Non-renewal of cantina lease in municipal market upheldImprocedencia de renovación de contrato de cantina en mercado municipal

No. 3579-2010 THIRD SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Anexo A, Goicoechea, at eleven hours forty minutes on September twenty-second, two thousand ten.

This Tribunal hears, as an improper hierarch, the Municipal Appeal filed by Nombre101901, of legal age, married, merchant, with identity card number CED77843, against resolution AM-2009-1066, signed by the Mayor of the Municipality of Puriscal on November fifth, two thousand nine.

Judge Fernández Brenes writes the opinion, and;

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the resolution of the appeal under study, the following facts are considered proven: 1.) That by certificate 0179, of February fourth, nineteen hundred ninety-two, the Municipality of Puriscal issued a national liquor license, number 22 Dto.1, to Nombre101902, for the business called Pulpería Centro de Amigos, located in the municipal market of the locality (folio 10); 2.) That on April twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred ninety-three, Nombre101902 and Nombre101901 signed a purchase-sale option for the commercial premises of the business called Pulpería y Cantina Centro de Amigos, of which the former is the titleholder in the municipal market (folios 9 and 11); 3.) That on May fourteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-three, Nombre101901 paid the Municipality of Puriscal the sum of twenty-eight thousand eight colones for the market transfer right (folio 12); 4.) That on May fourteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-three, Nombre101901 signed a lease contract with the municipality of Puriscal for the rental of commercial premises number 36 in the canton market, for the exclusive operation of a cantina activity, incorporating all the provisions established in the General Market Regulations of the canton, as well as Law 7027 and the Municipal Code (folio 13); 5.) That, by certificate 1090, of April seventh, two thousand, the Municipality of Puriscal issued a national liquor license, number 22 Dto.1, to Nombre101901, for the business called Pulpería Centro de Amigos, located behind the municipal market of the locality, for the 2000-2001 biennium (folio 22); 6.) That by resolution of ten hours thirty-five minutes on December ninth, nineteen hundred ninety-three, the Governorate of the Province of San José authorized the transfer of the national liquor license number 22 of the First District (Santiago) of Puriscal, owned by Nombre101902, so that Nombre101901 may continue to operate it in the commercial business Cantina Centro de Amigos, located on the west side of the Puriscal market (folios 15 and 16); 7.) That on January second, nineteen hundred ninety-five, Nombre101901 and the Municipality of Puriscal signed a lease contract for premises number 36 of the canton market, to be used exclusively for cantina activity (folio 17); 8.) That on March ninth, two thousand five, Mr. Nombre101901 signed a new lease contract for premises number 36 of the Puriscal market, under identical conditions as the previous one (folios 24 and 25); 9.) That by resolution AM-2009, of November fifth, two thousand nine, the Mayor of the municipality of Puriscal informs Mr. Nombre101901 that, in view of the commercial activity he carries out in the market premises, "it will not be renewed, so you are most respectfully requested to proceed to vacate stall number 36 once the contract's term of validity expires, that is, on December 31, 2009." This decision was notified to the interested party on the following November eleventh (folios 42 and 43); 10.) That in a note signed by Nombre101901 himself, he specifies "... that the cantina Bar Centro de Amigos, located behind the Santiago de Puriscal Market, sells liquor outside the Market, where it was previously designed in a corner location for said activity" (folio 29); 11.) That on November sixteenth, two thousand nine, Nombre101901 filed the remedies of revocation with subsidiary appeal (folios 45 to 51); and, 12.) That by resolution 025-2009, of ten hours forty minutes on November seventeenth, two thousand nine, the Mayor rejected the revocation filed and admitted the appeal to the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal.

II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.- Also of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following single fact is considered unproven: That the Municipality of Puriscal canceled Mr. Nombre101901's liquor license number 22 (district number 1), for the sale of national liquors, which he would use in the business Bar Centro Amigos, located behind the municipal market.

III.- GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.- Mr. Nombre101901 expresses disagreement with resolution AM-2009-1066, signed by the Mayor of the Municipality of Puriscal on November fifth, two thousand nine, which he describes as illegal and untimely, for the following reasons: a.) That the activity he has been carrying out in the premises has been permitted by the local authority itself, according to the signed contracts, with all the rights and obligations that the Commercial Code typifies; given that he has even been paying the corresponding municipal license and the re-qualifications of the rental amount; from which it is inferred that this is a contractual relationship, whose validity is indefinite, according to custom and usage; b.) That he has a national liquor license duly issued by the respondent municipality, according to certificates 0179 and 1090, for which he is authorized for the commercial activity in which he has been engaged, a reason why law number 2428 is applied retroactively; c.) That the manner in which his right to the contract extension is denied is illegal, as it affects an acquired right, which allows him to exercise the commercial activity of liquor sales that he has been carrying out for more than sixteen years. (Folios 45 to 51.)

