Expropriation within Las Baulas National Marine Park upheldConfirmación de expropiación dentro del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas

Proceeding: Ordinary Plaintiff: Shang Gi La de Santa Ana S.A.

Defendant: The State VOTO No. 02-2011-SII CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, SECOND SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ, at sixteen hundred hours on the twenty-eighth of January of two thousand eleven.- An appeal filed by the plaintiff within the ordinary proceeding brought by SHANG GI LA DE SANTA ANA S.A., legal identification number CED53650, represented by its special judicial agent, attorney Gonzalo Alberto Garzona Meseguer, of legal age, single, lawyer, resident of San José, identity card number CED53651 (folio 1); against THE STATE, represented by attorney Gloria Solano Martínez, of legal age, lawyer, in her capacity as deputy procurator (folio 53), and other unknown qualifications, is hereby heard.

WHEREAS

1.- That the amount in controversy in this matter having been set as inestimable (folio 439), the complaint seeks that the following claims of the plaintiff be declared with merit in the judgment: " (...) I request that the challenged administrative acts be declared absolutely null and inapplicable in the judgment as being violative of the legal system, which are: / 1. The binding opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005. / 2. Executive Decree (decreto ejecutivo) 33.707-MINAE-2007, which declares the partial expropriation of that land owned by my represented party to be of public interest (sic), / 3. The undated resolution issued by the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that initiated the administrative process for the partial expropriation of my represented party's property registered in the Party of Guanacaste at real folio registration number Placa11748, and all actions taken in that process, so that in the judgment these acts are declared absolutely null for being (sic) contrary to the Law and to the public powers (sic) attributed to the public entities that issued them, for being based on erroneous considerations, and all acts deriving from them, and to suspend all expropriation proceedings (sic) of my represented party's property. / 4. I also request that the State be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs." (Folios 73 to 86 of the record).

2.- The State's representation answered the action in the negative, raising the defenses of inadmissibility of the action due to formal defects that prevent a ruling on the merits, inadmissibility of the action due to acts not subject to challenge, and lack of right (folios 401 to 422).

3.- The first-instance judge, Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo, in judgment No. 2071-2010 at thirteen hundred hours on the twentieth of July of two thousand ten, ordered: "Therefore: The defense of inadmissibility due to formal defects that prevent a ruling on the merits is rejected. The defense of Inadmissibility is upheld as it concerns acts not subject to challenge, solely with respect to the criterion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, and consequently, claim number one of the complaint is declared inadmissible. The defense of lack of right is upheld with respect to the remaining claims. Consequently, the complaint is declared without merit in all its aspects. Procedural and personal costs are borne by the plaintiff, along with their respective interests." (Folios 511 to 538).

4.- That, disagreeing with the first-instance ruling, the plaintiff filed an appeal (folio 540 to 556, 583 to 608 of the judicial file), which was admitted for consideration before this Tribunal (folio 558 ibid).

5.- The prescriptions of the law have been observed in the proceedings, and no grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the actions taken are noted. This judgment is issued following the required deliberations.

Drafted by Judge REYES CASTILLO;

WHEREAS:

I. REGARDING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER ADJUDICATION

The appellant requests that the following be admitted as evidence for better adjudication: certification of documents corresponding to one of the four documents located in the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), dated September 30, 2009, and November 11, 2009, file number 07-005611-0007-CO, which are: resolution number 998-2008-SETENA of April 28, 2008, and official communication 04-459 of the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) of September 22, 2004, and official communications from SINAC of August 25, 2010, as these are new documents not known at the time of filing the action. It also requests that a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) be conducted in Playa Grande to verify the existence of vegetation in front of my represented party's property (and all the lands of Playa Grande), as well as the nesting area of the Leatherback turtles (tortugas Baulas) and the current conditions of Playa Grande (folios 607 and 608 of the main file). For the reasons that will be stated, the appellant's request must be rejected. According to the provisions contained in article 331, in conjunction with numeral 97, subsection 2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), and based on the reiterated jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (among others, ruling number 29 at 15:30 hours on February twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five), the admission or rejection of evidence for better adjudication constitutes a discretionary power of the judge and is appropriate in those cases where it is considered to have a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceeding and to complement the evidence offered by the litigants, without seeking to remedy its omission. The admission of this type of evidence is of a facultative or discretionary nature for the Court, and cannot be demanded by the parties; its ordering depends entirely on the initiative, prudent judgment, and criteria of the jurisdictional body, so its denial does not cause defenselessness, nor does it violate the principle of effective judicial protection. In this case, according to the reasons that will be stated, the evidence offered by the appellant for better adjudication would not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceeding, and therefore its admission is denied.

II.- PROVEN AND UNPROVEN FACTS: The list of proven and unproven facts contained in the judgment under review is approved, as it faithfully reflects the evidentiary material incorporated into the proceeding.

III.- PRELIMINARY ISSUE. In Voto No. 39-2010-SVII at 14:00 hours on April 29, 2010, issued by the Seventh Section of this Tribunal -among others-, it was deemed necessary to clarify to the parties the content of the appeal in contentious-administrative matters, indicating that: "Article 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) provides that, when appearing before the superior court, the appellant must express grievances against the challenged resolution. 'Expressing grievances' means highlighting the aspects of the appealed judgment that the appellant considers adverse to their interests, contrary to law, or contrary to the merits of the case. Therefore, the purpose of said allegation is not, strictly speaking, to combat the counterparty's arguments (since that was already done at the instance level), but to combat the arguments of the judgment; that is, those of the a quo court. Its importance is such that, as the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has insisted (see again the aforementioned resolution number 195-02), it delimits the competence of the appellate tribunal, establishing those aspects on which it can (and, by exclusion, cannot) rule. Consequently, it is exclusively from this perspective that what is stated in the appeal will be examined, setting aside any other allegation that does not constitute a clear and reasoned criticism against what was resolved (as would happen, for example, in those cases where the appellant merely reproduces issues already debated at the instance level, without explaining why they consider the analysis made of them in the ruling to be erroneous or lacking in factual or legal basis)." The foregoing is fully applicable to the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the first-instance judgment issued in this litigation. The grievances presented will be analyzed below, in accordance with the rules explained above.- IV.- ON THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL: The plaintiff files an appeal against the first-instance judgment based on the following grievances:

• 1)In the first ground of grievance related to the inadmissibility of the action against binding opinion 444-2005 of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), it points out that the judgment declares inadmissibility based on articles 18 and 60 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), because according to the judge's reasoning, it is a preparatory act that cannot be appealed. However, contrary to the judge's opinion, it considers that the criterion is binding and is in itself a definitive act that puts an end to the controversy raised before the Procurador, and far from being a simple preparatory act, it becomes a final act that is mandatory for the entire Public Administration, regardless of the proceeding in which it is intended to be used. It states that it is based on the aforementioned criterion that the expropriation of its property is proceeding, because in said criterion, it was considered to be part of the Las Baulas Marine Park (Parque Marino Las Baulas) created by Law number 7524, hence it is not a preparatory act. It argues that the link between criterion C-444-2005 and the expropriation is evident, because it became a law reform, a constitutional power corresponding solely to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa). It requests that the appealed resolution be revoked and that the merits of the proceeding regarding opinion C-444-2005 be examined, as it is a final act in another proceeding that directly affects the other acts whose nullity is sought to be declared (folios 540 to 541, 583 to 590 of the judicial file). The grievance is not acceptable and is rejected. Indeed, the challenged judgment resolves the point subject to the grievance and states that:

"(...) VI).- On the defense of Inadmissibility as it concerns acts not subject to challenge: The State's representation objects that the binding opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, and the undated resolution issued by the National System of Conservation Areas of the Ministry of Environment and Energy that initiated the administrative expropriation process, are mere procedural acts and do not constitute final decisions (no causan estado). Regarding this issue, it is this Judge's criterion that, above all, the provisions of article 18 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) must be taken into consideration, as it establishes the following:

"Article 18.- 1. The action shall be admissible in relation to the provisions and acts of the Administration, whether definitive or procedural (de trámite); and regarding the latter, if they directly or indirectly decide the merits of the matter, in such a way that they put an end to that avenue or make its continuation impossible or suspend it." In accordance with the foregoing, not just any act can ground a nullity claim in this venue, given that the legal system restricts it to definitive acts or procedural acts when the latter decides the merits of what has been raised. (...)

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, in the case of the act contained in the binding opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, it is noted that this is neither a definitive act nor a procedural act with its own effects, as it is a legal opinion that does not possess its own legal effects nor does it correspond to the final manifestation of the Public Administration, as it may contribute to it, but does not correspond to it as such. In this vein, the objected act was issued under article 4 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), which provides:

"ARTICLE 4.—CONSULTATIONS: The bodies of the Public Administration, through the heads of the different administrative levels, may consult the technical-legal criterion of the Procuraduría; in each case, they must accompany the opinion of the respective legal advisory office, except in the case of internal auditors, who may make the consultation directly." As a legal criterion without the capacity itself to have effects on third parties, given that it will only have them by virtue of the specific act of the Administration that accepts and applies it, the binding opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, does not fall within the assumptions of article 18 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), and therefore the inadmissibility of the complaint with respect to this act must be declared, in application of article 60 of said regulatory body, which provides:

"The inadmissibility of the action shall be declared in the following cases: ....c) If it concerns acts not subject to challenge, according to article 21" (...)". (Emphasis added).

It was fully demonstrated that the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) issued criterion C-444-2005 in response to a consultation raised by the Minister of Environment and Energy. However, the decision that produced the effects on the plaintiff was Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) Number 33707-MINAE, adopted by the then President of the Republic and the Minister of Environment and Energy. From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff's arguments referring to the binding nature of the criterion or that it resolves a problem raised by the Administration before the Procuraduría are not admissible, since the opinion of said advisory body does not produce effects against the plaintiff here, nor is it an act of a general nature that the individual must comply with (article 10, subsection 2 of the General Law of Public Administration - Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, such allegations are a mere reiteration of what was stated in the complaint, but they do not include any reproach against the grounds of the instance judgment, and therefore do not constitute a true grievance. The plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate in their argumentative discourse the existence of a legitimate interest or subjective right derived directly from the indicated advisory criterion, an essential aspect for admitting the challenge of the act as expressed in numerals 10 and 18 of the aforementioned Regulatory Law. Consequently, the only appropriate action is to reject the grievance raised for the indicated reasons.

• 2)In the second ground of grievance, the plaintiff states that the judge addresses a non-existent antinomy, derived from the unanimous approval of the motion legally introduced by Deputy Nombre72427, where the phrase "aguas adentro" (inward waters) was expressly introduced, modifying the original project where it read "tierra adentro" (inward land). It considers that the judge, in an effort to solve a non-existent antinomy, makes an incorrect assessment of what the Law Creating the Las Baulas Park (Ley de Creación del Parque Baulas) actually establishes, and that there is no contradiction. It argues that the judgment contains an error of appreciation of the law, by confusing the specific order to expropriate lands (specifically Cerro El Morro and Isla Verde) which does not include the plaintiff's property. The park limits are expressed in coordinates in Article one of the Law and do not include any private property, as the judgment incorrectly indicates, except for those already mentioned. It says that it should not be overlooked that the legislator was aware that the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo) had already been created, encompassing the public zone of Playa Grande, a nesting site for Leatherback turtles and others. It clarifies that Executive Decree (decreto ejecutivo) Nombre72428 was repealed by Law 7524, which established the park limits, the effectiveness of which was contingent on the acquisition of the properties included in the demarcation of the indicated decree; however, none were expropriated, and therefore it was not effective. Furthermore, by Law 7149, the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo) was created, comprising the area known as Playa Grande, precisely where the plaintiff's property is located. It alleges that when Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 20.518 MIRENEM was issued, the requirements established by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) for creating a national park were not met, specifically, the preliminary study of land tenure and population census were not conducted, plans were not made, and the minimum budgetary allocation for its protection and management was not provided. It points out that Law 7524 strictly delimited the area of the Las Baulas de Guanacaste Marine Park (Parque Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste), based on the decree's lack of effectiveness, and established that it was a marine park beginning one hundred twenty-five meters inward from the ordinary high-water mark (pleamar ordinaria); it was not a legislative error, as proven in the legislative file containing the motion presented by one of the deputies. It considers that there is no doubt whatsoever as to the legislator's intention and that they were clear that a refuge zone already existed that protected the turtle nesting, and that what had not been approved was the protection of turtles in the ocean, and that was their intention, which admits no interpretation. It reiterates that the supposed error the legislator is said to have made is not such, since there is a law that protects the beach where the turtles nest, which has been respected by all residents who have voluntarily restricted the effects that white light causes to these chelonians. It considers that the in dubio pro natura principle and all preventive and precautionary principles in environmental protection matters were duly protected, as Playa Grande is included within the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo), and it is not correct to interpret that there is environmental danger and lack of protection, as the judge does. It argues that the former Minister of Environment, Nombre72429, requested the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to perform an interpretation of the Law, an act reserved by the Political Constitution to the Legislative Branch. The Procuraduría, through official communication OJ-015-2004 of February 10, 2004, gave its non-binding opinion to the effect that there is a possible drafting error in Law 7524 Creating the Las Baulas Marine Park (Ley 7524 de Creación del Parque Marino Las Baulas). It notes that from the minutes of the discussion of Law 7524 in the Legislative Assembly, it is clear that the expression "aguas adentro" was not an error, as it arose from a motion presented by Deputy Engineer Nombre72427, which was approved by all the deputies present in the Third Full Commission (Comisión Plena Tercera), and they so decided, without any other interpretation being admissible. It describes that subsequently, and at the request of the same minister, the Procuraduría addressed the issue in official communication C-444-2005 of September 24, 2005, with binding effect, reiterating official communication OJ-015-2004, based on the fact that coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,000 are located on land, without any expert or scientific assessment to prove it. It affirms that, as demonstrated in the record through an expert criterion issued by engineer Nombre40730, the aforementioned point is covered by water, which definitively shows that it is not on solid ground, contrary to what the Procurador stated. It considers that the interpretation made in the appealed judgment and in pronouncement C-444-2005 is not in accordance with the law, as it starts from the assumption that the coordinates indicated in the Law are the park limits, "when the truth is that the coordinates serve as a specific starting point for the straight line up to 125 meters inward waters, since it is from 125 (sic) inward waters that a line parallel to the coast is drawn, which begins one hundred twenty-five meters inward waters from coordinates N 259,100 and E 322,000 and ends one hundred twenty-five meters inward waters from coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050, since those same coordinates are what make up the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo), which encompasses, as I have already said, the public zone of Playa Grande." It opines that the pro natura principle is not applicable, because there is a Law that created the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo) covering the turtle nesting area, and the other areas protected in Law 7524, particularly the mangroves and estuaries, have recognized state protection, and the animal and plant species inhabiting those lands are duly safeguarded from a legal standpoint. It clarifies that the legislator did not indicate the coordinates inward land as is claimed, but rather indicated a particular point from which the measurement must be taken, always understood that it cannot be done by a straight line, but by a line parallel to the coast, starting from the basic coordinates. It considers that illegally modifying the Park limits in this way has created a situation of anxiety among property owners, but even more so, it exceeds what the legislator intended and exceeds what is technically necessary to protect the turtles in their nesting and reproductive process that takes place on land. It indicates that turtles do not go beyond 50 meters of the public zone because they need to create their nests in sand, free of plants and roots that hinder their nesting work, and that it has voluntarily carried out work to protect the turtles by eliminating lights and creating barriers so that neither sound nor lights affect the nesting process (folios 541 to 556, 590 to 608 of the judicial file). The grievances are not acceptable and are rejected. Each of the grievances presented is analyzed in order below.
• a)Regarding the limits of the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas) and the appellant's arguments referring to the non-existence of an antinomy in Law 7524 due to the approval of a legislative motion, the instance judge resolved:

"(...) Notwithstanding the foregoing, another peculiarity of the law cannot be ignored, which is that the then Deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Nombre72427, presented a motion during the approval process of the bill aimed at adding after the phrase 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark (pleamar ordinaria), the words 'aguas adentro' (inward waters). Said motion was approved (folio 227 of the main file, session minutes 004 of the Third Commission with Full Legislative Powers, intervention of the deputy, folio 90, 91 note signed by the referenced former deputy). As is clear from the intervention and statements of Deputy Nombre72427, the purpose of the motion raised was to give an exclusively marine character to the park. However, for this Judge, it is notable that although the words 'aguas adentro' were incorporated into the definitive text of the law - upon acceptance of the motion - the rest of the law's text maintains an evident contradiction with those words. The foregoing, inasmuch as, as already stated, both the cited coordinates and the express mention in the law of potential expropriations open the possibility that private lands incorporated within the scope of said coordinates are included. (...)

