Administrative omission in payment for substitute judge and salary equalization at the Environmental Administrative TribunalOmisión administrativa en pago de suplencia y homologación salarial en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO ACTORA: Nombre78837 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO Nº 06 -2012-VI TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN SEXTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. ANEXO A. Goicoechea, at sixteen hours on the seventeenth of January of two thousand twelve.- Proceso de conocimiento declared of pure law, filed by Nombre78837 , of legal age, married, resident of Dirección8451 , attorney, identity card number CED58713, against the ESTADO, whose representative is the Deputy Procuradora GEORGINA INÉS CHAVES OLARTE, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Moravia, identity card number CED111876.

RESULTANDO:

1.- That by resolution number 468-2011 at nine hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-fifth of March of two thousand eleven (folios 227 to 228 of the judicial file), the Processing Judge ordered: “…The request for a precautionary measure managed by Nombre78837 , against the Estado is rejected...\". It does not appear from the record that resolution number 468-2011, by which it was agreed to deny the precautionary measure requested by the plaintiff, was appealed.

2.- The claims of the plaintiff –which were adjusted during the preliminary hearing held at eight hours thirty-five minutes on the eleventh of October of two thousand eleven–, are that “… 1) It be established in the judgment that the defendant has had an omissive conduct and therefore, it be established that I have the right to be recognized the respective homologation of position and equivalent salary, to be paid the salary bonus (plus salarial) and to have my position of Judge Nombre32983 and its corresponding salary recognized. 2) That the declaration requested in the previous point be retroactive to the publication of Decreto Ejecutivo number 34361-MINAE, published in La Gaceta number 25 of February 5, 2008, and therefore, the corresponding interest be paid up to the moment of its payment. 3) The defendant be ordered to pay, as material damage (daño material), the sum of ¢33,000,000.00 (thirty-three million exact colones), and as loss of earnings (perjuicios), the sum of ¢20,000,000.00 (twenty million exact colones). 4) The defendant be ordered to pay both procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales)…” (folios 20 and 21 of the judicial file and digital recording of the preliminary hearing).

3.- The representative of the ESTADO, answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación), lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), and lack of right (falta de derecho). She requested that the judgment declare the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects and order the plaintiff to pay both costs, as well as interest on them. Finally, she indicated that the Estado was not willing to conciliate and requested that the matter be submitted for direct ruling, without holding hearings, insofar as it is a matter of pure law (folios 215 to 226 of the judicial file).

4.- That by order at ten hours forty-seven minutes on the twenty-fifth of March of two thousand eleven (folio 229 of the judicial file), the Processing Judge resolved: a) To have the lawsuit as answered in time and form; to have the defenses of lack of standing, lack of current interest, and lack of right as filed; as well as, to grant a hearing for counter-evidence to the plaintiff regarding the objections raised; b) To grant a hearing to the plaintiff, so that she could expressly indicate whether or not she agrees with the request made by the Estado, in order to apply the provisions of Article 69 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 229 of the judicial file), which was reiterated by order at eight hours thirty-three minutes on the third of May of two thousand eleven, since it was not clear from the brief dated April 6, whether or not it referred to the provisions of Article 69 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 248 of the judicial file).

5.- That by resolution at ten hours fifty-six minutes on the twenty-fourth of May of two thousand eleven (folio 251 of the judicial file), the Processing Judge -among other aspects- ordered, in application of the provisions of numeral 69 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, to send the proceeding to the Sixth Section of this Tribunal, for whatever may be appropriate.

6.- That by resolution at fifteen hours on the fourteenth of June of two thousand eleven (folios 256 to 261 of the judicial file), the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, resolved \"...The application to this case of the direct ruling proceeding contemplated in Article 69.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, agreed upon in the resolution at 10:56 hours on May 24, 2011, is rejected. This matter is returned to the processing judge, so that the proceeding may continue according to the ordinary procedure...\".

7.- That by order at fourteen hours twenty minutes on the nineteenth of August of two thousand eleven (folio 265 of the judicial file), the Processing Judge summoned the parties to a preliminary hearing to be held at eight hours thirty minutes on the fourteenth of September of two thousand eleven. That by resolution at ten hours two minutes on the thirty-first of August of two thousand eleven (folio 269 of the judicial file), the Processing Judge proceeded to reschedule the preliminary hearing for eight hours thirty minutes on the eleventh of October of two thousand eleven.

8.- That the preliminary hearing was held at eight hours thirty-five minutes on the eleventh of October of two thousand eleven, which was recorded in the corresponding electronic system and is attached to the file in a special binder. That during this hearing, the Processing Judge adjusted the claims raised by the plaintiff, in the terms indicated in resultando one of this judgment; established the disputed and undisputed facts, transcendental for the case and therefore, subject to proof; admitted the entirety of the administrative files, as well as the documents visible from folio 23 to 159 of the judicial file, as documentary evidence. Consequently, as there was no testimonial, confessional, or expert evidence to be taken and in accordance with the provisions of Article 98.2 of the same Code, he declared this matter one of pure law and the parties presented their conclusions orally (see folios 280 to 281 of the judicial file and digital recording of the preliminary hearing).

9.- That this matter was sent to the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, on the thirteenth of December of two thousand eleven (folio 308 verso of the judicial file). In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness (indefensión) and the judgment is rendered within the period established in Articles 98 subsection 2) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to subsection 4) of Article 82 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio of this Jurisdiction.- Judge Álvarez Molina writes, with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Hess Araya; and, C O N S I DE R A N D O:

Io.- ON THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER) PROVIDED AND INCORPORATED INTO THIS PROCEEDING AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HELD. Prior to the list of proven facts, unproven facts, and the substantive analysis of this matter, this Tribunal considers it necessary to issue a ruling on the evidence for better decision offered by the representative of the plaintiff in this proceeding, after the preliminary hearing was held, so that the Deciding Tribunal could determine whether or not the evidentiary means were admissible, which consist of: a) Certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on the tenth of October of two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, which describes other additional functions supposedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Civil Service Job Manual (Manual de Puestos del Servicio Civil), for the post of Civil Service Professional 2, which she holds in said Tribunal (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial file); b) Notarial certification of the first instance judgment number 1228-2011 rendered by the Juzgado de Trabajo of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at ten hours ten minutes on the fourth of August of two thousand eleven (folios 285 to 304 of the judicial file). In that sense, this Tribunal considers that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 110 and 148 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the documentary evidence offered for better decision by the plaintiff company, should not be admitted for the following reasons: 1) The certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on the tenth of October of two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the additional functions supposedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Civil Service Job Manual, for the post of Civil Service Professional 2, which she holds in said Tribunal (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial file). The determination of that point precisely constitutes one of the facts (see folios 1 to 6 of the judicial file) that the plaintiff seeks to prove, in order for the claim to homologate her position to that of Judge 1 or 3 of the Poder Judicial to be upheld. Based on the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that the petitioner was not unable to provide these documents with the filing of the lawsuit, because considering the date on which she filed the request with the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, for the homologation to which she claims to be entitled -which dates from February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial file)-, this is data that the plaintiff should have had prior to July 22, 2010, the moment when the lawsuit was received in this Office (see folio 1 of the judicial file), as they constitute the basis for making the comparative study required to determine whether or not she is entitled to the homologation she seeks; 2) Therefore, the documents provided are also not related to new facts or rectifications made in the hearing itself, as the content of the certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on the tenth of October of two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to circumstances that arose prior to the initiation of the judicial proceeding, so much so, that it is based on the alleged performance of the additional functions indicated therein, that the plaintiff claims to have the right to the salary equalization (equiparación salarial) that paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo 34136-MINAE established, a request that was made in administrative channels since February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial file); 3) Finally, regarding the notarial certification of the first instance judgment number 1228-2011 rendered by the Juzgado de Trabajo of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at ten hours ten minutes on the fourth of August of two thousand eleven, this Tribunal considers that it does not constitute supplementary evidence, because although it is true that by said judgment a case similar to the one before us here was favorably resolved; it is also true that, in order to resolve this proceeding, said precedent is not binding on this Tribunal, since in principle and with the exception of the provisions of numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the exercise of the jurisdictional function is solely subject to the Constitución Política and the Law (Article 154 of the Constitution). 4) It should be remembered that evidence for better decision cannot remedy the evidentiary deficiency of a party who did not present it at the appropriate procedural moments for such effect. To hold otherwise would place the remaining parties in the proceeding in an imbalance, even more so when they do not fit within the exceptional cases provided for in Article 50 subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In that sense, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment number 794-F-2006 at nine hours thirty-five minutes on the twentieth of October of two thousand six, considered that: \"…it is necessary to indicate that it is not opportune to attempt, through the offering of evidence that should have been provided and taken in the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Giving room to this petition would mean that the parties could rectify their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered at the proper time and did not...\"; 5) Now, regarding the optional admission of evidence for better decision, it is the reiterated criterion of the jurisprudence of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia that the rejection thereof does not produce the defenselessness of the parties. Among other judgments, Voto N° 547-F-2002 at sixteen hours on the twelfth of July of two thousand two issued by the Sala Primera is transcribed in what is relevant, which indicates: “(…) IV.- Multiple precedents of this Chamber, referring to evidence for better decision, have pointed out that this is the judge's evidence, and not the parties'. Consequently, the decision to collect it is optional for the jurisdictional body, and it may be dispensed with without any resolution whatsoever. Ergo, the omission of a pronouncement regarding it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been surpassed, in which the parties must prove the facts constituting their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof, and once that stage has precluded, it will be the exclusive faculty of the judge to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the dispute must be added to the record. Among many others, the following resolutions may be consulted; 59 at 15:20 hours on May 31, 1996, 23 at 14:20 hours on March 4, 1992, 34 at 10:45 hours on May 28, 1993 and 83 at 14:40 hours on December 22, 1993. (…)”. For all the foregoing, this Tribunal rejects the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff after the preliminary hearing was held.

IIo.- PROVEN FACTS: The following facts that are relevant to this proceeding are deemed duly accredited: 1) That the plaintiff has worked since the nineteenth of November of two thousand seven, in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; she works in Civil Service post # 108532 , as a permanent employee, as a Civil Service Professional 2 ( folios 17 and 16 of volume II of the administrative file; 339, 340 and 341 of volume I of the administrative file); 2) That in La Gaceta # 25 of February 5, 2008, Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 was published, whose Article 4°, paragraph 2°, provided: “The remuneration of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Tribunales Superiores of the Poder Judicial, that of the rest of the personnel must be equalized, according to the case, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Tribunals or of other bodies of the Poder Judicial where equal or similar positions are performed”. This rule was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010 ( see the digital version of Decretos 34136 and 36035 on the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); 3) That on the fifth of February of two thousand eight, by official letter number 204 -0 7 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Human Resources Department, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken to homologate her position to the corresponding one in the Poder Judicial ( folio 59 of the judicial file); 4) That on the thirteenth of February of two thousand eight, by official letter number 251-08-TAA, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim to be recognized the 18% salary bonus (plus salarial) for the exercise of the judicial function (folios 61 and 62 of the judicial file); 5) That by resolution number R-DRH-AJ-144-2009 at eight hours five minutes on the thirtieth of March of two thousand eight, the Minister of Ambiente y Energía upheld the administrative claim filed by the plaintiff on February 13, two thousand eight (folio 61 of the judicial file), “…regarding the incentive of the Salary Bonus (Plus Salarial) called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (…) The Human Resources Department is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures so that the recognition is made retroactively from the moment the claim for said percentage was filed…” (folios 5 to 3 of volume III of the administrative file); 6) That by agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental on the eleventh of September of two thousand eight, the plaintiff was designated to occupy the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), from the eleventh of September to the thirty-first of December of two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file); 7) That by official letters 790-08 of September 29; 789-08 of September twenty-nine; 825-08 of October 17 and 891-08-TAA of November 28, all of two thousand eight, the President of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo communicated to the plaintiff the dates on which she would proceed to perform the substitutions of the Proprietary Judge Mario Leiva Vega (folios 342, 338 and 337 of volume I of the administrative file; 88, 95, 97 and 99 of the judicial file); 8) That on the fifth of November of two thousand eight, by official letter number 862-08-TAA addressed to the coordination of the Human Resources Department, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken to recognize the additional duties pay (recargo de funciones) in the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo ( folio 103 of the judicial file); 9) That by official letter number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office (Oficina del Servicio Civil) in the SINAC, it is clear in indicating -in what is relevant- that “…by agreement No. 002-2008, the Acting Minister of the Presidency, on behalf of the President of the Republic and the Ministers who are members of the Consejo Nacional Ambiental, agreed to appoint Mrs. Nombre78837 as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo ...\". It is clear then, that according to the aforementioned article, if the law indicates full-time, the additional duties pay (recargo) cannot be the figure to use in this case. In cases where the additional duties pay is to hold a position excluded from the Civil Service Merit System (Régimen de Méritos), a situation that we are observing in this report, we find no legal basis to apply the previously cited regulations, added to the fact that the Dirección General de Servicio Civil does not have the competence to resolve or authorize procedures on excluded positions...\" (folios 28 and 27 of the salary bonus payment file; 116 and 117 of the judicial file); 10) That by official letter number DRH-AO-017-09 of February third, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Unit (Proceso de Análisis Ocupacional) of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, communicated to the plaintiff that the Office of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil located in the SINAC, \"...referred to us Official Letter Nº OSC-S-070-2009 dated January 29 and received in this office on the 30th of the same month, pointing out to us that the recognition of additional duties pay is not appropriate...\" (folio 29 of the salary bonus payment file) ; 11) That since the month of May of two thousand nine, the plaintiff has received the respective amount for the salary bonus for compensation in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized to her by ruling number R-DRH-144-2009 at eight hours five minutes on the thirtieth of March of two thousand eight (see documents from folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative file ); 12) That by official letter number OSC-S-636-2009 of the seventeenth of August of two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Office of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil located in the SINAC, communicated to the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Unit of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, that in accordance with the criteria expressed in official letters AJ-386-2008 of July 7, two thousand eight and GESTIÓN-SAO-133-2008 of July 25, two thousand eight, as well as resolution number DG-015-2009 at nine hours on the fourteenth of January of two thousand nine, they proceeded to return the request to homologate the Civil Service Professional 2 position held by the plaintiff in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, which was filed under the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 34136 (folios 67, 66, 16, 15, 07 to 01 of the salary bonus payment file; 138 and 137 of the judicial file); 13) That by official letter number STAP-1467-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Autoridad Presupuestaria, communicated to the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, that regarding the request for homologation of positions 108532 and 036051 located in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, \"... the variation of the classification and valuation of these is not within the competencies of the Autoridad Presupuestaria or of this Secretaría Técnica. Therefore, I proceed to return the cited official letter without the respective procedure. On the other hand, you are reminded that by official letter STAP-1609-08 of August 5, 2008, that Ministry was requested to report on the actions that will be taken for the application of the liability regime, for the publication of the Decreto Ejecutivo in question (which contained salary provisions for officials who are within the scope of the Autoridad Presupuestaria), without this Secretaría having known of it beforehand...\" (folio 68 of the salary bonus payment file; 82 to 86 of the judicial file); 14) That by official letters number DRH-AO-112-09 of the nineteenth of August of two thousand nine and RH-AO-131-09 of the twenty-sixth of August of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area (Área de Análisis Ocupacional) of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, communicated to the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in the SINAC, and the Executive Director of the Secretaría Técnica of the Autoridad Presupuestaria, returned the request for homologation of positions made by the plaintiff without the respective approval (folios 76, 73 and 72 of the salary bonus payment file) ; 15) That by official letter number STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Secretaría Técnica of the Autoridad Presupuestaria, communicated to the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, that regarding the recognition of additional duties pay to the Civil Service Professional 2 position held by the plaintiff, as it is \"...assigned to the Civil Service Regime (Régimen de Servicio Civil), therefore, issuing a pronouncement on the query raised is not within the competencies of the Autoridad Presupuestaria, or of this Secretaría Técnica. Therefore, I proceed to return it without the respective procedure...\" (folio 85 of the salary bonus payment file); 16) That by official letter number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of the twenty-second of September of two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry, asked the Chief Administrative Officer (Oficial Mayor) to “…inform her of the status of the Query that the Legal Department was going to make to the Procuraduría General de la República, so that said entity would rule on the legality of the application of the aforementioned bonuses and salary incentives. The foregoing, so as not to harm the labor rights of the managing officials, given that the response to several of the aforementioned procedures depends on said procedure to attend to the queries as legally appropriate…” (folio 146 of the judicial file) ; 17) That by official letter number DRH-AO-165-2009 of the twenty-ninth of September of two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Unit requested from the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Legal) of the Human Resources Department, both of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, that certain aspects related to the request filed by the plaintiff be clarified, so that she could be recognized the payment for additional duties pay in the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, which is excluded from the Civil Service Regime (folio 148 of the judicial file) ; 18) That by official letter DRH-AJ-201-2009 of October 2, two thousand nine, the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to send the respective opinion in question, in order to attend to the plaintiff's request as appropriate (folio 150 of the judicial file) ; 19) That by official letter number DAJ-2109-2009 of the nineteenth of October of two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, that \"...we reiterate the response issued by the Dirección del Servicio Civil in official letter OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, to the effect that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the additional-duties position must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the exclusive case of substitute judges of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and additional duties pay is not applicable, since the appointment of a titular judge or substitute judge is full-time...\" (folio 152 of the judicial file) ; 20) That by procedures filed on the twenty-seventh of October of two thousand nine and the fourth of February of two thousand ten, the plaintiff requested the Chief Administrative Officer and the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, to indicate the status of the proceedings regarding the request she filed for payment of her substitution as a Judge in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (folios 154, 155, 159 of the judicial file).

IIIo.- UNPROVEN FACTS. Of relevance to this proceeding, the following are deemed unproven: a) That the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía has issued a final act aimed at resolving the request filed by the plaintiff on November fifth, two thousand eight, aimed at having her recognized the additional duties pay in the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, to which she was designated by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight. (no proof in the file) ; b) That the plaintiff has been paid the salary differences and other labor items not received, during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, a period in which she was appointed to occupy the full-time position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (no proof to support it); c) That the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía has issued a final act aimed at resolving the request filed by the plaintiff on February fifth, two thousand eight, aimed at having her Civil Service Professional 2 position homologated to the corresponding class of the Poder Judicial, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 34136-MINAE (no proof in the file) .

IVo.- SUBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING. The plaintiff estimates that as stated in the evidence provided, she served full-time as a substitute judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, without having been paid the corresponding salary for the judge function she performed in that Tribunal to date. She considers that if the salary she is entitled to is not paid, an illicit enrichment by the Estado and an economic-labor loss against her would occur. She alleges that in this case, the omissive conduct of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía consists of their not knowing how and who must pay her the salary they owe her and which, in her opinion, she has the right to receive. Regarding the request for homologation of the position she occupies as a Civil Service Professional 2, and therefore, her salary, to the class of assistant attorney 1 of the Poder Judicial, she alleges that the procedure is still pending before the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

It indicates that paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 341236-MINAET, until the day it was repealed, constituted a valid and effective rule that produced legal effects and generated rights, coupled with the fact that to date it has not been declared null or illegal, which is why it considers that, in application of the principle of legality, the Ministry of Environment and Energy is obligated to apply it, since otherwise it would engage in conduct contrary to law. It considers that it should be paid, as material damage, the salary differences derived from the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; the job reclassification (homologación de puesto) and the additional duties allowance (recargo de funciones) that it has processed since 2008 and which have not been resolved by a final act. Finally, it considers that the moral damage caused must be compensated, which consists of the anguish it has suffered due to the challenged omissive conduct, which even forced it to request two loans, one to cover the expenses of its daughter's university education and the other, for the construction of its home. For its part, the representative of the State maintains that with respect to the requests filed by the plaintiff, on October 26, two thousand nine and February 3, two thousand ten, in order to request information on the processing of the claim filed on November 5, two thousand eight - aimed at having the additional duties allowance recognized in the position of substitute judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal -, they constitute a reiteration of said claim, which was resolved by official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine, by the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. That in said document, it was indicated to her that the additional duties allowance for the position she occupies, number 108532, was not appropriate in conformity with official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, issued by the Civil Service Office. It considers that the same situation occurs regarding the claim filed by the plaintiff before the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the reclassification of her position to the class of Assistant Attorney 1 of the Judicial Branch. In that sense, it indicates that the General Directorate of Civil Service refused to approve the reclassification sought based on the reasons set forth in official communication OSC-S-636-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was communicated to the plaintiff via official communication number DRH-AO-112-09 of August 19, two thousand nine. It points out that the request for job reclassification was also sent to the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority; however, the Budgetary Authority rejected said claim through official communication STAP-1467-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was also notified to the plaintiff via official communication number DRH-AO-131-09 of August 26, two thousand nine. Finally, it considers that the compensatory claims of the plaintiff are inappropriate, since it seeks to be paid the salary of Judge 1 of the Judicial Branch, despite the fact that during the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 she was not even appointed as Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, given that the National Environmental Council designated her only for the period between September 11 and December 31, two thousand eight. Regarding moral damages, it indicates that insofar as she has no right to receive the salaries she indicates, the loans she requested were due to her own exclusive actions.