IV.- ON THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH THE CHALLENGED ACTION IS BASED.- To analyze the appealed action, we must clarify several basic concepts regarding the special regulation regime for municipal markets that directly affect the type of relationship these have with the stallholders (locatarios). Firstly, it must be kept in mind that municipal markets are public domain property, which have a legal regime different from private property (regulated in article 45 of the Political Constitution), and is composed of the set of properties –both real and personal– that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, as, by the express will of the constitutional legislator or the legislature, they are dedicated to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and because of this, they cannot be the object of private property, so they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private individuals, nor to the State –understood in a broad sense, in a strict sense, since the latter is limited to its administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain property and the State's private domain (fiscal) property are differentiated by their purpose and the titleholder subject, as what defines the legal nature of the former is the purpose given to this type of property, that is, by being dedicated to put them at the service of public use (uso público), in the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, one may consult rulings of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 2306-91, 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480 and 2005-7158, among others.) For this reason, the characteristics of inalienability, imprescriptibility, unattachability, and subjection to police power regarding administration for its use and exploitation have been attributed to them. Therefore, a purchase-sale contract signed between private individuals regarding the availability of premises in municipal markets can have no legal value, it is reiterated, because they are properties that are outside the commerce of men. The use and exploitation of this type of property –public domain– by private individuals is determined by the permits and concessions granted by the Administration itself. In the case of municipal markets, it is the Law on the Lease of Municipal Premises, number 2428, and its reforms, which determined that such exploitation be done through the form of a "rental contract," with the corresponding payment by the lessee, whose amount is set for a period of five years, but as contentious-administrative jurisprudence has indicated, it is a fiscal canon, for the use of a public domain property. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in its resolution number 5879-94, of ten hours on October seventh, nineteen hundred ninety-four, when considering:

"Any construction of premises permanently destined for a use of general utility, imposes that those properties be considered as demanial, as for example in the case of commercial premises in municipal markets or in this case, those built in bus service terminals. The norm in this case is that the Local Government builds the facilities and rents them to private individuals; the bond that arises from this relationship does not constitute a simple rental, in the terms of common law. For the individual, it constitutes a form of use and exploitation of a public thing (cosa pública) that is regulated by public law." Secondly, consequently, in accordance with the nature of the property –public domain–, its regime is determined by Administrative Law, not private law, as the appellant claims; the application of the Commercial Code to this matter is openly improper. It is in this sense, the sense of the relationship of numerals 4 and 6 of the Law on the Lease of Municipal Premises, number 2428 and its reforms, itself, that it is determined that the term of the misnamed rental contracts for municipal market premises is five years. Finally, it should be noted that the General Law of Public Administration regulates the possibility of revocation of permits for the use of public domain property, at any time, even for reasons of opportunity and convenience, in accordance with article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, with the only conditions that the decision not be untimely nor arbitrary.

V.- ON THE CONFORMITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTION WITH THE LEGAL SYSTEM.- In the case under study, it is true that Mr. Nombre101901 has a "rental contract" signed with the municipality of Puriscal, which empowers him to use and enjoy premises number 36 of that locality's market, to operate a cantina activity, which was signed on March ninth, two thousand five (folios 24 and 25). However, even though it is true that said contract does not establish a term, the same is derived from the application of numerals 6 and 4 of the Law on the Lease of Municipal Premises, number 2428 and its reforms, which provide that it may not be greater than five years. Now, it is noted that in this case, it is not about the revocation of a declaratory act of rights, in this case, of the national liquor license number 22 of the first district of the canton of Puriscal, nor is an administrative nature contract being rescinded, that is, the lease contract for a municipal market premises, as seems to be inferred from the appellant's arguments, but simply the decision not to extend the use contract for a municipal market premises, precisely in view of the type of activity "authorized" to the stallholder (locatario), that is, for exclusive use as a cantina, which is clearly contrary to the legal system, because it is true that in accordance with article twenty-eight itself of the General Market Regulations of the canton of the municipality of Puriscal, the operation of cantinas is expressly prohibited in municipal markets; which is coincident with, or rather a development of, numeral 8 of the aforementioned Law on the Lease of Municipal Premises, which expressly prohibits that type of establishment from being destined for the sale of liquor of any kind (national or foreign). The challenged decision does not affect any subjective right, as the rental contract for a premises in a municipal market has a determined term, which the law expressly provides, after the expiration of which, the irregular liquor sales activity cannot continue, as clearly and precisely provided by the Second Transitory Provision of the cited municipal regulation, by literally providing:

"Existing cantinas may continue to operate but in cases of dissolution, resolution, and rescission and other cause for contract termination, their operation in the market shall no longer be permitted." In this sense, it is undeniable that the activity carried out by Mr. Nombre101901 is a cantina, which denotes that the decision not to extend his contract is not arbitrary, as it conforms to the express text of the cited Law 7027, and is also not untimely, as he was notified personally on November eleventh, two thousand nine, and it is effective until January first, two thousand ten. Finally, it is necessary to note that the authorization of the license is to be used in a commercial premises located outside the municipal market, as clearly stated by certificate 1090, of April seventh, two thousand (at folio 22), and by the interested party himself, in a note of November twelfth last, (at folio 29). The foregoing does not prevent Mr. Nombre101901 from being able to negotiate a new contract in the same municipal market premises, but by adapting his activity to the requirements determined in the legal system. All of which has been considered, leads to confirming the appealed decision; and as there is no further recourse to this judgment, to deem the administrative route exhausted.