(...) It is clear then that the text of the law under analysis itself contains a contradiction originating from Nombre72427's motion. On one hand, it indicates geographic coordinates that encompass areas on privately-owned properties - reinforced by the provision for potential expropriations, and on the other hand, the motion is oriented towards the park being inward waters, as evidenced by what was stated by the proponent of said motion, stating:

'Studying the original text, it seems to me that it meets the requirements of a law for this type of park protection, especially that it should have been marine because that is what is customary in this case; however, the marine designation was not included. In defining the Park, it speaks of one hundred twenty-five meters, with an imaginary (sic) line one hundred twenty-five meters from the ordinary high-water mark and this must be understood as seaward, exactly what I think is clarified with this motion' (...)

Based on the foregoing considerations, this Judge considers that the limits of the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas), for the purposes of the specific situation under analysis and which will be elaborated on in the following considering clause, must necessarily take into account the coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, ending at the coordinate point N 255,000 and E 335,050 provided for in the law creating said Marine Park, given the evident contradiction of these with the incorporated phrase 'aguas adentro'. This latter phrase is evidently contradictory to the scope of the referenced coordinates and to the rest of the law's text - which refers to expropriations and properties on privately-owned lands - but moreover, it openly conflicts with the objectives of the law - evident from a simple reading of the statement of motives -, the public environmental interest, and the national and international legal system governing the matter. Given the above, and making use of the interpretive criteria indicated, it is considered that for the purposes of the resolution of this proceeding, proof of a property's location within the area of said coordinates is sufficient to determine its incorporation within the limits of the indicated National Marine Park. (...)

XI).- Determination of whether the property in the Party of Guanacaste, real folio registration Placa11748, is located within the area corresponding to the Las Baulas de Guanacaste National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste): The record has duly demonstrated that although the property in the Party of Guanacaste, real folio Placa11748, is evidently not located inward waters, it is indeed located within the coordinates of the Las Baulas National Marine Park. Specifically, it has been proven that the area to be expropriated is located between coordinates 255,000 N NIE38 (folio 7 of the administrative file, cadastral plan number 1042299-2005, see location on it, situated at the lower right edge of the plan). Said coordinates, due to their location, are found between coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000 and N 255,000 and E 335,050, indicated as limits of said National Park. Likewise, based on said documentation, the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) certified on April 11, 2007, that the property corresponding to cadastral plan 1042299-20055 is located within the Las Baulas de Guanacaste Marine National Park, created by Executive Decree (decreto ejecutivo) N.20518-MIRENEM of 07-09-91 and regulated in Law N. 7524 of August 16, 1995 (folio 9 of the administrative file, respective certification). The plaintiff has not provided any evidence that refutes the corresponding cadastral plan, in terms of a location at different geographic coordinates or that demonstrates falsity in said document or in said certification. At most, what the plaintiff has provided is an expert report indicating that the geographic coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050 are located in a terrain area that is part of an estuary or mangrove swamp and that on the day of the respective test, it was waterlogged at 13:20, using (sic) a tree at 3.10 m and an electric power pole at 26.72 m as reference (folios 447 to 453 of the main file), but without demonstrating that the coordinates where the property at real folio 86,044,000 is located are outside the limit coordinates of the National Park under analysis. Given the above, applying this Judge's criterion expressed in the previous considering clause, with respect to the fact that, for delimitation purposes of the Las Baulas National Marine Park, the areas in private domain located in said geographic coordinates should not be ignored, this Judge considers that for the purposes of resolving this proceeding and to specifically address the acts objected to by the plaintiff's claims, the property in the Party of Guanacaste at real folio 86,044,000 is located within the coordinates of the Las Baulas National Marine Park. (...)".

This Tribunal considers that what was resolved at the instance level is in accordance with the law. It is observed that the plaintiff merely reiterates an argument presented in the complaint again, which does not constitute a true grievance, since it in no way attacks the judicial criterion or provides new evidentiary or argumentative elements capable of modifying what was resolved in the first instance, hence this aspect of the appeal is rejected. In addition to what was resolved by the a quo court, it is important to emphasize that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) defined the protection area for the Leatherback turtles (tortugas Baulas) and established the park's parameter at 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark (pleamar ordinaria) in the same sense as provided in Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 20518-MIRENEM.

Vote number 2008-8713 of the referenced Chamber —likewise cited in the challenged judgment— is precise and forceful in establishing the boundaries of the park in the terms already indicated and the reasons that support the ruling:

“The Las Bualas (sic) de Guanacaste National Park has a very clear purpose: the protection of the nesting area of the Leatherback Turtle, which pursuant to Executive Decree No. Nombre72428 is necessary to ensure the perpetuation of the leatherback turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) colony and other natural resources, of the tourism and ecological activity, regarding the nesting that occurs throughout the year. This Chamber is struck by the fact that the bill creating the Park reiterates some criteria expressed by the Executive Decree, and the concern over hotel developments, since these will introduce lighting, waste, human traffic, outboard motor noise, music, discotheques, and automobiles that will destroy this natural habitat. Hence, a protection strip of two hundred meters from the ordinary high-water mark was initially proposed during the legislative process; however, with the Affirmative Report of Nombre20683, even though those same justifications are maintained, it reduces the protection strip to 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark, in the same sense as the aforementioned Executive Decree. Since our country has committed internationally to observe the protection and 'habitats of sea turtles,' the unconstitutionality action must be granted, and in accordance with the precautionary principle, as well as the binding nature of environmental regulations, the Maritime Terrestrial Zone must likewise be included as a necessary protection area for the different sea turtles that use that area as part of the environment utilized by them during their life cycle stages.” (Emphasis added, see among others votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the same Chamber).

The constitutional precedent indicated above is binding, in accordance with Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law; thus, the matter of the boundaries or parameters of Las Baulas National Park is clearly defined. Having said that, what was resolved by the lower court (a quo) —insofar as it admits the parameter of 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark and verifies that the plaintiff's property is located within that boundary— conforms to the constitutional jurisprudence on the matter and must therefore be confirmed.

• b)The next grievance, which refers to the alleged error of judicial interpretation regarding the expropriation mandate, since Law 7524 referred to specific lands (El Morro hill and Isla Verde), which do not include the plaintiff's property. On this issue, the trial judge stated the following:

“(...) It is interesting to note for the purposes of this resolution that the Constitutional Chamber imposes the duty to initiate expropriation proceedings on the private properties located within the Las Baulas Marine Park, which confirms their existence and the expropriation duty arising from the respective law. Likewise, in Resolution 2008-018529 at 8:58 a.m. on December 16, 2008, from the same Chamber, the following orders were issued:

“a) All environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) granted on properties located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park are annulled, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy is ordered to immediately continue with the expropriation processes for such properties. (...)”.

What was resolved in the first instance conforms to law. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber orders the Ministry of Environment and Energy to expropriate all private lands located within Las Baulas Park (see votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the indicated Chamber). On the other hand, from the text of Law 7524 it cannot be deduced that the expropriation of lands refers only to El Morro hill and Isla Verde, contrary to the appellant's claim, and that is how the Constitutional Chamber understood it when it stated the following:

“(...) It is not in vain that Article 2 of Law No. 7524 of July 10, 1995, creating Las Baulas National Marine Park, obligates the State to manage the expropriations of lands located within the Park, since it is of public interest that said lands be under state protection. Regarding the current status of these expropriations, the Minister of Environment and Energy reports that there were seventy-six properties, of which eighteen have already been expropriated and the remaining fifty-eight are in process, which is why, through vote 2008-007549 at 5:38 p.m. on April 30, 2008, this Chamber resolved to order said Ministry to proceed immediately and expeditiously with the expropriation procedures, in order to avoid causing further environmental damage. (...)”.

Consequently, having established that the plaintiff's property subject to expropriation is located within the boundaries of Las Baulas National Park, and the plaintiff not providing other evidence contradicting what is established (Articles 317 of the Civil Procedure Code and 103 of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law), the grievance must be rejected as unfounded.

• c)Regarding the grievance related to the protection of the same zone by the Law Creating the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge in Playa Grande, where her property is located, the lower court (a quo) considered the following:

“(...) XIII).- Other considerations of the plaintiff: The plaintiff's representative states that a national wildlife refuge exists that comprises the same public zone, under the same coordinates as the Las Baulas Marine Park. In this regard, the objected acts refer to the norm creating the latter and to other norms dealing with the environmental matter, so what is stated in this regard does not vitiate the act with nullity. (...)”.

This Court agrees with the trial judge's criteria and deems it important to add that Law 7524 creating Las Baulas National Park, in its Article 1, specifically includes the area of the Tamarindo Wildlife Reserve.

"ARTICLE 1.- Creation and boundaries.

Las Baulas de Guanacaste National Marine Park is created, whose boundaries, according to the Villarreal and Matapalo cartographic sheets, scale 1:50,000, of the National Geographic Institute, shall be as follows: starting from a point located at coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, it follows a straight line until it reaches an imaginary line parallel to the coast, one hundred twenty-five meters seaward from the ordinary high-water mark. Along this imaginary line, the boundary continues in a southeasterly direction, until ending at the point of coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050. The Park shall also encompass the Tamarindo, Ventanas, and San Francisco estuaries and their mangroves; the hill located immediately behind Ventanas beach, El Morro hill, Capitán Island, Isla Verde, the fifty-meter public zone, measured from the ordinary high-water mark, between Punta San Francisco and the San Francisco estuary, and the territorial waters of Tamarindo Bay, comprised between Punta Conejo and the southern end of Langosta beach, up to the ordinary high-water mark line.” (Emphasis added).

Regarding what is relevant to the case under study, it must be pointed out that the alleged “duplicity” of protection of the zone through separate laws regulating the same strip of land does not in any way affect the State's ability to expropriate the plaintiff's property in order to protect the public interest. The issue has already been reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, and it determined that the Las Baulas National Marine Park “is located within the Tempisque Conservation Area (ACT), entirely within the canton of Santa Cruz (...), and also constitutes an environmentally fragile area, at least the 500-meter strip adjacent to the Park's boundaries (...)” (vote number 2008-18529). The indicated 500-meter strip along the continental boundary has been designated as the buffer zone of the Las Baulas National Marine Park and constitutes an environmentally fragile area: biological-terrestrial fragility, hydrological fragility, fragility due to urban development; also, the Playa Grande sector is located within the mentioned Park and is considered to be of extreme vulnerability (vote number 2008-18529). For the stated reasons, the grievance presented by the plaintiff must be rejected, as the impossibility of the State to expropriate within the Playa Grande zone has not been demonstrated.

• d)The plaintiff argues that Decree Nombre72428 was repealed by Law 7524, since its effectiveness was subject to the expropriation of properties that was not carried out, and furthermore, it did not comply with the requirements demanded by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). The issue of the boundaries of Las Baulas National Park, which were initially set in Executive Decree 20518-MIRENEM, was reviewed in various votes of the Constitutional Chamber —the same ones cited by the lower court (a quo) and reiterated in this ruling—, in which the conclusion is reached that the boundaries established by said Decree must be maintained, and that the reduction of the zone protected by Las Baulas Park is not admissible given the absence of technical or legal grounds for it (vote number 2008-8713). The other objection regarding the non-compliance with Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) requirements for the Park's creation, which were omitted by Decree 20518-MIRENEM, constitutes a new point that was not debated by the parties in the instance and is also unrelated to the annulment claims brought by the plaintiff, which prevents issuing a pronouncement under the protection of Article 24 of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law. For the reasons stated, the grievance raised is rejected.
• e)The plaintiff states that the Ministry of Environment requested from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) an interpretation of the law that only the Legislative Assembly can provide, and that official letter C-444-2005 from the Attorney General's Office lacks expert criteria, that criteria being the basis of the expropriation proceeding. The grievance must be rejected for the following basic reasons: firstly, the cited criteria C-444-2005 was indeed challenged in this venue, but it was dismissed as inadmissible for the reasons indicated in Considering IV, part 1) of this ruling, because it lacks legal effects on the plaintiff, and that is how it was resolved in the instance. Secondly, upon reviewing Executive Decree number 33707-MINAE, through which the plaintiff's property is declared of public interest and the start of the partial expropriation proceeding is ordered, it is observed that among the grounds cited to sustain such administrative action, criteria C-444-2005 of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is not included. On the contrary, the cited conduct of the Public Administration is oriented toward compliance with the Law and constitutional jurisprudence; therefore, the plaintiff's grievance is rejected.

V.- ON COSTS. The plaintiff requests in her appeal that the State be ordered to pay costs. The grievance is receivable and is upheld. Article 221, first paragraph of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC) —supplementary by leave of numeral 103 of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law— establishes the general rule that the losing party must bear the payment of personal and procedural costs, for the mere fact of being so, without this implying that bad faith or recklessness in bringing the action is being judged. The exception to said rule is the exemption from payment, which can only be granted when it is verified —in a reasoned manner— that one of the exemption grounds provided for in numeral 98 of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law or in Article 222 of the cited CPC is present. In this case, this Panel finds that the indicated conditions are indeed met, since the justification for exempting the losing plaintiff from payment of both types of costs derives from the nature of the matter debated here, in which the fundamental right of private property was questioned against the public interest of protecting the environment and especially the Leatherback Turtles, which merited the legal analysis of the text of Law 7524 regarding the boundaries of Las Baulas National Park and led the Public Administration to request the legal opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. All of which, in this Court's judgment, provided sufficient reason for the plaintiff to litigate, and such circumstance falls within the statutory grounds that allow exemption from costs. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is reversed solely with respect to the imposition of costs, to exempt the losing party from their payment.

VI.COROLLARY. In accordance with the arguments set forth in the preceding recitals and in what has been the subject of the appeal, we proceed to confirm the appealed judgment in all other respects different from the costs.

POR TANTO:

The evidence for better resolution offered by the plaintiff is rejected. The judgment is partially reversed, only with respect to the imposition of costs, to exempt the losing party from their payment. In all other respects, the challenged judgment is confirmed. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Nombre15131 .

Nombre5243 JUDITH REYES CASTILLO It argues that the link between Opinion C-444-2005 and the expropriation is evident, because it became a law reform, a constitutional power that belongs exclusively to the Legislative Assembly. It requests that the appealed decision be revoked and that the merits of the proceeding be examined with respect to Opinion C-444-2005, given that it is a final act in another procedure that directly affects the other acts whose nullity is sought (folios 540 to 541, 583 to 590 of the judicial file). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">The grievance is not admissible and is rejected</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. Indeed, the contested judgment resolves the point at issue and states that:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"(...) VI).- Regarding the defense of Inadmissibility because the acts are not susceptible to challenge: The State's representation objects that the binding opinion (opinión vinculante) of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, and the undated resolution issued by the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía that initiated the administrative expropriation proceeding, are mere procedural acts and do not decide the matter definitively (no causan estado). With respect to this issue, it is this Judge's criterion that, above all, the provisions of Article 18 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa must be considered, as it establishes the following:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"Article 18.- 1. An action shall be admissible in relation to the provisions and acts of the Administration, whether they are final or procedural; and with respect to the latter, if they decide the merits of the matter directly or indirectly, in such a way that they terminate that channel, make it impossible, or suspend its continuation"</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In accordance with the foregoing, not any act can serve as the basis for a claim of nullity in this venue, given that the legal system restricts it to final acts or procedural acts when the latter decides the merits of the matter raised. (...)</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In accordance with the foregoing analysis, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">in the case of the act contained in the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, it is noted that it is neither a final act nor a procedural act with its own effects, inasmuch as it is a legal opinion (opinión jurídica) that does not possess its own legal effects nor does it correspond to the final manifestation of the Public Administration</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, as it may contribute to the latter, but does not correspond to it as such. In this line of reasoning, the act challenged was issued under Article 4 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, which provides:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"ARTICLE 4.—CONSULTATIONS: The bodies of the Public Administration, through the heads of the different administrative levels, may consult the technical-legal criterion of the Procuraduría; in each case, they must attach the opinion of the respective legal advisory office, except in the case of internal auditors, who may make the consultation directly"</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">As it is a legal criterion (criterio jurídico) without the capacity, by itself, to have effects on third parties, given that it will only have them by virtue of the specific act of the Administration that adopts and applies it, the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, does not fall within the assumptions of Article 18 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, and therefore the inadmissibility of the claim with respect to this act must be declared, in application of Article 60 of said normative body, which provides:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"The inadmissibility of the action shall be declared in the following cases:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">....c) If its object is acts not susceptible to challenge, according to Article 21" (...)". </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">(Emphasis added).</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">It was fully demonstrated that the Procuraduría General de la República issued Opinion C-444-2005 in response to a consultation raised by the Minister of Environment and Energy. However, the decision that produced effects on the plaintiff was Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) Number 33707-MINAE, adopted by the then-President of the Republic and the Minister of Environment and Energy. From the above, it is clear that the plaintiff's arguments referring to the binding nature of the opinion or that it resolves a problem raised by the Administration before the Procuraduría are not admissible, since the opinion of said advisory body does not produce effects against the claimant here, nor is it an act of a general nature that the individual must comply with (Article 10, subsection 2, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, such allegations are a mere reiteration of what was stated in the claim, but no criticism is included against the grounds of the lower court's ruling; hence, they do not constitute a true grievance. The plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate in its argumentative discourse the existence of a legitimate interest (interés legítimo) or subjective right derived directly from the indicated advisory opinion, an essential aspect for admitting the challenge of the act as expressed by Articles 10 and 18 of the aforementioned Regulatory Law. Consequently, the only appropriate course is to reject the grievance raised for the stated reasons.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">2)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> In the second ground of grievance, the plaintiff states that the judge proceeds to examine an antinomy that does not exist, which derives from the unanimous approval of the motion legally introduced by Deputy Nombre72427, where the phrase </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"aguas adentro"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> was expressly introduced, modifying the original bill where it read </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"tierra adentro"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. It considers that the judge, in an effort to resolve a non-existent antinomy, makes an incorrect assessment of what the Law for the Creation of Las Baulas Park actually establishes, and that no contradiction exists. It argues that the judgment contains an error in the appreciation of the law, by confusing the specific order to expropriate lands (specifically El Morro hill and Isla Verde) which does not include the plaintiff's property. The park's boundaries are expressed in coordinates in Article One of the Law and do not include any private farm as the judgment incorrectly indicates, except for those already mentioned. It states that it should not be overlooked that the legislator was aware that the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo had already been created, encompassing the public zone of Playa Grande, a nesting site for the Baula turtles and others. It clarifies that Executive Decree Nombre72428 was repealed by Law 7524, which established the park's boundaries, the effectiveness of which was conditioned on the acquisition of the properties included in the demarcation of said decree; however, none were expropriated, and therefore it was not effective. Furthermore, the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo was created by Law 7149, covering the area known as Playa Grande, precisely where the plaintiff's farm is located. It alleges that when Executive Decree 20.518 MIRENEM was issued, the requirements established by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) to create a national park were not met, specifically, a preliminary land tenure study and population census were not conducted, no plans were made, and no minimum budgetary content was provided for its protection and management. It points out that Law 7524 strictly delimited the area of the Parque Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste, based on the decree's lack of effectiveness, and established that it was a marine park that began one hundred twenty-five meters seaward of the ordinary high-tide line, and that this was not a legislative error, which is proven in the legislative file containing the motion presented by one of the deputies. It considers that there is no doubt as to the legislator's intent, and that they were clear that a wildlife refuge zone already existed that protected the turtles' nesting, and that what had not been approved was the protection of turtles in the ocean, and that was their intent, which does not admit interpretation. It reiterates that the supposed error the legislator is said to have incurred is not such, because a law exists that protects the beach where the turtles nest, which has been respected by all the neighbors who have voluntarily restricted the effects that white light causes to these chelonians. It considers that the principle of in dubio pro natura and all preventive and precautionary principles in the area of environmental protection were duly protected, as Playa Grande was included within the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, and it is not correct to interpret that there is an environmental danger and absence of protection, as the judge does. It argues that the former Minister of Environment, Nombre72429</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">requested the Procuraduría General de la República to make an interpretation of the Law, an act reserved by the Political Constitution to the Legislative Branch. The Procuraduría, through official communication OJ-015-2004 of February 10, 2004, gave its non-binding opinion (opinión no vinculante) to the effect that there is a possible drafting error in Law 7524 for the Creation of the Parque Marino Las Baulas. It notes that the minutes of the Legislative Assembly's discussion of Law 7524 show that the expression </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"aguas adentro"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> was not an error, as it derived from a motion presented by Deputy Engineer Nombre72427</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, which was approved by all deputies present in the Third Committee with Full Legislative Power, and that is what they decided, without any other interpretation being admissible. It describes that subsequently, and at the request of the same Minister, the Procuraduría addressed the issue with official communication C-444-2005 of September 24, 2005, with binding character, which reiterated official communication OJ-015-2004, based on the fact that coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,000 are located on land, without any expert or scientific assessment accrediting this. It states that, as was demonstrated in the proceedings by an expert opinion (dictamen pericial) issued by engineer Nombre40730, the point indicated above is covered by water, which definitively proves it is not on solid land, contrary to what was expressed by the Procurador. It considers that the interpretation made in the appealed judgment and in pronouncement C-444-2005 does not conform to the law, because it starts from the assumption that the coordinates indicated in the Law are the park's boundaries, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"when the truth is that the coordinates serve as a specific starting point for a straight line until reaching 125 meters seaward, because it is from 125 (sic) meters seaward that a line parallel to the coast is drawn, which begins one hundred twenty-five meters seaward of coordinates N 259,100 and E 322,000 and ends one hundred twenty-five meters seaward of coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050, since those same coordinates are those that form the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, which encompasses, as I have already said, the public zone of Playa Grande"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. It opines that the pro natura principle is not applicable, because there is a Law that created the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, which covers the turtles' nesting area; the other protected areas in Law 7524, particularly the mangroves and estuaries, have recognized state protection; and the animal and plant species that inhabit those lands are duly safeguarded from a legal standpoint. It clarifies that the legislator did not indicate landward coordinates as is intended to be claimed, but rather indicated a particular point from which the measurement must be taken, always understood that it cannot be done by a straight line, but by a parallel line to the coast, starting from the basic coordinates. It considers that modifying the Park's boundaries in such an illegal manner has created a situation of anxiety among the owners, but even more, it exceeds what the legislator intended and exceeds what is technically necessary to protect the turtles in their nesting and reproductive process that occurs on land. It indicates that the turtles do not go beyond 50 meters of the public zone because they need to create their nests in sand, free of plants and roots that hinder their nesting work, and that it has voluntarily carried out tasks to protect the turtles, eliminating lights and creating barriers so that neither sound nor lights affect the nesting process (folios 541 to 556, 590 to 608 of the judicial file). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">The grievances are not admissible and are rejected</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. Each of the grievances raised is analyzed in order below.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">a)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Regarding the boundaries of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas and the appellant's arguments referring to the non-existence of an antinomy in Law 7524 due to the approval of a legislative motion, the lower court judge ruled:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"(...) Notwithstanding the foregoing, another peculiarity of the law cannot be ignored, which is that then-Deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Nombre72427</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">presented, during the approval process of the bill, a motion aimed at adding after the phrase 125 meters of the ordinary high-tide line, the words "aguas adentro". Said motion was approved (folio 227 of the main file, minutes of session 004 of the Committee with Full Legislative Power Third, intervention of the deputy, folio 90, 91 note subscribed by the referred former deputy). As is clear from the intervention and statements of Deputy Nombre72427</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, the purpose of the motion raised was to give an exclusively marine character to the park. However, for this Judge, it is notable that although the words "aguas adentro" were incorporated into the final text of the law - upon adopting the motion - the rest of the law's text maintains an evident contradiction with those words. This is so, inasmuch as, as has already been said, both the cited coordinates and the law's express mention of eventual expropriations, open the possibility that private lands included within the scope of said coordinates are incorporated. (...) </span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">(...) It is clear then that the very text of the law under analysis contains a contradiction originating from Nombre72427's motion. On one hand, it indicates geographical coordinates that include areas in privately owned properties - reinforced by the provision for conducting eventual expropriations, and on the other hand, the motion is oriented so that the park is seaward, as evidenced by what was stated by the proposer of said motion, when indicating:</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"Studying the original text, it seems to me that it meets the requirements of a law for this type of park protection, especially that it should have been marine because that is what is customary in this case; however, it was not designated as marine. When defining the Park, it speaks of one hundred twenty-five meters, with an imaginary line of one hundred twenty-five meters from the ordinary high-tide line, and this must be understood as seaward, exactly what I think this motion clarifies" (...)</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Based on the foregoing considerations, this Judge considers that the boundaries of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, for the purposes of the specific situation under analysis and which will be elaborated upon in the following recital (considerando), must necessarily take into account the coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, ending at the coordinate point N 255,000 and E 335,050 provided for in the law creating said Marine Park, given the evident contradiction of these with the incorporated phrase "aguas adentro". This latter phrase is evidently contradictory to the scope of the referred coordinates and to the rest of the law's text - which refers to expropriations and properties on privately owned lands - but even more so, it openly conflicts with the law's objectives - evident from a simple reading of the explanatory statement -, the environmental public interest, and the national and international legal system governing the matter. Given the above, and using the interpretive criteria indicated, it is considered that for the purposes of resolving the present proceeding, evidence of a property's location within the area of said coordinates is sufficient to determine its incorporation within the boundaries of the indicated Marine National Park. (...)</span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">XI).- Determination of whether the farm of the Party of Guanacaste, real folio registration number Placa11748 is located within the area corresponding to the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">: It has been duly demonstrated in the proceedings that although the farm of the Party of Guanacaste, real folio Placa11748 is evidently not seaward, it is indeed located within the coordinates of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. In effect, it has been proven that the area to be expropriated is located between coordinates 255,000 N NIE38 (folio 7 of the administrative file, cadastral plan number 1042299-2005, see location on it, situated in the lower right-hand corner of the plan). Said coordinates, by their location, are situated between coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000 and N 255,000 and E 335,050, indicated as boundaries of said National Park. Likewise, based on said documentation, the Executive Secretariat of the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación certified on April 11, 2007, that the farm corresponding to cadastral plan 1042299-20055 is located within the Parque Nacional Mario Las Baulas de Guanacaste, created pursuant to Executive Decree No. 20518-MIRENEM of 07-09-91 and regulated in Law No. 7524 of August 16, 1995 (folio 9 of the administrative file, respective certification). The plaintiff has not provided any evidence that disproves the corresponding cadastral plan, regarding a location at different geographical coordinates or that demonstrates falsehood in said document or in said certification. At most, the plaintiff has contributed an expert report indicating that the geographical coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050 are located in a land area that is part of an estuary or mangrove (estero o manglar) and that on the day of the respective test, it was flooded with water at 13:20, using a tree at 3.10, and an electric power pole at 26.72 m as reference (folios 447 to 453 of the main file, but without demonstrating that the coordinates where farm real folio 86,044,000 is located are outside the boundary coordinates of the National Park under analysis. Given the above, applying this Judge's criterion expressed in the preceding recital, with respect to the fact that for the delimitation purposes of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, the areas in private ownership located within said geographical coordinates must not be ignored, this Judge considers that for the purposes of resolving the present proceeding and to specifically examine the acts challenged by the plaintiff's claims, the farm of the Party of Guanacaste, real folio 86,044,000 is located within the coordinates of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. (...)". </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">This Tribunal considers that what was resolved at the lower court is in accordance with the law. It is observed that the plaintiff merely reiterates an argument presented in the claim, which does not constitute a true grievance, as it does not attack the judicial criterion in any way nor provide new evidentiary or argumentative elements capable of modifying what was resolved in the first instance; hence, this aspect of the appeal is rejected. In addition to what was resolved by the lower court (a quo), it is important to emphasize that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) defined the protection area of the Baula turtles and established the park's parameter at 125 meters from the ordinary high-tide line in the same sense as Executive Decree 20518-MIRENEM provided. Vote number 2008-8713 of the referred Chamber - also cited in the contested judgment - is precise and forceful in establishing the park's boundaries in the terms already indicated and the reasons supporting the ruling: </span></p><p style="margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"The Parque Nacional Las Baulas de Guanacaste has a very clear purpose: the protection of the nesting area of the Baula Turtle, which, according to Executive Decree No. Nombre72428, is necessary to ensure the perpetuity of the colony of the Baula turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) and other natural resources, and the tourist and ecological activity, regarding nesting that occurs throughout the year. It draws this Chamber's attention that the Park Creation Bill reiterates some criteria expressed by the Executive Decree, and the concern for hotel developments, because with them, lighting, waste, traffic of people, noise from outboard motors, music, discos, and automobiles will be introduced, which will come to destroy this natural habitat. Hence, a protection strip of two hundred meters from the ordinary high-tide line was initially proposed in the legislative process; however, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">with the Affirmative Opinion (Dictamen Afirmativo) of Nombre20683, even though these same justifications are maintained, it reduces the protection strip to 125 meters from the ordinary high-tide line, in the same sense as the aforementioned Executive Decree</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">. Since our country has committed internationally to observing the protection and "habitats of marine turtles," the unconstitutionality action must be granted, and in accordance with the precautionary principle, as well as the binding nature of environmental regulations, the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre) must also be included as a necessary protection area for the different marine turtles that use that area as part of the environment used by them during their life cycle stages". </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">(Emphasis added; among others, see votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the same Chamber)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The constitutional precedent indicated above is binding, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); thus, the issue of the boundaries or parameters of the Parque Nacional Las Baulas is clearly defined. Now, what was resolved by the lower court - in admitting the parameter of 125 meters from the ordinary high-tide line and verifying that the plaintiff's farm is located within that boundary - conforms to constitutional jurisprudence on the matter, and therefore must be confirmed.</span></p> </span></p> b) The following grievance, which refers to the alleged error of judicial interpretation regarding the expropriation mandate, since Law 7524 referred to specific lands (Cerro El Morro and Isla Verde), in which the plaintiff’s property is not included. On this subject, the lower-court judge stated the following:

"(...) It is interesting to note for purposes of this resolution that the Constitutional Chamber imposes the duty to initiate expropriation proceedings on private estates (fundos) located in the Las Baulas Marine Park, thereby confirming the existence of the same and the duty of expropriation arising from the respective law. Likewise, in Resolution 2008-018529 of 8:58 a.m. on December 16, 2008, of the same Chamber, the following orders were issued:

“a) All environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) granted on properties located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park are annulled, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy is ordered to immediately continue with the expropriation processes for such properties. (...)”." What was decided in the first instance conforms to the law. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber orders the Ministry of Environment and Energy to expropriate all private lands located within the Las Baulas park (see votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the indicated Chamber). On the other hand, it cannot be deduced from the text of Law 7524 that the expropriation of lands refers only to Cerro El Morro and Isla Verde, contrary to what was asserted by the dissatisfied party, and the Constitutional Chamber so understood it when stating the following:

"(...) It is not in vain that through Article 2 of the Law for the creation of the Las Baulas National Marine Park No. 7524 of July 10, 1995, the State is obliged to manage the expropriations of the lands located within the Park, since it is of public interest that said lands be under state protection. Regarding the current state of these expropriations, the Minister of Environment and Energy reports that there were seventy-six properties, of which eighteen have already been expropriated and the remaining fifty-eight are in process, which is why, through vote 2008-007549 of 5:38 p.m. on April 30, 2008, this Chamber resolved to order said Ministry to proceed immediately and expeditiously with the expropriation procedures, so as not to continue causing greater damage to the environment. (...)".

Consequently, it having been proven that the plaintiff's property subject to expropriation is located within the boundaries of the Las Baulas National Park and the plaintiff not providing other evidence that contradicts what is established (articles 317 of the Civil Procedure Code and 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction), the grievance must be rejected as unfounded.

• c)Regarding the grievance related to the protection of the same zone by the Law for the Creation of the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge in Playa Grande, where her property is located, the a quo considered the following:

"(...) XIII).- Other considerations of the plaintiff: The plaintiff's representative indicates that there exists a national wildlife refuge that comprises the same public zone, under the same coordinates as the Las Baulas marine park. In this regard, the objected acts refer to the norm that creates the latter and to other norms dealing with environmental matters; therefore, what is indicated in this respect does not vitiate the act with nullity. (...)".

This Tribunal agrees with the criterion of the first-instance judge and deems it important to add that Law 7524 for the Creation of the Las Baulas National Park, in its Article 1, specifically includes the Tamarindo Wildlife Reserve zone.

"ARTICLE 1.- Creation and limits.

The Las Baulas de Guanacaste National Marine Park is created, the limits of which, according to the Villarreal and Matapalo cartographic sheets at a scale of 1:50,000 of the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional), shall be the following: starting from a point located at coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, it follows a straight line until reaching an imaginary line parallel to the coast, one hundred twenty-five meters seaward from the ordinary high-water mark. Along this imaginary line, the boundary continues in a southeasterly direction, until ending at the point with coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050. The Park shall also encompass the Tamarindo estuaries (esteros), Ventanas and San Francisco and their mangroves; the hill located immediately behind Playa Ventanas, Cerro El Morro, Isla Capitán, Isla Verde, the fifty-meter public zone, measured from the ordinary high-water mark, between Punta San Francisco and the San Francisco estuary, and the territorial waters of Tamarindo Bay, comprised between Punta Conejo and the southern end of Playa Langosta, up to the ordinary high-water line.” (Emphasis added).

In what concerns the case under study, it must be indicated that the alleged “duplicity” of protection of the zone through respective laws regulating the same strip of land in no way affects the State's ability to expropriate the plaintiff's property in order to protect the public interest. The issue has already been reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, which determined that the Las Baulas National Marine Park “is located within the Tempisque Conservation Area (ACT), entirely within the canton of Santa Cruz (...), it also constitutes an environmentally fragile area, at least the 500-meter band adjacent to the Park's limits (...)” (vote number 2008-18529). The indicated 500-meter band along the continental limit has been designated as the buffer zone of the Las Baulas National Marine Park and constitutes an environmentally fragile area: biological-terrestrial fragility, hydrological fragility, fragility due to urban development; the Playa Grande sector is also located in the aforementioned Park and is considered one of extreme vulnerability (vote number 2008-18529). For the indicated reasons, the grievance presented by the plaintiff must be rejected, as the impossibility of the State to expropriate within the Playa Grande zone has not been demonstrated.

• d)The plaintiff argues that Decree No. 72428 was repealed by Law 7524, given that its effectiveness was subject to the expropriation of properties that was not carried out and, furthermore, it did not comply with the requirements demanded by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). The issue of the limits of the Las Baulas National Park, which were initially fixed in Executive Decree 20518-MIRENEM, was reviewed in various votes of the Constitutional Chamber—the same ones cited by the a quo and reiterated in this ruling—, in which it is concluded that the boundaries established by the referred Decree must be maintained, without the reduction of the zone protected by the Las Baulas Park being admissible in the absence of technical or legal grounds for doing so (vote number 2008-8713). The other reproach points to the non-compliance with requirements of the Forestry Law for the creation of the Park that were omitted by Decree 20518-MIRENEM, which constitutes a new point that was not debated by the parties in the instance and which is also unrelated to the annulment claims deduced by the plaintiff, which precludes issuing a pronouncement under the protection of Article 24 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth, the grievance raised is rejected.
• e)The plaintiff states that the Ministry of Environment requested from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) an interpretation of the law that only the Legislative Assembly can give, and that opinion C-444-2005 of the Office of the Attorney General lacks expert criterion, with that criterion being the basis of the expropriation proceeding. The grievance must be rejected for the following basic reasons: first, the cited opinion C-444-2005 was indeed challenged in this venue, but it was declared inadmissible for the reasons indicated in Considerando IV, section 1) of this ruling, because it lacks legal effects on the plaintiff, and it was so resolved in the instance. Second, upon reviewing Executive Decree number 33707-MINAE, through which the plaintiff's property is declared of public interest and the start of the partial expropriation proceeding is ordered, it is observed that among the grounds cited to support such administrative action, opinion C-444-2005 of the Office of the Attorney General is not included. On the contrary, the cited conduct of the Public Administration is oriented toward compliance with the Law and constitutional jurisprudence; therefore, the plaintiff's grievance is rejected.

V.- REGARDING COSTS. The plaintiff requests in her appeal that the State be ordered to pay costs. The grievance is admissible and is granted. Article 221, first paragraph of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter by its acronym CPC) —supplementary by provision of numeral 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction— establishes the general rule that the losing party must assume the payment of personal and procedural costs, by the mere fact of being so, without this implying a judgment that there was bad faith or recklessness in bringing the action. The exception to that rule is the exemption from payment, which can only be granted when it is verified—in a reasoned manner—that one of the grounds for exoneration provided for in numeral 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction or in Article 222 of the cited CPC is present. In the case, this Court appreciates that we are indeed in the presence of the indicated conditions, since the justification for exonerating the losing plaintiff from the payment of both costs derives from the nature of the matter debated here, in which the fundamental right of private property was questioned against the public interest of protecting the environment and especially the leatherback turtles (tortugas Baulas), which warranted the legal analysis of the text of Law 7524 regarding the limits of the Las Baulas National Park and led the Public Administration to request the legal opinion of the Office of the Attorney General. All of which, in the judgment of this Tribunal, gave the plaintiff sufficient reason to litigate, such that this scenario falls within the legal grounds that permit exoneration from costs. Consequently, the lower court ruling is revoked, solely regarding the order to pay costs, to exonerate the losing party from the payment thereof.

VI.COROLLARY. In accordance with the arguments outlined in the preceding recitals and as to what has been the subject of appeal, we proceed to confirm the appealed judgment in all other aspects distinct from costs.

POR TANTO:

The evidence for a better decision offered by the plaintiff is rejected. The ruling is partially revoked, only as to the order to pay costs, to exonerate the losing party from the payment thereof. In all other respects, the contested judgment is confirmed.

NOTIFY.- **Nombre15131 .** **Nombre5243** **JUDITH REYES CASTILLO** _Expediente: 07-001255-0163-CA_ _Voto Nº 02-2011-SII_ _3 of 20_ Its importance is such that, as the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has insisted (see again the already cited resolution number 195-02), it delimits the competence of the appellate court, establishing those aspects on which it can (and, by exclusion, cannot) render a pronouncement.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Consequently, it is exclusively from this perspective that what is stated in the appeal will be examined, setting aside any other allegation that does not constitute a clear and reasoned objection against what was decided (as would occur, for example, in those cases where the appellant merely reproduces issues already debated at the instance, without explaining why they consider that the analysis made of them in the judgment is erroneous or lacking factual or legal basis)." </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">The foregoing is fully applicable to the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the first-instance judgment issued in this lawsuit. The grievances presented will now be analyzed, in accordance with the rules explained above.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">IV.- ON THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">The plaintiff files an appeal against the first-instance judgment based on the following grievances: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> In the first ground of grievance related to the inadmissibility of the action against the binding opinion (opinión vinculante) 444-2005 of the Procuraduría General de la República, it points out that the judgment declares inadmissibility based on Articles 18 and 60 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, because according to the judge's reasoning, it is a preparatory act that cannot be appealed. However, contrary to the judge's opinion, it considers that the opinion is binding and is in itself a definitive act that puts an end to the controversy raised before the Procurador and far from being a simple preparatory act, it becomes a final act that is mandatory for the entire Public Administration, regardless of the proceeding in which it is intended to be used. It states that it is based on the aforementioned opinion that the expropriation of the property owned by them proceeds, because in said opinion, it was considered that it forms part of the Parque Marino Las Baulas created by Law number 7524, hence it is not a preparatory act. It argues that the link between opinion C-444-2005 and the expropriation is evident, because it became a law reform, a constitutional power that corresponds solely to the Legislative Assembly. It requests that the appealed decision be revoked and that the merits of the proceeding regarding opinion C-444-2005 be examined, as it is a final act in another proceeding that directly affects the other acts whose nullity is sought to be declared (folios 540 to 541, 583 to 590 of the judicial file). </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">The grievance is not admissible and is rejected</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Indeed, the contested judgment resolves the point subject to grievance and indicates that:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"(...) VI).- On the defense of Inadmissibility because they are acts not susceptible to challenge: The State's representation objects that the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, and the undated resolution issued by the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía that advanced the administrative expropriation proceeding, are mere procedural acts (actos de mero trámite) and not definitive. Regarding this issue, it is the criterion of this Judge that, first of all, the provisions of Article 18 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa must be taken into consideration, as it establishes the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"Article 18.- 1. The action shall be admissible in relation to the provisions and acts of the Administration, whether definitive or procedural (de trámite); and regarding the latter, if they directly or indirectly decide the merits of the matter, in such a way that they put an end to that avenue or make its continuation impossible or suspend it"</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">In accordance with the foregoing, not just any act can support a claim for nullity in this venue, given that the legal system restricts it to definitive acts or procedural acts when they decide the merits of what is raised. (...)</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">In accordance with the above analysis, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">in the case of the act contained in the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, it is noted that this is neither a definitive act nor a procedural act with its own effects, inasmuch as it is a legal opinion that does not possess its own legal effects nor does it correspond to the final manifestation of the Public Administration</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">, as it can contribute to it, but does not correspond to it as such. In this vein, the challenged act was issued under Article 4 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, as it provides:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"ARTICLE 4.—CONSULTATIONS: The bodies of the Public Administration, through the heads of the different administrative levels, may consult the technical-legal opinion of the Procuraduría; in each case, they must accompany the opinion of the respective legal advisory office, except in the case of internal auditors, who may make the consultation directly"</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">As a legal opinion without the capacity by itself to have effects on third parties, given that it will only have them by virtue of the specific act of the Administration that accepts and applies it, the binding opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 of December 23, 2005, does not fall within the assumptions of Article 18 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, so the inadmissibility of the complaint with respect to this act must be declared, in application of Article 60 of said normative body, as it provides:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"The inadmissibility of the action shall be declared in the following cases:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">....c) If it concerns acts not susceptible to challenge, according to Article 21" (...)". </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(Emphasis added).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">It was fully demonstrated that the Procuraduría General de la República issued opinion C-444-2005 responding to a consultation raised by the Minister of Environment and Energy. However, the decision that produced effects on the plaintiff was Decreto Ejecutivo Número 33707-MINAE, adopted by the then-President of the Republic and the Minister of Environment and Energy. From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff's arguments referring to the mandatory nature of the opinion or that it resolves a problem raised by the Administration before the Procuraduría are not admissible, since the opinion of said advisory body does not produce effects against the plaintiff here, nor is it an act of a general nature that the individual must comply with (Article 10, subsection 2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, such allegations are a mere reiteration of what was set forth in the complaint, but no reproach is included against the grounds of the instance judgment, hence they do not constitute a true grievance. The plaintiff has also not managed to demonstrate in their argumentative discourse the existence of a legitimate interest or subjective right derived directly from said advisory opinion, an essential aspect to admit the challenge of the act as expressed in numerals 10 and 18 of the aforementioned Ley Reguladora. Consequently, the only appropriate course is to reject the grievance raised for the indicated reasons.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> In the second ground of grievance, the plaintiff states that the judge proceeds to examine an antinomy that does not exist, which derives from the unanimous approval of the motion legally introduced by Deputy Nombre72427, where the phrase </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"aguas adentro" (seaward)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> was expressly introduced, modifying the original bill where it read </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"tierra adentro" (inland)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. It considers that the judge, in their eagerness to solve a non-existent antinomy, makes an incorrect assessment of what the Law for the Creation of the Baulas Park actually establishes, there being no contradiction. It argues that the judgment contains an error of appreciation of the law, by confusing the specific expropriation order for lands (specifically El Morro hill and Isla Verde) which does not include the plaintiff's property. The park's limits are expressed in coordinates in the first article of the Law and do not include any private property as the judgment incorrectly indicates, except those already mentioned. It says that it should not be overlooked that the legislator was aware that the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo had already been created, encompassing the public area of Playa Grande, the nesting site for the Baulas turtles and others. It clarifies that Decreto Ejecutivo Nombre72428 was repealed by Law 7524, which established the park's limits, whose effectiveness was contingent on the acquisition of the properties included in the demarcation of said decree; however, none were expropriated, therefore it was not effective. Furthermore, through Law 7149, the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo was created, encompassing the area known as Playa Grande, precisely where the plaintiff's property is located. It alleges that when Decreto Ejecutivo 20.518 MIRENEM was issued, the requirements established by the Ley Forestal to create a national park were not met, specifically, the preliminary study of land tenure and the population census were not conducted, the plans were not made, and the minimum budgetary content for its protection and management was not provided. It points out that Law 7524 strictly delimited the area of the Parque Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste, based on the decree's lack of effectiveness, and established that it was a marine park starting one hundred twenty-five meters seaward from the ordinary high-water mark (pleamar ordinaria); it was not a legislative error, which is proven in the legislative file containing the motion presented by one of the deputies. It considers that there is no doubt as to the legislator's intent and that they were clear that a refuge area already existed that protected the turtles' nesting and that what had not been approved was the protection of turtles in the ocean, and that was their intention, which does not admit interpretation. It reiterates that the supposed error the legislator is said to have incurred is not such, as there is a law protecting the beach where the turtles nest, which has been respected by all the neighbors who have voluntarily restricted the effects that white light causes to these chelonians. It considers that the in dubio pro natura principle and all the preventive and precautionary principles regarding environmental protection were duly protected, as Playa Grande was included within the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, and it is not correct to interpret that there is an environmental danger and lack of protection, as the judge does. It argues that the former Minister of Environment, Nombre72429</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">requested the Procuraduría General de la República to interpret the Law, an act reserved by the Political Constitution to the Legislative Branch. The Procuraduría, through official letter OJ-015-2004 of February 10, 2004, gave its non-binding opinion to the effect that there is a possible drafting error in Law 7524 creating the Parque Marino Las Baulas. It notes that in the minutes of the discussion of Law 7524 in the Legislative Assembly, it is clear that the expression </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"aguas adentro"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> was not an error, as it arose from a motion presented by Deputy Engineer Nombre72427</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, which was approved by all the deputies present in the Third Plenary Legislative Committee and that is what they decided, without any other interpretation being admitted. It describes that subsequently, and at the request of the same Minister, the Procuraduría addressed the issue with official letter C-444-2005 of September 24, 2005, with a binding nature, in which official letter OJ-015-2004 is reiterated, based on the fact that coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,000 are located on land, without any expert or scientific assessment to support this. It affirms that, as was demonstrated in the records through an expert opinion issued by engineer Nombre40730, the aforementioned point is covered by water, which definitively shows that it is not on solid ground, contrary to what was stated by the Procurador. It considers that the interpretation made in the appealed judgment and in pronouncement C-444-2005 does not conform to the law, as it starts from the assumption that the coordinates indicated in the Law are the park's boundaries, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"when the truth is that the coordinates serve as a specific starting point for the straight line until reaching 125 meters seaward, as it is from 125 (sic) meters seaward that a line parallel to the coast is drawn, starting one hundred twenty-five meters seaward from coordinates N 259,100 and E 322,000 and ending one hundred twenty-five meters seaward from coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050, since those same coordinates are what make up the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, which encompasses, as I have already said, the public area of Playa Grande"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. It opines that the pro natura principle is not applicable, because there is a Law that created the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo encompassing the turtles' nesting area, and the other protected areas in Law 7524, particularly the mangroves and estuaries, have recognized state protection, and the animal and plant species that inhabit those lands are duly safeguarded from a legal standpoint. It clarifies that the legislator did not indicate the inland coordinates as is intended to be pointed out, but rather indicated a specific point from which the measurement must be made, always understood that it cannot be done by a straight line, but by a line parallel to the coast, starting from the basic coordinates. It considers that illegally modifying the Park's boundaries in this way has created a state of anxiety among the owners, but even more so, it exceeds what the legislator intended and exceeds what is technically necessary to protect the turtles in their nesting and reproductive process that occurs on land. It indicates that turtles do not go beyond 50 meters of the public area since they need to create their nests in sand, free of plants and roots that hinder their nesting work, and that it has voluntarily undertaken efforts to protect the turtles by eliminating lights and creating barriers so that neither sound nor light affects the nesting process (folios 541 to 556, 590 to 608 of the judicial file). </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">The grievances are not admissible and are rejected</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Each of the stated grievances is analyzed in order below.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Regarding the boundaries of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas and the appellant's arguments referring to the non-existence of an antinomy in Law 7524 due to the approval of a legislative motion, the first-instance judge resolved:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"(...) Notwithstanding the foregoing, another peculiarity of the law cannot be overlooked, which is that the then Deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Nombre72427</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">presented, during the approval process of the bill, a motion aimed at adding after the phrase 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark, the words "aguas adentro" (seaward). Said motion was approved (folio 227 of the main file, minutes of session 004 of the Third Committee with Full Legislative Power, intervention of the deputy, folio 90, 91 note signed by the aforementioned former deputy). As is clear from the intervention and statements of Deputy Nombre72427</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, the purpose of the motion raised was to give an exclusively marine character to the park. However, for this Judge it is noteworthy that although the words "aguas adentro" were incorporated into the final text of the law - when the motion was accepted - the rest of the law's text maintains an evident contradiction with these words. The foregoing, inasmuch as, as has already been said, both the cited coordinates and the express mention in the law of eventual expropriations open the possibility of including private lands incorporated within the scope of said coordinates. (...) </span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">(...) It is clear then that the very text of the law under analysis contains a contradiction originating from Nombre72427's motion. On one hand, it indicates geographical coordinates that encompass areas on privately owned properties - reinforced by the provision for eventual expropriations, and on the other hand, the motion is oriented towards the park being seaward (aguas adentro), as evidenced by what was pointed out by the proponent of said motion, when indicating:</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"Studying the original text, it seems to me that it meets the requirements of a law for this type of park protection, especially that it should have been marine because that is what is customary in this case; however, the marine aspect was not included. When defining the Park, it speaks of one hundred and twenty-five meters, with an imaginary line of one hundred and twenty-five meters from the ordinary high-water mark, and this must be understood as seaward, exactly what I think this motion clarifies" (...)</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Based on the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Judge considers that the boundaries of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, for the purposes of the specific analysis situation and which will be expanded upon in the following recital, must necessarily take into consideration coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, ending at coordinate point N 255,000 and E 335,050 provided for in the law creating said Marine Park, given the evident contradiction of these with the incorporated phrase "aguas adentro" (seaward). This last phrase evidently contradicts the scope of the referenced coordinates and the rest of the law's text - which refers to expropriations and properties on privately owned lands - but even more so, it openly confronts the objectives of the law - evident from a simple reading of the statement of motives - the public environmental interest, and the national and international legal system governing the matter. Given the above, and using the indicated interpretive criteria, it is considered that for the purposes of resolving the present proceeding, proof of the location of a property within the area of said coordinates is sufficient to determine its incorporation within the boundaries of the indicated Parque Nacional Marino. (...)</span></p><p style=\"margin:5.05pt 42.55pt 5.05pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">XI).- Determination whether the property of the Partido de Guanacaste, real folio number Placa11748, is located within the area corresponding to the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">: It has been duly demonstrated in the records that, although the property of the Partido de Guanacaste, real folio Placa11748, is evidently not located seaward (aguas adentro), it is indeed within the coordinates of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. In effect, it has been proven that the area to be expropriated lies between coordinates 255,000 N NIE38 (folio 7 of the administrative file, cadastral plan number 1042299-2005, see its location on it, situated at the bottom right corner of the plan). Said coordinates, by their location, are between coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000 and N 255,000 and E 335,050, indicated as boundaries of the referenced National Park. Likewise, based on said documentation, the Executive Secretariat of the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación certified on April 11, 2007, that the property corresponding to cadastral plan 1042299-20055 is located within the Parque Nacional Mario Las Baulas de Guanacaste, created by Decreto Ejecutivo N.20518-MIRENEM of 07-09-91 and regulated in Law N. 7524 of August 16, 1995 (folio 9 of the administrative file, respective certification). The plaintiff has not provided any evidence to refute the corresponding cadastral plan, regarding a location in different geographical coordinates or to demonstrate falsity in said document or in said certification. At most, what the plaintiff has provided is an expert report indicating that geographical coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050 are located in a land area that is part of an estuary or mangrove and that on the day of the respective evidentiary proceeding, it was flooded at 13:20, using as a reference a tree at 3.10 m, and an electric power pole at 26.72 m (folios 447 to 453 of the main file), but without demonstrating that the coordinates where the property real folio 86,044,000 is located are outside the boundary coordinates of the National Park under analysis. Given the above, applying the criterion of this Judge expressed in the preceding recital, that for delimitation purposes of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, the privately owned areas located in said geographical coordinates should not be overlooked, this Judge considers that for the purposes of resolving the present proceeding and to specifically examine the acts challenged by the plaintiff's claims, the property of the Partido de Guanacaste, real folio 86,044,000, is located within the coordinates of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. (...)". </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">This Tribunal considers that what was decided at the instance is in accordance with the law. It is observed that the plaintiff merely reiterates again an argument presented in the complaint, which does not constitute a true grievance, as it in no way attacks the judicial criterion nor provides new evidentiary or argumentative elements capable of modifying what was decided in the first instance, hence this aspect of the appeal is rejected. In addition to what was decided by the a quo, it is important to emphasize that the Constitutional Chamber defined the protection area for the Baulas turtles and established the park's parameter at 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark in the same sense as provided by Decreto Ejecutivo 20518-MIRENEM.</span></p> Vote number 2008-8713 of the aforementioned Chamber —likewise cited in the challenged judgment— is precise and categorical in establishing the boundaries of the park in the terms already indicated and the reasons that support the ruling:

“The Las Bualas (sic) de Guanacaste National Park has a very clear purpose: the protection of the leatherback turtle nesting area, which pursuant to Executive Decree No. Nombre72428 is necessary to ensure the perpetuity of the leatherback turtle colony (Dermochelys coriacea) and other natural resources, and of tourist and ecological activity, with respect to the nesting that occurs throughout the year. It calls the attention of this Chamber that the Park Creation Bill reiterates some criteria expressed by the Executive Decree, and the concern about hotel developments, since these will introduce lighting, waste, human traffic, outboard motor noise, music, discotheques, and automobiles that will come to destroy this natural habitat. Hence, a protection strip of two hundred meters from the ordinary high-water mark was initially proposed in the legislative process; however, **with Affirmative Opinion of Nombre20683, even though those same justifications are maintained, the protection strip is reduced to 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark, in the same sense as the aforementioned Executive Decree**. Since our country has internationally committed to observe the protection and ‘habitats of marine turtles,’ the unconstitutionality action must be declared with merit, and in accordance with the precautionary principle, as well as the binding nature of environmental regulations, the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone must likewise be included as a necessary protection area for the different marine turtles that use that area as part of the environment used by them during their life-cycle stages.” (Emphasis added, see among others votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the same Chamber).

The constitutional precedent cited above is binding, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); thus, the matter of the boundaries or parameters of Las Baulas National Park is clearly defined. That being so, the ruling of the court of first instance —in admitting the parameter of 125 meters from the ordinary high-water mark and verifying that the plaintiff’s property is located within that boundary— conforms to constitutional jurisprudence on the matter and must therefore be upheld.

&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;**b)** The next grievance refers to the alleged error of judicial interpretation regarding the expropriation mandate, since Law 7524 referred to specific lands (cerro El Morro and isla Verde), which do not include the plaintiff’s property. On this issue, the lower-court judge stated the following:

“(...) It is interesting to note for purposes of this resolution that the Constitutional Chamber imposes the duty to initiate expropriation proceedings for private properties located within Las Baulas Marine Park, which confirms the existence of the same and the duty of expropriation that arises from the respective law. Likewise, in Resolution 2008-018529 of 8:58 a.m. on December 16, 2008, of the same Chamber, the following orders were issued:

“a) They annul all environmental viability (viabilidades ambientales) granted on the properties located within Las Baulas Marine National Park, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) is ordered to immediately continue with the expropriation processes for such properties. (...).” The decision at first instance conforms to law. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber orders the Ministry of Environment and Energy to expropriate all private lands located within Las Baulas Park (see votes 2008-18529 and 2008-7549 of the indicated Chamber). Furthermore, it cannot be deduced from the text of Law 7524 that the expropriation of lands refers only to cerro El Morro and isla Verde, contrary to what was asserted by the dissatisfied party, and this is how the Constitutional Chamber understood it, indicating the following:

“(...) It is not in vain that through Article 2 of the Law Creating Las Baulas Marine National Park No. 7524 of July 10, 1995, the State is obliged to manage the expropriations of the lands located within the Park, since it is in the public interest that said lands be under State protection. Regarding the current status of these expropriations, the Minister of Environment and Energy reports that there were seventy-six properties, of which eighteen have already been expropriated and the remaining fifty-eight are in process, which is why, through vote 2008-007549 of 5:38 p.m. on April 30, 2008, this Chamber decided to order said Ministry to proceed immediately and expeditiously with the expropriation procedures, in order to stop causing further harm to the environment. (...)”.

Consequently, it having been accredited that the plaintiff’s property subject to expropriation is located within the boundaries of Las Baulas National Park and the plaintiff not providing other evidence that contradicts what has been established (Articles 317 of the Civil Procedure Code and 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativo)), the grievance must be dismissed as unfounded.

&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;**c)** Regarding the grievance related to the protection of the same zone by the Law Creating the Tamarindo National Wildlife Refuge (Reserva Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo) in Playa Grande, where her property is located, the court of first instance considered the following:

“(...) **XIII).- Other considerations of the plaintiff**: The representative of the plaintiff indicates that there is a national wildlife refuge that comprises the same public zone, under the same coordinates as Las Baulas Marine Park. In this regard, the challenged acts refer to the norm that creates the latter and to other norms that address the environmental issue, so what is stated in that respect does not vitiate the act with nullity. (...).”

This Court agrees with the criterion of the lower-court judge and considers it important to add that Law 7524 Creating Las Baulas National Park, in its Article 1, specifically includes the Tamarindo Wildlife Reserve zone.

"ARTICLE 1.- Creation and limits.

Las Baulas de Guanacaste Marine National Park is created, whose limits, according to the Villarreal and Matapalo cartographic sheets at a scale of 1:50,000 of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), shall be as follows: starting from a point located at coordinates N 259,100 and E 332,000, it follows a straight line until reaching an imaginary line parallel to the coast, distant one hundred twenty-five meters from the ordinary high-water mark into the water. Along this imaginary line, the boundary continues southeastward, until ending at the point of coordinates N 255,000 and E 335,050. The Park shall also encompass the Tamarindo estuaries (esteros Tamarindo), Ventanas and San Francisco and their mangroves; the hill located immediately behind Playa Ventanas, cerro El Morro, isla Capitán, isla Verde, the fifty-meter public zone, measured from the ordinary high-water mark, between punta San Francisco and the estero San Francisco and the territorial waters of Tamarindo Bay, encompassed between punta Conejo and the southern end of Playa Langosta, up to the ordinary high-water mark.” (Emphasis added).

Insofar as it concerns the case under study, it must be noted that the alleged “duplicity” of protection for the zone by means of separate laws regulating the same strip of land in no way affects the State’s ability to expropriate the plaintiff’s property for the sake of protecting the public interest. The matter has already been reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber and it determined that Las Baulas Marine National Park “is located within the Área de Conservación de Tempisque (ACT), entirely within the canton of Santa Cruz (...), it also constitutes an environmentally fragile area at least the 500-meter band adjacent to the Park’s limits (...)” (vote number 2008-18529). The indicated 500-meter band along the continental boundary has been designated as the buffer zone (zona de amortiguamiento) of Las Baulas Marine National Park and constitutes an environmentally fragile area: biological-terrestrial fragility, hydrological fragility, fragility due to urban development; also the Playa Grande sector is located within the mentioned Park and is considered one of extreme vulnerability (vote number 2008-18529). For the indicated reasons, the grievance presented by the plaintiff must be dismissed, as the impossibility of the State to expropriate within the Playa Grande zone has not been demonstrated.

&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;**d)** The plaintiff argues that Decree Nombre72428 was repealed by Law 7524, its effectiveness being subject to the expropriation of properties that was not carried out, and furthermore, it did not meet the requirements demanded by the Forest Law (Ley Forestal). The matter of the limits of Las Baulas National Park, which were initially set in Executive Decree 20518-MIRENEM, was reviewed in various votes of the Constitutional Chamber —the same ones cited by the court of first instance and reiterated in this judgment—, in which the conclusion is reached that the boundaries established by the aforementioned Decree must be maintained, and a reduction of the zone protected by Las Baulas Park is not admissible given the absence of technical or legal grounds for doing so (vote number 2008-8713). The other reproach points to non-compliance with the requirements of the Forest Law for the creation of the Park, which Decree 20518-MIRENEM omitted; this constitutes a new point that was not debated by the parties at the instance and that is also not related to the annulment claims advanced by the plaintiff, which prevents the issuance of a pronouncement under the protection of Article 24 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). For the reasons stated, the grievance raised is dismissed.

&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;**e)** The plaintiff states that the Ministry of Environment requested from the Procuraduría General de la República an interpretation of the law that only the Legislative Assembly can give, and that official communication C-444-2005 of the Procuraduría lacks expert criteria, that criterion being the basis of the expropriation procedure. The grievance must be dismissed for the following basic reasons: first, the cited criterion C-444-2005 was indeed challenged in this venue, but it was ruled inadmissible for the reasons indicated in Considerando IV, section 1) of this judgment, for lacking legal effects on the plaintiff, and it was so resolved at the instance. Second, upon reviewing executive decree number 33707-MINAE, through which the plaintiff’s property is declared of public interest and the initiation of the partial expropriation procedure is ordered, it is observed that within the grounds cited to support such administrative action, criterion C-444-2005 of the Procuraduría General de la República is not included. On the contrary, the cited conduct of the Public Administration is oriented toward compliance with the Law and constitutional jurisprudence; therefore, the plaintiff’s grievance is dismissed.

**V.- ON COSTS (COSTAS).** The plaintiff requests in her appeal that the State be ordered to pay costs (costas). **The grievance is received and upheld**. Article 221, first paragraph of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter by its acronym CPC) —supplementary by dispensation of numeral 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa)— establishes the general rule that the losing party must assume payment of both personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), by the mere fact of being the losing party, without this implying that there was bad faith or recklessness in bringing the action. The exception to that rule is the exemption from payment, which can only be granted when it is verified —in a reasoned manner— that one of the grounds for exoneration provided for in numeral 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) or in Article 222 of the cited CPC is present. In the present case, this Panel considers that we are indeed in the presence of the indicated conditions, since the justification for exonerating the losing plaintiff from the payment of both types of costs derives from the nature of the matter debated here, in which the fundamental right of private property was questioned in light of the public interest of protecting the environment and especially the leatherback turtles, which warranted the legal analysis of the text of Law 7524 with respect to the limits of Las Baulas National Park and led the Public Administration to request the legal opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República. All of which, in the judgment of this Court, provided the plaintiff sufficient reason to litigate, and such a scenario falls within the legal grounds that allow exemption from costs (costas). Consequently, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, only with respect to the order to pay costs, in order to exonerate the losing party from their payment.

**VI. COROLLARY.** In accordance with the arguments outlined in the preceding recitals and regarding what has been the object of appeal, the appealed judgment is hereby upheld in all other respects distinct from costs.

**POR TANTO**:

The evidence for better resolution offered by the plaintiff is rejected. It is **partially reversed**, only as to the order to pay costs, to exonerate the losing party from their payment. In all other respects, the challenged judgment is upheld.

</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">NOTIFY.-</span> Name15131 .

Name5243 JUDITH REYES CASTILLO

Proceso: Ordinario Actor: Shang Gi La de Santa Ana S.A.

Demandado: El Estado VOTO No. 02-2011-SII TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEGUNDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, a las dieciséis horas del veintiocho de enero del dos mil once.- Se conoce recurso de apelación presentado por la parte actora dentro del proceso ordinario interpuesto por SHANG GI LA DE SANTA ANA S.A., cédula jurídica CED53650, representada por su apoderado especial judicial el licenciado Gonzalo Alberto Garzona Meseguer, mayor, soltero, abogado, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad número CED53651 (folio 1); contra EL ESTADO, representado por la licenciada Gloria Solano Martínez, mayor, abogada, en su condición de procuradora adjunta (folio 53) y demás calidades ignoradas.

RESULTANDO

1.- Que fijada la cuantía del presente asunto como inestimable (folio 439), la demanda es para que en sentencia se declaren con lugar las siguientes pretensiones de la parte actora: " (...) pido que en sentencia sean declarados absolutamente nulos e inaplicables por violatorios al ordenamiento jurídico los actos administrativos impugnados, que son: / 1.- La opinión vinculante de la Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 del 23 de diciembre de 2005. / 2.- El decreto ejecutivo 33.707-MINAE-2007 que declara de interés publico (sic) la expropiación parcial de ese terreno propiedad de mi representada, / 3.- La resolución sin fecha dictada por el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía que le dio curso al proceso administrativo de expropiación parcial de la finca de mi representada inscrita en el Partido de Guanacaste al folio real matrícula Placa11748, a todo lo actuado en ese proceso, a fin de que en sentencia se declaren nulos absolutamente esos actos por se (sic) contrarios a la Ley y a las potestades publicas (sic) atribuidas a los entes públicos que las emitieron, por estar sustentadas en consideraciones erróneas y todos aquellos actos que deriven de los mismos y se suspenda todo tramite (sic) de expropiación de la finca de mi representada. / 4.- Pido asimismo se condene al Estado al pago de las costas personales y procesales." (Folios 73 a 86 de los autos).

2.- La representación estatal contestó negativamente la acción oponiendo las excepciones de inadmisibilidad de la acción por defectos formales que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo, inadmisibilidad de la acción por actos no susceptibles de impugnación y la falta de derecho (folios 401 al 422).

3.- El juez de primera instancia, Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo, en la sentencia Nº 2071-2010 de las trece horas del veinte de julio de dos mil diez dispuso: "Por tanto: Se rechaza la defensa de inadmisibilidad por defectos formales que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo. Se acoge la defensa de Inadmisibilidad por tratarse de actos no susceptibles de impugnación únicamente con respecto al criterio de la Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 del 23 de diciembre de 2005 y en consecuencia se declara inadmisible la pretensión número uno de la demanda. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho con respecto a las demás pretensiones. En consecuencia se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Son las costas procesales y personales a cargo de la parte actora, junto con sus respectivos intereses." (Folios 511 a 538).

4.- Que inconforme con lo resuelto en primera instancia, la parte actora presentó recurso de apelación (folio 540 a 556, 583 a 608 del expediente judicial), que fue admitido para su conocimiento ante este Tribunal (folio 558 ibídem).

5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley y no se notan causales de nulidad capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Esta sentencia se dicta previo las deliberaciones de rigor.

Redacta la Jueza REYES CASTILLO;

CONSIDERANDO:

I. EN CUANTO A LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER OFRECIDA

Solicita el apelante se admita como prueba para mejor resolver certificación de piezas que corresponden a uno de los cuatro documentos que se encuentran en la Sala Constitucional, fechados 30 de setiembre de 2009 y 11 de noviembre de 2009, expediente número 07-005611-0007-CO, que son: la resolución número 998-2008-SETENA del 28 de abril de 2008 y oficio 04-459 del Instituto Geográfico Nacional del 22 de setiembre de 2004 y oficios del SINAC del 25 de agosto de 2010, por ser documentos nuevos que no se conocían al momento de interponer la acción. También solicita se realice un reconocimiento judicial en Playa Grande a fin de comprobar la existencia de vegetación frente a la finca de mi representada (y de todos los terrenos de Playa Grande), así como el área de anidación de las tortugas Baulas y las condiciones en que se encuentra actualmente Playa Grande (folios 607 y 608 del expediente principal). Por las razones que se dirán, la solicitud del apelante debe ser rechazada. Según las disposiciones contenidas en el ordinal 331 en concordancia con el numeral 97 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Civil, y con sustento en la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (entre otras la número 29 de las 15:30 horas del veintidós de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco), la admisión o rechazo de la prueba para mejor resolver constituye una facultad discrecional del juzgador y es procedente en aquellos casos en que considere que la misma es de influencia decisiva en el resultado del proceso y complemento de las probanzas ofrecidas por los litigantes, sin que busque subsanar su omisión. La admisión de este tipo de prueba es de carácter facultativo o discrecional del Despacho, no pudiendo ser exigida por las partes; su ordenación depende, enteramente, de la iniciativa, prudente arbitrio y criterio del órgano jurisdiccional, por lo que su denegatoria no causa indefensión, ni quebranta el principio de tutela judicial efectiva. En la especie, conforme a las razones que se dirán, la prueba ofrecida por el apelante para mejor resolver no sería de influencia decisiva en el resultado del proceso, por lo que se deniega su admisión.

II.- HECHOS PROBADOS Y NO PROBADOS: Se aprueba el elenco de hechos demostrados e indemostrados que contiene la sentencia en estudio, por ser fiel reflejo del material probatorio incorporado al proceso.

III.- CUESTIÓN PRELIMINAR. En el voto Nº 39-2010-SVII de las 14:00 horas del 29 de abril de 2010 dictado por la Sección Sétima de éste Tribunal -entre otros-, se ha considerado necesario aclarar a las partes el contenido del recurso de apelación en materia contencioso-administrativa, indicando que: "El artículo 574 del Código Procesal Civil dispone que, en el acto de comparecer ante el superior, el apelante debe expresar agravios contra la resolución cuestionada. “Expresar agravios” significa poner de manifiesto los aspectos de la sentencia recurrida que aquél considera adversos a sus intereses, contrarios a derecho o al mérito de los autos. Por ende, el sentido de dicho alegato no es, en rigor, combatir los argumentos de la contraparte (pues eso ya se hizo en instancia), sino combatir los argumentos de la sentencia; es decir, los del a quo. Su importancia es tal que, como lo ha insistido la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (véase nuevamente la ya citada resolución número 195-02), delimita la competencia del tribunal de alzada, estableciendo aquellos aspectos sobre los cuales puede (y, por exclusión, no puede) verter pronunciamiento. En consecuencia, es exclusivamente desde esta óptica que se examinará lo manifestado en el recurso, haciendo a un lado cualquier otra alegación que no constituya un señalamiento claro y razonado contra lo resuelto (como sucedería, por ejemplo, en aquellos casos en que el recurrente se limite a reproducir cuestiones ya debatidas en instancia, sin explicar por qué considera que el análisis que de ellas se haya hecho en el fallo sea erróneo o carente de fundamento fáctico o jurídico)." Lo anterior resulta de plena aplicación a la apelación interpuesta por la parte actora contra la sentencia de primera instancia dictada en esta litis. De seguido se analizarán los agravios presentados, de conformidad con las reglas antes explicadas.- IV.- SOBRE LA APELACIÓN DE LA PARTE ACTORA: La parte actora presenta recurso de apelación contra la sentencia de primera instancia con fundamento en los siguientes agravios:

• 1)En el primer motivo de agravio relacionado con la inadmisibilidad de la acción contra la opinión vinculante 444-2005 de la Procuraduría General de la República, señala que la sentencia declara la inadmisibilidad con fundamento en los artículos 18 y 60 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, porque según el razonamiento del juez, se trata de un acto preparatorio que no admite ser recurrido. Sin embargo, contrario a la opinión del juzgador estima que el criterio es vinculante y es en sí mismo un acto definitivo que pone fin a la controversia que le fue planteada al Procurador y lejos de ser un simple acto preparatorio, se torna en un acto final que es de obligatorio acatamiento para toda la Administración Pública, independientemente del proceso en que se pretenda utilizarlo. Manifiesta que es con fundamento en el aludido criterio, que se procede a la expropiación de la finca de su propiedad, porque en el indicado criterio, se consideró que forma parte del Parque Marino Las Baulas creado por Ley número 7524, de ahí que no se trata de un acto preparatorio. Argumenta, que es evidente el vínculo entre el criterio C-444-2005 con la expropiación, porque se convirtió en una reforma de ley, cuya potestad constitucional le corresponde únicamente a la Asamblea Legislativa. Solicita se revoque la resolución recurrida y se entre a analizar el fondo del proceso respecto a la opinión C-444-2005, por tratarse de un acto final en otro procedimiento que afecta directamente los demás actos cuya nulidad se solicita declarar (folios 540 a 541, 583 a 590 del expediente judicial). El agravio no es de recibo y se rechaza. En efecto, la sentencia impugnada resuelve el punto objeto de agravio e indica que:

"(...) VI).- Sobre la defensa de Inadmisibilidad por tratarse de actos no susceptibles de impugnación: La representación del Estado objeta que la opinión vinculante de la Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 del 23 de diciembre de 2005 y la resolución sin fecha dictada por el Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía que le dio curso al proceso administrativo de expropiación, son actos de mero trámite y no causan estado. Con respecto a este tema, es criterio de este Juzgador, que ante todo debe tomarse en consideración lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, en tanto establece lo siguiente:

"Artículo 18.- 1. La acción será admisible en relación con las disposiciones y actos de la Administración, ya sean definitivos o de trámite; y en cuanto a estos últimos, si deciden directa o indirectamente el fondo del asunto, de tal modo que pongan término a aquella vía o hagan imposible o suspendan su continuación" De conformidad con lo anterior, no es cualquier acto el que puede fundar en una pretensión de nulidad en esta sede, habida cuenta que el ordenamiento lo restringe a actos definitivos o de trámite cuando éste decida el fondo de lo planteado. (...)

De conformidad con el anterior análisis, en el caso del acto contenido en la opinión vinculante de la Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 del 23 de diciembre de 2005, se advierte que ésta no es un acto definitivo ni de trámite con efectos propios, en tanto que es una opinión jurídica que no posee efectos jurídicos propios ni corresponde a la manifestación final de la Administración Pública, en tanto que puede contribuir a ésta, mas no corresponde a ésta como tal. En este orden de ideas, el acto objetado fue emitido al amparo del artículo 4 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República en tanto dispone:

"ARTÍCULO 4º.—CONSULTAS: Los órganos de la Administración Pública, por medio de los jerarcas de los diferentes niveles administrativos, podrán consultar el criterio técnico-jurídico de la Procuraduría; en cada caso, deberán acompañar la opinión de la asesoría legal respectiva, salvo el caso de los auditores internos, quienes podrán realizar la consulta directamente" En tanto que criterio jurídico sin capacidad por si mismo para tener efecto para con terceros, habida cuenta que sólo los tendrá en virtud del acto concreto de la Administración que lo acoja y lo aplique, la opinión vinculante de la Procuraduría General de la República C-444-2005 del 23 de diciembre de 2005 no se encuentra dentro de los supuestos del artículo 18 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, por lo que debe declararse la inadmisibilidad de la demanda con respecto a este acto, en aplicación del artículo 60 de dicho cuerpo normativo, en tanto dispone:

" Se declarará la inadmisibilidad de la acción en los casos siguientes:

....c) Que tuviere por objeto actos no susceptibles de impugnación, a tenor del artículo 21" (...)". (Énfasis añadido).

Quedó plenamente demostrado que la Procuraduría General de la República emitió el criterio C-444-2005 que da respuesta a una consulta planteada por el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía. No obstante, la decisión que produjo los efectos sobre la parte actora fue el Decreto Ejecutivo Número 33707-MINAE, adoptado por el -entonces- Presidente de la República y el Ministro del Ambiente y Energía. De lo anterior, queda claro que no son admisibles los argumentos de la parte actora que se refieren a la obligatoriedad del criterio o que el mismo resuelve un problema planteado por la Administración ante la Procuraduría, ya que la opinión del citado órgano asesor no produce efectos contra el aquí accionante, ni se trata de un acto de carácter general que deba cumplir el particular (artículo 10 inciso 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Además, tales alegaciones son una mera reiteración de lo expuesto en la demanda, pero no se incluye ningún reproche contra los fundamentos del fallo de instancia, de ahí que no constituyan un verdadero agravio. La parte actora tampoco ha logrado demostrar en su discurso argumentativo, la existencia de un interés legítimo o derecho subjetivo derivado directamente del indicado criterio consultivo, aspecto esencial para admitir la impugnación del acto conforme lo expresan los numerales 10 y 18 de la citada Ley Reguladora. En consecuencia, lo único procedente es rechazar el agravio planteado por las indicadas razones.

• 2)En el segundo motivo de agravio, expresa el actor que el juez entra a conocer una antinomia que no existe, que deriva de la aprobación unánime de la moción legalmente introducida por el diputado Nombre72427 , donde expresamente se introdujo la frase “aguas adentro” modificando el proyecto original donde se leía “tierra adentro”. Estima que el juzgador en su afán de solucionar una antinomia que no existe, hace una incorrecta valoración de lo que realmente establece la Ley de Creación del Parque Baulas, siendo que no existe ninguna contradicción. Argumenta que la sentencia contiene un error de apreciación de la ley, por confundir la orden específica de expropiar terrenos (puntualmente el cerro El Morro y la isla Verde) que no incluye la propiedad de la actora. Los límites del parque se expresan en coordenadas en el artículo primero de la Ley y no incluyen ninguna finca privada como lo indica de manera incorrecta la sentencia, salvo las ya mencionadas. Dice que no debe obviarse, que el legislador era consciente que ya se había creado el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo que abarca la zona pública de Playa Grande, sitio de desove de las tortugas Baulas y otras. Aclara que el decreto ejecutivo Nombre72428 fue derogado por la Ley 7524 que estableció los límites del parque, cuya eficacia se supeditó a la adquisición de las propiedades comprendidas en la demarcación del indicado decreto, sin embargo ninguna fue expropiada, por ende no era eficaz. Además, mediante Ley 7149 se creó el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, comprendiendo la zona conocida como Playa Grande, precisamente donde se encuentra la finca de la actora. Alega que cuando se emitió el Decreto Ejecutivo 20.518 MIRENEM no se cumplió con los requisitos establecidos por la Ley Forestal para crear un parque nacional, concretamente no se hizo el estudio preliminar de la tenencia de la tierra, el censo de poblaciones, no se hicieron los planos, no se dotó del contenido presupuestario mínimo para su protección y manejo. Señala que la Ley 7524 delimitó en sentido estricto el área del Parque Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste, partiendo de la falta de eficacia del decreto y estableció que se trataba de un parque marino que iniciaba ciento veinticinco metros adentro de la pleamar ordinaria, no se trató de un error legislativo, lo que se prueba en el expediente legislativo que contiene la moción presentada por uno de los diputados. Estima que no hay ninguna duda en cuanto a la intención del legislador y que estaban claros que ya existía una zona de refugio que protegía el desove de las tortugas y que lo que no se había aprobado era la protección de las tortugas en el océano y esa fue su intención, lo que no admite interpretación. Reitera que el supuesto error en que se dice incurrió el legislador no es tal, pues existe una ley que protege la playa en donde desovan las tortugas, que ha sido respetada por todos los vecinos que de forma voluntaria han restringido los efectos que la luz blanca causa a esos quelonios. Considera que el principio de in dubio pro natura y todos los principios preventivos y precautorios en materia de protección ambiental se encontraban debidamente protegidos, al estar la Playa Grande incluida dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, sin que sea correcto interpretar que existe peligro ambiental y ausencia de protección, como lo hace el juez. Argumenta que el anterior ministro de ambiente, Nombre72429 solicitó a la Procuraduría General de la República que realizara una interpretación de la Ley, acto reservado por la Constitución Política al Poder Legislativo. La Procuraduría mediante el oficio OJ-015-2004 de 10 de febrero de 2004 dio su opinión no vinculante en el sentido que existe un posible error de redacción de la Ley 7524 de Creación del Parque Marino Las Baulas. Apunta que en las actas de la discusión de la Ley 7524 de la Asamblea Legislativa, se desprende que no fue un error la expresión “aguas adentro”, pues se derivó de una moción presentada por el diputado Ingeniero Nombre72427 , que fue aprobada por la totalidad de los diputados presentes en la Comisión Plena Tercera y así lo decidieron, sin que pueda admitirse otra interpretación. Describe que posteriormente y a solicitud del mismo ministro, la Procuraduría se refiere al tema con el oficio C-444-2005 de 24 de setiembre de 2005 con carácter vinculante, en el que se reitera el oficio OJ-015-2004, sustentado en que las coordenadas N 255.000 y E 335.000 se encuentran ubicadas en tierra, sin que exista ninguna valoración pericial o científica que así lo acredite. Afirma que como fue demostrado en autos mediante criterio pericial emitido por el ingeniero Nombre40730 el punto antes indicado está cubierto por el agua, lo que en definitiva demuestra que no está en tierra firme, contrario a lo expresado por el señor Procurador. Considera que la interpretación que se hace en la sentencia recurrida y en el pronunciamiento C-444-2005 no es ajustada a la ley, pues parte del supuesto que las coordenadas que se indican en la Ley son los límites del parque, “cuando lo cierto es que las coordenadas sirven de punto específico de partida de la línea recta hasta alcanzar los 125 metros de agua adentro, pues es a partir de 125 (sic) aguas adentro que se traza una línea paralela a la costa, que inicia ciento veinticinco metros aguas adentro de las coordenadas N 259.100 y E 322.000 y finaliza ciento veinticinco metros aguas de las coordenadas N 255.000 y E 335.050, pues esas mismas coordenadas son las que conforman el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo, que abarca, como ya antes dije la zona pública de Playa Grande”. Opina que no es aplicable el principio pro natura, porque existe una Ley que creó el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo que abarca el área de anidación de las tortugas, siendo que las demás áreas protegidas en la Ley 7524, en particular los manglares y esteros tienen protección estatal reconocida, siendo que las especies animales y vegetales que habitan en esos terrenos se encuentran debidamente salvaguardados desde el punto de vista legal. Aclara, que el legislador no señaló las coordenadas tierra adentro como se pretende señalar, sino que indicó un punto particular a partir del cual se debe realizar la medición, siempre entendido que no puede hacerse mediante una línea recta, sino mediante una paralela a la costa, partiendo de las coordenadas básicas. Considera que modificar de esa forma ilegal los límites del Parque ha creado una situación de zozobra entre los propietarios, pero más aún, excede lo que el legislador pretendía y excede lo que técnicamente es necesario para proteger a las tortugas en su desove y proceso reproductivo que se da en tierra. Indica que las tortugas no sobrepasan los 50 metros de zona pública pues ellas necesitan crear sus nidos en arena, libre de plantas y raíces que obstaculicen su labor de desove y que voluntariamente ha realizado labores en protección de las tortugas eliminando luces y creando barreras para que ni el sonido ni las luces afecten el proceso de desove (folios 541 a 556, 590 a 608 del expediente judicial). Los agravios no son de recibo y se rechazan. De seguido se analizan en orden cada uno de los agravios expuestos.
• a)Respecto a los límites del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas y a los argumentos del apelante que se refieren a la inexistencia de una antinomia de la ley 7524 por la aprobación de una moción legislativa, el juez de instancia resolvió:

"(...) No obstante lo anterior, no puede obviarse otra particularidad de la ley, cual es que el entonces Diputado a la Asamblea Legislativa, Nombre72427 presentó durante el trámite de aprobación del proyecto de ley, una moción tendiente a agregar despues (sic) de la frase 125 metros de la pleamar ordinaria, las palabras "aguas adentro". Dicha moción fue aprobada (folio 227 del expediente principal, acta de sesión 004 de Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena tercera, intervención del diputado, folio 90, 91 nota suscrita por el referido ex diputado). Como queda claro de la intervención y manifestaciones del Dip. Nombre72427 el propósito de la moción planteada fue dar un carácter exclusivamente marino al parque. No obstante, para este Juzgador es de notar que si bien las palabras "aguas adentro" fueron incorporadas en el texto definitivo de la ley - al acogerse la moción- el resto del texto de la ley mantiene una contradicción evidente con dichas palabras. Lo anterior, en tanto que como ya se ha dicho, tanto las coordenadas citadas, como la expresa mención de la ley a eventuales expropiaciones, abre la posibilidad de que se incluya terrenos privados incorporados dentro del ámbito de las coordenadas dichas. (...)

(...) Es claro entonces que el propio texto de la ley de análisis contiene una contradicción originada en la moción de Nombre72427 . Por una parte, señala coordenadas geográficas que comprenden áreas en inmuebles de dominio privado - reforzado por la previsión de realizar eventuales expropiaciones, y por otra la moción se encuentra orientada a que el parque sea aguas adentro, así se evidencia de lo señalado por el proponente de dicha moción, al indicar:

"Estudiando el texto original, me parece que si cumple con los requisitos de una ley para este tipo de protección de parques, especialmente que debía haber sido marino porque es lo que se estila en este caso; sin embargo no se le puso lo de marino. Al definir el Parque, se habla de ciento veinticinco metros, con una línea inmaginaria (sic) de ciento veinticinco metros de la pleamar ordinaria y esto debe entenderse mar adentro, exactamente lo que pienso que con esta moción se aclara" (...)

Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, estima el suscrito Juzgador que los límites del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, para efectos de la situación de análisis concreto y que en el considerando siguiente se profundizará, deben tomar en consideración necesariamente las coordenadas N 259.100 y E 332.000, hasta terminar en el punto de coordenadas N 255.000 y E 335.050 previstas en la ley de creación de dicho Parque Marino, habida cuenta de la evidente contradicción de éstas con la frase incorporada "aguas adentro". Esta última frase evidentemente resulta contradictoria con los alcances de las referidas coordenas (sic) y con el resto del texto de la ley - que hace referencia a expropiaciones e inmuebles en tierras de dominio privado-, pero más aún, se enfrenta abiertamente con los objetivos de la ley - evidentes a una simple lectura de la exposición de motivos-, el interés público ambiental y el ordenamiento jurídico nacional e internacional que rige la materia. Dado lo anterior, y haciendo uso de los criterios interpretativos indicados, es que se estima que para efectos de la resolución de presente proceso, la prueba de la ubicación de un inmueble dentro del área de las coordenadas dichas, es suficiente para determinar su incorporación dentro de los límites del indicado Parque Nacional Marino. (...)

XI).- Determinación si la finca del Partido de Guanacaste folio real matrícula Placa11748 se encuentra dentro del área correspondiente al Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas de Guanacaste: En autos ha quedado debidamente demostrado que si bien, la finca del Partido de Guanacaste folio real Placa11748 evidentemente no queda aguas adentro, sí se encuentra dentro de las coordenadas del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. En efecto se tiene por probado que el área a expropiar se encuentra entre las coordenadas 255.000 N NIE38 (folio 7 del expediente administrativo, plano catastrado número 1042299-2005, ver ubicación en él, situado en el extremo inferior derecho del plano). Dichas coordenadas, por su ubicación, se encuentran entre las coordenadas N 259.100 y E 332.000 y N 255.000 y E 335.050, señaladas como límites del referido Parque Nacional. Asimismo, con base en dicha documentación, la Secretaría Ejecutiva del Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación certificó el 11 de abril de 2007 que la finca correspondiente al plano de catastro 1042299-20055 se ubica dentro del Parque Nacional Mario Las Baulas de Guanacaste, creado según decreto ejecutivo N.20518-MIRENEM del 09-07-91 y regulado en Ley N. 7524 de 16 de agosto de 1995 (folio 9 del expediente administrativo, certificación respectiva). No ha aportado la parte actora prueba alguna que desvirtue el correspondiente plano de catastro, en cuanto a una ubicación en coordenadas geográficas diferentes o que demuestre falsedad en dicho documento o en la certificación dicha. A lo sumo, la parte actora lo que ha aportado es informe experto que señala que las coordenadas geográficas N 255.000 y E 335.050 se encuentra en una zona de terreno que forma parte de estero o manglar y que en el día de la prueba respectiva, quedó anegada de agua a las 13:20, usandose (sic) como referencia un árbol a 3.10, y un poste de corriente eléctrica a 26.72 m (folios 447 a 453 del expediente principal, mas sin demostrar que las coordenadas en donde está ubicada la finca folio real 86.044.000, se encuentre fuera de las coordenadas límites del Parque Nacional de análisis. Dado lo anterior, aplicando el criterio de este Juzgador expresado en el considerando anterior, con respecto a que para efectos de delimitación del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas no debe obviarse las áreas en dominio privado ubicadas en las coordenadas geográficas dichas, estima este Juzgador que para efectos de resolución del presente proceso y para entrar a conocer específicamente los actos objetados por las pretensiones de la parte actora, la finca del Partido de Guanacaste folio real 86.044.000 se encuentra dentro de las coordenadas del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. (...)".

Estima este Tribunal que lo resuelto en instancia se ajusta a derecho. Se observa que el actor se limita nuevamente a reiterar un argumento presentado en la demanda, lo que no constituye un verdadero agravio, ya que en nada ataca el criterio judicial ni aporta nuevos elementos probatorios o argumentativos capaces de modificar lo resuelto en primera instancia, de ahí que se rechace este extremo de la apelación. En adición a lo resuelto por el a quo, es importante acentuar que la Sala Constitucional definió el área de protección de las tortugas Baulas y estableció el parámetro del parque en 125 metros de la pleamar ordinaria en el mismo sentido que lo disponía el Decreto Ejecutivo 20518-MIRENEM. El voto número 2008-8713 de la referida Sala -igualmente citado en la sentencia impugnada- es preciso y contundente al establecer los linderos del parque en los términos ya indicados y las razones que fundamentan el fallo:

“El Parque Nacional Las Bualas (sic) de Guanacaste tiene una finalidad muy clara: la protección del área de desove de la Tortuga Baula, que conforme al Decreto Ejecutivo No. Nombre72428 se hace necesario para asegurar la perpetuidad de la colonia de la tortuga baula (Dermochelys coriacea) y otros recursos naturales, de la actividad turística y ecológica, respecto de la nidificación que se da durante todo el año. Llama a la atención de esta Sala que el proyecto de Ley de Creación del Parque reitera algunos criterios expresados por el Decreto Ejecutivo, y la preocupación por desarrollos hoteleros, pues con ello se implantará la iluminación, desechos, tránsito de personas, ruido de motores fuera de borda, música, discotecas y automóviles que vendrá a destruir este habitat natural. De ahí que se propuso inicialmente en el trámite legislativo una franja de protección de doscientos metros desde la pleamar ordinaria, sin embargo con el Dictamen Afirmativo de Nombre20683, aún cuando se mantienen esas mismas justificaciones, reduce la franja de protección a 125 metros de la pleamar ordinaria, en el mismo sentido que lo hace el Decreto Ejecutivo mencionado. Como nuestro país se ha comprometido internacionalmente a observar la protección y “hábitats de tortugas marinas” la acción de inconstitucionalidad debe declararse con lugar, y conforme al principio precautorio, así como el de vinculatoriedad de la normativa ambiental, la Zona Marítimo Terrestre igualmente debe incluirse como área de protección necesaria para las diferentes tortugas marinas que utilizan esa área como parte del ambiente utilizado por ellas durante sus etapas de su ciclo de vida”. (Énfasis añadido, entre otros véase los votos 2008-18529 y 2008-7549 de la misma Sala).

El precedente constitucional arriba indicado es vinculante, de conformidad con el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de esa manera el tema de los linderos o parámetros del Parque Nacional Las Baulas se encuentra claramente definido. Ahora bien, lo resuelto por el a quo -en cuanto admite el parámetro de los 125 metros de la pleamar ordinaria y comprueba que la finca de la actora se localiza dentro ese lindero- se ajusta a la jurisprudencia constitucional en la materia y por ende debe ser confirmado.

• b)El siguiente agravio, que hace referencia al supuesto error de interpretación judicial respecto al mandato de expropiar, ya que la Ley 7524 se refería a unos terrenos específicos (cerro El Morro y la isla Verde), en los que no se incluye la propiedad de la actora. Sobre el tema, el juzgador de instancia señaló lo siguiente:

“(...) Es interesante señalar para efectos de esta resolución que la Sala Constitucional impone el deber de iniciar los procedimientos de expropiación en los fundos privados ubicados en el Parque Marino Las Baulas, con lo que se confirma la existencia de los mismos y el deber de expropiación que surge de la respectiva ley. Asimismo, en Resolución 2008-018529 de las 8:58 horas del 16 de diciembre de 2008 de la misma Sala se emitieron las siguientes órdenes:

“a) Anulan todas las viabilidades ambientales otorgadas en las propiedades ubicadas dentro del Parque Nacional Marino la Baulas, y se ordena al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía continuar de inmediato con los procesos de expropiación de tales propiedades. (...)”.

Lo resuelto en primera instancia se ajusta a derecho. Efectivamente, la Sala Constitucional ordena al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía a expropiar todas los terrenos privados que se ubican dentro del parque Las Baulas (ver votos 2008-18529 y 2008-7549 de la indicada Sala). Por otro lado, del texto de la Ley 7524 no se logra deducir que la expropiación de terrenos se refiera únicamente al cerro El Morro y la isla Verde contrariamente a lo afirmado por el disconforme, y así lo entendió la Sala Constitucional al indicar lo siguiente:

“(...) No en vano es que mediante el artículo 2 de la Ley de creación del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas no.7524 del 10 de julio de 1995 se obliga al Estado a gestionar las expropiaciones de los terrenos ubicados dentro del Parque, pues es de interés público que dichos terrenos estén bajo la protección estatal. Respecto del estado actual de estas expropiaciones, el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía informa que existían setenta y seis propiedades, de las cuales ya dieciocho fueron expropiadas y las cincuenta y ocho restantes están en proceso, razón por la cual mediante el voto 2008-007549 de las 17:38 horas del 30 de abril del 2008 esta Sala resolvió ordenar a dicho Ministerio proceder de inmediato y de forma célere con los trámites de expropiación, a efectos de no seguir produciendo mayores daños al ambiente. (...)”.

En consecuencia, habiéndose acreditado que la propiedad de la actora objeto de expropiación se ubica dentro de los linderos del Parque Nacional Las Baulas y no aportando la accionante otra prueba que contradiga lo establecido (artículos 317 del Código Procesal Civil y 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativo), el agravio debe ser rechazado por improcedente.

• c)Sobre el agravio relacionado con la protección de la misma zona por la Ley de Creación de la Reserva Nacional de Vida Silvestre Tamarindo en Playa Grande, donde se ubica la finca de su propiedad, el a quo consideró lo siguiente:

“(...) XIII).- Otras consideraciones de la parte actora: El representante de la parte actora indica que existe un refugio nacional de vida silvestre que comprende la misma zona pública, bajo las mismas coordenadas que el parque marino Las Baulas. Al respecto, los actos objetados lo que hacen referencia es a la norma que crea este último y a otras normas que tratan el tema ambiental, por lo que lo indicado al respecto no vicia de nulidad del acto. (...)”.

Este Tribunal coincide con el criterio del juzgador de primera instancia y estima importante adicionar que la Ley 7524 de Creación del Parque Nacional Las Baulas, en su artículo 1 específicamente incluye la zona de la Reserva Silvestre de Tamarindo.

"ARTICULO 1.- Creación y límites.

Se crea el Parque Nacional Marino las Baulas de Guanacaste, cuyos límites, según las hojas cartográficas Villarreal y Matapalo escala 1:50.000 del Instituto Geográfico Nacional, serán los siguientes: partiendo de un punto ubicado en las coordenadas N 259.100 y E 332.000, sigue por una línea recta hasta alcanzar una línea imaginaria paralela a la costa, distante ciento veinticinco metros de la pleamar ordinaria aguas adentro. Por esta línea imaginaria, continúa el límite con dirección sureste, hasta terminar en el punto de coordenadas N 255.000 y E 335.050. El Parque también abarcará los esteros Tamarindo, Ventanas y San Francisco y sus manglares; el cerro localizado inmediatamente detrás de playa Ventanas, el cerro El Morro, la isla Capitán, la isla Verde, la zona pública de cincuenta metros, medida desde la pleamar ordinaria, entre la punta San Francisco y el estero San Francisco y las aguas territoriales de la bahía Tamarindo, comprendidas entre punta Conejo y el extremo sur de playa Langosta, hasta la línea de pleamar ordinaria.” (Énfasis añadido).

En lo que al caso bajo estudio interesa, ha de indicarse que la supuesta “duplicidad” de protección de la zona mediante sendas leyes que regulan la misma franja de terreno, en nada afecta la posibilidad del Estado de expropiar la finca de la actora en aras de proteger el interés público. El tema ya ha sido revisado por la Sala Constitucional y determinó que el Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas “está ubicado dentro del Área de Conservación de Tempisque (ACT), en su totalidad dentro del cantón de Santa Cruz (...), constituye además un área frágil ambiental por lo menos la banda de 500 metros colindante con los límites del Parque (...)” (voto número 2008-18529). La indicada banda de 500 metros a lo largo del límite continental ha sido denominada como la zona de amortiguamiento del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas y constituye un área ambientalmente frágil: fragilidad biológica-terrestre, fragilidad hídrica, fragilidad por desarrollo urbano, también el sector de Playa Grande se ubica en el mencionado Parque y es considerado como de vulnerabilidad extrema (voto número 2008-18529). Por las indicadas razones, el agravio presentado por el actor debe ser rechazado al no demostrarse la imposibilidad del Estado de expropiar dentro de la zona de Playa Grande.

• d)Argumenta el actor que el Decreto Nombre72428 fue derogado por Ley 7524, siendo que su eficacia estaba sujeta a la expropiación de fincas que no se hizo y además, no cumplió con los requisitos exigidos por la Ley Forestal. El tema de los límites del Parque Nacional Las Baulas que fueron inicialmente fijados en el Decreto Ejecutivo 20518-MIRENEM, se revisó en diversos votos de la Sala Constitucional -mismos que cita el a quo y que se reiteran en este fallo-, en los que se llega a la conclusión de que los linderos establecidos por el referido Decreto deben mantenerse, sin que sea admisible la reducción de la zona protegida por el Parque Las Baulas ante la inexistencia de fundamentos técnicos o jurídicos para ello (voto número 2008-8713). El otro reproche señala el incumplimiento de requisitos de la Ley Forestal para la creación del Parque que omitió el Decreto 20518-MIRENEM, constituye un extremo nuevo que no fue debatido por las partes en instancia y que tampoco se relaciona con las pretensiones anulatorias deducidas por la actora, lo que impide emitir pronunciamiento al amparo del artículo 24 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. Por las razones expuestas se rechaza el agravio planteado.
• e)Manifiesta la parte actora que el Ministerio de Ambiente solicitó a la Procuraduría General de la República una interpretación de la ley que sólo la puede dar la Asamblea Legislativa y que el oficio C-444-2005 de la Procuraduría carece de criterio pericial, siendo ese criterio la base del procedimiento de expropiación. El agravio debe ser rechazado por las siguientes razones básicas: en primer lugar, el citado criterio C-444-2005, sí fue objeto de impugnación en esta sede, pero se inadmitió por las razones indicadas en el Considerando IV aparte 1) de este fallo, por carecer de efectos jurídicos sobre la parte actora y así fue resuelto en instancia. En segundo lugar, revisado el decreto ejecutivo número 33707-MINAE, mediante el cual se declara de interés público la propiedad de la actora y se dispone el inicio del procedimiento de expropiación parcial, se observa que dentro de los fundamentos citados para sustentar tal actuación administrativa, no se incluye el criterio C-444-2005 de la Procuraduría General de la República. Al contrario, la citada conducta de la Administración Pública se orienta al cumplimiento de la Ley y de la jurisprudencia constitucional, por ende se rechaza el agravio de la parte actora.

V.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS. El actor solicita en su recurso de apelación que se condene en costas al Estado. El agravio es de recibo y se acoge. El artículo 221, párrafo primero del Código Procesal Civil (en adelante por sus siglas CPC) -supletorio por dispensa del numeral 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa- establece la regla general de que el vencido debe asumir el pago de las costas personales y procesales, por el mero hecho de serlo, sin que esto implique que se juzgue que medió mala fe o temeridad al accionar. La excepción a dicha regla es la exención del pago, que solo se puede otorgar cuando se constate –en forma razonada– que media alguna de las causales de exoneración previstas en el numeral 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa o en el artículo 222 del citado CPC. En el caso, aprecia este Colegio que sí estamos en presencia de las indicadas condiciones, ya que la justificación para exonerar del pago de ambas costas al actor vencido, se deriva de la naturaleza del asunto aquí debatido, en el que se cuestionó el derecho fundamental de propiedad privada frente al interés público de proteger el ambiente y en especial a las tortugas Baulas, lo que ameritó el análisis jurídico del texto de la Ley 7524 respecto a los límites del Parque Nacional Las Baulas y llevó a la Administración Pública a requerir la opinión legal de la Procuraduría General de la República. Todo lo cual ha juicio de éste Tribunal le mereció motivo suficiente a la parte actora para litigar, siendo que tal supuesto se ubica dentro de las causales de ley que permiten la exención en costas. En consecuencia, se revoca el fallo de instancia, únicamente respecto a la condenatoria en costas, para exonerar a la parte perdidosa del pago de ellas.

VI . COROLARIO. Conforme los argumentos esbozados en los considerandos precedentes y en lo que ha sido objeto de apelación, se procede confirmar la sentencia apelada en todos los demás extremos distintos a las costas .

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la prueba para mejor resolver ofrecida por la actora. Se revoca parcialmente, solo en cuanto a la condenatoria en costas, para exonerar a la parte perdidosa del pago de ellas. En lo demás, se confirma la sentencia impugnada. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Nombre15131 .

Nombre5243 JUDITH REYES CASTILLO