Vo.- REGARDING THE REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF THE SALARY BONUS FOR RISK IN THE EXERCISE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION. Contrary to what the plaintiff states, by resolution number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March 30, two thousand eight (folio 05 to 03 of volume II of the administrative record), the Minister of Environment and Energy accepted the administrative claim filed by the petitioner on February 13, two thousand eight (folio 61 of the judicial record), “…with respect to the incentive of the Salary Bonus called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (…) The Human Resources Department is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures so that the recognition is processed retroactively from the moment of filing the claim for said percentage…”. Now, from the documents visible from folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative record, it is clear that since the month of May two thousand nine, the plaintiff receives the respective amount for the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized to her through pronouncement number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March 30, two thousand eight. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal deems it inappropriate for the plaintiff to allege omissive conduct on the part of the State regarding the request filed for recognition of the indicated salary bonus, not only because her claim was resolved on March 30, two thousand eight, but also because since the month of May two thousand nine, she receives the respective amount for said concept. Now, given that the plaintiff does not allege that periods prior to the month of May two thousand nine are owed for this item, an aspect that, in any case, would be subject to a sentence execution proceeding before this Tribunal (article 176 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code), this collegiate body considers that the omission alleged by the plaintiff does not materialize, given that the right was recognized to her since the year 2008 and its payment became effective from the month of May two thousand nine, and therefore, as a consequence, the claim brought for this purpose is declared without merit.

VIo.- REGARDING THE CLAIM AIMED AT HAVING THE ADDITIONAL DUTIES ALLOWANCE RECOGNIZED AS A SUBSTITUTE JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL. Contrary to what the representative of the State affirms, this Tribunal considers that regarding this matter, an omissive conduct on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Energy has materialized, which affects the right to salary and the principle of equality and non-discrimination, for the reasons set forth below: a) Official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC, is clear in indicating - in what is relevant - that “…by agreement No. 002-2008, the acting Minister of the Presidency, representing the President of the Republic and the Ministers who are members of the National Environmental Council, agree to appoint Mrs. Nombre78837 as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal...". It is therefore clear, that according to the aforementioned article, if the law specifies full time, the figure to be used in this case cannot be an additional duties allowance. In cases where the additional duties allowance is to occupy a position excluded from the Merit System, a situation we are observing in this report, we do not find legal grounds to apply the aforementioned regulations, added to the fact that the General Directorate of Civil Service lacks jurisdiction to resolve or authorize claims regarding excluded positions..." (folios 28 and 27 of the salary bonus payment record; 116 and 117 of the judicial record). Notwithstanding the above, inappropriately, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of MINAE consulted the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority, by official communication number DRH-520-09 of August two thousand nine, whether it was appropriate to recognize the additional duties allowance for the plaintiff in position number 108532 of the Professional Civil Service 2 Class (folio 84 to 79 of the salary bonus payment record), to which, by official communication number STAP-1592-2009 of September 08, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority indicated that "... the cited position is assigned to the Civil Service regime, therefore, issuing an opinion on the consultation is not within the powers of the Budgetary Authority, nor of this Technical Secretariat..." (folio 85 of the salary bonus payment record); b) By reason of the foregoing, it is inappropriate that by official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February three, two thousand nine (folio 29 of the salary bonus payment record), the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of MINAE communicated to the plaintiff that the recognition of the additional duties allowance in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal was not appropriate, not only because the Civil Service resolved that the figure of the additional duties allowance was not applicable, as it was a full-time appointment as substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, protected under article 105 of the Organic Law of the Environment, according to agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September eleven, two thousand eight, by which she was designated from the eleventh to the thirty-first of December, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative record); but also because the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority declined to rule, because the missive sent by the Ministry of Environment and Energy referred to a position attached to the Civil Service and not to the corresponding one, as Substitute Judge of the indicated Tribunal. Consequently, it cannot be validly maintained that official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February three, two thousand nine, definitively resolved the claim filed by the plaintiff regarding the additional duties allowance, given that official communications OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine and STAP-1592-2009 of September 08, two thousand nine, are mere procedural acts in which observations are made to the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the content and scope of the request filed and from which a definitive decision could have been made. c) So much so, that in response to a consultation sent by the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process, via official communication number DRH-AO-165-2009 of September 29, two thousand nine (folio 148 of the judicial record), the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to send the respective opinion in question, in order to attend to the plaintiff's request as appropriate (folio 150 of the judicial record). While it is true, in what is relevant, that by official communication number DAJ-2109-2009 of October nineteen, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, that "...we reiterate the response issued by the Directorate of Civil Service in official communication OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, to the effect that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the position subject to additional duties must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the specific case of the substitute judges of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and the additional duties allowance is not appropriate, since the appointment of a presiding judge or substitute judge is full-time..." (folio 152 of the judicial record); it is also true that it is inappropriate for the Ministry of Environment and Energy not to have definitively resolved the request filed by the plaintiff, because although we are not facing a case of additional duties allowance, the fact is that we are facing a case of a full-time appointment of the plaintiff as a substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (article 105 of the Organic Law of the Environment), in accordance with the provisions of agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September eleven, two thousand eight, and by which she was designated to occupy said position from September eleven to December thirty-one, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative record); a position that the petitioner effectively held during the aforementioned period, as is evident from the documents visible at folios 88, 95, 97, and 99 of the judicial record; 342, 338, and 337 of volume I of the administrative record. d) By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal could not endorse an abusive conduct on the part of the employer and, therefore, an illicit enrichment of the Public Administration to the detriment of the worker's assets, it having been accredited that, based on an institutional need and interest, the employer appointed the petitioner to a position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, in order for her to execute the tasks inherent to a higher-ranking position, paying her a lower salary than the one she should have received according to the position in which she was formally appointed. e) Consequently, this Tribunal considers that the omission in resolving by final act the request filed by the plaintiff to have the additional duties allowance paid as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Political Constitution; 104 and 105 of the Organic Law of the Environment and the principles of human dignity, worker protection, and the intangibility of assets. By reason of the foregoing, and given that the National Environmental Council, by agreement number 002-2008 of September eleven, two thousand eight, designated her to occupy the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal full-time, from September eleven to December thirty-one, two thousand eight, the claim filed by the plaintiff is accepted, and therefore, the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor items not received during the period between September eleven and December thirty-one, two thousand eight, the period in which she was appointed to occupy the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal full-time. Payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is proper, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates of deposit of the National Bank of Costa Rica, depending on the currency involved, as provided in article 1163 of the Civil Code, from September eleven, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, ordered by the National Environmental Council by agreement 002-2008, was in effect), until its effective payment, an amount which must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of article 123 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code.

VIIo.- REGARDING THE REQUEST FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE RECLASSIFICATION OF HER POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 4 OF EXECUTIVE DECREE NUMBER 34136. While it is true that, by official communications number DRH-AO-112-09 of August nineteen, two thousand nine and RH-AO-131-09 of August twenty-sixth of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy communicated to the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC and the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority (folios 76, 73, and 72 of the salary bonus payment record) returned the request for job reclassification filed by the plaintiff without the respective approval; it is also true that the reasons on which the decision not to approve the requested reclassification was based rested on allegations of illegality—both in form and substance—of the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136 (see folios 68 to 66, 16 to 15, 7 to 1 of the salary bonus payment record; 273 to 277 of the judicial record). By reason of the foregoing, it cannot be validly alleged that the Ministry of Environment and Energy resolved by final act the request for job reclassification filed by the plaintiff on February five, two thousand eight (folio 59 of the judicial record), since the resolution thereof was conditioned on determining whether the rule that served as the basis for said claim suffered from defects of illegality or not, which had to be established through the filing of a consultation before the Attorney General's Office or, alternatively, a contentious administrative lawsuit before this jurisdiction, by the Ministry of Environment and Energy. However, from official communication number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of September twenty-second, two thousand nine (folio 146 of the judicial record), the opposite is evident, since the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry requested the Chief Administrative Officer to “…inform her of the status of the Consultation that the Legal Department was going to make to the Attorney General's Office, so that said office would rule on the legality of the application of the cited salary bonuses and incentives. The foregoing, in order not to cause harm to the labor rights of the petitioning officials, since the response to several of the abovementioned claims depends on said procedure to attend to the consultations as legally appropriate…”. Despite the existence of an omissive conduct on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which is contrary to the provisions of article 41 of the Political Constitution, since the request for job reclassification filed by the protected party has not been resolved by final act; the truth is that this Tribunal considers it inappropriate to grant the claim related to recognizing in favor of the plaintiff the job and salary reclassification, based on paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136, for the reasons set forth below: a) Firstly, it should be clarified that Article 4, paragraph 2 of Executive Decree #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 05, 2008, whose application is demanded, was repealed by Decree #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. So that when the lawsuit was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. However, the Tribunal will address the examination raised, due to the effects it could have produced while it was in effect between February 05, 2008, and June 30, 2010. b) By express provision of article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [LOPJ], according to the amendment introduced by Law #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges "shall not": 1) apply laws or other rules or acts of any nature contrary to the Political Constitution or to international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any other higher-ranking norm. Before resolving the question raised, judges must ask themselves whether the rule applicable to the case conforms or not to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not administrators of justice or passive subjects at the service of the legislator limited to applying the rule issued by the parliament or the Executive Branch. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and the valid law, having to consult the Constitutional Chamber when they have founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, consistent interpretation, and immediate and direct effectiveness of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence (articles 10 and 154 of the Political Constitution –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the latter amended by Law #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and judgments #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036, and #3039 of 1996). The Constitutional Chamber, in the well-known judgment #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated: “… Hence, laws, and in general, rules and acts of authority require for their validity not only to have been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as standards of reasonableness. That is, that a rule or act, public or private, is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with its object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and liberties recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights limitations or burdens other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. In summary, the concept of due process, from the Magna Carta, but very especially in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, has developed in the three broad senses described: a) that of legal, adjective, or formal due process, understood as reservation of law and conformity with it in procedural matters; b) that of constitutional due process or due process per se, as a fair judicial procedure, still adjective or formal -procedural-; and c) that of substantive due process or the principle of reasonableness, understood as the concordance of all laws and norms of any category or content and of the acts of public authorities with the norms, principles, and values of the Law of the Constitution.” (Considering I, subsection c). The foregoing confirms that active, critical, guardian role that judges and tribunals must have in a Democratic State of Law regarding norms vis-à-vis the Political Constitution, as a preliminary operation to their practical application, in the incessant search for just decisions and in the guarantee of strict legality or substantial legality of the legal order. c) By provision of article 191 of the Political Constitution, relations between the State and public servants are regulated by a norm called the Civil Service Statute. This statute was promulgated according to Law #1581 of May 30, 1953; in its chapter X, relative to the salary regime, article 48, subsection b), it states that the salaries of the servants of the Executive Branch will be determined by a Salary Law that will set the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Public Administration Salary Law, #2166 of October 09, 1957, was promulgated, which constitutes the official compensation system for all classes of positions classified in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (article 1°). From these normative antecedents, related to articles 57 and 180 CP and 19 of the General Law of Public Administration [LGAP], it is clear that the determination of a public servant's salary is a matter reserved to formal law. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which the salaries of the public sector must be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Executive Branch. Not even through a Budget Law can these items be established. It is, on the one hand, the generation or creation of periodic obligations on the part of the State, and not simply paying or executing an authorized disbursement in a budget item. The Constitutional Chamber, in judgment #552-91 of 6:50 p.m. on March 15, stated: “VI.- In the same sense, that reservation of law implies that of ordinary law, not that of the budget, since the latter's purpose is not to create obligations for the State but only to authorize the spending of public funds, establishing a limit (maximum), so that the Public Administration (that of the Executive Branch and that of the other branches or deconcentrated bodies, as the case may be) is not obligated but only authorized to pay according to the budget items. Moreover, creating State obligations is a function of ordinary legislation, and recognizing them is a function of the Administration, within its budgetary limits; the budget is neither one nor the other.”. On the other hand, said determination falls within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a minimum salary of periodic fixation capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to law, by reason of constituting a guarantee for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the fluctuations of politics or other movements or interests of transient power-holding groups. In this sense, and in the same judgment, the Chamber stated: “VII.- … But remunerating the provision of a service to the State, whatever its rank or nature, as well as granting aid or facilities for its performance, within the limits of proportionality and reasonableness implicit in every democratic constitutional order, does not constitute a privilege, but on the contrary, a fundamental principle of sound administration, also intimately linked to the democratic state, because it is obvious that promoting or even favoring the provision of such services gratuitously or through symbolic or meager remuneration would be equivalent to nothing less than limiting access to public positions solely to persons who are in a position to hold them by enjoying a privileged situation of fortune, if not by lacking the scruples necessary not to use them incorrectly.” d) The Organic Law of the Environment, #7554 of October 4, 1995, in its chapter XXI, articles 103 to 112, created the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, and regulated its competencies, composition, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but provided nothing regarding the salary compensation of its members, of its personnel. The aforementioned article 4, paragraph 2 of Executive Decree #34136, before its repeal, provided: “The compensation of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Superior Tribunals of the Judicial Branch; that of the rest of the personnel must be equated, as the case may be, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Tribunals or of other bodies of the Judicial Branch where equal or similar positions are held”. A compensation mechanism is provided for the members of the Tribunal and for the rest of the personnel. But this rule, as the State argues, by attempting to fill a legal gap by equating the salaries of one category of public servants to those of other equivalent positions where equal or similar positions are held, exceeded its limits and invaded the sphere reserved to the ordinary legislator, who is the only one competent to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This was done in case law, for example, when the Administrative Tribunals of Transport and Customs were created, according to Laws #7969 of December 22, 1999, article 17, and #7557, article 207, respectively. Of course, we are not dealing with an act of periodic fixation or arithmetic updating of a pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, monetary depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, with the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing greater financial obligations on the State than those legally and ordinarily corresponding. And although it may be understood that what was wanted by the Executive Decree was the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the chosen means is not the appropriate avenue for the undertaken equalization, as it is outside the applicable legal rules and the official compensation system for all classes of positions attached to the Civil Service, among which the plaintiff resides. e) In harmony with the foregoing, the lawsuit must be dismissed regarding the petitionary matter aimed at recognizing in favor of the plaintiff the job and salary reclassification, based on paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136. This is because said rule does not have the virtue of supplementing normative gaps, generating obligations on the part of the State, or creating the right to the salary equalization sought in the specific case; therefore, the examination of the alleged omission serves no purpose.

In light of the foregoing, the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) sought by the petitioner for the failure to standardize her job and salary under the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 is also inadmissible.

VIII.— ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO). This Court concludes that the plaintiff has sufficient active standing to participate in this proceeding pursuant to subsection a) of Article 10 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, as she is the person who petitioned the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía to standardize her job and salary in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316; to be granted the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of jurisdictional functions; and to be paid the additional duty pay (recargo de funciones) as an Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribuna Ambiental Administrativo. Furthermore, the action is correctly brought against the State, as provided in subsection 1) of Article 12 of the cited Code, given that the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía was the author of the conduct subject to this proceeding. Moreover, the interest remains current, insofar as the challenged conduct continues to produce effects in the plaintiff’s legal sphere, requiring a jurisdictional decision to resolve it. Finally, this collegiate body finds that the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be rejected solely to the extent that, for all the reasons set forth in recitals V and VII of this judgment, the claims related to the following are declared inadmissible: i) the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of jurisdictional functions; ii) the retroactive recognition of the standardization of the job and salary, requested in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the indemnification for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused as a consequence of not having been granted that right to date. Consequently, and for all the reasons set forth in recital VI of this judgment, the defense of lack of right is rejected on the remaining claims, and the lawsuit filed by Nombre78837 against the State is partially granted, in the following terms, it being understood as denied in all matters not expressly stated: a) It is declared that the omission to resolve by a final act the request made by the plaintiff for payment of the additional duty pay (recargo de funciones) as an Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; and the principles of human dignity, labor protection, and inviolability of patrimony; b) In light of the foregoing, and given that the Consejo Nacional Ambiental, by means of agreement number 002-2008 of September 11, 2008, appointed her to occupy the full-time position of Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo from September 11 to December 31, 2008, the claim brought by the plaintiff is upheld, and therefore, the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected during the period from September 11 to December 31, 2008, the period during which she was appointed to occupy the full-time position of Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. c) The payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is appropriate, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates of deposit of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the currency in question, as provided in Article 1163 of the Código Civil, from September 11, 2008 (the date from which the full-time appointment as Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, established by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, took effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) phase before this same court. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts awarded for the purposes of Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

IX.— ON COSTS. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when, in the opinion of the Court, there were sufficient grounds to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, it is appropriate to resolve the dispute without a special award of costs; the conduct of the plaintiff conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the background surrounding the case (Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Strictly speaking, her underlying right, that is, the implicit claim for salary justice underlying the lawsuit, is not disputed, but rather the substantive legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo that supports it. In addition to the foregoing, it must be considered that there was a reciprocal defeat regarding the claims of the lawsuit.

THEREFORE.

The defenses of lack of standing and lack of current interest raised by the State are rejected. The defense of lack of right is accepted, only with respect to declaring inadmissible the claims related to: i) the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of jurisdictional functions; ii) the retroactive recognition of the standardization of the job and salary requested in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the indemnification for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused as a consequence of not having been granted that right to date. Consequently, the defense of lack of right is rejected on the remaining claims, and the lawsuit filed by Nombre78837 against the State is partially granted, in the following terms: a) It is declared that the omission to resolve by a final act the request made by the plaintiff for payment of the additional duty pay (recargo de funciones) as an Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; and the principles of human dignity, labor protection, and inviolability of patrimony; b) The defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected during the period from September 11 to December 31, 2008, the period during which she was appointed to occupy the full-time position of Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. c) The defendant is ordered to pay legal interest on the indicated principal obligation, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates of deposit of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the currency in question, as provided in Article 1163 of the Código Civil, from September 11, 2008 (the date from which the full-time appointment as Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, established by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, took effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the judgment enforcement (ejecución de sentencia) phase before this same court. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts awarded for the purposes of Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. d) There is no award for personal or procedural costs (costas personales ni procesales).

Marianella Álvarez Molina Cynthia Abarca Gómez Christian Hess Araya PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO ACTORA: Nombre78837 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO That during this hearing, the Procedural Judge adjusted the claims raised by the plaintiff, in the terms indicated in the first result section of this judgment; established the contested and uncontested facts, which are transcendent to the case and therefore subject to proof; admitted all the administrative case files, as well as the documents visible from folio 23 to 159 of the judicial file, as documentary evidence. Consequently, since there was no testimonial, confessional, or expert evidence to be taken, and in accordance with the provisions of article 98.2 of the same Code, declared this matter to be purely of law and the parties presented their conclusions orally (see folios 280 to 281 of the judicial file and digital backup of the preliminary hearing).