THEREFORE:

The challenged agreement is confirmed. The administrative route is deemed exhausted.

Nombre625

I. Nombre36194 Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes

that the Bar Centro de Amigos canteen, located behind the Santiago de Puriscal Market, sells liquor outside the Market, where it was previously designed in a corner location for said activity" (folio 29); **11** **.)** That on the sixteenth of November two thousand nine, Nombre101901 filed appeals for revocation with appeal in the alternative (folios 45 to 51); and, **1** **2** **.)** That by resolution 025-2009, issued at ten hours forty minutes on the seventeenth of November two thousand nine, the Mayor denied the revocation filed and admitted the appeal before the Contentious Administrative Court.

**II.- OF THE UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Also of importance for the resolution of this matter, the sole unproven fact is held to be the following: That the Municipality of Puriscal cancelled to Nombre101901 liquor license number 22 (district number 1), for the sale of national liquors, which he would use in the Bar Centro Amigos business, located behind the municipal market.

**III.- OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.-** Mr. Nombre101901 expresses disagreement with resolution AM-2009-1066, subscribed by the Mayor of the Municipality of Puriscal on the fifth of November two thousand nine, which he qualifies as illegal and inopportune, for the following reasons: **a.)** That the activity he has been carrying out in the premises has been permitted by the local authority itself, according to the contracts signed, with all the rights and obligations that the Commercial Code typifies; given that he has even been paying the corresponding municipal license and the reclassifications of the rental amount; from which it is inferred that it is a contractual relationship, whose duration is indefinite, according to custom and usage; **b.)** That he holds a national liquor license duly issued by the respondent municipality, according to certificates 0179 and 1090, by which he is authorized for the commercial activity he has been performing, a reason why law number 2428 is applied retroactively; **c.)** That the manner in which his right to an extension of the contract is denied is illegal, as it affects an acquired right, which allows him the exercise of the commercial activity of selling liquor that he has been carrying out, for more than sixteen years. (Folios 45 to 51.)

**I V.- OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH THE APPEALED ACTION IS BASED.-** To analyze the appealed action, we must clarify several basic concepts regarding the special regulatory regime of municipal markets, which directly affect the type of relationship they have with the tenants. **In the first place**, it must be borne in mind that **municipal markets are public domain assets**, which have a legal regime diverse from private property (regulated in article 45 of the Political Constitution), and is composed of the set of assets –both real and personal property– that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, insofar as, **by express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are affected to a special destiny of serving the community, that is, the public interest**, and for that reason, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to individuals, nor to the State –understood in a broad sense, in a strict sense, because it is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain assets and the State's private domain assets (fiscal) are differentiated by their purpose and the titleholder subject, insofar as what defines the legal nature of the former is the **destiny given to this type of assets, that is, by being affected to put them at the service of public use**, in the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, one can consult the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 2306-91, 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480 and 2005-7158, among others.) For this reason, the characteristics of **inalienability, imprescriptibility, unseizability and subjection to the police power regarding the administration for its use and exploitation** have been predicated of them. Therefore, no legal value can a purchase-sale contract signed between private parties have with respect to the availability of premises in municipal markets, it is insisted, because they are assets that are outside the commerce of men. The use and exploitation by private parties of this type of assets –of public domain– is left to the permits and concessions granted by the Administration itself. In the case of municipal markets, it is the Law on the leasing of municipal premises, number 2428, and its amendments that determined that such exploitation be done through the form of a "rental contract", with the corresponding payment of the lessee, whose amount is fixed for a period of five years, but as the contentious jurisprudence has indicated, it is a fiscal fee, for the use of a public domain asset. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber pronounced itself in its resolution number 5879-94, at ten hours on the seventh of October one thousand nine hundred ninety-four, upon considering:

"Any construction of premises permanently destined for a use of general utility, imposes that those assets be considered as demanial, as for example in the case of commercial premises in municipal markets or in this case, those built in bus terminals. The normal thing in this case is that the Local Government builds the facilities and leases them to private parties; **the bond that arises from this relationship does not constitute a simple rent, in the terms of common law**. For the private party it constitutes a form of use and exploitation of a public thing that is regulated by public law." **In the second place**, consequently, according to the nature of the asset –of public domain–, its regime is determined by Administrative Law, not private, as the appellant alleges; the application in this matter of the Commercial Code being openly improper. It is in this sense, the sense of the relationship of numerals 4 and 6 of the Law on the leasing of municipal premises itself, number 2428 and its amendments, that it is determined that the term of the so-called rental contracts for municipal market premises is five years. Finally, it is worth noting that the General Law of Public Administration regulates the possibility of revoking use permits for public domain assets, at any time, even for reasons of opportunity and convenience, according to article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, with the sole conditions, that the decision not be untimely nor arbitrary.

**V.- ON THE CONFORMITY OF THE APPEALED ACTION WITH THE LEGAL SYSTEM.-** In the case under study, it is true that Mr. Nombre101901 has a "rental contract" signed with the municipality of Puriscal, which empowers him to use and enjoy premises number 36 of the market of that locality, to develop the activity of a canteen, which was signed on the ninth of March two thousand five (folios 24 and 25). However, even though it is true that said contract does not establish a term, the same is derived from the application of numerals 6 and 4 of the Law on the leasing of municipal premises, number 2428 and its amendments, which provide that the same cannot be greater than **five years**. Now, it is noted that in the case, **it is not about the revocation of a declaratory act of rights**, in this case, of the national liquor license number 22 of the first district of the canton of Puriscal, **nor is a contract of an administrative nature rescinded**, that is, the lease contract for a municipal market premises, as seems to follow from the appellant's allegations, **but simply the decision to** **not extend the contract for the use of a municipal market premises**, **p** **recisely in attention to the** **type of activity** **"** *authorized* **"** **to the tenant**, that is, for exclusive use as a canteen, which is clearly contrary to the legal system, because it is true that according to article twenty-eight of the General Market Regulations of the canton of the municipality of Puriscal itself, the operation of canteens in municipal markets is expressly prohibited; which is coincident, or rather a development of numeral 8 of the Law on the leasing of municipal premises, cited above, which expressly prohibits that type of establishments from being destined for the sale of liquors of any type (national or foreign). The appealed decision does not affect any subjective right, since the rental contract for a premises in a municipal market has a determined term, which is expressly provided for by law, upon expiration of which, the irregular activity of liquor sales cannot continue, as is clearly and precisely provided in the Second Transitional Provision of the cited municipal regulation, by literally providing:

"Existing canteens may continue operating but in cases of dissolution, resolution, and rescission and other cause of termination of the contract, **their exploitation in the market will no longer be permitted**." In this sense, it is undeniable that the activity carried out by Mr. Nombre101901 is a canteen, which denotes that the decision not to extend his contract **is not arbitrary**, as it conforms to the express text of the cited Law 7027, nor is it untimely, since he is personally notified on the eleventh of November two thousand nine, and it is effective until the first of January two thousand ten. Finally, it is necessary to note that the license authorization is to be used in a commercial premises located outside the municipal market, as clearly stated by certificate 1090, of the seventh of April two thousand (at folio 22), and the interested party himself, in a note of the twelfth of November last, (at folio 29). The foregoing does not prevent Mr. Nombre101901 from being able to negotiate a new contract in the same municipal market premises, but adapting his activity to the requirements determined in the legal system. All of which has been considered, leads to confirming the appealed decision; and given that there is no further recourse to this ruling, to consider the administrative channel exhausted.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed agreement is confirmed.

The administrative pathway is hereby deemed exhausted.

**Nombre625** **I.** **Nombre36194** **Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes** **IV.- ON THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY SUPPORTING THE CHALLENGED ACTION.-** To analyze the appealed action, we must clarify several basic concepts regarding the special regulatory regime of municipal markets, which directly affect the type of relationship these markets have with their tenants. **In the first place**, it must be kept in mind that **municipal markets are public domain assets**, which have a legal regime different from private property (regulated in Article 45 of the Constitución Política), and is composed of all assets –both real and personal property– that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, insofar as, **by the express will of the constitution-maker or the legislator, they are assigned to the special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest**, and for this reason, they cannot be the object of private property, such that they are outside the commerce of men, meaning they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State –understood in a broad sense, in a strict sense, since it is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain assets and the State's private domain assets (fiscal assets) differ in their purpose and the owning subject, insofar as what defines the legal nature of the former is the **purpose given to this type of assets, that is, being affected to make them available for public use**, under the terms set forth in Article 261 of the Código Civil. (Along these same lines, one may consult the judgments of the Sala Constitucional numbers 2306-91, 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480 and 2005-7158, among others.) For this reason, the characteristics of **inalienability, imprescriptibility, unattachability (inembargabilidad), and subjection to police power regarding administration for their use and exploitation** have been attributed to them. Therefore, a purchase-sale contract executed between private parties can have no legal value regarding the disposal of stalls in municipal markets, it is insisted, because they are assets outside the commerce of men. The use and exploitation by private parties of this type of assets –of public domain– is left to the permits and concessions granted by the Administration itself. In the case of municipal markets, it is the Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, number 2428, and its reforms, which determined that such exploitation be carried out by means of a “*rental contract (contrato de alquiler)*”, with the corresponding payment by the tenant (arrendatario), whose amount is set for a period of five years, but as the contentious-administrative case law has indicated, it is a fiscal canon (canon fiscal), for the use of a public domain asset. In this regard, the Sala Constitucional ruled in its resolution number 5879-94, at ten o'clock on October seventh, nineteen ninety-four, when considering:

"Any construction of premises permanently destined for a use of general utility imposes that those assets be considered as demanial, as for example in the case of commercial stalls in municipal markets or, in this case, those built in bus service terminals. The normal thing in this case is that the Local Government builds the facilities and leases them to private parties; **the bond that arises from this relationship does not constitute a simple rental, under the terms of common law**. For the private party, it constitutes a form of use and exploitation of a public thing that is regulated by public law." **In the second place**, consequently, in accordance with the nature of the asset -of public domain-, its regime is determined by Administrative Law, not private law, as the appellant alleges; the application of the Código de Comercio in this matter being openly improper. It is in this sense, the sense of the relationship of Articles 4 and 6 of the Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales itself, number 2428 and its reforms, that it is determined that the term of the so-called rental contracts for municipal market stalls is five years. Finally, it is worth noting that the Ley General de la Administración Pública regulates the possibility of the revocation of use permits for public domain assets, at any time, even for reasons of opportunity and convenience, in accordance with Article 154 of the Ley General de Administración Pública, with the only conditions that the decision not be untimely nor arbitrary.

**V.- ON THE CONFORMITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTION WITH THE LEGAL ORDER.-** In the case under study, it is true that Mr. Prendas Castro has a “*rental contract*” executed with the municipality of Puriscal, which authorizes him to use and enjoy stall number 36 of the market in that locality to carry on the activity of a cantina, which was executed on March ninth, two thousand five (folios 24 and 25). However, even though it is true that said contract does not establish a term, it derives from the application of Articles 6 and 4 of the Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, number 2428 and its reforms, which provide that it cannot be greater than **five years**. Now then, it is noted that in this case, **it is not a matter of the revocation of an act declaratory of rights**, in this case, of the national liquor license (patente de licores nacionales) number 22 of the first district of the canton of Puriscal, **nor is an administrative nature contract being rescinded**, that is, the rental contract for a municipal market stall, as seems to be inferred from the appellant's arguments, **but simply the decision to** **not extend the contract for the use of a municipal market stall**, **precisely in consideration of the** **type of activity** “*authorized*” **to the tenant (locatario)**, that is, for exclusive use as a cantina, which is clearly contrary to the legal order, since it is true that according to Article twenty-eight of the Reglamento General de Mercados of the canton of the municipality of Puriscal itself, the operation of cantinas in municipal markets is expressly prohibited; which is coincident with, or rather a development of, Article 8 of the Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, cited above, which expressly prohibits that type of establishment from being destined for the sale of liquors of any kind (national or foreign).

The challenged decision does not affect any subjective right, since the lease contract for a premises in a municipal market has a specific term, expressly provided for by law, after which the irregular activity of selling liquor cannot continue, as clearly and precisely stipulated in the Second Transitory Provision of the aforementioned municipal regulation, which literally states:</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101'>“<i>Existing bars (cantinas) may continue to operate, but in cases of dissolution, termination (resolución), rescission (recisión), or any other cause for ending the contract, <b>their operation within the market shall no longer be permitted</b></i><b>.</b>”</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101'>In this regard, it is undeniable that the activity carried out by Mr. Prendas Castro is a bar (cantina), which indicates that the decision not to extend his contract <b>is not arbitrary</b>, as it conforms to the express text of the cited Ley 7027, nor is it untimely, since he was personally notified on November eleventh, two thousand nine, and it is effective until January first, two thousand ten. Finally, it is necessary to note that the authorization for the license (patente) is for use in a commercial premises located outside the municipal market, as clearly stated in certificate 1090, dated April seventh, two thousand (folio 22), and by the interested party himself, in a note dated November twelfth of last year, (folio 29). The foregoing does not prevent Mr. Prendas Castro from being able to apply for a new contract in the same premises of the municipal market, but by adapting his activity to the requirements set forth in the legal system. All of which having been considered, leads to the confirmation of the appealed decision; and, as there is no further remedy against this ruling, the administrative proceeding is hereby deemed exhausted.”</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> Now, it is noted that in this case, this is not a revocation of an act declaratory of rights, in this instance, the national liquor license number 22 of the first district of the canton of Puriscal, nor is an administrative contract being rescinded, that is, the lease contract for a municipal market premises, as seems to be inferred from the appellant's arguments, but rather simply the decision to not extend the contract for the use of a municipal market premises, precisely in consideration of the type of activity "authorized" to the lessee, that is, for the exclusive use of a cantina, which is clearly contrary to the legal system, since it is true that under the terms of article twenty-eight of the General Market Regulations of the canton of the municipality of Puriscal, the operation of cantinas in municipal markets is expressly prohibited; which is consistent with, or rather develops, numeral 8 of the Law on the Leasing of Municipal Premises, cited above, which expressly prohibits this type of establishment from being used for the sale of liquor of any kind (national or foreign). The challenged decision does not affect any subjective right, because the rental contract for a premises in a municipal market has a specific term, expressly provided for by law, upon the expiry of which, the irregular activity of selling liquor cannot continue, as clearly and precisely provided for in the Second Transitory Provision of the cited municipal regulation, when it literally states:

"Existing cantinas may continue operating, but in cases of dissolution, resolution, and rescission and other causes of termination of the contract, their operation in the market will no longer be permitted." In this regard, it is undeniable that the activity carried out by Mr. Nombre101901 is a cantina, which denotes that the decision not to extend his contract is not arbitrary, as it conforms to the express text of the cited Law 7027, nor is it untimely, since he was personally notified on November eleventh, two thousand nine, and it is effective until January first, two thousand ten. Finally, it is necessary to note that the authorization of the license is to be used in a commercial premises located outside the municipal market, as clearly stated in certificate 1090, of April seventh, two thousand (on page 22), and by the interested party himself, in a note of November twelfth last, (on page 29). The foregoing does not prevent Mr. Nombre101901 from being able to negotiate a new contract in the same municipal market premises, but by adapting his activity to the requirements established in the legal system. All of which having been considered, leads to the confirmation of the appealed decision; and since there is no further appeal to this ruling, the administrative venue is deemed exhausted.

POR TANTO:

The challenged agreement is confirmed. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted.

Nombre625

I. Nombre36194 Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes

No. 3579-2010 SECCIÓN TERCERA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Goicoechea, a las once horas cuarenta minutos del veintidós de setiembre del dos mil diez.

Conoce este Tribunal, como jerarca impropio, de la Apelación municipal interpuesta por Nombre101901 , mayor, casado, comerciante, con cédula de identidad número CED77843 contra la resolución AM-2009-1066, suscrita por el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Puriscal el cinco de noviembre del dos mil nueve.

Redacta la Juez Fernández Brenes, y;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para la resolución de la apelación en estudio, se tienen como probados los siguientes hechos: 1.) Que mediante certificado 0179, del cuatro de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y dos, la Municipalidad de Puriscal extendió patente de licores nacionales, número 22 Dto.1 a Nombre101902 , para el negocio denominado Pulpería Centro de Amigos, situado en el mercado municipal de la localidad (folio 10); 2.) Que el veinticuatro de abril de mil novecientos noventa y tres Nombre101902 y Nombre101901 , suscribieron una opción de compra-venta del local comercial del negocio llamado Pulpería y Cantina Centro de Amigos, que es titular el primero en el mercado municipal (folios 9 y 11); 3.) Que el catorce de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres Nombre101901 pagó en la M unicipalidad de Puriscal la suma de veintiocho mil ocho colones por el derecho de traspaso de mercado (folio 12); 4.) Que el catorce de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, Nombre101901 suscribió contrato con la municipalidad de Puriscal, de alquiler de arrendamiento del local comercial número 36 en el mercado del cantón, para el desarrollo exclusivo de la actividad de cantina, incorporándose al mismo, todas las disposiciones establecidas en el Reglamento General de mercados del cantón, así como la Ley 7027 y el Código Municipal (folio 13); 5.) Que, mediante certificado 1090, del siete de abril del dos, la Municipalidad de Puriscal extendió patente de licores nacionales, número 22 Dto.1 a Nombre101901 , para el negocio denominado Pulpería Centro de Amigos, situado detrás d el mercado municipal de la localidad, para el bienio dos mil dos mil uno (folio 22); 6.) Que mediante resolución de las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del nueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, la Gobernación de la Provincia de San José autorizó el traspaso de la patente de licores nacionales número 22 del Distrito Primero (Santiago) de Puriscal, propiedad de Nombre101902 para que la siga explotando Nombre101901 en el negocio comercial Cantina Centro de Amigos, ubicado en el costado oeste del mercado de Puriscal (folios 15 y 16); 7.) Que el dos de enero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, Nombre101901 y la Municipalidad de Puriscal suscribieron contrato de alquiler del local número 36 del mercado del cantón, para destinarlo exclusivamente a la actividad de cantina (folio 17); 8.) Que el nueve de marzo del dos mil cinco, el señor Nombre101901 firma nuevo contrato de alquiler del local número 36 del mercado de Puriscal, en idénticas condiciones que el anterior (folios 24 y 25); 9 .) Que mediante resolución AM-2009, del cinco de noviembre del dos mil nueve, el Alcalde de la municipalidad de Puriscal le comunica al señor Nombre101901 que en atención a la actividad comercial que realiza en el local del mercado, que “no se le renovará el mismo, por lo que se le solicita de forma muy respetuosa proceda a desalojar el tramo número 36 una vez que se cumpla el plazo de vigencia del contrato, es decir el 31 de diciembre del 2009.” Dicha decisión le fue notificada al interesado el once de noviembre siguiente (folios 42 y 43); 10.) Que en nota suscrita por el propio Nombre101901 , especifica "... que la cantina Bar Centro de Amigos, situada detrás del Mercado de Santiago de Puriscal expende licor fuera del Mercado, donde fue previamente diseñado en un lugar esquinero para dicha actividad" (folio 29); 11 .) Que el dieciséis de noviembre del dos mil nueve, Nombre101901 presentó los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio (folios 45 a 51); y, 1 2 .) Que mediante resolución 025-2009, de las diez horas cuarenta minutos del diecisiete de noviembre del dos mil nueve, el Alcalde rechaza la revocatoria formulada y admite la apelación para ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo.

II.- DE LOS HECHOS NO PROBADOS.- También de importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene como único hecho no probado el siguiente: Que la Municipalidad de Puriscal le canceló a Nombre101901 la patente de licor número 22 (distrito número 1), para el expendio de licores nacionales, que utilizaría en el negocio Bar Centro Amigos, ubicado detrás del mercado municipal.

III.- DE LOS AGRAVIOS DEL APELANTE.- Se muestra inconforme el señor Nombre101901 respecto de la resolución AM-2009-1066, suscrita por el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Puriscal el cinco de noviembre del dos mil nueve, que califica de ilegal e inoportuna, por los siguientes motivos: a.) Que la actividad que ha venido desarrollando en el local ha sido permitida por la propia autoridad local, según los contratos suscritos, con todos los derechos y obligaciones que el Código de Comercio tipifica; siendo que inclusive ha venido pagando la correspondiente patente municipal y las recalificaciones del monto del alquiler; de donde se infiere que se trata de una relación contractual, cuya vigencia es indefinida, según la costumbre y el uso; b.) Que tiene patente de licor nacional debidamente extendida por la municipalidad recurrida, según los certificados 0179 y 1090, por cual, está autorizado para la actividad comercial en la que se ha venido desempeñando, motivo por el cual la ley número 2428 es aplicada de manera retroactiva; c.) Que es ilegal la forma como se le niega su derecho de prórroga del contra to , por afectar un derecho adquirido, que le permite el ejercicio de la actividad comercial de venta de licor que ha venido realizando, por más de dieciséis años. (Folios 45 a 51.)

I V .- DE LA NATURALEZA JURÍDICA DEL BIEN SOBRE EL QUE SE SUSTENTA LA ACTUACIÓN IMPUGNADA.- Para analizar la actuación apelada, debemos clarificar varios conceptos básicos en lo que respecta al especial régimen de regulación de los mercados municipales y que inciden directamente en el tipo de relación de éstos con los locatarios. En primer lugar, debe tenerse presente que los mercados municipales son bienes de dominio público, que tienen un régimen jurídico diverso de la propiedad privada (regulado en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política), y está integrado por el conjunto de bienes –tanto inmuebles como muebles– que tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico virtualmente opuesto a los privados, en tanto, por expresa voluntad del constituyente o el legislador se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada, de modo que están fuera del comercio de los hombres, es decir, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado –entendido en sentido amplio, en sentido estricto, por cuanto éste se limita a su administración y tutela. Así, los bienes de dominio público y los de dominio privado del Estado (fiscales) se diferencian por su finalidad y el sujeto titular, en tanto lo que define la naturaleza jurídica de los primeros es el destino que se da a este tipo de bienes, sea, al afectarse para ponerlos al servicio del uso público, en los términos previstos en el artículo 261 del Código Civil. (En este mismo sentido, se pueden consultar las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional números 2306-91, 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480 y 2005-7158, entre otras.) Por tal motivo se ha predicado de ellos las características de inalienabilidad, imprescriptibilidad, inembargabilidad y la sujeción al poder de policía en lo relativo a la administración para su uso y aprovechamiento. Por ello, ningún valor jurídico puede tener un contrato de compra-venta suscrito entre particulares en lo que respecta a la disponibilidad de locales de los mercados municipales, se insiste, por ser bienes que están fuera del comercio de los hombres. El uso y aprovechamiento por parte de los particulares de este tipo de bienes –de dominio público- está librado a los permisos y concesiones concedidos por la propia Administración. En el caso de los mercados municipales, es la Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, número 2428, y sus reformas la que determinó que tal aprovechamiento se hiciese mediante la forma de un “contrato de alquiler”, con el correspondiente pago del arrendatario, cuyo monto se fija por un período de cinco años, pero como lo ha indicado la jurisprudencia contenciosa, se trata de un canon fiscal, por el uso de un bien de dominio público. En este sentido se pronunció la Sala Constitucional en su resolución número 5879-94, de las diez horas del siete de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, al considerar:

"Toda construcción de locales destinados en forma permanente a un uso de utilidad general, impone que esos bienes sean considerados como demaniales, como por ejemplo en el caso de los locales comerciales en mercados municipales o en este caso, de los construidos en las terminales para el servicio de autobuses. Lo normal en este caso es que el Gobierno Local construya las instalaciones y las de en arriendo a los particulares; el vínculo que surge de esta relación no constituye un simple alquiler, en los términos del derecho común. Para el particular constituye una forma de uso y aprovechamiento de una cosa pública que queda regulada por el derecho público." En segundo lugar, consecuentemente, al tenor de la naturaleza del bien -de dominio público-, su régimen está determinado por el Derecho Administrativo, no privado, como alega el apelante; siendo abiertamente improcedente la aplicación en esta materia, del Código de Comercio. Es en este sentido, sentido de la relación de los numerales 4 y 6 de la propia Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, número 2428 y sus reformas, es que se determina que el plazo de los mal llamados contratos de alquiler de locales de mercados municipales, es de cinco años. Finalmente, cabe señalar que la Ley General de la Administración Pública regula la posibilidad de la revocatoria de los permisos de uso de los bienes de dominio público, en cualquier momento, aún por motivos de oportunidad y conveniencia, al tenor del artículo 154 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, con las únicas condiciones, de que no la decisión no sea intempestiva ni tampoco arbitraria.

V.- DE LA CONFORMIDAD DE LA ACTUACIÓN IMPUGNADA CON EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO.- En el caso en estudio, es lo cierto que el señor Nombre101901 tiene un “contrato de alquiler” suscrito con la municipalidad de Puriscal, que le faculta el uso y disfrute del local número 36 del mercado de esa localidad, para desarrollar la actividad de cantina, el cual fue suscrito, el nueve de marzo del dos mil cinco (folios 24 y 25). Sin embargo, a ún y cuando es lo cierto que en dicho contrato no se establece un plazo, el mismo se deriva de la aplicación de los numerales 6 y 4 de la Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, número 2428 y sus reformas, que disponen que el mismo no puede ser mayor a cinco años. Ahora bien, se advierte que en el caso, no se trata de la revocatoria de un acto de clarativo de derechos, en este caso, de la patente de licores nacionales número 22 del distrito primero del cantón de Puriscal, ni tampoco se rescinde un contrato de naturaleza administrativa, sea, el contrato de arrendamiento de un local del mercado municipal, como parece desprenderse de los alegatos del apelante, sino simplemente la decisión de no prorrogar el contrato de uso de un local del mercado municipal, p recisamente en atención al tipo de actividad “autorizada” a l locatario, sea, para uso exclusivo de cantina, lo que a todas luces es contraria al ordenamiento jurídico, por cuanto es lo cierto que al tenor del propio artículo veintiocho del Reglamento General de Mercados del cantón de la municipalidad de Puriscal, expresamente se prohíbe en los mercados municipales el funcionamiento de cantinas; lo cual es coincidente, o más bien desarrollo del numeral 8 de la Ley sobre arrendamiento de locales municipales, supra citada que expresamente prohíbe que en ese tipo de establecimientos se destinen a la venta de licores de ningún tipo (nacionales o extranjeros). La decisión impugnada no afecta ningún derecho subjetivo, pues el contrato de alquiler de un local en un mercado municipal tiene un plazo determinado, que prevé expresamente la ley, vencido el cual, la actividad irregular de venta de licor no puede seguirse dando, como lo prevé de manera clara y precisa el Transitorio Segundo del citado reglamento municipal, al disponer literalmente:

“Las cantinas existentes podrán seguir funcionando pero en casos de disolución, resolución y recisión y otra causa de terminación del contrato no se permitirá más su explotación en el mercado.” E n este sentido, e s innegable que la actividad desplegada por el señor Nombre101901 es una cantina, lo que denota que la decisión de no prorrogarle el contrato, no es arbitraria, pues se ajusta al texto expreso de la citada Ley 7027, así como tampoco es intempestiva, ya que se le comunica en lo personal el once de noviembre del dos mil nueve, y es efectiva hasta el primero de enero del dos mil diez. Finalmente, es necesario advertir que la autorización de la patente es para ser usada en un local comercial ubicado fuera del mercado municipal, según lo dice claramente el certificado 1090, del siete de abril del dos mil (a folio 22), y el propio interesado, en nota del doce de noviembre último, (a folio 29). Lo anterior no obsta para que el señor Nombre101901 no pueda gestionar un nuevo contrato en el mismo local del mercado municipal, pero adecuando su actividad a los requerimientos determinados en el ordenamiento jurídico. Todo lo cual ha sido considerado, conlleva a confirmar la decisión apelada; y siendo que no hay ulterior recurso a este fallo, dar por agotada la vía administrativa.

POR TANTO:

Se confirma el acuerdo impugnado. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa .

Nombre625

I. Nombre36194 Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes