Annulment of procurement award for ruinous price and unrealistic termAnulación de adjudicación licitatoria por precio ruinoso y plazo irreal

1 1 NUE 05-000444-0161-CA Nº 02-2011-VII CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, SEVENTH SECTION. Second Judicial Circuit, Goicoechea, Annex A. San José, at eleven o'clock on the fourteenth day of January of the year two thousand eleven. Special Bidding Proceeding filed by SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA DE ARQUITECTURA SAAR, S. A., with legal entity identification number three- one hundred one- seventy nine thousand one hundred forty five, hereinafter SAAR, SA, represented by Nombre34809 , of legal age, married once, architect, resident of Dirección18314 , , one hundred meters west and seventy-five meters north of the main entrance, with identity card number CED117226- - , in his capacity as President, and Mrs. Nombre149743 , of legal age, married once, preschool teacher, of the same residence as the former, with identity card number CED117227- - , with powers as Unlimited General Attorneys-in-Fact without limit of sum of said company (certification on folio 5), in these proceedings represented by Nombre1801 , of legal age, married, Attorney, resident of San José, with identity card number CED117228- - , to whom they have granted special judicial power of attorney to exercise such representation (document visible on folio 9), against MUNICIPALIDAD DE SANTA CRUZ , with legal entity identification number CED117229- - , in these proceedings represented by the Mayor, a condition held by Mr. Nombre126747 , with identity card number CED117230- - (statement on folio 90); and against the company DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.), with legal entity identification number three- one hundred one- zero seventy two thousand nine hundred forty nine, represented by its President with powers as unlimited general attorney-in-fact without limit of sum, Mr. Nombre71574 , of legal age, divorced, resident of San Josecito de Heredia, with identity card number CED117231- - (certification on folio 184 of the main file).

Whereas:

1- The amount in controversy in this matter having been set at the sum of twenty million colones (by order of this office on folio 262 of the main file), the claim has been filed formulating the following relief sought:

"That the following agreements taken by the Municipal Council be annulled for being contrary to the legal system by having contracted an illicit object, which are described as follows: I. The agreement of the Municipal Council taken in ordinary session number 26-2005, article 5, subsection 07 of June 28, 2005, which agreed to the award of the bidding by registry 5-2005 to the company DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología paisajismo, planificación, arquitectura y turismo s.a.) (sic) II. The agreement of the Municipal Council taken in ordinary session number 43-2005, article 5, subsection 07 dated October 25, 2005, which declared without merit the appeal filed in accordance with article 92 of the Administrative Procurement Law. 1. That the defendant institution be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to my client, with their respective indexation. .2 Consequently, that the defendant Council be ordered to re-award (sic) to my client the Bidding by Registry 05-2005 promoted by the Municipality of Santa Cruz. 3. That the defendant institution and the company DEPPAT S.A., be ordered to pay both costs –personal and procedural- of this litigation*." (Cf. claim formalization brief on folios 121-122). *Use of italics supplied.

2- By brief filed on August 13, 2007, the representative of the plaintiff responds to the hearing granted by this Office by order of 2:56 p.m. on July 24, 2007 (at folio 153), and states the following:

"In accordance with the requirement of this Office, I allow myself to indicate that regarding the claim for recognition of damages and losses, they originate in the irregularities and violations of the legal system that occurred in the process and award of the bidding by registry 5-2005 in favor of the company DEPPAT (DESARROLLO EN ECOLOGÍA PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO S.A.), as well as in the invalidation of the award of said competition promoted by the Municipality of Santa Cruz. Those damages and losses consist of the impossibility, on the part of my client, of having become a co-contractor of the Administration, the expenses in the defense of legality, the proper use of public funds, transparency and good faith in administrative procurement, as well as the lost profit resulting from the projected utility in relation to the contractual process in question. The referred damages and losses are prudently estimated in the sum of ¢20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones), plus the respective interest until their effective payment and their indexation*." (see brief on folio 154 of the main file). *Use of italics supplied.

3- By brief filed on November 5, 2007, the plaintiff requests that "…for all material legal effects, the claim be considered amended, in its entirety, against Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo S.A.*" (thus at folio 191). *Use of italics supplied.

4- Once the transfer of the action was carried out, the co-defendant, company Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA (DEPPAT S.A.), answers the claim in the negative, and raises the defenses of lack of right, as it alleges that the plaintiff has no right to sue, and that of lack of passive standing since the nullity of the requested agreements and the damages and losses caused thereby are not attributable to the defendant company (brief added to folios ranging from 238 to 249 in the main file).

The Municipality of Santa Cruz did not answer the action and was declared in default by order of three forty-six p.m. on October twelfth of the year two thousand seven (folios 183-184 ibid.).

5- The prescriptions of the Law have been observed in the proceedings and no procedural defects are observed that cause nullity of actions or that prevent the fulfillment of due process, therefore, this matter is to be resolved after deliberation with the unanimous opinion of its members within the margin of time allowed by the Office's workload.

Drafted by Judge Isaac Amador Hernández; and

Considering:

FIRST: Proven Facts. For the resolution of this matter, the Court holds the following facts as proven: 1- Through an agreement issued by the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz, in its ordinary session No. 07-2005, Article 6, subsection 02 of February 15, 2005, the carrying out of the bidding by registry for the preparation of the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) of Playa Callejones- Playa San Juanillo of that Canton was unanimously approved (folio 21, Volume I of the administrative file). 2- That said bidding process was called Bidding by Registry No. 5-2005 Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (folio 30 Admin. File Volume I). 3- That a total of five bids submitted by different companies participated in said bidding process, namely, Ingenieros de Centroamérica SA; DEPPAT, SA.; ARGUESA, SA.; SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA DE ARQUITECTOS, SA (SAAR SA); and Nombre150242 ; two of such bidders being the plaintiff company in this proceeding and the co-defendant company (folios 502, 503, 504 and 507 of the Administrative File, Volume III, and integrally Volume II of the Admin. File). 4- That the bidding document (cartel licitatorio) describes the general conditions of the procurement, the terms of reference for the preparation of the regulatory plan Playa Callejones-Playa San Juanillo, the scope of the service to be contracted, the information regarding the representatives and personnel of each bidding company, the validity of the bids, the form of payment, the eligibility conditions, the conditions of the security deposit and penalty clause, and the evaluation system, the latter consisting of two items, a- the bid price, to which a value of 70 points is given, and, b- the delivery period, to which a value of 30 points is given (folios 22 to 30 of the Admin. File, Volume I). 5- That the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz, through an Agreement taken in its ordinary session No. 26-2005, Article 5, subsection 7 of June 28, 2005, agreed to award the bidding by registry No. 5-2005 to the company DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA), for an amount of eight million four hundred thousand colones, according to publication made in official gazette La Gaceta No. 145 of July 28, 2005, p. 27 (thus at folio 53 Admin. File, Volume III, also in relation to folio 3 of the main file). 6- Against said award, the company Arquitectura SAAR, SA, plaintiff in this proceeding, filed an appeal for reversal which was heard and resolved negatively against it by agreement of the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz, adopted in ordinary session No. 43-2005, Article 5, subsection 07 of October 25, 2005 (folios 1 and 2 of the main file). 7- That on November 28, 2005, the referred company, Sociedad Anónima Arquitectura SAAR, SA., filed this contentious administrative proceeding against the municipality of Santa Cruz and which ultimately includes as co-defendant the company DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA) (folios 6 to 8 and 99 and 100 of the main file). 8- That upon being filed, this matter was officially communicated by this Office to the Contraloría General de la República at 14:00 hours on April 7, 2006, without it being recorded that said entity appeared in the proceedings (folios 24 and 25 of the main file).

SECOND: Facts Not Proven. In the assessment of this matter, the Court holds as not proven or accredited in the record the existence of the damages and losses caused to the plaintiff company by reason of the bidding process that it is challenging in this venue; there is simply no proof thereof.

THIRD: Arguments of the Plaintiff. In the claim formalization brief, the plaintiff alleges and grounds what, without prejudice to its extensive literal content in the record (folios 99 to 122 of the main file), states the following: FACTS: As such, it cites the following, 1- The carrying out of the bidding procedure No. 5-2005 promoted by the Municipality of Santa Cruz, to contract the preparation of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) of Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo. 2- The publication of said competition in the official gazette. 3- The description made in subsection 2.10 of the bidding document regarding the requirement of a topographic survey with contour lines every meter at most for those terrains where the horizontal distance represents a determining factor in the vertical survey. 4- According to the bidding document description, the total study area is 91.6 hectares. 5- It describes the system proposed in the bidding document to evaluate the bids, the lowest price and delivery period being the only factors to consider in the qualification. 6- It briefly describes the content of the bids submitted based on those variables to be qualified. 7- It describes the administrative act by which the administration awards the competition to the company DEPPAT. 8- It cites the municipal agreement by which the appeal filed against the award act was dismissed. AS GROUNDS, it set forth the following:

I- Regarding the price and the violation of fundamental principles. The Municipality of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, promoted Bidding By Registry No. 5-2005 to contract the completion of the Regulatory Plan for the area of Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo, in which several companies participated bidding each of them the following conditions, the company DEPPAT SA for an amount of eight million four hundred thousand colones with a period of twenty-four days; the limited liability company Arquitectura SAAR for an amount of twenty million and with a delivery period of four point five months; ARGUESA SA, for an amount of eighteen million colones and a delivery period of twenty-two months; Ingenieros de Centroamérica Ltda., for an amount of forty-two million colones and a delivery period of four months; and Nombre71576 for an amount of thirty-eight million two hundred eighty thousand colones in a period of eight months. The defendant Municipal Council awarded said competition to the company Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA., for an amount of eight million four hundred thousand colones with a delivery period of twenty-four days. Such award, however, is in violation of the principle of constitutional legality, also contained in the subordinate regulations that reproduce its scope and that constrain all actions of the Public Administration, which was disregarded in the decision being challenged, because the awarded bid is based on a ruinous price and an unreal fulfillment condition, which results in an evident transgression of the principles of legality, economic balance of the contract, freedom of contract, reasonableness and proportionality. In this case, in the assessment of the principles of efficiency, equality of treatment and opportunities, legality, sound administration and good faith, the contracting municipal government should have, in accordance with the applicable regulations, disqualified the bid submitted by the awarded company, because it results in a ruinous price that leads to a clear violation of the provisions of the Fee Schedule Regulations for Professionals in Land Surveying, Topography and Topographic Engineering (Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica), Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 17481 of April 7, 1987 and its amendments. Just as the pronouncements of the Contraloría General de la República have stated, the Administration must not award the bid with the lowest price or the one offering the earliest delivery, as that is not sufficient, since it is legally obligated to verify those prices in order to determine that they are clearly truthful, real, reasonable and proportionate to the object to which the procurement refers. At this point, the plaintiff's representative cites ruling 998-98 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), resolution RSL No. 262-97 of 15:00 hours on November 10, 1997, resolution RC-573-2002 of 9:00 hours on September 4, 2002, as well as resolution R-DAGJ-500-2003 of 10:00 hours on November 10, 2003, issued by the Contraloría General de la República. In addition to the above, the Administrative Procurement Regulations (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), applicable to the case by virtue of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, requires in the study of the sealed bids the mandatory exclusion from the competition of those presenting an unacceptable price, whether for being excessive in relation to market prices or for being above fair or reasonable profit, or for being ruinous or non-remunerative for the bidder, in which case the exclusion is justified insofar as the price gives rise to presume the possible breach of the contractor regarding its contractual obligations due to insufficiency in the payment it will receive. In procurements such as the one challenged, in which the price factor has so much weight in choosing the contractor, the Administration must analyze the bids considering results of serious studies that allow it to decide the possible market value of the goods or services to be tendered, beyond the bidding document formula indicated in the evaluation of that item, which will allow it to know the value of what is contracted, but also to know if it can face the procurement and if the proposals received are acceptable in terms of prices. The responsibility for determining the ruinousness or not of a price bid belongs to the contracting administration, which must verify if a price is ruinous or non-remunerative, or on the contrary, if it is excessive. Hence, pursuant to Article 56 of the Administrative Procurement Regulations, the Administration is obligated to exclude those bids that quote ruinous or excessive prices, which points to the obligation of every administration to center its decision on objective parameters in the study of the prices quoted to it, in order to go beyond the simple comparison between low and high prices. In the challenged process, the bid awarded in comparison with the other bids submitted, shows a difference that ranges between ten and thirty-four million colones, which makes it far from an acceptable and competitive market price. In this regard, it cites the criterion expressed by the Contraloría General de la República to the effect that a bid with a ruinous price is not eligible. It also cites the content of Article 18 of the Administrative Procurement Law regarding the Administration's obligation to maintain the economic balance of the contract. In the present matter, the contracting Administration, in accordance with the principles of efficiency, transparency, equality, good faith and sound administration of public funds, should have disqualified the DEPPAT bid, since it was ineligible and invalid, therefore it should not have been awarded, which is consistent with the criterion that the Contraloría General de la República has applied, in observance of article 56.3 of the General Administrative Procurement Regulations. In this case, the ruinousness arises from the non-compliance with Article 1 of the Fee Schedule Regulations for Land Surveyors, according to Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 17481 of April 7, 1987, published in La Gaceta No. 74 of April 20, 1987. The bidding document establishes, in point 2.10, that the topographic survey must be carried out with contour lines every meter at most, for those terrains where horizontally the distance represents a determining factor in the vertical survey. By having requested the administration a topographic survey with contour lines every meter at most, it subjects the bidder to special conditions, it being technically and legally binding for the latter to prepare its bid based on the Fee Schedule Regulations for Professionals in Land Surveying, Topography and Topographic Engineering. Said requirement constitutes a discriminating element of the bidding document for the bids that were submitted, as it is defined a priori and must be satisfied with a view to the public purpose sought by the procurement. For the elaboration of the contour lines of the area to be regulated, the minimum fees established by Executive Decree 17481 must be observed. In Playa Callejones the space is seventy hectares, for Playa San Juanillo it is twenty-one point six hectares, which totals ninety point six hectares, to which is added a fourteen point thirty-nine percent inflation, which in accordance with article 17 of the Fee Schedule Regulations in that matter, allows establishing the price relationship reaching eight million seven hundred twenty-seven thousand nine hundred sixty-six colones with seventy cents, if all the land were flat; and eleven million eight hundred ninety-one thousand four hundred sixty-two colones with thirty cents if the land were undulating. That would amount to fourteen million two hundred sixty-four thousand eighty-seven colones with fifty cents, if it were mountainous land. Thus, the price bid by DEPPAT SA is ruinous since none of the cases of the bids submitted exceeds or equals that amount in application of the applicable fee schedule; it cites in this regard resolution RC-355-2001 of June 28, 2001 of the Contraloría General de la República. The awarded bid presents an essential defect such as the price factor, which in what happened becomes ruinous and illicit, therefore it is the Administration's duty to exclude the company DEPPAT, based on the constitutionally mandated principle of legality, since it is a defect that cannot be cured because that factor constitutes an essential element of the competition. In relation to this, there is a serious disrespect for the principle of inviolability of the public patrimony in the sense that this principle is linked to that of economic balance of the contract contemplated in Article 18 of the Administrative Procurement Law. There are sufficient technical arguments to consider that the bid presented by its principal is the best and the one that satisfies the general interest, therefore the annulment of the award made to DEPPAT SA is appropriate, so that the competition be re-awarded to its principal in its place.

II- Regarding the delivery period offered by the awarded company: Said period violates the principles of logic, technique, reason, proportionality, and balance between the price bid and the period offered, since it is materially impossible for the elaboration of a regulatory plan to be carried out in only twenty-four calendar days, when none of the bids proposes less than four months of time to perform said task. The plaintiff's representation mentions in this sense the jurisprudential scope that the Constitutional Chamber has given to the principle of reasonableness, in ruling 1420-91.

III- The legal prohibition of the awardee from participating in the competition: Article 22, subsection f) provides that natural or legal persons who have intervened as advisors in any stage of the procurement procedure or have participated in the preparation of the specifications, the design and construction of the work or the alternative variants regarding the specifications or plans provided by the administration, are legally prohibited from participating in administrative procurement procedures. In accordance with said rule, the professional in charge of the awarded company, Nombre71574 , has stated that during the time he worked for the ICT, he was in charge of the preparation of regulatory plans and prepared the model for the preparation of Regulatory Plans in the Zona Marítimo Terrestre in 1982, which is still in force, in which the technical criteria for the preparation of those coastal plans are defined, which are followed by consulting companies and applied by the institutions responsible for their approval. From such statements, the legal prohibition to participate in the bidding by registry 05-2005 for the company DEPPAT is inferred, since in one of its participating professionals, such prohibition applied, as it concerns the professional representative who participated in the preparation of the technical basis of the bidding, which was in use at the time of the competition, which contaminates his company's bid and makes it illicit pursuant to Article 22 of the Administrative Procurement Law, therefore in all procurement the principle of good faith must prevail and that no one may benefit from their own deceit. The object contracted by the administration is illicit for contravening the law in terms of the ruinousness of its bid, coming from the disrespect for the customs and special rules that regulate the fees in the respective professional field, and from the legal prohibition that arises at the moment the professional defends himself before his professional association. It is a bid contrary to the Law, which cannot be perfected nor produce legal effects. At this point, the representative of the plaintiff company carries out a verification task of the method provided in the bidding document to choose the bid to which the competition is awarded, which leads him to conclude –so he states-, that SAAR SA, is the one that demonstrates the aptitude to obtain the award in the event that what has been done is annulled. From what has been said, it follows that if the contracting administration had observed the applicable legality, especially the principles of efficiency and equality, the bid of the co-defendant company would have been disqualified and the final result of the award would have been different and it would not have caused real harm to its principal. In this regard, it cites resolution 021-2002 of January 9, 2002 of the Contraloría General de la República.

FOURTH: Arguments and Defense of the Awarded Company. The co-defendant and awarded company in the tendered competition, firm Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA, when answering the claim rejects the charges formulated as follows: It rejects the facts; points out that this firm has experience in the field covered by the procurement for about twenty-four years, alleges that if the plaintiff did not agree with some aspects of the procurement, such as the qualification table for the items and the percentages assigned for qualification purposes, it should have challenged in a timely manner what corresponded to the bidding document, as well as what regards point 2.10, and not come to do so in court once an award already exists. It argues that in this venue it is not appropriate to declare the nullity of the clauses of the bidding document; that the plaintiff's allegations have no support, as they reflect ignorance of the type of professional work required to carry out a coastal regulatory plan. It alleges that its company has extensive experience in this type of work and that those that have been entrusted to it have been for unrelated reasons.

Then, it argues the following: 1- To demonstrate that the plaintiff's arguments lack support due to ignorance of the type of professional work required for the completion of a coastal regulatory plan, it states that during his tenure at the ICT in charge of preparing regulatory plans, he prepared the model for the elaboration of those documents in 1982 which is still in force; that document defines the criteria for preparing coastal regulatory plans, which consulting companies follow and which the institutions responsible for the approval of such documents apply. 2- The co-defendant continues stating that professionals in these areas understand that a coastal regulatory plan constitutes a land-use zoning (zonificación de usos del suelo), whose technical nature does not even reach the level of an urbanization preliminary project, since what is sought is to define the most convenient land use and never to prepare an urban design proposal or an architectural project; the road network (viabilidad) that is proposed is preliminary in nature and can be modified in the design phase of each of the roads of the regulatory plan; this type of plan is a sui generis product within professional work and never constitutes a job that can be regulated by the traditional fees established by the Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. 3- The preparation of the environmental and physical diagnostic maps, as well as the zoning and road network proposal, is prepared on a base map that shows the main characteristics of the area to be planned, the location of boundary markers, rivers and creeks, location of facilities, contour lines and others. Given the preliminary nature of the coastal regulatory plan, great precision of this information is not required; it only needs to give an idea of the topographic variations for decision-making regarding land use. In many regulatory plans, consulting companies use an interpolation of the contour lines that appear in the sheets published by the IGN, which is accepted by the ICT and by the INVU; cases can even be documented in which the diagnostic and the proposal have been prepared on aerial photographs enlarged by the IGN, which is accepted by said institutions. Currently it has been possible to obtain, with some precision, contour lines derived from the satellite photographs available to the country. The defendant continues to argue that professionals in engineering and topography, as well as geographers and biologists with training and instruction, can prepare a base map with contour lines, and if necessary, field verification could be carried out, or if the information on levels at the boundary markers is sufficient, field work is not required; the topography work required for a coastal regulatory plan is not necessarily the professional work that has a fee schedule regulated by the CFIA, since due to the preliminary nature of the regulatory plan proposal, there are alternatives to obtain the base plan and consulting companies are free to contract a land surveyor, an engineer, a geographer or some other professional who provides that service. 4- Practically in no case, for the purposes of a quote for a coastal regulatory plan, is the calculation of the fees for traditional contour lines included as part of the cost; the contract made with the client is not for a topography work, but it is a final product where it is not a requirement to show or deliver the plan with the contour lines.

If the zoning and viability maps of approved regulatory plans published in the official gazette are carefully reviewed, it can be verified that contour lines are not included as a final deliverable of the regulatory plan; the base plan work, which includes contour lines, does not necessarily have to be carried out with field work and, therefore, the fees do not necessarily have to be applied either, since this work can perfectly be performed by a professional other than a surveyor. 5- At this point, the defendant develops several examples of contracts undertaken in which she attempts to demonstrate that the arguments of the plaintiff fall under their own weight and could support that the offer submitted by the plaintiff not be considered real, reasonable, and proportionate to the object of the procurement, but rather outside the normal market price. In this context, she cites three examples of a coastal regulatory plan which, according to her statement, were awarded by other municipalities, using fees that are not those governing the preparation of contour lines. 6- The quotations for coastal regulatory plans that include base plan work with contour lines are not formulated by accounting for the CFIA fees for surveying work as part of their costs. Given the preliminary nature of a coastal regulatory plan, there are options to undertake the zoning proposal with professional responsibility without traditional field work. When this company has contracted a surveyor to produce the contour lines of a project, it has been done under the modality of a staff professional (profesional de planilla), which means that during that time they will carry out various activities that remove them from liberal practice and for that reason the CFIA fee does not apply to their work, this being another modality by which companies in this market line perform tasks such as the one awarded in this instance at reasonable prices and without these becoming ruinous. She argues that regarding the alleged prohibition against contracting with the administration in this case, which the plaintiff claims against her, she indicates that such a situation does not occur because although in 1982, as an ICT official, she prepared the Model for the Preparation of Regulatory Plans in the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Modelo para la Elaboración de Planes Reguladores en la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), which is still in force, it never became official, remaining as a recommendation and consultation standard, without binding effects for any public or private institution, and therefore it is not a regulatory standard of mandatory compliance, but simply a model that was not made official. Consequently, the representative of the defendant company is not covered by the prohibitions of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), and therefore her offer is not contrary to law. She requests that the claim be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses caused to her represented party (document from folios 238 to 249). \n\nFIFTH: On the mathematical expert opinion provided to the case file. Upon filing the action, the plaintiff party requests the appointment of an expert opinion to calculate the minimum amount to be charged according to the Fee Schedule Regulations for Surveying, Topography, and Topographic Engineering Professionals (Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica) established in the tender documents, pursuant to numeral 2.10 of the tender documents and Article 10 of the Administrative Procurement Law. Furthermore, the plaintiff requests that the expert calculate the damages and lost profits of the company. Once these data are obtained, the corresponding interest that has ceased to be earned must be calculated, taking into consideration a price revision to date, in accordance with Article 18 of the Administrative Procurement Law, using the adjustment clause utilized by the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Court, by order of 3:51 PM on September 21, 2009, granted the request (see order on folio 263), and on April 5, 2010, the appointed Mathematical Actuary expert Nombre18237, renders the expert report indicating that direct damages amount to ¢4,510,000.00; the damage to image and damage to the company are to be calculated by the judge, while lost profits, understood as such as the percentage of profit the plaintiff lost by not carrying out the work, which she estimates at 25% of the given offer, amounts to ¢5,000,000.00; meanwhile, the legal interest on the direct damages caused to the plaintiff, in the period from June 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, amounts to ¢2,338,527.70, and the legal interest on the plaintiff's lost profits in the period from November 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, totals ¢Placa23189 (folios 279 to 283). By means of an amplification to that report, which was requested by the plaintiff party (at folio 290), the mentioned professional indicates that the information that has served as the basis for his report, regarding the investment of professional hours for field visits and site inspection; hotel expenses for the officials who made the visit; expenses for meals, mileage, and fuel; investment in professional hours for visits to the Municipality; expenses for maps, stationery, and photocopies; expenses for presenting the offer to the Municipality; cost of the non-recovered participation guarantee, are all data that were provided to him by the plaintiff party (folios 295 and 296 of the principal case file). \n\nIn this regard, this Court does not endorse the aforementioned expert report, primarily because it concerns a calculation obtained by means of a list of items whose existence is not accredited in the case file (see the orders in this respect); then, because the basis of the data constructed in that expert opinion was provided by the very party interested in obtaining the payment of those extremes (see the statement on folio 296 of the principal case file), which strips the final result obtained of all objectivity and independence of the expert's criterion, who limited himself to calculation, at the same time that the plaintiff party failed to accredit, at any stage of the proceeding, suitable evidence, such as invoices, vouchers, contracts, and documents to demonstrate the expenses she alleges incurred on the occasion of participating in the bidding process that is the object of this litigation. In addition to the foregoing, the mere statement of the expert does not, in itself, constitute the basis of the technical fact sought to be proven by his intervention in the proceeding, as the expert is a person with technical knowledge in a branch of knowledge that —it is usually conceived— is alien to that possessed by the adjudicator, such that the person designated in a jurisdictional proceeding to perform the expert task becomes an auxiliary to the judge naturally assigned to the case, this being the essential connotation of their participation in the trial, that of being an auxiliary to the judge who must form a criterion of certainty regarding what is requested in the claim, for which purpose they must rely upon and instrumentalize such input in their decision. In the instant case, this circumstance does not arise, because the expert report is limited to describing and calculating the accounts whose existence —certainly not verified in the case file— the plaintiff party provides, as is demonstrable by the simple and plain statement that said professional makes when amplifying his report (in accordance with folio 296). As indicated, such circumstance compromises the objectivity, impartiality, and independence of the expert professional, except for the simple arithmetic operation performed, who is called upon to construct a criterion of certainty based on objective parameters, even verifiable by the Court, which in the instant case is not met, meriting the rejection of said evidence. For these reasons, the Court disregards the expert criterion which is aimed only at ratifying, without further consideration, the plaintiff's statement regarding damages and losses, which lacks any verification in the case file and for that very reason becomes unaddressable. \n\nSIXTH: Merits of the matter. 1- ON THE DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITY. The Court has analyzed in its entirety the provided case file and the arguments of the parties, concluding, first, that the fact that the Municipality of Santa Cruz was declared in default, for not having answered the claim, should not be understood as sufficient merit to rule against it in the claim, since default as a procedural consequence of the lack of timely or total attention to the proceeding cannot have effects other than those created by the procedural law that regulates the institute; such that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 310 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), as authorized by numeral 103 of Law 3667 (RJCA/1966), the consequence for the party declared in default is that the claim is deemed affirmatively answered, regarding the facts invoked when filing and formalizing it; therefore, although the proceeding continues without the appearance of the defaulting party —the norm states "...the proceeding shall continue without their intervention;…"—, nevertheless, the defaulting party may appear at any later moment, taking the proceeding in the state in which it finds itself, which means they may not request a return to stages already precluded or the review of proceedings in which a procedural status has already been declared for or against them or their counterpart. Such a declaration of default, however, cannot suppose the outright defeat of the defaulting party, nor does it prevent them, upon resuming the proceeding, from offering the evidence they consider pertinent for their claim, be it new evidence or, simply, that which they believe can be adduced to better provide for the adjudicator's criterion. In this regard, in Decision 801-F-02 of 11:10 AM on October 18, 2002, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice stated: "(…) IX.-…the default is not by itself sufficient for the definitive accreditation of the facts; it only attains this value if other evidence of the same lineage does not contradict the deemed answer. Therefore, the default must be assessed alongside the rest of the evidentiary elements existing in the proceeding." In this line, the declaration of default against one of the parties in the proceeding does not dissipate or attenuate the procedural obligation of the adjudicator to, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, numeral 4) of the Civil Procedure Code, verify the affirmations made by the parties, analyzing the relevance and veracity of the evidence provided to the case file. What has been said allows establishing the guideline that, regarding what happened in the instant case, this collegiate body assumes, for the defendant Administration did not appear in the case file, although from this no ruling against it is derived "per se," without analyzing the body of evidence and other elements of the proceeding that circumstantiate the final resolution adopted. \n\n2- FIRST ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS BY THE PLAINTIFF: The ruinous nature of the price offered as grounds for the nullity of the challenged award. Now, regarding the grounds for the nullity of the award act for bid process 05-2005 promoted by the co-defendant municipality, it is a fact that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Administrative Procurement Law, No. 7494, published in Supplement No. 20 to La Gaceta No. 110 of June 8, 1995 (LCA), the nullities regime legislated in the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) applies to administrative procurement. This allows being clear that the legality review applicable to this matter is that provided for in the mentioned General Public Administration Law.\n\nDelving deeper into this purpose, it is necessary to keep in mind that the ruinous condition of a price offered in the bid of a tendering process (by registry, in this case) acquires that condition when it does not represent adequate remuneration for the costs that foreseeably—according to the tender documents of the competition—, the offeror will incur during the validity and execution of the contract to give full compliance to it, to the detriment of the Administration, in which case it is often mentioned that a price is ruinous for not being remunerative for whoever offers it, for the indicated reason. A price in that condition makes foreseeable not only the patrimonial impairment of the offeror but also the eventual non-compliance with the contract as a result of the lack of adequate remuneration, with the emergent patrimonial harm not only for the offeror but also for the contracting party. The ruinous or non-remunerative price comes to be a disvalue that harms the administrative contract and the patrimony of the contracting parties. In the consideration of this condition, according to what has been indicated above, the legality parameters regulated in the LGAP intervene, to which all activity of the Public Administration is subject by the principle of legality. The study of the specific case allows elucidating that the price offered by the awarded company, of eight million four hundred thousand colones for the realization of the coastal regulatory plans in Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo, within the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, was formulated without correlating the structure of the total amount with the activities that, according to the tendering documents, are the object of the administrative procurement according to the terms of reference and the scope of the services to be contracted that were tendered by the contracting administration. In the offer presented by the company DEPPAT, a cost for each activity described in the tender documents of the competition is not specified, which makes the assignment of a value representative of the cost of each one of them uncertain for the offeror, which allows concluding that the price indeed becomes ruinous, considering that it is not foreseeably remunerative of the list of tasks and specificities that the awardee must fulfill according to the tendering documents. It should be taken into account that, in fact, the detailed description of the economic offer proposed by the awarded company is not even recorded in the principal case file or the administrative file; in fact, it is the opening record of the offers submitted (folios 502 to 504, Volume III of the Admin. File) and the comparative table subsequently prepared by the Institutional Procurement Department (folio 520 ibidem), the elements that allow this Court to confirm the amount for which the offer presented by the co-defendant company was awarded. No less important and necessary to consider in verifying the defect that the price offered by the awarded company evidences is that the plaintiff party's argument is centered exclusively on the ruinous nature of the proposed price, claiming non-observance of the fee schedule that a professional in topography must charge to carry out the survey of the contour lines requested by the tender documents of the competition, considering that, according to that allegation, the offer submitted by the awardee fails to comply with the provisions of Executive Decree No. 17481 Fee Schedule Regulations for Surveying, Topography, and Topographic Engineering Professionals (Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales de Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica), of June 19, 1989. Nevertheless, and regarding the calculation of such non-compliance, it is a fact that the amount written in the bid does not demonstrate coverage of the fees of the remaining professionals of the interdisciplinary team that would be carrying out the Coastal Regulatory Plan for both beach areas, meaning that the price proposed in the economic offer of ¢8,400,000.00 does not demonstrate being remunerative, neither of the cost implied by hiring a professional in topography, even if by staff, nor of the remaining team of professionals that would have to be integrated in the formulation phase of the Regulatory Plan, as can be reasonably concluded from the list described in the SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED (ALCANCES DE LOS SERVICIOS A CONTRATAR) section contained in the tender documents of the competition (see folios 26, 27, and 28 of the Admin. File, Volume I). Stated in other terms, the offering of the price proposed by the company DEPPAT SA fails to demonstrate in the case file that it is remunerative of the costs represented by the contracting of a surveyor professional, nor of the professional team that would have to carry out the Regulatory Plan for the Beach areas described in the competition sub examine. Therefore, even beyond the non-compliance with the surveying professionals' fee schedule alleged by the plaintiff party, an argument that in any event the co-defendant fails to effectively disprove, a lack of coverage of the offered price occurs for the fees of the remaining professionals who would have to participate in the preparation of the Regulatory Plan, without the contrary being proven in the case file; to which must be added that the cost of the other items that the awardee would foreseeably have to incur, according to the list of specifications required in the contract, Section 2- of the terms of reference, which describes, as indicated, THE SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED (folios previously cited), is also not reflected in the offered price. When considering the exculpatory argument offered by the defendant, the Court finds that what her representative argued in this regard lacks regulatory support, since, even if the hiring of the surveyor professional is carried out under the "staff professional" (profesional en planilla) modality alluded to in the litis contestatio (at folio 247 of the principal case file), it is a fact that the price offered by the defendant fails to demonstrate a coverage level of the costs necessary to comply with the terms of reference of the competition. The arguments relative to the provisional nature of the information that the Regulatory Plan final document submitted by the awardee would be containing are not acceptable to this Court, since that is not the condition described in the tendering documents for the document that the Administration requests (see folio 5 of Volume I, folio 533 of Volume III, and the conditions described in the tender documents for the procurement on folios 26 to 30 of Volume I, all references made to the administrative case file provided in certified form by the defendant Administration). What the co-defendant argued in this respect is not supported by any of the characteristics and specificities of the tendered Regulatory Plan, nor, likewise, in her offer does the co-defendant at any time indicate that the work or final product will have that characteristic of provisionality or office-based formulation, with which she formulates the defense of the quoted price. \n\nFor what has been set forth so far, the Court concludes that the argument of the ruinous nature of the offered price, which was alleged by the plaintiff party, is found estimable and consequently, the alleged ground for the nullity of the award made in the competition is appropriate. \n\n 3- SECOND ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS BY THE PLAINTIFF: The impossibility of the term offered by the defendant as grounds for the nullity of the competition award act. In addition to the foregoing, from the comparison of the mentioned pieces of the administrative case file, namely folios 502 to 504 and folio 520 of Volume III, Administrative File, it follows that the time offer for the fulfillment and delivery of the final product proposed by the awardee is twenty-four calendar days, while the remaining offers exceed one hundred days (see aforementioned folio 520). Evidently, it concerns a term for performance that breaks any of the remaining offers, due to its brevity and reduction. The plaintiff party alleges that this is a materially impossible term to fulfill and that it transgresses the principle of reasonableness, constitutionally relevant as a parameter for the actions of public administrations. In itself, the defendant party does not comment on this, but rather her argument is limited to reasoning the feasibility of being able to quote a lower price for the competed task. However, she sets aside and in no way addresses the argument of a reasonable term for the fulfillment of the contracted object that the plaintiff party imputes against her. It is thus an unanswered argument on the part of the defendant, on which this Court holds the following: Although at folio 443 of Volume II of the provided Administrative File, the defendant awarded company offers a schedule of activities to be performed, it is a fact that at no point in the wording of said tool is it indicated that it is a performance calendar, but rather a list of activities with a placement in time for them, within the twenty-four days that the offeror proposes; however, that list does not correlate with the activities described in the tender documents of the competition, which makes it evident that, with the evidence provided in the case file, it can be concluded that the activities contained in the tendering documents, under numerals 2.16, are excluded from that list, since the time budget that they require is never mentioned in the proposed schedule, and in this sense, the bid of the awarded company partially fails to comply with the requirements of the tender documents in the indicated numeral; the foregoing reinforces the thesis of the impossibility of fulfilling the offered term. The absence of such content at the schedule level does constitute grounds for nullity because it is a deficiency contained in the offer, and which places the expectation of contract fulfillment below what is required by the contracting Public Administration in accordance with the tender documents of the competition that are integrated into the case file. In this regard, this Court considers it necessary to evidence that in matters of administrative procurement, the tendering administration must justify the lifting of any of the offer requirements in favor of the offerors, with due advance notice, even giving the real opportunity to hear the persons participating in the competition regarding such decision. In the instant case, such justification is not recorded in the case file, and if it was not done, the award becomes null for illegitimately omitting the requirement of a specification contained in the tender documents, with the double error that, in this case, such exemption favors only one of the participants, which is null and void ab initio for disrespecting constitutional and subordinate legality parameters, described in numerals 11, 33, 41, 49, 182 all of the Political Constitution and the contents of articles 4 and 5 of the Administrative Procurement Law No. 7494, published in Supplement No. 110 of June 8, 1995, Supplement No. 20, and its reforms.\n\nFurther elaborating on what the plaintiff party argued regarding this aspect, the award of the offer must be proportional not only regarding the financial budget but also regarding the time budget proposed by the bids submitted, in order to give full compliance to the technical legality parameters described in Article 16 of the General Public Administration Law, an aspect on which the plaintiff company's argument is found estimable.\n\nThis Court has found, in the legality review conducted, that other offers annexed to the administrative file also fail to be specific regarding the requirements of the tender documents, which is not considered sound practice, as the administration must ensure exhaustive compliance with the terms of reference formulated in the tendering documents, an aspect which, as stated, lacks full compliance in the instant case, and which, as it is not a matter that is the object of the proceeding, this Court merely wishes to evidence, considering the procedural legality to which the work of the undersigned is constrained, so that the contracting authority formulates the corrections that in sound law correspond, if it deems it appropriate. \n\n4- THIRD ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS BY THE PLAINTIFF: The possible incompatibility to contract with the State of the representative of the awarded company as grounds for the nullity of the competition award act. Not without warning that the argument of disrespect for Article 17 of the Code of Ethics of the CFIA, which the plaintiff party indicates (at folio 259), is omitted because it supports the application to the sub examine case of a norm that does not entail the effects of generality that are those that allow formulating an examination of the legality observable in a jurisdictional venue, with the application of said norm being reserved for the oversight bodies of the professional practice of the members of the mentioned Professional Association (Colegio Profesional), and therefore its allegation in this matter is rejected.\n\nA third argument for challenge indicated by the plaintiff party is the existence of a possible incompatibility of the awardee in the terms of articles 22 and 22 bis of the Administrative Procurement Law, considering that her legal representative has stated in the case file that, as an official of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), she participated in the year 1982 in the preparation of the model Coastal Regulatory Plan which, still being in force, is a document that guides the actions to be performed by private companies and the institutions that approve this type of Coastal Regulatory Plans, which —and this is the central argument of the plaintiff—, creates an advantage for her as a bidder in the tendering process, which is expressly forbidden in the mentioned norms of administrative procurement. \n\nUpon answering the claim, the representative of the plaintiff party confirms that as an ICT official in 1982, she was in charge of preparing the model that defines the technical criteria intervening in the preparation of the coastal regulatory plan followed by consulting companies and applied by the institutions in charge of approving them (thus at folio 241 of the principal case file). She then alleges that this document was never approved, and only serves as consultation; it is not binding or mandatory for any public or private institution, and it provides guidelines and technical criteria for preparing this type of regulatory plan. She argues that she is not covered by the prohibitions against contracting with the administration.\n\nIt is the criterion of this Court that in the instant case, the incompatibility that the plaintiff party accuses against the legal representative of the awarded company cannot be verified, because, from the outset, it is necessary to point out that such incompatibility constitutes a true interdiction on participation in administrative procurement processes carried out by public administrations, consequently governing a restrictive not only enunciative but also interpretive nature to which the legal operator cannot and must not superpose elements other than those that are in the normative. Thus, those norms provide a series of assumptions that require a responsible formulation of the charge attributed to the offeror to verify whether any of such assumptions in fact applies. \n\nThis Court has reviewed such norms, finding that they regulate the scope of participation of the public official in the competitive processes through which the public administration must acquire the goods and services required by its ordinary course of business. They are both norms, Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Administrative Procurement Law, that introduce an express prohibition under the conditions described therein to persons holding the designation or capacity of public official. In the instant case, such a condition cannot be proven nor verified, for there simply is no evidence in the case file that allows unequivocally assuming that the legal representative of the company DEPPAT SA, Mr. Nombre71574, when participating as the representative of said company in the mentioned tendering process, is holding the position of a public official with the possibility of influencing said decision. In this regard, the plaintiff party fails to demonstrate such a situation, breaching the principle of the burden of proof contained in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, from the legality examination carried out in this matter, the Court cannot deduce that the mentioned legal representative of the co-defendant company is a public official and that, at the time of formulating the bid, he was in any of the hypotheses described in the mentioned articles of the Administrative Procurement Law, and consequently, this charge against the actions whose nullity is sought must be rejected. \n\n SEVENTH: On the claims of the plaintiff party. A) THE ANNULMENT CLAIM. The plaintiff has requested that both the act of awarding the tendered competition and the administrative act by which the appeal for revocation filed against said award was rejected be annulled. Both are administrative acts issued by the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. As has been set forth, the Court has found that the plaintiff party is assisted by reason and right, and the claim must be partially granted. As indicated, what was claimed is appropriate regarding the ruinous price of the awarded offer and regarding the performance term described therein. Both being essential elements of administrative procurement in accordance with the mentioned protective legislation on the matter. What was alleged regarding the presumed incompatibility to contract with the State attributed to the legal representative of the awardee has no merit. For the foregoing, the action is partially estimable.\n\nB) THE DAMAGES CLAIM. Now, regarding the damages claim (pretensión resarcitoria) formulated by the plaintiff, the claim must be denied because in no way does the plaintiff prove the damages and losses that she alleges have been caused to her by her participation in the competition, or by failing to be awarded in the present competition.

In this regard, it is pertinent to bear in mind that participation in this type of tender does not generate for the bidder anything more than a mere expectation of a right, since its bid becomes subject to evaluation alongside any others that may have been submitted. Regarding participation in tenders inherent to administrative contracting, the mere invitation to participate in the tender does not give rise to a sphere of patrimonial liability on the part of the contracting administration—as the plaintiff party seems to understand—nor does the mere publication of the invitation to bid obligate it to compensate damages and losses that lack any verification whatsoever in the case file. In this specific case, although the tender progressed through those stages and reached the award stage, the necessary causal link that would make such a claim admissible does not arise—ipso jure—thereby, given that up to the moment of the tender award, all bidders not only participate on equal terms but all equally maintain a mere expectation of a contract, with the correlative requirement of an equal level of investment to formulate their bid. It is this mere legal expectation that allows the conclusion that the damages and losses the plaintiff alleges to have incurred are not produced for the tender participants, because the contracting process is, up to that moment—and it cannot be assessed differently—a mere and simple expectation of a contract; not a contract as such. A nexus giving rise to liability is not produced by the mere fact of awarding the tender. Conceiving of patrimonial liability of the contracting Administration for that fact would lead to the absurdity of supposing that every award of an administrative tender automatically renders the awarding Administration liable, which, besides being unlawful due to the lack of a legal norm so providing, is not accurate, since what the Administration has done in awarding the tender is to give full effect to its will in pursuit of satisfying the public interest that is presumed implicit in every administrative contract. It is not idle to indicate that in accordance with the applicable regulations, Article 317 of the procedural code, it is the duty of whoever formulates a claim to prove its assertion, which is summarized in the well-known formula onnus probandi (o qui alegans probando dobet) of Latin law. In this specific case, the plaintiff party does not prove in any way, or by any of the means of proof available in the legal system, the existence of such damages and losses, its simple assertion or the elaborations made through the rejected expert evidence not being sufficient for this, which, although ordered in the proceedings, does not manage to substantiate an objective criterion for this Court, and consequently, the compensatory claim brought by the plaintiff party must be rejected.

• C)OTHER LEGAL SITUATIONS PETITIONED: The claim formulated so that this authority order the re-awarding of the tender in favor of the plaintiff party lacks any sense, given that out of respect for the constitutional legality that governs the work of this Court, and within the framework of legality created by the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, this authority could in no way issue such an order, for which reason it is clearly illegal, senseless, and inadmissible, with no possible consequence other than to reject it outright.

EIGHTH: Regarding the exceptions and defenses invoked. The co-defendant company opposes the action brought against it, alleging the exceptions of lack of passive standing and lack of right. In this regard, this Court rejects the lack of passive standing exception, since it is evident from the case file that the present lawsuit affects possible rights and interests of the co-defendant, DEPPAT, SA., reason enough to have made it a party to this litigation and to bring it in as a co-defendant in the proceeding, so that it could face the situation created through the process, which demonstrates that it does indeed possess the capacity to be a party therein, given that it resulted as the awardee of the bidding process and this effectively creates an unavoidable effect of liability in the proceeding, and provides sufficient grounds to dismiss the exception of lack of passive standing ad causam invoked. Regarding the lack of right, it tends to vitiate the effects of the proceeding when the plaintiff party does not enjoy the legal backing in the action it brings; however, in this specific case, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff party not only had sufficient grounds to sue, but also that the legal situation of nullity raised does find echo and backing in the legal system applicable to the matter. Thus, the plaintiff party does have, in this examination, the sufficient, necessary, and timely right to sue for the alleged nullity, and consequently, the rejection of the exception of lack of right invoked by the co-defendant DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.) is imposed.

NINTH: Regarding the costs of the proceeding. In accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to the grace granted by numeral 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, No. 3667/1966, and because it is not within the circumstances described in Article 98 of that regulatory body and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the co-defendants Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, and the firm DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.) are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this lawsuit, which must be liquidated in the sentence execution stage.

TENTH: Corollary. For the foregoing reasons, and for the motives and reasoning given, the special bidding lawsuit must be declared partially with merit.

POR TANTO:

The defenses of lack of passive standing ad causam and lack of right are rejected. This special bidding lawsuit is declared partially with merit, it being understood as denied in what is not expressly granted. The award act of the tender by registration No. 5-2005 Planes Reguladores playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo de Santa Cruz, province of Guanacaste, adopted by agreement of the Municipal Council in its ordinary session No. 26-2005, article 5, clause 7 of June 28, 2005, is annulled ipso jure and in all its scope; also annulled, as a logical consequence of what has already been ordered, is the administrative act issued by that same Municipal Council that rejects the appeal for revocation filed against said award by the company Arquitectura SAAR, SA., adopted in ordinary session No. 43-2005, article 5, clause 07 of October 25, 2005. The defendants are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this lawsuit, which must be liquidated in the sentence execution stage. Let it be notified.

Isaac Guillermo Amador Hernández Name12757 Francisco Jiménez Villegas

SECCION SÉPTIMA,

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO NUE 05-000444-0161-CA In procurement processes such as the one challenged, in which the price factor carries so much weight in selecting the contractor, the Administration must analyze bids taking into account the results of serious studies that allow it to determine the possible market value of the goods or services it is going to tender, beyond the tender-document formula indicated in the evaluation of that item, which will allow it to know the value of what is being contracted, but also to know whether it will be able to meet the procurement obligations and whether the proposals it receives are acceptable in terms of price. The responsibility for determining whether an offered price is ruinous or not lies with the contracting administration, which must verify whether a price is ruinous or non-remunerative, or, conversely, whether it is excessive. Hence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 56 of the Reglamento a la Contratación Administrativa, the Administration is obligated to exclude those bids that quote ruinous or excessive prices, which points to the obligation of every administration to base its decision on objective parameters in the study of the prices quoted to it, in order to go beyond a simple comparison between low and high prices. In the challenged process, the awarded bid, compared to the other bids submitted, shows a difference ranging between ten and thirty-four million colones, which makes it far from an acceptable and competitive market price. In this regard, it cites the opinion issued by the Contraloría General de la República to the effect that a bid with a ruinous price is not eligible. It also cites the content of Article 18 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa regarding the Administration's obligation to maintain the economic balance of the contract. In the present matter, the contracting Administration, in accordance with the principles of efficiency, transparency, equality, good faith, and sound administration of public funds, should have disqualified the bid from DEPPAT, since it was ineligible and invalid, and therefore it should not have been awarded, which is consistent with the criterion applied by the Contraloría General de la República, in observance of Article 56.3 of the Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa. In this case, the ruinousness arises from non-compliance with Article 1 of the Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Agrimensores, according to Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 17481 of April 7, 1987, published in La Gaceta Nº 74 of April 20, 1987. The tender document establishes, in point 2.10, that the topographic survey must be carried out with contour lines at a maximum of every one meter, for those lands where horizontal distance represents a determining factor in the vertical survey. By having requested a topographic survey with contour lines at a maximum of every meter, the administration subjects the bidder to special conditions, being technically and legally binding for the bidder to prepare its bid based on the Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica. This requirement constitutes a tender-document element that discriminates among the bids that were submitted, since it is defined a priori and must be satisfied with a view to the public purpose pursued by the procurement. For the preparation of the contour lines of the area to be regulated, the minimum fees established by Decreto Ejecutivo 17481 must be observed. In Playa Callejones the area is seventy hectares, for Playa San Juanillo it is twenty-one point six hectares, which in total adds up to ninety point six hectares, to which is added fourteen point thirty-nine percent for inflation, which, in accordance with Article 17 of the Reglamento de Tarifas in that matter, allows establishing the price relationship that reaches eight million seven hundred twenty-seven thousand nine hundred sixty-six colones with seventy céntimos, if all the land were flat; and eleven million eight hundred ninety-one thousand four hundred sixty-two colones with thirty céntimos if the land were undulating. That would rise to fourteen million two hundred sixty-four thousand eighty-seven colones with fifty céntimos, if it were mountainous terrain. Thus, the price offered by DEPPAT SA is ruinous since none of the cases among the bids submitted exceeds or equals that amount in application of the applicable fee schedule; it cites in this regard resolution RC-355-2001 of June 28, 2001, of the Contraloría General de la República. The awarded bid presents an essential defect, namely the price factor, which in what occurred becomes ruinous and illicit, and therefore it is the duty of the Administration to exclude the company DEPPAT, based on the constitutionally established principle of legality, since it is a defect that cannot be remedied as that factor constitutes an essential element of the competitive process. In relation to this, a serious disrespect occurs for the principle of inviolability of public assets in the sense that this principle is linked to that of the economic balance of the contract contemplated in Article 18 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. There are sufficient technical arguments to consider that the bid submitted by its represented party is the best and the one that satisfies the general interest, and therefore the annulment of the award made to DEPPAT SA is appropriate, so that the competitive process is re-awarded in its place to its represented party.

**II-** Regarding the delivery period offered by the awarded company: Said period violates the principles of logic, technique, reason, proportionality, and balance between the price offered and the period offered, since it is materially impossible for the preparation of a regulatory plan to be carried out in only twenty-four calendar days, when none of the bids proposes less than four months of time to prepare said task. The plaintiff's representative mentions in this sense the jurisprudential scope that the Constitutional Chamber has given to the principle of reasonableness, in vote 1420-91.

**III-** The legal prohibition of the awardee from participating in the competitive process: Article 22, subparagraph literal f) provides that natural or legal persons who have intervened as advisors at any stage of the procurement procedure or have participated in the preparation of the specifications, the design and construction of the work, or alternative variants regarding the specifications or plans supplied by the administration, are legally prohibited from participating in administrative procurement procedures. In accordance with said norm, the professional in charge of the awarded company, Nombre71574, has stated that during the time he worked for the ICT, he was in charge of preparing regulatory plans and prepared the model for the preparation of Planes Reguladores in the Zona Marítimo Terrestre in 1982, which is still in force, in which the technical criteria for the preparation of those coastal plans are defined, which are those followed by consulting companies and applied by the institutions in charge of their approval. From such statements, the legal prohibition from participating in the procurement process by registry 05-2005 for the company DEPPAT emerges, since one of its participating professionals was covered by such a prohibition, as it concerns the representative professional who participated in the preparation of the technical basis of the procurement, which was in use at the time of the competitive process, which contaminates his company's bid and makes it illicit pursuant to the provisions of Article 22 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, and therefore in all procurement the principle of good faith must prevail and no one may benefit from their own deceit. The object contracted by the administration is illicit for contravening the law regarding the ruinousness of its bid, arising from disrespect for the customs and special norms regulating fees in the respective professional field, and the legal prohibition that arises at the moment the professional defends himself before his professional association. It is a bid contrary to the law, which cannot be perfected or produce legal effects. Having reached this point, the representative of the plaintiff company carries out a verification exercise of the method set forth in the tender document for selecting the bid to which the competitive process is awarded, which leads him to conclude—so he states—that SAAR SA is the one that demonstrates the aptitude to obtain the award in the event that what has been done is annulled. From what has been said, it is clear that if the contracting administration had observed the applicable legality, especially the principles of efficiency and equality, the bid of the co-defendant company would have been disqualified and the final result of the award would have been different and would not have caused real harm to its represented party. It cites in this regard resolution 021-2002 of January 9, 2002, of the Contraloría General de la República.

**FOURTH**: Arguments and defense of the Awarded Company. The co-defendant and awarded party in the tendered competitive process, firm Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA, upon answering the complaint, rejects the charges made as follows: It rejects the facts; points out that this firm has experience in the field covered by the procurement for some twenty-four years, alleges that if the plaintiff did not agree with some aspects of the procurement, such as the scoring table for the items and the percentages assigned for scoring purposes, it should have timely challenged what corresponded to the tender document, and likewise regarding point 2.10, and not come to do so through judicial channels when an award already exists. It argues that declaring the nullity of the clauses of the tender document is not appropriate in this channel; that the plaintiff's allegations lack support, as they reflect ignorance of the type of professional work required to carry out a coastal regulatory plan. It contends that its company has ample experience in this type of work and that those that have been entrusted to it have been due to unrelated reasons.

Then, it argues the following: 1- To demonstrate that the plaintiff's arguments lack support due to ignorance of the type of professional work required to carry out a coastal regulatory plan, it states that during his tenure at the ICT in charge of preparing regulatory plans, he prepared the model for preparing those documents in 1982, which is still in force; that document defines the criteria for preparing coastal regulatory plans, which consulting companies follow and which the institutions in charge of approving such documents apply. 2- The co-defendant continues to state that professionals in these areas understand that a coastal regulatory plan constitutes a land-use zoning (zonificación de usos del suelo), whose technical nature does not even reach the level of a preliminary urbanization project, since what is intended is to define the most convenient land use and never to prepare an urban design proposal or an architectural project; the viability that is proposed is of a preliminary nature and can be modified in the design phase of each of the roads of the regulatory plan; this type of plan is a sui generis product within professional work and never constitutes work that can be regulated by the traditional fees established by the Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. 3- The preparation of the environmental and physical diagnosis maps, as well as the proposed zoning and viability, is prepared on a base map that shows the main characteristics of the area to be planned, location of boundary markers (mojones), rivers and streams, location of facilities, contour lines, and others. Given the preliminary nature of the coastal regulatory plan, great precision of this information is not required; it only needs to give an idea of the topographic variations for decision-making regarding land use. In many regulatory plans, consulting companies use an interpolation of the contour lines that appear on the sheets published by the IGN, which is accepted by the ICT and by the INVU; cases can even be documented in which the diagnosis and the proposal have been prepared based on aerial photographs enlarged by the IGN, which is accepted by said institutions. Currently, it has been possible to obtain, with certain precision, contour lines derived from satellite photographs available to the country. The defendant continues to argue that professionals in engineering and topography, as well as geographers and biologists with training and instruction, can prepare a base map with contour lines, and if necessary, field verification could be carried out, or if the elevation information on the boundary markers is sufficient, field work is not required; the topographic work required for a coastal regulatory plan is not necessarily the professional work that has a fee schedule regulated by the CFIA, since due to the preliminary nature of the regulatory plan proposal, there are alternatives to obtain the base plan and consulting companies have the freedom to contract a topographer, an engineer, a geographer, or some other professional who provides that service. 4- Practically in no case, for purposes of quoting a coastal regulatory plan, is the calculation of fees for traditional contour lines included as part of the cost; the contract made with the client is not for a topography job, but rather it is a final product where it is not a requirement to show or deliver the plan with the contour lines. If the zoning and viability maps of regulatory plans approved and published in the official gazette are carefully reviewed, it will be verifiable that contour lines are not included as a final deliverable of the regulatory plan; the base plan work, which includes contour lines, does not necessarily have to be carried out with field work and, therefore, the fees do not necessarily have to be applied, since this work can perfectly well be carried out by a professional other than a topographer. 5- At this point, the defendant develops several examples of procurements made in which it tries to demonstrate that the plaintiff's arguments fall under their own weight and could support that the bid submitted by the plaintiff not be considered real, reasonable, and proportionate to the object of the procurement, but rather outside the normal market price. In this context, it cites three examples of coastal regulatory plans that, according to its statement, were awarded by other municipalities, using fees that are not those governing the preparation of contour lines. 6- Quotations for coastal regulatory plans that include base plan work with contour lines are not formulated by accounting for the CFIA fees for topographic work as part of their costs. Given the preliminary nature of a coastal regulatory plan, there are options to carry out the zoning proposal with professional responsibility without traditional field work. When that company has contracted a topographer to carry out the contour lines for a project, it has been done under the modality of a salaried professional, which means that during that time the professional will carry out diverse activities that remove him from independent practice and that for that reason the CFIA fee schedule does not apply to his work, this being another modality with which companies in this line of business carry out work such as that awarded on this occasion at reasonable prices and without these becoming ruinous. It argues that regarding the alleged prohibition against contracting with the administration in this case, which the plaintiff alleges against it, it indicates that such a situation does not occur because although in 1982, as an official of the ICT, he prepared the Model for the Preparation of Planes Reguladores in the Zona Marítimo Terrestre, which is still in force, it was never made official, remaining as a recommendation and consultation standard, without binding effects for any public or private institution, and therefore it is not a regulatory norm of mandatory compliance, but merely a model that was not made official. Therefore, the prohibitions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa do not cover the representative of the defendant company, and thus its bid is not contrary to law. It requests that the complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses caused to its represented party (brief on folios 238 to 249).

**FIFTH**: Regarding the mathematical expertise added to the case file. Upon filing the action, the plaintiff requests the designation of an expert opinion to perform the calculations related to the minimum amount to be charged according to the Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica established in the tender document, according to numeral 2.10 of the tender document and Article 10 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Additionally, the plaintiff requests that the expert calculate the damages and lost profits of the company. Once that data is obtained, the expert must calculate the respective interest that has not been received, taking into consideration the price revision to date, in accordance with Article 18 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, using the adjustment clause used by the Contraloría General de la República. The Court, by order of 3:51 p.m. on September 21, 2009, granted this request (see order on folio 263), and on April 5, 2010, the designated expert, Mathematical Actuary Nombre18237, renders the expert report indicating that direct damages amount to ¢4,510,000.00; the damage to image and damage to the company must be calculated by the judge, while the lost profits (lucro cesante), understood as the percentage of profit that the plaintiff lost by not performing the work, which he estimates at 25% of the given bid, amounts to ¢5,000,000.00; meanwhile, the legal interest on the direct damages caused to the plaintiff, for the period from June 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, amounts to ¢2,338,527.70 and the legal interest on the plaintiff's lost profits for the period from November 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, totals ¢Placa23189 (folios 279 to 283). By means of an amplification to said report, which was requested by the plaintiff (at folio 290), the aforementioned professional indicates that the information that served as the basis for his report, in terms of investment of professional hours for field visits and site inspections; hotel expenses of the officials who made the visit; expenses for meals, mileage, and gasoline; investment of professional hours for visits to the Municipality; expenses for maps, stationery, and photocopies; expenses for submitting the bid to the Municipality; cost of the non-recovered participation guarantee, are all data that were supplied to him by the plaintiff (folios 295 and 296 of the principal file).

In this regard, this Tribunal does not endorse the referenced expert report, firstly, because it concerns a calculation obtained through a list of items whose existence is not accredited in the case file (see in this regard the orders); next, because the basis of the data constructed in said expertise was supplied by the same party interested in obtaining payment for those items (see statement on folio 296 of the principal file), which strips the final result obtained of all objectivity and independence of criterion on the part of the expert, who limited himself to his calculation, while the plaintiff itself did not manage to accredit, at any stage of the proceedings, suitable evidence, such as invoices, vouchers, contracts, and documents to demonstrate the expenses it alleges incurred on the occasion of participating in the procurement process that is the subject of this dispute. In addition to the above, the expert's statement alone does not in itself constitute the foundation of the technical fact that is sought to be proven with his intervention in the process, since the expert is a person with technical knowledge in a branch of knowledge that is usually conceived as foreign to that possessed by the judge, in such a way that the person who is appointed in a jurisdictional process to perform the expert task becomes an auxiliary to the natural judge of the case, that being the essential connotation of his participation in the trial, that of being an auxiliary to the judge who must form a criterion of certainty regarding what is requested in the complaint, for which purpose the judge must utilize and base his decision on such input. In this case, that circumstance does not occur, because the expert report is limited to describing and calculating the accounts whose existence—certainly not verified in the case file—is supplied by the plaintiff, as is evident from the simple and plain statement made by said professional when amplifying his report (in accordance with folio 296). As indicated, such a circumstance compromises the objectivity, impartiality, and independence of the expert professional—with the exception of the simple arithmetic operation performed—who is called upon to construct a criterion of certainty on the basis of objective parameters, even verifiable by the Tribunal, which in this case is not fulfilled, meriting the rejection of said evidence. For these reasons, the Tribunal disregards the expert criterion, which is directed only at ratifying without further consideration the plaintiff's statement regarding damages and losses, which lacks any verification in the case file, and therefore becomes unworthy of attention.

**SIXTH**: Merits of the matter. 1- ON THE DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITY. The Tribunal has analyzed in its entirety the provided case file and the arguments of the parties, concluding, firstly, that not by the mere fact that the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz was declared in default, for not having answered the complaint, is this to be understood as sufficient merit to rule against it, since default, as a procedural consequence of the lack of timely or total attention to the process, cannot have effects other than those created by the procedural law that regulates this institution; in such a way that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 310 of the Código Procesal Civil, as authorized by numeral 103 of Law 3667 (RJCA/1966), the consequence that the party declared in default faces is that the complaint is deemed affirmatively answered with respect to the facts invoked when filing and formalizing it. Subsequently, even though the process continues without the appearance of the defaulting party—the norm states "…the process shall continue without its intervention;…"—, nevertheless, the defaulting party may appear at any later moment, taking the process in the state it finds itself in, which means that it may not request a return to stages already precluded or the review of actions in which a procedural status has already been declared in favor or against it or its counterpart. Such a declaration of default, however, cannot suppose the defeat, without further consideration, of the defaulting party, nor does it prevent the latter from, upon resuming the process, offering the evidence it deems pertinent to its claim, whether it is new evidence or simply evidence that it believes may be adduced to better inform the criterion of the judge. In this regard, in vote 801-F-02 of 11:10 a.m. on October 18, 2002, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice stated: "(…) IX.-…default is not in itself sufficient for the definitive accreditation of the facts, it only reaches this value if other evidence of the same lineage does not contradict the ficta confession. Therefore, default must be assessed together with the rest of the evidentiary elements present in the process." In this vein, the declaration of default against one of the parties in the process does not dissipate or attenuate the procedural obligation of the judge to, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, numeral 4) of the Código Procesal Civil, verify the statements made by the parties, analyzing the pertinence and certainty of the evidence contributed to the case file. The foregoing allows for specifying the guideline that, regarding what occurred in this case, this collegial body assumes, since the defendant Administration did not appear in the judicial record, although from that in no way derives "per se" a ruling against it without analyzing the body of evidence and other elements of the process that circumstantiate the final resolution adopted.

2- FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: The ruinousness of the price offered as a cause for nullity of the challenged award. Now then, regarding the cause for nullity of the act awarding competitive process 05-2005 promoted by the co-defendant municipality, it is true that in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494, published in Alcance No. 20 to La Gaceta No. 110 of June 8, 1995 (LCA), the regime of nullities legislated in the Ley General de la Administración Pública applies to administrative procurement. This allows for clarifying that the legality comparison applicable to this matter is that provided for in the aforementioned Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Delving into that purpose, it is necessary to bear in mind that the condition of ruinousness of a price offered in the sealed bid of a procurement process (by registry, in this case), acquires that condition when it does not represent adequate remuneration for the costs that foreseeably—in accordance with the tender document—the bidder will incur during the term and execution of the contract to give full compliance therewith to the detriment of the Administration, in which case, it is often mentioned that a price is ruinous for not being remunerative for the one offering it, for the indicated reason. A price in that condition makes foreseeable not only the patrimonial detriment of the bidder, but also the eventual breach of contract as a result of the lack of adequate remuneration with the resulting patrimonial harm not only for the bidder but also for the contracting party. The ruinous or non-remunerative price becomes a disvalue that harms the administrative contract and the assets of the contracting parties. In considering this condition, the legality parameters regulated in the LGAP intervene, according to what was previously indicated, to which all activity of the Public Administration is subject by the principle of legality.

The study of the specific case makes it clear that the price offered by the awarded company, of eight million four hundred thousand colones for carrying out the coastal regulatory plans (planes reguladores costeros) in Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo, within the jurisdiction of the municipal council of Santa Cruz, was formulated without correlating the structure of the total amount to the activities which, according to the bid specifications (cartel de la licitación), are the object of the administrative procurement under the terms of reference and the scope of services to be contracted that were tendered by the contracting administration. The offer presented by the company DEPPAT does not specify a cost for each activity described in the tender specifications (cartel del concurso), which makes the allocation of a representative value for the cost of each one uncertain for the bidder, allowing the conclusion that the price effectively becomes ruinous (ruinoso), given that it is not foreseeably remunerative for the list of tasks and specificities that the awardee must fulfill according to the bid specifications (cartel de la licitación). It should be noted that even in the main case file and the administrative file, the detailed description of the economic offer proposed by the awarded company does not appear; in fact, it is the record of opening of the submitted offers (folios 502 to 504, Volume III of the Administrative File) and the comparative chart subsequently prepared by the Institutional Procurement Office (Proveeduría Institucional) (folio 520 ibidem) that allow this Tribunal to confirm the amount for which the offer presented by the co-defendant company was awarded. No less important, and necessary to consider in verifying the defect evidenced by the price offered by the awarded company, is that the plaintiff's allegation focuses exclusively on the ruinousness (ruinosidad) of the proposed price, alleging non-compliance with the fee schedule (tabla tarifaria) that the professional in topography must charge to carry out the survey of the contour lines requested by the tender specifications (cartel del concurso), given that, according to such allegation, the offer presented by the awardee fails to comply with the provisions of Executive Decree No. 17481 Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales de Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica, of June 19, 1989. Even so, and regarding the calculation of such non-compliance, the fact is that the amount written in the sealed bid does not demonstrate coverage of the fees of the remaining professionals of the interdisciplinary team that would be carrying out the Coastal Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador Costero) for both beach areas; that is, the price proposed in the economic offer of ₡8,400,000.00 does not prove to be remunerative, neither for the cost of hiring a professional in topography, even if on a payroll basis, nor for the remaining team of professionals that would have to be integrated into the formulation phase of the Regulatory Plan, as can reasonably be concluded from the list described in the section SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED (ALCANCES DE LOS SERVICIOS A CONTRATAR) contained in the tender specifications (cartel del concurso) (see folios 26, 27, and 28 of the Administrative File, Volume I). In other words, the proposed price offering by the company DEPPAT SA fails to demonstrate in the case records that it is remunerative of the costs represented by hiring a professional topographer, nor the professional team that would have to carry out the Regulatory Plan for the beach areas described in the tender in question. Thus, even beyond the non-compliance with the fee schedule for professionals in surveying (agrimensura) alleged by the plaintiff—an argument which, in any case, the co-defendant does not manage to effectively refute—there is a lack of coverage in the offered price for the fees of the remaining professionals who would have to participate in the elaboration of the Regulatory Plan, without the case records proving otherwise; to which must be added that the offered price also does not reflect the cost of other items that the awardee would foreseeably have to incur, according to the list of specifications required in the contract, Section 2 of the terms of reference, which describe, as indicated, THE SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED (LOS ALCANCES DE LOS SERVICIOS A CONTRATAR) (folios cited above). Considering the exculpatory argument offered by the defendant, the Tribunal finds that what is alleged in this regard by its representative lacks regulatory support, because, even if the hiring of the professional topographer is carried out under the modality of “payroll professional” (“profesional en planilla”) referred to in the statement of defense (at folio 247 of the main file), the fact is that the price offered by the defendant fails to demonstrate a level of coverage of the necessary costs to fulfill the terms of reference of the tender. The arguments related to the provisional nature of the information that the final document Regulatory Plan presented by the awardee would contain are not accepted by this Tribunal, because that is not the condition described in the bid specifications (cartel de la licitación) for the document that the Administration requests (see folio 5 of Volume I, folio 533 of Volume III, and the conditions described in the bid specifications for the procurement, folios 26 to 30 of Volume I, all references made to the administrative file provided in certified form by the defendant Administration). What is argued in this regard by the co-defendant is not supported by any of the characteristics and specificities of the tendered Regulatory Plan, nor, in its offer, does the co-defendant at any time indicate that the work or final product will have that characteristic of provisionality or of desk-based formulation, with which it formulates the defense of the quoted price.

By virtue of the foregoing, the Tribunal concludes that the argument of ruinousness (ruinosidad) of the offered price, which was alleged by the plaintiff, is estimable and, consequently, the ground for nullity of the tender award made is appropriate in what was alleged.

3- SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: *The impossibility of the completion period offered by the defendant as a ground for nullity of the tender award.* Besides the foregoing, from the comparison of the aforementioned pieces of the administrative file, namely folios 502 to 504 and folio 520 of Volume III, Administrative File, it follows that the time offer for fulfillment and delivery of the final product proposed by the awardee is twenty-four calendar days, while the remaining offers exceed one hundred days (see folio 520 cited above). This is evidently a completion period that breaks with any of the remaining offers, due to its brevity and reduced nature. The plaintiff argues that this is a materially impossible period to fulfill and that it violates the principle of reasonableness, which is constitutionally relevant as a parameter for the actions of public administrations. The defendant party itself does not pronounce itself on this matter, but rather its allegation is limited to arguing the viability of being able to quote a lower price for the tendered work. However, it sets aside and in no way addresses the argument of a reasonable period for fulfilling the contracted object that the plaintiff imputes against it. This is therefore an uncontested argument by the defendant, regarding which this Tribunal holds the following: Although at folio 443 of Volume II of the provided Administrative File, the defendant awarded company offers a schedule of activities (cronograma de actividades) to be carried out, the fact is that nowhere in the text of that tool is it indicated that it is a compliance calendar, but rather a list of activities with a placement in time thereof, within the twenty-four days proposed by the bidder; however, that list does not correlate with the activities described in the tender specifications (cartel del concurso), which makes it evident that, with the evidence provided in the case records, it is concluded that the activities contained in the bid specifications (cartel de licitación) under numeral 2.16 are excluded from that list, since the time budget that they require is never mentioned in the proposed schedule, and in this sense, the sealed bid of the awarded company partially fails to comply with the requirements of the bid specifications in the indicated numeral, the foregoing reinforcing the thesis of the impossibility of fulfilling the offered period. The absence of such content at the schedule level does constitute a ground for nullity, as it is a deficiency contained in the offer that places the expectation of contract fulfillment below what is required by the contracting Public Administration in accordance with the tender specifications (cartel del concurso) that is part of the case records. In this regard, this Tribunal considers it necessary to demonstrate that in matters of administrative procurement, the tendering administration must justify the lifting of any of the offer requirements in favor of the bidders, with due advance notice, even giving a real opportunity to hear the persons participating in the tender regarding such a decision. In the present case, such justification does not appear in the case records, and if it was not done, the award becomes null and void for illegitimately omitting the requirement of a specification contained in the bid specifications, with the double error that, in this case, such exemption favors only one of the participants, which is null and void ab initio for disrespecting parameters of constitutional and subordinate legality, described in numerals 11, 33, 41, 49, 182 of the Political Constitution and the contents of Articles 4 and 5 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494 published in Supplement No. 110 of June 8, 1995, Supplement No. 20, and its amendments.

To further elaborate on what was alleged by the plaintiff on this aspect, the award of the offer must be proportional not only regarding the financial budget but also regarding the time budget proposed by the submitted sealed bids, in order to fully comply with the parameters of technical legality described in Article 16 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), an aspect regarding which the allegation of the plaintiff company is estimable.

This Tribunal has found, in the review of legality conducted, that other offers annexed to the administrative file also fail to be specific regarding the requirements of the bid specifications, which is not considered sound practice, because the administration must ensure exhaustive compliance with the terms of reference formulated in the bid specifications (cartel de la licitación), an aspect which, as stated, lacks full compliance in the present case, and which, as it is not the subject matter of the process, this Tribunal merely wishes to make evident, given the procedural legality to which the work of the undersigned is constrained, so that the contracting authority may formulate the corrections that appropriately correspond, if it sees fit to do so.

4- THIRD SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: *The possible incompatibility for contracting of the representative of the awarded company as a ground for nullity of the tender award.* Not without warning that the argument of disrespect for Article 17 of the Code of Ethics of the CFIA, indicated by the plaintiff (at folio 259), is omitted because it supports the application to the case under review of a norm that does not entail the effects of generality that are what allow for an examination of observable legality in a jurisdictional venue, the application of said norm being reserved for the oversight bodies of the professional practice of the members of the mentioned Professional Association, therefore its allegation in this matter is rejected.

A third challenge argument raised by the plaintiff is the existence of a possible incompatibility of the awardee under the terms of Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), given that its legal representative has stated in the case records that, as an official of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT), he participated in 1982 in the preparation of the model Coastal Regulatory Plan which, still being in force, is a document that guides the actions to be carried out by private companies and the institutions that approve this type of Coastal Regulatory Plans, which—and this is the central argument of the plaintiff—creates an advantage for him as a bidder in the tendering process, which is expressly prohibited in the aforementioned norms of administrative procurement.

When answering the complaint, the representative of the plaintiff ratifies that as an official of the ICT in 1982, he was in charge of preparing the model that defines the technical criteria that intervene in the preparation of the coastal regulatory plan (plan regulador costero) followed by consulting firms and applied by the institutions in charge of approving them (thus at folio 241 of the main file). He then argues that this document was never approved, and only serves as a reference, is not binding or mandatory for any public or private institution, and in it, guidelines and technical criteria are given for preparing this type of regulatory plan. He argues that he is not covered by the prohibitions for contracting with the administration.

It is the criterion of this Tribunal that, in the present case, the incompatibility that the plaintiff accuses against the legal representative of the awarded company cannot be verified, because, from the outset, it is necessary to point out that such incompatibility is a true interdiction against participation in administrative procurement processes carried out by public administrations, consequently governing an enumerated and also interpretative strictness to which the legal operator cannot and should not place other elements ahead of those that are in the regulations. Thus, those norms establish a series of assumptions that require a responsible formulation of the role attributed to the bidder in order to verify that one of such assumptions effectively applies.

This Tribunal has reviewed such norms, finding that they regulate the scope of participation of the public official in the competitive tender processes through which the public administration must acquire the goods and services required by its ordinary business. Both norms, Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), introduce an express prohibition under the conditions described therein for persons who hold the designation or status of public official. In the present case, such status is not proven, is not verified, because there is simply no evidence in the case records that allows for unequivocally assuming that the legal representative of the company DEPPAT SA, Mr. Nombre71574, when participating as the representative of said company in the mentioned tendering process, is holding the position of public official with the possibility of influencing said decision. In this regard, the plaintiff fails to demonstrate such a situation, failing to comply with the principle of the burden of proof contained in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, from the examination of legality carried out in this matter, the Tribunal cannot extract that the mentioned legal representative of the co-defendant company is a public official and that, at the time of formulating the sealed bid, he found himself within any of the hypotheses described in the mentioned articles of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), and consequently, this charge against the actions whose nullity is sought must be rejected.

**SEVENTH**: *Regarding the claims of the plaintiff.* A) THE CLAIM FOR ANNULMENT. The plaintiff has requested that both the award of the tendered bid and the administrative act by which the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against such award is rejected be annulled. Both are administrative acts issued by the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. As has been explained, the Tribunal has found that the plaintiff is assisted by reason and right, and the lawsuit must be partially granted. As indicated, what was petitioned is appropriate regarding the ruinous price (precio ruinoso) of the awarded offer and regarding the completion period described therein. Both being essential elements of the administrative procurement in accordance with the mentioned governing legislation of the matter. What was alleged regarding the presumed incompatibility for contracting with the State attributed to the legal representative of the awardee has no merit. Based on the foregoing, the action is partially estimable.

• B)THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. Now, regarding the claim for damages (pretensión resarcitoria) formulated by the plaintiff, the petition must be denied because the plaintiff in no way manages to demonstrate those damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that she alleges were caused to her by her participation in the tender, or by having failed to be awarded in this tender. In this regard, it is convenient to keep in mind that participation in this type of tenders generates for the bidder only a mere expectation of right, since their offer enters to be evaluated with the others that may have been submitted. In the case of participation in tenders specific to administrative procurement, the emergence of a scope of patrimonial liability of the contracting administration does not arise from the mere invitation to participate in the tender—as the plaintiff seems to understand it—nor is the administration obligated, merely by the publication of the invitation to bid, to compensate damages and losses that lack any verification in the case records. In the present case, although the tender surpassed those stages and reached the award stage, the necessary causal link that would make such a claim appropriate does not arise—ipso iure—, given that until the moment of the tender award, all bidders not only enter under equal conditions but also all equally maintain a mere expectation of contract, with the correlative requirement of the same level of investment to formulate their offer. It is this mere legal expectation that allows for concluding that the damages and losses that the plaintiff alleges as incurred do not occur for the participants in the tender, because the procurement is, up to that point and it is not appropriate to evaluate it differently, a mere and simple expectation of contract; not a contract properly speaking. A causative link of liability is not produced by the mere fact of awarding the tender. Conceiving of patrimonial liability of the contracting Administration for that fact would lead to the absurdity of supposing that every award of an administrative tender automatically makes the awarding Administration liable, which, besides being unlawful due to the lack of a legal norm that so provides, is not correct, because what the Administration has done upon awarding the tender is to fully comply with its will in pursuit of the satisfaction of the public interest that is presumed implicit in every administrative contract. It is not idle to indicate that in accordance with the applicable regulations, Article 317 of the procedural code, it is the duty of whoever formulates a claim to prove their assertion, which is summarized in the well-known formula onus probandi (incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat) of Latin law. In the present case, the plaintiff in no way accredits nor through any of the means of proof available in the legal system, the existence of such damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), her simple assertion or the elaborations made through the rejected expert evidence not sufficing in this regard, which although ordered in the case records, does not manage to substantiate an objective criterion for this Tribunal, and consequently, the claim for damages (pretensión resarcitoria) raised by the plaintiff must be rejected.
• C)OTHER PETITIONED LEGAL SITUATIONS: The claim formulated for this authority to order the re-awarding of the tender in favor of the plaintiff is completely senseless, given that out of respect for the constitutional legality that governs the work of this Tribunal, and within the framework of legality created by the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), in no way could this authority issue such an order, so it is manifestly illegal, senseless, and inadmissible, the only possible consequence being to reject it outright.

**EIGHTH**: *Regarding the exceptions and defenses invoked.* The co-defendant company opposes the action filed against it, alleging the exceptions of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right (falta de derecho). In this regard, this Tribunal rejects the lack of passive standing, because it is clear from the case records that this lawsuit affects possible rights and interests of the co-defendant, DEPPAT, SA., sufficient reason for having included it in this litigation and for bringing it as a co-defendant to the process, so that it could face the situation created through the process, which demonstrates that the capacity to be a party in the same does indeed fall upon it, given that it was the awardee of the competitive tender and that this effectively creates an effect of liability in the process that is unavoidable for it, and provides sufficient basis to dismiss the invoked exception of lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva). Regarding the lack of right, it tends to undermine the effects of the process when the plaintiff does not enjoy legal backing in the action filed; however, in the present case, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff not only had sufficient grounds to sue, but that the legal situation of nullity raised does indeed find resonance and support in the legal system applicable to the matter. Thus, the plaintiff in the case under review does have the sufficient, necessary, and timely right to demand the alleged nullity, and consequently, the rejection of the exception of lack of right invoked by the co-defendant DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.) is required.

**NINTH**: *Regarding the costs of the process.* In accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to the grace granted by ordinal 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), No. 3667/1966, and for not being within the assumptions described in Article 98 of said regulatory body and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the co-defendants Municipality of Santa Cruz (Municipalidad de Santa Cruz) and the firm DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.) are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this trial, which must be settled in the sentence enforcement stage.

**TENTH**: *Corollary.* Based on the foregoing, and due to the reasons and reasoning given, the special procurement lawsuit must be partially granted.

**POR TANTO**:

The defenses of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right (falta de derecho) are rejected. The present special procurement lawsuit is partially granted, it being understood that it is denied in what is not expressly granted. The award of the tender by registry No. 5-2005 Planes Reguladores Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo of Santa Cruz, province of Guanacaste, adopted by agreement of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) in its ordinary session No. 26-2005, article 5, subsection 7 of June 28, 2005, is annulled ab initio and in all its scopes; the administrative act issued by that same Municipal Council rejecting the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against said award by the company Arquitectura SAAR, SA., adopted in ordinary session No. 43-2005 article 5, subsection 07 of October 25, 2005, is also annulled, as a logical consequence of the foregoing. The defendants are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this trial, which must be settled in the sentence enforcement stage.

Notify.

Isaac Guillermo Amador Hernández Nombre12757 Francisco Jiménez Villegas SEVENTH SECTION, CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL NUE 05-000444-0161-CA That requirement constitutes a discriminatory cartel element of the bids that were submitted, since it is defined a priori and must be satisfied in view of the public purpose pursued by the contracting. For the preparation of the contour lines (curvas de nivel) of the area to be regulated, the minimum fees established by Executive Decree 17481 must be observed. In Playa Callejones the space is seventy hectares, for Playa San Juanillo it is twenty-one point six hectares, which totals ninety point six hectares, to which is added fourteen point thirty-nine percent inflation, which, in accordance with article 17 of the Fee Regulation on that matter, allows establishing the price relationship that reaches eight million seven hundred twenty-seven thousand nine hundred sixty-six colones with seventy cents, if all the land were flat; and eleven million eight hundred ninety-one thousand four hundred sixty-two colones with thirty cents if the land were undulating. That would amount to fourteen million two hundred sixty-four thousand eighty-seven colones with fifty cents, if it were mountainous land. Thus the price offered by DEPPAT SA is ruinous since none of the cases of the bids submitted exceeds or equals that amount in application of the applicable fee schedule; it cites in this regard resolution RC-355-2001 of June 28, 2001, of the Contraloría General de la República. The awarded bid presents an essential defect such as the price factor, which in what occurred becomes ruinous and unlawful, and therefore it is the duty of the Administration to exclude the company DEPPAT, based on the constitutionally established principle of legality, since it is a defect that cannot be corrected as this factor constitutes an essential element of the competition. In relation to this, there is a serious disrespect for the principle of intangibility of heritage in the sense that this principle is linked to the economic equilibrium of the contract contemplated in Article 18 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. There are sufficient technical arguments to consider that the bid presented by your represented party is the best and the one that satisfies the general interest, and therefore the annulment of the award made to DEPPAT SA is appropriate, so that the competition may instead be re-awarded to your represented party.

**II-** Regarding the delivery term offered by the awarded company: Said term violates the principles of logic, technique, reason, proportionality, and balance between the offered price and the offered term, since it is materially impossible for the preparation of a regulatory plan (plan regulador) to be carried out in only twenty-four calendar days, when none of the bids proposes less than four months of time to carry out said task. The plaintiff's representation mentions in this regard the jurisprudential scope that the Sala Constitucional has made of the principle of reasonableness, in vote 1420-91.

**III-** The legal prohibition of the awardee from participating in the competition: Article 22 subparagraph literal f) provides that natural or legal persons who have intervened as advisors at any stage of the contracting procedure or have participated in the preparation of the specifications, the design, and the construction of the work or the alternative variants with respect to the specifications or the plans supplied by the administration are legally prohibited from participating in administrative contracting procedures. In accordance with said norm, the professional in charge of the awarded company, Nombre71574 , has stated that during the time he worked for the ICT, he was in charge of preparing regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and prepared the model for the preparation of Regulatory Plans in the Zona Marítimo Terrestre in 1982, which is still in force, in which the technical criteria for the preparation of those coastal plans are defined, which are those followed by consulting companies and applied by the institutions in charge of their approval. From these statements, the legal prohibition against participating in tender by registry 05-2005 for the company DEPPAT is inferred, since such prohibition applied to one of its participating professionals, as he is the representative professional who participated in the preparation of the technical basis of the tender, which was being used at the time of the competition, which contaminates his company's bid and makes it unlawful according to the provisions of Article 22 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, and therefore the principle of good faith must prevail in all contracting and that no one may benefit from their own fraud. The object contracted by the administration is unlawful for contravening the law regarding the ruinous nature of its bid, arising from disrespect for the customs and special norms that regulate fees in the respective professional field, and from the legal prohibition that arises at the moment the professional defends himself before his professional association. It is a bid contrary to law, which cannot be perfected nor produce legal effects. Having reached this point, the representative of the plaintiff company performs a verification of the procedure set forth in the tender document (cartel) for choosing the bid to which the competition is awarded, which leads him to conclude – so he states – that SAAR SA is the one that demonstrates the aptitude to obtain the award in the event that what has been done is annulled. From the foregoing, it follows that if the contracting administration had observed the applicable legality, especially the principles of efficiency and equality, the offer of the co-defendant company would have been disqualified and the final result of the award would have been different and no real harm would have been caused to his represented party. It cites in this regard resolution 021-2002 of January 9, 2002, of the Contraloría General de la República.

**FOURTH**: Arguments and defense of the Awarded Company. The co-defendant and awardee in the tendered competition, the firm Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA, upon answering the lawsuit, rejects the charges made as follows: It rejects the facts; it points out that this firm has experience in the field of the contract for some twenty-four years, it alleges that if the plaintiff did not agree with certain aspects of the contract, such as the qualification table of the items and the percentages assigned for qualification purposes, it should have timely challenged the corresponding aspects of the tender document (cartel), as well as regarding point 2.10, and not come to do so through judicial means when an award already exists. It argues that in this venue it is not appropriate to declare the nullity of the clauses of the cartel; that the plaintiff's allegations have no support, as they reflect ignorance of the type of professional work required to carry out a coastal regulatory plan (plan regulador costero). It contends that its company has extensive experience in this type of work and that the works entrusted to it have been for unrelated reasons.

Then, it argues the following: 1- To demonstrate that the plaintiff's arguments have no support due to ignorance of the type of professional work required for the completion of a coastal regulatory plan (plan regulador costero), it states that during his tenure at the ICT in charge of preparing regulatory plans (planes reguladores), he prepared the model for the preparation of these documents in 1982, which is still in force; that document defines the criteria for preparing coastal regulatory plans, which are followed by consulting companies and applied by the institutions in charge of approving such documents. 2- The co-defendant continues, stating that professionals in these areas understand that a coastal regulatory plan constitutes a land-use zoning (zonificación de usos del suelo), whose technical nature does not even reach the level of a preliminary urbanization project (anteproyecto de urbanización), since what is intended is to define the most convenient land use and never to prepare an urban design proposal or an architectural project; the viability proposed is preliminary in nature and may be modified during the design phase of each of the roads of the regulatory plan; this type of plan is a sui generis product within professional work and never constitutes work that can be regulated by the traditional fees established by the Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. 3- The preparation of the maps for the environmental and physical diagnosis, as well as the zoning and viability proposal, is prepared on a base map that shows the main characteristics of the area to be planned, location of boundary markers (mojones), rivers and streams, location of facilities, contour lines (curvas de nivel), and others. Given the preliminary nature of the coastal regulatory plan, great precision of this information is not required; it only needs to give an idea of topographical variations for decision-making regarding land use. In many regulatory plans, consulting companies use an interpolation of the contour lines that appear on the sheets published by the IGN, which is accepted by the ICT and the INVU; cases can even be documented in which the diagnosis and proposal have been prepared on aerial photographs enlarged by the IGN, which is accepted by those institutions. Currently, it has been possible to obtain, with some precision, contour lines derived from satellite photographs available to the country. The defendant continues arguing, that engineering and surveying professionals, as well as geographers and biologists with training and instruction, can prepare a base map with contour lines, and if necessary, field verification could be carried out, or if the elevation information on the boundary markers (mojones) is sufficient, field work is not required; the surveying work required for a coastal regulatory plan is not necessarily the professional work that has a fee schedule regulated by the CFIA, since due to the preliminary nature of the regulatory plan proposal, there are alternatives to obtain the base plan and consulting companies are free to hire a surveyor (topógrafo), an engineer, a geographer, or some other professional who provides that service. 4- Practically in no case, for purposes of a quote for a coastal regulatory plan, is the calculation of the fees for traditional contour lines (curvas de nivel) included as part of the cost; the contract made with the client is not for surveying work, but rather it is a final product where it is not a requirement to show or deliver the plan with the contour lines. If one carefully reviews the zoning and viability maps of approved regulatory plans published in the official gazette, it can be verified that contour lines are not included as a final delivery of the regulatory plan; the work of the base plan, which includes contour lines, does not necessarily have to be carried out with field work and, therefore, the fees do not necessarily have to be applied, since this work can perfectly well be carried out by a professional other than a surveyor. 5- At this point, the defendant develops several examples of contracts entered into, in which it tries to demonstrate that the plaintiff's arguments are unfounded and could support that the bid presented by the plaintiff not be considered real, reasonable, and proportionate to the purpose of the contract, but rather outside the normal market price. In this context, it cites three examples of coastal regulatory plans that, according to its statement, were awarded by other municipalities, using fees that are not those governing the preparation of contour lines. 6- The quotes for coastal regulatory plans that include base plan work with contour lines are not formulated by accounting for the CFIA fees for topographic work as part of their costs. Given the preliminary nature of a coastal regulatory plan, there are options to carry out the zoning proposal with professional responsibility without traditional field work. When that company has hired a surveyor (topógrafo) to perform the contour lines of a project, it has been done under the modality of a salaried professional, which means that during that time they will perform various activities that remove them from independent practice and that for that reason the CFIA fee does not apply in their work, this being another modality by which companies in this market line carry out tasks like the one awarded on this occasion at reasonable prices without them becoming ruinous. It argues that regarding the alleged prohibition against contracting with the administration in this case, which the plaintiff alleges against it, it indicates that such a situation does not occur because, although in 1982, as an ICT official, he prepared the Model for the Preparation of Regulatory Plans in the Zona Marítimo Terrestre (Modelo para la Elaboración de Planes Reguladores en la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), which is still in force, it never became official, remaining as a recommendation and consultation norm, with no binding effects for any public or private institution, so it is not a regulatory norm of mandatory compliance, but simply a model that was not made official. Therefore, the representative of the defendant company is not covered by the prohibitions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, and therefore its bid is not contrary to law either. It requests that the lawsuit be rejected and the plaintiff be ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses caused to its represented party (brief on folios 238 to 249).

**FIFTH**: Regarding the mathematical expert opinion submitted to the case file. Upon filing the action, the plaintiff requests the designation of an expert opinion to perform the calculations related to the minimum amount to be charged according to the Fee Schedule Regulation for Professionals in Land Surveying, Topography, and Topographical Engineering established in the cartel, according to numeral 2.10 of the cartel and Article 10 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Furthermore, the plaintiff requests that the expert calculate the damages and loss of profit (lucro cesante) of the company. Once that data is obtained, they must calculate the corresponding interest that has been foregone, taking into consideration the price revision to date, in accordance with Article 18 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, using the adjustment clause used by the Contraloría General de la República. The Court, by order issued at 15:51 hours on September 21, 2009, granted said request, (see order on folio 263), and on April 5, 2010, the appointed Actuarial Mathematics expert, Nombre18237 , submitted the expert report indicating that the direct damages amount to ¢4,510,000.00; the damage to image and damage to the company are to be calculated by the judge, while the loss of profit (lucro cesante), understood as the percentage of profit that the plaintiff lost by not carrying out the work, which it estimates at 25% of the given offer, amounts to ¢5,000,000.00; meanwhile, the legal interest on the direct damages caused to the plaintiff, in the period from June 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, amounts to ¢2,338,527.70 and the legal interest on the plaintiff's loss of profit in the period from November 1, 2006, to April 30, 2010, totals ¢Placa23189 (folios 279 to 283). By means of an extension to said report, which was requested by the plaintiff (at folio 290), the mentioned professional indicates that the information that served as the basis for his report, regarding aspects of investment of professional hours per field visit and site inspection; hotel expenses of the officials who made the visit; meal, mileage, and gasoline expenses; investment in professional hours for visits to the Municipality; expenses for maps, stationery, and photocopies; expenses for presenting the bid to the Municipality; cost of the unrecovered participation guarantee, are all data provided by the plaintiff party (folios 295 and 296 of the main file).

In this regard, this Court does not endorse the aforementioned expert report, firstly, because it involves a calculation obtained through a list of items whose existence is not accredited in the file (see the orders in this regard); then, because the basis of the data constructed in said expert opinion was supplied by the same party interested in obtaining payment for those claims (see statement on folio 296 of the main file), which strips the final result obtained of all objectivity and independence of the expert's criteria, who limited himself to the calculation, while the plaintiff party itself failed to accredit, at any stage of the proceeding, suitable evidence, such as invoices, vouchers, contracts, and documents, to demonstrate the expenses it alleges were incurred on the occasion of participating in the bidding process that is the subject of this dispute. Besides the foregoing, the expert's statement alone does not in itself constitute the basis for the technical fact sought to be proven with his intervention in the proceeding, since the expert is a person with technical knowledge in a branch of knowledge that is usually conceived as alien to that possessed by the judge, such that the person designated in a jurisdictional proceeding to perform the expert work becomes an auxiliary to the natural judge of the case, this being the essential connotation of his participation in the trial, that of being an auxiliary to the judge who must form a criterion of certainty regarding what is requested in the lawsuit, for which purpose they must avail themselves of and implement such input in their decision. In this specific case, that circumstance does not occur, because the expert report is limited to describing and calculating the accounts whose existence – certainly not verified in the case file – is supplied to him by the plaintiff, as is simply and plainly demonstrated by the statement made by that professional when expanding his report (in accordance with folio 296). As indicated, such a circumstance compromises the objectivity, impartiality, and independence of the expert professional, except regarding the simple arithmetic operation performed, called to build a criterion of certainty based on objective parameters, even verifiable by the Court, which in this instance is not fulfilled, warranting the rejection of said evidence. For these reasons, the Court dispenses with the expert opinion, which is only aimed at ratifying, without further consideration, the plaintiff's statement regarding damages and losses, which lacks any verification in the case file and therefore becomes inadmissible.

**SIXTH**: Merits of the matter. 1- REGARDING THE DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITY. The Court has fully analyzed the case file provided and the allegations of the parties, concluding, firstly, that the mere fact that the Municipality of Santa Cruz was declared in default, for not having answered the lawsuit, does not mean that this constitutes sufficient merit to rule against it, since the default as a procedural consequence of the lack of timely or total attention to the proceeding cannot have effects other than those created by the procedural law that regulates the institute; in such a way that, as provided in Article 310 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as authorized by numeral 103 of Law 3667 (RJCA/1966), the fate of the party declared in default is that the lawsuit is deemed answered affirmatively, regarding the facts invoked at the time of filing and formalizing it; then, despite the fact that the proceeding continues without the appearance of the defaulting party – the norm says "…the proceeding will continue without their intervention;…" – the defaulting party may, however, appear at any later time, taking up the proceeding in the state in which it is found, which means they may not request the return to stages already precluded or the review of actions in which a procedural status has already been declared for or against them or their counterpart. Such declaration of default, however, cannot automatically imply the defeat of the defaulting party, nor does it prevent them, upon resuming the proceeding, from offering the evidence they consider pertinent for their claim, whether it is new evidence or simply evidence they believe they can provide to better inform the judge's criterion. In this regard, in vote 801-F-02 at 11:10 hours on October 18, 2002, the Sala Primera of the Supreme Court of Justice stated: “(…) IX.-… default is not by itself sufficient for the definitive accreditation of the facts; it only reaches this value if other evidence of the same lineage does not contradict the fictional answer. Therefore, the default must be assessed along with the rest of the evidentiary elements existing in the proceeding.” In this context, the declaration of default against any of the parties in the proceeding does not dissipate or attenuate the procedural obligation of the judge to, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98 numeral 4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, verify the statements made by the parties, analyzing the pertinence and certainty of the evidence provided to the case file. The foregoing allows concretizing the guideline that, regarding what occurred in this specific case, this collegiate body assumes, for the defendant Administration did not appear in the case file, although this in no way "per se" derives a ruling against it without analyzing the evidentiary record and other elements of the proceeding that shape the final resolution adopted.

2- PLAINTIFF'S FIRST ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS: The ruinous nature of the offered price as a cause for nullity of the challenged award. Now, regarding the cause for nullity of the act of awarding tender competition 05-2005 promoted by the co-defendant municipality, it is true that in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494, published in Supplement No. 20 to La Gaceta No. 110 of June 8, 1995 (LCA), the nullity regime set forth in the Ley General de la Administración Pública applies to administrative contracting. This makes it clear that the legality comparison applicable to this matter is that provided for in the aforementioned Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Delving into that purpose, it is necessary to bear in mind that the condition of ruinousness of a price offered in the sealed bid of a tender (by registry, in this case), acquires that condition when it does not represent adequate remuneration for the costs that foreseeably – in accordance with the competition's cartel – the offeror will incur during the term and execution of the contract to fully comply with it, to the detriment of the Administration, in which case, it is usually mentioned that a price is ruinous because it is not remunerative for the one offering it, for the indicated reason. A price in that condition makes it foreseeable not only the patrimonial detriment of the offeror, but also the eventual breach of contract as a result of the lack of adequate remuneration, with emergent patrimonial harm not only for the offeror but also for the contracting party. The ruinous or non-remunerative price becomes a disvalue that harms the administrative contract and the patrimony of the contracting parties. In the consideration of this condition, according to what was previously indicated, the legality parameters regulated in the LGAP intervene, to which all activity of the Public Administration is subject by the principle of legality. The study of the specific case allows us to elucidate that the price offered by the awarded company, of eight million four hundred thousand colones for carrying out the coastal regulatory plans (planes reguladores costeros) in Playa Callejones and Playa San Juanillo, in the jurisdiction of the municipal government of Santa Cruz, was formulated without correlating the structure of the total amount to the activities that, according to the tender cartel, are the purpose of the administrative contracting according to the terms of reference and the scope of the services to be contracted that were tendered by the contracting administration. In the bid presented by the company DEPPAT, a cost for each activity described in the competition's cartel is not specified, which makes uncertain the allocation of a representative value of the cost of each of them for the offeror, which leads to the conclusion that the price indeed becomes ruinous, given that it is not foreseeably remunerative for the list of tasks and specificities that the awardee must fulfill according to the tender cartel. Note that, indeed, the detailed description of the economic bid proposed by the awarded company does not even appear in the main case file or in the administrative file; in fact, it is the minutes of the opening of the submitted bids (folios 502 to 504, Volume III of the Adm.) and the comparative table subsequently prepared by the Institutional Procurement Department (folio 520 ibidem) that are the elements that allow this Court to confirm the amount for which the bid submitted by the co-defendant company was awarded. No less important and necessitating consideration in the verification of the defect evidenced by the price offered by the awarded company is that the plaintiff's allegation focuses exclusively on the ruinous nature of the proposed price, arguing the non-observance of the fee schedule that the topography professional must charge to perform the survey of the contour lines (curvas de nivel) requested in the competition's cartel, given that according to that allegation, the bid presented by the awardee fails to comply with what is stipulated in Executive Decree No. 17481 Fee Schedule Regulation for Professionals in Land Surveying, Topography, and Topographical Engineering, of June 19, 1989. Even so, and regarding the calculation of such non-compliance, the truth is that the amount written in the bid does not demonstrate that it covers the fees of the other professionals of the interdisciplinary team that would be carrying out the Coastal Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador Costero) of both beach zones, that is to say, that the price proposed in the economic bid of ¢8,400,000.00 does not demonstrate that it is remunerative, neither of the cost involved in hiring a topography professional, even if it were on payroll, nor of the remaining team of professionals that would have to be integrated in the formulation phase of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), as can be reasonably concluded from the list described in the SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED section contained in the competition's cartel (see folios 26, 27, and 28 of the Adm., Volume I). Stated otherwise, the offer of the price proposed by the company DEPPAT SA fails to demonstrate in the case file that it is remunerative of the costs represented by the professional contracting of a surveyor (topógrafo), nor of the professional team that would be carrying out the Regulatory Plan for the beach areas described in the competition under examination.

Thus, even beyond the non-compliance with the surveying professionals' fee schedule alleged by the plaintiff—an argument that the co-defendant, in any event, fails to effectively rebut—there is a lack of coverage in the offered price for the fees of the remaining professionals who would have to participate in the preparation of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), without the case file proving the contrary; to which must be added that the offered price also fails to reflect the cost of the other items that the awardee would foreseeably have to incur, according to the list of specifications required in the contract, Section 2- of the terms of reference, which describe, as indicated, THE SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE CONTRACTED (folios previously cited). Upon considering the defense argument offered by the defendant, the Tribunal finds that what its representative alleged in this regard lacks regulatory support, because, even if the hiring of the surveyor (topógrafo) professional is carried out under the "in-house professional" (profesional en planilla) modality referred to in the statement of defense (litis contestatio) (at folio 247 of the main file), the truth is that the price offered by the defendant fails to demonstrate a level of coverage of the necessary costs to comply with the terms of reference of the tender. The arguments relating to the provisional nature of the information supposedly contained in the final document Regulatory Plan submitted by the awardee are not receivable by this Tribunal, because that is not the condition described in the tender specifications (cartel de la licitación) for the document that the Administration requests (see folio 5 of Volume I, folio 533 of Volume III, and the conditions described in the tender specifications for the contracting at folios 26 to 30 of Volume I, all references made to the administrative record provided in certified form by the defendant Administration). What the co-defendant argued in this regard is not supported by any of the characteristics and specificities of the tendered Regulatory Plan, nor does the co-defendant, in its bid, at any time indicate that the work or final product will have that characteristic of provisionality or of desk-based formulation (formulación en gabinete), with which it formulates the defense of the quoted price.

Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal concludes that the argument of ruinousness of the offered price, which was alleged by the plaintiff, is estimable and consequently, the alleged ground for nullity of the award of the tender carried out is admissible.

3- SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: The impossibility of the term offered by the defendant as a ground for nullity of the act of awarding the tender. Besides the foregoing, from the comparison of the aforementioned pieces of the administrative record, namely folios 502 to 504 and folio 520 of Volume III, Administrative Record, it follows that the time offer for completion and delivery of the final product proposed by the awardee is twenty-four calendar days, while the other offers exceed one hundred days (see folio 520 cited above). Evidently, it is a performance period that breaks any of the other offers, due to its brevity and reduced nature. The plaintiff argues that this is a materially impossible period to fulfill and that it transgresses the principle of reasonableness, constitutionally relevant as a parameter for the actions of public administrations. The defendant, in itself, does not pronounce itself on the matter, but rather its pleadings are limited to arguing the viability of being able to quote a lower price for the tendered work. However, it omits and in no way addresses the argument of a reasonable period for the fulfillment of the contracted object that the plaintiff attributes against it. This is thus an unanswered argument on the part of the defendant, in which this Tribunal holds the following: Although at folio 443 of Volume II of the Administrative Record provided, the defendant awardee company offers an activity schedule (cronograma de actividades) of activities to be carried out, the truth is that at no time, according to the letter of said tool, is it indicated that it is a compliance schedule, but rather a list of activities with a placement in time of the same, within the twenty-four days proposed by the offeror; however, this list does not correlate with the activities described in the tender specifications, which makes it evident that, with the evidence provided in the case file, it is concluded that the activities contained in the tender specifications under numeral 2.16 are excluded from that list, since at no time in the proposed schedule is the time budget that they require mentioned, and in this sense, the sealed bid (plica) of the awardee company partially fails to comply with the requirements of the tender specifications in the indicated numeral, the foregoing reinforces the thesis of the impossibility of fulfilling the offered term. The absence of such content at the schedule level does constitute a ground for nullity because it is a deficiency contained in the offer and which places the expectation of contract performance below what is required by the contracting Public Administration in accordance with the tender specifications that are integrated into the case file. In this regard, this Tribunal considers it necessary to make evident that in matters of administrative contracting, the tendering administration must justify the lifting of any of the offer requirements in favor of the offerors, with due anticipation, even providing a real opportunity to hear the persons participating in the tender regarding such a decision. In this case, such justification is not recorded in the case file, and if it was not done, the award becomes null for illegitimately omitting the requirement of a specification contained in the tender specifications, with the double error that, in this case, such exemption favors only one of the participants, which is null and void ab initio (nulo de pleno derecho) for disrespecting constitutional and subordinate legality parameters, described in numerals 11, 33, 41, 49, 182 all of the Political Constitution and the contents of articles 4 and 5 of Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494 published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 110 of June 8, 1995, Supplement No. 20, and its reforms.

As a further elaboration regarding what the plaintiff alleged on this aspect, the award of the offer must be proportional not only regarding the financial budget, but also regarding the time budget proposed by the sealed bids submitted, in order to fully comply with the parameters of technical legality described in Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration, an aspect regarding which the allegation of the plaintiff company is estimable.

This Tribunal has found, in the legality review conducted, that other offers annexed to the administrative record also fail to be specific regarding the requirements of the tender specifications, which is not considered sound practice, because the administration must ensure the exhaustive compliance with the terms of reference formulated in the tender specifications, an aspect that, as stated, lacks full compliance in this case, and which, because it is not a matter that is the subject of the proceedings, this Tribunal only wishes to make evident, in view of the procedural legality to which the work of the undersigned is constrained, so that the contracting authority may formulate the corrections that in sound law correspond, if it sees fit.

4- THIRD SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: The possible incompatibility to contract of the representative of the awardee company as a ground for nullity of the act of awarding the tender. Not without noting that the allegation of disrespect to Article 17 of the CFIA Code of Ethics, indicated by the plaintiff (at folio 259), is omitted because it grounds the application to the case sub examine of a norm that does not entail the effects of generality that allow the formulation of an examination of legality observable in the jurisdictional venue, the application of said norm being reserved for the oversight bodies of the professional practice of the members of the mentioned Professional Association (Colegio Profesional), therefore its allegation in this matter is rejected.

A third challenge argument pointed out by the plaintiff is the existence of a possible incompatibility of the awardee under the terms of articles 22 and 22 bis of the Law on Administrative Contracting, considering that its legal representative has stated in the case file that, as an official of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), he participated in 1982 in the preparation of the Coastal Regulatory Plan model which, still being in force, is a document that guides the actions to be carried out by private companies and the institutions that approve this type of Coastal Regulatory Plans, which—and this is the central argument of the plaintiff—creates an advantage for him as a bidder in the tender process, which is expressly prohibited in the aforementioned administrative contracting rules.

When answering the complaint, the representative of the plaintiff party confirms that as an official of the ICT in 1982, he was in charge of preparing the model that defines the technical criteria involved in the preparation of the coastal regulatory plan that consulting companies follow and the institutions responsible for approving them apply (thus at folio 241 of the main file). He then argues that this document was never approved, and only serves as a consultation, is not binding or mandatory for any public or private institution, and in it, guidelines and technical criteria are given for preparing this type of regulatory plans. He argues that he is not covered by the prohibitions to contract with the administration.

It is the criterion of this Tribunal that in this case, the incompatibility that the plaintiff accuses against the legal representative of the awardee company is not verified, because, from the outset, it is necessary to point out that such incompatibility constitutes a true interdiction to participation in administrative contracting processes carried out by public administrations, consequently governing a specificity (taxatividad) that is not only enunciative but also interpretive, to which the legal operator cannot and must not put forward other elements that are not those in the regulations. Thus, these rules provide a series of scenarios that require a responsible formulation of the condition attributed to the offeror to verify that any of such scenarios actually applies.

This Tribunal has reviewed such rules, finding that they regulate the scope of participation of the public official in tender processes through which the public administration must acquire the goods and services required for its ordinary business. Both rules, Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Law on Administrative Contracting, introduce an express prohibition under the conditions described therein for persons who hold the designation or status of public official. In this case, such a condition is not proven, it is not verified, because there is simply no evidence in the case file that allows one to unequivocally assume that the legal representative of the company DEPPAT SA, Mr. Nombre71574, when participating as representative of said company in the mentioned tender process, was holding the position of public official with the possibility of influencing said decision. In this regard, the plaintiff fails to demonstrate such a situation, breaching the principle of the burden of proof contained in Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, from the legality review carried out in this matter, the Tribunal cannot deduce that the mentioned legal representative of the co-defendant company is a public official and that, at the time of formulating the sealed bid, he was found within any of the hypotheses described in the mentioned articles of the Law on Administrative Contracting; consequently, this charge against the actions whose nullity is sought must be dismissed.

SEVENTH: On the claims of the plaintiff. A) THE ANNULMENT CLAIM. The plaintiff has requested the annulment of both the act of awarding the tendered process, and the administrative act by which the appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) filed against said award was rejected. Both are administrative acts issued by the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. As has been set forth, the Tribunal has found that the plaintiff is assisted by reason and right, and the complaint must be partially granted. As indicated, the petition is admissible regarding the ruinous price of the awarded offer and regarding the performance period described therein. Both being essential elements of administrative contracting in accordance with the mentioned protective legislation on the matter. What was alleged regarding the presumed incompatibility to contract with the State attributed to the legal representative of the awardee has no merit. For the foregoing, the action is partially estimable.

• B)THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. Now, regarding the claim for damages (pretensión resarcitoria) formulated by the plaintiff, the petition must be denied because the plaintiff in no way manages to demonstrate those damages (daños y perjuicios) that it alleges have been caused to it by its participation in the tender, or by having failed to be awarded in this tender. In this regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind that participation in this type of tender does not generate for the offeror anything more than a mere expectation of right, since its offer goes on to be evaluated alongside the others that may have been submitted. In the case of participation in tenders typical of administrative contracting, a scope of patrimonial liability of the contracting administration does not arise from the mere invitation to participate in the tender—as the plaintiff seems to understand it—nor is it bound, by the mere publication of the invitation to bid, to compensate damages that lack any verification in the case file. In this case, although the tender surpassed those stages and reached the award stage, the necessary causal link that would make such a claim admissible does not therefore arise—ipso iure—considering that until the moment of the award of the tender, all offerors not only enter on an equal footing but all maintain equally a mere expectation of contract, with the correlative requirement of the same level of investment to formulate their offer. It is that mere legal expectation that allows one to conclude that the damages that the plaintiff alleges as incurred are not produced for the participants in the tender, because the contracting is, up to that moment, and it is not appropriate to value it differently, a mere and simple expectation of contract; not a contract properly speaking. A causal link giving rise to liability is not produced by the mere fact of awarding the tender. Conceiving patrimonial liability of the contracting Administration for that fact would lead to the absurdity of supposing that every award of an administrative tender automatically makes the Administration that awards it liable, which besides being unlawful for lacking a legal norm that so provides, is not correct, because what the Administration has done in awarding the tender is to give full effect to its will in pursuit of satisfying the public interest that is presumed implicit in every administrative contract. It is not idle to indicate that in accordance with the applicable regulations, Article 317 of the code of civil procedure, it is the duty of whoever formulates a claim to prove their assertion, which is summarized in the already well-known formula onus probandi (or ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat) of Latin law. In this case, the plaintiff in no way accredits, nor by any of the means of evidence that the legal system possesses, the existence of such damages, its simple assertion not being sufficient for this, nor the elaborations made through the rejected expert evidence, which, although it was ordered in the case file, fails to substantiate an objective criterion for this Tribunal; consequently, the claim for damages raised by the plaintiff must be rejected.
• C)OTHER PETITIONED LEGAL SITUATIONS: The claim formulated for this authority to order the re-awarding of the tender in favor of the plaintiff lacks all sense, considering that out of respect for the constitutional legality governing the task of this Tribunal, and within the framework of legality created by the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, this authority could in no way issue such an order, so it is clearly illegal, senseless, and inadmissible, the only possible consequence being to reject it outright.

EIGHTH: On the exceptions and defenses invoked. The co-defendant company opposes the action brought against it, pleading the exceptions of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right. In this regard, this Tribunal rejects that of lack of passive standing, because it is evident from the case file that this complaint affects possible rights and interests of the co-defendant, DEPPAT, SA., a sufficient reason to have joined it in this litigation and to bring it as a co-defendant to the proceedings, so that it may face the situation created by the process, which demonstrates that the suitability to be a party in it does indeed fall upon it, considering that it resulted as the awardee of the tender process and that this effectively creates an effect of liability in the proceedings that is unavoidable for it, and provides sufficient basis to dismiss the invoked exception of lack of passive standing ad causam. Regarding the lack of right, it tends to undermine the effects of the process when the plaintiff does not enjoy legal backing in the action it brings; however, in this case, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff not only had sufficient reason to sue, but that the claimed legal situation of nullity does find echo and support in the legal system applicable to the matter. Such that the plaintiff does have, in the sub examine, the sufficient, necessary, and opportune right to sue for the alleged nullity, and consequently, the rejection of the exception of lack of right invoked by the co-defendant DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.) is warranted.

NINTH: On the costs of the proceedings. In accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue of the authorization granted by article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, No. 3667/1966, and for not being within the scenarios described in Article 98 of said normative body and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the co-defendants Municipality of Santa Cruz, and the firm DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.), are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this trial, which must be settled in the judgment execution stage.

TENTH: Corollary. For the foregoing, and for the reasons and reasoning given, the special procurement complaint must be partially granted.

THEREFORE:

The defenses of lack of passive standing ad causam and of lack of right are rejected. The present special procurement complaint is partially granted, it being understood as denied in everything not expressly granted. The act of awarding the procurement under registration No. 5-2005 Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) for Callejones Beach and San Juanillo Beach of Santa Cruz, province of Guanacaste, adopted by agreement of the Municipal Council in its ordinary session No. 26-2005, article 5, subsection 7 of June 28, 2005, is annulled ab initio and in all its scope; also annulled, as a logical consequence of the foregoing, is the administrative act issued by that same Municipal Council that rejects the appeal for revocation filed against said award by the company Arquitectura SAAR, SA., adopted in ordinary session No. 43-2005 article 5, subsection 07 of October 25, 2005. The defendants are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this trial, which must be settled in the judgment execution stage. Let it be notified.

Isaac Guillermo Amador Hernández Nombre12757 Francisco Jiménez Villegas SEVENTH SECTION, CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL NUE 05-000444-0161-CA

1 1 NUE 05-000444-0161-CA Nº 02-2011-VII TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SÉPTIMA. Segundo Circuito Judicial, Goicoechea, Anexo A. San José, a las once horas del día catorce de Enero del año dos mil once. Proceso Especial Licitatorio interpuesto por SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA DE ARQUITECTURA SAAR, S. A., con cédula de persona jurídica número tres- ciento uno- setenta y nueve mil ciento cuarenta y cinco, en lo sucesivo SAAR, SA, representada por Nombre34809 , mayor de edad, casado una vez, arquitecto, vecino de Dirección18314 , , de la entrada principal cien metros oeste y setenta y cinco metros al norte, con cédula de identidad número CED117226- - , en condición de Presidente y la señora Nombre149743 , mayor de edad, casada una vez, profesora preescolar, del mismo vecindario del primero, con cédula de identidad número CED117227- - , con facultades de Apoderados Generalísimos sin límite de suma de dicha sociedad (certificación de folio 5), en autos representados por Nombre1801 , mayor, casado, Abogado, vecino de San José, con cédula de identidad número CED117228- - , a quien le han conferido poder especial judicial para el ejercicio de esa representación (documento visible a folio 9), en contra de MUNICIPALIDAD DE SANTA CRUZ , con cédula de persona jurídica número CED117229- - , en autos representada por el señor Alcalde, condición que recae en el señor Nombre126747 , con cédula de identidad número CED117230- - (manifestación de folio 90); y contra la empresa DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.), con cédula de persona jurídica número tres- ciento uno- cero setenta y dos mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, representada por su Presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma señor Nombre71574 , mayor, divorciado, vecino de San Josecito de Heredia, con cédula de identidad número CED117231- - (certificación de folio 184 del principal).

Resultando:

1- Habiendo sido fijada la cuantía de este asunto en la cantidad de veinte millones de colones (mediante auto de este despacho de folio 262 del principal), la demanda ha sido interpuesta formulando la siguiente pretensión:

“Que se anulen por ser contrarios al ordenamiento jurídico los siguientes acuerdos tomados por el Concejo Municipal al haber contratado un objeto ilícito, los cuales se describen así: I. El acuerdo del Concejo Municipal tomado en sesión ordinaria número 26-2005, artículo 5, inciso 07 del 28 de junio del 2005, que acordó la adjudicación de la licitación por registro 5-2005 a la empresa DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología paisajismo, planificación, arquitectura y turismo s.a.) (sic) II. El acuerdo del Concejo Municipal tomado en sesión ordinaria número 43-2005, artículo 5, inciso 07 de fecha 25 de octubre de 2005, que declaró sin lugar el recurso interpuesto de conformidad con el artículo 92 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. 1. Que se condene a la institución demandada al pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados a mi representada, con su respectiva indexación. .2 Consecuentemente se ordene al Concejo demandado que se readjudiquen (sic) a mi representada la Licitación por Registro 05-2005 promovida por la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. 3. Que se condene a la institución demandada y a la empresa DEPPAT S.A., al pago de ambas costas –personales y procesales- de esta litis*.” (Cfr. escrito de formalización de la demanda de folios 121-122). *Uso se cursiva suplido.

2- Por escrito presentado en fecha 13 de agosto del 2007, el representante de la parte actora contesta la audiencia conferida por este Despacho mediante auto de las 14:56 horas del 24 de julio del 2007 (a folio 153), y manifiesta lo siguiente:

“De conformidad con el requerimiento de ese Despacho, me permito indicar que en cuanto a la pretensión de reconocimiento de daños y perjuicios, los mismos se originan en las irregularidades y violaciones al ordenamiento jurídico acaecidas en el proceso y adjudicación de la licitación por registro 5-2005 a favor de la empresa DEPPAT (DESARROLLO EN ECOLOGÍA PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO S.A.), así como en la invalidación de la adjudicación de tal concurso promovido por la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. Esos daños y perjuicios consisten en la imposibilidad, por parte de mi representada, de haberse constituido en cocontratante de la Administración, los gastos en la defensa de la legalidad, el adecuado uso de los fondos públicos, la transparencia y buena fe en las contrataciones administrativas, así como en la ganancia dejada de percibir producto de la utilidad proyectada en relación con el proceso contractual de mérito. Los referidos daños y perjuicios se estiman prudencialmente en la suma de ¢20.000.000,00 (veinte millones de colones), más los respectivos intereses hasta su efectivo pago y su indexación*.” (véase escrito de folio 154 del principal). *Uso se cursiva suplido.

3- Mediante escrito presentado en fecha 5 de noviembre del 2007, la parte actora solicita que “…para todo efecto jurídico material, téngase por ampliada la demanda, en todo, en contra de Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo S.A.*” (así a folio 191). *Uso se cursiva suplido.

4- Efectuado el traslado de la acción, la codemandada, empresa Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA (DEPPAT S.A.), contesta negativamente la demanda, y opone las excepciones de falta de derecho, pues aduce que la actora no tiene ningún derecho a demandar, y la de falta de legitimación pasiva ya que no corresponde a la empresa accionada la nulidad de los acuerdos solicitados y los daños y perjuicios que se ocasionaron con el mismo (escrito agregado a folios que van del 238 al 249 en el principal).

La Municipalidad de Santa Cruz no contestó la acción y fue declarada en rebeldía mediante auto de las quince horas y cuarenta y seis minutos del doce de octubre del año dos mil siete (folios 183-184 ídem).

5- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de la Ley y no se observan vicios en la tramitación que causen nulidad de actuaciones o que obsten el cumplimiento del debido proceso, por lo que se procede a resolver este asunto previa deliberación con el criterio unánime de sus integrantes dentro del margen de tiempo que lo permiten las labores del Despacho.

Redacta el Juez Isaac Amador Hernández; y

Considerando:

PRIMERO: Hechos Probados. Para la resolución de este asunto el Tribunal tiene por demostrados los siguientes hechos: 1- Mediante acuerdo dictado por el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, en su sesión ordinaria Nº 07-2005, Artículo 6, inciso 02 del 15 de febrero del 2005, fue aprobada por unanimidad la realización de la licitación por registro para la elaboración de los planes reguladores de Playa Callejones- Playa San Juanillo de ese Cantón (folio 21, Tomo I del expediente administrativo). 2- Que dicho proceso licitatorio se denominó Licitación por Registro Nº 5-2005 Planes Reguladores Playa Callejones y Playa San Juanillo de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (folio 30 Exp. Adm. Tomo I). 3- Que en dicho proceso licitatorio participaron en total cinco ofertas presentadas por distintas empresas, a saber, la Ingenieros de Centroamérica SA; DEPPAT, SA.; ARGUESA, SA.; SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA DE ARQUITECTOS, SA (SAAR SA); e Nombre150242 ; siendo dos de tales oferentes la empresa actora en este proceso y la empresa codemandada (folios 502, 503, 504 y 507 del Administrativo, Tomo III, e integralmente el Tomo II del Adm.). 4- Que en el cartel licitatorio se describen las condiciones generales de la contratación, los términos de referencia para la realización del plan regulador Playa Callejones-Playa San Juanillo, los alcances del servicio a contratar, la información relativa a los personeros y personal de cada empresa oferente, la vigencia de las ofertas, la forma de pago, las condiciones de elegibilidad, las condiciones de la caución y cláusula penal, y el sistema de evaluación, consistente éste último, en dos ítems, a- el precio de la oferta, a la que se le da valor de 70 puntos y, b- el plazo de entrega, a la que se le da valor de 30 puntos (folios 22 a 30 del Exp. Adm., Tomo I). 5- Que el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz mediante Acuerdo tomado en su sesión ordinaria Nº 26-2005, Artículo 5º, inciso 7 del 28 de junio del 2005, acordó adjudicar la licitación por registro Nº 5-2005 a la empresa DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA), por un monto de ocho millones cuatrocientos mil colones, según publicación hecha en diario oficial La Gaceta Nº 145 del 28 de julio del 2005, pág. 27 (así en folio 53 Adm., Tomo III, en relación también, folio 3 del principal). 6- En contra de dicha adjudicación, la empresa Arquitectura SAAR, SA, actora en este proceso, presentó recurso de revocatoria el cual fue conocido y resuelto negativamente en su contra mediante acuerdo del Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, adoptado en la sesión ordinaria Nº 43-2005, Artículo 5, inciso 07 del 25 de Octubre del 2005 (folios 1 y 2 del principal). 7- Que en fecha 28 de noviembre del 2005, la referida empresa, Sociedad Anónima Arquitectura SAAR,SA., interpone el presente proceso contencioso administrativo en contra del ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz y que a la postre lleva como codemandada a la empresa DEPPAT (Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA) (folios 6 a 8 y 99 y 100 del principal). 8- Que al ser interpuesto, el presente asunto le fue comunicado oficiosamente por este Despacho, a la Contraloría General de la República a las 14:00 horas del 07 de abril del 2006, sin que conste el apersonamiento a los autos de dicha entidad (folios 24 y 25 del principal).

SEGUNDO: Hechos no demostrados. En la apreciación de este asunto el Tribunal tiene por no demostrado ni acreditado en los autos la existencia de los daños y perjuicios causados a la empresa actora con motivo del proceso licitatorio que está impugnando en esta vía; sencillamente no hay prueba de ello.

TERCERO: Argumentos de la parte actora. En el escrito de formalización de la demanda, la parte actora alega y fundamenta lo que sin el perjuicio de su extenso contenido literal en los autos (folios 99 al 122 del principal), expresa lo siguiente: HECHOS: Como tales cita los siguientes, 1- La realización del procedimiento licitatorio Nº 5-2005 promovido por la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, para contratar la confección del Plan Regulador de Playa Callejones y Playa San Juanillo. 2- La publicación de dicho concurso en el diario oficial. 3- La descripción hecha en el numeral 2.10 del cartel licitatorio en cuanto a que se requiere el levantamiento topográfico con curvas de nivel a cada metro como máximo para aquellos terrenos que en la distancia horizontal representan un factor determinante en el levantamiento vertical. 4- De acuerdo a la descripción cartelaria, el área total del estudio es de 91.6 hectáreas. 5- Describe el sistema propuesto en el cartel para evaluar las ofertas, siendo los factores menor precio y plazo de entrega los únicos a considerar en la calificación. 6- Describe brevemente el contenido de las ofertas presentadas en función de esas variables a calificar. 7- Describe el acto administrativo por el cual la administración adjudica a la empresa DEPPAT el concurso. 8- Cita el acuerdo municipal por el cual le fue rechazado el recurso interpuesto en contra del acto de adjudicación. COMO FUNDAMENTOS, expuso los siguientes:

I- En cuanto al precio y la violación a principios fundamentales. La Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, promovió la Licitación Por Registro Nº 5-2005 para contratar la realización del Plan Regulador de la zona de Playa Callejones y Playa San Juanillo, en la que tuvieron participación varias empresas ofertando cada una de ellas las siguientes condiciones, la empresa DEPPAT SA por un monto de ocho millones cuatrocientos mil colones con un plazo de veinticuatro días; la sociedad anónima Arquitectura SAAR por un monto de veinte millones y con un plazo de entrega de cuatro punto cinco meses; ARGUESA SA, por un monto de dieciocho millones de colones y un plazo de entrega de veintidós meses; Ingenieros de Centroamérica Ltda., por un monto de cuarenta y dos millones de colones y un plazo de entrega de cuatro meses; e Nombre71576 por un monto de treinta y ocho millones doscientos ochenta mil colones en un plazo de ocho meses. El Concejo Municipal demandado adjudicó dicho concurso a la empresa Desarrollo en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA., por un monto de ocho millones cuatrocientos mil colones con un plazo de veinticuatro días de entrega. Tal adjudicación sin embargo, es violatoria del principio de legalidad constitucional, contenido también en la normativa subordinada que reproduce sus alcances y que constriñe toda actuación de la Administración Pública, mismo que fue inobservado en la decisión que se impugna, por cuanto la oferta adjudicada se sustenta en un precio ruinoso y en una condición de cumplimiento irreal, lo cual resulta en una evidente transgresión a los principios de legalidad, equilibrio económico del contrato, libertad de contratación, de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En este caso, en apreciación de los principios de eficiencia, igualdad de trato y de oportunidades, legalidad, sana administración y buena fe, el gobierno municipal contratante debió, acorde con la normativa aplicable, descalificar la oferta presentada por la empresa adjudicada, por que deviene en un precio ruinoso que deriva en una violación clara a las disposiciones del Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica, decreto Ejecutivo Nº 17481 del 7 de abril de 1987 y sus reformas. Tal y como lo han manifestado los pronunciamientos de la Contraloría General de la República, la Administración no debe adjudicar la oferta con el precio más bajo o la que ofrezca la más pronta entrega, pues eso no es suficiente, ya que está legalmente obligada a verificar esos precios a fin de determinar que son claramente veraces, reales, razonables y proporcionados al objeto al que se refiere la contratación. Llegado a este punto, el representante de la actora cita el voto 998-98 de la Sala Constitucional, la resolución RSL Nº 262-97 de las 15:00 horas del 10 de noviembre de 1997, la resolución RC-573-2002 de las 9:00 horas del 4 de septiembre del 2002, así como la resolución R-DAGJ-500-2003 de las 10:00 horas del 10 de noviembre del 2003, dictadas por la Contraloría General de la República. Además de lo anterior, el Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, aplicable al caso por lo dispuesto en el Artículo 34 de la Constitución Política, requiere al estudio de las plicas la obligatoriedad de excluir del concurso aquellas que presenten un precio inaceptable, ya sea por ser excesivo en relación con los precios del mercado o por estar encima de justa o razonable utilidad, o por ser ruinoso o no ser remunerativo para el oferente, en cuyo caso la exclusión se justifica en tanto el precio da lugar a presumir el posible incumplimiento del contratista respecto a sus obligaciones contractuales por insuficiencia en el pago que va a recibir. En contrataciones como la impugnada, en las que el factor precio tiene tanto peso para elegir al contratista, la Administración debe analizar las ofertas considerando resultados de estudios serios que le permitan decidir el posible valor de mercado de los bienes o servicios que va a licitar, más allá de la fórmula cartelaria indicada en la evaluación de dicho rubro, lo cual le permitirá conocer el valor de lo contratado, sino también saber si podrá hacer frente a la contratación y si las propuestas que reciba son aceptables en término de precios. La responsabilidad de determinar la ruinosidad o no de un precio ofertado es de la administración contratante, que debe verificar si un precio resulta ruinoso o no remunerativo, o por el contrario, si resulta excesivo. De ahí que, conforme a lo dispone el Artículo 56 del Reglamento a la Contratación Administrativa, la Administración está obligada a excluir aquellas ofertas que coticen precios ruinosos o excesivos, lo que apunta la obligación de toda administración para centrar su decisión en parámetros objetivos en el estudio de los precios que se le cotizan, a fin de ir más allá del simple cotejo entre precios bajos y altos. En el proceso impugnado, la oferta adjudicada en comparación con las otras ofertas presentadas, muestra una diferencia que oscila entre los diez y los treinta y cuatro millones de colones, lo que la hace lejana de un precio de mercado aceptable y competitivo. Cita a este respecto, el criterio vertido por la Contraloría General de la República en el sentido que una oferta con precio ruinoso no es elegible. Cita también el contenido del Artículo 18 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa en cuanto a la obligación de la Administración para mantener el equilibrio económico del contrato. En el presente asunto, la Administración contratante, acorde con los principios de eficiencia, transparencia, igualdad, buena fe y sana administración de fondos públicos, debió descalificar la oferta de DEPPAT, ya que la misma era inelegible e inválida, por lo que no debió ser adjudicada, lo cual es conteste con el criterio que ha aplicado la Contraloría General de la República, en observancia del artículo 56.3 del Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa. En este caso, la ruinosidad deviene del incumplimiento en el Artículo 1 del Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Agrimensores, según Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 17481 del 7 de abril de 1987, publicado en La Gaceta Nº 74 del 20 de Abril de 1987. En el cartel de la licitación se establece, en punto 2.10 que el levantamiento topográfico debe realizarse con curvas de nivel a cada metro como máximo, para aquellos terrenos que horizontalmente la distancia representa un factor determinante en el levantamiento vertical. Al haber solicitado la administración un levantamiento topográfico con curva de nivel a cada metro como máximo, somete al oferente a condiciones especiales, siendo técnica y legalmente obligante para éste, confeccionar su oferta con base en el Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica. Dicho requerimiento constituye un elemento cartelario discriminante de las ofertas que se presentaron, pues está definido a priori y debe ser satisfecho con miras al fin público que persigue la contratación. Para la elaboración de las curvas de nivel del área a regular deben observarse las tarifas mínimas que establece el Decreto Ejecutivo 17481. En Playa Callejones el espacio es de setenta hectáreas, para la Playa San Juanillo es de veintiuna punto seis hectáreas, lo que suma en total noventa punto seis hectáreas, a lo que se agrega un catorce como treinta y nueve por ciento de inflación, que acorde con el artículo 17 del Reglamento de Tarifas en esa materia, permite establecer la relación de precio que llega a ocho millones setecientos veintisiete mil novecientos sesenta y seis colones con setenta céntimos, si todo el terreno fuere plano; y de once millones ochocientos noventa y un mil cuatrocientos sesenta y dos colones con treinta céntimos si el terreno fuere ondulado. Eso ascendería a catorce millones doscientos sesenta y cuatro mil ochenta y siete colones con cincuenta céntimos, si fuere terreno montañoso. Así el precio ofertado por DEPPAT SA, es ruinoso ya que ninguno de los casos de las ofertas presentadas supera o iguala ese monto en aplicación de la tabla de honorarios aplicable; cita al respecto la resolución RC-355-2001 del 28 de junio del 2001 de la Contraloría General de la República. La oferta adjudicada presenta un vicio esencial como lo es el factor precio, que en lo sucedido deviene en ruinoso e ilícito, por lo que es deber de la Administración, la exclusión de la empresa DEPPAT, con fundamento en el principio de legalidad constitucionalmente dispuesto, puesto que se trata de un vicio que no puede ser subsanado al constituir ese factor un elemento esencial del concurso. En relación con esto, se produce grave irrespeto al principio de intangibilidad del patrimonio en el sentido que ese principio está ligado con el de equilibrio económico del contrato que contempla el Artículo 18 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. Existen suficientes argumentos técnicos para considerar que la oferta presentada por su representada, es la mejor y la que satisface el interés general, por lo que procede la anulación de la adjudicación hecha a DEPPAT SA, para en su lugar se readjudique el concurso a su representada.

II- En cuanto al plazo de entrega ofrecido por la empresa adjudicada: Dicho plazo atenta contra los principios de lógica, la técnica, la razón, la proporcionalidad, y equilibrio entre precio ofertado y el plazo ofrecido, ya que es materialmente imposible, que la elaboración de un plan regulador pueda efectuarse en tan solo veinticuatro días naturales, cuando ninguna de las ofertas propone menos de cuatro meses de tiempo para elaborar dicha tarea. La representación de la actora menciona en este sentido los alcances jurisprudenciales que la Sala Constitucional ha hecho del principio de razonabilidad, en el voto 1420-91.

III- La prohibición legal de adjudicatario de participar en el concurso: El Artículo 22 inciso literal f) dispone que tienen prohibición legal para participar en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, las personas físicas o jurídicas que hayan intervenido como asesores en cualquier etapa del procedimiento de contratación o hayan participado en la elaboración de las especificaciones, el diseño y la construcción de la obra o las variantes alternativas respecto de las especificaciones o los planos suministrados por la administración. Acorde con dicha norma, el profesional a cargo de la empresa adjudicada, Nombre71574 , ha manifestado que durante el tiempo que se desempeñó para el ICT, estuvo a cargo de la elaboración de planes reguladores y preparó el modelo para la elaboración de Planes Reguladores en la Zona Marítimo Terrestre en el año de 1982, el cual aún sigue vigente, en el cual están definidos los criterios técnicos para la elaboración de esos planes costeros que son los que siguen las empresas consultoras y que aplican las instituciones encargadas de su aprobación. De tales manifestaciones se desprende la prohibición legal para participar en la licitación por registro 05-2005 para la empresa DEPPAT, ya que en uno de sus profesionales participantes, recaía tal prohibición, pues se trata del profesional representante que participó en la elaboración de la base técnica de la licitación, la cual era utilizada en el momento del concurso, lo que contamina la oferta de su empresa y la hace ilícita al tenor de lo dispuesto en el Artículo 22 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, por lo que en toda contratación debe privar el principio de la buena fe y que nadie puede beneficiarse de su propio dolo. El objeto contratado por la administración es ilícito por contravenir la ley en cuanto a la ruinosidad de su oferta, proveniente del irrespeto a las costumbres y normas especiales que regulan las tarifas en el campo profesional respectivo, y de la prohibición legal que surge en el momento en el que el profesional se defiende ante su colegio. Se trata de una oferta contraria al Derecho, que no puede ser perfeccionada ni surtir efectos jurídicos. Llegados a este punto, el representante de la empresa actora realiza una labor de comprobación de la forma dispuesta en el cartel de la licitación para elegir la oferta a la que se adjudica el concurso, lo que le lleva a concluir –así lo manifiesta-, que SAAR SA, es la que demuestra la aptitud para obtener la adjudicación en el caso que se anule lo actuado. De lo dicho se desprende que si la administración contratante hubiere observado la legalidad aplicable, sobretodo los principios de eficiencia e igualdad, se habría descalificado la oferta de la empresa codemandada y el resultado final de la adjudicación habría sido distinto y no se le habría causado perjuicio real a su representada. Cita a propósito la resolución 021-2002 del 9 de enero del 2002 de la Contraloría General de la República.

CUARTO: Argumentos y defensa de la Empresa Adjudicada. La codemandada y adjudicada en el concurso licitado, firma Desarrollos en Ecología, Paisajismo, Planificación, Arquitectura y Turismo SA, DEPPAT, SA, al contestar la demanda rechaza los cargos formulados de la siguiente manera: Rechaza los hechos; señala que esa firma tiene experiencia en el campo objeto de la contratación desde hace unos veinticuatro años, alega que si la parte actora no estaba de acuerdo con algunos aspectos de la contratación, tales como la tabla de calificación de los rubros y los porcentajes de asignados para fines de calificación, debió impugnar a tiempo lo correspondiente al cartel, así lo que respecta al punto 2.10, y no venir a hacerlo en la vía judicial existiendo ya una adjudicación. Argumenta que en esta vía no procede declarar la nulidad de las cláusulas del cartel; que los alegatos de la actora no tienen sustento, pues reflejan el desconocimiento del tipo de trabajo profesional requerido para realizar un plan regulador costero. Aduce que su empresa cuenta con amplia experiencia en este tipo de labores y que los que le han sido encomendados ha sido por razones ajenas.

Luego, argumenta lo siguiente: 1- Para demostrar que los argumentos de la parte actora no tienen sustento por desconocimiento del tipo de trabajo profesional requerido para la realización de un plan regulador costero, manifiesta que durante su gestión en el ICT a cargo de la elaboración de planes reguladores, preparó el modelo para elaboración de esos documentos en 1982 mismo que todavía está vigente; ese documento define los criterios para elaborar planes reguladores costeros, que siguen las empresas consultoras y que aplican las instituciones encargadas de la aprobación de tales documentos. 2- Sigue manifestando la codemandada, que los profesionales en estas áreas entienden que un plan regulador costero, constituye una zonificación de usos del suelo, cuyo carácter técnico no alcanza ni el nivel de anteproyecto de urbanización, ya que lo que se pretende es definir el uso del suelo más conveniente y nunca elaborar una propuesta de diseño urbanístico o un proyecto arquitectónico; la viabilidad que se propone es de carácter preliminar y puede ser modificada en la fase de diseño de cada una de las vías del plan regulador; este tipo de plan es un producto sui generis dentro de la labor profesional y no constituye jamás, un trabajo que pueda ser regulado por las tarifas tradicionales establecidas por el Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. 3- La elaboración de los mapas del diagnóstico ambiental y físico, así como la propuesta de zonificación y viabilidad se prepara sobre un mapa base que muestra las características principales del área a planificar, ubicación de mojones, de ríos y quebradas, localización de instalaciones, curvas de nivel y otros. Dado el carácter preliminar del plan regulador costero, no se requiere una gran precisión de esta información, únicamente debe dar idea de las variaciones topográficas para la toma de decisiones respecto al uso del suelo. En muchos planes reguladores, las empresas consultoras utilizan una interpolación de las curvas de nivel que aparecen en las hojas publicadas por el IGN, lo cual es aceptado por el ICT y por el INVU; pueden incluso documentarse casos en los cuales, el diagnóstico y la propuesta se han elaborado sobre fotografías aéreas ampliadas por el IGN, lo cual es aceptado por dichas instituciones. Actualmente ha sido posible obtener con cierta precisión, curvas de nivel derivadas de las fotografías satelitales con que cuenta el país. Sigue argumentando la demandada, que los profesionales en ingeniería y topografía, así como geógrafos y biólogos con capacitación y adiestramiento pueden preparar un mapa base con curvas de nivel, y si fuere necesario, se podría realizar verificación de campo, o si la información de niveles en los mojones es suficiente, no se requiere el trabajo de campo; el trabajo de topografía requerido para un plan regulador costero, no necesariamente es el trabajo profesional que tiene una tarifa de honorarios regulada por el CFIA, ya que por el carácter preliminar de la propuesta del plan regulador, existen alternativas para obtener el plano base y las empresas consultoras, tienen libertad de contratar a un topógrafo, a un ingeniero, a un geógrafo o algún otro profesional que provea de ese servicio. 4- Prácticamente en ningún caso, para efectos de una cotización de un plan regulador costero, se incluye como parte del costo, el cálculo de las tarifas para curvas de nivel tradicionales; el contrato que se efectúa con el cliente no es por un trabajo de topografía, sino que se trata de un producto final donde no es requisito mostrar o entregar el plano con las curvas de nivel. Si se revisa con detenimiento los mapas de zonificación y viabilidad de planes reguladores aprobados y publicados en el diario oficial, podrá verificarse que no se incluyen las curvas de nivel como entrega final del plan regulador; el trabajo del plano base, que incluye curvas de nivel, no necesariamente debe realizarse con trabajo de campo y por lo tanto, tampoco necesariamente deben aplicarse las tarifas, ya que este trabajo perfectamente puede ser realizado por otro profesional diferente a un topógrafo. 5- En este punto, la demandada desarrolla varios ejemplos de contrataciones efectuadas en las que trata de demostrar que las argumentaciones de la parte actora caen por su peso y podrían sustentar que la oferta presentada por la actora no sea considerada real, razonable y proporcionada al objeto de la contratación, sino fuera del precio normal de mercado. En este contexto cita tres ejemplos de plan regulador costero que, según su dicho, fueron adjudicados por otras municipalidades, empleando tarifas que no son las que rigen para la elaboración de curvas de nivel. 6- Las cotizaciones para planes reguladores costeros donde se incluye un trabajo de plano base con curvas de nivel, no se formulan contabilizando como parte de sus costos, las tarifas del CFIA para labores topográficas. Dado el carácter preliminar de un plan regulador costero, existen opciones para realizar con responsabilidad profesional la propuesta de zonificación sin un trabajo de campo tradicional. Cuando esa empresa ha contratado a un topógrafo para realizar las curvas de nivel de un proyecto, se ha hecho bajo la modalidad de profesional de planilla, lo que significa que durante ese tiempo va a realizar diversas actividades que lo sacan del ejercicio liberal y que por tal razón no aplica en su labor la tarifa del CFIA, siendo esa otra modalidad con la que las empresas en esta línea de mercado, realizan labores como la adjudicada en esta oportunidad a precios razonables y sin que éstos lleguen a ser ruinosos. Argumenta que en cuanto a la presunta prohibición para contratar con la administración en este caso, que alega en su contra la parte actora, indica que tal situación no ocurre por cuanto si bien en el año de 1982, como funcionario del ICT preparó el Modelo para la Elaboración de Planes Reguladores en la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, que aún está vigente, éste no llegó a ser oficializado, quedando como una norma de recomendación y consulta, sin efectos obligantes para ninguna institución pública o privada, por lo que no es una norma reglamentaria de acatamiento obligatorio, sino simplemente un modelo que no se oficializó. Por lo que al representante de la empresa demandada no le cubren las prohibiciones de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, por lo que tampoco su oferta es contraria a derecho. Solicita se rechace la demanda y la condena en costas, daños y perjuicios causados a su representada (escrito de folios 238 al 249).

QUINTO: Sobre la pericia matemática allegada al expediente. Al entablar la acción, la parte actora solicita la designación de un peritaje para que realice los cálculos relativos a monto mínimo a cobrar según el Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales en Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica establecido en el cartel, según el numeral 2.10 del cartel y Artículo 10 de Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Además, solicita la actora que el perito calcule los daños y lucro cesante de la empresa. Una vez obtenidos esos datos, deberá calcular los respectivos intereses que se han dejado de percibir, tomando en consideración la revisión de precio a la fecha, de conformidad con el Artículo 18 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, utilizando la cláusula de reajuste utilizada por la Contraloría General de la República. El Despacho por auto de las 15:51 horas del 21 de Septiembre del 2009 accedió a tal petición, (véase auto de folio 263), y en fecha 05 de Abril del 2010, el perito Actuario Matemático designado Nombre18237 , rinde el informe pericial indicando que los daños directos ascienden a ¢4.510.000,00; el daño de imagen y daño a la empresa habrán de ser calculados por el juez, en tanto que el lucro cesante, entendiendo por tal como el porcentaje de utilidad que perdió la actora al no realizar la obra, que estima en un 25% de la oferta dada, asciende a ¢5.000.000,00; en tanto los intereses legales de los daños directos ocasionados a la actora, en el período que va del 1 de junio del 2006 al 30 de abril del 2010, ascienden a ¢2.338.527,70 y los intereses legales del lucro cesante de la actora en el período que va desde el 1º de noviembre del año 2006 al 30 de abril del 2010, suman ¢Placa23189 (folios 279 a 283). Mediante ampliación a dicho informe, que fuera solicitada por la parte actora (a folio 290), el profesional mencionado indica que la información que le ha servido de base de su informe, en aspectos de inversión de horas profesionales por visita de campo e inspección del sitio; gastos de hotel de los funcionarios que hicieron la visita; gastos de alimentación, de kilometraje y gasolina, inversión en horas profesionales por visitas a la Municipalidad, gastos por mapas, papelería y fotocopias, gastos por presentación de la oferta a la Municipalidad, costo de la garantía de participación no recuperada, son datos todos que le fue suministrados por la parte actora (folios 295 y 296 del principal).

Al respecto este Tribunal no avala el referido informe pericial primeramente, por que se trata del cálculo obtenido mediante un listado de partidas cuya existencia no está acreditada en el expediente (véase al respecto los autos); luego, por que la base de los datos construidos en dicha pericia, fue suministrada por la misma parte interesada en obtener el pago de esos extremos (véase manifestación de folio 296 del principal), lo cual despoja el resultado final obtenido de toda objetividad e independencia de criterio del perito, quien se limitó a su cálculo, al tiempo que la misma parte actora no logró acreditar en ninguna etapa del proceso, prueba idónea, tal como facturas, comprobantes, contratos y documentos para demostrar los gastos que alega incurridos con ocasión de participar en el proceso licitatorio objeto de esta litis. Amén de lo anterior, el solo dicho del perito no constituye por sí mismo el fundamento del hecho técnico que se quiere probar con su intervención en el proceso, pues el perito es una persona con conocimientos técnicos en una rama del conocimiento que –se suele concebir- como ajena al que posee el juzgador, de tal manera que la persona que es designada en un proceso jurisdiccional para desempeñar la labor pericial, se constituye en auxiliar del juez natural de la causa, siendo esa la connotación esencial de su participación en el juicio, la de ser un auxiliar del juez quien debe formar criterio de certeza respecto a lo que se le solicita en la demanda, para lo cual ha de valerse e instrumentar en su decisión de tal insumo. En la especie esa circunstancia no se produce, pues el informe pericial se limita a describir y calcular las cuentas cuya existencia –ciertamente no comprobada en los autos-, le suministra la parte actora, tal y como permite demostrarlo la simple y llana manifestación que realiza dicho profesional al ampliar su informe (de conformidad con el folio 296). Como se indico, tal circunstancia compromete la objetividad, imparcialidad e independencia del profesional perito, a excepción en cuanto a la simple operación aritmética realizada, llamado a construir un criterio de certeza sobre la base de parámetros objetivos, incluso verificables por el Tribunal, lo cual en la especie no se cumple, mereciendo el rechazo de dicha prueba. Por tales razones el Tribunal prescinde del criterio pericial que no va orientado sino a ratificar sin mayores miramientos, el dicho de la actora en cuanto a daños y perjuicios, el cual carece de toda comprobación en los autos y por lo mismo se torna inatendible.

SEXTO: Fondo del asunto. 1- SOBRE LA REBELDÍA DEL AYUNTAMIENTO DEMANDADO. El Tribunal ha analizado en su totalidad el expediente proveído y los alegatos de las partes, concluyendo, primeramente, que no por el hecho de que la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz haya sido declarada en rebeldía, al no haber contestado la demanda, ello ha de sobreentenderse como mérito suficiente para fallar en su contra la demanda, toda vez que la rebeldía como consecuencia procesal de la falta de atención oportuna o total del proceso, no puede tener otros efectos que los creados por la ley procesal que regula el instituto; de tal manera que conforme lo dispone el Artículo 310 del Código Procesal Civil, según lo autoriza el numeral 103 de la Ley 3667 (RJCA/1966), la suerte que corre la parte declarada rebelde es que se tenga por contestada afirmativamente la demanda, en cuanto a los hechos que se invocan al interponerla y formalizarla, luego, a pesar que el proceso continua sin el apersonamiento de la parte rebelde –la norma dice “…se seguirá el proceso sin su intervención;…”-, no obstante, podrá el rebelde apersonarse en cualquier momento posterior, tomando el proceso en el estado en que se encuentre, lo que significa que no podrá pedir el regreso a etapas ya precluídas o la revisión de actuaciones en las que ya se ha declarado estado procesal a favor o en contra suya o de su contraparte. Tal declaratoria de rebeldía, sin embargo, no puede suponer la derrota sin más, del rebelde, ni impide a éste que al retomar el proceso pueda ofrecer la prueba que considere pertinente para su pretensión, ya se trate de nueva prueba o bien, simplemente de la que crea que pueda allegar para mejor proveer el criterio del juzgador. Al respecto, en voto 801-F-02 de las 11:10 horas del 18 de octubre del 2002, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia a dicho: “(…) IX.-…la rebeldía no es por sí sola suficiente para la acreditación definitiva de los hechos, solo alcanza este valor si otras pruebas de igual linaje no contradicen la contestación ficta. Por eso la rebeldía debe ser valorada con el resto de elementos probatorios obrantes en el proceso”. En esta tesitura, la declaratoria de rebeldía en contra de alguna de las partes en el proceso, no desvanece ni atenúa la obligación procesal del juzgador para, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Artículo 98 numeral 4) del Código Procesal Civil, verificar las afirmaciones hechas por las partes, analizando la pertinencia y certeza de la prueba aportada al expediente. Lo dicho permite concretar la pauta que respecto a lo sucedido en la especie, asume este órgano colegiado, pues la Administración demandada no se apersonó a los autos, aunque de ello de ninguna manera se deriva “per se”, un fallo en su contra sin analizar el acervo probatorio y demás elementos del proceso que circunstancian la resolución final que se adopta.

2- PRIMER ARGUMENTO DE FONDO DE LA ACTORA: La ruinosidad del precio ofertado como causal de nulidad de la adjudicación impugnada. Ahora bien, respecto a la causal de nulidad del acto de adjudicación del concurso licitatorio 05-2005 promovido por el ayuntamiento codemandado, es lo cierto que acorde con lo dispuesto en el Artículo 3º de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, Nº 7494, publicada en Alcance Nº 20 a La Gaceta Nº 110 del 8 de junio de 1995 (LCA), el régimen de nulidades legislado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se aplica a la contratación administrativa. Esto permite tener en claro que el cotejo de legalidad aplicable a este asunto es el previsto en la mencionada Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Ahondando en ese propósito, es necesario tener presente que la condición de ruinosidad de un precio ofrecido en la plica de una licitación (por registro, en este caso), adquiere esa condición cuando no representa una remuneración adecuada para los costes que previsiblemente –conforme al cartel del concurso-, habrá de incurrir el oferente durante la vigencia y ejecución del contrato para dar cabal cumplimiento de éste en perjuicio de la Administración, caso en el cual, se suele mencionar que un precio es ruinoso por no ser remunerativo para quien lo ofrece, por el indicado motivo. Un precio en esa condición hace esperable no sólo la desmejora patrimonial del oferente, sino el eventual incumplimiento del contrato como resultado de la falta de una adecuada remuneración con el perjuicio patrimonial emergente no sólo para el ofertante sino también para el contratante. El precio ruinoso o no remunerativo, viene a ser un desvalor que perjudica el contrato administrativo y el patrimonio de los contratantes. En la consideración de esta condición intervienen, según lo antes indicado, los parámetros de legalidad reglados en la LGAP, a los que está sujeta por principio de legalidad toda actividad de la Administración Pública. El estudio del caso concreto permite dilucidar que el precio ofrecido por la empresa adjudicada, de ocho millones cuatrocientos mil colones para la realización de los planes reguladores costeros en Playa Callejones y Playa San Juanillo, en la jurisdicción del ayuntamiento municipal de Santa Cruz, fue formulado sin correlacionar la estructura del importe total, a las actividades que conforme al cartel de la licitación, son el objeto de la contratación administrativa según los términos de referencia y el alcance de los servicios a contratar que fueron licitados por la administración contratante. En la oferta presentada por la empresa DEPPAT no se concreta un costo por cada actividad descrita en el cartel del concurso, lo cual hace incierta la asignación de un valor representativo del coste de cada una de ellas para el oferente, lo cual permite concluir que efectivamente el precio deviene en ruinoso, habida cuenta que no resulta previsiblemente remunerativo del elenco de tareas y especificidades que deberá cumplir el adjudicado conforme al cartel de la licitación. Tómese en cuenta que, incluso no consta en el expediente principal ni en el administrativo la descripción detallada de la oferta económica propuesta por la empresa adjudicada; de hecho, son el acta de apertura de las ofertas presentadas (folios 502 a 504, Tomo III del Adm.) y el cuadro comparativo posteriormente elaborado por la Proveeduría Institucional (folio 520 ibidem), los elementos que permiten a este Tribunal confirmar el monto por el que fue adjudicada la oferta presentada por la empresa codemandada. No menos importante y de necesaria consideración en la comprobación del vicio que evidencia el precio ofertado por la empresa adjudicada es que el alegato de la parte actora se centra exclusivamente en la ruinosidad del precio propuesto aduciendo la inobservancia de la tabla tarifaria que debe cobrar la persona profesional en topografía para realizar el levantamiento de las curvas de nivel que pide el cartel del concurso, habida cuenta que según tal alegación, la oferta presentada por la adjudicada incumple con lo dispuesto en el Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 17481 Reglamento de Tarifas de Honorarios para los Profesionales de Agrimensura, Topografía e Ingeniería Topográfica, del 19 de junio de 1989. Aún así, y sobre el cálculo de tal incumplimiento, es lo cierto que el monto escrito en la plica no demuestra cubrir los honorarios de los restantes profesionales del equipo interdisciplinario que estaría realizando el Plan Regulador Costero de ambas zonas de playa, es decir, que el precio propuesto en la oferta económica de ¢8.400.000,00 no demuestra ser remunerativo, ni del coste que implica contratar un(a) profesional en topografía, aun cuando fuere por planilla, así como tampoco del restante equipo de profesionales que habría de integrarse en la fase de formulación del Plan Regulador, tal y como permite concluirlo razonablemente la lista descrita en la sección de ALCANCES DE LOS SERVICIOS A CONTRATAR contenida en el cartel del concurso (véanse folios 26, 27 y 28 del Adm., Tomo I). Dicho en otros términos, el ofrecimiento del precio propuesto por la empresa DEPPAT SA, no logra demostrar en los autos ser remunerativo de los costes que representa la contratación profesional topógrafo, ni del equipo profesional que habría de realizar el Plan Regulador de las áreas de Playa descritas en el concurso subexámine. De tal manera que, aún más allá del incumplimiento de la tarifa de los profesionales en agrimensura que alega la parte actora, argumento que en todo caso no logra desvirtuar eficazmente la codemandada, se produce una falta de cobertura del precio ofertado para los honorarios de los restantes profesionales que tendrían que participar en la elaboración del Plan Regulador, sin que en autos se logre comprobar lo contrario; a lo que se suma, que tampoco queda reflejado en el precio ofertado, el coste de los otros rubros en los que previsiblemente tendría que incurrir la adjudicataria, según la lista de especificaciones requerida en el contrato, Sección 2- de los términos de referencia, en la que se describen, como se indicó, LOS ALCANCES DE LOS SERVICIOS A CONTRATAR (folios de cita previa). Al considerar el argumento de descargo que ofrece la demandada, el Tribunal encuentra que lo alegado al respecto por su representante, carece de sustento normativo, por cuanto, aun cuando la contratación del profesional topógrafo se realice bajo la modalidad de “profesional en planilla” a que alude la litis contestatio (a folio 247 del principal), es lo cierto que el precio ofertado por la demandada no logra demostrar un nivel de cobertura de los costes necesarios para cumplir con los términos de referencia del concurso. No son de recibo para este Tribunal los argumentos relativos a la provisionalidad de la información que estaría conteniendo el Plan Regulador documento final presentado por la adjudicada, por cuanto no es esa la condición descrita en el cartel de la licitación para el documento que la Administración solicita (véanse folio 5 del Tomo I, folio 533 del Tomo III, y las condiciones descritas en el cartel para la contratación folios 26 a 30 del Tomo I, todas referencias hechas al expediente administrativo proveído en forma certificada por la Administración demandada). Lo argumentado al respecto por la codemandada no se sustenta en ninguna de las características y especificidades del Plan Regulador licitado, así como tampoco, en su oferta la codemandada en ningún momento indica que la labor o producto final tendrá esa característica de provisionalidad o de formulación en gabinete, con las que la formula la defensa del precio cotizado.

Por lo hasta aquí expuesto, el Tribunal concluye que el argumento de ruinosidad del precio ofertado, que fue alegado por la parte actora, resulta estimable y por consiguiente procedente en lo alegado, la causal de nulidad de la adjudicación del concurso efectuado.

3- SEGUNDO ARGUMENTO DE FONDO DE LA ACTORA: La imposibilidad del plazo ofertado por la demandada como causal de nulidad del acto de adjudicación del concurso. Amén de lo anterior, del cotejo de las mencionadas piezas del expediente administrativo, a saber folios 502 a 504 y folio 520 del Tomo III, Expediente Administrativo, se sigue que la oferta de tiempo para cumplimiento y entrega del producto final propuesto por la adjudicada es de veinticuatro días naturales, en tanto que las restantes ofertas sobrepasan los cien días (véase folio 520 supra citado). Evidentemente se trata de un plazo de cumplimiento que rompe cualquiera de las restantes ofertas, por lo breve y reducido. La parte actora aduce que ese es un plazo materialmente imposible de cumplir y que transgrede el principio de razonabilidad, constitucionalmente relevante como parámetro de la actuación de las administraciones públicas. De suyo, la parte demandada no se manifiesta al respecto, sino que su alegato se reduce a argumentar la viabilidad de poder cotizar un precio menor para la labor concursada. Sin embargo, deja de lado y no aborda de ninguna manera el argumento de término razonable para el cumplimiento del objeto contratado que le endilga en su contra la parte actora. Se trata así de un argumento inconteste por parte de la demandada, en el que este Tribunal sostiene lo siguiente: Si bien a folio 443 del Tomo II del Expediente Administrativo proveído, la empresa adjudicataria demandada ofrece un cronograma de actividades a realizar, es lo cierto que en ningún momento a la letra de dicha herramienta se indica que se trata de un calendario de cumplimiento, sino bien de una lista de actividades con una ubicación en el tiempo de las mismas, dentro de los veinticuatro días que propone la oferente, sin embargo, esa lista no se correlaciona con las actividades descritas en el cartel del concurso, lo que hace ostensible que, con la prueba proveída en los autos, se concluya que están excluidas de esa lista, las actividades contenidas en el cartel de licitación, bajo los numerales 2.16, pues en ningún momento se menciona en el cronograma propuesto, el presupuesto de tiempo que las mismas requieren, y en este sentido la plica de la empresa adjudicada incumple parcialmente con los requerimientos del cartel en el señalado numeral, lo anterior refuerza la tesis de la imposibilidad de cumplimiento del plazo ofertado. La ausencia de tal contenido a nivel de cronograma sí constituye causal de nulidad por cuanto se trata de una carencia que contiene la oferta y que sitúa la expectativa de cumplimiento del contrato, por debajo de lo requerido por la Administración Pública contratante de conformidad con el cartel del concurso que está integrado a los autos. Al respecto considera necesario este Tribunal evidenciar que en materia de contratación administrativa, la administración licitante debe justificar el levantamiento de alguno de los requisitos de la oferta a favor de los oferentes, con la debida antelación, dando incluso la oportunidad real para escuchar a las personas participantes en el concurso respecto a tal decisión. En la especie, tal justificación no consta en los autos, y si no se hizo, la adjudicación deviene en nula por omitir ilegítimamente el requerimiento de una especificación contenida en el cartel, con el doble yerro que, en este caso, tal exención favorece tan solo una de las participantes, lo cual es nulo de pleno derecho por irrespetar parámetros de legalidad constitucional y subordinada, descritos en los numerales 11, 33, 41, 49, 182 todos de la Constitución Política y los contenidos de los artículos 4 y 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa Nº 7494 publicada en Alcance Nº 110 del 08 de junio de 1995, alcance Nº 20, y sus reformas.

A mayor abundamiento en cuanto a lo alegado por la parte actora sobre este aspecto, la adjudicación de la oferta ha de ser proporcional no sólo en cuanto al presupuesto financiero, sino en cuanto al presupuesto de tiempo que proponen las plicas presentadas, a fin de dar cabal cumplimiento a los parámetros de legalidad técnica descritos en el Artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, aspecto frente al cual, resulta estimable el alegato de la empresa actora.

Este Tribunal ha encontrado, en la revisión de legalidad hecha, que otras ofertas anexadas al expediente administrativo también dejan de ser especificas en cuanto a los requerimientos del cartel, lo cual no se considera sana práctica, pues la administración debe velar por el cumplimiento exhaustivo de los términos de referencia que se formulan en el cartel de la licitación, aspecto que, como se dijo, carece de un cabal cumplimiento en la especie, y que por no ser materia objeto del proceso, este Tribunal apenas quiere evidenciar, habida cuenta de la legalidad procesal a que está constreñida la labor de los suscritos, para que la autoridad contratante formule las correcciones que en sano derecho correspondan, si es que a bien lo tiene.

4- TERCER ARGUMENTO DE FONDO DE LA ACTORA: La posible incompatibilidad para contratar del representante de la empresa adjudicataria como causal de nulidad del acto de adjudicación del concurso. No sin advertir que el alegato de irrespeto al Artículo 17 del Código de Ética del CFIA, que indica la parte actora (a folio 259), se omite por cuanto sustenta la aplicación al caso subexámine de una norma que no comporta los efectos de generalidad que son los que permiten formular un examen de la legalidad observable en sede jurisdiccional, quedando reservada la aplicación de dicha norma a los órganos de fiscalización del ejercicio profesional de los miembros del mencionado Colegio Profesional, por lo que se rechaza su alegación en este asunto.

Un tercer argumento de impugnación que señala la parte actora, es la existencia de una posible incompatibilidad de la adjudicataria en los términos de los artículos 22 y 22 bis de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, habida cuenta que su representante legal ha manifestado en autos, que como funcionario del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, participó en el año de 1982 en la elaboración del modelo de Plan Regulador Costero que, estando aun vigente, es un documento que orienta las acciones a realizar por parte de las empresas privadas y las instituciones que aprueban este tipo de Planes Reguladores Costeros, lo cual –y este es el argumento central de la actora-, le crea una ventaja como concursante en el proceso licitatorio, lo cual está vedado expresamente en las mencionadas normas de la contratación administrativa.

Al contestar la demanda, el representante de la parte actora ratifica que como funcionario del ICT en el año de 1982, tuvo a cargo la preparación del modelo que define los criterios técnicos que intervienen en la elaboración del plan regulador costero que siguen las empresas consultoras y aplican las instituciones encargadas de aprobarlos (así a folio 241 del principal). Luego aduce que este documento nunca se llegó a aprobar, y únicamente sirve como consulta, no es vinculante ni obligatorio para ninguna institución pública o privada y en el se dan pautas y criterios técnicos para elaborar este tipo de planes reguladores. Argumenta que no está cubierto por las prohibiciones para contratar con la administración.

Es criterio de este Tribunal que en la especie no se logra constatar la incompatibilidad que acusa la parte actora, en contra del representante legal de la empresa adjudicada, por cuanto, de partida, es preciso señalar que tal incompatibilidad se trata de una verdadera interdicción a la participación en los procesos de contratación administrativa que realicen las administraciones públicas, rigiendo en consecuencia una taxatividad no sólo enunciativa sino interpretativa a la que el operador jurídico no puede ni debe anteponer otros elementos que no sean los que están en la normativa. Así, esas normas disponen una serie de supuestos que requieren una formulación responsable del cargo que se atribuye al oferente para comprobar que efectivamente recae alguno de tales supuestos.

Este Tribunal ha revisado tales normas encontrando que en ellas se regula el ámbito de participación del funcionario público en los procesos concursales mediante los cuales la administración pública debe adquirir los bienes y servicios que requiere su giro ordinario. Son ambas normas, Artículos 22 y 22 bis de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, que introducen una prohibición expresa en las condiciones ahí descritas a las personas que ostenten la designación o calidad de funcionario público. En la especie, tal condición no se logra probar, no se constata, pues sencillamente no existe prueba en autos que permita asumir inequívocamente que el representante legal de la empresa DEPPAT SA, señor Nombre71574 , cuando participa como representante de dicha empresa en el proceso licitatorio en mención, esté ostentando el cargo de funcionario público con posibilidad de influir en dicha decisión. Al respecto la parte actora no logra demostrar tal situación, incumpliendo el principio de la carga probatoria contenido en el Artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil. No obstante, del examen de legalidad realizado en este asunto, el Tribunal no logra extraer que el mencionado representante legal de la empresa codemandada sea funcionario público y que, al momento de formular la plica, se haya encontrado dentro de alguna de las hipótesis descritas en los mencionados artículos de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, debiendo en consecuencia, rechazarse este cargo en contra de las actuaciones cuya nulidad se demanda.

SÉPTIMO: Sobre las pretensiones de la parte actora. A) LA PRETENSIÓN ANULATORIA. La actora ha solicitado que se anulen tanto el acto de adjudicación del concurso licitado, como el acto administrativo mediante el cual se rechaza el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto en contra de tal adjudicación. Son ambos actos administrativos emitidos por el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. Tal y como se ha expuesto, el Tribunal ha encontrado que le asiste la razón y el derecho a la parte actora y la demanda debe ser parcialmente declarada con lugar. Como se indicó, lo peticionado resulta procedente en cuanto al precio ruinoso de la oferta adjudicada y en cuanto al plazo de cumplimiento que está descrito en ella. Siendo ambos elementos esenciales de la contratación administrativa de conformidad con la mencionada legislación tutelar de la materia. No tiene mérito lo alegado en cuanto a la presunta incompatibilidad para contratar con el Estado que le atribuyó al representante legal de la adjudicataria. Por lo dicho, la acción resulta parcialmente estimable.

• B)LA PRETENSIÓN RESARCITORIA. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la pretensión resarcitoria que formula la actora, la petición debe denegarse por cuanto en ninguna manera logra la actora demostrar esos daños y perjuicios que alega le han sido causados por su participación en el concurso, o por haber dejado de resultar adjudicada en el presente concurso. Al respecto es conveniente tener presente que, la participación en este tipo de concursos no genera para el oferente, sino una mera expectativa de derecho, puesto que su oferta entra a ser valorada con las otras que pudieren haber sido presentadas. En tratándose de la participación en los concursos propios de la contratación administrativa, no se produce el surgimiento de un ámbito de responsabilidad patrimonial de la administración contratante a partir de la sola invitación a participar en el concurso –como parece entenderlo la parte actora-, ni que por la sóla publicación de la invitación a ofertar venga obligada la resarcir daños y perjuicios que carecen de toda comprobación en los autos. En la especie, si bien el concurso superó esas etapas y llegó hasta la de adjudicación, no por ello surge –ipso iure-, el necesario nexo causal que haría procedente tal pretensión, habida cuenta que hasta el momento de la adjudicación del concurso, todos los oferentes no sólo entran en igualdad de condiciones sino que todos mantienen por igual una mera expectativa de contrato, con la correlativa exigencia de un mismo nivel de inversión para formular su oferta. Es esa mera expectativa jurídica la que permite concluir que no se producen para los participantes en el concurso, los daños y perjuicios que alega como incurridos la actora, por cuanto la contratación es hasta ese momento y no cabe valorarlo en forma diferente, una mera y simple expectativa de contrato; no un contrato propiamente tal. No se produce un nexo causante de responsabilidad por el sólo hecho de adjudicar el concurso. Concebir responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración contratante por ese hecho, llevaría al absurdo de suponer que toda adjudicación de concurso administrativo, torna en automáticamente responsable a la Administración que lo adjudica, lo cual además de ilícito por carecer de una norma jurídica que así lo disponga, no es acertado, pues lo que ha hecho la Administración al adjudicar el concurso, es darle pleno cumplimiento a su voluntad en procura de la satisfacción del interés público que se presume está implícito en todo contrato administrativo. No resulta ocioso indicar que de conformidad con la normativa aplicable, Artículo 317 del código de rito, es deber de quien formula una pretensión comprobar su dicho, lo cual se resume en la ya consabida formula onnus probandi (o qui alegans probando dobet) del derecho latino. En la especie, la parte actora no acredita de ninguna manera ni mediante alguno de los medios de prueba con los que cuenta el ordenamiento jurídico, la existencia de tales daños y perjuicios, no bastando al respecto su simple dicho o las elaboraciones hechas mediante la prueba pericial rechazada, que si bien fue ordenada en autos, no logra sustanciar un criterio objetivo para este Tribunal, debiendo en consecuencia, rechazarse la pretensión resarcitoria planteada por la parte actora.
• C)OTRAS SITUACIONES JURÍDICAS PETICIONADAS: La pretensión formulada para que esta autoridad ordene la readjudicación del concurso a favor de la parte actora, carece de todo sentido, habida cuenta que por respeto a la legalidad constitucional que rige el quehacer de este Tribunal, y dentro del marco de legalidad que crea la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, de ninguna manera podría esta autoridad librar semejante orden, por lo que la misma resulta a todas luces ilegal, carente de sentido e inadmisible, siendo posible no otra consecuencia que rechazarla de plano.

OCTAVO: Sobre las excepciones y defensas invocadas. La empresa codemandada se opone a la acción entablada en su contra alegando las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y la de falta de derecho. Al respecto este Tribunal rechaza la de falta de legitimación pasiva, por cuanto de los autos se desprende que con la presente demanda, se afectan posibles derechos e intereses de la codemandada, DEPPAT, SA., razón suficiente para haberla integrado en esta litis y para traerla en condición de codemandada al proceso, a fin de que afrontare la situación creada mediante el proceso, lo cual demuestra que sí recae en ella la aptitud para ser parte en el mismo, habida cuenta de haber resultado adjudicataria del concurso licitatorio y que esto efectivamente crea un efecto de responsabilidad en el proceso que le resulta ineludible, y da fundamento suficiente para desestimar la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva invocada. Respecto a la falta de derecho, la misma tiende a enervar los efectos del proceso, cuando la parte actora no goza del respaldo jurídico en la acción que entabla, sin embargo, en la especie ha quedado demostrado que la parte actora no sólo tuvo motivo suficiente para accionar, sino que la situación jurídica de nulidad planteada sí encuentra eco y respaldo en el ordenamiento jurídico aplicable a la materia. De tal suerte que la parte actora sí cuenta en el subexámine, con el derecho suficiente, necesario y oportuno para demandar la nulidad alegada y en consecuencia se impone el rechazo de la excepción de falta de derecho invocada por la codemandada DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.).

NOVENO: Sobre las costas del proceso. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil, según la gracia que concede el ordinal 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, Nº 3667/1966, y por no estar dentro de los supuestos descritos en el Artículo 98 de dicho cuerpo normativo y 222 del Código Procesal Civil, se condena a las codemandadas Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, y a la firma DESARROLLOS EN ECOLOGÍA, PAISAJISMO, PLANIFICACIÓN, ARQUITECTURA Y TURISMO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (DEPPAT, S.A.), al pago de las costas personales y procesales de este juicio, las que deberán ser liquidadas en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia.

DÉCIMO: Corolario. Por lo expuesto, y por los motivos y razonamientos dados, se debe declarar parcialmente con lugar la demanda especial licitatoria.

POR TANTO:

Se rechazan las defensas de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, y de falta de derecho. Se declara parcialmente con lugar la presente demanda especial licitatoria, debiendo entenderse denegada en lo no expresamente concedido. Se anula de pleno derecho y en todos sus alcances el acto de adjudicación de la licitación por registro Nº 5-2005 Planes Reguladores playa Callejones y Playa San Juanillo de Santa Cruz, provincia de Guanacaste, adoptada mediante acuerdo del Concejo Municipal en su sesión ordinaria Nº 26-2005, artículo 5º, inciso 7 del 28 de junio del 2005, también se anula, por lógica consecuencia de lo ya dispuesto, el acto administrativo emitido por ese mismo Concejo Municipal que rechaza el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto en contra de dicha adjudicación por la empresa Arquitectura SAAR, SA., adoptado en la sesión ordinaria Nº 43-2005 artículo 5, inciso 07 del 25 de Octubre del 2005. Se condena a las demandadas al pago de las costas personales y procesales de este juicio, las que deben ser liquidadas en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Notifíquese.

Isaac Guillermo Amador Hernández Nombre12757 Francisco Jiménez Villegas

SECCION SÉPTIMA,

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO NUE 05-000444-0161-CA