9.- That this matter was referred to the Sexta Sección of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven (folio 308 verso of the judicial file). In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness, and the judgment is issued within the period established in articles 98, subsection 2) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to subsection 4) of article 82 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio of this Jurisdiction.- Drafted by Judge Álvarez Molina, with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Hess Araya; and, C O N S I D E R I N G:

I.- REGARDING THE PROOF OFFERED FOR BETTER DECISION-MAKING (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER) PROVIDED AND INCORPORATED INTO THIS PROCEEDING AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HELD. Prior to the list of proven and unproven facts and the substantive analysis of this matter, this Court deems it necessary to issue a ruling on the proof offered for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver) that the representative of the plaintiff in this proceeding offered after the preliminary hearing was held, in order for the Deciding Court to determine in the judgment whether or not it was admissible, evidentiary means consisting of: a) Certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, describing other additional functions supposedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Manual de Puestos of the Civil Service, for the position of Profesional Servicio Civil 2, which she holds in said Court (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial file); b) Notarial certification of first instance judgment number 1228-2011 issued by the Juzgado de Trabajo of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, at ten hours ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand eleven (folios 285 to 304 of the judicial file). In this regard, this Court considers that, in accordance with the provisions of articles 110 and 148 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the documentary evidence offered for better decision-making by the plaintiff company should not be admitted for the following reasons: 1) The certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to the additional functions allegedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Manual de Puestos of the Civil Service, for the position of Profesional Servicio Civil 2, which she holds in said Court (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial file). The determination of this matter precisely constitutes one of the facts (see folios 1 to 6 of the judicial file) that the plaintiff seeks to prove, in order for the claim to homologate her position to that of Judge 1 or 3 of the Poder Judicial to be granted. By reason of the foregoing, this Court considers that the plaintiff was not unable to provide these documents with the filing of the claim, since in view of the date on which she filed the request before the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, for the homologation to which she claims entitlement to proceed –which dates from February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial file)–, this involves data that the plaintiff should have had prior to July 22, 2010, the moment at which the claim was received in this Office (see folio 1 of the judicial file), as they constitute the basis for conducting the comparative study required to determine whether or not she is entitled to the homologation she seeks; 2) Therefore, the documents provided are also not related to new facts or to rectifications made during the hearing itself, given that the content of the certification issued at seven hours thirty minutes on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, refers to circumstances that arose prior to the establishment of the judicial proceeding. So much so, that it is based on the supposed performance of the additional functions indicated therein that the plaintiff asserts she is entitled to have applied the salary equalization (equiparación salarial) established in paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo 34136-MINAE, a request that was raised through administrative channels since February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial file); 3) Finally, regarding the notarial certification of first instance judgment number 1228-2011 issued by the Juzgado de Trabajo of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, at ten hours ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand eleven, this Court considers that it does not constitute complementary evidence, since although it is true that through said judgment a case similar to the one at hand here was favorably resolved; it is also true that, for the purpose of resolving this proceeding, said precedent is not binding on this Court, since in principle and with the exception of the provisions of numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the exercise of the jurisdictional function is solely subject to the Constitución Política and the Law (article 154 of the Constitución Política). 4) It should be remembered that the proof offered for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver) cannot compensate for a party's evidentiary deficiency, when said party did not submit it at the appropriate procedural moments for that purpose. To maintain the contrary would place the remaining parties to the proceeding in an imbalance, even more so when they do not fit the exception assumptions provided for in article 50, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In that sense, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment number 794-F-2006 of nine hours thirty-five minutes on October twentieth, two thousand six, considered that: "...it is necessary to indicate that it is not appropriate to attempt, by offering evidence that should have been provided and taken in the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Giving room to this petition would mean that the parties have the possibility of correcting their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered at the opportune time and did not do so..."; 5) Now then, regarding the discretionary admission of proof offered for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver), it is reiterated criteria in the case law of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia that its rejection does not cause defenselessness to the parties. Among other judgments, Voto N° 547-F-2002 of sixteen hours on July twelfth, two thousand two, issued by the Sala Primera, is transcribed regarding what is of interest, indicating: "(…) IV.- Multiple precedents from this Chamber, referring to proof offered for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver), have indicated that this is evidence of the judge, and not of the parties. Consequently, the decision to gather it is discretionary for the jurisdictional body, and it may dispense with it without need of any resolution. Ergo, the omission of a ruling regarding it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been exceeded, in which the parties must demonstrate the constitutive facts of their right, as the rules on the burden of proof dictate, and once that stage has concluded, it shall be the exclusive faculty of the judge to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation should be added to the case file. Among many others, the following resolutions can be consulted; 59 of 15:20 hours on May 31, 1996, 23 of 14:20 hours on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 hours on May 28, 1993 and 83 of 14:40 hours on December 22, 1993. (…)". Based on all of the foregoing, this Court rejects the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff subsequent to the holding of the preliminary hearing.

II.- PROVEN FACTS: The following facts, which are relevant to this proceeding, are considered duly accredited: 1) That the plaintiff has worked since November nineteenth, two thousand seven, at the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; she holds Civil Service position # 108532, in property status, as Profesional Servicio Civil 2 (folios 17 and 16 of volume II of the administrative file; 339, 340 and 341 of volume I of the administrative file); 2) That in La Gaceta # 25 of February 5, 2008, Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 was published, whose article 4, paragraph 2, stated: "The remuneration of the members of this Court must be equal to the salary of the members of the Tribunales Superiores of the Poder Judicial; that of the remaining staff must be equated, as appropriate, to that of the equivalent positions of the staff of those Courts or of other Poder Judicial bodies where equal or similar positions are performed." This regulation was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010 (see the digital version of Decretos 34136 and 36035 on the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); 3) That on February fifth, two thousand eight, through official communication número 204-07 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken in order to homologate her position to the corresponding one in the Poder Judicial (folio 59 of the judicial file); 4) That on February thirteenth, two thousand eight, through official comunicación número 251-08-TAA, addressed to the Head of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim (reclamo administrativo) so that the salary bonus corresponding to 18% for the exercise of the judicial function be recognized (folios 61 and 62 of the judicial file); 5) That by resolution número R-DRH-AJ-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eight, the Minister of Ambiente y Energía granted the administrative claim (reclamo administrativo) filed by the plaintiff on February 13, two thousand eight (folio 61 of the judicial file), "...with respect to the incentive of the Salary Bonus called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (…) The Department of Human Resources is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures for the purpose of proceeding with the recognition retroactively starting from the moment of presentation of the claim for said percentage…" (folios 5 to 3 of volume III of the administrative file); 6) That by agreement número 002-2008 adopted by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental on September eleventh, two thousand eight, the plaintiff was designated to occupy the position of Substitute Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file); 7) That through official communications 790-08 of September 29; 789-08 of September twenty-ninth; 825-08 of October 17 and 891-08-TAA of November 28, all from two thousand eight, the President of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo informed the plaintiff of the dates on which she would proceed to carry out the substitutions for Proprietary Judge Mario Leiva Vega (folios 342, 338 and 337 of volume I of the administrative file; 88, 95, 97 and 99 of the judicial file); 8) That on November fifth, two thousand eight, through official communication número 862-08-TAA addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested that the pertinent steps be taken so that the function overload (recargo de funciones) in the position of Substitute Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo be recognized (folio 103 of the judicial file); 9) That through official communication número OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in the SINAC, it is clear in indicating –regarding what is of interest– that "...through agreement No. 002-2008, the Acting Minister of the Presidency, representing the President of the Republic and the Minister members of the Consejo Nacional Ambiental, agree to appoint Ms. Nombre78837 as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo...". So it is clear, that according to the aforementioned article, if the law stipulates full time, the figure to be used in this case cannot be function overload (recargo). In cases where function overload (recargo) is for occupying a position excluded from the Régimen de Méritos, a situation we are observing in this report, we find no legal basis to apply the previously cited regulations, coupled with the fact that the Dirección General de Servicio Civil does not have the competence to resolve or authorize proceedings regarding excluded positions..." (folios 28 and 27 of the salary bonus payment file; 116 and 117 of the judicial file); 10) That through official communication número DRH-AO-017-09 of February third, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía informed the plaintiff that the Office of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil located in the SINAC "...sends Official Communication No. OSC-S-070-2009 dated January 29 and received in this office on the 30th of the same month, pointing out to us that the recognition of function overload (recargo de funciones) is not appropriate..." (folio 29 of the salary bonus payment file); 11) That since May of two thousand nine, the plaintiff has received the respective amount for the salary bonus for remuneration in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized to her through ruling número R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eight (see documents from folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative file); 12) That through official communication número OSC-S-636-2009 of August seventeenth, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Office of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil located in the SINAC informed the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía that, in accordance with the criteria expressed in official communications AJ-386-2008 of July 7, two thousand eight and GESTIÓN-SAO-133-2008 of July 25, two thousand eight, as well as resolution número DG-015-2009 of nine hours on January fourteenth, two thousand nine, they were returning the request to homologate the position of Profesional Servicio Civil 2 held by the plaintiff in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, which was filed under the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 (folios 67, 66, 16, 15, 07 to 01 of the salary bonus payment file; 138 and 137 of the judicial file); 13) That through official communication número STAP-1467-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Autoridad Presupuestaria informed the Coordinator of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía that, regarding the request for homologation of positions 108532 and 036051 located in the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, "...the change to the classification and valuation of these is not within the competencies of the Autoridad Presupuestaria nor of this Secretaría Técnica. Therefore, I proceed to return the cited official communication without the respective processing." On the other hand, it is reminded that by official communication STAP-1609-08 of August 5, 2008, that Ministry was requested to report on the actions to be taken for the application of the liability regime, due to the publication of the Executive Decree in question (which contained provisions of a salary nature for officials who are within the scope of the Budgetary Authority), without this Secretariat having known of it beforehand..." (folio 68 of the salary supplement payment file; 82 to 86 of the judicial file); 14) That by official communications number DRH-AO-112-09 of August nineteenth, two thousand nine, and RH-AO-131-09 of August twenty-sixth of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy informed the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC and the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority returned the request for position homologation (homologación de puestos) filed by the plaintiff without the respective approval (folios 76, 73, and 72 of the salary supplement payment file); 15) That by official communication number STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority informed the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that, regarding the recognition of additional duties (recargo de funciones) for the position of Civil Service Professional 2 held by the plaintiff, since it is "...assigned to the Civil Service regime, therefore, ruling on the consultation raised is not within the competencies of the Budgetary Authority, nor of this Technical Secretariat. Therefore, I proceed to return it without the respective processing..." (folio 85 of the salary supplement payment file); 16) That by official communication number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of September twenty-second, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry requested the Senior Administrative Officer (Oficial Mayor) to "...report on the status of the Consultation that the Legal Department was to make to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), so that said office would rule on the legality of the application of the cited salary supplements and incentives. The foregoing, in order not to cause harm to the labor rights of the petitioning officials, given that the response to several of the above-cited petitions depends on said procedure, to address the consultations as legally corresponds..." (folio 146 of the judicial file); 17) That by official communication number DRH-AO-165-2009 of September 29, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process requested the Legal Advisory Office of the Human Resources Department, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, to clarify certain points related to the request filed by the plaintiff, in order for her to be recognized for payment of additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, which is excluded from the Civil Service Regime (folio 148 of the judicial file); 18) That by official communication DRH-AJ-201-2009 of October 2, two thousand nine, the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to forward the respective opinion in question, in order to address the plaintiff's request as appropriate (folio 150 of the judicial file); 19) That by official communication number DAJ-2109-2009 of October nineteenth, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, that "...we reiterate the response issued by the Directorate of Civil Service in official communication OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, to the effect that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the position subject to additional duties must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the exclusive case of substitute judges of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and the additional duties is not applicable, since the appointment of a presiding judge or substitute judge is full-time..." (folio 152 of the judicial file); 20) That by petitions filed on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, and February fourth, two thousand ten, the plaintiff requested the Senior Administrative Officer and the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy to indicate the status of the procedures regarding the request she filed for payment of her substitution as Judge in the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (folios 154, 155, 159 of the judicial file).

**III.- FACTS NOT PROVEN**. Of relevance to this proceeding, the following are considered not proven: **a)** That the Ministry of Environment and Energy issued a final act (acto final) aimed at resolving the request filed by the plaintiff on November fifth, two thousand eight, seeking recognition of the additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, to which she was appointed by the National Environmental Council (Consejo Nacional Ambiental) from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight. *(there is no evidence in the file)*; **b)** That the plaintiff was paid the salary differences and other labor items not received, during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, the period in which she was appointed to occupy the full-time position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal *(there is no evidence to prove it)*; **c)** That the Ministry of Environment and Energy issued a final act aimed at resolving the request filed by the plaintiff on February fifth, two thousand eight, seeking the homologation of her position of Civil Service Professional 2 to the corresponding class of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136-MINAE *(there is no evidence in the file)*.

**IV.- PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING.** The **plaintiff** argues that, as stated in the evidence provided, she worked full-time as a substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, without having been paid to date the corresponding salary for the judicial function she performed in that Tribunal. She considers that failure to pay the salary she is owed would result in the State's unlawful enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito) and economic labor harm to her. She alleges that in this case, the Ministry of Environment and Energy's omission consists of not knowing how and who must pay her the salary owed, which in her opinion she has a right to receive. Regarding the request for homologation of the position she holds as Civil Service Professional 2 and, consequently, her salary, to the class of Assistant Attorney 1 of the Judicial Branch, she alleges that the procedure is still pending before the Ministry of Environment and Energy. She indicates that paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 341236-MINAET, until the day it was repealed, constituted a valid and effective norm that produced legal effects and generated rights, coupled with the fact that to date it has not been declared null or illegal, which is why she considers that, in application of the principle of legality, the Ministry of Environment and Energy is obliged to apply it, since otherwise it would engage in conduct contrary to law. She considers that she must be paid, as material damages (daño material), the salary differences derived from the salary supplement for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; the position homologation; and the additional duties that she requested since 2008 and that have not been resolved by a final act. Finally, she considers that she must be compensated for the moral damages (daño moral) caused, which consists of the anguish she has suffered due to the challenged omissions, which even forced her to request two loans, one to cover the expenses of her daughter's university education and the other for the construction of her home. For its part, the **representative of the State** argues that regarding the petitions filed by the plaintiff on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, and February third, two thousand ten, in order to request information on the processing of the petition filed on November fifth, two thousand eight—seeking recognition of additional duties in the position of substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal—they constitute a reiteration of said petition, which was resolved by official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine, by the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. It states that in said document, she was informed that the additional duties for the position she holds, number 108532, was not applicable in accordance with official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, issued by the Civil Service Office (Oficina del Servicio Civil). It considers that the same situation arises regarding the petition filed by the plaintiff before the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the homologation of her position to the class of Assistant Attorney 1 of the Judicial Branch. In that sense, it indicates that the General Directorate of Civil Service refused to approve the intended homologation based on the reasons stated in official communication OSC-S-636-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was communicated to the plaintiff through official communication number DRH-AO-112-09 of August 19, two thousand nine. It notes that the position homologation request was also sent to the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority; however, the Budgetary Authority rejected said petition through official communication STAP-1467-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was also notified to the plaintiff through official communication number DRH-AO-131-09 of August 26, two thousand nine. Finally, it considers that the plaintiff's compensation claims are inadmissible, since she seeks to be paid the salary of Judge 1 of the Judicial Branch, despite the fact that during the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 she was not even appointed as Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, given that the National Environmental Council appointed her only for the period from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight. Regarding moral damages, it indicates that as long as she is not entitled to receive the salaries indicated, the loans she requested were due to her own exclusive actions.

**V.- REGARDING THE REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF THE SALARY SUPPLEMENT FOR RISK IN THE EXERCISE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION.** Contrary to what the plaintiff claims, by resolution number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes of March thirtieth, two thousand eight *(folio 05 to 03 of volume II of the administrative file)*, the Minister of Environment and Energy upheld the administrative claim filed by the plaintiff on February 13, two thousand eight *(folio 61 of the judicial file)*, *“…regarding the incentive of the Salary Supplement called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (…) The Human Resources Department is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures so that the recognition is made retroactively from the moment of filing the claim for said percentage…”* Now, from the documents visible at folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative file, it appears that since the month of May two thousand nine, the plaintiff receives the respective amount for the salary supplement for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized to her through pronouncement number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes of March thirtieth, two thousand eight. Given the above, this Tribunal considers inadmissible that the plaintiff alleges omission on the part of the State regarding the request filed to be recognized for the indicated salary supplement, not only because her petition was resolved on March thirtieth, two thousand eight, but also because since the month of May two thousand nine, she receives the respective amount for said concept. Now, given that the plaintiff does not claim that periods prior to the month of May two thousand nine are owed for that item—an aspect that, in any case, would be the subject of a sentence enforcement proceeding before this Tribunal *(article 176 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure)*—this collegiate body considers that the omission alleged by the plaintiff is not established, given that the right was recognized to her since 2008 and its payment became effective from the month of May two thousand nine. Therefore, consequently, the claim filed for this purpose is declared inadmissible.

**VI.- REGARDING THE PETITION SEEKING RECOGNITION OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES AS SUBSTITUTE JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL.** Contrary to what the State representative claims, this Tribunal considers that regarding this point, an omission has been established on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which impacts the right to salary and the principle of equality and non-discrimination, for the reasons set forth below: **a)** Official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC, is clear in indicating—as relevant—that *“…by agreement No. 002-2008, the acting Minister of the Presidency, representing the President of the Republic and the Ministers members of the National Environmental Council, agree to appoint Mrs. Nombre78837 as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal...". So it is clear, that according to the aforementioned article, if the law stipulates full-time, the figure to be used in this case cannot be additional duties (recargo). In cases where the additional duties is to occupy a position excluded from the Merit Regime, a situation we are observing in this report, we find no legal basis to apply the aforementioned regulations, coupled with the fact that the General Directorate of Civil Service lacks competence to resolve or authorize petitions regarding excluded positions..."* (folios 28 and 27 of the salary supplement payment file; 116 and 117 of the judicial file). Notwithstanding the foregoing, improperly, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of MINAE consulted the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority, by official communication number DRH-520-09 of August two thousand nine, whether it was appropriate to recognize the additional duties for the plaintiff in position number 108532 of the Civil Service Professional 2 Class *(folio 84 to 79 of the salary supplement payment file)*, in response to which, by official communication number STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority indicated that *"... the cited position is assigned to the Civil Service regime, therefore, ruling on the consultation is not within the competencies of the Budgetary Authority, nor of this Technical Secretariat..." (folio 85 of the salary supplement payment file)*; **b)** Given the above, it is improper that by official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine *(folio 29 of the salary supplement payment file)*, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of MINAE informed the plaintiff that the recognition of additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal was not applicable, not only because the Civil Service resolved that the figure of additional duties was not applicable—since it was a full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, under article 105 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), pursuant to agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September 11, two thousand eight, by which she was appointed from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight *(folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file)*—but also because the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority declined to rule, because in the communication sent by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, reference was made to a position assigned to the Civil Service and not to the corresponding one, as Substitute Judge of the indicated Tribunal. Consequently, it cannot be validly maintained that through official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine, the petition filed by the plaintiff regarding additional duties was definitively resolved, given that official communications OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, and STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, are mere procedural acts (actos de trámite) in which observations are made to the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the content and scope of the request filed, and from which a definitive decision could have been made. **c)** This is so much the case that, upon a consultation sent by the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process, through official communication number DRH-AO-165-2009 of September 29, two thousand nine *(folio 148 of the judicial file)*, the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to forward the respective opinion in question, in order to address the plaintiff's request as appropriate *(folio 150 of the judicial file)*. While it is true, and as relevant, that through official communication number DAJ-2109-2009 of October 19, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, that *"...we reiterate the response issued by the Directorate of Civil Service in official communication OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, to the effect that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the position subject to additional duties must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the exclusive case of substitute judges of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and additional duties is not applicable, since the appointment of a presiding judge or substitute judge is full-time..." (folio 152 of the judicial file)*, it is also true that it is improper for the Ministry of Environment and Energy not to have definitively resolved the request filed by the plaintiff, because although we are not facing a case of additional duties, the fact is that we are facing a case of a full-time appointment of the plaintiff as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal *(article 105 of the Organic Environmental Law)*, in accordance with the provisions of agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September 11, two thousand eight, and by which she was appointed to occupy said position from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight *(folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file)*; a position that the plaintiff effectively held during the aforementioned period, as shown in the documents visible at folios 88, 95, 97, and 99 of the judicial file; 342, 338, and 337 of volume I of the administrative file. **d)** Given the above, this Tribunal cannot condone abusive conduct by the employer and, therefore, the unlawful enrichment of the Public Administration to the detriment of the worker's assets, it having been proven that, based on an institutional need and interest, the employer appointed the plaintiff to a position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, for her to perform the tasks inherent to a position of higher rank, paying her a lower salary than she should have received according to the position to which she was formally appointed. **e)** Consequently, this Tribunal considers that the omission in resolving by final act the request filed by the plaintiff for payment of the additional duties as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Political Constitution; 104 and 105 of the Organic Environmental Law; and the principles of human dignity, protective principle in labor matters, and intangibility of assets. Given the foregoing, and since the National Environmental Council, through agreement number 002-2008 of September 11, two thousand eight, appointed her to occupy the full-time position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight, the claim filed by the plaintiff is upheld, and therefore the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor items not received during the period from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight, the period in which she was appointed to occupy the full-time position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. Payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is appropriate, which will be calculated based on the passive interest rate of six-month certificates of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Nacional de Costa Rica), according to the currency involved, as provided in article 1163 of the Civil Code, from September 11, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, ordered by the National Environmental Council through agreement 002-2008, took effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence enforcement phase before this same court.

Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**VIIo.- REGARDING THE REQUEST MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF SO THAT HER POSITION BE HOMOLOGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 4 OF DECRETO EJECUTIVO NÚMERO 34136.** While it is true that, through official communications number DRH-AO-112-09 of August nineteenth, two thousand nine, and RH-AO-131-09 of August twenty-sixth of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía informed the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office at SINAC and the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority *(folios 76, 73, and 72 of the expediente de pago pluses salariales)* returned the request for homologation of positions (homologación de puestos) filed by the plaintiff without the corresponding approval; it is also true that the reasons supporting the decision not to approve the requested homologation were based on allegations of illegality—both procedural and substantive—of the provisions in paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 *(see folios 68 to 66, 16 to 15, 7 to 1 of the expediente de pago pluses salariales; 273 to 277 of the judicial expediente)*. By reason of the foregoing, it cannot be validly argued that the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía resolved by final act the request for homologation of positions filed by the plaintiff on February fifth, two thousand eight *(folio 59 of the judicial expediente)*, since the resolution thereof was conditional upon determining whether the provision that served as the basis for said action suffered from defects of illegality or not, which had to be established by filing a consultation before the Procuraduría General de la República or, alternatively, by filing a contentious-administrative lawsuit before this jurisdiction, by the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. However, from official communication number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of September twenty-second, two thousand nine *(folio 146 of the judicial expediente)*, the contrary is evident, since the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry requested the Oficial Mayor to *“…informe el estado de la Consulta que el Departamento Legal iba a realizar a la Procuraduría General de la República, a efectos de que fuera dicha dependencia la que se pronunciara sobre la legalidad de la aplicación de los citados pluses e incentivos salariales. Lo anterior, a efectos de no causar perjuicio a los derechos laborales de los funcionarios gestionantes, en virtud que depende de dicha gestión la respuesta a varias de las gestiones supra citadas atender las consultas como en derecho corresponde…”* Despite the existence of an omission by the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, which is contrary to the provisions of article 41 of the Constitución Política, since the request for homologation of positions filed by the protected party has not been resolved by final act; the fact is that this Tribunal considers it improper to grant the claim related to recognizing in favor of the plaintiff the homologation of position and salary, based on paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136, for the reasons set forth below: **a)** Firstly, it is appropriate to clarify that article 4, paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, whose application is demanded, was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. Thus, when the lawsuit was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. However, the Tribunal will address the examination raised, due to the effects it may have produced while it was in force between February 5, 2008, and June 30, 2010. **b)** By express provision of article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], according to the reform introduced by law #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges **“no podrán”:** 1) apply laws or other norms or acts of any nature that are contrary to the Constitución Política or to international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any higher-ranking norm. Before resolving the issue raised, judges must ask themselves whether the norm applicable to the case conforms to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not *administrators* of justice or passive subjects at the service of the legislator limited to *applying* the norm issued by parliament or the Poder Ejecutivo. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and to the *valid* law, and must consult the Sala Constitucional when they have well-founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, conforming interpretation, and immediate and direct effectiveness of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence *(articles 10 and 154 of the Constitución Política –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, the latter reformed by Ley #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and judgments #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036, and #3039 of 1996).* The Sala Constitucional, in the well-known judgment #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated: *“… De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad. En resumen, el concepto del debido proceso, a partir de la Carta Magna, pero muy especialmente en la jurisprudencia constitucional de los Estados Unidos, se ha desarrollado en los tres grandes sentidos descritos: a) el del debido proceso legal, adjetivo o formal, entendido como reserva de ley y conformidad con ella en la materia procesal; b) el del debido proceso constitucional o debido proceso a secas, como procedimiento judicial justo, todavía adjetivo o formal -procesal-; y c) el del debido proceso sustantivo o principio de razonabilidad, entendido como la concordancia de todas las leyes y normas de cualquier categoría o contenido y de los actos de autoridades públicas con las normas, principios y valores del Derecho de la Constitución.”* (Considerando I, subsection c). The foregoing confirms that active, critical role of *guardian* that judges and tribunals must have in a Democratic State of Law regarding norms vis-à-vis the Constitución Política, as a prior operation to their practical application, in the ceaseless search for just decisions and in the guarantee of strict legality or substantial legality of the legal order. **c)** By provision of article 191 of the Constitución Política, the relations between the State and public servants are regulated by means of a norm called *Estatuto de Servicio Civil*. This statute was promulgated by Ley #1581 of May 30, 1953; in its chapter X, concerning the salary regime, article 48, subsection b), it indicates that the salaries of the servants of the Poder Ejecutivo shall be determined by a *Ley de Salarios* that shall fix the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, #2166 of October 9, 1957, was promulgated, which *constitutes the official system of remuneration* for all classes of positions classified in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (article 1). From these normative antecedents, related to articles 57 and 180 of the CP and 19 of the Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP], it follows that the determination of a public servant’s salary is a matter reserved to formal law. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which the salaries of the public sector must be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Poder Ejecutivo. Not even by Ley de Presupuesto can such items be established. It concerns, on the one hand, the generation or creation of periodic obligations chargeable to the State, and not simply paying or executing a disbursement authorized in a budget line item. The Sala Constitucional, in judgment #552-91 of 6:50 p.m. on March 15, stated: “*VI.- En el mismo sentido, esa reserva de ley implica la de ley ordinaria, no la de presupuesto, pues ésta no tiene por objeto crear obligaciones del Estado sino sólo autorizar el gasto de los fondos públicos, estableciendo un límite (máximo), de modo que la Administración Pública (la del Poder Ejecutivo y la de los demás poderes u órganos desconcentrados, en su caso) no está obligada sino sólo autorizada a pagar conforme a las partidas presupuestarias. Por lo demás, crear obligaciones del Estado en función de la legislación ordinaria, y reconocerlas lo es de la Administración, dentro de sus límites presupuestarios; el presupuesto no es, ni lo uno, ni lo otro*.” On the other hand, said determination is embedded within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a periodic minimum salary capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to law, because it constitutes a *guarantee* for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the vagaries of politics or other movements or interests of groups temporarily holding power. In this sense and in the same judgment, the Chamber stated: “*VII.- … Pero es que remunerar la prestación de un servicio al Estado, del rango o naturaleza que éste sea, así como otorgar ayudas o facilidades para su desempeño, dentro de los límites de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad implícitas en todo ordenamiento democrático constitucional, no constituye privilegio, sino por el contrario, un principio fundamental de sana administración, ligado también íntimamente al estado democrático, porque es obvio que propiciar o siquiera favorecer la prestación de esos servicios gratuitamente o mediante una remuneración simbólica o exigua equivaldría nada menos que a limitar el acceso a los cargos públicos únicamente a las personas en disposición de desempeñarlos por gozar de una situación privilegiada de fortuna, cuando no por carecer de los escrúpulos necesarios para no servirse de ellos incorrectamente*.” **d)** The Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, #7554 of October 4, 1995, in its chapter XXI, articles 103 to 112, created the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, and regulated its competencies, composition, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but it provided nothing regarding the salary remuneration of its members or its staff. The cited article 4, paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, before its repeal, provided: “*La retribución de los integrantes de este Tribunal debe ser igual al sueldo de los miembros de los Tribunales Superiores del Poder Judicial, la del resto del personal deberá equipararse, según el caso, a la de los cargos equivalentes del personal de esos Tribunales o de otros órganos del Poder Judicial donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares*.” A remuneration mechanism is provided for the members of the Tribunal and for the rest of the staff. But this norm, as argued by the State, in attempting to fill a legal vacuum by equating the salaries of one category of public servants to those of other equivalent positions where equal or similar posts are held, overstepped its bounds and invaded the domain reserved to the ordinary legislator, who is the only one competent to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This was the procedure in the case, for example, when the Tribunales Administrativos de Transporte and Aduanero were created, according to Leyes #7969 of December 22, 1999, article 17, and #7557, article 207, respectively. Of course, we are not dealing with an act of *periodic fixing* or arithmetic updating of a pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, currency depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, with the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing greater financial obligations on the State than those legally and ordinarily corresponding. And although it may be understood that what was intended by the Decreto Ejecutivo was the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the means chosen is not the suitable route for the equalization undertaken, as it is outside the applicable legal rules and the official system of remuneration for all classes of positions assigned to the Civil Service, among which the plaintiff resides. **e)** In harmony with the foregoing, the lawsuit must be dismissed regarding the claim tending to recognize in favor of the plaintiff the homologation of position and salary, based on paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136. This is because said norm does not have the virtue of filling normative gaps, generating obligations chargeable to the State, nor of creating the right to salary equalization sought in the specific case; therefore, the examination of the alleged omission serves no purpose. By reason of the foregoing, the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) that the protected party seeks for not having had her position and salary homologated in the terms of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 is also improper.

**VIIIo.- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO).** This Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff has sufficient **standing to sue (legitimación activa)** to participate in this process in accordance with article 10, subsection a) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, since she is the person who petitioned the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía to have her position and salary homologated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316; to have the salary bonus (plus salarial) for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function recognized; and to have the extra-duty pay (recargo de funciones) as Substitute Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo paid. Furthermore, **the action is correctly directed against the State,** just as article 12, subsection 1) of the cited Code provides, given that the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía was the author of the conducts that are the object of this process. On the other hand, **the interest remains current,** as long as the contested conducts continue to produce effects in the legal sphere of the plaintiff, who requires a jurisdictional resolution to resolve it. Finally, this collegiate body finds that **the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) must be rejected only** insofar as, for all the reasons set forth in considerandos V and VI of this judgment, the claims related to: ***i)*** the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; ***ii)*** the retroactive recognition of the homologation of the position and salary, requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the compensation for the damages caused as a consequence of not having had that right recognized to date, are declared improper. Consequently, and for all the reasons set forth in considerando VI of this judgment, **the defense of lack of right is rejected in the other aspects,** and the lawsuit filed by Nombre78837 against the State is partially granted, in the following terms, *it being understood as denied in whatever is not expressly indicated*: **a)** It is declared that the omission to resolve by final act the request made by the plaintiff for payment of the extra-duty pay as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; and to the principles of human dignity, protection in labor matters, and intangibility of patrimony; **b)** Based on the foregoing and given that the Consejo Nacional Ambiental, through agreement number 002-2008 of September eleventh, two thousand eight, designated her to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, the claim raised by the plaintiff is upheld, and therefore, the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837 retroactively the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected, during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, a period in which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. **c)** The payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is appropriate, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the currency involved, as provided in article 1163 of the Código Civil, starting from September eleventh, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, ordered by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, took effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**IXo.- ON COSTS (COSTAS).** In accordance with article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's opinion, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence the existence of which the opposing party was unaware. In the present case, the dispute must be resolved without special condemnation; the conduct of the plaintiff conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the antecedents surrounding the case *(article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).* Strictly speaking, her right itself, that is, the implicit claim for *salary justice* underlying the lawsuit, is not disputed, only the substantial legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo that supports it. Added to the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that there was a reciprocal defeat regarding the claims of the lawsuit.

**POR TANTO.** The defenses of lack of standing and lack of current interest filed by the State are rejected. **The defense of lack of right is upheld, only** regarding the declaration that the claims related to: ***i)*** the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; ***ii)*** the retroactive recognition of the homologation of the position and salary requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the compensation for the damages caused as a consequence of not having had that right recognized to date, are improper. Consequently, **the defense of lack of right is rejected in the other aspects, and the lawsuit** filed by Nombre78837 against the State **is partially granted,** in the following terms: **a)** It is declared that the omission to resolve by final act the request made by the plaintiff, so that the extra-duty pay as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo be paid to her, is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; and to the principles of human dignity, protection in labor matters, and intangibility of patrimony; **b)** The defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837 retroactively the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected, during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, a period in which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. **c)** The defendant is ordered to pay legal interest on the indicated principal obligation, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the currency involved, as provided in article 1163 of the Código Civil, starting from September eleventh, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, ordered by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, took effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

• d)There is no award of personal or procedural costs.

**Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Cynthia Abarca Gómez** **Christian Hess Araya** **EXPEDIENTE: 10-002215-1027-CA** **PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO** **ACTORA: Nombre78837** **DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO** Consequently, as there was no testimonial, confessional, or expert evidence left to be taken and pursuant to the provisions of Article 98.2 of the same Code, it declared this matter to be purely a question of law, and the parties presented their closing arguments orally (see folios 280 to 281 of the judicial case file and the digital recording of the preliminary hearing).

9.- That this matter was referred to the Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven (folio 308 verso of the judicial case file). In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities requiring correction or causing defenselessness have been observed, and the judgment is being issued within the time limit established in Article 98, subsection 2) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to subsection 4) of Article 82 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of this Jurisdiction.- Drafted by Judge Álvarez Molina, with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Hess Araya; and, C O N S I D E R I N G:

Io.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION-MAKING (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER) SUBMITTED AND INCORPORATED INTO THIS PROCEEDING AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HELD. Prior to the list of proven facts, unproven facts, and the substantive analysis of this matter, this Tribunal deems it necessary to issue a ruling on the evidence for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver) offered by the representative of the plaintiff in this proceeding, after the preliminary hearing was held, so that in the judgment, the Deciding Tribunal could determine whether or not it was admissible, evidentiary items consisting of: a) Certification issued at seven thirty hours on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), which describes other additional functions allegedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Civil Service Job Manual for the Professional Civil Service 2 position she holds at said Tribunal (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial case file); b) Notarial certification of first instance judgment number 1228-2011 issued by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at ten hours ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand eleven (folios 285 to 304 of the judicial case file). In this regard, this Tribunal considers that, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 110 and 148 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, the documentary evidence offered for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver) by the plaintiff company must not be admitted for the following reasons: 1) The certification issued at seven thirty hours on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), refers to the additional functions allegedly performed by the plaintiff, apart from those established in the Civil Service Job Manual for the Professional Civil Service 2 position she holds at said Tribunal (folios 282 to 284 of the judicial case file). The determination of this point constitutes precisely one of the facts (see folios 1 to 6 of the judicial case file) that the plaintiff seeks to prove, in order for the claim to homologate her position to that of Judge 1 or 3 of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) to be granted. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff was not prevented from providing these documents with the filing of the complaint, because given the date on which she filed the request with the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the homologation to which she claims to be entitled—which dates back to February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial case file)—this is data that the plaintiff should have had prior to July 22, 2010, the date the complaint was received by this Office (see folio 1 of the judicial case file), as it constitutes the basis for the comparative study required to determine whether or not she is entitled to the homologation she seeks; 2) Therefore, the documents provided are also not related to new facts or rectifications made in the hearing itself, given that the content of the certification issued at seven thirty hours on October tenth, two thousand ten, by the Secretary of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), refers to circumstances that occurred prior to the initiation of the judicial proceeding, so much so that it is based on the alleged performance of the additional functions indicated therein that the plaintiff contends she has the right to the salary equalization established in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Executive Decree 34136-MINAE, a request that was filed via administrative channels as of February 5, 2008 (see folio 59 of the judicial case file); 3) Finally, regarding the notarial certification of first instance judgment number 1228-2011 issued by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at ten hours ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand eleven, this Tribunal considers that it does not constitute complementary evidence, since while it is true that said judgment favorably resolved a case similar to the one before us; it is also true that, for the purpose of resolving this proceeding, said precedent is not binding on this Tribunal, as in principle, and with the exception of the provisions of numeral 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the exercise of the jurisdictional function is subject solely to the Political Constitution and the Law (Article 154 of the Constitution). 4) It bears recalling that the evidence for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver) cannot remedy the evidentiary deficiency of a party who failed to present it at the appropriate procedural moments for that purpose. Arguing the contrary would place the remaining parties in the proceeding in an imbalance, even more so when they do not fit within the exceptions provided for in Article 50, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. In that sense, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 794-F-2006 of nine hours thirty-five minutes on October twentieth, two thousand six, considered that: "...it is necessary to indicate that it is not appropriate to attempt, by offering evidence that should have been provided and taken at the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Giving way to this petition would mean that the parties have the possibility to correct their omissions regarding the evidence they could have offered at the time and did not..."; 5) Now, regarding the discretionary admission of the evidence for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver), it is a reiterated criterion of the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that its rejection does not cause the defenselessness of the parties. Among other judgments, the relevant part of Voto N° 547-F-2002 of sixteen hours on July twelfth, two thousand two, issued by the First Chamber, is transcribed, which states: "(…) IV.- Numerous precedents of this Chamber, referring to the evidence for better decision-making (prueba para mejor resolver), have indicated that this is evidence of the judge, and not of the parties. Consequently, the decision to gather it is discretionary for the jurisdictional body, and it can be dispensed with without any need for a resolution. Ergo, the omission of a ruling on this matter, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been surpassed, during which the parties must demonstrate the facts constituting their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof, and once that stage has concluded, it will be the exclusive discretion of the adjudicator to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation should be added to the case file. Among many others, the following resolutions may be consulted; 59 of 3:20 p.m. on May 31, 1996, 23 of 2:20 p.m. on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 a.m. on May 28, 1993, and 83 of 2:40 p.m. on December 22, 1993. (…)". For all the reasons stated, this Tribunal rejects the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff after the conclusion of the preliminary hearing.

IIo.- PROVEN FACTS: The following facts relevant to this proceeding are deemed duly accredited: 1) That the plaintiff has been working since November nineteenth, two thousand seven, at the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo); she holds Civil Service position # 108532, as a permanent employee, as Professional Civil Service 2 (folios 17 and 16 of volume II of the administrative file; 339, 340, and 341 of volume I of the administrative file); 2) That in Gazette # 25 of February 5, 2008, Executive Decree #34136 was published, whose Article 4, paragraph 2, provided: "The remuneration of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Higher Courts of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), and that of the rest of the personnel must be equalized, as the case may be, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Courts or of other bodies of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) where equal or similar positions are held". This norm was repealed by Decree #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in The Gazette #126 of June 30, 2010 (see the digital version of Decrees 34136 and 36035 on the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); 3) That on February fifth, two thousand eight, through official letter number 204-07 TAA of October 20, 2008, addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested the pertinent steps be taken to homologate her position to the corresponding one in the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) (folio 59 of the judicial case file); 4) That on February thirteenth, two thousand eight, through official letter number 251-08-TAA, addressed to the Head of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim for the recognition of the salary bonus corresponding to 18% for the exercise of the judicial function (folios 61 and 62 of the judicial case file); 5) That by resolution number R-DRH-AJ-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eight, the Minister of Environment and Energy granted the administrative claim filed by the plaintiff on February 13, two thousand eight (folio 61 of the judicial case file), "...regarding the incentive of the Salary Bonus called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of an 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (...) The Department of Human Resources is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures so that the recognition is processed retroactively from the moment of presentation of the claim for said percentage..." (folios 5 to 3 of volume III of the administrative file); 6) That by agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September eleventh, two thousand eight, the plaintiff was designated to occupy the position of Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file); 7) That through official letters 790-08 of September 29th; 789-08 of September twenty-ninth; 825-08 of October 17th; and 891-08-TAA of November 28th, all of two thousand eight, the President of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo) informed the plaintiff of the dates on which she would proceed to cover the substitutions for the Proprietary Judge (Juez Propietario) Mario Leiva Vega (folios 342, 338, and 337 of volume I of the administrative file; 88, 95, 97, and 99 of the judicial case file); 8) That on November fifth, two thousand eight, through official letter number 862-08-TAA addressed to the coordination of the Department of Human Resources, the plaintiff requested the pertinent steps be taken to recognize the overload of functions (recargo de funciones) for the position of Alternate Judge (Jueza Suplente) of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo) (folio 103 of the judicial case file); 9) That through official letter number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29th, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC, it is clear in indicating—in what is relevant—that "…through agreement No. 002-2008, the acting Minister of the Presidency, representing the President of the Republic and the Ministers members of the National Environmental Council, agreed to appoint Mrs. Nombre78837 as Alternate Judge (Juez Suplente) of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo)...". Then it is clear, that according to the aforementioned article, if the law stipulates full time, the figure to be used in this case cannot be an overload of functions (recargo). In cases where the overload (recargo) is for occupying a position excluded from the Merit System (Régimen de Méritos), a situation we are observing in this report, we find no legal basis to apply the regulations previously cited, in addition to the fact that the General Directorate of Civil Service has no competence to resolve or authorize proceedings on excluded positions..." (folios 28 and 27 of the salary bonus payment file; 116 and 117 of the judicial case file); 10) That through official letter number DRH-AO-017-09 of February third, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process of the Ministry of Environment and Energy informed the plaintiff that the Office of the General Directorate of Civil Service located in SINAC "...sends us Official Letter No. OSC-S-070-2009 dated January 29th and received in this office on the 30th day of the same month, indicating that the recognition of the overload of functions (recargo de funciones) is not applicable..." (folio 29 of the salary bonus payment file); 11) That as of the month of May, two thousand nine, the plaintiff receives the respective amount for the salary bonus for remuneration in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized to her through pronouncement number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eight (see documents from folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative file); 12) That through official letter number OSC-S-636-2009 of August seventeenth, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Office of the General Directorate of Civil Service located in SINAC informed the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that, in accordance with the criteria set forth in official letters AJ-386-2008 of July 7th, two thousand eight and GESTIÓN-SAO-133-2008 of July 25th, two thousand eight, as well as resolution number DG-015-2009 of nine hours on January fourteenth, two thousand nine, they were proceeding with the return of the request to homologate the Professional Civil Service 2 position held by the plaintiff at the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), which was filed under the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136 (folios 67, 66, 16, 15, 07 to 01 of the salary bonus payment file; 138 and 137 of the judicial case file); 13) That through official letter number STAP-1467-2009 of August 17th, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Budgetary Authority informed the Coordinator of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that, regarding the request for homologation of positions 108532 and 036051 located in the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo), "...the variation of the classification and valuation of these is not within the powers of the Budgetary Authority nor of this Technical Secretariat. Therefore, I proceed to return the cited official letter without the respective processing.

