the Judicial Branch; that of the rest of the personnel shall be equated, as applicable, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other organs of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held.” It foresees a remuneration mechanism for the members of the Tribunal and for the rest of the personnel. But this norm, just as the State argues, by attempting to fill a legal gap through equating the salaries of one category of public servants to those of other equivalent positions where equal or similar positions are held, overreached and invaded the sphere reserved to the ordinary legislator, which is the only competent entity to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This is how it was done in the case, for example, when the Tribunales Administrativos de Transporte y Aduanero were created, pursuant to Leyes #7969 of December 22, 1999, article 17, and #7557, article 207, respectively. Of course, we are not dealing with an act of periodic setting or arithmetic updating of a pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, monetary depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, with the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing on the State greater financial obligations than those that legally and ordinarily correspond. And although it may be understood that what was intended by the Decreto Ejecutivo was the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the means chosen is not the appropriate avenue for the attempted equalization, as it falls outside the applicable legal rules and the official system of remuneration for all classes of positions assigned to the Civil Service, among which the plaintiff is situated.

Seventh: Conclusion, defenses, and costs. That in harmony with the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed in all its aspects, as being improper, without it being necessary to examine each specific claim to so order. Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 does not have the power to supply normative gaps, generating obligations chargeable to the State, nor to create the right to the salary equating sought in the specific case; therefore, the examination of the alleged omission is of no utility. The defense of lack of right raised must be admitted. As for costs, the dispute should be resolved without a special award; the plaintiff's conduct conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the background surrounding the case (article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –CPCA). Strictly speaking, his right in itself, that is, the implicit claim for salary justice underlying the complaint, is not disputed, but rather the [i] substantive legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo that serves as its support.

Therefore:

The defense of lack of right is admitted. The complaint filed by Nombre142428 against the STATE is declared without merit in all its aspects. There is no award of personal or procedural costs.

JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ G.

Nombre65846 CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA Docket # 11-001050-1027-CA.

In said hearing, it ordered the case to be declared as one of pure law, and the attendees presented their conclusions, and it was ordered sent to this Court for judgment.

**IV.-** That in the processing of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed.

**JUDGE JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ DRAFTS**, and; **Considering**:

**First**: That the Court deems the following facts proven for resolving the case: **----- 1°)** that Mr. Nombre142428 has worked since December 5, 2005, at the Administrative Environmental Court; he currently serves as an assistant in Civil Service position #27517, with full tenure, as a Civil Service Professional 1 specializing in forestry engineering (see complaint, facts #1 and 2°, folios 1 to 23, its affirmative answer at folios 46 to 67 and folio 281 of the administrative file issued by MINAET); **----- 2°)** that in La Gaceta # 25 of February 5, 2008, Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 was published, whose article 4°, paragraph 2°, provided: “*The compensation of the members of this Court must be equal to the salary of the members of the Higher Courts of the Judicial Branch; the compensation of the rest of the personnel must be made equivalent, as appropriate, to that of equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other bodies of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held*”. This rule was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010 (complaint, fact #5 and its affirmative answer), and **----- 3°)** that in official communication #826-08 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested that the relevant steps be taken to homologate his position to the corresponding one in the Judicial Branch (complaint, fact #9, and its affirmative answer).

**Second**: **Object of the process and objections raised in the complaint and answer.** That the relief sought, with the clarification given at the preliminary hearing, is for the position and salary to be homologated to the equivalent of a judicial expert (perito judicial), in application of article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007; as material damages, he claims the money he has failed to receive due to the non-homologation of the position and salary, and subjective non-material damage for the anguish caused by the alleged omission. He invokes the constitutional principle of equality in salary matters. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in its written answer, stated that the Decree overreached and that the Law creating the Administrative Environmental Court #7554 does not authorize the intended homologation, nor does it authorize the State to recognize any right; in its oral conclusions, it stated that when dealing with the equalization of salaries from one Branch of the Republic to another, a law must mediate, according to Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruling #550-91, since each Branch has autonomy to set salaries.

**Third**: That the very extensive litany of facts set forth in the complaint, which strictly speaking are a reproduction of what occurred in the administrative venue, revolves around an equalization of position and salary agreed upon by regulation. In essence, it is sought to oblige the State to fulfill the obligation resulting from that regulatory provision which, in the end, would generate an expectant right and an important labor advantage. In the first place, it is appropriate to clarify that article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, whose application is demanded, was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. Thus, when the complaint was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. However, the Court will address the examination raised, due to the effects it may have produced while it was in force between February 5, 2008, and June 30, 2010.

**Fourth**: **On the merits of the case.** That by express provision of article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, LOPJ), according to the reform introduced by Law #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges “may not”: 1) apply laws or other rules or acts of any nature that are contrary to the Political Constitution or to international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any other higher-ranking rule. Before resolving the matter raised, judges must ask themselves whether the rule applicable to the case conforms to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not *administrators* of justice or passive subjects at the service of the legislator limited to *applying* the rule issued by parliament or the Executive Branch. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and the *valid law*, and must consult the Constitutional Chamber when they have well-founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, conforming interpretation, and immediate and direct efficacy of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence (articles 10 and 154 of the Political Constitution –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the latter reformed by Law #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and judgments #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036 and #3039 of 1996). The Constitutional Chamber, in the well-known judgment #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated:

“… Hence, laws and, in general, rules and acts of authority require for their validity not only to have been promulgated by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as standards of reasonableness. That is, a rule or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably grounded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with its object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or implied by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those essential for them to function reasonably in the life of society. In summary, the concept of due process, from the Magna Carta onward, but very especially in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, has been developed in the three broad senses described: a) legal, adjective, or formal due process, understood as reservation of law and conformity with it in procedural matters; b) constitutional due process or due process proper, as a fair judicial procedure, still adjective or formal -procedural-; and c) substantive due process or principle of reasonableness, understood as the concordance of all laws and norms of any category or content and of the acts of public authorities with the norms, principles, and values of the Law of the Constitution.” (Considering I, subsection c).

The foregoing confirms that active, critical, *guardian* role that judges and courts in a Democratic State of Law must have regarding norms vis-à-vis the Political Constitution, as a prior operation to their practical application, in the incessant search for just decisions and in guaranteeing strict legality or substantial legality of the juridical order.

**Fifth**: That by provision of article 191 CP, relations between the State and public servants are regulated by means of a rule called *civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil)*. This statute was enacted according to Law #1581 of May 30, 1953; in its chapter X, relating to the salary regime, article 48, subsection b), it indicates that the salaries of the servants of the Executive Branch shall be determined by a *Salary Law (Ley de Salarios)* that will establish the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Law of Salaries of the Public Administration, #2166 of October 9, 1957, was enacted, which *constitutes the official system of compensation* for all classes of positions classified in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (article 1°). From these normative antecedents, related to articles 57 and 180 CP and 19 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública, LGAP), it is clear that the determination of a public servant’s salary is a matter reserved to formal law. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which the salaries of the public sector are to be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Executive Branch. Not even by the Budget Law can these items be established. It concerns, on the one hand, the generation or creation of periodic obligations on the part of the State, and not simply paying or executing a disbursement authorized in a budget line item. The Constitutional Chamber, in judgment #552-91 of 6:50 p.m. on March 15, stated: “*VI.- In the same vein, that reservation of law implies that of ordinary law, not that of the budget, because the latter is not intended to create State obligations but only to authorize the expenditure of public funds, establishing a (maximum) limit, so that the Public Administration (that of the Executive Branch and that of the other branches or deconcentrated organs, as appropriate) is not obliged but only authorized to pay according to the budget line items. Moreover, creating State obligations is a function of ordinary legislation, and recognizing them is a function of the Administration, within its budgetary limits; the budget is neither the one nor the other*.”. On the other hand, said determination is embedded within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a periodically fixed minimum salary capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to law, by reason of constituting a *guarantee (garantía)* for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the fluctuations of politics or other movements or interests of groups temporarily holding power. In this sense and in the same judgment, the Chamber stated: “*VII.- … But it is that remunerating the provision of a service to the State, of whatever rank or nature it may be, as well as granting aid or facilities for its performance, within the limits of proportionality and reasonableness implicit in any democratic constitutional order, does not constitute a privilege, but on the contrary, a fundamental principle of sound administration, also intimately linked to the democratic state, because it is obvious that to propitiate or even favor the provision of those services gratuitously or through a symbolic or meager remuneration would amount to nothing less than limiting access to public positions only to persons in a position to perform them by enjoying a privileged situation of fortune, if not by lacking the necessary scruples not to avail themselves of them incorrectly*.”.

**Sixth**: That the Organic Law of the Environment, #7554 of October 4, 1995, in its chapter XXI, articles 103 to 112, created the Administrative Environmental Court, and regulated its competencies, integration, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but made no provision regarding the salary compensation of its members or its personnel. The cited article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, before its repeal, provided: “*The compensation of the members of this Court must be equal to the salary of the members of the Higher Courts of the Judicial Branch; the compensation of the rest of the personnel must be made equivalent, as appropriate, to that of equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other bodies of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held*”. A compensation mechanism is provided for the members of the Court and for the rest of the personnel. But this rule, just as the State argues, by attempting to fill a legal vacuum through the equalization of the salaries of one category of public servants to that of other equivalent positions where equal or similar positions are held, overreached and invaded the area reserved to the ordinary legislator, which is the only entity competent to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This was done in the case, for example, when the Administrative Courts of Transport and Customs were created, according to Laws #7969 of December 22, 1999, article 17, and #7557, article 207, in that order. Of course, we are not facing an act of periodic *setting (fijación)* or arithmetic updating of a pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, currency depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing greater financial obligations on the State than those that legally and ordinarily correspond. And although it can be understood that what the Decreto Ejecutivo intended was the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the chosen means is not the suitable path for the equalization undertaken, being outside the applicable legal rules and the official compensation system for all classes of positions assigned to the Civil Service, among which the plaintiff is domiciled.

**Seventh**: **Conclusion, defenses and costs**. That in harmony with the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed in all its aspects, as it is inappropriate, without it being necessary, in order to so decide, to specifically examine each petitionary aspect. Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 lacks the virtue to fill normative gaps, generating obligations on the part of the State, nor to create the right to the salary equalization sought in the specific case; therefore, the examination of the alleged omission is of no utility. The defense of lack of right raised must be admitted. As regards costs, the dispute should be resolved without special condemnation; the conduct of the plaintiff party conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the antecedents that surround the case (article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code –CPCA). Strictly speaking, his right itself, that is, the implicit claim to *salary justice (justicia salarial)* underlying the complaint, is not disputed, but rather the substantial legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo that serves as its support.

**Therefore**:

The defense of lack of right is admitted. The complaint filed by **Nombre142428** against the **STATE** is declared without merit in all its aspects.

There is no award of personal or procedural costs.

JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ G.

Nombre65846 CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA Carpeta # 11-001050-1027-CA.

REFERENCIA: Proceso de Puro Derecho. Nombre142428 . contra ESTADO. Carpeta #11-001050-1027-CA.

Nº 10-2012 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSE, Dirección01, at ten o'clock on January nineteenth, two thousand twelve.

Proceso de CONOCIMIENTO –relativo a función pública– processed as one of *puro derecho* established by Nombre142428 , married, forestry engineer, identity card number CED111919, resident of Heredia, San Francisco, against the ESTADO, represented by the Procuradora Miss Luz Marina Gutiérrez Porras, single, resident of San José. Acting as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff are licenciados Irene Araya Ortíz, single, identity card number CED58675, and José Aparicio Guillén Herrera, divorced, residence card number CED111920. All are of legal age and, with the stated exception, attorneys.

Resultando:

I.- That the plaintiff, based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, in a brief filed on February 18, 2011, formulated a lawsuit whose claim, clarified in the preliminary hearing, is that the judgment 1) establish that the Estado has engaged in omissive conduct and that he has the right to be granted the respective homologation of his position and salary equivalent to that of a judicial expert; 2) that the preceding declaration be retroactive to the time of publication of Decreto Ejecutivo #36361-MINAE [*sic*], published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008; 3) that the Estado be ordered to pay material damages consisting of the amounts foregone from the year 2008 to date, assessed at ¢8,309,884.26, and subjective non-material damages (daño moral subjetivo) due to the effects suffered from the non-payment, the anguish of performing a position and not having it recognized, assessed at ¢5,000,000.00, 4) The defendant be ordered to pay both costs.

II.- That the defendant was duly notified. In a brief filed on September 5, 2011, it responded negatively and raised the defense (excepción) of lack of right; it requests that the lawsuit be dismissed in its entirety, with its costs borne by the party who brought it (folios 46 to 67).

III.- That the preliminary hearing provided for in Article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) was held on October 6, 2011, with the attendance of both parties. At that hearing, the case was declared one of pure law, the attendees presented their conclusions, and it was ordered sent to this Tribunal for judgment.

IV.- That in the substantiation of the procedure, the legal requirements have been observed.

REDACTA EL JUEZ JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ, and;

Considerando:

Primero: That the Tribunal deems the following facts proven for the resolution of the case: ----- 1°) that Mr. Nombre142428 has worked since December 5, 2005, at the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; he currently serves as an assistant in Civil Service position #27517, as a permanent employee, as a Civil Service Professional 1 with a specialty in forestry engineering (ingeniería forestal) (see lawsuit brief, facts #1 and 2°, folios 1 to 23, its affirmative response at folios 46 to 67 and folio 281 of the administrative file issued by MINAET); ----- 2°) that in La Gaceta # 25 of February 5, 2008, Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 was published, whose Article 4°, paragraph 2°, provided: “*The compensation of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Superior Courts of the Judicial Branch, and that of the rest of the personnel must be equated, as applicable, to that of equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other bodies of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held*”. This norm was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010 (lawsuit, fact #5 and its affirmative response), and ----- 3°) that in official communication #826-08 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken so that his position be homologated to the corresponding one in the Judicial Branch (lawsuit, fact #9, and its affirmative response).

Segundo: Purpose of the proceeding and objections raised in the lawsuit and response. That the claim brought, with the clarification provided in the preliminary hearing, is for his position and salary to be homologated to the equivalent of a judicial expert, in application of Article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007; as material damages (daño material) he claims the money he has foregone due to the non-homologation of his position and salary, and subjective non-material damages (daño moral subjetivo) for the anguish generated by the alleged omission. He invokes the constitutional principle of equality in salary matters. The Procuraduría General de la República in its written response stated that the Decreto overstepped its bounds and that the Law creating the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo #7554 neither authorizes the homologation sought nor authorizes the Estado to recognize any right; in its oral conclusions it stated that regarding the equating of salaries from one Branch of the Republic to another, a law must mediate, according to the ruling of the Sala Constitucional #550-91, since each Branch has autonomy to set salaries.

Tercero: That the very extensive litany of facts set forth in the lawsuit, which are strictly a reproduction of what occurred in the administrative venue, revolve around an equating of position and salary agreed upon by way of regulation. At its core, it seeks to compel the Estado to fulfill the obligation resulting from that normative provision, which would ultimately generate an expectant right and an important labor advantage. First of all, it should be clarified that Article 4, paragraph 2° of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, whose application is being demanded, was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. So when the lawsuit was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. Nevertheless, the Tribunal will address the examination posed, due to the effects it may have produced while it was in force between February 5, 2008, and June 30, 2010.

Cuarto: On the merits of the case. That by express provision of Article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], according to the reform introduced by Law #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges “may not”: 1) apply laws or other norms or acts of any nature that are contrary to the Political Constitution or to international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any other norm of higher rank. Before resolving the matter raised, judges must ask themselves whether the norm applicable to the case conforms to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not mere *administrators* of justice or passive subjects in service of the legislator limited to *applying* the norm issued by parliament or the Executive Branch. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and valid *law*, and must consult the Sala Constitucional when they have founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, conforming interpretation, and immediate and direct efficacy of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence (Articles 10 and 154 of the Political Constitution –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, the latter reformed by Ley #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and rulings #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036 and #3039 of 1996). The Sala Constitucional, in the well-known ruling #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated:

“… Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only having been promulgated by competent bodies and due procedures, but also passing substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is therefore made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adaptation to the Constitution in general, and in particular, to the rights and freedoms recognized or presupposed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights limitations or burdens other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. In summary, the concept of due process, from the Magna Carta onwards, but very especially in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, has developed in the three broad senses described: a) that of legal, adjective, or formal due process, understood as reservation of law and conformity with it in procedural matters; b) that of constitutional due process or due process as such, as a fair judicial procedure, still adjective or formal -procedural-; and c) that of substantive due process or principle of reasonableness, understood as the concordance of all laws and norms of any category or content and of the acts of public authorities with the norms, principles, and values of the Law of the Constitution.” (Considerando I, subsection c).

The foregoing confirms that active, critical role of *guardian* that judges and courts must have in a Democratic State of Law with respect to norms vis-à-vis the Political Constitution, as an operation prior to their practical application, in the incessant search for just decisions and in the guarantee of strict legality or substantial legality of the legal order.

**Fifth**: That by provision of Article 191 CP, the relations between the State and public servants are regulated by means of a norm called *civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil)*. This statute was enacted by Law #1581 of 30 May 1953; in its Chapter X, concerning the salary regime, Article 48, subsection b), it indicates that the salaries of servants of the Executive Branch shall be determined by a *Salary Law (Ley de Salarios)* that will fix the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Public Administration Salary Law, #2166 of 09 October 1957, was enacted, which *constitutes the official compensation system* for all classes of positions classified in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (Article 1). From these normative antecedents, related to Articles 57 and 180 CP and 19 of the General Public Administration Law [LGAP], it follows that the determination of the salary of a public servant is a matter reserved to formal law. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which public sector salaries are to be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Executive Branch. Not even by Budget Law can those items be established. It is, on the one hand, a matter of the generation or creation of periodic obligations chargeable to the State, and not simply of paying or executing a disbursement authorized in a budget line item. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in judgment #552-91 of 18:50 hours of 15 March, stated: “*VI.- In the same sense, that reservation of law implies that of ordinary law, not that of the budget, since the latter does not have as its object to create obligations of the State but only to authorize the expenditure of public funds, establishing a (maximum) limit, so that the Public Administration (that of the Executive Branch and that of the other branches or deconcentrated organs, as applicable) is not obligated but only authorized to pay according to the budget items. Moreover, creating State obligations is a function of ordinary legislation, and recognizing them is a function of the Administration, within its budgetary limits; the budget is neither one nor the other*.” On the other hand, said determination is embedded within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a periodically fixed minimum salary capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to law, by reason of constituting a *guarantee (garantía)* for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the vagaries of politics or other movements or interests of transient power-holding groups. In this sense and in the same judgment the Chamber stated: “*VII.- … But remunerating the provision of a service to the State, whatever its rank or nature, as well as granting aids or facilities for its performance, within the limits of proportionality and reasonableness implicit in any democratic constitutional order, does not constitute a privilege, but on the contrary, a fundamental principle of sound administration, also intimately linked to the democratic state, because it is obvious that promoting or even favoring the provision of those services gratuitously or by symbolic or meager remuneration would amount to nothing less than limiting access to public office only to those persons in a position to perform them by enjoying a privileged situation of fortune, when not for lacking the scruples necessary not to use them incorrectly*.” **Sixth**: That the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), #7554 of 4 October 1995, in its Chapter XXI, Articles 103 to 112, created the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, and regulated its competencies, composition, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but provided nothing regarding the salary compensation of its members, of its personnel. The cited Article 4, 2nd paragraph of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, before its derogation, provided: “*The compensation of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Superior Courts of the Judicial Branch, that of the rest of the personnel must be equated, according to the case, to that of equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other organs of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are performed*.” A compensation mechanism is provided for the members of the Tribunal and for the rest of the personnel. But this norm, just as the State alleges, in attempting to fill a legal vacuum by equating the salaries of one category of public servants to those of other equivalent positions where equal or similar positions are performed, exceeded its bounds and invaded the sphere reserved to the ordinary legislator, who is the only one competent to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This was how it was done in the case, for example, upon creating the Administrative Tribunals of Transport and Customs, according to Laws #7969 of 22 December 1999, Article 17, and #7557, Article 207, in that order. Of course, we are not dealing with an act of periodic *fixing (fijación)* or arithmetic updating of pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, monetary depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, with the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing upon the State greater financial obligations than those legally and ordinarily corresponding. And although it may be understood that what was desired by the Decreto Ejecutivo was the application of the principle of equal salary for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the means chosen is not the appropriate route for the equalization undertaken, being outside the applicable legal rules and the official compensation system for all classes of positions assigned to the Civil Service, among which the plaintiff resides.

**Seventh**: **Conclusion, exceptions, and costs**. That in harmony with the foregoing, the claim must be dismissed in all its aspects, being improper, without it being necessary to specifically examine each petitionary aspect to so order. Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 does not have the virtue of supplying normative gaps, generating obligations chargeable to the State, nor of creating the right to salary equalization sought in the specific case; so that the examination of the alleged omission represents no utility. The exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised must be admitted. As concerns costs, the dispute is to be resolved without special condemnation; the conduct of the plaintiff party conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the antecedents surrounding the case (Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code –CPCA). Strictly speaking, his right itself, that is, the implicit claim for *salary justice (justicia salarial)* underlying the claim, is not disputed, if not the substantial legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo serving as its support.

**Por tanto**:

The exception of lack of right is admitted. The claim filed by **Nombre142428** against the **STATE (ESTADO)** is declared without merit in all its aspects. There is no condemnation in personal or procedural costs.

**JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ G.** **Nombre65846** **CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA** **Folder # 11-001050-1027-CA**.

REFERENCIA: Proceso de Puro Derecho. Nombre142428 . contra ESTADO. Carpeta #11-001050-1027-CA.

Nº 10-2012 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSE, Dirección01 , a las diez horas de diecinueve de enero de dos mil doce.

Proceso de CONOCIMIENTO –relativo a función pública- tramitado como de puro derecho establecido por Nombre142428 , casado, ingeniero forestal, cédula número CED111919, vecino de Heredia, San Francisco, contra el ESTADO, representado por la Procuradora señorita Luz Marina Gutiérrez Porras, soltera, vecina de San José. Como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora figuran los licenciados Irene Araya Ortíz, soltera, cédula número CED58675, y José Aparicio Guillén Herrera, divorciado, cédula de residencia número CED111920. Todos son mayores y, con la salvedad dicha, abogados.

Resultando:

I.- Que la parte actora, con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, en escrito presentado el 18 de febrero de 2011, formuló demanda cuya pretensión precisada en la audiencia preliminar, es para que en sentencia se 1) establezca que el Estado ha tenido una conducta omisiva y que tiene derecho a que se le reconozca la respectiva homologación de puesto y salario equivalente a perito judicial; 2) que la declaración anterior sea retroactiva al momento de publicación del Decreto Ejecutivo #36361-MINAE [sic], publicado en La Gaceta #25 de 05 de febrero de 2008; 3) que se condene al Estado al pago del daño material consistente en los montos dejados de percibir desde el año 2008 a la fecha, tasado en ¢8.309.884.26, y al daño moral subjetivo en razón de las afectaciones sufridas por el no pago, angustias de estar desempeñando un cargo y no se le ha reconocido, tasado en ¢5.000.000,00, 4) Se condene a la parte demandada al pago de ambas costas.

II.- Que la parte demandada fue debidamente notificada. En escrito presentado el 05 de septiembre de 2011, contestó negativamente e interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho; solicita declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, con sus costas a cargo de quien la promovió (folios 46 a 67).

III.- Que la audiencia preliminar prevista en el artículo 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), se celebró el 6 de octubre de 2011, con la asistencia de ambas partes. En tal audiencia dispuso declarar el caso como de puro derecho, y los asistentes rindieron conclusiones, y se ordenó enviarlo a este Tribunal para fallo.

IV.- Que en la substanciación del procedimiento se han observado las prescripciones legales.

REDACTA EL JUEZ JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ, y;

Considerando:

Primero: Que el Tribunal tiene por probados los siguientes hechos para resolver el caso: ----- 1°) que el señor Nombre142428 labora desde el 5 de diciembre de 2005 en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; en la actualidad se desempeña como asistente en el puesto del Servicio Civil #27517, en propiedad, como profesional 1 del Servicio Civil con especialidad en ingeniería forestal (ver escrito de demanda, hechos #1 y 2°, folios 1 a 23, su contestación afirmativa de folios 46 a 67 y folio 281 del legajo administrativo emitido por el MINAET); ----- 2°) que en la Gaceta # 25 de 05 de febrero de 2008, se publicó el Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, cuyo artículo 4°, párrafo 2°, disponía: “La retribución de los integrantes de este Tribunal debe ser igual al sueldo de los miembros de los Tribunales Superiores del Poder Judicial, la del resto del personal deberá equipararse, según el caso, a la de los cargos equivalentes del personal de esos Tribunales o de otros órganos del Poder Judicial donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares”. Esta norma fue derogada por el Decreto #36035 de 20 de mayo de 2010, publicado en La Gaceta #126 de 30 de junio de 2010 (demanda, hecho #5 y su contestación afirmativa), y ----- 3°) que en oficio #826-08 TAA de 20 de octubre de 2008, dirigido a la coordinación del Departamento de Recursos Humanos, el actor solicitó realizar las gestiones pertinentes a fin de que se homologara su puesto al correspondiente del Poder Judicial (demanda, hecho #9, y su contestación afirmativa).

Segundo: Objeto del proceso y objeciones planteadas en la demanda y contestación. Que la pretensión deducida, con la aclaración vertida en la audiencia preliminar, es para que se homologue el puesto y salario al equivalente de perito judicial, en aplicación del artículo 4, párrafo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 de 20 de junio de 2007; como daño material reclama el dinero que ha dejado de percibir por la no homologación del puesto y salario, y el daño moral subjetivo por la angustia generada con la omisión acusada. Invoca el principio de igualdad constitucional en materia salarial. La Procuraduría General de la República en su contestación escrita expresó que el Decreto se extralimitó y que la Ley de creación del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo #7554, no autoriza la homologación pretendida, ni autoriza al Estado a reconocer derecho alguno; en sus conclusiones orales manifestó que tratándose de la equiparación de salarios de un Poder de la República a otro, debe mediar una ley, según el voto de Sala Constitucional #550-91, pues cada Poder tiene autonomía para fijar salarios.

Tercero: Que la muy extensa letanía de hechos expuestos en la demanda, que en rigor son reproducción de lo acontecido en sede administrativa, giran en torno a una equiparación de puesto y salario acordada por vía de reglamento. En el fondo se pretende que se obligue al Estado a cumplir la obligación resultante de esa disposición normativa que a la postre generaría un derecho expectante y una ventaja laboral importante. En primer término conviene aclarar que el artículo 4, párrafo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 de 20 de junio de 2007, publicado en La Gaceta #25 de 05 de febrero de 2008, cuya aplicación se demanda, fue derogado por el Decreto #36035 de 20 de mayo de 2010, publicado en La Gaceta #126 de 30 de junio de 2010. De modo que cuando se presentó la demanda el 18 de febrero de 2011, ya había desaparecido del ordenamiento jurídico, siendo virtualmente inaplicable. Sin embargo, el Tribunal abordará el examen planteado, por los efectos que pudo producir mientras estuvo vigente entre el 05 de febrero de 2008 y el 30 de junio de 2010.

Cuarto: Sobre el fondo del caso. Que por expresa disposición del artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], según reforma introducida por ley #7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, los jueces “no podrán”: 1) aplicar leyes ni otras normas o actos de cualquier naturaleza, contrarios a la Constitución Política o al derecho internacional o comunitario vigentes en el país; tampoco podrán interpretarlos ni aplicarlos de manera contraria a los precedentes o la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional; 2) aplicar decretos, reglamentos, acuerdos y otras disposiciones contrarias a cualquier otra norma de rango superior. Antes de resolver la cuestión planteada, los jueces deban preguntarse si la norma aplicable al caso, se ajusta o no al bloque de constitucionalidad y legalidad ordinaria. Es decir, los jueces no son administradores de justicia o sujetos pasivos al servicio del legislador limitados a aplicar la norma emitida por el parlamento o el Poder Ejecutivo. Tienen un rol activo, sujeto a la Constitución y a la ley válida, debiendo consultarle a la Sala Constitucional cuando tuvieren dudas fundadas de su constitucionalidad, todo conforme a los principios de supremacía constitucional, interpretación conforme y eficacia inmediata y directa tanto de los preceptos constitucionales como de los precedentes y jurisprudencia constitucional (artículos 10 y 154 de la Constitución Política –CP, y 13 y 102 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, reformado este último por Ley #9003 de 31 de octubre, publicado en La Gaceta #228 de 28 de noviembre de 2011, y sentencias #1185 de 1995, #3035, #3036 y #3039 de 1996). La Sala Constitucional en la conocida sentencia #1739-92 de 11.45 horas de 1 de julio, expresó:

“… De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad. En resumen, el concepto del debido proceso, a partir de la Carta Magna, pero muy especialmente en la jurisprudencia constitucional de los Estados Unidos, se ha desarrollado en los tres grandes sentidos descritos: a) el del debido proceso legal, adjetivo o formal, entendido como reserva de ley y conformidad con ella en la materia procesal; b) el del debido proceso constitucional o debido proceso a secas, como procedimiento judicial justo, todavía adjetivo o formal -procesal-; y c) el del debido proceso sustantivo o principio de razonabilidad, entendido como la concordancia de todas las leyes y normas de cualquier categoría o contenido y de los actos de autoridades públicas con las normas, principios y valores del Derecho de la Constitución.” (Considerando I, inciso c).

Lo anterior confirma ese rol activo, crítico, de guardián que deben tener los jueces y tribunales en un Estado Democrático de Derecho respecto de las normas frente a la Constitución Política, como operación previa a su aplicación práctica, en la búsqueda incesante de decisiones justas y en la garantía de estricta legalidad o legalidad substancial del orden jurídico.

Quinto: Que por disposición del artículo 191 CP, las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, se regulan por medio de una norma llamada estatuto de servicio civil. Este estatuto se promulgó según Ley #1581 de 30 de mayo de 1953; en su capítulo X, relativo al régimen de sueldos, artículo 48, inciso b), señala que los salarios de los servidores del Poder Ejecutivo serán determinados por una Ley de Salarios que fijará las sumas mínimas, intermedias y máximas correspondientes a cada categoría de empleo. En desarrollo de esta previsión, se promulgó la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, #2166 de 09 de octubre de 1957, la cual constituye el sistema oficial de retribución para todas las clases de puestos clasificados en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (artículo 1°). De estos antecedentes normativos, relacionados con los artículos 57 y 180 CP y 19 de la Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP], se desprende que la determinación del salario de un servidor público, es materia reservada a la ley formal. La creación de las bases y demás parámetros con arreglo a los cuales han de establecerse o determinarse los salarios del sector público, corresponde al legislador ordinario, y no al Poder Ejecutivo. Ni siquiera por Ley de Presupuesto pueden establecerse esos rubros. Se trata por un lado de la generación o creación de obligaciones periódicas a cargo del Estado, y no simplemente de pagar o ejecutar un desembolso autorizado en una partida presupuestaria. La Sala Constitucional, en sentencia #552-91 de 18.50 horas de 15 de marzo, expresó: “VI.- En el mismo sentido, esa reserva de ley implica la de ley ordinaria, no la de presupuesto, pues ésta no tiene por objeto crear obligaciones del Estado sino sólo autorizar el gasto de los fondos públicos, estableciendo un límite (máximo), de modo que la Administración Pública (la del Poder Ejecutivo y la de los demás poderes u órganos desconcentrados, en su caso) no está obligada sino sólo autorizada a pagar conforme a las partidas presupuestarias. Por lo demás, crear obligaciones del Estado en función de la legislación ordinaria, y reconocerlas lo es de la Administración, dentro de sus límites presupuestarios; el presupuesto no es, ni lo uno, ni lo otro.”. Por otro lado, dicha determinación se incardina dentro del régimen jurídico de los derechos fundamentales, como lo es el derecho a recibir un salario mínimo de fijación periódica capaz de generar bienestar y existencia digna, materia igualmente reservada a la ley, en razón de constituir una garantía para la persona trabajadora, que por ende no puede estar sujeta a los vaivenes de la política u otros movimientos o intereses de grupos detentadores transitorios del poder. En este sentido y en la misma sentencia la Sala expresó: “VII.- … Pero es que remunerar la prestación de un servicio al Estado, del rango o naturaleza que éste sea, así como otorgar ayudas o facilidades para su desempeño, dentro de los límites de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad implícitas en todo ordenamiento democrático constitucional, no constituye privilegio, sino por el contrario, un principio fundamental de sana administración, ligado también íntimamente al estado democrático, porque es obvio que propiciar o siquiera favorecer la prestación de esos servicios gratuitamente o mediante una remuneración simbólica o exigua equivaldría nada menos que a limitar el acceso a los cargos públicos únicamente a las personas en disposición de desempeñarlos por gozar de una situación privilegiada de fortuna, cuando no por carecer de los escrúpulos necesarios para no servirse de ellos incorrectamente.”.

Sexto: Que la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, #7554 de 4 de octubre de 1995, en su capítulo XXI, artículos 103 a 112, creó el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, y reguló sus competencias, integración, obligaciones, procedimiento y principios rectores, pero nada dispuso respecto de la retribución salarial de sus miembros, de su personal. El citado artículo 4, párrafo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, antes de su derogación, disponía: “La retribución de los integrantes de este Tribunal debe ser igual al sueldo de los miembros de los Tribunales Superiores del Poder Judicial, la del resto del personal deberá equipararse, según el caso, a la de los cargos equivalentes del personal de esos Tribunales o de otros órganos del Poder Judicial donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares”. Se prevé un mecanismo de retribución para los integrantes del Tribunal y para el resto del personal. Pero esta norma, tal cual lo aduce el Estado, al pretender llenar un vacío legal mediante la equiparación de los salarios de una categoría de servidores públicos, a la de otros cargos equivalentes donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares, se extralimitó e invadió el ámbito reservado al legislador ordinario que es el único competente para regular la materia salarial e imponer obligaciones al Estado. Así se procedió en el caso, por ejemplo al crearse los Tribunales Administrativos de Transporte y Aduanero, según Leyes #7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, artículo 17, y #7557, artículo 207, por su orden. Desde luego que no estamos ante un acto de fijación periódica o de actualización aritmética del salario preestablecido, fundado en razones de costo de vida, inflación, devaluación, depreciación monetaria, antigüedad, etc., si no, como se dijo, frente a la transposición y establecimiento de una armazón o estructura salarial distinta, capaz de generarle ventajas económicas mayores a un grupo de trabajadores públicos e imponerle al Estado obligaciones financieras mayores a las que legal y ordinariamente corresponden. Y aunque pueda entenderse que lo querido por el Decreto Ejecutivo era la aplicación del principio de salario igual a igual trabajo en idénticas condiciones de eficiencia, el medio elegido no es la vía idónea para la igualación emprendida, por estar al margen de las reglas jurídicas aplicables y del sistema oficial de retribución para todas las clases de puestos adscritas al Servicio Civil, entre las que se residencia el actor.

Sétimo: Conclusión, excepciones y costas. Que en armonía con lo anterior, debe desestimarse la demanda en todos sus extremos, por resultar improcedente, sin que para disponerlo así sea preciso examinar específicamente cada extremo petitorio. El Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 no tiene la virtud de suplir vacíos normativos, generando obligaciones a cargo del Estado, ni de crear el derecho a la equiparación salarial pretendido en el caso concreto; de modo que ninguna utilidad representa el examen de la aducida omisión. Debe admitirse la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta. Por lo que concierne a costas, cabe resolver la contienda sin especial condenatoria; la conducta de la parte actora se ajusta a los cánones de buena fe, según los antecedentes que rodean el caso (artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –CPCA). En rigor su derecho en sí, es decir, la implícita pretensión de justicia salarial que subyace en la demanda, no se discute si no la [i] legalidad substancial del Decreto Ejecutivo que le sirve de apoyo.

Por tanto:

Se admite la excepción de falta de derecho. Se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda establecida por Nombre142428 contra el ESTADO. No hay condena en costas personales ni procesales.

JOSE PAULINO HERNANDEZ G.

Nombre65846 CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA Carpeta # 11-001050-1027-CA.