Furthermore, it is recalled that by official communication STAP-1609-08 of August 5, 2008, that Ministry was asked to report on the actions to be taken for the application of the liability regime, due to the publication of the Executive Decree in question (which contained provisions of a salary nature for officials who are within the scope of the Budgetary Authority), without this Secretariat having been aware of it beforehand..." (folio 68 of the salary bonus payment file; 82 to 86 of the judicial file); 14) That by official communications number DRH-AO-112-09 of August nineteenth, two thousand nine, and RH-AO-131-09 of August twenty-sixth of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy informed the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC and the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority returned the request for job classification (homologación de puestos) submitted by the plaintiff without the respective approval (folios 76, 73, and 72 of the salary bonus payment file); 15) That by official communication number STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority informed the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that, regarding the recognition of additional duties pay (recargo de funciones) for the Professional Civil Service 2 position held by the plaintiff, since it is "...assigned to the Civil Service regime, therefore, ruling on the consultation raised is not within the powers of the Budgetary Authority, nor of this Technical Secretariat. Therefore, I proceed to return it without the respective processing..." (folio 85 of the salary bonus payment file); 16) That by official communication number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of September twenty-second, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry requested the Senior Administrative Officer to "…inform the status of the Consultation that the Legal Department was to make to the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, so that said office would rule on the legality of the application of the cited salary bonuses and incentives. The foregoing, in order not to cause harm to the labor rights of the petitioning officials, given that the response to several of the above-cited procedures depends on said consultation being addressed as legally appropriate…" (folio 146 of the judicial file); 17) That by official communication number DRH-AO-165-2009 of September 29, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process requested the Legal Advisory Office of the Human Resources Department, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, to clarify certain points related to the request submitted by the plaintiff, so that she could be recognized the payment for additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, which is excluded from the Civil Service Regime (folio 148 of the judicial file); 18) That by official communication DRH-AJ-201-2009 of October 2, two thousand nine, the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to forward the respective opinion in question, in order to address the plaintiff's request as appropriate (folio 150 of the judicial file); 19) That by official communication number DAJ-2109-2009 of October nineteenth, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, that "...we reiterate the response issued by the Civil Service Directorate in official communication OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, in that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the position under additional duties must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the exclusive case of the substitute judges of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and additional duties is not applicable, since the appointment of a presiding judge or substitute judge is full-time..." (folio 152 of the judicial file); 20) That by filings submitted on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, and February fourth, two thousand ten, the plaintiff requested the Senior Administrative Officer and the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy to indicate the status of the procedures regarding the request she submitted for payment of her substitute service as Judge in the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (folios 154, 155, 159 of the judicial file).

III.- UNPROVEN FACTS. Of relevance to the present proceeding, the following are considered unproven: a) That the Ministry of Environment and Energy issued a final act aimed at resolving the request submitted by the plaintiff on November fifth, two thousand eight, seeking recognition of additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, to which she was appointed by the National Environmental Council from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight. (there is no evidence in the file); b) That the plaintiff has been paid the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, a period during which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (there is no evidence to substantiate it); c) That the Ministry of Environment and Energy issued a final act aimed at resolving the request submitted by the plaintiff on February fifth, two thousand eight, seeking the classification (homologación) of her Professional Civil Service 2 position to the corresponding class of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 34136-MINAE (there is no evidence in the file).

IV.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING. The plaintiff considers that, as evidenced in the proof provided, she served full-time as a substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, without having been paid to date the corresponding salary for the judicial function she performed in said Tribunal. She considers that if the salary she is entitled to is not paid, an illicit enrichment would occur on the part of the State and an economic labor harm to her detriment. She alleges that in this case, the omissive conduct of the Ministry of Environment and Energy consists in that they do not know how and who must pay her the salary owed to her, which in her judgment she has the right to receive. Regarding the request for classification (homologación) of the position she holds as Professional Civil Service 2 and, therefore, of her salary, to the class of assistant attorney 1 of the Judicial Branch, she alleges that the procedure is still pending before the Ministry of Environment and Energy. She indicates that paragraph 2 of article 4 of Executive Decree number 341236-MINAET, until the day it was repealed, constituted a valid and effective norm that produced legal effects and generated rights, in addition to the fact that to date it has not been declared null or illegal, which is why she considers that in application of the principle of legality, the Ministry of Environment and Energy is obliged to apply it, as otherwise it would incur in conduct contrary to law. She considers that she must be paid, as material damage, the salary differences derived from the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; the job classification (homologación de puesto) and the additional duties (recargo de funciones) she petitioned for since 2008 and that have not been resolved by a final act. Finally, she considers that she must be compensated for the moral damage caused, which consists of the anguish she has suffered due to the challenged omissive conduct, which even forced her to apply for two loans, one to cover her daughter's university education expenses and the other for the construction of her home. For its part, the representative of the State maintains that regarding the requests submitted by the plaintiff on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, and February third, two thousand ten, in order to request information on the procedure of the petition filed on November fifth, two thousand eight - aimed at recognition of additional duties in the position of substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal - these constitute a reiteration of said petition, which was resolved through official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine, by the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. That in said document, she was informed that additional duties for the position she holds, number 108532, was not applicable in accordance with official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, issued by the Civil Service Office. It considers that the same situation arises regarding the petition submitted by the plaintiff before the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the classification (homologación) of her position to the Assistant Attorney 1 class of the Judicial Branch. In that sense, it indicates that the General Directorate of Civil Service refused to approve the intended classification based on the reasons set forth in official communication OSC-S-636-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was communicated to the plaintiff through official communication number DRH-AO-112-09 of August 19, two thousand nine. It points out that the request for job classification (homologación de puestos) was also sent to the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority; however, the Budgetary Authority rejected said petition through official communication STAP-1467-2009 of August 17, two thousand nine, which was also notified to the plaintiff through official communication number DRH-AO-131-09 of August 26, two thousand nine. Finally, it considers that the plaintiff's claims for compensation are improper, as she seeks to be paid the salary of Judge 1 of the Judicial Branch, despite the fact that during the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 she was not even appointed as Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, given that the National Environmental Council appointed her only for the period from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight. Regarding moral damages, it indicates that since she is not entitled to receive the salaries she indicates, the loans she applied for were due to her own exclusive actions.

V.- REGARDING THE REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF THE SALARY BONUS FOR RISK IN THE EXERCISE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION. Contrary to what the plaintiff affirms, by resolution number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes of March thirtieth, two thousand eight (folio 05 to 03 of volume II of the administrative file), the Minister of Environment and Energy upheld the administrative claim filed by the plaintiff on February 13, two thousand eight (folio 61 of the judicial file), "…regarding the incentive of the Salary Bonus called Risk in the Exercise of the Judicial Function, of 18% corresponding according to her position and the functions she performs (…) The Human Resources Department is ordered to initiate the corresponding administrative procedures so that the recognition is made retroactively from the moment the claim for said percentage was filed…". Now, from the documents visible on folio 35 to 25 of volume II of the administrative file, it is clear that since the month of May two thousand nine, the plaintiff receives the respective amount for the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, which was recognized through pronouncement number R-DRH-144-2009 of eight hours five minutes of March thirtieth, two thousand eight. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal deems it improper for the plaintiff to allege omissive conduct on the part of the State regarding the request made for recognition of the indicated salary bonus, not only because her petition was resolved as of March thirtieth, two thousand eight, but because since the month of May two thousand nine, she has received the respective amount for said concept. Now, given that the plaintiff does not allege that periods prior to the month of May two thousand nine are owed for this item, an aspect that in any case would be the subject of a sentence execution proceeding before this Tribunal (article 176 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure), this collegiate body considers that the omission alleged by the plaintiff is not established, given that the right was recognized in 2008 and its payment became effective as of the month of May two thousand nine; therefore, consequently, the claim raised to that effect is declared improper.

VI.- REGARDING THE PETITION AIMED AT RECOGNITION OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES (RECARGO DE FUNCIONES) AS SUBSTITUTE JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNAL. Contrary to what the representative of the State affirms, this Tribunal considers that regarding this point, omissive conduct has been established on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which affects the right to salary and the principle of equality and non-discrimination, for the reasons set forth below: a) Official communication number OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, signed by the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office in SINAC, is clear in indicating - as relevant - that "…by agreement No. 002-2008, the Acting Minister of the Presidency, on behalf of the President of the Republic and the Ministers members of the National Environmental Council, agree to appoint Mrs. Nombre78837 as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal...". It is then clear that, according to the aforementioned article, if the law indicates full-time, the figure to be used in this case cannot be an additional duties (recargo). In cases where the additional duties is to occupy a position excluded from the Merit Regime, a situation we are observing in this report, we find no legal basis to apply the previously cited regulations, coupled with the fact that the General Directorate of Civil Service has no jurisdiction to resolve or authorize petitions on excluded positions..." (folios 28 and 27 of the salary bonus payment file; 116 and 117 of the judicial file). Notwithstanding the foregoing, improperly, the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of MINAE consulted the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority, by official communication number DRH-520-09 of August two thousand nine, whether it was appropriate to recognize the plaintiff's additional duties in position number 108532 of the Professional Civil Service 2 Class (folio 84 to 79 of the salary bonus payment file), to which, through official communication number STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority indicated that "... the cited position is assigned to the Civil Service regime, therefore, ruling on the consultation is not within the powers of the Budgetary Authority, nor of this Technical Secretariat..." (folio 85 of the salary bonus payment file); b) By reason of the foregoing, it is improper that by official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine (folio 29 of the salary bonus payment file), the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of MINAE communicated to the plaintiff that the recognition of additional duties in the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal was not applicable, not only because the Civil Service resolved that the concept of additional duties was not applicable, since it involved a full-time appointment as a substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, protected under article 105 of the Organic Environmental Law, in accordance with agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September eleventh, two thousand eight, through which she was appointed from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file); but also because the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority declined to rule, because the missive sent by the Ministry of Environment and Energy referred to a position assigned to the Civil Service and not to the corresponding one, as Substitute Judge of the indicated Tribunal. Consequently, it cannot be validly maintained that through official communication number DRH-AO-017-09 of February 3, two thousand nine, the petition raised by the plaintiff regarding additional duties was definitively resolved, since official communications OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, two thousand nine, and STAP-1592-2009 of September 8, two thousand nine, are mere procedural acts in which observations are made to the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the content and scope of the request raised, and from which a definitive decision could have been made. c) This is so much the case that, upon a consultation sent by the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Process, through official communication number DRH-AO-165-2009 of September 29, two thousand nine (folio 148 of the judicial file), the Legal Advisor of the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Environment and Energy requested the Coordinator of the Legal Department to forward the respective opinion in question, in order to address the plaintiff's request as appropriate (folio 150 of the judicial file). While it is true, as relevant, that through official communication number DAJ-2109-2009 of October nineteenth, two thousand nine, the Coordinator of the Legal Department indicated to the Head of Human Resources, both of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, that "...we reiterate the response issued by the Civil Service Directorate in official communication OSC-S-070-2009 of January 29, 2009, in that Article 22 bis of the regulation to the Civil Service Statute cannot be applied, since the position under additional duties must be under the Civil Service Regime. For the exclusive case of the substitute judges of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, these positions are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and additional duties is not applicable, since the appointment of a presiding judge or substitute judge is full-time..." (folio 152 of the judicial file); it is also true that it is improper for the Ministry of Environment and Energy not to have definitively resolved the request raised by the plaintiff, because although we are not facing a case of additional duties, the fact is that we are facing a case of a full-time appointment of the plaintiff as a substitute judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (article 105 of the Organic Environmental Law), in accordance with the provisions of agreement number 002-2008 adopted by the National Environmental Council on September eleventh, two thousand eight, and through which she was appointed to occupy said position from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight (folio 345 to 343 of volume I of the administrative file); a position that the plaintiff effectively exercised during the aforementioned period, as evident from the documents visible on folios 88, 95, 97, and 99 of the judicial file; 342, 338, and 337 of volume I of the administrative file. d) By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal could not endorse abusive conduct on the part of the employer and, therefore, an illicit enrichment of the Public Administration to the detriment of the worker's assets, given that it has been proven that, based on an institutional need and interest, the employer appointed the plaintiff to a position as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, so that she would perform the tasks specific to a position of higher rank, compensating her with a salary lower than what she should have received according to the position to which she was formally appointed. e) Consequently, this Tribunal considers that the omission to resolve by a final act the request raised by the plaintiff for payment of additional duties as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Political Constitution; 104 and 105 of the Organic Environmental Law, and the principles of human dignity, worker protection in labor matters, and inviolability of assets. By reason of the foregoing, and given that the National Environmental Council, through agreement number 002-2008 of September eleventh, two thousand eight, appointed her to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, the claim raised by the plaintiff is upheld and, therefore, the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor items left uncollected during the period from September eleventh to December thirty-first, two thousand eight, a period in which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal. Payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is appropriate, which will be calculated based on the passive interest rate for six-month certificates from the National Bank of Costa Rica, according to the currency involved, as provided in article 1163 of the Civil Code, from September eleventh, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal, ordered by the National Environmental Council by agreement 002-2008, was in effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal.

Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**VII.- AS TO THE REQUEST MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF SO THAT HER POSITION BE HOMOLOGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 4 OF DECRETO EJECUTIVO NÚMERO 34136.** While it is true that, through official letters number DRH-AO-112-09 of August 19, two thousand nine, and RH-AO-131-09 of August 26 of the same year, the Coordinator of the Occupational Analysis Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy informed the plaintiff that both the Coordinator of the Civil Service Office at SINAC and the Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority *(folios 76, 73, and 72 of the salary bonuses payment file)* returned the position homologation request filed by the plaintiff without the respective approval; it is also true that the reasons on which the decision not to approve the requested homologation was based rested on allegations of illegality – both procedural and substantive – of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 *(see folios 68 to 66, 16 to 15, 7 to 1 of the salary bonuses payment file; 273 to 277 of the judicial file)*. By reason of the foregoing, it cannot be validly argued that the Ministry of Environment and Energy resolved by final act the position homologation request filed by the plaintiff on February 5, two thousand eight *(folio 59 of the judicial file)*, given that the resolution thereof was conditional upon determining whether the norm that served as the basis for said action suffered from defects of illegality, which had to be established by filing an inquiry before the Procuraduría General de la República or, alternatively, a contentious-administrative lawsuit before this jurisdiction, by the Ministry of Environment and Energy. However, from official letter number DRH-AJ-192-2009 of September 22, two thousand nine *(folio 146 of the judicial file)*, the opposite is evident, given that the Coordinator of the Human Resources Department of said Ministry requested the Administrative Officer to *“…inform on the status of the Inquiry that the Legal Department was going to submit to the Procuraduría General de la República, so that it would be that office that ruled on the legality of the application of the cited salary bonuses and incentives. The foregoing, for the purpose of not harming the labor rights of the petitioning officials, given that the response to several of the aforementioned petitions depends on said action to address the inquiries as legally appropriate…”* Notwithstanding the existence of an omissive conduct on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which is contrary to the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitución Política, given that the position homologation request filed by the protected party has not been resolved by final act; the truth is that this Tribunal considers it improper to grant the claim regarding the recognition in favor of the plaintiff of the position and salary homologation, based on paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136, for the reasons set forth below: **a)** Firstly, it should be clarified that Article 4, paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 of June 20, 2007, published in La Gaceta #25 of February 5, 2008, whose application is demanded, was repealed by Decreto #36035 of May 20, 2010, published in La Gaceta #126 of June 30, 2010. Therefore, when the lawsuit was filed on February 18, 2011, it had already disappeared from the legal system, being virtually inapplicable. Nevertheless, the Tribunal will address the examination raised, due to the effects it could have produced while it was in force between February 5, 2008, and June 30, 2010. **b)** By express provision of Article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], according to the reform introduced by Law #7728 of December 15, 1997, judges **“may not”: ** 1) apply laws or other norms or acts of any nature, contrary to the Constitución Política or to the international or community law in force in the country; nor may they interpret or apply them in a manner contrary to the precedents or jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional; 2) apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions contrary to any higher-ranking norm. Before resolving the question raised, judges must ask themselves whether the norm applicable to the case conforms or not to the block of constitutionality and ordinary legality. That is, judges are not *administrators* of justice or passive subjects at the service of the legislator limited to *applying* the norm issued by parliament or the Executive Branch. They have an active role, subject to the Constitution and to the *valid law*, having to consult the Sala Constitucional when they have well-founded doubts about its constitutionality, all in accordance with the principles of constitutional supremacy, conforming interpretation, and immediate and direct efficacy of both constitutional precepts and constitutional precedents and jurisprudence *(Articles 10 and 154 of the Constitución Política –CP, and 13 and 102 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, the latter reformed by Law #9003 of October 31, published in La Gaceta #228 of November 28, 2011, and rulings #1185 of 1995, #3035, #3036, and #3039 of 1996).* The Sala Constitucional, in the well-known ruling #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, stated: *“… Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only to have been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as standards of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and liberties recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. In summary, the concept of due process, from the Magna Carta onward, but very especially in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, has developed in the three major described senses: a) that of legal, adjective, or formal due process, understood as reservation of law and conformity with it in procedural matters; b) that of constitutional due process or due process pure and simple, as a fair judicial procedure, still adjective or formal -procedural-; and c) that of substantive due process or the principle of reasonableness, understood as the concordance of all laws and norms of any category or content and of the acts of public authorities with the norms, principles, and values of the Law of the Constitution.”* (Considerando I, subsection c). The foregoing confirms that active, critical role of *guardian* that judges and tribunals must have in a Democratic State of Law with respect to norms vis-à-vis the Constitución Política, as a prior operation to their practical application, in the incessant search for just decisions and in the guarantee of strict legality or substantial legality of the legal order. **c)** By provision of Article 191 of the Constitución Política, relations between the State and public servants are regulated by a norm called *Estatuto de Servicio Civil*. This statute was promulgated through Law #1581 of May 30, 1953; in its Chapter X, relating to the salary regime, Article 48, subsection b), it indicates that the salaries of Executive Branch servants will be determined by a *Ley de Salarios* that will set the minimum, intermediate, and maximum sums corresponding to each employment category. In development of this provision, the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, #2166 of October 9, 1957, was promulgated, which *constitutes the official compensation system* for all classes of positions classified in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (Article 1). From these normative antecedents, related to Articles 57 and 180 CP and 19 of the Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP], it follows that the determination of the salary of a public servant is a matter reserved to formal law. The creation of the bases and other parameters according to which public sector salaries must be established or determined corresponds to the ordinary legislator, and not to the Executive Branch. Not even by the Ley de Presupuesto can such items be established. It is, on the one hand, the generation or creation of periodic obligations chargeable to the State, and not simply the payment or execution of a disbursement authorized in a budget line item. The Sala Constitucional, in ruling #552-91 of 6:50 p.m. on March 15, stated: “*VI.- In the same vein, that reservation of law implies that of ordinary law, not that of the budget, since the latter does not aim to create State obligations but only to authorize the expenditure of public funds, establishing a (maximum) limit, so that the Public Administration (that of the Executive Branch and that of the other branches or deconcentrated bodies, as applicable) is not obligated but only authorized to pay according to the budget line items. Moreover, creating State obligations is a function of ordinary legislation, and recognizing them is a function of the Administration, within its budgetary limits; the budget is neither the one nor the other*.” On the other hand, such determination is embedded within the legal regime of fundamental rights, such as the right to receive a minimum wage of periodic fixation capable of generating well-being and a dignified existence, a matter equally reserved to law, by reason of constituting a *guarantee* for the working person, which therefore cannot be subject to the vagaries of politics or other movements or interests of transitory power-holding groups. In this sense and in the same ruling, the Chamber stated: “*VII.- … But remunerating the provision of a service to the State, of whatever rank or nature it may be, as well as granting aid or facilities for its performance, within the limits of proportionality and reasonableness implicit in any constitutional democratic order, does not constitute a privilege, but on the contrary, a fundamental principle of sound administration, also intimately linked to the democratic state, because it is obvious that to propitiate or even favor the provision of such services gratuitously or by means of a symbolic or meager remuneration would be equivalent to nothing less than limiting access to public office only to persons in a position to perform them because they enjoy a privileged financial situation, if not because they lack the necessary scruples not to use them improperly*.” **d)** The Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, #7554 of October 4, 1995, in its Chapter XXI, Articles 103 to 112, created the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, and regulated its competencies, composition, obligations, procedure, and guiding principles, but did not provide anything regarding the salary compensation of its members or its personnel. The cited Article 4, paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, before its repeal, provided: “*The compensation of the members of this Tribunal must be equal to the salary of the members of the Tribunales Superiores of the Poder Judicial; that of the rest of the personnel must be equated, according to the case, to that of the equivalent positions of the personnel of those Tribunals or of other Poder Judicial bodies where equal or similar positions are performed*.” It foresees a compensation mechanism for the members of the Tribunal and for the rest of the personnel. But this norm, as argued by the State, by attempting to fill a legal gap by equating the salaries of one category of public servants to those of other equivalent positions where equal or similar positions are performed, exceeded its limits and invaded the sphere reserved to the ordinary legislator, who is the sole entity competent to regulate salary matters and impose obligations on the State. This was how it was done, for example, when the Tribunales Administrativos of Transport and Customs were created, according to Laws #7969 of December 22, 1999, Article 17, and #7557, Article 207, respectively. Of course, we are not facing an act of periodic *fixing* or arithmetic updating of a pre-established salary, based on reasons of cost of living, inflation, devaluation, currency depreciation, seniority, etc., but rather, as stated, the transposition and establishment of a different salary framework or structure, capable of generating greater economic advantages for a group of public workers and imposing on the State greater financial obligations than those legally and ordinarily corresponding. And although it may be understood that what was intended by the Decreto Ejecutivo was the application of the principle of equal salary for equal work under identical conditions of efficiency, the chosen means is not the suitable way for the undertaken equalization, as it is outside the applicable legal rules and the official compensation system for all classes of positions assigned to the Servicio Civil, among which the plaintiff is domiciled. **e)** In harmony with the foregoing, the lawsuit must be dismissed as to the petitionary extreme, aimed at recognizing in favor of the plaintiff the position and salary homologation, based on paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136. This is because said norm does not have the virtue of filling normative gaps, generating obligations chargeable to the State, nor of creating the right to the salary equalization sought in the specific case; so that the examination of the alleged omission represents no utility. By reason of the foregoing, the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) claimed by the protected party for not having her position and salary homologated under the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 is also improper.

**VIII.- ON THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.** This Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff has sufficient **active standing** to participate in this process in accordance with Article 10, subsection a) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, since she is the person who requested before the Ministry of Environment and Energy that her position and salary be homologated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316; that the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function be recognized; and that the additional duties supplement (recargo de funciones) as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo be paid. Furthermore, **the action is correctly directed against the State,** as provided in Article 12, subsection 1) of the cited Code, given that the Ministry of Environment and Energy was the author of the conducts under review in this process. Moreover, **the interest remains current,** insofar as the challenged conducts continue to produce effects within the legal sphere of the plaintiff, who requires a jurisdictional resolution to resolve them. Finally, this collegiate body finds that **the defense of lack of right must be rejected only** as to that, for all the reasons set forth in Considerandos V and VII of this judgment, the claims related to: ***i)*** the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; ***ii)*** the retroactive recognition of the position and salary homologation, requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the compensation for the damages caused as a consequence of not having recognized that right to date, are declared improper. Consequently, and for all the reasons set forth in Considerando VI of this judgment, **the defense of lack of right is rejected as to the remaining extremes,** and the lawsuit filed by Nombre78837 against the State is partially granted, in the following terms, *it being understood as denied in what is not expressly indicated*: **a)** It is declared that the omission to resolve by final act the request made by the plaintiff for the payment of the additional duties supplement (recargo de funciones) as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and to the principles of human dignity, worker protection, and intangibility of patrimony; **b)** By reason of the foregoing, and given that the Consejo Nacional Ambiental, by agreement number 002-2008 of September 11, two thousand eight, appointed her to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, from September 11 to December 31, two thousand eight, the claim raised by the plaintiff is upheld and, therefore, the defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor aspects not received during the period between September 11 and December 31, two thousand eight, the period during which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. **c)** The payment of legal interest on the indicated principal obligation is appropriate, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate of six-month certificates of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the applicable currency, as provided in Article 1163 of the Código Civil, from September 11, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, ordered by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, was in effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**IX.- ON COSTS.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the very fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there has been, in the Tribunal’s judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, it is appropriate to resolve the dispute without special condemnation; the plaintiff’s conduct conforms to the canons of good faith, according to the background surrounding the case *(Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).* Strictly speaking, her right itself, that is, the implicit claim for *salary justice* underlying the lawsuit, is not in dispute, but rather the [*i*] substantial legality of the Decreto Ejecutivo supporting it. In addition to the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that there was a reciprocal defeat regarding the claims of the lawsuit.

**POR TANTO.** The defenses of lack of standing and lack of current interest filed by the State are rejected. **The defense of lack of right is accepted, only** with respect to declaring improper the claims related to: **i)** the alleged omission to resolve the request for recognition and payment of the salary bonus for risk in the exercise of the jurisdictional function; **ii)** the retroactive recognition of the position and salary homologation requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316, as well as the compensation for damages caused as a consequence of not having recognized that right to date. Consequently, **the defense of lack of right is rejected as to the remaining extremes, and the lawsuit** filed by Nombre78837 against the State is partially granted, in the following terms: **a)** It is declared that the omission to resolve by final act the request made by the plaintiff, for the payment of the additional duties supplement (recargo de funciones) as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 33, 41, 56, and 57 of the Constitución Política; 104 and 105 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and to the principles of human dignity, worker protection, and intangibility of patrimony; **b)** The defendant is ordered to pay Nombre78837, retroactively, the salary differences and other labor aspects not received during the period between September 11 and December 31, two thousand eight, the period during which she was appointed to occupy full-time the position of Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. **c)** The defendant is ordered to pay legal interest on the indicated principal obligation, which shall be calculated based on the passive interest rate of six-month certificates of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, according to the applicable currency, as provided in Article 1163 of the Código Civil, from September 11, two thousand eight (the date from which the full-time appointment as Substitute Judge of the Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, ordered by the Consejo Nacional Ambiental through agreement 002-2008, was in effect), until its effective payment, an amount that must be calculated in the sentence execution phase before this same tribunal. Such recognition of interest implies, indirectly, the adjustment of the economic value of the amounts granted for the purposes of Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

• d)There is no award of personal or procedural costs.

**Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Cynthia Abarca Gómez** **Christian Hess Araya** **EXPEDIENTE: 10-002215-1027-CA** **PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO** **ACTORA: Nombre78837** **DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO**

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO ACTORA: Nombre78837 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO Nº 06 -2012-VI TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN SEXTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. ANEXO A. Goicoechea, a las dieciséis horas del diecisiete de enero del dos mil doce.- Proceso de conocimiento declarado de puro derecho, interpuesto por Nombre78837 , mayor, casada, vecina de Dirección8451 , abogada, cédula de identidad número CED58713, contra el ESTADO, cuya representante es la Procuradora Adjunta GEORGINA INÉS CHAVES OLARTE, mayor, casada, abogada, vecina de Moravia, cédula de identidad número CED111876.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Que por resolución número 468-2011 de las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veinticinco de marzo del dos mil once (folios 227 a 228 del expediente judicial), el Juez Tramitador dispuso: “…Se rechaza la solicitud de medida cautelar gestionada por Nombre78837 , contra el Estado...". No se desprende de los autos, que la resolución número 468-2011, mediante la cual, se acordó denegar la medida cautelar solicitada por la demandante, se haya apelado.

2.- Las pretensiones de la parte actora –que se ajustaron durante la audiencia preliminar que se realizó a las ocho horas treinta y cinco minutos del once de octubre del dos mil once-, son para que “… 1) Se establezca en sentencia que el demandado ha tenido una conducta omisiva y por ende, se establezca que tengo derecho a que se me reconozca la respectiva homologación de puesto y salario equivalente, se me pague el plus salarial y se me reconozca mi cargo de Jueza Nombre32983. y su correspondiente salario. 2) Que la declaración que se solicita en el punto anterior sea retroactiva a la publicación del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34361-MINAE, publicado en La Gaceta número 25 del 5 de febrero del 2008, y por ende, se paguen los intereses correspondientes hasta el momento de su pago. 3) Se condene a la demandada por concepto de daño material al pago de ¢3 3 .000.00,00 (treinta y tres millones de colones exactos), y por concepto de perjuicios la suma de ¢ 20.00000,00 (veinte millones de colones exactos). 4) Se condene a la demandada al pago de ambas costa s procesales y personales…” (folios 20 y 21 del expediente judicial y respaldo digital de la audiencia preliminar).

3.- La representante del ESTADO, contestó negativamente la demanda e interpuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación, falta de interés actual y de falta de derecho. Solicitó que en sentencia se declare sin lugar la demanda interpuesta en todos sus extremos y se condene a la parte actora al pago de ambas costas, así como al de los intereses sobre las mismas. Por último, indicó que el Estado no se encontraba anuente a conciliar y solicitó que el asunto se pasara a fallo directo, sin celebración de audiencias, en el tanto se está a n te un asunto de puro derecho (folios 215 a 226 del expediente judicial).

4.- Que por auto de las diez horas cuarenta y siete minutos del veinticinco de marzo del dos mil once (folio 229 del expediente judicial), el Juez Tramitador resolvió: a) Tener por contestada en tiempo y en forma la demanda; por interpuestas las excepciones de falta de legitimación, falta de interés actual y falta de derecho; así como también, conferir audiencia de contraprueba a la parte actora respecto de las oposiciones formuladas; b) Otorgar audiencia a la demandante, para que indicara de manera expresa si está o no de acuerdo con la solicitud planteada por el Estado, a fin de que se aplique lo dispuesto en el artículo 69 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 229 del expediente judicial), lo cual, le fue reiterado por auto de las ocho horas treinta y tres minutos del tres de mayo del dos mil once, toda vez que no quedó claro del escrito con fecha 6 de abril, si se refería o no a lo dispuesto en el artículo 69 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 248 del expediente judicial).

5.- Que por resolución de la diez horas cincuenta y seis minutos del veinticuatro de mayo del dos mil once (folio 251 del expediente judicial), el Juez Tramitador -entre otros aspectos- ordenó en aplicación de lo dispuesto en el numeral 69 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, remitir el proceso a la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal, para lo que correspondiera.

6.- Que por resolución de las quince horas del catorce de junio del dos mil once (folios 256 a 261 del expediente judicial), la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, resolvió "...Se rechaza la aplicación a este caso del trámite de fallo directo contemplado en el artículo 69.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, acordado en resolución de las 10:56 horas del 24 de mayo del 2011. Regrese este asunto al juez tramitador, para que prosiga la sustanciación conforme al trámite común...".

7.- Que por auto de las catorce horas veinte minutos del diecinueve de agosto del dos mil once (folio 265 del expediente judicial), el Juez Tramitador convocó a las partes a audiencia preliminar a realizarse a las ocho horas treinta minutos del catorce de setiembre del dos mil once. Que por resolución de las diez horas dos minutos del treinta y uno de agosto del dos mil once (folio 269 del expediente judicial), el Juez Tramitador procedió a reprogramar la audiencia preliminar, para las ocho horas treinta minutos del once de octubre del dos mil once.

8.- Que la audiencia preliminar se celebró a las ocho horas treinta y cinco minutos del once de octubre del dos mil once, la cual, fue grabada en el sistema electrónico correspondiente y corre agregada al expediente en un legajo especial. Que durante esta audiencia el Juez Tramitador ajustó las pretensiones planteadas por la parte actora, en los términos indicados en el resultado primero de esta sentencia; estableció los hechos controvertidos y no controvertidos, trascendentales para el caso y por ende, objeto de prueba; admitió la totalidad de los expedientes administrativos, así como también, los documentos visibles de folio 23 al 159 del expediente judicial, como prueba documental. En consecuencia, como no había prueba testimonial, confesional, ni pericial por evacuar y conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 98.2 del mismo Código, declaró este asunto de puro derecho y las partes rindieron en forma oral sus conclusiones (ver folios 280 a 281 del expediente judicial y respaldo digital de la audiencia preliminar).

9.- Que este asunto fue remitido a la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, el trece de diciembre del dos mil once (folio 308 vuelto del expediente judicial). En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas o que generen indefensión y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido en los artículos 98 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en relación con el inciso 4) del artículo 82 del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de esta Jurisdicción.- Redacta la jueza Álvarez Molina, con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Abarca Gómez y el juez Hess Araya; y, C O N S I DE R A N D O:

Io.- SOBRE LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER APORTADA E INCORPORADA EN ESTE PROCESO DESPUÉS DE REALIZADA LA AUDIENCIA PRELIMINAR. Previo al elenco de hechos probados, no probados y el análisis de fondo de este asunto, este Tribunal considera necesario realizar un pronunciamiento sobre la prueba para mejor resolver que ofreció el representante de la parte actora en este proceso, después de realizada la audiencia preliminar, a fin de que en sentencia el Tribunal Decisor determinara si resultaba o no admisible, medios probatorios que consisten en: a) Certificación emitida a las siete horas treinta minutos del diez de octubre del dos mil diez, por el Secretario del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, en que se describen otras funciones adicionales que supuestamente realiza la demandante, aparte de las establecidas en el Manual de Puestos del Servicio Civil, para el puesto de Profesional Servicio Civil 2, que ocupa en dicho Tribunal (folios 282 a 284 del expediente judicial); b) Certificación notarial de la sentencia de primera instancia número 1228-2011 dictada por el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a las diez horas diez minutos del cuatro de agosto del dos mil once (folios 285 a 304 del expediente judicial). En ese sentido, este Tribunal considera que de acuerdo a lo establecido en los artículos 110 y 148 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, la prueba documental ofrecida para mejor resolver por la empresa demandante, no debe admitirse por las siguientes razones: 1) La certificación emitida a las siete horas treinta minutos del diez de octubre del dos mil diez, por el Secretario del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, hace referencia a las funciones adicionales que presuntamente realiza la demandante, aparte de las establecidas en el Manual de Puestos del Servicio Civil, para el puesto de Profesional Servicio Civil 2, que ocupa en dicho Tribunal (folios 282 a 284 del expediente judicial). La determinación de ese extremo, precisamente constituye uno de los hechos (ver folios 1 a 6 del expediente judicial) que la actora pretende demostrar, a efecto de que se acoja la pretensión de homologar su puesto al de Juez 1 o 3 del Poder Judicial. En razón de lo anterior, este Tribunal considera que la accionante no estaba imposibilitada para aportar esos documentos con la interposición de la demanda, pues en atención a la fecha en que presentó la solicitud ante el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, para que se procediera a la homologación a la que dice tener derecho -que data del 5 de febrero del 2008 (ver folio 59 del expediente judicial)-, se trata de datos que la actora debía tener con anterioridad al 22 de julio del 2010, momento en que se recibió la demanda en este Despacho (ver folio 1 del expediente judicial), pues constituyen la base para hacer el estudio comparativo que se requiere para determinar si tiene o no derecho a la homologación que pretende; 2) Por ende, los documentos aportados, tampoco están referidos a hechos nuevos o a rectificaciones realizadas en la propia audiencia, toda vez que el contenido de la certificación emitida a las siete horas treinta minutos del diez de octubre del dos mil diez, por el Secretario del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, se refiere a circunstancias suscitadas de previo a la instauración del proceso judicial, tan es así, que a partir del supuesto desempeño de las funciones adicionales que allí se indican, es que la demandante aduce tener derecho a que se le aplique la equiparación salarial que establecía el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo 34136-MINAE, solicitud que fue planteada en vía administrativa desde el 5 de febrero de 2008 (ver folio 59 del expediente judicial); 3) Por último, en cuanto a la certificación notarial de la sentencia de primera instancia número 1228-2011 dictada por el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a las diez horas diez minutos del cuatro de agosto del dos mil once, este Tribunal considera que no constituye una prueba complementaria, ya que si bien es cierto, mediante dicha sentencia se resolvió favorablemente un caso similar al que aquí nos ocupa; también lo es, que a fin de resolver este proceso, dicho antecedente no resulta vinculante para este Tribunal, toda vez que en principio y con excepción de lo dispuesto en el numeral 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional está únicamente sometida a la Constitución Política y a la Ley (artículo 154 de la Constitución). 4) Cabe recordar que la prueba para mejor resolver, no puede suplir la deficiencia probatoria de la parte, que no la presentó en los momentos procesales oportunos para tal efecto. Sostener lo contrario, colocaría en un desequilibrio a las partes restantes en el proceso, más aún cuando no encuadran en los supuestos de excepción previstos en el artículo 50 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. En ese sentido, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 794-F-2006 de las nueve horas treinta y cinco minutos del veinte de octubre del dos mil seis, consideró que: "…es menester indicar que no es oportuno intentar, mediante el ofrecimiento de probanzas que debieron aportarse y evacuarse en la etapa procesal correspondiente, abrir de nuevo el debate. Darle cabida a esta petición, significaría que las partes estén en la posibilidad de subsanar sus omisiones respecto de la prueba que pudieron haber ofrecido en su oportunidad y no lo hicieron..."; 5) Ahora bien, respecto a la admisión facultativa de la prueba para mejor resolver, es criterio reiterado de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que el rechazo de la misma no produce la indefensión de las partes. Entre otras sentencias, se transcribe en lo que interesa el Voto N° 547-F-2002 de las dieciséis horas del doce de julio de dos mil dos dictada por la Sala Primera, que indica: “(…) IV.- Múltiples precedentes de esta Sala, refiriéndose a la prueba para mejor resolver, han señalado que esta es prueba del juez, y no de las partes. En consecuencia, la decisión de recabarla es facultativa del órgano jurisdiccional, y puede prescindirse de ella sin necesidad de resolución alguna. Ergo, la omisión de pronunciamiento a su respecto, precisamente porque ha sido rebasada la etapa probatoria, en la cual deben las partes demostrar los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, según lo imponen las normas sobre la carga de la prueba y precluída aquella etapa, será facultad exclusiva del juzgador, determinar si deben allegarse a los autos nuevas probanzas necesarias para la correcta decisión del litigio. Pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras las siguientes resoluciones; 59 de las 15:20 horas del 31 de mayo de 1996, 23 de las 14:20 horas del 4 de marzo de 1992, 34 de las 10:45 horas del 28 de mayo de 1993 y 83 de las 14:40 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1993. (…)”. Por todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal rechaza la prueba documental ofrecida por la parte actora con posterioridad a la celebración de la audiencia preliminar.

IIo.- HECHOS PROBADOS: Se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes hechos que resultan relevantes para este proceso: 1) Q ue la actora labora desde el diecinueve de noviembre del dos mil siete, en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo; se desempeña en el puesto del Servicio Civil # 108532 , en propiedad, como profesional Servicio Civil 2 ( folios 17 y16 del tomo II del expediente administrativo; 339, 340 y 341 del tomo I del expediente administrativo); 2) Q ue en la Gaceta # 25 de 05 de febrero de 2008, se publicó el Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, cuyo artículo 4°, párrafo 2°, disponía: “La retribución de los integrantes de este Tribunal debe ser igual al sueldo de los miembros de los Tribunales Superiores del Poder Judicial, la del resto del personal deberá equipararse, según el caso, a la de los cargos equivalentes del personal de esos Tribunales o de otros órganos del Poder Judicial donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares”. Esta norma fue derogada por el Decreto #36035 de 20 de mayo de 2010, publicado en La Gaceta #126 de 30 de junio de 2010 ( ver la versión digital de los Decretos 34136 y 36035 en la página web: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); 3) Que el cinco de febrero del dos mil ocho, mediante oficio número 204 -0 7 TAA de 20 de octubre de 2008, dirigido a la coordinación del Departamento de Recursos Humanos, l a actor a solicitó realizar las gestiones pertinentes a fin de que se homologara su puesto al correspondiente del Poder Judicial ( folio 59 del expediente judicial); 4) Que el trece de febrero del dos mil ocho, mediante oficio número 251-08-TAA, dirigido al Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, la demandante planteó reclamo administrativo para que se le reconociera el plus salarial correspondiente al 18% por ejercicio de la función judicial (folios 61 y 62 del expediente judicial); 5) Que por resolución número R-DRH-AJ-144-2009 de las ocho horas cinco minutos del treinta de marzo del dos mil ocho, el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía acogió el reclamo administrativo presentado por la demandante el 13 de febrero del dos mil ocho (folio 61 del expediente judicial), “…en lo que respecta al incentivo del Plus Salarial denominado Riesgo en el Ejercicio de la Función Judicial, de un 18% correspondiente de acuerdo a su cargo y las funciones que realiza (…) Se le ordena al Departamento de Recursos Humanos, iniciar los trámites administrativos correspondientes a efectos de que se proceda al reconocimiento de manera retroactiva a partir del momento de presentación del reclamo de dicho porcentaje…” (folios 5 a 3 del tomo III del expediente administrativo); 6) Que por acuerdo número 002-2008 adoptado por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental el once de setiembre del dos mil ocho, se designó a la actora para ocupar el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, del once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho (folio 345 a 343 del tomo I del expediente administrativo); 7) Que por oficios 790-08 del 29 de setiembre; 789-08 del veintinueve de setiembre; 825-08 del 17 de octubre y 891-08-TAA del 28 de noviembre, todos del dos mil ocho, el Presidente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo le comunicó a la actora las fechas en que procedería a realizar las suplencias del Juez Propietario Mario Leiva Vega (folios 342, 338 y 337 del tomo I del expediente administrativo; 88, 95, 97 y 99 del expediente judicial); 8) Que el cinco de noviembre del dos mil ocho, por oficio número 862-08-TAA dirigido a la coordinación del Departamento de Recursos Humanos, l a actor a solicitó realizar las gestiones pertinentes a fin de que se le reconociera el recargo de funciones en el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo ( folio 103 del expediente judicial); 9) Que por oficio oficio número OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del dos mil nueve, suscrito por el Coordinador de la Oficina del Servicio Civil en el SINAC, es claro al indicar -en lo que interesa- que “…mediante acuerdo No. 002-2008, el Ministro a.i. de la Presidencia, en representación del señor Presidente de la R epública y los Ministros miembros del Consejo Nacional Ambiental, acuerdan nombrar como Juez Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo a la señora Nombre78837 ...". Entonces es claro, que de acuerdo al artículo precitado, si la ley señala tiempo completo, no pude (sic) ser un recargo la figura a utilizar en este caso. En los casos en donde el recargo es para ocupar un puesto excluido del Régimen de Méritos, situación que estamos observando en este informe, no encontramos fundamento jurídico para aplicar la normativa anteriormente citada, aunado al hecho de que la Dirección General de Servicio Civil no tiene competencia para resolver o autorizar gestiones sobre puestos excluidos..." (folios 28 y 27 del expediente de pago pluses salariales; 116 y 117 del expediente judicial) ; 10) Que por oficio número DRH-AO-017-09 del tres de febrero del dos mil nueve , el Coordinador del Proceso de Análisis Ocupacional del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, le comunicó a la actora que la Oficina de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil ubicada en el SINAC, les "...remite el Oficio Nº OSC-S-070-2009 de fecha 29 de enero y recibido en esta oficina el día 30 del mismo mes. señalándonos que el reconocimiento de recargo de funciones no es procedente..." (folio 29 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales) ; 11) Q ue desde el mes de mayo del dos mil nueve, la actora recibe el monto respectivo por concepto del plus salarial por retribución en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, que le fue reconocido mediante el pronunciamiento número R-DRH-144-2009 de las ocho horas cinco minutos del treinta de marzo del dos mil ocho (ver documentos de folio 35 al 25 del tomo II del expediente administrativo ); 12) Que por oficio número OSC-S-636-2009 del diecisiete de agosto del dos mil nueve, el Coordinador de la Oficina de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil ubicada en el SINAC, le comunicó al Coordinador del Proceso de Análisis Ocupacional del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que de conformidad con los criterios vertidos en los oficios AJ-386-2008 del 07 de julio del dos mil ocho y GESTIÓN-SAO-133-2008 del 25 de julio del dos mil ocho, así como, la resolución número DG-015-2009 de las nueve horas del catorce de enero del dos mil nueve, procedían a la devolución de la solicitud para que se homologara el puesto de Profesional Servicio Civil 2 que ocupa la actora en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, que fue presentada al amparo de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 (folios 67, 66, 16, 15, 07 a 01 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales; 138 y 137 del expediente judicial); 13) Que por oficio número STAP-1467-2009 del 17 de agosto del dos mil nueve, la Directora Ejecutiva de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, comunicó a la Coordinadora del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que respecto a la solicitud de homologación de los puestos 108532 y 036051 ubicados en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, "... la variación de la clasificación y valoración de éstos no está dentro de las competencias de la Autoridad Presupuestaria ni de esta Secretaría Técnica. Por lo que procedo a devolver sin el trámite respectivo el oficio citado. Por otra parte , se le recuerda que mediante oficio STAP-1609-08 del 05 de agosto de 2008, se le solicitó a ese Ministerio informar sobre las acciones que se realizarán para la aplicación del régimen de responsabilidad, por la publicación del Decreto Ejecutivo de marras (que contenía disposiciones de índole salarial de funcionarios que están dentro del ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria), sin que esta Secretaría lo conociera antes..." (folio 68 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales; 82 a 86 del expediente judicial); 14) Que por oficios número DRH-AO-112-09 del diecinueve de agosto del dos mil nueve y RH-AO-131-09 del veintiséis de agosto del mismo año, el Coordinador del Área de Análisis Ocupacional del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, comunicó a la accionante que tanto el Coordinador de la Oficina del Servicio Civil en el SINAC, como la Directora Ejecutiva de la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, devolvieron la solicitud de homologación de puestos planteada por la actora sin la respectiva aprobación (folios 76, 73 y 72 del expediente de pago pluses salariales) ; 15) Que por oficio número STAP-1592-2009 del 08 de setiembre del dos mil nueve, la Directora Ejecutiva de la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, le comunicó al Coordinador del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que con relación al reconocimiento de recargo de funciones al puesto de Profesional Servicio Civil 2 que ocupa la actora, al estar "...asignado al régimen de Servicio Civil, por lo tanto, el pronunciarse sobre la consulta planteada no está dentro de las competencias de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, ni de esta Secretaría Técnica. Por lo que procedo a devolver sin el trámite respectivo..." (folio 85 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales); 16) Que por oficio número DRH-AJ-192-2009 del veintidós de setiembre del dos mil nueve , la Coordinadora del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de dicho Ministerio, le solicitó al Oficial Mayor que le “…informe el estado de la Consulta que el Departamento Legal iba a realizar a la Procuraduría General de la República, a efectos de que fuera dicha dependencia la que se pronunciara sobre la legalidad de la aplicación de los citados pluses e incentivos salariales. Lo anterior, a efectos de no causar perjuicio a los derechos laborales de los funcionarios gestionantes, en virtud que depende de dicha gestión la respuesta a varias de las gestiones supra citadas atender las consultas como en derecho corresponde…” (folio 146 del expediente judicial) ; 17) Que por oficio número DRH-AO-165-2009 del 29 de setiembre del dos mil nueve , el Coordinador del Proceso de Análisis Ocupacional solicitó a la Asesoría Legal del Departamento de Recursos Humanos, ambos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que se aclararan algunos extremos relacionados con la solicitud planteada por la actora, a fin de que se le reconociera el pago por recargo de funciones en la plaza de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, que se encuentra excluida del Régimen de Servicio Civil (folio 148 del expediente judicial) ; 18) Que por oficio DRH-AJ-201-2009 del 02 de octubre del dos mil nueve, la Asesora Legal del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, solicitó a la Coordinadora del Departamento Legal, que remitiera el respectivo criterio en cuestión, a fin de atender la solicitud de la actora como corresponda (folio 150 del expediente judicial) ; 19) Que mediante oficio número DAJ-2109-2009 del diecinueve de octubre del dos mil nueve, la Coordinadora del Departamento Legal le indicó al Jefe de Recursos Humanos, ambos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que "...le reiteramos la respuesta emitida por la Dirección del S ervicio Civil en el oficio OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del 2009, en cuanto a que no se puede aplicar el Artículo 22 bis del reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil, ya que el puesto en recargo debe estar bajo el Régimen de Servicio Civil. Para el caso exclusivo de los jueces suplentes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, estos cargos están excluidos del Régimen del Servicio Civil, y no es procedente el recargo de funciones, ya que el nombramiento de juez titular o juez suplente, es a tiempo completo..." (folio 152 del expediente judicial) ; 20) Que por gestiones presentadas el veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve y el cuatro de febrero del dos mil diez, la actora solicitó al Oficial Mayor y a la Asesora Legal del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que se indicara el estado de los trámites con respecto a la solicitud que presentó para que se le pagara su suplencia como Jueza en el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (folios 154, 155, 159 del expediente judicial).

IIIo.- HECHO S NO DEMOSTRADO S . De relevancia para el presente proceso, se tiene n por no demostrado s l os siguiente s : a) Que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía haya dictado acto final tendente a resolver la solicitud presentada por la actora el cinco de noviembre del dos mil ocho, tendente a que se le reconozca el recargo de funciones en la plaza de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, en la que fue designada por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental del once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho . (no hay prueba en el expediente) ; b) Que a la actora le hayan pagado las diferencias salariales y demás extremos laborales dejados de percibir, durante el período comprendido entre el once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, lapso en el cual, fue nombrada para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (no hay prueba que lo acredite); c) Que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía haya dictado acto final tendente a resolver la solicitud presentada por la actora el cinco de febrero del dos mil ocho, tendente a que se homologue su puesto de Profesional Servicio Civil 2, a la clase correspondiente del Poder Judicial, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136-MINAE (no hay prueba en el expediente) .

IVo.- OBJETO DEL PROCESO. La parte actora estima que tal y como consta en la prueba aportada, se desempeñó a tiempo completo como jueza suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, durante el período comprendido entre el once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, sin que a la fecha se le haya cancelado el salario correspondiente por la función de juez que desempeñó en ese Tribunal. Considera que de no pagársele el salario que le corresponde, se produciría un enriquecimiento ilícito por parte el Estado y un perjuicio económico laboral en su contra. Alega que en este caso, la conducta omisiva del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, consiste en que desconocen cómo y quién debe cancelarle el salario que le adeudan y que a su juicio tiene derecho a recibir. En cuanto a la solicitud de homologación del puesto que ocupa como Profesional Servicio Civil 2 y por ende, de su salario, a la clase de abogada asistente 1 del Poder Judicial, alega que el trámite aún se encuentra pendiente ante el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. Indica que el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 341236-MINAET, hasta el día que fue derogado, constituyó una norma válida y eficaz que surtió efectos jurídicos y generó derechos, aunado a que a la fecha no ha sido declarada nula o ilegal, razón por la cual, estima que en aplicación del principio de legalidad, el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía está obligado a aplicarla, pues en caso contrario incurriría en una conducta contraria a derecho. Estima que deben pagársele como daño material, las diferencias salariales derivadas del plus salarial por riesgo en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional; la homologación de puesto y el recargo de funciones que gestionó desde el año 2008 y que no le han sido resueltas por acto final. Por último, estima que debe indemnizársele el daño moral causado, que consiste en la angustia que ha padecido por las conductas omisivas impugnadas, que incluso la obligaron a solicitar dos préstamos, uno para sufragar los gastos de la educación universitaria de su hija y el otro, para la construcción de su vivienda. Por su parte, l a representante del Estado , sostiene que respecto a las solicitudes presentadas por la actora, el 26 de octubre del dos mil nueve y el tres de febrero del dos mil diez, a fin de solicitar que se le informara el trámite de la gestión planteada el cinco de noviembre del dos mil ocho -tendente a que se le reconociera el recargo de funciones en la plaza de jueza suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo-, constituyen una reiteración de dicha gestión, la cual, fue resuelta mediante oficio número DRH-AO-017-09 del 3 de febrero del dos mil nueve, por el Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. Que en dicho documento, se le indicó que el recargo de funciones del puesto que ella ocupa, número 108532, no resultaba procedente de conformidad con el oficio número OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del dos mil nueve, emitido por la Oficina del Servicio Civil . Considera que igual situación se presenta, en cuanto a la gestión presentada por la actora ante el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, para la homologación de su puesto con la clase Abogado Asistente 1 del Poder Judicial. En ese sentido, indica que la Dirección General de Servicio Civil se negó a aprobar la homologación pretendida con fundamento en las razones expuestas en el oficio OSC-S-636-2009 del 17 de agosto del dos mil nueve, lo cual, fue comunicado a la demandante mediante oficio número DRH-AO-112-09 del 19 de agosto del dos mil nueve. Señala que la solicitud de homologación de puestos, también remitida a la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, sin embargo, la Autoridad Presupuestaria rechazó dicha gestión mediante el oficio STAP-1467-2009 del 17 de agosto del dos mil nueve, lo cual también le fue notificado a la actora mediante oficio número DRH-AO-131-09 del 26 de agosto del dos mil nueve. Por último, estima que las pretensiones indemnizatorias de la actora son improcedentes, pues pretende que se le pague el salario de Juez 1 del Poder Judicial, a pesar de que durante los años 2008, 2009 y 2010 ni siquiera estuvo nombrada como Jueza del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, puesto que el Consejo Nacional Ambiental la designó únicamente por el período comprendido entre el 11 de setiembre al 31 de diciembre del dos mil ocho. En cuanto a los daños morales, indica que en el tanto no tiene derecho a percibir los salarios que indica, los préstamos que solicitó se debieron a su propio y exclusivo accionar.

Vo.- EN CUANTO A LA SOLICITUD DE PAGO DEL PLUS SALARIAL POR RIESGO EN EL EJERCICIO DE LA FUNCIÓN JUDICIAL. Contrario a lo que afirma la parte actora, por resolución número R-DRH-144-2009 de las ocho horas cinco minutos del treinta de marzo del dos mil ocho (folio 05 a 03 del tomo II del expediente administrativo), el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía acogió el reclamo administrativo presentado por la demandante el 13 de febrero del dos mil ocho (folio 61 del expediente judicial), “…en lo que respecta al incentivo del Plus Salarial denominado Riesgo en el Ejercicio de la Función Judicial, de un 18% correspondiente de acuerdo a su cargo y las funciones que realiza (…) Se le ordena al Departamento de Recursos Humanos, iniciar los trámites administrativos correspondientes a efectos de que se proceda al reconocimiento de manera retroactiva a partir del momento de presentación del reclamo de dicho porcentaje…”. Ahora bien, de los documentos visibles de folio 35 al 25 del tomo II del expediente administrativo, se desprende que desde el mes de mayo del dos mil nueve, la actora recibe el monto respectivo por concepto del plus salarial por r iesgo en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, que le fue reconocido mediante el pronunciamiento número R-DRH-144-2009 de las ocho horas cinco minutos del treinta de marzo del dos mil ocho. En razón de lo expuesto, este Tribunal estima improcedente, que la actora alegue una conducta omisiva por parte del Estado, en cuanto a la solicitud planteada a fin de que se le reconociera el plus salarial indicado, no sólo porque su gestión fue resuelta desde el treinta de marzo del dos mil ocho, sino porque desde el mes de mayo del dos mil nueve, recibe el monto respectivo por dicho concepto. Ahora bien, dado que la accionante no alega que se le adeuden períodos anteriores al mes de mayo del dos mil nueve por ese rubro, aspecto que en todo caso, sería objeto de un proceso de ejecución de sentencia ante este Tribunal (artículo 176 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), este órgano colegiado estima que no se configura la omisión alegada por la parte actora, dado que el derecho le fue reconocido desde el año 2008 y su pago se hizo efectivo, desde el mes de mayo del dos mil nueve, por lo que, en consecuencia, se declara improcedente la pretensión planteada al efecto.

VIo.- RESPECTO A LA GESTIÓN TENDENTE A QUE SE LE RECONOCIERA EL RECARGO DE FUNCIONES COMO JUEZA SUPLENTE DEL TRIBUNAL AMBIENTAL ADMINISTRATIVO. Contrario a lo que afirma la representante del Estado, este Tribunal estima que con relación a este extremo, se ha configurado una conducta omisiva por parte del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que incide en el derecho al salario y en el principio de igualdad y no discriminación, por las razones que de seguido se exponen: a) El oficio número OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del dos mil nueve, suscrito por el Coordinador de la Oficina del Servicio Civil en el SINAC, es claro al indicar -en lo que interesa- que “…mediante acuerdo No. 002-2008, el Ministro a.i. de la Presidencia, en representación del señor Presidente de la R epública y los Ministros miembros del Consejo Nacional Ambiental, acuerdan nombrar como Juez Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo a la señora Nombre78837 ...". Entonces es claro, que de acuerdo al artículo precitado, si la ley señala tiempo completo, no pude (sic) ser un recargo la figura a utilizar en este caso. En los casos en donde el recargo es para ocupar un puesto excluido del Régimen de Méritos, situación que estamos observando en este informe, no encontramos fundamento jurídico para aplicar la normativa anteriormente citada, aunado al hecho de que la Dirección General de Servicio Civil no tiene competencia para resolver o autorizar gestiones sobre puestos excluidos..." (folios 28 y 27 del expediente de pago pluses salariales; 116 y 117 del expediente judicial). No obstante lo anterior, de manera improcedente el Coordinador del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del MINAE, consultó a la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, por oficio número DRH-520-09 de agosto de dos mil nueve, si procedía reconocerle a la actora el recargo de funciones en el puesto de número 108532 de la Clase Profesional Servicio Civil 2 (folio 84 a 79 del expediente de pago pluses salariales), ante lo cual, mediante oficio número STAP-1592-2009 del 08 de setiembre del dos mil nueve, la Directora Ejecutiva de la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, le indicó que "... el puesto citado está asignado al régimen de Servicio Civil, por lo tanto, el pronunciarse sobre la consulta no está dentro de las competencias de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, ni de esta Secretaría Técnica..." (folio 85 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales); b) En razón de lo anterior, resulta improcedente que por oficio número DRH-AO-017-09 del tres de febrero del dos mil nueve (folio 29 del expediente de pago de pluses salariales), el Coordinador del Área de Análisis Ocupacional del MINAE le haya comunicado a la demandante que el reconocimiento del recargo de funciones en el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, no resultaba procedente, no sólo porque el Servicio Civil resolvió que la figura del recargo no era aplicable, pues se estaba ante un nombramiento a tiempo completo como jueza suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, amparado en el artículo 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, conforme al acuerdo número 002-2008 adoptado por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental el once de setiembre del dos mil ocho, mediante el cual, se le designó del once al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho (folio 345 a 343 del tomo I del expediente administrativo); sino también, porque la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria declinó pronunciarse, porque en la misiva enviada por el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, se hizo referencia a un puesto adscrito al Servicio Civil y no al que correspondía, como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal indicado. En consecuencia, no puede sostenerse válidamente que mediante el oficio número DRH-AO-017-09 del tres de febrero del dos mil nueve, se haya resuelto en definitiva la gestión planteada por la actora con relación al recargo de funciones, toda vez que los oficios OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del dos mil nueve y STAP-1592-2009 del 08 de setiembre del dos mil nueve, son meros actos de trámite en los que se hacen observaciones al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, respecto al contenido y alcances de la solicitud planteada y a partir de los cuales, se hubiera podido tomar una decisión definitiva. c) Tan es así, que ante consulta enviada por el Coordinador del Proceso de Análisis Ocupacional, mediante oficio número DRH-AO-165-2009 del 29 de setiembre del dos mil nueve (folio 148 del expediente judicial), la Asesora Legal del Departamento de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, solicitó a la Coordinadora del Departamento Legal, que remitiera el respectivo criterio en cuestión, a fin de atender la solicitud de la actora como corresponda (folio 150 del expediente judicial). Si bien es cierto, en lo que interesa mediante oficio número DAJ-2109-2009 del diecinueve de octubre del dos mil nueve, la Coordinadora del Departamento Legal le indicó al Jefe de Recursos Humanos, ambos del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que "...le reiteramos la respuesta emitida por la Dirección del S ervicio Civil en el oficio OSC-S-070-2009 del 29 de enero del 2009, en cuanto a que no se puede aplicar el Artículo 22 bis del reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil, ya que el puesto en recargo debe estar bajo el Régimen de Servicio Civil. Para el caso exclusivo de los jueces suplentes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, estos cargos están excluidos del Régimen del Servicio Civil, y no es procedente el recargo de funciones, ya que el nombramiento de juez titular o juez suplente, es a tiempo completo..." (folio 152 del expediente judicial); también lo es, que resulta improcedente que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía no haya resuelto en definitiva la solicitud planteada por la accionante, pues aunque no nos encontramos ante un supuesto de recargo de funciones, lo cierto es, que se está ante un supuesto de nombramiento a tiempo completo de la actora, como jueza suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo (artículo 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), conforme a lo dispuesto en el acuerdo número 002-2008 adoptado por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental el once de setiembre del dos mil ocho, y mediante el cual, se le designó para ocupar dicho puesto del once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho (folio 345 a 343 del tomo I del expediente administrativo); cargo que la demandante ejerció de manera efectiva durante el período antes indicado, según se desprende de los documentos visibles a folios 88, 95, 97 y 99 del expediente judicial; 342, 338 y 337 del tomo I del expediente administrativo. d) En razón de lo expuesto, este Tribunal no podría prohijar una conducta abusiva por parte del patrono y por ende, un enriquecimiento ilícito de la Administración Pública en perjuicio del patrimonio del trabajador, al haberse acreditado que partiendo de una necesidad e interés institucional, el patrono nombró a la demandante en un cargo de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, a efecto de que ejecutara las tareas propias de un puesto de superior jerarquía, remunerándole con un salario menor, al que le correspondía recibir conforme al puesto en que formalmente se encontraba nombrada. e) En consecuencia, este Tribunal considera que la omisión en resolver por acto final la solicitud planteada por la actora para que se le cancelara el recargo de funciones como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, es sustancialmente contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 33, 41, 56 y 57 de la Constitución Política; 104 y 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y a los principios de dignidad humana, protector en materia laboral, e intangibilidad del patrimonio. En razón de lo anterior y dado que Consejo Nacional Ambiental mediante acuerdo número 002-2008 del once de setiembre del dos mil ocho, la designó para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, desde el once de setiembre del treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, se acoge la pretensión planteada por la parte actora y por ende, se ordena al demandado pagar a Nombre78837 , de manera retroactiva, las diferencias salariales y demás extremos laborales dejados de percibir, durante el período comprendido entre el once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, lapso en el cual, fue nombrada para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. Procede el pago de los intereses legales sobre la obligación principal indicada, que se calcularán con base en la tasa pasiva de intereses de los certificados a seis meses plazo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, según la moneda que se trate, conforme lo dispone el artículo 1163 del Código Civil, a partir del once de setiembre del dos mil ocho (fecha a partir de la cual, regía el nombramiento a tiempo completo como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, dispuesto por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental mediante acuerdo 002-2008), hasta su efectivo pago, monto que deberá ser calculado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia ante este mismo tribunal. Tal reconocimiento de intereses supone, de manera indirecta el ajuste del valor económico de los montos otorgados para los efectos del artículo 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

VIIo.- EN CUANTO A LA SOLICITUD PLANTEADA POR LA ACTORA A FIN DE QUE SE HOMOLOGARA SU PUESTO CONFORME A LO DISPUESTO EN EL PÁRRAFO 2º DEL ARTÍCULO 4 DEL DECRETO EJECUTIVO NÚMERO 34136. Si bien es cierto, por oficios número DRH-AO-112-09 del diecinueve de agosto del dos mil nueve y RH-AO-131-09 del veintiséis de agosto del mismo año, el Coordinador del Área de Análisis Ocupacional del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, comunicó a la accionante que tanto el Coordinador de la Oficina del Servicio Civil en el SINAC, como la Directora Ejecutiva de la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria (folios 76, 73 y 72 del expediente de pago pluses salariales), devolvieron la solicitud de homologación de puestos planteada por la actora sin la respectiva aprobación; también lo es, que las razones en que se sustentaba la decisión de no aprobar la homologación gestionada, se sustentaban en alegatos de ilegalidad -tanto de forma como de fondo- de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136 (ver folios 68 a 66, 16 a 15, 7 a 1 del expediente de pago pluses salariales; 273 a 277 del expediente judicial). En razón de lo anterior, no puede alegarse de manera válida, que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía resolviera mediante acto final la solicitud de homologación de puestos planteada por la actora el cinco de febrero del dos mil ocho (folio 59 del expediente judicial), toda vez que la resolución de la misma estaba condicionada a que se determinara si la norma que servía de base para dicha gestión, adolecía o no de vicios de ilegalidad, lo cual, debía establecerse mediante la interposición de una consulta ante la Procuraduría General de la República o bien, de una demanda contencioso administrativa ante esta jurisdicción, por parte del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. No obstante, del oficio número DRH-AJ-192-2009 del veintidós de setiembre del dos mil nueve (folio 146 del expediente judicial), se desprende lo contrario, toda vez que la Coordinadora del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de dicho Ministerio, le solicitó al Oficial Mayor que le “…informe el estado de la Consulta que el Departamento Legal iba a realizar a la Procuraduría General de la República, a efectos de que fuera dicha dependencia la que se pronunciara sobre la legalidad de la aplicación de los citados pluses e incentivos salariales. Lo anterior, a efectos de no causar perjuicio a los derechos laborales de los funcionarios gestionantes, en virtud que depende de dicha gestión la respuesta a varias de las gestiones supra citadas atender las consultas como en derecho corresponde…”. No obstante la existencia de una conducta omisiva por parte del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, que resulta contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, toda vez que no se ha resuelto por acto final la solicitud de homologación de puestos interpuesta por la amparada; lo cierto es, que este Tribunal considera improcedente otorgar la pretensión relativa a que se reconozca a favor de la actora la homologación de puesto y de salario, fundamentada en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136, por las razones que de seguido se exponen: a) En primer término conviene aclarar que el artículo 4, párrafo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo #34136 de 20 de junio de 2007, publicado en La Gaceta #25 de 05 de febrero de 2008, cuya aplicación se demanda, fue derogado por el Decreto #36035 de 20 de mayo de 2010, publicado en La Gaceta #126 de 30 de junio de 2010. De modo que cuando se presentó la demanda el 18 de febrero de 2011, ya había desaparecido del ordenamiento jurídico, siendo virtualmente inaplicable. Sin embargo, el Tribunal abordará el examen planteado, por los efectos que pudo producir mientras estuvo vigente entre el 05 de febrero de 2008 y el 30 de junio de 2010. b) Por expresa disposición del artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], según reforma introducida por ley #7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997, los jueces “no podrán”: 1) aplicar leyes ni otras normas o actos de cualquier naturaleza, contrarios a la Constitución Política o al derecho internacional o comunitario vigentes en el país; tampoco podrán interpretarlos ni aplicarlos de manera contraria a los precedentes o la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional; 2) aplicar decretos, reglamentos, acuerdos y otras disposiciones contrarias a cualquier otra norma de rango superior. Antes de resolver la cuestión planteada, los jueces deban preguntarse si la norma aplicable al caso, se ajusta o no al bloque de constitucionalidad y legalidad ordinaria. Es decir, los jueces no son administradores de justicia o sujetos pasivos al servicio del legislador limitados a aplicar la norma emitida por el parlamento o el Poder Ejecutivo. Tienen un rol activo, sujeto a la Constitución y a la ley válida, debiendo consultarle a la Sala Constitucional cuando tuvieren dudas fundadas de su constitucionalidad, todo conforme a los principios de supremacía constitucional, interpretación conforme y eficacia inmediata y directa tanto de los preceptos constitucionales como de los precedentes y jurisprudencia constitucional (artículos 10 y 154 de la Constitución Política –CP, y 13 y 102 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, reformado este último por Ley #9003 de 31 de octubre, publicado en La Gaceta #228 de 28 de noviembre de 2011, y sentencias #1185 de 1995, #3035, #3036 y #3039 de 1996). La Sala Constitucional en la conocida sentencia #1739-92 de 11.45 horas de 1 de julio, expresó: “… De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad. En resumen, el concepto del debido proceso, a partir de la Carta Magna, pero muy especialmente en la jurisprudencia constitucional de los Estados Unidos, se ha desarrollado en los tres grandes sentidos descritos: a) el del debido proceso legal, adjetivo o formal, entendido como reserva de ley y conformidad con ella en la materia procesal; b) el del debido proceso constitucional o debido proceso a secas, como procedimiento judicial justo, todavía adjetivo o formal -procesal-; y c) el del debido proceso sustantivo o principio de razonabilidad, entendido como la concordancia de todas las leyes y normas de cualquier categoría o contenido y de los actos de autoridades públicas con las normas, principios y valores del Derecho de la Constitución.” (Considerando I, inciso c). Lo anterior confirma ese rol activo, crítico, de guardián que deben tener los jueces y tribunales en un Estado Democrático de Derecho respecto de las normas frente a la Constitución Política, como operación previa a su aplicación práctica, en la búsqueda incesante de decisiones justas y en la garantía de estricta legalidad o legalidad substancial del orden jurídico. c) Por disposición del artículo 191 Constitución Política, las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, se regulan por medio de una norma llamada Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Este estatuto se promulgó según Ley #1581 de 30 de mayo de 1953; en su capítulo X, relativo al régimen de sueldos, artículo 48, inciso b), señala que los salarios de los servidores del Poder Ejecutivo serán determinados por una Ley de Salarios que fijará las sumas mínimas, intermedias y máximas correspondientes a cada categoría de empleo. En desarrollo de esta previsión, se promulgó la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, #2166 de 09 de octubre de 1957, la cual constituye el sistema oficial de retribución para todas las clases de puestos clasificados en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (artículo 1°). De estos antecedentes normativos, relacionados con los artículos 57 y 180 CP y 19 de la Ley General de Administración Pública [LGAP], se desprende que la determinación del salario de un servidor público, es materia reservada a la ley formal. La creación de las bases y demás parámetros con arreglo a los cuales han de establecerse o determinarse los salarios del sector público, corresponde al legislador ordinario, y no al Poder Ejecutivo. Ni siquiera por Ley de Presupuesto pueden establecerse esos rubros. Se trata por un lado de la generación o creación de obligaciones periódicas a cargo del Estado, y no simplemente de pagar o ejecutar un desembolso autorizado en una partida presupuestaria. La Sala Constitucional, en sentencia #552-91 de 18.50 horas de 15 de marzo, expresó: “VI.- En el mismo sentido, esa reserva de ley implica la de ley ordinaria, no la de presupuesto, pues ésta no tiene por objeto crear obligaciones del Estado sino sólo autorizar el gasto de los fondos públicos, estableciendo un límite (máximo), de modo que la Administración Pública (la del Poder Ejecutivo y la de los demás poderes u órganos desconcentrados, en su caso) no está obligada sino sólo autorizada a pagar conforme a las partidas presupuestarias. Por lo demás, crear obligaciones del Estado en función de la legislación ordinaria, y reconocerlas lo es de la Administración, dentro de sus límites presupuestarios; el presupuesto no es, ni lo uno, ni lo otro.”. Por otro lado, dicha determinación se incardina dentro del régimen jurídico de los derechos fundamentales, como lo es el derecho a recibir un salario mínimo de fijación periódica capaz de generar bienestar y existencia digna, materia igualmente reservada a la ley, en razón de constituir una garantía para la persona trabajadora, que por ende no puede estar sujeta a los vaivenes de la política u otros movimientos o intereses de grupos detentadores transitorios del poder. En este sentido y en la misma sentencia la Sala expresó: “VII.- … Pero es que remunerar la prestación de un servicio al Estado, del rango o naturaleza que éste sea, así como otorgar ayudas o facilidades para su desempeño, dentro de los límites de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad implícitas en todo ordenamiento democrático constitucional, no constituye privilegio, sino por el contrario, un principio fundamental de sana administración, ligado también íntimamente al estado democrático, porque es obvio que propiciar o siquiera favorecer la prestación de esos servicios gratuitamente o mediante una remuneración simbólica o exigua equivaldría nada menos que a limitar el acceso a los cargos públicos únicamente a las personas en disposición de desempeñarlos por gozar de una situación privilegiada de fortuna, cuando no por carecer de los escrúpulos necesarios para no servirse de ellos incorrectamente.” d) La Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, #7554 de 4 de octubre de 1995, en su capítulo XXI, artículos 103 a 112, creó el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, y reguló sus competencias, integración, obligaciones, procedimiento y principios rectores, pero nada dispuso respecto de la retribución salarial de sus miembros, de su personal. El citado artículo 4, párrafo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo #34136, antes de su derogación, disponía: “La retribución de los integrantes de este Tribunal debe ser igual al sueldo de los miembros de los Tribunales Superiores del Poder Judicial, la del resto del personal deberá equipararse, según el caso, a la de los cargos equivalentes del personal de esos Tribunales o de otros órganos del Poder Judicial donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares”. Se prevé un mecanismo de retribución para los integrantes del Tribunal y para el resto del personal. Pero esta norma, tal cual lo aduce el Estado, al pretender llenar un vacío legal mediante la equiparación de los salarios de una categoría de servidores públicos, a la de otros cargos equivalentes donde se desempeñen cargos iguales o similares, se extralimitó e invadió el ámbito reservado al legislador ordinario que es el único competente para regular la materia salarial e imponer obligaciones al Estado. Así se procedió en el caso, por ejemplo al crearse los Tribunales Administrativos de Transporte y Aduanero, según Leyes #7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, artículo 17, y #7557, artículo 207, por su orden. Desde luego que no estamos ante un acto de fijación periódica o de actualización aritmética del salario preestablecido, fundado en razones de costo de vida, inflación, devaluación, depreciación monetaria, antigüedad, etc., si no, como se dijo, frente a la transposición y establecimiento de una armazón o estructura salarial distinta, capaz de generarle ventajas económicas mayores a un grupo de trabajadores públicos e imponerle al Estado obligaciones financieras mayores a las que legal y ordinariamente corresponden. Y aunque pueda entenderse que lo querido por el Decreto Ejecutivo era la aplicación del principio de salario igual a igual trabajo en idénticas condiciones de eficiencia, el medio elegido no es la vía idónea para la igualación emprendida, por estar al margen de las reglas jurídicas aplicables y del sistema oficial de retribución para todas las clases de puestos adscritas al Servicio Civil, entre las que se residencia la actora. e) En armonía con lo anterior, debe desestimarse la demanda en cuanto al extremo petitorio, tendente a que se reconozca a favor de la actora la homologación de puesto y de salario, fundamentada en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136. Ello por cuanto, dicha norma no tiene la virtud de suplir vacíos normativos, generando obligaciones a cargo del Estado, ni de crear el derecho a la equiparación salarial pretendido en el caso concreto; de modo que ninguna utilidad representa el examen de la aducida omisión. En razón de lo anterior, también resulta improcedente el pago de daños y perjuicios, que pretende la amparada por no haberse homologado su puesto y su salario en los términos del párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34136.

VIIIo.- SOBRE LAS EXCEPCIONES DE FONDO. Este Tribunal llega a la conclusión de que la actora cuenta con suficiente legitimación activa para participar en este proceso conforme al artículo 10 inciso a) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, ya que es la persona que gestionó ante el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía que se le homologara el puesto y el salario conforme a lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316; que se le reconociera el plus salarial por riesgo en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional y que se le pagara el recargo de funciones como Jueza Suplente del Tribuna Ambiental Administrativo. Además, la acción se dirige correctamente contra el Estado, tal y como lo dispone el artículo 12 inciso 1) del citado Código, dado que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía fue el autor de las conductas objeto de este proceso. Por otra parte, el interés, se mantiene actual, en el tanto las conductas impugnadas siguen surtiendo efectos en la esfera jurídica de la demandante y requiere de una resolución jurisdiccional que la resuelva. Finalmente, encuentra este órgano colegiado que debe rechazarse la excepción de falta de derecho únicamente en cuanto a que, por todo lo expuesto en los considerandos V y VI I de esta sentencia, se declaran improcedentes las pretensiones relacionadas con : i) la presunta omisión en resolver la solicitud para que se le reconociera y cancelara el plus salarial por riesgo en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional ; ii) el reconocimiento retroactivo de la homologa ción d el puesto y d el salario , solicitado conforme a lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316 , así como, la indemnización por los daños y perjuicios causados, a consecuencia de no habérsele reconocido ese derecho hasta la fecha. En consecuencia y por todo lo expuesto en el considerando VI de esta sentencia , se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho en los demás extremos, y se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda interpuesta por Nombre78837 contra el Estado , en los siguientes términos, entendiéndose por denegada en lo que no se indique expresamente: a) Se declara que la omisión en resolver por acto final la solicitud planteada por la actora para que se le cancelara el recargo de funciones como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, es sustancialmente contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 33, 41, 56 y 57 de la Constitución Política; 104 y 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y a los principios de dignidad humana, protector en materia laboral, e intangibilidad del patrimonio ; b) En razón de lo anterior y dado que Consejo Nacional Ambiental mediante acuerdo número 002-2008 del once de setiembre del dos mil ocho, la designó para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, desde el once de setiembre del treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, se acoge la pretensión planteada por la parte actora y por ende, se ordena al demandado pagar a Nombre78837 , de manera retroactiva, las diferencias salariales y demás extremos laborales dejados de percibir, durante el período comprendido entre el once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, lapso en el cual, fue nombrada para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. c) Procede el pago de los intereses legales sobre la obligación principal indicada, que se calcularán con base en la tasa pasiva de intereses de los certificados a seis meses plazo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, según la moneda que se trate, conforme lo dispone el artículo 1163 del Código Civil, a partir del once de setiembre del dos mil ocho (fecha a partir de la cual, regía el nombramiento a tiempo completo como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, dispuesto por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental mediante acuerdo 002-2008), hasta su efectivo pago, monto que deberá ser calculado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia ante este mismo tribunal. Tal reconocimiento de intereses supone, de manera indirecta el ajuste del valor económico de los montos otorgados para los efectos del artículo 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

I X o.- SOBRE COSTAS. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, cabe resolver la contienda sin especial condenatoria; la conducta de la parte actora se ajusta a los cánones de buena fe, según los antecedentes que rodean el caso (artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). En rigor su derecho en sí, es decir, la implícita pretensión de justicia salarial que subyace en la demanda, no se discute si no la [i] legalidad substancial del Decreto Ejecutivo que le sirve de apoyo. Aunado a lo anterior, debe tomarse en consideración que hubo un vencimiento recíproco en cuanto a las pretensiones de la demanda.

POR TANTO.

Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de legitimación y falta de interés actual interpuestas por el Estado. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho, únicamente respecto a que se declara n improcedente s la s pretensi ones relacionada s con: i) la presunta omisión en resolver la solicitud para que se le reconociera y cancelara el plus salarial por riesgo en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional ; ii) el reconocimiento retroactivo de la homologa ción d el puesto y d el salario solicitado conforme a lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2º del artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 34316 , así como, la indemnización por los daños y perjuicios causados, a consecuencia de no habérsele reconocido ese derecho hasta la fecha . En consecuencia, se rechaza la excepción de falta derecho en los demás extremos y se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda interpuesta por Nombre78837 contra el Estado , en los siguientes términos: a) Se declara que la omisión en resolver por acto final la solicitud planteada por la actora , a fin de que se le cancelara el recargo de funciones como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, es sustancialmente contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 33, 41, 56 y 57 de la Constitución Política; 104 y 105 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y a los principios de dignidad humana, protector en materia laboral, e intangibilidad del patrimonio ; b) S e ordena al demandado pagar a Nombre78837 , de manera retroactiva, las diferencias salariales y demás extremos laborales dejados de percibir, durante el período comprendido entre el once de setiembre al treinta y uno de diciembre del dos mil ocho, lapso en el cual, fue nombrada para ocupar a tiempo completo el puesto de Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo. c) Se ordena al demandado a pag ar los intereses legales sobre la obligación principal indicada, los cuales, se calcularán con base en la tasa pasiva de intereses de los certificados a seis meses plazo del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, según la moneda que se trate, conforme lo dispone el artículo 1163 del Código Civil, a partir del once de setiembre del dos mil ocho (fecha a partir de la cual, regía el nombramiento a tiempo completo como Jueza Suplente del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo, dispuesto por el Consejo Nacional Ambiental mediante acuerdo 002-2008), hasta su efectivo pago, monto que deberá ser calculado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia ante este mismo tribunal. Tal reconocimiento de intereses supone, de manera indirecta el ajuste del valor económico de los montos otorgados para los efectos del artículo 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. d) No hay condena en costas personales ni procesales.

Marianella Álvarez Molina Cynthia Abarca Gómez Christian Hess Araya PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO DECLARADO DE PURO DERECHO ACTORA: Nombre78837 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO